Nationalistic Attitudes and Ethnic Exclusionism in a Comparative Perspective

An Empirical Study of Attitudes Toward the Country and Ethnic Immigrants in 22 Countries

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Nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme
in een landenvergelijkend perspectief
Een empirische studie van attitudes jegens het land en etnische immigranten in 22 landen

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied
van de Sociale Wetenschappen

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CHAPTER 1

Nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism: introducing the research problem

1.1 Introduction

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world witnessed a startling number of ethnic conflicts and other instances of ethnic antagonism. Among the most dreadful examples were the ethnic cleansing that occurred following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia Republic and during the lengthy violent ethnic struggles in Burundi and Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1996). In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Rouhana, 1997), the repression against the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, the riots in Indonesia, as well as numerous other conflicts between ethnic groups (see Gurr, 2000) are all indications of the persistent significance of ethnic group identifications and ethnic boundaries in the modern world.

Less extreme ethnic violence occurred in Western Europe, where ethnic migrants, asylum seekers centres, and mosques have occasionally been the targets of intimidations and violent assaults. Extreme right-wing political parties that oppose ethnic immigration gained considerable electoral successes in various European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, Austria, France, but also in Australia. In addition to this electoral support, negative stances toward ethnic immigrants and ethnic minorities were even more widespread among the general public. For instance, in 1997, the European Year Against Racism, 40% of the European public considered that there were "too many" people from minority groups living in their country (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1). Across the Atlantic too, race remains a pervasive problem. In 1956, Hyman and Sheatsley (1956) predicted that the demographic process of generational replacement and the process of educational expansion would have ongoing liberalising effects, and thus would result in an ongoing growth of ethnic tolerance. However, longitudinal research among the U.S. public indicated that although support for principles of racial equality has strongly risen, support for the implementation of such principles remains much lower (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Hence, contrary to functionalist theory, in which ethnic bonds are considered an anachronism in a modernised world, it appears that the significance of ethnic identities and boundaries has not vanished.[1]

Furthermore, massive international migration, as one of the facets of the ongoing globalisation process, has resulted in many societies becoming more multi-cultural and multi-ethnic than ever before in history.[2] Due to this demographic transformation process, the issue of ethnic relations in general, and antagonistic reactions of the ethnic majority population toward ethnic newcomers in particular, has gained increasing relevance and acquired a truly global scale.

In this study, I focus on the attitudes of individuals from the ethnic majority population toward – on the one hand – their own ethnic group and – on the other hand – ethnic immigrants. By studying the attitudes toward ethnic in-group and ethnic out-groups, this study addresses the issue of *latent* conflicts between ethnic groups.

Research on ethnic attitudes and inter-ethnic relations has a long-standing tradition in social sciences. To a large extent, previous research focused exclusively on attitudes and behaviour directed toward ethnic out-groups, such as unfavourable stereotypes and attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Pedersen & Walker, 1997), anti-Semitism (Konig, 1997; Martire & Clark, 1982), preferred social distance (Bogardus, 1968; Smith & Dempsey, 1983), public opposition towards affirmative action policies (Bobo, 1983; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998), denial of civil rights (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, to be published; Schuman et al., 1997), discriminative behaviour (Bovenkerk, 1978), voting for extreme right-wing parties (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000), and ethnic mobilisation and collective action (Olzak, 1989; 1992). In addition to research on attitudes and behaviour directed toward ethnic out-groups, other researchers focused on feelings of pride and superiority toward the ethnic in-group (Dekker & Malová, 1995; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Topf, Mohler, Heath, & Trometer, 1990). Fewer studies have examined both the attitudes toward the ethnic in-group and attitudes toward ethnic out-groups simultaneously. In these latter studies, it was ascertained that feelings of pride and superiority toward the ethnic in-group were strongly related to negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969; Billiet, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 1996; Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1989). This complex of attitudes – positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group accompanied by negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups – is labelled *ethnocentrism* (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sumner, 1959).

However, previous studies mostly focused on the variation in in-group and out-group attitudes within countries. Less research has been done regarding the variation between countries. Due to the relative lack of international comparative empirical studies, several questions remained unanswered, as I will outline in Section 1.3. In this study, I extend previous research by examining both in-group and out-group attitudes in a comparative perspective, analysing the attitudes of ethnic majority populations in 22 different countries. In each of these countries, the same survey questions were applied to measure in-group and out-group attitudes, enabling cross-national comparisons. Furthermore, the countries covered by this study vary considerably according to socio-economic, historical, cultural, and political conditions that presumably affect the ethnic attitudes of their populations. Hence, this data set, gathered in a large and heterogeneous set of countries, allows an international comparison on a larger scale than has been possible to date.

In this chapter I introduce the research problem of this study. In Section 1.2, I define attitudes toward in-group and out-groups in general, and I present the conceptualisation of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in particular. Next, in Section 1.3, I briefly review previous studies of nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. The shortcomings and lacunae in these studies led to the formulation of the research questions investigated in the present study, which are also presented in Section 1.3. I conclude this introductory chapter with an outline of the subsequent chapters of this book.

1.2 Concepts

In this study I examine attitudes of the ethnic majority group in different countries toward the in-group and toward ethnic out-groups. For the sake of clarity, I label favourable attitudes toward the own country and the national in-group as nationalistic attitudes, and unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants as ethnic exclusionism. In this section, I discuss the definition of the aforementioned concepts and related concepts that are applied throughout this study. Subsequently, I discuss the concepts of attitude, social groups, in-group and out-groups, ethnic majority group, and finally, nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

For a definition of the concept of *attitude*, I refer to the conceptual framework of Fishbein and Ajzen (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). They distinguished four related concepts: belief, attitude, behavioural intention, and behaviour. A 'belief' represents the information an individual has about a given object. The individual associates the object with various attributes. The totality of an individual's beliefs serves as the informational base that determines his attitudes, intentions, and behaviours. The concept of 'attitude' is distinguished from the concept of belief by its evaluative or affective nature. That is, an attitude refers to a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of an object.[3] An individual's attitude toward some object is "determined by his beliefs that the object has certain attributes and by his evaluations of those attributes" (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 14). 'Behavioural intentions' refer to the individual's intentions, or subjective probabilities, to demonstrate a given behaviour. Finally, overt 'behaviour' simply refers to actually observed or reported acts toward the object. In Fishbein and Ajzen's 'theory of planned behaviour' (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), a person's behaviour is determined by his behavioural intentions, which in turn are affected by his attitudes (as well as his subjective norms concerning a given behaviour). Their distinction between belief, attitude, and behavioural intention corresponds to the well-known distinction between cognition, affect, and conation (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Hence, the evaluative or affective element is essential in this definition of attitude.

To define the concept of *social group*, I refer to the work of Tajfel (1981; 1982b) on group membership and group identification. Tajfel defined a social group on the basis of both external *and* internal criteria. External criteria are 'outside' designations that refer to shared characteristics of an entity of individuals. These characteristics are used by individuals to define other individuals as members of a group. For instance, in the context of inter-ethnic relations,

such characteristics can be physical (skin colour, distinctive clothing such as headscarves), linguistic, or cultural (religious beliefs, social practices). The internal criteria refer to the individual's identification with the group. Tajfel (1981, p. 229) distinguished three aspects of the latter social psychological definition of group membership: a cognitive, evaluative, and emotional component. The first component refers to the sense of knowledge that one belongs to a group; the second component refers to the evaluation of the group and/or one's membership of it; the third component refers to the emotions that may accompany the cognitive and evaluative aspects.

Whereas individuals identify with some groups, they will contra-identify with other groups. That is, by means of social categorisation, individuals categorise other individuals either as members of their own group or as members of other groups (Tajfel, 1981). In short, they distinguish between *in-group* and *out-groups*, between 'us' and 'them'.

In this study, I designate an entity of individuals that share a common characteristic as a *social category*. For instance, I will analyse the differences in attitudes of social categories such as elderly persons, the unemployed, or the higher educated. I will apply the concept of *group*, whenever it is plausible that individuals not only share common characteristics (external criteria) but also identify with the respective group (internal criteria).

In this cross-national comparative study, I focus on the attitudes of the *ethnic majority group* in various countries. The ethnic majority group of a given country is defined as the dominant ethnic group in that country, in terms of political power and economic status. In most countries, such as in Europe, this coincides with the indigenous ethnic group. In other countries, which have a long history of large-scale immigration, such as Australia, the indigenous ethnic group (e.g., the Aboriginals in Australia) is the subordinate group in terms of their control of state and economic organizations. Conversely, the former immigrants (of European ancestry) have become the super-ordinate, that is, the majority group.

In this study, attitudes toward the in-group are circumscribed as attitudes toward the own country and the national in-group, that is, the people from one's own country. Favourable attitudes toward the own country and national in-group are labelled as *nationalistic attitudes*. Ethnic minorities and immigrants are considered as relevant out-groups for the ethnic majority group, and hence, attitudes toward out-groups are circumscribed as attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants. Unfavourable attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants are labelled as *ethnic exclusionism*.

I conclude this section with an outline of my conceptualisation of nationalistic attitudes. Firstly, the label nationalistic attitudes is defined as a generic label for positive attitudes toward the country and the national in-group. Hence, my utilisation of the concept of nationalistic attitudes is not equivalent to the concept of nationalism, since it does not incorporate the political-ideological striving for a nation-state, as the concept of nationalism is commonly applied in historical or political studies (e.g., Gellner, 1983).

Secondly, nationalistic attitudes refer to people's attitudes toward their own country and the people from one's own country. In multinational states, this is not necessarily the same as the attitudes towards the 'nation', conceptualised as the imagined community of one's people

(Anderson, 1991). As Connor (1993) stated, the attitude toward the 'nation' and the attitude toward the state or country only merge in true nation-states in which the borders of the ethno-national group closely coincide with the borders of the state. For ethnic minorities in a multinational state, the attitude toward the own 'nation' or ethnic group may differ from the attitude toward the national state. However, even in a multinational state, the ethnic majority group tends to perceive the state as the political extension of its own ethnic group, and therefore their attitudes toward the state and toward the 'nation' are more closely related. As Connor (1993) noted, this is often true in the case of what the Germans term a 'Staatvolk' – a people who are culturally and politically pre-eminent in a state, even though other ethnic groups are present in significant numbers.

In this study, I will not examine the attitude toward the 'nation', as defined by Anderson (1991). Instead, I focus on the attitudes toward the own country and the people from one's own country (i.e., the national in-group). I will clarify this conceptual distinction for the case of Spain. The purpose of this study is to examine the attitudes of the Spanish population (excluding those inhabitants of Spain whose parents were not Spanish citizens) toward, on the one hand, ethnic immigrants and minorities, and on the other hand toward Spain and the Spanish. The attitude of Basques, as a 'nation' within Spain, toward Basque people and the Basque region will not be addressed in the study.

1.3 Research questions

The study of ethnic attitudes is a major research area in social sciences. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, most research has focused on the attitudes toward ethnic out-groups. In other studies, it was ascertained that people with a stronger negative attitude toward ethnic minorities, were also more likely to have a positive attitude toward their own country and the national in-group (Adorno et al., 1969; Billiet, Carton, & Huys, 1990; Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989; Hagendoorn & Janssen, 1983). This complex of related attitudes is known as ethnocentrism, that is, the combination of a positive attitude toward the in-group and a negative attitude toward out-groups (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sumner, 1959). Previous research on ethnocentric attitudes showed quite some variation between social categories (Brown, 1995; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999; Schaefer & Six, 1978; Vogt, 1997). However, international comparative research regarding in- and out-group attitudes is relatively scarce. Most studies have focused on the variation in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes within countries, and much less research has been done regarding the variation across different countries.

In addition, comparative research conducted in the past often suffered from one or more of the following shortcomings. Firstly, most comparative research took only a few countries into account (Billiet et al., 1996; Eisinga, Carton, & Lammers, 1993; Pieterse, Scheepers, & Ven, 1991; Savulescu-Voudouris & Fuchs, 2000; Weil, 1985). In comparisons of such a small number of countries, it is rather difficult to disentangle the effects of various national circumstances on

individuals' attitudes toward in- and out-groups. Therefore, it does not allow a stringent test of the impact of macro-contextual circumstances. Secondly, studies that did cover a wider range of countries were often quite descriptive (Dekker & Van Praag, 1990) and did neither explicate nor systematically test previously developed theories on nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. Thirdly, large-scale comparative studies often applied data from sub samples of the population, in particular students or adolescents, instead of nationwide samples from the national population (e.g. Poppe, 2000).

In this study, I try to improve upon previous research by performing a systematic test of hypotheses, derived from various theoretical perspectives, applying comparable data from nationwide samples of 22 countries. Data were derived from the 1995 module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP is a cross-national collaboration in survey research that was founded in order to achieve more cross-national comparability in attitudinal research. Since 1985, annual surveys have been conducted in a growing number of countries. In 1995, the topics of investigation included the attitudes toward the country and the national in-group, and toward ethnic minorities and immigrants. The wording of the questions, response categories, and sequencing of questions were virtually identical in all countries, and therefore very suitable for cross-national comparisons of nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. The survey was conducted in nine Western European countries, eight former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan.

As I have already stated, previous research showed a correlation between a positive attitude toward the ethnic in-group and a negative attitude toward ethnic out-groups. In this research tradition, both the attitude toward the in-group and the attitude toward ethnic out-groups were conceptualised as one-dimensional phenomena (Billiet et al., 1996; Scheepers et al., 1989). However, it has been argued that this conceptualisation is not very sophisticated. Following a conceptual distinction that was already – at least theoretically – implicit in the study of Adorno and associates (Adorno et al., 1969), various authors proposed that attitudes toward the country and the national in-group possess various dimensions. In particular, a study of Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) among American students and a study of Blank and Schmidt (1993) in two German cities, suggest a distinction between feelings of national pride and national superiority. Theoretically, this distinction is acknowledged in various studies, but until now, empirical evidence has been based either on specific sub samples of the population or on a few single-country studies. In the present study, I will test this conceptual distinction in a large number of countries, applying data derived from nationwide samples of the adult population.

Similarly, it has been argued that attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants possess different dimensions, either with respect to the content or expression of negative attitudes – e.g., blatant versus subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), traditional versus symbolic racism (Sears, 1988), overt versus covert negative attitudes (Verberk, 1999a) – or with respect to the target out-group (e.g., the perception of ethnic hierarchies as in Hagendoorn, 1995; Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993). The first research question therefore regards the proposed multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism:

1. *Are nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional concepts?*

Related to the issue of multi-dimensionality, is the proposition that various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes are differently related to ethnic exclusionism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Feelings of national superiority are presumably stronger related to out-group derogation than feelings of national pride (Blank & Schmidt, 1993). In this sense, the concept of ethnocentrism – positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group are intrinsically related to negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups – may need to be refined. The second research question is therefore as follows:

2. *If these phenomena are multi-dimensional, are various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes differently related to dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?*

To date, the presumed association between in-group and out-group attitudes has only been tested in a few single-country studies (Billiet et al., 1990; Scheepers et al., 1989). Sumner (1959), who introduced the concept of ethnocentrism, presumed that the phenomenon of ethnocentrism is universal: each (ethnic majority) group presumably has positive attitudes toward the in-group and negative attitudes toward out-groups (cf. LeVine & Campbell, 1972). In this study of the attitudes of ethnic majority populations in 22 countries, I examine whether nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are indeed systematically related across countries, thereby taking into account the presumed multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Hence, the third research question:

3. *Are there differences in the interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (or dimensions thereof) across countries?*

Next to dimensions of and interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I explore the inter- en intra-national differences in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Due to the previous lack of comparable cross-national data, empirical studies with a large cross-national scope are scarce. The data set applied in this study allows an international comparison on a larger scale than was previously possible. Therefore, I set out to explore the differences in the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism of ethnic majority populations in a wide variety of countries:

4. *What are the differences between ethnic majority populations from different countries with regard to the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?*

Previous research indicated that individuals (within countries) differ in their level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (Brown, 1995; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Schaefer & Six, 1978). In general, the degree of positive in-group and negative out-group attitudes differed

between social categories, such as age (Scheepers, Schmeets, & Felling, 1997; Smith, 1985; Steeh & Schuman, 1992), occupational status (Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1990; Winkler, 1999), denomination and church attendance (Eisinga, Felling, & Peters, 1988; Konig, 1997; Pieterse et al., 1991; Roof, 1974). One of the most consistent findings in research on in-group and out-group attitudes is the difference between educational categories: educational attainment is inversely related to in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice (Haegel, 1999; Vogt, 1997; Wagner & Zick, 1995).

In previous research, however, the differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism between social categories have not been addressed in a large cross-national comparative scope. In particular, given the significance of the educational effect, the question arises whether this so-called liberalising effect of education is universal, or whether the effect of education varies systematically across countries, as is suggested by some authors (Weil, 1985). In this study, I will derive testable hypotheses regarding the presumed varying effect of education. In order to test these hypotheses in a stringent manner, I control the effect of education for other individual socio-demographic characteristics. Hence the following two research questions:

5. *What are the differences between social categories of the ethnic majority population with regard to nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?*

6. *Does the effect of educational attainment on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism vary systematically across types of countries?*

In previous empirical studies on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, the prevailing mode of explanation focused almost exclusively on individual factors. The impact of the national context on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism remained therefore, at least empirically, relatively unexplored. In this study, I develop a theoretical-conceptual model of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism that incorporates not only individual level factors, but also contextual level factors. To test this multi-level theoretical model, I will supplement the survey data with data derived from national statistics, and simultaneously estimate the effects of individual and contextual variables.

Theoretically, the relation between independent characteristics and nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism is interpreted by means of various intervening factors, generally referring to individual's predispositions, attitudes, or perceptions. In this study, I will operationalise some of the central intervening factors, as proposed by various theoretical frameworks. Hence, next to independent individual and contextual factors, I will assess to what extent nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are related to intervening factors, that presumably intervene the relation between individual and contextual factors on the one hand, and nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes on the other hand. The final research question therefore addresses the explanation of the observed differences between social categories and countries, by

means of intervening variables and independent variables, both at the individual and the contextual level:

7. *To what extent are the observed differences between social categories and differences between countries in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism related to independent individual socio-demographic variables, intervening individual variables, and independent contextual variables?*

1.4 Outline of this study

To conclude this introduction, I present the outline of this study. In Chapter 2, I discuss in detail two theoretical frameworks that have dominated sociological and social psychological research on in-group and out-group attitudes: social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory. I discuss the origins and the empirical bases of both theoretical frameworks. Next, I argue that despite their different focus, both theories can be considered as complementing each other. Therefore, I synthesize core theoretical propositions from both theories into one general theoretical framework, labelled as ethnic competition theory. This theoretical framework relates nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism to general social identity needs as well as specific situational conditions, both at the individual level and the contextual level. Chapter 2 concludes with the derived theoretical-conceptual model that forms the core theoretical framework of this study. In addition, in subsequent chapters, some hypotheses are derived from additional theories, that is, socialisation theory (in Chapter 5) and localism theory (in Chapter 6).

In Chapter 3 I introduce the applied data set that was gathered by the ISSP, an international collaboration of survey researchers. In this chapter, I also focus on the methodological problems and limitations of international comparative research, in particular with regard to survey research. One of the issues in comparative research – the comparability of the measurement instrument – is empirically addressed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I assess the degree of cross-national equivalence of the measurement model of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

The aforementioned research questions will be answered in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. In Chapter 4, the multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism as well as their interrelations are examined. I conclude this chapter with an exploration of the cross-national differences in the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. In Chapter 5, I explore the differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism between social categories. In addition, I test whether the effect of education varies systematically across countries. Finally, in Chapter 6, I systematically derive hypotheses regarding the effect of independent individual and contextual factors, as well as intervening factors at the individual level. Next, I simultaneously test the effect of these individual and contextual factors on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. I conclude in Chapter 7 by summarizing and discussing the main findings of this study.

Notes Chapter 1

[1] In the functionalist theoretical approach, ethnic bonds are likely to dissolve over time, due to the increasing emphasis on achievement instead of ascription as a concomitant of the process of modernisation (Davis & Moore, 1945; Parsons, 1970).

[2] The nature of international migration has changed considerably over the years. Whereas Europeans once migrated to the 'New World', Europe is now itself de facto an immigration area. After World War II, migration toward Western Europe emerged due to the process of decolonisation. Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s, Western European countries actively recruited labour migrants from the Mediterranean region to meet the increasing demand of low-waged, unskilled and low-skilled workers. Although the presence of the latter migrants was initially regarded as being temporary, most labour migrants chose to stay, which led to follow-up migration by their family members. Especially since the 1980s, European countries have been confronted with the arrival of asylum seekers. Since the end of the cold war, immigration to Central and Eastern Europe has slowly increased. At present, the largest international migration waves are occurring within Asia and Africa: migrants from Asian countries as well as migrants from African countries below the Sahara mostly migrate within their own region. Migrants from North Africa and the Middle East are directed toward Western Europe, whereas migrants from Middle America and South America and the Caribbean are almost exclusively directed toward North America. Most immigrants in Oceania arrive from countries in Asia. Among the most important motives to migrate is the desire to improve one's economic conditions (labour migration), to flee from violence and oppression (refugees), and to join up with relatives who have already migrated (follow-up migration) (Muus, 1995).

[3] In survey research, attitudes are assumed to underlie the actual responses expressed in the interview or questionnaire (Krosnick, 1999).

CHAPTER 2

The theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

In this cross-national study I focus on the attitudes of individuals towards – on the one hand – their own country and national in-group and – on the other hand – ethnic out-groups. The research will be restricted to the attitudes of the *majority-group* within each country. The majority group of a certain country is defined as the dominant ethnic group in that country, in terms of political power and economic status. In most countries, such as those in Europe, this coincides with the indigenous ethnic group. In other countries, which have had a long history of large-scale immigration, such as Australia, the indigenous ethnic group (e.g., the Aboriginals in Australia) is the subordinate group in terms of their control of state and economic organizations. Conversely, the immigrants (of European ancestry) have become the superordinate group, that is, the majority group.

The study of ethnic attitudes and inter-ethnic relations is a major research area in the social sciences. To a large extent, research is focused either on the attitudes towards the ethnic in-group (i.e., nationalistic attitudes) or on the attitudes towards ethnic out-groups (i.e., prejudice and racism). Other research focuses on both types of attitudes. The latter research has shown that these two types of attitudes are relatively highly interrelated: positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group are accompanied by negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969; Billiet, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 1996; Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1989). This phenomenon is labelled *ethnocentrism*.

In this chapter, I discuss several theories that offer possible explanations for questions such as why people subscribe to ethnocentrism, and under what circumstances are people more or less ethnocentric? Typically, these theories were developed to explain antagonistic feelings between members of different ethnic groups, residing in the same country; for instance, negative feelings of white Americans towards black inhabitants. Consequently, empirical tests of these theories commonly concentrated on attitudes towards inhabitant ethnic out-groups.

However, given the occurrence of large waves of migration in recent history, the present study also focuses on opposition towards the arrival of ethnic immigrants, that is, members of ethnic out-groups who are not yet resident in a particular country. I would claim that the

aforementioned theories are also applicable to the latter situation. In other words, theoretical notions regarding negative attitudes and behavioural intentions toward ethnic residents can also be applied or specified to explain opposition towards newly arrived ethnic immigrants. After all, a crucial element in the theories I will be mentioning is the distinction between the ethnic in-group on the one hand and ethnic out-groups on the other hand. The distinction between resident members and new immigrants of ethnic out-groups is much less relevant, all the more since resident ethnic minority communities bring about chain or follow-up migration of members of their own ethnic group (Muus, 1995).

In this study, I focus on theories that attempt to explain inter-group attitudes and inter-group relations from a group perspective. Theories that emphasize intra-individual and inter-individual causes of ethnocentrism are not discussed in detail. Examples of the latter theories are the frustration-aggression theory (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) and the authoritarian personality approach (Adorno et al., 1969).

2.2 Ethnocentrism

William Sumner introduced the concepts of in-group, out-group, and ethnocentrism as far back as 1906. He wrote:

> Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Folkways correspond to it to cover both the inner and the outer relation. Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn. (1959, p. 13).

This definition of ethnocentrism covers both the self-centred scaling of other groups' values and habits in terms of the values and habits of the in-group, as well as the relationship between in-group and out-group.[1] For this study, there are two important aspects of Sumner's notion of ethnocentrism. The first is the presumed association between the in-group and out-group orientations. Sumner stated "The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other" (p.12). Indeed, as I have already stated, empirical research displayed strong relationships between positive in-group orientations and negative out-group orientations (Adorno et al., 1969; Billiet, Carton, & Huys, 1990; Billiet et al., 1996). For example, Scheepers et al. (1989) found a correlation of 0.58: positive attitudes towards the Netherlands and the Dutch people were accompanied by negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans) in the Netherlands.

The second important aspect of Sumner's notion is his claim of universality. Sumner generalized that all groups show this syndrome of ethnocentrism; *each* group would have a positive orientation to its in-group and a negative orientation towards out-groups. He underlined

this claim of universality by numerous illustrations of ethnic groups throughout the world, that, without exception, could be characterized as ethnocentric. However, Sumner's interpretations of ethnographic studies were just illustrations, not empirical tests, and one could raise several critical remarks regarding his data (see LeVine & Campbell, 1972, p. 10). Campbell and LeVine (1961) report one negative instance – The Lepchas – out of 36 investigated groups. Blalock (1967, p. 169-173) referred to studies that claim that areas such as Brazil, Hawaii, and the Caribbean islands were remarkably free of prejudice and racial discrimination in spite of the existence of large concentrations of minority members.[2] In this study, Sumner's notion of the universality of ethnocentrism will be tested on a broad cross-national scope. In Chapter 4, I will analyse whether ethnic exclusionistic attitudes and nationalistic attitudes are indeed positively interrelated.

In the present chapter, I will discuss several theories that try to explain *why* people subscribe to nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes and the kind of social conditions in which people have s*tronger* nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes. In particular, I discuss two theoretical approaches that have dominated social psychological and sociological research: *realistic group conflict theory* and *social identity theory*. Within the former approach, the social psychological and sociological research traditions have mostly developed independent of one another (Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989). Social psychologists, inspired by the experiments of Sherif (1966, Sherif & Sherif, 1953, 1969) in the 1950s, have studied the effects of inter-group competition and conflicts of interests on intra- and inter-group relations, typically within experimental situations. Sociologists like Coser (1956) on the other hand, have focused on the sources of inter-group competition and conflicts of interests in real-life situations. Whereas both social psychologists and sociologists have contributed to realistic group conflict theory, social identity theory stems for the greater part from a social psychological tradition, in particular the work of Henri Tajfel on social categorization.

In the next section, I first discuss the social psychological experiments of Sherif. According to the results from these experiments, inter-group competition leads to in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. This causal link represents the basic general proposition of realistic group conflict theory. These findings, however, gave rise to the question of whether inter-group competition is a necessary condition for in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Tajfel and his colleagues addressed this question in their 'minimal-group' experiments. These social psychological experiments, as discussed in Section 2.4, formed the initial stimulus for the development of social identity theory, as presented in Section 2.5. Whereas the aforementioned studies focus on inter-group relations within experimental settings, sociologists have studied inter-group relations in real-life situations. In Section 2.6, I discuss the sociological research tradition of the realistic group conflict approach. Next, I propose that the theoretical propositions derived from realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory can be considered as complementing each other. Consequently, in Section 2.7, both theories will be integrated in what I label as *ethnic competition theory* (cf. Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, in press).

2.3 Realistic group conflict theory: a social psychological approach

In this section I focus on the theoretical approach that has been labelled as "realistic group conflict theory" (Austin & Worchel, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972) or "group-threat theory" (Quillian, 1995, 1996). The core of this approach lies in the conflict of interests between social groups. This conflict of interests arises from competition regarding scarce resources and values. The conflict of interests between social groups is seen as the catalyst for antagonistic inter-group attitudes and inter-group conflict.

In essence, realistic group conflict theory is an economic theory of inter-group attitudes and behaviour, based on a more or less rational view of humankind. One of its central assumptions about human behaviour is that people are selfish and will try to maximize their own rewards (cf. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987, p. 34). Realistic group conflict theory is therefore related to rational choice theory. From this point of view, inter-group conflicts are assumed to be *rational*: different groups have incompatible goals and compete with each other for scarce resources, and hostility towards out-groups is a means for reaching the in-group's goals. Focussing on the competition for scarce resources as a "realistic" source of inter-group conflict, scholars that apply this view, oppose against psychological theories that focus solely on intra-group or intra-individual sources of inter-group conflict. Consequently, LeVine and Campbell (1972, p.28) labelled this societal-level theory as "probably the most anti-psychological one".[3] Conflict theory scholars, like Sherif and Sherif (1969; 1979), strongly opposed well-known (intra-) individual models of inter-group hostility, such as the frustration-aggression model (Dollard et al., 1939) and the authoritarian personality model (Adorno et al., 1969). Sherif claimed that whereas such models view inter-group prejudice and hostility as the problems of the deviate personality, the appropriate frame of reference in the study of inter-group attitude and behaviour has to include the relations between the respective groups (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p. 224).

Furthermore, Sherif rejected the view that the character of relationships and norms within a certain group wholly determines the course of inter-group relations. As clearly demonstrated in his experiments, the prevailing modes of behaviour within groups are not necessarily the prevailing modes of behaviour in inter-group relations. In fact, he demonstrated that hostility toward out-groups was most severe when the degree of solidarity and cooperativeness within the group was very high.

Many scholars have articulated a realistic group conflict point of view. As long ago as 1906, Sumner, the founder of the ethnocentrism concept, stated that "the closer the neighbors, and the stronger they are, the intenser is the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each" (p. 12). In essence, there is a considerable consensus among contributors in this research field. As LeVine and Campbell assert in their review of literature: "The greater the conflict of interest, the greater the ethnocentrism, if one adds the assumption, that the actual conflict of interests is perceived as such by the group involved" (1972, p. 222).

The social psychological research tradition within the realistic group conflict approach is mostly based on experimental studies. This research tradition started with the pioneering work of

Muzafer Sherif and his associates, in particular the boys summer camp experiments (Sherif, 1966, 1979; Sherif & Sherif, 1969, 1979). Sherif has been described as the most important social psychologist in the history of the field of inter-group research (cf. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987, p. 35). His experiments on inter-group behaviour conducted between 1949 and 1954 have become classics. At the time, with the 'cold war' at its height and the cruel memories of World War II still very fresh in people's minds, it is not surprising that the objective of these experiments was to study – under controlled conditions – the rise and consolidation of unfavourable inter-group stereotypes and social distances between groups, in order to specify the conditions in which they could be changed (Sherif & Sherif, 1979, p. 10).[4]

Sherif and his associates carried out three separate, large-scale experiments among young males between 11 and 12 years old. The boys, all with homogeneous social backgrounds, believed that the camp in which the experiments took place was a genuine summer camp. The experimental research design consisted of a series of successive stages. In the stage of experimental group formation, the boys were placed in two separate groups. While contact between the two groups was prevented, the boys engaged in many camping and sporting activities. Rather quickly, within each group a definite group structure evolved, that is, a pattern of status positions, roles and norms came into being.

In the next stage, the stage of inter-group conflict, the two groups engaged in a tournament of games, such as baseball, football, treasure hunt, and tug of war. This experimental condition was a competitive and frustrating one: the success of one group inevitably meant a defeat for the other. The inter-group rivalry began in a 'healthy' sporting way, but fairly soon the boys started name calling against their rivals and both competing groups made threatening posters and planned raids. Negative ratings were given to the character of all the boys in the other group, whereas ratings of fellow group members were almost exclusively favourable. Furthermore, the solidarity and cooperativeness within each group increased, as shown by the sociometric choices of the boys. To summarize, the competition between the groups led to greater social distance between groups, hostility toward the out-group, unfavourable attitudes of out-group members, as well as heightened in-group solidarity and pride. This was, among other things, reflected in an overestimation of the achievements by fellow group members and much lower estimations of the achievements by members of the out-group.

In the final stage of the experiment, the researchers tried to reduce the inter-group conflict. However, appeals to moral values or pronouncements by the adult staff were not effective. Likewise, mere contact between the groups as equals in situations that did not involve any interdependence (for instance, going to the movies or eating in the same dining room) did not reduce the hostility. These activities served only as occasions for the rival groups to decry and attack each other.[5] On the other hand, the introduction of "superordinate goals" did reduce inter-group conflict. Sherif and Sherif defined these superordinate goals as urgent goals, that is, goals that cannot be ignored, and that are compelling and highly appealing for members of all the groups. By definition, superordinate goals cannot be achieved by the efforts and resources of one group alone, but require the coordinated efforts and resources of all the groups involved. Finally, they are superordinate rather than merely common goals, in the sense that they must override

some of the goals of both groups, which are incompatible with them. In the Robbers Cave summer camp experiment, such superordinate goals were introduced by situations such as a breakdown in the water supply, or a defective food delivery truck. It turned out that a single episode of inter-group cooperation was insufficient. Only a series of cooperative activities toward superordinate goals effectively reduced inter-group hostility.

In summary, the social psychological experiments conducted by Sherif and his associates, reveal that inter-group competition leads to heightened in-group favouritism, in-group solidarity and in-group pride on the one hand, and out-group prejudice and hostility on the other hand. Sherif labelled his theory as a 'theory of conflict' (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p. 268). Later on, this theoretical model became known as the realistic group conflict theory (Austin & Worchel, 1979). The causal link between competition and in-group preference and out-group hostility forms the basic proposition of realistic group conflict theory, as depicted below:



Inspired by Sherif's work, social psychologists have studied the effect of inter-group competition in various experimental conditions. Blake and Mouton (1961; 1962) studied inter-group competition among employees in large industrial organizations, medical organizations, and research organizations. They assigned employees to experimental groups that were placed in a competitive situation in which the groups were given the task to find solutions for specific organizational problems. Next, individual subjects had to rate the quality of the various solutions to the problem, as suggested by their own group and by the competitive group. Consistent with the results from Sherif's experiments, subjects rated the quality of the product of their own group as superior to that of the opposing group. These findings have been supported by other studies on the effect of inter-group competition. In a review of the (mostly social psychological) literature, Jackson concluded that the results of empirical studies, specifically designed to examine realistic group conflict theory, have almost always been positive (Jackson, 1993, p. 405).

However, the aforementioned findings gave rise to the question of whether inter-group competition is a *necessary* condition for in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. In other words, can in-group favouritism and out-group hostility arise in non-competitive circumstances? Tajfel and his colleagues addressed this question in their 'minimal-group' experiments, described in the next section.

2.4 Competition or social categorization?

According to realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972), in-group favouritism and out-group hostility are the results of inter-group competition. The subjects in Sherif's

summer camp experiments all came from homogeneous ethnic, socio-economic, religious, and educational backgrounds (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). The boys were raised in stable, white Protestant families from the middle socio-economic strata. Furthermore, the boys were healthy and well-adjusted, both in school and at home. In this manner, Sherif and his colleagues ruled out alternative explanations for inter-group hostility, such as economic deprivation, frustration-aggression theory, and explanations in terms of deviant personalities. Sherif therefore concluded:

> ...neither cultural, psychical, nor economic differences are *necessary* for the rise of inter-group conflict, hostile attitudes, and stereotyped images of out-groups. Nor are maladjusted, neurotic, or unstable tendencies necessary conditions for the appearance of inter-group prejudice and stereotypes. The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile and aggressive deeds … and for the standardization of social distance justified by derogatory images of the out-group was the existence of two groups competing for goals that only one group could attain, to the dismay and frustration of the other group."(Sherif, 1966, p.85)

Other scholars, such as Tajfel and Turner (1979), acknowledged that such an explicit conflict of objective interests will often be a *sufficient* condition for inter-group discrimination. However, they doubted whether competitive inter-group relations are a *necessary* condition for inter-group discrimination. This critical question gave rise to the search for the *minimal* conditions that are sufficient to generate in-group favouritism and out-group hostility.

The experimental studies in which this question was addressed were very different from the ones performed by Sherif and his colleagues. The latter group of scholars tried to create 'real' social groups in the experiments, in order to enlarge the external validity (i.e. generality) of the results (Sherif & Sherif, 1979). In the experimental phase of group formation, which lasted about a week, subjects interacted with one another. As a result, a pattern of role and status positions emerged as well as a set of norms and values regulating the behaviour of individuals within the group. Thus, the groups in the Sherif experiments were well-developed groups with a sense of history, some degree of organization and shared norms and values. Jones (1997) referred to such groups as *maximal groups*.

In contrast to the *'maximal group experiments'* conducted by Sherif, other scholars conducted experimental studies with ad hoc laboratory groups, with no or hardly any interaction within and between groups. This line of research started with the study of Rabbie and Horwitz (1969). In their experiment, subjects were divided into two groups. The subjects, who did not interact with each other, had to evaluate the in-group and out-group members by rating their personal attributes. In the control condition, the groups were neither rewarded nor punished. In the experimental conditions, one of the two groups was rewarded with gifts. Rabbie and Horwitz found that in these latter conditions, subjects markedly favoured the in-group over the out-group.[6] In the control condition, they found no difference between evaluations of in- and out-group. They concluded, "Group classification per se appears to be insufficient to produce discriminatory evaluations" (p. 272).

In another experiment, Rabbie and Wilkens (1971) found that subjects who merely *anticipated* future social interaction within and between groups felt more positive about their own group members than subjects who did not anticipate social interaction. The authors also tested a Sherif-like hypothesis stating that the anticipation of inter-group competition would lead to stronger in-group – out-group differentiation in evaluations. In the competition (C) condition, the groups were told that they were to compete with the other group in constructing a building made from paper; the winning group would receive a price. In the no-competition (N.C.) condition, both groups could receive a price if their product satisfied certain criteria (e.g., height, sturdiness, etc.). However, there were no significant differences between these two experimental conditions in terms of in-group – out-group differentiation. Consequently, Rabbie and Wilkens concluded that inter-group competition did not affect the in-group and out-group evaluations. However, I would argue that this conclusion is not valid, since, upon being asked how strongly the subjects felt that they were in competition with the other group, there was only a small difference between the competition and no-competition condition. As the authors note: "psychologically, the C and N.C. conditions are rather similar to the subjects" (p. 224). Therefore, Rabbie and Wilkens failed to control for *perceived* competition.

To explore whether the very act of categorizing subjects into different groups leads to discriminative inter-group behaviour, Tajfel and his associates conducted a series of experiments, known as the *'minimal group experiments'* (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In contrast to Sherif's experiments, there was neither a conflict of interest nor a history of hostility between the groups. Furthermore, there was no social interaction between the subjects; the groups were purely cognitive and therefore referred to as *minimal* (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The two earliest experiments (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971) each consisted of two parts: in the first part, an inter-group categorization was established; in the second part the effects of social categorization on inter-group behaviour was assessed. In the first experiment, subjects had to estimate varying numbers of dots projected on a screen. Next, the subjects were told that they would be divided into two groups: one group would consist of those who underestimated the number of dots; the other group would consist of those who overestimated the number of dots. In the second experiment, subjects were told that they were divided into two groups on the basis of their expressed preference for a number of abstract paintings by two artists, Klee and Kandinsky. In reality, in both experiments, the composition of the groups was random. Once this imposed social categorization had taken place, subjects had to assign rewards and penalties (i.e., points, later translated into money) to two anonymous subjects, who were both in-group members ('in-group choice'), or both out-group members ('out-group choice'), or one from either group ('inter-group choice'). The subjects could not assign rewards to themselves, so individual interests could not have influenced the results. The subjects were given a number of different matrices. Each matrix consisted of a series of boxes, containing two numbers each – one representing the points for one person, the other the points for the other person. The matrices were designed in such a way, that the subjects could follow different strategies: a strategy of fairness, a strategy of maximum joint profit (i.e., allocating the greatest possible common benefit to both individuals), a strategy of maximum in-group profit

(i.e., allocating the largest possible reward to a member of the in-group), or a maximum difference strategy (i.e., choosing the largest possible difference in gain between a member of the in-group and a member of the out-group, in favour of the former).

Both experiments showed clear results. In the in-group choices and out-group choices, rewards were very closely distributed around the point of fairness. But in the inter-group choices, most subjects favoured the in-group members. Subjects even tried to achieve a maximal difference in gain between an in-group member and an out-group member, even if this lowered the absolute gain for the in-group member: relative in-group favouritism was more important than absolute in-group favouritism. In addition, the 'rational' strategy of maximum joint profit was ignored.

Thus, although the subject's own individual gains were not involved in their decisions, and although they could have chosen to achieve the greatest common good, the subjects favoured the members of their in-group and discriminated against the members of the out-group.[7] That is, they acted in terms of their in-group membership. On the basis of these experiments, Tajfel and his associates concluded that social categorization is *sufficient* to produce in-group favouritism (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971).

However, in a later study, Billig and Tajfel (1973) noted that the variable of social categorization was not entirely isolated in the two aforementioned experiments. That is, the manner in which social categorization was imposed by the experiment, brought about some similarity between the in-group members, and some difference between members of the in-group and members of the out-group – either in terms of performance (making estimates of the number of projected dots) or in terms of their aesthetic preference (for Klee or Kandinsky). Consequently, the variables of social categorization and similarity between in-group members were never properly differentiated. This is a shortcoming of these experiments, since a considerable amount of research demonstrated that subjects are attracted to others who have similar personality characteristics or socio-economic status (for an overview, see Billig & Tajfel, 1973, p. 30). Therefore, Billig and Tajfel tried to investigate separately the effects of similarity and social categorization on inter-group behaviour, applying a 2x2 factorial design. In the categorization conditions, the subjects were explicitly divided into groups, whereas in the non-categorization conditions there was no mention of 'groups'. In the similarity conditions, the subjects were told that they were assigned code numbers and/or group membership on the basis of their aesthetic preference for Klee or Kandinsky; in the non-similarity conditions, code numbers and/or group membership were openly assigned by chance.[8] Next, the subjects had to assign points to other anonymous subjects, just as was done in the two earlier experiments.

This third 'minimal group experiment' showed that both social categorization and similarity affected in-group favouritism positively. Social categorization, however, was the most important variable: it was the *sufficient* condition for in-group favouritism. Social categorization may even be a necessary condition, since neither of the non-categorization conditions produced any significant in-group favouritism. Similarity on the other hand, was neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for in-group favouritism.

In summary, the series of minimal inter-group experiments (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971) showed that the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups – social categorization – is a sufficient condition for in-group favouritism and discrimination against the out-group. Since any objective conflict of interest or prior hostility between groups was absent in these experiments, Tajfel and his associates concluded that inter-group competition or a conflict of interests are not necessary conditions for inter-group discrimination.

The finding of the importance of social categorization contradicts the aforementioned result of Rabbie and his associates, who established no effect of social categorization in their control conditions (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971). Billig and Tajfel (1973, p. 31) claimed that this contradiction is due to differences in the sensitivity of the method used for assessing in-group bias: the task of awarding money (i.e., points) to others would be a much more significant or sensible task than evaluating the personality characteristics of others.

The results from the 'minimal group experiments' formed the initial stimulus for the development of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In his early work, Tajfel (1970, Tajfel et al., 1971) interpreted the findings as evidence of a 'generic' norm of out-group behaviour; a norm for favouring one's own kind (1970, p. 102). Later on, the emphasis shifted to the need to define one's social identity (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), as will be discussed in the next section.

2.5 Social identity theory

Social identity theory, as developed by Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, 1981, 1982a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982) is first and foremost a psychological theory: it attempts to explain inter-group attitudes and behaviour through referring to the psychological processes underlying the development and maintenance of group identity. It contains four interlinked central concepts: social identity, social categorization, social comparison and psychological group distinctiveness. Accordingly, this theory is also labelled as the social-identity/social-comparison theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) or the C.I.C. theory (social categorization – social identity – social comparison theory; (Tajfel, 1982b)).

Tajfel objected to the "individualistic" nature of many of the major theories in social psychology. According to Tajfel, due to this focus on intra-individual and interpersonal psychological processes, these theories ignored the social context of social behaviour (Tajfel, 1981, chap. 2 & 3). In much of his work, Tajfel focused on the effects of *group* identification on inter-group behaviour. In this manner, he challenged the individualistic emphasis of other social psychological studies on prejudice and discrimination – such as the frustration-aggression theory (Dollard et al., 1939) and the authoritarian personality theory (Adorno et al., 1969) – which did not acknowledge the understanding that individuals interact with each other as members of their respective social groups (Tajfel, 1978, 1981).[9] Before presenting the propositions of social

identity theory, I will introduce a set of central concepts of social identity theory and their definitions.

Tajfel (1982b, p. 2) defined a group on the basis of both external and internal criteria. External criteria are 'outside' designations that refer to common 'outside' characteristics. They are used by individuals to define other individuals as members of a group, for instance, members of a trade union, hospital patients, etc. Internal criteria, on the other hand, refer to the individual's identification with the group. There are three aspects of the latter social psychological definition of group membership or *group identification*: a cognitive component, in the sense of knowledge or awareness that one belongs to a group; an evaluative component, in the sense that the notion of the group and/or one's membership of it may be related to positive or negative value connotations; and an emotional component, in the sense that the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the group and one's membership of it may be accompanied by emotions. The first two components are necessary components of Tajfel's definition of group identification, and the third one is frequently associated with them (1982b, 1981, p. 229).

External criteria, which are classifications by others of some people as a group, are not sufficient for the existence of a group in the social psychological sense of the term. Individuals classified by others as a group, must have an awareness of this common group membership and some value connotations associated with it. Accordingly, Tajfel viewed *inter-group behaviour* in terms as proposed by Sherif: "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members *in terms of their group identification*, we have an instance of inter-group behaviour" (Sherif, 1966, p. 12) [Italics added].

Similarly, group identification alone is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of inter-group behaviour; others must perceive the individuals as members of a common group. Consequently, Tajfel's definition of a *group* requires a combination of the aforementioned internal criteria and *some* external criteria (Tajfel 1982, p. 2).

Social categorization

At the basis of inter-group attitudes and inter-group behaviour lies the perceived distinction between the own group and other groups. This distinction between in-group and out-group, between 'us' and 'them', is made via *social categorization*, in general defined as the "process of bringing together social objects or events in groups which are equivalent with regard to an individual's actions, intentions and system of beliefs" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 254).

As Allport (1954) pointed out, the process of categorization is an inevitable process that dominates our entire social life. Categorizations are cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the human environment. The main function of this cognitive process of categorizing is to simplify or systematize the abundance and complexity of the information received by the human organism from its environment (Tajfel 1981, p. 145). Orderly living depends on such oversimplifications, as they make the enormous amount of environmental events comprehensible, by placing a single event within a familiar category (Allport, 1954).[10]

In his early research during the 1950s and 1960s, Tajfel focused on the cognitive basis of categorization. In these early experiments he applied non-social stimuli. For instance, subjects

had to judge the size of coins or the length of lines. Through a series of experiments he showed that classification of non-social stimuli in distinct classes led to perceived uniformity within classes and perceived distinctiveness between classes. In other words, imposing a categorization on non-social stimuli led to the accentuation of intra-category similarities and inter-category differences: subjects underestimated within-category differences and overestimated between-category differences (Tajfel, 1981, Ch. 4-6; Tajfel, 1982a).

In Tajfel's later work, the emphasis shifted towards the social setting. He subsequently showed that when persons were applied as stimuli, subjects' overestimation of intra-group similarities turned out to be larger in the out-group. Thus with regard to the process of *social* categorisation, subjects perceived greater homogeneity among out-group members than among in-group members. Subjects therefore considered members of out-groups in a relatively uniform manner, as "undifferentiated items in a unified social category" (Tajfel, 1982b, p.21). Tajfel referred to the endpoint of this process as the "depersonalisation" and "dehumanisation" of the out-group.

Social identity

Social categorizations are not merely cognitive tools that systematize the social world, but they also create and define the individual's place in society. In this sense, social groups provide their members with an identification of themselves in social terms (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group identification, as defined above, forms an important aspect of an individual's self-definition. An individual can define himself as a member of numerous social groups and these memberships contribute, positively or negatively, to the image that he has of himself. Accordingly, *social identity* is defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p.255). Social identity may be positive or negative according to the evaluations of those social groups that contribute to an individual's social identity.

The central axiom of social identity theory is the assumption that individuals strive to achieve or maintain a satisfactory concept or image of themselves: they strive for a positive self-concept (Tajfel, 1981).[11] Consequently, individuals strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity.

Social comparison

Tajfel and his associates considered social identifications and social identities as being primarily relational and comparative in nature. In other words, to a large extent, they are based on comparisons with members of other groups: "they define the individual as similar to or different from, as 'better' or 'worse' than, members of other groups" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). A positive social identity is thus largely established through favourable comparisons between one's own group and relevant other groups. Consequently, the central axiom of social identity theory can be rephrased as follows: individuals strive to achieve and maintain a positive psychological group distinctiveness.

Social comparison – comparison between in-group and relevant out-groups with regard to value-laden attributes and characteristics – provides a way to create and maintain a positive psychological group distinctiveness. Tajfel underlines that it is through the social comparison process that individuals achieve an understanding of the relative status and value of their own group, and, consequently, the status and value they acquire through membership of their group:

> The characteristics of one's group as a whole (such as its status, its richness or poverty, its skin colour or its ability to reach its aims) achieve most of their significance in relation to perceived differences from other groups and the value connotation of these differences.... the definition of a group (national, racial or any other) makes no sense unless there are other groups around (Tajfel, 1981, p. 258).

The theoretical proposition of the need for a positive psychological group distinctiveness, which can be achieved through social comparison, offers an explanation for the findings of the minimal-group experiments, as discussed in the previous section. The mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups (e.g., the Klee group and the Kandinsky group), and the possibility of social comparison led to in-group favouritism and discrimination against the out-group. As stated in the previous section, subjects did not follow the strategy of maximizing the monetary rewards for the in-group, but instead they followed the strategy of maximizing the difference in monetary rewards between in-group and out-group. Thus, the subjects strove for a positive group distinctiveness by maximizing the difference between in-group and out-group with regard to monetary rewards, which functioned as the (only available) dimension of comparison in the experiment (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In general, the need to evaluate one's own group positively results in psychological pressure to differentiate the in-group from other groups and to achieve superiority over other groups on some value dimension of comparison. In order to achieve such a positive group distinctiveness, individuals selectively perceive mainly positively valued characteristics among members of the in-group and mainly negatively valued characteristics among members of the out-group or groups. Next, these positive, respectively, negative characteristics are generalized to the whole in-group, respectively, out-group. By applying the positive in-group stereotypes to oneself, one achieves a positive social identity.

The mental process by which this social identity is constructed, is labelled *social identification* (Brown, 1995; Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989). The counterpart of social identification – the perception and generalization of mainly negatively valued characteristics of out-groups – is labelled *social contra-identification* (Billiet et al., 1996; Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989). The result of the processes of social identification and social contra-identification is ethnocentrism: a positive attitude towards the in-group and a negative attitude towards the out-group or groups.

The value of the aforementioned theoretical notions for the present study is two-fold. Firstly, they complement the notions from realistic group conflict theory since, according to social identity theory, nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes may exist even in the absence of a conflict of objective interests between ethnic groups. Secondly, these notions

explicate the underlying psychological mechanisms resulting in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. Social identity theory can provide an answer to the question *why* people feel proud of their country and national in-group and dislike ethnic immigrants. The explanatory scheme of social identity theory is schematically depicted in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 *Explanatory scheme of social identity theory*

(a)	Individuals strive for a positive *self*-concept
(b)	Social identity is that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from the process of social categorization and the awareness of membership of a social group, together with the value connotations of this membership and the emotional investment in the awareness and evaluations
(c)	Individuals strive for a positive *social* identity
(d)	Individuals determine the relative status and value of their own group through inter-group comparisons
(e)	Individuals strive for a positive in-group distinctiveness
(f)	Individuals have a positive attitude towards their own group and a negative attitude towards out-groups, and consequently,
(g)	Individuals have nationalistic attitudes and exclusionistic attitudes towards ethnic immigrants

However, the theoretical notions of social identity theory as presented thus far, are not very useful for deducing hypotheses regarding *differences* in the extent of nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes between social categories of the dominant ethnic group and/or between countries. In other words, given the assumption that nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes are brought about by a fundamental human need – the need for a positive social identity – then logically, the hypothesis would read that all individuals, regardless of their social positions, will have positive attitudes toward their in-group and negative attitudes towards out-groups. In other words, *all* individuals will have nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes as a result of the mechanisms of social identification and social contra-identification.

To summarize, the core of social identity theory as presented here, lacks explicit testable notions regarding variation in ethnocentrism between social categories and countries, as has been found in previous research (Billiet et al., 1996; Dekker & Van Praag, 1990). Consequently, Felling, Peters and Scheepers (1986, p. 59) labelled this theory as an "*unconditional theory*", in the sense that ethnocentrism is viewed as a universal phenomenon, which, irrespective of the specific social conditions, is present to the same extent in different segments of society.

However, I do not suggest that social identity theory is totally inadequate for explaining variations in ethnocentrism or inter-group conflict. But in the present study, I mainly apply social

identity theory to explicate the underlying psychological strivings and mechanisms that result in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. In other words, I apply central concepts and propositions of social identity theory – social categorization, social comparison, and the striving for positive social identity – which are presumably ubiquitous and thus characteristic of each and every single human being, irrespective of the surrounding social conditions. In this respect, I regard social identity theory as an unconditional theory.

Tajfel did however mention some conditions that presumably increase the level of ethnocentrism (1981, p. 156). These are conditions which require: (i) a search for the understanding of complex and usually distressful, large-scale social events, (ii) justification of actions, committed or planned, against out-groups, (iii) a positive differentiation of the in-group from selected out-groups at a time when such differentiation is perceived as becoming insecure and eroded; or when it is *not* positive, and social conditions exist which are perceived as providing a possibility for a change in the situation.[12] The latter condition – a lack of positive social identity – has been the focus of many theoretical and empirical studies within the social identity approach (see also Abrams & Hogg, 1990). When an individual's social identity is unsatisfactory, an individual can follow three different strategies, according to Tajfel and Turner (1979). Firstly, he or she can strive to leave the existing group and join a more positively valued group. It is evident that in the context of ethnic groups, this strategy of 'individual mobility' is hardly conceivable, if not simply impossible. Secondly, the members of the respective group may seek positive group distinctiveness through direct competition with the out-group. Since this mostly involves a conflict regarding the distribution of scarce resources, this second strategy relates to the notions of realistic group conflict theory. Thirdly, the members of the group may seek positive group distinctiveness by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation. Tajfel and Turner label this strategy as 'social creativity'. In this respect, an individual can either (i) compare the in-group to out-groups on a different dimension; (ii) apply the same dimension of comparison, but change the subjective value of the attributes of the in-group (e.g., "black is beautiful"); or (iii) compare the in-group to a different, low-status out-group. The aim of this 'social creativity' is to make the existing in-group more positively distinct. In the present study I will not test these latter notions, for this would require gathering in-depth data on individual's social identity and psychological inter-group comparisons that are beyond the scope of the present large-scale cross-national study.

