

Lower Bound on Linear Authenticated Encryption

Charanjit S. Jutla

IBM T. J. Watson Research Center,
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA

Abstract. We show that any scheme to encrypt m blocks of size n bits each, which assures message integrity, is linear in $(GF2)^n$, uses $m + k$ invocations of random functions (from n bits to n bits) and vn bits of randomness, must have $k + v$ at least $\Omega(\log m)$. This lower bound is proved in a very general model which rules out many promising linear modes of operations for encryption with message integrity. This lower bound is tight as in an earlier paper “Encryption Models with Almost Free Message Integrity”, Proc. Eurocrypt 2001, we show a linear scheme to encrypt m blocks while assuring message integrity by using only $m + 2 + \log m$ invocations of random permutations.

1 Introduction

Recently, new modes of operation for block ciphers (IAPM, IACBC, XCBC-XOR) were described in [9] and [5], which in addition to assuring confidentiality of the plaintext, also assure message integrity. Prior to this, two separate passes were required; first to compute a cryptographic MAC (e.g. CBC-MAC [2]) and then to encrypt the plaintext with the MAC appended to the plaintext (e.g. using CBC [18]). Following up on works of [9], and [5], another authenticated encryption mode (OCB) was described in [20].

Before the modes in [9] and [5] many unsuccessful attempts were made to do authenticated encryption in one pass (e.g. [4]). Most of these attempts try to use a simple checksum instead of a cryptographic MAC, as the tag appended to the plaintext before encryption. Other attempts try to do additional chaining, on top of the cipher block chaining in CBC (see figure 2 for one such mode called MPCBC [11] [12] - modified plaintext ciphertext block chaining). In essence, all these proposed modes try to do authenticated encryption by using only exclusive-or operations (i.e. operations linear in $(GF2)^n$, where n is the block cipher size), and without generating any extra randomness using the block cipher or some pseudo-random function. A successful mode for authenticated encryption was described in [10], however it increased the length of the ciphertext by a constant factor.

One of the modes in [9] is proven to be secure for both encryption and authentication even though it only uses operations linear in $(GF2)^n$ (apart from block cipher invocations), but it actually generates $\log m$ extra blocks of randomness




Fig. 1. Authenticated Encryption Mode IAPM

(where m is the number of blocks to be encrypted) by $\log m$ extra block cipher invocations.

In this paper we show a matching lower bound to the construction in [9] (see Figure 1). In other words, we show that the $\log m$ additional cryptographic operations in IAPM/IACBC scheme are essentially the least one has to do to assure message integrity along with message secrecy in any scheme linear in $(GF2)^n$.

We prove our lower bound in a very general model. We assume that the block cipher is modeled as a length preserving random function on n bits. Any invocation of such a random function constitutes one application of a cryptographic function. The only other operations allowed are linear operations over $(GF2)^n$ (i.e. n -bit exclusive-or), or testing an n bit quantity for zero. There is no other restriction on the scheme, apart from it being one to one (i.e. no two plaintexts generate the same ciphertext). There is no assumption about whether the scheme is actually invertible (which is the surprising part). The scheme is also allowed to be probabilistic with v blocks of randomness. For example, the v blocks of randomness could be v blocks of shared keys.

As our main result, we prove that any such linear scheme which encrypts m blocks of plaintext while assuring message integrity, using v blocks of randomness, and only $m+k$ cryptographic operations, must have $k+v$ at least $\Omega(\log m)$.

We use a well known theorem from linear algebra, and other techniques from linear algebra to prove our lower bound. Specifically we analyze the ranks of matrices and solution spaces of linear system of equations to prove the lower bound. Linear algebra techniques like analysis of rank of matrices have been used previously by [14] to show attacks on a whole class of schemes (double




Fig. 2. Encryption Mode MPCBC

block length hash functions), although the matrices involved in [14] were of constant ranks (three or four).

