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Modernizing Women:
Gender and Social Change
in the Middle East

THIRD EDITION

Valentine M. Moghadam

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ISBNs: 978-1-58826-933-1 hc

978-1-58826-909-6 pb

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WOMEN

GENDER AND
SOCIAL CHANGE
IN THE
MIDDLE EAST

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This excerpt was downloaded from the
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1 Gendering the Middle East and North Africa

The study of social change has tended to regard certain societal institutions and structures as central and then to examine how they change. Family structure, the organization of markets, the state, religious hierarchies, schools, the ways elites have exploited workers and peasants to extract surpluses from them, and the general set of values that governs society's cultural outlook are part of the list of key institutions. Social change and societal development come about principally through technological advancements, class conflict, and political action. Change in women's social positions has come about through a combination of long-term macrolevel processes—notably industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, the demographic transition, globalization—and forms of collective action that include national liberation movements, revolutions, and social movements. At the same time, such processes have been gendered, in that men and women have had different roles, experiences, and outcomes, while concepts of masculinity and femininity have infused a range of political processes and policies.

In societies everywhere, cultural institutions and practices, economic processes, and political structures are interactive and relatively autonomous. In the Marxist framework, infrastructures and superstructures are made up of multiple levels, and there are various types of transformations from one level to another. There is also an interactive relationship between structure and agency, inasmuch as structural changes are linked to “consciousness”—whether this is class consciousness (of interest to Marxists) or gender consciousness (of interest to feminists). Each society is located within and subject to the influences of a national class structure, a regional context, and a global system of states and markets. The world-system perspective regards states and national economies as situated within an international capitalist nexus characterized by a division of labor corresponding to its constituent

parts—core, periphery, and semiperiphery. As such, no major social change occurs outside the world context.¹ Thus, to understand the roles and status of women or changes in the structure of the family, it is necessary to examine economic development and political change within the society—which in turn are affected by regional and global developments. As we shall see in the discussion of women's employment, the structural determinants of world-system location, class location, state legal policy, and development strategy intersect to shape the pace and rhythm of women's integration into the labor force and their access to economic resources.


Figure 1.1 illustrates the institutions and structures that affect and are affected by social changes in a Marxist-feminist and world-system perspective. The institutions are embedded within a class structure (the system of production, accumulation, and surplus distribution), a set of gender arrangements and norms (roles ascribed to men and women through custom or law, cultural understandings of feminine and masculine), a regional context (e.g., the Middle East, Europe, Latin America), and a world system of states and markets characterized by asymmetries across core, peripheral, and semiperipheral countries.

The study of social change is often done comparatively. Although it cannot be said that social scientists have a single, universally recognized "comparative method," some of our deepest insights into society and culture are reached in and through comparison. In this book, I have compared women's legal status and social positions across countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and some comparisons are made between MENA and other world regions. Because a major objective of this book is to show the changing and variable status of women in the Middle East, the most effective method is to study the subject comparatively, emphasizing the factors that best explain the differences in women's status across the region and over time. Yet such an approach is rarely applied to the Middle East or to the "Muslim world" as a whole.²

On the Determining Role of Islam: A Critical Perspective

Since the 1980s, the subject of women and gender in the Middle East has been tied to the larger issue of Islamic revival and, particularly, the emergence of fundamentalist or politicized Islamist movements. We might identify three phases or strands of scholarship on Islamism. The first sought to define concepts—such as fundamentalism, Islamism, political or radical or revivalist Islam—and identify the origins, social bases, and objectives of movements. A second phase or strand has examined the "moderation" of the early movements and their success in expanding their sphere of influ-

Figure 1.1 Social Structures and Principal Institutions in Contemporary Societies



ence in both civil society and the political process. A third one emerged after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and focused on transnational Islamist terrorism. With respect to the early phase, Syrian Marxist philosopher Sadik al-Azm identified fundamentalism, whether Christian or Islamic, as the notion of the inerrancy or infallibility of holy texts: "The Koran is absolutely infallible, without error in all matters pertaining to faith and practice, as well as in areas such as geography, science, history, etc." Gilles Kepel has defined political Islam as the movement and ideology of a state based on Islamic law, or sharia as codified in one or another of the five schools of Islamic jurisprudence.³ In this book I use the term *Islamism*

to refer to movements and ideas predicated on the expressed goal of spreading Islamic laws and norms, whether through parliamentary means or violent means. The Islamic revival has generated polemics and debates as well as numerous scholarly works, with critics and advocates holding divergent views. Those identifying most with Islamic law are convinced that Islam provides all the necessary rights for humankind and womankind, and that Islamic states—whether some as-yet-attained ideal type or an existing one such as the Islamic Republic of Iran—go the furthest in establishing those rights. In contrast, some secular feminists have tended to describe adherence to Islamic norms and laws as the main impediment to women's advancement.⁴ Perhaps midway between the two, Freda Hussein stressed “complementarity of the sexes” in Islam, distinguishing “authentic Islam” from “pseudo-Islam” and asserting that the former is emancipatory. She and other Muslim feminists—Asma Barlas, Riffat Hassan, Azizah al-Hibri, Zainah Anwar, and Amina Wadud, among others—emphasize the egalitarian and emancipatory content of the Quran, which they maintain has been hijacked by patriarchal interpretations since the early Middle Ages.⁵

For outside observers, fundamentalism and the rise of Islamist movements reinforced stereotypes about the region, in particular the idea that Islam is ubiquitous in the culture and politics of the region, that tradition is tenacious, that the clergy have the highest authority, and that women's status is everywhere low. Studies began to appear suggesting that a distinctive pattern of values and behavior set the Muslim world apart from, and sometimes in collision with, the West. These studies were based on culturalist arguments and emphasized the constraining impact of Islamic orthodoxy in hampering the Muslim world's intellectual, technological, scientific, and economic progress. Others cited as principal culprits “petro Islam” in the Middle East and North Africa or Islamist movements such as those in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, and elsewhere. Samuel Huntington, the best-known proponent of the culturalist explanation, argued that modernization, interdependence, and democratization had not fostered convergence and increased cooperation among nations, but instead had resulted in growing divergence that was likely to culminate in a clash of civilizations. He was particularly concerned that the demographic surge of the Islamic world, which he saw as a source of strength, was a threat to the West.⁶

In the wake of the terrorist assaults on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, a new wave of commentary appeared, especially in the United States, that questioned the capacity of Muslim and especially Middle Eastern countries to establish modern, democratic, secular, and gender-egalitarian social systems. One article claimed that Muslim societies had fallen behind Western societies because of the “slow evolution of Islamic societies' treatment of women.” A study by Ronald Inglehart and

Pippa Norris asserted that countries in the Islamic world were most resistant to the achievement of equality between women and men and that the cultural fault line dividing the West and the Islamic world had to do with gender relations, the position of women, and attitudes toward sexuality. They maintained that on issues of gender and sexuality, “Muslim nations have remained the most traditional societies in the world,” and asserted that despite surveys showing Muslims—including those in MENA—favoring democracy, their lack of “commitment to gender equality and sexual liberalization” meant that “democracy may not be sustainable in their societies.” (Inglehart and Norris included attitudes not only toward male-female equality but also “sexual liberalization,” or attitudes toward homosexuality, as an indicator of tolerance.) Some political scientists distinguished the MENA region from the rest of the Muslim world, asserting that even though democracy had been embraced in some Muslim-majority countries, it had not been implemented in MENA. The democracy deficit was also identified by the *Arab Human Development Report*, which has been published every two to three years since 2002, as one of the region’s three central problems, the other two being the knowledge deficit and the gender equality deficit.⁷

There exists, therefore, a fairly long history in the social science literature of “Muslim exceptionalism,” and especially of “Middle Eastern exceptionalism,” in terms of resistance to democracy or to gender equality. Such studies have been especially prevalent in political science, where scholars tend toward formalism borrowed from economics, applying sophisticated statistical methods or modeling techniques to large-N data sets or surveys. They often come up with conflicting findings: in some papers the main problem is oil; in others it is sharia law; in yet others the main culprit is gender inequality. There are several problems with such studies. They rely excessively on snapshots of popular attitudes and values to explain complex structural phenomena; they are often written by scholars without extensive familiarity with the MENA region or country expertise; they do not venture outside the “home” discipline to examine how other studies or scholars have tackled the question at hand; and they are devoid of any case studies or even vignettes that might illustrate the claims made. Because they are testing hypotheses and engaging in arguments with each other, such studies do not add to wider knowledge of the region.

Of course, there is some basis for some of the claims made in this type of literature. But complexities are overlooked, such as exogenous influences, variations in the region, and change over time. For those who have doubted the region’s democratic impulses, the findings of the World Values Survey and the Arab Barometer—which have shown a high preference for democracy in MENA—were confirmed in the June 2009 Green Protests in Iran, the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, and the first democratic elections in Tunisia.⁸ Moreover, the demographic surge that so concerned Huntington turned out

to be a challenge to entrenched regimes in MENA and a clarion call for political reforms and democratization rather than a threat to the West. The flow of migrants—illegal and otherwise—from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe might be associated with the region’s demographic surge, but it is more directly the result of economic difficulties in the region, including high unemployment among youth, limited foreign direct investment, and the neoliberal economic policy turn.

