



Managing Rockfall Risk through Baseline Monitoring of Precursors with a Terrestrial Laser Scanner

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1 **Managing Rockfall Risk through Baseline Monitoring of**

2 **Precursors with a Terrestrial Laser Scanner**

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23 *Abstract*

24 Rockfalls represent significant risks to safe and efficient use of transportation corridors. In this
25 paper we address the management of rockfall risk through baseline remote monitoring of
26 susceptible slopes (every 2-4 months) along a transportation corridor along the Fraser River
27 Valley in western Canada with a terrestrial laser scanner and supporting remote sensing
28 technologies. This includes identifying potential rockfall source zones based on incipient signs of
29 failure, tracking kinematics in 3D to better understand the mechanism of failure, estimating
30 potential failure volumes based on bounding joint structure and transmitting this information to
31 the railway operator for an assessment of risk. We demonstrate our approach for one case along
32 the line where we identified several potential failures ranging in volume from 48 m³ to 4200 m³.
33 Our projections of the location of failures were successful, in that volume projections were
34 within 10-55%, and the anticipated kinematics and failure mechanism were consistent with the
35 assessment of post failure rockfall scar geometries. Accurate volume and kinematics estimates
36 are important for the assessment of hazard, risk and the planning of risk mitigation options. In
37 general, this approach can be used to better manage risk from rockfall hazard in communities,
38 transportation corridors or other infrastructure.

39 Les dangers d'éboulement rocheux représentent l'un des risques les plus importants affectant les
40 infrastructures situées dans les terrains montagneux. Nous recherchons la gestion des risques des
41 dangers d'éboulement rocheux avec la surveillance de base (chaque 2-4 mois) avec un scanner
42 laser terrestre et autre technologie supportant le long d'un corridor ferroviaire situer dans
43 L'Ouest canadien. Le but de cette étude est d'identifier les zones de déformation avant la rupture
44 de la roche, de suivre les zones de déformation en 3D pour mieux comprendre le mécanisme de
45 rupture, de calculer les volumes potentiels, ainsi que de transmettre l'information a la compagnie

46 de chemin de fer pour une évaluation de risque. On montre que notre approche pour quatre blocs
47 avec volumes entre 48 - 4200m³ qui étaient analysés avant les ruptures se soit produite. Analyse
48 de la pente après les ruptures nous avons indiqué qu'il y avait un bon accord avec les projections
49 de mécanisme et une erreur entre 10-55 % pour les volumes. L'identification de la location, la
50 mécanique et volume potentiel en avance des chutes de blocs a résulté en une meilleure gestion
51 de la priorisation des efforts de réduction des impacts, en une réduction des risques, ainsi qu'en
52 une amélioration de la compréhension des mécanismes précurseurs à la rupture en général.

53 **Key Words: Risk Assessment, terrestrial laser scanning, rock slope hazard, landslide risk**
54 **management**

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64 **Introduction**

65 Transportation corridors, infrastructure, and communities are exposed to various geological
66 hazards, including rock slope failures. These failures result from natural and man-made
67 processes and their occurrence can be sudden and unexpected. Potential rock slope failures are
68 present in a wide variety of different terrains, making them difficult hazards to manage and it is a
69 challenge to anticipate the location and time of failure in advance. As a result, rock slope failures
70 pose significant risks to transportation corridor infrastructure and the travelling public (Hungry et
71 al. 1999; Peckover and Kerr 1977).

72 As part of a collaborative effort between the Canadian government, industry and universities,
73 under the umbrella of the Railway Ground Hazard Research Program, we have been monitoring
74 a selection of hazardous slopes across the Canadian rail network using Terrestrial Laser
75 Scanning (TLS), Terrestrial Photogrammetry, Oblique Aerial Photogrammetry (OAP), and
76 Aerial Laser Scanning (ALS) (Lato et al. 2011; 2014; Kromer et al. 2015a). These approaches
77 can aid in risk assessment by:

- 78 1. Providing a higher degree of safety to personnel managing risk from rock slope hazards
79 as data can be collected remotely.
- 80 2. Allowing the efficient collection of vast amounts of high resolution data of previously
81 inaccessible areas (Oppikofer et al. 2008; Stock et al. 2011; Sturzenegger and Stead
82 2009).
- 83 3. Providing frequent data collection and the observation of change, including frequencies,
84 locations and characteristics of rock movement events (Jaboyedoff et al. 2012; Abellán et
85 al. 2014).

86 TLS is particularly advantageous technology for slope monitoring and hazard assessment. It can
87 be used to monitor a large number of sites along transportation corridors or other elements at risk
88 at a baseline level (monthly, bimonthly, for example). In some circumstances, it is possible to
89 detect millimetre-level changes by taking advantage of point redundancy (Abellán et al. 2011;
90 Kromer et al. 2015b; Lague et al. 2013), and extract 3D deformation vectors through tracking the
91 3D movement of an object (Oppikoffer et al. 2009; Teza et al. 2007). It is a relatively affordable
92 and versatile technique as compared to other slope scale rockfall monitoring approaches (Lato et
93 al. 2015). Comparison of point clouds collected from TLS can also be used to identify signs of
94 progressive failure of a rock slope allowing the identification of potential failure locations
95 (Abellán et al. 2010). These precursor signs include deformation, sometimes ending in an
96 observed acceleration period (Royán et al. 2015), the development of tension cracks or other
97 fractures (Kromer et al. 2015a; Stock et al. 2012) and precursor rockfalls concentrated along the
98 perimeter of the progressively developing failure (Kromer et al. 2015a; Rosser et al. 2007; Royán
99 et al. 2015; Stock et al. 2012) that ultimately define the evolution of the slope (Royán et al.
100 2013).

