Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective

Daniel Druckman

National Research Council

The purpose of this essay is to introduce the reader to a social psychological perspective on the roots of nationalism. At its heart is the description of how individuals develop feelings about and attachments to groups—how they build loyalty to groups. The review explores how such loyalty can lead to hostile reactions to other groups, can become translated into stereotypes that are shared by individuals, can shape the collective behavior of groups, and can help differentiate the multiple groups that define any political environment.

At a time when ethnic nationalism seems insurgent and capable of pushing much of the world into chaos and war, there is increased need both to understand and to learn how to cope with the conditions that promote such extreme group loyalty. While each of the social sciences has something to say about nationalism, social psychologists have, over the years, contributed, in often neglected ways, to our knowledge about the roots of nationalism. Specifically, they have explored the factors that arouse feelings of group loyalty when such group loyalty promotes hostility toward other groups; how cross-cutting or multiple loyalties can change the face of nationalism; and how individual group loyalties influence and shape collective behavior. It is the purpose of this article to discuss this literature and show its relevance to what is happening in the post-Cold War world.

Focusing their attention primarily on individuals and small interacting groups, social psychologists have sought basic knowledge about the ways in which people relate to groups and nations. Central to this focus is the role played by feelings of loyalty to groups and the conditions that arouse or reduce attachments. While relying largely on data from laboratory experiments and surveys of college students, the results are relevant to a wide variety of situations and populations. Whether or not the findings have such broad implications depends on the conditions under which we can reasonably draw conclusions from them about the behavior of national aggregates. It may be that the phenomena do, in fact, aggregate directly from the individual to the collective much as votes can be aggregated. Or, we may be able to make a strong analogy between the behavior of individuals and small groups, on the one hand, and that of leaders, social movements, and whole national populations on the other. We will use both approaches and consider some of the implications of such issues as we review the research.

Although granting that nationalism is a political, economic, and sociological phenomenon, it becomes a social-psychological phenomenon to the extent that individuals develop attitudes about their own and other nations. Such attitudes reflect the feelings that persons have toward these objects and their sense of loyalty to them. These feelings of attachment are at the heart of nationalism. In the review to follow, we will focus on how these feelings of attachment are formed and take root. In particular, we will explore how such loyalty on the part of individuals: (1) can lead to hostile reactions toward other groups and become translated into stereotypes that are shared across individuals, (2) can shape the collective behavior of groups, and (3) can help differentiate among the multiple groups that define any political environment.

National Loyalty and Inter-Group Conflict

Even the casual observer of the international scene today is haunted by the impact that loyalties have on what people are doing politically. Strong, even extreme, attachments to ethnic, religious, national, and clan identities have appeared to push individuals and groups to engage in what often seem to be inhumane and improbable acts toward those perceived to be the enemy. Where do such feelings come from? Why do they arise? Why do feelings of loyalty to one group generate negative or hostile feelings toward other groups? In order to understand how individual loyalties can affect inter-group conflict, we must first consider the importance of group loyalty to the individuals in the group. The feelings of attachment that comprise loyalty for many are not whimsical but are generally basic to the individuals' definitions of themselves. Loyalty to a group strengthens one's identity and sense of belonging. Let us explore what social psychology has to say about the bases for loyalty.

The Bases of Group Loyalty

The bases for group and national loyalty are widely assumed to be lodged in human needs: "Groups in general are organized to meet human needs, their structures and processes are in part molded by these needs" (Guetzkow, 1957:47). At the level of the nation, the group fulfills economic, sociocultural, and political needs, giving individuals a sense of security, a feeling of belonging, and prestige. While these needs are regarded as universal, their strength appears to vary in different nations and in different individuals (see Terhune, 1964; DeLamater et al., 1969). These needs are not limited to national identifications but have been found to be the basis for group identification in general. "The ways by which an individual relates to his nation have aspects in common with the ways an individual relates to any group of which he is a member" (Terhune, 1964:258).

The underlying needs for attachment take several forms. In general these needs tend to arise out of the affective and instrumental functions that nations serve for their citizens. As Terhune (1964) has observed, the nation achieves personal relevance for individuals when they become sentimentally attached to the homeland (affectively involved), motivated to help their country (goal oriented), and gain a sense of identity and self-esteem through their national identification (ego involved). DeLamater et al. (1969) added to this triad a normative involvement which occurs when individuals internalize the norms and role expectations of the nation. Parallel concepts are found in the literatures on individual motivation and small groups. Much of social behavior appears to be motivated by the need for affiliation (affective involvement), the need for

achievement (goal involvement), and the need for power (ego involvement) (McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1973). Groups function because they are attractive to members (affective involvement), accomplish things and solve problems (goal involvement), and provide status for members (ego involvement) (Bass, 1981; Stogdill, 1974). Kelman (1988) has recently proposed that these needs form the basis for the individual's need for self-protection and self-transcendence. People see the nation as providing them and their progeny with security and safety as well as status and prestige in return for their loyalty and commitment.

Although these needs, in general, characterize the bases for nationalism, individuals often combine and emphasize them in different ways. Terhune (1964) found a group of non-American students more focused on nations as problem solvers while American students perceived nations more as symbols and objects for sentimental attachment. DeLamater, et al. (1969) reported stronger affective attachment to nations by people who saw the nation as a symbol for what was important in their lives. These same individuals were more traditional in their nationalism and more negative toward all supra-national organizations.

Theories of cognitive development such as that of Piaget (1965) suggest that children typically move from a focus on themselves to identifying with those who are important to them in their surroundings. Thus, building attachments to groups is part of the normal socialization process as individuals move toward adulthood. It is the way we learn to understand and function in the world around us. There is a progression from being egocentric to increasingly sociocentric (Gladstone, 1962). As a result, as children grow older, they become less focused on themselves *per se* and more focused on themselves as part of a larger social setting. These theories highlight the importance of self-definition and emotional identification with objects in early learning. Gradually, individuals develop a sensitivity to the needs and interests of others.

This movement from self- to other-orientation is evidenced in increased pro-social behavior that includes helping others, showing sympathy for them, and even altruism (Wispe, 1972). Such forms of social behavior have adaptive advantages. It has been argued from the perspective of evolutionary psychology that cooperative behavior promotes individual survival (Corporeal, et al., 1989), and that groups composed of members who are cooperative are more effective than those with members who are less cooperative (Brewer and Kramer, 1986). Such behavior also contributes to a person's sense of identity by distinguishing them from those who are like them and those who are not, between friends and foes (Volkan, 1988). The cooperative behavior displayed between members of one's own group, strengthened by pressures of conformity to group norms, is rarely seen in relations between members of different groups. It is in this sense, as Ross (1991:177) notes, that "sociality promotes ethnocentric conflict, furnishing the critical building block for in-group amity and out-group hostility." As individuals move from a self- to other-orientation, they also begin to distinguish among the others, becoming more attached and sympathetic to some and more critical and detached from others. The groups they belong to through birth or through early experience have an impact on which they deem to be ingroups and which outgroups.

