Lockless Blockchain Sharding with Multiversion Control

Ramesh Adhikari

School of Computer and Cyber Sciences Augusta University Augusta, GA 30912, USA radhikari@augusta.edu Costas Busch

School of Computer and Cyber Sciences Augusta University Augusta, GA 30912, USA kbusch@augusta.edu

ABSTRACT

Sharding is used to address the performance and scalability issues of the blockchain protocols, which divides the overall transaction processing costs among multiple clusters of nodes. Shards require less storage capacity and communication and computation cost per node than the existing whole blockchain networks, and they operate in parallel to maximize performance. However, existing sharding solutions use locks for transaction isolation which lowers the system throughput and may introduce deadlocks. In this paper, we propose a lockless transaction method for ensuring transaction isolation without using locks, which improves the concurrency and throughput of the transactions. In our method, transactions are split into subtransactions to enable parallel processing in multiple shards. We use versions for the transaction accounts to implement consistency among the shards. We provide formal proof for liveness and correctness. We also evaluate experimentally our proposed protocol and compare the execution time and throughput with lock-based approaches. The experiments show that the transaction execution time is considerably shorter than the lock-based time and near to the ideal (no-lock) execution time.

Keywords Blockchains · Blockchain Sharding · Lockless Transactions · Transaction Conflicts · Parallel Commits

1 Introduction

The popularity of blockchains has grown due to their numerous benefits in decentralized applications. They have several special features such as fault tolerance, transparency, non-repudiation, and immutability [25]. To maximize bandwidth usage, every transaction is hashed with a cryptographic function and multiple transactions are divided into blocks [9]. After that, a ledger is created by chaining all the blocks together using a consensus mechanism to append blocks. Assuming that nobody else can be trusted, every node is in charge of keeping its own copy of the distributed ledger. As a result, if someone or some system attempts to alter or restore a portion of these transactions it will be detected, which provides assurances of data integrity and finality.

The distributed cryptocurrency blockchain system known as Bitcoin [22] is one of the first and most well-known instances of how blockchain was originally designed for the reliable exchange of digital goods. A permissionless blockchain allows anyone to join or leave the network without having to reveal their true identity. No participant can be truly trusted in such situations. Due to the lack of identity, a computationally intensive consensus process called proof-of-work that is based on cryptography is required. On the other hand, in permissioned systems the environment is more controlled and allows for more power-efficient consensus protocols based on Byzantine agreement [1]; nevertheless, even these blockchain protocols do not scale well due to large communication overhead.

Unfortunately, conventional blockchain applications have a fully replicated architecture where each node stores a copy of the whole blockchain and processes every transaction which causes scalability issues in contemporary very big data-based applications [23]. When the number of transactions and storage nodes increases, the blockchain system not only takes a longer time to achieve a consensus among nodes but also takes more time to process the transaction; therefore, it reduces the overall performance of the system. To mitigate the scalability issue of the blockchain, several blockchain protocols like Elastico [20], OmniLedger [18], RapidChain [27], and ByShard [14] has proposed to introduce sharding to provide scalability which divides the whole replicated single blockchain system to multiple shards and each shard processes its own transactions independently.

The blockchain nodes are divided into clusters of nodes called shards. Subsets in each shard may contain Byzantine nodes. We presume that each shard employs a BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerant) consensus algorithm with authentication, such as PBFT [7]. Existing sharding solutions such as, Elastico [20], OmniLedger [18], and RapidChain [27] are tailored for supporting open (or permissionless) cryptocurrency applications and are not easily generalizable to other systems. To address system-specific specialized approaches towards sharding, Hellings *et al.* [14], introduced ByShard, and combine two conventional sharded database concepts, two-phase commit and two-phase locking for atomicity and isolation of transactions in a Byzantine environment. However, their sharding solutions are not optimal as the locks are expensive, and when a process locks a data set for reading or writing, all other processes attempting to access the same data set are blocked until the lock is released, which lowers system throughput.

In this paper, we propose a different method for ensuring transaction isolation without using locks, which improves the transaction processing time. We propose a novel algorithm for ensuring atomicity and isolation of the transactions in the distributed environment.

1.1 Contributions

To our knowledge, we give the first lockless approach to blockchain sharding. We provide the following contributions:

- We provide a lockless protocol for sharded blockchains. Our protocol is based on multi-version concurrency control of the various shared objects (accounts) that the transactions access. A transaction is first split into subtransactions that execute in parallel in multiple shards. Using object versioning, the subtransactions can detect whether there is a conflict with other subtransactions that attempt to access the same shared objects concurrently. In case of a conflict, a transaction may need to restart and attempt to commit again.
- We provide correctness proofs for the safety and liveness of our proposed protocol. We also evaluate our protocol experimentally through simulations and we observe that the transaction execution time is considerably faster than the lock-based approaches and also the throughput of the transactions is improved with an increasing number of shards.

Paper Organization: The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides previous related works. Section 3 describes the preliminaries for this study and the sharding model. Section 4 discusses our proposed lockless sharding protocol. In 5 we provide the correctness analysis. Section 6 discusses the performance evaluation of our work, experimental setup, and experimental results. Finally, we give our conclusions in Section 7.

2 Related Work

Several proposals have come forward to address the blockchain scalability issue in the consensus layer [15, 17, 10, 16, 12]. Although these protocols have addressed the scalability issues to some extent, the system still cannot maintain good performance as the network size grows too large (thousand or more node participants). The sharding technique has been used to further improve the scalability of a blockchain network. Sharding is a fundamental concept in databases which has been recently used to improve the efficiency of blockchains [14, 27].

The way that conventional big database systems achieve scalability is by separating the whole database into shards (or partitions) [2], which increases the efficiency of the system by dividing the workload among the shards. To ensure ACID characteristics [11] of the database transactions, coordination is needed among the multiple shards if the transaction access multiple shards objects. In the distributed database system two-phase commit (2PC), and two-phase locking (2PL) [8], are used for atomicity, concurrency control, and isolation for the transactions. And we achieved these characteristics in our model in a different way without using locks.

