

Lear points out, "philosophers have sometimes complained that psychoanalysis is not an empirical discipline, that it is not a 'science.' This seems to me a reason for hope, not disdain: for perhaps reflection on the therapeutic model will shed light on how to proceed philosophically in a way which is neither a methodology of the sciences nor a purely transcendental investigation" (p. 272). I have devoted a forthcoming paper, "What Is Psychoanalysis?" to this problem.

I question for what audience this book is intended. Certainly chapter two would be read with profit by any educated individual. Some of the chapters, such as the review of the work of Loewald in chapter six, will be of interest to psychoanalysts, and it was already published in a psychoanalytic journal. Many of the chapters will be of value to those philosophers who do not insist that all philosophy should be a branch of symbolic logic. This book is the work of a thoughtful educated individual with obviously many years of teaching experience, and it represents a genuine contribution to knowledge.

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JONATHAN LEAR: *Love and Its Place in Nature*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1998, 243 pp., \$12.50 (paper), ISBN 0-300-07467-0.

Early in his career, Freud claimed that he had no interest in philosophy. Yet, later, in his works on culture and society, he admitted that at heart he had always been a philosopher and explorer, not a physician, or even an able scientist. Freud's latent love affair with philosophy has not been lost on humanities scholars. They have joined the analytic ranks as theorists and practitioners.

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The subject of Lear's provocative essays is the philosophical implication of Freudian Psychoanalysis. He starts with the thesis that a delineation of the vicissitudes of human *individuation* is the major contribution of psychoanalysis to knowledge; and dependent on the success of this pursuit, it will survive or not. Lear promotes his thesis by examining several of Freud's texts in more or less chronological order to show that psychoanalysis developed in large part as attempts by Freud to address discrepancies that arose as he sought to explain his clinical data in light of his previous theoretical assumptions. Central to these efforts, according to Lear, were Freud's continual attempts to demonstrate that the human mind unceasingly strives for self-understanding. Inappropriate behavior, as such, is due not to inappropriate emotions, but because the individual's difficulties in self-awareness have led to directing his emotions to inappropriate people. Emotions were conceived by Freud as "a framework through which the world is viewed" (p. 47), "packaged with its own *justification*" (p. 49). Consequently, Freud's therapeutic methods, according to Lear, are efforts to enable the patient to change the type of responsibility he characterologically assumes for his emotions.

The problem with Lear's examination is that he fails to notice the unfortunate

counterpoint to psychoanalysis' concern with individuation—social irrelevance and a lack of attention to moral responsibility. In other words, psychoanalysis' most serious error is the notion that the psyche is located within the encapsulated self, removed from a deteriorating social world—which leads to a lack of responsiveness to social and community responsibilities of analytic patients.

Of no less concern to this reviewer are a number of Lear's contentions that characterize analytic inquiry as an act of generosity and compassion (he regards *Interpretation* as "an act of Love," p. 15). This, I believe, misrepresents Freud's view of mental life. A few examples:

1. A purview of Lear's references shows that almost all of Freud's most important writing on love are missing. Undoubtedly, it is easier to present Freud's views on love as concordant with that of the author by avoiding what Freud actually wrote. For example, Lear indicates that Freud regarded love as a dynamic force for superior personality development. This would suggest that Freud held great stock in love. In fact, Freud's forty years of scattered writings on the subject present a very different picture. According to Freud, mature attempts at love fail because they are driven by inherent infantile patterns to secure satisfactions native to the infant-mother bonding; as such, they result in inevitable narcissistic hurt and depression. In short, Freud dismisses mature love as a desperate pretense at affection because men cannot experience genuine affection for those women for whom society legitimizes sexual relations: in so far as men desire intimate connection, it is not with strangers but with women of the primary family who have been loved since childhood. Women are no more fortunate in this regard, since according to Freud, a husband serves only as a proxy for a woman's genuine love feelings.

2. Lear indicates that "Freud was committed to science" (p. 17). It is far more likely that Freud was quite ambivalent about science. He was too well trained in the philosophy of science not to recognize that his use of a single case to test his theories meant that psychoanalysis was not an empirical science competently modeled after the natural sciences. As a semantic (logical) discipline, psychoanalysis requires its explanations—whether offered in clinical interpretations or in theoretical assumptions—to be stated in such a way that its premises are subject to refutability by logical deduction. But neither Freud nor his followers have pursued this task.

3. Lear's effort to reconcile Freud's deterministic perspective with personal responsibility is as unconvincing as have been previous attempts by analytic theorists. Since psychoanalysis is neither a science, nor best served by it, why not abandon its strict deterministic and reductionistic assumptions, which inevitably lead to a view of human society that is pessimistic, limited in options for improvement, and inaccessible to verification? There are numerous better models.

*Love and Its Place in Nature* is recommended as a thoughtful account of what Lear believes psychoanalysis should be about. But the reader would be prudent not to assume that Lear's contentions emanate confluent from those of Freud's.

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