Do these feelings, which developed in children for groups in their immediate environment, transfer to the larger system in which those groups are embedded? In other words, is loyalty similar if the group consists of interacting individuals that one can actually talk with or involves abstract entities like the nation? Feelings expressed toward small groups such as the family or clan need not precede those expressed toward such larger entities as nations and may, in fact, be contradictory. Much of social psychological experimentation is guided by the

assumption that similar processes can be invoked simultaneously; that is, in the present case, national loyalties do not depend on the prior development of communal loyalties. But Etzioni (1968) has called this assumption into question, proposing that loyalties transfer from smaller to larger entities. He argues that the feelings expressed toward small groups or communities form the basis for those expressed toward nations. Such a perspective requires an upward transfer of loyalties from smaller units to the center of the system of which they are a part. This transfer may be facilitated by gradually enlarging the group that the individual perceives himself to represent and building in accountability to that bigger group.

The construction of the Egyptian pyramids as a case of nation-building exemplifies Etzioni's point. During the Nile's flood season workers from throughout the country were brought to work on the pyramids. Working in teams composed of neighbors and family members, they competed in bringing in the biggest and best stones. While working on the pyramids, however, they were rewarded as a larger unit for cooperating with teams from other villages in putting the stones together to create the pyramids. These men had loyalty originally to those in their village, but transferred that loyalty to the larger community by participating in a process whereby they enlarged their definition of the group to include all countrymen.

From In-Group Loyalty to Inter-Group Conflict

Our discussion to this point suggests the intrinsic importance of group loyalty to individuals. But it begs some basic questions. Do national feelings once developed necessarily lead to negative feelings toward other groups? And can feelings of loyalty, once they emerge, be changed or broadened? Two strands of social psychological studies are relevant here. The first explores the differences between nationalism and patriotism, suggesting that not all loyalty is associated with hostile feelings toward others. The second shows how endemic in-group bias is to the human species and suggests that loyalty toward one's own group leads to the denigration of other groups.

Nationalism and Patriotism. Feshbach and his colleagues (Feshbach, 1987, 1990; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989) have wrestled with the relationship between positive feelings toward one's own group and negative feelings toward others. They wondered if negative feelings toward other groups was an automatic consequence of loyalty to one's own group. Or are there different types of attachments to one's own group that may or may not include consideration of other groups?

In their research, a factor analysis of responses to items in a questionnaire about attitudes toward one's own and other countries revealed two relatively independent factors. One focused on feelings about one's own country. Strong loadings were obtained for such items as "I love my country," "I am proud to be an American," and "In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and emotionally affected by its actions." This factor was labeled "patriotism" by Feshbach and his associates. The second factor involved feelings of national superiority and a need for national power and dominance. Strong loadings here were found for such items as "In view of America's moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in deciding UN policy", and "Other countries should try to make their governments as much like ours as possible." This factor was called "nationalism." Correlations between these factors and such variables as early familial attachments, attitudes toward nuclear

arms, and readiness to go to war suggest distinct patterns. Nationalists indicated stronger support for nuclear armament policies and were ready to go to war but less willing to risk their lives than patriots. Patriots showed a stronger early attachment to their father than did nationalists.

The pattern of relationships between nationalism and hawkish attitudes suggested by the data did not, however, include individual aggressive activities as part of the "syndrome." Feshbach found that his respondents' own reported aggressiveness was only weakly related to both nationalism and to attitudes toward war. While supporting more aggressive postures for their nation, nationalists were not more aggressive in their personal activities than were patriots. The patriots indicated a willingness to subordinate personal interests to national interests but were not particularly supportive of war. Both sets of findings suggest that nationalism is associated more with a competitive or militaristic approach to the world, patriotism with a more cooperative or peaceful approach to the world. The strategies that each would advocate appear to differ. In effect, the nationalists would constitute the hawks, the patriots the doves in any debate over policy.

This distinction between nationalism and patriotism suggests that attitudes toward militarism or peace are rooted in basic underlying dispositions which may prove difficult to change. Studies of children's development of attitudes, reviewed by Sears (1969), indicate that nationalism, at least in the U.S., arises first as highly favorable affect without supporting cognitive content. Children experience positive feelings about their country before they can put a label on such feelings. When content becomes attached to the feelings, it is as a rationalization for the feelings which, in turn, may linger even after other cognitive components of the attitudes have changed. The nature of the rationalization leads to the differentiation between nationalism and patriotism. Are the feelings justified in terms of being superior to others or because one's nation is good? Since the feelings develop earlier than the content, they are likely to be more resistant to extinction. It is these feelings, reflected in the distinction between patriotism and nationalism, that render debates between hawks and doves so vociferous and difficult to resolve. Attempts to mediate the differences are made difficult by the deep-rooted needs served by the attitudes. Policy consensus is more likely to be the result of compromises in positions than changes in the underlying feelings.

The findings and recommendations made by Feshbach and his colleagues are consistent with the argument that we should be able to distinguish among kinds of ingroup orientations and identifications. Certain types of ingroup orientations are associated with a tendency to denigrate outgroups, while others are not (Berry, 1984). This distinction is also made in the well-known work of Adorno, et al. (1950) on the authoritarian personality. They note a difference between a healthy patriotic love of one' own country, not associated with prejudice against outgroups, and an ethnocentric patriotism (like Feshbach's nationalism) which was associated with such prejudice. More recently, Duckitt (1989) indicated that ethnocentric patriotism was associated with insecure group identifications, and patriotism was related to secure group identifications. The more secure individuals felt in the groups to which they belonged, the more healthy their relationship to the group and the lower their need for distancing their group from others. This set of studies calls into question the overall relationship between ingroup and outgroup attitudes, that is, the notion that attitudes toward ingroups explain attitudes toward outgroups.

But Feshbach's interpretation is only one among a number of theories that can be applied to these data. Another interpretation is that nationalism is merely a more complex form of patriotism. Thus, patriotism is commitment—a readi-

ness to sacrifice for the nation—while nationalism is commitment plus exclusion of others, a readiness to sacrifice bolstered by hostility toward others. Patriotism is the simpler relationship between the individual and group, in this case, the nation. Nationalism requires a more elaborate matrix embedding one's own nation into a set of nations and differentiating among those nations. In this interpretation, patriotism would be the orientation acquired earlier in the socialization process and, as a consequence, the stronger feeling.

Moreover, Feshbach's view assumes that these orientations are stable attitudinal dispositions which are difficult to change. Conceivably, however, the orientations are not stable across situations but are aroused under certain well-defined conditions. For example, the patriotic orientation may occur more frequently in non-competitive situations while the nationalistic attitudes are expressed more strongly in competitive intergroup situations. There is little need for persons to consider outgroups in situations that are not competitive whereas they loom large when the situation becomes more competitive. At issue for the current discussion is whether it is possible to arouse nationalistic attitudes in cooperative situations? In other words, must the situation already be conflictual before nationalism becomes a force or do nationalistic feelings overlay the situation and lead people to be more prone to seeing situations involving certain others as laden with conflict and competition? The research literature on ingroup bias provides us with some answers to this question.

Ingroup Bias.   Results from a wide variety of experiments leave little doubt that the mere classification of people into groups evokes biases in favor of one's own group. Just by being told that one belongs to a particular group as opposed to another—even if one has never seen or met any other members of that group—is enough to make the individual prefer the group over others. This group is perceived as better, friendlier, more competent, and stronger than other groups. And classification in these experiments has been on such things as whether one is an over- or under-estimator of certain patterns of dots or favors one type of painter over another. Reviews by Brewer (1979), Tajfel (1982), Brewer and Kramer (1985), and, most recently, by Messick and Mackie (1989), document the extent of this bias toward one's own group. Moreover, this ingroup bias is found even under conditions of cooperative interdependence when no group gains an advantage by such a bias and often risks losing as a result (Brewer and Silver, 1978). This research challenges the theory that favoring one's own group over other groups is aroused by the task or situation and is more prevalent when groups are in competition with one another or in conflict as suggested by early field and laboratory experiments (Blake and Mouton, 1962; Bass and Dunteman, 1963; Ferguson and Kelley, 1964; Sherif and Sherif, 1965; Druckman, 1968b). The more recent studies (and an earlier one by Hatt, 1950) suggest that competition and conflict are not necessary conditions for ingroup bias, although such situations may enhance such bias. Membership in a group appears to lead people to favor that group and see others as less worthy in comparison.

