
LITERARY BORROWING...AND STEALING :
PLAGIARISM, SOURCES, INFLUENCES,
AND INTERTEXTS

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The entire corpus of existing literature should be regarded as a limbo from which discerning authors could draw their characters as required, creating only when they failed to find a suitable existing puppet. The modern novel should be largely a work of reference. Flann O'Brien, *At Swim-Two-Birds*

Recently we witnessed what happens today in the literary "interpretive community" when a modern novel - *The White Hotel* - is even in part a "work of reference." D. M. Thomas's sin, however, seems to have been that of enlarging the corpus from which a novelist draws to include non-fictional, historical texts, in this case the testimony of Dina Pronicheva, the sole survivor of Babi Yar. Although Thomas acknowledged his debt openly on the copyright page of the novel, his more or less verbatim borrowing launched an intense, but perhaps ultimately fruitless, debate in the pages of the *Times Literary Supplement* in March and April of 1982.

Thomas's reply' to accusations of opportunistic, exploitive plagiarism is an interesting one. After pointing out that his novelistic account of Babi Yar is three times the length of Dina's, the novelist remarks that at this point in the novel his heroine changes from being an individual (whose single unique life is of interest to "Sigmund Freud") to being only one of many anonymous victims of history. The text, Thomas felt, had to reflect this change from individual self-expression to common fate, and it did so in the modulation of the narrative voice from an authorial one (because, as he writes, at the start "there is still room for fiction") to that of the recording of one who had been there --- the only appropriate and truthful voice possible, given the circumstances. The novel's much misread epigraph from Yeats underlines this progression from the private to the public:

We had fed the heart on fantasies,
The Heart's grown brutal from the fare;
More substance in our enmities
Than in our love... .

In addition, the text of the novel itself acknowledges the debt - or the plagiarism: "Dina survived to be the only witness, the sole authority for what Lisa [the novel's heroine] saw and felt. Yet it had happened thirty thousand times; always in the same way and always differently."²

It is interesting that few have attacked Thomas for plagiarizing Freud though he has produced a fine, though invented, example of a Freudian case history in his novel, complete with lines straight out of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Perhaps the "Author's Note" about his fictionalizing of what he calls the "discoverer of the great and beautiful modern myth of psychoanalysis" had forestalled the critics. Or is it a matter less of the *manner* in which one uses another text than of the *kind* of text from which one borrows -- or steals?³ Is it now illicit for a writer to draw on what Jonathan Culler has called "the discursive space of a culture"?⁴ Is psychoanalysis more overtly discursive than history? These are the obvious questions raised by this controversy. But there are many others as well.

As the subsequent symposium on plagiarism in the *Times Literary Supplement*⁵ made clear, novelists today - and perhaps always - feel that books are as legitimate a part of their experience as eating a meal, or visiting a place about which they then write. Certainly Dante and Cervantes thought so. Even critics today seem to agree - whether the experience of reading be deemed consciously or unconsciously influential on the writer.⁶ But the key word here is *writer*, for in this debate on *The White Hotel* I believe we are viewing only an overt version of a contemporary critical muddle regarding the *status* and, more significantly, the *locus* of textual appropriation. On the one hand, we are dealing with *authorial* intent and with the historical issue of sources and influences; on the other, it is a question of *reader* interpretation whereby visible sources become signs of plagiarism, and influences yield to "intertextual" echoes.

I stress this seemingly obvious, if overlooked, point of critical focus because it seems to be the particular source of much confusion between new and old theoretical terms that sound familiar but, in fact, may prove to be very different. I am thinking of concepts such as "subject" and character, or as is the case here, intertextuality and influence. Depending on our critical temperament, we are likely to be all too quick to want to reject either the recent term, as an obvious continental barbarism, or the traditional one, as an out-of-date redundancy. These knee-jerk dismissals require examining, however. Critical fashion being what it is today, it is natural that some of us will want to be post-structurally *à la mode*, while others of us will want, no less fiercely, to keep to the familiar and comfortable theoretical garb of humanist discourse. Yet, perhaps we need to stand back for a moment in order to investigate the very need for the emperor's new- and old - clothes. Maybe the two apparels are not negations or even dupli-

cations of each other; maybe each dresses and addresses another part of the "emperor of signs" (with apologies to Roland Barthes). This, I'd like to argue, is often precisely what happens, and certainly this is so in the case of intertextuality and influence. It is not a matter of new French and American formalism or post-structuralism *versus* solid, traditional, humanist scholarship. The relationship is, instead, a complementary, not oppositional, one.