We again emphasize that our lower bound is a very general result, as it rules out many potential schemes for authenticated encryption by just an inspection of the number of cryptographic operations, and the mixing operations used (i.e. regardless of the structure of the scheme). Figures 3 and 4 (in addition to Figure 2) describe some other modes which by this lower bound turn out to be insecure for authenticated encryption. The mode in Figure 3 tries to use the structure of both the counter mode[17], and the CBC mode. All mixing operations in Figures 1 to 4 are n -bit exclusive-or operations.

Note that there are versions of IAPM/IACBC in [9], and modes for authenticated encryption in [5],[20] which are proven secure while using only one or two extra cryptographic operations. This does not contradict our lower bound as these schemes are not linear in $(GF2)^n$. In fact, the main theorem in [9] shows that authenticated encryption can be achieved by generating and using (linearly) a sequence of random numbers which are only pairwise -differentially uniform (or XOR-universal, a property slightly weaker than pairwise independence). Such a sequence can be generated by only one additional cryptographic operation if operations in GFp or $GF(2^n)$ are allowed, but such a sequence does indeed require $\log m$ extra cryptographic operations, if only linear in $(GF2)^n$ operations are allowed.

It is worth noting that schemes which use $GF(2^n)$ to generate the XOR-universal whitening sequence are linear in $GF2$, and hence by the discussion in




Fig. 3. Erroneous Mode 2

the previous paragraph, there cannot be a similar lower bound for schemes linear in $GF2$.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we state some lemma from linear algebra which are used in proving the main theorem. In section 3 we describe the model of authenticated encryption. In section 4 we prove the main lower bound theorem.

2 Linear Algebra Basics

The first lemma is basic, and the second is a key theorem in linear algebra [13].

Lemma 2.1: Let

$$[X_1 \dots X_q] \cdot \mathbf{A} = [Y_1 \dots Y_m]$$

where \mathbf{A} is a $q \times m$ binary matrix of rank m , and all the variables represent elements of $(GF2)^n$. If for some subset \mathbf{B} of rows of \mathbf{A} , $\text{rank}(\mathbf{B}) < m$, then there is a non-trivial linear (over $GF2$) relation between the variables $Y_1 \dots Y_m$, and variables $\{X_i | i \in [1..q], \text{ and } i \text{ not index of some row in } \mathbf{B}\}$.

Proof: Since \mathbf{B} has rank less than m , there exists a non-zero vector x such that $\mathbf{B} \cdot x = 0$. In fact, the set of such vectors are of dimension $m - \text{rank}(\mathbf{B})$ (see the next lemma). The following equation then yields the required linear relation:

$$[X_1 \dots X_q] \cdot \mathbf{A} \cdot x = [Y_1 \dots Y_m] \cdot x$$

□

Lemma 2.2: Let

$$[X_1 \dots X_q] \cdot \mathbf{A} = [Y_1 \dots Y_m]$$




Fig. 4. Erroneous Mode 3

where \mathbf{A} is a $q \times m$ binary matrix of rank $m' \leq m$, and $m \leq q$, and all the variables represent elements from $(GF2)^n$. Then for a fixed $Y = [Y_1 \dots Y_m]$, which allows for at least one solution in $[X_1 \dots X_q]$ of the above equations, the solution space of $[X_1 \dots X_q]$ is a $q - m'$ dimensional affine space, namely

$$[X_1 \dots X_q] = [\langle f(Y) \rangle] + \alpha_1 \cdot V_1 + \dots + \alpha_{q-m'} \cdot V_{q-m'}$$

where $\langle f(Y) \rangle$ is a row of q linear functions determined by \mathbf{A} , each of $\alpha_1 \dots \alpha_{q-m'}$ is a scalar ranging over all elements in $(GF2)^n$, and $V_1 \dots V_{q-m'}$ are $q - m'$ linearly independent binary row vectors determined by \mathbf{A} .

The vectors $V_1 \dots V_{q-m'}$ constitute a basis of the *null space* of \mathbf{A} .