Tajfel (1981, 1982) has advanced "social identity theory" to explain ingroup bias. According to this theory, people's self-evaluations are shaped in part by their group memberships so that viewing their group in positive terms enhances their self-esteem. An individual's self-esteem is further increased by making a favorable comparison between his or her own and another group. Not only are they part of a "good" group, but it is "better" than another group. The person's social identity is tied to the importance of the groups to which he or she belongs. In effect, nationalism links individuals' self-esteem to the esteem in which the

nation is held. Loyalty and identification with the nation become tied to one's own sense of self.

If this theory is accurate, we should see an increase in self-esteem with being able to discriminate one's own group from others. Oakes and Turner (1980), and Lemyre and Smith (1985), indeed, did find support for this hypothesized relationship. When people were divided into groups, they showed higher self-esteem scores when they were given the opportunity to make allocation decisions favoring their group. These researchers, however, reported that the mere act of dividing individuals into groups without allowing for discrimination among the groups led to lower self-esteem. Being able to discriminate one's own group from others appeared most important to enhancing self-esteem and loyalty. The discrimination process, in effect, provided a rationale for why one belongs to a particular group and made one feel good about oneself.

Another theory proposed to explain ingroup bias, initially advocated by Turner (1987), is referred to as self-categorization theory. This theory, in contrast to social identity theory, places greater emphasis on the nature of the categorization process that occurs when people identify with groups. Self-categorization theory contains two elements: perceptual accentuation and positive regard for the ingroup. Perceptual accentuation is the process whereby objects in the same category appear more similar to one another than to objects in different categories. Nations that have freely elected governments seem more similar to one another than they do to nations whose leaders came to power through coups or involve hand-picked successors. This theory posits that this perceptual bias leads to an evaluative preference for those individuals and groups that are similar to oneself. Without the categorizations that distinguish people in terms of similarities and differences, the evaluative bias would not be possible. Brown and Adams (1986) found that people strive to find differences between their group and others even when they appear highly similar. Individuals in groups that appeared similar in status and attitudes differentiated among themselves by evaluating the other group's performance more negatively. "We should not assume that just because two groups enjoy friendly or cooperative relations that they will necessarily not seek ways to derogate each other by making ingroup-favoring-judgments on other subjectively important dimensions of intergroup comparison" (Brown and Adams, 1986: 89; see also Tesser and Campbell, 1980).

Insko and his colleagues (1988) have posed a theory to explain ingroup bias and the increased competition and hostility that appear to follow. They found that when members of a group reached consensus on the strategy (goals, priorities) they were going to follow, these groups became more hostile and competitive toward other groups. A consensual strategy within the group may shape the perceptual lens through which other groups are discriminated and evaluated. Druckman (1968a) also found that when members of groups agreed on the relative importance of the issues under discussion in a prenegotiation session, the group became more competitive. The consensus facilitates group members working in tandem in defining their environment and the other groups that can hinder or help them. Such consensus establishes the parameters that are important to discriminating and evaluating groups.

These theories of ingroup bias show how group membership becomes entangled with the way individuals perceive themselves in relation to their world. Ingroup bias helps individuals organize their world and place themselves in that world. In turn, such bias enhances their feelings about themselves and those in their group. Membership in a clan, religious group, or ethnic group, becomes part of the individual's self identity and critical to a sense of self-worth. The self

is threatened by information that calls into question the groups to which one belongs. People learn to react based on their loyalties; they defend those groups that are important to their definition of who they are. Moreover, these loyalties differentiate whom in their environment is appropriate to support and whom to avoid. And such loyalties can foster a consensus among members that becomes self-fulfilling and difficult to change. The stronger the loyalty, the more likely members of a group are to hold similar views and endorse similar strategies. They approach the world in lockstep, perceiving and defining others in the world similarly. There is little, if any, chance for discrepant information to filter through or for reasons to change to be considered.

From Individual to Collective Images

This discussion of nationalism, patriotism, and ingroup bias suggests that loyalty not only has feelings associated with it but also images of what one's own and other groups are like. In other words, there is a cognitive as well as an affective component to loyalty. Images provide individuals with maps of the groups in their environment on which to act. But these image-derived maps only really become critical to politics when they are held by larger collectivities and help define the world for those larger collectivities. When these individual images become shared within a group, they become stereotypes. Stereotypes represent widespread agreement among members of a particular group about the nature of a specific image. We are moving here to consider how individual loyalty becomes translated into a more collective phenomenon that can influence what groups of people do. Let us explore some of the research that has a bearing on how these collective images come about.

Descriptive and Evaluative Aspects of Images.   In their study of children's views of foreign peoples, Lambert and Klineberg (1967) tried to distinguish between two aspects of images: the content versus evaluative emphases of images, and the diversity in terms used in describing images. These researchers were interested in separating considerations of content (references to the nature of the political or economic system, the nation's demography, its physical and social attributes, its value orientations, for example) from evaluative concerns (descriptions of the people as kind, naive, talkative, arrogant, competitive). They found that children from a national group with a positive or friendly orientation toward another nation tended to describe that other country with a wider variety of content-oriented terms while using a minimum number of evaluative terms. There was more agreement among the children on how to evaluate the other people than on how to describe them. In contrast, if the children from the same national group had a negative or unfriendly orientation toward another nation, they were in agreement about how to describe the other country while at the same time exhibiting a proliferation of evaluative references. In other words, the children agreed on how to describe the other nation but not on how to evaluate it.

Druckman, Ali, and Bagur (1974) report a similar set of findings in studying stereotyping in three cultures: India, Argentina, and the United States. In each culture, there was more stereotyping in terms of the descriptive categories used for other nations that were considered unfriendly and about which little was known than when the other countries were viewed as friendly and a lot was known about them. In other words, the people in these cultures were more likely to stereotype disliked (and less familiar) nations than those that were liked (and familiar). However, just the reverse was found for how people evaluated other countries. There was more stereotyping in the evaluative terms used to

talk about liked than disliked nations and familiar than unfamiliar. (See also Druckman and Ludwig, 1970.)

In effect, cognitive factors appear to underlie judgments based on familiarity with another country. The more familiar the nation, the less likely people are to describe it in a stereotyped manner. Motivational factors, on the other hand, seem to underlie judgments based on friendliness and evaluative stereotypes. Friendly nations were evaluated in a more stereotypic fashion than unfriendly countries. The mechanisms responsible for these findings differ. The lack of agreement on appropriate categories to use in describing nations with which one is unfamiliar is likely due to a lack of knowledge. The lack of agreement obtained for unfriendly nations on evaluative categories is probably the result of a lack of desire to become informed. In both cases, information is important to the explanation. The cognitive explanation focuses on the possession of knowledge while the motivational explanation emphasizes the desire to seek any information at all about the other nation. What appears to happen is that people only seek information about nations they like. If they are willing to gain information and can do so, the other country becomes more familiar.

