

Lightweight RFID authentication with forward and backward security

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We propose a lightweight RFID authentication protocol that supports forward and backward security. The only cryptographic mechanism that this protocol uses is a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) that is shared with the backend Server. Authentication is achieved by exchanging a few numbers (3 or 5) drawn from the PRNG. The lookup time is constant, and the protocol can be easily adapted to prevent online man-in-the-middle relay attacks. Security is proven in the UC security framework.

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Additional Key Words and Phrases: RFID, EPCGen2, authentication, forward security, backward security, universal composability

1. INTRODUCTION

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a promising new technology that is widely deployed for supply-chain and inventory management, retail operations and more generally, automatic identification. The advantage of RFID over barcode technology is that it does not require direct line-of-sight reading. Furthermore RFID readers can interrogate tags at greater distances, faster and concurrently. One of the most important advantages of RFID technology is that tags have read/write capability, allowing stored information to be altered dynamically.

To promote the adoption of RFID technology and support interoperability, EPC-Global [EPC Global] has ratified the EPC Class 1 Gen 2 (EPCGen2) standard for RFID deployments. This defines a platform for RFID protocol interoperability, and supports basic reliability guarantees, provided by an on-chip 16-bit pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) and a 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC16). The EPCGen2 standard is designed to strike a balance between cost and functionality, with less attention paid to security.

Several RFID authentication protocols that address security issues have been proposed in the literature (we refer the reader to a comprehensive repository available online at [Avoine 2010]). Cryptography especially designed for constrained devices is called *lightweight*, or low-cost, cryptography. Most lightweight protocols use hash functions [Sharma et al. 2003; Ohkubo et al. 2003; Henrici and Müller 2004; Avoine and Oechslin 2005; Dimitriou 2006; Molnar et al. 2006], which are

beyond the capability of low cost tags and not supported by EPCGen2. Some protocols use pseudorandom functions [Burmester et al. 2006a; van Le et al. 2007; Burmester and de Medeiros 2008], or PRNGs (as in [Burmester and de Medeiros 2008; Choi et al. 2009]), mechanisms that are supported by EPCGen2, but are not optimized for EPCGen2 compliance. Thus, new lower complexity (*flyweight*) protocols that are suitable for EPCGen2 platforms are needed.

Some researchers have adopted a systematic approach designed to capture specific security requirements by using *privacy* models (e.g., [Paise and Vaudenay 2008; Juels and Weis 2009; Michahelles et al. 2007; Avoine et al. 2007]), *computational* models (e.g., [Vaudenay 2007]), or *symbolic* models (e.g., [Arapinis et al. 2008]). In this article we propose to use a formal specifications based framework that captures these models and addresses composability issues. This extends earlier work in [Burmester et al. 2009b] to more general functionalities, such as refreshment and backward security, appropriate for lightweight RFID deployments. There is comparatively little work on RFID protocols in this framework, see e.g., [Burmester et al. 2006a; 2006b; van Le et al. 2007; Burmester et al. 2008a; 2008b; Burmester and de Medeiros 2009; Burmester et al. 2009a; 2009b].

Our main contribution in this article is to present a novel low cost lightweight RFID protocol that supports mutual authentication with *forward* and *backward* security [Barak and Halevi 2005]. The protocol has minimal overhead with constant lookup time and can be implemented on an EPCGen2 platform. Authentication is achieved by exchanging a few numbers (3 or 5) drawn from a PRNG that is shared with the back-end Server. The protocol supports forward and backward security. Forward security protects *past* tag interrogations from being linked to a captured tag. Tags are not tamper-resistant, and therefore the adversary can access the private data of a captured tag. Backward security protects *future* tag interrogations from traffic analysis (correlation) attacks in which the adversary uses information leaked by tags to determine their internal state. Such attacks exploit the fact that the state of lightweight tags has low entropy. An important feature of our protocol is that RFID tags can pre-compute their response to Server challenges, and therefore the Server can detect online man-in-the-middle relay attacks by controlling the round-trip time of a challenge-response.

We then extend the Universally Composable (UC) security framework for RFID systems presented recently in this journal [Burmester et al. 2009b], to capture lightweight-to-flyweight RFID applications, and in particular forward and backward security with refreshment. We conclude by showing that our protocol UC-realizes mutual authentication and session unlinkability with forward and backward security. We note that UC-security supports modular deployments, a feature essential for most ubiquitous applications.

Our contributions

- A Flyweight RFID protocol that provides mutual authentication with session unlinkability, extending work in [Burmester et al. 2009a; Burmester and Munilla 2009] (Section 4).
- A tag refreshment mechanism, that extends the functionality of the Flyweight protocol to capture forward and backward security (Section 5).

- An implementation that addresses online relay attacks (Section 6).
- An implementation that secures the EPCGen2 Inventory protocol (Section 7).
- A UC framework that adapts the model in [Burmeister et al. 2009b] to capture availability,¹ mutual authentication and session unlinkability with forward and backward security (Section 8).
- A security proof and security reductions (Section 9).

1.1 A motivating paradigm

Alice wants to purchase an RFID ski-lift pass. Two versions are available: A \$50 card for 10 applications (tag interrogations) and a \$200 pass for unlimited applications (for the season). She purchases the former. For her money she gets:

Availability. The RFID pass uses five numbers drawn from an on-chip PRNG that is shared with authorized RFID readers to authenticate Alice. Readers will only accept Alice’s pass if its numbers match those generated locally. Up to 50 numbers can be drawn before correlation attacks become an issue: she is allowed only 10 sessions (a design constraint).

Session unlinkability. The adversary cannot link authorized interrogation sessions.

The adversary’s goal is to undermine the security features of the RFID pass. In particular, to impersonate Alice, track Alice and/or deny service. The adversary can eavesdrop on all interrogations of Alice’s RFID pass and activate her RFID pass with rogue readers.

Security analysis. The RFID pass prevents Steve (an eavesdropping stalker) from impersonating Alice by replaying her pseudorandom numbers (different numbers are used each time). However Mark (a man-in-the-middle active adversary) has found a way to deplete the card (he “steals” her numbers via a rogue RFID reader). Alice gets only two authentications. She does not want to break-up with Mark so she buys the \$200 pass. This time after two authentications—Mark is at it again, *Voila!* the card morphs into a brand new RFID pass (with a fresh PRNG). This happens over and over again, whenever the card is depleted, even when Mark causes it and Alice is not in the range of an authorized reader (“quantum refreshing”). Steve and Mark give up. Mischief doesn’t work. However Alice is now concerned about accessing her BlackBerry while using her ski-lift pass (she is obsessed with multitasking). Ran, the analyst, assures her that the card uses a protocol that remains secure when composed with other protocols.

2. RFID DEPLOYMENTS

An RFID deployment involves tags, readers and a backend Server. Tags are wireless transponders that typically have no power of their own and respond only when they are in an electromagnetic field, while readers are transceivers that generate such fields. Tags are physically constrained devices that *cannot execute concurrently*—this will make our analysis and proofs in Sections 8 and 9 much simpler. Readers implement a radio interface to tags and a high level interface to a backend Server.

¹Protocols that employ shared security mechanisms may be subject to de-synchronization attacks.

The Server is a trusted entity that processes private tag data. Readers do not store locally any private data and the channels that link them to the Server are assumed to be secure—hardware constraints are not so tight here, and common security protocols can be used (SSL/TLS).

2.1 Threats and Attacks

The goal of the adversary is to undermine the functionality of the RFID deployment. Below we list the most important adversarial attacks.

Availability. Tag disabling: the adversary tries to cause tags to assume a state from which they can no longer function.

Privacy. Tag tracking: the adversary tries to trace tags from their protocol flows.

Integrity.

- Replay: The adversary tries to use a tag’s response to a reader’s challenge to impersonate the tag.
- Cloning: The adversary tries to capture identifying information of a tag.
- Offline man-in-the-middle offline attacks: The adversary tries to impersonate a tag by interposing between the tag and a reader and exchanges their (possibly modified) messages.

There are also attacks on RFID systems that are usually excluded from the security model, such as:

Online man-in-the-middle relay attacks [Bengio et al. 1991; Kim et al. 2008]: these are similar to the offline attacks above, with the exception that the adversary relays messages online.

