

Madrasa Reform as a Secularizing Process: A View from the Late Russian Empire

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What is Islamic about reform among Muslims and what is not? How can we differentiate reform within an Islamic paradigm and a paradigmatic shift from the Islamic tradition to something else in a Muslim community? How do we establish the connection between reform as an intellectual or scholarly project and the translation of that project into social reality (or, in some cases, the absence of such a translation)? This article addresses these questions in the context of the Volga-Ural region in the late Russian Empire, where reformist Muslims attempted to reform existing Islamic educational institutions, particularly the religious seminaries called “madrasas,” as a means to modernize the region’s Muslim communities. Educational reform initiatives among Volga-Ural Muslims originated within the framework of Muslim networks and institutions. Yet, especially after Russia’s Revolution of 1905, reform in a number of prominent madrasas came to be characterized by various non-religious and at times even anti-religious influences emerging from the globalization of Western European modernity. Consequently, in these madrasas, education and the overall student experience turned into a secularizing process, and Islam as a religious system lost its weight and appeal for many students, who then engaged in a reform movement that evolved beyond an Islamic paradigm.

For the leading scholars of reform among Muslims, the idea of reform in Islam has usually corresponded with the concepts of renewal (*tajdīd*) and setting aright (*iṣlāḥ*) in the two authoritative sources of Islam—the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions. These scholars therefore trace the history of reform among Muslims as far back as the early centuries of Islam.¹ Yet, they

Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Stephen Kotkin, Mona Hassan, Bruce Lawrence, Ebrahim Moosa, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, and the editors and anonymous reviewers of *Comparative Studies in Society and History* for their invaluable help in improving this article.

¹ See John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: *Tajdid* and *Islah*,” in John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), esp.

also note Europe's rise to global eminence, especially from the eighteenth century onward, as an historic development that obliged reformist Muslims to focus their efforts on dealing with the growing power discrepancy between Western European states and Muslim communities around the world. Since the late nineteenth century, a common response of reformist Muslims to this challenge has been a dedicated effort to render Muslim theology, law, and institutions compatible with the evolving standards of modernity—as perceived by reformist Muslims—in order to enable Muslim communities to adapt to those standards.² Scholars generally characterize such efforts among Muslims as “Islamic” or “within Islam,” thereby locating them within an Islamic paradigm.³ In the case of Volga-Ural Muslims, however, although the educational reform movement started as the product of an effort to improve schooling within the existing system of Islamic education, it gradually turned into a movement *away* from this system and from Islam in general. It came to mean leaving the Islamic tradition and adopting in its place a European-inspired, secular educational model.

The distinction I make here in locating madrasa reforms among Volga-Ural Muslims *within* or *away* from Islam is not about the compliance of those reforms with a universally accepted or unchanging “textual blueprint” that defines what is Islamic.⁴ After all, even a cursory look at Muslims across

33–37; John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1984), esp. 30–39.

² *The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); *The Islamic Revival since 1988: A Critical Survey and Bibliography* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), both by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, offer extensive bibliographies of reform movements among Muslims. For the evolution of the standards and definition of modernity, among many other sources, see Peter N. Stearns, “Modernization and Social History: Some Suggestions, and a Muted Cheer,” *Journal of Social History* 14, 2 (1980): 189–209; Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18; the collection of articles on “Multiple Modernities” in *Daedalus* 129, 1 (2000); Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjunction,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2, 1 (2001): 111–64; and Chris Lorenz, “‘Won’t You Tell Me, Where Have All the Good Times Gone?’ On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Modernization Theory for History,” *Rethinking History* 10, 2 (2006): 171–200. Bruce Lawrence provides a good analysis of how modernity has been conceptualized in the field of Islamic studies in “Modernity,” in Jamal J. Elias, ed., *Key Themes for the Study of Islam* (Oxford: OneWorld Publications, 2010), 245–62.

³ For a few examples, see Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth-Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); Voll, “Renewal and Reform”; Nehemia Levtzion and John O. Voll, eds., *Eighteenth-Century Revival and Reform in Islam* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987); David Dean Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Ottoman Syria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Haddad, *The Contemporary Islamic Revival*; Fazlur Rahman, “Revival and Reform in Islam,” in P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2B (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 632–56; and Ahmet Kanlıdere, *Reform within Islam: The Tajdid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars, 1809–1917: Conciliation or Conflict?* (İstanbul: Eren, 1997).

⁴ For a brief review of how scholars of Islam, primarily anthropologists, have approached this “textual blueprint,” see Gregory Starrett, “The Anthropology of Islam,” in Stephen D. Glazier, ed., *Anthropology of Religion: A Handbook* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 282, 288–90.

time and space reveals many differences both in doctrine and in practice; the blueprint that defines what is Islamic can and does change in different contexts, and this fluidity eliminates the possibility of demarcating sharp lines around what is or is not Islamic.

What, then, differentiates a movement within Islam from one that moves away from it? I find Talal Asad's definition of Islam as a "discursive tradition" helpful in answering this question. Asad argues that Islam "is a tradition" that "includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith." Yet, it is a *discursive* tradition, because it is "the practitioners' conceptions of what is *apt performance*, and of how the past is related to practices, that will be crucial for tradition, not the apparent repetition of an old form." Therefore, a practice becomes Islamic if "it is authorized by the discursive traditions of Islam, and is so taught to Muslims" by the authorities of a given context, be they scholars, preachers, Sufi masters, or even one's parents.⁵ This definition preserves the fluidity of what the designation "Islamic" means across time and space, but it also gives us an opportunity to evaluate how certain practices, such as the madrasa reforms of the Volga-Ural region, relate to a discursive Islamic tradition. If a reform activity initiates a change of attitudes about the very necessity of compliance with Islamic principles and discursive ideals, or if it cuts its participants off from the authority structures needed to maintain and engage those principles and ideals, it may be qualified as a movement *away* from the Islamic tradition. The educational reform movement among Volga-Ural Muslims provides both of these conditions, and therefore I suggest that it is better understood as a reform activity among Muslims that indicates a shift from the Islamic tradition to something else.

THE CONTEXT OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM

Madrasa reform in the Volga-Ural region emerged in the context of two broader transformations: the large-scale reform projects of the late Russian Empire that aimed to increase administrative and economic efficiency in an effort to catch up with Western Europe's level of development, and the religious revival movements that surged within and spread through Muslim communities around the world from at least the eighteenth century onward.⁶ Ğabdurrahîm bin Ğusman Utz İmenî (1754–1835) and Ebunnasr Ğabdunnasîr el-Qursâvî (1776–1812) were two prominent Muslim scholars from the Volga-Ural region in whose works we can observe the influence of the eighteenth-century religious revival movements among Muslims. Between the mid-seventeenth

⁵ Talal Asad, *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Occasional Papers Series, 1986).

⁶ Among other sources, see Levtzion and Voll, eds., *Eighteenth-Century*; and George Rentz, *The Birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb (1703/4–1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia* (London: Arabian Publications, 2004).

and late nineteenth centuries, aspiring students of Islamic scholarship from the Volga-Ural region traveled to Bukhara, or more broadly to Transoxiana, to access a higher level of learning not available in Russia.⁷ Utız İmenî and Qursâvî also studied in Bukhara, but then they called for a reevaluation of the long-established Bukhara-based Islamic scholarship and its practical implications in the daily lives of Muslims in the Volga-Ural region. Following a common theme among eighteenth-century Muslim reformers around the world, Qursâvî, especially, forcefully criticized the scholars of his time for dissociating from the founding sources of Islam like the Qur'an and the prophetic traditions and relying instead on the works of later scholars. These criticisms prompted long-lasting debates among the Volga-Ural ulama and provided an incentive for religious and educational reform by generating a vein of discontent about the quality of Islamic scholarship in the region.⁸

Then, in the late nineteenth century, a more practical incentive for educational reform emerged among Volga-Ural Muslims as a result of the sweeping transformations in the Russian imperial framework. Following its defeat by European powers and the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Russian state launched a series of reform projects that came to be known as the “Great Reforms.” These projects and the accompanying improvements in Russia’s economic, political, and physical infrastructure, which continued until World War I, created many opportunities for Volga-Ural Muslims. Railways, postal services, and big financial institutions exposed formerly insulated Muslim communities to the effects of a rapidly globalizing world economy.⁹ It became possible for a significant number of Muslims to travel to and stay in Russia’s cosmopolitan cities or the Ottoman territories and Egypt. Some even went to Western Europe. A growing bureaucracy and the introduction of local governing bodies brought the imperial state closer to its subjects. Services that the Muslims had rarely accessed in earlier times, such as imperial

⁷ Mustafa Özgür Tuna, “Imperial Russia’s Muslims: Inroads of Modernity,” PhD diss., Princeton University, 2009, 58–61.

⁸ Rızaeddin Fahreddin, *Âsar: Üz Memleketimizde Ulgan İslâm Âlimleriniñ Tercüme ve Tabaqaları* (Kazan: Tipo-litografiya imparatoroskogo universiteta, 1900–1908), vol. 1: 95–130, 290, 300–16, 331, 469–70, 476–78; and vol. 2: 15–16, 72, 75, 105, 146–51, 218, 234, 267–79, 320, 341, 393–95, 407–8, 432, 461, 471; Michael Kemper, “Entre Boukhara et la Moyenne-Volga: Abd an-Naşır al-Qursâvî (1776–1812) en conflit avec les oulémas traditionalistes,” *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 37, 1–2 (1996): 41–51; Michael Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte in Tatarien und Baskirien, 1789–1889: Der Islamische Diskurs unter Russischer Herrschaft* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998), esp. 172–212, 225–13; Michael Kemper, “Şihâbadîn al-Marğânî über Abū n-Naşır Qursâvîs Koflikt mit den Gelehrten Bucharas,” in Anke von Kügelgen, Aşırbek Muminov, and Michael Kemper, eds., *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia: Vol. 3: Arabic Persian and Turkic Manuscripts (15th–19th Centuries)* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2000), 353–71; İbrahim Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dinî Yenileşme (1850–1917)* (Istanbul: Ötügen, 2002), esp. 47–53.