3 Linear in $(GF2)^n$ Authenticated Encryption Model

We consider the following model. We assume a fixed block size n for a block cipher (or random permutations or length preserving random functions). Any application of one of these will constitute one application of a cryptographic operation. From now on we will assume that the block cipher is modeled as a length preserving n bit random function. The only other operations allowed are linear operations over $(GF2)^n$, i.e. bit-wise exclusive-or. Of course, operations of testing whether an n bit quantity is zero is also allowed. Since, the scheme could be probabilistic, as IACBC/IAPM [9] is, we also allow v blocks of randomness, r_1, \dots, r_v . These blocks of randomness could be shared beforehand as keys.

Let the message P to be encrypted be of size m blocks, i.e. mn bits (as we will see later, we only need to model a single message encryption). Call the input blocks P_1, \dots, P_m . Let there be $m + k$ invocations of random functions, and let

the inputs to these functions be M_1, M_2, \dots, M_{m+k} . Similarly, let the outputs of these random functions be N_1, N_2, \dots, N_{m+k} . Let, $C = C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{m+t}$ be linear functions of P 's, r 's, and N 's. Here, $t \geq 0$. Similarly, each M_i is a linear combination of P, r and N .

Thus let,

$$[P_1 \dots P_m r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k} \ 1] \cdot \mathbf{B} = [C_1 \dots C_{m+t}]$$

$$[P_1 \dots P_m r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k} \ 1] \cdot \mathbf{E} = [M_1 \dots M_{m+k}]$$

where each of \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{E} is a binary matrix except for the last row in which each entry can have arbitrary elements in $(GF2)^n$.

We have not addressed the question of invertibility of this scheme. It will turn out, that for the purpose of proving our lower bound, it is not important whether the scheme is invertible or not. However, we do require the scheme to be one-to-one. More precisely, a scheme is *one-to-one* if it is not the case that there are two different plaintext messages P^1 and P^2 , and a random string r , such that $\langle r, P^1 \rangle$ generates ciphertext C , and $\langle r, P^2 \rangle$ generates the same ciphertext C (as r could be part of the shared key, two different r 's on different plaintexts are allowed to generate the same ciphertext).

Our aim is to show that either the scheme is not secrecy secure, or it is not message integrity secure, or it is not one to one (not just not invertible), or $k + v = \Omega(\log m)$. We now define each of these terms formally.

The scheme is not *secrecy secure* if an adversary can correctly predict a non-trivial linear combination of the plaintext blocks, given the corresponding ciphertext, with probability more than $1 - O(2^{-n})$, in time polynomial in m and n . Note that we do not need an epsilon-delta definition of security, as we will always be able to demonstrate attacks which work with high probability. Also our attacks will not need to see many ciphertexts before predicting the plaintext. Thus, we have a weak adversarial model.

For *message integrity*, let there be $u > 0$ MDC (manipulation detection code) functions μ_1, \dots, μ_u , each a linear function of P 's, M 's, N 's, and r 's. Without loss of generality assume that they are linearly independent. During encryption of plaintext P , using randomness r , each μ_i is computed as a linear combination of P 's, M 's, N 's, and r 's. During decryption of the corresponding ciphertext C , another set of functions μ'_1, \dots, μ'_u is computed as a function of C 's, M 's, and N 's. The decryption process passes the message integrity test if for all i , $\mu_i = \mu'_i$. For example in IAPM (fig 1), $\mu_1 = \Sigma P$, and $\mu'_1 = M_z \oplus S_z$, where S_z is some linear combination of $N_{-1} \dots N_{-t}$. Now, define $D_i = \mu_i \oplus \mu'_i$, a linear function of P, M, N, r , and C . Since C can be written as a linear combination of P, N , and r , each D_i is a linear function of P, M, N , and r . On a valid decryption all the D_i should evaluate to zero.

A scheme is not message integrity secure, if for a fixed r , and given P and corresponding C , an adversary can produce a $C' \neq C$ in time polynomial in m and n , such that on inversion, all the functions D_i evaluate to zero. Once again, our attacks do not require many plaintext, ciphertext combinations before a forged ciphertext is demonstrated. Note that the notion of message integrity here is that

of ciphertext forgery in the known plaintext, known ciphertext model. Clearly, the lower bound holds as well for the chosen plaintext attacks.