The “Muslim world” is in reality quite diverse. Table 1.1 classifies the Muslim world by region, providing data for 2010. Some patterns can be discerned. The countries that granted women the right to vote earliest were the former Soviet republics; they also tend to have the highest female labor force shares. Indonesia and Malaysia likewise show relatively high rates of female labor force participation (in part a function of their adoption of an export-led manufacturing model of development), though the presence of women in parliament or other legislative bodies is less impressive. Among MENA countries, Tunisia stands out both for its female parliamentary share and its low fertility rate. The mean age at first marriage for women is relatively high for all but the poorest Muslim-majority countries, and it is highest in MENA countries.

Is the Middle East and North Africa region so different from other regions? Can we understand women’s roles and status in MENA only in terms of the ubiquity of deference to Islam in the region? In fact, such conceptions are too facile. It is my contention that the position of women in the Middle East cannot be attributed to the presumed intrinsic properties of Islam. It is also my position that Islam is neither more nor less patriarchal than other major religions, especially Hinduism and the other two “Abrahamic religions,” Judaism and Christianity, all of which share the view of woman as wife and mother. Within Christianity, religious women continue to struggle for a position equal with men, as the ongoing debate over women priests in Catholicism and women bishops in the Anglican Communion attests. As late as 1998, the Southern Baptist Convention in the United States passed a resolution calling on wives to follow and obey their husbands. In Hinduism a potent female symbol is the *sati*, the self-immolating widow. And the Orthodox Jewish law of personal status bears many similarities to the fundamentals of Islamic law, especially with respect to marriage and divorce.⁹ The gender configurations that draw from religion and cultural norms to affect women’s work, political praxis, family status, and other aspects of their lives in the Middle East are not unique to Muslim or Middle Eastern countries.

Religious-based law exists in the Middle East, but not exclusively in Muslim countries; it is also present in the Jewish state of Israel. Rabbinical judges are reluctant to grant women divorces, and, as in Saudi Arabia, Israeli women cannot hold public prayer services. Israeli women have far

Table 1.1 Social and Gender Indicators, Muslim-Majority Countries by Region, 2010

	Total Population (millions)	GDP (\$US, billions)	Mean Age of Marriage (females, years)	Fertility Rate	Female Share, Paid Labor Force (%)	Female Share, Parliamentary Seats (%)	Year Women Received Vote
Eastern Europe							
Albania	3.14	5.66	23	1.9	33	16	1920
Central Asia/ Caucasus							
Azerbaijan	8.68	18.50	23	2.1	44	11	1918
Kazakhstan	15.67	37.27	23	2.3	50	18	1924, 1993
Kyrgyzstan	5.28	1.98	22	2.5	51	26	1918
Tajikistan	6.84	1.67	21	3.4	37	20	1924
Uzbekistan ^a	28.56	39.33	20	2.5	48	22	1938
South Asia							
Afghanistan ^b	34.39	17.24	18	6.3	16	27.5	1963
Bangladesh	160.00	73.94	19	2.3	20	19	1935, 1972
Pakistan	166.11	108.00	23	4.0	13	22	1956
Sub-Saharan Africa							
Chad	10.91	3.02	18	6.2	6	5	1958
Mali	12.71	3.74	18	5.5	35	10	1956
Nigeria	151.21	74.18	21	5.3	21	7	1958
Senegal	12.21	6.55	21	5.0	11	23	1945
Southeast Asia							
Indonesia	227.35	247.23	23	2.2	32	18	1945, 2003
Malaysia	27.01	139.16	25	2.6	39	10	1957
Middle East & North Africa							
Algeria	34.37	75.28	29	2.4	13	8	1962
Bahrain	.78	13.16	26	2.3	10	3	2002
Egypt	81.53	145.59	23	2.9	19	2	1956
Iran	71.96	151.80	24	1.8	16	3	1963
Iraq ^c	32.9	115.4		4.5	13	25	1980
Jordan	5.91	14.62	25	3.1	16	6.4	1974
Kuwait	2.73	61.4	27	2.2	23	8	2005
Lebanon	4.19	24.38	27	1.9	14	3	1952
Libya ^c	6.4	62.3		2.4	—	8	1964
Morocco	31.61	55.16	26	2.4	21	10	1959
Oman	2.79	27.20	25	3.1	22	0	1994, 2003
Qatar	1.28	29.27	26	2.4	13	0	2003
Saudi Arabia	24.65	252.63	25	3.3	15	0	—
Syria	20.58	27.37	25	3.3	16	12	1949, 1953
Turkey	73.91	376.87	23	2.1	22	9	1930
Tunisia	10.33	28.34	27	1.9	25	28	1959
UAE	4.48	113.77	24	1.9	20	23	2006
Yemen	22.92	12.86	22	5.2	6	0	1967, 1970

Sources: Compiled from World Economic Forum, *Global Gender Gap Report 2010*, country profiles <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-2011/#=> and from UNDP, UNIFEM, and World Bank sources (see below), accessed March 2011.

Notes: a. Data for Uzbekistan from <http://www.undp.uz/en/mdgs/?goal=3>. b. data for Afghanistan from <http://afghanistan.unifem.org/media/pubs/factsheet/10/marriage.html>; www.ipu.org; c. data for Iraq and Libya from World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>; http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Tables.pdf.

more autonomy than do women in Saudi Arabia, but the Halacha, or Jewish law, does govern marital relations such that the husband is obligated to pay for his wife's maintenance, while she should provide household services. According to one account, "The structure of the arrangement is such that the woman is sheltered from the outside world by her husband and in return she adequately runs the home. The obligations one has toward the other are not equal but rather based on clear gender differentiation."¹⁰ This is especially the case among ultra-Orthodox Jews.

In northern India and parts of rural China, son preference leads to neglect of baby girls to such an extent that infant and child mortality is greater among females; moreover, female feticide has been well documented, leading to an adverse sex ratio (i.e., a larger male population).¹¹ The low status of women and girls, therefore, should be understood not in terms of the intrinsic properties of any one religion or culture but of kin-ordered patriarchal and agrarian structures.

Finally, it should be recalled that in all Western societies, women as a group were disadvantaged until relatively recently.¹² Indeed, Islam provided women with property rights for centuries while women in Europe were denied the same rights. In India, Muslim property codes were more progressive than English law until the mid-nineteenth century. It should be stressed, too, that even in the West today there are marked variations in the legal status, economic conditions, and social positions of women. The United States, for example, lags behind northern Europe in terms of social rights for working mothers and overall security for women. Why Muslim women lag behind Western women in legal rights, mobility, autonomy, and so forth has more to do with modernization and development—the extent of urbanization, industrialization, and proletarianization, as well as the political ploys of political elites—than with religious and cultural factors.

Gender asymmetry and the status of women in the Muslim world cannot be solely attributed to Islam because gender asymmetry is present in non-Islamic contexts and because adherence to Islamic precepts and the applications of Islamic legal codes differ throughout the Muslim world. For example, Turkey is a secular state, and only Iran has direct clerical rule. Morocco reformed its highly patriarchal family law in 2003–2004, granting women rights and opportunities in the home and society that women in Saudi Arabia can only dream about. And within the same Muslim-majority society, social class largely determines the degrees of sex segregation, female autonomy, and mobility. Today upper-class women have more mobility than do lower-class women, although in the past it was the reverse: veiling and seclusion were upper-class phenomena, signs of social status. By examining changes over time and variations within societies and by comparing Muslim and non-Muslim gender patterns, one recognizes that the status of women in Muslim-majority societies is neither uniform nor unchanging nor unique.

The emphasis on the status of women *in Islam* does little to satisfy social science inquiry because Islam is experienced, practiced, and interpreted differently over time and space. As the Tunisian sociologist Abdelwahab Boudhiba has shown, Islam is fundamentally “plastic,” and there are varieties of Islam. Tunisia has long produced female lawyers, judges, parliamentarians, government officials, and political activists. In Syria, the first woman judge was appointed in 1975, and until the uprising of 2011–2013, about 14 percent of judges were women, primarily working as public prosecutors.¹³ By contrast, Saudi women lack all these advantages, and in the Islamic Republic of Iran, women have not been permitted to serve as judges. MENA countries have seen economic and social development, diverse political regimes, and a variety of social movements, including Islamist and women’s rights movements. In short, the question of whether the content of the Quran is inherently conservative and hostile toward women or egalitarian and emancipatory, although not irrelevant to social science inquiry, is less central or problematical than is often assumed. In order to understand Islam’s social implications for the status of women, it is necessary to look at the broader sociopolitical and economic order within which these are realized.¹⁴

The relationship between gender and sociopolitical processes is interactive, but gender relations broadly, and women’s legal status more specifically, have generally followed such broad social change processes as modernization, state building, and economic development, as well as dramatic political changes such as revolutions. Since the 1990s, when globalization became the term used to denote a broad set of processes operating at transnational levels, many studies have examined its impact on women’s economic conditions and political participation. In the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011, new questions were formulated regarding the prospects for gender equality following the political revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and democratic transitions in those countries as well as in Morocco.