When Julia Kristeva⁷ coined the term "intertextuality," she noted that there were three elements involved besides the text under consideration: the author, the reader, and the other exterior texts. These elements she arranged along two axes: a horizontal one of the dialogue of the author with his/her potential reader, and a vertical one between the text itself and other texts. This set-up is very neat; it is possibly too neat, however, too schematic to be true to the actual experience of reading. Is the intertextual dialogue not rather one between the reader and his/her memory of other texts, as provoked by the work in question? Certainly the role of the author in contemporary discussions of intertextuality has proved to be minimal; in fact, it is only even posited when intentionality is required - as in the case of parody - to define a particular kind of literary borrowing. As the work of Michael Riffaterre⁸ has made clear, from the perspective of a theory of intertextuality, the experience of literature consists only of a text, a reader, and his or her reactions that take the form of systems of words, which are grouped associatively in the reader's mind. Two texts, then, could share these systems without it being a question of influence - or plagiarism - because the locus of textual appropriation is the reader, and not the author:

intertextuality is not just a perception of homologues or the cultivated reader's apprehension of sameness or difference. Intertextuality is not a felicitous surplus, the privilege of a good memory or a classical education. The term indeed refers to an operation of the reader's mind, but it is an obligatory one, necessary to any textual decoding. Intertextuality necessarily complements our experience of textuality. It is the perception that our reading of the text cannot be complete or satisfactory without going through the intertext, that the text does not signify unless as a function of a complementary or contradictory intertextual homologue.⁹

Lately there seems to have been a sort of eclipse in critical studies of the influences upon writers. There are many literary historical reasons for this, and not the least significant of these is this refocusing of critical attention upon the reader. But this change in criticism has come about, I would argue, the way most critical changes do -- that is, primarily because of a change in the literature itself. Like architectural "postmodernism" which sees itself as being derived from, yet challenging, the tradition of modernism

in architecture, a tradition that it inverts and subverts, what we call "post-modern" literature today - especially auto-representational fiction¹⁰ - would also seem to be the direct heir to the modernist alteration of sensibility and taste. What Joyce, Eliot, Pound, and others brought to their art was an awareness both of the importance of their literary heritage and of the power of the assimilating reader: the only person who can revivify the "waste land" is the reader who brings together the fragments of civilization which Eliot has shored against his ruins. Contemporary self-reflexive fiction - or metafiction, for short - also situates itself overtly in the context of the literary tradition, and writers like John Fowles, John Barth, and Vladimir Nabokov, while parodying earlier forms, also put into question the usual hierarchy of what is being mocked. As well, however, they openly turn to their readers as the active co-creators of the text. In other words, in the very strategies and structures of these texts lie the seeds of that critical confusion we witnessed in the *White Hotel* debate: metafiction has to posit *authorial* intent - even if only *inferred* - to account for its parodic form, but its overt pointing to the act of reading and to the role of the *reader* places it squarely in the intertextual domain.

Failure to make the important distinction between an author- and a reader-centred orientation can lead to bizarre critical situations. Although, in a very formalist phase, Kristeva had made it clear that, to her, the meaning of a text is only dependent on other texts which it absorbs and transforms, when she illustrates her theory using the work of a particular writer, what we find is more of a traditional influence study - to the point where she claims we must even know the particular editions of the texts the author read!¹¹ At least Harold Bloom (in *The Anxiety of Influence*) is more overt in his attribution of the significance of influence to the encoding author - albeit to his unconscious. What has usually happened, however, is that most discussions of intertextuality proper have ultimately ended up centering upon the reader, no matter how formalist they have attempted to sound. We witness, for instance, such typical formal statements as that of Gerard Genette, for whom intertextuality is simply a relationship of co-presence between two texts, the "effective" presence of one text within another.¹² For Laurent Jenny, intertextuality is a matter of formal invariants or archetypes.¹³ For Michael Riffaterre, intertextuality is what actually defines the formal and semiotic unit that constitutes the literary text, but it is worth stressing that it is still, in the end, only the reader who can activate the "intertext," which is defined by Riffaterre as "the corpus of texts the reader may legitimately connect with the one before his eyes, that is, the texts brought to mind by what he is reading."¹⁴