Let

$$[M_1 \dots M_{m+k} P_1 \dots P_m r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k} 1] \cdot \mathbf{F} = [D_1 \dots D_u]$$

We combine these three systems of equations to write a big system as follows:

$$[M_1 \dots M_{m+k} P_1 \dots P_m r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k} 1] \cdot \mathbf{G} = [C_1 \dots C_{m+t} D_1 \dots D_u 0 \dots 0]$$

where there are $m+k$ 0's in the R.H.S vector corresponding to the matrix \mathbf{E} (i.e. second system of equations). More precisely,

$$\mathbf{G} = \begin{matrix} \left[\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{F} & \mathbf{I} \\ \mathbf{B} & \mathbf{F} & \mathbf{E} \end{array} \right] & \begin{matrix} \} m+k \\ \} m+v+m+k+1 \end{matrix} \\ \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{m+t} & \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_u & \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{m+k} \end{matrix}$$

We will refer to a given *authenticated encryption scheme* by the matrix \mathbf{G} .

4 Lower Bound

Theorem 1: If the scheme \mathbf{G} is secrecy secure, message integrity secure, and one-to-one, then $k+v$ is at least $\Omega(\log m)$.

We first give an informal description of the proof technique, followed by lemmas and their formal proof, finally followed by the formal proof of this theorem.

We first prove that the number of extra encryptions (including the randomness used) is at least the number of extra ciphertexts and the number of checksum blocks minus one, or else the secrecy is compromised. This is far from obvious, and is proven formally in lemma 1 below. Informally, it is reasonable to assume that each extra ciphertext requires an extra encryption. However, the fact that each checksum block requires an extra encryption is a bit tricky. The main idea is that the checksum blocks in a valid decryption evaluate to zero, and being linearly independent of each other, they must not be just linear combinations of ciphertexts and plaintexts.

The scheme G maybe generating some or all of its ciphertext blocks in a manner similar to the counter mode. In other words, some ciphertext block C_i may just be the plaintext block P_i xor'ed with the encryption of a counter. We next prove that each such block of ciphertext which is generated using the "counter mode", requires its own checksum (MDC) block. This is proven formally in lemma 2.

We say that N_i and N_j *resolve* if $N_i \oplus N_j$ can be written as a linear combination of only the C 's and P 's. Similarly, we say that M_i and M_j resolve if $M_i \oplus M_j$ can be written as a linear combination of only the C 's and P 's.

Informally, if N_i and N_j resolve, an adversary can calculate the change required in the given ciphertext so that all the checksums come out correct. Thus, in lemma 3 we prove that if there exists a pair i, j , $i \neq j$, such that N_i and N_j resolve, M_i and M_j resolve, and N_i and N_j (similarly M_i and M_j) contribute

identically to each MDC D , then that leads to the scheme being compromised for message integrity.

We show in lemma 4 that if the scheme is secrecy secure, and if the total number of extra encryptions (taking into account the bounds of lemma 1 and 2) is not at least $\log m$, then the conditions in the previous paragraph (i.e. the antecedent in lemma 3) are met.

Informally, that proves theorem 1. Now, to the formal proofs of the four lemmas.

Lemma 1: Either the scheme \mathbf{G} is not secrecy secure or $k + v \geq t + u - 1$

Proof: Use the identity matrix in the top right corner of \mathbf{G} to zero out the first $m + k$ rows of the the first $m + t + u$ columns. We call this new matrix \mathbf{G}' . We now write the columns corresponding to D as $[\mathbf{0} \mathbf{F}'^\top]^\top$. Thus,

$$\mathbf{G}' = \begin{matrix} \left[\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{I} \\ \mathbf{B} & \mathbf{F}' & \mathbf{E} \end{array} \right] & \left. \begin{array}{l} \} m+k \\ \} m+v+m+k+1 \end{array} \right\} \\ \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{m+t} & \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_u & \underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}_{m+k} \end{matrix}$$