An Alternative Framework for Analysis

How might we better understand and explain women’s legal status and social positions and their prospects for gender equality? A useful conceptual framework would draw on the Marxist-feminist focus on the social relations of gender and class, and world-polity theory and world-systems theory, which help to explain the spread of “modern” institutions, norms, and networks in the region as well as the persistence of inequalities and geopolitical challenges. World-system theory grew out of dependency theory, continued the latter’s critique of modernization (the theory and the practice), and posited a single capitalist world-system with an unequal system of states

and markets, led by a hegemon, across the economic zones of core, periphery, and semiperiphery. World-polity theory is a variant of modernization theory that posits the global spread of similar institutions, standards, and organizational forms, sometimes referred to as “Western.”¹⁵

The analytical point of departure, therefore, is that the MENA region is located in a hierarchical world-system of states, economies, and cultures. Countries share common features (e.g., bureaucratic institutions and procedures, economic strategies, cultural values, and norms inscribed in the international treaties that governments have signed), but countries also have distinctive histories, resource endowments, and practices. The world-system and world culture exert considerable influence over gender relations, but women’s status is also shaped by the histories and institutions of particular nation-states. Although social and gender inequalities are products of national and global processes alike, there are pressures at both the domestic and global levels to improve gender relations and the status of women.

MENA includes countries with different histories, political cultures, levels of development, and wealth. In modern times, some MENA countries were subjected to Western colonialism, which often distorted their institutions and social structures and left bitter memories. Countries that escaped colonial rule include Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. In fact, Turkey was itself a colonial power, with the Ottoman Empire extending its rule across the Arab world and into Eastern Europe until the empire’s collapse after World War I. During the interwar period, MENA countries had diverse sociopolitical arrangements and economic resources at their disposal, and some of the contradictions of this era and the post–World War II international landscape led to revolutions in some MENA countries that overthrew monarchies and established authoritarian republican regimes. The changing nature of international relations and the emergence of the Cold War saw MENA countries positioned differently: some allied themselves with the capitalist West (e.g., Iran, Lebanon, Jordan), others with the socialist bloc (e.g., Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen), and yet others helped form the Non-Aligned Movement (notably, Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser). Development strategies and internal politics differed significantly across MENA, with implications for women’s participation and rights. Thus in Tunisia, the postindependence period saw the adoption of a family law that gave women more rights within the family than was the case anywhere else in the region; by contrast, Morocco adopted a very patriarchal family law that placed women under the control of male kin. As explained by Mounira Charrad, different kin-ordered structures, along with the objectives of the new political elites and the compromises they made, influenced the direction of the legal and policy frameworks in this period.

The history of the “status of women” and of gender relations in the MENA region has been significantly influenced by a variety of endogenous

factors and forces, but exogenous processes cannot be overlooked. Foreign intrigues or occupations are one form of exogenous factors that generally play a negative role with respect to women and gender. Global economic restructuring—which had its origins in the core countries of the world system and then encompassed the world through a combination of force and concession—is another type of exogenous influence. “World society,” however, can have a positive impact, whether in the form of international standards and norms, the activities of transnational advocacy networks, or imperatives on governments as a result of membership in multilateral organizations. I now elaborate on this proposition.

“Universal declarations” and conventions formulated within the United Nations and its specialized agencies—such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the children’s fund UNICEF, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—are agreed upon by the world community and have created what some scholars call a set of shared values in an otherwise diverse and unequal world. Examples are the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). In June 2011, the ILO—at its annual conference involving governments, employers’ associations, and trade unions, and some seventy years after the issue was first taken up—adopted Convention 189, which will regulate wages and working conditions of domestic workers. Other conventions and declarations promulgated by the ILO pertain to the protection and rights of working mothers and nondiscrimination in employment.

Conventions and declarations pertaining to women constitute what I call the global women’s rights agenda, which includes the 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (calling on governments to “seek to promote and protect the full enjoyment of all human rights and the fundamental freedoms of all women throughout the life cycle”), the Millennium Declaration and Goals of 2000 (Goal 3: to promote gender equality of girls as measured by educational attainment and political participation), and Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000 to highlight and criminalize sexualized violence against women during conflict and to ensure the participation of women, and women’s groups, in postconflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.

CEDAW is very clear that its provisions obtain across cultures and religions, stating in Article 2 that “States Parties . . . undertake . . . to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.” Since CEDAW went into force in 1981, countries have chosen to ratify completely, or to ratify the convention with reservations (as

with many MENA countries, who claimed that where a CEDAW provision contradicted sharia law, the latter would take precedence), or to remain outside the convention (as with the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran). By 2012, however, nearly all countries around the world had ratified the convention (even Saudi Arabia, albeit with substantial reservations), and a number of MENA countries, notably Morocco and Tunisia, had removed the reservations they had earlier inserted. Signatories and nonsignatories to CEDAW are listed in Table 1.2, which also illustrates some of the other key international conventions that have been signed by MENA countries.

The UN-originated international standards and norms have constituted a kind of moral universe and source of legitimacy for advocacy and activist groups, including human rights, labor rights, and women's rights networks. In MENA, for example, feminist groups have sought implementation of CEDAW or the removal of reservations, along with the formulation of national action plans for women's advancement based on the Beijing Platform for Action. They have been strong proponents of human rights, which they understand to encompass civil, political, and social rights. Many feminists would agree with the Sudanese Islamic scholar and now US-based professor Abdullahi an-Na'im that "human rights are claims we make for the protection of our vital interests in bodily integrity, material well-being, and human dignity."¹⁶ Advocacy and activist groups have put pressure on UN bodies to more actively promote existing standards or to adopt new and more assertive ones. Women's rights groups and scholar-activists, for example, have pushed for transparency in the reporting of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and especially for more progress in the achievement of MDG 3.

Actors are individuals, groups of citizens, corporate bodies, and governments, and their insertion into various structures could influence their behavior. Since the formation of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and other multilateral organizations, member-states have had to implement resolutions or action plans in line with those promoted or adopted by intergovernmental organizations, and these have helped to shape opportunity structures for various advocacy or activist groups within countries. Although there remain significant differences in the power and capacity of states within the world-system, with the result that peripheral countries are the most likely to be influenced by multilateral organizations, it is also the case that core and semiperipheral countries are normatively obligated to conform to the "world values" of human rights, women's rights, and environmental protection.

A conceptual framework that situates MENA countries in a world system and a world polity and acknowledges the role of domestic structures

Table 1.2 International Conventions Signed by Selected MENA Countries, Year of Ratification

Convention	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Jordan	Iran
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979 (with or without reservations)	1996	1993	1985	1981	1992	—
Optional Protocol, 1999	1996	—	1996	—	—	—
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995	Adopted ^a	Adopted ^a	Adopted ^a	Adopted ^a	Adopted ^a	Adopted ^a
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966	1989 ^a	1979	1969	1982	1975	1975
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966	1989	1979	1969	1982	1975	1975
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families, 1990	2005	2003	—	1993	—	—
UNESCO Convention: Discrimination in education, 1960	1968	1968	1969	1962	1976	1968
ILO Convention 111: Discrimination in employment/occupation, 1958	1969	1963	1959	1960	1963	1964
ILO Convention 100: Equal remuneration for men and women for equal work, 1951	1962	1979	1968	1960	1966	1972
ILO Conventions 87 & 98: Freedom of association and right to organize, 1948	1962	—	1957	1957, 1954	1968	—
ILO Convention 182: Worst forms of child labor	2001	2001	2000	2002	2000	2002
ILO Convention 183: Maternity protection, 2000	—	—	—	—	—	—

Sources: Compiled from "A Summary of United Nations Agreements on Human Rights," <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.html>; and the International Labour Organization NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards, [*Note:* a. Made general and interpretative statements or expressed reservations.](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11001:0::NO::; accessed December 2012.</p>
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and actors is a fruitful way of examining stability and change. In particular, it helps to identify patterns, trends, and changes in women's social roles in the household, the economy, the polity, and the cultural sphere. At the same time, it draws attention to women as actors. MENA women are not only the objects of historical circumstances, the passive targets of policies, or the victims of distorted development; they are also shapers and makers of social change. To paraphrase Karl Marx, women make history, though not under conditions of their own choosing.

Diversity in the Middle East

The analytical framework sketched above and elaborated below helps us to recognize similarities between MENA and other regions and to identify differences. The same applies to processes within regions. In what follows, I outline some key differences within and across regions.

To study the Middle East and North Africa is to recognize the diversity within the region and within the female population. Contrary to popular opinion, the Middle East is not a uniform and homogeneous region. Women are themselves stratified by class, ethnicity, education, and age. There is no archetypal Middle Eastern Woman, but rather women inserted in diverse socioeconomic and cultural arrangements. The fertility behavior and needs of a poor peasant woman are quite different from those of a professional woman or a wealthy urbanite. The rich Saudi woman who has no need for employment and is chauffeured by a Sri Lankan migrant worker has little in common with the educated Moroccan woman who needs to work to augment the family income and also acquires status with a professional position. There is some overlap in cultural conceptions of gender in Morocco and Saudi Arabia, but there are also profound dissimilarities (and driving is only one of the more trivial ones). Saudi Arabia is far more conservative than Morocco in terms of what is considered appropriate for women.

Women are likewise divided ideologically and politically. Some women activists align themselves with liberal, social-democratic, or communist organizations; others support Islamist and other fundamentalist groups. Some women reject religion as patriarchal; others wish to reclaim religion for themselves or to identify feminine aspects of it. Some women eschew traditions and time-honored customs; others find identity, solace, and strength in them. More research is needed to determine whether social background shapes and can predict political and ideological affiliation, but in general women's social positions have implications for their consciousness and activism. Certainly the civic activism of MENA women has grown in line with their educational attainment.

