Research on democratic party competition in the formal spatial tradition of Downs and the comparative-historical tradition of Lipset and Rokkan assumes that linkages of accountability and responsiveness between voters and political elites work through politicians’ programmatic appeals and policy achievements. This ignores, however, alternative voter-elite linkages through the personal charisma of political leaders and, more important, selective material incentives in networks of direct exchange (clientelism). In light of the diversity of linkage mechanisms appearing in new democracies and changing linkages in established democracies, this article explores theories of linkage choice. It first develops conceptual definitions of charismatic, clientelist, and programmatic linkages between politicians and electoral constituencies. It then asks whether politicians face a trade-off or mutual reinforcement in employing linkage mechanisms. The core section of the article details developmentalist, statist, institutional, political-economic, and cultural-ideological theories of citizen-elite linkage formation in democracies, showing that none of the theories is fully encompassing. The final section considers empirical measurement problems in comparative research on linkage.
accountability and responsiveness have to do with delivering specific material advantages to a politician’s electoral supporters (clientelist linkage)?

Normative democratic theory debates the justifiability and desirability of these linkage mechanisms for a democratic polity. By contrast, positive comparative democratic theory focuses on the empirical conditions that promote different linkage mechanisms and their consequences for the functioning of democratic polities in terms of durability, civic legitimacy, and policy performance. Although we have plenty of theoretical fragments that promote hypotheses about the causal conditions for specific linkage mechanisms, there is hardly any systematic treatment of alternative linkage modes and their causes.

This article reviews and synthesizes arguments explaining the diversity of democratic linkage types in time and space. Historically, the empirical variance of linkage mechanisms has become a fascinating research topic, particularly in the past 20 years. An increasing diversity of democratic linkage mechanisms has accompanied the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) since the mid-1970s. Moreover, durable democracies like Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Japan have experienced a crisis of clientelist citizen-elite linkages in their party systems.

As long as durable democracy was mostly confined to today’s post-industrial Western polities, both historical cleavage theorists (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and formal spatial theorists of democratic competition inspired by Downs (1957) worked from the simplifying assumption that above all, programmatic linkages matter for democratic accountability and responsiveness. The behavioral literature on party identification, of course, constructs linkages in a different fashion as a psychological, cognitive, and normative bond. However, more recently, Fiorina (1981) has reinterpreted the habitual allegiance to a party in programmatic terms as the sedimented, individual, and collective judgments about parties’ past programmatic appeals and policy performance. As information misers, voters only periodically update this running tally of the parties’ issue commitments by incorporating new experiences.

Two other critiques of spatial political competition models also confirm rather than challenge the idealization of programmatic linkages as the essence of democratic accountability and responsiveness. First, Kirchheimer’s (1966) claim that catchall parties replace ideological parties only says that the dimension on which parties distinguish themselves from one another in spatial programmatic issue competition shrinks dramatically and explodes into a multiplicity of disparate issues on which opportunistic politicians take positions as they see fit to satisfy their desire to maximize electoral support and win political office. Second, theories of directional voting confirm the significance of politicians’ policy appeals for electoral competition but sug-
gest a calculus of how voters compare alternatives that is slightly different from standard spatial models (Iversen, 1994; Merrill & Grofman, 1999; Rabinowitz & McDonald, 1989; Westholm, 1997). Because the focus on programmatic citizen-politician linkages has dominated in the comparative study of democratic competition, the empirical literature on charismatic and clientelist linkage mechanisms has remained mostly confined to individual case studies without much theoretical ambition for comparative generalization until recently. Nevertheless, my review of often only implicit or restrictively conceptualized theories of democratic citizen-elite linkage building might stimulate a more systematic comparative account of diversity in the modes of democratic accountability and responsiveness. This important subject should rank much higher on the comparative politics research agenda.

The first section of the article clarifies basic concepts. The second section explores whether charismatic, clientelist, and programmatic citizen-elite linkages are complementary or rival arrangements. The third section describes and assesses existing partial theories that account for diverse democratic linkage patterns. My evaluation is tentative because requisite systematic comparative empirical research still needs to be conducted. The final section discusses operational obstacles to the realization of such an empirical research agenda.

ALTERNATIVE CITIZEN-POLITICIAN LINKAGES: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

The analytical distinctiveness of different citizen-elite linkages can be theoretically constructed by drawing on Aldrich’s (1995) account of political problem solving by parties in democratic politics, that is, a collective action and a social choice problem. The former has to do with resource pooling among candidates and voters’ information problems when choosing between alternative candidates. If office-seeking politicians band together in parties, they can more effectively advertise their candidacies, while helping voters with limited political attention to reduce the complexity of choosing between political alternatives. What facilitates collective action is an investment in parties’ administrative-organizational infrastructure.

Solving social choice problems addresses the complexity of decision making over political alternatives faced by both politicians and voters. Individual politicians may have sufficiently different preference schedules that no democratic method of interest aggregation (rules of agenda setting over issues and of choosing between issue positions) may lead to stable collective
results. Voters do not know how their preference for a particular politician is likely to affect the ultimate outcomes of democratic decision making. Even elected legislators face cycling majorities and cannot know how to affect the ultimate policy outcome. Parties address this problem of social choice by working out a joint preference ranking supported by multiple politicians (program). Voters, in turn, may then more clearly anticipate how their choice between programmatic teams will affect binding, collective democratic outcomes of the policy-making process. If voters choose between parties based on issue positions but are information misers, then parties will be successful only if they can map their issue positions on simple conceptual alternatives (Left and Right) based on underlying programmatic principles (Hinich & Munger, 1994, pp. 19, 62). If parties develop even a modicum of programmatic coherence, also relatively uninformed voters can infer a party’s position on a range of issues from basic programmatic cues and then choose between the alternatives in an intelligent fashion. Because of the informational role of simple ideological and programmatic principles, some define the concept of party as a group of citizens that “hold in common substantial elements of a political doctrine identified, both by party members and outsiders, with the name of the party” (Hinich & Munger, 1994, p. 85). Programmatic parties invest in intraparty procedures of conflict resolution among diverse preference schedules based on deliberation, persuasion, indoctrination, coercion, and bargaining. To make such procedures work, a certain level of investment in organizational-technical infrastructure is also needed. Ideology tends to be thus more a quality of parties than of individuals (Hinich & Munger, 1994, p. 64).

In the institutional sense, all bands of politicians that run in competitive elections under joint labels may be called parties. However, parties in the institutional sense are not always parties in the functional sense, namely, collective vehicles that solve problems of collective action and of collective choice. Aldrich (1995) addresses when and how U.S. political parties in the institutional sense became parties in the functional sense in a historical-descriptive way. In this article, I explore in a broader comparative mode what we know about the conditions that may induce politicians to solve collective action and social choice problems. Let me first, however, describe the ideal types that result when politicians solve none, one, or both of the problems of collective action through organizational infrastructure and social choice through techniques of programmatic unity building.