Similarly, the blockchain network can be split up into smaller committees using the well-researched and tested technique of sharding, which also serves to scale up databases and lower the overhead of consensus algorithms. Elastico [20], OmniLedger [18], and RapidChain [27] are a few examples of sharded blockchains. These methods are not generalizable to other applications since they concentrate on a simple data model, that is the unspent transaction output (UTXO) model [13]. In addition, these methods use locks for the isolation of transactions. As in databases, a blockchain transaction must be isolated since it interacts with the global state. In reality, it is necessary to avoid dirty, phantom, or unrepeatable reads [3]. Additionally, transactions must comply with all of the ACID properties [11]. Typically, two-phase locking [8] is used to accomplish optimistic concurrency control [19], serializable snapshot isolation [6, 24].

To mitigate the system-specific specialized approaches towards sharding, Hellings *et al.* [14], propose ByShard. It uses a two-phase commit to ensure the atomicity of the transaction and two-phase locking for isolation of the transaction in a Byzantine environment of the blockchain system. However, locking is expensive because when a process locks a data set for reading or writing, all other processes attempting to access the same data-set are blocked until the lock is released, which lowers system throughput. An innovative lock-free method for ensuring transaction isolation is presented by Hagar Meir *et al.* [21], In order to construct version-based snapshot isolation, it takes advantage of the key-value pair versioning that already exists in the database and is mostly utilized at the validation phase of the transaction to detect the read-write [21]. However, they are not addressing their solution in a sharding-based blockchain model.

In our solution, we are using a lockless approach to achieve transaction isolation with sharding. We use multiversion concurrency control [5], as we describe in our proposed model in Section 4.

3 Preliminaries and Sharding Model

Blocks and Blockchain: Similar to a page in a record-keeping book (ledger), a block in a blockchain is a data structure that contains a sequence of transactions. A block has a header with additional metadata, including the block hash and a Merkle root hash for all the transactions in the block. Blockchain is a chain (linked list) of blocks, which is an immutable, distributed, decentralized, peer-to-peer ledger replicated over several nodes connected in a network that allows the recording of transactions.

Shards: We assume that the system consists of a set of N (replica) nodes, where n = |N|. We design a sharded system as a partitioning of the N nodes into w shards S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_w , where $N = \bigcup_i S_i$ and each $S_i \subseteq N$ is a subset of the nodes such that $S_i \cap S_j = \emptyset$, for $i \neq j$. Let $n_i = |S_i|$ represent the number of replica nodes in shard S_i , and f_i represent the number of Byzantine nodes in shard S_i . Similar to related work [27], to achieve Byzantine fault tolerance in each shard we assume that $n_i > 3f_i$ within each shard. Hence, we focus on the consistency aspects, assuming there is an underlying consensus protocol in each shard.

Let \mathcal{O} be a set of shared objects that are accessed by the transactions. Similar to related work [14] we assume that every shard is responsible for a subset of the shared objects (accounts) that are accessed by the transactions. Namely, \mathcal{O} is partitioned into subsets $\mathcal{O}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{O}_w$, where \mathcal{O}_i is the set of objects handled by shard S_z . Every shard S_i maintains its own local ledger (local chain) L_i and runs a local consensus algorithm to achieve this (e.g. PBFT [7]). The shard S_i processes subtransactions related to the object set \mathcal{O}_i (see below for the description of subtransactions). The local chains define implicitly the global blockchain, that is, the global order of all transactions is implied by the order of their respective subtransactions in the local chains. **Timing Assumptions:** We consider a semi-synchronous setting where communication delay is upper bounded by some time Δ_1 , which means that every message is guaranteed to be delivered within Δ_1 time. Our sharding protocol does not require knowledge of Δ_1 . We assume that every transaction has a unique ID based on its generation timestamp, hence IDs grow over time. Due to the semi-synchronous model, since local clocks are not perfectly synchronized, we assume a new timestamp (generated at any node in N) will be strictly larger than any timestamp generated $c \cdot \Delta_1$ time earlier (where the constant c depends on the system). Hence, we assume that for a transaction T_i that arrives at time t, any other transaction T_i that arrives after $t + c \cdot \Delta_1$ will have always a higher ID than T_i .

For guaranteeing liveness in our protocol, we assume that each Δ_2 time each shard sends the lowest transaction ID from its transaction pool to other shards. Here Δ_2 is known to each shard (in order to periodically perform the lowest ID transmission) but is not related to Δ_1 . In this way, each shard maintains the set of lowest transaction IDs which are periodically updated with new lowest ID information from each shard. The transaction which has the global lowest ID gets within a bounded time high priority and is eventually added to the blockchain. The process of propagating the lowest IDs is running in the background while the normal execution phases take place.

Similar to previous works [14], we assume that each shard runs locally a PBFT-style [7] consensus algorithm in every phase of our algorithm which takes bounded time Δ_3 for decisions (e.g. in [14] it is assumed that $\Delta_3 = 30ms$). Our protocol does not need to know Δ_3 .

Subtransactions: We model each transaction T_i which consist of subtransactions $T_{i,k_1}, \ldots, T_{i,k_j}$, such that:

- Subtransaction T_{i,k_l} uses only objects in \mathcal{O}_{k_l} in shard S_{k_l} . We also say that the subtransaction T_{i,k_l} belongs to shard S_{k_l} .
- The subtransactions of a transaction T_i do not depend on each other and can be executed in parallel in any relative order.
- A subtransaction consists of two parts: (i) condition checking, where various explicit conditions on the objects are checked, and (ii) updates on the objects.

Example 1. Consider a transaction (T_1) consisting of read-write operations on the accounts with several conditions.

 T_1 = "Transfer 2000 from Rock account to Asma account, if Rock has 3000 and Asma has 500 and Mark has 200". We split this transaction into three subtransactions, where shards r, a, and m are responsible for the respective accounts of Rock, Asma, and Mark:

$T_{1,r}$: "Check Rock has 3000"	$T_{1,a}$: "Check Asma has 500"
	: "Remove 2000 from Rock account"		: "Add 2000 to Asma account"

 $T_{1,m}$: "Check Mark has 200"

After splitting the transaction T_1 into its subtransactions we send each subtransaction to its respective shard associated with that account. If the conditions are satisfied (for example in $T_{1,r}$ check if Rock has 3000) and the transaction is valid (for example in $T_{1,r}$ Rock has indeed 2000 in the account to be removed) then the destination shards are ready to commit the subtransactions which imply that T_1 will commit as well. Otherwise, if any of the conditions in the subtransactions is not satisfied or the subtransactions are invalid, then the corresponding subtransactions abort, which results in T_1 aborting as well. In this case, all subtransactions of T_1 will also be forced to abort.