The countries of the Middle East and North Africa differ in their historical evolution, social composition, economic structures, and state forms. All were once under some form of colonial rule except for Iran (which nonetheless experienced Russian and especially British intervention in the nineteenth century), Turkey (which was once a colonial power itself), and Israel (which some commentators have called a settler-colonial state). All the countries are predominantly Arab except Iran, Israel, and Turkey, and all have majority Muslim populations except for Israel. Most MENA countries are largely Sunni except Iran, which is Shia; Bahrain, which has a Shia majority; and Iraq and Lebanon, whose Sunni and Shia populations are roughly equal in size. Some of the countries (Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, Syria) have had sizable Christian minority populations, though far less so today than in the past; others (Iran, Iraq, Morocco) are ethnically and linguistically diverse. Some have had strong working-class movements and trade unions (Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey) or large communist organizations (Iran, Egypt, South Yemen, the Palestinians). In all the countries, the middle classes have received Western-style education. The richest countries are found among the member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Other than Israel and the most advanced GCC countries, the countries of the region are considered “developing countries,” but there are marked differences among them. Their locations in the economic zones of the world-system—whether the periphery (Yemen, the West Bank and Gaza) or semiperiphery (Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria), along with the vast differences in their resource endowments (the oil-rich and labor-importing United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Qatar versus the low-income and labor-exporting Syria and Morocco)—have had implications for economic and social development, state capacity, and women’s participation and rights. At the same time, links to world society through involvement in multilateral agencies or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the spread of the Internet, have enabled norm diffusion and demands for sociopolitical change.

Economically, the countries of the region comprise oil economies poor in other resources, including population (Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE), mixed oil economies (principally Algeria, Iraq, and Iran, but also Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria), and non-oil economies (Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Yemen). The latter two categories have a more diversified structure, and their resources include oil, agricultural land, and large populations. Some MENA countries are rich in capital and import labor, whereas others are capital-poor or are middle-income countries that export labor. Some countries have more developed class structures than others; the size and significance of the industrial working class, for example, have varied across the region, as has the strength of the modern middle

class. There is variance in the development of skills or human capital formation, the depth and scope of industrialization, integration into the global economy, standards of living and welfare, and women's participation and rights. The countries of the Middle East are not among the most unequal in the world; neither are their poverty rates among the highest. All, however, exhibit forms of social stratification that are both familiar and distinctive. Privilege or disadvantage is determined by class, gender, ethnicity, and national origin; religious affiliation is another significant social marker. Table 1.3 illustrates economic classification by human development.

Politically, the regime types range from theocratic monarchies (Saudi Arabia) to secular republics (Turkey). Until 1992 the kingdom of Saudi Arabia had no formal constitution apart from the Quran and the sharia. Many of the states in the Middle East have experienced legitimacy problems, which became acute in the 1980s when Islamist movements spread across the region. Until then, political scientists used various terms to describe the states in the Middle East: authoritarian-socialist (for Algeria, Iraq, Syria), radical Islamist (for Iran and Libya), patriarchal-conservative (for Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia), and authoritarian-privatizing (for Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey). Most of these states now have strong capitalist features. The 1990s saw the beginnings of political liberalization and quasi-democratization, but for the most part the process stalled and many MENA states remained authoritarian, with limited citizen participation. For these reasons, I have used the term *neopatriarchal state*, adopted from Hisham Sharabi, as an umbrella term for the various state types in the Middle East, especially in connection with how gender and family are structured in these societies.¹⁷ In the neopatriarchal state, unlike liberal or social democratic

Table 1.3 Political Economy and Human Development in MENA, 2012

	Very High Human Development	High Human Development	Medium Human Development	Low Human Development
Oil economies	Bahrain, Qatar, UAE	Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia	Libya	—
Mixed oil economies	—	Iran, Tunisia	Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Syria	—
Non-oil economies	Israel	Lebanon, Turkey	Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Territories	Yemen

Source: Level of human development is based on each country's ranking in the UNDP's 2012 *Human Development Report*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

societies, the family, rather than the individual, constitutes the universal building block of the community; religion is bound to power and state authority; and women and men have distinctly separate roles, rights, and responsibilities. The neopatriarchal state, family, and family laws reflect and reinforce each other. Empirical measures such as women's labor force participation rates, parliamentary participation, or representation in decisionmaking positions reveal the influence of such institutions, laws, and norms. (See Table 1.4 on women's political participation and Chapter 3 for a discussion of employment.) In recent years, however, neopatriarchal structures have been undermined by sociodemographic changes such as women's educational attainment and challenged by civil society organizations and new social movements focused on human rights, women's rights, and democracy.

In the Middle East there is a variable mix of religion and politics. Although Turkey is the only country in the region with a constitutional separation of religion and the state, Islam was not the state religion in Syria, whose Baathist-inspired constitution provided that "freedom of religion shall be preserved, and the state shall respect all religions and guarantee freedom of worship to all, provided that public order is not endangered." Syria's Muslim majority coexisted with a Christian minority totaling about 12 percent of the population. Christian holidays were recognized in the same way as Muslim holidays. Syria observes Friday rest, but the Baathist state allowed time off for Christian civil servants to attend Sunday religious services. The constitution guaranteed women "every opportunity to participate effectively and completely in political, social, economic, and cultural life." Some commentators were therefore concerned that the 2011–2013 armed rebellion in Syria would usher in either a monolithic Islamist regime or a weak state unable to protect citizens—such as occurred in Libya in the immediate aftermath of its own political revolution in 2011, and earlier in Iraq, following the US invasion and the emergence of a fierce resistance and sectarian conflict.

In many countries in the region, urban women, especially those who are educated and professional, enjoy a degree of freedom comparable to their counterparts in, for example, Southeast Asian and Latin American countries. But it is difficult to reconcile women's rights with Islamic law, which remains unfavorable to women with regard to marriage, divorce, and inheritance, as codified in Muslim family law. Tunisia modernized its family law immediately after independence, further reforms were adopted in 1993, and in 2011 the new transitional government removed the remaining reservations to CEDAW. Turkey's family law was not based on Islam but was quite conservative nonetheless, until the women's movement forced changes in 2001. Even so, a controversy broke out in 2012 when prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the ruling Islamic AK Party,

Table 1.4 Political Systems and Women's Representation in MENA

Middle East and North Africa	Type of Political System	Year Women Received Vote	Female Share of Parliamentary Seats (%)				
			2000	2005	2010	2011–2012	
Algeria	Republic, multiparty	1962	3.4	6.2	8	31.6	
Bahrain	Monarchy, ethnic-based	2002	NFP	0	3	10	
Egypt	Republican	1956	2.0	2.9	2	2	
Iran	Islamic republic/theocracy	1963	3.4	4.1	3	3	
Iraq	Republic, under occupation	—	6.4	NFP	25	25	
Jordan	Monarchy	1974	0	5.5	6.4	10.8	
Kuwait	Monarchy	2005	0	0	8	6.3	
Lebanon	Republic, multiparty, confessional	1952	2.3	2.3	3	3	
Morocco	Monarchy, multiparty	1959	0.6	10.8	10	17	
Oman	Monarchy	1994, 2003	0	2.4	0	1	
Qatar	Monarchy	2003	0	NFP	0	0	
Saudi Arabia	Monarchy	—	0	0	0	0	
Syria	Republic, single party, secular	1949, 1953	10.4	12	12	12	
Tunisia	Republic, multiparty	1959	11.5	22.8	28	27	
Turkey	Republic, multiparty	1930	4.2	4.4	9	14	
UAE	Monarchy	2006	0	0	23	17.5	
Yemen	Republic, tribal	1967, 1970	0.7	0.3	0	0	

Sources: World Economic Forum, *Global Gender Gap Report 2011*; Interparliamentary Union: <http://www.ipu.org/wmm-e/classif-arc.htm>.

Note: NFP means "no functioning parliament."

announced his intention to abolish women's right to abortion, which he likened to a mass killing. Elsewhere, family laws based on Islamic texts continue to govern the personal and family status of women and hence confer on them second-class citizenship (see also Chapter 2).

Given the range of socioeconomic and political conditions, it follows that gender is not fixed and unchanging in the Middle East (and neither is culture). As I document in this book, gender norms differ throughout the region, as measured by women's legal status, education levels, fertility trends, employment patterns, and political participation.

Determinants: The World-System, States, Class, and Gender

The theoretical framework that informs this book rests on the premise that both stability and change in the status of women are shaped by a combination of structural factors that operate within the capitalist world system: economic development and state policies, class, and the gender system. Analysis of any single country or group of countries must start with their location and function within the world system of markets and states.