101 We propose the inclusion of quantitative rockfall precursor observations in the risk management
102 process using baseline monitoring with TLS. The focus of this monitoring is on detecting
103 incipient signs of failure known as the detachment or the damage accumulation phase of failure
104 (Sättele et al. 2015). By detecting these precursor signs, we can assess the hazard, defined as the
105 spatial and temporal probability of rockfall failure of a particular size or intensity (Hungry et al.
106 1999; Corominas et al. 2013), by locating areas showing precursor signs of failure, and
107 estimating the potential volume, kinematics and relative likelihood of failure. Temporal
108 probability is generally analyzed based on historical magnitudes and frequencies and represents

109 an average for an area and not a probability for a specific location (Frayssines and Hantz 2006;
110 Hungr et al. 1999). In our framework, we assume that areas showing precursors signs have a
111 much higher spatial and temporal likelihood of failure than the slope average, essentially
112 providing a long term or very early warning of failure.

113 The aim of this study is to use TLS monitoring at a baseline level (bi-monthly) and other
114 supporting remote sensing technologies, to demonstrate how the proposed framework can
115 improve risk management along transportation corridors exposed to rock slope hazards, by
116 providing assessments and warning of incipient rock slope failure and engineering parameters
117 necessary to guide risk mitigation efforts. We demonstrate our approach for one rock slope prone
118 to failure located along the CN mainline track in western Canada, which has been monitored for
119 an 809-day period at the time of writing.

120 ***Study Site Description***

121 The case history site discussed in this paper consists of a geomorphologically complex rock
122 slope, with a mean angle ranging from 45 to 55°, that is located along the CN rail line 150 km
123 northeast of Vancouver within the Fraser River valley, at railway mile 109.4 of the Ashcroft
124 subdivision. In November 2012, a 53 000 m³ rockslide occurred, resulting in the destruction of a
125 21 m long rockfall protection structure, the burial of a 100 m section of track and a four-day
126 interruption in rail service. A more detailed description of the failure can be found in
127 Sturzenegger et al. (2014) and of the remediation work in Lato et al. (2014). Several remote
128 sensing technologies were also combined at this site for mapping change in mountainous terrain
129 by Lato et al. (2014).

130 Geologically, the slope is composed of a thick succession of Cretaceous-aged shallow water
131 deltaic sedimentary rocks, described in detail by MacLaurin et al. (2011). Sturzenegger et al.
132 (2014) describe two local scale faults that cross cut the slope and four main joint sets (J1-J4 dip
133 dir. /dip: $069^{\circ} / 88^{\circ}$, $120^{\circ} / 85^{\circ}$, $252^{\circ} / 44^{\circ}$ and $031^{\circ} / 84^{\circ}$), Figure 1, bottom right. The structure of
134 this slope results in various failure styles, including sliding, wedge and toppling failures.

135

Figure 1

136 ***Data Collection***

137 A combination of complementary remote sensing technologies was used throughout the study as
138 discussed by Lato et al. (2015). Aerial laser scanning data was collected from a fixed wing
139 aircraft in November 2012 and April 2014. We used these data for the structural characterization
140 and to detect change over a wide area of the rail corridor. We have collected high resolution
141 terrestrial laser scanning data on a periodic basis since 28 November 2013 from a position on the
142 opposite (west) side of the Fraser River valley; utilizing the TLS data for detailed change
143 detection and to identify failure precursors (deformation, precursor rockfalls and tension cracks
144 opening) using the techniques and logic described by Kromer et al. (2015a). We collected a total
145 of 15 TLS scans, including multiple scans during some campaigns for redundancy and error
146 checking, spanning nine time intervals between collection campaigns (Figure 2). We collected
147 high resolution photography from the same location using a Gigapan robotic head for creation of
148 high-resolution panoramic images of the slope, as in Stock et al. (2011) and Lato et al. (2012).
149 After several rockfall events in December 2014, we collected oblique photos from a helicopter
150 (OAP-H) to construct a model for a post failure assessment of rock runout and integrity of the
151 rail infrastructure.

152 We collected TLS data using an Optech Ilris 3D-ER scanner. This scanner has a range of 1800 m
153 at 80% surface reflectivity and a manufacturer-specified range and angular accuracy at 100 m per
154 point of 7 mm and 8 mm, respectively (Teledyneoptech 2014). The area of the slope we
155 monitored with TLS, shown in Figures 1 and 2, ranges from 185 to 340 m a.s.l. and spans a 200
156 m length of railway track. We collected TLS data from two stations located on the opposite side
157 of the river valley, providing overlapping coverage of the area of interest, with a minimum and
158 maximum range to slope (bottom and top) of 350 and 550 m respectively. The spacing between
159 data points is therefore between 0.05 and 0.08 m. We collected 162 oblique aerial photographs of
160 the post failure slope on 14 December 2014, using a Nikon D800 camera equipped with a 50 mm
161 (f/1.8G) Nikon lens. CN Rail procured the ALS data and the supplier processed the raw data, as
162 detailed in Lato et al. (2014).

163 ***Data Processing and Analysis***

164 ***Terrestrial Laser Scanning Data Processing***

165 We used IMAAlign (InnovMetric 2014) to register each successive TLS scan to the baseline
166 reference scan from 28 November 2013. We used a three step alignment procedure consisting of:
167 (i) manual identification of common points, (ii) implementation of the PolyWorks' iterative
168 surface matching algorithm which is based on the iterative closest point (ICP) best fit algorithm
169 (Besl and McKay 1992), and (iii) identification and omission of areas of slope change followed
170 by a reapplication of the best fit algorithm. We omitted all data points affected by the
171 construction of the rockfall protection structure, seen in Figure 1, from the alignment process.
172 Interscan alignment error (1 St. Dev) between TLS scans varied from 0.011 to 0.018 m.

