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Learning attack strategies from intrusion alerts — Source link

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Learning Attack Strategies from Intrusion Alerts

Abstract

Understanding the strategies of attacks is crucial for security applications such as computer and network forensics, intrusion response, and prevention of future attacks. Though time-consuming and error-prone, manual analysis has been the dominant way to learn attack strategies from intrusion alerts. This paper presents techniques to automatically learn attack strategies from intrusion alerts. Central to these techniques is a model that represents an attack strategy as a graph of attacks with constraints on the attack attributes and the temporal order among these attacks. To learn the intrusion strategy is then to extract such a graph from a sequences of intrusion alerts. To further facilitate the analysis of attack strategies, which is essential to many security applications such as computer and network forensics and incident handling, this paper presents techniques to measure the similarity between attack strategies. The basic idea is to reduce the similarity measurement of attack strategies into error-tolerant graph isomorphism problem, and measures the similarity between attack strategies in terms of the cost to transform one strategy into another. Finally, this paper presents some experimental results, which demonstrate the potential of the aforementioned techniques.

1 Introduction

It has become a well-known problem that current intrusion detection systems (IDSs) produce large volumes of alerts, including both actual and false alerts. As the network performance improves and more network-based applications are being introduced, the IDSs are generating increasingly overwhelming alerts. This problem makes it extremely challenging to understand and manage the intrusion alerts, let alone respond to intrusions timely.

It is often desirable, and sometimes necessary, to understand attack strategies in security applications such as computer and network forensics and intrusion responses. For example, attack strategies may be used to profile hackers or hacking tools in computer and network forensics. As another example, it is easier to predict attacker's next move, and reduce the damage caused by intrusions, if the attack strategy is known during intrusion response. However, in practice, it usually requires that human users analyze the data collected during intrusions manually to understand the attack strategy. This process is not only time-consuming, but also error-prone. An alternative to manual analysis is to list all possible attack strategies using vulnerability analysis tools such as attack graphs [1, 36]. However, these tools require a predefined security property so that they can use modeling checking techniques to identify possible attack sequences that may lead to the violation of the security property.

In this paper, we present techniques to automatically learn attack strategies from intrusion alerts reported by IDSs. Our approach is based on the recent advances in intrusion alert correlation [11, 32]. By examining correlated intrusion alerts, our method extracts the constraints intrinsic to the attack strategy automatically. Specifically, an attack strategy is represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), which we call an *attack strategy graph*, with nodes representing attacks, edges representing the (partial) temporal order of attacks, and constraints on the nodes and edges. These constraints represent the conditions that any attack instance must satisfy in order to use the strategy. To cope with variations in attacks, we use generalization techniques to hide the differences not intrinsic to the attack strategy.

To facilitate intrusion analysis in applications such as computer and network forensics, we further develop techniques to measure the similarity between sequences of intrusion alerts based on their attack strategies. Similarity measurement of alert sequences is a fundamental problem in many security applications such as profiling

hackers or hacking tools, identification of undetected attacks, attack prediction, and so on. To achieve this goal, we harness the results on error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism detection in the pattern recognition field. By analyzing the semantics and constraints in similarity measurement of alert sequences, we transform this problem into error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism detection.

Our contribution in this paper is three-fold. First, we develop a model to represent attack strategies as well as algorithms to extract attack strategies from correlated alerts. Second, we develop techniques to measure the similarity between sequences of alerts on the basis of the attack strategy model. Third, we perform a number of experiments to validate the proposed techniques. Our experimental results show that our techniques can successfully extract invariant attack strategies from sequences of alerts, measure the similarity between alert sequences conforming to human intuition, and identify attacks possibly missed by IDSs.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model to represent and extract attack strategies from a sequence of correlated intrusion alerts. Section 3 discusses the methods to measure the similarity between sequences of related alerts based on their strategies. Section 4 presents the experiments we perform to validate the proposed methods. Section 5 discusses the related work, and Section 6 concludes this paper. The appendices give details of proof, analysis, and experimental results.

2 Modeling Attack Strategies

In this section, we present a method to represent and automatically learn attack strategies from a sequence of related intrusion alerts. Our method is developed by extending the alert correlation model by Ning, Cui, and Reeves [32], which we call the NCR model for the sake of presentation. In the following, we first give a brief overview of the NCR model, and then discuss our method.

2.1 An Overview of the NCR Model

The NCR model was developed to reconstruct attack scenarios from alerts reported by IDSs. It is based on the observation that “most intrusions are not isolated, but related as different stages of attacks, with the early stages preparing for the later ones” [32]. The NCR model requires the prerequisites and consequences of intrusions. The prerequisite of an intrusion is the necessary condition for the intrusion to be successful. For example, the existence of a vulnerable ftp service is the prerequisite of a ftp buffer overflow attack against this service. The consequence of an intrusion is the possible outcome of the intrusion. For example, gaining local access as root from a remote machine may be the consequence of a ftp buffer overflow attack. The NCR model then correlates two alerts if the consequence of the earlier alert prepares for the prerequisites of the later one.

The NCR model uses logical formulas, which are logical combinations of predicates, to represent the prerequisites and consequences of intrusions. For example, a scanning attack may discover UDP services vulnerable to certain buffer overflow attacks. Then the predicate *UDPVulnerableToBOF* (*VictimIP*, *VictimPort*) may be used to represent this discovery.

The NCR model formally represents the prerequisites and consequences of known attacks as hyper-alert types. A *hyper-alert type* is a triple (*fact*, *prerequisite*, *consequence*), where *fact* is a set of alert attribute names, *prerequisite* is a logical formula whose free variables are all in *fact*, and *consequence* is a set of logical formulas such that all the free variables in *consequence* are in *fact*. Intuitively, a hyper-alert type encodes the knowledge about the corresponding attacks. Given a hyper-alert type $T = (fact, prerequisite, consequence)$, a *type T hyper-alert h* is a finite set of tuples on *fact*, where each tuple is associated with an interval-based timestamp [*begin_time*, *end_time*]. The hyper-alert *h* implies that *prerequisite* must evaluate to True and all the logical formulas in *consequence* might evaluate to True for each of the tuples.

The correlation process in the NCR model is to identify the *prepare-for* relations between hyper-alerts. Intuitively, it is to check if an earlier hyper-alert *contributes* to the prerequisite of a later one. In the formal




Figure 1: An example of hyper-alert correlation graph

model, this is performed through the notions of prerequisite and consequence sets. Consider a hyper-alert type $T = (fact, prerequisite, consequence)$. The *prerequisite set* (or *consequence set*) of T , denoted $Prereq(T)$ (or $Conseq(T)$), is the set of all predicates that appear in *prerequisite* (or *consequence*). Moreover, the *expanded consequence set* of T , denoted $ExpConseq(T)$, is the set of all predicates that are implied by $Conseq(T)$. Thus, $Conseq(T) \subseteq ExpConseq(T)$. Given a type T hyper-alert h , the *prerequisite set*, *consequence set*, and *expanded consequence set* of h , denoted $Prereq(h)$, $Conseq(h)$, and $ExpConseq(h)$, respectively, are the predicates in $Prereq(T)$, $Conseq(T)$, and $ExpConseq(T)$ whose arguments are replaced with the corresponding attribute values of each tuple in h . Each element in $Prereq(h)$, $Conseq(h)$, or $ExpConseq(h)$ is associated with the timestamp of the corresponding tuple in h . Then hyper-alert h_1 prepares for hyper-alert h_2 if there exist $p \in Prereq(h_2)$ and $c \in ExpConseq(h_1)$ such that $p = c$ and $c.end.time < p.begin.time$.