1. Of course, Hinich and Munger (1994) add to their functional definition of party the institutional element that parties must compete for office in elections.
When politicians make neither investment and thus address neither challenge, all that may hold them together is the charismatic authority of typically one, or a very few, leaders. Charisma pertains to an individual's unique personal skills and powers of persuasion that instill followers with faith in the leader's ability to end suffering and create a better future. Charismatic authority involves asymmetry between leaders and followers, but also directness and great passion (Madsen & Snow, 1991, p. 5). Charismatic politicians disarticulate political programs that would distract from their personality and force them to invest in techniques of resolving the problem of social choice. They tend to promise all things to all people to maintain maximum personal discretion over the strategy of their party vehicle.

When politicians invest only in problem-solving techniques but not in organizational infrastructure, they build legislative caucuses and factions. Because such techniques empirically occur in competitive oligarchies with restrictive suffrage, I will ignore them in the remainder of this article.

When politicians invest in administrative-technical infrastructure but not in modes of interest aggregation and program formation, they create bonds with their following through direct, personal, and typically material side payments. Such clientelist linkages involve two different circuits of exchange. First, resource-rich but vote-poor constituencies provide politicians with money in exchange for material favors, dispensed by politicians when they are empowered with public office (public works contracts, regulatory decisions, subsidies, monopolies, etc.). This exchange builds up practices of rent seeking and market distortion. Constituencies buy protection against market uncertainty (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1981, pp. 280-281). Second, vote-rich but resource-poor constituencies receive selective material incentives before and after elections in exchange for surrendering their vote. The material goods involved in the exchange range from gifts in kind and entertainment before elections to public housing, welfare awards (e.g., early disability pensions for supporters), and public sector jobs in lower and midlevel administrative positions. Clientelist parties often can handle the complexity of material resource flows only through heavy investments in the administrative infrastructure of multilevel political machines that reach from the summits of national politics down to the municipal level.

Clientelism involves reciprocity and voluntarism but also exploitation and domination. It constitutes a logic of exchange with asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open-ended transactions (Roniger, 1994, p. 3). Personalistic clientelism based on face-to-face relations with normative bonds of deference and loyalty between patron and client represents one end of the continuum of informal political exchanges without legal codification. At the opposite end to this traditional clientelism stands the modern clientelism of anonymous

In contrast to clientelist linkage strategies, programmatic linkages build on politicians’ investments in both procedures of programmatic conflict resolution and organizational infrastructure. Political parties offer packages (programs) of policies that they promise to pursue if elected into office. They compensate voters only indirectly, without selective incentives. Voters experience the redistributive consequences of parties’ policy programs regardless of whether they supported the governing party or parties. This does not imply that programmatic parties automatically supply collective goods, whereas clientelist parties specialize in club goods and selective incentives. The definitional difference between programmatic and clientelist parties is not teleological in the purposes that the parties serve. The definitional distinction is procedural, in terms of the modes of exchange between constituencies and politicians. Some programmatic parties, in fact, are likely to serve rent-seeking special interests, particularly in highly fragmented party systems in which small constituencies have their own parties (farmers, small business, regions). However, this does not make them clientelist as long as they disburse rents as a matter of codified, universalistic public policy applying to all members of a constituency, regardless of whether a particular individual supported or opposed the party that pushed for the rent-serving policy.

In operational terms, it is much easier to identify the procedural terms of exchange between voters and politicians than the teleological nature of parties’ policy programs. It is often impossible to determine whether a public policy is rent seeking or public goods oriented. Teleological approaches would have to decide, for example, whether the public investments in nuclear power technology serve a rent-seeking industrial group or the collective good of promoting research in which market failures make private investors shy away from uncertainties. There is no objective basis on which to classify the policy as rent seeking or public goods promoting.2

The constitutive element of programmatic political linkage is that parties solve their problems of social choice through the development of policy packages that make it possible to map issues onto underlying simple competitive dimensions. Inasmuch as these dimensions are durable and enable voters to identify clear interparty differences, they constitute political cleavages

2. McCubbins and Rosenbluth (1995, pp. 53-54) try to categorize the Japanese budget according to teleological criteria. I find this enterprise doomed to failure precisely because of the ambiguities involved in deciding whether a particular policy is rent seeking.
When parties appeal to voters based on such cleavages, the latter become competitive dimensions. Politicians building programmatic linkages have to bundle their competing issue positions in simple low-dimensionality spaces for at least two reasons. First, in representative democracy, citizens do not choose issues but politicians in geographical districts. These representatives are charged with representing their constituencies over an infinite and uncertain range of issues. Thus, to enable voters to anticipate candidate positions on issues in which voters do not know the parties’ positions or in which parties do not (yet) have positions, parties must signal to voters more fundamental principles for generating policy stances that would apply to new and ex ante unforeseeable political issue conflicts. Second, voters are information misers and typically lack time and resources to review the candidates’ and parties’ specific issue positions. Instead, they are looking for simple underlying principles according to which parties generate issue stances. Hence, it is for reasons of attracting voters through programmatic appeals that parties must work out policy packages and underlying principles and, in that process, make heavy investments in procedures of internal conflict resolution about programmatic disagreements and organizational infrastructure. Creating a new dimension of competition and definition positions on that new dimension thus is an extremely costly process that is not easily manipulated by individual politicians. Hence, in polities with predominantly programmatic competition over long periods, only a few new parties may appear that reshape the competitive dimension(s).4

In contrast to the procedural distinction between the linkage mechanisms that I have advocated above, the existing literature sometimes proposes two other distinctions between clientelist and programmatic linkages that I find imprecise or even misleading: (a) clientelist politics is personalistic and programmatic politics is not, and (b) clientelist politics undercuts democratic accountability, whereas programmatic politics creates it. Quite to the contrary, clientelist politics establishes very tight bonds of accountability and responsiveness. Given the direct exchange relation between patrons and cli-
ents, it is very clear what politicians and constituencies have to bring to the table to make deals work. Politicians who refuse to be responsive to their constituents’ demands for selective incentives will be held accountable by them and no longer receive votes and material contributions. Of course, once constituencies have been bought off with selective incentives, politicians are free to pursue policy programs as they see fit, including the option not to create policies at all that provide an indirect, programmatic policy compensation to voters. For this reason, clientelist democracies often yield a bias toward high income inequality skewed toward resource-rich rent-seeking clients and legislative immobilism. To serve rent-seeking special interests, clientelist democracy may violate formal institutional legality, whereas public policy resulting from party governments with programmatic constituency linkages rely on the universalist legal codification of citizens’ entitlements and obligations. All these differences between clientelist and programmatic democratic politics, however, do not imply the absence of bonds of accountability and responsiveness in clientelist arrangements.

In a similar vein, we should not put too much emphasis on personalism as an attribute of clientelist politics and impersonality as a defining criterion of programmatic politics. First of all, direct face-to-face interactions cemented by normative bonds between politicians and their clients occur only in the traditionalist type of clientelism. Second, although clientelist relations involve exchanges between particular individuals and small constituency groups arranged in hierarchical political machines, the latter may be highly institutionalized (and thus impersonal) in the sense that actors express stable expectations vis-à-vis the nature of the players and the interactive linkage that they have entered. If institutionalization is a prerequisite of democratic stability (Huntington, 1968; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), then democracies with a predominance of clientelist practices may often be durable. In this sense, Weiner (1967) treats the successful clientelist penetration of the Indian electorate by the Congress party in the 1950s as a major achievement of regime stabilization and institutionalization benefiting Indian democracy.