There appears to be a motivational screen in place that limits people to wanting to learn more about the countries they like rather than those they dislike. This screen makes changing negative stereotypes difficult as there is little desire to gain information about disliked nations and, thus, the tendency to keep them at a distance (unfamiliar) and easy to describe as well as classify. One wonders what impact the global media, such as CNN, will have on these relationships as it exposes people of most nations to information they are not actively seeking. It may have the effect of making nations and peoples familiar who were unfamiliar even if they are disliked. At issue is whether the motivational screen will merely block out information on disliked nations or selectively filter the information to reinforce the stereotype and, in turn, the negative evaluation of the group.

Interaction Between Descriptive and Evaluative Aspects of Images. This distinction between motivational and cognitive aspects of stereotypes is not meant to imply a single factor explanation for the findings on the extent of agreement about images of one's own and other nations. Any stereotype or image is the result of an interplay among cognitive and affective factors. Cottam (1977, 1987; see also Herrmann, 1985, 1988) has illustrated this interplay in his theoretical work on the relationship between motives and the content of images. Governments and peoples, he argues, develop their images of other nations based on their perceptions of the threat or opportunity the other nation poses for them, their perceptions of the relative power distance between their country and the other nation, and perceptions of the differences between their culture and that of the other nation. Cottam's description of the "barbarian" and "degenerate" images demonstrates how governments and people use these perceptions to form images.

The "barbarian" image results from the perception that the other nation is threatening, superior to one's own country in terms of military and economic capabilities, but inferior in terms of culture. People holding the image describe the other nation in diabolical terms similar to the Reagan administration's view of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." The content of their stereotype includes: (1) perceiving the other nation as a simple, single-minded aggressive enemy, (2) that has a monolithic decision structure, (3) and a decision style oriented toward elaborate conspiracies, (4) as well as a determination that the enemy's advantage in capabilities is due to one's own inability to use one's capabilities to optimal

advantage in opposing the "morally inferior enemy," (5) with any citizens in one's own nation who disagree with this portrayal being "at best dupes, at worst traitors." The other nation is viewed as dangerous, a view that tempers hasty aggressive actions against them.

The contrasting "degenerate" image results from a perception that the other nation offers one's own country an opportunity coupled with a view that the target nation is comparable in strength yet vulnerable culturally. The content of this stereotype consists of the perceptions: (1) that the other nation is uncertain, confused, and inconsistent, (2) has a highly diffuse and uncoordinated decision structure, (3) as well as a decision style without a strategic framework for action, (4) and a lack of will that prevents effective use of capabilities, (5) with any citizens in one's own nation who disagree with this view being "effete and weak," much like those in the target nation. The other nation is viewed as being "ripe for the picking," a view that encourages and/or rationalizes aggressive actions against them.

These stereotypes can be inferred from the statements and policies articulated by a nation's elite. Statements that embody these images are simplistic and potentially dangerous stereotypes of other nations. They reflect motivations that lead one to perceive a threatening enemy or that prompt one to be opportunistic and exploitative in one's orientation toward the "enemy." Statements that do not embody these images are more likely to reflect a complex view of other nations—as neither consistently threatening or "ripe for the picking." Unlike much of the literature on national stereotypes, Cottam relates the images to strategies that governments and leaders can adopt. He proposes that a containment strategy is appropriate to counter an opportunistic aggressor's "degenerate" image; a detente strategy is useful in countering the enemy stereotype of nations that perceive one as threatening. Cottam's theory, however, does not take into account the apparent rapid swings in feelings that can occur as events and leadership change. We have observed how rapidly the Chinese became "good guys" after Richard Nixon went to China, how fast Saddam Hussein became "a devil" after his invasion of Kuwait, and how feelings expressed by Americans toward the U.S. military changed dramatically following the war in the Persian Gulf.

Images Embedded in Schemas.   Cottam's images illustrate the sort of stereotyped thinking psychologists consider simplistic and undifferentiated (Holt, 1984; Tetlock, 1985). His theory can be compared with one posited by Silverstein and Holt (1989) that focuses on images of the enemy as part of schemas or theories of war that people have and maintain in order to account for their world and the nations and groups they perceive to define that world. These researchers posit three theories of war that people use to organize their images of the enemy: (1) the folk or Rambo theory, (2) the realpolitik theory, and (3) the scientific or systems theory.

The folk theory posits that politics is a contest between good and evil, that the world is composed of "dichotomous certainty without ambiguity." Thus, evil is the work of one's enemies. The folk theory, in effect, contains a demonic image of the enemy which includes within it both of Cottam's images—the "barbarian" and "degenerate." This theory is closest to the traditional meaning of stereotypes as oversimplified images of one's own and other nations. When the peoples of two nations both hold this demonic view of the other, researchers have talked about them as holding "mirror images" of one another (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). Such polarized thinking on the part of both parties generally reduces interest in interaction, increases perceptions of threat, leads to distrust, and creates a win-lose orientation in attempts at conflict resolution (see Druckman,

1977a; Druckman et al., 1988). In effect, as Osgood (1962), Milburn (1972), Mueller (1973) and others have shown, people lapse into simplified stereotypes of the enemy. Deutsch (1983) has shown how this folk theory of war can precipitate a malignant social conflict that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as it spirals out of control, each side perceiving only the worst of the other. Holsti (1972) and Stuart and Starr (1982) have shown how some American presidents and their advisors have built an inherent bad faith image of the Soviet Union growing out of this folk theory. They perceived that all behaviors of the Soviet Union were motivated by expansionary intentions and hostile feelings.

The realpolitik theory of war is based on the notion of power as the focus of politics—power that is defined on the basis of self interests as translated into national interests (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985; Hoffmann, 1985). In an anarchic world, people and governments must seek to preserve themselves by adding to their strengths. Cooperation with others is only viable if it is done on one's own terms and is assured to benefit one's own nation. One's own power is taken into account when defining self or national interests and in weighing the consequences of alternative political actions. Power here is relative vis-a-vis other peoples and nations. Other nations and peoples are defined in terms of their power and what they can do or provide to enhance one's own power and, thus, ensure that one can achieve and maintain what is in one's own self or national interest. As Hoffmann (1985: 134) has observed, governments with this theory guiding their perceptions and behavior start with a representation of their ends and "then calculate the amount of power needed to reach them, distinguish among the very different sorts of power appropriate to different ends, and decide, if necessary, how to increase one's power of the kinds required for the absolutely indispensable ends." Whereas in the folk theory of war, the enemy was the focus of attention; in the realpolitik theory, one's own nation is the focus of attention. In the folk theory, conflict is perceived as under the control of the enemy; in realpolitik, conflict is perceived to be more under one's own control and as potentially good if one gains one's ends and more power in the process.

Silverstein and Holt (1989) argue that the systems (or scientific) theory of war is a more complex way of organizing images that allows individuals to maintain their attachment to their own nation while using the political context to differentiate among other nations. Other nations can play different roles in the system depending on what is happening at the moment. One's own actions need to be guided by what the current organization of the system is perceived to be and the problem that is the focus of attention. Other nations do not consistently get placed into a particular category. Rather there is a search for which others should be included to solve this specific problem in this political context. The situation becomes the focal point and others are judged by their positions in relation to the particular situation. This theory makes stereotyped images more difficult unless nations are perceived to assume the same role all the time. There are usually other countries or entities out there who share one's interests or concerns to whom one can turn for support. Since as the adage goes "your friend one day may be your enemy the next," giving other nations fixed labels may defeat one's purposes and make it more, rather than less, difficult to reach one's goals.