The NCR model uses a hyper-alert correlation graph to represent a set of correlated alerts. A *hyper-alert correlation graph* $CG = (N, E)$ is a connected directed acyclic graph (DAG), where N is a set of hyper-alerts, and for each pair $n_1, n_2 \in N$, there is a directed edge from n_1 to n_2 in E if and only if n_1 prepares for n_2 . Figure 1 shows a hyper-alert correlation graph adapted from [32]. The numbers inside the nodes represent the alert IDs, and the types of alerts are marked below the corresponding nodes.

Limitations of the NCR model. The NCR model can be used to construct attack scenarios, which are represented as hyper-alert correlation graphs, from intrusion alerts. Although such attack scenarios *reflect* attack strategies, they do not capture the essence of the strategies. Indeed, even with the same attack strategy, if an attacker changes certain details during attacks, the NCR model will generate very different hyper-alert correlation graphs. For example, an attacker may repeat (unnecessarily) one step in a sequence of attacks many times, and the NCR model will generate a much more complex attack scenario. As another example, if an attacker uses equivalent, but different attacks, the NCR model will generate different hyper-alert correlation graphs as well. It's then up to the user to figure out manually the common strategy behind two sequences of attacks. This fact certainly increases the overhead in intrusion alert analysis.

2.2 Attack Strategy Graph

In the following, we present a model to represent and automatically extract attack strategies from correlated alerts. The goal of this model is to capture the invariants in attack strategies that do not change across multiple instances of attacks.

The strategy behind a sequence of attacks is indeed about how to arrange earlier attacks to prepare for the later ones so that the attacker can reach his/her final goal. Thus, the prepare for relations between the intrusion alerts (*i.e.*, detected attacks) is intrinsic to attack strategies. However, in the NCR model, the prepare for relations are between specific intrusion alerts; they do not directly capture the conditions that have to be met

by related attacks. To facilitate the representation of the invariant attack strategy, we transform the prepare for relation into some common conditions that have to be satisfied by *all* possible instances of the same strategy. In the following, we formally represent such a conditions as an *equality constraint*.

Definition 1 Given a pair of hyper-alert types (T_1, T_2) , an *equality constraint for (T_1, T_2)* is a conjunction of equalities in the form of $u_1 = v_1 \wedge \dots \wedge u_n = v_n$, where u_1, \dots, u_n are attribute names in T_1 and v_1, \dots, v_n are attribute names in T_2 , such that there exist $p(u_1, \dots, u_n)$ and $p(v_1, \dots, v_n)$, which are the same predicate with possibly different arguments, in $ExpConseq(T_1)$ and $Prereq(T_2)$, respectively. Given a type T_1 hyper-alert h_1 and a type T_2 hyper-alert h_2 , h_1 and h_2 *satisfy the equality constraint* if there exist $t_1 \in h_1$ and $t_2 \in h_2$ such that $t_1.u_1 = t_2.v_1 \wedge \dots \wedge t_1.u_n = t_2.v_n$ evaluates to True.

There may be several equality constraints for a pair of hyper-alert types. However, if a type T_1 hyper-alert h_1 prepares for a type T_2 hyper-alert h_2 , then h_1 and h_2 must satisfy at least one of the equality constraints. Indeed, h_1 preparing for h_2 is equivalent to the conjunction of h_1 and h_2 satisfying at least one equivalent constraint and h_1 occurring before h_2 . Assume that h_1 occurs before h_2 . If h_1 and h_2 satisfy an equality constraint for (T_1, T_2) , then by Definition 1, there must be a predicate $p(u_1, \dots, u_n)$ in $ExpConseq(T_1)$ such that the same predicate with possibly different arguments, $p(v_1, \dots, v_n)$, is in $Prereq(T_2)$. Since h_1 and h_2 satisfy the equality constraint, $p(u_1, \dots, u_n)$ and $p(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ will be instantiated to the same predicate in $ExpConseq(h_1)$ and $Prereq(h_2)$. This implies that h_1 prepares for h_2 . Similarly, if h_1 prepares for h_2 , there must be an instantiated predicate that appears in $ExpConseq(h_1)$ and $Prereq(h_2)$. This implies that there must be a predicate with possibly different arguments in $ExpConseq(T_1)$ and $Prereq(T_2)$ and that this predicate leads to an equality constraint for (T_1, T_2) satisfied by h_1 and h_2 .

Example 1 Let us use an example from [32] to illustrate the notion of equality constraint. Consider the following hyper-alert types: $SadminPing = (\{VictimIP, VictimPort\}, ExistsHost(VictimIP), \{VulnerableSadmin(VictimIP)\})$, and $SadminBufferOverflow = (\{VictimIP, VictimPort\}, ExistHost(VictimIP) \wedge VulnerableSadmin(VictimIP), \{GainRootAccess(VictimIP)\})$. The first hyper-alert type indicates that $SadminPing$ is a type of attacks that requires the existence of a host at the $VictimIP$ to succeed, and as a result, the attacker may find out that this host has a vulnerable $Sadmin$ service. The second hyper-alert type indicates that this type of attacks requires a vulnerable $Sadmin$ service at the $VictimIP$, and as a result, the attack may gain root access. It is easy to see that there is a common predicate $VulnerableSadmin$ in both $Prereq(SadminBufferOverflow)$ and $ExpConseq(SadminPing)$. Thus, we have an equality constraint $VictimIP = VictimIP$ for $(SadminPing, SadminBufferOverflow)$, where the first $VictimIP$ comes from $SadminPing$, and the second $VictimIP$ comes from $SadminBufferOverflow$.

We observe in many occasions that one step in a sequence of attacks may trigger multiple intrusion alerts, and the number of alerts may vary in different situations. This is partially due to the existing vulnerabilities and the hacking tools. For example, `unicode_shell` [33], which is a hacking tool against Microsoft IIS web server, checks about 20 vulnerabilities at the scanning stage and usually triggers the same number of alerts. As another example, in the attack scenario reported in [32], the attacker tried 3 different stack pointers and 2 commands in $Sadmin_Amslverify_Overflow$ attacks for each victim host until one attempt succeeded. Even if not necessary, an attacker may still deliberately repeat the same step multiple times to confuse IDSs and/or system administrators. However, such variations do not change the corresponding attack strategy. Indeed, these variations make the attack scenarios unnecessarily complex, and may hinder manual or automatic analysis of the attack strategy. Thus, we decide to disallow such situations in our representation of attack strategies.

In the following, an attack strategy is formally represented as an attack strategy graph.

Definition 2 Given a set \mathcal{S} of hyper-alert types, an *attack strategy graph* over \mathcal{S} is a quadruple (N, E, T, C) , where (1) (N, E) is a connected DAG (directed acyclic graph); (2) T is a mapping that maps each $n \in N$ to a hyper-alert type in \mathcal{S} ; (3) C is a mapping that maps each edge $(n_1, n_2) \in E$ to a set of equality constraints for $(T(n_1), T(n_2))$; (4) For any $n_1, n_2 \in N$, $T(n_1) = T(n_2)$ implies that there exists $n_3 \in N$ such that $T(n_3) \neq T(n_1)$ and n_3 is in a path between n_1 and n_2 .