⁹ On the globalization of the world economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999).

educational institutions or public health facilities, became more readily available to them, especially in relatively urbanized locations.¹⁰

A telling sign of the significance of these transformations is the support wealthy Muslim merchants gave to educational reform initiatives in the Volga-Ural region. Merchants experienced first-hand the fast-changing circumstances of the world that surrounded the insular peasant communities of the Volga-Ural Muslims. Thus they felt the need to train young Muslims with skills needed to adapt to the demands of an increasingly capitalist and globally integrated economy.¹¹ The founder of one of the first reformed madrasas in the Volga-Ural region, Ğälimcan Barudî (1857–1921), was the son of Muhammedcan Ğaliyef (1832–1909), a successful merchant who made a fortune in the 1860s by selling Asian shoes and headgear in the city of Kazan. Ğaliyef also developed an interest in finance, entered the boards of several banks in Kazan, and served as an elected member of the Kazan City Duma between 1875 and 1905.¹² Similarly, the Hüseyinof brothers, one of the biggest Russian Muslim merchant families of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, financed the reform initiatives in at least two big madrasas in the Urals region: the Hüseyiniye Madrasa in Orenburg and the Ğusmâniye Madrasa in Ufa.¹³ One graduate of the Ğusmâniye Madrasa, Ziyâ Kemâlî (1873–1942), studied in Cairo with a scholarship from the Ufa Muslim Charitable Society, and when he returned to Ufa in 1904 the wealthy Muslims of Ufa helped him open a large madrasa, the Ğaliye, with a Westernized curriculum that offered courses on chemistry, history, psychology, and the Russian language, in addition to religious courses.¹⁴

THE MODELS FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM

The Volga-Ural Muslims' discontent with the quality of their Islamic scholarship and the effects of the transformations in the Russian imperial framework

¹⁰ Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims," 106–20.

¹¹ See Halîl Sultanmuhammed, "Sevdagirlik," *Şûra* 15 (1911): 461–62; G. A. Dikhtiar, *Vnutrenniaia torgovlia v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960); Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims," esp. 152–61.

¹² Munir Yusupov, *Galimdzhan Barudî* (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 2003), 20–28. Also see Abdullah Battal-Taymas, *Kazanlı Türk Meşhurlarından Alimcan Barudî* (Istanbul: İstanbul Sıralar Matbaası, 1958).

¹³ On the Hüseyinof Brothers, see Rızaeddin Fahreddin, *Ahmed Bay* (Orenburg: Vaqıt Matbaası, 1911); and Burhan Şeref, *Gani Bay* (Orenburg: Vakit Matbaası, 1913). On the Hüseyiniye Madrasa, see Mâdinâ Râximkulova and Liron Xâmidullin, "Xüsâyniyâ Mâdrâsâse," in Röstâm Mâhdiev, ed., *Mâdrâsâlerdâ Kitap Kıştâse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nâşriyatı, 1992). For the Ğusmâniye Madrasa, see Z. T. Sharafuddinov and Iaakub Iskhak Khanbikov, *Istoriia pedagogiki Tatarstana* (Kazan: Kazan State Pedagogical University, 1998), 138–39; and Fahreddin, *Ahmed Bay*, 31. Similarly to the Hüseyinof Brothers, a merchant family from Tyumen, the Saydukof Brothers, financed the madrasa of their city beginning in the 1870s and they invited reformist scholars to it in the 1890s. Foat Väliyev, "Sibir Mâdrâsâse," in Röstâm Mâhdiev, ed., *Mâdrâsâlerdâ Kitap Kıştâse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nâşriyatı, 1992), 185–98.

¹⁴ Süläyman Râximov, "Galiyâ Mâdrâsâse," in Röstâm Mâhdiev, ed., *Mâdrâsâlerdâ Kitap Kıştâse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nâşriyatı, 1992), 114–28.

form the backdrop against which madrasa reforms took place in the region, but they do not explain how these reforms turned into a movement away from the Islamic tradition. The answer lies in the models that inspired Volga-Ural reformists, namely the Westernized institutions of lay education in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Volga-Ural Muslims distinguished both places as Muslim-ruled territories, but nonetheless, the intellectual culture that evolved around their Westernized institutions of lay education, loaded with secular and even anti-religious ideological baggage, eventually permeated the reformed madrasas of the Volga-Ural region and the experiences of their students.

The idea of educational reform as a means to revitalize Muslim communities was a dominant theme among Muslim reformists of the late nineteenth century in many parts of the world. This idea materialized in many different forms that range from the modest improvements of the Zaytuna Madrasa in Tunis in the 1860s to the Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in India that opened in 1875.¹⁵ But the particular version of educational reform that struck students and scholars from the Volga-Ural region was the creation of European-inspired institutions of lay education in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Especially in the Ottoman Empire, military engineering schools, professional—particularly medical, military, and judicial—schools, public schools at various levels, and a university in Istanbul constituted a new educational system that was independent from and parallel to the existing institutions of Islamic education.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Jonathan P. Berkey, "Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, Education, and the Problem of Muslim Identity," in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 40–60; David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, 2 (1999): 294–323; and Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, "Muslim Reformist Action in Nineteenth-Century Tunisia," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 25, 2 (2008): 49–82.

¹⁶ See Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991); Linda Ann Herrera, "The Sanctity of the School: New Islamic Education and Modern Egypt," PhD diss., Columbia University, 2000; Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Berrak Burçak, "Science, a Remedy for all Ills. Healing 'the Sick Man of Europe': A Case for Ottoman Scientism," PhD diss., Princeton University, 2005, 27–54; and James Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (repr., London: Frank Cass, 1968 [1939]). European-inspired schools separate from the existing Islamic educational institutions opened also in other Muslim countries like Iran and British India, but it was the Ottoman and to some extent Egyptian schools that influenced the Russian Muslim reformists the most. See Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation*; and Monica M. Ringer, *Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar Iran* (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 2001).

It was no accident that Ottoman and Egyptian institutions of lay education were chosen as a model for madrasa reform in the Volga-Ural region. Most of Russia's leading reformist Muslims established and maintained close relations with the scholars and intellectual circles of these countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Aside from the role of print media in facilitating such contacts,¹⁷ increasing numbers of Muslims from the Russian Empire traveled to the Ottoman territories—mostly to perform the Hajj—thanks to improvements in transportation in the second half of the nineteenth century. Additionally, following the Crimean War and the Russian invasion of the Caucasus region, hundreds of thousands of Russian Muslims migrated to Anatolia and the Ottoman Balkans, especially from the Crimea and the Caucasus but also from the Volga-Ural region.¹⁸ For instance, when İsmâ'îl Gaspıralı, a famous reformist Russian Muslim from the Crimea, visited Istanbul in 1874, his paternal uncle was already a resident of the city to host him.¹⁹

Muslim students from the Russian Empire studied in the Westernized institutions of higher education in the Ottoman Empire, and some of them returned to Russia to found or teach in educational institutions that offered European-inspired courses with European pedagogical principles. In his European travel notes, Fâtiḥ Kerimî, from the Kazan region, who taught at Hüseyiniye Madrasa in Ufa after graduating from the Ottoman Imperial School of Public Administration in Istanbul, provides information about several Westernized institutions of higher education in Istanbul where Russian Muslim students studied or could study.²⁰ Ğubeydullah Bubî (1865–1938) graduated from the same school and returned to his village in the Viatka Province of the Ural region after finishing his studies, where he and his younger brother Ğabdullah Bubî (1871–1922) turned the village madrasa into one of the most controversial Westernized madrasas of the Russian Empire, the Bubi Madrasa.²¹

¹⁷ See İsmail Türkoğlu, *Rusya Türkleri Arasında Yenileşme Hareketinin Öncülerinden Rızaeddin Fahreddin* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000), 102–3; Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Echoes to al-Manār among the Muslims of the Russian Empire: A Preliminary Research Note on Rıza al-Din b. Fakhr al-Din and the Şūrā (1908–1918)," in Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Kosugi Yasushi, eds., *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 85–117.

¹⁸ About the migration of Muslims from the Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire, see Justin McCarthy, *Death in Exile* (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995); Abdullah Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (1856–1876)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997); and *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kazan* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2005), 69–178.

¹⁹ Edward J. Lazzarini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878–1914," PhD diss., University of Washington, 1973, 5.

²⁰ Fâtiḥ Kerimî, *Avrupa Seyahatnamesi* (repr. in modern Turkish adaptation, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 2001 [1901]), 131–33.

²¹ Raif Märdanov, Ramil Minnullin, and Süläyman Răximov, *Bertugan Bubiylar Mädresäse* (Kazan: Ruhıyat, 1999); Al'ta Kh. Makhmutova, *Lish tebe narod sluzhen'e: istoriia tatarskogo*

Even when the Russian Muslim students who went to the Ottoman territories or Egypt studied in seemingly conventional institutions of Islamic education, like the madrasas of Medina or al-Azhar in Cairo, they could still be influenced by the modernist scholars at them. These included the renowned Muslim reformist of the early twentieth century Muhammad ‘Abduh at al-Azhar, and the scholars whom Abdulhamîd II (1876–1909) exiled to Medina because of their political activities. Muhammad ‘Abduh, for instance, had a strong influence over Ziyâ Kemâlî, the founder of the Ğaliye Madrasa in Ufa,²² and Ğabdurreşîd İbrâhîm (1857–1944), an influential Russian Muslim reformist and political activist, especially during the Revolution of 1905, received his initiation into politics from the exiled Ottoman scholars and intellectuals in Medina.²³

Scholars from the Volga-Ural region who had finished their studies also traveled to the Ottoman territories and Egypt and met the scholars and intellectual figures of major cities like Istanbul, Mecca, Medina, and Cairo. For instance, Barudî studied first in Kazan and then in Bukhara. When he finished and returned to Kazan to open his own madrasa, which was named after his father Muhammedcan Ğaliyef as the “Muhammediye Madrasa,” he already thought the madrasa education system needed to be improved, but he did not know how to set about this.²⁴ In 1886, he went on a Hajj journey through Istanbul and Cairo and exchanged ideas with the scholars and intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire along the way. He later wrote that this trip “enriched his understanding in the field of religion and straightened his ideas on madrasa reform.” Barudî does not specify whom he met during this journey or how his ideas on madrasa reform actually evolved as a result of his contacts, but from the changes that he initiated at the Muhammediye Madrasa beginning in the early 1890s, we can infer that he was influenced by the Westernist currents then prevalent in the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ Barudî was probably also

prosvetitel'stva v sud'bach dinastii Nigmatullinykh-Bubi (Kazan: Izdatel'stvo Magarif, 2003), 59–62.

²² Răximov, “Ğaliyâ Mädresäse,” 115.

²³ Ğabdurreşîd İbrâhîmof, *Tercüme-yi Hâlim yaki Başıma Kilenler* (St. Petersburg: Elektropeçhati A. O. İbragimova), 76–113. Also see Ravil Amirkhanov, “Mulla i revoliutsioner—v odnom litse,” *Gasırlar Avazı/Ekho Vekov* 3/4 (2001), at: http://www.archive.gov.tatarstan.ru/magazine/go/anonymous/main/?path=mg:/numbers/2001_3_4/04/04_4/&searched=1 (accessed 19 Oct. 2008). On the function of Medina as a center of intellectual activity, see Stefan Reichmuth, “The Interplay of Local Developments and Transnational Relations in the Islamic World: Perceptions and Perspectives,” in Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, and Allen J. Frank, eds., *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998): 21–26.