4 Sharding Algorithm

Our sharding protocol consists of two parts, the leader shard algorithm (Algorithm 1), and the destination shard algorithm (Algorithm 2).

Every transaction has a designated *leader shard*, which will handle its processing. Each leader shard has a transaction pool for all the transactions that have it as their leader. The job of the leader shard is to pick a transaction from the transaction pool and split it into subtransactions and send them to *destination shards*. The leader shard interacts with the destination shards through a protocol with seven phases which decide whether the subtransactions they receive are able to commit locally or not. The leader shard picks the transaction from its transaction pool on the basis of the priority of the transactions so that the earliest transaction (i.e. with lower ID) proceeds first. Whereas the destination shard checks each received subtransaction and if it is valid then it commits it and appends it to its local ledger, otherwise, it aborts the subtransaction and sends the corresponding message to its leader shard.

To achieve transaction isolation, we use multi-version concurrency control [5] in each destination shard, which saves multiple versions of each object (account) so that data can be safely read and modified simultaneously. When a destination shard processes a subtransaction, it takes a snapshot of the current version of each object that the subtransaction will access. When the subtransaction is about to commit, it compares the latest version with the recorded snapshot version. If these are the same then the subtransaction is eligible to commit; otherwise, the subtransactions are eligible to commit. The leader shard is informed accordingly from the destination shards. If all subtransactions are eligible to commit then the whole transaction will commit and is removed from the leader shard pool. If however, a subtransaction is not eligible to commit, the whole transaction will restart and is reinserted back into its pool.

In our algorithm, each transaction whose conditional statements are satisfied will eventually commit (as we show in the correctness proofs). Our algorithm may attempt to commit the transaction multiple times by restarting it in case of conflicts with other transactions. However, if the condition of a transaction is not satisfied then the transaction is aborted and will not restart (is removed completely from the pool). Using the object versions the algorithm guarantees safety, as it does not allow conflicting transactions to commit concurrently. To ensure liveness, the algorithm prioritizes earlier generated transactions.

4.1 Detailed Algorithm

We now describe the details of our protocol in Algorithms 1 and 2. Our combined protocol consists of seven phases. As mentioned in Section 3, to ensure liveness, periodically every Δ_2 time, each leader shard sends the lowest ID from its transaction pool to every other shard. So that in case of conflict, priority is given to the transaction with the smallest known ID. In this way, each destination shard maintains in T_l'' (Algorithm 2) the lowest known ID that it received from all leader shards. If a subtransaction realizes that it belongs to a transaction with the smallest ID in the system then it gets the highest priority and enforces itself to commit. This is further achieved with the help of a rollback mechanism that we discuss below.

Now we describe each phase of our algorithm. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that each subtransaction accesses a single object in each destination shard. However, our algorithms can be generalized for the case where each subtransaction accesses multiple objects.

Phase 1: (Algorithm 1) the leader shard (S_k) picks a transaction with the lowest transaction ID from its transaction pool (P_k) and splits that transaction T_i into its subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ and sends each $T_{i,j}$ to corresponding destination shards (S_j) in parallel.

Phase 2: (Algorithm 2) after receiving the subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ in destination shard (S_j) accessing an object, say O_d , it takes the latest version (say V_d) of the object O_d . After that, it checks the conditions (constraints) of the subtransaction $T_{i,j}$. If the constraints match (means subtransaction is eligible to commit) then, it adds the $T_{i,j}$ to the read set $R(O_d)$ and if $T_{i,j}$ will also write to O_d then it also adds $T_{i,j}$ to write set $W(O_d)$ and sends a "commit vote" to the leader shard S_k . Otherwise, it sends a "abort vote" to the leader shard.

Phase 3: (Algorithm 1) the leader shard S_k collects the votes from all the destination shards, and if it gets all "commit vote", (that means constraints are matched in all respective destination shards) then it sends the "commit" message

Algorithm 1: Leader Shard S_k

```
1 Let P_k be the pool of pending transactions in shard S_k;
```

// Periodically, every Δ_2 time the transaction with lowest ID in P_k is sent to every other shard

2 Let C_k be the committed transaction pool;

// Phase 1

- 3 Pick transaction T_i with lowest ID from P_k and remove it from P_k ;
- 4 Split T_i into subtransactions;
- 5 Let $S(T_i)$ be the set of destination shards for the subtransactions of T_i ;
- 6 Send each subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ to the corresponding destination shard S_i (in parallel for all subtransactions of T_i);

// Phase 3

7 if "commit vote" message is received from all shards in $S(T_i)$ then

- 8 Send "commit" message to all shards in $S(T_i)$;
- 9 else if "abort vote" message is received from any shard in $S(T_i)$ then
- 10 Send "abort" message to all shards in $S(T_i)$;

11 end

// Phase 5

12 if "committed" message is received from all shards in $S(T_i)$ then

- 13 Send "release" to all shards in $S(T_i)$;
- 14 else if "restart vote" message is received from any shard in $S(T_i)$ then
- 15 Send "restart" message to all shards in $S(T_i)$;
- 16 else if "aborted" message is received from all shards in $S(T_i)$ then
- 17 | Transaction T_i is discarded;