Clientelism may be as hostile to the exalted personalism of charismatic authority characterized so well by Weber (1978) as programmatic democratic politics. In India, charismatic politicians triggered a deinstitutionalization of politics with an at least initially antiorganizational and anticlientelist bent (cf. Kohli, 1990, 1994). Clientelism is also not the same thing as the more mild-mannered cousin of charismatic personalistic politics—the personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987). The personal vote is the effect of a candidate’s personal initiatives on his or her electoral success, net of aggregate partisan trends that affect partisans as members of their parties.
In the analysis of programmatic and clientelist politics, we thus have to separate definitional distinctions from empirical associations. In definitional terms, only the procedural nature of exchange relations counts to separate clientelist from programmatic linkage (direct versus indirect exchange). Empirically, party competition based on predominantly programmatic linkages may result in greater depersonalization of politics, more collective goods provision, and more institutionalization than clientelist politics. This is a contingent empirical association, however, diluted by democratic polities with predominantly clientelist linkages that are also highly institutionalized and routinized.

In a similar vein, there is an empirical, but not a conceptual, relationship between clientelist linkage politics on one hand and political corruption on the other. Although it is difficult to delineate precisely, corruption involves the use of public office for private ends, whether they are personal or promoting one’s political club (party or clique) (Heywood, 1997; Hutchcraft, 1997). Corruption appears in many polities and in many forms, but in clientelist democracy, it directly works through the democratic exchange relations, whereas under conditions of programmatic party competition, it may be more accidental than constitutive.

At the most fundamental level, the difference between clientelism and programmatic linkages has nothing to do with the regime divide between democracy and authoritarianism. Neither clientelism nor programmatic linkages are phenomena exclusive to democracy. Authoritarian rulers from Brazil (Hagopian, 1994, p. 39) via Taiwan (Wang, 1994) to neopatrimonialism/patrimonialism in Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, pp. 65-67, 77-82) have employed clientelist techniques. Conversely, authoritarian regimes have sometimes avoided clientelist exchange relations in critical political-economic respects and have tried to rally support based on a programmatic development, a strategic choice that is often credited with promoting economic growth (Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999).

**TRADE-OFFS OR MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT BETWEEN LINKAGE STRATEGIES?**

For ambitious politicians, would it be a winning strategy to diversify linkage mechanisms? Should they highlight their personal qualities of leadership and vision, build clientelist exchanges, and push an encompassing programmatic agenda simultaneously? Indeed, empirical examples suggest the possibility of combining political linkage mechanisms, or what Randall (1988)
refers to as the “schizophrenic blend” (p. 177) of corruption and clientelism with ideological politics. The main Turkish parties used to be grounded in clientelism, but they have more recently become ideologically divisive (Günes-Ayata, 1994). However, a West European example shows the limits of combining linkage strategies: In Austria, both the Catholic People’s party (ÖVP) and its Socialist rival (SPÖ) once upon a time were highly ideological and programmatic parties, but then they increasingly added clientelist constituency bonds through public sector patronage, public housing, and industrial protection (Kitschelt, 1994a). Clientelism and programmatic convergence eventually triggered a backlash that resulted in the surge of a right-wing challenger (cf. Kitschelt, with McGann, 1995, pp. 180-184).

Why might clientelism and programmatic linkages be hard to combine? If politicians pay voters and financial contributors off through selective incentives in direct exchange relations, would this not enable them to pursue highly ideological programmatic policies even if not endorsed by the popular demand of their electoral constituencies? Several arguments weigh in against that possibility. For one thing, programmatic focal points that permit solutions to social choice problems in existing democracies are typically grounded in universalistic principles that militate against particularistic, informal practices of resource allocation (liberalism, socialism, and in some ways, Catholic social thought). Both an offensive liberalism and socialism directly threaten rent-seeking clients. In Austria, for example, the disparity between clientelist deeds and Socialist words hung like a millstone around the neck of the SPÖ and eventually undercut the party’s credibility.

For another thing, once politicians have secured their political office through clientelist exchanges, they may have expended their resources and/or lost their incentives to address the challenge of the collective choice problem. Consequently, empirical research should find a negative association between clientelist linkage building and programmatic cohesion inside parties. In clientelist parties, an unambiguous, united programmatic voice is not vital for politicians’ professional survival, or it may even positively disorganize the party machine. The various rent-seeking support groups of a party may harbor such disparate programmatic preferences that the costs of programmatic unification are simply too high for the party. Giving salience to programmatic principles would obliterate the electoral coalition configured around a party’s disbursement of selective incentives.5

5. Gibson (1997) shows how the exigencies of combining disparate constituencies and clientelist groups under the umbrellas of the Argentinean Justicialists and the Mexican Revolutionary Institutionalized party (PRI) limited market liberal reforms in these countries.
Postulating a trade-off between clientelism and programmatic linkage is the hard case. It is much easier to claim plausibly that either of these two linkage mechanisms is incompatible with charismatic politics. Following Weber (1978), charisma is a quality of personal authority that is difficult to sustain in a movement or party. Sooner or later, charismatic leaders or their successors will be forced to routinize authority relations and put them on a different grounding. Charismatic leaders focus the allegiance of their rank and file on their personal qualities by not permitting the emergence of party machines with routines or with fixed programs that could bind their hands and divert the attention of their supporters to more mundane and predictable bases of political mobilization. Charismatic party leaders engage in “rule by theatrics rather than by the painstaking, mundane tasks of building party cells” (Kohli, 1990, p. 191). By contrast, democratic polities grounded in programmatic competition permit only a highly limited net effect of personal leadership on voter-party linkages (Hayes & McAllister, 1996; McAllister, 1996). Personalism in programmatic party systems is often of a definitively noncharismatic type (Ansell & Fish, 1999).

The incompatibilities between charismatic, clientelist, and programmatic linkages are not absolute. At low dosages, all linkage mechanisms may be compatible. As politicians intensify their cultivation of a particular type of linkage, however, they reach a production possibility frontier at which further intensifications of one linkage mechanism can occur only at the expense of toning down other linkage mechanisms. To visualize but not operationalize these trade-offs, consider a three-dimensional space in which politicians can employ each mechanism from a lower bound (0) to an upper bound (1) (see Figure 1). Compatibility between linkage mechanisms pertains below a possibility frontier that envelops three corners of the three-dimensional quadrant (1, 0, 0; 0, 1, 0; and 0, 0, 1).

THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE STRATEGIES

There is no systematic comparative literature on the rise or decline of clientelist and programmatic linkage strategies. The clientelism literature is case study driven, without much comparative analytics (Eisenstadt & Lémaréchand, 1981; Migdal, Kohli, & Shue, 1994; Roniger & Günes-Ayata, 1994). The literature on comparative party systems and electoral competition mentions clientelism not at all (e.g., LeDuc, Niemi, & Norris, 1996) or only in passing (Sartori, 1976, p. 107). The same applies to studies of party cohesiveness (e.g., Harmel & Janda, 1982) and party organization (Mair, 1997;
Panebianco, 1988; Scarrow, 1996). Even literature on parties and party systems outside the advanced postindustrial Western world mentions clientelism only in an ad hoc fashion (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). My own work on Western Europe long ignored clientelism (e.g., Kitschelt, 1994b) and began to recognize its significance only when comparing the strategy and support base of the northern Italian and Austrian right-wing populists of the 1990s with the new radical right elsewhere in Europe (cf. Kitschelt, with McGann, 1995, chap. 2, 5).