To conclude this discussion of the merit of social identity theory, I would like to outline two other conditional propositions that unfortunately could not be tested with the applied cross-national data set in this study. The first one concerns the importance of self-esteem. According to social identity theory, one would expect that the lower the individual's self-esteem, the stronger the need to enhance one's social identity by means of favourable inter-group comparisons. Consequently, lower individual self-esteem is presumably related to stronger nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. However, Wagner and Schönbach (1984) found no direct effects of two distinct measures of self-esteem on prejudice. Unfortunately, the ISPP1995 questionnaire did not include a measurement of self-esteem.

The second proposition relates to Tajfel's notion on *insecure* social identity (Tajfel, 1974). It has been frequently postulated that the European unification process will result in an erosion of the differentiation between national groups and the emergence of a European identity (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, 1999). The empirical relationship between increasing loss of national sovereignty, insecure national identity and changes in national stereotypes has yet to be established in longitudinal research.

Returning to the theoretical framework of the present cross-national study, I apply the core notions of social identity theory in order to explicate the underlying psychological mechanisms (social identification and social-contra identification), which result in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. In this respect, social identity theory offers a plausible interpretation as to the motive of nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. In contrast to individualistic theories such as the theory of the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1969), social identity theory underlines that in-group pride and out-group antagonism are not extraordinary phenomena, resulting from some deviant personality structure, but rather, they are ubiquitous phenomena, caused by the fundamental need of each individual to strive for a positive social identity.

So far, I have discussed social-psychological studies that are mainly based on experimental designs. However, one could question the external validity of conclusions drawn upon highly controlled experimental studies. Are they relevant for inter-group relations in real life? In the next section, I turn to the work of sociologists within the realistic group conflict approach, who have focused on the sources of inter-group antagonism and conflict in real-life situations. In Section 2.7 I will try to integrate the notions of social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory.

2.6 Realistic group conflict theory: a sociological approach

As I mentioned previously, realistic group conflict theory has been developed and applied by social psychologists and sociologists. The social psychological experimental studies, as discussed in Section 2.3, revealed that inter-group competition led to heightened in-group favouritism, in-group solidarity and in-group pride on the one hand, and out-group prejudice and hostility on the other hand. However, several questions are not fully answered in this social psychological research tradition (cf. Felling, Peters, & Scheepers, 1986).

Firstly, what *kinds of goods* are at stake in the competition between groups? Secondly, what are the *societal conditions* under which inter-group competition or perceptions of inter-group competition arise? And thirdly, are the empirical findings of these experimental studies *externally valid*? That is, does inter-group competition and conflict of interests also lead to more in-group solidarity and out-group hostility in everyday life? For a more elaborate answer to these questions, I refer to the work of sociologists such as Coser, Blumer, and Blalock. These scholars argued that conflict of interests between groups is very common in everyday life and functions as

a catalyst for in-group favouritism and out-group antagonism. Hence, they presume that the empirical regularities found within experimentally controlled conditions, also apply to everyday life. The aforementioned questions regarding the sources of realistic group conflicts are addressed in the next subsection.

2.6.1 Sources of realistic group conflicts

In his study 'The functions of social conflict', Coser (1956) dealt with a number of George Simmel's propositions, which he extended by relating them to other theoretical and empirical findings. He aimed at clarifying the concept of social conflict. In contrast with contemporary authors of that time, such as Parsons, Coser emphasized the functions, rather than the dysfunctions of social conflict. According to Coser, a function of social conflict is that it establishes and maintains group identities and boundaries. The distinction between the in-group and out-groups is established in and through conflict (p. 35).

Coser drew a distinction between realistic and non-realistic conflict. Conflicts which arise from frustrations of specific demands within a relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants, and which are directed at the presumed object causing frustration, are called *realistic conflicts*. Such conflicts are means toward specific results. They are induced by the competition between antagonists, and the conflict is directed against the person or group that is the source of frustration. *Non-realistic conflicts*, on the other hand, are not occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonists, but by the need for tension release of at least one of them. Such conflicts are not oriented toward the attainment of specific results, but are an end in itself (Coser, 1956, p. 49).

Consequently, realistic conflict will cease if the actor can find alternative ways to achieve the desired result. There are functional alternatives with regard to means. In non-realistic conflicts, on the other hand, functional alternatives exist with regard to the object of hostility. Thus, according to Coser, anti-Semitism, except where it is caused by conflicts of interest or values between the Jewish and other groups or individuals, is an example of non-realistic conflict, insofar as it is primarily a response to frustrations in which the object (Jews) appears suitable for a release of aggression (p. 49).[13] Coser recognized that the distinction between the two types of conflict involves a conceptual abstraction from concrete reality. In the real world, a mixture of both types may merge, such that realistic conflict situations may be accompanied by unrealistic sentiments (p. 53).[14] Of special interest are Coser's notions regarding the sources of realistic conflicts:

> Each social system contains sources of realistic conflict insofar as people raise conflicting claims to scarce status, power and resources, and adhere to conflicting values. The allocation of status, power and resources, though governed by norms and role allocation systems, will continue to be an object of contention to some degree. Realistic conflicts arise when men clash in the pursuit of claims based on frustration of demands and expectancies of gains. (p. 54)

As to the consequences of (realistic) inter-group conflict, Coser stated – in accordance with the experimental findings of Sherif – that inter-group conflict strengthens the internal cohesion of the group. Not only are group boundaries established through conflict with the outside, so that a group defines itself through conflict, but outside conflict also unites the group and heightens morale.[15]

Around the same time that Coser (1956) published his study, Herbert Blumer (1958) wrote a 5-paged essay entitled 'Race prejudice as a sense of group position'. Despite its short length, this work had a major influence on the work of later conflict-theoretical scholars such as Bobo (Bobo, 1983, 1988; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996), Smith (1981) and Quillian (1995; 1996).

Blumer focused on race prejudice of the dominant group in society.[16] In Blumer's view, four basic types of feelings are always present in race prejudice of the dominant group. These are: (1) a feeling of superiority, (2) a feeling that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien, (3) a feeling of proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage, and (4) a fear and suspicion that the subordinate race harbours designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race (1958, p. 4). The first two feelings that Blumer mentioned correspond with the outcomes of the social identification process, as described earlier (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The third feeling is the feeling on the part of the dominant group of being entitled to either exclusive or prior rights in many important areas of life, such as the right to certain jobs, industry, positions of control, or membership in schools. The fourth feeling can be labelled as perceived group threat: the fear or apprehension that the subordinate racial group (or in general an out-group) is threatening, or will threaten, the (entitled) social position of the dominant group (or in general the in-group).

Blumer opposed individual-level explanations of prejudice, based on feelings or experiences of individuals, and claimed that prejudice exists basically in a sense of group position rather than in a set of feelings that members of one racial group have toward members of another racial group. According to Blumer, race prejudice is fundamentally a matter of relationship between racial *groups*. Individuals think of themselves as belonging to a given racial group, and they form images of their own racial group and of another racial group. In a continuous process, the dominant racial group defines and redefines the subordinate racial group and their mutual relations. This process of definition occurs through complex interaction and communication between the members of the dominant group, and occurs in the 'public arena', where an abstract collective image of the subordinate racial group is formed.

Blumer emphasizes that this process of group characterization is a collective process, and from it emerges a *sense of social position*. This sense of social position or group position is a general kind of orientation, a sense of where the two racial groups belong. It is not a mere reflection of the objective inter-group relations, but rather, it stands for 'what ought to be' than for 'what is' (p. 5). This sense of group position grows out of a history of unequal power relations between groups. The source of race prejudice lies in a felt challenge to this sense of group position. Race prejudice is then a defensive reaction to such challenging to the sense of group position. It functions, however short-sightedly, to preserve the integrity and the position of the dominant group. With regard to the perceived challenge to the sense of group position, Blumer argues:

> The challenge ...may come in many different ways. It may be in the form of an affront to feelings of group superiority; it may be in the form of attempts at familiarity or transgressing the boundary line of group exclusiveness; it may be in the form of encroachment at countless points of proprietary claim; it may be a challenge to power and privilege; it may take the form of economic competition. (p. 5)

Despite the differences in terminology, Blumer and Coser's notions correspond with each other. Ethnic groups have conflicting claims over status, power, privileges, and other scarce resources. Therefore, ethnic groups are mutual competitors. Each group has certain expectations with regard to their possessions of these scarce resources, as well as judgements about the 'proper' distribution of power, privilege and other scarce resources over the different ethnic groups. An ethnic out-group that lays claim to the same scarce resources, and challenges the prerogatives of the in-group, is considered to be a threat to the in-group. This out-group frustrates the demands and blocks the expectations of the in-group members and is considered to be a threat to the – in the eyes of in-group members – entitled social position of the in-group. This conflict of interests between ethnic groups leads to more internal cohesion, solidarity, and feelings of superiority among in-group members, and more hostile and prejudiced attitudes towards members of ethnic out-groups.

The notions of Coser and Blumer have generally been applied in a more or less strict socio-economic view. Group threat has mostly been confined to conflict of economic interests between groups. However, Coser (1956, p. 54) and other scholars (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967; Brown, 2000; Schnabel, 2000) stress that realistic conflict also arises from struggles concerning values, or competing systems of values. In this respect, Allport (1954) referred to the ideological conflict between religions: "if two religions (or branches of a religion) are militantly disposed, each claiming to be the one and only true religion, and if each is bent on converting or eliminating the rival sect, a genuinely realistic conflict will ensue" (p. 224). In general, an ethnic out-group that deviates – or has been defined as deviant – from important in-group norms and values can form a *cultural threat* to the in-group. For instance, in contemporary Western Europe, the growing numbers of Muslims are sometimes viewed as a threat to established European values, such as the split between church and state, and equal rights for women (Schnabel, 2000). Unlike the 'superior' Western culture, the Muslim culture is perceived as violent, aggressive, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a 'clash of civilisations' (see Brown (2000) for an overview of the characteristics of this Islamophobia).[17]

In the present cross-national study – regarding determinants of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism – I focus mainly on conflicts of socio-economic interests. The main reason for doing so is that it is very difficult to determine the amount of value conflict between the national ethnic majority population and ethnic minorities and immigrants, and to compare the intensity of value conflicts across 22 countries.

The aforementioned theoretical notions refer to the first question that I formulated at the beginning of this section. That is, what *kinds of goods* are at stake in inter-group competition? To summarise, competition between ethnic groups may stem from conflicting claims over status,

power, privileges, and other scarce resources (socio-economic competition), or conflicting values and belief systems (cultural competition). The second, related, question referred to the *societal conditions* that induce ethnic inter-group competition. Based on the notion of socio-economic competition, the level of ethnic inter-group competition may logically depend on at least three types of societal factors, that is, demographic, economic, and political factors (cf. Blalock, 1967).

Firstly, the larger the relative number of competitors from an ethnic out-group, the stronger the competition between ethnic in-group and out-group, since more ethnic out-group members compete with the ethnic in-group for, ceteris parabus, the same amount of scarce resources. Secondly, the stronger the scarcity of valuable goods that is at stake in the competition, the stronger the competition between ethnic in-group and out-group. Thirdly, the degree of ethnic competition is also affected by political conditions, regulating the distribution of scarce resources. That is, policies regulating market mechanisms in general, and policies aimed at assisting ethnic minorities in particular.

2.6.2 Actual competition and perceived threat

The key element in the aforementioned notions is the conflict of interests between in-group and out-group. When severe competition exists between both groups, the out-group poses an *actual group threat* to the in-group.

Whereas Coser's propositions with regard to inter-group conflict refer to social groups in general, Blalock (1967) focused on the relationship between blacks and whites in the United States. Just as Coser did, Blalock viewed the objective competition for scarce means of economic livelihood as a cause of inter-group conflict (p. 78). In search of a theoretical framework of majority-minority relations, Blalock advocated the strategy of developing causal models of complex processes. In the causal model that Blalock suggested, the concept of inter-group competition is divided into two components: the *actual competition* and the *perceived competition* (p. 102). According to Blalock, prejudice and discrimination are partially affected by the amount of perceived competition, which in turn is caused by actual competition, as well as the visibility of minorities and personality traits.[18] The actual competition can be specified as the institutional aspect of inter-group competition (cf. Felling, Peters, & Scheepers, 1986), for instance, the availability of scarce goods that are at stake in the competition, and the number and relative strength of the competitors. The perceived competition refers to the subjectively experienced degree of competition. In other words, group competition does not only involve objective conditions of competition between members of different groups, but also the subjective perception that out-group members pose a threat to members of the in-group.

The notion of perceived competition is an interesting one and is indeed necessary for interpreting the assumed relationship between actual inter-group competition and ethnocentrism. The real conflict of interests between groups is a group level phenomenon. Ethnocentric attitudes, or attitudes in general, are on the other hand by definition individual level phenomena.

Whenever one states that inter-group competition increases ethnocentrism, an implicit assumption is needed linking this group level phenomenon to the individual attitudes. In other words, a macro-to-micro proposition (Coleman, 1990) must be formulated, stating that actual conflict of interests between groups leads to *individual perceptions* of the inter-group conflict of interests. This perceived conflict of interest, in turn, affects the individual attitudes toward the ethnic in-group and out-groups.

Following Blalock, I assume that the actual competition affects perceptions of group threat; this perceived group threat in turn affects the level of ethnocentric attitudes. The stronger the actual competition between in-group and out-group, the stronger in-group members perceive threat on the part of ethnic out-groups. Applying Blalock's conceptual distinction between actual and perceived competition, the following causal sequence arises, as depicted in Figure 2.1. Note that the micro-to-macro link from individual's ethnocentric attitudes to ethnic conflict and exclusionism at the group or societal level will not be addressed in this study.

Figure 2.1 *Links between macro- and micro-level phenomena regarding inter-ethnic relations*



With this causal sequence of actual competition and perceived threat, the sources of ethnocentrism – according to realistic group conflict theory – are to be identified in terms of 'real' group threat, that is, actual inter-group competition, or perceived group threat, or both. Authors disagree on whether or not group threat must be 'real' or merely 'perceived' (cf. Quillian, 1996, p. 820). Whereas Coser concentrates on actual conflict of interests, Blumer focuses on perceived group threat. Reviewing the literature of the time, LeVine and Campbell (1972, p. 30) conclude that in most studies, the real threat statement had been employed, with

perceived threat implicit, except in those instances where perceived threat has other sources than real threat.

The issue of the relationship between actual and perceived group threat is still unresolved; it is not clear to what extent perceptions of threat are merely a reflection of actual threat from ethnic out-groups, and to what extent they are autonomous. Several authors referred to so-called "false perceptions" of threat of out-groups (LeVine and Campbell, 1972, p. 41). Sherif, for instance, noted that when there is little face-to-face interaction between groups, interested parties within or outside of either group might present a picture of the relationships between the groups that reflects their own special interests more than the actual state of affairs. Such relatively autonomous perceived threat would be particularly prevalent in a world in which mass communication is widespread and rapid (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p. 269). Similarly, Coser pointed to the strategy adopted by group leaders of searching for an external enemy – whether real or fictitious – in order to strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of the group. Building on the theorem of W.I. Thomas – if men define their situations as real, they are real in their consequences – Coser stated "If men define a threat as real, although there may be little or nothing in reality to justify this belief, the threat is real in its consequences – and among these consequences is the increase of group cohesion" (Coser, 1956, p. 105-107). Bobo (1988, p. 91) stated that although objective group interests do not invariably become subjectively perceived interests, they do, in the long run exert an important influence on subjective ones. In other words, actual threat of ethnic out-groups does not always immediately lead to perceived threat of ethnic out-groups, however, in the long run, it does affect the perception of threat.

Bobo (1988) labelled perceived threat as one specific type of "group conflict motives", that is, "attitudes directly concerned with the competitive aspects of group relations and attempts to alter those relations" (p 95). Other types of group conflict motives are perceptions of incompatible group interests, and perceptions and evaluations of relative group standing (that is, fraternal deprivation). Bobo assumed that both latter types of group conflict motives precede perceived threat. That is, stronger perceptions of incompatible group interests and fraternal deprivation increase perceptions of threat. With regard to the question as to what extent perceptions of threat are "real", this leads to the expectation that real threat causes perceived threat, whenever, (i) people perceive that in-group and out-group have conflicting interests and objectives, and (ii) people compare the position of their in-group with that of an out-group, along some dimension (such as power, wealth, or status).

2.6.3 Group threat and personal threat

The aforementioned notions regarding the link between competition and perceived threat on the one hand and ethnocentric attitudes and ethnic conflict on the other hand, are widespread. However, various authors have applied different conceptualisations of this relationship. I have already mentioned that there is no consensus in the literature regarding the issue of whether or not threat from ethnic out-groups must be real or merely perceived. Another discordance in the

literature is the issue of whether or not personal interests, next to group interests, have an effect on antagonistic attitudes and behaviour. That is, some studies focus solely on group interests (e.g., Blumer, 1958), others on personal or individual interests (e.g., Sears et al., 1979), or both.

In this section I firstly discuss the theoretical approach that focuses solely on group interests (group threat). I label this approach the narrow interpretation of realistic group conflict theory: in-group members have antagonistic attitudes toward an out-group, because this out-group poses a threat to the social position of the in-group. Secondly, I discuss a theoretical approach that focuses solely on personal interests (personal threat). This approach has been labelled *simple self-interest theory* (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993). The main features of both theoretical approaches are summarised in Table 2.2. Thirdly, I argue that these two approaches can be integrated into a general framework, which I label as the broader interpretation of realistic group conflict theory.

Table 2.2 *Realistic group conflict theory and simple self-interest theory: group-level versus individual-level approach*

	Realistic group conflict theory (narrow interpretation)	Simple self-interest theory
Unit of analysis	Group	Individual
Focus	Group variation in dependent variable	Individual variation in dependent variable
Type of competition	Between in-group and out-group	Between in-group members and out-group members
Interest at stake	Group interest	Personal interest
Threat	Collective threat: group position	Individual threat: individual position
Target of exclusionism	Out-group as competitor	Out-group members as competitors

2.6.3.1 A narrow interpretation of realistic group conflict theory

Typically, realistic group conflict theory assumes that antagonistic attitudes are rational in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Consequently, the focus is on inter-group relations, particularly, the conflict of interests between in-group and one or more out-groups, that is, an ethnic out-group is regarded as a threat to the prerogatives of the in-group.

As a result, many authors have (sometimes explicitly, but mostly implicitly) confined their theoretical notions to group interests and *group threat*, that is, the in-group is (or perceives to be) threatened by the out-group. Propositions, such as those found in the work of Coser (1956)

and Blumer (1958), refer to relations between in- and out-groups, and can therefore be labelled as *group-level* propositions.

The most explicit example of a group-level approach is Blumer's theory, in which the source of prejudice lies in a perceived challenge to the sense of group position. Blumer explicitly used a group-level theoretical point of view. In his view, the sense of group position transcends the feelings of individual members of the in-group. It refers to the position of in-group as compared to the out-group, not to that of individual in-group members to individual out-group members. As Blumer puts it: "the unlettered individual with low status in the dominant racial group has a sense of group position common to that of the elite of his group.... He forms his conceptions as a representative of the dominant group; he treats individual members of the subordinate group as representative of that group" (p. 5). Prejudice is the result of the fear and suspicion that the ethnic out-group threatens, or will threaten, the position of the in-group.

Recently, Blumer' theory of prejudice has been applied by Quillian (1995, 1996) and Bobo and Hutchings (1996). Following Blumer, Quillian viewed prejudice as a response to threats to established in-group privileges. He adds explicitly that these group privileges are not necessarily linked to the individual interests of group members (1995, p. 586). He labelled this theoretical framework as *group-threat theory*. The key element is the fear that the in-group will be put at a systematic disadvantage in relation to the out-group. Prejudice is the result of the *collective* feeling that the in-group is threatened by one or more out-groups. According to Quillian (1996, p. 820), it is not individual threat, but group threat that is the source of racial hostility, and this group threat does not necessarily coincide with self-interest.

These group-level propositions regarding the effect of group threat can offer explanations for differences in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes between different regions or countries, and differences over time. For example, Sherif (1979) studied changes over time in positive in-group and negative out-group stereotypes; Blalock (1956; 1957) studied differences between American cities and regions in the level of economic discrimination of blacks; Quillian studied differences in prejudice between 12 countries of the European Union (1995) and between American regions, as well as changes over time (1996).

Due to the group-level focus in this approach, the explanation of *individual differences* in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes has been understated. Although it has been recognized that individual group members may differ in the extent to which they view an out-group as a threat to their in-group (e.g., Bobo & Hutchings, 1996), the (narrow interpretation of) realistic group conflict theory does not offer explanations for these individual differences in perceived group threat.

However, in many empirical studies individual differences in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes have been found, for instance, differences between age, educational, or social class categories (Billiet et al., 1990; Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989; Jones, 1997; Schaefer & Six, 1978; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Vogt, 1997; Wagner & Zick, 1995).

2.6.3.2 Simple self-interest theory

According to simple self-interest theory, hostile attitudes between members of two racial or ethnic groups reflect an underlying clash of *personal self-interest*. Individuals develop negative attitudes towards individuals with whom they are in direct competition.

This self-interest theory is related to rational-choice perspectives (Coleman, 1990; Lindenberg, 1985), since individuals aim at furthering their own self-interest. Personal or individual self-interest has often been defined narrowly to mean tangible losses or gains to an individual or their immediate family (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993). The losses and gains are often determined from an economic point of view. For instance, whenever an in-group member has to compete with members of ethnic out-groups for jobs, promotion, or other scarce resources, there is a conflict of personal self-interests between this individual in-group member and members of ethnic out-groups. Ethnic out-group members form an immediate and direct evident threat to the individual in-group member. In addition to economic losses or gains, other tangible benefits can be at stake, such as shelter, safety, and the protection of one's own and one's children's future well being (Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979).

The effect of self-interest has often been determined in an indirect manner, for instance, through applying social-demographic variables as measures of self-interest. For example, given an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities among the lower income groups and lower occupational status classes, it could be expected that ethnic minorities are a more prominent threat to the individual position of indigenous people with a low income and low occupational status class (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Giles & Evans, 1984; Scheepers & Coenders, 1996; Scheepers, Schmeets, & Felling, 1997).

Instead of using demographic variables as indirect measures of self-interest, Sears and associates (Sears et al., 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980) pleaded for a direct measurement of self-interest. In order to determine the effect of self-interest on attitudes towards policy issues, they measured self-interest by items, assumed to directly reflect the tangible impact of the policy issue on the individual's personal life.[19] However, it turned out that controlling for the strong effects of racial intolerance and political conservatism, such self-interest variables did not have any significant effect on opposition to bussing (Sears et al., 1979). Moreover, the correlations between self-interest and racial intolerance were negligible in virtually all cases. Similarly, they found no self-interested issue voting. That is, the effect of the attitude toward bussing on presidential election preference did not increase with self-interest. For instance, people living in a neighbourhood where a bussing plan is being implemented have a direct, personal stake in the bussing issue. However, among these people, the magnitude of the effect of the bussing attitude on voting preference was similar to those without a direct, personal stake in the bussing issue (Sears et al., 1979). With regard to various policy areas (unemployment, national health insurance, law and order) Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980) found similar results: direct self-interest measures had very little effect in determining either policy preferences or voting behaviour. Similarly, Kinder and Sears (1981) – who analysed the effect of personal racial threats in several potential areas of threat (neighbourhood desegregation

and interracial social contact, economic competition, bussing) – found only little effect of direct racial threats measures on whites' voting behaviour in two mayoral elections in Los Angeles.

Whereas Sears and his associates found almost no significant effect of direct personal threat measures, they found strong effects of political conservatism and racial prejudice. In particular, they argued that a new form of racism had emerged: "symbolic racism" (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988). Symbolic racism is defined as "a blend of antiblack affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic ... [it] represents a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline" (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416). It is assumed that this new, more symbolic, form of racism is acquired during the pre-adult socialization period; it is rooted in "deep-seated feelings of social morality and propriety and in early-learned racial fears and stereotypes" (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416). Consequently, this new form of racism may be strongly independent of any existing tangible threat from ethnic out-group members. This assumption of symbolic racism – that prejudice is often an *irrational* response to long-standing predispositions, rather than a reasonable response to the realities of life (Sears, 1988) – contradicts the core of realistic group conflict theory, in which prejudice is a more or less rational response to ethnic out-groups that are viewed to threaten the position of the in-group.

Sears and his associates claim that their theory of symbolic racism offers an explanation of the paradox in contemporary racial attitudes of white Americans (Sears, 1988). The contemporary racial attitudes of white Americans are characterized by a gap between 'principles and implementation'. Whereas the principles of racial integration and non-discrimination are supported by an overwhelming majority of whites, the support for the implementation of these principles is considerably less widespread (Kluegel & Smith, 1983; Schuman et al., 1997).[20] The concept of symbolic racism is closely linked to this paradox of progress and resistance: it states that whereas 'old-fashioned racism' (Sears, 1988) – explicitly segregationist and white supremacist views – has nearly disappeared, it has been replaced by a new, more symbolic form of racism. However, research on symbolic racism has been severely criticised, particularly with regard to the lack of clarity in theoretical definitions and inconsistencies in the operationalisation (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). Other researchers have proposed alternative conceptualisations and measurements with regard to the distinction between 'traditional' and 'contemporary' forms of prejudice (see Verberk, 1999a, for an extensive overview).[21]

Additionally, the contemporary paradox in white Americans' racial attitudes can also be addressed from the realistic group conflict theoretical perspective. That is, whites support the principle of racial equality, but oppose implementation programs (such as affirmative action) that pose a threat to their privileged economic position. The commitment of American whites to principles of racial justice is limited: insofar as blacks are perceived as competing for the resources that whites posses and value, the commitment to principles of racial justice is not translated into support for concrete policy change (Bobo, 1988).[22]

Bobo (1983; 1988) strongly opposed the symbolic racism theory of Sears and his associates. Using the same data as Sears et al. (1979, 1980), Bobo (1983) concluded that

American whites' opposition to bussing is in part a response to perceived threat. He demonstrated that whereas Sears et al. used a one-dimensional prejudice scale, the items were in fact multidimensional, and differentially related to bussing opposition. By far the strongest predictors of opposition to bussing were the item 'civil rights push' (civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast) for the 1972 data; and the component 'black political push' (consisting of the items 'civil rights push' and 'dislike black militants') for the 1976 data. Bobo interpreted these items as indicators of perceived threat. Furthermore, he demonstrated that using multidimensional prejudice scales, the personal self-interest measures in some instances did have significant effects on prejudice. For instance, whites living in neighbourhoods where bussing occurred or was threatening to occur scored higher on the aforementioned perceived threat indicators. However, in general the effects of personal self-interest indicators on racial attitudes were far from unanimous. Finally, Bobo confirmed Sears' finding that the direct self-interest measures had no effect on opposition to bussing, after controlling for prejudice.

2.6.3.3 A broader interpretation of realistic group conflict theory

Several authors have stressed the distinction between individual and group interests, since they are not always mutually in harmony. Outcomes that benefit (or injure) an individual group member may not benefit (or injure) the group and its position (Bobo, 1988). Consequently, the realistic group conflict theory has sometimes been set against the Simple Self-Interest Model (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Quillian, 1995, 1996) in the sense that the former theory deals solely with group interests, and the latter deals solely with personal interests.

In realistic group conflict theory, it is emphasized that in-group members view ethnic out-groups as a threat to their collective situation (in terms of economic position, status, power), whether or not they are threatened personally. In simple self-interest theory, it is emphasized that in-group members view ethnic out-group members as a threat to their personal situation. The distinction between individual and group self-interest should however not be emphasized unduly. Insofar as individuals identify themselves as members of the specific group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), social identification will result in an association between perceived group and perceived personal self-interests; and consequently, between perceived group threat and perceived personal threat.

I would furthermore argue that the two aforementioned approaches are complementary. That is, nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes arise not only because the ethnic out-group is a threat to the social position of the in-group in general (group threat), but also because the ethnic out-group is a *stronger* threat to specific individual in-group members, given their specific social position. In other words, ethnic out-group members form a threat to the in-group as a whole, because they compete for the same scarce resources, such as status, power, and privileges. Some in-group members, however, have to compete more with out-group members than other in-group members on average, namely, those in-group members who hold similar positions as (the majority of) out-group members in the labour and housing market.

The key element in what I label the broader interpretation of realistic group conflict theory, is the notion that ethnic out-groups may be perceived as a threat to the position of the in-group in general, and to the position of specific in-group members in particular (cf. Giles & Evans, 1984).

In the narrow sense, the realistic group conflict theory can be labelled as a *group-level theory*: nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes stem from competition between in-group and out-groups. Simple self-interest theory can be labelled as an *individual-level theory*: the more an individual in-group member has to compete with ethnic out-group members, the stronger his nationalistic and anti out-group attitudes. The version of realistic group conflict theory that I would propose can be labelled as a *multi-level theory*. The key concept of this theory is threat posed by an ethnic out-group. This threat can vary between different societal contexts (group level) as well as within a specific societal context (individual level). For instance, in times of high immigration, ethnic immigrants pose more of a threat than in times of low immigration. Similarly, in a country with severe economic recession, an ethnic out-group poses more of a threat than in a country with healthy economic conditions. Within a specific societal context, the threat posed by an ethnic out-group could be more severe among specific in-group members, i.e., those that feel personally threatened by an in-group. For example, lower income categories of the ethnic majority population have to compete more with ethnic minorities in the housing market, than higher income categories.

The aforementioned viewpoint is implicitly present in Blalock's assumed causal model of prejudice and discrimination (1967, p. 102). Although Blalock was mostly interested in differences in prejudice and discrimination between different regions (Blalock, 1956, 1957), he also recognized that individual class variables (education, occupation, income) influenced the amount of actual competition, thereby taking into account individual differences. In the remaining part of this study I refer to realistic group conflict theory in the aforementioned broader interpretation.

To summarize then, realistic group conflict theory has been applied in numerous studies on prejudice and discrimination, both by social psychologists as well as sociologists. In both research traditions it has been proposed that inter-group competition is a catalyst for in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Social psychological experimental studies, as discussed in Section 2.3, revealed the causal relation between inter-group competition and in-group favouritism as well as out-group hostility. Sociological studies addressed the sources of inter-group competition in real life, that is, outside experimentally controlled settings. Scholars such as Coser proposed that each social system is characterised by inter-group competition. The goods at stake in the competition between social groups may be either material (power, status, and scarce resources) or immaterial (values and belief systems). Social groups such as ethnic groups lay claim to scarce goods or adhere to conflicting values, and as a result they have conflicting interests and consider other groups as competitors. In this sense, inter-group conflict may be realistic, so far as the hostility is directed toward the competitor.

The ethnic out-group that allegedly challenges the social position of the in-group is considered to be a threat. Perceptions of ethnic threat may be either real or distorted. That is,

perceptions of ethnic threat may only partly reflect the actual amount of inter-ethnic competition. Furthermore, an ethnic out-group may pose a threat to the social position of the in-group in general (group threat), but it may pose a stronger threat to specific in-group members in particular (personal threat), that is, those in-group members who hold similar social positions as most out-group members.

2.7 Synthesis: ethnic competition theory

In the previous sections I discussed social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory. , I now propose to integrate both theories into one theoretical framework, which I label *ethnic competition theory*. This framework will be presented in Section 2.7.2. Firstly, however, I will review the differences as well as some similarities between social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory.

2.7.1 Discordance and concordance between social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory

Up to now, I have emphasized the differences between social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory. According to social identity theory, the source of ethnocentric attitudes and inter-group hostility is located in the psychological processes of social categorization and social comparison. Realistic group conflict theory on the other hand, relates ethnocentrism and inter-group hostility to the amount of inter-group competition for scarce resources or conflicting values and beliefs. Consequently, disagreement exists with regard to the necessary and sufficient conditions of inter-group hostility. Whereas adherents of realistic group conflict theory implicitly oppose the argument that social categorization inevitably leads to inter-group hostility, adherents of social identity theory reject the notion that competitive inter-group relations are a necessary condition for inter-group hostility.

Despite these evident discordances between social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory, one should not overlook the concordances between these theories. Such concordances indicate that the two theoretical approaches might be considered as complementary to one another. Let me mention three instances of concordance between social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory.

(i) Both theoretical approaches oppose psychodynamic theoretical perspectives that merely focus on intra-individual or interpersonal causes of prejudice and inter-group hostility, such as Authoritarianism Theory (Adorno et al., 1969). Both Sherif (1966) and Tajfel (1978) emphasized that prejudice and inter-group hostility are not the result of some deviant personality structure. Instead, a proper explanation should include the social context of individual attitudes and behaviour, by acknowledging that individuals identify with social groups and consequently may interact with other individuals *as members of their respective social groups*. The notions of

group membership and *group identification* are common elements in social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory.

(ii) The founders of social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner, did not reject the basic findings of realistic group conflict theory studies with regard to the *effect of inter-group competition*. That is, they acknowledged that real or perceived conflict of interests between social groups results in heightened out-group antagonism and heightened identification with and positive attachment to the in-group. However, they criticised realistic group conflict theory since it focuses neither upon the psychological processes underlying group identifications, nor upon the possibly autonomous effects of group identifications on in-group and out-group attitudes and behaviour (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 33-34). In other words, social identity theory rejects the notion that inter-group competition is a necessary condition for prejudice and inter-group hostility, but it acknowledges that it will often prove to be a sufficient condition.

(iii) The notion of *perceived ethnic threat* can be related to the notion of *insecure social identity*. According to social identity theory, individuals strive for a positive group distinctiveness, in order to enhance and maintain a positive social identity. By means of social comparison they strive for a high relative group position on some evaluative dimension of comparison. However, such a positive outcome of inter-group comparison is challenged whenever an out-group poses a stronger threat to the relative position of the in-group. The more actual inter-group competition or perceived ethnic threat there is, the higher the potential loss of positive inter-group comparisons. In-group members will react to such an insecure social identity by searching for enhanced group distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Thus, although social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory are commonly characterized as two competing theoretical models (Felling et al., 1986; Forbes, 1997), this view underestimates the aforementioned degree of concordance and the possibility to complement both theories with one another and to synthesize them into one theoretical framework.[23]

2.7.2 Theoretical-conceptual model of ethnic competition theory

In this study I will not empirically assess the necessary or sufficient conditions for ethnocentric attitudes. Instead, the main question is how to explain observed *differences* in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes between social categories of the ethnic majority population as well as between ethnic majority populations of different countries. For this purpose, a conditional theoretical framework is needed, such as realistic group conflict theory. However, the latter theory lacks an understanding of the psychological mechanisms that result in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. I therefore propose to integrate the dispositional notions from social identity theory with the situational notions of realistic group conflict theory into one theoretical framework, which I label *ethnic competition theory*.

This theoretical framework is founded upon the proposition that in everyday life, the process of categorisation is necessary and inevitable in order to deal with the complexities of social interaction and human society: we need to make use of generalisations and

oversimplifications if we wish to make any sense of the enormous number of events taking place in our environment (Allport, 1954). As a result of this categorization process, intra-category differences become minimized and inter-category differences become exaggerated (Tajfel, 1981). With regard to *social categorization*, similarities between members of different social groups are underestimated, while similarities between members of the same group are overestimated, and this latter tendency is even greater with regard to out-group members (Tajfel, 1981). As the minimal group experiments of Tajfel and his associates have shown, social categorisation as such leads to in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1971; Tajfel et al., 1971). This finding is interpreted in terms of social identity needs: individuals strive for a *positive social identity*. Social identity is defined as that component of the individual's self-concept that stems from the subjective membership of a social group or groups, together with the value and emotional significance attached to the subjective group membership.

A positive social identity can be established through favourable *social comparisons* between the in-group and any relevant out-group , with regard to some value dimension of comparison. In order to achieve such positive in-group distinctiveness, individuals selectively perceive mainly positively valued characteristics among members of the in-group and mainly negatively valued characteristics among members of the out-group. Subsequently, these positive, respectively, negative, characteristics are generalized to the entire in-group, respectively, out-group. In this manner, the processes of social identification and social contra-identification result in positive attitudes towards the in-group and negative attitudes towards any relevant out-group.

Compared to social groups in general, social categorization is particularly relevant with regard to *ethnic groups*. Here, the boundaries between in-group and out-groups are based upon the concurrence of several distinctions. These distinctions may reflect perceived differences in biological features (skin colour) and other physical features (clothing, such as headscarves), socio-economic status; linguistics; religious affiliations; and other cultural differences. With regard to members of the national ethnic majority group, the outcomes of the process of social categorization and the need for positive social identity are positive attitudes toward the own country and the national in-group (i.e., nationalistic attitudes) and negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants (i.e., ethnic exclusionism).

The degrees of in-group identification and out-group contra-identification are heightened by *inter-group competition*. Within each social system, social groups, such as ethnic groups, compete with each other for material goods and resources (power, status, privileges, and other scarce resources) or they adhere to conflicting values. Each ethnic group has expectations about its possession of scarce resources as well as judgements about the entitled and 'proper' distribution of wealth and power over ethnic groups. Whenever there is a conflict of interest between ethnic groups, these groups are mutual competitors. However, *perceptions* of inter-group competition and out-group threat may only partly reflect the *actual* amount of inter-group competition.

The ethnic out-group may pose a (real or perceived) threat to the social position of the in-group in general (*group threat*) and to specific in-group members in particular (*personal threat*).

That is, those in-group members who hold similar social positions as most ethnic out-group members will have to compete more with ethnic out-group members than the average in-group member. Consequently, compared to the average in-group member, they will have stronger feelings of perceived ethnic threat. However, since individuals identify themselves as members of the ethnic in-group and contra-identify with relevant ethnic out-groups, it is likely that perceived personal self-interests and perceived group-interests are at least partly interrelated.

Actual inter-group competition and perceived ethnic threat affect the processes of social identification and social contra-identification. The more the ethnic out-group poses a threat to the power, social status and prerogatives of the in-group, the higher the potential loss of positively valued comparisons between the in-group and out-group. In order to maintain positive in-group distinctiveness and to prevent an imminent loss of positive social identity, the individual enhances the distinction between its own group and other groups. Perceived ethnic threat thus strengthens the boundary between in-group and out-group. Perceived conflict with an out-group increases the identification with the own group and strengthens the internal cohesion of the group, while simultaneously increasing the contra-identification with the out-group. In short, the processes of social identification and social contra-identification are intensified by actual inter-group competition and perceptions of ethnic threat.

The association between inter-group relations and the process of social categorization has been empirically assessed in an experimental study by Gaertner et al. (1990). In this study, they focused on the relation between inter-group cooperation – being the opposite of inter-group competition – and addressed the question of why cooperation between different groups leads to less in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. They hypothesized that the effect of inter-group cooperation on inter-group bias (measured as the difference in evaluative ratings of in-group and out-group members) is mediated by the cognitive representation of the aggregate of individuals. In their experiment, participants from two different groups were brought together in either a cooperative or non-cooperative inter-group condition. Next, the participants were asked to what extent they felt that the aggregate of all participants could be best described as one group, two groups, or separate individuals. The findings supported the hypothesis that inter-group cooperation reduces inter-group bias due to the diminished cognitive salience of the inter-group boundary. In other words, whenever different groups cooperate with one another, the members of these groups conceive the aggregate of individuals as one group rather than as two separate groups. Furthermore, the less they categorize the aggregate as two separate groups, the lower the degree of inter-group bias. Gaertner et al. thus empirically assessed that inter-group cooperation induces members from different groups to re-categorise themselves primarily as one large group. From this empirical finding, I deduce the proposition that inter-group competition increases the cognitive salience of the inter-group boundary. Accordingly, the effect of inter-group competition on in-group favouritism and out-group hostility is thus mediated by the psychological process of social categorisation and social (contra-) identification.

The *general proposition* of ethnic competition theory therefore reads: *the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, socio-cultural or socio-historical circumstances, whether at the individual or the contextual level – the stronger the*

perceived ethnic threat, that in turn reinforces the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, leading to stronger nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes.

Ethnic competition theory is a multi-level theory, which can be applied to deduce micro- as well as macro-hypotheses regarding variations in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism within and between countries. That is, the degree of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism is presumably affected by the level of actual competition and/or perceived ethnic threat, which may vary between different social categories (micro-propositions) and between various contexts, such as different countries, or different time-periods (macro-propositions).

In summary, I propose that the notions of social identity theory and realistic conflict theory can be regarded as complementary to one another (cf. Brown, 1995; Jones, 1997), and can be synthesised into a general framework labelled *ethnic competition theory*. The fundamental assumption of this theoretical model is that nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes are caused by general social identity needs (*dispositional proposition*), while the intensity of nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes varies depending on the amount of actual competition and/or perceived ethnic threat (*situational proposition*).

Figure 2.2 *Ethnic competition theory: theoretical-conceptual model*



Figure 2.2 shows the theoretical-conceptual model derived from ethnic competition theory. The model consists of presumably causal relations between independent, intervening, and dependent concepts. Independent factors are located both at the individual level (i.e., individual's social position) as well as at the contextual level (i.e., actual ethnic competition at the national level). The effects of these independent factors on the dependent concepts – individual's nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes – are mediated by the individual's perceptions of ethnic threat. The grey coloured box at the right-hand side of Figure 2.2 illustrates that nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes are interrelated, and that they are *both* affected by the depicted independent and intervening factors.

The numbers of the arrows in Figure 2.2 relate to the chapters in which I explore the specific relationship. In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) I explore the relationship between the dependent variables and their dimensions, and test for cross-national differences regarding the interrelation between nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. The effects of individual's social position on nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes are explored in Chapter 5. In particular, I test whether the effect of educational level varies across different countries. Next, in Chapter 6, I systematically test the effects of the individual's social position variables, and test whether the observed effects are intervened by perceptions of ethnic threat. Additionally, I ascertain the extent to which actual ethnic competition at the contextual national level has a direct effect on nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes, and to what extent its effect is intervened by perceptions of ethnic threat.

Ethnic competition theory forms the core theoretical framework of this study. In the chapters to follow, I will apply this general multi-level framework to deduce testable hypotheses regarding differences in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism between social categories (micro-level propositions) or differences between countries (macro-level propositions). In addition to ethnic competition theory, I will introduce additional theories – in particular Socialization Theory and Localism Theory – in Chapters 5 and 6 in order to derive specific hypotheses at the micro-level.

In the next chapter, I will first introduce the applied international survey dataset, together with a discussion of the benefits and problems of conducting international comparative survey research.

Notes Chapter 2

[1] In everyday language, the concept of ethnocentrism is commonly defined only in terms of the first aspect, that is, the rating of other groups with reference to one's own group.

[2] The point is often made that in Brazil and the Caribbean islands discrimination is based on 'class' rather than race. It seems that there are no sharp racial or ethnic lines in these areas. Colour differences have been defined along a continuum, rather than as involving two or more distinct sociological groups (Blalock, 1967, p. 169-173).

[3] Moreover, as Taylor and Moghaddam (1987, p. 34) note, even the work of social psychologists guided by this theoretical approach is in an important sense devoid of social psychology. Once it is assumed that conflicts of interests are the causes of inter-group hostility, and inter-group behaviour is mainly determined by the compatibility or incompatibility of group goals, then social psychological phenomena assume the role of dependent variables in the inter-group settings.

[4] After World War II, applied psychologists had two major concerns (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987, p. 35). The first one was to understand how seemingly normal people could have carried out the cruel mass murders of that war. This led to studies focusing on intra-individual personality variables, such as the authoritarian personality research of Adorno and associates (1969). The second concern was to try to prevent the outbreak of World War III. This led to studies such as conducted by Sherif. These studies tried to map the processes of inter-group behaviour and to identify strategies for transforming hostile inter-group relations into cooperative ones.

[5] One of the oldest and most well-known notions concerning the reduction of prejudice and inter-group conflict is the 'contact hypothesis' (Allport, 1954): the best way to reduce tension and hostility between groups would be to bring groups into contact with each other. However, as the experiments of Sherif demonstrate, contact alone is not enough. Instead, mere contact offers an opportunity for hostile behaviour. Thus, the *nature* of the contact is important. Several conditions have been identified that must be satisfied before contact will lead to heightened tolerance and cohesion. The contact between different ethnic groups must be based on equal status relations, and the groups must pursue common goals (e.g. the superordinate goals in Sherif's experiments). Furthermore, the contact situation must receive social and institutional support and the contact must be of sufficient frequency, duration, and closeness in order to develop meaningful relationships between members of different groups ('high acquaintance potential') (Brown, 1995).

[6] There were three experimental conditions in which one group was rewarded. The decision which group would get the rewards was respectively determined by chance (i.e., a flip of a coin), by the experimenter, or the subjects were made to belief that one of the two groups was responsible for the decision and that this group decided to give the gifts to themselves. The difference with the control condition – in which no group was rewarded – was most consistent for the 'chance' condition. The finding that subjects favoured their in-group over the out-group was interpreted by Rabbie and Horwitz in terms of perceived emotional difficulties of interpersonal interaction with out-group members after the experiment. That is, winners who interact with losers feel that they need to suppress any display of satisfaction with winning, and losers who interact with winners would need to suppress their dissatisfaction. Interaction with in-group members, on the other hand, offers social support for freely expressing their feelings about winning or losing (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969, p.276).

[7] This discrimination, however, was not 'absolute'. That is, subjects attempted to achieve a compromise between favouring their own group and the norm of fairness (Tajfel, 1970).

[8] Accordingly, there were four experimental conditions. In the first ('categorization: similarity') condition, subjects were divided into the Klee group and the Kandinsky group (e.g., 'member no. 49 of the Kandinsky group' and

'member no. 79 of the Klee group'). In the 'categorization: non-similarity' condition, the subjects were told that they were randomly divided into two groups: group W and group X (e.g., 'member no. 49 of group W'). In the 'non-categorization: similarity' condition, there was no reference to any group membership. Subjects only knew the code number (e.g., 'number 49') of the other subjects. They were told that those who preferred Kandinsky were given code numbers in the forties, while those who preferred Klee were give code numbers in the seventies. Likewise, in the 'non-categorization: non-similarity' condition, the subjects were told that the code numbers were assigned randomly by the toss of a coin.

[9] As Bruner (in Tajfel, 1981) puts it in the foreword of one of Tajfel's books: "Tajfel cannot … accept the view that prejudice is an expression only of individual malaise or maladjustment or even of straightforward inter-individual conflict".

[10] In our daily lives, in which we receive enormous amounts of information on persons, social relations, and events, it is simply impossible to accurately process all relevant social information. There is no alternative but to apply simple and crude social classifications. Some authors suggest that our fundamental tendency to categorize people into social groups can be explained from an evolutionary perspective. That is, this tendency presumably arose from an evolutionary pressure to distinguish friend from foe, in order to facilitate exchange and alliance formation. An innate competence for rapidly and accurately categorising the social environment and assessing the pros and cons of affiliations would have provided men with an adaptive advantage (cf. Hirschfeld, 2000; Jones, 1997, p. 204).

[11] Strive for a positive self-concept was one of the basic postulates of Festinger's theory of social comparison (1954). In contrast with Tajfel, Festinger focused primarily on social comparisons made between individuals, that is, within-group comparisons.

[12] Based on these three conditions, Tajfel distinguishes three functions of social stereotypes. These functions are respectively those of social causality, justification, and differentiation (1981, p. 156).

[13] Coser assumed that non-realistic conflicts arise from deprivations and frustrations stemming from the socialization process and from later adult role obligations, or they result from a conversion of originally realistic antagonism that was disallowed expression (Coser, 1956, p. 54). In the latter case, the hostile sentiments are not released upon the original object of frustration, but upon a substitute object. This argument is in accordance with the frustration-aggression-displacement theory of Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939).

[14] Likewise, according to Parsons (in Coser, 1956, p. 53), scapegoating rarely appears without some degree of real conflict of ideals or interests being involved. That is, with regard to the choice of the object in unrealistic conflict, it is easier to choose an out-group as scapegoat to which there already exists some basis of antagonism – based on realistic conflicts. In the same manner, Blalock (1967, p. 49) argues that in a situation in which there is displaced aggression, minorities are likely to be selected as targets to the degree that such displaced aggression can serve as a means to other goals. For instance, if this aggression can serve the purpose of reducing competition with the minority.

[15] However, there is one reservation as to the latter proposition. In general, prior to the outbreak of inter-group conflict, there has to be a basic degree of group consensus. Otherwise, conflict with other groups will not lead to increased in-group cohesion, but to apathy and possible disintegration of the in-group (Coser, 1956, p. 92-93).

[16] Bobo and Hutchings (1996) tried to extend Blumer's theory to a multiracial social context and to include the attitudes of both dominant group members and minority ethnic group members. They focused on the concept of racial alienation, measured by beliefs about the treatment received by and opportunities offered to one's racial or

ethnic group in (American) society. However, I would argue that this concept is inappropriate for extending Blumer's theory, since it (i) does not deal with the position to which the in-group is entitled *relative to out-groups*, and (ii) does not deal with any (perceived) threat from ethnic out-groups. Moreover, the authors did not deal with the crucial element of Blumer's theory, that is, the presumed effect of group threat on prejudice.

[17] The aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001, showed a severe increase in threats and violence directed toward Muslims and mosques in the U.S. and European countries.

[18] Blalock presumed both actual competition and personality traits (e.g., authoritarianism, rigidity, status consciousness) to be partially caused by status or class factors, such as education, occupation, and income (1967, p. 102).

[19] For instance, in order to analyse white Americans' opposition towards bussing (i.e. transporting pupils to schools outside their neighbourhood, in order to enhance ethnic desegregation of schools), they applied the following indicators of self-interest: respondents were asked whether they lived in a neighbourhood in which bussing occurred or threatened to occur; whether they had school-aged children; and whether the neighbourhood schools where mostly white (Sears, et al., 1979). Such items were meant to locate respondents whose personal life and that of their families, were most affected by bussing.

[20] From the 1940s on, survey researchers have monitored attitudes among American whites. This research has shown a remarkable decline in blatant racist attitudes. Whites' racial attitudes in America shifted from widespread acceptance of segregation and discrimination in the 1940s to a new and equally widespread commitment to tolerance, racial equality, and integration in the 1970s (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Schuman et al., 1997; see also Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). For instance, in 1942, 54% of American whites thought that there should be separate sections for Negroes in streetcars and buses. By 1970, this figure had declined to 22%. The percentage of whites that agreed that white and black students should go to the same schools rose from 32% in 1942 to 90% in 1982. More than half of all white Americans in 1944 approved the blatantly discriminatory proposition that "white people should have the first chance at any kind of job", whereas in 1972 nearly 100% thought that "Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job" (Schuman et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 1978). In addition, there has been a continuing improvement in whites' beliefs about blacks. For instance, the proportion of whites believing that blacks are less intelligent than whites dropped dramatically after the 1940s (Schuman et al., 1997). However, next to this 'progressive trend', other questions – dealing with steps that the government might take either to reduce discrimination and segregation or to improve the economic status of blacks – display a very different picture. The support among American whites for the implementation of principles of racial equality and integration has been much less, compared to the support for these general principles themselves. Furthermore, over time, there have been only partial signs of increasing support for translating the principles into practice (Schuman, et al., 1997). In addition, there has been pronounced opposition to participation in social settings where blacks are a substantial majority (Schuman et al., 1997; Smith, 1981). Next to the gap between 'principles and implementation', the level of opposition towards implementation programs is not uniform, but depends on the proposed actions. Programs designed to simply help ethnic minorities (i.e., opportunity enhancement through training and education programs) have much more support among white Americans than programs designed to achieve equal outcomes between whites and ethnic minorities (e.g., specific hiring quotas) (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Kluegel & Smith, 1983; Lipset & Schneider, 1978; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997).

[21] Research on this new, contemporary form of prejudice is characterised by a wide variety of different conceptualisations and operationalisations. Contemporary racial attitudes are for instance referred to as "new racism" (Barker, 1981; Verkuyten & Masson, 1995); "everyday racism" (Essed, 1984; 1991); "aversive racism" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977); and "laissez faire" racism (Bobo, Kluegel, & Smith, 1997),

or as already mentioned, "symbolic racism" (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981; Sears, 1988). The distinction between blatant (traditional) and subtle (contemporary) prejudice, as proposed by Pettigrew and Meertens (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) seemed to be of particular relevance, as they showed cross-cultural empirical evidence on the existence of both forms of prejudice in four West-European countries. However, a secondary analysis of their data showed that their claim regarding the distinction between blatant and subtle prejudice had to be refuted (Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, & Verberk, in press).

[22] In addition to symbolic racism, self-interest and group-interest conflict-motives, several authors have proposed that opposition to social policies to assist ethnic minorities stems from stratification beliefs (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Lipset & Schneider, 1978; Kluegel & Smith, 1983; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). It has been argued that affirmative action policies violate the widespread values of individualism and meritocratic advancement. Next to these normative stratification beliefs (i.e., beliefs about how the stratification system should work), existential stratification beliefs (i.e., how does the stratification system work?) play a role: people who attribute inequality and poverty to individual as opposed to structural causes, are more opposed to affirmative action. In conclusion, one should be careful when interpreting opposition to affirmative action programs as an indication of white racial hostility (Kluegel & Smith, 1983).

[23] Tajfel and Turner hinted at a possible synthesis of both theoretical approaches, when they stated: "The theoretical orientation to be outlined here [i.e. social identity theory] is intended not to replace the RCT [Realistic (group) Conflict Theory], but to supplement it in some respects" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 34).

CHAPTER 3

Comparative research

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I focus on some methodological aspects of this international comparative study and introduce the applied survey data. I start with a discussion of the need for a comparative approach in research on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. To address the formulated research questions outlined in Chapter 1, I applied data gathered by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 1995. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, I discuss the background of this cross-national collaboration in survey research, and I present the set of countries that are included in this comparative study. In Section 3.5, I focus on some of the methodological problems and obstacles in international comparative research, in particular with regard to the study of attitudes. I discuss the manner in which some of these problems are dealt with in the present study in particular, and in the ISSP in general.

3.2 The need for comparison

The popular view that the Dutch have of themselves is that they have held a long tradition of hospitality and tolerance toward ethnic immigrants and religious minorities. In particular, this renowned national image stems from the shelter that was offered to political and religious refugees during the 16th and 17th centuries (e.g., Walloon and Flemish protestants, French 'Huguenots', and Jews from Spain and Portugal) (Lucassen & Penninx, 1994). Historians, however, have criticized this popular complacent conception of Dutch tolerance (Schutte, 1998).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the national image of Dutch hospitality was more severely threatened by incidents of racist violence directed toward mosques, asylum centres, and ethnic immigrants and their families. Furthermore, although the electoral support for extreme right-wing parties was rather small (despite some short-term growth during the early 1980s and early 1990s, see Scheepers, Eisinga, & Lammers, 1993), public opinion research revealed rather widespread support for ethnocentric policies among the general public. In 1994, approximately 29 per cent of the Dutch were in favour of a ban on immigration of labour migrants from

countries outside the European Union; 16 per cent of the Dutch favoured a ban on the arrival of asylum seekers (Scheepers, Schmeets, & Felling, 1997). In addition, in 1995, 44 per cent of the Dutch were of the opinion that there were too many non-Dutch inhabitants living in the Netherlands (SCP, 1996).