Side Channel and *Power Analysis* [Mangard et al. 2007] attacks: the adversary exploits information gained by the physical implementation of protocols.

These attacks are usually prevented by using “out of system” protection mechanisms.

2.2 Priorities, Constraints and Optimizations

In the context of RFID applications, nearly every factor having impact on tag resources and capabilities is important. In particular, with EPCGen2 compliant systems one must take into account the execution time of the protocol: for many applications the number of tags identified per second is crucial (*e.g.*, in supply chains). Thus, we aim to *minimize* requirements for: (i) non-volatile RAM on the tag, (ii) tag code (gate count) complexity, (iii) tag computation requirements, (iv) tag turn-around-time, (v) the number of rounds in reader-tag interactions, (vi) the message size in reader-tag interactions, (vii) the server real-time computation load, and (viii) the server storage requirements. Furthermore, we restrict concurrency by prohibiting RFID tags from executing more than one session at a time (as in [Burmeister et al. 2009b]). Note that this is a restriction only on individual honest tags: RFID readers (whether honest or corrupt), the Server, and dishonest tags can execute multiple sessions simultaneously. This is a mild requirement that facilitates the design of concurrently secure protocols and in accordance with the capabilities

of RFID technology (this restriction can be relaxed when tags use multiple separate keys for concurrent executions [van Le et al. 2007]).

Finally, we observe that mechanisms such as public key cryptosystems, tamper-resistant shielding, and on-board clocks are not considered realistic for low-cost applications. Furthermore symmetric-key cryptographic systems such as hash functions or encryption schemes are beyond the capability of most lightweight applications. Even, pseudorandom functions (PRF) based on PRNG (as in [van Le et al. 2007; Burmester et al. 2009b]) are too slow for EPCGen2 applications (to generate an n -bit output of a PRF by running a PRNG as in [Goldreich et al. 1986] requires $2n$ numbers to be drawn).

2.3 Design Requirements

In designing our lightweight RFID protocols, we set to achieve the following security goals:

Availability. RFID systems are vulnerable to attacks that aim to incapacitate tags, *i.e.*, force them into a state from which they cannot recover. De-synchronization attacks target availability. Such vulnerabilities are often exacerbated by the wireless and human-imperceptible nature of RFID tags, allowing them to be manipulated at a distance by covert readers.

Authentication. Client authentication is a process in which one party, the Server \mathcal{S} , is assured of the identity of another party, the client (a tag \mathcal{T}), by acquiring corroborative evidence. We have *anonymous* client authentication when the identity of \mathcal{T} remains private to third parties that may eavesdrop on the communication or invoke the protocol and interact with the parties directly. We have *mutual* authentication if both \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{T} are authenticated. In our protocol the Server is *implicitly* authenticated: that is, the assurance for tags is only implicit.

Privacy. Most proposed RFID applications inherently require anonymity and untraceability of individual tags. The need for privacy is critical when tags are used for medical purposes and for authorization/identification purposes. In our Flyweight protocols privacy is captured by *session unlinkability* with *forward* and *backward security*:

Session unlinkability. The adversary cannot link any two interrogations of a tag if, the tag either updated its state in the first, or updated it in an intermediate interrogation.

Forward Security. Past tag outputs, prior to refreshment, cannot be disambiguated by the adversary even if the adversary can access the full internal state of the tag (the state of the tag's PRNG and its private key) after it is refreshed.

Backward Security. Future tag outputs, after refreshment, cannot be disambiguated by the adversary even if the adversary knew the state of the tag's PRNG (*e.g.* by analyzing its outputs) before it was refreshed.

Other goals address implementation and practical aspects of RFID systems.

Efficiency. Protocols must be lightweight: many RFID platforms can only implement highly optimized symmetric-key cryptographic techniques. Furthermore, the overhead should be minimal, in particular when the system is not under

attack—we call this *optimistic performance*. Finally the lookup time for the Server should be constant, or at most logarithmic (in the number of tags).

Concurrent Security. RFID systems are nearly always highly concurrent (a large number of tags are interrogated concurrently [EPC Global]). It is important therefore to address security in concurrent environments where the adversary can adaptively manipulate communications.

Modularity and Re-usability. Protocols are often analyzed under the implicit assumption of operating in isolation, and therefore may fail in unexpected ways when used in combination with other protocols (for example, in [Burmeister and de Medeiros 2009] a proven secure route discovery protocol becomes insecure when executed concurrently with itself). Since RFID tags are components of larger systems, it is important to require that security is preserved when the protocols are executed in arbitrary composition with other (secure) protocols. This type of security is provided by the Universal Composability (UC) framework.

3. THE EPCGEN2 STANDARD

EPCGen2 defines the physical and logical requirements for a passive-backscatter, Interrogator-talks-first, radio-frequency identification system operating in the 860 - 960 MHz range. The system comprises Interrogators (RFID readers) and tags. Interrogators manage tag populations using three basic operations: *select*—choose a tag population, *inventory*—identify tags, and *access*—read from and/or write to a tag.

The Inventory Protocol has (at least) 4 passes that involve: a *Query*, a 16-bit number *RN16*, an acknowledgment *ACK(RN16)*, and *EPCdata* (a tag’s identifying




Fig. 1. The 4-pass EPCGen2 Inventory Protocol.

data)—see Figure 1. The Interrogator starts by sending a *Query* that includes a parameter $Q \in [0 : 15]$. A random-slotted collision algorithm (the “Q-protocol”) is used to singulate tags. Tags that receive *Query* load a random Q -bit number into a slot counter, and decrease this counter whenever they receive the command *QueryRep*. When their counter is zeroed, tags send a random number *RN16* to the Interrogator. When the Interrogator detects a reply from a tag, it sends an acknowledgment *ACK(RN16)*, which requests from the tag its PC (protocol control), EPC (electronic product code), and a CRC16 (cyclic redundancy code). If the Tag does not receive a valid *ACK(RN16)* (possibly because of a collision), it transitions to its initial state and the process is repeated. Tags may also store a

32-bit Kill Password, and a 32-bit Access Password.

Tags implement a 16-bit cyclic redundancy code (CRC16) and a 16-bit random or pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). CRCs are error-detecting codes that check faults during transmission. A CRC maps arbitrary length inputs $A = (A_0, A_1, \dots, A_{m-1})$ onto n -bit outputs as follows: first the input is represented by a polynomial $A(x) = A_0 + A_1x + \dots + A_{m-1}x^{m-1}$ over the finite field $GF(2)$, and then its remainder is computed modulo an appropriate generator polynomial $g(x)$ of degree n (if $m < n$, zeroes are added to make up the difference). EPCGen2 uses the CRC-CCITT generator $g(x) = x^{16} + x^{12} + x^5 + 1$, and an implementation that XORs and appends fixed bit patterns. In particular, we have:

$$\text{CRC16}(A) = [(A(x) + \sum_{i=m-16}^{m-1} x^i \cdot x^{16}) \bmod g(x) = A(x)x^{16} \bmod g(x) + \text{CRC16}(0),$$

where $\text{CRC16}(0) = \sum_m^{m+15} x^i \bmod g(x)$ is a fixed polynomial. Since the modulo $g(x)$ operator is a homomorphism, CRC16 is semi-linear. That is, for numbers A, B , we have:

$$\text{CRC16}(A + B) = \text{CRC16}(A) + \text{CRC16}(B) + \text{CRC16}(0).$$

Therefore the CRC16 of a sum of numbers can be computed from the CRC16s of the numbers. Consequently CRC16 by itself will not protect data against intentional alteration. Its functionality is to support error detection, in particular with respect to burst errors, not security.

A PRNG is a pseudorandom bit generator (PRG) whose output is partitioned into blocks of given length n . Each block defines an n -bit number, said to be *drawn* from the PRNG. A PRG is a deterministic algorithm that, on input a truly random binary string of length k , called the *seed*, generates a binary string s of length $m \gg k$ which “appears” to be random. A PRG is *cryptographically secure* if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that given the first $t < m$ bits of s can predict the $(t+1)^{\text{th}}$ bit of s with probability significantly greater than $1/2$. Cryptographically secure PRGs define secure PRNGs. For these, there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that given the first t n -bit numbers drawn, $t < \lfloor m/n \rfloor$, can predict the next n -bit number of s with probability significantly greater than $1/2^n$ (a formal definition is given in Section 5, where we also address the robustness of pseudorandom generators).