The Silverstein and Holt images suggest that stereotypes can focus on different aspects of the environment and attribute control to these different arenas. The folk theory image assigns control to the enemy. One's stereotype about the enemy becomes all important in determining strategies and tactics as Cottam has proposed. In the realpolitik image, control is retained by the actor who anticipates what others will do given the nature of the political system. Collective

stereotypes about one's own power vis-à-vis others lead to action. In the systems image, the current situation and problem help to determine how one's own and other nations are viewed and defined. Standard operating procedures as well as lessons from the past concerning particular problems and issues take over as the stereotypes of the moment to guide behavior.

Group Loyalty and Collective Behavior

Our discussion has begun to turn to how these stereotyped images of one's own group and other groups influence collective behavior. Of interest is the nature of the relationship between group loyalty and collective action. This question is at the interdisciplinary juncture between psychology, sociology, and political science. Moreover, it crosses the boundaries between levels of analysis, from individuals and small interacting groups to collectivities and nations. In what follows, we will focus on several possible connections between people's loyalties and what collectivities do. We will consider several instances where the nature of peoples' loyalties can have an impact on collective behavior at the institutional level: (1) through action as a representative of a group; (2) through support for particular policies; (3) through defining group norms; and (4) through the decision-making process. In each of these cases there is a nexus where images and actions at the individual level can help to shape what happens at the collective level. These effects get played out through the influence they have on the expectations of leaders, the shaping of public opinion, or creation of norms. Let us explore each of these points of connection further.

Role as Representative

When people are told that they are representatives of a group and are perceived to stand for a group, research suggests their loyalty constrains behavior. Blake and Mouton (1962) began this series of studies by noting the effects of group pressures on the compromising behavior of representatives. In effect, individuals designated as representatives of groups reached fewer agreements and were more competitive than individuals acting on their own behalf. These researchers argued that group loyalty served to limit persons known to be representing a group. As representatives, these individuals were relatively inflexible in their search for solutions to problems shared with members of other groups because they would be accountable for what they knew their group wanted. In particular, representatives were likely to approach intergroup negotiations over conflicts of interest with a "win-lose" rather than problem-solving orientation.

Druckman and his associates (Druckman, 1967, 1971a, 1971b, 1977b; Druckman et al., 1972, 1976, 1977, 1988; Solomon and Druckman, 1972; Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973; Benton and Druckman, 1974) explored a set of variables that increased the representative's responsibility for his or her own group's outcome and found more constraint as responsibility increased. The studies compared individuals negotiating on behalf of a group with those negotiating on behalf of themselves. As the individual's accountability to the group increased, as the outcome became more important to the group, and as the chances that the group would know what happened increased, the representative felt more and more tied to the goals, norms, and values of the group. In a sense, these individuals perceived themselves more as agents of the group than representatives, with little room to maneuver. Their loyalty was always in question and they could do hardly anything without undergoing scrutiny. They had to

prove that the group was important to them through their behavior. In the world of international relations these variables can be manipulated by groups or their leaders to produce the "desired" degree of loyalty. They can also be manipulated by third parties who are asked to mediate conflicts between groups or nations. Note that to prove their allegiance members of terrorist groups are often required to kill, kidnap, or rob one of the enemy (see Crenshaw, 1986). They risk death themselves should they fail to carry out the mission.

In effect, these findings draw attention to ways of increasing or decreasing actions taken by individuals on behalf of a group. As the demands for loyalty and commitment increase, the tendency is to defend the group's position and to gain something for the group in any negotiation. These effects are not only found in the representatives' behavior but in their perceptions of what is happening. They report stronger loyalty and commitment as the pressures on them mount. Their perceptions and feelings mediate between the demands of the group and their behavior (see Druckman, 1968a; Zechmeister and Druckman, 1973). The perceptions and feelings help to "justify" the behavior.

Support of Particular Policies

In discussing ingroup loyalty, we observed that nationalist feelings magnify the propensity for misperception. These feelings influence how others are defined and the nature of desirable action. They lead to "bad faith" images (Larson, 1986), "ethnocentric bias" (Druckman, 1968b), or "partisan bias" (Fisher and Brown, 1988) in which others' actions are evaluated on whether or not they are a friend or an enemy. As a result of this bias, people—leaders included—often overestimate the relative strength of their own group vis-à-vis other groups. Moreover, the same actions are viewed differently if carried out by an ally or an enemy. In effect, a double standard is applied and similar behaviors are perceived as different. While regarded in much of the psychological literature as a "universal" phenomenon, this biasing tendency of loyalty can be enhanced by events that cause tension or are perceived as threatening to one's view of one's own nation.

These examples of misperceptions—precipitated by exaggerated national self-images—can lead to miscalculations of likely outcomes from collective actions. With regard to strategic policy decisions, an overestimation of a nation's strength compared to that of the enemy can lead to aggressive postures culminating in wars that are lost. When people overvalue a nation's worth vis-à-vis other countries, such perceptions can restrict leaders' behavior, forcing them to become committed to possibly misguided courses of action. Lebow (1981) cites the example of American foreign policy toward China in the 1950s to illustrate these effects. The view of China as a weak nation was a self-serving stereotype that contributed to American miscalculations of the risk involved in taking more aggressive actions toward China. These linkages involve attempts to understand policy in terms of broader national self images. A similar phenomenon is found in case studies reported by Stoessinger (1978) on Sino-Soviet-American relations, by Brecher (1975) on Israel's foreign policy, and by Lebow (1976) on British rule in Ireland. Of these latter three studies, only Brecher's extends the causal sequence to an actual decision to go to war. He makes a strong case, based on interviews with policy makers, for the connection between Israeli self perceptions as "victims" and the decision to go to war in 1967. The Arab threat was seen as yet another attempt to impose a "final solution" on Israel—to drive them into the sea.

In effect, national self images and the strong feelings often attached to such

images constrain the range of options that policymakers have in dealing with other nations. In some instances they can lead to overly aggressive actions when such are precipitous; in other instances they can prevent action when such may be relevant. These images and feelings set the parameters within which leaders can work. If leaders, themselves, have similar images and feelings, they can enhance and exacerbate what the public is feeling. An illustration of the latter is Slobadan Milosevic of Serbia. He helped to intensify the growing feelings of nationalism within Serbia by launching the movement toward "ethnic cleansing." Building on the bias already present in the Serbia people, he heightened the contrast with the enemy and clarified the action that needed to be taken. In other words, he gave direction to feelings that were already intense and ready to explode.

Defining Group Norms

Another connection between group loyalty and collective action lies in how group norms are defined. Of interest here is the social psychological literature on group and organizational cohesion. Considered to result from interactions among group members, cohesion is an attribute of groups that may mediate the relationship between the loyalties or attachments of individuals to groups and collective action or performance. Group loyalty is usually regarded as a defining aspect of cohesion. As Zander (1979:433) notes, the most commonly accepted definition of cohesion is "the desire of members to remain as members of a group." Researchers have observed that group loyalty may lead to cohesion but it also appears to be a result of cohesion as well (Terborg et al., 1976; Landers et al., 1982; Stokes, 1983). There is a reinforcing effect of loyalty and cohesion— groups whose members are loyal perform better, leading the group to become more cohesive and the members more loyal.