Nevertheless, the existing body of literature allows us to extract a variety of theoretical arguments about parties’ linkage strategies. They involve accounts of comparative, static, cross-polity variance and of dynamic, intertemporal change of linkage strategies. Some of these explanations address patterns of diversity across whole party systems, whereas others focus on the linkage strategies of particular parties within polities.

**SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION**

According to Huntington (1968, pp. 71, 405-406), parties and party systems are clientelist, patronage oriented, and localist in early stages of modernization but become more programmatic and institutionalized with progressing development. The same developmentalist ring reappears in Sartori’s (1986) distinction between weak, localized nonprogrammatic party systems and strong national programmatic systems. We can supply a rational choice
micrologic for a developmentalist theory of linkage formation. First, poor and uneducated citizens discount the future, rely on short causal chains, and prize instant advantages such that the appeal of direct, clientelist exchanges always trumps that of indirect, programmatic linkages promising uncertain and distant rewards to voters. Because of poor people’s limited physical mobility and clustered patterns of residence, politicians can also monitor the adherence of the poor to clientelist deals better than that of affluent individuals.

Second, more affluent and educated citizens perceive the higher opportunity costs of clientelism. Such citizens demand more expensive material rewards such as jobs or housing. Moreover, clientelism-based socioeconomic distribution and social mobility may look increasingly unattractive compared to other avenues of advancement and reward in society. More educated and resourceful citizens also perceive longer causal chains flowing from political choice. They become aware of the detrimental effects of rent-seeking politics and the resulting undersupply of collective goods. Because of all these developments, clientelism becomes an increasingly expensive proposition for politicians and society at large. Politicians must extract the bribes and contributions that feed clientelist networks from the more resourceful middle class. These efforts, in turn, further enhance that group’s disposition to oppose such linkage mechanisms, particularly in an economic downturn when critical groups are squeezed. On top of these difficulties, politicians also have a hard time enforcing implicit clientelist contracts with more affluent, sophisticated, and mobile voters.

The developmentalist account predicts the prevalence of clientelist linkage mechanisms in poor countries and their transformation and eventual abolition with growing affluence, industrialization, and postindustrialization. Within countries, a rising urban white-collar and professional middle class is the first to defect from clientelism. In large cities, programmatic, ideological voting tends to be most widespread. The rise of professions, often associated with an expansion of a universalistic welfare state, spells the demise of clientelism (Randall, 1988, p. 185; Ware, 1987, p. 128). Lower class politics, by contrast, can be organized better around selective material incentives (Wilson, 1973, p. 72).

Developmentalist accounts have much empirical evidence on their side but cannot explain the persistence of clientelism in some advanced democracies (e.g., Japan, Italy, and Austria). Moreover, the theory cannot explain why clientelist politics appears to be much more prominent in some post-Communist polities, such as Russia or the Ukraine, than in others with equal or lesser affluence, such as the Baltic countries.
The timing of suffrage extension relative to the formation of a professional career civil service and industrialization may matter for politicians’ linkage strategies (Shefter, 1994, chap. 2). Where professionalization precedes democratization, ambitious politicians, particularly those insiders who have already served in oligarchical assemblies elected with restricted suffrage, cannot resort to public sector jobs or other state resources to attract voters with clientelist linkage mechanisms to their cause. Furthermore, where universal suffrage is granted after industrialization has come under way, the mobilization of proletarians excluded from the political process relies on mass parties (Socialist, Catholic) that mobilize internal membership resources and do not rely on clientelist state incentives. Most conducive to clientelism therefore is the absence of a professionalized predemocratic (absolutist) state apparatus together with early suffrage before industrialization (Shefter’s case of the United States). Most favorable to programmatic partisan linkages is the existence of a bureaucratic state apparatus and universal suffrage only after industrialization had already triggered mass party formation (Shefter’s cases of France and Prussia/Germany).

For contemporary new democracies, the statist theory of linkage building has several further implications. Newly independent states with universal suffrage are conducive to clientelist politics because of the absence of a pre-existing professional civil service. Moreover, the breakdown of sultanist authoritarian regimes with patrimonial administration (Chehabi & Linz, 1998a, 1998b) may yield clientelist democracies. This applies to Communist regimes built on pre-Communist patrimonial state machineries, such as Russia or the Ukraine, the central Asian republics, or China (cf. Boisot & Child, 1996; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Toka, 1999; Kitschelt & Smyth, 1999), as well as to many states of sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, pp. 252, 258-259; Jackson & Rosberg, 1984).

The statist theory also leaves unexplained anomalies worth further exploration. Shefter’s (1994) statist argument involves an overpowering path dependence. However, clientelism sometimes thrives in polities with early civil service professionalization, such as Austria. Maybe over time, democratic competition overcomes predemocratic legacies and introduces clientelism where favorable historical conditions did not exist. Conversely, Shefter’s static theory lacks a set of mechanisms that could destabilize clientelism after some decades of democratic practice. It cannot account for India, for example, where a new cohort of charismatic politicians challenged the established clientelist networks of notables and patrons by mobilizing
groups of poor and marginal citizens into the political process that formally always had the right to vote (Kohli, 1990, pp. 186-196).

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS SHAPING CITIZEN-POLITICIAN LINKAGES

Democratic institutions may be a major proximate cause of citizen-elite linkage patterns, even though they may be endogenous to historical antecedents such as strategic power configurations among competing politicians that result from state formation and social mobilization (cf. Boix, 1999). Electoral laws and the relationship between the executive branch and legislature are particularly important for shaping linkages.

**Electoral laws.** The personalization of candidate competition through electoral rules facilitates clientelism, whereas rules that focus the contest on teams of politicians promote programmatic linkages. Personalized contests permit candidates and constituencies to organize, monitor, and enforce direct trades of support for favors flowing from office. In multimember electoral districts, personal preference votes for individual candidates rather than entire party lists make possible personalized trades. Politicians’ incentives to pursue clientelism further increase when the votes that different candidates for the same party receive individually are not pooled to calculate the seats won by the entire party and/or when the party leadership does not control the nomination of list candidates. Contrary to the naive presumption that single-member districts (SMDs) offer the greatest chances for clientelist linkage building, the latter pertains in multimember districts (MMDs), provided that the ballot offers personal preference votes, no vote pooling among candidates on the same list, and no party control over the nominations process.

Empirically, the link between electoral system and clientelism is not quite tight. Austria, with a closed-list MMD system, has had high levels of clientelism. The same applies to Venezuela. In a similar vein, Mexico’s electoral system offers plenty of cues for candidates to operate as party teams, yet the ruling party has run clientelist networks for many years. Belgium and Italy have only limited electoral system cues favoring clientelism, yet they have rather strong clientelist linkage mechanisms.