While it is impossible to give a mathematical proof that a PRNG is indeed secure, we gain confidence that it is secure by subjecting it to a variety of statistical tests designed to detect the specific characteristics expected of random sequences. A comprehensive collection of randomness tests suitable for the evaluation of PRNGs used in cryptographic applications is proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [Rukhin et al. 2001]. There are many other such randomness tests (*cf.* [Menezes et al. 1996], [Walker 1998]), and most of these include correlation tests which indicate the dependency of an output upon the previous output.

EPCGen2 specifies 16-bit PRNGs, whose numbers are denoted by $RN16$, which should meet the following randomness criteria, independently of the strength of the

energizing field, the reader-to-tag link rate, and the data stored in the tag:

Probability of a single RN16: The probability that a *RN16* drawn from the PRNG has value $RN16 = j$ for any 16-bit number j , is bounded by

$$0.8/2^{16} < \text{Prob}[RN16 = j] < 1.25/2^{16}.$$

Probability of simultaneously identical sequences: For a tag population of up to 10,000 tags, the probability that any of two or more tags simultaneously generate the same sequence of *RN16*s shall be less than 0.1%, regardless of when the tags are energized.

Probability of predicting an RN16: An *RN16* drawn from a tag's PRNG shall not be predictable with a probability greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from the PRNG, performed under identical conditions, are known.

These guarantee a reasonable level of pseudorandomness, except for the last prediction bound which is rather crude for cryptographic PRNGs: too high when only one number is drawn and too low when many numbers are drawn (*e.g.*, more than a cycle of the PRNG). In general we have to make certain that the entropy of a PRNG is sufficient and/or regularly refreshed to prevent correlation attacks. We refer the reader to [Burmester and de Medeiros 2008] for further discussion regarding these security criteria.

Recently several RFID authentication protocols specifically designed for compliance with the EPCGen2 standard have been proposed: [Chen and Deng 2009], [Qingling et al. 2008], [Sun and Ting 2009], [Seo et al. 2005], and [Choi et al. 2009]. These combine the CRC16 of EPCGen2 with its 16-bit PRNG to hash, randomize and link protocol flows. However, these protocols fail to achieve their security goals and indeed are subjects to one or more of the attacks discussed in Section 2.1, as shown in [Burmester and Munilla 2009]. One may argue that because EPCGen2 supports only a very basic PRNG, any protocol that complies with this standard is potentially vulnerable, for example to ciphertext-only attacks that exhaust the range of the values of protocol flows. While this is certainly the case, such attacks may be checked by refreshing key material and/or constraining the application (*e.g.*, the life-time of tags).

4. FLYWEIGHT RFID AUTHENTICATION

We first present our basic RFID authentication protocol which we call Flyweight. In this protocol, each tag \mathcal{T} shares with the backend Server \mathcal{S} a (loosely) synchronized PRNG (same algorithm, key, seed), say $g_{tag} = g_{tag}(state)$. \mathcal{T} is authenticated by exchanging either three consecutive numbers RN_1, RN_2, RN_3 (when the adversary is passive), or five numbers $RN_1, RN_2, RN_4, RN_3, RN_5$ drawn from the shared g_{tag} .

The RFID reader \mathcal{R} starts the protocol by sending a *Query*. Then \mathcal{T} responds by sending the number RN_1 drawn from g_{tag} to the reader \mathcal{R} . \mathcal{R} forwards this to \mathcal{S} , who identifies the tag's PRNG g_{tag} , and responds by drawing the next number RN_2 from g_{tag} and sends this to \mathcal{T} (via \mathcal{R}) as an authenticator. Finally \mathcal{T} responds by drawing the third number RN_3 from g_{tag} (after checking the correctness of the second number) and sends this to \mathcal{S} (via \mathcal{T}) for mutual authentication. Five numbers are required only when the interrogation was previously interrupted, *i.e.*,

when the first number RN_1 was already used (in which case an *alarm* is ON). In this case RN_4 is sent in the third pass, and the numbers RN_3 and RN_5 are used as authenticators.

The security of the protocol is based on the fact that: (i) it is hard for the adversary to predict the next number drawn from a PRNG, and (ii) parties \mathcal{T} , \mathcal{S} are synchronized at all times. Synchronization is guaranteed by making certain that \mathcal{T} and \mathcal{S} always share at least one number. The protocol supports mutual authentication, a certain degree of privacy (session unlinkability), forward and backward security (the robust version), and is provably secure, as we shall see in Sections 8, 9. The protocol is presented in Figure 2. Each tag \mathcal{T} stores in non-volatile memory two numbers, $g_{tag}(state)$ (the current state), a refresh key K , and a 1-bit flag cnt : $(RN_1, RN_2, g_{tag}(state), K, cnt)$. The Server \mathcal{S} stores in a database DB for each \mathcal{T} an ordered list containing:

- six numbers $(RN_1^{cur}, RN_1^{next}, RN_2, RN_3, RN_4, RN_5)$,
- a tag identifier ID_{tag} , $g_{tag}(state)$, the refresh key K , and
- a 1-bit flag cnt^* .

The lists in DB are doubly indexed by RN_1^{cur} and RN_1^{next} respectively. To initialize the values of its variables, \mathcal{T} draws two successive values RN_1, RN_2 from $g_{tag}(state)$ and sets $cnt \leftarrow 0$. \mathcal{S} draws six successive numbers from the PRNG of each tag \mathcal{T} and assigns their values to the variables in the list of \mathcal{T} :

$$RN_1^{cur}, RN_2, RN_3, RN_4, RN_5, RN_1^{next} \text{ (in this order),}$$

and sets $cnt^* \leftarrow 0$. To update a list, \mathcal{S} uses the function *update* for which: $RN_1^{cur} \leftarrow RN_1^{next}$, the five values $RN_2, RN_3, RN_4, RN_5, RN_1^{next}$ are updated by drawing new numbers from $g_{tag}(state)$, and $cnt^* \leftarrow 0$.

4.1 Features of the Flyweight protocol

The basic features of the Flyweight protocol are listed below and in Section 4.2. In Section 8 we discuss its security in a formal specifications framework (in terms of its functionality \mathcal{F}_{su-aut}) and in Section 9 we prove that it realizes its specifications.

SYNCHRONIZATION. At all times the Server \mathcal{S} shares with each tag \mathcal{T} at least one number: either $RN_1 = RN_1^{cur}$ or $RN_1 = RN_1^{next}$. For each session, \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{T} each use a block of five successive numbers drawn from their shared PRNG. We distinguish two cases identified by Configuration A and Configuration B in Figure 3. Configuration A describes the normal state, when the previous flow was not interrupted: in this case \mathcal{S} , \mathcal{T} use the same block. When \mathcal{T} receives RN_2 , it sends RN_3 or RN_4 and moves to the next block. If the message of \mathcal{T} (RN_3 or RN_4) is interrupted, then Configuration B will be the initial state for the next session. Otherwise, \mathcal{S} receives \mathcal{T} 's message and also moves ahead to the next block, returning to Configuration A. When the initial state is described by Configuration B then \mathcal{S} receives RN_1^{next} (RN_1' in Figure 3) and will advance to the next block. It must be noted that the synchronization process is independent of the authentication process: *i.e.*, the parties can advance along the stream and get synchronized even when the authentication was not completed successfully. The adversary may try to de-synchronize \mathcal{T} by challenging it with a *Query*, or the number RN_2 obtained





Fig. 2. The basic Flyweight RFID protocol.

by using a man-in-the-middle attack on \mathcal{S} , \mathcal{T} . In the first case \mathcal{T} will not update its stored values, so it will share $RN_1 = RN_1^{cur}$ with \mathcal{S} . In the second, \mathcal{T} updates its values and will share $RN_1 = RN_1^{next}$ with \mathcal{S} (RN'_1 in Figure 3). The protocol prevents any further updating by \mathcal{T} before \mathcal{S} does: \mathcal{T} can only update its values when it is prompted by RN_2 (RN'_2 in Figure 3).