This relationship between loyalty and cohesion can increase to the point that we get the phenomenon Janis (1989; see also, t'Hart, 1990) has called "group-think." Here members of the group become excessively protective of the group as an entity, restricting membership to those also loyal to the group, isolating themselves from any information counter to their own image of the group, and viewing threats to their policies as threats to the group. Because of the insular quality of such groups, they can take extreme actions without realizing the impact more information would have had on such behaviors. Moreover, these groups tend to define the outside world in such a way as to engage in self-fulfilling prophecies—they perceive others as working against them, so they engage in aggressive behavior against these others, and thus ensure that the others will be hostile in return. Terrorist groups, military juntas, authoritarian leaders with their close advisors often give evidence of groupthink. But it also occurs in governmental cabinets, policy planning staffs, and national security councils. Moskos (1970), Lynn (1984), and Henderson (1985) have commented on how prevalent this phenomenon is in combat troops, particularly those in front-line positions.

These ideas have implications for groups, organizations, and nations that are fairly homogeneous. The more alike people are, the easier it is to generate loyalty and cohesion. There are common customs, values, and socialization to build upon. It becomes less difficult to develop a shared image and to define what are standard operating procedures toward certain other groups. Leaders and representatives have a sense of where people stand and can take actions with some assurance of support. Moreover, the population is more easily mobilized by certain cries to arms. As cohesion and loyalty reinforce one another, such groups can become insulated from the rest of the world and appear to be

"marching to their own drummer." Hitler's Germany, Castro's Cuba, and Khomeini's Iran provide some relevant examples of these phenomena.

Decision-Making Processes

In the above three ways of connecting individual loyalties and collective behavior, the focus is on the impact of the attitudinal climate on collective actions. Loyalties toward a group condition the perceptions and images people have of themselves and other groups and impose certain constraints on the leadership through support for particular policies or through shared stereotypes. Individual and group factors, however, probably have their most direct link to collective action in the policymaking process itself. Since policy decisions are often made by single, powerful individuals or in small, face-to-face groups (Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, 1987), the perceptions and biases induced by loyalty can influence both how the decision making is structured and the nature of the process. As an example, consider Ronald Reagan's image of the Soviet Union as "the evil empire," and of communism as intent on dominating the world. In his own experience, he had faced an attempted takeover of the Screen Actor's Guild by a communist leaning faction and knew how dangerous "they" could be (Cannon, 1982). He believed that communists were behind most anti-American activity around the world and, as a consequence, made staffers and members of his administration prove they were not supporting such actions rather than the more usual procedure of proving that they were. He viewed the communists as guilty unless proven innocent (Glad, 1983; Hermann, 1983). They were the enemy, and we know what enemies do. His image and bias made it difficult for people who did not share a similar tendency to remain in the administration and, indeed, led to persons who were like him to become part of the administration (Bennis, 1973).

We noted above the influence of group loyalty on the creation of groupthink, which can affect decision making in small, interacting political groups. It is also important to note the impact of the images and self-serving stereotypes that individuals bring to such groups. Are the missiles the Soviet Union placed in Cuba in 1963 perceived as offensive or defensive? They are more likely to be judged offensive if the Soviet Union is seen as an enemy. Are Japanese-Americans perceived by American policymakers as "one of us" or as untrustworthy? They are generally seen as "just one of us" unless Japan has launched a war against us, at which time they become potential enemies too. Are the Muslim fundamentalists seen as more or less of a threat by moderate Arab regimes? After Khomeini came to power in Iran and called such fundamentalists to action, they were seen as a growing threat—they had a sponsor who had been successful in his own revolution. Loyalties and attachments influence and help to shape the lens through which leaders and policymakers interpret their world. The resulting images narrow the range of options that are likely to be considered and provide rationalizations for actions.

Modifying Group Loyalty

In previous sections we have described the influence that group loyalty can have on perceptions of one's own group and other groups and how such perceptions shape stereotypes and collective action. Much of the discussion has focused on the way loyalty increases the potential for intergroup conflict and self-fulfilling prophecies regarding the correctness of one's own behavior and the lack of good faith on the part of others. It seems appropriate to ask if there is any hope for the resolution of the clan rivalries in Somalia or the ethnic conflicts in the former

Yugoslavia given the portrait we have painted here. Similarly, is a European community feasible? What does the social psychological perspective have to say about our ability to modify, create, or extend loyalties to new, larger, or more inclusive groups? Exploring the literature on multiple loyalties can give us some perspective on this question.

Most of the studies reviewed to this point have concentrated on assessing group loyalty in terms of two groups—an ingroup and outgroup. They have engaged individuals in distinguishing between the group to which they belong, and another to which they do not belong. In effect, the ingroups have been their membership group and the outgroups have been non-membership groups. Largely ignored in this research is how people deal with multiple group loyalties and the attendant outgroups such loyalties invoke. Overlapping and cross-cutting group memberships are part of the landscape of intergroup relations, particularly within and between nations. When faced with multiple groups with which one can identify and become committed to, how do people choose among them and how does such choice influence their images and collective action? Does the presence of multiple groups dampen the impact of loyalty or condition the nature of its influence?

The Scaling Hypothesis

One proposal advanced to explain how people cope with the multiple groups in their environment is called the "scaling hypothesis." According to this hypothesis, people rate the various groups along a continuum from positive to negative. They also rate such groups in terms of the intensity—from weak to strong—with which they hold these feelings. Of interest are the characteristics of groups that determine where they are placed on these dimensions and the impact of the ratings, and concomitant feelings, on behavior. Four studies speak to this so-called "scaling hypothesis," and the influence of this intuitive scaling on the actions of citizens.

Using an inter-nation simulation, Druckman (1968b) studied the effects of nationalism on the individuals playing the roles of policymakers for a set of nations. As expected, the findings showed that these decision makers overvalued members of their own government and undervalued members of other governments. There was a distinct bias and loyalty toward the ingroup as compared to the outgroups. But each rating was influenced by the relationships among the "nations" in the system. Outgroups were differentially undervalued depending on whether they were allies or enemies, and on how conflictual or cooperative their behavior was in general. Moreover, members of one's own government differentially over- or undervalued other governments based on the roles they played vis-à-vis other governments . . . whether they favored or pushed for another government's position, like a foreign minister, or were they highly loyal to their own consensual government position, like a head of state.

Strong support was found for "ethnocentrism theory" in the ratings. The governments were arrayed along a continuum with members of one's own government being rated more positively when compared to one's allies and enemies being viewed as least similar and most negative. Among allies, "renegade allies" were considered more dissimilar and more negative than continuing enemies and former "enemies" converted to members of the alliance. Individual members of governments were able to make subtle distinctions among the various other governments based on the perceived nature of the relationships they had with such governments and their recent behavior toward them. There was also some elasticity to the concept of ingroup to include those other gov-

ernments that were currently friendly and cooperative. At least such govern-ments were perceived as closer to one's own government than all others.