The Capitalist World-System: States and Development

As noted, world-system theory posits an unequal and hierarchical ordering of states and markets across the economic zones of core, periphery, and semiperiphery. For several centuries, the dominant economic system has been capitalist, and since the 1980s, the form has been known as neoliberal capitalism. Alternative systems of production and distribution have coexisted with capitalism, though not easily: they include socialism (1917–1990); some precapitalist forms of production and exchange found in remote or tribal areas; and a new form known as the social or solidarity economy, premised on notions of the collective good. States are also capitalist states, here understood in the Weberian sense of the state as a set of institutions and bureaucracies with a “legitimate” monopoly over the means of violence, and in the Marxist-feminist notion of the state as representing the dominant economic class and embodying a masculinist order. States maintain power by combining force and coercion with measures to acquire legitimacy and concessions to widen their social base of support. What follows is a broad outline of the region's economic evolution over several decades.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, the MENA region has participated in a global process variously called the internationalization of capital, the new (or changing) international division of labor, global Fordism, and globalization. National development plans, domestic industrialization projects, and

foreign investment led to significant changes in the structure of the labor force, including an expansion of nonagricultural employment. Oil revenues assisted industrial development projects, which also led to new employment opportunities and changes in the occupational structure. Historically, the Middle East has had thriving cities, but increased urbanization and rural-urban migration occurred in tandem with changes in the economy and in property relations. Property ownership patterns shifted from being based almost exclusively on land or merchant capital to being based on the ownership of large-scale industrial units and more complex and international forms of commercial and financial capital. The process of structural transformation and the near-universal shift toward the nonagrarian urban sector in economic and social terms produced new class actors and undermined (though it did not destroy) the old. Industrial workers, a salaried middle class, and large-scale capitalists have been products of and participants in economic development.

Mass education and bureaucratic expansion since the 1960s led to prodigious growth in the new middle class, while the creation and absorption into the public sector of important productive, commercial, and banking assets spawned what Alan Richards and John Waterbury called a new managerial state bourgeoisie. Other classes and strata affected by economic development and state expansion were the peasantry, rural landowning class, urban merchant class, and traditional petty bourgeoisie. High population growth rates, coupled with rural-urban migration, concentrated larger numbers of semiproletarians, informal workers, and the unemployed in major urban areas.¹⁸

In the heyday of economic development, most of the large MENA countries—such as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey—embarked on a development strategy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI), in which machinery was imported to run local industries producing consumer goods. This strategy was associated with an economic system characterized by central planning and a large public sector. State expansion, economic development, oil wealth, and the region's increased integration into the world system combined to create educational and employment opportunities for women in the Middle East. For about ten years after the oil price increases of the early 1970s, a massive investment program by the oil-producing nations affected the structure of the labor force not only within the relevant countries but throughout the region as a result of labor migration. The urban areas saw an expansion of the female labor force, with women occupying paid positions as workers and professionals. The state played a central role in the development process.

Indeed, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the third world state was a major actor in the realization of social and economic development. As such, the state had a principal part in the formulation of social policies, development

strategies, and legislation that shaped opportunities for women. Family law; affirmative action-type policies; protective legislation regarding working mothers; policies on education, health, and population; and other components of social policy designed by state managers have affected women's status and gender arrangements.

Strong states with the capacity to enforce laws may undermine customary discrimination and patriarchal structures—or they may reinforce them. The state can enable or impede the integration of women citizens into public life. As Jean Pyle found for the Republic of Ireland, state policy can have contradictory goals: development of the economy and expansion of services on one hand and maintenance of the “traditional family” on the other.¹⁹ Such contradictory goals could create role conflicts for women, who may find themselves torn between the economic need or desire to work and the gender ideology that stresses family roles for women. Conversely, economic development and state-sponsored education could have unintended consequences: the ambivalence of neopatriarchal state managers notwithstanding, there is now a generation and stratum of educated women who actively pursue employment and political participation in defiance of cultural norms and gender ideologies—or with the effect that such norms and ideologies gradually change.

The positive relationship between women's education and nonagricultural employment is marked throughout the Middle East. In the 1980s, research found that education increased the aspirations of women in certain sectors of society for a higher income and better standards of living; each increase in the level of education was reflected in a corresponding increase in the level of women's nonagricultural employment and a decrease in fertility.²⁰ Education also served to weaken the restrictive barriers of traditions and increased the propensity of women to join the labor force and public life. These social changes had a positive effect in reducing traditional sex segregation and female seclusion and in producing a generation of middle-class women with a degree of economic independence.

At the same time, it is necessary to recognize the limits to change—including those imposed by a country's or a region's location within the economic zones of the capitalist world system. Development strategies and state economic policies are not formulated in a vacuum; they are greatly influenced, for better or for worse, by world-system imperatives. Although most of the large MENA countries are semiperipheral, the function of the region within the world system thus far has been to guarantee a steady supply of oil for foreign, especially core-country, markets, and to import industrial goods, especially armaments, mainly from core countries. One result has been limited economic diversification and competitiveness, especially in terms of manufactured goods for export. Another result has been limited employment opportunities for working-class women in the formal industrial sector, as

capital-intensive industries and technologies tend to favor male labor. By 2012, the MENA region as a whole still had less female involvement in paid employment than was the case in other regions (see Chapter 3).

Class and the Effects of Globalization

Class constitutes a basic unit of social life and thus of social research. Class is here understood in the Marxist sense as determined by ownership or control of the means of production; social classes also have differential access to political power and the state. Class location shapes cultural practices, patterns of consumption, lifestyle, reproduction, and even worldview. As Ralph Miliband put it, class divisions “find expression in terms of power, income, wealth, responsibility, ‘life chances,’ style and quality of life, and everything else that makes up the texture of existence.”²¹ Class shapes women’s roles in the sphere of production, and it shapes women’s choices and behavior in reproduction.

In the stratified MENA societies, social class, along with state action and economic development, acts upon gender relations and women’s social positions. Although state-sponsored education has resulted in a certain amount of upward social mobility and has increased the number of women seeking jobs, women’s access to resources, including education, is largely determined by their class location. That a large percentage of urban employed women in the Middle East are found in the services sector or in professional positions can be understood by examining class. As in other world regions where social disparities are great, upper-middle-class urban women in the Middle East can exercise a greater number of choices and thus become much more “emancipated” than lower-middle-class, working-class, urban poor, or peasant women. In 1971, Constantina Safilios-Rothschild wrote that women could fulfill conflicting professional and marital roles with the help of cheap domestic labor and the extended family network.²² In 2012 this observation was still true for women from wealthy families, especially in the GCC countries. In contrast, middle-class women in most of the large Middle Eastern countries are less likely to be able to afford domestic help and more likely to rely on a mother or mother-in-law. For women from working-class or low-income families, the absence of affordable and quality childcare facilities or paid maternity leave makes them less likely to enter or remain in the labor force. Although some states have been committed to some female participation in industrial production (such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey), the system extracts the labor of women in economic need without giving them the social supports to balance their roles in the family and the workplace.

Modernization and globalization have led to the growth of the middle class, especially the salaried middle class. The middle class in MENA

countries is internally differentiated. There exists a traditional middle class of shopkeepers, small bazaaris, and the self-employed—what Marxists call the traditional petty bourgeoisie—as well as a more modern salaried middle class comprising persons employed in the government sector or in the private sector as teachers, lawyers, engineers, bankers, administrators, secretaries, nurses, doctors, and so on. But this modern salaried middle class is itself differentiated culturally, for many of its members are children of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The political implications are profound, for Islamist movements have recruited from the more traditional sections of the contemporary middle class: the petty bourgeoisie and conservative elements of the professional middle class.

Globalization—here understood as a multifaceted process of economic, political, and cultural change where the circulation of capital, goods, services, organizations, and discourses takes on an increasingly global or transnational form—has had direct effects on social class in at least two ways. First, the form of economic globalization known as neoliberalism—with its emphasis on liberalized prices and trade, the free flow of capital, and privatization—has benefited some but created hardships for many more. Small domestic producers find it difficult to compete with the cheap prices of imported goods and go out of business; workers lose jobs when state-owned enterprises are sold off to private owners; low-income citizens and the poor lose access to healthcare, schooling, and subsidized utilities when government cutbacks or privatization schemes set in; employees increasingly find it difficult to secure stable employment with good benefits when labor markets and work contracts are increasingly “flexible.”

Second, as the global economy has become more integrated—with a kind of global assembly line and commodity chains linking labor and financial markets across the world—so have the capitalist classes across the globe, such that sociologists Leslie Sklair and William I. Robinson have written of a “transnational capitalist class.” Factions of the transnational capitalist class—along with political elites and representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other representatives of the institutions of global governance—meet annually at the World Economy Forum in Davos, Switzerland, for discussions and deliberations. Such meetings always include the political and economic elites of the MENA region, especially those of the GCC countries, with their great wealth and global investments. In every society, the upper classes have benefited from free markets, imports, travel, and new jobs. The consumption patterns of the upper classes may generate some revenue, but they also generate resentment, especially when income inequalities become very wide, as they have in most parts of the world since the 1980s and especially in the twenty-first century.²³ In 2011, such consumption patterns and income inequalities, at a time of global economic recession, led to anti-

austerity riots in Europe, Occupy Wall Street in the United States, and the Arab Spring in MENA.