EFFICIENCY. The overhead is minimal when the adversary is passive: in this case only three numbers have to be exchanged to authenticate a tag \mathcal{T} . If an active adversary tries to replay flows, this will cause \mathcal{T} to activate $alarm$, and two additional numbers will be needed (Pass 5 and Pass 6). Observe that the numbers RN_3 , RN_4 and RN_5 are always fresh (never sent more than once), because at this point \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{T} have already updated their pseudorandom values for the next interrogation.

CONSTANT LOOKUP TIME. The Server needs to perform at most two lookups in the database DB (for RN_1^{cur} and RN_1^{next}) to identify \mathcal{T} . The cost of a simple key

Fig. 3. Synchronizing the pseudorandom streams of S and T .

lookup in DB using Linear Hashing is $O(1)$ [Zhang et al. 2009].

TIMERS. We have not included timers to simplify the presentation. However in any implementation timers are needed to close sessions. Parties should abort if no response is received after sending a challenge within a certain time T_{abort} .² Crude timers can be based on discharging capacitors [Juels 2004]. If precise timers are used, then it may be possible to thwart *online* man-in-the-middle relay attacks. In particular, the more accurate T_{abort} is, the harder such attacks become [Munilla et al. 2006]. Naturally, an active attack that involves relaying flows between protocol parties faster than T_{abort} will succeed. In Section 6 we will explain how to deal with such attacks in our protocols.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLEXITY. There are several efficient implementations of PRNGs appropriate for lightweight RFID applications. The shrinking generator of Coppersmith, Krawczyk and Mansour [Coppersmith et al. 1994], which is based on linear feedback shift registers, has been estimated to require only 1435 logic gates, 517 clock cycles and $64B$ memory (clock frequency 100 kHz), and achieves 128 bit security [Lee and Hong 2006]. More recently, a hardware implementation LAMED-EPC [Peris-Lopez et al. 2009] specifically tailored for EPCGen2 applications has been proposed. This is estimated to require 1566 logic gates, 194 clock cycles (at 100 kHz) and $64B$ memory. In Table I we compare these implementations with some block ciphers (in counter mode [Menezes et al. 1996]): DESL [Poschmann et al. 2007] and PRESENT-80 [Bogdanov et al. 2007], which were the first candidates for RFID devices, AES-128 [Feldhofer et al. 2005], the family KATAN and KTANTAN [Cannière et al. 2009], with blocks of 32, 48 or 64 bits (KTANTAN is a compact version of KATAN with hardcoded key), the stream ciphers Grain [Hell et al. 2005], and a low-cost implementation of Trivium [Mentens et al. 2008].

Note that RFIDs derive their energy from the air interface, and therefore power consumption is an important metric for implementations. However most of the proposed generators do not provide estimates for it: the only available estimates

²If timers are not used, then after sending a challenge, the reader will wait indefinitely until it gets a reply. This can lead to a man-in-the-middle offline attack (Section 2.1).

Generator	Gate Count	Throughput (at 100 kHz)
Shrinking Generator	1435 GEs	24.7 <i>kbps</i>
LAMED-EPC	1566 GEs	8.2 <i>kbps</i>
PRESENT-80	1570 GEs	200 <i>kbps</i>
AES-128	3596 GEs	11.5 <i>kbps</i>
KATAN-32-48-64	802-927-1054 GEs	12.5-18.8-25.1 <i>kbps</i>
KTANTAN-32-48-64	462-588-688 GEs	12.5-18.8-25.1 <i>kbps</i>
Grain	1294 GEs	100 <i>kbps</i>
Trivium	749 GEs	100 <i>kbps</i>

Table I. Gate count and throughput of lightweight PRNG proposals

are for PRESENT-80 (5 μW) and AES-128 (4.5 mW).

4.2 Session unlinkability

The notion of session unlinkability was discussed earlier in the Introduction and in Section 2.3. We now define it more formally in terms of an experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{O}}^b$, $b \in \{0, 1\}$, involving an observer \mathcal{O} , a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPT), and the RFID system. \mathcal{O} has access to a history of earlier tag interrogations and is given two tag interrogations int_1 and int_2 (not necessarily complete, or by authorized readers), such that:

- int_1 took place before int_2 ,³ and
- either int_1 completed normally (successfully), or an interrogation of the tag involved in int_1 completed normally after int_1 and before int_2 ,

and must decide whether the same tag was involved in both int_1 and int_2 . $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{O}}^0$ corresponds to the event that the same tag was involved in both interrogations int_1 , int_2 , while $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{O}}^1$ corresponds to the event that different tags were involved in these interrogations.

Definition 4.1. A RFID authentication protocol provides *session unlinkability* if for any PPT observer \mathcal{O} the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{O}} = |\text{Prob}[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{O}}^0 = 1] - \text{Prob}[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{O}}^1 = 1]|$$

is negligible.

The Flyweight protocol provides session unlinkability. Indeed:

SESSION UNLINKABILITY. The only instances in which an adversarial observer can link sessions are those in which the tag is prevented from accessing an authorized reader. In such cases the tag outputs the same number RN_1 each time, so these sessions can be linked. On receiving a response RN_2 from the reader the tag will update its stored values, and its flows become unlinkable.

In Section 8 we shall present a more general security framework in which the specifications for session unlinkability are captured by their functionality in the real-world/ideal-world paradigm [Goldreich et al. 1987], and in Section 9 we give a formal proof.

³A temporal relationship, as observed by the observer. Note that if two interrogations that overlap in time are observed, then it can certainly be asserted that they do not belong to the same tag, since tags are currently technologically limited to single-threaded execution.

5. A ROBUST FLYWEIGHT RFID PROTOCOL

Our next protocol uses (loosely) synchronized PRNGs that can be refreshed. PRNGs are refreshed to ensure resilience against traffic analysis attacks that exploit the correlation between successive numbers drawn from a PRNG (*state entropy leakage*). That is, to ensure that the adversary cannot predict with probability better than a certain threshold:

- (1) the next number drawn (*e.g.*, by using an exhaustive analysis of all possible states that produce the tag’s output), and/or
- (2) the internal state of the PRNG,

until the tag is next refreshed. For a detailed discussion on security issues of PRNGs see [Barak and Halevi 2005; Kelsey et al. 1998]. Furthermore, as we shall see, refreshing a PRNG will restrict the impact of a compromised internal state.⁴




Fig. 4. Refreshing the internal state of a PRNG.

Refreshing a PRNG involves updating its internal state with fresh (high entropy) randomness—see Figure 4. In our protocol this randomness is provided by the Server when needed: *e.g.*, when the probability that the state of the PRNG of the tag is compromised is higher than a certain threshold (this will depend on the specific features of the implemented PRNG). To refresh the internal state of a PRNG, we combine it with randomness and input this to a keyed *refresh* function to get:

$$state^{ref} = refresh(K; R, state),$$

where K is the refresh key and R is the randomness.

The following definition formally captures our requirements for robustness of pseudorandom number generators [Barak and Halevi 2005].

Definition 5.1. The pair of functions $(g(), refresh(,))$ with $(r_i, \sigma_{i+1}) \leftarrow g(\sigma_i), i = 1, 2, \dots$: on input the current state σ_i , g returns an n -bit string r_i and replaces σ_i by the new state σ_{i+1} ; the length k of the internal state of g is the security parameter, and $k \geq n$;
 $\sigma' \leftarrow refresh(K; R, \sigma)$: on input a private key K , a random string R with uniform distribution of length at least k and the current internal state σ of g , *refresh* updates the state of g ;

⁴The term “compromised *state*” is used here in a broad sense: it specifies information captured by the adversary in a correlation attack used to predict the next number drawn from a PRNG. The prediction is probabilistic, not necessarily deterministic.

is a *robust* pseudorandom number generator if there is a threshold N such that, for any PPT observer \mathcal{O} :

- Resilience*. Given any $t < N$ successive n -bit numbers r_1, r_2, \dots, r_t drawn from g : \mathcal{O} cannot predict the next number drawn r_{t+1} with probability better than $1/2^n + \varepsilon$, ε negligible in k , if \mathcal{O} does not know the internal state of g ; this holds even if \mathcal{O} has access to the randomness R and the state used to refresh g (but not the private key K).
- Forward security*. Given any past numbers r_i , $i \leq N$, drawn from g : \mathcal{O} cannot distinguish these from random n -bit numbers with probability better than $1/2^n + \varepsilon$, ε negligible, even if \mathcal{O} learns the internal state of g after it is refreshed.
- Backward security*. Given any future numbers r_i , $i \leq N$, drawn from g : \mathcal{O} cannot distinguish these from random n -bit numbers with probability better than $1/2^n + \varepsilon$, ε negligible, even if \mathcal{O} knows the current internal state of g , provided that g is refreshed.