6. The single best analysis of ballot format and personalization of political competition, although not in its relation to clientelism, is Carey and Shugart (1995). See Ames (1995a, 1995b) for the clientelist consequences of personalist arrangements, Mainwaring (1999, chap. 6, 8) for Brazil, and Cox and Rosenbluth (1995) for Japan with mixed cues (there is no vote pooling, but there is party control over nominations).
Executive-legislative arrangements. In parliamentary systems, the chief executive is fully responsible to the legislature. Presidential systems are often defined by the independent election of a chief executive with a fixed term and no direct legislative accountability. What makes polities more or less presidential, however, is the legislative and executive powers vested in that office. They are either reactive to the legislature (veto powers over legislative bills, the right to dissolve the legislature, the right to dismiss the cabinet) or proactive (decree powers with the force of law, presidential initiative to schedule referendums, special presidential preserves to introduce legislation or the budget, the right to appoint the cabinet, emergency powers, etc.).

As summarized by Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, chap. 1), the standard account in the American politics literature is that presidents and legislators engage in a division of labor, with the former attending to broad national policy programs and collective goods, whereas the latter cultivate particularistic groups through selective incentives (pork) and clientelism. However, even in presidential systems, the legislative arena often offers bases for team competition around rival programs (Aldrich, 1995; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). Moreover, presidents themselves may be tempted to employ their powers to provide selective incentives to potential allies to construct presidential majorities on a case-by-case basis. The Russian presidency, for example, has become the fountain of clientelist linkage building (cf. Thames, 1999), and similar observations could be made about Brazil and many other countries. Students of comparative politics, rather than Americanists, have insisted on the clientelist dispositions of strong presidential powers and sometimes linked it to the propensity of presidential democracies to collapse (Linz & Valenzuela, 1994), particularly when interacting with high fragmentation among programmatic parties in the legislature (Mainwaring, 1993; Ordeshook, 1995).

Four mechanisms make polities with strong presidential powers more prone to clientelism. First, they personalize competition for the highest office and attract ambitious politicians who are often distinguished only by their personal support networks buttressed by personal charisma or relations of clientelism but not by policy programs. Contingent on the electoral system, this promotes personalist-clientelist intraparty factions or a fragmented, clientelist multiparty spectrum. Second, the personalist contest for the presidential office encourages candidates to deprioritize programs and issue programmatically diffuse catchall appeals. This makes it easy for them to cultivate and maintain complementary clientelist linkages. Third, elected

7. Shugart and Carey (1992), Carey and Shugart (1998), and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) operationalize presidential-legislative power relations.
presidents succeed in becoming powerful players only if they prevent the emergence of a stable, program-based legislative majority that would constrain their control and discretion over the legislative agenda. To do so, they may prefer to govern with shifting legislative majorities constructed by means of side payments to legislators, thus encouraging clientelism. Fourth, because legislators are not responsible for the survival of the presidential government, they are more likely to withdraw support from the cabinet and maintain loyalty to the president only if they receive selective material inducements that permit them to maintain their own clientelist networks.

It may be possible to reconcile the apparent conflict between students of American politics and comparative politics concerning the expectations of how strong presidential powers affect citizen-elite linkages. The former compares the potential of presidents and legislators to embrace encompassing programs within the same polity, whereas the latter compares the clientelist potential of presidentialism and parliamentarism across polities. Both perspectives may arrive at correct conclusions. Although politicians in parliamentary systems promote more programmatic competition than those under presidentialism (cross-polity perspective), within strong presidential systems, the presidents have still somewhat greater propensities to construct a programmatic agenda than do legislators bent on clientelist linkage building.

Furthermore, the net effect of presidentialism may be contingent on the prevailing electoral system and party system (cf. Shugart & Haggard, in press). Going beyond institutional contingencies, where socioeconomic development and state formation strongly pull a democratic polity toward clientelist linkage mechanisms, at the margin in a new democracy, the power of the presidency may be the only available institutional antidote to the reign of special interests in clientelist networks (cf. Shugart, 1999; see Kitschelt, 1999b).

In addition to electoral laws and executive-legislative arrangements, the presence of federalism, defined by the presence of subnational jurisdictions with separate representative organs, may affect politicians’ linkage strategies (cf. Mainwaring, 1999, chap. 9). However, even if we take all these institutional arrangements together and examine their contingent effects, they are unlikely to offer a fully satisfactory explanation of politicians’ linkage strategies. Just about all of Austria’s political institutions favor programmatic party competition, yet the country has exhibited a strong dosage of clientelist politics throughout the post–World War II era. Furthermore, leftist parties in

8. As Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) remind us, presidents, of course, do not want too much fragmentation in the legislature because that would raise their transaction costs of coalition building too high.
Brazil or Uruguay appear to defy all institutional incentives to verge toward clientelism (see Keck, 1992; Mainwaring, 1999).

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE MECHANISMS

Other explanations of citizen-elite democratic linkage rely on political economic causes. The first of them directly builds on the institutional argument about electoral laws and clientelism but accounts for the choice of such laws in political economic terms. The basic idea is functionalist: Countries with high trade exposure and foreign pressure to open trade cannot afford electoral systems that promote clientelism and thus rent seeking. They abolish clientelism by switching to closed-list MMD electoral systems (Cox & Rosenbluth, 1995; Rogowski, 1987). Unfortunately, this functionalist account lacks an actor-based causal mechanism that specifies how actors solve problems of collective action and social choice to arrive at the stipulated outcomes. Both a historical path-dependency argument (Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 150-157) and a rational choice account of strategic politicians (Boix, 1999) show that domestic considerations, not trade exposure, motivated electoral system changes in Western Europe. There is also no convincing evidence showing that the recent Japanese electoral system change resulted from political coalitions concerned with trade openness. Moreover, Japan’s new electoral system of 1994 reestablishes the old clientelist linkages in a more subtle fashion.9

Rather than trade, the size of the public sector economy may be a more plausible explanation of constituency-politician linkages. Polities with a large share of nationalized and/or regulated industries create the potential for patronage appointments and clientelism (Lémarchand, 1988, p. 155). Further clientelist opportunities result from public housing and from the delegation of social services—particularly health care, education, unemployment insurance, and means-tested welfare programs—to organizations directly or indirectly affiliated with political parties such as labor unions, nonprofit community associations, or churches. Such arrangements often originate in a compromise among parties after World War II in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Italy, or even France (Müller, 1993).

The opportunities to employ public resources to build clientelist linkages are even greater in post–World War II democracies that engaged in important

9. Candidates may run in both single-member districts (SMD) and on the lists of multimember districts (MMD). Parties are not obliged to rank their MMD candidates. In that case, the candidate on an unranked MMD list who is elected to parliament is the strongest loser in his or her SMD district. Thus, the personal following of candidates still matters in the new Japanese electoral system (cf. McKean & Scheiner, 1996).
substituting industrialization (ISI) with large state (regulated) sectors. This includes most of Latin America but also India and some Southeast Asian democracies. The extremes of ISI and public sector size, of course, are reached in early post-Communist democracies, but it is unlikely that highly clientelist linkages will be uniform in these polities. In a number of these countries, past experiences with programmatic party competition before Communism and a rather high professionalization of the civil service militates against clientelism (cf. Kitschelt, 1999a, 1999b; Kitschelt, Mansfeldor et al., 1999; Kitschelt & Smyth, 1999).