Now, what conclusion can be drawn from the results of these public opinion polls? Certainly, a sizeable proportion of the Dutch wants to exclude ethnic newcomers, but is this a very high proportion? Do the figures tell us that the Dutch are remarkably intolerant toward ethnic immigrants? In order to fully assess the level of ethnic tolerance among the Dutch, a comparative approach is needed. A comparison with data from other countries can illustrate whether the aforementioned level of opposition toward immigration is a specific Dutch phenomenon, or whether it is an instance of a more general social phenomenon. Furthermore, cross-national research can assess to what extent different social mechanisms occur in different countries or cultures. For instance, to what extent are exclusionistic reactions toward immigrants in different societies induced by similar societal conditions?

Traditionally, there has always been some controversy within social sciences with regard to the merits of (international) comparative research. Whereas some scholars – stressing the uniqueness of social phenomena – strongly oppose comparative research, others actively encourage it. According to the former type of scholars – for instance, the anthropologist Malinowski – each culture should ideally be understood in its own terms (cf. Berry, 1969). Attitudes, behaviour, and institutions should be viewed in relation to their specific settings. Consequently, according to this view, a cross-cultural comparison is essentially a false enterprise, for one is 'comparing incomparables'. Other scholars take the view that (international) comparative research deepens the understanding of one's own society. It is through the comparison with other societies, that the typical characteristics of one's own society are identified. As Davis and Jowell put it, "...we cannot learn much about ourselves as a society unless we compare ourselves with others" (1989). Several authors (e.g., Korsten, Bertrand, Jong, & Soeters, 1995) stress the increasing need for comparative research as a consequence of the globalisation process. In an era of growing worldwide interconnectedness of societies, social phenomena have acquired a truly global scale. In particular, this applies to large-scale international labour migration and immigration of political refugees, as well as the subsequent reactions of the host society toward these ethnic newcomers.

The two aforementioned perspectives on comparative research have been respectively labelled as the ideographic and nomothetic approaches. Whereas ideographic research focuses on the uniqueness of each case, nomothetic research focuses on comparisons.[1] Clearly, in the present study I adopt the nomothetic approach. That is, I take the position that international comparative research can increase our understanding of the phenomena of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, and the rationale behind these attitudes toward in-group and out-groups. However, very little international comparative research on nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes has been conducted. The relative scarcity of empirical studies with a large cross-national scope is a result of a lack of comparable cross-national data. Up till now, there have been only a few attempts to measure attitudes toward in-groups and out-groups in a

similar (equivalent) manner across a considerable number of countries.[2] In 1995, however, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) gathered data on nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes. In the next section, I discuss the organisational structure of the ISSP and the rationale behind this cross-national collaboration in survey research and introduce the data collection.

3.3 The International Social Survey Programme

In order to make meaningful comparisons across countries, one has to strive for equivalent measurements across these countries. However, generally, attitudinal questions used in one country are rather different from those applied in another country, although the intention may be to measure the same theoretical concept. As Davis and Jowell (1989) pointed out, the choice both of topics and of question wording tends to reflect national rather than cross-national priorities, since research funding often stems largely from national sources. Consequently, year-by-year comparability within a country is often preferred over comparability between countries.

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is an annual cross-national collaboration in survey research, founded in 1983 in order to achieve more cross-national comparability in attitudinal research. The background for this initiative was the fact that while on factors such as economic growth, income distribution, social mobility, voting and social policy, good comparative data had been available for some time, the situation was markedly inferior when it came to comparing attitudes (Svallfors, 1996). In the field of international social survey research, there is no other comparable project, expect for the Eurobarometer Survey Project, which however does not cover countries outside the European Union.

The ISSP started in 1983 with the goal to further international collaboration between four existing national surveys: the General Social Survey, conducted by NORC (USA); the British Social Attitudes Survey, conducted by SCPR (Great Britain); the Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozial-Wissenschaften, conducted by ZUMA (West Germany); and the National Social Science Survey, conducted by ANU (Australia). The four founding members agreed to jointly develop modules dealing with important areas of social sciences and to form these modules as a fifteen-minute supplement to their regular national surveys.

Annual ISSP modules have been conducted since 1985 and cover a wide range of topics, such as the role of government, work orientations, and religion. From 1990 on, previous surveys have been replicated, combining a cross-national and over-time perspective. The first module covering nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism was conducted in 1995, and a second module is scheduled for 2003.

Since 1985, the number of ISSP members (i.e., countries) has grown continually to 25 in 1995 and 37 in 2001. Unfortunately, there is no rationale for the choice of countries. In fact, ISSP membership depends primarily on the presence of a research team that is willing and able to satisfy the ISSP requirement of conducting an annual, collectively designed national survey. Since there are no central funds, each national research team must fund all of its own work. Consequently, those research teams that have access to an already existing annual national

survey – in which the ISSP modules can be incorporated – are most likely to join the ISSP (Jowell, 1990). The merging of the national data into a cross-national data set is performed by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne.

Within each country, the survey should be conducted in accordance with fixed ISSP requirements. According to these 'ISSP working principles', firstly, a common core of background variables (covering socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents) has to be included in the regular surveys. Secondly, the 15-minute long supplementary and topic-specific ISSP module should be suitable for self-administration, primarily for reasons of cost-efficiency as well as to avoid increasing respondent fatigue due to the lengthy personal interview (Davis & Jowell, 1989). Thirdly, the questions in the module should be asked in a single block in identical order in each country. Fourthly, in each country the survey should be carried out among a probability-based, nation-wide sample of the adult population, designed to achieve a norm of 1,400 cases, and, in any event, a minimum of 1,000 cases. Despite these formulated requirements, in practice, there are still some methodological inconsistencies between the countries (Park & Jowell, 1998), although this is not surprising in such a large-scale cross-national collaboration as the ISSP. I will return to this topic at the end of Section 3.5 when I discuss the problems in conducting comparative survey research.

3.4 Set of countries

The data in this study were derived from the 1995 ISSP module entitled 'Aspects of national identity'. This survey regarding attitudes toward the country, the national in-group, and ethnic minorities and immigrants was conducted in 23 countries. Except for the Philippines, these are all industrial societies. For reasons of comparability, I excluded the Philippines' sample from the analyses. The remaining countries are listed in Table 3.1. There are nine Western European countries as well as eight former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, four traditional immigration societies – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – are covered. Finally, Japan is the only Asian country. Data for unified Germany were analysed separately for the territories of the old Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) and the former German Democratic Republic (DDR), due to the large differences in political and economic developments that took place after the Second World War, as well as the vast differences in economic circumstances in 1995 between East and West Germany.

The inclusion of countries in the ISSP is based on a rather pragmatic rationale, that is, only countries are covered for which national research teams were able to finance the survey and were willing to comply with the ISSP requirements. For instance, the survey was, unfortunately, not conducted in France, which could have provided an interesting case, since in France electoral support for extreme right (Front National) was rather high in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, it has been argued that attitudes toward the national in-group and ethnic minorities might be related to the conception of nationhood. According to Brubaker (1992), the conception of nationhood in France ('jus soli') is the polar opposite to the conception of nationhood in Germany ('jus

sanguinis'). It would have been interesting to compare nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism among the general public in France and Germany. Brubaker, however, focused on the elite-understanding of nationhood in France and Germany, and as he probably rightfully notes, "popular understandings may be much more similar" (Brubaker, 1992, p. 242, note 9).

Table 3.1 *Set of countries*

Australia	Great Britain	The Netherlands	Slovenia
Austria	Hungary	New Zealand	Spain
Bulgaria	Ireland	Norway	Sweden
Canada	Italy	Poland	United States
Czech Republic	Japan	Russia	
Germany [a]	Latvia	Slovak Republic	

[a]Data for East Germany and West Germany were analysed separately

Since the selection of countries covered by the ISSP is based on pragmatic reasons, it does not arise from an explicit choice of research strategy, such as a 'most similar systems design' or a 'most different systems design' (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). However, the set of countries presented in Table 3.1 displays a wide variety in socio-economic, cultural, political, and historical circumstances. This diversity suits the purpose of the present empirical research: that is, testing hypotheses regarding *overall or general mechanisms* (i.e. mechanisms that are not country-specific or culture-specific) regarding the interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism and the explanation of differences in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism between social categories and countries.

Additional benefits of applying this large and diverse set of countries are that it increases the variation in the dependent variable, and it decreases the danger of overdetermination, which occurs whenever countries have clustered scores on theoretical relevant characteristics, so that partial effects of these characteristics cannot be correctly estimated.[3]

3.5 Problems and limitations of comparative survey research

In this section I discuss several problems and limitations of international comparative survey research. Most of these problems also arise in survey research conducted in a single country, but these problems are heightened in a cross-national study. In addition, I indicate the manner in which these problems are addressed in the methodological design of the ISSP in general, and in the present study in particular.

Perhaps the most crucial problem in comparative research is that of *indicator equivalence* or *concept validity*: do the measurements refer to the same theoretical concepts in different

countries? Survey questions need to be expressed in an equivalent manner, so that they refer to the same theoretical concepts in the different countries. It is certainly not difficult to think up questions for which identical answers would have a different meaning in different countries. Not surprisingly, one of the most widespread criticisms toward comparative attitudinal research refers to the danger that the meanings and connotations of applied questions and concepts vary across cultures, and that, consequently, one would not be able to measure the same concept using identical questions in different countries. If one would advocate the latter argument in a strict sense, one is left with two – rather unsatisfactory – options. That is, one would either take the view that comparative survey research is not feasible, or, one would argue that in order to measure identical theoretical concepts in different countries, one needs country-specific operationalisations. The latter strategy – applying different measurements in different countries – does not inform the researcher of the actual degree of comparability, since no tools are available to evaluate the degree of comparability.

The problem of concept validity not only refers to question wordings, but also to the *framing* of the issues covered by the survey questions, that is, the manner in which the issue is presented to the respondent (Kinder & Sanders, 1990). If the frames in which the issue is presented have different connotations across national contexts, then, once again, questions are not cross-nationally comparable.

Related to the problem of concept validity is the problem of *translation difficulties*. The translation of survey questions always incorporates the danger of changing its original meaning. Exact translation is sometimes impossible, since many words simply do not have an exact equivalent in another language. In order to minimise translation problems, the wording of the questionnaire should be as simple as possible. But even a slight difference in translation or connotation may cause a large difference in marginal frequencies between the response categories 'agree' and 'strongly agree' (Hofstede, 1995).

Due to the aforementioned problems of translation and concept validity, one should be suspicious about research that is completely designed within a particular country and afterwards fielded elsewhere.[4] Therefore, the conceptualisation and development of the questionnaire should be a team effort, consisting of scholars residing in the countries under study (Küchler, 1990). Within the ISSP, the construction of the questionnaire design is a truly cross-national exercise: researchers from different countries are closely involved in this process.[5] A large amount of time is invested in formulating the questions in a manner that, in cultural terms, is as neutral as possible, in order to enhance indicator equivalence. The original questionnaire is drafted in British English and then translated into other languages. The aim of this translation is to obtain functionally equivalent question wordings rather than identical (i.e., formally equivalent) wordings (Davis & Jowell, 1989).

Another problem related to the problem of concept validity, is that of the '*paradox of the standardisation of the measurement*' (Peschar, 1982). To make valid cross-national comparisons, one would like to have measurement instruments that are as universal as possible, since such highly standardized instruments are insensitive to national contexts. (An example of such a universal standardized instrument is the measurement of educational achievements in physics -

since there is no such thing as a specific English or German physics). However, given a theoretical concept that is more context-dependent, a highly standardized measurement instrument is also a less interesting one. With a highly standardized measurement one loses sight of the specific national characteristics of the studied social phenomena.

During the design of their 1995 questionnaire, the ISSP scholars were confronted with this paradox. Initially, they set out to develop cross-national indicators of the rituals and symbols that help to constitute a sense of national identity. However, it turned out that these rituals and symbols were very strongly context-dependent. For an American, raising the flag and feeling very strongly about the national anthem would be good indicators. For a Swede, such indicators made little sense, whereas celebrating midsummer's eve or eating traditional Swedish food at Christmas would be important indicators. Given the country-specific nature of these rituals and symbols, the measurement instrument would have to consist of an enormous list of variables. For this reason, this topic was not incorporated in the final questionnaire (Svallfors, 1996).

In addition to the aforementioned problems, there are some other problems that threaten comparability across countries. Firstly, there is the problem of *non-response*, which is generally high in survey research. Non-response is a problem in every study to the extent that it causes bias. In comparative research, additional problems are the varying levels of non-response and varying degrees of bias across countries.

Furthermore, national populations can differ in *general answer tendencies*, such as the tendency to choose more extreme answer categories, to choose "don't know" answers, or the tendency to give confirmative answers. The latter agreeing-response bias is called the acquiescence response bias (Billiet & McClendon, 2000; Krosnick, 1999). In relation to the general answer tendencies, Küchler (1990, p. 10) advocated that the selected countries should be similar in their populations' experience with and exposure to attitude surveys. Moreover, he argued that social norms governing behaviour related to central topics of the study should be similar. Of course, these suggestions are very demanding, but they stress that the survey interview is a particular form of communication between interviewer and respondent, and therefore, the data obtained in the interview partly reflect this communication process (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000). Ideally, there should be no major cross-national differences between taboos related to the questionnaire topics; national sensitivities; the demarcation of the private sphere; acquiescence; openheartedness and social desirability. In particular, given the topic of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic intolerance, interviewers and respondents should stem from the same ethnic group. In this specific study, I have restricted the analyses to respondents from the ethnic majority group in each country. Since the chances that an interviewer would be part of an ethnic minority group were rather small, interviewer effects due to the interviewer's ethnicity are negligible.

Cross-national comparability can also be endangered by *differences in sampling methods and fieldwork procedures*. Ideally, the sampling procedure should be the same for each country. The population from which the sample is drawn should be equivalent across countries. With regard to the ISSP, the members of the ISSP are compelled to draw a national representative random sample of the adult population. Furthermore, in the ideal situation, data should be

collected during the same time period in all countries. This minimizes the impact of world politics and events on the responses (Küchler, 1990). Still, specific national events may affect the results, but in order to control for the impact of national events, one would need a longitudinal design.[6]

International comparative research is also complicated by problems related to the explanation of observed differences between countries. With regard to ethnocentrism, nationalistic attitudes, and ethnic exclusionism, many theoretical studies focus on intra-individual or inter-individual factors (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969; De Witte, 1999; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Gabennesch, 1972). Hence, there is a *need for macro-theories*: there is a relative lack of well-specified macro-theories regarding cross-national differences in ethnocentric attitudes. One theoretical framework that could be applied both at a macro level and a micro level – in order to explain differences between countries as well as differences between social categories within countries – is ethnic competition theory, as presented in Chapter 2.

Typically, a theory for explaining cross-national differences refers to contextual characteristics at the national level. Hence, Przeworski and Teune (1970) formulated the goal of comparative research as the substitution of names of variables for the names of countries. Such contextual variables can either be aggregates based on survey data, or data that are only defined at the national level. The latter contextual variables induce another problem, that of *comparability of national statistics*. This comparability can be problematic, due to cross-national differences in applied definition, registration, and classification. Furthermore, there can be sizeable differences in reliability of national statistics between countries (see for example Entzinger, 1985).

If national characteristics are applied as explanatory variables for cross-national differences, the problem of *overdetermination* might arise, since various national characteristics – such as economic indicators – might be strongly interrelated (Korsten et al., 1995). High collinearity between predictors influences the properties of the effect parameter estimates, especially their efficiency (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). That is, high collinearity leads to larger standard errors compared to the situation in which the predictors are mutually independent. Hence, in my analyses, I summarised various national indicators into a general index (see Chapter 6).

Another difficult problem in comparative survey research is the *coding of background variables*. There are considerable differences between countries regarding occupation titles, educational systems, etc. Consequently, there is a large variety between countries with regard to the applied indicators of these individual characteristics. To overcome these difficulties, the ISSP has defined a standard set of background variables and operationalisations. With regard to occupational coding, each ISSP member has to apply the same standard measurement (i.e., the ISCO / ILO occupation code). However, with regard to the measurement of education, there are still considerable differences between the various countries. To achieve a better cross-national comparable measurement, I recoded the original national measurements to a less detailed cross-

national measurement of educational level. Furthermore, in some instances, the original national data were transformed by the Zentralarchiv to achieve more comparative indicators.

Finally, due to its size and complexity, comparative research is not only extremely expensive, but also leads to specific demands on the *organisation* of the research. Most of the early comparative research was organized in a very centralized manner (Peschar, 1982). In this so-called 'safari research' (Szalai, 1977) there was hardly any international cooperation. In reaction to this type of research, a more cooperative approach developed, as is being followed by the ISSP. In this approach, members of all the participating countries are involved in the design and planning of the research. The joint effort of such an international research team in the development of the questionnaire is a necessary condition for achieving indicator equivalence (Küchler, 1990).

In summary, conducting international comparative research, and in particular survey research, is a difficult task. There are several methodological problems and obstacles that can affect the results. In this chapter, I have given a short overview of these problems, which should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

Although, obviously, not all of the aforementioned problems have been solved – or perhaps cannot even be solved – up till now, the ISSP offers the best available data set on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, covering the attitudes of adult populations across a considerable number of countries. In the research design of the International Social Survey Programme, some of the aforementioned problems are explicitly addressed.

Firstly and most importantly, the construction of the questionnaire design is a truly cross-national exercise, in which researchers from all countries are involved. This team effort warrants that no survey questions, which were developed in a specific national context, are automatically considered as valid in other national contexts. Instead, questions are formulated in terms which are as culturally neutral as possible, in order to enhance functional equivalence.

Secondly, international comparison is facilitated by the relatively high degree of standardisation within the ISSP. As stated, the ISSP has formulated a set of requirements, ranging from questionnaire design (identical order of questions and answer categories), sampling methods, modes of administration, to the coding of background variables.

However, despite these requirements, it turns out that *in practice* there are still some disturbing methodological differences between countries. Park and Jowell (1998) examined in detail the methodological consistencies and differences among all countries that participated in the ISSP in 1995. They concluded that although there were some universal consistencies (e.g., with regard to the fixed question order), there were also methodological inconsistencies. Some of these differences were minor and will most likely not have affected the comparability of results. Other methodological differences, however, were more important. But, as Park and Jowell note, such discrepancies often result from deep-seated national differences in procedures and methods, and hence these will be difficult to alter.

With regard to the period of data gathering, there was some variation in the dates of fieldwork across the 22 countries listed in Table 3.1. In 14 countries, the research team did manage to undertake the survey in 1995, as was intended. In one country (Slovenia) the

fieldwork started as early as November 1994, whereas in the Netherlands it started in September 1995 and was completed in January 1996. Six countries began their fieldwork in 1996. The last country to begin their fieldwork was Russia, where the survey was fielded in June 1996 (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1998).

Unfortunately, there were also differences in sampling methods. In 8 of the 22 countries, substitution of individuals was permitted during the selection process. That is, non-contacts or refusals were substituted. Due to this substitution method, Park and Jowell could not calculate the response figures for these countries. Furthermore, they were only able to calculate the response rate among those countries that had supplied sufficient data. Among the latter 11 countries, response rates ranged from 94% in Bulgaria to 56% in Latvia. The majority of countries had response rates between 60 and 70%. In 13 of the 22 countries, weighting or post-stratification was applied to correct for errors of selection or response bias. In the present study, I applied these weighted data in the analyses.

Finally, a potentially disturbing dissimilarity in fieldwork methods was the different mode of administration used in various countries. Although the ISSP module was intended as a self-administered questionnaire, in only 10 countries was the questionnaire indeed administered in a self-completion form, either delivered by post or by the interviewer. In the other countries face-to-face interviews were conducted. Research on mode effects showed that the mode of administration has an effect on the responses obtained (De Leeuw, 1992). In a face-to-face interview, the respondent is confronted with problems of self-presentation (Sudman & Bradburn, 1974). Particularly with regard to sensitive questions, such as opinions about ethnic immigrants, the respondent may feel inclined to give socially desirable answers to the interviewer. Hence, self-administered questionnaires are to be preferred with regard to these sensitive topics.

I conducted a separate analysis to explore whether the different modes of administration might have affected the responses. I tested whether the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism was related to the applied mode of administration. If respondents in face-to-face interviews are more inclined to give socially desirable answers, then the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism would be lower in countries where face-to-face interviews were applied, compared to countries where a self-administered questionnaire was applied. The results are presented in Chapter 4, where I discuss the operationalisation and scale construction of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. For now, I will just mention that in this preliminary analysis, no indications of the aforementioned mode effect were found. Hence, it appears that the different modes of administration did not severely affect the comparability of the results.

In the next chapter, I will focus in detail on the question regarding the international comparability of the survey data: is it possible to construct an internationally comparable measurement of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism? Applying data from the ISSP 1995 module, I will empirically assess the degree of equivalence of a measurement instrument for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Using the constructed measurement model, I will also address the dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, as well as the interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

Notes Chapter 3

[1] In anthropology, these approaches are respectively indicated as 'emic' and 'etic', following the distinction in linguistics between the study of phonemics (i.e., the examinations of sounds used in a particular language) and the study of phonetics, which covers all languages (Berry, 1969; Hofstede, 1995).

[2] Occasionally, the Eurobarometer surveys contain questions regarding attachment to the nation state, as well as attitudes toward ethnic immigrants. For instance, data from the 1988 Eurobarometer survey on intolerance and racism were analysed in various studies (Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, & Verberk, 2001; Dekker & Van Praag, 1990; Fuchs, Gerhards, & Roller, 1993; Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997). Results from the 1997 Eurobarometer Survey have been reported elsewhere (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, in press). The Eurobarometer Surveys are conducted on a regular basis among the general public of European Union member states. Unfortunately, to the extent that nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism have been covered by these surveys, the formulation of the survey questions has changed considerably over time, thus limiting the possibilities of longitudinal comparative research.

[3] The danger of overdetermination relates to the problem of 'limited degrees of freedom' that is common in international comparative research. Although there are generally numerous theoretical relevant variables, the number of countries (i.e., cases) for which data are available is usually rather small – and of course world wide logically limited. Hence, the classical degrees of freedom problem arises: many variables, small N.

[4] Mindlessly transposing a measurement instrument, developed within a specific national context, to another national context, can be labelled as ethnocentric methodological behaviour of the researcher. In other words, the researcher who wants to study the theoretical concept of ethnocentrism in a comparative perspective should avoid ethnocentric research behaviour.

[5] The questions of the 'Aspects of national identity' module were examined by people from 20 different national backgrounds (Svallfors, 1996, p. 132).

[6] In 1993, the findings from a study among Dutch youngsters of their attitude toward Germany and Germans (Janssen, 1993) led to shock reactions among the Dutch and German public: the research revealed that Dutch youngsters had an extremely negative attitude toward Germans. However, critics pointed out that the survey took place just after several attacks on Turks and asylum seekers in Germany, and hence, these events might have (temporarily) boosted negative attitudes toward Germany and Germans.

CHAPTER 4

Nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism: dimensions, interrelations, and levels

4.1 Introduction and research questions

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Generally speaking, social scientists often assume that positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group are associated with negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups. This complex or syndrome of attitudes is defined as ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1959). The notion of interrelated attitudes toward ethnic in-group and out-groups has been applied in numerous theoretical studies and has been supported by empirical evidence, showing that favourable attitudes toward the in-group are indeed accompanied by unfavourable attitudes toward ethnic out-groups (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969; Billiet, Carton, & Huys, 1990; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Schaefer & Six, 1978; Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1989; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). Furthermore, in most studies it is often, more or less implicitly, assumed that this syndrome of ethnocentrism is universal. That is, although it is acknowledged that there might be differences in the *level* of ethnocentrism between cultures and over time, *each* ethnic group is assumed to have rather positive attitudes toward its own group and rather negative attitudes toward (relevant) out-groups.

Other authors, such as Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), proposed a more differentiated view regarding the interrelation between in-group and out-group attitudes. They argued that attitudes toward the in-group are *multi-dimensional*, and that various forms or dimensions of favourable in-group attitudes might be differentially related to unfavourable attitudes toward ethnic out-groups. Related to this issue is the question of whether a positive attitude toward the in-group is inevitable related to a negative attitude toward the out-group.

In yet another line of research, it has been argued that stances toward ethnic out-groups are also more appropriately conceived of as multi-dimensional, either with regard to the content or expression of negative attitudes, or with regard to the target out-group. With regard to the *content* of attitudes, various authors proposed that, in addition to traditional overt or blatant negative attitudes, newer, more subtle or covert forms of out-group prejudice have developed (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sears, 1988) (see also Chapter 2, section 2.6.3.2). Although this

topic cannot be empirically addressed in this study, for an extensive overview and empirical test of the distinction between traditional and modern forms of out-group prejudice, I refer to Verberk (1999a) and Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, and Verberk (2001). With regard to the *target* of out-group prejudice, Adorno et al. (1969) proposed that ethnocentric individuals have negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups *in general*, irrespective of the particular out-group in question. Hence, this aspect of ethnocentrism was often operationalised by attitudes toward numerous ethnic out-groups (Billiet, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 1996). However, a study by Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993, see also Hagendoorn, 1995) revealed the existence of an ethnic hierarchy: the level of ethnic out-group prejudice depended on the out-group in question. Hence, it may be argued that due to the diversity of ethnic out-groups in modern societies – that is, resident ethnic minorities, recently arrived labour migrants or family migrants, political and economic refugees – stances toward ethnic out-groups are also more appropriately conceived as multi-dimensional. In this chapter, I therefore address the following research questions:

1. *Are nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional concepts?*
2. *If these phenomena are multi-dimensional, are various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes differently related to dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?*

In addition to these questions regarding dimensions and interrelations of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I also explore the degree of universality or invariance in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. I address this issue in two ways. Firstly, I explore whether the same associations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (or dimensions thereof) can be found in 22 different countries. Secondly, I explore the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism among the ethnic majority population in 22 different countries. The third and fourth research questions therefore read:

3. *Are there differences in the interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (or dimensions thereof) across countries?*
4. *What are the differences between ethnic majority populations from different countries with regard to the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?*

These questions – regarding dimensions, interrelations, and levels of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism – need to be answered before any explanatory questions regarding cross-national differences in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism can be adequately addressed. If it were shown, for instance, that there are negligible cross-national differences in levels of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (question 4), a macro-level theoretical approach would be futile.

In the next section, I discuss the concept of ethnocentrism, followed by a discussion of the presumed multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes, and ethnic exclusionism and their interrelations. Then I describe the data and method used to test the formulated hypotheses. In order to achieve more meaningful cross-national comparisons, I have attempted to construct a common measurement model for different countries.[1] In Section 4.5, I present the results of the analyses, which I discuss in the final part of this chapter.

4.2 Ethnocentrism, nationalistic attitudes, and ethnic exclusionism

4.2.1 Ethnocentrism as a universal syndrome

Ethnocentrism has been defined as a complex of attitudes, consisting of positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group and negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups (Adorno et al., 1969; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). The concepts of in-group, out-group, and ethnocentrism were introduced by William Sumner (1959), as far back as 1906. Sumner's notion of ethnocentrism contained two important aspects. The first is the presumed association between the in-group and out-group orientations: "The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other" (p. 12). The second important and related aspect of Sumner's notion is his claim of universality. Sumner generalised that all groups show this syndrome of ethnocentrism; *each* group supposedly has a positive orientation to its in-group and a negative orientation toward out-groups. He underlined this claim of universality by numerous illustrations of ethnic groups that, without exception, all could be characterised as ethnocentric.[2] Other authors found some exceptions to this rule of universality. LeVine and Campbell (1972, p. 10) reported one negative instance - The Lepchas - out of 36 investigated groups. Brewer and Campbell (1976) found three out of thirty tribes in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania without the ethnocentric syndrome. In addition, Jaspars and Warnaen (1982) found three out of eleven ethnic groups in Indonesia without the ethnocentric pattern. Thus, although exceptions have been noted, the empirical evidence indicates that ethnocentrism is a rather universal phenomenon in inter-group relations.

Sumner's assumption of the universal syndrome of ethnocentrism is also supported by notions of social identity theory, as discussed in Chapter 2. According to Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982) individuals have the fundamental need to perceive their in-group as superior to out-groups, in order to achieve a positive social identity. To achieve and preserve such positive group distinctiveness, individuals compare their in-group with out-groups and selectively perceive mainly positively valued characteristics among members of their in-group and they simultaneously perceive mainly negatively valued characteristics among out-group members. The favourable characteristics perceived among in-group members are applied to themselves, resulting in a positive social identity. This process, labelled as social identification, results in a favourable attitude toward the in-group. Its counterpart, the selective perception of unfavourably valued characteristics among out-group members, results in an unfavourable attitude toward out-groups. The latter process was labelled as social contra-identification (Billiet et al., 1996; Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989). Since the psychological processes of social identification and social contra-identification stem from a fundamental need for a positive social identity, ethnocentric attitudes are presumably common among all ethnic groups.

By combining Sumner's proposition of the syndrome of ethnocentrism and the propositions of social identity theory, we can conclude that nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are presumably positively interrelated in each country.

4.2.2 The multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes

Other authors, however, stressed that the relation between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism is more differentiated. This argument is based on the presumed multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes. In this study, I define nationalistic attitudes as favourable attitudes toward one's own country and the national in-group.[3] Several authors argued that nationalistic attitudes entail multiple dimensions, that is, theoretically and empirically distinct aspects (Bar-Tal, 1993; Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Dekker & Malová, 1995; Knudsen, 1997; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Of particular interest is the question of whether it is possible to distinguish between a more 'positive' and a more 'negative' type of nationalistic attitudes. That is, whether particular types of attitudes toward one's own country and in-group can be regarded as an essentially positive attachment to the country and in-group, whereas other types of nationalistic attitudes contain more aggressive-chauvinistic elements.

As Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) pointed out, this notion of multi-dimensionality is not new. It did not, however, receive adequate attention in empirical research, due to a severe confusion of concepts as well as a long-lasting emphasis on the negative consequences of nationalistic attitudes: in most research, such attitudes were predominantly viewed as a cause of war. The Second World War especially led to greater attention being paid to the negative consequences of nationalistic attitudes and dispositions: "The 'badness' of nationalism became the overriding theme for many years to come" (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989, p. 259).

As early as in the 1920s, scholars such as Allport and Mead (see Kosterman & Feshbach 1989) had written essays that alluded to the distinction between nationalistic attitudes as a jingoistic cause of war (i.e. 'chauvinistic nationalistic attitudes') and 'patriotism' as a healthy national self-concept. However, this distinction, as well as the call for clarification of concepts made in these early essays, received little attention in later research.

Moreover, the distinction between different types of nationalistic attitudes became obscured, if not conceptually, at least in an empirical sense. This is clearly illustrated in the influential work of Adorno and his associates. In "The Authoritarian Personality" (1969), they developed a measurement scale for ethnocentrism, known as the E-scale. This scale consisted of three subscales: the Negro Subscale, the Minority Subscale, and the Patriotism Subscale. However, a more appropriate label for the latter subscale would have been the Chauvinism Subscale. In fact, as they describe the Patriotism Subscale, Adorno and his associates made a similar remark:

> The term "patriotism" as used here does not mean "love of country". Rather, the present concept involves blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as out-groups. It might better be termed *pseudopatriotism* and distinguished from *genuine* patriotism, in which love of country and attachment to national values is based on critical understanding. The genuine patriot, it would appear, can appreciate the values and ways of other nations, and can be permissive toward much

> that he cannot personally accept for himself. He is free of rigid conformism, out-group rejection, and imperialistic striving for power (Adorno et al., 1969, p. 107).

Clearly, the distinction between 'pseudopatriotism' as a blind and uncritical attachment to one's own group and country, and 'genuine patriotism' as a more critical attachment to one's own group and country, corresponds to the aforementioned distinction between 'chauvinistic nationalistic attitudes' and 'patriotism'. Unfortunately, since Adorno and his associates labelled the subscale measuring pseudopatriotism as the Patriotism Subscale, the distinction between both concepts faded.

Due to this obscurity, a chauvinistic and a patriotic stance have often been treated as equivalent in many scientific publications, as well as in the public debate (Bar-Tal, 1993; Blank & Schmidt, 1993). Not surprisingly, this heightened the debate about the inherent character and value of positive attitudes toward one's own group and one's country. In particular, there has been, and still is, a heated debate about the positive or negative character of national pride. Whereas some take the view that national pride is an unacceptable attitude – since they emphasise the presumed link with prejudice toward ethnic and religious minorities, and sometimes even perceive national pride as part of the fascist ideology – others take the view that national pride can be seen as an essentially positive, and indeed necessary, attitude. That is, they argue that specific forms of pride and attachment of group members toward their group and country have strong positive implications. Bar-Tal (1993) stressed that attachment of group members toward their group and the country in which they reside is an essential condition for group existence. The attachment to collective national symbols provides a basis for national identity and integration (Topf, Mohler, Heath, & Trometer, 1990). Insofar as pride in these national symbols can exceed boundaries between social classes, religious denominations, and other social groups, it increases the societal cohesion. Furthermore, pride in national institutions - in particular, democratic political institutions - is seen as an important condition for the continuation of a stable political democratic order (Topf et al., 1990). In this view, the absence of pride in political institutions indicates a deficient attachment to the political democratic system, which in turn implies potential political instability (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963).

More recently, the presumed multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes has received renewed interest, partly due to the work of Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), who called for a sharp distinction between patriotism and chauvinism. In an exploratory study among 239 American subjects, (mostly students), questioned on 120 items, they found several dimensions in a factor analysis. The first two factors, and empirically most important dimensions, were labelled as 'Patriotism' and 'Nationalism'. Whereas the former factor referred to affect for one's own country, most of the items of the 'Nationalism' factor referred to an "America-first" or "American-superiority" view relative to other countries. I re-label this latter factor therefore as 'chauvinistic nationalistic attitudes', applying nationalistic attitudes as a generic term for positive attitudes toward the country and the national in-group.[4]

Based on the aforementioned notions, I expect that nationalistic attitudes encompass several distinct, but related, aspects. In particular, a conceptual distinction can be made between

chauvinism and patriotism.[5] *Chauvinism* is the view of uniqueness and superiority of one's own national in-group and country. It implies a downward comparison of other national groups and countries. These feelings of superiority are intertwined with a rather blind, absolute, and uncritical attachment to the national in-group and country. *Patriotism*, on the other hand, refers to the degree of attachment to the national in-group and country; that is, the love for and pride of one's group and country. But whereas chauvinism refers to extreme forms of pride and feelings of superiority, patriotism is based on a critical assessment of one's own group and country. In summary, I propose to test whether nationalistic attitudes are multi-dimensional; i.e., referring to chauvinism and patriotism (*Hypothesis 1*).

4.2.3 The multi-dimensionality of ethnic exclusionism

Negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups have been a significant topic in social sciences for many years. Typically, both theoretical and empirical research focused on antagonism toward members of ethnic out-groups, resident in the same country; for instance, negative feelings of white Americans toward black inhabitants or vice versa (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). One of the relevant topics here is the question of whether the ethnic majority group is willing to accept these ethnic minorities and to include them into their communities and daily social life. Is it possible for someone from an ethnic minority to become - in the view of the ethnic majority group - a 'full' and 'equal' member of their community? This relates to the manner in which the ethnic majority group defines their own community and group identity: what are typical characteristics of 'true' members of the national in-group? For instance, when do the British perceive someone as 'true' British? Should this person have a white skin colour? Or should he or she have been born in Great Britain in order to become a full member of 'the British community'? Such questions refer to the extent to which the access to group membership is firmly restricted for ethnic minorities. Members of the ethnic majority group who apply strict conditions in their subjective definition of 'true British' are more exclusionistic toward ethnic out-groups than those who apply less strict conditions. The more restrictive this notion of in-group membership, the more resident ethnic out-group members are excluded and the lower the cohesion between different ethnic groups in the society.

In addition to the attitudes toward *resident ethnic minorities*, more recently, the issue of negative responses to *ethnic newcomers* has come to the fore, as a result of large waves of migration in the contemporary world. The labour migration to the Western world that took place in the 1960s and 1970s has been followed by social migration, in other words, migration of family members of migrant workers. Since the late 1980s, numerous other immigrants have come to Western countries. Some are clearly considered as political refugees, having fled their country because of internal political strife. Others are suspected of emigrating for merely economic reasons. Given these mass waves of immigration, the issue of the readiness of the ethnic majority population to admit immigrants – whether these are social, political or economic immigrants – has become highly relevant.

These notions of distinctive types of ethnic out-groups led me to cast doubt on the formerly proposed one-dimensionality of ethnic exclusionism. It may be more appropriate to distinguish between different types of ethnic exclusionism, referring to different target out-groups, such as exclusionism of resident ethnic out-group members, exclusionism of immigrants, and exclusionism of political refugees. On the one hand, *exclusion from group membership* refers to the subjective definition of the national in-group and to the perceived typical characteristics of 'true' in-group members. The more individuals from the ethnic majority group take the view that certain characteristics (such as being born in the country or having lived in the country for most of one's life) are very important conditions for being a 'true' member of the in-group, the more restrictive their notion of the in-group, and the stronger ethnic out-group members are excluded. On the other hand, *exclusion of immigrants and political refugees* refers to the willingness to close the national borders to ethnic out-groups. The readiness of the ethnic majority group to allow immigrants to enter their country very probably depends on the personal circumstances of these immigrants in their country of origin and their motives for migrating. Hence, the readiness to allow political refugees to migrate to one's country is presumably higher and more consensual than the readiness to allow other groups of immigrants. In summary, I propose to test whether ethnic exclusionism is multi-dimensional; i.e. referring to exclusionism from group membership, exclusionism of immigrants in general, and exclusionism of political refugees in particular (*Hypothesis 2*).

4.2.4 Associations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism

Next, I turn to the associations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (or dimensions thereof). As stated previously, I propose a conceptual distinction between chauvinism and patriotism. Whereas patriotism refers to an attachment to one's own national group and country, based on a critical understanding, chauvinism refers to feelings of national superiority and a blind, uncritical attachment to the group and country. Consequently, I expect that both types of nationalistic attitudes are differently related to disparagement and exclusionism of ethnic out-groups. That is, the more aggressive-chauvinistic form of nationalistic attitudes is presumably positively related to ethnic exclusionism. However, insofar as nationalistic attitudes contain less aggressive and more humanistic elements, they are not necessarily related to negative feelings toward ethnic minorities and ethnic newcomers. Therefore, I hypothesise that chauvinism is positively related to ethnic exclusionism (or dimensions thereof), whereas the relationship between patriotism and ethnic exclusionism is less positive, neutral, or even negative (*Hypothesis 3*).

If the contention holds that nationalistic attitudes entail multiple dimensions, differentially related to ethnic exclusionism, then the notion of ethnocentrism as such has become too simplified. That is, a positive in-group identity – as expressed by a high degree of patriotism – does not necessarily imply out-group hostility. Or, as Kosterman and Feshbach state: "A healthy patriotic spirit may be as important to the well being of a nation as high self-

esteem is to the well being of an individual.... In fact, patriotism may be an often overlooked means of *reducing* belligerence, much as an individual's healthy self-esteem can promote better interpersonal relationships" (1989, p. 273). Likewise, in his theoretical study, Bar-Tal (1993) stressed that patriotism is essentially positive, since without it groups would disintegrate.

In the following sections, I construct measurement models for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. As discussed in Chapter 3, cross-national comparisons are more meaningful, if these measurement models are equivalent in the different countries. That is, the more the measurement models are cross-nationally equivalent, the stronger the basis for meaningful empirical comparisons between countries. In this chapter, I therefore also address the following *methodological question: to what extent is it possible to measure nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism with a common measurement model applied in the different countries?*

4.3 Data

The data reported here were derived from the 1995 module of the International Social Survey Programme, as described in Chapter 3. In each country, the surveys were carried out among nation-wide samples of adults. However, when studying a population's attitude toward ethnic minorities and immigrants, it is crucial to distinguish between respondents from the ethnic majority population and respondents from ethnic minority groups. It is rather surprising that this notion has not been recognised in many empirical cross-national studies (e.g., as in Knudsen, 1997; Quillian, 1995). In the present study, I restrict the analyses to attitudes of the ethnic majority group in each country, that is, the dominant ethnic group in that country.[6] In Appendix A, I explain the manner in which I selected respondents from the ethnic majority group. This appendix also contains an overview of the original sample sizes, as well as the sample sizes after this selection of the ethnic majority population and after selection of age groups. Since the various national samples contained different age limits, I applied common age limits for all samples: only respondents between 18 and 75 years of age were included in the analyses.

Scholars interested in large-scale international survey research must, given restraints in time and budget, almost of necessity restrict themselves to secondary analyses of previously gathered data. A common drawback of this approach is that the applied questionnaire was often not specifically developed for the purpose of answering the specific questions of the researcher or matching the conceptual distinctions as proposed by the researcher. However, the ISSP 1995 dataset contained many items that – with respect to face validity – referred to the aforementioned dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. This pool of items (presented in Appendix B) served as a starting point for constructing a cross-national comparable measurement instrument for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

First of all, *Chauvinism* was measured by a set of items referring to superiority of one's own country and its residents, as well as an item that refers to a blind, uncritical attachment to one's own country. Next, a set of items referring to *Patriotism* indicated pride in collective assets

of the country, such as its democracy, political influence and economic achievements. Another set of items referring to *Exclusionism of immigrants* and *Exclusionism of political refugees*, measured the respondent's inclination to close the national borders for ethnic newcomers. A final set of items, referring to *Exclusionism from group membership*, covered the respondent's subjective definition of the national in-group. These items referred to the importance attached to conditions for being a 'true' member of the national in-group and, consequently, the degree to which ethnic out-group members who do not fulfil these conditions, are excluded.

4.4 Methods

In the previous section, I discussed several sets of items, which I have assumed to be indicative of the aforementioned theoretical concepts. In this section, I test whether these items can be applied as valid and reliable measurements across countries. I test this by means of structural equation modelling (Jöreskog, 1977; Jöreskog, 1993), applying the LISREL computer program, as developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a, 1993b). In order to avoid a small effective sample size, I applied missing mean substitution, within each country, for the measurement items. The measurement sub model of a full structural equation model describes the causal links between the unobserved theoretical concepts or latent variables and the observed or manifest variables. Whether, and to what extent, the applied indicators indeed refer to the same theoretical concept (or dimension thereof) can be examined by means of the measurement model.

As discussed in Chapter 3, an important question in international comparative survey research is the degree of comparability of the measurement instrument: Is it possible to construct an international comparable measurement of nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes? If it can be demonstrated that theoretical concepts are measured in a quite comparable or equivalent manner in different countries, then we have a basis for valid cross-national comparisons. By means of multi-sample analysis, that is, the simultaneous analysis of independent random samples from several populations (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a), it is possible to empirically test the equivalence of the measurement instrument in the different countries, and to assess whether, and to what extent, the measurement instruments operate in a similar fashion in these different national settings.

The causal relationships between latent and manifest variables are modelled in measurement equations, generally denoted as (cf. Bollen, 1989):

$$x_q = \lambda_{q1}\xi_1 + \lambda_{q2}\xi_2 + \ldots + \delta_q \text{ (with } q = 1, 2, \ldots, \text{ the number of manifest variables } x).$$

The entire set of measurement equations for all manifest variables written in matrix notation is:

$$x = \Lambda_x \xi + \delta$$

Consequently, the covariance matrix of observed variables (Σ) is defined as:

$$\Sigma = \Lambda_x \Phi \Lambda_x' + \Theta_\delta$$

The terms in the measurement model are defined as follows:

Variables:	x	is a q x 1 vector of observed indicators of ξ
	ξ	is a n x 1 vector of latent variables (common factors)
	δ	is a q x 1 vector of measurement errors (unique factors) for x
Coefficients:	Λ_x	is a q x n matrix of coefficients (factor loadings) of the regression of x on ξ
Covariance matrices:	Φ	is a n x n covariance matrix of ξ
	Θ_δ	is a q x q covariance matrix of δ

The parameters in Λ_x (lambda x), Φ(phi), and Θ_δ (theta-delta) can either be fixed, constrained, or freed. That is, parameters can either be given specified values (i.e. fixed), or parameters can be constrained to be equal to one or more other unknown parameters. Free parameters are neither fixed nor constrained. The scale indeterminacy of the latent variables is eliminated by giving the latent variable the scale of one of the observed variables (i.e., fixing a factor loading to one).

To take into account the ordinal scale scores of the measurement items, I analysed the matrix of polychoric correlations with the Generally Weighted Least Squares method with a Correct Weight matrix (Jöreskog, 1990). In this approach, for each ordinal variable x, it is assumed that there is an underlying continuous variable x* that is standard normally distributed.[7] The polychoric correlations are the theoretical correlations of the underlying x*-variables (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993b).

The fit of the measurement model is assessed by means of the Chi-square statistic. This statistic can be used for a goodness-of-fit test of the model against the alternative model that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained. However, such a test is only justified if all the model assumptions are satisfied, if the sample size is sufficiently large, and if the model holds exactly in the population. Consequently, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a, p. 122) suggested that in practice it is more useful to regard the Chi-square statistic as a *measure* of fit rather than as a formal *test statistic*. In this view, the Chi-square statistic is a measure of the overall 'badness-of-fit' of the model to the data; the larger the Chi-square value, the worse the fit of the model.[8]

The model fit can often be improved by allowing correlations between the error terms of observed variables. This procedure has been applied in several applications in the social sciences. Jöreskog (1993, p. 297) however states that "It is a widespread misuse of structural equation modelling to include correlated error terms in the model for the sole purpose of obtaining a better fit to the data". Correlated error terms indicate that the observed variables measure something else or something in addition to the construct that they are intended to

measure. Jöreskog therefore rightfully remarks that each correlation between error terms must be justified and interpreted substantively.

Based on the aforementioned notions, I therefore preferred not to search for a measurement model with a 'perfect' fit (i.e., a non-significant Chi-square value), but instead to start with a model without correlated error terms, and to examine whether such a model has an acceptable model fit, as indicated by several fit indexes. In addition to the Chi-square statistic, I assessed the fit of the measurement model applying other goodness-of-fit measures such as GFI, CFI, NFI and RMSEA.[9]

As stated in the previous section, I started the search for an internationally comparable measurement instrument of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism with an original pool of items. These 25 items, which were included in the questionnaire in all countries, are listed in Appendix B. Each item is assumed to indicate one and only one theoretical variable. To select the best cross-nationally equivalent indicators for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism I applied the following procedures and criteria. Step-by-step, I excluded indicators that were less suitable, as judged by the goodness-of-fit of the LISREL model and a detailed examination of the parameter estimates. That is, I subsequently removed items that were hardly affected by the latent variable, as shown by a low explained item-variance ($R^2 < .20$ on average in the samples), indicating that this item cannot be regarded as a reliable indicator for the proposed (dimension of the) theoretical concept. However, before excluding such an item from further analyses, I checked whether the specific item should not in fact have been regarded as an indicator of a *different* (dimension of a) theoretical concept than the one I initially presumed. If this was the case, this is indicated by a considerable high modification index for a zero-element of the matrix offactor loadings, indicating that freeing and estimating this factor loading (i.e., allowing a relationship between the item and a different concept than the one originally proposed) will improve the fit of the model considerably. The modification indices for factor loading parameters were also examined in order to check whether items – on average in the different samples – referred to more than one latent variable, indicating that the specific item cannot be applied to discriminate between the different theoretical concepts (or dimensions thereof). In this manner, I selected a set of indicators that – on average in all the samples – can be regarded as valid, reliable, and one-dimensional indicators. However, some of these indicators were still excluded from further analyses, due to strong fluctuations between national samples regarding the corresponding explained item-variance, factor loading estimates, and modification indices, indicating strong cross-national differences in the extent to which the item refers to the theoretical concept.

Following these procedures, I selected a set of 11 items for the measurement of the dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, as presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 *Indicators of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism*

Chauvinism	
RATHERBE	I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world [1]
MORELIKE	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [nationality] [1]
SUPPORT	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong [1]
Patriotism	
How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?	
PROUDDEM	The way democracy works [2]
PROUDPOL	Its political influence in the world [2]
PROUDECO	[Country's] economic achievements [2]
Exclusionism of immigrants	
NUMBER	Do you think the number of immigrants to [country] nowadays should be... (increased / reduced) [3]
Exclusionism of political refugees	
POLREF	How much do you agree or disagree that refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in [country]? [4]
Exclusionism from in-group membership	
Some people say the following things are important for being [truly British]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…	
MEMBORN	To have been born in [country] [5]
MEMLIFE	To have lived in [country] for most of one's life [5]
MEMLANG	To be able to speak [national language(s)] [5]

[1] answer categories: strongly agree, agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree. Reversed scoring.
[2] answer categories: very proud; somewhat proud; not very proud; not proud at all. Reversed scoring.
[3] answer categories: increased a lot; increased a little; remain the same as it is; reduced a little; reduced a lot.
[4] answer categories: strongly agree, agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree.
[5] answer categories: very important; fairly important; not very important; not important at all. Reversed scoring.

4.5 Results

In this section, I first address the question of multidimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Next, I turn to the question of comparability in measurement models across different countries. Then, I address the interrelations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in different countries. Finally, in an explorative analysis, I examine the cross-national differences in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

4.5.1 Dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism

In section 4.2.2, I hypothesised that chauvinism and patriotism are two distinguishable types of nationalistic attitudes. To test this hypothesis, the goodness-of-fit statistics for two models are presented in the upper part of Table 4.2. The first model is a one-dimensional model: all six nationalistic attitudes items load on one latent variable. As for all models in Table 4.2, this model contains no equality constraints with respect to the size of factor loadings and (co-)variances across samples. The second model contains two interrelated latent variables, with each item loading on one factor only. Whereas the items RATHERBE, MORELIKE, and SUPPORT are forced to load on one of the two factors, the items PROUDDEM, PROUDPOL, and PROUDECO load on the other factor. Clearly, the two-factor model fitted much better, as indicated by the goodness-of-fit statistics: the χ^2 was much lower, whereas the GFI, and in particular CFI and NFI were much higher. In addition, the two-factor model also had an acceptable RMSEA (<.05), a smaller standardised root mean square residual (RMR) and a better cross-validation index (ECVI). Although in general, more complex models fit the data better, the large difference in goodness-of-fit between the one-factor and two-factor model supports the first hypothesis regarding the multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes.

Table 4.2 *One-dimensional versus multi-dimensional models of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism*

Model	χ^2	df	χ^2 / df	RMSEA	st. RMR	GFI	CFI	NFI	ECVI
Nationalistic attitudes									
One-factor model	2707.41	207	13.08	0.106	0.111	0.969	0.855	0.846	0.132
Two-factor model	460.62	184	2.50	0.037	0.037	0.993	0.984	0.974	0.043
Ethnic exclusionism									
One-factor model	2424.67	115	21.08	0.137	0.087	0.975	0.893	0.889	0.117
Three-factor model	548.70	92	5.96	0.068	0.030	0.995	0.979	0.975	0.043

Note: multi-sample analysis of 23 samples, N = 24,778

The second hypothesis concerns the multi-dimensionality of ethnic exclusionism. To test this hypothesis, I tried to test three models with respectively 1, 2, and 3 dimensions. In the latter model, 'exclusion of immigrants' and 'exclusion of political refugees' are solely measured by a single item, respectively NUMBER and POLREF, whereas 'exclusion from in-group membership' is measured by 3 items, MEMBORN, MEMLIFE, and MEMLANG. In the two-dimensional model, NUMBER and POLREF both load on the same factor. Finally, in the one-dimensional model, all 5 items refer to one ethnic exclusionism factor. However, parameter estimates of the two-dimensional model showed anomalies: the explained item-variance of the

items NUMBER and POLREF were below zero for the Russian and Spanish sample, indicating a misspecification of the model in these samples. Apparently, at least in Russia and Spain – both countries that have experienced non-democratic political regimes in recent history – the 'political refugees' item referred to a different stance than the 'preferred number of immigrants' item. In addition, not only in Russia and Spain, but also in Hungary and other former socialist countries (including Eastern Germany), as well as in Ireland, the correlation between both items was considerably lower than in the other countries. In summary, the 'preferred number of immigrants' and the 'political refugees' item could not be combined into a one-dimensional measurement of the attitude toward ethnic newcomers.

The lower part of Table 4.2 shows the goodness-of-fit statistics for the one-dimensional and three-dimensional model of ethnic exclusionism. Clearly, the fit of the three-factor model was superior to the fit of the single-factor model, as indicated by the large differences in goodness-of-fit statistics. This supports the hypothesis that ethnic exclusionism should not be regarded as a one-dimensional concept, but as a multi-dimensional phenomenon.

Next, I assess the cross-national comparability of the measurement instrument for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, thereby taking into account that two, respectively three, dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism should be distinguished, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 *Measurement model of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism*



4.5.2 Cross-national comparable dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism

Firstly, I assumed that the form of the measurement model as illustrated in Figure 4.1 is the same in the different countries.[10] That is, the parameter matrices (Λ_X, Φ, and Θ_δ) of the measurement models in the different countries have the same dimensions (in other words, each model has the same numbers of observed and latent variables) and the same pattern of fixed and freed elements. Consequently, in this model, an observed variable is regarded as an indicator of the *same* theoretical construct in the different countries. Each observed variable is strictly one-dimensional, referring to only one theoretical variable. Furthermore, following the theoretical expectations, the theoretical variables are allowed to covariate: the model therefore gives an oblique solution. In addition, the measurement errors of the observed variables are assumed not to be correlated with each other.[11] With respect to comparability across different countries, the model only assumes comparability in model form, and not in parameter values: all non-fixed parameters are allowed to vary across countries.

Table 4.3 presents the overall goodness-of-fit statistics of this model (Model 1). As can be seen in Table 4.3, the χ^2 test statistic was significantly too large, indicating a non-perfect fit. However, the RMSEA was lower than .05, indicating a close fit for Model 1. In addition, the high values of GFI, CFI, and NFI suggest that Model 1 had an acceptable fit. This finding implies that the invariance in model *form* was rather high. Therefore, I conclude that in each country, the *same* indicator referred to the *same* theoretical concept.