Singer, Radloff, and Wark (1963) examined the roles of heretic and renegade in exploring feelings toward the members of one's own group and other groups. These investigators reported that renegades were liked even less than members of other groups who were, in turn, liked less than members of one's own group. Feelings expressed toward the heretic role, however, were more positive than those expressed toward renegades, and only somewhat less positive than those directed toward regular ingroup members. Because heretics never disavow their membership in the group, their deviation can apparently be tolerated better than that of renegades, who renounce their membership and the group. Dis-agreements with heretics are usually over the preferred actions to take rather than over the group's central values which the renegades are questioning. This study suggests that members of groups not only differentiate among other groups but among roles played by members of their own group. Generally, members value loyalty to the group and favorable attachment to the group. Thus, individuals who question or challenge the group's core values are consid-ered deviant and not loyal. They are no longer good members and are assigned roles that befit their expressions of dissent. The feelings of other group members toward them indicate their marginality.

Fishbein (1963) elaborated on the above findings by exploring differences in feelings toward non-group members based on their interest in joining the group (positive or negative), their eligibility to join the group (eligible or ineligible), and their current membership status (continuing non-group member or ex-group member). He was interested in which non-members were perceived as most threatening as well as least liked. The findings showed that candidates for membership who were eligible and interested were viewed as least threatening and most favorable. The potential candidate for membership, however, who was not interested in the group and, indeed, saw the group in a negative light, was perceived by the group as most threatening and least favorable. Ex-group members who viewed the group negatively were seen by members of the group as more threatening than continuing non-members (members of outgroups). In both instances the more negative the orientation toward the group, the more concerned group members became about what the non-member could do to undermine group confidence and loyalty. Parallels to organizations like the Palestinian Liberation Organization come to mind, especially the attempts of its leadership to constrain the more militant members when negotiations with the Israelis and other Arab states seem imminent. The PLO leadership perceives that what they want to do can be limited by what others see in these non-conforming members; the actions of these extremist members become viewed by the rest of the world as representative of the position of the PLO.

Brewer (1968) built on the above studies, examining the criteria on which people base their feelings about various types of outgroups. What was it about these groups and individuals that triggered negative or positive feelings? In gathering data, she examined the 30 African tribes in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. She was interested in the kinds of variables that helped determine when the various tribes would be willing to work with, to have as a neighbor, to share a meal with, and to become related to the other tribes. The more a tribe was interested in engaging in these behaviors with members of another tribe, the closer the social distance between the two tribes was perceived to be. Among the variables she associated with social distance were perceptions of similarity, physical or geographic proximity, and educational and economic advancement. Members of the tribes were willing to be socially closer to other

tribes they perceived to be more similar to them, geographically adjacent, and more advanced. Judged similarity had the strongest impact, followed in order by geographic proximity, and advancement. There was an interaction between similarity and advancement such that being educationally and economically advanced was more important to judgments of social distance if the tribe was considered dissimilar rather than similar. In effect, perceived similarity appears to be the most important dimension for scaling other groups. "We only want to interact with groups like us." Visible and successful outgroups are also worthy of attention and emulation *unless* they are perceived to be different from one's own group. If different, they may have a bad influence on the members of the ingroup and force change; thus, they are to be avoided.

Together, these studies reveal some dimensions along which multiple groups are perceived and regarded in the decision making of ingroups. Feelings expressed in favor of one's own group members or against another group's members depend on how each is perceived in relation to one's own group. Toward some groups—those that are perceived to be allies, similar to one's own group, advanced, or having persons eligible and interested in membership in one's own group—there are more favorable leanings and a willingness to interact on a regular basis. However, toward other groups—those that are perceived to be enemies or contain renegades from one's own group, dissimilar and "backward" or distant, as well as having individuals not eligible or disinterested in membership in one's own group—there is a sense of threat and vigilance and a wariness about interaction unless absolutely necessary. When, and if, interaction occurs with these latter groups, it should be on one's own terms.

Reference Groups

These studies do not, however, help us answer the question about how people decide among potential ingroups. If one is born into a clan with a particular religious orientation in a specific region of the country, to which of these groups does loyalty develop? Or, does the individual build loyalty to all or integrate them in forming his or her identity? At issue is when do other groups become ingroups and when do they become outgroups? Under what conditions do people see a group as one to be emulated or, at the least, positively regarded? And under what conditions do they perceive another group as threatening and, thus, to be hostilely regarded as an outgroup?

Merton (1957) among others (Kelley, 1952; Hyman, 1960) proposed reference group theory as a possible means of answering these questions. In reference group theory, nationalism does not necessitate that other nations be viewed with hostility. Having negative feelings toward another nation may be merely a special case of nationalism because intense loyalty to one nation does not necessarily have to lead to hostility toward another. The distinction between patriotism and nationalism made earlier is relevant here. It should be possible to have pride, patriotism, in one's nation while still recognizing its shortcomings and being willing to cooperate with and, perhaps, even include other nations in one's ingroup.

Having positive feelings toward groups is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for designating such groups as reference groups. Positive feelings for another group or nation does not automatically indicate identification or loyalty to that group or nation. More is required for it to become a reference group, such as adopting its values or aspiring to membership or citizenship. How do we know when a person has moved from positive feelings toward another nation to identification with that other nation? Varying degrees of identification with

groups or nations can be scaled in terms of the way one relates to the group. The following is an example of such a scale:

(1) Motivated toward becoming a member
(2) Assuming the group's norms and values
(3) Using the group's standards for evaluating performance
- -
(4) Taking a positive orientation toward the group
(5) Understanding the group's norms and values
(6) Recognizing the group's existence

Another group becomes a reference group as one moves from step four to step three. The closer to step one, the greater the identification the individual has with the reference group. To the extent that the reference group meets the individual's needs or enhances his or her self-esteem more than, or at least in the same way as, current membership groups, negative feelings are reduced. An example of this process can be seen in the transference of loyalties to the European Community from its member nations. The European Community probably has reference group properties for many Europeans. When it begins to fulfill the needs of individuals in its various member countries better than their national governments, loyalty toward one entity may be decreased and increased toward the other.

An extreme form of identification with groups of which one is not a member is depicted by Swartz's (1961) concept of negative ethnocentrism or by Kent and Burnight's (1951) term, xenocentrism. The former involves attributing one's own values to another group and at the same time evaluating that group as being more successful than one's own group in being able to achieve them. There is a bias not for one's own group but for the other group. The latter concept refers to using another group as the center of everything, and all others, including one's own group, are scaled and rated in reference to it. Recent studies in Latin America (see Montero, 1986) suggest that xenocentrism—or altercentrism as they refer to the phenomenon—is characteristic of countries that have a dependent relation with a powerful country. Researchers (Quieros de Ramos, 1979; Salazar, 1983) have found that individuals in several Latin American countries evaluated themselves in relation to the United States, undervaluing themselves and overvaluing Americans. "People in countries such as Venezuela, who engage in self-deprecation, tend to exhibit a United States-dependent ideology—the United States being the country with the highest evaluation" (Montero, 1986: 421). Dependency is not only externally imposed but internally it reproduces the norms and values of the center of power. The people in the dependent country begin to "compare themselves to those in the centers of power and, in turn, to devalue themselves" (Montero, 1986: 421; see also Salazar, 1983). Altercentrism leads to a negative national identity because the reference group is outside one's own country. These researchers argue that this negative self-identity can be inhibiting as people deny their possibilities and blame themselves for their condition, always looking outside themselves for the defining characteristics of what is good and important.