Moving from comparative statics to a dynamic perspective, even where state sectors invite clientelist democratic politics, the declining economic performance of ISI policies is likely to undercut clientelism. Clientelism remains viable as long as rent-seeking industries are not becoming a major drag on the economy. This applies where some profits generated by an internationally competitive sector can be channeled to rent-seeking sectors with clientelist politics without too much economic harm, as in Japan, Southeast Asia, and even some of Europe’s more clientelist democracies until recently. Alternatively, state-governed extractive industries (e.g., oil in Mexico or Indonesia) may supply the resources for rent-seeking industries (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984, p. 208).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the happy complementarity between productive, export-oriented and unproductive domestic sectors has come under stress from two fronts. Productive sectors meet intensified international competition and generate less slack than can be absorbed by domestic industries. More important, the costs of clientelism have ratcheted up with the growing affluence of democratic polities, obliging politicians to provide bigger and bigger selective incentives to satisfy their clienteles. As increased funds for clientelism become imperative to sustain that system, progressive and populist movements mobilize against corruption and clientelism and eventually lead to a phase of clean politics without clientelism.10

Although in comparative static terms, countries with a small public sector yield fewer opportunities for rent-seeking groups and clientelism than do large public sector countries, the transition from the former to the latter state through privatization and deregulation is fraught with opportunities for corruption and clientelist constituency building (Manzetti & Blake, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 35). The Russian privatization process is a vivid example that has resulted in a fusion of old Communist and new post-Communist clientelist networks (Hellman, 1998; Vorozheikina, 1994, p. 113-114). In

10. For a formal model of cycles between clientelism and clean politics, driven by resource scarcity, see Bicchieri and Duffy (1997).
Latin America, market liberalization in Argentina and Mexico offered clientelist opportunities for business constituencies and prompted clientelist compensation packages for the aggrieved core voters of the ruling parties (Fox, 1994; Gibson, 1997). In Latin America, O’Donnell (1998, 1999, chap. 7, 8) sees a major trend in democratic regimes in the rise of delegative democracy, in which presidents rid themselves of vertical and horizontal accountability to their electorates and legislative assemblies in favor of a politics of personal charisma. Another and possibly more adequate interpretation, however, may emphasize that Latin American presidents pursue clever strategies to refashion clientelist networks in the course of overcoming the legacies of ISI economic development strategies.

Political-economic explanations of clientelism and its abolition in favor of programmatic competition add a key ingredient to our understanding of alternative citizen-politician linkages. In part, however, political-economic theories highlight processes that may be endogenous to the developmental and the statist accounts of diversity in citizen-politician linkage strategies. However, as the group of post-Communist countries and their highly diverse democratic trajectories show, this explanation of alternative linkage strategies cannot account for the full range of variation in the practical organization of accountability and responsiveness in contemporary democracies.

**POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ETHNOCULTURAL CLEAVAGES**

Although most of the theories discussed so far have a systemic bent that enables them to account more for cross-national variance in linkage mechanisms than intrapolity variance across parties, a further stream of theories focuses on the ideologies and cultural claims of individual parties as forces that mold linkage strategies of politicians, regardless of economic and political-institutional boundary conditions. Although cultural and ideas-based accounts of linkage mechanisms thus primarily operate at the individual-party level, the electoral success of particular ideologies and of associated citizen-politician linkages, of course, may over time affect the conduct of all parties within a polity and drive out competitors with alternative linkage patterns.

Parties with a market-liberal and a Marxian Socialist ideology probably have the strongest bent toward programmatic competition and are least pernicious to particularist exchange relations and clientelism. Both offer universalist conceptions of citizenship and social rights inimical to special group preferences, something market liberals would call rent seeking and Socialists would call privilege. Both types of parties emphasize a public legal order with a universalist emphasis on formal rights and obligations as opposed to the
informal practices of clientelism (Roniger, 1994, p. 9). Finally, such parties highlight rational deliberation, political doctrine, and responsiveness to rank-and-file policy preferences but not the personal charisma of political leaders. These general dispositions toward programmatic politics do not apply to parties that appropriate liberal and Socialist labels without substantively acting on such political beliefs. Moreover, they cannot entirely override the clientelist incentives of institutional rules in democratic polities. Nevertheless, they separate liberal and Socialist parties from their competitors.

The increasing salience of what I call left-libertarian politics, supporting social equality and redistribution, together with a broader scope of direct popular participation in decision making and strong civil liberties, may also generate an aversion to clientelist and charismatic linkages and a preference for programmatic competition in both new and established parties that advance the left-libertarian agenda. In the United States, the middle-class political amateurs of the center Left that undermined the ethnically segmented big-city political machines are precursors of a left-libertarianism averse to mass patronage politics (Wilson, 1962, p. 289). Later, the push of new left-libertarian social movements in the 1960s may have provided an impulse toward more ideological polarization (Aldrich, 1995, p. 264), resulting in a shift of party power from activists with patronage concerns to policy seekers (Aldrich, 1995, p. 181) and in greater legislative party discipline in the U.S. legislatures of the 1980s (Aldrich, 1995, p. 195; Cox & McCubbins, 1993). In the course of these changes, U.S. electoral competition simultaneously became more candidate centered but also more ideologically programmatic (Aldrich, 1995, p. 272). The ideological mobilization of left-libertarian political ideas undercut clientelist linkage patterns in favor of programmatic politics, no matter whether it worked through established parties or led to the emergence of new political parties.

By contrast to liberal, Socialist, and left-libertarian universalism, ethnocultural parties of different stripes (religious, ethnic, racial, regional, or linguistic) tend to favor and consolidate clientelist linkages (Roniger, 1994, p. 4). Ideological particularism with an emphasis on ascriptive group membership favors these practices for reasons of doctrine but also for organizational expediency. First, patterns of ethnocultural social separation in terms of area of residence, physical appearance, social networks, or labor market segmentation facilitate the contracting, monitoring, and enforcing of direct clientelist exchange relations between politicians and citizens. Ethnic clientelism provides club goods that make it hard for individuals to avoid adherence to an ethnocultural community (Hardin, 1995). With sharply defined group boundaries, politicians compete only for supporters within
their groups rather than across groups (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 334, 342). Second, clientelist exchange relations help ethnopolitical entrepreneurs to preempt cross-cutting cleavages in their ethnic constituency, whether they are class related or of some other kind. These mechanisms may explain Horowitz’s (1985, pp. 302-306) generalization that, as a rule, ethnic parties drive out nonethnic parties unless nonethnic cleavages historically antedate the appearance of ethnocultural divides (e.g., Belgium).11

Political scientists disagree on whether consociational bargaining between the leaders of highly organized ethnocultural segments promotes a stable democracy (cf. Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1977). With or without consociationalism, however, ethnopolitics tends to promote clientelism and inefficient rent seeking. This, in turn, exacerbates social inequalities within ethnic groups because, most of the time, a group’s selective advantages accrue primarily to a thin elite (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 130).

Table 1 summarizes the diverse explanations of how citizens and politicians organize linkages of accountability and responsiveness in democratic politics. Most theories operate at the level of whole political systems but also permit propositions at the level of individual parties. As the column on empirical anomalies shows, none of the theories is encompassing without empirical anomalies. Which theory works best may depend on the passage of time under democratic rule. In early rounds of democratic rule after the transition from authoritarianism, causal forces external to the new institutions, such as socioeconomic development, state formation, and political-economic property relations, may offer the most powerful explanations of linkage mechanisms. The learning process involved in repeatedly playing the competitive game, however, may make democratic institutions the major determinant of linkage strategies later on (cf. Kitschelt & Smyth, 1999).