Yet even Riffaterre masks this implied reader-focus in his formalist distinction between influence and intertextuality. Influence, he argues, is a

vertical relationship of text to text, a relationship of recurrence and sameness, while intertext is related to text laterally through simultaneity and otherness.¹⁵ But the existence of metafictional parody, of course, would confuse this neat solution thoroughly for, in the case of all literary parody, overt influence obviously leads to inversion, as well as sameness. In other words, this tidy formalist distinction ignores the real problem - the difference between a reader-centred and an author-centred critical perspective. Elsewhere, however, when not bothered by this pesky question of influence, Riffaterre, along with Roland Barthes,¹⁶ is careful to define intertextuality as a modality of perception, an act of "decoding" texts in the light of other texts. For Barthes, however, the reader is free to associate texts more or less at random, limited only by individual idiosyncrasies and personal culture. Riffaterre, on the other hand, argues that the text in its "structured entirety" demands a more conditioned and therefore more limited reading.¹⁷

Perhaps the best illustration of the difference in critical orientation between influence and intertextuality studies is to be found in that off-quoted Borges story, "Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*." This is not a tale about the writing or the rewriting of the *Quixote*; it is rather about the reading of it by that peevish, argumentative snob who narrates the story. It is an allegory of the power and of the limits of intertextual reading, not of the influences or sources available to a writer or rewriter. Borges makes this evident in his conclusion: "Menard (perhaps without wanting to) has enriched, by means of a new technique, the halting and rudimentary art of reading: this new technique is that of the deliberate anachronism and the erroneous attribution."¹⁸

Whether we see such self-consciousness about the reader and the reading of this and other texts as a sign of a current cultural crisis or, as I have suggested earlier, as the logical development out of modernism.¹⁹ it has certainly had its effect on much literary theory today in the general displacement of the locus of meaning from the author and the text to the reader, at least within the limits of the dominant Western "metaphysical" tradition. Intertextuality is a function of reading, of "decoding." Formalist insisting to the contrary, it is not only a matter of the *text's* somehow parthenogenetic or magical absorption and transformation of other texts.²⁰ This formalism, however, is perfectly understandable in terms of critical or intellectual history, for it marks a conscious and, I would say, thoroughly predictable reaction against the Romantic preoccupation with the author and against the "Great Tradition" of canonized authors that has dominated much English criticism to this day. In the early work of Roland Barthes, in the criticism of French formalists like Jean Ricardou, and in the even more influential theories of Michel Foucault, we find a rejection of the "ideology" of the author as the unique, inspired, and original source (and proprietor)

of the work of art. I have always suspected, in fact, that Nabokov was playfully allegorizing this "death of the author" in *Lolita*. In that novel, you will recall, Humbert searches for the writer, Quilty, through clues in a series of texts (in this case, hotel registers) in order, of course, in the end, to do him in. On a more serious note, the recent philosophical challenge to the even more broad notion of the coherent self or "subject" has been cogently expressed by Foucault in his essay, "What Is An Author?" "The writing of our day," he asserts, "has freed itself from the necessity of 'expression'; it only refers to itself. ... [T]he essential basis of this writing is not the exalted emotions related to the act of composition or the insertion of the subject into language. Rather, it is primarily concerned with creating an opening where the writing subject endlessly disappears."²¹

This iconoclastic reaction to the Romantic valuing of the individual and the original was probably a healthy one for criticism. That texts are not just passive expressions of authorial reflection has become a critical truism in some circles today. But to go the next step and argue that somehow texts are active, generating forces in their own right is perhaps to fall into another trap, a formalist one, ultimately as (potentially) reductive as Romantic intentionalism. Texts do not come to life, texts do not generate anything - until they are *read*. Without the reader, texts remain collections of black marks on white pages. Metafictional self-consciousness about this basic fact of aesthetic reception has forced critics - who, after all, are readers - to integrate into their anti-Romantic formalism some acknowledgement of the importance of the act of reading. One result has been, I think, an awareness of the need for a theory of intertextuality.