Figure 2: An example of attack strategy graph

In an attack strategy graph, each node represents a step in a sequence of related attacks. Each edge (n_1, n_2) represents that a type $T(n_1)$ attack is needed to prepare for a successful type $T(n_2)$ attack. Each edge may also be associated with a set of equality constraints satisfied by the intrusion alerts. These equality constraints indicate how one attack prepares for another. Finally, as represented by condition 4 in Definition 2, the same type of attacks should be considered as one step, unless they are in different stages of the attacks.

Note that attack strategies may also be specified manually in languages such as LAMBDA [12] and STATL [15]. However, manual specification of attack strategies requires prior knowledge of the strategies, and is also time-consuming and error-prone. Tools based on modeling checking techniques (*e.g.*, attack graphs [21, 36]) can certainly be used to build attack strategies from knowledge of individual types of attacks. However, these methods require clearly identified security properties to run the model checking tools, which may not always be available in reality. In contrast, our notion of attack strategy graph is intended to represent the strategies extracted from correlated intrusion alerts. Based on the knowledge about individual attack types, a program can automatically extract attack strategies from correlated intrusion alerts.

Now let's see an example of an attack strategy graph.

Example 2 Figure 2 is the attack strategy graph extracted from the hyper-alert correlation graph in Figure 1. The hyper-alert types are marked above the corresponding nodes, and the equality constraints are labeled near the corresponding edges. This attack strategy graph clearly shows the component attacks and the constraints that the component attacks must satisfy.

2.2.1 Learning Attack Strategies from Correlated Intrusion Alerts

As discussed earlier, our goal is to learn attack strategies automatically from correlated intrusion alerts. This requires that we extract the constraints intrinsic to attack strategy from alerts so that the same constraints apply to all the other instances of the same strategy.

Our strategy to achieve this goal is to process the correlated intrusion alerts in two steps. First, we aggregate intrusion alerts that belong to the same step of a sequence of attacks into one hyper-alert. For example, in Figure 1, alerts 002 through 005 are indeed attempts of the same attack with different parameters, and thus they should be aggregated as one step in the attack sequence. Second, we extract the constraints between the attack steps and represent them as an attack strategy graph. For example, after we aggregate the hyper-alerts in the first step, we may extract the attack strategy graph shown in Figure 2.

The challenge lies in the first step. Because of the variations of attacks as well as the signatures that IDSs use to recognize attacks, there is no clear way to identify intrusion alerts that belong to the same step in a sequence of attacks. In the following, we first attempt to use the attack type information to do so. The notion of *aggregatable* hyper-alerts is introduced formally to clarify when the same type of hyper-alerts can be aggregated.

Definition 3 Given a hyper-alert correlation graph $CG = (N, E)$, a subset $N' \subseteq N$ is *aggregatable*, if (1) all nodes in N' are the same type of hyper-alerts, and (2) $\forall n_1, n_2 \in N'$, if there is a path from n_1 to n_2 , then all nodes in this path must be in N' .

Intuitively, in a hyper-alert correlation graph, where intrusion alerts have been correlated together, the same type of hyper-alerts can be aggregated as long as they are not used in different stages in the attack sequence. Condition 1 in Definition 3 is quite straightforward, but condition 2 deserves more explanation. Consider the same type of hyper-alerts h_1 and h_2 . If h_1 prepares for a different type of hyper-alert h' (directly or indirectly),




Figure 3: An algorithm to extract attack strategy graph from a hyper-alert correlation graph

and h' further prepares for h_2 (directly or indirectly), h_1 and h_2 obviously belong to different steps in the same sequence of attacks. Thus, we shouldn't allow them to be aggregated together. Although we have never observed such situations, we cannot rule out such possibilities.

Based on the notion of aggregatable hyper-alerts, the first step in learning attack strategy from a hyper-alert correlation graph is quite straightforward. We only need to identify and merge all aggregatable hyper-alerts. To proceed to the second step in strategy learning, we need a hyper-alert correlation graph in which each hyper-alert represents a separate step in the attack sequence. Formally, we call such a hyper-alert correlation graph an irreducible hyper-alert correlation graph.

Definition 4 A hyper-alert correlation graph $CG = (N, E)$ is *irreducible* if for all $N' \subseteq N$, where $|N'| > 1$, N' is not aggregatable.

Figure 3 shows the algorithm to extract attack strategy graphs from hyper-alert correlation graphs. The subroutine *GraphReduction* is used to generate an irreducible hyper-alert correlation graph, and the rest of the algorithm extracts the components of the output attack strategy graph. The steps in this algorithm are self-explanatory; we do not repeat them in the text. Lemma 1 ensures that the output of algorithm 1 indeed satisfies the constraints of an attack strategy graph. The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A.

Lemma 1 *The output of Algorithm 1 is an attack strategy graph.*

2.3 Dealing with Variations of Attacks

Algorithm 1 in Figure 3 has ignored equivalent but different attacks in sequences of attacks. For example, an attacker may use either *pmap_dump* or *Sadmind_Ping* to find a vulnerable *Sadmind* service. As another example, an attacker may use either *SadmindBufferOverflow* or *TooltalkBufferOverflow* attack gain remote access to a host. Obviously, at the same stage of two sequences of attacks, if an attacker uses equivalent but different attacks, Algorithm 1 will return two different attack strategy graphs, though the strategies behind them are the same.

We propose to generalize hyper-alert types so that the syntactic difference between equivalent hyper-alert types is hidden. For example, we may generalize both *SadmindBufferOverflow* and *TooltalkBufferOverflow* attacks into *RPCBufferOverflow*.

A generalized hyper-alert type is created to hide the unnecessary difference between specific hyper-alert types. Thus, an occurrence of any of the specific hyper-alerts should imply an occurrence of the generalized one. This is to say that satisfaction of the prerequisite of a specific hyper-alert implies the satisfaction of the prerequisite of the generalized hyper-alert. Moreover, to cover all possible impact of all the specific hyper-alerts, the consequences of all the specific hyper-alert types should be included in the consequence of the generalized hyper-alert type. It is easy to see that this generalization may cause loss of information. Thus, generalization of hyper-alert types must be carefully handled so that information essential to attack strategy is not lost.

In the following, we formally clarify the relationship between specific and generalized hyper-alert types.

Definition 5 Given two hyper-alert types T_g and T_s , where $T_g = (fact_g, prereq_g, conseq_g)$ and $T_s = (fact_s, prereq_s, conseq_s)$, we say T_g is *more general than* T_s (or, equivalently, T_s is *more specific than* T_g) if there exists an injective mapping f from $fact_g$ to $fact_s$ such that the following conditions are satisfied:

- If we replace all variables x in $prereq_g$ with $f(x)$, $prereq_s$ implies $prereq_g$, and
- If we replace all variables x in $conseq_g$ with $f(x)$, then all formulas in $conseq_s$ are implied by $conseq_g$.

The mapping f is called the *generalization mapping* from T_s to T_g .