**CHALLENGES OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: HOW TO COMPARE LINKAGE STRATEGIES?**

The case study and comparative literature harbor many, often inconsistent, qualitative judgments about the prevalence of charismatic, clientelist, or programmatic linkages. Roniger (1994) baldly asserts the “near ubiquity”
Table 1

**Clientelist and Programmatic Citizen-Politician Linkage Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Approach</th>
<th>System-Level Proposition About Clientelism (CL) and Programmatic Linkage (PRO)</th>
<th>Individual Party-Level Proposition</th>
<th>Empirical Anomaly Encountered by a Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic development modernization</td>
<td>Poor societies→ CL; rich societies→ PRO. Growing affluence→ CL will be challenged by PRO.</td>
<td>Parties of the poor→ CL; parties of the middle classes→ PRO.</td>
<td>Some wealthy countries with CL-based linkages. Some working-class parties with PRO-based linkages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State formation and democratic suffrage</td>
<td>Universal suffrage before professional civil service→ CL-based parties. Neopatrimonial or neosultanist rule leads to CL-based democracy, which may precipitate relapse into patrimonial authoritarianism.</td>
<td>Insider parties in oligarchies become CL based when suffrage expands; outsider parties are PRO with universal suffrage; → CL.</td>
<td>Democratic inclusion may undermine CL-based linkage (e.g., India). Relapse into patrimonial bureaucracy under democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic institutions</td>
<td>Personalist electoral systems→ CL; closed-list impersonal systems→ PRO. Strong presidential executive and legislative powers→ CL-based linkages; parliamentary governance→ PRO.</td>
<td>No individual party-level predictions</td>
<td>Choice of institutions endogenous to development and state formation. Individual parties defy the institutional logic (especially parties of the Socialist left).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Approach</th>
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<tr>
<td>Personalist electoral system and weak parties → strong presidency may somewhat counteract the CL-based propensities of the electoral system</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-economic theories</td>
<td>High trade exposure → less CL; trade opening → more PRO parties Large public sector or encompassing state regulation of business → more CL Declining profitability of the private market sector → pressure to dismantle public sector and CL Some privatization → CL linkages</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental ideologies and ethnocultural divides</td>
<td>If there are strong ethnocultural parties with CL, they tend to drive out parties based on other divides Ethnocultural parties → CL</td>
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</tr>
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Key counterexamples are Austria and Belgium. Formidable resistance of the public sector and CL parties to change, especially in less developed countries.

CL also in homogeneous ethnic polities.
(p. 3) of patronage and clientelism in all modern polities. By contrast, students of European politics have little doubt that those phenomena are exceptionally well entrenched only in Belgium and Italy (De Winter, della Porta, & Deschouwer, 1996), followed by Austria (Müller, 1989). For the more developed Latin American countries, Mainwaring (1999) claims that Brazil and Mexico “stand out in the use of patronage in elections” (p. 189). Unfortunately, the rigorous operationalization of linkage mechanisms, particularly of clientelism, is absent from the comparative politics literature. How can we decide between competing qualitative judgments about the ubiquity or diversity of programmatic and clientelist citizen-elite linkages in democracies?

Socioeconomic development theory tells us why we cannot simply ask politicians to explain their favorite linkage mechanism. Educated, sophisticated citizens, such as politicians, find clientelism morally objectionable, even if they practice it. They realize the disparity between the formal equality of all citizens in determining the public policy promised by electoral democracy and the informal realities of clientelist, particularist practices privileging rent-seeking interests. Consequently, politicians as survey respondents will always conceal their own clientelist practices, blame other parties for engaging in patronage and corruption, and generally voice a commitment to programmatic competition, while rejecting clientelist inducements and charismatic appeals as bad for democracy. Compliance with programmatic competition is a valence issue that politicians in each party claim to adhere to, whereas their adversaries allegedly do not. This, at least, is one finding of a survey among 400 Russian middle-level politicians that Regina Smyth and I conducted in a wide range of regions (oblasts) in 1998.

A variety of indirect techniques to identify more clientelist or programmatic linkage mechanisms with unobtrusive measures may get at the diversity of linkage strategies in more valid ways, although all have disadvantages. By inviting politicians to score their own party and its competitors on a variety of issue scales, one can measure each party’s programmatic cohesion. It is tracked by the standard deviation of the scores that politicians assign to their own party on the most salient issues. Theoretically, a programmatic linkage requires considerable intraparty programmatic cohesion so that voters can discern the party’s policy commitments in spite of a fog of competing voices during electoral campaigns. The programmatic profile of a party is particularly sharp when even rival politicians in other parties attribute to the focal party the issue positions claimed by its own politicians. Of course, in the case of valence issues, politicians attempt to place their competitors in a different issue position that is more distant from the valence value than do politicians belonging to the scored party. Thus, systematic asymmetries in the issue
scores assigned to a party by insiders and outsiders signal the presence of valence issues.

Programmatic party cohesion is different from party discipline, as measured by the uniformity of legislative roll-call voting conduct among representatives of the same party. Party discipline may be a matter of organizational coercion more than of programmatic cohesion. Roll call compliance tends to be high where central party officers select party nominees for electoral office. Roll call discipline may result even from clientelist linkage building. Legislators are indifferent to policy programs and do as they are told by the party leadership as long as the resources needed to feed their clientelist networks keep flowing.

The logic of party cohesion and discipline has implications for the study of clientelism. The existence of programmatic incohesiveness and the lack of discipline in roll call voting may serve at least as an indirect indication that a party, as a coalition of politicians, is held together by nonprogrammatic clientelist or charismatic linkages. However, several qualifications apply. First, the lack of party cohesion and discipline may simply result from inexperience. In recently founded democracies and parties, they signal the absence of any kind of firm linkage mechanism at a time when party politicians have not (yet) invested in organizational infrastructure and/or deliberative techniques to resolve the problems of social choice. The comparison of linkage strategies therefore should control for the age of parties and party systems to draw inferences about the nature of linkage mechanisms in the cross-sectional comparison of polities. Causal inferences about linkage mechanisms are complicated when new parties appear in established party systems that prompt all competitors to engage in a renewed learning process to recalibrate each party’s programmatic profile and reputation.

Second, the measure of party cohesion I have suggested may be difficult to interpret for parties whose mean issue position is close to the center of a salient issue space. If we find that this party is exceptionally cohesive, it may mean one of two different things. Either the party is firmly situated in the middle of a programmatic dimension or respondents assign it the middle position as a result of not knowing where a party stands on the respective issues. The latter interpretation is most plausible with newly formed, seemingly centrist parties.