173 *Structure from Motion Photogrammetry Data Processing*

174 We used oblique aerial photos collected from a helicopter (OAP-H) to build a 3D point cloud
175 and meshed surface model using Photoscan (V1.021) (Agisoft 2014). We omitted alignment tie-
176 points with reprojection errors greater than 0.5 pixels from the optimized camera alignments. To
177 coarsely scale and register the meshed surface model, we used location data provided by a GPS
178 peripheral to the camera. We used the ICP routine in Cloud Compare (Cloud Compare 2014)
179 software with scale adjustment for fine alignment with the TLS data. The residual cloud to mesh
180 differences between the photogrammetry model and the TLS data, ignoring areas of significant
181 slope change, resulted in a distribution with mean 0.00 m and standard deviation of 0.06 m.

182 *Structural Analysis*

183 We analyzed the slope structure surrounding deforming areas and behind failure zones using
184 IMInspect by manually selected points belonging to a joint or failure plane and using a best fit
185 algorithm to fit a plane to the selected points. We used these results in the estimation of potential
186 failure volume, in combination with the 3D tracking analysis to estimate pre-failure kinematics
187 and to measure post-failure scar structure.

188 *Change Detection, Hazard Identification and Deformation Monitoring*

189 To detect change smaller than the limit of detection for a single point (0.022 to 0.036 m), we
190 implemented the spatial portion of the change detection and filtering algorithm outlined in
191 Kromer et al. (2015b). The algorithm calculates differences along a slope dependent vector as
192 discussed by Lague et al. (2013) and filters point cloud differences using the median of
193 neighboring difference values, as in Abellán et al. (2009). The filtered differences are mapped
194 on to the reference point cloud with a location index. We used a 2 m radius to calculate the slope
195 dependent comparison vectors and 80 neighboring points for filtering of the differences for this

196 slope. Differences in a direction towards the scanner position were assigned a positive value, and
197 differences radiating away from the scanner position were assigned a negative difference value.

198 We assessed error by analyzing point cloud differences for stable areas of the slope measured on
199 different dates, for example, at the tunnel portal entrance or at unchanged sections of outcrop,
200 and by comparing differences from repeat scans from the same date where no significant change
201 is assumed to have occurred. We found that comparison means were less than 1 mm and the
202 standard deviations of the compared differences were as low as 2.5 mm at the bottom of the
203 slope and as high as 7 mm at the top portion of the slope. Based on this analysis we define a
204 conservative limit of detection as the 95% ($LoD_{95\%}$) confidence of 12 mm, which is used to
205 display slope change spatially. We also recorded the standard deviation of the means calculated
206 from the neighbourhood filtering. This allowed us to calculate a per point or location specific 95
207 % confidence interval.

208 The filtered cloud to cloud differences were interpreted to be the result of accumulations of soil
209 or rocky debris, rockfalls, tension crack opening, discrete block deformation, vegetation growth
210 or related to human/construction activity. For example, accumulation of debris at the base of the
211 slope generates a conical shape and characteristic surface roughness, generating a positive
212 difference. Block deformation usually appears as a positive deformation, on discrete rock blocks,
213 as it moves away from the slope towards the scanner position. Rocks that detach from a portion of
214 the slope appear as negative differences and a corresponding positive difference (accumulation)
215 is usually found downslope from the source area. Tension crack opening is distinguished from
216 rockfall as it is associated with the movement of discrete rock blocks and no corresponding
217 accumulation is found below. Errors greater than the 95% confidence interval that are the result
218 of low incidence angle, poor surface reflectance or the presence of vegetation were distinguished

219 by their implausible kinematics, or systematic expression, for example linear change features or
220 errors concentrated on planes at oblique angles to the scanner line of sight. We also used the high
221 resolution photographs and observations from track maintenance employees to aid in the
222 interpretation of measured point cloud differences.

223

224 *3D Movement Tracking Analysis*

225 We obtained the deformation vector magnitude and direction by using three dimensional block
226 tracking (Teza et al. 2007; Oppikofer et al. 2009). We used the ICP algorithm (Besl and McKay
227 1992) to fit the reference point cloud representation of the deforming block to each
228 representation of the block in successive point clouds, followed by the extraction of the
229 deformation magnitude and directions from the affine transformation matrices. Compared to the
230 slope dependent normal vector, this analysis gives the true deformation direction of the central
231 point of the chosen blocks.

232 Errors in this method depend on several factors, including the number of points describing the
233 moving block and its size and shape. Very small blocks, or blocks containing too few points,
234 may result in convergence of the ICP on an incorrect location or local minimum. We assessed
235 error by performing the alignment method on 10 stable areas of representative size and shape
236 located across the slope for various collection dates. Mean error in the magnitude is 0.007 m in
237 the vertical plane and 0.005 m in the horizontal plane. Errors of the deformation magnitude,
238 topple angle and tilt angle are fixed, whereas the trend and plunge of deformation, and azimuth
239 of topple are dependent on the deformation magnitude and the topple magnitude, respectively, as

240 described by Oppikoffer et al. (2009). We present the calculated errors alongside the results for
241 each block and comparison interval.

242 *Assessment of Rockfall Volumes*

243 We estimated volume of potential rockfalls from the identified surface representations of the
244 deforming areas, the surrounding defining discontinuities and the volume of overlying surficial
245 material. This was then compared to the volume that eventually failed. We calculated the volume
246 of failed material by comparing pre-failure models with post failure models, either TLS to TLS
247 or TLS to OAP-H, using the 3D methodology described in Rabatel et al. (2008).

248 Uncertainty in calculating the rockfall volumes results from the presence of occluded areas and
249 the quality of the surface meshes used to generate the volume estimate. Uncertainty in the
250 surface mesh arise from the procedure used to generate the mesh, errors specific to the TLS
251 equipment and survey related errors, e.g. distance to target, incident angle, atmospheric
252 conditions. As a result, there is a relative volume error which depends on the ratio of rockfall
253 surface area to volume ratio. Rockfall shapes which include higher surface area to volume ratios
254 result in higher relative errors. For this study, we estimated error resulting from the surface by
255 multiplying the $LoD_{95\%}$ of the surface by the surface area. We report volumes as order of
256 magnitude estimates to account for occlusion uncertainty, e.g. $4200 \text{ m}^3 \pm 50 \text{ m}^3$ or $210 \text{ m}^3 \pm 5$
257 m^3 . In all cases however, the uncertainty in estimating volume based on appropriate bounding
258 joint structure is much greater than the volume measurement uncertainty. We assess the relative
259 accuracy of our volume estimates by comparing our pre-failure estimates with measured post-
260 failure volumes.