We first show that w.l.o.g. we can assume that the rank of the matrix \mathbf{G}' is at least $m + t + u$. Suppose the rank of the matrix \mathbf{G}' is $m' < m + t + u$. Clearly the columns corresponding to D are linearly independent, as we assumed earlier. Thus, there are $m + t + u - m'$ columns corresponding to C which are linear combinations of the other columns corresponding to C , and the columns corresponding to D . However, on a valid encryption all the D_i are zero. This means, that these $m + t + u - m'$ C_i 's corresponding to the columns mentioned can be computed as a linear combination of the other $m + t - (m + t + u - m') = m' - u$ C_i 's. Thus, there need only be $m' - u$ C_i s, in the big equation above. Thus, we can assume w.l.o.g that the rank of the matrix \mathbf{G}' is at least $m + t + u$.

In fact by the above argument, the rank of the sub-matrix of \mathbf{G}' consisting of the first $m + t + u$ columns is $m + t + u$.

Now, let's focus on the matrix \mathbf{G}'' comprising of only the first $m + t + u$ columns of \mathbf{G}' and the rows of \mathbf{G}' excluding the rows corresponding to P . If the rank of the sub-matrix \mathbf{G}'' is less than $m + t + u$, then there is a non-trivial linear relationship between C 's, D 's, and P . Once again, since on a valid encryption D 's are zero, we would get a non-trivial linear relation between P 's and C 's, contradicting that the scheme is secrecy-secure. Since the $m + k$ rows of the first $m + t + u$ columns of \mathbf{G}'' are zero, we have that $(v + (m + k) + 1) \geq m + t + u$, or $k + v \geq t + u - 1$. \square

Going back to \mathbf{G} , it is useful to reduce the rows corresponding to P in \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{F} to zero, if possible. In other words, we would like to express P in terms of M , N , and r , if possible (else such blocks are encrypted as in "counter mode"). So, by doing column operations, let the rows in $[\mathbf{I} \mathbf{E}^\top]^\top$ corresponding to P be reduced to

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & X \\ 0 & \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}$$

where the identity matrix is of size w , $0 \leq w \leq m$, resulting in the new equation

$$[M_1 \dots M_{m+k} P_1 \dots P_m r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k} 1] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{F} & \mathbf{E}' \\ \mathbf{B} & & \end{bmatrix} = [C_1 \dots C_{m+t} D_1 \dots D_u 0 \dots 0]$$

Consequently we can assume, w.l.o.g., that the bottom w rows corresponding to P in \mathbf{F} are zero. Let the resulting big matrix be \mathbf{H} .

We now have the system of equations

$$[M_1 \dots M_{m+k} P_1 \dots P_m r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k} 1] \cdot \mathbf{H} = [C_1 \dots C_{m+t} D_1 \dots D_u 0 \dots 0]$$

where in \mathbf{H} the bottom w rows corresponding to P are zero in the columns corresponding to D .

Lemma 2: Either the scheme \mathbf{G} is not message integrity secure or not one-to-one, or $u \geq (m - w)$

Proof: Let c be a ciphertext which is computed based on a given p and r . Consider the sub-matrix of \mathbf{H} which consists of the first $m - w$ rows corresponding to the P 's and the u columns corresponding to D . If this sub-matrix has rank less than $m - w$, then there is a $p' \neq p$ (with p' different from p only in the first $m - w$ indices (blocks)), such that D 's remain same, i.e. zero. Because, of the identity matrix in \mathbf{E}' we can arrive at a p'' , which is identical to p' in the first $m - w$ blocks, but possibly different in the remaining w blocks, so that none of the M 's and N 's are affected (i.e. p'' is consistent with same M s and N s as computed from p). The new p'' still keeps all the D s zero (as the bottom w rows corresponding to P were zeroed out in \mathbf{F}). This new p'' results in a new c'' which is different from c (as the scheme is 1-1). Thus, we have a different c'' . Note that, $p'' \oplus p$, does not depend on p ; and similarly, $c'' \oplus c$ does not depend on p (and not even c). Thus, an adversary with access to a valid c , can come up with a c'' which on decryption leads to all the D 's being zero. Thus, $u \geq m - w$. \square