I would argue, then, that there has *not* been today an abrupt break, in terms of literary history, between *kinds* of texts, as French criticism of the sixties would have us believe. All texts can be *scriptible* to some extent;²² the degree and the kind of engagement with a text depends - at least in part -- upon the *reader*. In other words, if there has been a break, it has been one in the attitude *of* the reader and *to* the reader -- by critics and novelists alike. Therefore, today we may indeed seem more interested in the functional reverberations caused by textual strategies in the mind of the reader, than in proving that *x* influenced *y* by textual or biographical evidence. While even the most naive of formalists would admit that *someone* obviously had to place those strategies in the text, the dominant *new* critical ideology, in the last fifteen years, both on the continent and in North America, has been, I think, basically an anti-Romantic one: perhaps only in a Romantic (and capitalist?) context where individuality and originality define art can the "borrowing" from other texts be considered plagiarism -- or "stealing." What we have witnessed in the columns of the *Times Literary Supplement* is the clash of critical orientations, and it is a historically deter-

mined clash, at that. *The White Hotel* is a metafictional work that contains, indeed constitutes, its own first critical commentary, and, as such, its implicit orientation is anti-Romantic, in the sense that it is more text- and reader-centred (or directed). Perhaps the closest textual analogies to this present self-reflexive literary situation are now too far in the past for our immediate critical memory. I am thinking of the Classical practice of citing from the great works of the past - in order to lend prestige and authority, of course - but also to internalize literary models. I am also thinking of the Medieval and the Renaissance revivals of this practice, of, for instance, Dante's use of Virgil -- which was intended to show both the poet's respect for and knowledge of the tradition in which he operated, and also the new possibilities he saw in his particular redistribution of those traditional formal elements.²³ I am thinking too of the sixteenth-century debate over whether the poet should follow Medieval or Classical models.²⁴ For authors and readers both, and this is my point, the tradition was what Paul Zumthor has called a memory "continuum": "Tradition was a collection of paradigms, an implicit and shared knowledge. It constituted a finality exterior to the poet's individual discourse, determined its functioning, and, at one and the same time, gave it the authority of the enduring past and projected it into the unknowable future."²⁵ Both author and reader once operated within this tradition.

Since the Romantic rejection of this method of operation in the name of originality, however, some critics have not even felt comfortable with the word *tradition*. So they have adopted - for the reader's perspective - the more neutral and certainly more technical-sounding term, "intertextuality," as coined by Kristeva, and utilized by critics like Riffaterre. Within the latter's semiotic theory, intertextual reading involves the perception of order, of what he calls "comparabilities" from text to text.²⁶ While this is undoubtedly true, this comparative systemizing is made possible, paradoxically, by the disruptive effect of intertextuality upon the act of reading. What happens when a textual strategy engenders an intertextual echo in the reader is that the tyrannical linearity of the act of reading is exploded. This is especially true in the novel genre where there exists a double linear tyranny - that of narrative as well as that of language (and the printed word). The text's progress is now at the mercy of its readers. Will they Continue to read, obeying the cumulative narrative and linguistic pressure to proceed? Or will they stop, investigate the alternative, the contiguous or Simultaneous echoing reference, and then, perhaps, integrate *that* into their reading and interpreting as they proceed? Of course, most often both processes will operate. Readers effect what we could call a kind of textual incest.

I use this metaphor of incest deliberately, for I have in mind the central structuring image of that most literary of modern novels, Nabokov's *Ada*.

In that book, of course, disruptions are occasioned not just by *intertextual* reverberations, but by *interlingual* ones as well. And the multi-language play, the inter-language punning, of the inhabitants of "Amerussia" is the direct analogue of the intertextual play with Proust, Tolstoy, Chateaubriand, Maupassant, and so many others. In other words, on both linguistic and narrative levels, we witness the formal realization of the major theme of the novel - sibling incest. You will recall that the otherwise immoral, dissolute Demon Veen is shocked, indeed horrified, when he learns of his children's incest. He tells them: "You force me to bring up the tritest terms such as 'family,' 'honor,' 'set,' 'law.' . . . All right, I have bribed many officials in my wild life but neither you nor I can bribe a whole culture, a whole country".²⁷ Certain rules cannot be broken, Demon suggests. And Nabokov, like Van and Ada, here challenges even the most liberal of modern readers, disrupting not only the story line but the very sentences in which it is conveyed. Yet, in the world of the novel, incest seems implicitly pardonable; indeed, it is considered a very fine topic for exploitation in literature (remember Mile Lariviere's romantic novel *cum* movie). Is Nabokov perhaps also suggesting that the true place for *formal* incest, then, is also fiction - *this* fiction? If so, there is yet another "incestuous" relationship involved - that between the readers' present reading and their memory of past books read.