261 ***Timeline of Events***

262 A detailed timeline of events including data collection, warning to railway operators, and
263 failures is presented in Figure 2. The construction of the rockfall protection structure commenced
264 in October 2013 and was completed in June 2014. We identified three discrete areas of rock
265 deformation after 279 days of monitoring. These three areas are labelled A, B and C in Figure 2.
266 On 09 September 2014, we provided detailed information to CN of the largest identified
267 expected rockfall source area (Area A), which included the location of failure, its potential
268 volume and kinematics of motion.

269 CN conducted a risk assessment using the information we provided and determined that the new
270 rockfall protection structure would provide sufficient protection to the railway. We continued to
271 monitor the slope in the fall of 2014 and noted continued deformation of the identified Areas A,
272 B and C prior to failure.

273 On 03 December 2014, during regular track inspection, a CN engineer noted an accumulation of
274 approximately 20-30 m³ of rock debris in a draped steel mesh fence located above the newly
275 built protection structure. Following three days of heavy rainfall, totaling 41 mm (Environment
276 Canada, 2014), on 11 December 2014 a CN maintenance employee noticed a large accumulation
277 of debris behind the rockfall protection structure.

278 We were able to assess the rockfall source zones and rockfall run out within three days of the
279 observed accumulation by using the detailed 3D photogrammetric slope model generated from
280 oblique aerial photographs taken from a helicopter (OAP-H) on 14 December 2014. We found
281 that failure had occurred at all of the sites A, B and C. Subsequently the south (railway west

282 direction) end of the rockfall protection structure was modified by adding a draped catchment
283 fence to channel debris away from the side of the structure to prevent overtopping.

284 The TLS data collected on 17 February 2015 revealed areas of deformation adjacent to each of
285 the failed Areas A, B and C. We informed CN of these areas on 03 March 2015. Due to the
286 lower resolution and limit of detection of the photogrammetry model (LoD_{95%} 0.12 m) we were
287 not able to detect deformation by comparison with the model obtained on 14 December 2014
288 with confidence. Subsequent data collections revealed no further increase in deformation.

289 Following our analysis of the data collected on 29 March 2015 we identified a new area of
290 deformation (Area D) and notified CN engineers. Continued monitoring of this area revealed the
291 opening of a tension crack, a pattern of rockfall surrounding the perimeter of the deforming area
292 and continuation of the observed deformation. We identified two additional areas of possible
293 deformation (Areas E and F) after analysis of data collected on 22 October 2015. We transmitted
294 this information to CN on 18 November 2015. We later re-interpreted these areas using a
295 combination of photographs and TLS change detection and found that these areas were
296 accumulations of sediment on top of the rock outcrop due the presence of a sediment source area
297 above, its characteristic tear drop shape and surface roughness.

298 Finally, between 22 October 2015 and 15 February 2016, the blocks at Area D failed, permitting
299 an assessment of the quality of the pre-failure volume and kinematic projections.

300

301

Figure 2

302

303 ***Initial Projections and Failure Warning***

304 The point cloud differences for the three deformation areas identified in September 2014 are
305 presented in Figure 3 and are labelled as A, B and C. There was observable deformation in all
306 three areas in the 28 November 2013 to 04 June 2014 comparison interval (Figure 3, top inset).

307 The deformation at A is characterized by a group of blocks bounded by four discontinuity sets
308 (dip dir. /dip: 115°/43°, 145°/85°, 103°/74°, 225°/70°). Blocks formed by joints sets in the
309 central portion of the area appear to deform together, while blocks that are on the outer perimeter
310 are characterized by a lower magnitude of deformation. We interpreted point cloud differences
311 directly upslope of Area A to be the result of movement of soil associated with the deformation
312 of the rock blocks. This makes the interpretation of the block deformation difficult because the
313 soil appears to overtop the group of blocks, see Figure 3, Area A deformation series. Based on
314 the area of interpreted deformation and the bounding joint sets, we calculated a projected volume
315 of failure of 4800 m³ of combined rock and soil.

316 Point cloud differences at Area B indicate deformation from three distinct planar blocks with a
317 slope face plane orientation of dip dir. /dip: 223°/73°. Area C consists of two separate blocks.
318 The top block has a well-defined back fracture (based on area of movement) with orientation of
319 dip dir. /dip: 297°/82° and was bounded by joints dip dir. /dip: 335°/84°, 270°/63°, 061°/78°.
320 Volumes of blocks at B and C were not precisely projected prior to failure due to their relatively
321 small size (in the 100 m³ range) compared to the blocks at Area A, our inexperience with
322 providing this type of information to CN and the assumption that the potential consequences
323 from Area A would be of more significant concern.

324

325

Figure 3

326 The point cloud difference time series for the three areas are presented in Figure 4. We chose a
327 point representing the greatest amount of deformation for each area in order to plot the time
328 series. The time series of all three areas display a similar evolution of deformation. The greatest
329 observed deformation occurred during the period between 28 November 2013 and 04 June 2014,
330 followed by a period of insignificant ($p > 0.05$) change, between 04 June 2014 and 03 September
331 2014. Area B continued to deform up to the time of data collection in November 2014. We
332 cannot, however, be certain whether significant deformation occurred or not during this interval
333 for areas A and C because the 95% confidence intervals overlap. We did not collect TLS
334 between the November 2014 campaign and the interpreted failure date, 11 December 2014.