²⁴ For the Muhammediye Madrasa, see Ravil Āmirxan, “Muxammädiyâ Mädresäse,” in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädresälärdä Kitap Kıştāse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nāşriyatı, 1992), 12–33.

²⁵ Battal-Taymas, *Kazanlı Türk Meşhurlarından*, 15–20; Āmirxan, “Muxammädiyâ Mädresäse,” 15, 19, 32–33; Yusupov, *Galimdžhan Barudı*, 48–49.

inspired by Gaspıralı, who maintained close connections with Ottoman intellectual circles and inspired many reformist Muslims in the Russian Empire and Central Asia through his publications and personal encouragement. One of Barudî's first reform initiatives was to introduce a new method of teaching literacy, *usûl-i cedîd* (literally the "new method"), which Gaspıralı had borrowed from the Ottoman Empire and had been trying to propagate in Russia since 1884.²⁶

Similarly, Zeynullah Rasûlî (1835–1917) studied in the Volga-Ural region. He went on two Hajj journeys in 1869 and 1882 during which he met famous religious scholars of the major cities on his way. In his first journey he received Sufi initiation into the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandî Sufi order from Sheikh Ahmed Ziyâüddin Gümüşhânevî, known for his innovative ideas about finding Islamically acceptable solutions to modern problems, such as initiating a mutual aid society as an alternative to banking.²⁷ In Russia, Rasûlî gathered a large following as a Naqshbandî Khalidi sheikh, and in 1884, with the support of his followers, he built a complex that involved a mosque, library, hospice, and madrasa, which became known as the Rasûliye Madrasa. In the 1890s, and especially in the early twentieth century when Rasûlî's son Ğabdurrahmân Rasûlî started to administer the madrasa with his father, the Rasûliye Madrasa also joined the reformed madrasas of the Russian Empire.²⁸

Aside from the creation of new, European-inspired schools, the Ottoman and Egyptian madrasas evolved and improved, particularly in the early twentieth century.²⁹ Moreover, there were various attempts to institute reformed but still Islamic educational institutions in Egypt.³⁰ But these developments were rather imperceptible compared to the growth of new schools that provided lay education, and already by the end of the nineteenth century lay school graduates manned the bureaucracy, military, and press, especially in the

²⁶ See Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey"; Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 162–64, passim; and Fahri Temizyürek, "Osmanlı Mekteplerinde Ceditçilik Hareketi ve Gaspıralı'nın İlham Kaynakları," in Hakan Kırımlı, ed., *Ismail Bey Gaspıralı İçin* (Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Yayınları, 2004).

²⁷ See Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century," *Die Welt des Islam* 22, 1 (1982): 1–36; İrfan Gündüz, *Gümüşhânevî Ahmed Ziyâüddin (ks): Hayatı-Eserleri-Tarikatı Anlayışı ve Hâlidîyye Tarikatı* (Ankara: Seha Neşriyat, 1984).

²⁸ Hamid Algar, "Shaykh Zaynullah Rasulev: The Last Great Naqshbandî Shaykh of the Volga-Ural Region," in Jo-Ann Gross, ed., *Muslims in Central Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 112–33; İbrahim Maraş, "İdil-Ural Bölgesinin Ceditçi Dinî Lideri Zeynullah Rasûlî'nin Hayatı ve Görüşleri," *Dinî Araştırmalar* 1, 1 (1998): 76–92; L. Iamaeva, "Ğabdrakhman Rasulev," in S. M. Prozorov, ed., *İslam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol. 4 (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literature, 1998), 68–69.

²⁹ See Yaşar Sarıkaya, *Medreseler ve Modernleşme* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1997), esp. 71–200; Indira Falk Gesink, "Islamic Reformation: A History of Madrasa Reform and Legal Change in Egypt," *Comparative Education Review* 50, 3 (2006): 325–45.

³⁰ Herrera, "The Sanctity of the School."

Ottoman Empire but also in Egypt.³¹ Not surprisingly, it was the impressive growth of these lay educational institutions, more than the improvements in religious educational institutions, which caught the attention of reformist Muslims in Russia.

IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN RUSSIA

Reformist Muslims of the Volga-Ural region could have followed the Ottoman or Egyptian models directly and tried to open lay educational institutions, but instead they focused their efforts on reforming the area's madrasas. The Volga-Ural madrasas appeared to have many inadequacies by the standards of modern educational institutions that these reformists observed in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and the Russian Empire. Their buildings were often poorly designed and maintained, lacking basic facilities and hygienic standards. Most madrasas had only one instructor who could teach in only one or a few fields of Islamic scholarship, which obliged the students to continually switch madrasas as they studied. The books students read were in Arabic—a foreign language for the Turkic-speaking Volga-Ural Muslims—but the region's madrasas offered only poor language instruction. Students entered a madrasa to study a more or less standardized list of books under the supervision of their instructors, each proceeded at his own pace, and more often than not, it took a discouragingly long time before one could read all the required books.³² Nevertheless, the primary function of the region's madrasas was to provide men of religion to its Muslim communities, and they fulfilled this function adequately. Indeed, in the late nineteenth century, when the major reform initiatives took place, the region's madrasas supplied significantly more men of religion than its Muslim communities could employ.³³ Therefore, in theory at least, the reformists could have left the madrasas alone and established lay educational institutions.

But establishing lay educational institutions required securing permissions from the Russian imperial state, and this was unlikely until at least the 1910s.³⁴ The madrasas, however, were relatively free from government

³¹ Caner Arabacı, *Osmanlı Dönemi Konya Medreseleri (1900–1924)* (Konya: Konya Ticaret Odası, 1998), 452–53; Heyworth-Dunne, *Education in Modern Egypt*; Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

³² See Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*, 215–17; Türkoğlu, *Rusya Türkleri Arasında*, 40–41; Allen J. Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District & the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910* (Boston: Brill, 2001).

³³ Ia[kov] D[mitrevich] Koblov, *O magometanskikh mullakh: religiozno-bytovoï ocherk* (repr., Kazan: Izdatel'stvo Iman, 1998 [1907]), 125; and “Mullalıktan Küñil Suvunuvı ve İşbu Haqda Sualler,” *Şüra* 1 (1914): 20.

³⁴ For an attempt to open a Muslim Girls' Gymnasium, that is, a lay institution of education for Muslim girls, and the bureaucratic complications this caused in 1913, see Alta Maxmutova, “Kazandagı Kızlar Öcin Mäktäp-Mädräsälär,” in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädräsälärdä Kitap Kıştäsä* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Näşriyatı, 1992), 142–48; and National Archive of the Republic

intervention in the early stages of the madrasa reforms. Before the 1870s, Russian bureaucrats perceived institutions of Islamic education as connected to the mosques, and mosques in the Volga-Ural region remained under the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, an institution that regulated the religious affairs of Muslims in the Volga-Ural region, most of European Russia, and Siberia, and answered to the minister of internal affairs.³⁵ Beginning in the 1870s, the imperial state repeatedly passed laws to transfer the jurisdiction of *maktabs* (Muslim elementary schools) and madrasas from the Assembly to the Ministry of Public Enlightenment, but it was unable to enforce these laws. In the end, the Assembly lost its authority over the *maktabs* and madrasas while the Ministry failed to take them under de facto control. Muslim communities steadfastly thwarted the attempts of school inspectors to supervise and regulate *maktabs* and madrasas, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was too wary of instigating a religious rebellion among Muslims to back the Ministry of Public Enlightenment bureaucrats with its police forces. By the century's turn, the Ministry of Public Enlightenment was able to require all *maktabs* and madrasas that had opened after 1870 to offer the Russian language as a course subject in order to obtain or maintain official recognition. Occasionally, it could even close certain *maktabs* and madrasas, but it could not control what Muslim instructors taught to their students or how they taught it.

Thus, especially in the 1880s and 1890s, when the first substantial attempts to improve Muslim schooling in the Russian Empire took place, *maktabs* and madrasas existed in an administrative limbo. Muslim reformists could take over an old madrasa and experiment with its system of education without having to get permission from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment or remain under the supervision of its inspectors. If they wanted to open a new madrasa, all they had to do to evade state intervention was offer the Russian language as a course subject, and the reformists willingly did this anyway.³⁶

Another advantage of the existing madrasa system for the reformists was the high value that the Volga-Ural region's Muslim communities attributed to Islamic education, which, in practical terms, meant material support and a

of Tatarstan (henceforth, NART), f. 1, op. 4, d. 5526, pp. 3–6. Despite these bureaucratic complications, opening a lay institution of education for Muslim girls was still within the limits of possibility by 1913, but definitely not before the revolution of 1905. For other reformist initiatives about female education, see note 53.

³⁵ On the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, see Daniel Damirovich Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe Magometanskoe Dukhovnoe Sobranie v kontse XVIII–XIX vv.* (Ufa: Gilem, 1999); Robert Crews, "Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia," *American Historical Review* 108, 1 (2008): 1–51.

³⁶ See NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 19435, pp. 12–14. Also see Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims," 98–137.

reliable supply of students.³⁷ Almost every Russian Muslim community employed a mullah (a certified man of religion) to oversee its religious needs, and almost every mullah provided elementary Islamic education to the community's children.³⁸ In addition, hundreds of Islamic scholars with more advanced levels of knowledge offered religious training at the madrasa level to aspiring young men in mosques and, when funds were available, in separate buildings that served as dorms and classrooms.³⁹ Even if the Russian Muslim reformists secured permission from the imperial state and convinced their merchant sponsors to build lay schools as in the Ottoman Empire, finding students for them would be difficult. In fact, the Russian state did establish model secondary-level schools for Muslims that provided secular education along with some religious training, but their poor reception by the population remained a major problem in the Volga-Ural region until the early twentieth century.⁴⁰ Working with the existing system of Islamic education, on the other hand, enabled Russian Muslim reformists to tap into the readily available scholarly and student networks in order to attract students and spread their ideas of change.⁴¹

Although locating their reform initiatives within the madrasa system enabled Muslim reformists to benefit from the Volga-Ural Muslims' support for Islamic education, the continuity of that support in the long run required the approval of the region's Muslim communities regarding the actual content of those initiatives. In the Ottoman Empire, the government had avoided meddling with the existing institutions of Islamic education and created a parallel system of lay

³⁷ This seems to be a broadly shared attitude among Muslim communities across time and space. See Jonathan Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 3–5.

³⁸ NART, f. 92, op. 1, d. 11513, pp. 16–20; Mikhail Rybushkin, *Kratkaia istoriia goroda Kazani*, pt. 2 (Kazan: Tip. L. Shevietis, 1849), 92–95; Seydahmet, *Gaspıralı İsmail Bey*, 104; R. U. Amirkhanov, "Nekotorye osobennosti razvitiia narodnogo obrazovaniia u Tatar v dooktiabrskii period," in R. M. Amirkhanov and I. A. Giliazov, eds., *Narodnoe prosveshcheniie u Tatar v dooktiabr'skii period* (Kazan: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1992), 28; and İbrahim Maraş, "İsmail Gaspıralı'nın Bilinmeyen Bir Risalesi: 'Mektep ve Usûl-i Cedid Nedir,'" *Emel* 219 (1997): 13.