From intertextual incest to Roland Barthes's "erotics" of reading is not a difficult step. When he discussed - as he so often did - the various intertexts of his *own* work, Barthes acted more as their reader than as their writer. He admitted to having been influenced by Nietzsche" as he wrote *The Pleasure of Text*, but in that same work he admitted to reading always according to Proust.²⁹ *A la recherche du temps perdu* was *the* reference work for him, as the tales of chivalry were for Don Quijote. It is not a question of the *author's* authority here, so much as one of the *reader's* circular memory. And for Barthes the intertext need not be a particular work, but what he called the "infinite text" of discourse that makes all particular discourses both possible and intelligible.

Obviously literary theory can only make this kind of statement when it is actually concerned with the question of *intelligibility*; in other words, when its orientation is towards the "decoding" reader. According to Riffaterre, the intertext is the identity base, not the source, of a literary work."³⁰ That is, it is defined by the reading, not the writing of it. Similarly, when Kristeva defines intertextuality as the sum of knowledge that makes it possible for texts to have meaning³¹ the source of that knowledge must, of course be the reader, though she would never say so. Meaning in literature is in part dependent not just on other texts which it absorbs and transforms, but on the reader's recognition and activation of that intertextual process. It is

the reader who assimilates and transforms. Yet, if I may add a parenthesis, the uneasiness demonstrated by French formalist criticism, in particular, in the face of this new, if unacknowledged potential for an analysis of "subjectivity" is a real one. For these critics, the Romantic author has been done away with and with him/her went the need for influence studies. But in substituting a definition of intertextuality which sounds purely formalistic, but which, in fact, as we have seen, conceals a reader-oriented hermeneutic, these critics have, I think, sensed their straying from the new *doxa*, the Foucauldian and Lacanian "decentering of the subject." There would now seem to be - despite all - a new coherent, continuous source of signification - the reader. And intertextuality has become his/her critical mode of perception. However, to call this hermeneutic process by such a technical and formalist-sounding name does not make it any more objective, of course. What it does do, and what it intended to do, is to shift the focus away from the Romantic author.

T. S. Eliot once suggested that bad poets borrow; good poets steal. And never was his unacknowledged Romanticism ever clearer. That formalist, text-oriented, critical ideology - born in New Criticism and reared in Gallic style in the sixties and seventies - was a natural reaction against the even longer author-centred tradition. But the self-reflective literature of recent years has kept reminding us that there are other players in the interpretive game, players with active literary memories, with active archival imaginations. Literary *criticism* has been somewhat slower than literary *theory* to acknowledge the role of these other players. The neo-Romantic among us understandably feel more comfortable detecting sources, influences, even plagiarism. The formalists still want to consider only the text. But those other players - the readers - demand to be taken into account too, and a theory of intertextuality is one way of granting them official status in the game. There seem, therefore, to be several distinct critical perspectives - author-, text-, and reader-centred ones - each equally valid, each equally conditioned (even determined) by both the intellectual history and the literature of its privileged time and place. The study of intertextuality - as both a formalist and a hermeneutic concept - shares with influence and source studies the mechanism of textual comparison. But this does not mean that they either duplicate or negate one another. But, in order to perceive their complementarity, we will have to go beyond looking just at our critical "terminology." We will have to investigate the actual focus or orientation of the underlying theories. The relevance of any textual affiliation to interpretation, for example, can only be determined when we have decided *who* is going to be praised . . . or blamed for the literary borrowing . . . or stealing.