18 end

// Phase 7

```
19 if "released" message is received from all shards in S(T_i) then
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- **20** Transaction T_i has completed;
- Add T_i to C_k ;

22 else if "restarted" message is received from all shards in $S(T_i)$ then

23 Transaction T_i is reinserted into the pool P_k to be processed again;

24 end

// Handling Force Rollback Messages

25 if "force rollback $T'_{x,j}$ " message is received and S_k is the leader shard of the respective transaction T' then

26 if $T' \in C_k$ then

27 Get subtransaction information from C_k ;

- 28 Send respective "force rollback $T'_{x,z}$ " to all destination shards of T';
- 29 if "rollbacked $T'_{x,z}$ " message is received from all destination shards of T' and S_k is the leader shard of the transaction T' then
- 30 Insert T' back in the pool P_k ;
- 31 **if** $T' \in C_k$ then
- 32 Remove T' from C_k ;
- 33 end

Algorithm 2: Destination Shard S_j

1 $T_l'' \leftarrow$ the lowest transaction ID from the IDs propagation process;

// Phase 2

- 2 Subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ from leader shard S_k is received;
- 3 Suppose $T_{i,j}$ accesses object O_d ;
- 4 Let $R(O_d)$ and $W(O_d)$ be a set of transactions that will respectively read or write O_d ;
- 5 Let V_d be the latest version of object O_d ;

6 if constraint match then

- 7 Add $T_{i,j}$ to $R(O_d)$;
- 8 **if** $T_{i,j}$ will write to O_d then
- 9 Add $T_{i,j}$ to $W(O_d)$;
- 10 Send "commit vote" message to S_k ;

11 else

12 Send "abort vote" message to S_k ;

13 end

// Phase 4

14 if "commit" message is received from S_k then

```
15 if (((W(O_d) \setminus \{T_{i,j}\} = \emptyset) \text{ or } (T_{i,j} \in W(O_d) \text{ and } R(O_d) \setminus \{T_{i,j}\} = \emptyset)) and (the latest version of object O_d

is still V_d)) or (T_{i,j} = T''_l) then

16 Append transaction T_{i,j} to local chain L_j;
```

```
17 Send "committed" message to S_k;
```

- 18 | if $T_{i,j} = T_l'' / / T_{i,j}$ has the lowest ID in the system
- 19 then

For each $T'_{x,i} \in W(O_d)$ send "force rollback" message to its respective leader shard;

```
21 end
```

20

22 else

23 send "restart vote" message to S_k ;

25 else if "abort" *message is received from* S_k **then**

26 Send "aborted" message to S_k ;

```
27 end
```

// Phase 6

- **28 if** "restart" message is received from S_k then
- 29 Remove $T_{i,j}$ from $R(O_d)$ and $W(O_d)$ and from local chain L_j ;
- 30 Send "restarted" message to the leader S_k ;

```
31 else if "release" message is received from S_k then
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32 | if T_{i,j} in W(O_d) then
```

```
33 Create new version V_d + 1 for the object O_d;
```

- 34 end
- 35 Remove $T_{i,j}$ from $R(O_d)$ and $W(O_d)$;
- 36 Send "released" message to S_k ;

```
37 end
```

// Handling Force Rollback Messages

```
38 if "force rollback T'_{x,j}" message is received then
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- 39 Remove $T'_{x,j}$ from $R(O_d)$ and $W(O_d)$;
- 40 Let Z be the suffix in local chain L_j starting from $T'_{x,j}$;
- 41 Remove from L_j the suffix Z and send "rollbacked $T'_{x_{7j}}$ " message to its leader shard;
- 42 For each subtransaction $T'_{x,j}$ in Z, send "force rollback $T'_{x,j}$ " message to the leader shard of $T'_{x,j}$;

to the corresponding destination shards. Similarly, if it gets any "abort vote" then it sends an "abort" message to all respective destination shards.

Phase 4: (Algorithm 2) if the destination shard receives a "commit" message from a leader shard then, it checks the read set $(R(O_d))$ and write set $(W(O_d))$ of the accessing object and also checks the version of the object. If the subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ is only reading the object O_d and the latest version of the object O_d is still the same (i.e. V_d) then the shard appends this subtransaction to its local ledger L_j and sends "committed" message to the leader. Similarly, if $T_{i,j}$ is trying to update object O_d and the read set only contains $T_{i,j}$ (i.e. $(T_{i,j} \in W(O_d)$ and $R(O_d) \setminus \{T_{i,j}\} = \emptyset$)) and the latest version of the object O_d is still same as the previously taken version (i.e. V_d) (that means the object is not modified by other transactions) then it does the necessary update operation and adds the subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ to its local chain and sends the "committed" message to the leader shard. Moreover, if the transaction ID of subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ is lequal to the lowest known transaction ID (T_l'') , that means the current subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ to its local chain and sends a "committed" message to its leader shard, and also sends "force rollback" to the leader of the subtransaction which is in the write set $(W(O_d))$. Otherwise, it sends a "restart vote", which means there is another higher-priority transaction accessing the object O_d and not released yet. Similarly, if it receives the "abort" message then it sends an "aborted" message to its leader shard.

Phase 5: (Algorithm 1) if it receives a "committed" message from all destination shards (means that eligible to commit subtransactions are added to their local chain) then it sends a "release" message to the respective destination shards to release the subtransactions from their read set, write set and also to update the version of the object if required. Similarly, if the leader receives any "restart vote" message from any shards then it sends the "restart" message to the respective destination shards because some of the shards may have appended the subtransaction to their local chain so that should be removed, and restart should be consistent in all shards. Moreover, if it receives an "aborted" message from all destination shards, then transaction T_i is discarded.

Phase 6: (Algorithm 2) if the destination shard receives a "restart" message from the leader shard, then it removes the transaction $T_{i,j}$ from $R(O_d)$ and $W(O_d)$ and also removes $T_{i,j}$ from its local chain L_k if it already added and sends "restarted" message to the leader. Similarly, if it receives a "release" message and $T_{i,j}$ is already in $W(O_d)$ that means it updated the object O_d so it creates the new version of the object as $V_d + 1$. After that, it removes $T_{i,j}$ from $R(O_d)$ and $W(O_d)$ and sends a "released" message to its leader shard.

Phase 7: (Algorithm 1) if the leader shard receives a "released" message from all destination shards that means the transaction T_i is completed, so it adds T_i to the pool of committed transactions (C_k) so that it can get all the subtransaction information of T_i in case of rollback. Similarly, if it receives a "restarted" message from all destination shards, then this transaction needs to be processed again, and is reinserted into the transaction pool P_k .