We will need yet another combination of equations to prove the next lemma. This time, using the identity matrix in \mathbf{E}' corresponding to the P rows, we now also zero out the corresponding entries in \mathbf{B} and let the new matrix be \mathbf{H}' . Thus, \mathbf{H}' is different from \mathbf{H} in only the columns corresponding to C .

Using \mathbf{H}' (or \mathbf{H}) let's rewrite the equations for D more conveniently:

For $i = 1..u$, let

$$D_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m+k} (a_j^i \cdot M_j) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^{m+k} (b_j^i \cdot N_j) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^v (c_j^i \cdot r_j) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^{m-w} (d_j^i \cdot P_j)$$

In the matrix \mathbf{E}' , the first $(m - w)$ columns have the rows corresponding to P equal to zero. In a way these columns also work as hidden integrity checks, though not always. So, for $i = u + 1..u + m - w$ define D'_i similar to above, using the $(m - w)$ columns of \mathbf{E}' or \mathbf{H} .

$$D'_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m+k} (a_j^i \cdot M_j) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^{m+k} (b_j^i \cdot N_j) \oplus \sum_{j=1}^v (c_j^i \cdot r_j)$$

We say that N_i and N_j *resolve* if $N_i \oplus N_j$ can be written as a linear combination of only the C 's and P 's. Similarly, we say that M_i and M_j resolve if $M_i \oplus M_j$ can be written as a linear combination of only the C 's and P 's.

We will later show that there exists a pair $i, j, i \neq j, i, j \in [1..m+k]$ such that

1. N_i and N_j resolve
2. M_i and M_j resolve
3. For all $x \in [1..u+m-w]$, $a_i^x \oplus a_j^x = 0$, and $b_i^x \oplus b_j^x = 0$
4. There exists $y \in [1..m+t]$, $\mathbf{H}'_{2m+k+v+i,y} \oplus \mathbf{H}'_{2m+k+v+j,y} = 1$

In item (4), $\mathbf{H}'_{2m+k+v+i,y}$ is the entry in \mathbf{H}' in row corresponding to N_i and in column corresponding to C_y . Essentially, it says that the rows corresponding to N_i and N_j are not identical (for the first $m+t$ columns).

In the next lemma we show that if such a pair exists with the above four conditions holding then the scheme \mathbf{G} is not message integrity secure.

Lemma 3: If there exists a pair $i, j, i \neq j, i, j \in [1..m+k]$ such that the above four conditions hold, then the scheme \mathbf{G} is not message integrity secure.

Proof: We will show that with probability greater than $1 - O(2^{-n})$ there exists a c' (different from a given c) which can easily be computed (given c and the corresponding p) such that

- $N'_i = N_j$
- $N'_j = N_i$
- for z different from i, j , $N'_z = N_z$
- the first $m-w$ blocks of P remain same

We have a similar set of relations for M , and hence given (3), all the D functions would evaluate to zero, leading to \mathbf{G} being insecure for message integrity.

To demonstrate such a c' , using \mathbf{H}' , we evaluate Δc , for ΔN and ΔM , where

- $\Delta N_j = \Delta N_i = N_i \oplus N_j$
- $\Delta M_j = \Delta M_i = M_i \oplus M_j$

Because of (3) all the D' remain zero, which means there is no change in any other N or M . Moreover the changes above in M and N do not cause any change in the first $m-w$ plaintext blocks (all the changes can be incorporated in the lower w blocks because of the identity matrix in \mathbf{E}'). Since the rows corresponding to the bottom w rows of P in \mathbf{B} were zeroed out, these changes in the plaintext do not affect Δc .