The second model in Table 4.3 assumes not only an invariant model form, but also invariant relationships between indicators and theoretical variables, in other words, invariant factor loadings across countries. In this model, there are no cross-national differences with respect to the (relative) degree in which indicators refer to a theoretical variable.[12] If this model is acceptable, it seems more likely that the same latent variables are being tapped in the different countries (Williams & Thomson, 1986). Although the χ^2 statistic for this restricted model showed a significant worse fit compared to Model 1, the overall goodness-of-fit statistics GFI, CFI, and NFI were still rather high (respectively, 0.988, 0.942, and 0.921). In addition, these fit-statistics showed only a minor drop compared to Model 1. Moreover, the RMSEA was 0.047, which, according to the guidelines of Browne and Cudeck (1992), indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom. In other words, to make the assumption that factor loadings are invariant in all the 23 samples inevitably led to a worse fit, but the loss of fit associated with this simplification seemed to be acceptable.

Building on the previous model, in Model 3 the covariances between the latent variables are assumed to be cross-nationally invariant. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the loss of fit associated with this even more simplified assumption was large: CFI and NFI dropped from respectively 0.942 and 0.921 to 0.896 and 0.871, below the minimal acceptable value of 0.90. Likewise, the values of RMSEA and ECVI indicated a much smaller goodness-of-fit compared to Model 2.

Table 4.3 *Invariance in measurement models of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism*

Model with invariance in	χ^2	df	χ^2 / df	RMSEA	st. RMR	GFI	CFI	NFI	ECVI
1 Model form	2632.81	828	3.18	0.045	0.038	0.990	0.955	0.936	0.162
2 + factor loadings	3241.48	960	3.38	0.047	0.042	0.988	0.942	0.921	0.176
3 + factor covariances	5294.72	1180	4.49	0.057	0.047	0.985	0.896	0.871	0.241
4 + factor variances	5816.92	1290	4.51	0.057	0.050	0.980	0.886	0.858	0.253

Note: multi-sample analysis of 23 samples, N = 24,778

To take the test of invariance of model parameters one step further, Model 4 in Table 4.3 assumes not only invariant factor loadings and factor covariances, but also invariant factor variances. Not surprisingly, the fit of this most restrictive model was even less acceptable compared to Model 3. In summary, whereas the first two models had a high and acceptable goodness-of-fit – indicating that the assumptions of invariance in model form and factor loadings can be justified – the considerably worse fit of Models 3 and 4 indicated that there were cross-national differences in associations between the latent variables, which cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, these results show that the dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism can be equivalently measured in different countries by means of the same indicators, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The applied indicators can be regarded as valid cross-national indicators of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. However, the relations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism differed between countries. There was no universal structure of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Given the latter finding, in the next section, I take a closer look at the relations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in the different countries.

Following Bollen (1989), factor loadings can be regarded as validity coefficients.[13] In the model with invariant factor loadings (Model 2) the unstandardised factor loadings or validity coefficients were respectively 1, 0.87, and 0.79 for RATHERBE, MORELIKE, and SUPPORT; 1, 1.09, and 0.95 for PROUDDEM, PROUDPOL, and PROUDECO; and 1, 1.02, and 0.83 for MEMBORN, MEMLIFE, and MEMLANG. The common metric standardised factor loadings or validity coefficients were respectively 0.66, 0.57, and 0.52 for RATHERBE, MORELIKE, and SUPPORT; 0.71, 0.77, and 0.68 for PROUDDEM, PROUDPOL, and PROUDECO; and 0.79, 0.81, and 0.66 for MEMBORN, MEMLIFE, and MEMLANG.

The reliability coefficients of the model with invariant factor loadings (model 2) are documented in Appendix C.[14] The items MEMBORN, MEMLIFE, and PROUDPOL had relatively high reliabilities in all samples (respectively .50, .52, and .46 or higher). The reliability of two of the three chauvinism items (MORELIKE and SUPPORT) was relatively less high, and reached values between .20 and .30 in various samples.

4.5.3 Interrelations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism

Next, I examined the relationships between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in the various countries, applying measurement model 2. The correlations between the latent variables in each country are presented in Table 4.4. An overview of these national-specific results is presented in Table 4.5.

As expected, both dimensions of nationalistic attitudes were positively related in each country. The stronger a respondent's degree of chauvinism, the more patriotic he or she was, and vice versa. In most of the countries, the correlation was rather high, ranging from 0.31 in the Netherlands to 0.70 in the Slovak Republic. In only two countries, Sweden and Russia, was the correlation less than 0.20 (respectively 0.18 and 0.19).

Similarly, in almost all countries, all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism were positively interrelated. The more respondents were in favour of reducing the number of immigrants, the less hospitality they showed toward political refugees, and the more exclusive was their view of the national community. There were only two minor exceptions: in Russia and Spain, the correlation between exclusionism of refugees on the one hand and exclusionism from group membership on the other hand was not significantly positive. In general, the inter-correlations between dimensions of ethnic exclusionism were lower in the former socialist countries as well as in Ireland and Spain. The difference between these countries and the other countries was most clearly shown in the correlation between exclusionism of immigrants and exclusionism of political refugees. In each of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe (including East Germany) as well as in Ireland and Spain, this correlation was lower than in any of the other countries (on average .29 versus .48).

The relation between chauvinism and the different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism was generally positive. Only in a few countries the correlation was positive, but not significant. Regarding exclusionism of immigrants, there was no significant relation with chauvinism in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. In all other countries, a stronger degree of chauvinism was associated with a stronger willingness to close the national border to immigrants, ranging from a correlation of .11 in Russia to .52 in Norway. Similarly, in general, chauvinism correlated with exclusionism of political refugees, although in four Eastern European countries, Spain, and Ireland the relationship was not significant. Finally, in each country, chauvinism was positively related to exclusionism from group membership. In each country, the interrelation between chauvinism and exclusionism from group membership was stronger than the interrelations between chauvinism and, respectively, exclusionism of immigrants or political refugees.

The overall positive correlation between chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism supports the conceptual notion of chauvinism as a rather 'aggressive' form of nationalistic attitudes: The stronger people perceive their own country and national in-group as unique and superior, the more they are inclined to exclude ethnic out-group members. In general, these relationships were relatively less strong in most of the East-European countries.

Table 4.4 *Polychoric correlations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in 23 populations*

	Chauvinism *by* Patriotism	Chauvinism *by* Exclusion immigrants	Chauvinism *by* Exclusion refugees	Chauvinism *by* Exclusion membership	Patriotism *by* Exclusion immigrants	Patriotism *by* Exclusion refugees	Patriotism *by* Exclusion membership	Exclusion immigrants *by* Exclusion refugees	Exclusion immigrants *by* Exclusion membership	Exclusion refugees *by* Exclusion membership
Bulgaria	.609 **	.136 **	.204 **	.576 **	–.056	.085 *	.348 **	.317 **	.136 **	.125 **
Czech Republic	.216 **	.276 **	.167 **	.737 **	–.111 **	–.226 **	.117 *	.333 **	.208 **	.119 **
Slovak Republic	.695 **	.059	.119 **	.647 **	–.067	–.015	.343 **	.301 **	.184 **	.168 **
Hungary	.414 **	.072	.039	.563 **	–.193 **	–.151 **	.148 **	.189 **	.195 **	.085 *
Poland	.395 **	.179 **	.067	.617 **	–.058	–.010	.209 **	.261 **	.130 **	.087 **
Latvian	.401 **	.179 **	.015	.387 **	.029	–.036	.294 **	.246 **	.262 **	.103 *
Russia	.189 **	.113 **	.064	.437 **	–.053	–.051	.015	.286 **	.108 **	.007
Slovenia	.520 **	.281 **	.236 **	.654 **	–.047	–.071	.269 **	.339 **	.306 **	.220 **
Austria	.483 **	.310 **	.241 **	.796 **	–.015	–.063	.307 **	.486 **	.358 **	.347 **
Germany-East	.616 **	.410 **	.321 **	.766 **	.127 *	.193 **	.587 **	.352 **	.362 **	.265 **
Germany-West	.489 **	.465 **	.432 **	.803 **	.136 **	.110 **	.283 **	.468 **	.441 **	.420 **
Great Britain	.540 **	.412 **	.270 **	.828 **	.056	.024	.329 **	.499 **	.389 **	.304 **
Italy	.288 **	.290 **	.248 **	.631 **	–.161 **	–.148 **	.145 **	.393 **	.256 **	.216 **
Ireland	.348 **	.199 **	.092	.755 **	–.003	–.029	.251 **	.349 **	.129 **	.104 *
Netherlands	.308 **	.420 **	.379 **	.662 **	–.022	–.045	.189 **	.514 **	.537 **	.410 **
Norway	.340 **	.523 **	.342 **	.767 **	–.030	–.093 **	.134 **	.537 **	.519 **	.325 **
Sweden	.183 **	.505 **	.450 **	.719 **	–.314 **	–.289 **	–.103 *	.590 **	.558 **	.519 **
Spain	.401 **	.205 **	.069	.715 **	–.011	–.024	.375 **	.170 **	.134 **	.054
Canada	.672 **	.136 **	.191 **	.492 **	–.085 *	–.020	.296 **	.521 **	.314 **	.341 **
USA	.431 **	.261 **	.246 **	.686 **	–.012	–.037	.165 **	.426 **	.337 **	.360 **
AUS	.496 **	.380 **	.343 **	.715 **	–.036	–.033	.121 **	.518 **	.501 **	.461 **
New Zealand	.441 **	.315 **	.305 **	.701 **	–.068	–.011	.196 **	.410 **	.418 **	.443 **
Japan	.677 **	.300 **	.259 **	.773 **	.083 *	.105 **	.452 **	.366 **	.211 **	.227 **

Note: measurement model with cross-national invariant factor loadings. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$. (two-tailed)

Table 4.5 *Overview of polychoric correlations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in 23 populations*

	Chauvinism	Patriotism	Exclusionism of immigrants	Exclusionism of refugees
Patriotism	+ (23)			
Exclusionism of immigrants	+ (21) n.s. (2)	+ (3) n.s. (15) – (5)		
Exclusionism of refugees	+ (17) n.s. (6)	+ (4) n.s. (14) – (5)	+ (23)	
Exclusionism from group membership	+ (23)	+ (21) n.s. (1) – (1)	+ (23)	+ (21) n.s. (2)

Note: between brackets the number of populations (+ , n.s., and – refer to respectively a positive, a non-significant, and a negative relation).

Comparing the correlations between ethnic exclusionism and, respectively, chauvinism and patriotism, a consistent finding emerged: The correlation between chauvinism and dimensions of ethnic exclusionism was stronger compared with the correlation between patriotism and dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. This applies to each country and each dimension of ethnic exclusionism.

In the majority of the countries, a higher degree of patriotism was associated with stronger exclusionism from group membership. Only in Sweden was the relation significantly negative and in Russia positive, but not significant.

It is noteworthy that the cross-national differences in the relationship between patriotism on the one hand and exclusionism of immigrants and political refugees on the other hand are great. In five countries, these relationships were negative. That is, a higher level of patriotism was associated with the willingness to accept *more* immigrants in Sweden, Hungary, Italy, Czech Republic, and in Canada. In addition, patriotism was associated with *less* exclusionism of political refugees in Norway, and, again, in Sweden, Hungary, Italy, and Czech Republic. However, in a majority of the countries (respectively 15 and 14 out of 23) patriotism was not significantly related to either exclusionism of immigrants or exclusionism of refugees. These findings are in accordance with the conceptualisation of patriotism as a less aggressive and rather

humanistic attachment to the own country and group, since it was not – or even negatively – related to either exclusionism of immigrants or exclusionism of refugees. Hence, the aforementioned results support Bar-Tal's (1993) notion that patriotism is essentially positive and does not have a negative meaning.

On the other hand, in a few countries, patriotism was positively related to exclusionism of immigrants and political refugees. Firstly, the results for Bulgaria were ambiguous in this respect: whereas patriotism was negatively, but not significantly related to exclusionism of immigrants, it was positively related to exclusionism of political refugees. These mixed results seem puzzling. Secondly, in only 3 of the 23 populations, patriotism was positively associated with both exclusionism of immigrants and exclusionism of political refugees. In the two German populations - resident in the territory of the former Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic Republic – as well as in Japan, a high degree of patriotism was associated with stronger exclusionism of immigrants and political refugees. It appeared that patriotism was of a different nature in Germany and Japan compared to that in other countries.

Presumably, this striking finding is related to the special historical context in both countries, in which debates about national identity and patriotism may be strongly affected by the historical experiences prior to and during the Second World War. I will return to this topic in section 4.6. First, I turn to the fourth and final research question of this chapter, regarding the differences between countries with respect to the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

4.5.4 Levels of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism

After selecting the set of items that can be used to measure dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in different countries in an equivalent manner (as illustrated in Figure 4.1), I am now able to compare the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism among the ethnic majority group in these countries. To answer this descriptive question, I computed the average sum of scores of the indicators for each theoretical concept. In these analyses, data were weighted to correct for national-specific sample characteristics (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1998).

Before I describe the cross-national differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I return to a topic raised in Chapter 3, regarding the effect of different modes of questionnaire administration in various countries. In some countries, the questionnaire was fielded as a self-administered questionnaire, whereas in other countries face-to-face interviews were conducted. Presumably, in the latter mode of administration, the respondent is more confronted with problems of self-presentation. If, indeed, the respondents were more inclined to give social desirable answers in face-to-face interviews, then this would result in an underestimation of the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in countries where face-to-face interviews were conducted.

As a crude test to explore whether the different mode of administration affected the results, I examined whether the average score on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism was related to the mode of administration. The results are presented in Appendix D. No support was found for the aforementioned proposition that nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are lower in countries with face-to-face administration. By contrast, the average level of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism in these countries was stronger compared to countries in which a self-completion questionnaire was fielded. Hence, cross-national difference in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism cannot be explained by the different mode of questionnaire administration.

Next, I briefly describe the cross-national differences in the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism among the ethnic majority population. In Figure 4.2 the average chauvinism scores for each country are presented, as well as the general mean. In addition, countries are also divided into four groups: the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Russia; the Western European countries (including the territory of the former German Democratic Republic); the traditional immigration countries (Canada, U.S.A., Australia, and New Zealand); and finally, Japan as the only Asian country. On the potential range in scores from 1 to 5, there were considerable differences between countries (eta = 0.33). On average, there was a slight inclination to superiority feelings, with an average mean of 3.26. Bulgarians showed the highest level of chauvinism (3.76), followed by the Austrians and Hungarians (respectively 3.62 and 3.58). It is interesting to note that the position of Bulgaria as the most chauvinistic country, as well as the high score of some other Eastern European countries, did not correspond to the country's prestige in the international economic and political domain. Apparently, feelings of national superiority were only marginally based on the actual international performance of the country.

The Dutch were the least chauvinistic (2.74), followed by the two German populations. The Dutch and the Germans were also the only populations in which feelings of superiority tend to be lacking, as indicated by an average score below the neutral mark (3.0). Although there are strong differences within the four types of countries, there are also some differences between types of countries (eta = .19). Chauvinism tended to be low in the Western European countries (3.09), compared to Eastern Europe (3.41) and the immigration countries (3.40), with Japan taking a middle position (3.31).

With regard to patriotism, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, there were strong differences between countries, ranging from 1.82 and 1.85 in respectively Hungary and Russia, to 3.07 in the U.S.A. (eta = 0.56). Here, the national differences corresponded more clearly with the classification of countries (eta between categories = 0.45). In Russia and the Eastern European countries, people on average lacked pride in their country, whereas the degree of patriotism was much higher in Western European countries and in particular in the immigration countries and Japan. Most probably, these differences were influenced by the perception of actual country performance in the domain of democracy, economic achievements and international political influence. In this sense, the low values of the Eastern European countries and the top position of the United States are not surprising. In addition, this could partly explain the exceptional low

degree of patriotism among Italians as compared to other Western European countries. Note also the strong different relative position of the Eastern European countries in Figure 4.3 compared to Figure 4.2: whereas at the individual level, the level of chauvinism and patriotism were positively interrelated within each country, this relation did not hold at the country level.

Figure 4.2 *Mean level of chauvinism in 23 populations*



Figure 4.3 *Mean level of patriotism in 23 populations*



Next, I turn to the cross-national differences in dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Starting with the exclusionism of immigrants (Figure 4.4), I observed relatively strong differences between countries (eta = 0.34). In general, the Eastern European countries scored somewhat higher (4.06) compared to the immigration countries and particularly Japan (3.74 and 3.38); eta = 0.17. Latvians (4.49) and Hungarians (4.42) were most in favour of restricting the number of immigrants, followed by the Germans in the former GDR (4.34) who scored somewhat higher than their western counterparts (4.25). The least exclusionistic stance toward immigrants was found among the Irish population (3.05). On average, they took a neutral position, preferring the number of immigrants to their country to remain "the same as it is" (score 3). Apart from the Irish, all other ethnic majority populations favour reducing the number of immigrants, with an average mean of 3.88.

Figure 4.4 *Mean level of exclusionism of immigrants in 23 populations*



In sharp contrast with this reluctance to allow in more immigrants, the willingness to admit political refugees was surprisingly rather high, as depicted in Figure 4.5. Only in two countries, Slovenia (mean 3.59) and in particular Latvia (3.99), did the ethnic majority population take the view that political refugees should not be allowed to stay in their country. In all other countries, people tended to a neutral or positive stance toward admittance of political refugees. Exclusionism of refugees was least supported in the two German populations and in Austria (eta between countries = 0.36). In general, the Western European nations were less exclusive, with the remarkable exceptions of Great Britain and Italy (eta between country categories = 0.23).

Figure 4.5 *Mean level of exclusionism of political refugees in 23 populations*



Figure 4.6 *Mean level of exclusionism from group membership in 23 populations*



The difference between the level of exclusionism of immigrants in general and political refugees in particular was surprisingly striking in East and West Germany: the relative position of the Germans regarding their willingness to admit political refugees was almost the mirror image of their reluctance to admit more immigrants in general.

Finally, Figure 4.6 shows the average scores on exclusionism from the national community. Compared to the previous figures, here I found the least differences between nations (eta = 0.22). In general, membership of the national in-group was defined fairly restrictively in terms of country of birth, length of residence and language. In other words, people who are not able to speak the national language, who are foreign-born, and/or who have not lived in the country for the majority of their lives, were not viewed as 'true' members of the national community. As stated, there was considerable consensus in the importance of these criteria. Exclusionism from group membership was the strongest in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (respectively 3.43 and 3.36). The lowest average score on exclusionism from group membership was found in Canada (2.77), which corresponds with the official multicultural policy of the Canadian government.

The relatively low level of the latter dimension of ethnic exclusionism in Germany may be related to the distinction between two different notions of nationhood: a notion of nationhood based on *jus soli* (i.e., soil or place of residence) versus a notion of nationhood based on *jus sanguinis* (i.e., blood or descent). The system of *jus soli* originated from the French Revolution, whereas Germany is regarded as the typical representative of the system of *jus sanguinis* (Brubaker, 1992). That is, people resident outside Germany, who can prove that their ancestors were of German origin, are entitled to migrate to Germany and to receive German citizenship. In line with this notion of citizenship as applied by the German government, the German population attached relatively less importance to whether or not a person was born in Germany, had lived in Germany for a long time, or even spoke the German language, regarding their view of whether or not this person is a 'true' German.

Regarding the level of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I found no marked differences between the populations of the old Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic Republic, despite their distinct historical experiences after World War II. Regarding chauvinism, exclusionism of immigrants, and exclusionism from the national community, East Germans scored somewhat higher. On the other hand, West Germans showed slightly more patriotism and exclusionism of political refugees.

In the previous section, I noted that it was only in Germany and in Japan that patriotism was positively related to both exclusionism of immigrants and refugees. With regard to the level of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, Germans and Japanese were not dissimilar from other populations in a clear, consistent manner. Both populations showed somewhat higher degrees of patriotism compared to the overall mean. Whereas Germans were more exclusionistic toward immigrants, the Japanese showed less exclusionism of immigrants than average. Regarding exclusionism of political refugees, the differences were reversed.

4.6 Conclusions and discussion

In this chapter, I conducted an international comparison of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, focusing on the dimensions, interrelations, and levels of nationalistic attitudes and exclusionism of ethnic out-groups. I showed that these attitudes could be measured in an

international study by means of measurements that were cross-nationally equivalent in a large number of countries. That is, a measurement model in which (a) each indicator referred validly and reliably to the same theoretical concept in each and every country, and (b) the degree to which an indicator referred to the theoretical concept was invariant across countries, showed an acceptable goodness-of-fit. The present study therefore contradicts the beliefs of sceptics who doubt whether it is possible to compare nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes by means of the same survey-questions in different countries.

The first research question addressed the issue whether nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are multi-dimensional, rather than one-dimensional concepts. The findings support *Hypothesis 1*, stating that nationalistic attitudes entail two different dimensions: chauvinism and patriotism, and both dimensions are positively related. Furthermore, in accordance with *Hypothesis 2*, three different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism could be distinguished: the preference to reduce the number of immigrants in general; the willingness to close the national borders to political refugees in particular; and the extent to which ethnic out-groups are excluded as members of the national in-group.

The second research question concerned the interrelations between (dimensions) of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Both dimensions of nationalistic attitudes turned out to be differentially related to exclusionism of immigrants and political refugees. Firstly, in general, chauvinism is positively related to all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism (with only few exceptions). Secondly, chauvinism is stronger related to ethnic exclusionism than is patriotism. This applies for each country and each dimension of ethnic exclusionism. This consistent finding confirms *Hypothesis 3*, and is in accordance with the conceptual distinction between chauvinism as a blind, uncritical national attachment, combined with feelings of national superiority, and patriotism as a less extreme national attachment, based on a more critical evaluation of one's own country.

Thirdly, in the majority of countries, patriotism is not significantly related to either exclusionism of immigrants or exclusionism of political refugees. Moreover, in five countries patriotism is associated with *less* exclusionism of immigrants (i.e., in Sweden, Hungary, Italy, Czech Republic, and Canada) and with *less* exclusionism of political refugees (i.e., in Norway, and, again, Sweden, Hungary, Italy, and Czech Republic). This finding illustrates that the notion of ethnocentrism (the combination of positive in-group attitudes and negative out-group attitudes) is too simplified. That is, a positive in-group attitude – as expressed by a high degree of patriotism – does not necessarily imply out-group hostility.

No universal pattern of relationships between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism was found, since dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism were differently related in various countries. It was striking to find that only in Germany and Japan, was a higher level of patriotism related to both stronger exclusionism of immigrants and stronger exclusionism of political refugees, whereas in other countries this relationship was absent or even reversed. I note that the latter findings for Germany are consistent with a study by Blank and Schmidt (Blank & Schmidt, 1993) in two West German cities. In a reply to Noelle-Neumann and Köcher (Noelle-Neumann & Köcher, 1987) who argued that national pride has

many more positive outcomes than negative outcomes, Blank and Schmidt showed that national pride – measured as proud to be a German – correlated with feelings of hostility toward foreigners, the denial of citizenship for foreigners, anti-Semitism, as well as with the denial of negative aspects of and the idealisation of German history.[15]

The status of Germany and Japan as exceptions to the general rule most probably indicates the troublesome relation of these nations with their collective past, in particular the Second World War. In Germany, the debate about the national identity received renewed interest following the 1989 reunification of former West and East Germany (Blank & Schmidt, 1993). In addition, both in Germany and Japan, the debate about national identity and history was heightened by the commemorations of the end of the Second World War, which took place in 1994 and 1995, just before the survey data were collected. In Germany, these wartime anniversary events revealed the difficulties of trying to come to terms with the atrocities of the Nazi past, and defining a new future for Germany in a unified Europe.

Japan's post-war struggle with its national past is particularly reflected in the heated debate over school curricula and textbook contents. Since 1945, there has been an ongoing battle over the extent to which school textbooks should acknowledge the atrocities of the Japanese past (McCormack, 1998; Nozaki & Inokuchi, 1998).[16] Until the 1990s, there was official silence on shameful topics such as the 'military comfort women'. However, in the beginning of the 1990s, Japan was confronted with dozens of lawsuits, filed among others by 'military comfort women', claiming apology and compensation for Japan's colonialism and aggression (McCormack, 1998). According to Hein and Selden (1998), the 1990s witnessed an unprecedented level of openness in Japanese discussion of wartime responsibilities, including several public apologies by Japanese prime ministers.

One could argue that, due to historical experiences, the German and Japanese discourse on national identity and pride have been contaminated with severe negative connotations. With regard to the political culture in (West) Germany, Topf et al. (1990, p. 172) pointed out that it has not been opportune to flaunt one's pride of being a German. Indeed, previous research supported this notion: data from the European Values Study of 1981/1982 showed that only 21% of West Germans were 'very proud to be German', whereas on average 38% of the inhabitants of the participating European countries said that they were 'very proud to be a [nationality]' (Noelle-Neumann & Köcher, 1987, p. 50). Data from the Eurobarometer Studies showed the same gap in pride in 1988: 19% of the West Germans said they were very proud, compared to 43% among the other participating European countries (Eurobarometer 30, own calculations). Almost a decade later, in 1997, this gap had even increased: whereas on average 39% of the citizens of other European countries said that they were 'very proud', only 10% of the West Germans were very proud to be German. The figure was even lower in Eastern Germany; only 5% were very proud to be German (Eurobarometer 47.1, own calculations).

In accordance with these findings, the results of the present study show that the Germans were, next to the Dutch, the least chauvinistic. However, the Japanese level of chauvinism equalled the cross-national average. Furthermore, I found that the level of patriotism in Germany and Japan was higher than average, which contradicts the contention that it would not be

opportune to express patriotic feelings in Germany and Japan. Partly, their relatively high degree of patriotism was influenced by pride in their countries' economic achievements. However, even if I control for the latter result, West Germans and the Japanese still show a higher degree of patriotism than average, whereas East Germans show only slightly less patriotism.

If, following the notion of Topf et al. (1990), it would not be opportune to flaunt one's pride of being a German or a Japanese, one would also expect that those Germans or Japanese who, despite the historical burden of their countries, are very patriotic, bear more resemblance to chauvinists in other countries than to patriots in other countries. This would then explain why Germans and Japanese who are more patriotic are more strongly inclined to exclude immigrants and refugees. This notion is however only partly supported by my empirical findings. That is, following the aforementioned argument, one would expect higher correlations between chauvinism and patriotism in Germany and Japan. Indeed, the Japanese and East German populations are among the four populations with the highest correlation between chauvinism and patriotism, respectively .68 and .62. On the other hand, the correlation in West Germany is considerably lower (.49), although this is still higher than in 14 other populations. In conclusion, the exceptional relation between patriotism and exclusionism of immigrants and refugees in Germany and Japan is not yet satisfactorily explained.

In this chapter, I argued that it is possible to compare nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in a large number of countries by means of equivalent measurements. I investigated the multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, as well as the interrelations of these dimensions in 23 different countries. Next, in an explorative analysis of the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in 23 countries, I found considerable cross-national differences. In Chapter 6, I will systematically test hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory, regarding the explanation of cross-national differences in the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. First, in Chapter 5, I explore the differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism between social categories. In particular, I focus on the effect of educational attainment on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

Notes Chapter 4

This chapter is a translation and an adaptation of a chapter that appeared in a book edited by Shadid and Van Koningsveld (Coenders, 1999).

[1] At the outset of this analysis, I note that the attempt to construct a common measurement model for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism may be hindered by the fact that I have to apply the available secondary data, i.e., data previously gathered by other researchers with presumably other research goals and questions than the ones I attempt to address.

[2] Sumner's interpretations of ethnographic studies, however, were simply illustrations, not empirical tests, and one could raise several objections to his data (see LeVine & Campbell, 1972, p. 10).

[3] In the present study, I will not address the difference between one's attachment to the ethnic 'nation' as the imagined community of one's people (Anderson, 1991), and one's attachment to the state, country or the people from one's country. I explicated the applied conceptualisation of nationalistic attitudes in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1.

[4] In addition, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) investigated the impact of these factors on public opinion regarding nuclear policy. They found a striking difference between the correlation of the nuclear policy opinion with respectively the patriotism factor and the (chauvinistic) nationalistic attitudes factor. This finding supports the contention that nationalistic attitudes entail multiple dimensions. While Kosterman and Feshbach found a positive correlation between patriotism and (chauvinistic) nationalistic attitudes ($r = .28$), it appears that both aspects should be regarded as separate dimensions of nationalistic attitudes.

[5] The applied conceptualisation in this study corresponds with the conceptual distinction between chauvinism and patriotism as proposed by Bar-Tal (1993).

[6] In most countries, such as the European countries, the dominant ethnic group is the indigenous ethnic group (e.g., Germans in Germany). In other countries, which have had a long history of large scale immigration, such as Australia, the indigenous ethnic group (e.g., the Aboriginals in Australia) is the subordinate group in terms of their control of state and economic organisations. Conversely, the initial immigrants have become the superordinate group. In the present study, I will not elaborate on the attitudes of ethnic minority groups, due to the overall small number of respondents from these ethnic groups in national samples.

[7] Jöreskog (1990) reports that estimates of polychoric correlations are robust against departures from bivariate normality of the underlying variables.

[8] Jöreskog & Sörbom (1993a) noted that the Chi-square measure is very sensitive to departures from multivariate normality of the observed variables. In large samples, these departures from normality tend to increase the Chi-square measure over and above what can be expected due to the model's error of specification.

[9] I applied the goodness-of-fit measure GFI of Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a), the comparative fit index CFI of Bentler (1990) as well as the normed fit index NFI, as developed by Tucker and Lewis, and Bentler and Bonett (see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a). GFI, CFI and NFI are normed statistics, ranging from zero to one. As a rule-of-thumb, a minimum value for GFI and CFI of 0.90 has been proposed. Browne and Cudeck (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) proposed a fit measure that takes account of the error of approximation in the population. They suggested using Steiger's Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as a measure of the discrepancy (due to approximation) per degree of freedom. RMSEA will be zero only if the model fits exactly. It will decrease if parameters are added to the model that substantially reduce the discrepancy due to approximation. If, however, the

additional parameters reduce the discrepancy only slightly, the RMSEA can increase. Based on practical experience, Browne and Cudeck suggested that a value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom, whereas values of 0.08 and lower indicate a reasonable error of approximation. Knudsen (Knudsen, 1997, p. 240) noted that, according to direct communication from Karl Jöreskog the 8.12a version of LISREL does not give the correct RMSEA value in multi-group analyses. The value as given by the program should be multiplied by the square root of the number of groups (here 23). In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, I present the adjusted RMSEA-value. Finally, I assess the goodness-of-fit by taking into account the standardised root mean square residual (st. RMR) and the expected value of the cross-validation index (ECVI).

[10] As Bollen (1989, p. 356) pointed out, the comparability (or invariance) in models represents a continuum. He distinguished between two dimensions of comparability: model form and similarity in parameter values. Models for different samples have the same form if each model has the same parameter matrices with the same dimensions and the same location of fixed, free, and constrained parameters. The invariance in model form is a matter of degree. On the one hand, the invariance in model form can be rather low if models have very different numbers of latent variables or if observed variables load on different latent variables in different models. On the other hand, the invariance in model form is rather high if the model forms are identical except for the pattern of correlated measurement errors. Models can also differ with regard to the parameter values, from the one extreme where no parameters are equal across the populations under study, to the other extreme where all are invariant.

[11] In matrix terms, this implies the following: Each row of the matrix Λx contains one factor loading, the other row elements are fixed to zero. The elements of the covariance matrix of latent variables, Φ, are all free, and the matrix of measurement errors $\Theta\delta$ is a diagonal matrix.

[12] Since only ratios of factor loadings are identified – and not factor loadings themselves – the model assumes invariance of factor loading ratios across countries. Invariance of all factor loadings across countries is not a testable assumption. However, if the assumption of invariant factor loading ratios is justified, then it is probably safe to assume invariance of the factor loadings themselves (Bielby, 1986).

[13] Bollen (1989, p. 197) defined the indicator validity – the extent to which an indicator measures what it is supposed to measure – as the magnitude of the direct structural relation between the theoretical concept and its indicator. The magnitude of the validity coefficient (or factor loading) of each item has to be compared relative to the validity coefficient of the item whose factor loading has been constrained at unity, since only ratios of factor loadings are identified.

[14] The reliability of an observed variable is defined as the magnitude of the direct relations that all variables (except measurement errors) have on the observed variable (Bollen, 1989, p. 221). Reliability can therefore be measured as the squared multiple correlation coefficient R^2, indicating the proportion of item variance explained by the latent variable.

[15] Blank and Schmidt (1993) applied two sorts of measurement for 'national pride': a global measure of national pride ("proud to be a German") as well as pride in specific collective assets of the country (such as its history, political system, economic achievements). Their results indicated that national pride is a multi-dimensional concept. They found three dimensions: the first dimension consisted of the global pride item and an item measuring pride in the history of Germany; the second dimension consisted mostly of items referring to the political system and the achievements of the social security system; whereas pride in other collective assets such as the country's political influence in the world or its economic achievements loaded on a third factor. Anti-foreigner attitudes and anti-Semitism correlated most strongly with global national pride and pride in the history of Germany, and to a lesser extent with items referring to pride in Germany's economic achievements, political influence, achievements in

sports, etc. In general, items referring to the political system and the achievements of the social security system did not correlate with anti-foreigner attitudes and anti-Semitism. In the present comparative study, this presumed multi-dimensionality of national pride will not be addressed.

[16] From 1953 onwards, the Japanese Ministry of Education has applied a textbook screening system, forcing textbook authors to make revisions such as eliminating or toning down negative comments on Japanese wartime conduct. Many Japanese criticized this censorship, demanding a more critical view of Japan's past international conduct (Nozaki & Inokuchi, 1998). Others, however, such as the 'Liberal View of History Study Group' reject even the slightest acknowledgements of Japanese wartime atrocities, claiming that such an education prohibits Japanese children from taking pride in their country's history (McCormack, 1998).

CHAPTER 5

The effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism: an international comparison

5.1 Introduction and research questions

One of the most consistent findings in social research on ethnic attitudes is the negative association between educational attainment and ethnic prejudice: higher educated people are less prejudiced toward ethnic out-groups compared to lower educated people. This relationship has been established in empirical research over time as well as in different countries (Fuchs, Gerhards, & Roller, 1993; Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Smith, 1981, 1985; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978; Vogt, 1997). Although most studies focus solely on attitudes toward ethnic out-groups, there is also empirical evidence that the higher educated are less prone to chauvinism than lower educated groups (Billiet, Carton, & Huys, 1990; Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989). In short, feelings of in-group superiority and ethnic prejudice are more commonly found among lower educated strata.

Due to the relative scarcity of cross-national comparative studies, it is not well known whether this so-called liberalising effect of education is universal, or whether and to what extent it varies across countries. According to Weil (1985) the effect of education may vary systematically across countries. However, Weil's 4-country study has severe shortcomings due to lack of comparability in the applied data. In this study, I set out to extend previous research – in particular Weil's study – by applying cross-national comparable measurements of nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes of the ethnic majority population in 22 different countries, gathered in 1995.

I investigate whether the effect of educational attainment on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism varies systematically across types of countries. In particular, I test hypotheses on whether the educational effect varies with the length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form and the degree of religious heterogeneity within a country.

For a rigorous test of the effect of education, I conduct multivariate analyses, controlling the effect of education for other individual background variables as age, social class, income level, denomination, and church attendance. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I conduct an exploratory analysis of the differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic

exclusionism between social categories in general. Secondly, I focus in particular on the effect of education, controlled for other individual characteristics, and test whether the educational effect varies systematically across countries. Hence, I address the following research questions, as formulated in Chapter 1:

What are the differences between social categories of the ethnic majority population with regard to nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?

Does the effect of educational attainment on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism vary systematically across types of countries?

5.2 Previous empirical research regarding the effect of education

The negative relationship between educational attainment and (various measures of) ethnic intolerance has been established time and again, especially in studies of the white American population (Schuman et al., 1997; Vogt, 1997). In a series of articles, applying continuous survey research from 1942 onwards, Sheatsley and various co-authors showed that higher educated white Americans were more supportive toward racial integration (Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1956, 1964; Taylor et al., 1978). Selznick and Steinberg (1969) and Martire and Clark (1982) found less anti-Semitism among the higher educated. Research conducted in European countries also showed that negative stereotypes toward ethnic minorities were less accepted among the higher educated (Billiet, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 1996; De Witte, 1999; Haegel, 1999; Peri, 1999; Wagner & Zick, 1995; Winkler, 1999). Furthermore, support for unfavourable treatment of ethnic minorities in the housing and labour market was found to be particularly present among the lower educated (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Verberk, 1999).

In addition, researchers also found liberalising effects of educational attainment in other realms (Hyman & Wright, 1979), such as moral attitudes (Walzer, 1994; Wilcox, 1992) and political tolerance or support for civil liberties (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Lipset, 1981; Stouffer, 1955).

In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between education and negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants as well as positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group. The interrelation between unfavourable attitudes toward out-groups and favourable attitudes toward the in-group is called *ethnocentrism*. Although the concept of ethnocentrism was already introduced in 1906 by William Sumner (1959), and adopted – among others – by Adorno and his associates in their classic study on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969), most contemporary research focuses solely on attitudes toward ethnic out-groups, neglecting the attitudes toward the in-group. However, some studies showed a negative relationship between education and positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group: that is, chauvinistic nationalistic feelings were less widespread among higher educated persons (Billiet et al., 1996). In short, the dominant research finding has been that educational attainment is

associated with increasing tolerance toward ethnic out-groups and decreasing feelings of in-group superiority.

However, this effect of education is not universal. That is, the effect of education on inter-ethnic attitudes and tolerance varies across contexts. Firstly, the educational effect depends on the applied measure of ethnic tolerance. Secondly, there are some indications that the effect of education varies across countries.

With respect to the applied measurement, Hyman and Sheatsley (1956) found strong effects of education on the approval of school integration and the approval of integration of public transportation, but they found no differences between educational groups with respect to the approval of residential integration.[1] Smith (1981) compared approval of the principle of school desegregation with the willingness to send one's children to school where a few, half, or most of the children are black. The liberalising effect of education varied negatively with the proportion of black children in the school. Schuman, et al. (1997) reported the same finding in an overview study of trends in racial attitudes in the U.S. between the 1940s and the 1990s. In addition, they found similar effects with respect to residential integration.[2] In summary, they concluded, "when the degree of integration proposed would make whites into a minority, highly educated respondents are no longer in the vanguard".

Furthermore, Schuman et al. (1997) reported that educational attainment was generally associated with stronger adherence to principles of non-discrimination and desegregation, but this association tended to decrease when implementation of these principles was involved (cf. Jackman, 1978; Jackman & Muha, 1984).

Not only does the effect of education depend on the measure of ethnic intolerance, there is some evidence that the effect of education may vary across countries. Based on a study of anti-Semitism in 4 countries, Weil (1985) concluded that, overall, education had the largest effect in the U.S., smaller effects in West Germany and France, and the smallest effect in Austria.

A major drawback of Weil's study is the lack of comparability of his data. Due to the lack of cross-national comparable data, he was forced to apply items that had different item formulations and different answer categories across countries, and that were gathered in different time periods in different countries. Therefore, as Weil rightfully acknowledged, his results are more suggestive than conclusive.

With recently available cross-national survey data gathered by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), it is now possible to investigate the effect of education on inter-ethnic attitudes more thoroughly and systematically. The 1995 ISSP dataset entitled 'Aspects of National Identity' has several advantages. Firstly, equivalent question wordings and answer categories are applied in each country. Secondly, data were gathered in a large heterogeneous set of countries – covering Western European countries, former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Russia, as well as traditional immigration countries, such as the U.S. and Australia – allowing a systematic investigation of the effect of education.

5.3 Overview of theoretical interpretations of the effect of education

Although there are numerous studies reporting an overall negative effect of education on in-group favouritism or out-group prejudice, it is much less clear why education has such an effect. Various interpretations have been offered, but only in a few studies were such interpretations operationalised, measured, and empirically tested.

In this study, I focus on *socialisation theory* as a plausible explanation of the educational effect. A central thesis of socialisation theory is the notion that educational institutions transmit norms, values, and models of behaviour deemed to be appropriate in a given society. Presumably, the negative association between education and nationalistic attitudes or ethnic exclusionism is due particularly to the dissemination of democratic value orientations in the educational system (Selznick & Steinberg, 1969). Before I discuss socialisation theory in detail, I briefly present other theoretical explanations for the educational effect (i.e., the more general cognitive approach; the personality development approach; and realistic group conflict theory), in order to explore whether these theories may provide other – complementary or contradictory – hypotheses.

In contemporary research, most theoretical interpretations regarding the relation between education and inter-ethnic attitudes stress the cognitive component of these attitudes. In this cognitive approach, it is emphasized that prejudiced beliefs are intellectually unenlightened beliefs (Selznick & Steinberg, 1969; Weil, 1985). Ethnic stereotypes – whether positive stereotypes toward the in-group or negative stereotypes toward out-groups – are simplifications of social reality; they are generalizations that are improperly applied to *all* members of an ethnic group. Similarly, xenophobic beliefs in which immigrants and foreigners are viewed as the (primary) cause of societal problems reflect a simplified view of social reality. Individuals with a primitive cognitive style assign blame to ethnic out-groups and look for scapegoats because they fail to comprehend impersonal and abstract causes (Selznick & Steinberg, 1969). Nevertheless, although many stereotype attributions are crude and simple, they are to a certain extent the inevitable result of attempting to deal with the complexities of daily social life. The question then becomes why highly educated people reject such prejudiced beliefs and antagonistic attitudes that arise from these beliefs. According to the *cognitive approach*, the differences in prejudice between educational groups can be interpreted in terms of three central processes within the educational system: the transfer of knowledge and information; the development of cognitive capacities; and, finally, the transfer of norms, values, and modes of behaviour. The latter process refers to the central thesis of socialisation theory (cf. De Witte, 1999).

With regard to the first two central processes mentioned, education is firstly characterized as a learning process through which people acquire knowledge and information. Basically, this relates to the well known 'ignorance causes prejudice' thesis (Stephan & Stephan, 1984). A higher level of education increases insight into the complexity and multi-causality of society and of individual behaviour, refuting simplifications inherent in ethnic stereotypes. In addition, education broadens one's social perspective: it increases the knowledge and understanding of different norms and values other than those common in one's own social group. Education,

therefore, raises the awareness of the subjective and particularistic character of the individual beliefs (Gabennesch, 1972; Roof, 1974). Based on a comprehensive review of (U.S.) data, Hyman, Wright, and Reed (1975) concluded that education indeed increases knowledge, deepens receptivity to further knowledge, and stimulates the urge to actively seek new information, long after formal schooling has ended. Furthermore, Stephan and Stephan (1984) showed that cultural knowledge (knowledge of the roles, norms, and values) of the ethnic out-group is strongly correlated to positive attitudes toward this out-group.

Secondly, the relation between educational attainment and inter-ethnic attitudes is interpreted in terms of cognitive capacities and/or habits. That is, education may increase cognitive abilities, which are necessary for a sophisticated analysis of problems in order to counterbalance the rigid simplifications inherent in most positive in-group and negative out-group attitudes. Although this interpretation is widespread, only a small number of empirical studies have employed direct measures of cognitive abilities. For instance, Wagner and Schönbach (1984) found that their measure of cognitive complexity was an important mediator in the link between educational attainment and ethnic prejudice. In a study on the related topic of political tolerance, Bobo and Licari (1989) found a strong effect of their measure of cognitive sophistication.[3]

Whereas the aforementioned theoretical approaches stress the cognitive component of prejudice, other theories focus on personality needs as the cause of prejudice. The most well known example of this *personality development approach* is the theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1969). In previous studies, strong empirical interrelations were found between ethnic prejudice and authoritarianism, as well as between educational attainment and authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1969; Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1990). In addition, the interrelation between education and prejudice has been interpreted in terms of self-esteem (Wagner & Schönbach, 1984). Higher educated persons, and in general people from a higher social strata, are assumed to have a higher self-esteem, and are therefore less inclined to enhance their social identity by perceiving their in-group as superior to out-groups (Tajfel, 1981, 1982a).

In addition to the cognitive approach and the personality development approach, the relationship between educational attainment and nationalistic attitudes or ethnic exclusionism can also be interpreted by *realistic group conflict theory* (LeVine & Campbell, 1972), as discussed in Chapter 2. A key element in this theory is the proposition that competition over scarce resources between social groups (e.g., ethnic groups) is the catalyst for antagonistic attitudes: inter-group competition leads to more in-group solidarity and to more out-group hostility (Bobo, 1988; Olzak, 1992; Sherif, 1979). In this view, ethnic groups are mutual competitors, since they have conflicting claims over status, power, privilege, and other scarce resources, along with expectations and subjective judgements about the 'proper' distribution of such scarce resources (Blumer, 1958; Coser, 1956). According to Blalock (1967), actual competition is reflected in perceptions of competition, that is, the subjectively perceived socio-economic threat that ethnic minorities pose to the social position of the dominant ethnic group. However, the extent to which dominant ethnic group members experience a threat from ethnic minorities may depend on their personal situation. Particularly those social categories that hold

social positions similar to those of the ethnic minorities will have to compete more with ethnic minorities on the labour and housing market than the average member of the in-group. Since ethnic immigrants and minorities are in general over-represented in the lower social strata of society (Kiehl & Werner, 1998), it is expected that nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are strongly prevalent among lower educated people, lower social classes and lower income groups. Because education, social class, and income are strongly interrelated, as shown by status-attainment models, it is necessary to estimate the effect of educational attainment in a multivariate analysis, controlling for the effects of social class position and income level.

To conclude this overview of interpretations of the relationship between educational attainment and nationalistic attitudes or ethnic exclusionism, I note that some authors doubt whether education really has a true effect, or, whether the effect is (to some extent) an empirical artefact. For instance, the educational effect may be overestimated due to a stronger tendency for lower educated respondents to answer in the affirmative to the (ethnocentric) items offered (Jackman, 1973). However, Schönbach et al. (1981) found no support for this 'acquiescent response bias'. Furthermore, the effect of education may be overestimated due to a stronger predisposition of higher educated respondents to give socially desirable answers. To test this latter proposition, Wagner and Zick (1995) conducted an experiment with a bogus-pipeline measurement procedure, in which responses are relatively free of response tendencies and strategies of positive self-presentation. As expected, respondents expressed more negative out-group attitudes when their attitudes were measured by the bogus-pipeline procedure compared to a paper-and-pencil method. However, contrary to expectations, the difference between lower and higher educated respondents was even stronger in the bogus-pipeline experimental group, indicating that even under conditions in which the tendency to give socially desirable answers is reduced, the differences between educational groups did not diminish, but in fact, even increased.

I introduced this chapter with the question of whether the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism varies across countries. Most of the aforementioned theories on the relation between education and ethnic attitudes do not incorporate any explanations of varying effects of educational attainment across countries. In a strict sense, psychodynamic theories that focus on personality needs, such as the theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1969), pose no cross-cultural variation (cf. Weil, 1985). Other theoretical propositions are difficult to test by means of cross-sectional survey data. For instance, to test the notions that educational systems transfer knowledge and information or support the development of cognitive abilities ideally requires a detailed examination of the content of educational curricula and teaching practices across countries. On the other hand, as I explicate in the next section, socialisation theory can be applied to derive testable hypotheses regarding cross-national variations in the educational effect. The aforementioned notions of realistic group conflict theory point out that such hypotheses should be tested in multivariate analyses, controlling for the effects of social class position and income level.

5.4 Socialisation theory

A key element in socialisation theory is the thesis that students are exposed to values, norms, and modes of behaviour transmitted by the educational system. That is, education brings people into contact with the official norms and values of society. According to Selznick and Steinberg (1969), the formal educational system is *the* main social institution for the transmission and elaboration of – what they designate as – the 'official' culture. This official, or ideal culture, which contains society's ideal norms, is distinguished from the 'unofficial or common' culture. Selznick and Steinberg viewed the official culture of the United States as an enlightened and unprejudiced culture, organized around scientific and democratic values. Conversely, they viewed the historically more archaic common culture in the United States as a prejudiced culture, characterized by pre-scientific, pre-democratic and pre-humanitarian values. Thus, the longer individuals participate in the educational system, the more they are exposed to scientific and democratic values. Since most prejudiced beliefs are, as Selznick and Steinberg argued, incongruent with these values, adherence to scientific and democratic values and ideals can counterbalance the – cognitively unenlightened – prejudiced beliefs.[4]

Selznick and Steinberg's (1969) analysis of the relation between education and (anti-Semitic) prejudice was confined to the United States. They argued that in such a society, with its democratic political order and its technologically based economy, the ideal norms of the official culture are derived from democratic and scientific values. Weil (1985) generalized their thesis by stating that the values that are transmitted by a country's educational system reflect the official or political culture of that country, which in turn is determined by the existing regime form. That is, in countries with a liberal, democratic regime form, the official or political culture encompasses democratic values and ideals, which are promulgated by the educational system. Accordingly, the negative association between education and nationalistic attitudes or ethnic exclusionism is due to the dissemination of democratic value orientations in educational institutions. However, since the values transmitted by the educational system reflect the dominant political culture, one would expect that the effect of education is smaller in countries with a less democratic regime form or a less long-standing democratic tradition.

The cross-national dataset at hand offers a unique opportunity to test these propositions. The inhabitants of Eastern Europe and Russia have only recently witnessed the transformation from a socialist one-party political power to a democratic political regime form. Most of the adult population in Eastern Europe and Russia attended educational institutions in times of a non-democratic government. Therefore, I expect that the differences between educational groups in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are smaller in these former socialist countries. The first hypothesis therefore reads that the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism depends on the *political regime form* of the country: the effect of education is smaller in recently established democracies *(hypothesis 1a)*.

Weil (1985) furthermore assumed a time lag between a change in political regime form and the ability of the educational system to socialise students into the new official political culture. Therefore, the length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form is

assumed to determine the extent to which the population is socialized in democratic ideals and values. Consequently, I expect that the effect of education is stronger in prolonged democracies as compared to countries where the liberal-democratic tradition has been interrupted, due to non-democratic regime forms since the 1940's, such as is the case in Italy, Germany, Austria, Spain, and Japan. Thus, the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism depends on the *length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form*: the effect of education is the strongest in prolonged democracies, less strong in interrupted democracies, and the smallest in recently established democracies *(hypothesis 1b)*.

In addition, Weil (1985) hypothesized that the political culture, as transmitted by the educational system, is also affected by the degree of cultural pluralism. Based on studies of conflict resolution in pluralistic societies (e.g. Lijphart, 1977), Weil stated that in a pluralistic society, in order to avoid overt conflict between population segments, the political elites must take the lead in promoting peaceful accommodation among the different groups. Since the political culture is transmitted through the educational system, it is assumed that in a more pluralistic society, educational institutions are more likely to attempt to teach and promulgate tolerant values and attitudes. I test this notion by investigating the extent to which the effect of education varies with the degree of religious heterogeneity of a country.[5] The hypothesis therefore reads that the effect of education depends on the degree of *religious heterogeneity*: the effect of education is stronger in more religious heterogeneous societies *(hypothesis 2)*.

5.5 Data and methods

Data were derived from the 1995 module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), as discussed in Chapter 3. The operationalisation and measurement of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism is described in Chapter 4. In section 4.5.2, I showed that the applied items form a cross-national comparable measurement instrument (i.e. with invariant factor loadings) for dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Analyses were restricted to respondents from the ethnic majority group in each country, as displayed in Appendix A.

Among the 22 countries for which data were available, there is a wide variety with respect to world region, ethnic and religious heterogeneity, immigration history, as well as the length of time that a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form. With regard to the latter characteristic, I distinguished three groups of countries: countries with a long-standing tradition of democratic government; countries where the liberal-democratic tradition was temporarily interrupted, due to a non-democratic regime before or (as in Spain) after 1945; and finally, the former socialist countries in Europe and Russia that only very recently made the transition to a political democracy. Furthermore, I grouped the countries by degree of religious heterogeneity within each country. Based on the religious denomination of all respondents (including respondents from ethnic minority groups) within each country, I calculated an index of religious

heterogeneity (Agresti & Agresti, 1977).[6] Table 5.1 displays the length of liberal-democratic tradition and the degree of religious heterogeneity for each country.

Table 5.1 *Liberal-democratic tradition and religious heterogeneity of 23 countries*

Country	Liberal-democratic tradition	Religious heterogeneity	
Australia	long	high	.88
Austria	interrupted	moderate	.43
Bulgaria	short	moderate	.40
Canada	long	high	.78
Czech Republic	short	moderate	.63
Germany-East	short	moderate	.64
Germany-West	interrupted	high	.79
Great Britain	long	high	.76
Hungary	short	moderate	.57
Ireland	long	low	.15
Italy	interrupted	low	.14
Japan	interrupted	moderate	.59
Latvia	short	high	.86
Netherlands	long	moderate	.66
New Zealand	long	high	.87
Norway	long	low	.27
Poland	short	low	.27
Russia	short	moderate	.65
Slovak Republic	short	moderate	.61
Slovenia	short	moderate	.43
Spain	interrupted	low	.18
Sweden	long	moderate	.57
USA	long	high	.94

5.5.1 Independent variables

Educational attainment was measured by means of the international educational classification scheme of the ISSP. I collapsed the original 7 categories into 4 categories: 'lower educational level', 'incomplete secondary educational level', 'completed secondary educational level' and 'higher educational level'.[7]

To indicate respondents' *social position* I combined several variables. Firstly, I used a variable that indicated whether respondents were currently employed or not. Among the latter

group, a further distinction was made between unemployed, students, retired persons, persons working in the household and a miscellaneous category of other social positions (also including employees whose occupation could not be classified). Secondly, for those respondents currently employed, I recoded the available occupational classification codes into the nominal class typology of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979). Most ISSP members applied the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) of the International Labour Office of the United Nations, either the 1968-revision or the 1988-revision (ILO, 1969, 1990).[8] To derive the EGP categories from ISCO68 and ISCO88, I followed the procedures of and standard modules generated by Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989) and Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).[9] For five countries – Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Great Britain, and Sweden – only a national specific occupational classification was available. I recoded the latter classifications into the EGP classification, following the aforementioned procedures (see also note 8).[10] To avoid small class frequencies, I combined several class categories, which resulted in a 6-category ordinal class classification: higher controllers; lower controllers, routine non-manual workers; self-employed (with or without employees); manual supervisors and skilled manual workers; and, finally, semi-unskilled manual workers.[11]

As a measure of the economic position, I applied the *household income*. In order to achieve a cross-national comparable measure, I standardised this variable within each country.[12] Furthermore, to avoid having a small effective sample size, I substituted missing data with the country-mean. Finally, I included *sex*, *age*, *denomination* and *church attendance* as control variables in the analysis. Since the various samples contained different age limits, I applied a common age limit for all samples, including only respondents between 18 and 75 years of age in the analyses. I distinguished 12 birth cohorts, in order to explore possible non-linear age effects. For the construction of the variable *denomination*, I subsumed small or country-specific denominations into broader denominational categories. I distinguished between Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant denominations; non-Christian denominations; non-religious persons; and finally, a category consisting of all non-valid answers (such as non-classifiable denominations, refusals, and other missing answers). *Church attendance* was measured by means of four categories, ranging from never going to church to attending nearly once a week or more.[13]

5.5.2 Methods

To investigate the relationship between the aforementioned individual characteristics and nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I applied multiple regression analyses. In these analyses, I computed the score for each dimension of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism by applying the average sum of scores of the specific indicators. Data were weighted to correct for national-specific sample characteristics (Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1998). The total number of valid responses in the 23 national samples – from 22 countries, with East and West Germany treated as separate samples – was 24,247. In order to

achieve equal sample size for each sample I re-weighted the data to sample sizes of 1,000 (total N=23,000).