The Gender System

Marxist-feminists first used the term *sexual division of labor* to refer to the ideological and material ordering of roles, rights, and values in the family, the workplace, and society that have their origins in male-female sexual difference and especially in women's reproductive capacity. They pointed out that patriarchy, a system of male dominance over women, historically has coexisted with modes of production, and that women's status has been affected by both the sexual division of labor and class divisions corresponding to modes of production. Today the term *gender* is used more broadly to denote the meanings given to masculine and feminine, asymmetrical power relations between the sexes, and the ways that men and women are differently situated in and affected by social processes. Judith Lorber defines gender as "a process of social construction, a system of social stratification, and an institution that structures every aspect of our lives because of its embeddedness in the family, the workplace, and the state, as well as in sexuality, language, and culture." Sylvia Walby writes that gender "is a relationship that reproduces itself, whether or not the individuals involved are aware of it, hence it has the key characteristics of a system, a gender regime." Lorber, Walby and other feminists regard gender as a powerful source of social distinctions while also recognizing that gender differences are elaborated by class and, where relevant, by race and ethnicity, which Walby has theorized as "complex inequalities." She has also written of the tendency for the gender regime to transform from a domestic, private, and familiar one to a public form.²⁴

Combining Marxist-feminist and sociological perspectives leads to an understanding of the gender system as a cultural construct that is itself constituted by social structure. That is to say, gender systems are differently manifested in kinship-ordered, agrarian, developing, industrialized, and postindustrial settings. Type of political regime and state ideology further influence the gender system. States that are socialist (for example, Cuba or the former German Democratic Republic), liberal democratic (the United States), social democratic (the Nordic countries), or neopatriarchal (the Islamic Republic of Iran) have had quite different laws about women and different policies on the family.

The thesis that women's relative lack of economic power is the most important determinant of gender inequalities, including those of marriage, parenthood, and sexuality, is cogently demonstrated by Rae Lesser Blumberg and Janet Chafetz, among others.²⁵ In modern societies, the division of labor by gender at the macro (societal) level reinforces that of the house-

hold. This dynamic is an important source of women's disadvantaged position and of the stability of the gender system. Another important source lies in law and ideology. In most contemporary societal arrangements, the terms *masculine* and *feminine* are defined by law and custom; men and women have unequal access to political power and economic resources, and cultural images and representations of women are fundamentally distinct from those of men—even in societies formally committed to social (including gender) equality. Many governments do not take an active interest in improving women's status and opportunities, and not all countries have active and autonomous women's organizations to protect and further women's interests and rights. Where textbooks and official and popular discourses stress sexual differences rather than legal equality, an apparatus exists to create stratification based on gender. The legal system, education system, and labor market are all sites of the construction and reproduction of gender inequality.

Contemporary gender systems are often designed by ideologues and inscribed in law, justified by custom and reflected in policy, sustained by processes of socialization, and reinforced through distinct institutions. But gender differences are not the only "fault lines"; they operate within a larger matrix of other socially constructed distinctions, such as class, ethnicity, religion, and age, which give them their specific dynamics in a given time and place. Gender is thus not a homogeneous category. To paraphrase Michael Mann, gender is stratified and stratification is gendered.²⁶ Nor is the gender system static. In the Middle East, the gender system, while retaining patriarchal features, has undergone considerable change. In the section that follows, I examine in more detail the gender dynamics of social change in the region—and, by extension, the organization of this book.

Social Changes and Women in the Middle East

A body of feminist scholarship has analyzed the gendered nature of various movements—notably nationalist and fundamentalist movements—and their impact on women's legal status and social position. Key studies on the Muslim world have contributed to theory building by elucidating the centrality of gender and the "woman question" in constructions of national, cultural, and religious identity.²⁷ Women have been socially constructed as symbols of the nation-state, bearers of cultural identity, and repositories of religious values. State-building has been a highly gendered phenomenon, in that notions of gender—of masculinities, femininities, and appropriate roles for women and men—are often central to state-building projects and to constructions of national identity. The democracy movements in Iran in 2009 and in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in 2011 showed that women can

be major participants in such movements. As we shall see, however, the gender dynamics of political movements are not necessarily in favor of women's equality.

Nationalist movements have had both positive and negative features. They may be expansive and inclusive or narrow and exclusionary. Nationalism may be imbued with concepts of inclusion and equality, modernity and progress, in which case it is often compatible with women's participation, advancement, and rights. Or it may be infused with cultural defensiveness and nostalgia for a bygone era or invented golden age, placing on women the burden of reproducing cultural values and traditions through prescribed dress and comportment. In some cases, nationalist movements grow violent and extremist, targeting the women of the opposing collectivity while also imposing ever tougher restrictions on their own women.²⁸ Gendered cultural constructions and practices also gain currency during times of dramatic upheavals, such as large-scale social revolutions or more limited political revolutions. In many cases, revolutions have helped to build strong, centralized states; in other cases, revolutions have resulted in chaos or decentralization. Modernizing revolutionary states have been crucial agents in the advancement of women by enacting changes in family law, providing education and employment, and encouraging women's participation in public life. Radical measures generated by states and legitimized in political ideologies were important factors in weakening the hold of traditional kinship systems on women—even though the latter remain resilient in some parts of the MENA region. Weak states, however, may be unable to implement their ambitious programs for change. The case of Afghanistan in the 1980s is illustrative of the formidable social-structural and international hurdles that may confront a revolutionary state and of the implications of these constraints for gender and the status of women. Thus in Chapter 2, I provide a historical overview of the “woman question” in the MENA region and examine the effects of nationalism, revolutions, and Islamism.

One of the most vexed issues of the region, with significant implications for the rise of Islamism and the question of women, is the continuing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A deep sense of injustice directed at Israeli actions and US foreign policy pervades the region. In Iran the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup d'état against the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran and subsequent US support for the second Pahlavi monarch linger in collective memory. That the Shah had friendly relations with Israel was used against him during the Iranian Revolution. Significantly, one of the first acts of the new revolutionary regime in Iran in 1979 was to invite Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat to Tehran and hand over the former Israeli legation building to the PLO. Throughout the region—in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Algeria—large seg-

ments of the population find the displacement of fellow Arabs or Muslims (Palestinians) and the intrigues of Israel and the United States to be an enormous affront. Although this sense of moral outrage is common to liberals, leftists, and Islamists alike, it is typically strongest among Islamists, who make the elimination of Zionism, the liberation of Jerusalem, humiliation of the United States, and other such aspirations major goals and slogans of their movements—as we saw with al-Qaeda and the events of September 11, 2001.

The implications for women are significant, inasmuch as anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist, and especially Islamist movements are preoccupied with questions of cultural identity and authenticity. Because women play a crucial role in the socialization of the next generation, they become symbols of cultural values and traditions. Some Muslim women regard this role as an exalted one and gladly assume it, becoming active participants, in some cases ideologues, in Islamist movements. Other women find it an onerous burden; they resent restrictions on their autonomy, individuality, mobility, and range of choices. In some countries, these nonconformist women pursue education, employment, and foreign travel to the extent that they can, joining women's associations or political organizations in opposition to Islamist movements. In Algeria, the Islamist movement spurred a militant feminist movement, something that did not exist before. In other, more authoritarian countries, nonconformist women face legal restrictions on dress, occupation, travel, and encounters with men outside their own families. Their response can take the form of resentful acquiescence, passive resistance, or self-exile. In the 1980s, middle-class Iranian women responded in all three ways, although in the 1990s women began to challenge the gender system and patriarchal Islamist norms more directly.

To veil or not to veil has been a recurring issue in Muslim countries. Polemics surrounding hijab (modest Islamic dress for women) abound in every country. During the era of early modernization and nation building, national progress and the emancipation of women were considered synonymous. This viewpoint entailed discouragement of the veil and encouragement of schooling for girls. The veil was associated with national backwardness, as well as female illiteracy and subjugation. But a paradox of the 1980s was that more and more educated women, even working women (especially in Egypt), took to the veil. It is true that the veil has been convenient for militants and political activists. For example, in the Algerian war for independence against the French and the Iranian Revolution against the Shah, women used the *chador*, or all-encompassing veil, to hide political leaflets and arms. But is veiling always a matter of individual choice, or does social pressure also play a part? In the case of compulsory veiling in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Afghanistan under the Taliban, the answer is clear. But what of the expansion of veiling in Algeria, Egypt,

and Turkey and among the Palestinians? After the downfall of Tunisia's Ben Ali government in early 2011, salafists—bearded men and heavily veiled women who seek implementation of a fundamentalist form of Islam—appeared on the streets and in the media demanding strict adherence to Islamic laws and norms.²⁹ How would the new wave of Islamization—this time under ostensibly democratic conditions—affect women's rights? Chapter 2 takes up these questions as well.

One of the ways that societies influence each other economically, politically, and culturally is through international labor migration, which also has distinct gender-specific effects. In the MENA region, oil-fueled development encouraged labor migration from labor-surplus and capital-poor economies to capital-rich and labor-deficit oil economies. For example, there was substantial Tunisian migrant labor in Libya, Egyptian and Palestinian migrant labor in the Gulf emirates, and Yemeni labor in Saudi Arabia. This migration affected, among other things, the structure of populations, the composition of households, and the economies of both sending and receiving countries. Many of the oil-rich Gulf states came to have large populations of noncitizens, and female-headed households proliferated in the labor-sending countries. During the years of the oil boom, roughly until the mid-1980s, workers' remittances helped to secure not only the welfare of families and households but also the fortunes of economies such as Jordan's and Egypt's. Labor migration to areas outside the Middle East has been undertaken principally by North Africans and Turks. Historically, North Africans have migrated to French cities, although large populations of Moroccans have settled in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain as well. Turkish "guest workers" were an important source of labor for (West) German capital starting in the 1950s.