For our particular application we shall take $k = O(n)$.

REMARK. Our definition of robustness differs in several respects from the one in [Barak and Halevi 2005] to address our particular applications. In particular: (i) the security parameter is the length of the input to the generator g (its internal state) and (ii) the distribution of the refresh randomness R is uniform. Furthermore, our definition does not model the capability of an attacker, or capture the security requirements in terms of a probabilistic game between the system and an attacker in the real-world/ideal-world paradigm. We rectify this in Sections 8 and 9 where the specifications of robustness are captured in the UC framework by the functionality \mathcal{F}_{robust} . In the real-world the adversary (a malicious observer \mathcal{O}) can prompt generators for their output, observe the data used to refresh generators, and access their internal state. In the ideal-world the adversary can access the generators via \mathcal{F}_{robust} by invoking commands UPDATE, REFRESH and COMPROMISE. Robustness requires that, for any PPT adversary the environment (a PPT) cannot distinguish protocol flows in the real-world from flows in the ideal-world—see Section 8.

5.1 Adding robustness to the Flyweight protocol

We now describe the modifications to the Flyweight protocol needed to refresh the PRNGs of tags. For each tag the Server uses a 1-bit trigger *refresh* and stores additionally five numbers:

- A high entropy random number R
- Numbers NA (start refresh), NB (end refresh)
- Numbers $RN5'$ (a message authentication code for R) and $N0$ (initial point)

In Figure 5 we illustrate the process of refreshing a stream generated by a shared PRNG. **A** and **B** mark the beginning and end of refreshing.

The modifications are presented in Figure 6. Only Flow 3 is affected, with the reader sending two numbers R, RN'_5 instead of R_2 . *Normal execution* indicates that the pass is executed as in the basic protocol— see Figure 2.




Fig. 5. Transition from the Current to the Refresh Stream.

\mathcal{S} : set *refresh* ON, generate a random number R , assign $N0 \leftarrow RN_1^{cur}$, $NA \leftarrow RN_1^{next}$, $NB \leftarrow \perp$ and $RN_5' \leftarrow \perp$

(1) $\mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$: Query
 \mathcal{T} : Normal execution.

(2) $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \mathcal{S}$: RN_1
 \mathcal{S} when *refresh* is ON: Check if RN_1 is in DB
 If $RN_1 = N0$ then Normal execution
 Elseif $RN_1 = NB$ then set *refresh* OFF and Normal execution
 Elseif $RN_1 = NA$ then,
 If $RN_1 = RN_1^{next}$ then update
 If $RN_5' = \perp$ then set $state^{ref} \leftarrow refresh(K; R, state')$. Draw two numbers and assign to RN_5' and RN_1^{next} .
 Set $alarm^* \leftarrow cnt^*$, $cnt^* \leftarrow 1$. Broadcast R, RN_5' .
 Else abort

(3) $\mathcal{S} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$: R, RN_5' (Refresh Pass)
 \mathcal{T} : Check the format of the received message.
 If it corresponds to “refresh” (two numbers) then,
 Store the current $state$ of g_{tag} . Draw 3 numbers from $g_{tag}(state)$ and assign their values to RN_3, RN_4, RN_5 (volatile). Draw an extra number to get $state'$, and set $state^{ref} \leftarrow refresh(K; R, state')$.
 Draw one number from $g_{tag}(state^{ref})$.
 If it is RN_5' then draw two more numbers and assign their values to RN_1, RN_2 .
 If $alarm = 0$ then broadcast $RN = RN_3$.
 Else broadcast $RN = RN_4$.
 Else reset the $state$ of g_{tag} and abort.
 Else Normal execution.

(4) $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \mathcal{S}$: RN (RN_3 or RN_4)
 \mathcal{S} : Normal execution.

(5) $\mathcal{S} \Rightarrow \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$: RN_3
 \mathcal{T} : Normal execution.

(6) $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \mathcal{S}$: RN_5
 \mathcal{T} : Normal execution.

Fig. 6. The robust Flyweight RFID protocol.

To refresh a tag the Server generates a random (uniformly distributed) number R , and sets: *refresh* ON, the initial point $N0 \leftarrow RN_1^{cur}$, the start refresh number $NA \leftarrow RN_1^{next}$, and the end refresh number NB and RN_5' to null. When the start number is received ($RN_1 = NA$), the Server computes RN_5' and $NB = RN_1^{next}$ on

the Refresh Stream—Figure 5, and broadcasts R, RN'_5 . If NA is received again, the Server broadcasts the same R, RN'_5 (never RN_2). The number RN'_5 authenticates both the refresh session and the random number R . If the tag gets R, RN'_5 (a message format with two numbers) then it draws numbers from $g_{tag}(state)$ to get $state'$, which it refreshes to get its own evaluation of RN'_5 . If there is a match the protocol continues normally. In the following session all numbers drawn will be on the Refresh Stream ($RN_1 = NB$). When NB is received, both tag and Server have refreshed and the process has finished. The tag's computations for checking the value of RN'_5 are done in volatile memory: the tag must keep the original $state$ of its PRNG in non-volatile memory in case there is a mismatch, so that it can reset to its initial state.

SYNCHRONIZATION. In the robust Flyweight protocol at all times the Server \mathcal{S} shares with each tag \mathcal{T} at least one number: either NA or NB . The adversary may try to de-synchronize \mathcal{T} by trying to force it to advance on the current stream while the Server \mathcal{S} updates and advances on the refreshed stream—Figure 5. However, this is not possible since \mathcal{T} would need RN_2 to advance on the current stream and this number is never sent by \mathcal{S} , which will repeatedly send $R, RN5'$ (Flow 3) until it gets the correct RN (Flow 4) or NB (Flow 2). If the tag updates—and sends RN or NB , this is because it has checked $R, RN5'$ and refreshed its PRNG properly.

COMPROMISING PRNGS. PRNGs are refreshed to prevent the adversary from compromising their internal state and predict the next number drawn with probability significantly better than $1/2^n$. If the adversary succeeds in compromising the $state$ of the PRNG of a tag before it gets refreshed then it can impersonate that tag, and/or de-synchronize it (by getting the Server to *update* through interrogation). Typically such attacks exploit the inadequate frequency of refreshing, or the low entropy of the seed of the PRNG. They cannot be considered attacks on the Flyweight protocol itself, which is proven secure in Section 9, but on the security parameters used. However, the implementation of *refresh* (if this is done properly) restricts the impact of such impersonation attacks until the next refreshing. The adversary cannot compute the refreshed internal state without knowing the refresh key K . This can be used by the Server \mathcal{S} to revive de-synchronized (*zombie*) tags. \mathcal{S} accepts previously used (since the last refreshing) values (RN_1), but will force the tag \mathcal{T} to refresh again at this point. Only if a tag knows the private key K will it be able to refresh its internal state correctly.

Another possible way to refresh the PRNG of a tag with entropy from the Server involves flipping the order of the numbers drawn, *e.g.*, RN_2 and RN_3 , so that one bit of the state of the tag (determined by a counter) is refreshed. This would support resilience against correlation attacks if the information leaked when five numbers are drawn from a PRNG is no more than one bit. We shall discuss the security of our protocol in Section 8.