335

Figure 4

336 We used the 3D block tracking analysis prior to failure of the blocks at A to develop a better
337 understanding of the failure mechanism. We determined the behaviour of blocks B and C from
338 back analysis (Figure 5). For block A, the central blocks deformed 0.09 m over the first 188
339 days, along a plunge of $22^\circ \pm 8^\circ$ trending 211° . We reported this information to CN on 03
340 September 2014. Our subsequent analysis revealed that the plunge became shallower over time;
341 this can be seen from the decreasing plunge angle and the increasing uncertainty in the plunge
342 angle. The plunge error is greatest for shallow to horizontal plunges because the error is
343 dependent on the ratio between the vertical deformation component and the error in the vertical
344 deformation component. At the time of analysis, we interpreted the movement as a shallow
345 wedge failure along a 22° sliding wedge line.

346 We characterized the 3D deformation for the top block at Area B by a magnitude of movement
347 between 0.042 and 0.061 m over 347 days, with a shallow plunging angle (seen by the high error
348 in plunge), which was on average negative. The deformation magnitudes of the bottom block
349 ranged between 0.040 – 0.058 m plunging at a shallow angle. The direction of both block
350 deformations trended between 197°-216°. We recorded a topple angle for both blocks reaching
351 0.6° and 0.9° for the top and bottom block, respectively.

352 The blocks tracked in Area C registered the smallest deformation of all of the areas, reaching a
353 maximum of 0.019 and 0.026 m for the top and bottom block, respectively, over 347 days. We
354 obtained negative plunges for both blocks with equally high error values. This is due to a small
355 vertical component of deformation relative to the vertical component error; however, in this case
356 the net measured plunge is negative (upwards). Similarly, there is a high error in the trend due to
357 the small horizontal component of deformation relative to the horizontal component error. A
358 maximum topple was recorded of 0.1° for the top block and 0.7° for the bottom block.

359

Figure 5

360 ***Post Failure Analysis and Assessment of Initial Projections***

361 Post failure, we analyzed the three rockfall source zones from the comparison between the
362 OAP-H model collected a few days after the failure, and the pre-failure TLS model. We found
363 that the failure areas corresponded to the previously identified areas of deformation (Figure 6).
364 We calculated a source zone volume at zone A of approximately 4200 m³, consisting of 3300 m³
365 of rock blocks and 900 m³ of overlying soil. We interpreted the areas of negative model change
366 downslope of Area A to be the result of loss of material due to impact of the rocks sliding down

367 the slope. We calculated failed volumes for Areas B and C to be approximately 220 m³ and 210
368 m³, respectively.

369 Most of the rockfall runout was contained by the rockfall protection structure. From analysis of
370 post failure photographs, the debris accumulation from rockfall source Area A appears to cover
371 the debris accumulation below source zone B, indicating that rockfalls from source zone B
372 preceded A. Soil overlying A also overtopped the south (railway west) end of the rockfall
373 protection structure. This prompted the construction of a catchment fence at this location of the
374 structure following the failures.

375 The projected volume was 14% greater than that measured post failure. The projection of the
376 volume in this case was challenging for two main reasons: (1) the volume of soil affected by the
377 failure of the deforming rocks is difficult to estimate, and (2) there is large uncertainty in where
378 to locate the back scarp plane. The approximate planes and shape of the defining planes used for
379 the analysis can be seen in Figure 6, top right inset. The projected volume estimate in this case
380 was sufficiently accurate to assess the effectiveness of the rockfall protection structure and assess
381 risk mitigation requirements. In this case, CN determined that the structure would provide
382 adequate protection to the rail line for the projected volume of failure.

383 **Figure 6**

384 We analyzed the geological structure exposed in the failure scars to better understand the
385 mechanism of the three failure sites and to assess the accuracy of the kinematics estimated prior
386 to failure, as shown in Figure 7. The post failure planes at A are consistent with those identified
387 prior to failure, and led to wedge-type kinematics, formed from the intersection of joints with dip
388 dir./dip: 238°/46°, 103°/74°, 115°/43° with the sliding direction oriented approximately 190°/20°.

389 This is consistent with the trend and plunge obtained using 3D tracking of the blocks,
390 considering the natural variance in joint orientation and the error in the 3D tracking method.

391 Our analysis of the failure scar at Area B revealed that it was controlled by a near vertical back
392 plane with an orientation of $232^{\circ}/80^{\circ}$ (dip/dip dir.). This correlates well with the trend (197° -
393 216°) and shallow plunges observed with the 3D tracking analysis. We interpret this failure as a
394 buckling failure because the upper and lower planar block surfaces were separated by a fracture,
395 there were significant toppling angles, and there was measured upward movement of the top
396 block.

397 The back scarp at Area C measured post failure is $137^{\circ}/82^{\circ}$ (dip/dip dir.). The deformation
398 trend, as well as the toppling azimuth, vary between 248° - 306° , indicating that this was a
399 toppling failure away from the plane $137^{\circ}/82^{\circ}$. The rotation from $137^{\circ}/82^{\circ}$ towards the
400 toppling/deformation direction would have required rotation through 90° , which could explain
401 the upwards measured plunge of deformation.

402 **Figure 7**

403 ***Ongoing Monitoring and Projections***

404 Following the failures at Areas A, B and C, our continued monitoring during 2015 revealed
405 additional areas of slope deformation, outlined in Figure 8. Relative to the original baseline scan
406 of 28 November 2013, we observed deformation of areas on either side of the failed block at A,
407 labelled A1 and A2 in Figure 8. We found similar areas adjacent to failed Areas B and C, labeled
408 B1 and C1. We projected volumes of 7, 1000, and 44 m^3 for blocks A1, A2 and B1, respectively.
409 We identified three additional areas of deformation in 2015; Area D, consisting of two separate

410 deforming blocks D1 and D2, Area E consisting of many separate distinct deforming zones over
411 the area, and Area F consisting of a single zone of deformation. We notified CN of all these
412 deforming areas throughout 2015 (see timeline of events).