Handling Rollbacks: This part of our protocol executes only in the special case (i.e. when the current transaction has the highest priority to execute than the already running transaction accessing the same object). After receiving the "force rollback" message from destination shards, the leader shard checks whether that subtransaction belongs to the committed transaction pool (C_k) or not. If the transaction of that subtransaction is in C_k then it gets the other subtransaction information from C_k otherwise it has the information about the currently running transaction, then it sends a "force rollback" message to all respective destination shards because it should be rollbacked in all the shards to be consistent. So if the destination shard receives the "force rollback $T'_{x,j}$ " message from the leader then it rollbacks $T'_{x,j}$ from its shards and sends "rollbacked $T'_{x,j}$ " message to its leader. Furthermore, if there exists some depending subtransaction T' on $T'_{x,j}$ accessed the version of the object added by $T'_{x,j}$ then all depending transactions should be rollbacked and it sends "rollback T'" to its leader shard so this function executes recursively to rollback all the transactions which read the version of object added by T'. The leader shard collects the "rollbacked" messages from all the destination shards, and after receiving all the "rollbacked" messages from all the respective shards for the transaction T', it adds T' to its transaction pool to be processed again and removes T' from the committed pool (C_k) if T' is already in C_k .

Example 2. Consider two conflicting transactions T_1 and T_2 consisting of read-write operations on the accounts. We explain how our protocol handles these transactions.

 T_1 = "Transfer 2000 from Rock account to Asma account, if Rock has 3000 and Asma has 500 and Mark has 200".

 T_2 = "Transfer 500 from Asma account to Bob account, if Asma has 5000".

Suppose leader shard (S_{k_1}) handles transaction T_1 and splits it into three subtransactions, where shards S_r , S_a , and S_m are responsible for the respective accounts of Rock, Asma, and Mark. Similarly, the leader shard (S_{k_2}) handles transaction T_2 and splits it into two subtransactions where shard S_a is responsible for the Asma account and shard S_b is responsible for the Bob account.

$T_{1,r}$: "Check Rock has 3000"	$T_{2,a}$: "Check Asma has 5000"
: "Remove 2000 from Rock account"	: "Remove 500 from Asma account"
$T_{1,a}$: "Check Asma has 500"	$T_{2,b}$: "Add 500 to Bob account"
: "Add 2000 to Asma account"	

 $T_{1,m}$: "Check Mark has 200"

Let us consider both leader shards (S_{k_1} and S_{k_2}) are trying to execute their transaction in parallel. At this condition, there are two subtransactions accessing the same account of Asma (i.e. $T_{1,a}, T_{2,a}$) so there will be a conflict on the respective subtransactions. So, in our algorithm, each destination shard takes the version of every account and checks that version at the time of commit. In case of conflicts, the transaction that updated earlier the read and write sets (R and W) at the destination shard will have a chance to commit.

5 Correctness Analysis

Consider a set of transactions $\mathcal{T} = \{T_1, T_2, \dots, T_{\zeta}\}$. The objective is to arrange all transactions in \mathcal{T} in a sequence $B = T_{i_1}, T_{i_2}, \dots, T_{i_{\zeta}}$, which is agreed upon by all non-faulty nodes in N. We also write $T_{i_l} \prec_B T_{i_{l'}}$ for l < l' to denote the relative order between two transactions in the sequence B. The sharding system does not maintain the actual B as a single blockchain (or ledger) explicitly, but rather, the blockchain consists of a collection of local chains which if combined they jointly give the whole blockchain B.

Each shard S_{α} maintains a local chain L_{α} of the sub-transactions $T_{i,\alpha}$ that it receives. The subtransactions are appended in L_{α} according to the order that they commit in S_{α} . If $T_{i,\alpha} \prec_{L_{\alpha}} T_{j,\alpha}$, and $T_{i,\alpha}$ conflicts with $T_{j,\alpha}$ (the two subtransactions conflict if they access the same object in S_{α} and one of the two is updating the object), then we say that $T_{i,\alpha}$ causes $T_{j,\alpha}$ and we write $T_{i,\alpha} \rightarrow_{L_{\alpha}} T_{j,\alpha}$.

We define the *local chain system* as the tuple $L = (L_1, \ldots, L_w)$ consisting of local chains in shards. If $T_{i,\alpha} \to_{L_{\alpha}} T_{j,\alpha}$, we can also simply write $T_{i,\alpha} \to_L T_{j,\alpha}$. The casual relation \to can be extended across two local chains L_{α} and L_{β} , $\alpha \neq \beta$, in the following way.

- If $T_{i,\alpha} \to_{L_{\alpha}} T_{j,\alpha}$ and T_j has a subtransaction $T_{j,\beta}$.
- If T_i has subtransactions $T_{i,\alpha}$ and $T_{i,\beta}$ such that $T_{i,\beta} \rightarrow_{L_\beta} T_{j,\beta}$.

In both cases, we say that $T_{i,\alpha}$ causes $T_{j,\beta}$, and we write $T_{i,\alpha} \to_L T_{j,\beta}$. Consider from now on the transitive closure of the causal relation \to_L .

We say that the local chain system L is *valid* if there is no subtransaction $T_{i,\alpha}$ such that $T_{i,\alpha} \to_L T_{i,\alpha}$. That is, L is a valid local chain system if there is no cyclic (transitive) causal relationship of a subtransaction to itself.

We say that a sequence B is a valid serialization of the local chain system L if B is a sequence of all the subtransactions which preserves the causal relationship of L. Namely, if $T_{i,\alpha} \to_L T_{j,\beta}$ then $T_{i,\alpha} \prec_B T_{j,\beta}$. We say that a sequence B is a blockchain serialization of L if B is a valid serialization of L, and for each transaction T_i its subtransactions $T_{i,j_1}, \ldots, T_{i,j_k}$ appear consecutively in B (without being interleaved by subtransactions of other transactions).

The goal is to show that our sharding protocol generates a local chain system L that has a blockchain serialization B. We introduce the *shard-coherence property* which we will use to prove the existence of B.

Definition 1 (Shard-coherence). We say that transactions T_i and T_j are shard-coherent with respect to local chain system L if whenever two of their subtransactions are casually related as $T_{i,\alpha} \rightarrow_L T_{j,\beta}$, then for any two of their conflicting subtransactions $T_{i,\gamma}$ and $T_{j,\gamma}$ it holds that $T_{i,\gamma} \prec_{L_{\gamma}} T_{j,\gamma}$. The local chain system L is shard-coherent if every pair of transactions are shard-coherent.