³⁹ Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions*, 227–36.

⁴⁰ See NART, f. 92, op. 1, d. 13158, pp. 4–6ob (also repr. in L. V. Gorokhova, *Kazanskaia tatarskaia uchitel'skaia shkola 1876–1917 gg.* [Kazan: Izdatel'stvo Gasır, 2005], 20–22); NART, f. 92, op. 1, d. 18999, pp. 1–16ob; A. Khabutdinov, "Tatarskoe obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v rossiiskom soobshchestve (konets XVIII–nachalo XX veka)," PhD diss., Kazan State University, 2002: <http://www.tatar.info/file.php?name=habutdinov-diser#1> (accessed 19 Apr. 2007), n.p.; and Norihiro Naganawa, "Maktab or School? Introduction of Universal Primary Education among the Volga-Ural Muslims," in Tomohiko Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Hokkaido: Slavic Research Center, 2007), 78.

⁴¹ For the advantages that existing social networks provide to the formation of new social movements, see David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, "Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment," *American Sociological Review* 45, 5 (1980): 787–801; J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1980): 527–53, esp. 538.

education for the very purpose of avoiding the ulama's opposition. Although this parallel system enabled the Ottoman state to realize its Westernizing reforms with minimal tension, it also created a Westernized elite that engaged in a bitter competition with the ulama and was alienated from the broader Muslim population.⁴² In the Volga-Ural region, the early reformists were already members of the ulama, and as such, they already enjoyed the trust and respect of the broader Muslim population. The beginnings of their initiatives were experimental and limited in scope. They looked to the Westernized institutions of lay education in the Ottoman Empire for inspiration, but they still conceived the reform of madrasas as an improvement within the Islamic paradigm. Both the Muhammediye and Rasûliye Madrasas, for example, started as regular madrasas, and the initial changes that Barudî and Rasûlî introduced were small. Barudî concentrated on teaching Qur'anic exegesis and the science of hadith among Islamic sciences; that is, he broke away from the Bukharan tradition by focusing on the foundational sources of Islam. He also introduced courses in the Russian and Turkic languages, geography, history, math, and the science of nature, all taught in Turkic.⁴³ Likewise, Rasûlî did not reform his course curriculum radically until his son started to oversee education at the Rasûliye Madrasa in the early twentieth century, but he did provide his students with physical facilities that were unusually amenable compared to those of regular madrasas.⁴⁴

The convenient physical facilities that founders of reformed madrasas introduced at this early stage increased the popularity of their institutions among students. Such improvements mainly involved buildings and educational equipment that matched the standards of the imperial—both Ottoman and Russian—institutions of secondary education, such as stone buildings with several classrooms, large bedrooms, dining halls, and separate

⁴² See Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 48–49; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*; Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905–1926* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984); M. Şükrü Haniöğlü, “Garbcılar: Their Attitudes toward Religion and Their Impact on the Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic,” *Studia Islamica* 86 (1997): 133–58; Şükrü Haniöğlü, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Burçak, “Science,” esp. 57; İsmail Kara, “Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition,” in Elisabeth Özdalga, ed., *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 162–200; Eric Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Legacy of the Kemalist Republic,” in Toraj Atabaki, ed., *The State and the Subaltern* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 95–110; and Hülya Küçük, “Sufi Reactions against the Reforms after Turkey's National Struggle: How a Nightingale Turned into a Crow,” in Toraj Atabaki, ed., *The State and the Subaltern* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 123–42.

⁴³ Battal-Taymas, *Kazanlı Türk Meşhurlarından*, 15–20; Âmirxan, “Muxammâdiyâ Mädra-sâse,” 32–33.

⁴⁴ Algar, “Şaykh Zaynullah Rasulev,” 121–23; Maraş, “İdil-Ural Bölgesinin,” 81–82; İamaeva, “Gabbrakhman Rasulev.”

kitchens.⁴⁵ In his reminiscences about the Muhammediye Madrasa, where he studied between 1907 and 1914, Bâqî Urmançı (1897–1990) writes that the Muhammediye Madrasa was different from other madrasas in not only its program but also its construction. It had well-aired bedrooms instead of the large sleeping areas divided into cells with curtains conventional in regular madrasas, common cafeterias rather than individual cooking in the student cells, hot water for tea around the clock, and separate facilities for bathing. Instead of empty rooms where students sat on the floor, classrooms had desks, blackboards, rostrums, and big maps, and there were laboratories for natural science and astronomy, a workshop for woodworks, an infirmary, a courtyard, and even a skating rink.⁴⁶

THE SECULARIZATION OF MADRASA EDUCATION

The Revolution of 1905, which turned Russia into a constitutional monarchy, created a relatively liberal atmosphere and made bold cultural and political experimentation possible for the various population groups of the empire.⁴⁷ In the years that followed, the reformed madrasas of the Volga-Ural region began to depart from the existing madrasa system in more radical ways. They started to prioritize the appropriation of European scientific achievements and pedagogical principles over aspiring to improve the existing system of Islamic education. The weight of non-Islamic subjects in their curriculums increased significantly, often at the expense of Islamic subjects. New extracurricular activities exposed students to the worlds of secular arts and politics. The reformed madrasas started to look less like religious seminaries and more like the Ottoman, Egyptian, or even Russian imperial institutions of lay education.

Revealing at this point is a look at the nature of education at one of the Ottoman institutions of lay education, the Imperial School of Public Administration, where several reformist Russian Muslims studied in the 1890s and after. Due to the near absence of religious education at this school before 1891, the Sublime Port had received several complaints about “the signs of weakness in the faith” of its graduates. In response, in 1891, the Ottoman authorities added a

⁴⁵ See O. R-v, *K voprosu o magometanskikh i russko-tatarskikh uchilishchakh* (Kazan: Tsentral'naia tamografiia, 1916), 15–20, 23–26; Väliyev, “Sibir Mädäsäse,” 188; Ämirxan, “Muxam-mädiyä Mädäsäse,” 19; Räkımkułova and Xämıdullın, “Xüsäyniyä Mädäsäse,” 93; Räkımov, “Galiyä Mädäsäse,” 117; Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 66–68, 91, 173; Märdanov, Minnullın, and Räkımov, *Bertugan Bubiylar*, 31–33, 37–41.

⁴⁶ Baki Urmançı, “Çıkısa Magriptän Koyaş,” in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädäsälärdä Kitap Kıştāse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Näşriyatı, 1992), 36. For similar examples of improvements in physical conditions, see Räkımov, “Galiyä Mädäsäse,” 116–21; Räkımkułova and Xämıdullın, “Xüsäyniyä Mädäsäse,” 75–76.

⁴⁷ See Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); L. A. İamaeva, *Musul'manskii liberalizm v nachala XX veka kak obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie* (Ufa: Gilem, 2002); A. İu. Khabutdinov and D. V. Mukhetdinova, *Vserossiiskie Musul'manskie S'ezdy 1905–1906 gg.* (Nizhny Novgorod: Makhinur, 2005).

few religious courses to its curriculum. But even with the new additions, the number of weekly class hours for courses with a religious content remained at only about 15 percent. Even so, this development was criticized as a reactionary move by the teachers of non-religious subjects, who had been raised in the secular atmosphere of the earlier period and strongly influenced the students.⁴⁸

Russian Muslim reformists generally had to improvise and proceed gradually while adapting the models they borrowed from Ottoman educational institutions, such as the Imperial School of Public Administration, to the Volga-Ural madrasas. Ğubeydullah Bubî, one of the reformers of the Bubi Madrasa, graduated from this school in 1895 and returned to Russia to, together with his brother Ğabdullah Bubî, take over teaching at the Bubi Madrasa from their father Ğabdul'allâm Hazret. Ğabdullah Bubî in his memoirs provides a detailed account of how the two brothers gradually transformed the curriculum.⁴⁹ Initially, students arrived expecting to study the conventional subjects that Ğabdul'allâm Hazret had taught, and not the European-inspired courses that the Bubî brothers wanted to offer. Furthermore, some scholars in and around the Bubi Village already had a history of enmity toward Ğabdul'allâm Hazret, and they became still more hostile as they observed the brothers gradually move away from the established madrasa system. Ğabdul'allâm Hazret gave full support to his sons, but they still had to proceed with caution. They started by dropping, one by one, some of the conventional books from Ğabdul'allâm Hazret's original list and introducing modern subjects in their stead.⁵⁰ In this way, by the year 1900 they had built a six-year program that included the basics of Islam, *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), the methodology of *fiqh*, ethics, oration, Arabic, Persian, Turkic grammar, Turkic composition, arithmetic, geometry, general history, geography, and logic.⁵¹

This was still a modest curriculum relative to those of other reformed madrasas at that time. The brothers were disadvantaged by starting late, by their location in a distant village, and by having fewer funds (despite the support of a local merchant), but they were more daring in their projects than were other Russian Muslim reformist educators. By constantly improving their program from one year to the next, they managed to create the most radically reformed or Westernized madrasa program in Russia in about a decade and attracted students from across the empire. In the 1900–1901 school year, Arabic language and religious subjects took about 64 percent of the weekly class hours (105 out of 163), and there were no courses on exact sciences or the Russian language. By the 1910–1911 school year, the total of Arabic

⁴⁸ Hüseyin Atay, *Osmanlılarda Yüksek Din Eğitimi* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1983), 201–5. “Class hours” refers to the total hours that several teachers could teach simultaneously in different classrooms during the time the school was in session in a week.

⁴⁹ Mârdanov, Minnullin, and Râximov, *Bertugan Bubylyar*.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 36–37; and Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 70–71.

⁵¹ Mârdanov, Minnullin, and Râximov, *Bertugan Bubylyar*; and Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 35.

language and religion class hours had decreased to some 26 percent (57 out of 220), and the program included sixty hours of Russian language and eighty hours of European-inspired non-religious courses. Furthermore, Turkic or Turkish gradually replaced Arabic as the language of study and textbooks, even in religious courses.⁵² (The evolution of the Bubi Madrasa program is shown in Table 1.)

A key problem the founders of all reformed madrasas in the Volga-Ural region faced while developing such programs was finding teachers for such a broad spectrum of courses.⁵³ In the madrasas of the Russian Empire, a single scholar typically taught or at least supervised all instruction. Only the largest madrasas offered a full curriculum, but even in those exceptional cases the chief instructor held classes only in his fields of specialization while advanced students guided the younger ones in other fields. In some cases it was possible for a scholar to not lecture at all but rather assign books to his students and follow their progress with oral examinations from time to time.⁵⁴ The reformed madrasas could not maintain this system while they claimed to offer courses ranging from Qur'anic recitation to mineralogy, in a total of one hundred to two hundred class hours a week with a predetermined academic calendar. They needed to find and hire teachers who specialized in specific fields.