All nominal variables as well as educational attainment and age were dummified. That is, the original variable was broken down into as many variables as it contained categories, minus one that served as a reference category. In order to correct for country-specific effects, I included country as a dummified variable in the analyses, with one country as reference category. In this manner, I obtained more accurate estimates of the effects of individual characteristics.[14] To test whether the educational effect differed across countries according to the liberal-democratic tradition or the degree of religious heterogeneity, I included interactions for education and, respectively, liberal-democratic tradition and religious heterogeneity.

5.6 Results

The results of a multivariate regression analysis in all countries simultaneously are presented in Table 5.2. For each of the five dependent variables, the unstandardised regression parameters are displayed. As can be seen at the top of the table, there were considerable differences between educational groups for 4 of the 5 dependent variables. Controlled for all the variables displayed in Table 5.2, lower educated respondents were more chauvinistic compared to higher educated respondents. Lower educated respondents demonstrated stronger exclusionistic tendencies toward ethnic out-groups on all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, although the size of the differences varies. Clearly, educational attainment was strongly related to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. In contrast, there were only minor differences between educational groups regarding the degree of patriotism. Only respondents with the lowest educational attainment level were significantly more patriotic compared to the highest educated ones. Again, this confirms the results presented in Chapter 4, i.e. that there is a substantial difference between a positive orientation toward the own country and the national in-group characterised by feelings of superiority and a blind, uncritical in-group attachment (i.e., chauvinism) and feelings of pride in specific achievements of one's own country (i.e., patriotism).

In addition to differences between educational groups, there were also considerable differences in chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism between respondents with different social positions. In general, lower social classes displayed a higher degree of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism, compared to the highest social class. Self-employed, manual supervisors and skilled manual workers scored significantly higher on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism than the reference category of higher controllers. This was also the case for semi-unskilled manual workers as well as for those who were unemployed, with the exception that the difference between these groups and higher controllers was not significant for the degree of exclusionism of political refugees. Furthermore, the routine non-manual workers scored somewhat higher than the higher controllers, but the difference was only significant for two dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

Table 5.2 *Unstandardised regression parameter estimates of individual characteristics on dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in overall population*

	Chauvinism	Patriotism	Exclusionism of immigrants	Exclusionism of political refugees	Exclusionism from group membership
Education					
Lower	.42 **	.05 **	.33 **	.42 **	.25 **
Incomplete secondary	.25 **	.01	.25 **	.30 **	.17 **
Complete secondary	.13 **	.00	.14 **	.14 **	.07 **
Higher	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Social position					
Higher controllers	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Lower controllers	–.01	.02	.03	–.01	–.00
Routine non-manual	.05	.02	.12 **	.06	.05 *
Self-employed	.08 **	.00	.18 **	.12 **	.06 *
Supervisors, skilled manual	.09 **	.01	.15 **	.14 **	.06 *
Semi-unskilled manual	.14 **	–.01	.12 **	.06	.11 **
Unemployed	.06 *	–.03	.13 **	.08	.10 **
Student, vocational training	–.11 **	.02	–.04	–.14 **	–.02
Retired	.12 **	.02	.13 **	.06	.06 **
Housekeepers	.09 **	.02	.15 **	.12 **	.08 **
Not classifiable	.06 *	–.01	.14 **	.07	.05 *
Family income	–.03 **	.01 *	–.02 **	–.03 **	–.01 *
Sex (male)	.03 *	.03 **	–.03 *	.01	–.01
Age					
18-21	–.29 **	–.13 **	.00	.16 **	–.23 **
22-26	–.32 **	–.15 **	–.03	.11 *	–.22 **
27-31	–.31 **	–.16 **	–.02	.05	–.23 **
32-36	–.31 **	–.15 **	–.01	.05	–.24 **
37-41	–.26 **	–.14 **	–.00	.05	–.20 **
42-46	–.23 **	–.12 **	–.01	.04	–.22 **
47-51	–.21 **	–.13 **	–.03	–.00	–.19 **
52-56	–.12 **	–.10 **	.02	.03	–.14 **
57-61	–.06	–.11 **	.04	.08	–.07 **
62-66	–.08 **	–.10 **	.04	.07	–.07 **
67-71	–.02	–.04	.01	–.08	–.03
72-75	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Denomination					
Catholic	.12 **	.03 *	.11 **	.12 **	.15 **
Orthodox	.02	.03	–.01	–.05	–.03
Protestant	.10 **	.05 *	.15 **	.09 **	.15 **
Other	.03	.00	.07 **	–.03	.03
No religion	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Church attendance					
≥ Nearly once a week	.03	.08 **	–.16 **	–.13 **	–.00
≥ Once a month	.06 **	.07 **	–.15 **	–.09 **	–.00
Less than once a month	.04 **	.06 **	–.08 **	–.01	–.01
Never	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Intercept	3.38 **	2.68 **	3.63 **	2.78 **	3.01 **
Adj. R^2	.209	.308	.167	.189	.113

Note: the effects of individual characteristics are controlled for the overall means of the 23 samples, by including 22 dummy-variables for the samples (parameter estimates not displayed). N = 23,000. Ref = reference category.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. (two-tailed)

With regard to social categories outside the labour force, chauvinism was lower among students, but higher among retired persons and people working in the household. For ethnic exclusionism I found the same pattern, although not all differences with the reference category were significant.

Controlled for (in particular) educational level and social position, the effect of family income was rather small. The higher the income, the lower the degree of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Patriotism, on the other hand, is slightly positively related to the income level.

Next, I consider the effects of the control variables sex, age, religious denomination, and church attendance. Differences between the sexes were small: males displayed more chauvinism and patriotism, but were less exclusionistic toward immigrants. Regarding age differences, the results were only partly in accordance with previous findings that indicated that the young were less nationalistic and less prejudiced (Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989; Smith, 1985). Indeed, younger birth cohorts appeared less chauvinistic and patriotic compared to older birth cohorts. The relationship was almost linear. In addition, the young were less negative toward ethnic out-groups regarding exclusionism from group membership. However, regarding exclusionism of immigrants and political refugees, the young were not more tolerant than the old. Conversely, it appeared that the youngest respondents were more in favour of exclusionism of political refugees than the older cohorts. This may indicate a decrease in support for the admission of political refugees in the near future.

In general, respondents who considered themselves to be members of a denomination had relatively stronger nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes. Orthodox religious respondents, predominantly inhabitants of Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic and Russia, did not deviate from non-religious respondents. The results for church attendance were mixed and somewhat puzzling. Whereas churchgoers were more nationalistic than non-churchgoers, they appeared to be relatively less exclusionistic toward immigrants and political refugees.

Table 5.2 indicates that educational attainment was strongly related to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism, even after controlling for a number of individual characteristics interrelated with educational level, such as social class position, income, age, religious affiliation and church attendance. To investigate the relative importance of educational attainment for the explanation of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I created composite variables for all categorical variables. A composite or compound variable for each categorical variable was created by using the estimated unstandardised regression coefficients for the dummified categories, as displayed in Table 5.2, as weights (Eisinga, Scheepers, & Snippenburg, 1991). Next, I conducted a second regression analysis in which each categorical variable was replaced by its composite variable. The standardised regression coefficient for the composite variable (also referred to as the sheaf-coefficient) reveals the overall effect of the categorical variable, and can be compared with the effect of non-categorical variables, such as income.

The standardized regression coefficients are displayed in Table 5.3.[15] This table shows that, controlled for all other individual variables, education had the strongest overall effect on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Compared to education, the effects of social position and income were considerably smaller. In summary, in multivariate analyses, education turned out to be the most important indicator for the explanation of individual differences in chauvinism and

ethnic exclusionism. Patriotism, however, was hardly affected by educational attainment, and related more strongly to age and church attendance.

Table 5.3 *Standardised regression parameter estimates of individual characteristics on dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in overall population, applying composite variables for categorical variables*

	Chauvinism	Patriotism	Exclusionism of immigrants	Exclusionism of political refugees	Exclusionism from group membership
Education	.19 **	.03 **	.13 **	.13 **	.14 **
Social position	.08 **	.02 **	.06 **	.05 **	.06 **
Family income	−.03 **	.01 *	−.02 **	−.03 **	−.01 *
Sex	.02 *	.02 **	−.02 **	.00	−.01
Age	.14 **	.05 **	.02 **	.04 **	.11 **
Denomination	.06 **	.03 **	.06 **	.05 **	.11 **
Church attendance	.03 **	.05 **	.06 **	.04 **	.00

Note: composite variables for education, social position, age, denomination, and church attendance were created using the unstandardised regression parameter estimates for the dummy variables, as displayed in Table 5.2, as weights. N = 23,000.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. (two-tailed)

Next, I investigated whether the effect of education varied systematically across countries, according to the length of liberal-democratic regime history and the degree of religious heterogeneity of the country. For a formal test of the varying effects of education, I computed interaction variables between education and, respectively, liberal-democratic tradition and religious heterogeneity. For convenience and clarity, educational attainment was treated as a metric variable in these analyses.

First, I tested whether the effect of education depended on the length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form. Table 5.4 summarizes the results, presenting only the parameter estimates for educational attainment. Note that these are multivariate parameter estimates, controlled for all other individual characteristics (social position, family income, sex, age, religious denomination, and church attendance). The first row in Table 5.4 displays the main effect of education, which indicates the educational effect in prolonged democracies. This serves as the reference point for the interpretation of the interaction parameters. The next two rows display the parameter estimates of the two interaction variables, representing the difference in the effect of education in respectively, interrupted democracies and recently established democracies, as compared to the educational effect in prolonged democracies.

Table 5.4 *Unstandardised regression parameter estimates of educational attainment and interaction between educational attainment and length of democratic tradition on dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism*

	Chauvinism	Patriotism	Exclusionism of immigrants	Exclusionism of political refugees	Exclusionism from group membership
Education (in prolonged democracies)	−.137 **	−.008	−.145 **	−.167 **	−.104 **
Education * Interrupted democracies	−.032 **	−.043 **	.008	−.022	−.011
Education * most recent democracies	.019	−.001	.086 **	.072 **	.055 **

Note: the main and interaction effects of educational attainment are controlled for all individual characteristics as displayed in Table 5.2 as well as for the overall means of the 23 samples, by including 22 dummy-variables for the samples (parameter estimates not displayed). N = 23,000.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. (two-tailed)

Let me first consider the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism. According to hypothesis 1a, the effect of education is smaller in recently established democracies than in other countries. As can be seen in the bottom row of Table 5.4, the last three parameter estimates were significantly positive. This indicates that the negative effect of education on exclusionism was, indeed, significantly weaker strong in the most recent established democracies, compared to the educational effect in prolonged democracies: the higher educated were less exclusionistic than the lower educated, but the difference between the higher and lower educated was smaller in the recently established democracies in Eastern Europe and Russia.

I furthermore hypothesised that the difference between educational groups would be stronger in prolonged democracies as compared to less prolonged or interrupted democracies. However, regarding the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism, the parameter estimates in the third row of Table 5.4 indicate that the educational effect in interrupted democracies did not significantly deviate from the educational effect in prolonged democracies. This contradicts hypothesis 1b. Furthermore, a comparison of parameter estimates in Table 5.4 reveals that the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism in interrupted democracies was stronger than in recent established democracies. A replication of the analysis with the educational effect in recently established democracies as reference (not displayed), revealed that this difference was indeed significant.

In summary, the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism was significantly less strong in recently established democracies, as compared to either prolonged democracies or interrupted democracies, thereby confirming hypothesis 1a. However, the educational effect in prolonged democracies did not significantly deviate from the educational effect in interrupted democracies, refuting hypothesis 1b.

Table 5.5 *Unstandardised regression parameter estimates of educational attainment on dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in three types of countries, grouped by length of liberal-democratic regime history*

	All countries (N=23.000)	Prolonged democracies (N=9.000)	Newer established democracies (N=5.000)	Recently established democracies (N=9.000)
Chauvinism				
Education				
Lower	.42 **	.44 **	.43 **	.37 **
Incomplete secondary	.25 **	.30 **	.25 **	.23 **
Complete secondary	.13 **	.14 **	.11 **	.14 **
Higher	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Patriotism				
Education				
Lower	.05 **	.05 *	.08 **	.02
Incomplete secondary	.01	.02	.02	−.00
Complete secondary	.00	.02	.03	−.02
Higher	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Exclusionism of immigrants				
Education				
Lower	.33 **	.40 **	.37 **	.20 **
Incomplete secondary	.25 **	.36 **	.32 **	.10 **
Complete secondary	.14 **	.20 **	.12 **	.06 *
Higher	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Exclusionism of political refugees				
Education				
Lower	.42 **	.46 **	.52 **	.27 **
Incomplete secondary	.30 **	.39 **	.30 **	.19 **
Complete secondary	.14 **	.19 **	.13 *	.05
Higher	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*
Exclusionism from group membership				
Education				
Lower	.25 **	.32 **	.29 **	.17 **
Incomplete secondary	.17 **	.23 **	.22 **	.09 **
Complete secondary	.07 **	.09 **	.11 **	.03
Higher	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*	*Ref.*

Note: the parameter estimates are controlled for other individual characteristics (i.e. social position, family income, sex, age, denomination, and church attendance) as well as for the overall means of the samples, by including k-1 dummy-variables for the k samples (parameter estimates not displayed). Ref = reference category.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. (two-tailed)

Next I turn to the effect of education on chauvinism and patriotism. As shown in Table 5.4, there was no significant difference in the effect of education in recently established democracies as compared to the effect of education in prolonged democracies. Furthermore, the parameters in the second row of Table 5.4 indicate that the negative effect of education in interrupted democracies was – contrary to the expectation – significantly stronger than in prolonged democracies. These findings refute hypotheses 1a and 1b regarding the varying effect of education on nationalistic attitudes.

To formally test the differential effects of education in prolonged, interrupted, and newly established democracies, I treated education as an interval variable for the sake of convenience and clarity. Now that I have established that the educational effect indeed varied to some extent between these types of countries, I present the parameter estimates for all educational categories. Table 5.5 shows the results of three separate multivariate regression analyses for, respectively, prolonged, newer established or interrupted, and recently established democracies. Note once again that the parameter estimates for educational attainment are controlled for all other individual characteristics.

As already established in a formal manner, Table 5.5 shows that, regarding ethnic exclusionism, the differences between educational groups were considerably smaller in recently established democracies compared to prolonged or interrupted democracies. The differences in exclusionism between educational groups in the latter two types of countries were minor. With respect to chauvinism and patriotism, I found relatively small differences in the effect of education in the three types of countries.

Next, I tested whether the effect of education varies according to the degree of religious heterogeneity. The results are summarized in Table 5.6, in which the parameter estimates of educational attainment (as an interval variable) and the interaction between educational attainment and degree of religious heterogeneity of a country are shown. Note once again that these are multivariate parameter estimates, controlled for all other individual characteristics as displayed in Table 5.2.

Table 5.6 *Unstandardised regression parameter estimates of educational attainment and interaction between educational attainment and religious heterogeneity on dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism*

	Chauvinism	Patriotism	Exclusionism of immigrants	Exclusionism of political refugees	Exclusionism from group membership
Education	–.141 **	–.035 **	–.095 **	–.133 **	–.071 **
Education * Religious heterogeneity	.007	.031 *	–.027	–.019	–.027

Note: the main and interaction effects of educational attainment are controlled for all individual characteristics as displayed in Table 5.2 as well as for the overall means of the 23 samples, by including 22 dummy-variables for the samples (parameter estimates not displayed). N = 23,000.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. (two-tailed)

According to hypothesis 2, the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism is stronger in more heterogeneous societies. However, as shown in the bottom row of Table 5.6, for four of the dependent variables, I found no significant interaction between the size of the (linear) educational effect and the degree of religious heterogeneity of a country. This refutes the hypothesis. Only with regard to patriotism did I find a minor significant ($p = .049$) interaction effect between education and religious heterogeneity, but the sign of this effect is contrary to the expectation: the negative effect of education was slightly lower in more heterogeneous societies. In short, I found no support for the hypothesis regarding the degree of cultural pluralism.

5.7 Conclusions and discussion

One of the most consistent findings in previous research on inter-ethnic attitudes is the negative association between educational attainment and negative out-group attitudes as well as positive in-group attitudes. However, due to the relative lack of cross-national comparative studies, it has not been established whether education has about the same effect in different countries, or whether the educational effect varies systematically across countries. In this contribution I applied survey data gathered in 22 countries to examine the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

I started with a brief review of different theoretical approaches regarding the interpretation of the relationship between education and nationalistic attitudes or ethnic exclusionism. I explored the extent to which these theories can be applied to derive testable hypotheses concerning cross-national varying effects of education. In particular, I focused on socialisation theory. A key element in this theory is the thesis that educational institutions transmit norms, values, and modes of behaviour deemed to be appropriate in a given society. Education thus brings students into contact with the official norms and values of society. According to Weil (1985), this official or political culture, as transmitted by the educational system, is determined by the political regime form and the length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form. Furthermore, he assumed that the political culture is also affected by the degree of cultural pluralism within a country. Therefore, I investigated whether the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism varied cross-nationally according to the liberal-democratic tradition and the degree of religious heterogeneity of a country.

To assess the relative importance of educational attainment as a predictor of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I conducted multivariate regression analyses, controlling for the effect of age, social class position, income, denomination, and church attendance. Of these individual variables, education turned out to be by far the most important variable for the explanation of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Patriotism, on the other hand, was hardly affected by educational attainment.

To investigate whether the effect of education varied according to the liberal-democratic tradition of a country, I distinguished between countries with a long-standing tradition of democratic government, countries where the liberal-democratic tradition had been interrupted, and finally, the very recently established democracies in Eastern Europe and Russia. The results indicate that the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism was, in accordance with the hypothesis, significantly smaller in recently established democracies as compared to prolonged or interrupted democracies. However, contrary to expectation, the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism in interrupted democracies did not deviate from the educational effect in prolonged democracies. Regarding the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes, the hypotheses were also not confirmed: the effect of education was found to be slightly stronger in interrupted democracies compared to prolonged democracies. Furthermore, there was no significant difference between prolonged democracies and recently established democracies regarding the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes. Finally, I found no support for the hypotheses that the effect of education is stronger in more religious heterogeneous societies.

In summary, the hypotheses derived from socialisation theory were only partly supported. The effect of education does indeed depend on the liberal-democratic tradition of a country, as far as I found that the educational effect on ethnic exclusionism is smaller in recent established democracies. This supports the notion that the values that are transmitted by the educational system reflect the extent to which a country has had a liberal-democratic tradition: in established democracies, the educational institutions promulgate democratic values and ideals. Consequently, the difference in ethnic exclusionistic attitudes between the higher educated and the lower educated is stronger in established democracies.

According to Weil (1985) there is a time lag between a change in political regime form and the ability of the educational system to socialise students into the new official political culture. Consequently, I assumed that the effect of education would be stronger in prolonged democracies as compared to countries where the liberal-democratic tradition had been interrupted in the 1940s (or, as in the case of Spain, even after 1945). However, the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism in interrupted democracies (i.e., West Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Japan) was not smaller than the effect of education in more prolonged democracies. This suggests that, in 1995, the population of interrupted democracies had been socialized to democratic values to the same extent as the population in prolonged democracies.

Comparing the effect of education in prolonged and recently established democracies, the results indicate that in countries with a short democratic history, the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism is smaller, but there is no difference in the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes. A possible interpretation of this deviant result is the proposition that educational institutions in countries with a long-standing democratic history transmit and promulgate the ideals of democracy and tolerance, but that the focus is more on the condemnation of out-group hostility than on the condemnation of in-group favouritism.

Finally, the results also indicated that the effect of education does not depend on the degree of cultural pluralism within a country. The formulated hypothesis that the effect of education would be stronger in pluralistic societies was based on political theories of conflict

resolution in pluralistic societies. According to Lijphart (1977), in a pluralistic society, political elites must take the lead in promoting peaceful accommodation among the different population segments. Since, according to socialisation theory, the values and norms transmitted by the educational system reflect the political culture of a country, one would expect that in a religious herogeneous society, educational institutions are more likely to propagate tolerant attitudes (Weil, 1985). However, whereas in this study I analysed public opinion in societies with varying degrees of cultural pluralism, an alternative test of the notion of conflict resolution in pluralistic societies would be to focus on the attitudes of the political elites in these countries.

In this chapter, I focused on the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. In doing so, I simultaneously explored the differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism between other social categories, such as age, income, and social class categories. In the next chapter, I expand upon these analyses, and systematically test hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory and localism theory regarding these differences between social categories, as well as differences between countries in the average level of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

Notes Chapter 5

This chapter is an adaptation of an article that will appear in *Political Psychology* (Coenders & Scheepers, in press).

[1] According to Hyman and Sheatsley (1956), the lack of a bivariate relation between education and approval of neighbourhood integration may be due to the effect of social and financial status, which illustrates the need for a multivariate analysis.

[2] That is, whereas there were (at least in the North of the U.S.) small educational differences in the willingness to move when some blacks reside in one's neighbourhood, the effect of education disappeared when the survey question referred to a large proportion of black residents in the neighbourhood (Schuman et al., 1997).

[3] Studies show a wide variety of conceptualisations and measurements of cognitive capacities, e.g. associative flexibility, cognitive complexity or cognitive flexibility (Wagner & Schönbach, 1984), cognitive sophistication (Bobo & Licari, 1989).

[4] According to Selznick and Steinberg (1969) prejudiced beliefs are cognitively simplistic beliefs and thus incongruent with the scientific rules of evidence and inference as promulgated by the educational institutions. This notion corresponds with the view that educational differences in prejudice reflect differences in cognitive abilities and cognitive habits between educational groups.

[5] To apply religious heterogeneity as an indicator of a pluralistic society is in line with the work of Lijphart. Furthermore, for most people, several years or decades have passed since they last attended the educational system. Hence, religious heterogeneity is a more appropriate indicator than indicators that show relatively more short-term fluctuations, such as the degree of political diversity or ethnic heterogeneity.

[6] The index of diversity is calculated as:

$$heterogeneity = \frac{1 - \sum_{j=1}^{N_j} \left(\frac{f_j}{N} \right)^2}{1 - \frac{1}{N_j}}$$

with N = total frequency; f_j = frequency of category j; N_j = number of categories. The index is adjusted for the number of denominations (categories) that were distinguished in the questionnaire, as is displayed by the denominator of the equation.

[7] The lowest category of the 7-category ISSP classification referred to respondents with no educational qualifications as well as those still at school. Another variable indicated whether respondents were students or not. To achieve a better ordinal measure of educational level, I excluded respondents from the analyses if they were students and fell into the lowest category of the ISSP educational classification (n=50).

[8] The 1995 ISSP dataset (as distributed in May 1998 by the Zentralarchiv (1998)) contained some errors concerning the variable with the ISCO-codes. That is, in contrast to the variable label, the specific variable did *not* contain the ISCO classification in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. I therefore contacted the original investigators and it transpired that in both countries the variable referred to a country-specific occupational classification. Therefore, the original investigators in the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic supplied additional datafiles containing, respectively, the correct ISCO-1988 variable and a recode scheme to recode the country-specific codes into ISCO-1988. Both files may be obtained from the author.

[9] In order to construct more appropriate EGP categories, the occupational classification is enhanced by additional information on employment status and supervisory status. That is, I applied three additional variables of the ISSP dataset: a variable that indicated whether respondents were self-employed or not (available for each country); a variable that indicated the number of employees of self-employed persons (available for 15 countries), and finally a variable that indicated whether respondents supervised others at work (not available for the USA).

[10] The EGP classification for Italy, the Netherlands, Japan and Great Britain should be regarded with some caution since the original occupational categories were rather unspecified.

[11] In Italy, no distinction could be made between skilled and semi-unskilled manual workers.

[12] In order to distinguish between single person households and other households with the same household income, I divided the household income by two for married or cohabiting respondents. Furthermore, for Russia, the variable referred to the income per family member, therefore I corrected the Russian data for the household size.

[13] In three countries, a category 'not applicable: no (Christian) religion' was applied. I classed these respondents in the category of non-church-goers.

[14] There were considerable cross-national differences in the variance of individual characteristics as well as in the mean score of the dependent variables. Consequently, estimated parameters of individual characteristics obtained by an analysis without country dummies, are distorted.

[15] The sheaf coefficients for education, social position, age, religious denomination, and church attendance are displayed along with the standardised coefficient for sex and the unstandardised coefficient for income, since the latter variable was standardized within each country beforehand. Note that the positive sign of the sheaf coefficients is a technical artifice (Eisinga, Scheepers, & Van Snippenburg, 1991), and therefore not related to the sign of the relationship between independent and dependent variable.

CHAPTER 6

Ethnic exclusionism, chauvinism, and ethnic threat: effects of individual and contextual characteristics

6.1 Introduction and research question

In the previous chapter the question was addressed as to what extent nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism were related to educational attainment, and to what extent this educational effect varied across countries. That is, whether the educational effect varied according to the liberal-democratic tradition and the degree of religious heterogeneity within a country. For a stringent test, the effect of education was controlled for other individual socio-demographic characteristics, such as social position and income. In the present chapter, the analysis is extended in two ways, by including, in addition to individual socio-demographic variables, also intervening individual variables as well as a set of contextual variables.

Firstly, the explanatory question of why some social categories are more nationalistic or ethnic exclusionistic than others is addressed by a systematic test of hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory and localism theory. In addition, I test to what extent differences between social categories are related to factors that might intervene the relationship between independent individual characteristics on the one hand and nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism on the other hand.

Secondly, from the theoretical perspective of ethnic competition theory, macro-level hypotheses are derived, regarding the effect of actual competition between the ethnic majority group and ethnic minorities, as reflected by national demographic, economic, and political characteristics.

In chapter 4, I distinguished two dimensions of nationalistic attitudes: chauvinism and patriotism. As expected, the association between chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism was much stronger than the association between patriotism and ethnic exclusionism. With a few exceptions, higher levels of patriotism were not associated with higher levels of exclusionism of immigrants or exclusionism of refugees. Furthermore, the regression analyses in Chapter 5 showed that patriotism was differentially related to individual socio-demographic characteristics, compared to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. The level of education hardly affected the degree of patriotism, and there were no differences in patriotism between individuals with varying social

positions. Given these results, in this chapter I will confine the analysis of nationalistic attitudes to chauvinism. Hence, the main research question in this chapter is:

To what extent are the observed differences between social categories and differences between countries in the level of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism related to independent individual socio-demographic variables, intervening individual variables, and independent contextual variables?

6.2 Ethnic competition

In order to investigate the differences in chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism between countries as well as between individuals within countries, I derive theoretical propositions from two different theoretical frameworks: ethnic competition theory and localism theory. In this section, I briefly summarise the general framework of ethnic competition theory, which has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Within this framework, the dispositional notions from social identity theory are synthesized with the situational notions of realistic group conflict theory.

As stated in Chapter 2, according to social identity theory, positive attitudes towards the in-group and negative attitudes towards out-groups are the outcomes of the processes of social identification and social contra-identification. According to this theory, each individual strives to achieve a satisfactory self-concept (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). Part of this self-concept, referred to as social identity, arises from the subjective membership of social groups, together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). Consequently, individuals have a fundamental need to achieve and maintain a positive social identity, which can be achieved through favourable inter-group comparisons. The distinction between in-group and out-group, between 'us' and 'them', is made via *social categorisation*, a necessary and inevitable cognitive process required to simplify or systematise the abundance and complexity of information an individual receives (Allport, 1954). Through *social comparison*, the comparison of in- and out-group members, the relative status and value of the in-group is determined. In order to achieve positive in-group distinctiveness, individuals selectively perceive mainly positively valued characteristics among members of the in-group and mainly negatively valued characteristics among members of the out-groups. Next, these characteristics are generalised to the whole in- or out-group. By applying the relatively positive in-group stereotypes to themselves, individuals create a positive social identity. The process through which this social identity is constructed, is labelled *social identification* (Brown, 1995). The counterpart of social identification, the perception and generalisation of mainly negatively valued characteristics of out-groups, is labelled *social contra-identification*. In short, the need for a positive social identity results in positive attitudes toward the ethnic in-group (e.g., chauvinism) and negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups (e.g., ethnic exclusionism). These notions of social identity theory are based on empirical findings from social psychological

experiments, showing that social categorisation is a sufficient condition for in-group favouritism (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1970, 1981; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).

The merits of these notions of social identity theory are that they explicate the underlying psychological mechanisms leading to positive in-group attitudes and negative out-group attitudes. Furthermore, they explicate why positive in-group attitudes are often strongly intertwined with negative out-group attitudes (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969; Billiet, Carton, & Huys, 1990; Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989), a complex of attitudes known as ethnocentrism.

The core of social identity theory can be phrased as a *dispositional hypothesis*: individuals have nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes due to their need for a positive social identity. In order to deduce testable hypotheses regarding differences within and between countries, this dispositional proposition is linked with the situational propositions of realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972).

As stated in Chapter 2, the key element in realistic group conflict theory is the notion of inter-group competition, i.e. the conflict of interests between in-group and out-group. According to Coser (1956) each social system contains sources of so-called realistic conflicts insofar as social groups lay claims to scarce resources (such as material resources, power, and status) or hold conflicting values. Consequently, these social groups, e.g. ethnic groups, have mutually conflicting interests and consider other groups as competitors.

Following Blalock (1967), a distinction is often made between *actual competition* and *perceived competition* or *perceived ethnic threat*. Actual competition refers to the objective competition, for instance socio-economic circumstances such as the availability of scarce resources and market mechanisms regulating the distribution of these scarce resources. Perceived competition and perceived ethnic threat refer respectively to the subjectively experienced degree of competition and the perception that the ethnic out-group poses a threat to the social position of the in-group. According to Blalock, the actual competitive circumstances are reflected in these perceptions of competition and threat. However, perceptions of ethnic competition and threat may be partially distorted.

Theoretically, a further distinction can be made between group threat and personal threat, although empirically, perceptions of group threat and personal threat will generally be strongly intertwined, due to group identification. An ethnic out-group may pose a threat to the social position of the in-group in general (group threat), but it may pose a relatively stronger threat to specific in-group members in particular (personal threat), namely those in-group members who hold similar socio-economic positions as most out-group members.

Perceived ethnic threat is regarded as the catalyst of antagonistic inter-group attitudes and conflict. The stronger the perception that the out-group poses a threat, the more in-group cohesion and solidarity there is, as well as out-group hostility. Social-psychological experiments have established the causal effect of competitive inter-group situations on heightened positive in-group bias and in-group solidarity as well as out-group hostility (Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1979). The core of realistic group conflict theory can be phrased as a *situational hypothesis*: the greater the competition or conflict of interest between ethnic groups, the stronger the perceived

ethnic threat, and the stronger the nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Olzak & Nagel, 1986; Quillian, 1995).

The notions of social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory can be regarded as complementary to one another (cf. Brown, 1995; Jones, 1997), and can be synthesised into a general framework labelled as *ethnic competition theory*. The fundamental assumption of this theoretical model is that nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes are caused by general social identity needs, while the intensity of nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes varies according to the situation, depending on the amount of actual competition and perceived ethnic threat. In other words, the processes of social identification and social contra-identification are intensified by actual inter-group competition and perceived ethnic threat. Individuals strive for a positive group distinctiveness, based on favourable comparisons between their in-group and out-groups. The more an ethnic out-group poses a threat to the social position of the in-group, the higher the potential loss of such positive inter-group comparisons. In order to maintain positive in-group distinctiveness, the distinction between in-group and out-group is made more pronounced. Inter-group competition and perceived ethnic threat thus strengthen the group boundaries. They affect the process of social categorization and intensify the identification with the in-group and the contra-identification with the out-group.

The *general hypothesis* of ethnic competition theory therefore reads: the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, socio-cultural or socio-historical circumstances, whether at the individual or at the contextual level – the stronger the perceived ethnic threat, that in turn reinforces the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, leading to stronger chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

Ethnic competition theory can be applied to deduce macro- as well as micro-hypotheses regarding within and between country variations in chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. That is, the amount of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism is presumably affected by the level of ethnic competition and perceived ethnic threat, which can vary between different social categories (micro-hypotheses) and between various contexts, such as different countries, or different time periods (macro-hypotheses).

6.3 Breadth of perspective

A second theoretical perspective that might account for the individual variation in chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism is the Breadth of Perspective approach, also referred to as the localism theory (Gabennesch, 1972; Roof, 1974). This approach links ethnic attitudes to the worldview of individuals. Whereas some people are preoccupied with and strongly identify with the local community, others are more oriented to the world outside this local community. Merton (1949) specified these orientations with the concepts 'local' and 'cosmopolitan'. According to Roof (1978), localism coincides with a traditional and conservative value orientation. Clark (1970) asserted that especially persons with a local orientation think in terms of insiders and outsiders: they are strongly attached to the local community and wish to protect it against influences from

the outside world. Consequently, it can be assumed that individuals with a localistic orientation are strongly opposed to the presence and arrival of ethnic out-groups (Scheepers, Schmeets, & Felling, 1997). In terms of social (contra-) identification, persons with a local orientation identify more strongly with the local in-group and contra-identify with the corresponding out-groups. Since individuals can define themselves as members of numerous social groups (Tajfel, 1981), such as the family, local community, or national community, and given the flexibility of the boundaries between in-group and out-groups (Adorno et al., 1969; Allport, 1954), localists will presumably not only have a strong identification with their local in-group, but also with their ethnic majority in-group. In summary, a localistic worldview would be expected to reinforce social identification with the ethnic in-group and social contra-identification with ethnic out-groups, leading to stronger chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

6.4 Effects of individual socio-demographic characteristics

The first set of hypotheses to be derived from ethnic competition theory concern the effects of independent individual characteristics. Individual members of the ethnic majority group may differ in the extent to which they view ethnic minorities as a threat, because the level of actual (in particular, socio-economic) threat posed by these ethnic minorities may vary between social categories of the majority population. Presumably, particularly those social categories that hold socio-economic positions similar to those of ethnic minorities may experience higher levels of ethnic competition, and consequently, display stronger nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes.

Typically, ethnic minorities have a relatively disadvantaged socio-economic position compared to the ethnic majority population (Kiehl & Werner, 1998). A relatively large proportion of ethnic minorities and immigrants is located in the lower strata of the host society, characterised by relatively low educational attainment, low income, a high proportion of manual labour, as well as higher levels of unemployment. This is particularly true for the former 'guest workers' who were actively recruited by western countries in the sixties and seventies in order to fill vacancies in low-waged jobs with low educational requirements. Although some of the newly-arrived asylum seekers may have attended higher educational programs in their country of origin, their educational qualifications are often not that valuable in the host society.

Consequently, social categories of the ethnic majority population who occupy approximately the same socio-economic positions as ethnic minorities – that is, those with a low educational level, a low income level, manual workers, and unemployed – will have to compete more strongly with ethnic minorities and immigrants on for instance, the labour market than other members of the in-group. In addition to competition for jobs in the same labour market segment, other arenas of competition may be the housing market as well as the 'competition' for social security benefits (such as unemployment benefits and financial support for lower income groups). Furthermore, the petty bourgeoisie may experience a greater ethnic threat due to the competition from 'ethnic enterprises', that is, ethnic shopkeepers, retailers, and restaurants of

ethnic origin. In addition, on average, the petty bourgeoisie may feel more insecure about their future financial well being compared to employees.

The relatively higher level of ethnic competition may be reflected in stronger perceptions of ethnic threat among the aforementioned social categories, thus reinforcing the process of social (contra-) identification and resulting in stronger nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes. Hence, it is expected that chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism will be more strongly prevalent among ethnic majority individuals with a relatively low educational level (hypothesis 1a), among the self-employed (hypothesis 1b), manual workers (hypothesis 1c), and unemployed persons (hypothesis 1d), as well as among those with a relatively low income level (hypothesis 1e).

According to the localism theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism may be more prevalent among individuals with a localistic orientation. This small breadth of perspective may be found in particular among lower educated individuals. As stated in the previous chapter, it has been argued that education broadens one's social perspective by increasing one's knowledge and understanding of norms and values other than those common in one's own social group. According to Gabennesch (1972) and Roof (1974) education raises the awareness of the subjective and particularistic character of individual beliefs. Consequently, the higher the educational level, the less likely that individuals will have a 'narrow, localistic perspective' (Roof, 1974).

Roof (1978a) asserted that a localistic worldview is strongly present among religious people in the United States, a finding that has also been confirmed in other countries (Eisinga, Lammers, & Peters, 1990, 1991). This finding is interpreted in terms of the plausibility of traditional religious beliefs (Berger, 1967). According to Roof, a broader social perspective undermines the plausibility of the traditional religious worldview. In modern societies, characterised by pluralistic meaning systems, the values, beliefs and practices of traditional religion retained their plausibility only in the immediate local community (Roof, 1972, 1976). Therefore, localistic orientation, religiosity, denomination, and church attendance are presumably interrelated. Religious people, people who consider themselves to be a member of a denomination, and church-goers can therefore be expected to have stronger nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes.

In addition, a localistic worldview is also more commonly found among elderly persons (Eisinga et al., 1990). Generally, the process of growing older leads to increasing social and political conservatism, due to physiological, psychological, and social factors (Steeh & Schuman, 1992). Since traditionalism, conservatism and localism are interrelated (Roof, 1978a) it can be argued that elderly persons have a stronger localistic orientation and therefore subscribe more strongly to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

Hence, a set of four hypotheses can be derived from the notions of localism theory. Firstly, in accordance with hypothesis 1a derived from ethnic competition theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism will presumably be more strongly prevalent among ethnic majority individuals with a relatively low level of education. Secondly, in addition to the previously formulated hypotheses, it is expected that chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism will be more

strongly prevalent among older people (hypothesis 1f), people who consider themselves to be a member of a denomination (hypothesis 1g), and churchgoers (hypothesis 1h).

6.5 Intervening factors: perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation

The aforementioned theoretical notions indicated two concepts that presumably intervene the link between individual background and chauvinism or ethnic exclusionism: the level of perceived ethnic threat and the degree of localistic orientation.

Blalock (1967) divided the concept of inter-group competition into two components: actual competition and perceived competition.[1] The conceptual distinction as well as the causal relationship between actual competition and perceived threat is a crucial proposition of ethnic competition theory. Increasing levels of ethnic competition will induce more widespread antagonism, if and only if individuals perceive an increasing amount of ethnic threat. Although this distinction between actual and perceived threat is often recognised in theoretical terms (Bobo, 1988; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Castles & Kosack, 1973; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Krauth & Porst, 1984; Quillian, 1995), this proposition is often not explicitly tested. That is, individual perceptions of ethnic threat were not often operationalised and measured, but indirectly indicated by means of individual or contextual background variables, such as being unemployed or not, and the relative size of the ethnic minority group (Quillian, 1995). Consequently, the relationship between actual threat, perceived threat, and ethnic attitudes has not often been tested explicitly. Some studies, however, did incorporate direct measures of perceived threat (Giles & Evans, 1984; Taylor, 1998)

Although actual threat can only affect chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism via individual perceptions of threat, the question remains of the extent to which perceptions of threat are merely a reflection of actual threat, or to what extent they are autonomous. That is, it can be argued that in some instances, perceptions of threat of out-groups may be "false perceptions" (LeVine & Campbell, 1972).

In this study, I will explicitly test the intervening effects of perceptions of ethnic threat, as well as the influence of localistic orientation on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism. The hypotheses to be tested therefore read: perceptions of ethnic threat are positively related to ethnic exclusionism (hypothesis 2a) and chauvinism (hypothesis 2b), and a localistic orientation is positively related to ethnic exclusionism (hypothesis 3a) and chauvinism (hypothesis 3b). Furthermore, perceived ethnic threat is assumed to be more strongly prevalent among social categories of the ethnic majority group that occupy similar social positions to those of most ethnic minorities; i.e., among ethnic majority individuals with a relatively low educational level (hypothesis 4a), among the self-employed (hypothesis 4b), manual workers (hypothesis 4c), unemployed (hypothesis 4d), as well as among those with a relatively low income level (hypothesis 4e). Regarding the social origins of a localistic orientation, it is expected that a localistic orientation is more strongly prevalent among lower educated people (hypothesis 5a),

older people (hypothesis 5b), people who consider themselves to be a member of a denomination (hypothesis 5c), and churchgoers (hypothesis 5d).

In Figure 6.1 the hypotheses 1a to 5d are represented schematically. The socio-demographic independent individual variables, as mentioned in hypotheses 1a through 1h, are related to the dependent attitudinal variables. This causal relationship is represented by a dotted line to indicate that the bivariate relationship is (in part) intervened by the level of perceived ethnic threat and the strength of the localistic orientation.

Figure 6.1 *Theoretical model: effects of independent and intervening individual variables*



6.6 Effects of contextual characteristics

According to ethnic competition theory, cross-national variations in nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes are related to cross-national differences in the level of actual or perceived competition. The general proposition reads: the more actual competition between the ethnic majority on the one hand and ethnic minorities and immigrants on the other hand, the stronger ethnic majority individuals perceive ethnic threat, and the stronger their degree of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

The effect of actual ethnic competition on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism

The actual level of ethnic competition in a country may depend on at least three factors (cf. Blalock, 1967): (a) demographic conditions, e.g., the relative size of competitors from ethnic out-groups; (b) economic conditions, e.g., the scarcity of valuable goods that are at stake in the competition; and (c) political conditions, e.g., policies regulating market mechanisms in general and policies aimed at assisting ethnic minorities in particular.

With respect to demographic conditions, a larger proportion of resident ethnic minorities creates a situation in which the ethnic majority group has to compete with a relatively larger number of competitors from ethnic minority groups. Similarly, higher numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers create a situation in which increasing numbers of peoples have to compete for, ceteris paribus, approximately the same amount of scarce resources.

With regard to economic conditions, a high national unemployment level or low national economic welfare create a situation in which, ceteris paribus, approximately stable numbers of people are competing for fewer resources. Finally, political conditions may increase or lessen the competition. For instance, countries with an extensive social security system provide more socio-economic safeguards to their citizens and therefore lessen the risks that are at stake. In addition, the effects of demographic, economic, and political contextual conditions may reinforce each other. For example, the combination of poor economic conditions *and* a large proportion of ethnic minorities may have an additional effect on perceived ethnic threat (Olzak & Nagel, 1986).

Furthermore, some authors have argued that there might be a curvilinear relationship between ethnic competition and ethnic exclusionism. For instance, Bovenkerk, Bruin, Brunt, and Wouters (1985) proposed that the relative proportion of ethnic minorities is not linearly related to ethnic exclusionism. That is, initially, when the number of ethnic minorities is rather small, these ethnic out-group members are treated with sympathy. However, this stage of hospitality ends, when a certain threshold is passed and the relative proportion of ethnic minorities rises to a considerably figure. At this point, the ethnic majority perceives the ethnic minorities as a threat to their social, economic, and cultural position. Bovenkerk et al. (1985) labelled this the 'invasion-theory'.

There are also other theoretical notions that suggest a curvilinear relationship between the relative proportion of ethnic minorities and ethnic exclusionism. In a predominantly mono-ethnic society, there are few opportunities to become acquainted with other ethnic groups, and this unfamiliarity may cause a lack of understanding and dislike of ethnic out-groups. Based on this line of reasoning, one of the most prominent methods for reducing ethnic prejudice and discrimination is to enhance contact between members of different ethnic groups (Allport, 1954; Brown, 1995). Based on the combination of this 'contact-hypothesis' with the notions from ethnic competition theory, one might expect the following curvilinear effect: a very small number of ethnic minorities may lead to unfamiliarity and, consequently, ethnic exclusionism. When the proportion of ethnic out-groups is somewhat higher, unfamiliarity and ethnic exclusionism may be lower. However, if the proportion of ethnic minorities further grows and reaches a considerable figure, the ethnic minorities may be perceived as a threat, and consequently, ethnic exclusionism may again rise. In order to explore such curvilinear effects, I will also include quadratic terms in the analyses.

In summary, according to ethnic competition theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are affected by the amount of actual ethnic threat at the national level. In addition to the effect of the contemporary national context, it can be argued that recent *changes* in the national circumstances might have an additional influence on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. For

instance, a rapid increase in ethnic immigration or a sharp deterioration in economic prosperity may have a larger impact on perceived ethnic threat as compared to stable contextual circumstances. In accordance with this argument, Olzak (Olzak, 1989; Olzak, 1992) showed that rates of ethnic collective action in American cities at the turn of the twentieth century were not only affected by the level of immigration, but also by the percentage change in immigration.

From the aforementioned notions, I derive the following set of hypotheses regarding the effect of national characteristics on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Firstly, I expect chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism to be more strongly prevalent in countries where poor economic conditions exist, as indicated by relatively high unemployment levels and relatively low economic prosperity (hypothesis 6a). In addition, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are assumed to be more strongly prevalent in countries with declining economic conditions, as indicated by rising unemployment and declining economic prosperity (hypothesis 6b). Furthermore, I hypothesise that chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are more strongly prevalent in countries with, ceteris paribus, a less extensive social security system (hypothesis 6c). Regarding ethnic demographic conditions, I expect that chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism will be more strongly prevalent in countries with a larger proportion of ethnic minorities (hypothesis 6d), a larger number of asylum seekers (hypothesis 6e), or with a sharper increase in the number of asylum seekers (hypothesis 6f).

Furthermore, it would be expected that the effects of economic conditions, the social security system, and demographic conditions might reinforce one another. That is, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism will be more strongly prevalent in countries where the aforementioned national conditions coincide (interaction hypothesis 6g). The aforementioned contextual propositions are often implicitly endorsed in studies of inter-ethnic relations; however, due to lack of internationally comparable data, they are generally not explicitly tested.

The effect of actual ethnic competition on perceived ethnic threat

According to the notions of ethnic competition theory, the aforementioned link between the degree of actual competition between ethnic groups on the one hand and individual attitudes towards ethnic in-groups and out-groups on the other hand, is intervened by the level of perceived ethnic threat. That is, actual ethnic competition induces the perception that the ethnic out-groups pose a threat, and this in turn increases chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

For this reason, it is expected that the contextual variables mentioned in hypotheses 6a to 6g, also have an effect on perceived ethnic threat. Thus, perceived ethnic threat will be more strongly prevalent in countries characterised by either poor economic conditions (hypothesis 7a); declining economic conditions (hypothesis 7b); a less extensive social security system (hypothesis 7c); a larger proportion of ethnic minorities (hypothesis 7d), a larger number of asylum seekers (hypothesis 7e), or a sharper increase in the number of asylum seekers (hypothesis 7f), or in countries where these economic, social security, and demographic conditions coincide (interaction hypothesis 7g).

Ethnic competition theory thus presumes a two-step causal link: actual ethnic competition induces perceived ethnic threat, which in turn increases chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

The question then arises whether it is plausible to assume that the relationship between actual ethnic competition and chauvinism or ethnic exclusionism is fully interpreted by perceived ethnic threat. There are several counter-arguments to such a stringent view. Firstly, as is common in social sciences, measurement errors lead to imperfect relationships. Secondly, perceptions of ethnic threat may not only be rooted in actual threatening conditions, but may also have an autonomous component. That is, perceptions of ethnic threat may be 'real' or rational in so far as they reflect the degree of actual ethnic competition. However, perceptions of ethnic threat may be, as LeVine and Campbell (1972) labelled them, "false perceptions". Therefore I presume that the effect of actual ethnic competition on chauvinism or ethnic exclusionism will only be partly intervened by perceived ethnic threat. The aforementioned presumed causal effects of the national context on the individual attitudes, as derived from ethnic competition theory, are schematically represented in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2 *Theoretical model: effects of contextual variables*



The effect of national context on localism

As stated in Section 6.2, localism theory can be applied to derive hypotheses regarding individual variation in chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Hypotheses regarding the effect of the national context cannot be derived in a straightforward manner, since the theoretical framework of the localism theory is formulated at the individual level, oriented towards differences between individuals or social categories. One of the propositions commonly derived

from localism theory is the presumed difference between people living in cities versus people living in the country. That is, those living in large cities presumably are less localistic. Note that I could not derive a cross-national comparable measure for the degree of residential urbanization from the ISSP survey data. However, in a more general sense, the aforementioned proposition would read that individuals who live in a cosmopolitan environment are less inclined to localism. A cosmopolitan environment can be defined as an environment in which individuals are confronted with a wide range of people from various social and cultural backgrounds. In this manner, people get acquainted with various beliefs and opinions. As a result of increasing knowledge and understanding of beliefs, norms, and values other than those common in their own social group, individuals may broaden their social perspective and, consequently, feel less attached to their local community (Roof, 1978a).

At the national level, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity could be regarded as an indicator of a cosmopolitan environment. The more heterogeneous a society, the more individuals are confronted with members from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, hypothesis (8) reads: a localistic orientation is more prevalent among individuals living in more ethnically homogeneous countries.

Figure 6.3 *Theoretical model: effects of individual and contextual variables*



The full theoretical model is represented in Figure 6.3. It consists of relationships between independent, intervening and dependent individual variables (as represented in Figure 6.1) and of

relationships between contextual and individual variables (as represented in Figure 6.2). In other words, this multi-level theoretical model combines micro-to-micro-propositions as well as macro-to-micro propositions (Coleman, 1990).

6.7 Data and measurements

In Chapter 4 I described the individual data derived from the 1995 module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The measurement instruments of the dependent and independent individual variables are dealt with in, respectively, Chapters 4 and 5. In this chapter, I discuss the operationalisation and measurement of individual intervening variables and contextual variables.

6.7.1 Intervening individual variables

To operationalise *perceived ethnic threat* I applied 4 items from the ISSP 1995 module. The items measured the agreement with various statements about immigrants. Two of the statements were negatively worded and two were positively worded with regard to immigrants. The formulation of the items together with the overall mean score, communality, and factor loading in a principal factor analysis are presented in Table 6.1. In the questionnaire, the items were preceded by the following introduction: "There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [country]. (By 'immigrants' we mean people who come to settle in [country]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?". Thus, in these items the term "immigrants" is used in a broad sense. It does not so much refer to the group of newly-arrived migrants, but to the larger group of *resident ethnic minorities*, that either immigrated themselves or whose parents or grandparents once immigrated. For this reason, I refer to this measurement as perceived *ethnic* threat.

The items covered various forms of threat. The statement in the first item presented immigrants as a social or safety threat, whereas the statements in the second and third items referred to immigrants as an economic threat. A rejection of the fourth statement indicated some sense of cultural threat. Overall, a considerable number of respondents perceived immigrants as a threat. Across the 23 national samples, almost half of the respondents believed that immigrants increase crime rates: 28.8% agreed and 21.0% agreed strongly with this statement. More than one third of the respondents took the view that immigrants take jobs away from the native-born population (25.5% agreed and 13.7% agreed strongly). Likewise, 36.7% of the respondents rejected the statement that immigrants are generally good for the country's economy (25.7% disagreed and 11.0% disagreed strongly). Finally, 22.0% did not subscribe to the positively worded statement that immigrants make the country more open to new ideas and culture (14.5% disagreed and 7.5% disagreed strongly).

Table 6.1 *Perceived ethnic threat: overall mean score, communality, and factor loading*

		Mean	h^2	Loading
V47	Immigrants increase crime rates [a]	3.43	0.38	0.61
V48	Immigrants are generally good for [country's] economy	3.20	0.45	0.67
V49	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country] [a]	3.11	0.31	0.55
V50	Immigrants make [country] more open to new ideas and cultures	2.70	0.42	0.65
		Explained variance = 38.8%		

Note: 5-point scale ranging from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly). Total N = 24,247.
[a] Reversed scoring.

In the overall sample, across all respondents, the items were moderately inter-correlated with correlations ranging from 0.31 to 0.51. As can be seen in Table 6.1, in an explorative principal factor analysis, the four items all loaded on one factor, indicating a general sense of ethnic threat. The inter-item correlations as well as the factor analysis did not suggest a distinction between economic threat and socio-cultural threat. This finding was supported by an exploration of the correlations of the threat items with various socio-demographic variables and attitudinal measures. Overall, the four items, as well as combinations of the items (i.e. economic threat, socio-cultural threat) were related in quite a similar manner to other variables. There were only a few minor exceptions that could be interpreted in a plain manner.[2] These results indicate that the 4 items can be applied together as a measurement of perceived ethnic threat.[3]

To investigate the extent to which these four items of perceived ethnic threat form a cross-nationally comparable measurement instrument, I conducted multi-sample analysis. I followed the same procedure as presented in chapter 4, regarding the measurement of the dependent variables. That is, in the LISREL analysis, I took into account the ordinal scale scores of the items, by analysing the matrix of polychoric correlations with the Generally Weighted Least Squares method with a Correct Weight Matrix. The scale indeterminacy of the latent variable 'perceived ethnic threat' was eliminated by fixing a factor loading of one of the items to the value 1. The goodness-of-fit statistics of three successive models are displayed in Table 6.2.

In the first model, only the form of the measurement model is invariant across countries, but the model parameters may vary across different countries. In other words, the 4 items are regarded as indicators of *one* theoretical construct in every country. The χ^2-test statistic of the first model was significantly too large, indicating a non-perfect fit, which is not surprising given the large sample size. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a, p. 122) suggested that in practice, the χ^2 statistic should be regarded as a measure of fit rather than as a formal test statistic. The high value of the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI = 0.990) suggested that the fit of this model was quite acceptable. On the other hand, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation was rather high (RMSEA = 0.134).[4] This fit measure takes into account the error of approximation in the population per degree of freedom. Based on practical experience, Browne and Cudeck (1992, p.

239) suggested that a value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom, whereas they advised not to employ models with a RMSEA greater than 0.10. Thus, in relation to the degrees of freedom, the fit of the first model was rather unsatisfactory.