413 We used the deformation time series, the shape of the deforming area, surface roughness and
414 surrounding change to interpret whether measured differences were related to discrete block
415 deformation, accumulation of sediment on the rock surface, or the result of systematic error. We
416 gave notification based on this type of interpretation for all areas that are potentially or could
417 potentially develop into a rock fall source zone, even though the interpretation can change with
418 ongoing monitoring and additional sources of data. Our ongoing monitoring of Areas A1, A2,
419 B1, C1, for example revealed no further development of deformation since the interval where the
420 initial failures occurred. These areas were then no longer interpreted to be blocks showing signs
421 of progressive failure, but rather are interpreted to be a consequence of the failures at A, B and
422 C. The identified blocks were spatially located within the deforming zones of A, B and C prior to
423 failure, the blocks deformed over time along with the blocks that eventually failed, and during
424 the failure interval a large increase in deformation was observed followed by stabilization.
425 Similarly, we re-interpreted the change detected at Areas E and F and found that the change is
426 likely due to accumulation of soil. In the case of zone E, it was being sourced from the soil slope
427 overlying the area. For Area F we interpreted the change as an accumulation of soil due its
428 location within a small gully and characteristic tear drop shape.

429 We interpreted Area D as a potential rockfall source zone because of its characteristic rock shape
430 and continued increase in measured change. Prior to failure, the deformation time series ends
431 with an increase in the deformation rate during the last scan interval (22 October 2015 – 15
432 February 2016). We estimated the most probable time of failure of Area D as being during the

433 spring freeze thaw season after the last scan, because the observed deformation was reaching a
434 critical value as compared to similar failures studied along the main line. This is consistent with
435 Hungr et al's (1999) observation that rockfalls occur at higher frequency during this season in
436 this region. We gave warning to CN with a projected volume of 21 m³ and 5 m³ for blocks D1
437 and D2, respectively. CN performed a risk assessment and determined no action was required
438 due to adequate catchment and the presence of a slide detector fence.

439 **Figure 8**

440

441 We applied 3D block tracking analysis to the two blocks identified in Area D to better
442 understand the mechanism of failure. We observed a deformation magnitude larger than the limit
443 of detection between 13 September 2014 and 10 November 2014. Following this interval, both
444 blocks continued to deform reaching a maximum of 0.098 m and 0.034 m for blocks D1 and D2,
445 respectively, prior to failure. The error in the plunge is significant for both blocks as a result of a
446 low vertical component of deformation compared to the vertical component error. We calculated
447 a topple angle measuring 1.4° for D1 and 0.5° for D2. We interpreted the failure mechanism for
448 this block to be a topple resulting from detachment from J2 120°/85° (dip dir. /dip).

449 **Figure 9**

450 For each area of deformation, we analyzed surrounding rockfall events. For all but one of the
451 areas we found detectable pre-failure rockfalls surrounding the perimeter of the failure, at
452 potential rockfall source zone D (Figure 10). We observed an increase in rockfalls surrounding
453 both D1 and D2 starting between 04 June 2014 and 03 September 2014. Our monitoring of the
454 total volume at three separate points (1, 2 & 3 in Figure 10) revealed that points 1 and 2 were the

455 result of discrete rockfall events and that point 3 was the result of an increasing volume from the
456 reference point cloud. This is probably due to increased volume behind the rock block as the
457 back scarp was opening, and may not be the result of loss of physical rock volume.

458 **Figure 10**

459 **Failure Area D**

460 The block we identified at Area D failed between TLS scan intervals 22 October 2015 and 15
461 February 2016 (Figure 11). We estimated the resultant failed volume to be 48.6 m^3 , which
462 includes additional failed material surrounding the identified areas of deformation. Due to the
463 larger area involved in the failure, the failed volume was 53% greater than we projected.

464 Our analysis of the post failure geometry revealed a back scarp at D1 oriented $042^\circ/83^\circ$ (dip/dip
465 dir) and a back scarp at D2 oriented at $323^\circ/89^\circ$ (dip/dip dir), corresponding to J4 and J2
466 respectively. We also observed a sliding plane oriented at $239^\circ/76^\circ$ (dip/dip dir) linking blocks
467 D1 and D2. The sliding of the block was not apparent prior to failure in this case due to the high
468 error in the plunge angles. The interpreted failure mechanism post failure was slightly different
469 than was projected in this case. Our post failure interpretation of the mechanism was a sliding
470 failure along $239^\circ/76^\circ$ and a toppling failure in the direction of sliding as a result of the block
471 detachment from $239^\circ/76^\circ$ and $042^\circ/83^\circ$.

472

473 **Figure 11**

474

475 **Discussion**

476 In this study, we relied on the ability to detect precursors of failure resulting from progressive
477 failure to assess location, magnitude and kinematics of future failures. Compared to previous
478 studies using TLS to detect rock slope deformation (Abellán et al. 2010; Kromer et al. 2015a;
479 Rosser et al. 2007; Royán et al. 2013), precursor rockfalls (Rosser et al. 2005; Stock et al 2012)
480 and tension crack opening (Kromer et al 2015a; Stock et al 2012), we have extended these
481 techniques to estimate the volume and kinematics prior to failure. This is then used in a risk
482 management framework by owners to estimate rockfall risk along an operational rail corridor
483 and to plan appropriate mitigation measures.

484 Basing our approach on identifying precursors in the damage accumulation phase (Sättele et al.
485 2015), instead of conducting early warning monitoring (Atzeni et al. 2014; Sättele et al. 2015),
486 permits the monitoring of many sites with the same instrument for a modest field monitoring
487 expense. This is in contrast to early warning monitoring, which requires more frequent or
488 continuous data collection (Kieffer and Valentin 2016), and the identification of the tertiary or
489 acceleration phase of the failure followed by the fitting of models (Crosta and Agliardi 2003;
490 Dick et al. 2015; Fukuzono 1985; Mufundirwa et al. 2010; Voight 1989). Additionally,
491 compared to methods relying solely on the assessment of hazard temporal probability through
492 magnitude frequency (Abott et al. 1998; Hungr et al. 1999; Lato et al. 2011), this approach leads
493 to better decision making through a long term forecast of failure by the identification of incipient
494 failure signs for specific locations with a given magnitude rather than relying on average
495 temporal probabilities from past activity.