For example, the Hüseyinof brothers established the Hüseyiniye Madrasa in 1889 by combining the madrasas of three scholars in Orenburg among whom

⁵² In fact, one of the reformist scholars, Musâ Cârullah Bigiyef (1870–1949), bitterly complained about the neglect of Islamic sciences in the reformed madrasas. In, *El-Lüzümiyyat Tercümesi* (Kazan: n.p., 1907), 3, quoted in Ahmet Kanlıdere, *Kadimle Cedit Arasında Musa Cârullah* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 189.

⁵³ For the programs of other reformed madrasas in the early twentieth century, see Sharafuddinov and Khanbikov, *Istoriia pedagogiki*, 159–60; Râximkulova and Xâmidullin, “Xüsâyniyâ Mädresâse,” 99–105; Râximov, “Galiyâ Mädresâse”; Vâliyev, “Sibir Mädresâse”; Maraş, “İdil-Ural Bölgesinin,” 81; Yusupov, *Galimdzhan Barudi*, 169–70. For other programs that offered European-inspired courses in the early twentieth century, see Kâmile Hanım and Gâzime Hanım, *Mu'allimlerde Numune: İbtidâî ve Rüşdî Mektepleri İçin Ders Programması* (Ufa: Şarq, 1912); Ğayniye Yavşiyeva, *Biş Yıllıq Qız Mektebi Programması* (Ufa: Şarq, 1912); Yahin Nurmuhammed, *Qız Talebelere Mahsûs Programma* (Ufa: Şarq Matba'ası, 1912); *Medrese-yi Muhammediyye Programması* (no author or publication information is given); Fâtiḥ Seyfi, *Mu'allimlerde Ürnek yaki Ğumûmî Program* (Kazan: Tipolitografiia Ümid, 1914); and *Orenburg'da Bağbustan Hanım Tarafından Te'sîs İtilüb Anı İdâresinde Devâm İtmekle Bulgan Medrese-yi Bağbustaniyyeniñ Müfredât Programması* (Orenburg: Tipografiia M. V. Hüseyinova, 1915). Some of these items involved both *maktab* and madrasa programs, and some were prepared for girls' schools that were called “madrasas,” although there had been no madrasas for girls in the tradition of Russia's Muslims until this time.

⁵⁴ For the subjects covered in some madrasas, see Muhammed Şakir Mahdum Tuqayef, *Tarih-i İsterlibaş: Ufa Guberniyası İsterli Tamak Uyezi Kalkaşı Volosu İsterlibaş Avılında Turhanoğlu Muhammed Şakir Tuqayef* (Kazan: B. L. Dombrovskogo Tipografiyası, 1899), 10–11; Fahreddin, *Âsar*, vol. 1, 272–75; and vol. 2, 241–42, 313, 400–2; İbrâhîmof, *Tercüme-yi Hâlim*, 11–15. For one example of how a madrasa student circulated among several madrasas, see Fahreddin, *Âsar*, vol. 2, 488–89. Also see Tuna, “Imperial Russia's Muslims,” 56–58.

TABLE 1.
Evolution of the Bubi Madrasa Program^a

Course Titles	1900–01 6 years	1902–03 7 years	1904–05 6 years	1907–08 6 years	1908–09 8 years	1909–10 8 years	1910–11 8 years
Combined Class Hours of all Years of Study per Week							
<i>Religion Courses and Other Subjects Related to Religious Service</i>							
<i>Total</i>	105	100	50	34	59	80	57
Basics of Faith	8	10	6		3	6	
Methodology of <i>Fiqh</i>	8	12	6		4	4	4
<i>Fiqh</i>	15	14	7	5	6	13	7
Qur'an Recitation			1		2	15	3
Qur'anic Exegesis		2	2		4	4	4
<i>Hadith</i>		2	2		4	4	4
Worship				4	5	6	5
Rules of Inheritance					1	1	
<i>Siyer</i>					1		
Ethics	9	14	5	5	4	3	2
Oration	4	8	3	4	2		
Arabic Language & Lit.	61	38	18	16	23	24	28
<i>Languages other than Arabic</i>							
<i>Total</i>	21	22	42	82	95+	96	83
Russian Language			24	72	78	72	60
Turkic Language	15	16	8	4	15	17	16
French Language					elective	3	4
German Language					elective		
Persian Language	6	6	7	3			
Calligraphy			3	3	2	4	3

Non-Religious Courses

<i>Total</i>	37	64	55	63	82	78	80
Mathematic	15	14	10	17	17	16	21
Geometry	6	8	6	6	5	5	4
Astronomy		2		2	1	1	2
Mineralogy				1			
Natural History						3	3
Knowledge of Nature			6	6		4	4
Geology			2		1		
Botany		4	1	1	8		
Zoology		4	1	1	1		
Physics		4		8	6	4	4
Chemistry		4	6	4	4	4	4
General History	4	10	8	10	8	8	6
History of Islam		4	4		8	8	8
Philosophy		2			4		
Geography	3	4	4	4	9	11	9
Logic	9	2	2	1	1	3	
Economy					2	2	2
Pedagogy and Method.		2	4		1	2	4
Drawing					5	6	8
Hygiene			1	2	1	1	1
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>163</i>	<i>186</i>	<i>147</i>	<i>179</i>	<i>236+</i>	<i>247</i>	<i>220</i>

⁸Ğabdullah Bubi included copies of the Bubi Madrasa programs for each of these years in his memoirs. See Märdanov, Minnullin, and Răximov, *Bertugan Bubiylar*, 35, 46–47, 51, 56–57; Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 77, 85, 92, 171, 181, 195, 198; Rafilia Gimazova, *Prosvetitel'skaia deiatel'nost' Nigmatullinykh-Bubi (konets 19–nachalo 20 vv.)* (Kazan: Pechatnyi dvor, 2004), 170–82.

Damulla Şâhimerdan Hazret became the chief instructor while the other two continued to teach under his supervision. Later, the teachers of the Ufa/Orenburg Tatar Teachers' School, which the government had opened in 1873 and closed in 1890, also taught at the Hüseyniye Madrasa and contributed to improving its curriculum.⁵⁵ As the curriculum expanded, the Hüseyni of brothers hired specialists to teach different courses, and transferred administration from Şâhimerdan Hazret to an administrative board. Only a few of the teachers that the brothers hired were Bukhara graduates. Fâtih Kerîmî and Ğabdullah İbrâhîmof had diplomas from Istanbul, at least six others were graduates of al-Azhar in Cairo, three were from the American College in Beirut, and others had studied at the madrasas and imperial institutions of secondary and higher education in the Russian Empire. The brothers regularly sent successful graduates of their madrasa to government schools in Russia and the Ottoman Empire for further education, and a few students even attended universities in Europe. Those who continued their education at the expense of the Hüseyni of brothers served at the Hüseyniye Madrasa, or at one of the other educational institutions that the brothers sponsored, for four years after their graduation. As a result, former students of the Hüseyniye Madrasa who studied in Ottoman, Russian, or European institutions of lay education or al-Azhar in Egypt began to dominate its faculty by the 1910s.⁵⁶

Another feature of the reformed madrasas that contributed to the intellectual development of students in significant ways was the extracurricular activities that most of them built into their programs. Literary activity was cherished and encouraged by the reformed madrasa teachers. Writing literary pieces, especially poetry, was common among all madrasa students, including those of the regular madrasas, but the reformed madrasa students published their works in amateur newspapers, which they perceived as a preparation for stepping into the real world of publication. Ziyâ Kemâlî, who founded the reformed Ğâliye Madrasa in Ufa in 1904, provided his students musical instruments and encouraged them to attend theater plays and concerts, although use of instruments is a controversial issue in Islamic jurisprudence and Volga-Ural Muslims generally maintained an attitude of uneasiness about those who played music.⁵⁷ The Bubî brothers' father, Ğabdul'allâm Hazret, had prohibited playing musical instruments at his madrasa, but the brothers encouraged

⁵⁵ For the Ufa/Orenburg Tatar Teachers' School, see NART, f. 92, op. 1, d. 18999, pp. 1–16ob; and Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims," 190–91.

⁵⁶ Râximkulova and Xâmidullin, "Xüsâyniyâ Mädäsäse," 76, 91–93, 99–105; Fahreddin, *Ahmed Bay*, 41–43; NART, f. 142, op. 1, d. 307, p. 34, printed in Gorokhova, *Kazanskaia*, 194. Also see Râximov, "Ğaliyâ Mädäsäse," 125–26.

⁵⁷ Fahreddin, *Âsar*, vol. 2, 200–1; İbrâhîmof, *Tercüme-yi Hâlim*, 12–15; Zeki Velidi Togan, *Hatıralar: Türkistan ve Diğer Müslüman Doğu Türklerinin Milli Varlık ve Kültür Mücadeleleri* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1999), 19. Also see Khalid Baig, *Slippery Stone: An Inquiry into Islam's Stance on Music* (Garden Grove, Calif.: Open Mind Press, 2008).

their students to play an instrument like the violin, accordion, or flute.⁵⁸ While constructing a new building for the Bubi Madrasa in 1907, they included a large hall in the plan, and there, the students organized musical spectacles, theater plays, literary nights, and scientific and political conversation sessions.⁵⁹ Conversation sessions or presentations were common in other madrasas too. Topics of speeches given in sessions at the Ğaliye Madrasa included: “Why Do India and Indonesia Remain Slaves under the Domination of Britain and Holland?,” “Now We Are in the Twentieth Century,” “Revolution and the Types of States,” and “Our Nation and Its Signs.”⁶⁰

STUDENT DEMANDS FOR FURTHER SECULARIZATION

Such changes in the curriculum, teacher bodies, and the overall educational experience made available to the reformed madrasa students a whole range of new ideas and ideologies unimaginable for the students of regular madrasas. The teachers who came from the Ottoman Empire or Egypt and the textbooks they used introduced what historians of the Ottoman Empire have identified as “scientism,” a worldview that privileged reason and empirical observation over revelation as the means of knowing reality.⁶¹ On the other hand, learning Russian and having access to the Russian-language publications familiarized reformed madrasa students not only with the various colors of Russia’s growing socialist movement and the anti-religious views of the Russian intelligentsia, but also with pan-Slavism, which they could then use as a model to develop Muslim nationalisms.⁶²

In the liberal political atmosphere that followed the Revolution of 1905, reformed madrasa students fraternized with Russian students, particularly in the city of Kazan, read the revolutionary—mostly socialist but also nationalist—literature, and wanted to participate in the revolutionary activities. Especially the extracurricular activities in the reformed madrasas provided students with occasions for political discussion and organized activity beyond the purview of their teachers. Gradually, the student profile of reformed madrasas

⁵⁸ Zäynäp Maksudova, “Bubida Birinçi Spektakl’,” in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädräsälärdä Kitap Kıştāse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Näşriyatı, 1992), 71–73; Märdanov, Minnullin, and Räkımov, *Bertugan Bubiylar*, 43–44, 165; Mahmutova, *Lish tebe*, 173–76.