In addition to measures of party cohesion, there is another indirect strategy to determine prevailing citizen-elite linkage mechanisms in a polity: levels of corruption in a polity. Full-fledged clientelist systems typically involve a large magnitude of exchanges that meet the definition of corruption supplied earlier. In descriptive terms, elected politicians take money from supporters in exchange for favorable administrative treatment (regulatory deci-
sions, government procurement contracts, jobs, housing, etc.). Because corruption cannot be observed directly in any systematic fashion, it is useful to rely on financial risk assessment firms and other commercial surveys of experts, such as business people, economists, or journalists, who score the ubiquity and intensity of corruption in a variety of countries. The presence of clientelist linkages is particularly plausible when different indirect measures point in the same direction. It is pretty safe to conclude that clientelism prevails in a polity if we find that parties are programmatically incohesive and that experts also attribute high scores of corruption to that country. Although the judgments of experts knowing only a limited set of countries may be difficult to compare cross-nationally, empirical studies have found rather robust convergence in the rank ordering and scoring of countries on corruption scales (see Ades & DiTella, 1997).

A less reliable indicator of clientelism may be the proportion of public budgets allocated to pork and special interest projects (cf. McCubbins & Rosenbluth, 1995). As argued earlier, what counts as pork or a public good may often be in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, not all pork projects flow from clientelism in the procedural sense of specific exchanges between politicians and their constituencies, but they may result from more generalized personal representation without specific exchanges.

Scholars interested in the exploration of voter-politician linkage techniques can only hope that some of their peers will invent new ways of empirically capturing the relevant phenomena in a cross-nationally reliable and valid way. Beyond the existing approximations (programmatic cohesion, corruption), scholars currently have to rely on comparative case studies that cumulatively generate the collective wisdom of the profession and enable us to classify countries in very rough terms according to high, medium, or low corruption, patronage, and clientelism scores. Few experts would challenge the assertion that Sweden scores lower than the Philippines on roundabout judgmental scales of clientelist party politics and higher on programmatic party cohesion. Comparisons become more ambiguous, if not arbitrary, when we attempt to rank the intensity of clientelism or programmatic competition in countries with more similar linkage practices (e.g., Philippines vs. Indonesia, Mexico vs. Colombia).

**CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE STRATEGIES AND THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE**

one causal variable and examines its varied effects on a range of phenomena. Backward-looking analysis starts with an outcome and examines its likely causes. In a complex world, most phenomena have multiple causes, and they must be identified by backward-looking analysis. In that spirit, I have offered a range of empirically plausible though imperfect theories that account for the preponderance of clientelist or programmatic voter-politician linkage mechanisms in a democratic polity or in particular parties. I discussed a third and most likely transitory linkage mechanism, appeals to the charismatic qualities of the political leader, only in passing.

Contrary to the tendency of different new institutionalisms in the comparative politics literature, I argue that the choice of linkage mechanisms is not just predicated on formal democratic institutions but also on substantive economic and political power relations that manifest themselves in socioeconomic development, patterns of state formation and democratic suffrage diffusion, and the control of the political economy by markets or political-regulatory mechanisms. Furthermore, the institutional mechanisms that promote clientelist or programmatic linkage strategies may be at least in part endogenous to such power relations. Nevertheless, when institutions remain stable over extended periods and there are no significant external economic, political, or cultural shocks, they induce voters and politicians to adjust their political strategies, even when noninstitutional variables may provide different cues.

An important argument underlying this article is the proposition that clientelist and programmatic linkage mechanisms should be treated as equivalents in one important respect, namely, that both, under specific circumstances, have the capacity to organize and institutionalize relations of democratic accountability and responsiveness. Political analysts and citizens in advanced industrial societies, as well as members of the educated middle class in many developing countries, may treat clientelist democracy as a normatively deficient polity that stifles political freedom and perpetuates profound inequalities in citizens’ control of economic resources and capacities for political participation. However, this should not lead us to ignore that, from a perspective of positive theory building, clientelist democracy has proved durable and has commanded sufficient support to institutionalize and entrench itself for long periods in a variety of polities.

To take this argument to a more fundamental level, in 19th-century political theory, both Socialists like Karl Marx and market liberals like John Stuart Mill, in spite of their very different normative orientations, subscribed to the positive analytical proposition that capitalism and universal suffrage are incompatible because the economically deprived, overwhelming majority of citizens would support an expropriation of the wealthy capitalist minority if
they obtained the right to vote and choose the government executive. Marx and particularly Friedrich Engels therefore hailed the advent of political democracy as a step on the road to socialism, whereas Mill feared it as a dangerous move toward the restriction of liberties and rights of property. Both were empirically wrong because 20th-century democratic polities crafted political-economic institutions that made capitalism and democracy compatible with each other, particularly in the golden age of economic growth after World War II (cf. Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, & Stephens, 1999). From the vantage point of comparative political economy, the basic reason for this compatibility is the emergence of a welfare state that organized a class compromise between capitalists and wage laborers by redistributing resources to the less well-off and containing the social risks of labor market participation, thus taming the democratic class struggle (Lipset, 1981). This solution presupposed programmatic competition and then policy bargaining among liberal-capitalist, Christian Catholic, or Socialist parties.

Looking beyond advanced Western democracies, however, one sometimes finds that democracy and capitalism coexist for long periods in the face of extreme inequalities and without comprehensive, encompassing welfare states. This applies, for example, not only to many democracies in Latin America but also in south Asia (India, Philippines, Sri Lanka) or post-Communist Eastern Europe (Russia). The comparative analysis of democratic linkage mechanisms between citizens and politicians suggests one solution to that puzzle. In the absence of a redistributive welfare state, democratic politicians may contain distributive struggles from spinning out of control and threatening the foundations of democracy by building clientelist citizen-elite linkages wherever the circumstances are conducive in terms of socioeconomic development, state formation, political institutions, political-economic property relations, or ethnocultural segmentation. For democracies from India to much of Latin America, clientelist politics has constituted the functional equivalent of the welfare state, appeasing the have-nots to abide by political orders that tremendously advantage the have.

Whether clientelist linkage mechanisms have a future in many of the new democracies depends on the specific circumstances identified by theories that account for diverging linkage patterns. If we consider post-Communist democracies, their middle-income developmental status and the size of their educated middle strata tend to be unfavorable to clientelist linkage persistence. However, in some of them, the underlying trajectory of state formation, lacking bureaucratic professionalization and rule of law, and having no

12. Of course, often such democracies have a tendency not to protect civil rights and political liberties very well. They qualify as pure electoral democracies (cf. Diamond, 1999, pp. 24-63).
past episodes of political mobilization with programmatic universalist liberal and social democratic parties, as well as their current democratic institutions (strong presidentialism, personalistic electoral laws), ethnopolitical conflict, and partial economic reform privileging rent-seeking groups in the privatization process, make clientelist politics a rather plausible prospect. In a similar vein, we can examine the political, economic, and institutional conditions in Western European, Latin American, south and east Asian democratic polities, as well as the few African polities that qualify as democratic, to gauge their prospects of evolving toward more programmatic or more clientelist linkage patterns and retrospectively explain current crises of existing party systems precipitated by challenges to the prevailing linkage techniques. Given the currently fragmented state of research on democratic linkage mechanisms but the empirical and theoretical significance of this topic for the development of democratic polities, systematically comparative studies should offer a promising field for ambitious scholars of democratic politics.

13. For a related but somewhat different theoretical approach to gauge the prospects of patronage parties in post-Communist democracies, see Perkins (1996).

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