Now, ΔN_j is non-zero with probability $1 - 2^{-n}$ (at least). Since M_i is related to N_i by a random function, the probability that ΔM cancels out ΔN in computing Δc is at most 2^{-n} . This leads to a non-zero Δc because of (4) above with probability at least $1 - O(2^{-n})$.

Since conditions (1) and (2) hold as well, an adversary can compute such a c' from c and p . □

Lemma 4: Either $k + v + u + m - w$ is $\Omega(\log m)$, or the scheme \mathbf{G} is not secrecy secure, or there exists a pair i, j satisfying (1),(2), (3) and (4)

Proof: Recall that,

$$[P_1 \dots P_m r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k} \ 1] \cdot \mathbf{B} = [C_1 \dots C_{m+t}]$$

The rank of the matrix \mathbf{B} is at least m , say m' . Now, we call a pair of rows from the rows corresponding to N in \mathbf{B} dependent if one row can be expressed linearly in terms of other using the bottom w rows corresponding to P . This is clearly an equivalence relation. From each such pairwise dependent set (including sets with only one row), pick only one row, and push the remaining rows to the bottom. Let q be the number of rows so picked. The rank of the top $m + v + q$ rows is still at least m' .

Now if we also ignore the top m rows (corresponding to P), the rank of the remaining $v + q$ rows is still m' , for otherwise we have a non-trivial linear relationship between C and P , and hence the scheme is not secrecy secure.

This implies (by lemma 2.2) that

$$[r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_q] = [\langle f(C, P) \rangle] + (\text{GF2})^n \cdot V_1 + \dots + (\text{GF2})^n \cdot V_{q+v-m'}$$

where $\langle f(C, P) \rangle$ is a set of linear functions of C and P , and V_i are linearly-independent binary row-vectors. For a subset of N 's with indices a set $J \subseteq [1..q]$ to be pair-wise “non-resolving” thus requires $q + v - m' \geq \log |J|$. In other words, there exists $i, j \in J, i \neq j, N_i$ and N_j resolve if $q + v - m' < \log |J|$. Stated differently, there is a set $J1$ of size $|J1| = (q)/2^{q+v-m'}$ in which all pairs of N 's resolve with each other.

Now each M_i can be written as a linear combination of r, N and P (using matrix \mathbf{E}). Once again (using lemma 2.2) we have

$$[r_1 \dots r_v N_1 \dots N_{m+k}] = [\langle f'(C, P) \rangle] + (\text{GF2})^n \cdot V'_1 + \dots + (\text{GF2})^n \cdot V'_{m+k+v-m'}$$

where $V'_1 \dots V'_{m+k+v-m'}$ are linearly-independent binary row vectors. Thus, for any set of indices $J' \subseteq [1..m+k]$, there is a set $J'' \subseteq J'$ of size $|J''|$ at least $|J'|/2^{m+k+v-m'}$, such that all pairs of M s in this set J'' resolve with each other.

Using $J1$ for J' , thus there is a set $J2$ of size $q/2^{q+v-m'+m+k+v-m'}$ such that for all $i, j \in J2, M_i$ and M_j resolve, and so do N_i and N_j .

Similarly, there is a set $J3$ of size $|J3| = |J2|/2^{u+m-w}$ such that

$$\forall k \in [1..u + m - w], \forall i, j \in J3 : a_i^k \oplus a_j^k = 0$$

Thus, there exists a pair satisfying (1), (2) ,(3) and (4) if $2^{m+k+q+2v-2m'+u+m-w} < q$. Now, $q + v \geq m' \geq m$. Thus, either v is $\Omega(\log m)$ in which case we are done, or q is at least $\Omega(m)$. Thus, there exists a pair satisfying (1.4) if $m + k + q + 2v - 2m' + u + m - w < O(\log m)$. Since, $q - m < k$, the previous inequality is implied by $2(k + v) + u + m - w < O(\log m) + 2(m' - m)$, which in turn is implied by $2(k + v) + 2(u + m - w) < O(\log m)$. Thus, either there exists a pair with (1.4) holding or, $k + v + u + m - w$ is $\Omega(\log m)$. \square

Finally, we are ready to prove the main theorem.