⁵⁹ Urmançı, “Çıksa,” 37; Zäynäp Maksudova, “Bubidä Birinçi Spektakl’,” in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädräsälärdä Kitap Kıştāse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Näşriyatı, 1992), 71–73; Märdanov, Minnullin, and Räkımov, *Bertugan Bubiylar*, 43–44, 165; Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 173–76.

⁶⁰ Räkımov, “Galiyā Mädräsäse,” 121–22.

⁶¹ See M. Şükrü Hanioglu, “Transformation of the Ottoman Intelligentsia and the Idea of Science,” *Academia de Stiinte Sociale Politice a Republicii Socialiste Romania* 24, 2 (1987): 1–6; Burçak, “Science.”

⁶² Some of the reformed madrasa students were involved in the publication of *el-İslāh* and *Tañ Yuldızı*, two periodicals with a socialist revolutionary leaning. For an example of debates about various nationalisms, see Ğälımcan İbrahimof, “Biz Tatarmız,” *Şūra*, 15 Apr. 1911: 236–38; Türköglü, “Biz Türkımız,” *Şūra*, 15 Apr. 1911: 238–41; 1 Jan. 1912: 19–21; 15 Jan. 1912: 55–56; 1 Feb. 1912: 79–80.

began to be dominated by students who wanted to pursue lay careers and were interested in social and political questions of a secular nature rather than questions of religious scholasticism or even the religious aspects of those socio-political issues. They pressured the owners of reformed madrasas to depart from the course curriculum and daily regimen of regular madrasas in more radical ways and, as a result, pulled those madrasas further away from being Islamic institutions.⁶³

Students of the Muhammediye Madrasa were among the first Muslim students in the Russian Empire to develop an interest in social and political questions of a secular nature and to start pushing the madrasa administration for more radical reforms. In 1902, a group of students there founded a reading circle called “İttihâd” (Unity) under the leadership of Fâtiḥ Emirhan, who later became a well-known journalist and litterateur with leftist ideas. Members of İttihâd dressed in the European style, prepared several amateur newspapers that circulated in the madrasa, organized literary and musical events, and staged theater plays. Over time, Muslim students attending government schools in Kazan started to join them, too. During the revolutionary years, the members of İttihâd fraternized with students of the Imperial Kazan University, organized a society called “İslâh Cem‘iyeti” (the Society of Reform), printed and distributed pamphlets with revolutionary content, organized an “All-Russian Congress of Tatar Students” to which they invited Muslim students from across the empire, and published the leftist newspaper *eI-İslâh*.⁶⁴

Barudî, the founder of the Muhammediye Madrasa, himself was actively involved in imperial politics in the revolutionary years. In 1908, he was even exiled to Vologda for two years because of his political activities.⁶⁵ But he followed a more conservative line than his students. Members of the İslâh Cem‘iyeti wanted him to relax discipline in the madrasa and de-emphasize religion entirely in its program. Neither Barudî nor the wealthy merchants who supported the Muhammediye Madrasa were willing to meet this demand. Barudî was a devout Muslim who considered the sciences of religion important and also had Sufi inclinations. The tension between the students and the madrasa administration grew rapidly, and members of the İslâh Cem‘iyeti left the Muhammediye Madrasa amid demonstrations.⁶⁶

⁶³ See NART, f. 142, op. 1, d. 154, p. 24; “Mullahlıktan Küñil Suvunuvi ve İŖbu Haqda Sualler,” *Şûra* 20 (1913): 622–23; Battal-Taymas, *Kazanlı Türk MeŖhurlarından*, 23–26; Ämirxan, “Muxammädiyä Mädresäse,” 22–24; Urmançı, “Çıksa,” 37; Sharafuddinov and Khanbikov, *Istoriia pedagogiki*, 7–9; Märdanov, Minnullin, and Răximov, *Bertugan Bubiylar*, 137–38; Yusupov, *Galimdzhan Barudî*, 39; Tuna, “Imperial Russia’s Muslims,” 268–72.

⁶⁴ Ämirxan, “Muxammädiyä Mädresäse,” 22–24.

⁶⁵ Battal-Taymas, *Kazanlı Türk MeŖhurlarından*, 20–25; Yusupov, *Galimdzhan Barudî*, 53–63.

⁶⁶ Battal-Taymas, *Kazanlı Türk MeŖhurlarından*, 23–26; Yusupov, *Galimdzhan Barudî*, 39; Baqı Urmançı, “Çıksa Mağripten KoyaŖ” in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädresälärdä Kitap Kıştäse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap NäŖriyatı, 1992), 37. İrfan Gündüz relates Barudî’s Sufi credentials to Ahmed Ziyaüddin GümüŖhânevi through Zeynullah Rasüli. Gündüz, *GümüŖhânevi*, 157–58.

Similar events occurred at the Hüseyniye Madrasa in 1908. Two teachers fell into disagreement with its administration and transferred to the Bubi Madrasa, which was by now the most radically Westernized Muslim educational institution in the empire. Following this, 101 students of the Hüseyniye Madrasa petitioned the board for improvements in its program, more freedom for students to choose whether or not to follow an Islamic way of life, the recall of the two teachers, and the replacement of the madrasa manager. When the board rejected their demands, thirty-three students petitioned again. Mainly, they wanted the madrasa to adopt a more secular program by further limiting the number of religious courses. They also wanted some of the teachers to be fired. The board refused these demands once again, and the students formed an action committee. Under its guidance, they began to boycott the classes of teachers they did not like. At one point, they were only attending the classes of Fâtiḥ Kerimî, another graduate of the Imperial School of Public Administration in Istanbul. They also sang the Marseillaise and read political pamphlets aloud from time to time. When the madrasa board decided to expel members of the action committee, thirty-three students left the Hüseyniye Madrasa in protest; twenty-seven of them transferred to the Bubi Madrasa, and six entered government schools.⁶⁷

As opposed to the founders of other reformed madrasas, the Bubi brothers themselves encouraged student activity in the revolutionary period following 1905. They left the administration of the students' daily life to an elected student committee and regularly organized discussions about what they deemed to be the pressing problems of Russia's Muslims. The Bubi students also established a society called "İttihâd" (probably in imitation of the earlier İttihâd Circle of the Muhammediye Madrasa) and held meetings with student representatives from the neighboring provinces. However, the students' self-administration collapsed by 1909. Books had started to disappear from the library, acts that would normally call for disciplinary action had started to go unnoticed, and life in the madrasa had become unpredictable. The Bubi brothers transferred all administrative decisions back to a pedagogical committee of teachers. But students were still content with the education they received at the Bubi Madrasa, because it provided the most Westernized curriculum among Russia's madrasas.⁶⁸

THE LOSS OF DEVOTION TO THE ISLAMIC TRADITION AND ALIENATION

Although the earlier madrasa reformers of the Volga-Ural region altered their curriculums primarily to improve Islamic education and thereby to revitalize

⁶⁷ Märdanov, Minnullin, and Răximov, *Bertugan Bubiylar*, 46, 177–79; Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 180, 186–89.

⁶⁸ Märdanov, Minnullin, and Răximov, *Bertugan Bubiylar*, 50–51, 137–38; Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 93, 185.

Muslim communities, a practical, unintended consequence of their endeavors was a reduction of the weight of religion in the thinking and lives of their students.⁶⁹ This consequence should not be taken to imply a teleological relationship between curriculum change and loss of religious devotion. Other experiences show that it is possible to incorporate the achievements of empirical science into Muslim schooling without necessarily distancing students from the Islamic tradition. For instance, in the Turkish context, the famous theologian Bediüzzaman Said Nursî (1876–1960) took issue with late-Ottoman intellectuals' scientism and employed the concept of "reading" the "book of the universe" (*kitab-ı kâinat*) through observation and examination in order to conceptualize scientific investigation as a form of worship. This form of worship, Nursî suggested, could help one know God and come closer to Him through studying His creation.⁷⁰ Later, the followers of Fethullah Gülen, a highly influential Turkish religious leader born in 1938, employed Nursî's approach in the hundreds of educational institutions they have opened in Turkey and around the world since the 1970s in order to arouse students' interest in the sciences while simultaneously reinforcing their religiosity.⁷¹ By contrast, the founders of reformed madrasas in the Volga-Ural region who introduced new, European-inspired courses along with the Russian language in their madrasas and imported teachers and textbooks from the Ottoman Empire simultaneously, and perhaps unintentionally, exposed their students to the scientific worldview of the Ottoman Westernizers and the anti-religious discourse of the Russian intelligentsia. It was this exposure that transformed educational reform among Volga-Ural Muslims into a secularizing process.

⁶⁹ See the discussions in "Bize Qaysı Çilmler Lâzımdır" (all 1908): *Şûra* 7: 197–99; 11: 338–43; 12: 370–72; 13: 317–20; 14: 434–36; and 15: 470–73. Also see Agafangel' Krymskii, *Shkola, obrazovannost' i literature u rossiiskikh musul'man* (Moscow: n.p., 1905), 17.

⁷⁰ Among many other places in the corpus of Nursî's works, see Said Nursî, *Kaynaklı-İndeksli-Lügatli Risale-i Nur Külliyyatı* (İstanbul: Nesil Basım-Yayın, 1996): 49–50, 803–4, 954–56, 1965–66, 1985–2001.

⁷¹ On the educational institutions of the Gülen movement, see Bekim Agai, "The Gülen Movement's Islamic Ethic of Education," 48–68; and Thomas Michel, "Fethullah Gülen as Educator," 69–84; both in M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, eds., *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003). Various issues of the popular scientific magazines *Sızıntı* and *Fountain*, which have been published by the followers of Fethullah Gülen since 1979 and 1993, respectively, also reveal a sustained effort to Islamicize scientific findings. For other religious movements that have adopted a similar approach in Turkey and elsewhere, see Recep Şentürk, "Islamic Reformist Discourses and Intellectuals in Turkey: Permanent Religion with Dynamic Law," in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., *Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2009), esp. 242–43; and other contributions in the same volume. Arguably, the Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College students also remained within an Islamic paradigm while transforming to a large extent the Islamic tradition that they received from their parents. See Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation*; and Gail Minault, "Shaikh Abdullah, Begam Abdullah, and Sharif Education for Girls at Aligarh," in Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., *Modernization and Social Change among Muslims in India* (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1983), 207–36.