Example 3 Suppose the hyper-alert types *SadmindBufferOverflow* and *TooltalkBufferOverflow* are specified as follows: *SadmindBufferOverflow* = ($\{VictimIP, VictimPort\}$, $ExistHost(VictimIP) \wedge VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP)$, $\{GainRootAccess(VictimIP)\}$), and *TooltalkBufferOverflow* = ($\{VictimIP, VictimPort\}$, $ExistHost(VictimIP) \wedge VulnerableTooltalk(VictimIP)$, $\{GainRootAccess(VictimIP)\}$). Assume that *VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP)* imply *VulnerableRPC(VictimIP)*. Intuitively, this represents that if there is a vulnerable *Sadmind* service at *VictimIP*, then there must be a vulnerable *RPC* service (i.e., the *Sadmind* service) at *VictimIP*. Similarly, we assume *VulnerableTooltalk(VictimIP)* also implies *VulnerableRPC(VictimIP)*. Then we can generalize both *SadmindBufferOverflow* and *TooltalkBufferOverflow* into *RPCBufferOverflow* = ($\{VictimIP\}$, $ExistHost(VictimIP) \wedge VulnerableRPC(VictimIP)$, $\{GainRootAccess(VictimIP)\}$), where the generalization mapping is $f(VictimIP) = VictimIP$.

By identifying a generalization mapping, we can specify how a specific hyper-alert can be generalized into a more general hyper-alert. Following the generalization mapping, we can find out what attribute values of a specific hyper-alert should be assigned to the attributes of the generalized hyper-alert. The attack strategy learning algorithm can be easily modified: We first generalize the hyper-alerts in the input hyper-alert correlation graph into generalized hyper-alerts following the generalization mapping, and then apply Algorithm 1 to extract the attack strategy graph.

Although a hyper-alert can be generalized in different granularities, it is not an arbitrary process. In particular, if one hyper-alert prepares for another hyper-alert before generalization, the generalized hyper-alerts should maintain the same relationship. Otherwise, the dependency between different attack stages, which is intrinsic in an attack strategy, will be lost.

The remaining challenge is how to get the “right” generalized hyper-alert types and generalization mappings. The simplest way is to manually specify them. For example, *Apache2*, *Back*, and *Crashiis* are all Denial of Service attacks. We may simply generalize all of them into one *WebServiceDOS*. However, there are often different ways to generalize. To continue the above example, *Apache2* and *Back* attacks are against the apache web servers, while *Crashiis* is against the Microsoft IIS web server. To keep more information about the attacks, we may want to generalize *Apache* and *Back* into *ApacheDOS*, while generalize *Crashiis* and possibly other DOS attacks against the IIS web server into *IISDOS*. Nevertheless, this doesn’t affect the attack strategy graphs extracted from correlated intrusion alerts as long as the constraints on the related alerts are satisfied.

Automatic Generalization of Hyper-Alert Types It is time-consuming and error-prone to manually generalize hyper-alert types. One way to partially automate this process is to use clustering techniques to identify the hyper-alert types that should be generalized into a common one. In our experiments, we use the bottom-up hierarchical clustering [20] to group hyper-alert types hierarchically on the basis of the similarity between them, which is derived from the similarity between the prerequisites and consequences of hyper-alert types. The method used to compute the similarity is described below.

To facilitate the computation of similarity between prerequisites of hyper-alert types, we convert each prerequisite into an *expanded prerequisite set*, which includes all the predicates that appear or are implied by the prerequisite. Similarly, we can get the expanded consequence set. Consider two sets of predicates, denoted S_1 and S_2 , respectively. We adopt the Jaccard similarity coefficient [19] to compute the similarity between S_1 and S_2 , denoted $Sim(S_1, S_2)$. That is, $Sim(S_1, S_2) = \frac{a}{a+b+c}$, where a is the number of predicates in both S_1 and S_2 , b is the number of predicates only in S_1 , and c is the number of predicates only in S_2 .

Given two hyper-alert types T_1 and T_2 , the similarity between T_1 and T_2 , denoted $Sim(T_1, T_2)$, is then computed as $Sim(T_1, T_2) = Sim(XP_1, XP_2) \times w_p + Sim(XC_1, XC_2) \times w_c$, where XP_1 and XP_2 are the expanded prerequisite sets of T_1 and T_2 , XC_1 and XC_2 are the expanded consequence sets of T_1 and T_2 , and w_p and $w_c = 1 - w_p$ are the weights for prerequisite and consequence, respectively. (In our experiments, we use $w_p = w_c = 0.5$ to give equal weight to both prerequisite and consequence of hyper-alert types.) We may then set a threshold t so that two hyper-alert types are grouped into the same cluster only if their similarity measure is greater than or equal to t . Appendix B includes some generalization hierarchies we encountered in our experiments.

3 Measuring the Similarity between Attack Strategies

In this section, we present techniques to measure the similarity between attack strategy graphs based on error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism detection, which has been studied extensively in pattern recognition [4, 24–27]. Since the attack strategy graphs are extracted from sequences of correlated alerts, the similarity between two attack strategy graphs are indeed the similarity between the original alert sequences in terms of their strategies. Such similarity measurement is a fundamental problem in intrusion analysis; it has potential applications in incident handling, computer and network forensics, and other security management areas.

We are particularly interested in two problems. First, how similar are two attack strategies? Second, how likely is one attack strategy a part of another attack strategy? These two problems can be mapped naturally to error tolerant graph isomorphism and error tolerant subgraph isomorphism problems, respectively.

To facilitate the later discussion, we give a brief overview of error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism. Further details can be found in the rich literature on graph/subgraph isomorphism [4, 24–27].

3.1 Error Tolerant Graph/Subgraph Isomorphism

In graph/subgraph isomorphism, a graph is a quadruple $G = (N, E, T, C)$, where N is the set of nodes, E is the set of edges, T is a mapping that assigns labels to the nodes, and C is a mapping that assigns labels to the

edges. Given two graphs $G_1 = (N_1, E_1, T_1, C_1)$ and $G_2 = (N_2, E_2, T_2, C_2)$, a bijective function f is a *graph isomorphism* from G_1 to G_2 if

- for all $n_1 \in N_1, T_1(n_1) = T_2(f(n_1))$;
- for all $e_1 = (n_1, n'_1) \in E_1$, there exists $e_2 = (f(n_1), f(n'_1)) \in E_2$ such that $C(e_1) = C(e_2)$, and for all $e_2 = (n_2, n'_2) \in E_2$, there exists $e_1 = (f^{-1}(n_2), f^{-1}(n'_2)) \in E_1$ such that $C(e_2) = C(e_1)$.

Given a graph $G = (N, E, T, C)$, a *subgraph* of G is a graph $G_s = (N_s, E_s, T_s, C_s)$ such that (1) $N_s \subseteq N$, (2) $E_s = E \cap (N_s \times N_s)$, (3) for all $n_s \in N_s, T_s(n_s) = T(n_s)$, and (4) for all $e_s \in E_s, C_s(e_s) = C(e_s)$. Given two graphs $G_1 = (N_1, E_1, T_1, C_1)$ and $G_2 = (N_2, E_2, T_2, C_2)$, an injective function f is a *subgraph isomorphism* from G_1 to G_2 , if there exists a subgraph G_{2s} of G_2 such that f is a graph isomorphism from G_1 to G_{2s} .

As a further step beyond graph/subgraph isomorphism, error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism (which is also known as error correcting graph/subgraph isomorphism) is introduced to cope with noises or distortion in the input graphs. There are two approaches for error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism: graph edit distance and maximal common graph. In this paper, we focus on graph edit distance to study the application of error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism in intrusion detection.