Labor migration may improve the economies of the host country (in that it receives cheap labor) and the sending country (in that unemployment goes down and capital inflows increase because of workers' remittances); emigration, especially of professionals (the so-called brain drain), may also be advantageous to receiving countries. Like exile, however, labor migration and emigration have other consequences, including social-psychological, cultural, and political effects. In the case of Iran—characterized by the brain drain of Iranian professionals following the coup d'état engineered by the CIA in 1953 and supported by the UK government, the massive flow of students to the West in the 1960s and 1970s, a second wave of emigration and exile following Islamization, and the proliferation of draft-dodgers in the mid-1980s—the society became fractured and contentious. When, in 1979, tens of thousands of Iranian students in the United States and Europe returned en masse to help construct the new Iran, they brought with them both organizational and leadership skills learned in the anti-Shah student movement *and* a secular, left-wing, political-cultural orientation that put

them at odds with the Islamists. Most Iranian students abroad were members of the Confederation of Iranian Students, one of the largest and best-organized student movements anywhere.³⁰

Exile, emigration, and refugee status almost always change attitudes and behavior, but whether these changes improve or worsen women's lot depends on many intervening factors. In the refugee camps on the Algeria-Morocco border, where tens of thousands of Sahrawis have lived for some three decades, contesting Moroccan control over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara, the women who make up three-quarters of the adult population have played a central role in running the camps from the time of their arrival. They set up committees for health, education, local production, social affairs, and provisions distribution.³¹ Janet Bauer informs us that among Algerian Muslim immigrants in France, women have a strong role in maintaining religious rituals and symbolic meanings that are important in preserving cultural identity and adaptation. The same is true for many Turkish residents in Germany. The situation for Iranian refugees, exiles, and immigrants after 1979 seems to differ, however, as they may be ambivalent about the very traditions and religious rituals from which individuals are said to seek comfort in times of crisis or change. Socioeconomic status and political ideology may also explain differences between Algerian, Turkish, and Iranian immigrants.³²

A key element of social change is economic structure and, tied to that, class and property relations. The major source of social change in the Middle East in the post-World War II period has been the dual process of economic development and state expansion. As discussed above, the economic systems of the region have undergone development and growth, with implications for social structure (including the stratification system), the nature and capacity of the state, and the position of women. Much of this economic modernization was based on income from oil, and some came from foreign investment and capital inflows. Modernization and globalization alike have altered the social conditions of women in different ways across nations and classes. How women have been involved in and affected by development and globalization is the subject of Chapter 3. Because the state is the manager of economic development in almost all cases, and because state economic and legal policies shape women's access to employment and economic resources, this chapter underscores the government's role in directing development and its impact on women. It also examines shifting state policies in an era of globalization, and their effects on women's economic participation and rights—or their economic citizenship.

One important dimension of social change in the region has been the weakening of the patriarchal family and traditional kinship systems. Demographic changes, including patterns of marriage and fertility behavior, have followed from state-sponsored economic development, legal reforms, and

women's educational attainment. Industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization have disrupted kinship-based structures and gender and age hierarchies, while economic and employment opportunities have accelerated fertility decline. In some cases, revolutionary states have undermined patriarchal structures, or attempted to do so, through legislation aimed at weakening traditional rural landlord structures or the power of tribes. Often this type of change comes about coercively. Whether changes to patriarchal family structures come about gradually and nonviolently or rapidly and coercively, the implications for the status of women within the family and in the society are profound. Yet most MENA states have been ambivalent about transforming women and the family. They have sought the apparently contradictory goals of economic development and strong families. The latter objective is often a bargain struck with more conservative social elements, such as religious leaders or traditional local communities. Changes in the patriarchal social structure, the contradictory role of the neopatriarchal state, and the profound changes occurring to the structure of the family are examined in Chapter 4.

Political conflict and war can also bring about social change, including opportunities and risks for women. Change in the economic and political status of women, a heightened sense of gender awareness, and political activism on the part of women constitute one set of changes; another is the spread of hypermasculinity and controls over women. World War II has been extensively analyzed in terms of gender and social change. Wartime conditions radically transformed the position of women in the workforce. Postwar demobilization rapidly restored the prewar sexual division of labor, and American culture redefined woman's place in terms of the now-famous "feminine mystique." Still, female labor force participation rose rapidly in the postwar decades, and some authors suggest a strong link between the wartime experience and the emergence, two decades later, of the second wave of feminism.³³

The Middle East has endured numerous wars and political conflicts since the 1950s, with varying implications for societies and for women. In some cases, an unexpected outcome of economic crisis caused by war is higher education and employment opportunities for women. In a study I undertook of women's employment patterns in postrevolutionary Iran in 1986, I was surprised to discover that, notwithstanding the exhortations of Islamist ideologues, women had not been driven out of the workforce, and their participation in government employment had slightly increased relative to 1976. This I attributed to the imperatives of the wartime economy, the personnel needs of the expanding state apparatus, and women's resistance to subordination. A subsequent study by Maryam Poya confirmed my hypothesis. She found that the mobilization of men at the war front and the requirements of gender segregation had resulted in an increased need for

female teachers and nurses. In Iraq the mobilization of female labor accelerated during the war with Iran, though that was apparently coupled with the contradictory exhortation to produce more children. Another study conducted at Lebanese University found that Lebanese parents felt more strongly than before that educating their daughters was now a good investment, as higher education represented a financial asset. Such a sentiment is now widely shared across the region. In addition to offering good work opportunities and qualifications for a “better” husband, a degree acts as a safety net should a woman’s marriage fail or should she remain single.³⁴

Wars are gendered, and they may reinforce the power of the state and its gender ideology. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian women were constantly harassed by zealots if they did not adhere strictly to Islamic dress and manner. Those women who complained about hijab or resisted by showing a little hair or wearing bright-colored socks were admonished to “feel shame before the corpses of the martyrs of Karbala”—a reference to an incident in religious history as well as to the fallen soldiers in the battle with Iraq. Similar dynamics have been observed in other MENA countries. In Palestine, expulsion by Zionists or flight from the villages during periods of strife caused profound changes in rural Palestinian life and the structure of the family. During the first intifada, Palestinian women made gains in social and political participation, but the second intifada had more negative effect. In Afghanistan, a left-wing government tried to make schooling compulsory but was defeated. The Afghan case places the Marxist-inspired reforms of 1978 in proper historical and social context and shows how the subversion of a modernizing state by an Islamist group financed by an international coalition of states led straight to the Taliban, and how the United States and international military intervention since 2001 has not created security, stability, or development in Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, the combination of wars, international sanctions, and Saddam Hussein’s own flawed policies and priorities resulted in the deterioration of women’s status and conditions, but the US invasion and occupation caused development setbacks, infrastructural damage, and serious socio-psychological harm.³⁵ What is more, although MENA countries have always had high rates of military spending and have spent far more on the military than on the social sectors, the new century has seen spectacular amounts expended on arms purchases, largely by US allies in the region. In Chapter 5, I look at the effect of conflict and war on gender dynamics.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 had a profound effect on the region, in that the victory of the Islamic forces inspired Islamist movements throughout MENA and indeed across the Islamic world. Islamization and the new regime’s repression caused deep rifts within Iranian society, leading many into self-exile, asylum, or—in the case of young men—flight from military service during the dreadful years of the war with Iraq. In her study of

Iranian immigrants in France, Vida Nassehy-Behnam stated: "Since the initiation of 'theocracy,' Iranian emigration in general has been partly motivated by the pervasiveness of a religious ideology which impinges so dramatically upon individual lifestyles." She then offered two categories of emigrants: (1) political emigrants—that is, those whose exodus began in February 1979, including monarchists, nationalists, communists, and the Organization of Iranian People's Mojahedin and (2) sociocultural emigrants, defined as those Iranians who were not politically active to any great extent but left the country out of fear over an uncertain future for their children or because of the morose atmosphere that prevailed in Iran, especially for women and youth. In their study of Iranian exiles and immigrants in Los Angeles, Mehdi Bozorgmehr and Georges Sabagh showed that some 65 percent of immigrants and 49 percent of exiles had four or more years of college. They noted that these findings for Iranians stood in contrast to the figures for many other migration streams. Another difference between Iranian exiles, refugees, and immigrants and those of North Africa and Turkey is the greater preponderance of religious minorities—Christians, Jews, and Baha'is—among Iranians. Such minorities are especially prevalent within the Iranian exile group in Los Angeles. Bozorgmehr and Sabagh offer these religious patterns as an explanation for why the Iranian exiles they surveyed perceived less prejudice than other groups, which may contain a larger share of Muslims.³⁶

These factors—socioeconomic status, education, and political ideology—shape the experience of female exiles, immigrants, and refugees. Bauer notes that although women in Middle Eastern Muslim societies are rarely described as migrating alone, many Iranian women after 1979 did go into exile alone. The women she interviewed in Germany typically had been involved in secular-left political and feminist activities in Iran and had high school or college education. She elaborates: "Some married young in traditional marriages; others were single or divorced. Some were working class; others middle or upper middle class . . . but most of those I interviewed did come into exile with some ideas about increasing personal autonomy and choice."³⁷

Can emigration lead to emancipation? Bauer notes the growing feminist consciousness of Iranian exiles and writes that among those she interviewed, there was a general feeling that the traumatic events of 1979–1982 had initiated cross-class feminist cooperation among women and rising consciousness among all Iranians on the issue of gender relations. She adds that larger political goals may be lost, however, as people put aside notions of socialist revolution, social transformation, and political activity and wrap themselves in introspection and their individual lives. Although that was true for the early 1990s, a repoliticization occurred in the latter part of the 1990s, in tandem with the emergence of a movement for political reform

within Iran. Expatriate Iranians regained their political identity and aspirations, although they held different perspectives on the reform movement, “Islamic feminism,” prospects for “Islamic democracy,” secularism, and other political alternatives.