The more that reformed madrasa students were exposed to alternative world-views, including but not limited to scientism and socialism, the less that they cared about whether or not an idea or practice was authorized by the discursive traditions of Islam, no matter who endorsed that authorization or how. Schooling in the regular madrasas, in principle, provided what we may call an “Islamic social patterning” to the students through engagement with long-established Islamic texts, the incorporation of religious practices into the daily regimen, and the idealization of piety in the example of madrasa instructors or model men of religion. Most members of the early generation of reformists, including the founders of some of the reformed madrasas such as Barudî, Rasûlî, or even the Bubi brothers, had received this Islamic social patterning as madrasa students before they developed their reform projects. As a result, for the earlier reformists the teachings of Islam and an Islamic way of life constituted a natural given. They sought adaptation to the transformations of the world that contained local Muslim communities by reconciling the norms and values of that world with the Islamic tradition. But the reformed madrasas provided students with a different kind of social patterning, one that prioritized the appropriation of Western European ideas and practices under the banners of enlightenment and progress. As Islamic social patterning faded away in the experience of the students, empirical science and Western European values replaced Islamic tradition as the starting point, or natural given, in their thinking. A new student culture emerged that idealized enlightenment and progress rather than piety.⁷² These students, who constituted the later generation of reformists, became less insistent on trying to reconcile the norms and values of Western European modernity, which they witnessed through the mediation of the Ottoman Westernizers and the Russian intelligentsia, with the Islamic tradition. Instead, they tried to reconcile the teachings of Islam with social necessity, empirical science, and Western European values. When their efforts at reconciliation failed, many preferred to relegate Islam to a secondary position.

In his memoirs, Zeki Velidi Togan, the famous Bashkir political leader and historian, provides a frank account of how he experienced this process. While studying in the madrasa of his uncle Habîb Neccâr, who had reformist ideas, Togan had learned Arabic and Persian very well, developed acquaintance with the works of history and literature in these languages, and also studied some Russian. But he had not built a solid background in Islamic sciences. In 1908, he left his village intending to go to Egypt or Beirut for further study. He first went to Orenburg, where he met some students from the Hüseyniye Medrese who lived a free and easy life, drank alcohol, and

⁷² The eminent Tatar historian Mirkasım Usmanov describes the idealization of enlightenment and progress in this period as a “cult.” See M[irkasım]. A. Usmanov, “O triumfe i tragedii idei Gasprinskogo,” his introduction to the reprint of Ismail Gasprinskii, *Rossiiia i Vostok* (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1993 [1881]), 4.

gambled—acts forbidden in Islam. The students ridiculed Togan's Bashkir clothes from his village and gave him the first European-style clothes he had ever had. He asked for the support of a merchant in Orenburg in order to go to Egypt, but after a quick examination the merchant found his religious knowledge lacking and wanted him to first improve himself further in Russia. In the meanwhile, the reformist Muslim scholars that Togan met in Orenburg also encouraged him to stay in Russia, improve his Russian, and attend government schools.

Togan stayed in Russia and settled in Kazan. There, he took private courses on Qur'anic exegesis and Islamic jurisprudence, but also entered into the milieu of reformists, got to know the Muhammediye Madrasa students, who also drank alcohol and gambled, started to earn his way by writing in reformist newspapers, grew used to wearing Russian clothes, started smoking, developed acquaintance with the Russian Orientalists at the Imperial Kazan University, and studied Russian literature, math, and pedagogy. When, after one year, he visited his village, he noticed that the bond that had made him a part of this village was no longer intact. Later, he further adapted to the cosmopolitan culture of Kazan, and for a time he rejected religion altogether and drank heavily. Eventually, as he recalls in his memoirs, he developed a new understanding of religion in which he accepted the basic tenets of Islam, but he subjected the Qur'an to historical analysis and refused to abide by the practical restrictions and obligations of an Islamic way of life. This intellectual transformation led him to a painful conflict with his father. They reconciled thanks to the intervention of Togan's uncle, Habīb Neccâr, but his father only came to genuinely approve of him—though not his ideas—when Togan led the Bashkir nationalist movement after 1917.⁷³

It is difficult to know how many young Volga-Ural Muslims shared Togan's loss of devotion to the Islamic tradition of his community, but the total student population of even the few well-known reformed madrasas that are recorded in historiography numbered several thousands.⁷⁴ This younger generation of reformist Muslims constituted a new category among Volga-Ural Muslims.⁷⁵ Although nominally they were madrasa graduates, they were no longer able or willing to act as members of the ulama.⁷⁶ The reformed curriculums

⁷³ Togan, *Hâtıralar*, 42–87.

⁷⁴ Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädräsälärdä Kitap Kıştāse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Näşriyatı, 1992). This volume provides a good but not comprehensive list of the most important reformed madrasas, and includes the Muhammediya, Bubi, Hüseyiniye, Ğaliye, and İsterlibaş madrasas. For estimates of student populations in some of the reformed madrasas, see Tuqayef, *Tarih-i İsterlibaş*; Väliyev, "Sibir Mädresäse," 187; Ämirxan, "Muxammädiyä Mädresäse," 21; Răximov, "Ğaliyä Mädresäse"; and Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims," 218–20.

⁷⁵ Although he is writing about a different historical context, Adeb Khalid also draws our attention to the change of attitudes about reform between generations, in *Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 80–113.

⁷⁶ This was generally not the case for the graduates of reformed madrasas in India, the Ottoman Empire, or Egypt. See Zaman, "Religious Education," 308–9.

equipped them with skills to earn their livings in various jobs ranging from teaching in reformed *maktabs* to serving as clerks in business companies or joining civil service.⁷⁷ They remained connected by the networks that emerged from their student years and by a shared world outlook that prioritized social and scientific progress and was sustained by a growing body of publications. But these also separated them from the rest of the Muslim community.

In a telling example from 1911, Fettâh Ğadlî, a reader of the Orenburg-based reformist periodical *Şûra*, describes these young and reformist Muslims as “some members of the youth who sell philosophies” that are “far from being in tandem with the sacred feelings of our people.” Ğadlî writes, “Although they are very few in number, they are very bold, and they defend their position powerfully.... However, the people do not accept their philosophy, which they express with a language that is a mixture of the Russian and Tatar vocabularies and which they themselves understand only superficially.”⁷⁸

One radical expression of the boldness Ğadlî complains of was the way these younger reformists disparaged members of the ulama. In 1914, another reader of *Şûra*, Hüccetülhakîm Mahmûdof, wrote that the “national press,” which was dominated by young and reformist Muslims, “satirized and criticized [the ulama] without measure and without sparing to the extent that there [was] not a single novel or theater play in which the imams [had] not been insulted and ridiculed!”⁷⁹ Indeed, the ulama were represented in reformist publications as ignorant, greedy, and intimidating figures with dark features. In the discourse of the younger reformists, the turban, which had long distinguished the learned class among Volga-Ural and many other Muslim populations, came to symbolize a bait that ignorant mullahs used to give the impression of being knowledgeable so they could lure and exploit common believers.⁸⁰ Tensions gradually increased between reformist Muslims, especially younger ones, and the conservative members of the ulama who still enjoyed significant authority among local Muslim communities. It was precisely these communities that the reformists had long wanted to change, but despite occasional conflicts between congregations and their mullahs,⁸¹ the common believers among Muslim peasants and most city dwellers valued piety and scholarship and

⁷⁷ Râximov, “Galiyâ Mâdrâsâse.”

⁷⁸ “İslâmlar Arasında,” *Şûra* 19 (1911): 588.

⁷⁹ “Mullahıkdan Küñil Suvunuñı ve İşbu Haqda Sualler,” *Şûra* 5 (1914): 135–40.

⁸⁰ A good example of this depiction is: Fatih Kerimî, *Bir Şakird ile Bir Student* (Kazan: Tipografiya B. L. Dombrovskogo, 1903). The Baku-based, illustrated satirical journal *Molla Nasreddin* epitomized such ridicule with cartoons. Although published in Baku, it also had a following among the Muslim reformists of the Volga-Ural region. See Şerif el-Hamdi, “Matbu‘at Vistafqası,” *Şûra* 6 (1911): 91.

⁸¹ For examples of such conflicts, see Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and the Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 92–142, passim.

therefore respected the mullahs. By moving away from religion and the ulama, reformist Muslims were alienating themselves from the broader Muslim population.

Reformist Russian Muslim publishers of the early twentieth century, in the Volga-Ural region as well as in other parts of Russia, often characterized this tension as a controversy between the progressive and enlightened (*ziyalı*) reformists, dubbed “*Cedidciler*” or Jadidists, and the reactionary and ignorant traditionalists, dubbed “*Qadimciler*” or Qadimists.⁸² With a few exceptions, this characterization has dominated the historiography of Russia’s Muslims.⁸³ Some historians have also portrayed the efforts of Russian Muslim reformists as a successful “symbiosis” or “conciliation” between the religious and the secular, or the Islamic and the Western, thus justifying the categorization of the opposition to Muslim reformists as a reactionary response.⁸⁴

One drawback of this line of thinking that has already been recognized in the historiography on Russia’s Muslims is its poor appreciation of the conservative ulama’s response to the problems arising from the changes in social, political, and economic circumstances.⁸⁵ In fact, as Adeeb Khalid has also suggested, conservative members of the Russian Muslim ulama *did* respond to such changes, and they should be identified as proponents of a different kind of reform rather than as “traditionalists” or “reactionaries.”⁸⁶ Another, equally important shortcoming of the historiography that celebrates the Russian Muslim reformists’ “success” is its extensive and sometimes exclusive use of

⁸² See Kerimî, *Bir Şakird*; [İsmâ’il Gaspıralı], “Mizan,” *Tercüman*, 5 May 1909; and various issues of the satirical journal *Molla Nasreddin*.

⁸³ See Seydahmet, *Gaspıralı İsmail Bey*; Akdes Nimet Kurat, “Kazan Türklerinde ‘Medeni Uyanış’ Devri,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 24, 3–4 (1966): 95–194; Battal-Taymas, *Kazanlı Türk Meşhurlarından*; Lazzerini, “İsmail Bey”; Nadir Devlet, *Rusya Türkleri’nin Millî Mücadele Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1985); Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905–1916* (Leiden: E. K. Brill, 1996); Türkoğlu, *Rusya Türkleri Arasında*; Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*.

⁸⁴ See Ayşe Azade-Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); and Kanlıdere, *Reform within Islam*. Two other works, among many, that follow this line of thought are: Ravil Âmirhan, *İmanga Tugrılık* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Nâşriyatı, 1997); and Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dinî Yenileşme*.