The edit distance method assumes a set of edit operations (*e.g.*, deletion, insertion and substitution of nodes and edges) as well as the costs of these operations, and defines the similarity of two graphs in terms of the least cost sequence of edit operations that transforms one graph into the other. We denote the edited graph after a sequence of edit operations Δ as $\Delta(G)$. Consider two graphs G_1 and G_2 . The *distance* $D(G_1, G_2)$ from G_1 to G_2 *w.r.t. graph isomorphism* is the *minimum* sum of edit costs associated with a sequence of edit operations Δ on G_1 that leads to a graph isomorphism from $\Delta(G_1)$ to G_2 . Similarly, the *distance* $D_s(G_1, G_2)$ from G_1 to G_2 *w.r.t. subgraph isomorphism* is the *minimum* sum of edit costs associated with a sequence of edit operations Δ on G_1 that leads to a *subgraph* isomorphism from $\Delta(G_1)$ to G_2 . An *error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism* from G_1 to G_2 is a pair (Δ, f) , where Δ is a sequence of edit operations on G_1 , and f is a graph/subgraph isomorphism from $\Delta(G_1)$ to G_2 .

It is well known that subgraph isomorphism detection is an NP-complete problem [17]. Error tolerant subgraph isomorphism detection, which involves subgraph isomorphism detection, is also in NP and generally harder than exact subgraph isomorphism detection [25]. Nevertheless, error tolerant subgraph isomorphism has been widely applied in image processing and pattern recognition [4, 24–27]. In our application, all the attack strategy graphs we have encountered are small graphs with less than 10 nodes. We argue that it is very unlikely to have very large attack strategy graphs in practice. Thus, we believe error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism can be applied to measure the similarity between attack strategy graphs with reasonable response time. Indeed, we did not observe any noticeable delay in our experiments.

3.2 Working with Attack Strategy Graphs

To successfully use error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism detection techniques, we need to answer at least the following three questions. What are the edit operations on an attack strategy graph? What are reasonable edit costs of these edit operations? What is the right similarity measurement between attack strategy graphs?

All the edit operations on a labeled graph are applicable to attack strategy graphs. Specifically, an *edit operation* on an attack strategy graph $ASG = (N, E, T, C)$ is one of the following:

1. Inserting a node n : $\$ \rightarrow n$. This represents adding a stage into an attack strategy. This edit operation is only needed for error-tolerant graph isomorphism.
2. Deleting a node n : $n \rightarrow \$$. This represents removing a stage from an attack strategy. Note that this implies deleting all edges adjacent with n .

3. Substituting the hyper-alert type of a node n : $T(n) \rightarrow t$, where t is a hyper-alert type. This represents changing the attack at one stage of the attack strategy.
4. Inserting an edge $e = (n_1, n_2)$: $\$ \rightarrow e$, where $n_1, n_2 \in N$. This represents adding dependency (*i.e.*, prepare for relation) between two attack stages.
5. Deleting an edge $e = (n_1, n_2)$: $e \rightarrow \$$. This represents removing dependency (*i.e.*, prepare for relation) between two attack stages.
6. Substituting the label of an edge $e = (n_1, n_2)$: $C(e) \rightarrow c$, where c is a set of equality constraints. This represents changing the way in which two attack stages are related to each other. (Note that c is not necessarily a set of equality constraints for $(T(n_1), T(n_2))$.)

These edit operations do not necessarily transform one attack strategy graph into another attack strategy graph. Indeed, a labeled graph must satisfy some constraints to be an attack strategy graph. For example, all the equality constraints in the label associated with (n_1, n_2) must be valid equality constraints for $(T(n_1), T(n_2))$. It is easy to see that the edit operations may violate some of these constraints.

One may suggest these constraints be enforced throughout the transformation of attack strategy graphs. As an additional benefit, this can be used to reduce the search space required for graph/subgraph isomorphism. However, this approach may not find the least expensive sequence of edit operations, and may even fail to find a transformation from one attack strategy graph to (the subgraph of) another. Indeed, editing distance is one way to measure the difference between attack strategy graphs; it is not necessary to require that all the intermediate edited graphs are attack strategy graph. As long as the final edited graph is isomorphic to an attack strategy graph, it is guaranteed to be an attack strategy graph. Thus, we do not require the intermediate graphs during graph transformation be attack strategy graphs.

Assignment of edit costs to the edit operations is a critical step in error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism. The actual costs are highly dependent on the domain in which these techniques are applied. In our application, there are multiple reasonable ways to assign the edit costs. In the following, we attempt to give some constraints that the cost assignment must satisfy.

In an attack strategy graph, a node represents a stage in an attack strategy, while an edge represents the causal relationship between two steps in the strategy. Obviously, changing the stages in an attack strategy affects the attack strategy significantly more than modifying the causal relationships between stages. Thus, the edit costs of node related operations should be significantly more expensive than those of the edge related operations.

Inserting or deleting a node implies having one more or fewer step in the strategy, while substituting a node type implies to replace the attack in one step in the strategy. Thus, inserting or deleting a node has at least the same impact on the strategy as substituting the node type. Moreover, deleting a node and inserting a node are both manipulations of a stage; there is no reason to say one operation has more impact than the other. Therefore, they should have the same cost. Both inserting and deleting an edge changes the causal relationship between two attack stages, and they should have the same impact on the attack strategy. However, substituting the label of an edge is just to change the way in which two attack stages are related. Thus, it should have less cost than edge insertion and deletion. In summary, we can derive the following constraint in edit cost assignments.

Constraint 1 $Cost_{n \rightarrow \$} = Cost_{\$ \rightarrow n} \geq Cost_{T(n) \rightarrow t} \gg Cost_{\$ \rightarrow e} = Cost_{e \rightarrow \$} \geq Cost_{C(e) \rightarrow c}$.

The labels in an attack strategy graph is indeed a set of equality constraints. As a result, labels are not entirely independent of each other. This further implies that edit costs for edge label substitution should not be uniformly assigned. For example, substituting an edge label $\{A, B\}$ for $\{A, C\}$ should have less cost than substituting $\{A, B\}$ for $\{C, D\}$. This observation leads to another constraint.

Constraint 2 *Assume that the edit operation $C(e) \rightarrow c$ replaces $C(e) = c_{old}$ with c_{new} . The edit cost $Cost_{C(e) \rightarrow c}$ should be smaller when c_{old} and c_{new} have more equality constraints in common.*

Here we give a simple way to accommodate Constraint 2. We assume there is a maximum edit cost for label substitution operation, denoted as $MaxCost_{C(e) \rightarrow c}$. The edit cost of a label substitution is then $Cost_{C(e) \rightarrow c} = MaxCost_{C(e) \rightarrow c} \times \frac{|c_{old} \cap c_{new}|}{|c_{old} \cup c_{new}|}$, where c_{old} and c_{new} are the labels (*i.e.*, sets of equality constraints) before and after the operation.

Error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism detection techniques can conveniently give a distance between two labeled graphs, which is measured in terms of edit cost. As we discussed earlier, we use these techniques to help answer two questions: (1) How similar are two sequences of attacks in terms of their attack strategy? (2) How likely does one sequence of attacks use a part of attack strategy in another sequence of attacks? In the following, we transform the edit distance measures into more direct similarity measures.