6. ONLINE RELAY ATTACKS

Distance bounding protocols based on round-trip delay measurements are the main defense against attacks related to proximity verification. These estimate the propagation time as accurately as possible so as to determine the distance between the reader and tag. Determining the processing time is essential in order to isolate

the propagation component from the overall measured time, and therefore variable processing times constitute a major problem for distance bounding. The processing time must be as short as possible since the adversary could overclock the tag to absorb the delay introduced by its own devices. Thus, the Flyweight protocol with its fixed nearly-zero processing delay is particularly suitable to protect against on-line man-in-the-middle relay attacks (Section 2.1). This is because in the Flyweight protocol every tag pre-computes its response (RN/RN_5 drawn from its PRNG) to the challenge of the reader (RN_2/RN_3).

To estimate the round-trip time of a challenge-response we use *temporal leashes* [Hu et al. 2006]. The RFID reader must have an accurate clock, but there is no need for the tags to have such clocks (tags need timers to close sessions—see Section 4.1; also depending on the implementation we may require the Server to have a clock that is synchronized with the clock(s) of the reader(s)). Let δ_0 be a temporal bound calculated using a distance bound (the allowable reader-tag broadcast range), the propagation speed of the wireless medium (*i.e.*, the speed of light) and the tag processing time (which includes the time taken to detect the challenge and transmit the response). If the challenge (RN_2/RN_3) of the reader is sent at time t_1 and the response of the tag (RN/RN_5) is received at time t_2 ,⁵ then the reader will only accept it when $t_2 - t_1 \leq \delta_0$. If the delay introduced by the adversary’s devices is greater than δ_0 then online relay attacks will be prevented: *i.e.*, the adversary will not be able to relay the messages without being detected.

This simple way to address online relay attacks and the constant lookup time, highlight the extended functionality that is provided by sharing a synchronized RFID stream as opposed to sharing a private number (key)—captured by “quantum refreshing” in the introductory motivating paradigm.

7. AN EPCGEN2 IMPLEMENTATION

The EPCGen2 Inventory protocol has 4 passes for identification (acknowledged state): *Query*, $RN16$, $Ack(RN16)$ and *EPCdata* (Section 3, Figure 1). To enable mutual authentication we replace $RN16$ by RN_1 , $Ack(RN16)$ by RN_2 and *EPCdata* by RN_3 . We illustrate the modifications in Figure 7: on the left is the 4-pass EPCGen2 Inventory protocol, while on the right is the proposed Flyweight protocol. Note that the latter requires two additional passes for secure mutual authentication when the adversary is active (RN_1 has been used previously—*alarm* is ON).

To ensure that it is hard to find the state of an EPCGen2 PRNG by using an exhaustive search over all possible state values that produce a given sequence of numbers, the entropy of the state of PRNG must be sufficiently large. If a 64-bit state⁶ with refreshment provides adequate security then we may use the following

⁵For δ_0 to be accurate the tag must send its response immediately after receiving the challenge. Note that we are assuming that (honest) RFID tags execute one session at a time—see Section 2. If several tags are interrogated simultaneously by an RFID reader, then the reader must keep track of the round-trip time of each tag separately. For EPCGen2 readers (Section 3), tag interrogation is sequential.

⁶This does not affect the length of the outputs, which can still be of 16 bits.




Fig. 7. The 4-pass EPCGen2 Inventory (left) and the proposed Flyweight Inventory.

simple implementation:

$$\text{refresh}(K; R, \text{state}) = g_{\text{tag}}(K \oplus R \oplus \text{state}),$$

where R is a 64-bit random number and K a 64-bit password. At this point one may think that if the PRNG is used as a pseudorandom function (PRF), then many other solutions (apart from the Flyweight protocol) are feasible. However, one has to be careful: PRNGs when used as PRFs may be subject to *related-key* attacks [Burmester and de Medeiros 2008]. That is, if g is a PRNG and K a key then there are no guarantees that $g(K \oplus X)$ (or $g(K, X)$) is a secure message authentication code (MAC) for X (at least, not until proven). In a *related-key* attack, the adversary uses values drawn from $g(K, \cdot)$ (or $g(\cdot)$), whose keys are related (in this case, the same), to infer information about the next numbers drawn. If the adversary can choose the values of X then the problem is far worse, because the adversary can perform adaptive attacks. Most protocols that use a PRNG to generate message authentication codes (*e.g.*, [Choi et al. 2009; Huang and Ku 2009]) are subject to such attacks. This problem is prevented in the Flyweight protocol by using synchronized PRNGs, since the value of state is not known by the adversary, and changes dynamically. To conclude we note that one may use a provable secure (but slower) alternative,

$$\text{PRF}_{\text{tag}}(K \oplus R \oplus \text{state}),$$

where PRF_{tag} is the PRF defined by g_{tag} [Goldreich et al. 1986].

7.1 Collisions

We have collisions during Inventory and in DB . With Inventory collisions, several tags in the operating range of the reader respond to the same Query. This is solved in EPCGen2 by using the Q -protocol in which a random Q -bit number is loaded into a slot counter and decreased with each interrogation (Section 3): the tags respond when it is zeroed. In our case we use the bits of RN_1 instead of Q (*alarm* is activated if these bits are used more than once).

With collisions in DB several tags share the same RN_1 . In this case the Server receives RN_1 but does not know which of the RN_2 's in DB must be sent because several numbers are possible. The easiest way to deal with this, is to modify the protocol and have a backup number RN_1^{backup} . In this case the parties use blocks of six pseudorandom numbers. Then, when the Server detects a collision, it sends

a new command *QueryB*, requesting the tag to send RN_1^{backup} . By using extra numbers, the probability of collision can be reduced as much as needed.

However, the protocol can be modified to deal with collisions without requiring an extra number RN_1^{backup} . We propose the following solution. Suppose there is a collision in *DB* for RN_1 . The Server tries to identify \mathcal{T} by sending RN_2 's which were previously used (for which $alarm = 1$). If the tag responds with RN_4 , then \mathcal{T} is identified, and the six-pass protocol is executed. If RN_2 was not previously used by \mathcal{T} , then the Server sends RN_5 to inform the tag \mathcal{T} of the collision. When \mathcal{T} gets RN_5 in the second pass, it exchanges RN_2 with RN_5 , and proceeds normally. Tags for which RN_5 was sent prior to identification get marked by the Server and their identification must be performed without using such RN_5 's: that is, with four passes or in a new updated session.

Finally, we could have the unlikely event when several tags that share the same RN_1 are interrogated simultaneously (simultaneous collision in Inventory and in *DB*). In this case the Server would not detect the collision during Inventory (constructive interference), and the Server would deal with it as a collision in *DB*. The Server sends a previously used RN_2 or RN_5 . The tag (among the ones present) whose value coincides with this (RN_2 or RN_5) will answer and will be identified. The remaining tags get identified one-at-a-time in the same way (with new *Queries*).

8. SECURITY

Our formal security specifications capture: *mutual authentication*, and *session unlinkability* with *forward* and *backward* security. Since RFIDs are often used as components of more complex systems, we focus on security frameworks that support Universal Composability (UC). The choice of cryptographic primitives to implement the protocols must take into consideration: (i) the need for computationally lightweight solutions that adhere to the hardware-imposed constraints of the platform, and (ii) scalability, when the number of devices is large. We will use the security framework proposed in [Burmeister et al. 2009b], which we extend to accommodate our particular specifications.

We adopt the Byzantine threat model. All parties including the adversary \mathcal{A} are modeled as probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines (PPTs). \mathcal{A} controls the delivery schedule of all communication channels, and may eavesdrop into, or modify, their contents and may also initiate new communication channels and directly interact with honest parties. For convenience, in our proofs below, we identify the readers with the Server.