Table 6.2 *Invariance in measurement models of perceived ethnic threat*

Model	Invariance in	χ^2	Df	χ^2 / df	RMSEA	st. RMR	GFI	CFI	NFI	ECVI
1	model form	935.98	46	20.35	0.134	0.051	0.990	0.926	0.923	0.053
2	+ factor loadings	1248.45	112	11.15	0.097	0.051	0.989	0.905	0.897	0.060
3	+ factor variances	1717.39	134	12.82	0.105	0.064	0.984	0.868	0.858	0.077

Note: 23 samples, N = 24,247

In the second model in Table 6.2, the factor loadings of the four items are assumed to be invariant across countries. That is, in this model there are no cross-national differences with respect to the (relative) degree in which the four indicators refer to the same latent variable. Since this model is more restrictive, logically, the χ^2 of this model was higher than the previous model. However, the overall goodness-of-fit statistics GFI, CFI and NFI were still rather high (respectively 0.989, 0.905 and 0.897), and these values were only slightly lower compared to model 1. If the goodness-of-fit is judged in relation to the degrees of freedom of the model, then the fit of model 2 was even more satisfying than the fit of model 1. For model 1, the χ^2 divided by the degrees of freedom was 20.35, whereas for the more restrictive model 2 this value was 11.15. Also, the RMSEA dropped from 0.134 to 0.097. In summary, the goodness-of-fit of the parsimonious model 2 was lower, but in relationship to the degrees of freedom, the loss of fit seems to be acceptable. In other words, this suggests the following: to make the assumption that the factor loadings are invariant in all the 23 samples logically implied a worse fit, but the loss of fit associated with this simplification seemed to be acceptable. This latter finding suggests indeed that the same latent variable ('perceived ethnic threat') was measured in the different countries.

Finally, in the third model as displayed in Table 6.2, the variance of the latent variable is assumed to be invariant across countries. The goodness-of-fit of this most restrictive model was less satisfactory compared to the previous model, both with regard to overall goodness-of-fit measures as well as with regard to measures that take into account the degrees of freedom. Thus, the results from the LISREL analyses point out that (a) the four items can be applied as a cross-national measurement instrument for perceived ethnic threat, since the factor loadings were rather invariant across countries, but that (b) the variance of perceived ethnic threat differed between countries.

In the multi-level analysis, the four items were combined as a Likert-scale measure of perceived ethnic threat. The overall Cronbach's alpha of this perceived ethnic threat measure was 0.713. In Appendix E, the inter-item reliability is shown for each of the 23 different samples. The Cronbach's alpha ranged from a rather low 0.432 in Bulgaria to a rather high 0.792 in Canada.

In Chapter 2, I discussed the dispute in the literature regarding the question of whether perceptions of ethnic threat are really distinguishable from prejudice and support for ethnic exclusionism. Regarding the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the concepts of perceived ethnic threat and ethnic exclusionism, there are at least three types of arguments that support the notion that perceived ethnic threat and ethnic exclusionism should be distinguished.

Firstly, there is a theoretical-conceptual argument. The core proposition of ethnic competition theory – actual competition or threat induces perceptions of threat, which in turn lead to prejudice and ethnic exclusionism – has been adopted by many authors in a wide range of studies. This two-step causal mechanism is, more or less explicitly, found in the work of many authors (Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1999; Olzak & Nagel, 1986; Quillian, 1996). Thus, the concepts of perceived ethnic threat and ethnic exclusionism take different positions in this theoretical framework: perceived ethnic threat is considered to intervene the relationship between actual inter-group competition as an independent variable and ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism as dependent variables.

Secondly, in this study there are large differences in the operationalisation of both concepts. Perceived ethnic threat was operationalised by adherence to negative beliefs about immigrants, moreover expressing some form of economic or socio-cultural threat. On the other hand, the items applied as indicators of ethnic exclusionism did not refer to negative statements about immigrants or ethnic out-groups. Instead, these items captured beliefs about how ethnic out-groups should be treated. Exclusionism of immigrants and exclusionism of refugees was measured by the level of support for specific policies, namely should immigration be reduced and should political refugees be allowed to stay? Finally, the indicators for exclusionism of group membership referred to the subjective requirements for inclusion or exclusion of the 'other' as member of the in-group. Thus, regarding both the conceptualisation and the operationalisation, there were large differences between perceived ethnic threat and ethnic exclusionism.

Thirdly, there are analytical reasons to distinguish perceived ethnic threat and ethnic exclusionism. That is, perceived ethnic threat and ethnic exclusionism have partly different causes, as I will present in the remaining part of this chapter.

Localism was operationalised by two variables. These items indicate the attachment to one's surrounding neighbourhood (or village) and the willingness to move to another neighbourhood (or village). The first item asked respondents "how close do you feel to your neighbourhood (or village)?". The four response categories ranged from "very close" to "not close at all". Overall, across the 23 national samples, 28.2% of the respondents felt "very close" and 42.4% felt "close", whereas only 5.6% felt no attachment to their neighbourhood or village.

Table 6.3 *Means and standard deviations of perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation*

	Perceived ethnic threat		Localistic orientation	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Australia	2.65	0.77	2.90	0.92
West Germany	2.86	0.74	3.10	0.94
East Germany	3.22	0.75	3.27	0.94
Great Britain	3.06	0.70	2.93	0.94
United States	2.92	0.75	2.67	0.92
Austria	3.08	0.83	3.73	1.06
Hungary	3.82	0.77	3.76	1.18
Italy	3.28	0.85	3.18	1.16
Ireland	2.51	0.63	3.59	1.09
Netherlands	2.93	0.67	2.99	0.94
Norway	3.16	0.70	2.80	0.97
Sweden	2.94	0.77	3.04	0.91
Czech Republic	3.61	0.72	3.60	1.00
Slovenia	3.47	0.69	3.55	0.98
Poland	3.20	0.58	3.35	0.95
Bulgaria	3.81	0.65	3.78	1.09
Russian Federation	3.50	0.71	3.76	0.91
New Zealand	2.65	0.68	2.93	0.96
Canada	2.45	0.80	2.86	0.95
Japan	2.88	0.73	3.79	0.92
Spain	2.88	0.64	3.55	1.01
Latvia	3.85	0.74	3.57	0.96
Slovak Republic	3.66	0.71	3.43	0.95
All countries	3.11	0.82	3.27	1.04

Note: total N = 24,247

The second items asked respondents: "If you could improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling would you be to move to another neighbourhood (or village)?" There were five response categories ranging from "very willing" to "very unwilling". Overall, 18.9% and 28.0% of the respondents answered respectively "very willing" and "fairly willing", whereas 17.9% and 20.8% were "fairly unwilling" or "very unwilling" to leave their neighbourhood or village. The overall correlation between the two items was 0.32. To construct a measure of localism, the scores on the two items were added to one index.[5] First, the scores of the "feeling close to" item were reversed in order to interpret high scores as referring to a high degree of localism. Second, the scale of this item was altered to a 5-point scale so that the scores on the two items could be summed. The inter-item reliability of the localism measure according to

Cronnbach's alpha was 0.433. This figure is rather low, but not surprising since the measure consists of merely 2 items. The reliability in the different national samples is shown in Appendix E, and ranged from 0.231 in the Russian Federation to 0.592 in Hungary. For both intervening variables – perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation – the means and standard deviations in the overall sample and the 23 national samples separately are depicted in Table 6.3. The overall correlation between perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation was 0.16.

6.7.2 Contextual variables

Individuals, as social beings, are affected by their surrounding social contexts. In this study I focus on the impact of the *national* context on individual attitudes towards ethnic groups. In order to explain cross-national differences in chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism, one should look for appropriate operationalisations and measurements of national contextual characteristics. Hence, Przeworski and Teune (1970, p. 8) phrased the goal of international comparative research as the substitution of names of variables for the names of countries. These national variables can either be aggregates based on survey data, or data that are only defined at the national level. However, one should be cautious when comparing national statistics. The comparability of national statistics can be problematic, due to cross-national differences in applied definitions, modes of registration and classification. Furthermore, there can be sizeable differences in the reliability of national statistics between countries.[6]

In this study, in order to minimise these problems of comparability, contextual data are primarily derived from internationally recognised organisations, such as the United Nations Development Programme and the International Labour Office. The statistical departments of these international organisations have put a lot of effort in the standardisation of definitions and data collection methods in order to improve consistency and comparability of indicators across countries.

Before presenting the operationalisation and measurement of the contextual variables, I would once again like to point out that throughout this study, Germany is regarded as consisting of two separate contexts, namely the territories of the former Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic Republic. However, some contextual variables, such as the number of asylum applications, are by definition only defined for the whole German nation. Also note that, for convenience, I applied national figures for the United Kingdom as indicative for the context in Great Britain.

In the operationalisation of the contextual variables, I suggest a small *time lag effect*. That is, according to the theory of Ethnic Competition, inter-ethnic competition will lead to increased in-group favouritism and out-group exclusionism, due to perceptions of ethnic threat. The formation of perceptions is partly based upon information received through the mass media. Typically, published figures regarding, for instance, asylum applications or unemployment level, refer to the circumstances in the past months or the past year. Hence, to account for such a time lag effect, I operationalised the national circumstances as the national conditions in the year prior

to the year of measurement of the survey variables. In other words, I suggest that the individual attitudes in 1995 partly reflect the national conditions in 1994.

To indicate *changes in contextual circumstances*, I applied a 5-year period, comparing the 1994 and 1989 figures. In addition, I tried to operationalise the change compared to the previous year, measuring the change from 1993 to 1994. However, it turned out that the change in national economic and demographic circumstances in a 1-year period was not suitable for international comparison. For instance, among the 23 countries, the (minor) changes in gross national product and unemployment from 1993 to 1994 were positively interrelated ($r = 0.31$): countries with a relatively greater economic growth also experienced a relatively sharper increase in unemployment. This demonstrates that a 1-year time period is too short to indicate cross-national differences in changing national conditions.

Economic prosperity

Economic prosperity is most commonly equated with a nation's Gross National Product or Gross Domestic Product.[7] One way to compare the GNP or GDP, expressed in domestic currency, across countries, is to convert the figures into a common currency, usually the U.S. dollar. However, the use of official exchange rates does not reflect the international variation in prices of consumer goods and services. In particular, prices of non-traded goods such as housing or personal services differ widely across countries, since they are determined by local demand and supply conditions (World Bank, 1995). Therefore, in order to achieve a more appropriate measure of the economic prosperity of nations, the GDP can be adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), which equalises the price of the same bundle of goods and services across countries.[8] PPP exchange rates thus offer a better basis for welfare comparisons. A country's GDP per capita converted into U.S. dollars on the basis of the purchasing power parity of the country's currency, is referred to as the Real GDP per capita (UNDP, 1998, p. 220).

To compare the economic prosperity of countries, I applied the *1994 Real GDP Per Capita (PPP$)*, as reported by the United Nations Development Programme (1997). The UNDP reported only figures for Germany as a whole. Separate figures for (former) West and East Germany were estimated, applying data from the German national statistical office. For instance, for West Germany, the German 1994 Real GDP per capita – as reported by UNDP (1997) – was multiplied by the ratio of the 1994 GNP per capita of West Germany and unified Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (1995).[9]

To calculate changes in economic prosperity, Real GDP per capita could not be applied, since time series data were not available for several Eastern European countries. Instead, I applied the *change in GNP per capita expressed in US$*. Although the latter statistic is somewhat less suitable for international comparisons than Real GDP, this is not a major shortcoming, since the interest here is to indicate changes *within* countries over time. The ratio of 1994 GNP per capita (UNDP, 1997) to 1989 GNP per capita (UNDP, 1992) was used to indicate changes in economic prosperity. Again, separate figures for West and East Germany had to be calculated.[10] Due to lack of data for 1989, there are a few exceptions with regard to the time period covered. For Russia and Latvia, the period 1990 to 1994 is covered, for East Germany the period 1991 to

1994 (additional data derived from UNDP, 1993; 1994). Furthermore, the 1989 figure for Slovenia refers to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and the separate 1989 figures for Czech Republic and Slovakia refer to Czechoslovakia as a whole. Both the change in GNP per capita and the 1994 Real GDP per capita are displayed in Table 6.4.

Unemployment

The percentage of unemployed is taken from statistical yearbooks of the International Labour Office (ILO, 1995, 1996a, 1998).[11] International comparisons of unemployment figures are made more difficult by the variety of types of source of unemployment statistics and the scope and coverage of such sources. For instance, unemployment figures may be based upon labour force sample surveys, social insurance statistics or employment office statistics. In general, statistics based on labour force sample surveys are more comparable internationally than those obtained from other sources, such as employment office statistics (ILO, 1998, p. 453). Furthermore, the percentages of unemployment based on labour force sample surveys are also generally more reliable since they are calculated by relating the estimated number of persons unemployed to the estimate of the total number of employed and unemployed (the labour force) derived from the same survey (ILO, 1998, p. 453). Therefore, I applied unemployment figures based on labour force sample surveys, if they were available.

The figures for the *unemployment level in 1994* were all based on labour force sample surveys.[12] Due to missing data, I applied the 1995 figure for Latvia. The *change in unemployment* from 1989 to 1994 was measured as the ratio of the unemployment in 1994 to the unemployment in 1989. For most countries, the change in unemployment was based on data derived from labour force sample surveys. However, in the Central and Eastern European countries, the period covered by labour force sample surveys was too short, and therefore, I calculated the change in unemployment based on employment office statistics. Although the latter registered unemployment statistics are less suitable for international comparison than the total unemployment statistics derived from labour force sample surveys, the primary interest here is to indicate changes *within* countries over time. In addition, due to a methodological revision in 1993 of the Swedish labour force sample surveys, I applied the Swedish employment office statistics to indicate the change in unemployment in Sweden.

In some countries, due to missing data in previous years, the change in unemployment covered a smaller time period: that is, 1990 to 1994 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and 1991 to 1994 in the Slovak Republic and East Germany. This may lead to an underestimation of the change in unemployment since 1989 compared to other countries. In particular, this was problematical for Latvia, since the available data only covered the period 1992 to 1994, however, still indicating an increase in unemployment of 283%.

Table 6.4 *Contextual characteristics: economic prosperity and unemployment*

	Real GDP per capita (PPP$) 1994 [a]	Change in GNP per capita (US$) 1989-94 [b]	Unemployment level 1994 [c]	Change in unemployment 1989-94 [d]
Australia	19285	1.253	9.7	1.56
West Germany	22120	1.407	8.4	1.05
East Germany	9240	1.562 [e]	19.2	1.67 [e]
Great Britain [f]	18620	1.255	9.6	1.33
United States	26397	1.238	6.1	1.15
Austria	20667	1.424	3.6	1.16
Hungary	6437	1.483	10.7	6.12 [g]
Italy	19363	1.276	11.3	0.94
Ireland	16061	1.553	14.7	0.98
Netherlands	19238	1.383	6.8	0.85
Norway	21346	1.184	5.4	1.10
Sweden	18540	1.091	8.0	5.50
Czech Republic	9201	0.928 [h]	4.1	4.57 [g]
Slovenia	10404	2.411 [i]	9.0	4.97
Poland	5002	1.346	14.4	2.46 [g]
Bulgaria	4533	0.539	20.2	7.29 [g]
Russian Federation	4828	0.773 [g]	7.4	9.38 [j]
New Zealand	16851	1.106	8.2	1.15
Canada	21459	1.025	10.4	1.39
Japan	21581	1.454	2.9	1.26
Spain	14324	1.441	24.2	1.40
Latvia	3332	0.646 [g]	18.9 [k]	2.83 [j]
Slovak Republic	6389	0.652 [h]	13.7	2.06 [e]
Mean	14575	1.236	10.7	2.70

Note: see main text for more information regarding definitions, data sources and own calculations for specific countries.

[a] GDP per capita converted into U.S. dollars on the basis of the Purchasing Power Parity of the country's currency. Sources: UNDP (1997), for West and East Germany own calculation applying data from UNDP (1997) and Statistisches Bundesamt (1995).

[b] Change in GNP per capita (US$) from 1989 to 1994 (as the ratio of the 1994:1989 figures). Sources: UNDP (1992, 1997), for Russia and Latvia UNDP (1993, 1997), for West and East Germany own calculation applying data from UNDP (1992, 1994, 1997) and Statistisches Bundesamt (1995).

[c] Total unemployed as percentage of the labour force, based on data from labour force sample surveys. Sources: ILO (1998), for West and East Germany ILO (1995), for Sweden ILO (1996a).

[d] Change in unemployment from 1989 to 1994 (as the ratio of the 1994: 1989 figures). For Sweden and Central and Eastern European Countries: change in registered unemployment, based on data from employment office statistics. For other countries: change in total unemployment, based on data from labour force sample surveys. Sources: ILO (1998), for West and East Germany ILO (1995), for Sweden ILO (1996a).

[e] Change from 1991 to 1994. [f] Data refer to United Kingdom. [g] Change from 1990 to 1994. [h] Data in 1989 refer to former Czechoslovakia. [i] Data in 1989 refer to former Yugoslavia. [j] Change from 1992 to 1994. [k] Measured in 1995.

Finally, the data for Russia had to be adjusted. According to the employment office statistics, the earliest available unemployment figure was 0.1% in 1991. That is, the official unemployment figure was almost zero. If this figure is applied to calculate the change in unemployment from 1991 to 1994, the ratio amounts to a value of 75. Such an extremely high value, would certainly distort the estimated linear effect of this contextual variable in the analyses. In order to prevent the possible influence of extreme cases, I calculated the change in unemployment in Russia based on the figure for 1992 (0.8%), which still amounted to a growth in unemployment with almost factor 10.

The unemployment figures are displayed in Table 6.4. Although the growth in unemployment in the aforementioned Eastern European countries may be relatively underestimated, there were nonetheless large differences between Central and Eastern European countries and other countries. On average, the increase in unemployment in Central and Eastern European countries was much higher, that is, a ratio of 4.59 compared to only 1.49 for the other countries.

Initially, I tried to apply a third type of indicator of the national economic conditions. Next to (the changes in) the economic prosperity and unemployment, inflation and the change in inflation were used as variables indicative of the economic conditions. Data for *inflation*, defined as the annual percentage change in consumer prices, were derived from the World Economic Outlook database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1999a, 1999b).[13] These figures were yearly averages. Inflation figures for West and East Germany were taken from the German statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999). These German inflation figures were also defined as annual percentage change in consumer prices and thus comparable to the IMF data.[14] The *change in inflation* was calculated as the ratio of the inflation in 1994 to the inflation in 1989.[15] Due to missing data in earlier years, in Russia and Latvia, the change of inflation measure covered the period 1990-1994, and in East Germany only the period 1992-1994.[16] Once again, the 1989 figures for Czech Republic and Slovakia referred to Czechoslovakia as a whole. Furthermore, the IMF only presented figures for Slovenia from 1992 onwards. Therefore, data for earlier years were derived from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (1999).[17]

The application of the inflation figures raised several problems, however. Firstly, the two variables, inflation in 1994 and the change in inflation between 1989 and 1994, were almost perfectly inter-correlated: the correlation at the country level was 0.97. Therefore, it would be impossible to include both variables in the analysis, due to multi-collinearity. Secondly, the change in inflation was differently related to other economic variables in Eastern European countries compared to other countries. Among the Eastern European countries, an increase in inflation was associated with a decline in economic prosperity and a rise in unemployment. This is not surprising, since in the Eastern European countries, inflation in 1994 was on average 10 times higher than in 1989. Thus, in these countries, the enormous growth of inflation was indicative of declining economic conditions. However, among the other countries, both inflation and the change in inflation were much smaller. Among these countries, an increase in inflation was associated with growing economic prosperity and a drop in unemployment level. Thus,

whereas relatively high inflation figures among Western countries were indicative of rapidly expanding economies, among the Eastern European countries high inflation figures were indicative of a collapse in economic conditions. In other words, the (change in) inflation could not be regarded as an unambiguous indicator of national economic conditions.

Indexes for economic conditions

The between-country correlations in economic prosperity and unemployment, as well as the changes in these figures are presented in Appendix F. The change in economic prosperity was moderately correlated to the change in unemployment ($r = -0.26$), whereas the real GDP per capita in 1994 was strongly related to the 1994 unemployment figure ($r = -0.53$). Furthermore, there was a strong correlation of –0.64 between the economic prosperity in 1994 and the change in unemployment. In order to prevent problems of multi-collinearity and to reduce the number of contextual variables in the analysis, I decided to combine the economic prosperity and unemployment figures into a single index for economic conditions. Similarly, the changes in economic prosperity and unemployment were combined into an index for the change in economic conditions. In order to add the scores properly, the figures were first standardised and subsequently the standardised unemployment figure was subtracted from the standardised economic prosperity figure. The indexes for economic conditions and change in economic conditions are presented in Table 6.5. Applying these indexes instead of the original economic variables has the further advantage that the results of the analysis are less influenced by extremely high or low scores on one of the original indicators. Furthermore, applying a sum of indicators would presumably diminish any problems of comparability of a single indicator across countries.

Social security

According to Coser (1956), each society is characterised by a struggle for scarce resources, such as economic resources. This competition, however, may lose its harsh character if a society offers an extensive system of social security. The more extensive the social security system, the more individual citizens are protected from severe losses of income due to unemployment, sickness, disability, and so on. To indicate the extensiveness of the national social security programme, I applied figures derived from the International Labour Office. The ILO conducts an inquiry every three years into the cost of national social security programmes. As defined by the ILO, social security schemes cover the following contingencies: medical care, sickness benefit, maternity benefit, old-age benefit, invalidity benefit, survivors' benefit, family benefit, employment injury benefit, and unemployment benefit. These social security schemes or services (except for employment injury compensation schemes) should, according to the ILO criteria, be administered by a public, semi-public or autonomous body (ILO, 1996b).

To measure the extensiveness of the national social security programme, I applied the total social security benefits expenditure, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Data were derived from the ILO's 'Fifteenth International Inquiry 1990-1993'. In contrast to previous inquiries (ILO, 1996b), its results will only be published on the World Wide Web (ILO, 2000).

Table 6.5 *Contextual characteristics: economic conditions and social security*

	Economic conditions 1994 [a]	Change in economic conditions 1989-94 [b]	Social security benefits expenditure [c]
Australia	0.848	0.522	11.30 [d]
West Germany	1.477	1.125	23.16 [e]
East Germany	–2.248	1.260	23.31 [f]
Great Britain [g]	0.771	0.623	20.55 [h]
United States	2.487	0.653	14.39 [e]
Austria	2.120	1.121	23.70 [h]
Hungary	–1.142	–0.801	15.78 [d]
Italy	0.576	0.839	10.86 [h]
Ireland	–0.491	1.526	19.20 [h]
Netherlands	1.353	1.146	29.72 [h]
Norway	1.898	0.537	19.60 [d]
Sweden	1.043	–1.538	38.63 [h]
Czech Republic	0.413	–1.564	19.50 [h]
Slovenia	–0.282	2.038	16.90 [e]
Poland	–1.998	0.382	21.07 [d]
Bulgaria	–3.089	–3.688	24.28 [d]
Russian Federation	–0.787	–3.967	10.80 [i]
New Zealand	0.769	0.319	18.16 [d]
Canada	1.031	0.013	21.98 [h]
Japan	2.373	1.158	11.99 [h]
Spain	–2.414	1.064	21.30 [h]
Latvia	–3.029	–1.552	14.14 [j]
Slovak Republic	–1.679	–1.215	20.94 [d]
Mean	0.000	0.000	19.62

Note: See Table 6.4 for sources and notes regarding the original economic contextual characteristic that are applied in the economic factors.

[a] Calculated as z-score of 1994 real GDP per capita (PPP$), minus z-score of 1994 unemployment level, as displayed in Table 6.4.

[b] Calculated as z-score of the change in GNP per capita (US$) between 1989 and 1994, minus the z-score of the change in unemployment level between 1989 and 1994 (n=23 national samples), as displayed in Table 6.4.

[c] Social security benefits expenditure, expressed as percentage of GDP. Sources: ILO (2000), for Russia (ILO, 1996b).

[d] Measured in 1992.

[e] Measured in 1991.

[f] Measured in 1990.

[g] Data refer to United Kingdom.

[h] Measured in 1993.

[i] Measured in 1989, expressed as percentage of GDP in purchasers' value.

[j] Measured in 1994.

The most recent figure from the fifteenth inquiry was applied. For most countries, this refers to the (fiscal) year 1992 or 1993. For Latvia, social security benefits expenditures refer to 1994; for Slovenia, the United States and West Germany the data refer to 1991; for East Germany, data refer to 1990. Finally, no data were available for the Russian Federation in the fifteenth ILO inquiry. Instead, 1989 data were applied from the previous ILO inquiry (ILO, 1996b). Note that social security benefits expenditure for Russia was therefore expressed as a percentage of GDP in purchasers' value, whereas for other countries it was expressed as a percentage of GDP. The national figures are again displayed in Table 6.5. Since the measure of the extensiveness of the social security programme was not available in every year for each country, it was not possible to construct a suitable variable indicating the change in social security benefits expenditures.

Ethnic heterogeneity

It turned out to be extremely difficult to find comparative population figures regarding ethnic composition. There are considerably differences in demographic statistics regarding the definition, modes of registration, and classification of ethnicity. The proportion of ethnic out-groups can, for instance, be operationalised by means of various criteria such as nationality, citizenship, ethnic origin of parents and/or grandparents, country of birth, or country of origin. Furthermore, there are differences with respect to the treatment of members from ethnic minority groups that have acquired more than one nationality.

These differences seriously hamper international comparisons. In addition, data for Eastern European countries are scarce, and if they are available, they are mostly based on census data that are gathered in different time periods in different countries. Consequently, international statistical organisations such as the United Nations and the OECD (1998) have only comparative data at their disposal with regard to a subset of the 22 ISSP countries. One might complement the latter data with additional data from national statistical offices; however, this raises serious problems of international comparability.

As an alternative, I constructed an index of ethnic heterogeneity based on the ISSP survey data, aggregating individual data on the country level (Agresti & Agresti, 1977). For this purpose I applied the survey question that asked respondents whether, at the time of respondent's birth, his or her parents were citizens of the respondent's country. I distinguished between respondents whose parents were citizens, and respondents for whom one or both parents were non-citizens, and regarded the two groups as indicative of respectively the ethnic majority and the ethnic minority. For each country, these figures were calculated using the whole national sample. The index of ethnic heterogeneity reflected the differential size of the two ethnic groups.[18] When all respondents' parents were citizens, there was perfect ethnic homogeneity, and the ethnic heterogeneity index equalled zero. The higher the index, the more ethnically heterogeneous a country was. That is, the more equal the proportion of ethnic majority and ethnic minority. The maximum value of the ethnic heterogeneity index – based on the proportion of two groups – was 0.50. The index of ethnic heterogeneity is displayed in Table 6.6. According to this indicator, Japan was the most ethnically homogeneous country. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, all had relatively high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity, due to their long-term history of

immigration. The country with the highest amount of heterogeneity, however, was Latvia, reflecting the large number of ethnic Russians within Latvia.

Asylum applications

As a second indicator of the national demographic conditions I applied the yearly figures regarding the arrival of asylum seekers. The yearly number of asylum applications is quite an appropriate indicator for international comparison as compared to other figures on asylum seekers. That is, it is much more complicated to produce comparable figures regarding the number of *admitted* refugees, due to cross-national differences in legal regulations, residence permits (e.g., provisional versus durable permits), as well as differences in registration, classification and political circumstances in general.

Data on the number of asylum *applications* were derived from several yearbooks of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The number of submitted *asylum applications in 1994* was taken from the UNHCR (UNHCR, 1999). In general, the data refer to the number of persons that submitted an application. For the United States, the number of cases was listed. Therefore, I estimated the number of persons by multiplying this figure by the average number of persons per asylum case, which, from 1989 till 1998 was 1.45 according to the UNHCR (1999, p. 65). Data for the United Kingdom were derived from a previous yearbook (UNHCR, 1998) in which the number of persons was listed, whereas a more recent yearbook (UNHCR, 1999) listed the number of cases. For some countries, the number of asylum applications in 1994 was not available. As an estimate for the number of asylum applications in Bulgaria in 1994, I applied the number of asylum applications in 1995. For Slovenia, UNHCR figures were only listed as of 1996. Additional data were derived from the Statistical Office of the European Union, which reported Slovenian asylum application figures as of 1994 (Eurostat, 2000).

In addition, the UNHCR did not report figures on the annual number of submitted asylum applications in Latvia. However, the UNHCR estimated the total number of asylum seekers in Latvia in 1998 as a mere 20 (UNHCR, 1999, p. 10). Since this number of people whose asylum applications are pending in the procedure was so tiny in 1998, I assumed that the annual number of asylum applications in Latvia in 1994, as well as in earlier years, equals zero. Finally, data on the number of asylum applications were not available for the Russian Federation. I could not locate any additional data that could be applied to estimate the number of asylum applications in Russia.[19] Instead, I applied a means substitution for the missing data in Russia: the number of asylum applications as well as the change in asylum applications in Russia was set equal to the average values of all other countries. In this way, I was not forced to remove Russia from the analyses, whereas the Russian survey data had no strong distorting impact on the estimate of the effect of asylum applications on ethnic attitudes.

To compare the burden of the absolute numbers of asylum applications across countries, I related these figures to the size of the total population. The mid-year population estimate was derived from the Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations (1998). Table 6.6 shows the number of asylum applications in 1994 per 100,000 inhabitants.

Table 6.6 *Contextual characteristics: demographic conditions*

	Ethnic heterogeneity [a]	Asylum applications 1994 per 100,000 capita [b]	Change in asylum applications 1989-94 [c]
Australia	0.390	35.09	4.68
West Germany	0.160	156.24 [d]	1.01 [d]
East Germany	0.033	156.24 [d]	1.01 [d]
Great Britain [e]	0.113	72.27	2.47
United States	0.173	80.42 [f]	1.35 [f]
Austria	0.130	63.25 [g]	0.22 [g]
Hungary	0.035	4.29 [h]	11.15 [h]
Italy	0.036	3.13	0.80
Ireland	0.072	10.05	8.83 [i]
Netherlands	0.087	341.74	3.65
Norway	0.096	78.15	0.75
Sweden	0.238	212.28	0.59
Czech Republic	0.063	11.51	0.67 [j]
Slovenia	0.176	1.51 [k]	1.72 [l]
Poland	0.046	1.56	14.77 [m]
Bulgaria	0.037	6.16 [n]	13.84 [m]
Russian Federation	0.024	57.10 [m]	3.89 [m]
New Zealand	0.332	12.88	0.69 [m]
Canada	0.354	75.23	1.03
Japan	0.005	0.06	1.38
Spain	0.027	30.63	2.92
Latvia	0.459	0.00 [m]	0.00 [m]
Slovak Republic	0.071	2.62	9.21 [n]
Mean	0.140	61.41	3.77

Note: see main text for more information regarding definitions, data sources and own calculations for specific countries.

[a] Ethnic heterogeneity index based on the proportion of respondents whose parents were citizens of the respondent's country at the time of respondent's birth. Source: ISSP 1995 data.

[b] Relative number of persons submitting an asylum application per 100,000 inhabitants in 1994. Sources: UNHCR (1999) and UN (1998), for Great Britain: UNHCR (1998) and UN (1998).

[c] Change in asylum applications from 1989 to 1994 (as the ratio of the 1994:1989 figures). Sources: UNHCR (1999) and UN (1998), for Great Britain UNHCR (1998) and UN (1998).

[d] Data refer to unified Germany.

[e] Data refer to United Kingdom

[f] Estimated number of persons, based on the number of cases and the average number of persons per case (1.45) during the period 1989 till 1998. Data refer to U.S. fiscal year (1 October – 30 September).

[g] Excluding de facto refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina (OECD, 1998).

[h] Includes applications under the UNHCR Mandate.

[i] 1989 figure derived from Eurostat (2000). [j] Change from 1990 to 1994.

[k] Source: Eurostat (2000) [l] Own estimation of 1989 figure, by means of extrapolation.

[m] Own estimate. [n] Data refer to 1995.

In the analysis I applied the number of applications per 1,000 inhabitants, in order to avoid small parameter estimates that could only be displayed with a large number of decimals.

The *change in asylum applications* from 1989 to 1994 was measured as the ratio of the relative number of asylum applications in 1994 to the relative number of asylum applications in 1989 (UNHCR, 1999). For both years, the absolute number of asylum applications (UNHCR, 1999) was related to the total national population in, respectively, 1994 and 1989 (United Nations, 1998). Again, data for Great Britain were derived from a previous yearbook (UNHCR, 1998) and US data were again corrected to derive the number of persons that submitted an asylum application. For some countries, no UNHCR figures were available regarding the number of persons that submitted an asylum application in 1989. For Ireland, the 1989 figure was derived from the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat, 2000), since its figures for more recent years were identical to the ones presented by the UNHCR (1999). For the Czech Republic, I set the number of applications in 1989 equal to the number in 1990, which was the earliest available figure. For the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the number of asylum applications was only known as of, respectively, 1992 and 1994. I estimated the number of asylum applications in 1989 through linear extrapolation by means of the data from the three first available figures, referring to, respectively, the period 1992-1994 and 1994-1996. In both cases, the number of asylum applications continuously increased during the latter time periods. In addition, data for New Zealand and Poland were only available as of, respectively, 1991 and 1993. Since for both countries the number of asylum applications had shown no stable trend in more recent years, I could not apply an extrapolation to estimate the 1989 figures. Instead, the number of asylum applications in New Zealand was set equal to the average during 1991 to 1993. For Poland (data available as of 1993), as well as for Bulgaria (data available as of 1995), I had to apply a rough estimate of the – presumably very low – number of asylum applications in 1989. The number of asylum applications in 1995 in Poland and Bulgaria was approximately as high as in Hungary (UNHCR, 1999). For Hungary, data on asylum applications was available as of 1989. As a rough estimate of the number of asylum applications in Poland and Bulgaria in 1989, I applied the 1989 figure of Hungary, that is, the very low number of 40 persons submitting an asylum application. Finally, as mentioned earlier, due to missing data, the change in asylum applications in Latvia was set equal to zero, and the change in Russia was estimated as the average change in all other countries. Obviously, this implies that – especially for Eastern European countries – the figures regarding change in asylum applications should be treated with some caution.

6.8 Method

In order to estimate the effects of individual and contextual characteristics simultaneously, I applied multi-level modelling. Firstly, I will present some of the basic ideas behind multi-level modelling as well as the advantages of this approach compared to ordinary regression modelling.

Then, I will present a series of models, with increasing complexity, that are applied in order to test my hypotheses.

Multi-level models are used to analyse populations with multi-level structures, which - although not always recognised as such - are ubiquitous. Multi-level structures are structures in which units (e.g., individuals) are nested within higher-level units (e.g., groups). Populations commonly exhibit complex multi-level structures. Examples are patients (at level 1) who are assigned to clinics (at level 2); pupils (level 1) who attend classes (level 2) within schools (level 3) that are situated in different regions (level 4); or - as in this study - individuals living within the boundaries of countries. In general sociological terms, individuals are nested in specific social contexts. Other examples of multi-level structures result from multi-stage sampling methods (e.g., respondents nested within households, that are nested in municipalities, nested in regions); longitudinal designs (e.g., repeated measurements are nested within individuals); and meta analysis (subjects are nested within several studies) (Goldstein, 1995; Jones, 1993).[20]

In social science, multi-level models have mainly been developed and applied within the context of educational research, to analyse the achievements of students nested within schools (Raudenbush & Bryk, 1986; Veenstra, 1999). These models have further been used to analyse data on voters in constituencies in regions (Jones, Johnston, & Pattie, 1992), on siblings in families (Need, 1995), and on surveys in different years in various countries (Nieuwbeerta, 1995).

In this study I focus on ethnic attitudes of individuals nested within countries. Using multi-level models, the variance at both levels can be modelled simultaneously: the variance between individuals as well as the variance between countries. The existence of different levels of variation is the fundamental principle of multi-level modelling (Rasbash et al., 1999).

To model the variance between individuals as well as the variance between countries simultaneously, I used the software program MlwiN (Rasbash et al., 1999). For each dependent variable, I estimated a set of successive models, as represented in Table 6.7. I started by estimating a single-level model, ignoring for the moment the variation between countries, and allowing only variation between individuals. This model (model 0) merely includes an intercept, indicating the overall mean, and a random part, indicating the individual level variation around the overall mean. This corresponds to the traditional regression model.

Next, in accordance with the hierarchical structure of the data, I estimated a model that also incorporates random variation between countries in the intercept. That is, the intercept is allowed to vary between countries. This is the first truly *multi-level* model and therefore labelled as model 1. Since there are as yet no explanatory variables included, this random intercept model is referred to as the empty model or null model. The model 1 is formally summarised in 2 equations:

Micro-model: $$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

Macro-model: $$\beta_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \mu_{0j} \quad (2)$$

Table 6.7 *Successive models in multi-level analyses*

	Model
Single-level model	
0	Single–level null model
Two-level random intercept models	
1	2–level random intercept null model
2	+ individual variables
3	+ economical country variables
4	+ social security country variable
5	+ demographic country variables
6	+ curvilinear effects of country variables
7	+ interactions between country variables
8	+ intervening variable perceived ethnic threat
9	+ intervening variable localistic orientation

The two equations combined form the 2-level random intercept null model:

Combined model 1: $Y_{ij} = \beta_{00} + (\mu_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij})$ (3)

Equation (1) presents the micro-model or the within-countries model in which Y_{ij} is the score on a dependent variable for individual i in country j. Individual-level variables are generally designated with a subscript ij, indicating that these variables may vary between individuals within countries. Country-level variables have only a subscript j, and variables without subscript i or j are constant over all individuals and countries. β_{0j} is the country-dependent intercept that may vary between countries. The between-countries model or macro-model is summarised in equation (2), where the intercept of country j is expressed as the sum of the overall intercept (β_{00}) and the departure of the j-th country's intercept from the overall intercept (μ_{0j}). The combined model in equation (3) consists of a fixed part, that is constant over individuals and countries, and – between brackets – a random part that is allowed to vary between individuals or countries.

The model consists of one fixed parameter (β_{00}) and two random parameters σ^2_{ε} and $\sigma^2_{\mu 0}$. The level-1 random parameter σ^2_{ε} is the variance between individuals, given the country in which they reside. The level-2 random parameter $\sigma^2_{\mu 0}$ is the between-country variance in the intercept. As is common in multi-level modelling, it is assumed that the random variables (or residuals) of different levels are not correlated. The parameters are estimated by means of the Iterative Generalised Least Squares (IGLS) method, which yields maximum likelihood estimates (Goldstein, 1995). The significance of fixed parameters can be judged by means of the Wald test statistic: the ratio of the parameter estimate to its standard error, which is approximately standard Normally distributed in large samples. For random parameters, this ratio may depart

considerably from normality. A better test statistic for random parameters is therefore the likelihood ratio statistic (–2*loglikelihood). The difference in likelihood ratio between a given model and a model with additional parameters has an approximate Chi-square distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of new parameters, if the simple model is correct (Goldstein, 1995; Rasbash et al., 1999). This deviance test statistic can also be applied to judge the significance of (multiple) fixed parameters.

If the $\sigma^2_{\mu 0}$ parameter proves significant, then there are significant differences between countries in the intercept. The 2-level model then provides a better description of the data compared to the single-level model. The degree to which the scores of individuals in the same country resemble each other as compared with those from individuals in different countries is illustrated by the intra-country correlation, which is the between-country variance expressed as the proportion of the total variance (Goldstein, 1995). In a random intercept model, this is the ratio $\sigma^2_{\mu 0} / (\sigma^2_{\varepsilon} + \sigma^2_{\mu 0})$.

After estimating the two-level random intercept null model, the individual explanatory variables were included in the model to test the hypotheses 1a to 1h. This model (model 2), with p individual variables is formally summarised in the following equations:

Micro-model: $$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{10} X_{1ij} + \beta_{20} X_{2ij} + \ldots + \beta_{p0} X_{pij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (4)$$

Macro-model: $$\beta_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \mu_{0j} \quad (2)$$

Combined model 2: $$Y_{ij} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{10} X_{1ij} + \beta_{20} X_{2ij} + \ldots + \beta_{p0} X_{pij} + (\mu_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij}) \quad (5)$$

where β_{10} is the coefficient of the individual variable X_{1ij}. Note that the individual variables are included in the micro-model and that the macro-model, as presented in equation (2), has not changed compared to the previous model. In order to enhance interpretation of the overall and group-dependent intercepts, interval individual variables were centred by their overall mean across all countries. In this manner, the intercept represents the overall mean score across all individuals.

For each j-th country, the residual μ_{0j} can be estimated.[21] Comparing the country residuals in model 1 with those in model 2, shows the influence of composition effects. That is, differences in the average scores between countries may to some extent be caused by differences in population composition, for instance differences in the proportion of higher educated people.

Next, to test the hypotheses on contextual level effects, country characteristics were included in the random intercept model. Negative values of country characteristics were not allowed, thereby making it possible to model quadratic terms of country characteristics. Therefore, I transformed the variables 'economic conditions in 1994' and the 'change in economic conditions' with a linear transformation with a new minimum value of zero. As the number of national samples in the analyses was limited to the – from a methodological point of view – rather small number of 23, I decided not to include all contextual characteristics at once into the model. Instead, I gradually increased the complexity of successive models by

incorporating a growing number of variables. Firstly, in model 3, the economic conditions as well as the change in economic conditions were included. In model 4, the social security benefits expenditure was added, and finally, in model 5 the three demographic variables were included. By presenting the estimated parameters of these successive models, one can see how parameter values of contextual variables change when other contextual variables were added to the model. A model with contextual variables is formally summarised in the following equations:

Micro-model: $$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{10}X_{1ij} + \beta_{20}X_{2ij} + \ldots + \beta_{p0}X_{pij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (4)$$

Macro-model: $$\beta_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01}Z_{1j} + \beta_{02}Z_{2j} + \ldots + \beta_{0q}Z_{qj} + \mu_{0j} \quad (6)$$

Combined model: $$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} &= \beta_{00} + \beta_{10}X_{1ij} + \beta_{20}X_{2ij} + \ldots + \beta_{p0}X_{pij} \\ &\quad + \beta_{01}Z_{1j} + \beta_{02}Z_{2j} + \ldots + \beta_{0q}Z_{qj} + (\mu_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij}) \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where β_{01} to β_{0q} are the coefficients of the contextual variables Z_1 to Z_q. With this model the contextual hypotheses can be tested, regarding the effects of national characteristics, controlled for individual-level effects. If the parameters of the contextual variables turn out to be significant, then the country-level variance σ^2_{u0} will be substantially lower than in the previous model.

Next, I tested for non-linear contextual effects, by including quadratic terms for each of the 6 contextual variables in the previous model. To limit the number of contextual variables in the analysis, I estimated 6 different models that, compared to model 5, each had one additional quadratic term. If more than one of the quadratic terms turned out to have a significant effect, I incorporated them simultaneously into a model. Next, quadratic terms with a non-significant effect in the latter model were removed. This procedure resulted in model 6, as represented in Table 6.7.

Subsequently, I tested whether there were any interactions between the various contextual variables. According to hypotheses 6g and 7g, the effects of national conditions (economic conditions, extensiveness of social security, and demographic conditions) might reinforce each other. I followed the same a similar procedure as just described. First, a set of different models with only one interaction term was estimated. If more than one of these interaction effects were significant, I tested whether these effects remained significant, controlling for the other interaction variables. If not, they were removed from the model, which resulted in model 7, as represented in Table 6.7.

After the independent individual and contextual variables were included in the model, I successively incorporated both intervening variables – perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation (model 8 and 9). As with the independent individual variables, the intervening individual variables were centred by their overall mean across all countries.

6.9 Results

This section contains a detailed description of the results of multi-level analyses for each of the four dependent variables separately, i.e., exclusionism of immigrants, refugees, group membership, and chauvinism. This is followed by the results of the multi-level analyses for the two intervening variables: perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation. In each case, the parameter estimates of a set of subsequent models are presented. In this manner, one can determine how parameter values alter by inclusion of (more) contextual variables and intervening variables. A summary of these results as well as an overview of the observed empirical support for the tested hypotheses, can be found in Section 6.10.

6.9.1 Exclusionism of immigrants

The results regarding exclusionism of immigrants are presented in Table 6.8. The single-level null model with only variation at the individual level had a likelihood ratio statistic of 65886.6 (not displayed). In the next model, I took into account the hierarchical structure of the data – individuals nested within countries – by allowing variation in the intercept at the country level. The likelihood ratio of this 2-level random intercept null model was 63008.4. Compared to the single-level model, this was a decrease of 2878.2. This deviance value, with 1 degree of freedom, showed a highly significant improvement of the model fit, indicating that there were significant differences between countries in the mean score on exclusionism of immigrants. The overall mean score across countries was 3.909, as shown in the second column of Table 6.8. The variance components are displayed in the lower part of this table. In a random intercept model, the total variance can be decomposed in variance at the individual level and variance at the country level. The variance between individuals *within* countries (0.785) turned out to be much higher than the variance *between* countries (0.121). Nonetheless, the variance between countries was highly significant, thus individuals within a country were, on average, more alike than individuals from different countries. This finding is also reflected by the amount of intra-country correlation, that is, the between-country variance as a proportion of the total variance. The intra-country correlation had an estimated value of (0.121 / (0.785 + 0.121) =) 0.134. This is the correlation between two randomly chosen individuals within a country (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The national context therefore proved to be a relevant social context with regard to an individual's stance toward immigrants.

Effects of independent individual characteristics on exclusionism of immigrants

To test the hypotheses regarding differences in exclusionism of immigrants between social categories (hypotheses 1a to 1h), the individual characteristics were included in model 2. As can be seen in Table 6.8, this resulted in a significant improvement of the model fit: the difference in likelihood ratio was 1021.9, with 21 degrees of freedom (p-value = 0.000).

Table 6.8 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism of immigrants*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Intercept	**3.909**	(0.073)	**3.760**	(0.075)	**4.133**	(0.186)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)			–0.022	(0.012)	–0.022	(0.012)
Age			0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Education			**–0.115**	(0.006)	**–0.115**	(0.006)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)			—		—	
Lower controllers			**0.059**	(0.027)	**0.059**	(0.027)
Routine non-manual			**0.154**	(0.030)	**0.154**	(0.030)
Self–employed			**0.208**	(0.033)	**0.208**	(0.033)
Supervisors, skilled manual			**0.183**	(0.031)	**0.183**	(0.031)
Semi–unskilled manual			**0.158**	(0.031)	**0.157**	(0.031)
Unemployed			**0.148**	(0.034)	**0.148**	(0.034)
Student, vocational training			–0.003	(0.035)	–0.003	(0.035)
Retired			**0.170**	(0.030)	**0.170**	(0.030)
Housekeepers			**0.195**	(0.031)	**0.195**	(0.031)
Not classifiable			**0.176**	(0.032)	**0.176**	(0.032)
Denomination						
Catholic			**0.120**	(0.021)	**0.120**	(0.021)
Orthodox			0.023	(0.045)	0.015	(0.045)
Protestant			**0.163**	(0.021)	**0.164**	(0.021)
Other			**0.068**	(0.026)	**0.069**	(0.026)
No religion (ref.)			—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week			**–0.157**	(0.021)	**–0.157**	(0.021)
≥ once a month			**–0.141**	(0.023)	**–0.141**	(0.023)
Less than one a month			**–0.071**	(0.016)	**–0.070**	(0.016)
Never (ref.)			—		—	
Family income			**–0.020**	(0.006)	**–0.020**	(0.006)
Intervening variables						
Perceived ethnic threat						
Localism						
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994					–0.034	(0.041)
Change economic conditions 1989-94					–0.068	(0.045)
Social security benefits expenditure						
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995						
Asylum seekers 1994						
Change asylum seekers 1989-94						
(Change asylum seekers 1989-94)^2						
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.785**	(0.007)	**0.752**	(0.007)	**0.752**	(0.007)
% explained variance			4.1%		4.1%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.121**	(0.036)	**0.112**	(0.033)	**0.093**	(0.028)
% explained variance			7.0%		22.8%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	63008.4		61986.5		61982.2	
Δ –2*log likelihood	2878.2		1021.9		4.3	
Δ df	1		21		2	
p–value.	0.000		0.000		0.114	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.8 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism of immigrants (continued)*

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Intercept	**4.157**	(0.275)	**4.333**	(0.347)	**4.775**	(0.336)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)	–0.022	(0.012)	–0.022	(0.012)	–0.022	(0.012)
Age	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Education	**–0.115**	(0.006)	**–0.115**	(0.006)	**–0.115**	(0.006)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)	—		—		—	
Lower controllers	**0.059**	(0.027)	**0.059**	(0.027)	**0.059**	(0.027)
Routine non-manual	**0.154**	(0.030)	**0.155**	(0.030)	**0.155**	(0.030)
Self–employed	**0.208**	(0.033)	**0.209**	(0.033)	**0.208**	(0.033)
Supervisors, skilled manual	**0.182**	(0.031)	**0.183**	(0.031)	**0.183**	(0.031)
Semi–unskilled manual	**0.157**	(0.031)	**0.158**	(0.031)	**0.158**	(0.031)
Unemployed	**0.148**	(0.034)	**0.148**	(0.034)	**0.148**	(0.034)
Student, vocational training	–0.003	(0.035)	–0.003	(0.035)	–0.003	(0.035)
Retired	**0.170**	(0.030)	**0.170**	(0.030)	**0.170**	(0.030)
Housekeepers	**0.195**	(0.031)	**0.195**	(0.031)	**0.195**	(0.031)
Not classifiable	**0.176**	(0.032)	**0.176**	(0.032)	**0.176**	(0.032)
Denomination						
Catholic	**0.120**	(0.021)	**0.121**	(0.021)	**0.122**	(0.021)
Orthodox	0.015	(0.045)	0.017	(0.045)	0.014	(0.045)
Protestant	**0.164**	(0.021)	**0.164**	(0.021)	**0.164**	(0.021)
Other	**0.069**	(0.027)	**0.069**	(0.027)	**0.068**	(0.026)
No religion (ref.)	—		—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week	**–0.157**	(0.021)	**–0.156**	(0.021)	**–0.157**	(0.021)
≥ once a month	**–0.141**	(0.023)	**–0.141**	(0.023)	**–0.141**	(0.023)
Less than one a month	**–0.070**	(0.016)	**–0.070**	(0.016)	**–0.070**	(0.016)
Never (ref.)	—		—		—	
Family income	**–0.020**	(0.006)	**–0.020**	(0.006)	**–0.020**	(0.006)
Intervening variables						
Perceived ethnic threat						
Localism						
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994	–0.034	(0.041)	–0.070	(0.046)	***–0.071***	(0.040)
Change economic conditions 1989-94	–0.068	(0.045)	***–0.072***	(0.043)	***–0.065***	(0.038)
Social security benefits expenditure	–0.001	(0.010)	–0.014	(0.014)	**–0.027**	(0.013)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995			0.272	(0.514)	0.205	(0.456)
Asylum seekers 1994			0.145	(0.111)	**0.246**	(0.106)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94			–0.009	(0.018)	**–0.135**	(0.053)
(Change asylum seekers 1989-94)^2					**0.010**	(0.004)
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.752**	(0.007)	**0.752**	(0.007)	**0.752**	(0.007)
% explained variance	4.1%		4.1%		4.1%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.093**	(0.028)	**0.083**	(0.025)	**0.065**	(0.019)
% explained variance	22.9%		31.7%		46.6%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	61982.2		61979.4		61973.8	
Δ –2*log likelihood	0.0		2.8		5.6	
Δ df	1		3		1	
p–value.	1.000		0.425		0.017	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.8 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism of immigrants (continued)*

	(Model 7)	Model 8		Model 9	
Intercept		**3.934**	(0.226)	**3.928**	(0.228)
Individual characteristics					
Sex (male)		**–0.043**	(0.011)	**–0.043**	(0.011)
Age		0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Education		**–0.032**	(0.006)	**–0.031**	(0.006)
Social position					
Higher controller (ref.)		—		—	
Lower controllers		**0.070**	(0.023)	**0.070**	(0.023)
Routine non-manual		**0.121**	(0.026)	**0.120**	(0.026)
Self–employed		**0.150**	(0.029)	**0.149**	(0.029)
Supervisors, skilled manual		**0.110**	(0.027)	**0.110**	(0.027)
Semi–unskilled manual		**0.087**	(0.027)	**0.086**	(0.027)
Unemployed		**0.092**	(0.030)	**0.093**	(0.030)
Student, vocational training		0.042	(0.031)	0.043	(0.031)
Retired		**0.089**	(0.026)	**0.089**	(0.026)
Housekeepers		**0.137**	(0.027)	**0.138**	(0.027)
Not classifiable		**0.102**	(0.028)	**0.102**	(0.028)
Religious denomination					
Catholic		**0.057**	(0.018)	**0.056**	(0.018)
Orthodox		0.049	(0.039)	0.048	(0.039)
Protestant		**0.077**	(0.018)	**0.077**	(0.018)
Other		**0.056**	(0.023)	**0.056**	(0.023)
No religion (ref.)		—		—	
Church attendance					
≥ nearly once a week		**–0.120**	(0.018)	**–0.123**	(0.018)
≥ once a month		**–0.113**	(0.020)	**–0.115**	(0.020)
Less than one a month		**–0.061**	(0.014)	**–0.062**	(0.014)
Never (ref.)		—		—	
Family income		0.002	(0.005)	0.001	(0.005)
Intervening variables					
Perceived ethnic threat		**0.628**	(0.007)	**0.627**	(0.007)
Localism				**0.011**	(0.005)
Country characteristics					
Economic conditions 1994		–0.013	(0.027)	–0.012	(0.027)
Change economic conditions 1989-94		0.020	(0.026)	0.021	(0.026)
Social security benefits expenditure		–0.014	(0.009)	–0.014	(0.009)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995		**0.662**	(0.306)	**0.673**	(0.308)
Asylum seekers 1994		**0.210**	(0.071)	**0.211**	(0.072)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94		**–0.079**	(0.035)	**–0.079**	(0.036)
(Change asylum seekers 1989-94)^2		**0.006**	(0.003)	**0.006**	(0.003)
Variance components					
Individual–level variance in intercept		**0.563**	(0.005)	**0.563**	(0.005)
% explained variance		28.3%		28.3%	
Country–level variance in intercept		**0.029**	(0.009)	**0.029**	(0.009)
% explained variance		76.2%		75.8%	
Goodness–of–fit					
–2*log likelihood		54923.9		54919.8	
Δ –2*log likelihood		7049.9		4.1	
Δ df		1		1	
p–value.		0.000		0.040	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value < 0.10).