496

497 We detected a range of precursor activity for different failure mechanisms on this slope. All
498 failure styles resulted in detectable deformation, however precursor rockfalls were only detected
499 in one case around the perimeter of two distinct deforming areas. Similar to observations by
500 Abellán et al. (2010), Rosser et al. (2007) and Royán et al. (2015), we observed that larger
501 rockfalls were preceded by higher deformation. We do, however, note a difference in the nature
502 of precursor activity and the mechanism controlling failure and the fracture planes involved. For
503 example, area D, which was interpreted as a combination of a sliding and toppling mechanism
504 resulted in both detectable precursor rockfalls and a relatively high deformation magnitude for its
505 failed magnitude. Area C, however, was also interpreted as a toppling mechanism and did not
506 result in detectable precursor rockfall nor significant precursor deformation. This suggests that
507 the mechanism of failure and the state of damage accumulation on the failure planes controls the
508 type and magnitude of precursors that can be observed.

509 The monitoring frequency of this study is sufficient to capture pre-failure deformation and other
510 precursors at this site. This approach only works at slopes that show detectable signs of
511 progressive failure. Due to rock strength, scale of events, joint structure and damage state, some
512 slopes may not exhibit detectable signs prior to failure (Rosser et al. 2007). Our ability to detect
513 precursors is limited by our ability to detect small deformations, by our data collection frequency
514 and by our ability to differentiate block deformation associated with progressive failure from
515 small accumulation of sediment or other processes, or error. TLS data used with high resolution
516 photography can aid in this differentiation by allowing the interpretation of characteristic shape,
517 the calculation of 3D deformation vectors for relatively small rock slope failures and the
518 extraction of deformation time series. Due to our relatively infrequent data collection campaigns,
519 it is likely that we missed detecting a number of precursor rockfalls. The observed accumulation

520 of rock debris occurring prior to 12 December 2014, for example, is likely due to rockfall
521 precursors to the identified areas, as no other source zone was identified in the comparison
522 between the OAP-H and the TLS models.

523 The 3D tracking analysis has primarily been used for tracking deformation of large landslide
524 blocks (Oppikoffer et al. 2009), but in this case has been shown to be beneficial in understanding
525 the kinematics of relatively small rockfall failures. The primary limitations are small deformation
526 values in the horizontal or vertical planes or in the toppling angle, which result in a decreased
527 ability to identify meaningful deformation plunges and trends or toppling azimuths, respectively.

528 The magnitude and kinematics of future events are important parameters for risk assessment and
529 planning risk mitigation options. Our projection of source zone location, volume and kinematics
530 was consistent with an assessment of the post failure scars. In this case, CN determined that the
531 newly built rockfall protection structure would provide sufficient protection against the projected
532 event at A and the existing ditch and warning fence below area D would provide an adequate
533 level of protection. In general, an accurate volume and kinematic estimate can help plan hazard
534 removal options such as scaling and blasting, design stabilization measures such as bolting and
535 design protection methods such as netting and rockfall protection structures. In some cases, the
536 appropriate mitigation option could be the increase in monitoring frequency at a particular site or
537 the installation of a continuous monitoring early warning system.

538 A more precise estimate of temporal probability can be attained by comparing the state of
539 damage accumulation (i.e. rockmass deformation) to thresholds reached by previous failures of
540 similar nature and by analyzing the influence of environmental factors. Although Rosser et al.
541 (2007) and Royán et al. (2013) have noted a lack of correlation between the tertiary acceleration

542 phase of failure and environmental triggers at their sites, rockfall activity along this rail line was
543 observed by Peckover and Kerr (1977) as being affected by seasonal climatic effects including
544 freeze-thaw cycles and precipitation. Beginning on 08 December 2014, three days prior to failure
545 of Area A, the region experienced 41 mm of rainfall, which we hypothesize was the primary
546 triggering factor for the failure events. Although we can only constrain the time of failure of
547 blocks at Areas B and C to be between 03 December 2014 and 11 December 2014, we
548 interpreted a failure date during or shortly after this rainfall event as well. Additionally, we
549 observed an apparent link between deformation and weather for Areas A, B, C and D. We
550 believe that environmental triggers such as rainfall and frost jacking, along with slope creep
551 (progressive sliding or brittle fracture propagation) are resulting in damage accumulation and
552 eventual failure of rockfalls at this slope.

553 Temporal probability of failure can also be better estimated by better understanding the type,
554 magnitude and duration of precursors for different failure modes, magnitudes and in different
555 rock masses. As discussed in Eberhardt et al. (2004) and Rosser et al. (2007), slopes accumulate
556 damage up until a critical threshold, at which point the failure transitions to the tertiary phase
557 leading to collapse. The state of damage of a potential failure can be an indicator of temporal
558 failure probability if critical damage thresholds are known. Potential failures close to the
559 threshold are more likely to progress to the tertiary stage from internal processes such as crack
560 growth and external influences such as environmental triggers. Further study of failure types,
561 magnitude and duration of precursors as a function of failure mode, magnitude and rockmass
562 type can also help us better understand likely failure time.

563

564

565 ***Conclusions***

566 Monitoring rock slopes at a baseline level (once every 2-4 months) with TLS and supporting
567 remote sensing technologies has great potential to improve rockfall risk management strategies
568 for complex rock slope settings. As shown in this study, it is possible to estimate source zone
569 location, volume and kinematics prior to failure based on the identification of precursor signs of
570 slope failure. The estimation of volumes and mechanisms of future rockfalls is of critical
571 importance for the assessment of consequences and thus risk, and for planning risk mitigation
572 options. Our detection of the failure locations was successful, volume projections were within
573 10-55% of the eventual failure, and the anticipated kinematics and failure mechanism were
574 consistent with that indicated by an assessment of post failure rockfall scar geometries. This
575 strategy can be extended to manage risk from rockfall hazard in mountainous communities or to
576 other sensitive infrastructure.