The studies we have just reviewed suggest that where people place their loyalty depends on how they perceive and array the various groups in their environment. The first cut at differentiating among these groups appears to depend on whether one has positive or negative feelings toward the group. Groups toward whom one has positive feelings may become reference groups—

that is, potential ingroups; those toward whom one has negative feelings become outgroups and potential targets for bolstering positive feelings toward one's ingroup. Which groups an individual will build a strong identification with and, in turn, develop loyalty to become those perceived to have similar norms, values, and customs to one's own preferences, those that inculcate what one holds dear or desires. Contact with other groups can result in positive feelings if the groups are viewed as similar to one's own. Contact with groups seen as dissimilar from one's own will lead to negative feelings unless members of those groups are perceived as advanced or more powerful than one's own group. With a more powerful group that is perceived as dissimilar, individuals may refocus their attention and begin to devalue their own group, holding the more powerful group up as a model for emulation—particularly if the more powerful group can influence what happens to one's own group.

The research on the scaling hypothesis and reference groups gives us some hints about how we might modify group loyalty. Getting people to develop positive feelings toward another group appears to facilitate paying attention to that group and a willingness to learn about the group. Positive feelings seem more likely to occur toward groups that are viewed as similar, as friends, as advanced or having status, and as interested in one's own group. Contacts, information, and image-building need to center around interactions that indicate how the other group fits one of these criteria for being viewed positively. Contacts, for example, should be between high status or, at least, equal status, representatives of the two groups with some interest or curiosity about the other group. The purpose of such contacts would be to help members of the group begin to perceive outgroups as reference groups and, thus, potential ingroups, by seeing how these outgroups are similar to them. The scaling hypothesis would suggest that such movement will be more feasible the closer the outgroup is to the ingroup to start with. It is unlikely that members of a group will perceive an outgroup they place very far away from them and have strong negative feelings toward as worthy of interaction.

It is interesting to conjecture what happens when people have multiple reference groups which, in turn, each have a set of outgroups. Say an individual was involved with an ethnic group, religious group, and nation as his or her reference groups. If the reference groups all espoused the same outgroups using similar criteria, we might hypothesize that the reinforcing qualities of the groups would increase the individual's hostility toward those outgroups and facilitate strong loyalty to all three ingroups. There is little contradiction among what is seen as good and desirable and what bad and undesirable. But what if the reference groups differ in whom they see as outgroups and in the criteria they use for defining themselves vis-à-vis others? How do individuals resolve these contradictions? Do they focus on the most proximate group, the ethnic or religious group, and follow their dictates; or, do they create an amalgam of the groups, picking and choosing what they will use to define their ingroup and, in turn, outgroups? The above studies raise these questions but provide us with few answers.

Conclusions

The purpose of this essay was to introduce the reader to a social psychological perspective on the roots of nationalism. At its heart is the description of how individuals develop feelings about and attachments to groups—how they build loyalty to groups. The nation is viewed here as one type of group that fosters

loyalty. What have we learned in this process and what questions form the research agenda for the future?

Studies suggest that people see groups as providing them with security and safety as well as status and prestige in return for their loyalty and commitment. Nations, in particular, achieve personal relevance for individuals when they become sentimentally attached to the homeland (affectively involved), motivated to help their country (goal-oriented), and gain a sense of identity and self esteem through their national identification (ego involved). This sense of loyalty builds through the socialization process, as people become less focused on themselves and learn to take into account the needs and interests of others. And they begin to distinguish among these others, becoming more attached and sympathetic to some and more critical and detached from others. The feelings transfer across the socialization process from smaller to ever larger groups as people perceive themselves to represent and be accountable to these larger entities.

The bias toward one's own group that comes with loyalty appears critical to defining who one is and occurs in both cooperative and competitive intergroup situations. In fact, people have been shown to favor their own group even when they could lose substantially in the process. This ingroup bias, however, generally is more extreme in competitive situations where there is incentive to favor one's own group. It also appears to increase when there is consensus among group members about their goals and strategies—not only are they loyal to the group but they all define the problem, what they want to do, and how they want to do it in a similar manner. There is little chance for discrepant information to filter into the group or for them to consider reasons for change.

Loyalty includes both emotional and cognitive aspects that interrelate to form images of groups. When these images are shared among members of a group, they become stereotypes. The emotional aspects of an image indicate whether there is any desire to seek information about another group based on one's evaluation of the other as friend or foe; the cognitive aspects denote the information one possesses about the other group. As a result, stereotypes become a means for maintaining one's images because there is little desire to gain information about disliked nations and, thus, the tendency to keep them at a distance, easy to describe and classify.

Stereotyped images can be very simplistic with a focus on a dichotomous world made up of us and them, or they can become more differentiated based on the situation in which people find themselves at the moment. Moreover, other groups can be viewed in static, never-changing terms or in very dynamic terms based on the political context. Stereotyped images influence how political entities act. They do so by defining the climate in which action takes place—public opinion, norms, values—and by affecting the decision-making process. In each instance, these images limit and constrain the options leaders can choose.

Much of the time individuals define their ingroups and outgroups in the context of a set of groups. In this process, they seem to scale the groups intuitively according to their feelings and their perceptions of the status, preferences, norms, values, and power of the groups. Those that are seen in more positive terms and as more similar may become reference groups; those that are seen in more negative terms and as more dissimilar become outgroups.

Some scholars have raised the question of whether or not feelings toward ingroups can be decoupled from those toward outgroups. There appears to be some distinctions that can be made between "patriotism" and "nationalism" that facilitate such a decoupling. Patriotism seems to lead to strong attachments and loyalty to one's own group without the corresponding hostility toward other groups while nationalism encourages an orientation involving liking for one's

own group and disliking of certain other groups. While those strong in patriotism are willing to risk their lives for their country, they are not as prone to war as those strong in nationalism who have an enemy built into their attachments to their nation.

As the above paragraphs attest, the existing social psychological literature can contribute in important ways to our understanding of the foundations of national loyalty and its relation to intergroup conflict. Moreover, the literature suggests insights into the challenges of transforming and modifying such loyalty. The extant research, however, also triggers a great many questions begging for further exploration. The following is but a sample:

(a) Assuming that group loyalty is developed in small familial or community groups, how do these early attachments transfer to such larger units as ethnic groups, nations, or regions of the world? What happens in the socialization process that leads individuals to expand what they are loyal to and how do they link early and late attachments?

(b) Under what kinds of conditions is it possible to limit loyalty to positive feelings toward one's own nation without generating negative feelings toward other nations? In other words, how can we decouple ingroup amity from outgroup enmity? How do we build patriotism instead of nationalism?

(c) Taken together, the experiments on the influence of loyalty on ingroup bias show support for the phenomenon under a wide variety of circumstances. There is much less consensus on why this occurs. Why do individuals' self-esteem and identity become entangled with loyalty? Are there ways of being loyal without placing one's sense of self on the line?

(d) Much is still to be learned about the roles played by cognitive and emotional factors in stereotyped images. Of particular interest is whether loyalty, and its accompanying biasing tendencies, hinder the development of complex images of other groups and their policies. Does loyalty predispose individuals to screen out information and selectively impose a certain vision on the environment?

(e) What is the impact of multiple loyalties on how people act? Do multiple loyalties keep group conflict in check, or do they merely reinforce a particular view of the world, exacerbating conflict?

These issues fall at the juncture between disciplines and cry for interdisciplinary exploration. The challenge for future research is to bring diverse perspectives and methodologies to bear on the topic. The current piece is but a start in that direction.

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