It turned out that exclusionism of immigrants was relatively strongly supported by lower educated people (b = –0.115): the lower the level of educational attainment, the stronger the opposition to migration. This finding corroborates hypothesis 1a. Next, consistent with hypothesis 1b, self-employed persons were more inclined to exclusionism of immigrants than people belonging to the reference category of higher controllers (b = 0.208). Furthermore, skilled manual workers and supervisors (b = 0.183) and (semi-) unskilled manual workers (b = 0.158) referred to in hypothesis 1c, as well as unemployed people (0.148), referred to in hypothesis 1d, were relatively strongly in favour of exclusionism of immigrants. Finally, consistent with hypothesis 1e, income had a negative effect (–0.020): the lower the family income, the more one favoured exclusionism of immigrants.

In contrast to hypothesis 1f, age did not have a significant effect. People who consider themselves to be a member of a denomination turned out to be more inclined to exclude immigrants than non-members, with the exception of the (relatively small number of) orthodox religious persons. These findings support hypothesis 1g. However, controlled for denomination, the more frequently individuals attended church, the less they were inclined to exclude immigrants, which is a refutation of hypothesis 1h.[22] As can be seen in Table 6.8, there were also other significant differences between social categories. Higher controllers, as well as students, were less supportive of exclusionism than all other categories on the social position variable.

Looking at the lower part of Table 6.8, one can see that by including the independent individual variables, the variance between individuals within countries dropped slightly from 0.785 to 0.752. In other words, the individual characteristics only accounted for 4.1% of the individual-level variance. In addition, due to composition effects, the variance between countries decreased from 0.121 to 0.112. This implies that 7.0% of the observed differences between countries in mean level of exclusionism of immigrants could be attributed to differences in the population composition.

Effects of national characteristics on exclusionism of immigrants

Next, contextual characteristics were included into the analyses. As can be seen in Table 6.8, the effects of both economic variables in model 3 were negative, but not significant. Including these contextual variables therefore did not improve the goodness-of-fit of the model. Likewise, including the social security variable (model 4) and the demographic variables (model 5) did not significantly improve the goodness-of-fit, as is indicated by the low deviance values of models 4 and 5. However, in model 5, one parameter estimate reached significance ($p < 0.010$): controlled for all other contextual variables, the change in economic conditions had a significant effect. That is, the stronger the decline in economic conditions of the country, the more its residents were in favour of exclusionism of immigrants.[23]

Next, I tested for non-linear contextual effects, by including quadratic terms for each of the 6 contextual variables in model 5. That is, I estimated 6 different models that, compared to model 5, each had one additional quadratic term. Only one of these quadratic terms led to a significant improvement in model fit, namely the quadratic term of the change in asylum seekers. The likelihood ratio of this model (model 6) was 61973.8. The deviance of 5.6 with one degree

of freedom was highly significant. The parameter estimates of model 6 in Table 6.8 show that most of the contextual effects became significant. In this multivariate analysis, controlling for the curvilinear effect of the change in asylum seekers and all other contextual variables, most of the effects were in accordance with the hypotheses. That is, the better the economic conditions of a country, the less its residents were inclined to exclusionism of immigrants (b = –0.071). In addition, if the national economic conditions had improved over the previous five years, individuals were less supportive of exclusionism of immigrants (b = –0.065). These findings support hypotheses 6a and 6b. Also – controlled for the economic and demographic conditions – the more extensive the social security system in a country, the less its residents were prone to exclude immigrants (b = –0.027), which supports hypothesis 6c.

The degree of ethnic heterogeneity of the country was positively, but not significantly, related to exclusionism of immigrants, which refutes hypothesis 6d. But, in accordance with hypothesis 6e, the higher the number of asylum applications per 1,000 capita, the more individuals were in favour of exclusionism of immigrants (b = 0.246). Finally, the change in asylum applications turned out to be non-linearly related to exclusionism of immigrants. This finding refutes hypothesis 6f, in which it was stated that the higher the increase in asylum applications, the stronger the ethnic exclusionism. Instead, exclusionism of immigrants was lower when asylum applications increased (b = –0.135); however, if there was a huge increase in asylum seekers, exclusionism tended to be higher (b = 0.010). This curvilinear relation between the change in asylum applications and exclusionism is depicted in Figure 6.4. It turned out that when the number of asylum applications had grown by a factor of 7.0 or more, there was a positive relationship between the change in asylum applications and exclusionism of immigrants.

Figure 6.4 *Predicted effect of the change in asylum applications on exclusionism of immigrants*



Next, I tested whether there were any significant interactions between economic and social security characteristics on the one hand, and demographic characteristics on the other hand. That is, according to hypothesis 6g, the effects of economic conditions, the change in economic conditions, as well as the extensiveness of the social security system, all are presumed to be stronger in national contexts that are characterised by high ethnic heterogeneity, and high and growing numbers of asylum seekers. However, in contrast to hypothesis 6g, there were no significant interactions between these variables. As mentioned in the previous section, I labelled a model with significant interaction variables as model 7, in order to achieve consistency in designation of models across different analyses with different dependent variables. Since none of the aforementioned interactions between contextual characteristics led to a significant improvement of model fit, Table 6.8 shows no parameter estimates for model 7, that is, a model with interaction variables.

Effects of intervening individual characteristics on exclusionism of immigrants

Next, two intervening individual variables were included in the analysis. First, perceived ethnic threat was included (model 8), which caused a huge drop in the log likelihood ratio: the deviance is 7049.9. Accordingly, the explained variance at both the individual and contextual level was much higher compared to the previous model. As is displayed in Table 6.8, including perceived ethnic threat, 28.3% of the variance between individuals (within countries) could be explained. In addition, 76.2% of the differences between countries were explained. Thus, some populations had a higher mean score on exclusionism of immigrants due to their higher mean score on perceived ethnic threat. The estimated positive effect of perceived ethnic threat on exclusion of immigrants was highly significant (b = 0.628), which supports hypothesis (2a).

Looking at the parameter estimates of the individual variables in model 8, one can see that, controlled for perceived ethnic threat, most of the effects of the individual background characteristics decreased. Family income was no longer significantly related to exclusion of immigrants. Thus, the original relationship between family income and exclusion of immigrants was fully explained by perceived ethnic threat: individuals with a lower family income were more inclined to exclusion of immigrants, due to their stronger perception of ethnic threat. Furthermore, the effect of education declined from –0.115 to –0.032, a change of 72%, but the latter effect was still significant. In general, although the differences between higher controllers and other social positions declined sharply, they remained significant.

Likewise, most of the contextual effects were smaller compared to the previous model. Controlled for perceived ethnic threat, the effects of the non-demographic characteristics (i.e., economic conditions, the change in economic conditions, and social security benefits) were no longer significant. That is, the relations between these contextual characteristics and exclusion of immigrants, were fully intervened by the level of perceived ethnic threat. In other words, populations of countries that were characterised by either less prosperous or decreasing economic conditions, or by a limited social security system, were on average more inclined to exclusion of immigrants, due to their stronger perception of ethnic threat.

In addition, the effects of asylum applications and the change in asylum applications, were smaller than in the previous model, but they remained significant. Finally, in contrast to the other contextual variables, the effect of ethnic heterogeneity had strongly increased and its effect was now significantly positive: the higher the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in a country, the stronger its population was inclined to exclusion of immigrants. And, one might add, *despite* the level of perceived ethnic threat. That is, in countries with a higher degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the average score on exclusion of immigrants was higher than one would expect given the average score on perceived ethnic threat.

Finally, the degree of localism was included in model 9. As displayed in Table 6.8, inclusion of this second intervening individual variable led to a significant improvement of model fit (deviance = 4.1). In accordance with hypothesis (3a), the higher the degree of localism, the higher the score on exclusion of immigrants was (b = 0.011). The other parameters hardly changed, compared to the previous model. That is, controlled for localism, the effects of independent individual characteristics, perceived ethnic threat, and contextual characteristics remained the same.

To what extent could the initial cross-national differences in exclusion of immigrants be explained by the included national characteristics? As can be seen in Table 6.8, including the contextual characteristics decreased the variance between countries from 0.112 to 0.065, a decline of 42.0%. Compared to the model with no explanatory variables (model 1), 75.8% of the between-country variance could be explained by including contextual as well as individual characteristics.

So far, in presenting the results of the analyses, I have not made any reference to specific countries. To illustrate the aforementioned results, the residuals for each country are displayed in Figure 6.5. The residual at the country level is the difference between the observed and predicted score on exclusion of immigrants, both taken as an average score across the individuals within the country. Figure 6.5 displays the country-level residuals in 4 different models. The residuals in the random intercept null model (model 1) correspond with the observed differences between countries regarding exclusion of immigrants. Controlling for differences in population composition – that is, by including the independent individual characteristics (model 2) – these residuals decreased slightly overall. As stated before, 4.1% of the observed differences between countries could be attributed to composition effects. When the contextual characteristics were included (model 6), the country-level residuals declined sharply. Controlling for the cross-national differences in the (change in) economic conditions, social security system, ethnic heterogeneity, the relative number of asylum applications, as well as the (curvilinear effect of) the change in asylum applications, the differences between countries were sharply reduced. In addition, controlling for perceived ethnic threat further diminished the cross-national differences in exclusion of immigrants, as is illustrated by the smaller country-level residuals of model 8.

As can be seen in Figure 6.5, Ireland and Latvia had, respectively, the lowest and highest average score on exclusion of immigrants. For both countries, the figure shows that these extreme scores were not due to differences in population composition, but were mostly caused by differences in the contextual characteristics of both countries.

Figure 6.5 *Country level residuals in exclusionism of immigrants*



That is, the ethnic majority in Ireland had experienced a relatively strong economic growth and a relatively low rise in unemployment between 1989 and 1994, and in addition, the number of asylum applications in 1994 was rather low (see Tables 6.4 to 6.6). These factors led to a low level of support for exclusionism of immigrants. Although the number of asylum applications in Ireland rose considerably between 1989 and 1994 by a factor of almost 9, this did not result in a high level of exclusionism of immigrants, as was also illustrated in Figure 6.4.

The population in Latvia on the other hand, experienced extremely poor economic conditions in 1994. Furthermore, the economic conditions had declined since 1989 and the social security system was less extensive compared to other countries. These factors, together with the relatively high proportion of ethnic out-groups in Latvia (i.e. Russians), boosted the support for exclusionism of immigrants among the ethnic Latvian population.

6.9.2 Exclusionism of refugees

The results of the multi-level analyses on exclusionism of refugees are presented in Table 6.9. I followed the same procedure as in the analyses on exclusionism of immigrants. The single-level model with only random variation between individuals (model 0) had a likelihood ratio statistic of 75871.6 (not shown).

Table 6.9 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism of refugees*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Intercept	**2.661**	(0.098)	**2.549**	(0.110)	**2.899**	(0.292)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)			0.022	(0.015)	0.022	(0.015)
Age			**–0.003**	(0.001)	**–0.003**	(0.001)
Education			**–0.158**	(0.008)	**–0.158**	(0.008)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)			—		—	
Lower controllers			–0.000	(0.033)	–0.000	(0.033)
Routine non-manual			0.061	(0.036)	0.061	(0.036)
Self–employed			**0.147**	(0.041)	**0.148**	(0.041)
Supervisors, skilled manual			**0.145**	(0.038)	**0.145**	(0.038)
Semi–unskilled manual			0.067	(0.038)	0.067	(0.038)
Unemployed			0.070	(0.042)	0.070	(0.042)
Student, vocational training			**–0.102**	(0.043)	**–0.102**	(0.043)
Retired			**0.084**	(0.037)	**0.083**	(0.037)
Housekeepers			**0.124**	(0.038)	**0.124**	(0.038)
Not classifiable			**0.098**	(0.039)	**0.098**	(0.039)
Denomination						
Catholic			**0.109**	(0.026)	**0.109**	(0.026)
Orthodox			–0.009	(0.055)	–0.014	(0.056)
Protestant			**0.099**	(0.025)	**0.100**	(0.025)
Other			–0.027	(0.032)	–0.026	(0.032)
No religion (ref.)			—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week			**–0.119**	(0.026)	**–0.119**	(0.026)
≥ once a month			**–0.084**	(0.028)	**–0.084**	(0.028)
Less than one a month			–0.005	(0.019)	–0.005	(0.019)
Never (ref.)			—		—	
Family income			**–0.020**	(0.007)	**–0.020**	(0.007)
Intervening variables						
Perceived Ethnic Threat						
Localism						
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994					–0.047	(0.065)
Change economic conditions 1989-94					–0.052	(0.072)
Social security benefits expenditure						
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995						
Asylum seekers 1994						
Change asylum seekers 1989-94						
(Asylum seekers 1994)²						
Change in economic conditions * (asylum seekers 1994)²						
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	1.165	(0.011)	1.126	(0.010)	1.126	(0.010)
% explained variance			3.3%		3.3%	
Country–level variance in intercept	0.219	(0.065)	0.252	(0.075)	0.234	(0.069)
% explained variance			0.0%		0.0%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	72578.8		71764.9		71763.1	
Δ –2*log likelihood	3292.8		813.9		1.8	
Δ df	1		21		2	
P–value	0.000		0.000		0.409	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.9 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism of refugees (continued)*

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Intercept	**3.781**	(0.354)	**3.506**	(0.401)	**3.641**	(0.333)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)	0.022	(0.015)	0.022	(0.015)	0.022	(0.015)
Age	**–0.003**	(0.001)	**–0.003**	(0.001)	**–0.003**	(0.001)
Education	**–0.158**	(0.008)	**–0.158**	(0.008)	**–0.158**	(0.008)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)	—		—		—	
Lower controllers	–0.000	(0.033)	–0.000	(0.033)	0.000	(0.033)
Routine non-manual	0.061	(0.036)	0.061	(0.036)	0.062	(0.036)
Self–employed	**0.147**	(0.041)	**0.147**	(0.041)	**0.147**	(0.041)
Supervisors, skilled manual	**0.145**	(0.038)	**0.145**	(0.038)	**0.145**	(0.038)
Semi–unskilled manual	0.066	(0.038)	0.066	(0.038)	0.067	(0.038)
Unemployed	0.070	(0.042)	0.070	(0.042)	0.071	(0.042)
Student, vocational training	**–0.102**	(0.043)	**–0.102**	(0.043)	**–0.101**	(0.043)
Retired	**0.083**	(0.037)	**0.083**	(0.037)	**0.083**	(0.037)
Housekeepers	**0.123**	(0.038)	**0.124**	(0.038)	**0.123**	(0.038)
Not classifiable	**0.098**	(0.039)	**0.098**	(0.039)	**0.098**	(0.039)
Denomination						
Catholic	**0.108**	(0.026)	**0.108**	(0.026)	**0.107**	(0.026)
Orthodox	–0.015	(0.055)	–0.011	(0.055)	–0.009	(0.055)
Protestant	**0.101**	(0.025)	**0.099**	(0.025)	**0.100**	(0.025)
Other	–0.027	(0.032)	–0.027	(0.032)	–0.027	(0.032)
No religion (ref.)	—		—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week	**–0.119**	(0.026)	**–0.119**	(0.026)	**–0.119**	(0.026)
≥ once a month	**–0.084**	(0.028)	**–0.084**	(0.028)	**–0.084**	(0.028)
Less than one a month	–0.005	(0.019)	–0.004	(0.019)	–0.004	(0.019)
Never (ref.)	—		—		—	
Family income	**–0.020**	(0.007)	**–0.020**	(0.007)	**–0.020**	(0.007)
Intervening variables						
Perceived Ethnic Threat						
Localism						
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994	–0.043	(0.053)	–0.054	(0.053)	–0.038	(0.044)
Change economic conditions 1989-94	–0.057	(0.059)	–0.049	(0.050)	–0.066	(0.042)
Social security benefits expenditure	**–0.045**	(0.013)	**–0.042**	(0.016)	**–0.033**	(0.013)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995			**1.706**	(0.595)	**1.650**	(0.489)
Asylum seekers 1994			–0.015	(0.129)	**–0.756**	(0.248)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94			0.003	(0.021)	–0.018	(0.018)
(Asylum seekers 1994)²					**0.233**	(0.070)
Change in economic conditions * (asylum seekers 1994)²						
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	1.126	(0.010)	1.126	(0.010)	1.126	(0.010)
% explained variance	3.3%		3.3%		3.3%	
Country–level variance in intercept	0.156	(0.046)	0.110	(0.033)	0.074	(0.022)
% explained variance	29.1%		49.7%		66.1%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	71753.9		71746.0		71737.1	
Δ –2*log likelihood	9.2		7.9		8.9	
Δ df	1		3		1	
P–value	0.003		0.047		0.003	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.9 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism of refugees (continued)*

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Intercept	**3.810**	(0.328)	**3.213**	(0.261)	**3.193**	(0.261)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)	0.022	(0.015)	0.004	(0.014)	0.004	(0.014)
Age	**–0.003**	(0.001)	**–0.002**	(0.001)	**–0.003**	(0.001)
Education	**–0.158**	(0.008)	**–0.088**	(0.007)	**–0.085**	(0.007)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)	—		—		—	
Lower controllers	0.000	(0.033)	0.009	(0.031)	0.010	(0.031)
Routine non-manual	0.062	(0.036)	0.033	(0.034)	0.033	(0.034)
Self–employed	**0.147**	(0.041)	**0.098**	(0.038)	**0.095**	(0.038)
Supervisors, skilled manual	**0.145**	(0.038)	**0.084**	(0.036)	**0.084**	(0.036)
Semi–unskilled manual	0.067	(0.038)	0.008	(0.036)	0.007	(0.036)
Unemployed	0.071	(0.042)	0.024	(0.039)	0.027	(0.039)
Student, vocational training	**–0.101**	(0.043)	–0.063	(0.041)	–0.061	(0.041)
Retired	**0.084**	(0.037)	0.016	(0.035)	0.015	(0.035)
Housekeepers	**0.123**	(0.038)	**0.076**	(0.036)	**0.076**	(0.036)
Not classifiable	**0.098**	(0.039)	0.036	(0.037)	0.035	(0.037)
Denomination						
Catholic	**0.106**	(0.026)	**0.050**	(0.024)	**0.047**	(0.024)
Orthodox	–0.005	(0.055)	0.027	(0.052)	0.025	(0.052)
Protestant	**0.100**	(0.025)	0.025	(0.024)	0.023	(0.024)
Other	–0.027	(0.032)	–0.037	(0.030)	–0.038	(0.030)
No religion (ref.)	—		—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week	**–0.120**	(0.026)	**–0.088**	(0.024)	**–0.094**	(0.024)
≥ once a month	**–0.084**	(0.028)	**–0.061**	(0.026)	**–0.064**	(0.026)
Less than one a month	–0.005	(0.019)	0.003	(0.018)	0.001	(0.018)
Never (ref.)	—		—		—	
Family income	**–0.020**	(0.007)	–0.003	(0.007)	–0.003	(0.007)
Intervening variables						
Perceived Ethnic Threat			**0.528**	(0.009)	**0.526**	(0.009)
Localism					**0.028**	(0.007)
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994	–0.057	(0.043)	–0.017	(0.034)	–0.015	(0.034)
Change economic conditions 1989-94	–0.030	(0.044)	0.057	(0.035)	0.059	(0.035)
Social security benefits expenditure	**–0.048**	(0.015)	**–0.047**	(0.012)	**–0.047**	(0.012)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995	**1.544**	(0.464)	**1.898**	(0.367)	**1.928**	(0.368)
Asylum seekers 1994	**–0.779**	(0.233)	**–0.597**	(0.185)	**–0.583**	(0.185)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94	–0.013	(0.017)	–0.000	(0.014)	0.000	(0.014)
(Asylum seekers 1994)²	**0.542**	(0.190)	**0.546**	(0.150)	**0.542**	(0.151)
Change in economic conditions * (asylum seekers 1994)²	***–0.057***	(0.033)	**–0.069**	(0.026)	**–0.069**	(0.026)
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	1.126	(0.010)	0.992	(0.009)	0.991	(0.009)
% explained variance	3.3%		14.8%		14.9%	
Country–level variance in intercept	0.066	(0.020)	0.041	(0.012)	0.047	(0.014)
% explained variance	70.1%		81.5%		81.4%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	71734.2		68658.6		68642.7	
Δ –2*log likelihood	2.9		3075.6		15.9	
Δ df	1		1		1	
P–value	0.085		0.000		0.000	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

The first multi-level model (model 1), incorporating country-level variation in the intercept, had a likelihood ratio of 72578.8. The highly significant deviance of 3292.8 indicates large and significant differences between countries in the mean score on exclusionism of refugees.

As can be seen in Table 6.9, the variance in the random intercept null model between individuals *within* countries (1.165) was much larger than the variance *between* countries (0.219). Most of the variance was thus occurring between individuals, but there was nonetheless significant variance between countries. The intra-country correlation of 0.158 was slightly higher compared to the intra-country correlation regarding exclusionism of immigrants, which was 0.134. Again, the national context can be regarded as a relevant social context, since there was a considerable correlation of 0.158 between two randomly selected individuals within a country, regarding their score on exclusionism of refugees.

Effects of independent individual characteristics on exclusionism of refugees

Including the independent individual characteristics (model 2) led to a significant increase in model fit (deviance = 813.9 with 21 degrees of freedom). The parameter estimates in Table 6.9 show that, in accordance with hypothesis 1a, lower educated persons were more inclined to exclusionism of refugees (b = –0.158). Furthermore, self-employed persons had a higher score on exclusionism of refugees, compared to higher controllers (b = 0.147), which supports hypothesis 1b. Also, supervisors and skilled manual workers were more in favour of exclusionism of refugees (b = 0.145). However, the semi-unskilled manual workers were not significantly more inclined to exclusionism, compared to higher controllers. Hypothesis 1c, regarding the manual workers, is therefore partly refuted. In addition, hypothesis 1d is refuted, since the unemployed did not display a significantly higher score on exclusionism of refugees than the higher controllers. Hypothesis 1e is not refuted: the lower the family income, the higher the individual's score on exclusionism of refugees.

Surprisingly, older people were less inclined to exclude refugees than younger people (b = –0.013). This finding refutes hypothesis 1f and is in contrast with previous studies that showed younger cohorts to be generally less exclusionistic and prejudiced than older cohorts (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Denomination and church attendance were again differently related to the dependent variable. In accordance with hypothesis 1g and consistent with the results regarding exclusionism of immigrants, religious persons appeared to be more inclined to exclusionism of refugees compared to non-religious persons, again with the exception of the orthodox religious. However, and once again in contrast to hypothesis 1h, the higher the frequency of church attendance, the lower the score on exclusionism of refugees. This differential effect of the two characteristics of religiosity is puzzling.

There were also additional significant differences between social categories. Retired persons and persons working in the household supported exclusionism of refugees more strongly compared to higher controllers, and students scored considerably lower on exclusionism of refugees. This latter finding may be related to the socialising effect of the educational system, as discussed in the previous chapter.

The variance components of model 2 show that no more than 3.3% of the differences between individuals within countries could be explained by this set of individual background characteristics. The individual attitude regarding exclusion of refugees was thus only weakly related to the individual's socio-demographic characteristics.

Compared to the previous model, the country-level variance did not decrease, but rather increased from 0.219 to 0.252. This implies that the observed cross-national differences in mean level of exclusionism of refugees could not be explained by differences in the population composition.[24]

Effects of national characteristics on exclusionism of refugees

In models 3 to 5, the contextual variables were successively included in the analyses. The national economic conditions in 1994 as well as the change in economic conditions between 1989 and 1994 were not significantly related to exclusionism of refugees, as indicated by the non-significant deviance value and the parameter estimates of model 3. In contrast to hypotheses 6a and 6b, exclusionism of refugees was not significantly higher in countries with less prosperous or declining economic conditions.

The extensiveness of the social security system, however, did have an impact on exclusionism of refugees. Adding this contextual variable to the model led to a significant improvement in model fit (deviance = 9.2). In accordance with hypothesis 6c, there was a negative relationship: the higher the social security benefits expenditure in a country, the lower the mean score of the population on exclusionism of refugees (b = –0.045).

Adding the three demographic variables (model 5) significantly decreased the likelihood ratio (deviance = 7.9 with 3 degrees of freedom). The parameter estimates show that this was only induced by the significant effect of ethnic heterogeneity: the higher the degree of ethnic heterogeneity of a country, the more its population was inclined to exclude refugees (b = 1.706). This finding supports hypotheses 6d. However, hypotheses 6e and 6f regarding the effect of the relative number of asylum seekers and the change in asylum seekers were refuted. It appears that the inflow of asylum seekers was not related to the attitude towards refugees.

Next, I tested again for non-linear relationships by including a quadratic term for each contextual variable. Only one of the quadratic effects turned out to be significant. That is, the inclusion of a quadratic term for the number of asylum seekers led to a significant improvement of model fit: the deviance was 8.9. Compared to the previous model, the inflow of asylum seekers was now significantly curvilinear related to exclusionism of refugees. Overall, in contrast to the theoretical expectation, the relationship was negative, indicating that greater inflows of asylum seekers were accompanied by *less* exclusionism. However, if the relative number of asylum seekers was extremely large (that is, larger than 1.6 per 1,000 capita), the relationship was positive. This curvilinear effect is illustrated in Figure 6.6.

To test whether the effects of economic and social security variables interacted with demographic contextual variables, I added interaction terms to the model. I first estimated 12 different models that, compared to model 6, each had an additional interaction variable.

Figure 6.6 *Predicted effect of asylum applications on exclusionism of refugees*



Only one of these models had a significant smaller log likelihood ratio than model 6: including the interaction between the change in economic conditions and the quadratic term for asylum applications led to a decrease in log likelihood ratio of 2.9. With 1 degree of freedom, this improvement in model fit was significant at the 10% level. The parameter estimates of the model (model 7) are displayed in Table 6.9. The parameter estimate of the interaction term was negative. This implies that the effect of the quadratic term of the inflow of asylum seekers was stronger when economic conditions had declined. The predicted effect of the inflow of asylum seekers on exclusionism of refugees thus varied according to the economic conditions.

Overall, the larger the inflow of asylum seekers, the lower the exclusionism of refugees (main effect = –0.779). However, for large numbers of asylum seekers, exclusionism of refugees tended to be higher (curvilinear effect = 0.542). And this effect was even stronger in countries with declining economic conditions (interaction effect = –0.057).

The variance components in Table 6.9 show that 70.1% of the country-level variance in the mean score on exclusionism of refugees was explained by the contextual variables in model 7. The effects of individual variables were logically still identical compared to model 2 and thus the explained variance at the individual level remained 3.3%.

Effects of intervening individual characteristics on exclusionism of refugees

How much of the aforementioned effects of individual and contextual variables were intervened by the level of perceived ethnic threat and localism? To answer this question, these two intervening variables were consecutively included in the analysis. In model 8, perceived ethnic threat was included. The large deviance of 3075.6 indicated a strong improvement of model fit. This is also illustrated by the variance components of model 8. The explained variance at the

individual level increased from 3.3% to 14.8% and the explained variance at the contextual level increased from 70.1% to 81.5%. Thus, perceived ethnic threat is an important explanation for the differences between individuals within countries, as well as the differences between countries. In accordance with hypothesis (2a), the effect of perceived ethnic threat on exclusionism of refugees was positive (b = 0.528).

Accordingly, the effects of individual variables were strongly reduced compared to the previous model. For instance, the effect of education diminished from –0.158 to –0.088. This implies that 44% of the educational effect was intervened by perceived ethnic threat. The majority of the individual effects, however, remained significant. Only the original significant effect of family income disappeared.

Compared to model 7, the parameter estimates of the contextual variables in model 8 led to the same substantial conclusions. Including perceived ethnic threat in the analyses only changed the size of some of the effects, but not their significance. The negative effect of asylum seekers declined, but remained significant. And just as in the analyses of exclusionism of migrants, the effect of ethnic heterogeneity increased after controlling for perceived ethnic threat.

Finally, in model 9, localism was included. This led to a significant decrease in log likelihood ratio of 15.9. In accordance with hypothesis (3a), localism had a significant positive effect on exclusionism of refugees. The parameters of the contextual variables and the other individual variables remained almost identical. Accordingly, the variances between individuals and between countries were hardly affected by the inclusion of localism in the model.

To illustrate the explained variance at the country level, the country-level residuals for four different models are displayed in Figure 6.7. The residuals in the null model correspond with the observed differences in mean score on exclusionism of refugees. As previously stated, these differences could not be attributed to compositional effects, since the inclusion of individual background characteristics did not lead to a decline in the country-level variance. This is illustrated in Figure 6.7: the residuals in model 2 were overall just as large or slightly larger than the residuals in model 1. However, by including the contextual characteristics, the country-level residuals were sharply reduced. Most of the observed differences in mean score between countries could be attributed to differences in the contextual characteristics, in particular the social security benefits expenditure, the ethnic heterogeneity and the inflow of asylum seekers. Finally, by including perceived ethnic threat, the residuals were further reduced. That is, the higher the average mean score on perceived ethnic threat of the population, the higher the average score on exclusionism of refugees.

Just as with regard to exclusionism of immigrants, the strongest support for exclusionism of refugees was found among the ethnic majority population in Latvia. And once again, this extremely high score can be mostly attributed to the contextual characteristics. Since there was no significant relationship between (the change in) economic conditions and exclusionism of refugees, it is not so much the poor and declining economic conditions in Latvia that boosted exclusionism of refugees. Instead, it is the less extensive Latvian social security system and in

particular the high ethnic heterogeneity in Latvia that gave rise to strong support for exclusionism of refugees in Latvia.

It is also illustrative to compare the residuals of Ireland in both Figure 6.5 and 6.7. The extremely low support for exclusionism of immigrants in Ireland (Figure 6.5) could to a considerable extent be attributed to the rise in economic prosperity in Ireland. However, since the change in economic conditions was not related to exclusionism of refugees, the average score on exclusionism of refugees is not extremely low in Ireland (Figure 6.7). Furthermore, including contextual characteristics in the model did not substantially reduce the residual for Ireland, as is illustrated by the difference between the residual in model 2 and 7 (Figure 6.7).

Figure 6.7 *Country-level residuals in exclusionism of refugees*



6.9.3 Exclusionism from group membership

In Table 6.10, the results of the multi-level analyses on exclusionism from group membership are presented. To achieve a better comparison across analyses with different dependent variables, the scale of the measurement instrument was transformed from the original 4-point scale to a 5-point scale. The 2-level random intercept null model had a log likelihood ratio of 63692.1. Compared to a single-level model that neglected variation between countries, the deviance was 1121.5, which indicated that there were significant differences between countries.

Table 6.10 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism from group membership*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Intercept	**3.873**	(0.043)	**3.662**	(0.053)	**4.007**	(0.111)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)			–0.013	(0.012)	–0.013	(0.012)
Age			**0.005**	(0.001)	**0.005**	(0.001)
Education			**–0.119**	(0.006)	**–0.120**	(0.006)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)			—		—	
Lower controllers			–0.014	(0.027)	–0.014	(0.027)
Routine non-manual			**0.063**	(0.030)	**0.063**	(0.030)
Self–employed			0.061	(0.033)	0.062	(0.033)
Supervisors, skilled manual			**0.074**	(0.031)	**0.074**	(0.031)
Semi–unskilled manual			**0.153**	(0.031)	**0.153**	(0.031)
Unemployed			**0.124**	(0.034)	**0.123**	(0.034)
Student, vocational training			0.030	(0.035)	0.030	(0.035)
Retired			**0.135**	(0.030)	**0.135**	(0.030)
Housekeepers			**0.124**	(0.031)	**0.125**	(0.031)
Not classifiable			**0.117**	(0.032)	**0.117**	(0.032)
Religious denomination						
Catholic			**0.208**	(0.021)	**0.209**	(0.021)
Orthodox			–0.040	(0.045)	–0.054	(0.045)
Protestant			**0.195**	(0.021)	**0.196**	(0.021)
Other			0.032	(0.027)	0.032	(0.027)
No religion (ref.)			—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week			0.008	(0.021)	0.010	(0.021)
≥ once a month			0.017	(0.023)	0.019	(0.023)
Less than one a month			0.007	(0.016)	0.008	(0.016)
Never (ref.)			—		—	
Family income			**–0.012**	(0.006)	**–0.012**	(0.006)
Intervening variables						
Perceived ethnic threat						
Localism						
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994					–0.008	(0.024)
Change economic conditions 1989-94					**–0.081**	(0.027)
Social security benefits expenditure						
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995						
Asylum seekers 1994						
Change asylum seekers 1989-94						
Social security * ethnic heterogeneity						
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.808**	(0.007)	**0.755**	(0.007)	**0.755**	(0.007)
% explained variance			6.5%		6.5%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.043**	(0.013)	**0.048**	(0.014)	**0.031**	(0.009)
% explained variance			0.0%		27.4%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	63692.1		62054.7		62044.7	
Δ –2*log likelihood	1121.5		1637.4		10.0	
Δ df	1		21		2	
p–value	0.000		0.000		0.007	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.10 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism from group membership (continued)*

	Model 4		Model 5		(Model 6)
Intercept	**4.214**	(0.151)	**4.167**	(0.192)	
Individual characteristics					
Sex (male)	–0.013	(0.012)	–0.013	(0.012)	
Age	**0.005**	(0.001)	**0.005**	(0.001)	
Education	**–0.120**	(0.006)	**–0.120**	(0.006)	
Social position					
Higher controller (ref.)	—		—		
Lower controllers	–0.014	(0.027)	–0.014	(0.027)	
Routine non-manual	**0.063**	(0.030)	**0.063**	(0.030)	
Self–employed	0.061	(0.033)	0.060	(0.033)	
Supervisors, skilled manual	**0.073**	(0.031)	**0.073**	(0.031)	
Semi–unskilled manual	**0.153**	(0.031)	**0.153**	(0.031)	
Unemployed	**0.123**	(0.034)	**0.123**	(0.034)	
Student, vocational training	0.030	(0.035)	0.030	(0.035)	
Retired	**0.135**	(0.030)	**0.135**	(0.030)	
Housekeepers	**0.124**	(0.031)	**0.124**	(0.031)	
Not classifiable	**0.117**	(0.032)	**0.117**	(0.032)	
Religious denomination					
Catholic	**0.209**	(0.021)	**0.208**	(0.021)	
Orthodox	–0.052	(0.045)	–0.053	(0.045)	
Protestant	**0.196**	(0.021)	**0.197**	(0.021)	
Other	0.031	(0.027)	0.031	(0.027)	
No religion (ref.)	—		—		
Church attendance					
≥ nearly once a week	0.009	(0.021)	0.009	(0.021)	
≥ once a month	0.018	(0.023)	0.018	(0.023)	
Less than one a month	0.008	(0.016)	0.008	(0.016)	
Never (ref.)	—		—		
Family income	**–0.012**	(0.006)	**–0.012**	(0.006)	
Intervening variables					
Perceived ethnic threat					
Localism					
Country characteristics					
Economic conditions 1994	–0.007	(0.022)	0.004	(0.025)	
Change economic conditions 1989-94	**–0.082**	(0.025)	**–0.082**	(0.024)	
Social security benefits expenditure	***–0.010***	(0.006)	–0.006	(0.007)	
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995			–0.299	(0.282)	
Asylum seekers 1994			–0.058	(0.061)	
Change asylum seekers 1989-94			–0.001	(0.010)	
Social security * ethnic heterogeneity					
Variance components					
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.755**	(0.007)	**0.755**	(0.007)	
% explained variance	6.5%		6.5%		
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.027**	(0.008)	**0.024**	(0.007)	
% explained variance	37.6%		43.0%		
Goodness–of–fit					
–2*log likelihood	62041.3		62039.3		
Δ –2*log likelihood	3.4		2.0		
Δ df	1		3		
p–value	0.062		0.576		

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.10 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of exclusionism of group membership (continued)*

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Intercept	**3.699**	(0.227)	**3.462**	(0.172)	**3.417**	(0.178)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)	–0.013	(0.012)	**–0.024**	(0.012)	**–0.023**	(0.012)
Age	**0.005**	(0.001)	**0.005**	(0.001)	**0.004**	(0.001)
Education	**–0.119**	(0.006)	**–0.076**	(0.006)	**–0.070**	(0.006)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)	—		—		—	
Lower controllers	–0.014	(0.027)	–0.008	(0.026)	–0.005	(0.026)
Routine non-manual	**0.063**	(0.030)	0.046	(0.029)	0.045	(0.029)
Self–employed	0.061	(0.033)	0.031	(0.032)	0.023	(0.032)
Supervisors, skilled manual	**0.073**	(0.031)	0.036	(0.030)	0.036	(0.030)
Semi–unskilled manual	**0.153**	(0.031)	**0.116**	(0.030)	**0.115**	(0.030)
Unemployed	**0.123**	(0.034)	**0.095**	(0.033)	**0.103**	(0.033)
Student, vocational training	0.030	(0.035)	0.054	(0.034)	0.061	(0.034)
Retired	**0.135**	(0.030)	**0.093**	(0.029)	**0.092**	(0.029)
Housekeepers	**0.123**	(0.031)	**0.095**	(0.030)	**0.096**	(0.030)
Not classifiable	**0.117**	(0.032)	**0.079**	(0.031)	**0.078**	(0.031)
Religious denomination						
Catholic	**0.209**	(0.021)	**0.173**	(0.020)	**0.167**	(0.020)
Orthodox	–0.056	(0.045)	–0.028	(0.043)	–0.035	(0.043)
Protestant	**0.197**	(0.021)	**0.151**	(0.020)	**0.146**	(0.020)
Other	0.032	(0.027)	0.025	(0.026)	0.023	(0.026)
No religion (ref.)	—		—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week	0.009	(0.021)	0.029	(0.020)	0.015	(0.020)
≥ once a month	0.019	(0.023)	0.033	(0.022)	0.025	(0.022)
Less than one a month	0.008	(0.016)	0.012	(0.015)	0.009	(0.015)
Never (ref.)	—		—		—	
Family income	**–0.012**	(0.006)	–0.002	(0.006)	–0.002	(0.006)
Intervening variables						
Perceived ethnic threat			**0.325**	(0.008)	**0.323**	(0.008)
Localism					**0.068**	(0.006)
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994	0.038	(0.024)	**0.058**	(0.018)	**0.062**	(0.019)
Change economic conditions 1989-94	**–0.110**	(0.023)	**–0.055**	(0.017)	**–0.052**	(0.018)
Social security benefits expenditure	**0.026**	(0.012)	**0.021**	(0.009)	**0.021**	(0.010)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995	**2.156**	(0.861)	**1.685**	(0.649)	**1.776**	(0.673)
Asylum seekers 1994	**–0.115**	(0.055)	**–0.098**	(0.042)	**–0.089**	(0.043)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94	–0.009	(0.009)	–0.003	(0.007)	–0.002	(0.007)
Social security * ethnic heterogeneity	**–0.155**	(0.052)	**–0.111**	(0.039)	**–0.112**	(0.041)
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.755**	(0.007)	**0.704**	(0.006)	**0.700**	(0.006)
% explained variance	6.5%		12.8%		13.3%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.017**	(0.005)	**0.010**	(0.003)	**0.010**	(0.003)
% explained variance	59.3%		77.5%		75.7%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	62031.8		60328.6		60195.4	
Δ –2*log likelihood	7.5		1703.2		133.2	
Δ df	1		1		1	
p–value.	0.006		0.000		0.000	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Again, the variance between individuals within countries (0.808) was much larger than the variance between countries (0.043). The intra-country correlation amounted to 0.050, which was considerably smaller than the intra-country correlation with regard to exclusionism of immigrants (0.134) or exclusionism of refugees (0.158). Regarding exclusionism from group membership, the variation between countries was thus relatively small.[25]

Effects of independent individual characteristics on exclusionism from group membership

In model 2, the independent individual characteristics were included, which led to a great improvement in the model fit (deviance =1637.4). In accordance with hypothesis 1a, the higher the educational level, the lower exclusionism from group membership (b = –0.119). In contrast to hypothesis 1b, the self-employed were not significantly more inclined to exclusionism from group membership compared to the reference category of higher controllers. On the other hand, in accordance with hypotheses 1c and 1d, supervisors, skilled manual and semi-unskilled manual workers, as well as the unemployed, showed significantly more support for exclusionism from group membership compared to the higher controllers. Furthermore, family income had a negative effect (b = –0.012), which supported hypothesis 1e.

Moreover, exclusionism was stronger among the elderly and religious persons, again with the exception of the small group of orthodox religious. The effects of age and religiosity correspond with hypotheses 1f and 1g and with previous studies that showed both elderly and religious persons to be more intolerant with regard to various measures of ethnic prejudice and ethnic exclusionism (Adorno et al., 1969; Schuman et al., 1997; Selznick & Steinberg, 1969). Controlled for denomination, church attendance had no significant effect. This refutes hypothesis 1h. Finally, exclusionism from group membership was relatively strong among retired persons and persons working in the household.

Taken together, the individual characteristics accounted for 6.5% of the variance between individuals within countries. Similar to the results regarding exclusionism of refugees, the observed variance between countries could not be attributed to differences in population composition of the aforementioned individual characteristics. As can be seen in Table 6.10, the country-level variance did not decrease, but rather increased slightly. This implies that populations with a relatively high proportion of social categories with tolerant attitudes, nevertheless had a relatively high average score on exclusionism from group membership.

Effects of national characteristics on exclusionism from group membership

Adding the economic characteristics to the model (model 3) led to a significant decrease in the log likelihood ratio (deviance = 10.0 with 2 degrees of freedom). It turned out that the stronger the decline in economic conditions in the recent past, the higher the individual's score on exclusionism from group membership (b = –0.081). This finding supported hypothesis 6b. The economic conditions in 1994 were however not related to exclusionism. In model 4, the social security benefit expenditures were added, which led to a small but significant ($p < 0.10$) decrease in log likelihood ratio. The small significant effect of the social security variable (b = –0.010) disappeared when, subsequently, the demographic variables were added to the analysis (model

5). In model 5, only the change in economic conditions had a significant effect on exclusionism from group membership.

Similar to the previous analysis on exclusionism of immigrants and refugees, I tested whether there were any curvilinear effects of the contextual variables. However, including quadratic variables in the analysis did not lead to a significant improvement in model fit. As mentioned previously (see also Table 6.7), I used the label 'model 6' to designate a model with curvilinear effects, in order to achieve consistent designation of models across analyses with different dependent variables. Since there were no significant curvilinear effects, no model 6 is shown in Table 6.10.

Next, I tested whether there were any significant interactions between the economic or the social security variables on the one hand and the demographic variables on the other hand. Only one interaction turned out to be significant. Adding the interaction between the social security benefit expenditures and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity led to a significant improvement of model fit (deviance = 7.5 with 1 degree of freedom). The parameter estimates of model 7 in Table 6.10 again confirm that exclusionism from group membership was stronger in countries where the economic conditions have declined (b = –0.110). The non-significant effects of the economic conditions in 1994 as well as the change in the number of asylum seekers led to a refutation of hypotheses 6a and 6f. Furthermore, in contrast with hypothesis 6e, the higher the inflow of asylum seekers, the *lower* the score on exclusion from group membership.

The extensiveness of the social security system and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity interacted with one another. The small main effect of social security (b = 0.026) was positive, in contrast to hypothesis 6c: the more extensive the social security system, the higher the score on ethnic exclusionism. The effect of ethnic heterogeneity as well as the interaction effect was in accordance with hypothesis 6d and hypothesis 6g. That is, exclusionism from group membership was higher in countries that were ethnically more heterogeneous (main effect = 2.156). The positive association between ethnic heterogeneity and exclusionism from group membership was stronger in countries that had lower social security expenditures (interaction effect = –0.155). Together, the contextual variables accounted for 59.3% of the observed differences between countries.

Effects of intervening individual characteristics on exclusionism from group membership

Including perceived ethnic threat in the analyses (model 8) led to a great improvement in model fit. The deviance of model 8 was 1703.2 and the variance at both the contextual and individual level was increased. The explained variance between countries rose from 59.3% to 77.5%, and the explained variance between individuals rose from 6.5% to 12.8%. In accordance with hypothesis (2a), perceived ethnic threat had a strong significant positive effect (b = 0.325); the stronger the perception of ethnic threat, the higher the score on exclusionism from group membership.

Compared to the previous model, the effects of individual background characteristics overall declined. Controlled for perceived ethnic threat, the effect of family income was no longer significant. In addition, routine non-manual employees as well as supervisors and skilled

manual workers were no longer significantly more inclined to exclusionism compared to higher controllers. With the exception of the effect of sex and age, all individual effects were smaller, once they had been controlled for perceived ethnic threat.

Similarly, the effects of most contextual characteristics declined. Only the effect of economic conditions was surprisingly stronger compared to the previous model. The effects of the other contextual characteristics, when controlled for perceived ethnic threat, decreased. In other words, the effect of the national context on exclusionism from group membership was partly intervened by the level of perceived ethnic threat. For instance, 50% of the original relationship between exclusionism and changing economic conditions could be explained by perceived ethnic threat.

The degree of localism was included in model 9. Adding this second intervening individual variable to the model reduced the log likelihood ratio significantly by 133.2. The stronger the localistic orientation, the higher the score on exclusionism from group membership (b = 0.068). This finding supports hypothesis (3a). Accordingly, the explained variance at the individual level increased slightly from 12.8% to 13.3%. On the other hand, the explained variance at country level did not increase, indicating that the differences between countries could not be attributed to differences in mean score on localism. Compared to the previous model, the effects of individual and contextual characteristics hardly changed.

To illustrate these results, the country-level residuals for 4 different models are depicted in Figure 6.8. The country-level residuals in model 1 represent the observed international differences in mean score on exclusionism from group membership. As can be seen in Figure 6.8, these differences could not be attributed to composition effects: overall, the country-level residuals did not decrease after the individual background variables were added (model 2). On the other hand, 59.3% of the variation between countries could be explained by differences in national contexts, as indicated by the included contextual variables (model 7). The country-level residuals could be reduced even further by including perceived ethnic threat (model 8), which raised the explained variance to 77.5%.

As can be seen in Figure 6.8, Bulgaria had the highest average support for exclusionism from group membership. This high score could not be attributed to the specific composition of the Bulgarian population with regard to socio-demographic variables (model 2). However, after contextual characteristics were added to the model (model 7), the residual for Bulgaria was much smaller. In other words, the high average support for exclusionism from group membership in Bulgaria was due to the specific national conditions. Closer examination of the contextual characteristics of Bulgaria as presented in Tables 6.4 to 6.6 shows that the high average score on exclusionism from group membership was, in particular, caused by the relative low economic growth and high unemployment level in Bulgaria.

Figure 6.8 *Country-level residuals in exclusionism from membership*



6.9.4 Chauvinism

Next, I present the results for the chauvinistic form of nationalistic attitudes, which are presented in Table 6.11. Compared to the single-level model, the 2-level random intercept null model had a deviance of 2749.1, indicating that there were significant differences between countries. Thus, the national context proved to be a relevant social context regarding chauvinism. Once again, the individual-level variance (0.570) is much greater than the country-level variance (0.065). The intra-country correlation was 0.103, that is, the correlation regarding the score on chauvinism between two randomly chosen individuals in a given country.

Effects of independent individual characteristics on chauvinism

In model 2, the individual background characteristics were included. The log likelihood ratio dropped considerably by 3034.7. As shown by the parameter estimates in Table 6.11, the effects of individual characteristics all correspond with the individual hypotheses 1a to 1h. That is, the higher the educational level and the higher the family income, the lower the individual's score on chauvinism. Also, unemployed, self-employed, supervisors, and manual workers were more chauvinistic than higher controllers. In addition, chauvinism was stronger among males, elderly persons, religious persons (except for orthodox religious), and churchgoers. Compared to higher controllers, routine non-manual employees as well as retired persons and housekeepers were also more chauvinistic. Together, the independent individual characteristics accounted for 11.8% of

the variance between individuals. However, the variance between countries did not decrease. Thus, the international differences in mean level of chauvinism could not be attributed to differences in population composition.

Effects of national characteristics on chauvinism

The national characteristics were gradually included in the analyses. Adding the two economic variables simultaneously to the model (model 3) did not significantly improve the model-fit, as judged by the non-significant value of the deviance of 3.7. Only the change in economic conditions had a small significant negative effect. As the parameter estimates for model 4 illustrate, the social security benefits expenditure was negatively related to the degree of chauvinism. This effect, however, disappeared when the demographic variables were added to the model.

In model 5, the economic conditions in 1994 were, in contrast to hypothesis 6a, positively related to chauvinism. The better the national economic circumstances, the more chauvinistic the respondents were (b = 0.067). However, respondents were also stronger inclined to chauvinism, if the economic conditions had worsened during the previous five years (b = –0.062). The latter result is in accordance with hypothesis 6b. In addition, consistent with hypothesis 6f, the higher the rise in asylum applications, the stronger the degree of chauvinism (b = 0.027). The other contextual hypotheses were refuted. In particular, the relative number of asylum seekers was not positively related to chauvinism, but negatively related.

Next, I estimated models that included a quadratic term for one of the contextual variables. It turned out that only the change in economic conditions was significantly curvilinearly related to chauvinism. Adding the quadratic variable to the model (model 6) led to a deviance of 6.0. As the parameter estimate of model 6 in Table 6.11 shows, controlled for the curvilinear effect of the change in economic conditions, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity now had a significant effect: the more ethnically heterogeneous the population, the stronger the degree of chauvinism of the respondents (b = 0.632). The latter finding was in accordance with hypothesis 6d. In model 6, the change in economic conditions was curvilinearly related to chauvinism. Respondents were less chauvinistic if the economic conditions had improved over time (b = –0.291). However, this effect diminished increasingly if economic conditions had improved substantially. This curvilinear effect is illustrated in Figure 6.9. When the ratio of the economic conditions in 1994 compared to the economic conditions in 1989 was larger than 3.8, the slope became positive.

Next, I tested for interactions between economic variables and social security benefits expenditure on the one hand and demographic variables on the other hand. However, none of these interactions turned out to be significant. Therefore, no model 7 is depicted in Table 6.11.