Proof (Theorem 1): By Lemma 3, since the scheme \mathbf{G} is message integrity secure, there does not exist a pair with conditions (1.4) holding. Thus, by lemma 4, and the fact that \mathbf{G} is secrecy secure, we have $k + v + u + m - w > \Omega(\log m)$. By lemma 1 and 2 it follows that $k + v$ is at least $\Omega(\log m)$. \square

4.1 Block Ciphers as Random Permutation Generators

In section 3, and the corresponding theorem in section 4, the block cipher was modeled as a random permutation (or random function). However, it is plausible that the block cipher may be keyed differently to encrypt different blocks (particularly, since we allow v blocks of randomness which could be used as key materials).

It can be shown that the previous theorem generalizes to block ciphers modeled as functions from $2n$ bits to n bits (which is even more general than random function generators [8]) with only a factor of two cut in the lower bound. Essentially, the only change occurs in lemma 4, where we estimate the size of the set J_2 .

References

- [1] ANSI X3.106, “American National Standard for Information Systems – Data Encryption Algorithm – Modes of Operation”, American National Standards Institute, 1983.
- [2] M. Bellare, J. Kilian, P. Rogaway, “The Security of Cipher Block Chaining”, CRYPTO 94, LNCS 839, 1994 348
- [3] M. Bellare, C. Namprempe, “Authenticated Encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm”, Proc. Asiacrypt 2000, T. Okamoto ed., Springer Verlag 2000
- [4] V.D. Gligor, P.Donescu, “Integrity Aware PCBC Encryption Schemes”, 7th Intl. Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, LNCS, 1999 348
- [5] V.D. Gligor, P. Donescu, “Fast Encryption Authentication: XCBC Encryption and XECB Authentication Modes”, Proc. Fast Software Encryption 2001. 348, 350
- [6] ISO 8372, “Information processing – Modes of operation for a 64-bit block cipher algorithm”, International Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland, 1987
- [7] ISO/IEC 9797, “Data cryptographic techniques – Data integrity mechanism using a cryptographic check function employing a block cipher algorithm”, 1989
- [8] M. Luby, “Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications”, Princeton Computer Science Notes, 1996. 359
- [9] C.S. Jutla, “Encryption Modes with Almost Free Message Integrity”, Proc. Eurocrypt 2001, LNCS 2045. 348, 349, 350, 352
- [10] J. Katz and M. Yung, “Unforgeable Encryption and Adaptively Secure Modes of Operation”, Proc. Fast Software Encryption 2000. 348
- [11] Modified PCBC for DES,
<http://diswww.mit.edu:8008/menelaus.mit.edu/kprot/23> 348

- [12] Adam Black, Anton Stiglic, “Free-Mac Mode”, sci.crypt Newsgroup, 2000/03/07 **348**
- [13] Saunders MacLane, “Algebra”, New York : Macmillan (1967) **351**
- [14] L. R. Knudsen, X. Lai, B. Preneel, “Attacks on Fast Double Block Length Hash Functions”, Journal of Cryptology, Vol 11, No. 1, Winter 1998 **349, 350**
- [15] Hugo Krawczyk, “LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication”, Proc. Crypto 94. LNCS 839, 1994
- [16] C. H. Meyer, S. M. Matyas, “Cryptography: A New Dimension in Computer Data Security”, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1982
- [17] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation”, SP 800-38A, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html> **350**
- [18] National Bureau of Standards, NBS FIPS PUB 81, “DES modes of operation”, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1980. **348**
- [19] RFC 1510, “The Kerberos network authentication service (V5)”, J. Kohl and B. C. Neuman, Sept 1993
- [20] Phillip Rogaway, Mihir Bellare, John Black, and Ted Krovetz, “OCB: A Block-Cipher Mode of Operation for Efficient Authenticated Encryption”, Eighth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS-8), ACM Press, pp. 196-205, 2001. **348, 350**