The Iranian state’s control over society, however considerable, is not of a “totalitarian” kind, and there have been many forms of resistance to its ideological control and social restrictions, including those by youth, women, and dissident intellectuals. Moreover, the state has not barred women from education, and in the twenty-first century women began to surpass men in higher education enrollments. Meanwhile, Iranian women themselves are making major demands for the modernization of family law and for greater political participation. The focus of Chapter 6 is on social changes in Iran since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

During the 1990s and into the next century, much ink was spilled about the question of whether MENA could overcome authoritarian rule to develop democratic political systems. It was claimed that the Middle East was unique among developing regions in not experiencing democratic transition, with various strands of the literature attempting to explain why. As noted earlier in this chapter, studies that reinforce the myth of Middle Eastern exceptionalism have focused on cultural explanations, that is, the idea that Arab culture or Islam or both are incompatible with democracy, and that the region lacks the prerequisites for democracy and suffers from a defective political culture that somehow favors autocracy and repression. Some political analyses have presumed the endurance of authoritarianism in the region and the absence of democratization but explained it in terms of the nature of the opposition or the state. Ellen Lust-Okar, for example, attributed it to the weakness and nature of the opposition vis-à-vis the regimes. Similarly, Eva Bellin argued that the region’s exceptionalism lay in conditions and institutions that fostered robust authoritarianism, including politically tenacious coercive apparatuses. Other studies examined civil society and trends in the popular classes. Many surveys quoted in the literature have pointed to the compatibility of public attitudes in the region with democracy and their similarity to other people’s aspirations. Asef Bayat noted that myths of Muslim or Middle Eastern exceptionalism have neglected the politics of ordinary people, particularly the youth, which were a key mobilizing force in the 2011 uprisings. In Bahgat Korany’s volume, several authors similarly emphasized that the region’s youth bulge seemed eager for change.³⁸ And since the 1993 edition of this book, I have argued that “modernizing women” are the main advocates and agents of democratization.

Contra the proponents of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, the Arab Spring and regime change in Tunisia and Egypt launched the two countries on the path of democratic transition, whereas Morocco, which had started a slower, more gradualist transition in 1998, approved constitutional changes in

the referendum of July 2011 that limited some of the vast powers of the king. The path to democratic consolidation, however, is replete with obstacles, including hard-line Islamism and external interference. The pro-democracy movements of the region and the prospects for successful democratic transitions that are inclusive of women constitute the subject of Chapter 7.

Conclusion

Women are actively involved in movements for social change—revolution, national liberation, human rights, women’s rights, and democratization. Besides national groupings, there are region-wide organizations and networks within which women are active, such as the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité, the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association, and the Arab Human Rights Organization; such groups also have links to transnational feminist networks such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws; the Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace; and Women in Development Europe (WIDE). Women also actively support and oppose Islamist and fundamentalist movements. Islamist women are discernible by their dress, the Islamic hijab. Anti-fundamentalist women are likewise discernible by their dress, which is Western, and by their liberal or left-wing political views. In between are Muslim women who may veil but are also opposed to second-class citizenship for women. All in all, women in the Middle East, North Africa, and Afghanistan have participated in political organizations, social movements, and revolutions, as well as productive processes and economic development. Whether as peasants, managers of households, factory workers, service workers, or street vendors or as teachers, nurses, or other professionals, MENA women have contributed significantly to economic production and social reproduction—though their contributions are not always acknowledged, valued, or remunerated. And through their organizations and lobbying and advocacy efforts, they have succeeded in effecting significant legal and policy reforms. In Chapter 8, I discuss the activities of women’s organizations and their contributions to civil society, democratization, and citizenship rights.

This book, therefore, is an exploration of the causes, nature, and direction of change in the Middle East and North Africa, particularly as those have affected women’s status and social positions. I underscore the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of change and highlight the unintended consequences of state policies as they affect women. The chapters reveal the contradictions and paradoxes of social change, as well as its more predictable patterns and trends. In particular, the chapters draw attention to the genuinely revolutionary role of middle-class Middle Eastern women, especially secular feminists and Muslim feminists using the languages of

socialism, liberalism, feminism, and an emancipatory Islam. These women are not simply acting out roles prescribed for them by religion, culture, or neopatriarchal states; they are questioning their roles and status, demanding social and political change, participating in movements, and taking sides in ideological battles. In particular, they stand at the center of the new social movements for democratization, civil society, and citizenship.

Notes

1. Chirot 1983, p. 3. For an elaboration of the structuralist and Marxist approach, see Lloyd 1986, especially p. 3. On world-system theory, see Wallerstein 1979, and Chase-Dunn 1998.

2. Very useful early studies include Hajjar 1985, especially the introduction by Hajjar, the chapter on demography by Basheer Nijim, and the essay on education and political development in the Middle East by Nancy and Joseph Jabbra. See also Hopkins and Ibrahim 1997. Charrad 2001 provides a comparative study of the evolution of women's rights in postcolonial Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Another comparative study is Moghadam and Gheytauchi 2010.

3. al-Azm, 1993, p. 117; Kepel 2002.

4. See essays by Azar Tabari and Haleh Afshar, both in Tabari and Yeganeh 1982; Minces 1982; Ghousoub 1987; Sabbah 1984; Moghissi 1999; Manji 2003. See also the symposium on fundamentalism and feminism in *Journal of Women's History* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2001).

5. See the Introduction by Freda Hussein in Hussein 1984. Leila Ahmed once poignantly wrote, "One can perhaps appreciate how excruciating is the plight of the Middle-Eastern feminist caught between those opposing loyalties [sexual and cultural identities] forced almost to choose between betrayal and betrayal." See her essay in Hussein 1984. See also Barlas 2002; Hassan 1996; al-Hibri 1997; Wadud 1999.

6. Huntington 1996; see also Landes 1998; Shayegan 1997; Viorst 1998; Roy 1994.

7. Landes and Landes 2001; Inglehart and Norris 2003a, esp. chap. 3. See also Huntington 2001; Fukuyama 2001 for post-9/11 commentaries on the Muslim world. On the democratic difference between MENA and the rest of the Islamic world, see Fish 2002. The *Arab Human Development Report*—published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and written by a group of Arab social scientists—is a more sophisticated treatment of the region.

8. Jamal 2011; Tessler 2007, 2010.

9. See contributions in Moghadam 1994.

10. Lahav 1987, p. 199. See also Aloni 1984; Tress 1994.

11. Boutalia 1985; Miller 1981; Drèze and Sen 1989, esp. chap. 4; Hudson and Den Boer 2004.

12. See Bullough, Shelton, and Slavin 1988. For a comparative study of changing family law in Western countries (from patriarchal to egalitarian), see Glendon 1977, 1989.

13. Monica C. Cardinal, comments made at the workshop Women Judges in the Muslim World, University of Oslo, December 17–18, 2012, organized by Monika Lindbekk.

14. Boudhiba 1985. See also Ertürk 1991.
15. On world-systems, see Chase-Dunn 1998; on world society, see Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997; Boli 2005.
16. an-Na'im 1999.
17. Sharabi 1988. On state types, see Hudson 1977; Richards and Waterbury 1990, 1996; Hinnebusch 2000; Brumberg 2002; Posusney and Angrist 2005.
18. Richards and Waterbury 1996; see also contributions in Gerner and Schwedler 2004.
19. Pyle 1990.
20. Chamie 1985; Azzam, Abu Nasr, and Lorfing 1985, p. 11.
21. Miliband 1989, p. 25.
22. Safilios-Rothschild 1971.
23. On the transnational capitalist class, see Sklair 2001; Robinson 2004. On the social protests across the world generated by neoliberal globalization, see Moghadam 2013a.
24. Lorber 1994, p. 5; Walby 2009.
25. Blumberg 1978; Chafetz 1984.
26. Mann 1986.
27. Jayawardena 1986; Chatterjee 1993; M. Badran 1995; Bodman and Tohidi 1998; Kandiyoti 1991; Joseph 2000; Charrad 2001; Moghadam 1994, 2003. See also Chapter 2.
28. Moghadam and Mitra 2013.
29. Hijab is the Arabic term for modest Islamic dress. Across countries and social groups, hijab encompasses the all-enveloping veil (*burqa* in Afghanistan, *chador* in Iran, *niqab* in Arab countries), a large headscarf and long coat (seen also in Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and elsewhere), or a headscarf and modest Western dress.
30. See Matin-Asgari 2002; Moghadam 1987.
31. O'Connell 1993.
32. Klausen 2005; Cesari 2004.
33. Milkman 1987; K. Anderson 1981; Staggenborg 1998.
34. Zureik 1991; Moghadam 1988; Poya 1999; al-Khalil 1991, p. 12.
35. al-Jawaheri 2008; see also al-Ali and Pratt 2010.
36. Bozorgmehr and Sabagh 1991; Bauer 1991.
37. Bauer 1991, p. 93.
38. Bayat 2010; Korany 2010; Bellin 2004; Lust-Okar 2005.