- 1 Thomas's reply is in a letter to the editor of the *TLS*, 2 April 1982, p. 383. It is in answer to D. A. Kenrick's letter of 26 March 1982, p. 355. See also letters by James Fenton (2 April 1982, p. 383), Emma Tennant and David Frost (9 April 1982 p. 412), Geoffrey Grigson (16 April 1982, p. 439), Sylvia Kantaris (23 April 1982' p. 463). Thomas replied to Tennant, Frost, and Grigson on 30 April 1982, p. 487.
- 2 D. M. Thomas, *The White Hotel* (Harmondsworth: Penguin-King, 198[], pp. 220-21.
- 3 It is true, however, that John Fowles's *The French Lieutenant's Woman* was attacked, on similar grounds, even when the sources were deemed fictional. See for instance, Phyllis Grosskurth, "The French Lieutenant's Woman," *Victorian Studies* 16 (September 1972), 130-31. In his novel, *Lanark* (New York: Harper & Row' 198[], Alasdair Gray spoofs the entire debate by providing the reader with an "Index of Plagiarisms." We are also informed that there are three kinds of "literary theft" in the book: "BLOCK PLAGIARISM, where someone else's work is printed as a distinct typographical unit, IMBEDDED PLAGIARISM, where stolen words are concealed within the body of the narrative, and DIFFUSE PLAGIARISM, where scenery, characters, actions or novel ideas have been stolen without the original words describing them. To save space these will be referred to hereafter as Blockptag, Implag, and Difplag" (p. 485).
- 4 *The Pursuit of Signs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 103.
- 5 9 April 1982, pp. 413-15.
- 6 See J. Gerald Kennedy, "Parody as Exorcism: 'The Raven' and 'The Jewbird,'" *Genre*, 13, 2 (Summer 1980), 161-69. Cf. Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence* (New York: Oxford, 1973), *A M.o.p. of Misreading* (New York: Oxford University Press, [1975]; *Poetry and Repression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
- 7 Julia Kristeva, *Semeiotiki*: (Paris: Seuil, 1969), p. 145.
- 8 See *Semiotics of Poetry* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, [1978]), p. 1[0], and *La Production du textie* (Paris: Seuil, 1979), pp. 9, 90, 97.
- 9 "Intertextual Representation," *Critical Inquiry*, 11, 1 (1984), 142-43.
- 10 See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *La Condition postmoderne* (Paris: Minuit, 1979) and Linda Hutcheon, *Narcissistic Narrative: The Metafictional Paradox* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980).
- 11 See *La Revolution du langage poetique* (Paris: Seuil, 1974), p. 343. See too Todorov's discussion of Bakhtin's dialogism as intentional intertextuality in *Afikhail Bakhtine: Le Principe dialogique* (Paris: Seuil, 198[], pp. 95-115, especially pp. 96 and 114.
- 12 Gene tte, *Palimpsestes* (Paris: Seuil, 1982), p. 8.
- 13 Laurent Jenny, "La Strategie de la forme," *Poetique*, 27 (1976), 257.
- 14 "Syllepsis," *Critical Inquiry*, 6, 4 (Summer 1980), 626.
- 15 "Syllepsis," 627.
- 16 *The Pleasure of the Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 36.
- 17 *Semiotics of Poetry*, p. 195, n. 27.
- 13 *Labyrinths* (New York: New Directions, 1962, 1964), p. 44.
- 19 For a fuller discussion of these possibilities, see Laurent Jenny, pp. 258-59.
- 20 The two strongest statements are those of Kristeva and Jenny. In *Semeiotike*, Kristeva writes: "tout texte se construit comme mosaïque de citations, tout rextie est absorption et transformation d'un autre texte" (p. 146). In "La Strategie de la forme, Jenny asserts: "l'intertextualite designe non pas une addition confuse et mysterieuse d'influences, mais le travail de transformation et d'assimilation de plusieurs texts opere par un texte centreur qui garde le leadership du sens" (p. 262). See also Tzvetan Todorov, *Poetique de la prose* (Paris: Seuil, 1971), pp. 250-52.

- 21 *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, trans. D. F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 116.
- 22 Roland Barthes, *S/Z* (Paris: Seuil, 1970), p. 19.
- 23 Gianfranco Contini, *Varianti e altra linguistica* (Torino: Einaudi, (970), pp. 372-90.
- 24 See Baxter Hathaway, *Marvels and Commonplaces: Renaissance Literary Criticism* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 32ff.
- 25 "Le Carrefour des rhetoriciens: intertextualite et rhetorique," *Poetique*, 27 (1976), 320, my translation.
- 26 "Syllepsis," 626.
- 27 Vladimir Nabokov, *Ada or Ardor: A Family Chronicle* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), p. 443.
- 28 Roland Barthes (Paris: Seuil, 1975), pp. 110-11 on influence as "sonorite pensive."
- 29 *The Pleasures of the Text*, p. 36.
- 30 "The Making of the Text," lecture at the University of Toronto, 11 December 1981.
- 31 *Semeiotike*, p. 84.