Consider an attack strategy graph ASG . We refer to the distance from ASG to an empty graph as the *reductive weight* of ASG , denoted as $W_r(ASG)$. Similarly, we refer to the distance from an empty graph to ASG as the *constructive weight* of ASG , denoted $W_c(ASG)$.

Definition 6 Consider two attack strategy graphs ASG_1 and ASG_2 . The *similarity between ASG_1 and ASG_2 w.r.t. (attack) strategy* is $Sim(ASG_1, ASG_2) = \frac{Sim(ASG_1 \rightarrow ASG_2) + Sim(ASG_2 \rightarrow ASG_1)}{2}$, where $Sim(ASG_x \rightarrow ASG_y) = 1 - \frac{D(ASG_x, ASG_y)}{W_r(ASG_x) + W_c(ASG_y)}$.


Definition 7 Consider two attack strategy graphs ASG_1 and ASG_2 . The *similarity between ASG_1 and ASG_2 w.r.t. (attack) sub-strategy* is $Sim_{Sub}(ASG_1, ASG_2) = 1 - \frac{D_s(ASG_1, ASG_2)}{W_r(ASG_1) + W_c(ASG_2)}$.

Appendix C gives a simple analysis of the impact of edit costs on the similarity measurements. In summary, when the number of edges are not substantially more than the number of nodes, and the number of edge operations are not substantially more than the number of node operations, the similarity measure is mainly determined by the number of nodes and node operations rather than the edit costs.


4 Experiments

We have performed a series of experiments to study the techniques proposed in this paper. In our experiments, we used the implementation of the NCR model, the NCSU Intrusion Alert Correlator [31], to correlate intrusion alerts. Following their example, we also used GraphViz [2] to visualize graphs. In addition, we used *GUB* [24], A Toolkit for Graph Matching, to perform error tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism detection and compute distances between attack strategy graphs. We used Snort [35] as our IDS sensor.


Our test data sets include the 2000 DARPA intrusion detection scenario specific data sets [28]. The data sets contain two scenarios: LLDOS 1.0 and LLDOS 2.0.2. In LLDOS1.0, the sequence of attacks includes IP sweep, probes of sadmind services, breakins through sadmind exploits, installations of DDoS programs, and finally the DDoS attack. LLDOS 2.0.2 is similar to LLDOS 1.0; however, the attacks in LLDOS 2.0.2 are more stealthy than those in LLDOS 1.0. In addition to the DARPA data sets, we also performed three sequences of attacks in an isolated network. In all these three attack sequences, the attacker started with nmap [16] scans of the victim. Then, in the first sequence, the attacker sent malformed urls [8] to the victim's Internet Information Services (IIS) to get a cmd.exe shell. In the second sequence, the attacker took advantage of the flaws of IP fragment reassembly on Windows 2000 [7] to launch a DoS attack. In the third sequence, the attacker launched a buffer overflow attack against the Internet Printing Protocol accessed via IIS 5.0 [5, 9]. Further details of these attack sequences are included in Appendix D. We also used the alert sets provided along with the Intrusion Alert Correlator [31]. These alerts were generated by RealSecure Network Sensor [18] on the 2000 DARPA data sets, too. We label their alert sets with *RealSecure*, while label ours with *Snort* to distinguish between them.




(a) LLDOS1.0 inside dataset (RealSecure)




(b) LLDOS1.0 inside dataset (Snort)




(c) LLDOS2.0.2 inside dataset (RealSecure)




(d) LLDOS2.0.2 inside dataset (Snort)



(e) WEB-IIS unicode exploits (Snort)



(f) jolt2 DoS attack (Snort)



(g) WEB-IIS ISAPI .printer access (Snort)

Figure 4: Attack Strategy Graphs Extracted from Our Experiments

4.1 Learning Attack Strategies from Correlated Intrusion Alerts

Our first goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach on extracting the attack strategies. Figure 4 shows all of the attack strategy graphs extracted from the test data sets. The label inside each node is the node ID followed by the hyper-alert type of the node. The label of each edge describes the set of equality constraints for the hyper-alert types associated with the two end nodes.

The attack strategy graphs we extracted from LLDOS 1.0 (inside part) are shown in Figure 4(a) and 4(b). Comparing them with the description of the data set [28], we know that both Figures 4(a) and 4(b) have captured most of the attack strategy. The missing parts are due to the attacks missed by the IDSs. Since we didn't generalize variations of hyper-alert types, these graphs still have syntactic differences despite of their common strategy. (Note that the "RPC sadmind UDP PING" alert reported by Snort is indeed the "Sadmind_Amslverify_Overflow" alert by RealSecure, and the "RPC portmap sadmind request UDP" alert by Snort is the "Sadmind_Ping" alert by RealSecure.) Moreover, false alerts are also reflected in the attack strategy graphs. For example, the hyper-alert types "Email_Almail_Overflow" and "FTP_Syst" in Figure 4(a) do not belong to the attack strategy, but they are included because of the false detection.

The attack strategies extracted from LLDOS 2.0.2 are shown in Figures 4(c) and 4(d). Compared with the five phases of attack scenarios [28], it is easy to see that Figure 4(c) reveals most of the adversary's strategy. However, Figure 4(d) reveals two steps fewer than Figure 4(c). Our further investigation indicates that this is because one critical attack step, the buffer overflow attacks against sadmind service, was completely missed by Snort. Figures 4(e), 4(f), and 4(g) show the attack strategies extracted from the three sequences of attacks we performed. By comparing with the attacks, which are described in Appendix D, we can see that the stages as well as the constraints intrinsic to these attack strategies are mostly captured by these graphs.

Though showing some potential, these experimental results also reveal a limitation of the attack strategy learning method: That is, our method depends on the underlying IDSs as well as the alert correlation method. If the hyper-alert correlation graphs do not reveal the entire attack strategy, or include false alerts, the attack strategy graphs generated by our method will not be perfect. Nevertheless, our technique is intended to automate the analysis process typically performed by human analysts, who may make the same mistake if no other information is used. More research is clearly needed to mitigate the impact of imperfect IDS and correlation.

Another observation is that alerts from heterogeneous IDSs can help complete the attack strategies. For example, combining Figures 4(c) and 4(d), we know that an attacker may launch buffer overflow attacks against sadmind service and then use telnet to access the victim machine.

Note that we do not give a quantitative performance evaluation of attack strategy extraction (*i.e.*, the false positive and false negative of the extracted attack strategies). This is because such measures are indeed determined by the underlying intrusion alert correlation algorithm. As long as correlation is performed correctly, our method can always extract the strategy reflected by the correlated alerts.

4.2 Measuring the Similarity between Alert Sequences

We performed some experiments to measure the similarity between the previously extracted seven attack strategy graphs. To hide the unnecessary differences between alert types, we generalized similar alert types. Due to space reasons, we do not redraw the attack strategy graphs. The generalization details are given in Appendix D. We assume the edit costs for node operations are all 10, and the edit costs for the edge operations are all 1.

Tables 1 and 2 show the similarity measurements between each pair of attack strategy graphs w.r.t. attack strategy and attack sub-strategy, respectively. Each subscript in the tables denotes the graph it represents. We notice that $Sim_{Sub}(G_i, G_j)$ may not necessarily be equal to $Sim_{Sub}(G_j, G_i)$.