8.1 The security framework

The UC framework specifies a particular approach to security proofs for protocols π , and guarantees that proofs that follow this approach remain valid if π is, say, composed with other protocols (modularity) and/or under arbitrary concurrent protocol executions (including with itself). The UC framework defines a *real-world* simulation, an *ideal-world* simulation, a *simulator* \mathcal{Sim} that translates runs of π from the real-world to runs in the ideal-world, and an interactive *environment* \mathcal{Z} , a PPT, that captures whatever is external to the current protocol execution. The components of a UC formalization are:

- (1) A *mathematical model* of real executions of protocol π in which the honest parties execute as specified, whereas adversarial parties can deviate from π arbitrarily. These are controlled by the adversary \mathcal{A} that has full knowledge of the state of adversarial parties, and can arbitrarily schedule the communication channels and activation periods of all parties, and interact with \mathcal{Z} in arbitrary ways.
- (2) An *idealized model* of executions, where the security properties of protocol π depend on the behavior of a *trusted functionality* \mathcal{F}_π . \mathcal{F}_π controls the ideal-world adversary $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ so that it reproduces as faithfully as possible the behavior of \mathcal{A} .
- (3) A *proof* that, for every adversary \mathcal{A} there is a simulator *Sim* that translates real-world protocol runs of π in the presence of \mathcal{A} into ideal-world runs of π in the presence of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ such that, no environment \mathcal{Z} can distinguish whether \mathcal{A} is communicating with a instance of π in the real-world or $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ is communicating with \mathcal{F}_π in the ideal-world.

In the UC framework the context of a protocol is captured by a session identifier *sid*. This is controlled by the environment \mathcal{Z} and reflects external aspects of the execution (such as temporal and/or locational aspects, shared attributes etc). All parties involved in the protocol execution share the same *sid*. The environment \mathcal{Z} is the first party to be activated. \mathcal{Z} instantiates the protocol parties and the adversary.

8.2 Mutual authentication with session unlinkability

Mutual authentication with session unlinkability in the UC framework is captured by the parties (the Server and tags) having access to an ideal functionality which we denote by \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} . \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} formally defines the security specifications for, availability, mutual authentication and session unlinkability, in protocols for which the Server and tag share a (loosely) synchronized PRNG. It is presented in Figure 8. \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} specifies protocols for which the tags determine the interrogation sub-session. Below we describe the basic components and attributes of the ideal-world simulation.

PARTIES. There are two types of parties: **tag** and **server**. In each session a single instance of **server** and arbitrary many instances of **tag** are involved. Upon successful completion of a sub-session involving a **tag**, the **server** ACCEPTS the **tag** as authenticated.

SESSIONS. A single session spans the entire lifetime of our system (session instance). It consists of several concurrent sub-sessions which are initiated by protocol parties, which in turn get INITATED by the environment \mathcal{Z} . While the Server and tags initiate sub-sessions, the adversary controls the concurrency and interaction between sub-sessions. All parties involved in a sub-session of the authentication scheme are given the unique session identifier *sid* by \mathcal{Z} .

CONCURRENCY. Tags are constrained devices that cannot execute concurrently. In the ideal-world this is captured by restricting tags to one sub-session identifier *s* at a time. The adversary cannot INITIATE the same tag concurrently.




Fig. 8. Ideal mutual authentication with session unlinkability.

AVAILABILITY. In the real-world this requires that a tag is always available for interrogation. In the ideal-world this is captured by assigning to each initiated tag a subsession identifier s and making it available for interrogation by invoking commands **UPDATE**(s), **ACCEPT**(s), **IMPERSONATE**(s) or **CORRUPT**(s).

MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION. Successful authentication in the real-world is the result of sharing common secrets: the Server can corroborate values produced by the tag as a function of a (loosely) synchronized shared PRNG, and conversely. The choice of the tag to be authenticated is determined by the adversary. To guarantee that the PRNG remains synchronized, mutual authentication in the real-world requires the tag to update its state. In the ideal-world this is captured by invoking command **ACCEPT** (Item 4, Figure 8). To get a tag with subsession identifier s authenticated, command **UPDATE**(s) must have been invoked (Item 3, Figure 8). The true identity of a tag is given to the **server**, but not the adversary. This limits the adversary to invoking and scheduling the protocol at each party.

SESSION UNLINKABILITY. In the real-world session unlinkability requires that given any two tag interrogations, if the tag has updated its state in the first, or in an intermediate interrogation, then the adversary cannot link these with probability better than negligible. The adversary can link interrogations that have not been updated (they have the same value) until the next successful updating. In the ideal-world this is emulated by acquiring access to a list of identifiers $\text{session_id}(\text{tag})$ of all preceding incomplete subsessions returned by the functionality by invoking **INITIATE**

at the `tag` (Item 2, Figure 8). The only information revealed to the adversary by the functionality is the subsession identifiers of tags: no information regarding the tag itself is revealed. Once a tag with subsession identifier s is successfully UPDATED in the ideal-world, all earlier subsessions identifiers (in $session_id(\mathbf{tag})$) of the same tag are discarded by the functionality (Item 3).

TAG CORRUPTION. In the real-world tags may get corrupted by the adversary, who can then access their full state. This is emulated in the ideal-world by invoking command CORRUPT (Item 6, Figure 8). The functionality maintains for each `tag` a list $state(\mathbf{tag})$ of all subsession records concerning `tag`. This list is discarded by the ideal functionality upon corruption of the tag when invoking command CORRUPT (Item 7). Consequently in the ideal-world, control of a corrupted tag is passed on to the adversary.

ACTIVATION SEQUENCE. The receiving party of any message is activated next. If no output is produced while processing an incoming message then by convention the environment \mathcal{Z} is activated next.

8.3 Capturing robustness

To capture robustness we need two more commands: COMPROMISE and REFRESH. Invoking COMPROMISE(s), where s is a subsession identifier of `tag`, results in `tag` getting marked as compromised by the functionality. COMPROMISED tags can be successfully IMPERSONATED by the adversary until they get REFRESHED, when they are de-synchronized—*zombie* tags. Such tags cannot be IMPERSONATED by the adversary unless command COMPROMISE is invoked again. However invoking the command REFRESH(s) will unmark `tag`. So a COMPROMISED tag can be impersonated until it is next refreshed. The functionality \mathcal{F}_{robust} is presented in Figure 9. The additional attributes are:

FORWARD SECURITY. In the real-world this requires that past protocol flows, prior to refreshment, look random even if the tag gets corrupted after refreshment. In the ideal-world this is emulated by requiring that after REFRESH(s) the functionality discards all entries in $session_id(\mathbf{tag})$, so past sessions look random (Item 4, Figure 9).

BACKWARD SECURITY. In the real-world this requires that future tag outputs, after refreshment, look random to an adversary even if the adversary can access the state of the PRNG of the tag (e.g., by analyzing its outputs) before it is refreshed. In the ideal-world tag compromise is emulated by invoking command COMPROMISE. Tags that get COMPROMISED are marked by \mathcal{F}_{robust} as such, and therefore can be successfully IMPERSONATED by the adversary (Item 7, Figure 9). However after REFRESHMENT a COMPROMISED tag is marked *zombie* and cannot be IMPERSONATED.

9. MAIN RESULTS AND PROOFS

We first consider the security of the basic protocol.

THEOREM 9.1. *The Flyweight RFID protocol UC-realizes \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} .*

PROOF. We must show that Condition 3 in Section 8.1 holds, that is, there is a





Fig. 9. Ideal robust authentication.

Fig. 10. Simulated interactions between \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} and $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}, \widehat{\mathbf{server}}, \widehat{\mathbf{tag}}$

simulator that translates real-world protocol runs into ideal-world runs such that these cannot be distinguished by the environment \mathcal{Z} . Our simulator Sim :

- Simulates a copy $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$ of the adversary and copies $\widehat{\mathbf{server}}$ of the Server and $\widehat{\mathbf{tag}}$ of each tag initialized by \mathcal{Z} , and activated by the adversary.
- Adds/removes values to/from a database \widehat{DB} of $\widehat{\mathbf{server}}$ that contains persistent values of adversarially controlled tags as well as the transient values of honest tags. The simulated interactions between the functionality \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} and

$\widehat{\mathcal{A}}, \widehat{\text{server}}, \widehat{\text{tag}}$ are defined by \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} —see Figure 9, and detailed in Figure 10.

- Faithfully translates real-world messages between $\{\mathcal{A}, \text{Server}, \text{tag}\}$ into their ideal-world counterparts between $\{\widehat{\mathcal{A}}, \widehat{\text{server}}, \widehat{\text{tag}}_s\}$ as specified in the Flyweight protocol (Figure 2). This is detailed in Figure 11. In this simulation the ideal-world adversary $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$ invokes $\text{SEND}(s, r, \widehat{\text{tag}})$ to send to $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$ the number r , and $\text{SEND}(s, r', \widehat{\text{server}})$ to send to $\widehat{\text{server}}$ the number r' .