⁸⁵ Some of the works that pay close attention to the conservative Russian Muslim ulama are Kemper, *Sufis und Gelehrte*; Allen J. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and ‘Bulghar’ Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998); Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions*; Stephen A. Dudoignon, “Qadimiya as a Historiographical Category: The Question of Social and Ideological Cleavages between ‘Reformists’ and ‘Traditionalists’ among the Muslims of Russia and Central Asia, in the Early 20th Century,” in Timur Kocaoğlu, ed., *Türkistan’da Yenilik Hareketleri ve Devrimler, 1900–1924* (Haarlem: SOTA, 2001): 159–78; and Rafik M. Muhammetshin, *Tatarskii traditsionalizm: osobennosti i formy proiavlennii* (Kazan: Meddok, 2005).

⁸⁶ Adeeb Khalid, “Review of DeWeese, Frank, and Dudoignon, et al.,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 3, 4 (2002): 728–38, esp. 737.

the writings of prominent and prolific reformist scholars in order to demonstrate how they reconciled the religious and the secular or the Islamic and the Western.⁸⁷ Yet, for the students who studied in the reformed madrasas of the Volga-Ural region, the upshot of their educational experience was a loss of devotion to the Islamic traditions of the region's Muslim communities, and their consequent alienation.

The primary function of Volga-Ural madrasas was to raise pious and righteous Muslim men of religion who could, in turn, uphold a high standard of piety and morality in their communities,⁸⁸ but the reformed madrasas ceased to fulfill this function. They were still called "madrasas," nominally, but the form and content of the education they offered was more European or Western than Islamic. Moreover, their students often embraced the rather liberal and radical elements of the European or Western spectrum of ideas. Especially in the 1910s, when the liberal atmosphere of the revolutionary period following 1905 surrendered its place to St. Petersburg's restored authority,⁸⁹ the Russian imperial bureaucracy also grew wary of this situation. If madrasas were categorically religious institutions, the imperial bureaucrats claimed, they should teach exclusively religious subjects and keep their students away from politics.⁹⁰ Although the root cause of this wariness was an unfounded assumption about the existence of a separatist, pan-Islamist movement among Russia's Muslims,⁹¹ the directors of the reformed madrasas still had to protect their schools from closure by *convincing* the police and the Ministry of Public Enlightenment inspectors that they operated exclusively religious institutions, which should continue to be categorized as "madrasas" and therefore left alone.⁹² In 1911, as a result of such suspicions, the police closed the Bubi Madrasa and about seventy other reformed *maktabs* and madrasas.⁹³ After the Bolshevik Takeover in 1917, many others had to close their doors along with the regular *maktabs* and madrasas, but the Soviet authorities

⁸⁷ For two good examples that follow this line of analysis, see Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dini Yenileşme*; and Ahmet Kanlıdere, *Kadimle Cedit Arasında Musa Cârullah* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2005).

⁸⁸ Khalid, *Jadidism*, 31–32; and Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions*, esp. 143–46.

⁸⁹ See Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

⁹⁰ NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 14835, pp. 12–14; and Alta Mahmutova, "Kazandagı Kızlar Öcin Mäktäp-Mädräsälär," in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädräsälärdä Kitap Kıştäse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Näşriyatı, 1992), 137.

⁹¹ See NART, f. 41, op. 11, d. 8; Robert Geraci, *Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Imperial Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 186, 282–83; Tuna, "Imperial Russia's Muslims," 317–50.

⁹² Răximov, "Galiyâ Mädresäse," 119–20; and Maxmutova, "Kazandagı Kızlar Öcin," 137.

⁹³ NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 14852, pp. 22–24ob; Muhammet Mähdiev, "Bubi Mädresäse," in Röstäm Mähdiev, ed., *Mädräsälärdä Kitap Kıştäse* (Kazan: Tatarstan Kitap Näşriyatı, 1992), 43–66; Makhmutova, *Lish tebe*, 231–362; Märdanov, Minnullin, and Răximov, *Bertugan Bubyylar*, 61–89, 113–28, 180–207.

recognized the graduates of most of the reformed madrasas as possessing training equal to the graduates of tsarist or Soviet secondary schools.⁹⁴ Ironically, the Hüseyiniye Madrasa was even converted into a Soviet Teachers' School, where prospective teachers were trained to raise atheist Soviet citizens, without radical changes in the form and content of the "madrasa" education it provided.⁹⁵

CONCLUSION

Madrasa reform in the Volga-Ural region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a product of the Volga-Ural Muslims' encounter with modernity. Modernity in this encounter was represented by Western European values and practices, often in their more liberal and radical forms as refracted through Ottoman, Egyptian, and imperial Russian sources.⁹⁶ Muslims in many other places also had to face Western modernity as it became a deeply penetrating global phenomenon. This was what Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson have called the "first globalization boom"—the formation of a global economy made up of not only interconnected but also interdependent markets, roughly between the 1870s and 1914. However, once we move beyond essentializing conceptions of both Islam and modernity, we can recognize that neither the ingredients nor the products of this encounter were identical, or needed to be, across Muslim communities.⁹⁷ The channels and processes through which the values and practices of Western Europe reached a given Muslim community and the institutions and networks that welcomed or resisted these values and practices made a definitive difference.

The Egyptian and especially the Ottoman institutions of lay education inspired the early reformists of the Volga-Ural region. However, the legal and administrative circumstances of the region in the late nineteenth century, when the first reform initiatives materialized, did not allow these reformists to establish lay educational institutions as in the Ottoman Empire. They channeled their energies into introducing in their madrasas courses sampled from the curriculums of Ottoman lay schools. This initiative was still pursued within the Islamic paradigm. It was an attempt by those members of the ulama who were deeply connected to the Islamic tradition to reconcile the novelty of modernity with the natural given of Islam. Yet, especially after

⁹⁴ Ämirxan, "Muxammädiyä Mädäsäse," 33; Raximkulova and Xämidullin, "Xüsäyniyä Mädäsäse," 89, 106–9; Raximov, "Galiyä Mädäsäse," 126–27; Gimazova, *Prosvetitel'skaia deiatel'nost'*, 193–218.

⁹⁵ Raximkulova and Xämidullin, "Xüsäyniyä Mädäsäse," 113–14.

⁹⁶ For the merger of modernity and the West in Islamic studies in general, see Lawrence, "Modernity," 248.

⁹⁷ Adebek Khalid makes an excellent case for the wisdom of paying attention to local historical developments in the study of Muslim communities as opposed to essentializing approaches, in Adebek Khalid, *Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 1–18.

1905, student pressure, teachers with lay educations, and changes in Russia's socio-political environment carried educational reform in the Volga-Ural region away from the Islamic tradition. By the 1910s, the reformed madrasas of the Volga-Ural region had transformed to such an extent that even those Ottoman Westernists who were interested in reforming Ottoman madrasas could point to the reformed madrasas of Russia as a model to follow.⁹⁸ Therefore, it makes more sense to compare the reformed madrasas of the Volga-Ural region to the Westernized educational institutions of the Ottoman Empire or Egypt⁹⁹—which historians have generally qualified as “Westernized” rather than “Islamic”¹⁰⁰—than to madrasas outside of Russia that experienced reform at the turn of the twentieth century, like al-Azhar in Egypt until the mid-twentieth century,¹⁰¹ Deoband in India,¹⁰² or even the Ottoman madrasas after 1908.¹⁰³

The nature of this institutional transformation from madrasas to Westernized educational institutions, despite the nominal preservation of the “madrasa” designation, entailed a paradigmatic shift from Islam to something else—to a search for individual and societal reform and revival within the vaguely defined boundaries of secular modernity. Things were in flux, and it is difficult, and perhaps unnecessary, to pin down a single paradigm that replaced Islam in this shift until the consolidation of socialism in the Soviet Union. It is important to note, however, that at this crucial juncture students of the reformed madrasas shed their devotion to Islam and began to desert the ranks of the ulama. They broke out of the domain of Islam into a secular and cosmopolitan world, as did

⁹⁸ See Arabacı, *Osmanlı Dönemi*, 463.

⁹⁹ Compare the programs of Egypt's Dār al-Ulūm, the Ottoman *'idādi* (higher) schools shortly before 1908, and the program of İstanbul Mekteb-i Sultānisi (Galatasaray Lycée) with the reformed madrasa programs in Russia. See A. Chris Eccel, *Egypt, Islam, and Social Change: Al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1984), 166–67; Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, vol. 3–4, 930–31; *İstanbul Mekteb-i Sultānisi Ders Müfredat Programı* (İstanbul: Matba'a-yı 'Âmire, 1329/1913).

¹⁰⁰ One noteworthy exception that complicates this qualification is Fortna's work on the efforts to introduce Islamic morality in the Ottoman schools during Abdulhamid II's reign. Yet, it is implicit even in Fortna's work that these were Westernized or “secular” educational institutions into which Abdulhamid II's bureaucrats tried to introduce Islamic elements. See Benjamin C. Fortna, “Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman ‘Secular’ Schools,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, 3 (2000): 363–93.

¹⁰¹ Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, 63–70, 99–101.

¹⁰² Metcalf, *Islamic Revival*; Zaman, “Religious Education”; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Zaman, “Tradition and Authority.” For other madrasas in India, see Ziyad-Din A. Desai, *Centres of Islamic Learning in India* (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1978), 19–68; Kuldip Kaur, *Madrasa Education in India: A Study of Its Past and Present* (Chandigarh, India: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1990), 188–95.

¹⁰³ *Dāru'l-Hilāfeti'l-Âliyye Medresesi* (İstanbul: Matba'a-yı Ahmed Kemal, 1330/1914); Sarıkaya, *Medreseler ve Modernleşme*, esp. 132–34, 149–50; Arabacı, *Osmanlı Dönemi*, 459–512; A. Osman Koçkuzu, *Paşadaireisi: Fahrettin Kulu ve Haciveyisâde Mustafa Kurucu Hoca Efendilerin Hayatı* (Konya: Damla Ofset, 2004), esp. 84–85.

graduates of Westernized lay educational institutions in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.¹⁰⁴ Thus, madrasa reform in the Volga-Ural region both initiated a change of attitudes about the necessity of compliance with the Islamic tradition, and cut its participants off from the authority structures needed to maintain and engage that tradition. Madrasa reform in the Volga-Ural region evolved beyond an organic transformation of the Islamic tradition within an Islamic paradigm; it moved *away* from the Islamic tradition and ceased to qualify as reform “within Islam.”

Whether this move represents a common trend in the Muslim world or a unique instance in the history of Volga-Ural Muslims can only be determined by those who study other Muslim communities. Be that as it may, this case calls for scholarly caution in labeling reform activities—or any activity for that matter—among Muslims as “Islamic” or “within Islam.” Initiatives that originate in the framework of Muslim networks and institutions can move away from the Islamic tradition and result in a paradigmatic shift to a realm where the Islamic tradition loses its very substance and significance.

¹⁰⁴ “İslâmlar Arasında Ğilm Niçün Lâzım Derecede Taralmıy?” *Şûra* 19 (1911): 588; Togan, *Hatıralar*, 42–87; Tuna, “Imperial Russia’s Muslims,” esp. 272–93.