Table 1 indicates that Figure 4(a) is more similar to Figures 4(b), and 4(c) to the other graphs. In addition, Figure 4(g) is more similar to Figures 4(e) and 4(f) than the other graphs. Based on the description of these attack sequences, we can see these similarity measures conform to human perceptions.

Table 1: The similarity w.r.t. attack strategy between attack strategy graphs in Figure 4

	$G_{4(a)}$	$G_{4(b)}$	$G_{4(c)}$	$G_{4(d)}$	$G_{4(e)}$	$G_{4(f)}$	$G_{4(g)}$
$G_{4(a)}$	/	0.72	0.73	0.21	0.29	0.31	0.25
$G_{4(b)}$	0.72	/	0.66	0.55	0.25	0.25	0.29
$G_{4(c)}$	0.73	0.66	/	0.40	0.34	0.38	0.30
$G_{4(d)}$	0.21	0.55	0.40	/	0.21	0.40	0.38
$G_{4(e)}$	0.29	0.25	0.34	0.21	/	0.48	0.74
$G_{4(f)}$	0.31	0.25	0.38	0.40	0.48	/	0.61
$G_{4(g)}$	0.25	0.29	0.30	0.38	0.74	0.61	/

Table 2: The similarity w.r.t. attack sub-strategy between attack strategy graphs in Figure 4

	$G_{4(a)}$	$G_{4(b)}$	$G_{4(c)}$	$G_{4(d)}$	$G_{4(e)}$	$G_{4(f)}$	$G_{4(g)}$
$G_{4(a)}$	/	0.72	0.66	0.31	0.53	0.31	0.43
$G_{4(b)}$	0.89	/	0.67	0.55	0.61	0.38	0.51
$G_{4(c)}$	0.90	0.68	/	0.40	0.61	0.38	0.52
$G_{4(d)}$	0.89	1.00	0.86	/	0.79	0.60	0.73
$G_{4(e)}$	0.51	0.58	0.58	0.21	/	0.48	0.26
$G_{4(f)}$	0.72	0.65	0.65	0.40	0.91	/	0.89
$G_{4(g)}$	0.59	0.51	0.48	0.27	0.93	0.61	/

Table 2 shows the similarity between attack strategy graphs w.r.t. attack sub-strategy. We can see that Figures 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) are very similar to a sub-strategy of Figure 4(a). In addition, Figure 4(d) is exactly a sub-strategies of Figure 4(b). Similarly, Figures 4(g) and 4(f) are both similar to sub-strategies of Figure 4(e), and Figure 4(f) is also similar to a sub-strategy of Figure 4(g). Comparing these measure values with these attack sequences, we can see these measures also conform to human perceptions.

The experiments also reveal some remaining problems that haven’t been addressed by our techniques. First, the similarity measures make sense in terms of their relative values. However, we still do not understand what a specific similarity measure represents. Second, false alerts generated by IDSs have a negative impact on the measurement. It certainly requires further research to address these issues.

4.3 Identification of Missing Detections

Our last set of experiments is intended to study the possibility to apply the similarity measurement method to identify attacks missed by IDSs. For the sake of presentation, we first introduce two terms: precedent set and successive set. Intuitively, the *precedent set* of a node n in an attack strategy graph is the set of nodes from which there are paths to n , while the *successive set* of n is the set of nodes to which n has a path. In the following, we show two examples we encountered in our experiments.

Example 4 The attack strategy graph in Figure 4(c) has no network probe phase, but Figure 4(a) does. The similarity measurement $Sim_{Sub}(G_{4(c)}, G_{4(a)}) = 0.90$ and $Sim(G_{4(c)}, G_{4(a)}) = 0.73$ indicate that these two strategies are very similar and it’s very likely that Figure 4(c) is a sub-strategy of Figure 4(a). Thus, it is possible that some probe attacks are missed by the IDS when the IDS detected the attacks corresponding to Figure 4(c). Indeed, this is exactly what happened in LLDOS 2.0.2. The adversary uses some stealthy attacks (*i.e.*, HINFO query to the DNS server) to get the information about the victim host.

Example 5 Consider Figures 4(d) and 4(b). We have $Sim_{Sub}(G_{4(d)}, G_{4(b)}) = 1.0$. Thus, $G_{4(d)}$ is exactly a sub-strategy of $G_{4(b)}$. By checking the LLDOS2.0.2 alerts reported by Snort, we know that there are also “RPC portmap sadmind request UDP” alerts as in Figure 4(b). However, since Snort did not detect the later buffer overflow attack, these “RPC portmap sadmind request UDP” alerts aren’t correlated with the later alerts.

We then perform the following steps, trying to identify attacks possibly missed in LLDOS 2.0.2. We pick node $n1$ in Figure 4(d), and find its corresponding node $n3$ in Figure 4(b), which is mapped to $n1$ by the subgraph isomorphism. It is easy to see that in Figure 4(b), the precedent set of $n3$ is $\{n1\ n2\}$, and $n1$ has the type “RPC portmap sadmind request UDP”. We then go back to LLDOS 2.0.2 alerts, and find “RPC portmap sadmind request UDP” alerts before “TELNET ACCESS”. By comparing the precedent set of $n1$ in Figure 4(d) and the precedent set of $n3$ in Figure 4(b), we suspect that “RPC sadmind UDP PING” (which corresponds to node $n2$ in Figure 4(b)) has been missed in LLDOS 2.0.2. If we add such an alert, we may correlate it with “RPC portmap sadmind request UDP” and further with “TELNET access” in Figure 4(d). Indeed, “RPC sadmind UDP PING” is the buffer overflow attack missed by Snort in LLDOS 2.0.2.

The later part of example 5 is very similar to the abductive correlation proposed in [11]. The additional feature provided by the similarity measurement is the guidelines about what attacks may be missed. In this sense, the similarity measurement is complementary to the abductive correlation. Moreover, these examples are provided to demonstrate the potential of identifying missed attacks through measuring similarity of attack sequences. It is also possible that the attacker didn’t launch those attacks. Additional research is necessary to improve the performance and reduce false identification rate.

5 Related Work

Our work in this paper is closely related to the recent results in intrusion alert correlation. In particular, our attack strategy model can be considered as an extension to [11] and [32]. In addition to correlating alerts together based on their relationships, we further extract the attack strategy used in the attacks, and use them to measure the similarity between sequences of alerts.

There are other alert correlation techniques. The techniques in [10, 13, 37, 40] correlate alerts on the basis of the similarities between the alert attributes. The Tivoli approach correlates alerts based on the observation that some alerts usually occur in sequence [14]. M2D2 correlates alerts by fusing information from multiple sources besides intrusion alerts, such as the characteristics of the monitored systems and the vulnerability information [29], thus having a potential to result in better results than those simply looking at intrusion alerts. The mission-impact-based approach correlates alerts raised by INFOSEC devices such as IDS and firewalls with the importance of system assets [34]. The alert clustering techniques in [22, 23] use conceptual clustering and generalization hierarchy to aggregate alerts into clusters. Alert correlation may also be performed by matching attack scenarios specified by attack languages. Examples of such languages include STATL [15], LAMBDA [12], and JIGSAW [38].

Our approach to similarity measurement of attack strategies is based on error-tolerant graph/subgraph isomorphism techniques [3, 6, 24, 25, 39]. The early work about graph/subgraph isomorphism was presented in [3, 6, 39]. The traditional methods are A* based approaches [30]. The more efficient algorithms proposed recently include decomposition-based approaches [24–26] and decision tree-based approaches [24, 27].