Fig. 11. Simulated interactions between $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}, \widehat{\text{server}},$ and $\widehat{\text{tag}}$.

- Simulates the interactions with \mathcal{Z} , i.e., the externally visible part of the protocol. More specifically, it invokes \mathcal{F}_{su_aut} with command $\text{ACCEPT}(s)$ when the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} forwards unmodified inputs between honest tags and the Server, and $\text{IMPERSONATE}(s)$ when \mathcal{A} succeeds in authenticating adversarially controlled tags.
- Prevents the $\widehat{\text{server}}$ from outputting $\text{accept}(\widehat{\text{tag}})$ in the ideal-world when \mathcal{A} tampers with messages created by honest tags in the real-world.

Observe that if the tags generate true random numbers then the flows of the Flyweight protocol are uniformly distributed and independent. Under this assumption the real- and ideal-world simulations might differ only when the simulator \mathcal{Sim} intervenes to prevent $\text{ACCEPT}(s)$ in the ideal-world. For this to happen the messages created by honest tags in the real-world must have been tampered by \mathcal{A} , so that there is a collision between the (tampered) real-world outputs of tag and the idealized outputs of $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$ in a subsession s . Since we assume that truly random numbers are generated, the adversary cannot count on this happening with more than negligible probability.

Upon request $\text{SEND}(s, r_1, \widehat{\text{server}})$ from $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$. If there are numbers r_1, r_2 in $\text{flow}(s)$ of $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$ in \widehat{DB} and no number has been marked then: If *refresh* is OFF then $\widehat{\text{server}}$ marks r_1, r_2 and sends r_2 to $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$. If *refresh* is ON then $\widehat{\text{server}}$ marks r_1, r_2, r'_5 and sends (r, r'_5) to $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$.

Upon request $\text{SEND}(s, r, r'_5, \widehat{\text{tag}})$ from $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$. If r_2 is the first unmarked number in $\text{flow}(s)$ then $\widehat{\text{tag}}_s$ marks r_2, r'_5, r_3 , outputs UPDATE, and sends r_3 to $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$.

Fig. 12. Additional simulated interactions between $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$, $\widehat{\text{tag}}$.

More concretely, this will happen with probability at most $2^{1-n}mL$, where n is the length of the random numbers generated, m is the number of tags managed by the Server, and L is the total number of tag interrogations. This is negligible in the *security parameter* k if we assume that m and L are polynomially bounded in k , and $k = O(n)$. It follows that if \mathcal{Z} can distinguish real simulations with pseudorandom numbers from ideal simulations, then it can also distinguish pseudorandom numbers from true random numbers. This leads to a contradiction, if the numbers generated by a pseudorandom number generator are indistinguishable from random by a PPT adversary. \square

9.1 A concrete security reduction, I

A security reduction must relate distinguishing real-vs-ideal-worlds to distinguishing pseudovs-true randomness. To accomplish this, faithfully simulate the real-world and use \mathcal{Z} as a distinguisher. For a true random number generator, we get the ideal simulation subject to collisions, for which the probability is at most $2^{1-n}mL$. If we also take into account the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{PRNG}}(q, t)$ of distinguishing a pseudorandom number generator from a true random number generator, when q numbers are drawn and t is the computational time (steps) taken to draw a number, then the advantage of distinguishing real from ideal is bounded by: $2^{1-n}mL + \text{Adv}_{\text{PRNG}}(mL, T + mL)$, where T is the combined time complexity of \mathcal{Z} and \mathcal{A} .

9.2 Robustness

The refresh functionality endows the Flyweight RFID protocol with forward and backward security.

THEOREM 9.2. *The robust Flyweight protocol UC-realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{robust}}$.*

PROOF. We extend the proof of Theorem 9.1 to capture the specifications of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{robust}}$. *Sim* simulates copies of parties $\widehat{\mathcal{A}}$, $\widehat{\text{server}}$, $\widehat{\text{tag}}$, objects \widehat{DB} , triggers etc, and faithfully translates real-world runs between $\{\mathcal{A}, \text{Server}, \text{tag}\}$ into their ideal-world counterparts between $\{\widehat{\mathcal{A}}, \widehat{\text{server}}, \widehat{\text{tag}}_s\}$, adhering to the specifications of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{robust}}$. The refresh functionality requires the additional REFRESH (Item 4, Figure 9) and COMPROMISE (Item 7, Figure 9) items to be simulated. Also, $\text{flow}(s)$ in Figure 10 has one more number: $\text{flow}(s) = (r_1, r_2, r'_5, r_3, r_4, r_5)$. To deal with the case when *refresh* is ON in the simulations in Figure 11, the $\text{SEND}(s, r_1, \widehat{\text{server}})$ command (Item 3) needs to be modified and a new $\text{SEND}(s, r, r'_5, \widehat{\text{tag}})$ command added—see Figure 12. Resilience against forward security attacks in the real-world

follows from our assumption that the protocol is robust (Definition 5.1). In the ideal-world linking past flows separated by refreshment is prevented by the functionality \mathcal{F}_{robust} even if the tag gets COMPROMISED (the entries in record $session_id(\mathbf{tag})$ are discarded—Item 4, Figure 9). Resilience against backward security attacks is similar. In the real-world it follows from our assumption that the protocol is robust. In the ideal-world linking future flows separated by refreshment is prevented by the functionality \mathcal{F}_{robust} (again Item 4). Thus, as in Theorem 1, the environment \mathcal{Z} cannot distinguish real from the ideal simulations. \square

9.3 A concrete security reduction, II

Let $Adv_{PRNG}(n, N, t, s)$ be a lower bound on the probability of predicting the next n -bit number drawn from a PRNG of a tag, if fewer than N numbers are drawn from it, with t, s bounds on the time and space complexity. If we assume that the Server refreshes all tags prior to N numbers being drawn from their PRNGs, then the probability of distinguishing real from ideal-world executions is bounded by:

$$2^{1-n}mL + Adv_{PRNG}(n, N, t, s).$$

9.4 A robust refresh function

We give an informal proof that the function

$$refresh(K; R, state) = g_{tag}(K \oplus R \oplus state)$$

proposed in Section 7 supports resiliency. Let $\mathcal{RN}\mathcal{G}_{n,N,p_0}$ be a family of PRNGs for which the probability that a drawn n -bit number can be distinguished from random is no better than p_0 , provided no more than N numbers are drawn, given all previous numbers drawn. Let $X, Y \in \mathcal{RN}\mathcal{G}_{n,N,p_0}$, with Y the refreshed PRNG. The state of Y is randomized, so it is uniform in $\mathcal{RN}\mathcal{G}_{n,N,p_0}$. We claim that one cannot distinguish pairs of numbers $(x, y), (x', y'), (x'', y''), \dots$, drawn from (X, Y) from random pairs with probability better than p_0 , if no more than N numbers are drawn. Suppose, by contradiction, that one can distinguish $(x, y), (x', y'), \dots$, from random pairs with probability better than p_0 . Then a Distinguisher can use Y (a random generator in $\mathcal{RN}\mathcal{G}_{n,N,p_0}$) as an oracle to distinguish x, x', x'', \dots , from random numbers with probability better than p_0 . This is a contradiction. This also implies unlinkability: if x'' drawn from X can be linked to a number x drawn earlier with probability better than p_0 , then it is not random.

10. CONCLUSION

Secret sharing (sharing a key) and threshold cryptography (sharing a cryptographic function) are powerful cryptographic mechanisms that support fault-tolerant multi-party communication and computation. Similarly sharing clocks, even if these are only loosely synchronized, will thwart replay attacks.

In this paper we have shown that by sharing a loosely synchronized stream of pseudorandom numbers we can implement a lightweight authentication mechanism that: (i) guarantees session unlinkability with forward and backward security and (ii) thwarts man-in-the-middle relay attacks, in a formal security framework. In particular, for appropriate implementations, we can guarantee that the failure rate is kept below a given threshold through regular refreshing.

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