The following result shows that in order to build a blockchain serialization B from a chain system L, it suffices to prove that L is shard-coherent.

Proposition 1. If a local chain system L is shard-coherent, then L has a blockchain serialization B.

The proof of Proposition 1 follows directly from Corollary 1 and Lemma 3 given below. In the results below consider a local chain system $L = (L_1, \ldots, L_w)$ for transactions $\mathcal{T} = \{T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_{\mathcal{L}}\}$.

Lemma 1. If L is a valid local chain system, then L has a valid serialization.

Proof. Consider the sequence A of subtransactions which is the concatenation of sequences L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_w . Suppose that $A = a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_\delta$, where $a_\sigma = T_{i_\sigma, j_\sigma}$ where T_{i_σ, j_σ} is a subtransaction of transaction $T_{i_\sigma} \in \mathcal{T}$.

From A we incrementally build a sequence A' which is a valid serialization of L. Let A'_{σ} denote the sequence that we obtain after we appropriately insert (as explained below) the σ th element of A into A'. We prove by induction that A'_{σ} is a valid serialization of the involved subtransactions of the respective induced subsystem L^{σ} of L that consists of the σ subtransactions of L under consideration (the subsystem L^{σ} keeps from each L_i the involved subtransactions; note that the subsystem is valid). The main claim follows when we consider $\sigma = \zeta$ which gives $A' = A'_{\sigma}$.

For the basis case $\sigma = 1$, and $A'_1 = a_1$ which is trivially a valid serialization of the single subtransaction. Suppose that we built A'_{σ} which is a valid serialization of the first σ subtransactions in A, where $\sigma < \zeta$.

In order to build $A'_{\sigma+1}$ we take $a_{\sigma+1}$ and insert it into A'_{σ} , as follows. Suppose that $A'_{\sigma} = a'_1, \ldots, a'_{\sigma}$. If there is no $a'_i \in A'_{\sigma}$ such that $a_{\sigma+1} \to_L a'_i$, then append $a_{\sigma+1}$ at the end of A'_{σ} , to obtain $A'_{\sigma+1}$, which is clearly a valid serialization.

Otherwise, let a'_i be the earliest subtransaction in A'_{σ} (*i* is the smallest index within A'_{σ}) such that $a_{\sigma+1} \rightarrow_L a'_i$, and let a'_i be the latest subtransaction in A'_{σ} (*j* is the largest index within A'_{σ}) such that $a'_i \rightarrow_L a_{\sigma+1}$. We examine two cases:

- j < i: in this case we append $a_{\sigma+1}$ just before a'_i (and clearly after a'_j) in A'_{σ} to obtain $A'_{\sigma+1}$, which gives a valid serialization.
- *i* < *j*: we examine three sub-cases as follows.
 - $a'_i \rightarrow_L a'_j$: this case is impossible since this would create a cycle $a_{\sigma+1} \rightarrow_L a_{\sigma+1}$ in the causal relation \rightarrow_L , and hence, L would not be valid, contradicting the assumptions.

- $a'_j \rightarrow_L a'_i$: since $a'_i \prec_{A'_{\sigma}} a'_j$ this would imply that in A'_{σ} is not a valid serialization of the involved subtransactions of A, which contradicts the induction hypothesis.
- a'_j and a'_i are not related by \rightarrow_L to one another: consider the subsequence s of A'_{σ} from a'_i to a'_j (including a'_i and a'_j). Let s_1 be the subsequence of s that includes all a'_q such that $a'_i \rightarrow_L a'_q$; let s_2 be the subsequence of s that includes all a'_q such that $a'_q \rightarrow_L a'_j$; let s_3 be the remaining elements of s. Note that s_1 and s_2 are disjoint, since otherwise $a'_i \rightarrow_L a'_j$. Next, we move all the elements in the sequence s_2 (keeping their relative order) to be before the first element in s_1 . Moreover, add $a_{\sigma+1}$ between the last element of s_2 and the first element of s_1 . The resulting sequence $A'_{\sigma+1}$ is clearly a valid serialization of the involved subtransactions.

Lemma 2. If the local chain system L has a valid serialization, then L is blockchain serializable.

Proof. Let A be a valid serialization of L. Suppose that $A = a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{\delta}$, where $a_{\sigma} = T_{i_{\sigma}, j_{\sigma}}$ and $T_{i_{\sigma}, j_{\sigma}}$ is a subtransaction of $T_{i_{\sigma}} \in \mathcal{T}$.

We will rearrange the subtransactions in A to a new sequence A' such that each transaction T_i has its subtransactions consecutively in A'. We will show how to do the transformation for a single transaction, and this can repeat for the remaining transactions.

For a transaction T_i let $T_{i,j_1}, \ldots, T_{i,j_q}$ denote its subtransactions, with respective positions a_{s_1}, \ldots, a_{s_q} in A.

From the validity of A and transitivity of \rightarrow_L , we have that if for some $l \in [q]$, $a_j \rightarrow_L a_{s_l}$, then $a_j \prec_A a_{s_{l'}}$, for every $l' \in [q]$. Hence, if a_{s_l} is the earliest subtransaction of T_i in A (i.e. s_l has the smallest index among those with $l \in [q]$), any a_j that causes (through \rightarrow_L) any of the subtransactions of T_i must appear in A before a_{s_l} . Therefore, we can move the subtransactions of T_i and arrange them to appear consecutively starting at the position of a_{s_l} , so that a_{s_1} will take the place of a_{s_l} , a_{s_2} will appear immediately after a_{s_1} , and so on, until a_{s_a} .

Let A' be the resulting sequence after we rearrange the subtransactions of T_i . Clearly, this transformation of A has preserved its validity and also the subtransactions of T_i appear consecutively in A'. By repeating this process for each remaining transaction we obtain the final A'. By induction (on the number of transactions), it is clear that the final A' is a blockchain serialization of L.

From Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 1. A valid local chain system L is blockchain serializable. **Lemma 3.** If a local chain system L is shard-coherent, then L is valid.