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we developed techniques to extract attack strategies from correlated intrusion alerts based on the recent advances in intrusion alert correlation [11, 32]. Our contributions include a model to represent and algorithms to extract attack strategies from intrusion alerts. Moreover, to accommodate variations in attacks that are not intrinsic to attack strategies, we propose to generalize different types of intrusion alerts to hide the unnecessary difference between them. Finally, we developed techniques to measure the similarity between sequences of attacks based on their strategies. Our experimental results have shown that our techniques can successfully extract invariant attack strategies from sequences of alerts, measure the similarity between alert sequences in a way conforming to human intuition, and has a potential to identify attacks missed by IDSs.

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A Proof Sketch of Lemma 1

We first prove the output of the subroutine *GraphReduction* is an irreducible hyper-alert correlation graph by contradiction. Consider the output $CG' = (N', E')$ of *GraphReduction*. Suppose there exists $N_s \subseteq N'$, where $|N_s| > 1$, such that N_s is aggregatable. Thus, all nodes in N_s are the same type of hyper-alerts, and for any two different nodes $n_1, n_2 \in N_s$, if there is a path from n_1 to n_2 , then all nodes in the path are in N_s . Since CG' is aggregated from the input hyper-alert correlation graph, for all pairs of nodes n'_1 and n'_2 , where n'_1 and n'_2 are aggregated into n_1 and n_2 , respectively, if there exists a path from n'_1 to n'_2 in the input graph, all the nodes in the path must be in the group of nodes aggregated into the nodes in N_s . According to steps 3 and 4 in *GraphReduction*, they should have been kept in the same group and aggregated into one node in CG' . This leads to a contradiction to the assumption that n'_1 and n'_2 are aggregated into n_1 and n_2 , respectively.

Now we prove the output of Algorithm 1 is an attack strategy graph. Consider the output of Algorithm 1 $ASG = (N, E, T, C)$. It is easy to see that T is a mapping that maps each $n \in N$ to a hyper-alert type, and C is a mapping that maps each edge $e \in E$ to a set of equality constraints. In addition, because the input hyper-alert correlation graph is a DAG, (N, E) must be a directed graph. Suppose there is a cycle n_1, n_2, \dots, n_1 in (N, E) . There must exist two nodes n_{11}, n_{12} , and n_{21} in the input hyper-alert correlation graph such that n_{11} and n_{12} are aggregated into n_1 , n_{21} is aggregated into n_2 , and there exists a path $n_{11}, \dots, n_{21}, \dots, n_{12}$. However, according to the subroutine *GraphReduction*, n_{11} and n_{12} should have been put into two separate groups. Thus, (N, E) cannot have any cycle. Finally, for any $n_1, n_2 \in N$, since the output of *GraphReduction* is irreducible, if $T(n_1) = T(n_2)$, then there must exist $n_3 \in N$ in a path between n_1 and n_2 such that $T(n_3) \neq T(n_1)$.

B Automatic Generalization of Hyper-Alert Types

This appendix shows some examples for automatic generalization of hyper-alert types. Figure 5 shows the results we obtained for the hyper-alert types in the 2000 DARPA data sets. Here the string inside the non-leaf node means *Generalization Type* followed by an ID. From Figure 5(b), we know that *FTP_Put* and *Rsh* can be generalized to the same type. These results were used in our later experiments when we computed the similarity measures between attack strategy graphs.

C Analysis of the Edit Cost Influence to Similarity Measurement

Suppose we have two graph G_a and G_b , which have n_a and n_b nodes, and e_a and e_b edges, respectively. Suppose we perform an error tolerant graph isomorphism from G_a to G_b , the node operations have the same cost C_N , and edge operations have the same cost C_E , where $C_N \gg C_E$. In the sequence of edit operations, suppose there are N_N node operations, and N_E edge operations. Then the similarity measure can be simplified as follows:




Figure 5: Generalization hierarchies for the hyper-alert types in DARPA 2000 dataset. Threshold $t = 0.5$.

$$Sim(G_a, G_b) = 1 - \frac{D(G_a, G_b)}{W_r(G_a) + W_c(G_b)} = 1 - \frac{C_N \times N_N + C_E \times N_E}{C_N \times (n_a + n_b) + C_E \times (e_a + e_b)}$$

Further let $e_a + e_b = k \times (n_a + n_b)$, and $N_E = s \times N_N$. Then we have

$$Sim(G_a, G_b) = 1 - \frac{C_N \times N_N + C_E \times s \times N_N}{C_N \times (n_a + n_b) + C_E \times k \times (n_a + n_b)} = 1 - \frac{N_N \times (C_N + C_E \times s)}{(n_a + n_b) \times (C_N + C_E \times k)}$$

When k and s are not large, since $C_N \gg C_E$, the formula can be further simplified below:

$$Sim(G_a, G_b) = 1 - \frac{N_N}{n_a + n_b}$$

Thus, under the above assumptions, the similarity is approximately determined by the proportion of the number of edited nodes to the total number of nodes.

D Further Details of The Experiments

Attack Sequences in Our Experiments. Here we describe the three sequences of attacks performed in our experiments. Since the descriptions of the attacks in the DARPA datasets are available on-line [28], we don't repeat them in this paper.

In the first sequence of attacks (Figure 4(e)), the attacker first uses nmap [16] to scan the victim machine. (Nmap supports ping sweeps, port scans, and operating system detection.) After knowing that the OS of the




Figure 6: Additional generalizations of hyper-alert types in our experiments

victim may be windows 2000 and port 80 is open, the attacker runs a Perl script which includes 20 different malformed urls [8] against the victim machine’s Internet Information Services (IIS). The output of the Perl script is a list of malformed urls to which the victim IIS is vulnerable. The attacker then selects one of the vulnerabilities to perform the actual attack and gets a cmd.exe shell on the victim machine. The attacker then uses interactive commands to list and delete some files, and finally exit the command shell. Figure 4(e) reveals this strategy.

In the second sequence of attacks (Figure 4(f)), the attacker uses nmap to scan the victim machine. However, after knowing that the OS of the victim may be windows 2000, the attacker ran a “jolt2” Perl script, which would create a DoS attack to the victim machine. (Jolt2 is a DoS attack which can take advantage of the flaws of IP fragment reassembly on Windows 2000 [7].) Figure 4(f) reveals this strategy, and because of the limitation of the Snort’s signatures, it can only tell administrators “(spp_frag2) Oversized fragment, probable DoS”.

In the third sequence of attacks (Figure 4(g)), the attacker uses nmap to scan the victim machine. After knowing the OS of the victim may be windows 2000 and the port 80 is open, the attacker sets up a netcat listening port on his machine, and runs a program “iis5hack” buffer overflow attack, which may result in a buffer overflow on the Internet Printing Protocol accessed via IIS 5.0 [5, 9]. Following a successful iishack attack, the attacker’s machine would get a reverse cmd.exe shell on the netcat listening port, and the attacker can do whatever he/she wants on the victim machine, such as listing and deleting files. In Figure 4(g), the netcat command shell attack is missing, because Snort cannot detect such attacks.

Generalization of Hyper-alert Types. The generalizations of hyper-alert types in our experiments include those in Figure 5 as well as additional ones in Figure 6.