577 In this study, we move away from defining hazard temporal probability based on magnitude
578 frequency relationships which are based on the long term behavior of the slope. Instead, with the
579 assumption that areas showing precursor signs of failure have a much higher likelihood of failure
580 than that obtained from magnitude frequency relationships, we can specifically locate, assess
581 volume and kinematics of potential rockfalls, before failure occurs. This can be done for many
582 slopes at baseline level.

583 The ability to detect, locate and quantify hazard source zones with accurate volume estimation
584 and kinematics prior to failure has resulted in an improved ability to prioritize mitigation efforts,
585 manage risk, and better understand slope failure mechanisms. This will ultimately improve

586 safety of people and property exposed to many types of slope hazards, particularly rockfall and
587 related landslide types.

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596

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Figure Captions

Figure 1: Top left: Site location in the Fraser Valley in British Columbia. Bottom left: Oblique helicopter photogrammetry (OAP-H) model of the slope from 14 December 2014, including the new rock protection structure. Top right: location of the monitored area on an ALS DEM, showing position relative to the Canadian National Rail line and the TransCanada Highway. Bottom right is the rockmass structure of the study site as analyzed by Sturzenegger et al. (2014).

Figure 2: Timeline data collection, events observed and action taken. Top Photo: Areas where slope deformation was identified. The events that occurred during the top part of the timeline (day 0-381) are described in the “Initial Projection and Failure Warning” section and the events from day 381 onwards, shown in the bottom half of the timeline, are described in the “Ongoing Monitoring and Projections” section.

Figure 3: Identification and analysis of slope deformation in three distinct Areas A, B and C. Top: Filtered positive point cloud differences along slope dependent normal vector from reference scan 28 November 2013 to 04 June 2014. Bottom: Cumulative time series of identified areas of positive change prior to failure. Other observed slope changes are due to construction of the rockfall protection structure and accumulation of rock debris and soil (annotated in top image).

Figure 4: Time series of positive point cloud differences along slope dependent normal vector at the point of maximum difference in Areas A, B and C between 28 November 2013 and 10

November 2014 (0-347 days). Interpreted failure date is indicated by a yellow star. Bottom graph: Cumulative precipitation for the same time period.

Figure 5: 3D block tracking analysis of deforming blocks at Areas A, B and C. Left images show points used for 3D tracking analysis in colour. Right tables show the translation component of the center point of the tracked block as magnitude, trend and plunge of translation vector, and the rotation component as the angle between a vertical vector and the topple vector, azimuth of topple vector and rotation around topple vector (tilt).

Figure 6: Analysis of slope post failure and assessment of initial projections. Top left: Change detection map between reference TLS scan (28 November 2013) and OAP-H data (14 December 2014). Bottom left: Photograph showing rockfall source zones and accumulation of rock and soil debris. Right column: TLS model of source zones prior to failure, overlain on after failure photogrammetry model and failed volumes for Areas A, B, and C. Areas of failure correspond to projected source zones outlined in Figure 3.

Figure 7: Equal Area stereonet of structure at post failure source zones for Areas A, B and C.

Figure 8: Identification and analysis of slope deformation after initial failures. Top: Filtered positive point cloud differences along the slope based on a comparison between the reference scan from 28 November 2013 with 22 October 2015. Bottom: Time series of cumulative positive point cloud differences along a slope dependent normal vector at the point of maximum difference in each respective area.

Figure 9: 3D block tracking analysis of deforming blocks at Area D. Left image shows points used for 3D tracking analysis in colour. Right tables show the translation component of the center point of the tracked block as magnitude, trend and plunge of translation vector, and the rotation component as the angle between a vertical vector and the topple vector, azimuth of topple vector and rotation around topple vector (tilt).

Figure 10: Analysis of precursor rockfalls around the perimeter of deforming blocks at Area D. Rockfall surface areas are represented by coloured points associated with a comparison period. Volumes of the 3 rockfall areas are plotted as well as deformation at point D1.

Figure 11: Post failure of block at Area D. A, TLS image showing failure at D between 22 October 2015 and 15 February 2016; B, before failure photograph taken on 11 June 2015; and C, after failure photograph taken on 15 February 2016.




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


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


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


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


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


Figure 6: Analysis of slope post failure and assessment of initial projections. Top left: Change detection map between reference TLS scan (28 November 2013) and OAP-H data (14 December 2014). Bottom left: Photograph showing rockfall source zones and accumulation of rock and soil debris. Right column: TLS model of source zones prior to failure, overlain on after failure photogrammetry model and failed volumes for Areas A, B, and C. Areas of failure correspond to projected source zones outlined in Figure 3.




Figure 7: Equal Area stereonets of structure at post failure source zones for Areas A, B and C.

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


Figure 8: Identification and analysis of slope deformation after initial failures. Top: Filtered positive point cloud differences along the slope based on a comparison between the reference scan from 28 November 2013 with 22 October 2015. Bottom: Time series of cumulative positive point cloud differences along a slope dependent normal vector at the point of maximum difference in each respective area.




Figure 9: 3D block tracking analysis of deforming blocks at Area D. Left image shows points used for 3D tracking analysis in colour. Right tables show the translation component of the center point of the tracked block as magnitude, trend and plunge of translation vector, and the rotation component as the angle between a vertical vector and the topple vector, azimuth of topple vector and rotation around topple vector (tilt).




Figure 10: Analysis of precursor rockfalls around the perimeter of deforming blocks at Area D. Rockfall surface areas are represented by coloured points associated with a comparison period. Volumes of the 3 rockfall areas are plotted as well as deformation at point D1.




Figure 11: Post failure of block at Area D. A, TLS image showing failure at D between 22 October 2015 and 15 February 2016; B, before failure photograph taken on 11 June 2015; and C, after failure photograph taken on 15 February 2016.