Proof. Suppose that L is shard-coherent. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is subtransaction $T_{i,j}$ such that $T_{i,j_k} \to_L T_{i,j_k}$ (that is, there is a cycle in L with respect to causal relation \to_L).

Let $p = a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_\ell$ be a transitive "relation path", where each node in a_i is a subtransaction of some transaction in \mathcal{T} and $a_1 = a_\ell = T_{i,j_k}$, and $a_i \to_L a_{i+1}$, for each $1 \le i < \ell$. Among all possible relation paths starting and ending to T_{i,j_k} , let p be the longest (and if there are multiple paths of the same longest length then pick one of them arbitrarily). Note that it has to be $\ell > 2$ since a subtransaction alone by itself cannot create cyclic dependencies.

First, consider the case where each subtransaction in p is in the same shard $S_{\alpha} = S_{j_k}$ as that of T_{i,j_k} . We consider two sub-cases:

• $a_1 \prec_{L_{\alpha}} a_2$: let $a_r, 1 < r < \ell$, have the largest index r such that $a_1 \prec_{L_{\alpha}} a_r$. Then clearly, $a_{r+1} \prec_{L_{\alpha}} a_r$ (note that a_{r+1} exists since we took $r < \ell$ and also it holds $\ell > 2$). However, since $a_r \rightarrow_L a_{r+1}$, the shard-coherence property of L is violated between a_r and a_{r+1} , a contradiction. • $a_2 \prec_{L_{\alpha}} a_1$: since $a_1 \rightarrow_L a_2$, the shard-coherence of L is violated between a_1 and a_2 , a contradiction.

Next, consider the case where some subtransaction in p is in a different shard than S_{α} . Let a_r , where $1 \le r < \ell$ be the first subtransaction (with the smallest index r) in p which is in a different shard, say S_{β} , where $\alpha \ne \beta$.

We now show that a_{r+1} must also be in S_β conflicting with a_r . Suppose to the contrary that a_{r+1} is not in S_β . Since $a_r \to_L a_{r+1}$, there must be a subtransaction T' in S_β which conflicts with a_r , such that $a_r \to_{L_\beta} T'$ and $T' \to_L a_{r+1}$. However, this implies that p can be augmented with T', which is a contradiction since p is the longest relation path. Thus, a_{r+1} is in S_β . Moreover, a_{r+1} must be conflicting with a_r , since otherwise we would find as above some other transaction T' that conflicts with a_r which could be inserted into p to increase its length. We examine two cases:

- $a_r \prec_{L_\beta} a_{r+1}$: from the cyclicity of path p we have that $a_{r+1} \rightarrow_L a_r$ (going through a_1). Hence, the shard-coherency is violated between a_r and a_{r+1} , a contradiction.
- $a_{r+1} \prec_{L_{\beta}} a_r$: from p we have that $a_r \rightarrow_L a_{r+1}$. Hence, the shard-coherency is violated between a_r and a_{r+1} , a contradiction.

Next, we continue to show that in our sharding protocol two transactions that conflict in the same shard, they cannot have some of their phases interleave.

Lemma 4. If two transactions T_i and T_j conflict in a destination shard S_{γ} , and their respective subtransactions are processed concurrently by S_{γ} so that they both go past phase 2 in S_{γ} concurrently, then at least one of the two transactions will restart or rollback.

Proof. Suppose transactions T_i and T_j have respective subtransactions $T_{i,\gamma}$ and $T_{j,\gamma}$ in S_{γ} . Moreover, suppose that these subtransactions conflict in S_{γ} by accessing the same object O_d and at least one of two of them is updating O_d .

Without loss of generality assume that $T_{i,\gamma}$ is updating O_d . Suppose that $T_{i,\gamma}$ has finished executing phase 2. Hence, $T_{i,\gamma}$ has been added to write set $W(O_d)$. Then when $T_{j,\gamma}$ reaches phase 4, it will observe that $T_{i,\gamma}$ is already in $W(O_d)$ which will force $T_{j,\gamma}$ to restart.

On the other hand, if $T_{j,\gamma}$ has the lowest *ID* then when $T_{j,\gamma}$ will reach phase 4 it will force $T_{i,j}$ to rollback. In either case, one of the two transactions will either restart or rollback.

Theorem 1 (Safety). *The local chain system L produced by our protocol has a blockchain serialization B.*

Proof. From Proposition 1, we only need to prove that L is shard-coherent.

Consider any two transactions T_i and T_j such that $T_{i,\alpha} \to_L T_{j,\beta}$. Suppose that $T_{i,\gamma}$ and $T_{j,\gamma}$ conflict in shard S_{γ} because they access at least one common object O_d and one of the two subtransactions updates O_d . It suffices to show that $T_{i,\gamma} \prec_{L_{\gamma}} T_{j,\gamma}$.

Since $T_{i,\alpha} \to_L T_{j,\beta}$, from the definition of the \to_L relation, we have that there is a sequence of transactions $T_{k_1}, T_{k_2}, \ldots, T_{k_z}$ with $T_{k_1} = T_i$, $T_{k_z} = T_j$ and $T_{k_i} \to T_{k_{i+1}}$, for $1 \le i < z$, such that any pair of consecutive transactions T_{k_l} and $T_{k_{l+1}}$ have respective conflicting subtransactions $T_{k_l,\delta}$ and $T_{k_{l+1},\delta}$ on some common shard S_{δ} such that $T_{k_l,\delta} \prec_{L_{\delta}} T_{k_{l+1},\delta}$.

Since $T_{k_l,\delta}$ and $T_{k_{l+1},\delta}$ are appended in the local chain L_{δ} , while they both conflict, we have from Lemma 4 that they cannot go past phase 2 concurrently without one of them restarting or rolling back. Therefore, $T_{k_l,\delta}$ finishes phase 6, before $T_{k_{l+1},\delta}$ enters phase 4.

This implies that phase 5 of T_{k_l} (at its leader shard) finishes before phase 5 of $T_{k_{l+1}}$ starts (at its leader shard). Therefore, by induction, we can easily show that the end of phase 5 of T_i (at its leader shard) occurs earlier than the beginning of phase 5 of T_i (at its leader shard).

Suppose now that $T_{j,\gamma} \prec_{L_{\gamma}} T_{i,\gamma}$. Since T_i and T_j commit in S_{γ} and also conflict in S_{γ} by sharing the same object, then from Lemma 4, phase 6 of T_j ends before phase 4 of T_i starts in S_{γ} . Therefore, phase 5 of T_j ends before phase 5 of T_i starts (at their respective home shards). This is a contradiction. Therefore, $T_{i,\gamma} \prec_{L_{\gamma}} T_{j,\gamma}$, as needed.

Theorem 2 (Liveness). Our protocol guarantees that every issued transaction will eventually commit.

Proof. Consider the timing assumptions for Δ_1 , Δ_2 , and Δ_3 as described in Section 3. Consider a transaction T_i with ID $ID(T_i)$ generated at time t. In the worst case, T_i will execute when its ID is the lowest in the system, through force rollback messages.

After $c \cdot \Delta_1$ time steps, every new transaction generated will have a larger ID than $ID(T_i)$, and hence lower precedence than T_i . It takes additional time Δ_2 to propagate $ID(T_i)$.

Let ID'_{\min} be the smallest ID of all transactions considering all the pools of all shards at time t. Let q be the number of transactions which at time $t + \Delta_2 + c \cdot \Delta_1$ have ID at least ID'_{\min} and less than $ID(T_i)$. In the worst case, all of these q transactions may commit before T_i . As we have 7 phases in our protocol, for each committed transaction, the combined upper bound for communication and consensus delay time is $7(\Delta_1 + \Delta_3)$. Hence, it takes at most $q \cdot 7(\Delta_1 + \Delta_3)$ time to commit the q transactions. Therefore, by time $t + q \cdot 7(\Delta_1 + \Delta_3) + \Delta_2 + c \cdot \Delta_1$ transaction T_i will be committed in the blockchain.

6 Performance Evaluation

We set up our experiments in a virtual machine in M1 MAC PC with a 10-core CPU and 32-core GPU, including 32 GB RAM. We used Python programming language for the experiments which supports multiprocessing and multithreading. We virtually created multiple shards within a machine and conducted the experiment with different numbers of shards. For the communication between the shards, we use socket programming in Python, which enables the communication between shards by message passing. Same as previous work [14], we also assume that each shard runs the consensus algorithm and takes 30ms (say Δ_3) for decisions.

We generate 1000 accounts randomly by using the combination of the English alphabet letters and assigned an initial balance of 3000 to each account. Moreover, we generate 1500 transactions by randomly selecting the account from 1000 accounts. Each transaction includes the read and writes operations with some constraints. The generated 1500 transactions are divided with respect to the number of shards and randomly assigned to the transaction pool of each leader shard.

We show the experimental results in three categories. Firstly, optimal (no lock), means there is no transaction isolation; concurrent transactions can access the accounts and update those accounts without any consideration of the data consistency. Secondly, We used the concept of exclusive lock protocol to ensure transaction isolation and concurrency control. This approach acquires a lock on an object (account), at the time of accessing it and releases the lock after the transaction completes [4]. This prevents other transactions from accessing the same object until the lock is released, ensuring that transactions do not interfere with each other. When a transaction acquires an exclusive lock on a data item, no other transaction can read or modify that data item until the lock is released, providing exclusive access to the data. In our implementation, when an object is locked, other transactions attempting to access the same object wait until the lock is released. This guarantees that the transaction holding the lock has exclusive access to the data and can

modify it without interference from other transactions. Finally, we used our protocol to achieve transaction isolation and concurrency control without using a lock, which takes a snapshot of each object (account) and if there is conflict occurs then priority to access the object is given to the earliest transaction and other transaction are restart and rollback to re-execute again.

Experimental Results: In the first experiment, we evaluate the average throughput of the transactions using 1500 generated transactions, in which each transaction checks whether the account has sufficient balance or not before transferring from its own account to another account, and the other three constraints. If the transaction is valid and satisfies all the conditions then the transaction is executed by removing the balance from one account and adding that balance to another account (i.e. two write operations). To measure the average throughput of transactions, we initialize the start time at the beginning of the transaction processing and capture the final time after processing all the 1500 transactions.

The average throughput of the transaction with respect to the number of shards is shown in Figure 1, where we measure the average throughput of the transactions by varying the number of shards. From the experiment, we observe that the throughput increases with the number of shards. From Figure 1 we can see that the transaction throughput of our protocol is better than the lock-based protocol and quite close to the no-lock protocol.



Figure 1: Average transaction throughput with the number of shards

Figure 2: Average execution time of a transaction with numbers of constraints

In the second experiment, we set up the environment with four shards and calculate the average execution time of a transaction with respect to the number of conditions in each transaction. We increases the constraints of the transactions and recorded the execution of the transactions. In each experiment, we found that the average execution time of our protocol is less than the lock-based protocol also shown in Figure 2. From the experimental result, we see that as the number of conditions to execute the transaction increased, the commit process takes a long time. As a result, in the lock-based protocol, the lock is kept for a long period, which adds a lot of overhead and takes more time for the execution of transactions than in our proposed protocol.

7 Conclusion

In this research work, we presented a lockless transaction scheduling protocol for blockchain sharding. Our protocol is based on taking a snapshot version of the various shared objects (accounts) that the transactions access in each shard.

We provide a correctness proof with the safety and liveness properties of our protocol. We also evaluate our protocol experimentally through simulations and we observe that the transaction execution time is considerably faster than the lock-based approaches and also the throughput of the transactions is improved with an increasing number of shards.

This study still has some room for improvement. One possible extension could be a study on efficient communication between leader shards and destination shards. Introducing a formal performance analysis for blockchain sharding is another interesting topic for future work, which will quantify the performance based on parameters of the blockchain, such as the number of shards and the sizes of the shards.

In recent literature, Schwarzmann [26] reviewed several requirements that need to be satisfied by electronic poll book systems, such as ensuring correctness, security, integrity, fault-tolerance, consistent distributed storage, etc. Our proposed protocol can be used to address some of these issues because it not only provides blockchain features but also offers scalability and better performance for recording transactions. Overall, our protocol may offer many unique features for electronic check-in poll book systems, including decentralization, immutability, and consensus.

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