Table 6.11 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of chauvinism*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Intercept	**3.271**	(0.053)	**3.064**	(0.060)	**3.307**	(0.151)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)			**0.032**	(0.010)	**0.032**	(0.010)
Age			**0.006**	(0.000)	**0.006**	(0.000)
Education			**–0.142**	(0.005)	**–0.142**	(0.005)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)			—		—	
Lower controllers			–0.004	(0.022)	–0.004	(0.022)
Routine non-manual			**0.050**	(0.024)	**0.050**	(0.024)
Self–employed			**0.075**	(0.027)	**0.075**	(0.027)
Supervisors, skilled manual			**0.098**	(0.025)	**0.097**	(0.025)
Semi–unskilled manual			**0.132**	(0.025)	**0.132**	(0.025)
Unemployed			**0.071**	(0.028)	**0.071**	(0.028)
Student, vocational training			–0.028	(0.029)	–0.028	(0.029)
Retired			**0.150**	(0.025)	**0.150**	(0.025)
Housekeepers			**0.102**	(0.025)	**0.102**	(0.025)
Not classifiable			**0.091**	(0.026)	**0.091**	(0.026)
Denomination						
Catholic			**0.116**	(0.017)	**0.117**	(0.017)
Orthodox			0.033	(0.037)	0.029	(0.037)
Protestant			**0.118**	(0.017)	**0.118**	(0.017)
Other			**0.043**	(0.022)	**0.043**	(0.022)
No religion (ref.)			—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week			**0.052**	(0.017)	**0.053**	(0.017)
≥ once a month			**0.069**	(0.018)	**0.069**	(0.018)
Less than one a month			**0.048**	(0.013)	**0.049**	(0.013)
Never (ref.)			—		—	
Family income			**–0.028**	(0.005)	**–0.028**	(0.005)
Intervening variables						
Perceived Ethnic Threat						
Localism						
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994					0.014	(0.033)
Change economic conditions 1989-94					***–0.072***	(0.037)
Social security benefits expenditure						
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995						
Asylum seekers 1994						
Change asylum seekers 1989-94						
(Change economic conditions 89-94)²						
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.570**	(0.005)	**0.503**	(0.005)	**0.503**	(0.005)
% explained variance			11.8%		11.8%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.065**	(0.019)	**0.072**	(0.021)	**0.061**	(0.018)
% explained variance			0.0%		6.2%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	55250.8		52216.1		52212.4	
Δ –2*log likelihood	2749.1		3034.7		3.7	
Δ df	1		21		2	
p–value.	0.000		0.000		0.155	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.11 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of chauvinism (continued)*

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Intercept	**3.639**	(0.202)	**3.140**	(0.218)	**3.198**	(0.193)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)	**0.032**	(0.010)	**0.032**	(0.010)	**0.032**	(0.010)
Age	**0.006**	(0.000)	**0.006**	(0.000)	**0.006**	(0.000)
Education	**–0.142**	(0.005)	**–0.142**	(0.005)	**–0.142**	(0.005)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)	—		—		—	
Lower controllers	–0.004	(0.022)	–0.004	(0.022)	–0.004	(0.022)
Routine non-manual	**0.050**	(0.024)	**0.050**	(0.024)	**0.050**	(0.024)
Self–employed	**0.075**	(0.027)	**0.075**	(0.027)	**0.075**	(0.027)
Supervisors, skilled manual	**0.097**	(0.025)	**0.097**	(0.025)	**0.097**	(0.025)
Semi–unskilled manual	**0.132**	(0.025)	**0.132**	(0.025)	**0.132**	(0.025)
Unemployed	**0.071**	(0.028)	**0.071**	(0.028)	**0.071**	(0.028)
Student, vocational training	–0.028	(0.029)	–0.027	(0.029)	–0.027	(0.029)
Retired	**0.150**	(0.025)	**0.150**	(0.025)	**0.150**	(0.025)
Housekeepers	**0.101**	(0.025)	**0.102**	(0.025)	**0.102**	(0.025)
Not classifiable	**0.091**	(0.026)	**0.091**	(0.026)	**0.091**	(0.026)
Denomination						
Catholic	**0.117**	(0.017)	**0.115**	(0.017)	**0.115**	(0.017)
Orthodox	0.030	(0.037)	0.032	(0.037)	0.024	(0.037)
Protestant	**0.118**	(0.017)	**0.117**	(0.017)	**0.118**	(0.017)
Other	**0.043**	(0.022)	**0.042**	(0.022)	**0.043**	(0.022)
No religion (ref.)	—		—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week	**0.053**	(0.017)	**0.052**	(0.017)	**0.051**	(0.017)
≥ once a month	**0.069**	(0.018)	**0.068**	(0.018)	**0.069**	(0.018)
Less than one a month	**0.049**	(0.013)	**0.048**	(0.013)	**0.049**	(0.013)
Never (ref.)	—		—		—	
Family income	**–0.028**	(0.005)	**–0.028**	(0.005)	**–0.028**	(0.005)
Intervening variables						
Perceived Ethnic Threat						
Localism						
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994	0.015	(0.030)	**0.067**	(0.029)	**0.079**	(0.026)
Change economic conditions 1989-94	**–0.074**	(0.033)	**–0.062**	(0.027)	**–0.291**	(0.090)
Social security benefits expenditure	**–0.017**	(0.007)	–0.005	(0.009)	0.001	(0.008)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995			0.331	(0.322)	**0.632**	(0.305)
Asylum seekers 1994			**–0.140**	(0.070)	**–0.176**	(0.063)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94			**0.027**	(0.011)	**0.028**	(0.010)
(Change economic conditions 89-94)²					**0.038**	(0.014)
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.503**	(0.005)	**0.503**	(0.005)	**0.503**	(0.005)
% explained variance	11.8%		11.8%		11.8%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.050**	(0.015)	**0.032**	(0.010)	**0.025**	(0.007)
% explained variance	23.2%		50.6%		62.1%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	52207.8		52197.8		52191.8	
Δ –2*log likelihood	4.6		10.0		6.0	
Δ df	1		3		1	
p–value.	0.030		0.018		0.014	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.11 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of chauvinism (continued)*

	(Model 7)	Model 8		Model 9	
Intercept		**2.965**	(0.205)	**2.902**	(0.207)
Individual characteristics					
Sex (male)		**0.025**	(0.010)	**0.026**	(0.010)
Age		**0.006**	(0.000)	**0.005**	(0.000)
Education		**–0.114**	(0.005)	**–0.106**	(0.005)
Social position					
Higher controller (ref.)		—		—	
Lower controllers		–0.000	(0.021)	0.005	(0.021)
Routine non-manual		0.038	(0.024)	0.038	(0.024)
Self–employed		**0.055**	(0.027)	0.044	(0.027)
Supervisors, skilled manual		**0.073**	(0.025)	**0.074**	(0.025)
Semi–unskilled manual		**0.108**	(0.025)	**0.107**	(0.025)
Unemployed		0.052	(0.027)	0.063	(0.027)
Student, vocational training		–0.012	(0.028)	–0.004	(0.028)
Retired		**0.123**	(0.024)	**0.122**	(0.024)
Housekeepers		**0.083**	(0.025)	**0.083**	(0.025)
Not classifiable		**0.066**	(0.026)	**0.066**	(0.025)
Religious denomination					
Catholic		**0.094**	(0.017)	**0.084**	(0.017)
Orthodox		0.035	(0.036)	0.028	(0.036)
Protestant		**0.089**	(0.016)	**0.082**	(0.016)
Other		0.039	(0.021)	0.036	(0.021)
No religion (ref.)		—		—	
Church attendance					
≥ nearly once a week		**0.064**	(0.017)	**0.044**	(0.017)
≥ once a month		**0.078**	(0.018)	**0.066**	(0.018)
Less than one a month		**0.052**	(0.013)	**0.047**	(0.013)
Never (ref.)		—		—	
Family income		**–0.021**	(0.005)	**–0.021**	(0.005)
Intervening variables					
Perceived Ethnic Threat		**0.209**	(0.006)	**0.206**	(0.006)
Localism				**0.093**	(0.005)
Country characteristics					
Economic conditions 1994		**0.099**	(0.027)	**0.104**	(0.027)
Change economic conditions 1989-94		**–0.277**	(0.096)	**–0.251**	(0.097)
Social security benefits expenditure		0.004	(0.008)	0.003	(0.008)
Ethnic heterogeneity 1995		**0.796**	(0.324)	**0.868**	(0.327)
Asylum seekers 1994		**–0.177**	(0.067)	**–0.162**	(0.067)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94		**0.031**	(0.011)	**0.033**	(0.011)
(Change economic conditions 89-94)²		**0.040**	(0.015)	**0.037**	(0.015)
Variance components					
Individual–level variance in intercept		**0.482**	(0.004)	**0.474**	(0.004)
% explained variance		15.5%		16.8%	
Country–level variance in intercept		**0.028**	(0.008)	**0.028**	(0.009)
% explained variance		57.1%		56.4%	
Goodness–of–fit					
–2*log likelihood		51150.4		50784.6	
Δ –2*log likelihood		1041.4		365.8	
Δ df		1		1	
p–value		0.000		0.000	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Figure 6.9 *Predicted effect of change in economic conditions on chauvinism*



Effects of intervening individual characteristics on chauvinism

Adding the intervening variable perceived ethnic threat to the model (model 8) substantially improved the goodness-of-fit (deviance = 1041.4). In accordance with hypothesis 2b, the effect of perceived ethnic threat on chauvinism was positive (b = 0.209). The stronger the respondent's perception of ethnic threat, the more chauvinistic the respondent was. Consequently, the explained variance at the individual level increased from 11.8% to 15.5%. However, the explained variance at the country level did not increase, and even slightly decreased from 62.1% to 57.1%. Thus, in contrast to ethnic exclusionism, the differences between countries in the mean score on chauvinism could not be explained by the differences in mean score on perceived ethnic threat.[26]

This finding implies that there were different relationships at different levels. At the individual level, there was a positive relationship between the individual perception of ethnic threat and the individual's degree of chauvinism. At the contextual level, controlled for other individual as well as contextual characteristics, there was no positive relationship between the mean level of perceived ethnic threat and the mean level of chauvinism. Such a finding points out the methodological norm that conclusions based on analysis at a given level (e.g. individuals) cannot automatically be applied to a different level (e.g. groups). Erroneously applying conclusions, based on analysis at the individual level, as valid conclusions at the aggregate level is known as the "atomistic fallacy" (Riley, 1963).[27]

This differential explanatory power of the intervening variable perceived ethnic threat is also illustrated by the differences in parameter estimates of the individual and contextual variables in model 8 compared to the previous model. As can be seen in Table 6.11, the effects of the majority of individual variables in model 8 were smaller than in model 6. That is, the original effects of individual characteristics, such as educational level, social position and family income, on chauvinism, were partly mediated by perceived ethnic threat. On the other hand, the effects of most contextual variables in model 8 were slightly greater than in model 6. Controlled for perceived ethnic threat, the effects of the national context on chauvinism subsisted.

Finally, in model 9, the degree of localism was added to the analyses. With a deviance of 365.8, this induced a substantial improvement of model-fit. In accordance with hypothesis (3b), respondents with a stronger localistic orientation were more chauvinistic (b = 0.093). Controlled for localism, the effects of individual and contextual characteristics hardly deviated from the parameter estimates of the previous model. The explained variance at the individual level was slightly increased from 15.5% to 16.8%. The variance at the contextual level remained very much the same.

The extent to which cross-national differences in chauvinism could be attributed to individual and contextual characteristics can again be illustrated by the country-level residuals of several models. The observed differences in mean level of chauvinism between countries are depicted by the country-level residuals in the empty random intercept model (model 1) in Figure 6.10.

Figure 6.10 *Country-level residuals in chauvinism*



This variance between countries could not be attributed to differences in population composition, as the residuals in the model with the independent individual variables (model 2) were not smaller compared to the residuals in the empty model. Adding contextual variables to the model (model 6) diminished the country-level residuals by more than 60%. Finally, Figure 6.10 illustrates that the country-level residuals, on average, did not decrease when perceived ethnic threat was included in the model (model 8). In summary, the differences between countries in the mean level of chauvinism could only be attributed to differences in the national contexts, and not to differences in the mean level of perceived ethnic threat or differences in the population composition of socio-demographic characteristics.

As can be seen in Figure 6.10, the ethnic majority in Bulgaria had on average the highest score on chauvinism. However, controlling for differences in contextual characteristics, the average level of chauvinism in Bulgaria did not deviate from the overall mean. In other words, the high level of chauvinism in Bulgaria reflected the contextual conditions in Bulgaria. A closer study of these national conditions as presented in Tables 6.4 through 6.6, together with the parameter estimates of model 6 in Table 6.11, shows that the high average score on chauvinism was mostly caused by the relatively minor improvement in economic conditions between 1989 and 1994 and the relatively strong rise in applications for asylum.

6.9.5 Perceived ethnic threat

The aforementioned results clearly indicate that, in accordance with the hypotheses, both perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation were positively related to the various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism. The stronger the perceived ethnic threat, the stronger the support for ethnic exclusionism (hypothesis 2a) and the higher the degree of chauvinism (hypothesis 2b). Furthermore, the higher the degree of localism, the stronger the ethnic exclusionism (hypothesis 3a) and chauvinism (hypothesis 3b).

Next, I turn to the second set of hypotheses concerning the presumed intervening effect of perceived ethnic threat and localism. That is, having established that both variables are indeed related to the dependent variables, I will now address the link between independent variables and the two intervening variables. I start with the analysis regarding perceived ethnic threat, and address the question of whether perceived ethnic threat is indeed related to actual threat, as indicated by individual and contextual characteristics. The results of the multi-level analyses are displayed in Table 6.12.

The 2-level random intercept null model had a log likelihood ratio of 52931.4, with compared a single-level model, a highly significant deviance of 6079.9. The variance between individuals within countries (0.517) was much greater than the variance between countries (0.166), but there were nonetheless highly significant differences between countries. The intra-country correlation was 0.243, that is, the correlation in the level of perceived ethnic threat between two randomly chosen individuals within a country. Thus, with regard to individual's perceptions of ethnic threat too, the national context proved to be a relevant social context.

Table 6.12 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of perceived ethnic threat*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Intercept	**3.145**	(0.085)	**3.006**	(0.088)	**3.792**	(0.173)	**4.047**	(0.246)
Individual characteristics								
Sex (male)			**0.034**	(0.010)	**0.034**	(0.010)	**0.034**	(0.010)
Age			–0.001	(0.000)	–0.001	(0.000)	–0.001	(0.000)
Education			**–0.133**	(0.005)	**–0.133**	(0.005)	**–0.133**	(0.005)
Social position								
Higher controller (ref.)			—		—		—	
Lower controllers			–0.017	(0.021)	–0.016	(0.021)	–0.017	(0.021)
Routine non-manual			**0.055**	(0.024)	**0.055**	(0.024)	**0.055**	(0.024)
Self–employed			**0.093**	(0.027)	**0.094**	(0.027)	**0.093**	(0.027)
Supervisors, skilled manual			**0.117**	(0.025)	**0.117**	(0.025)	**0.117**	(0.025)
Semi–unskilled manual			**0.113**	(0.025)	**0.113**	(0.025)	**0.113**	(0.025)
Unemployed			**0.089**	(0.027)	**0.089**	(0.027)	**0.089**	(0.027)
Student, vocational training			**–0.072**	(0.028)	**–0.072**	(0.028)	**–0.072**	(0.028)
Retired			**0.128**	(0.024)	**0.128**	(0.024)	**0.128**	(0.024)
Housekeepers			**0.092**	(0.025)	**0.092**	(0.025)	**0.092**	(0.025)
Not classifiable			**0.119**	(0.026)	**0.119**	(0.026)	**0.119**	(0.026)
Denomination								
Catholic			**0.103**	(0.017)	**0.103**	(0.017)	**0.103**	(0.017)
Orthodox			–0.047	(0.036)	–0.054	(0.036)	–0.054	(0.036)
Protestant			**0.138**	(0.016)	**0.139**	(0.016)	**0.139**	(0.016)
Other			0.020	(0.021)	0.020	(0.021)	0.020	(0.021)
No religion (ref.)			—		—		—	
Church attendance								
≥ nearly once a week			**–0.058**	(0.017)	**–0.058**	(0.017)	**–0.058**	(0.017)
≥ once a month			**–0.045**	(0.018)	**–0.044**	(0.018)	**–0.044**	(0.018)
Less than one a month			–0.015	(0.013)	–0.015	(0.013)	–0.015	(0.013)
Never (ref.)			—		—		—	
Family income			**–0.034**	(0.005)	**–0.034**	(0.005)	**–0.034**	(0.005)
Country characteristics								
Economic conditions 1994					**–0.084**	(0.038)	**–0.083**	(0.037)
Change economic conditions 1989-94					**–0.133**	(0.042)	**–0.135**	(0.041)
Social security benefits expenditure							–0.013	(0.009)
Ethnic heterogeneity								
Asylum seekers 1994								
Change asylum seekers 1989-94								
(Asylum seekers 1994)²								
Economic conditions 1994 * ethnic heterogeneity								
Variance components								
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.517**	(0.005)	**0.482**		**0.482**		**0.482**	
% explained variance			6.9%		6.9%		6.9%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.166**	(0.049)	**0.168**		**0.081**		**0.075**	
% explained variance			0.0%		50.9%		54.8%	
Goodness–of–fit								
–2*log likelihood	52931.4		51212.8		51196.1		51194.2	
Δ –2*log likelihood	6079.9		1718.6		16.7		1.9	
Δ df	1		21		2		1	
p–value.	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.164	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Table 6.12 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of perceived ethnic threat (continued)*

	Model 5		Model 6		Model 7	
Intercept	**4.242**	(0.314)	**4.306**	(0.298)	**3.804**	(0.340)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)	**0.034**	(0.010)	**0.034**	(0.010)	**0.034**	(0.010)
Age	–0.001	(0.000)	–0.001	(0.000)	–0.001	(0.000)
Education	**–0.133**	(0.005)	**–0.133**	(0.005)	**–0.133**	(0.005)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)	—		—		—	
Lower controllers	–0.017	(0.021)	–0.017	(0.021)	–0.016	(0.021)
Routine non-manual	**0.055**	(0.024)	**0.055**	(0.024)	**0.055**	(0.024)
Self–employed	**0.093**	(0.027)	**0.093**	(0.027)	**0.093**	(0.027)
Supervisors, skilled manual	**0.116**	(0.025)	**0.116**	(0.025)	**0.117**	(0.025)
Semi–unskilled manual	**0.113**	(0.025)	**0.113**	(0.025)	**0.113**	(0.025)
Unemployed	**0.089**	(0.027)	**0.089**	(0.027)	**0.089**	(0.027)
Student, vocational training	**–0.072**	(0.028)	**–0.072**	(0.028)	**–0.072**	(0.028)
Retired	**0.128**	(0.024)	**0.128**	(0.024)	**0.128**	(0.024)
Housekeepers	**0.092**	(0.025)	**0.091**	(0.025)	**0.091**	(0.025)
Not classifiable	**0.119**	(0.026)	**0.119**	(0.026)	**0.119**	(0.026)
Denomination						
Catholic	**0.103**	(0.017)	**0.103**	(0.017)	**0.104**	(0.017)
Orthodox	–0.054	(0.036)	–0.054	(0.036)	–0.052	(0.036)
Protestant	**0.139**	(0.016)	**0.140**	(0.016)	**0.140**	(0.016)
Other	0.020	(0.021)	0.020	(0.021)	0.020	(0.021)
No religion (ref.)	—		—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week	**–0.058**	(0.017)	**–0.058**	(0.017)	**–0.059**	(0.017)
≥ once a month	**–0.044**	(0.018)	**–0.044**	(0.018)	**–0.045**	(0.018)
Less than one a month	–0.015	(0.013)	–0.015	(0.013)	–0.015	(0.013)
Never (ref.)	—		—		—	
Family income	**–0.034**	(0.005)	**–0.034**	(0.005)	**–0.034**	(0.005)
Country characteristics						
Economic conditions 1994	**–0.092**	(0.041)	**–0.084**	(0.039)	0.010	(0.053)
Change economic conditions 1989-94	**–0.141**	(0.039)	**–0.149**	(0.037)	**–0.138**	(0.034)
Social security benefits expenditure	–0.013	(0.012)	–0.008	(0.012)	–0.005	(0.011)
Ethnic heterogeneity	–0.684	(0.466)	–0.710	(0.438)	–0.884	(0.778)
Asylum seekers 1994	–0.005	(0.101)	–0.355	(0.222)	–0.128	(0.221)
Change asylum seekers 1989-94	–0.013	(0.016)	–0.023	(0.016)	–0.003	(0.017)
(Asylum seekers 1994)²			***0.110***	(0.063)	0.036	(0.065)
Economic conditions 1994 * ethnic heterogeneity					**–0.582**	(0.245)
Variance components						
Individual–level variance in intercept	**0.482**		**0.482**		**0.482**	
% explained variance	6.9%		6.9%		6.9%	
Country–level variance in intercept	**0.068**		**0.060**		**0.048**	
% explained variance	58.9%		63.8%		71.0%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	51192.0		51189.2		51184.1	
Δ –2*log likelihood	2.2		2.8		5.1	
Δ df	3		1		1	
p–value.	0.535		0.090		0.022	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

Effects of independent individual characteristics on perceived ethnic threat

According to ethnic competition theory, perceived ethnic threat is more prevalent among social categories of the ethnic majority group that are in similar social positions as many ethnic minorities (hypotheses 4a to 4e). In order to test this proposition, socio-demographic variables were added to the model (model 2), as indicators of actual threat at the individual level. The results are in accordance with the hypotheses. That is, the higher the educational attainment, the lower the perceptions of ethnic threat (b = –0.133). Self-employed, manual workers, and unemployed all have higher scores on perceived ethnic threat compared to the reference category of higher controllers. And persons with a lower family income are more inclined to perceive ethnic minorities as a threat (b = –0.034).

There were also some additional differences between social categories. Perceived ethnic threat was relatively more prevalent among men compared to women, among routine non-manual, retired persons and housekeepers compared to higher controllers, and among Catholics and Protestants compared to non-religious persons. On the other hand, perceived ethnic threat was less prevalent among students compared to higher controllers, and among frequent churchgoers.

As can be seen in the lower part of Table 6.12, these individual characteristics accounted for 6.9% of the variance at the individual level. The variance at the country level hardly changed after inclusion of individual characteristics, indicating that the differences between countries in averagely perceived ethnic threat could not be attributed to differences in population composition.

Effects of national characteristics on perceived ethnic threat

Next, contextual characteristics were added to the model, as indicators of actual threat at the contextual level. Adding the economic characteristics (model 3) caused a significant decrease in the log likelihood ratio of 16.7. Both factors were, in accordance with the hypotheses (6a) and (6b), negatively related to perceived ethnic threat: the lower the economic conditions, and the stronger the decline in economic conditions, the higher the perceived ethnic threat. Adding the social security benefit expenditures (model 4) and the demographic variables (model 5) did not lead to a significant improvement in model fit. As can be seen in Table 6.12, these variables were not related to perceived ethnic threat, and therefore the respective hypotheses (6c to 6f) were refuted.

Next, I tested whether there were any curvilinear effects of contextual variables. Only one of the quadratic effects turned out to be significant. Adding a quadratic term for the number of asylum applications in 1994 led to a small significant deviance of 2.8. This curvilinear effect is illustrated in Figure 6.11. When the number of asylum applications per 1,000 capita is smaller than 1.6, there was a negative relation between the asylum applications and perceived ethnic threat. Only when the number of asylum applications per 1,000 capita is higher than 1.6, was a higher number of asylum applications associated with stronger perceived ethnic threat.

Figure 6.11 *Predicted effect of asylum applications on perceived ethnic threat*



Finally, interaction terms were added to the model in order to test the proposition that the effects of economic conditions or the level of social security on the one hand and demographic variables on the other hand, reinforced each other. Only the interaction between the economic conditions in 1994 and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity was significant (b = –0.582). That is, economic conditions have a stronger negative effect on perceived ethnic threat when the degree of ethnic heterogeneity is higher. This finding is in accordance with the hypothesis: the better the economic conditions, the less perceived ethnic threat, but the effect is even stronger when the relative proportion of ethnic out-groups is higher.

Controlled for this interaction between economic conditions and ethnic heterogeneity, the curvilinear effect of asylum applications was no longer significant. Thus, in model 7, perceived ethnic threat was only affected by the change in economic conditions and the interaction between economic conditions and ethnic heterogeneity. There were no significant (main) effects of the level of social security and the demographic conditions.

The variance components in Table 6.12 show that 71.0% of the variance at the contextual level could be attributed to the aforementioned contextual characteristics. This is also illustrated in Figure 6.12. In this figure, the country-level residuals are displayed for the null model, for the model with only individual characteristics, and for the model with both individual and contextual variables. The country-level residuals in the null model correspond with the observed cross-national differences in average perceived ethnic threat. As stated before, these differences could not be attributed to compositional effects: on average, the country-level residuals in the model with individual characteristics were just as large as in the null model.

Figure 6.12 *Country-level residuals in perceived ethnic threat*



Only when contextual characteristics were added to the model, did the country-level residuals substantially decline. For instance, the average level of perceived ethnic threat was rather high in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Latvia. To a large extent, this could be attributed to the national context of these countries, in particular, their poor economic conditions and the relative lack of a positive change in economic conditions (see also Table 6.5). For Latvia, these poor economic conditions coincided with a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity. As can be seen in Figure 6.12, controlled for these contextual circumstances, the average level of perceived ethnic threat in Latvia did not deviate from the overall mean across all countries.

Australia is another country that is characterized by a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity (see also Table 6.6). Despite this high degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the average level of perceived ethnic threat in Australia was rather low, since the economic conditions in Australia were much better. This is also illustrated in Figure 6.12. The residual for Australia in model 1 was largely negative, indicating that the average level of perceived ethnic threat was rather low. In the model with contextual characteristics, the residual for Australia fell to almost zero. Thus, the low level of perceived ethnic threat could fully be attributed to the contextual characteristics of Australia, in particular, the prosperous economic conditions and the recent improvement in economic conditions.

6.9.6 Localistic orientation

The results of the multi-level analyses on the second intervening variable, localistic orientation, are displayed in Table 6.13. The random intercept null model (model 1) had a highly significant deviance of 2907.7, indicating large differences between countries in the average score on localistic orientation. Nonetheless, the variance between individuals within countries (0.961) was much larger than the variance between countries (0.127). The intra-country correlation was 0.117.

Effects of independent individual characteristics on localistic orientation

To test the hypotheses regarding differences between social categories, socio-demographic variables were included (model 2). In accordance with hypotheses (5a) and (5b), lower educated persons and elderly persons had relatively stronger localistic orientations (coefficients were respectively –0.096 and 0.018). Furthermore, localism was stronger among religious persons compared to non-religious persons, although the difference between the orthodox religious and the non-religious did not reach a significance level of 5%. Finally, the more often the respondent went to church, the stronger his localistic orientation. These findings support hypotheses (5c) and (5d). Thus these four hypotheses derived from localism theory were not refuted. There were also some additional significant differences between social categories. Compared to the higher controllers, the self-employed were more localistic, whereas the unemployed and students had a less localistic orientation.

Compared to the empty model, 13.7% of the variance between individuals could be explained. Regarding the variance between countries, 10.9% could be explained by including individual characteristics in the model. That is, the original cross-national differences in average level of localism were partly due to composition effects.

Effect of ethnic heterogeneity on localistic orientation

Finally, in model 3, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity is added, in order to test the proposition that a localistic orientation is more prevalent among individuals living in more ethnically homogeneous countries. Adding this contextual characteristic led to a small improvement in model fit of 3.4, which was significant at the 10% level. In accordance with hypothesis 8, the effect of ethnic heterogeneity was negative: individuals living in more ethnically heterogeneous countries, were on average less oriented towards their local community. With this model, 23.2% of the variance between countries could be explained.

Table 6.13 *Parameter estimates from multi–level models of localistic orientation*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Intercept	**3.312**	(0.075)	**3.181**	(0.076)	**3.315**	(0.100)
Individual characteristics						
Sex (male)			–0.009	(0.013)	–0.009	(0.013)
Age			**0.018**	(0.001)	**0.018**	(0.001)
Education			**–0.096**	(0.007)	**–0.095**	(0.007)
Social position						
Higher controller (ref.)			—		—	
Lower controllers			–0.053	(0.028)	–0.053	(0.028)
Routine non-manual			0.005	(0.031)	0.005	(0.031)
Self–employed			**0.124**	(0.035)	**0.124**	(0.035)
Supervisors, skilled manual			–0.005	(0.033)	–0.005	(0.033)
Semi–unskilled manual			0.015	(0.033)	0.015	(0.033)
Unemployed			**–0.109**	(0.036)	**–0.109**	(0.036)
Student, vocational training			**–0.095**	(0.037)	**–0.095**	(0.037)
Retired			0.016	(0.032)	0.016	(0.032)
Housekeepers			–0.002	(0.033)	–0.002	(0.033)
Not classifiable			0.012	(0.034)	0.012	(0.034)
Religious denomination						
Catholic			**0.106**	(0.022)	**0.106**	(0.022)
Orthodox			0.091	(0.047)	0.090	(0.047)
Protestant			**0.085**	(0.022)	**0.085**	(0.022)
Other			0.028	(0.028)	0.028	(0.028)
No religion (ref.)			—		—	
Church attendance						
≥ nearly once a week			**0.212**	(0.022)	**0.212**	(0.022)
≥ once a month			**0.123**	(0.024)	**0.123**	(0.024)
Less than one a month			0.050	(0.017)	0.050	(0.017)
Never (ref.)			—		—	
Family income			0.005	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)
Country characteristic						
Ethnic heterogeneity					***–0.978***	(0.513)
Variance components						
Individual–level variance	**0.961**	(0.009)	**0.830**	(0.008)	**0.830**	(0.008)
% explained variance			13.7%		13.7%	
Country–level variance	**0.127**	(0.038)	**0.113**	(0.034)	**0.098**	(0.029)
% explained variance			10.9%		23.2%	
Goodness–of–fit						
–2*log likelihood	67914.8		64360.7		64357.3	
Δ –2*log likelihood	2907.7		3554.1		3.4	
Δ df	1		21		1	
p–value.	0.000		0.000		0.062	

Note: N=24,247. Parameter estimates in bold figures are significant at the 5% level (p-value < 0.05), contextual parameter estimates in bold and italic figures are significant at the 10% level (p-value< 0.10).

6.10 Summary: overview of results

In this section I present an overview of the aforementioned results by discussing the effects of individual and contextual characteristics across all the different dependent variables.

6.10.1 Effects of independent individual variables on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism

Most of the hypotheses (1a) to (1h) regarding the effects of independent individual variables on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism were not refuted, as is shown in Table 6.14. In the body of this table, as well as in the subsequent tables, the label 'confirmed' indicates that the effect was in line with the hypothesis. The label 'refuted' indicates that the effect was significant but opposite to the hypothesized effect, whereas the label 'refuted, n.s.' indicates that there was no significant effect of the variable. Finally, the label 'mixed' indicates that there are several effect parameters of which some were in line with the expectation.

As can be seen in Table 6.14, the hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory (1a to 1e) gained strong empirical support. Ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism were, as expected, higher among the lower educational strata and lower income groups. Furthermore, support for most dimensions of ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism were, as expected, stronger among the self-employed, manual workers, and the unemployed.

Table 6.14 *Effects of independent individual variables on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism*

Hypotheses: higher levels among:	Exclusion of migrants	Exclusion of refugees	Exclusionism of group membership	Chauvinism
(1a) lower educated	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed
(1b) self-employed	confirmed	confirmed	refuted, n.s.	confirmed
(1c) manual workers	confirmed	mixed	confirmed	confirmed
(1d) unemployed people	confirmed	refuted	confirmed	confirmed
(1e) low income	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed
(1f) older people	refuted, n.s.	refuted	confirmed	confirmed
(1g) members of denomination	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed
(1h) churchgoers	refuted	refuted	refuted, n.s.	confirmed
Explained individual level variance	4.1%	3.3%	6.5%	11.8%
Explained country level variance due to composition effects	7.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

The hypotheses derived from localism theory (1a, 1f through 1g) gained somewhat lesser empirical support. As expected, ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism was higher among the lower educated and people who consider themselves to be a member of a religious denomination. Age and church attendance, however, were not consistently related to the different dimensions of exclusionism and chauvinism. The elderly were relatively more chauvinistic and more inclined to exclusionism of group membership, but age was not related to exclusionism of migrants. Surprisingly, younger persons were more inclined to exclude political refugees. Controlled for religious denomination, church attendance was negatively related to exclusionism of migrants and refugees, but positively related to chauvinism. With regard to other characteristics, retired persons as well as housekeepers had consistently higher scores on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism.

Overall, the independent individual variables were rather weakly related to ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism. The variables education, age, income, social position, religiosity and church attendance could only account for between 3.3% and 6.5% of the individual-level variance in ethnic exclusionism. Most variance between individuals within countries therefore remained unexplained. Chauvinism was somewhat stronger related to these individual background variables: 11.8% of the observed differences in chauvinism between individuals could be attributed to these socio-demographic background variables.

The overall weak relation between socio-demographic background and ethnic exclusionism or chauvinism was also illustrated by the small effects of population composition. That is, 7.0% of the observed differences between countries in mean level of exclusionism of immigrants could be attributed to differences between countries regarding the population composition. With regard to the mean level of the other ethnic attitudes, differences between countries could not be attributed to differences in population composition.

6.10.2 Effects of contextual variables on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism

According to ethnic competition theory, the average level of ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism of the ethnic majority population is affected by the degree of actual ethnic competition. Table 6.15 presents an overview of the effects of the applied indicators for actual ethnic competition at the national level. These contextual hypotheses were partly refuted.

With regard to *national economic conditions*, it turned out that the better the economic conditions of a country, the less its residents are inclined to exclusionism of migrants. This finding was in accordance with ethnic competition theory. However, in contrast to the hypothesis, national economic conditions were not related to exclusionism of refugees and group membership. And in addition, chauvinism was even positively affected by the economic conditions.

The recent *change in national economic conditions* was more consistently – and in line with ethnic competition theory – related to ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism. The stronger the deterioration (or the lesser the improvement) in national economic conditions over the previous

five years, the higher the degree of exclusionism of migrants, group membership, and chauvinism. In line with ethnic competition theory, a decline in economic prosperity was accompanied by stronger ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism.

Exclusionism of political refugees was however not related to changing economic conditions. It is interesting to note that this latter form of ethnic exclusionism, with its relatively strong connotation of humanity and morality, is – in contrast to the other two forms of ethnic exclusionism – not affected by economic circumstances, neither the present economic conditions, nor the recent change in economic conditions.

Table 6.15 *Effects of contextual variables on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism*

Hypotheses: higher levels depending on:	Exclusion of migrants	Exclusion of refugees	Exclusionism of group membership	Chauvinism
(6a) Poor economic conditions	confirmed	refuted, n.s.	refuted, n.s.	refuted
(6b) Declining economic conditions	confirmed	refuted, n.s.	confirmed	confirmed
(6c) Less extensive social security system	confirmed	confirmed	refuted [1]	refuted, n.s.
(6d) More ethnic heterogeneity	refuted, n.s.	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed
(6e) Larger number of asylum seekers	confirmed	refuted [2]	refuted	refuted
(6f) Stronger increase in asylum seekers	refuted [2]	refuted, n.s.	refuted, n.s.	confirmed
(6g) Concurrence of economic, political and demographic characteristics (interaction)	refuted, n.s.	mixed [3]	mixed [1]	refuted, n.s.

[1] Interaction between extensiveness of social security system and ethnic heterogeneity. In contrast to the hypothesis, the main effect of the extensiveness of the social security system was positive. However, the interaction effect was in line with the expectation: the less extensive the social security system, the stronger the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on exclusionism.

[2] However, the effect was curvilinear with– as expected – a positive sign of the quadratic term.

[3] Interaction between declining economic conditions and the squared number of asylum seekers: the stronger the decline in economic conditions, the stronger the effect of the (squared) number of asylum seekers.

In addition to economic conditions, the inter-group competition for scarce resources is also affected by political conditions, such as the *extensiveness of the social security system*. An extensive social security system protects citizens from severe losses of income and thus alleviates the harshness of economic competition. In accordance with the hypothesis, the higher the social security benefits expenditure of a nation, the less the population is inclined to exclude migrants and refugees. Chauvinism, however, was not related to the level of social security benefits. In addition, there was a small positive effect of the extensiveness of the social security

system on exclusionism of group membership. The latter result stemmed from the inclusion of an interaction term in the model. Regarding exclusionism of group membership, there was a significant interaction between the extensiveness of the social security system and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity: the less extensive the social security system, the stronger the positive effect of ethnic heterogeneity on exclusionism of group membership. This interaction effect was in accordance with ethnic competition theory.

Regarding the various demographic contextual variables, the degree of *ethnic heterogeneity* had the most consistent effect on chauvinism and the different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. As expected, the higher the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the stronger the exclusionism of refugees, exclusionism of group membership, and chauvinism. Only the degree of exclusionism of migrants was not related to ethnic heterogeneity.

The hypotheses regarding the effect of the number of *asylum applications* and the recent *change in asylum applications* received mixed empirical support. Only two of the eight parameter estimates (see Table 6.15) display a linear relationship in accordance with ethnic competition theory. That is, the higher the inflow of asylum seekers, the stronger the exclusionism of migrants, and the higher the increase in asylum applications, the stronger the degree of chauvinism. In addition, two non-linear relationships could be observed.

Firstly, in contrast to the expectation, a (relatively minor) growth in the number of asylum applications was accompanied by declining support for exclusionism of migrants. However, when there was a very large increase in the number of asylum applications (i.e. a growth of a factor of 7 or more), the relationship was positive, indicating that the stronger the inflow of asylum seekers, the higher the exclusionism of migrants (see Figure 6.4). Apparently, there is a kind of threshold: the assumed positive relation between growing numbers of asylum seekers and exclusionism of migrants only holds for strong – and thus prominently visible – increases in the number of asylum applications.

Secondly, there was an analogous curvilinear relation between the number of asylum applications and exclusionism of refugees. When the number of asylum applications per 1,000 capita was relatively small, the average level of exclusionism of refugees was smaller in countries with a larger inflow of asylum seekers. However, when the number of asylum applications per 1,000 capita is relatively strong (i.e., larger than 1.6 per 1,000 capita) the relationship was positive. Again, there was a threshold, as was illustrated in Figure 6.6. These two curvilinear effects of (the change in) the number of asylum applications imply a specification of ethnic competition theory. That is, large or growing numbers of asylum applications are not always linearly related to stronger ethnic exclusionism. Both aforementioned relations are characterised by a threshold level, above which larger or growing inflows of asylum seekers are accompanied by stronger ethnic exclusionism. Apparently, the (growing) size of the ethnic out-group must be considerably large and thus highly visible, in order to serve as a relevant out-group for social contra identification. The psychological process of social contra identification subsequently results in ethnic exclusionism.

Finally, I tested for interaction effects of the aforementioned economic, political, and demographic contextual variables. Presumably, ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism are strongly

prevalent in countries where the various indicators of actual ethnic competition coincide. Of the possible interaction effects, only two turned out to be significant. Both effects were in accordance with ethnic competition theory. Firstly, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity had a stronger positive effect on exclusionism of group membership when the social security system was less extensive. Secondly, the curvilinear effect of asylum applications on exclusion of refugees varied with the change in economic conditions: the stronger the decline in economic conditions, the stronger the effect of the (squared) number of asylum applications.

6.10.3 The intervening effect of perceived ethnic threat

A crucial proposition of ethnic competition is the conceptual distinction between actual ethnic competition and perceived ethnic threat. Presumably, the effects of individual and contextual characteristics (indicative of actual ethnic competition) are intervened by perceptions of ethnic threat. In accordance with hypothesis 2a, perceived ethnic threat was positively related to all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism, as is illustrated in Table 6.16. Moreover, compared to all other variables, perceived ethnic threat had the strongest effect on all four dependent ethnic attitudes, as judged by the relative size of the parameter estimates to their standard errors. Thus, perceived ethnic threat was the most important factor for the explanation of both ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism.

The effects of independent individual variables on perceived ethnic threat were all in accordance with hypotheses 4a to 4e derived from ethnic competition theory, as depicted in Table 6.17. Perceived ethnic threat was relatively higher among lower educated persons, self-employed, manual workers, unemployed and lower income categories. This confirmed the notion of the link between actual ethnic competition and perceived ethnic threat. The applied socio-demographic variables (education, social position, income) served as indirect measures of actual ethnic competition.

In addition, perceived ethnic threat was relatively high among retired persons, housekeepers, members of religious denominations, and those who attend church less frequently. Overall, the socio-demographic background variables accounted for 6.9% of the variance in perceived ethnic threat between individuals within countries. The differences between countries in the mean level of perceived ethnic threat could not be attributed to differences in population composition.

Table 6.16 *Effects of intervening individual variables on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism*

Hypotheses: higher levels among those individuals with:	Exclusion of migrants	Exclusion of refugees	Exclusionism of group membership	Chauvinism
(2a) higher perceived ethnic threat	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed
(2b) stronger localistic orientation	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed	confirmed

Table 6.17 *Effects of independent individual variables on intervening variables*

Hypotheses: higher levels among:	Perceived ethnic threat	Localistic orientation
(4a + 5a) lower educated	confirmed	confirmed
(4b) self-employed	confirmed	
(4c) manual workers	confirmed	
(4d) unemployed people	confirmed	
(4e) low income	confirmed	
(5b) older people		confirmed
(5c) members of denomination		confirmed
(5d) churchgoers		confirmed
Explained individual level variance	6.9 %	13.7 %
Explained country level variance due to composition effects	0.0 %	10.9 %

Table 6.18 *Effects of contextual variables on intervening variables*

Hypotheses: higher levels among:	Perceived ethnic threat	Localistic orientation
(7a) Poor economic conditions	refuted, n.s. [1]	
(7b) Declining economic conditions	confirmed	
(7c) Less extensive social security system	refuted, n.s.	
(7d) More ethnic heterogeneity	refuted, n.s. [1]	(8) Less ethnic heterogeneity: confirmed
(7e) Larger number of asylum seekers	refuted, n.s.	
(7f) Stronger increase in asylum seekers	refuted, n.s.	
(7g) Concurrence of economic, political and demographic characteristics (interaction)	mixed [1]	

[1] Interaction between economic conditions and ethnic heterogeneity. In contrast to the hypothesis, the main effect of economic conditions was not significant. However, the interaction effect was in line with the expectation: the worse the economic conditions, the stronger the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on perceived ethnic threat.

Perceived ethnic threat was only affected by some of the contextual variables, as summarized in Table 6.18. Most of these indicators for actual ethnic competition at the contextual level were not significantly related to perceived ethnic threat. However, as expected, the stronger the decline in economic conditions, the higher the average level of perceived ethnic threat. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between economic conditions and ethnic heterogeneity: the worse the economic conditions of a country, the stronger the positive relation between ethnic heterogeneity and perceived ethnic threat.

Thus, if there were any significant effects of contextual variables, these effects were in accordance with ethnic competition theory: perceived ethnic threat was positively related to declining economic conditions, and to poor economic conditions in conjunction with high ethnic heterogeneity. Again, this confirmed the link between actual ethnic competition and perceived ethnic threat. The higher the degree of actual ethnic competition at the contextual level (as indicated by the aforementioned contextual characteristics), the stronger the perceived ethnic threat. To a large extent (71.0%), the differences between countries regarding the mean level of perceived ethnic threat could be attributed to the differences in actual ethnic competition. The remaining unexplained variance in perceived ethnic threat, as well as the non-significant effects of other contextual variables on perceived ethnic threat, indicate that, to some extent, the perceptions of ethnic threat are "autonomous", or "distorted" since they are not fully based on actual ethnic competition.

As expected, the effects of independent individual variables on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism could partly be explained by perceived ethnic threat. Inclusion of this intervening variable led to a substantial decline of the direct effects of education level, social position, and income on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism. Inclusion of perceived ethnic threat also affected the direct effects of contextual variables. Since perceived ethnic threat was positively related to declining economic conditions, the original negative effect of declining economic conditions on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism diminished when controlled for perceived ethnic threat. In general, most of the other contextual effects decreased as well. However, in some instances, the direct effects increased after inclusion of perceived ethnic threat. This was due to the fact that these specific contextual variables were positively related to the dependent variable, but they had a (very small and not significant) negative effect on perceived ethnic threat.

In summary, with regard to the effects of contextual variables on perceived ethnic threat, ethnic exclusionism, and chauvinism, two consistent findings stand out:

(1) In accordance with ethnic competition theory, perceived ethnic threat, ethnic exclusionism, and chauvinism were all related to declining economic conditions. Only one dimension of ethnic exclusionism, that is, exclusionism of political refugees, was not related to the change in economic conditions. Apart from that, the stronger the recent decline in national economic conditions, the more the ethnic majority population felt threatened by ethnic minorities, supported ethnic exclusionism, and adhered to chauvinism.

(2) In addition to the change in economic conditions, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity was a major contextual effect on perceived ethnic threat, ethnic exclusionism, and chauvinism.

Only exclusionism of migrants was not related to the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. Otherwise, the stronger the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the higher the exclusionism of refugees, exclusionism of group membership, and chauvinism. Furthermore, ethnic heterogeneity interacted with economic conditions on perceived ethnic threat: the worse the economic conditions, the stronger the positive effect of ethnic heterogeneity on perceived ethnic threat. Similarly, the less extensive the social security system, the stronger the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on exclusionism of group membership. These findings with regard to the effects of ethnic heterogeneity are in accordance with the notions of ethnic competition theory.

6.10.4 The intervening effect of localistic orientation

According to localism theory, ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism are associated with a small breadth of perspective. To test this proposition, localistic orientation was included as a second intervening variable. As displayed in Table 6.16, hypothesis 2b was not falsified: the stronger the localistic orientation, the higher the degree of both ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism. Furthermore, as summarized in Table 6.17, localistic orientations were more widespread among lower educated, older people, people who consider themselves to be a member of a denomination, as well as frequent churchgoers, which supports the notions of localism theory. Finally, as displayed in Table 6.18, in accordance with hypothesis 8, the higher the ethnic heterogeneity within a country – presumed to be indicative of a cosmopolitan environment – the lower the average level of localistic orientation.

Compared to perceived ethnic threat, the effect of localistic orientation on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism is much lower. Accordingly, inclusion of this second intervening variable led to only minor changes in the effects of independent individual and contextual variables. In the final chapter, I will review these results in the light of the research problems and questions.

Notes Chapter 6

[1] In the applied survey data, no measurement of perceived inter-group competition was available. Instead, I focus on the related concept of perceived threat. Theoretically, one could assume that higher levels of perceived competition do not necessarily imply stronger negative out-group attitudes, as far as the competition is perceived as being a fair competition.

[2] Compared to young respondents, elderly respondents had relatively higher scores on the "crime rates" item than on the other threat items. Regarding the social position of respondents, unemployed respondents had the highest score on the "immigrants take jobs away" item. The differences in mean score of the unemployed versus the higher controllers was much smaller on the other three items.

[3] Missing values were substituted by the mean score of the item in the respective country.

[4] Knudsen (1997, p. 240) noted that, according to direct communication from Karl Jöreskog the 8.12a version of LISREL does not present the correct RMSEA value in multi-group analyses. The value as given by the program should be multiplied by the square root of the number of groups (here 23). In the table this adjusted RMSEA-value is presented.

[5] Since the latent variable localism was measured by two items, it was not possible to perform a multi-sample analysis in LISREL. That is, a measurement model with two observed items and one latent variable is unidentified due to the negative degrees of freedom (i.e. there are 3 observed (co-)variances and 4 model parameters, consisting of 2 measurement errors, 1 factor variance and 1 freed factor loading). If both factor loadings are assumed to be invariant, then the degrees of freedom is zero, and thus the model has a perfect fit.

6 See Entzinger (1985), who conducted an international comparative research on immigration policies, for an example of the problems of comparing national statistics.

7 The Gross Domestic Product is defined as the total output of goods and services for final use produced by an economy, by both residents and non-residents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. It does not include deductions for depreciation of physical capital or depletion and degradation of natural resources (UNDP, 1998, p. 218). The Gross National Product comprises GDP plus net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor services (labour and capital), less similar payments made to non-residents who contribute to the domestic economy (UNDP, 1998, p. 218).

8 The purchasing power of a country's currency is defined as the number of units of that currency required to purchase the same representative basket of goods and services (or a similar basket of goods and services) that a U.S. dollar (the reference currency) would buy in the United States (UNDP, 1998, p. 220). For example, the Dutch guilder PPP exchange rate measures the amount in guilders it would take in the Netherlands to buy a selected basket of traded and nontraded goods that cost one dollar in the United States. The system of purchasing power parities has been developed by the United Nations International Comparison Programme (ICP) to make more accurate international comparisons of GDP than those based on official exchange rates, which can be subject to considerably fluctuations (UNDP, 1998).

[9] The German 1994 Real GDP per capita was 19675 PPP$ (UNDP, 1997). The 1994 GNP per capita (expressed in 1991 prices) for respectively Germany, West Germany, and East Germany was 36200, 40700, and 17000 DM (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995, p. 655). The estimated 1994 Real GDP per capita for West Germany was therefore (19675 x 40700 / 36200 =) 22120. For East Germany the figure was (19675 x 17000 / 36200 =) 9240.

[10] The 1994 GNP per capita in US$ for West and East Germany was estimated by applying the 1994 GNP per capita in US$ for Germany (25580 US$, see UNDP, 1997) and the 1994 GNP per capita in DM for Germany, West Germany, and East Germany (respectively 36200, 40700, and 17000 DM, see Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995). Thus, the figure for West Germany was equal to (25580 x 40700 / 36200 =) 28760 and for East Germany (25580 x 17000 / 36200 =) 12012. The 1989 GNP per capita in US$ for West Germany (20440 US$) is reported by UNDP (1992), so the estimated change in economic prosperity between 1989 and 1994 was 1.41 (28760 / 20440). The earliest available figure for East Germany was the 1991 figure (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995). Therefore the change in economic prosperity for East Germany (1.56) was the ratio of the estimated 1994 GNP per capita in US$ (12012) to the estimated 1991 GNP per capita in US$ (7691.25). The latter figure for East Germany was estimated by multiplying the 1991 GNP per capita of the unified Germany (20510US$) – as reported by UNDP (1994) – with the ratio of the 1991 GNP per capita in DM of East Germany and Germany as a whole, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (1995).

[11] According to the international standard definition as applied by ILO, the unemployed comprise all persons above a specified age who (during the reference period) were not in paid employment or self-employment, but were available for work and had taken specific steps to seek paid employment or self-employment. National definitions of unemployment may vary as regards inter alia age limits, reference periods, criteria for seeking work, and treatment of persons temporarily laid off or seeking work for the first time (ILO, 1998).

[12] Although labour force sample surveys are the best source for an international comparison of unemployment statistics, there were still some difficulties in comparing these figures across countries. For instance, the national definitions of unemployment differed with regard to the applied age limits (varying from persons aged 16-64 years to all persons aged 15 years and over) and with regard to the measured time-period (yearly or monthly average) (ILO, 1998).

[13] Inflation was measured as the annual percent change in consumer prices, with the exception of the United Kingdom, in which the figure referred to the annual percentage change in retail price index excluding mortgage interest (IMF, 1999b, p. 181).

[14] The inflation figures derived from German national statistics were comparable to the IMF statistics: when data are available in both data sources (i.e. West Germany 1989 and 1990) the figures were identical.

[15] The use of the ratio as an indicator of change in inflation was appropriate here, since there were no negative inflation figures in the years of measurement. If there had been a negative inflation (e.g., in 1995 the average inflation in Japan was -.07%), then the ratio would have been an inappropriate indicator of change in inflation, since both an increase (e.g., from –1 to +3) and a decrease (e.g., from +3 to –1) could result in a negative figure.

[16] Even in this short period, the average annual inflation in East Germany dropped dramatically: from 13.4% in 1992, through 10.6% in 1993, to 3.6% in 1994 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999). The calculated change in inflation ratio amounted to 0.27; a remarkable strong decline in inflation compared to other countries. If data prior to 1992 had been available, the calculated ratio would probably be even lower. Thus, the applied variable underestimated the change in inflation in East Germany, but the effect of this was probably minor since the estimated change in inflation in East Germany already showed a dramatic decline of inflation.

[17] The data on inflation, measured as the average annual percentage change in consumer prices, as reported by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (1999) were comparable to the figures reported by IMF (1999a): from 1992 onwards, both data sources reported the annual inflation in Slovenia and the figures in both data sources were identical.

[18] The index of ethnic heterogeneity was calculated as $1 - (X_a^2 + X_b^2)$, where X_a was the proportion of respondents whose parents were citizens at the time of respondent's birth, and X_b the proportion of respondents for whom one or both parents were not citizens at the time of respondent's birth.

[19] The earliest available estimate of the number of asylum seekers in Russia – that is, persons whose applications for asylum are pending in the asylum procedure or who are otherwise registered as asylum seekers – was 89,900 in 1997 (UNHCR, 1998). A year later, the figure dropped to 11,300 (UNHCR, 1999).

[20] Multilevel modelling is also referred to as hierarchical modelling. However, multilevel modelling is not restricted to hierarchical (or nested) structured data in which each lower-level unit nests exactly within one, and only one, higher-level unit. Multilevel modelling can also be applied to cross-classified structures in which, for instance, pupils (level-1 units) are nested within postal districts (level-2 units) and within schools (also level-2 units) (Plewis, 1997).

[21] In MlwiN, the estimates of residuals at the group level are posterior estimates.

[22] Even in a bivariate analysis, the variables religious denomination and church attendance were differently related to exclusionism of immigrants. Non-religious persons were less inclined to exclude immigrants compared to religious persons, but the higher the frequency of church attendance, the lower the score on exclusionism of immigrants.

[23] The variables 'economic conditions' and 'change in economic conditions' are indices of economic prosperity and unemployment. These indices were constructed by subtracting the standardised unemployment figure from the standardised economic prosperity figure, as described in Section 6.8. Furthermore, in order to test for curvilinear effects by including a quadratic term in the model, negative values of country characteristics were not allowed. Therefore, I applied a linear transformation of both indices with a new minimum of zero. Hence, higher scores on the variable 'change in economic conditions' indicate a stronger improvement of economic conditions, *relative* to other countries. Countries with a low score on the variable 'change in economic conditions' had a less strong improvement of economic conditions, *relative* to other countries. Stated differently, the latter countries showed a decline in economic conditions, *relative* to other countries. For convenience, in the discussion of the results, I simply refer to this as a stronger decline in economic conditions.

[24] In fact, there were *negative* compositional effects: populations with a larger proportion of social categories with high scores on exclusionism of refugees (e.g., lower educated persons), nonetheless had a lower average score on exclusionism of refugees.

[25] This partly reflected the different number of measurement items of the dependent variables.

[26] Note that at the aggregate level (i.e., 23 national samples), there was a small positive correlation between the average level of chauvinism and the average level of perceived ethnic threat (r= 0.18).

[27] The opposite, drawing conclusions at the individual level from conclusions based on analysis at the aggregate level, is known as the "aggregative" or "ecological fallacy".

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions and discussion

7.1 Recapitulation of research problems and questions

In this study, I examined nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes in a comparative perspective. In other words, I focused on the attitudes of ethnic majority populations in different countries toward their own country and national in-group on the one hand, and attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants on the other hand. For the sake of clarity, I labelled favourable attitudes toward the country and the national in-group as nationalistic attitudes, and unfavourable attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants as ethnic exclusionism.

The prime reason for conducting this study was the relative lack of large-scale cross-national empirical studies in the field of ethnic in-group and out-group attitudes. Up till now, studies have mostly focused on the variation in in-group and out-group attitudes *within* countries. Less research has been done regarding the variation *between* countries. In addition, the latter comparative research often suffered from one or more of the following shortcomings. Firstly, most comparative research took only a few countries into account, thus neglecting a stringent test of the macro contextual circumstances that might affect these attitudes (e.g. Billiet, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 1996). Secondly, studies that did cover a wider range of countries were often quite descriptive, and did not explicate or systematically test previously developed theories on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (e.g. Dekker & Van Praag, 1990). Thirdly, large-scale comparative studies often applied data from sub-samples of the population, such as students or adolescents, instead of nationwide samples from the (adult) population (e.g. Poppe, 2000).

With this study, I have aimed to improve upon previous research using a systematic test of hypotheses, derived from various theoretical perspectives, applying data from nationwide samples of 22 countries. The large-scale scope of this study enabled me to address several lacunae in previous theoretical and empirical research.

In previous studies, it was often assumed that favourable attitudes toward the ethnic in-group are generally accompanied by unfavourable attitudes toward ethnic out-groups. This complex of interrelated attitudes is known as ethnocentrism (Brown, 1995; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Indeed, previous empirical studies among ethnic majority populations revealed an

association between a positive attitude toward the country and national in-group and a negative attitude toward ethnic minorities (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969; Billiet et al., 1996; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1989). In this latter research tradition, both the attitude toward the country and national in-group and the attitude toward ethnic out-groups were conceptualised as one-dimensional phenomena.

However, some authors proposed a more differentiated view. They argued that attitudes toward the country and national in-group entail multiple dimensions (Dekker & Malová, 1995; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), and moreover, that these various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes are differently related to attitudes toward ethnic out-groups (Blank & Schmidt, 1993). In particular, they argued that a positive attitude toward the in-group does not necessarily imply a negative attitude toward out-groups. Yet another line of research has suggested differentiations in attitudes toward ethnic out-groups, either with respect to the content or expression of attitudes – for example, blatant versus subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), overt versus covert negative attitudes (Verberk, 1999) – or with respect to the target out-group (for example, the perception of ethnic hierarchies (Hagendoorn, 1995).In this study, therefore, I addressed both issues by investigating the dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism as well as the interrelations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. In addition, the large-scale scope of this study offered the possibility to test Sumner's proposition of universality (Sumner, 1959), by exploring the variation in interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism across a large set of countries. According to Sumner (1959), ethnocentrism is a universal syndrome: each group presumably has a positive orientation to its in-group and a negative orientation toward relevant out-groups, and, consequently, the association between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism is supposedly rather invariant across countries or cultures.

In addition to dimensions and interrelations, I focused upon the individual level causes of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Previous studies have revealed quite some variation in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism between social categories, such as educational groups, occupational categories, income categories, age groups, and denominations. In particular, the significance of education has been stressed. Perhaps the most consistent finding in research on ethnic attitudes is the negative association between educational level on the one hand, and in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice on the other (Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999; Vogt, 1997). However, due to the relatively low number of comparative studies, little is known about whether the size of this so-called liberalising effect of education – controlled for other relevant individual characteristics – varies systematically across countries.

In addition to the effects of aforementioned individual level variables, I investigated the societal causes of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. In the majority of research, the impact of the national context on attitudes has, at least in an empirical sense, been rather neglected.

One of the dominant theoretical perspectives on ethnic inter-group attitudes focuses on the competition between ethnic groups. This inter-group competition presumably induces

perceptions of ethnic threat that are regarded as the catalyst for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. The level of actual competition and/or perceived ethnic threat may vary between national contexts. Therefore, in this study, I examined the effects of both individual and contextual characteristics, and determined the extent to which these effects were mediated by intervening variables, such as perceived ethnic threat.

The above considerations led me to formulate the following research questions:

1. *Are nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional concepts?*
2. *If these phenomena are multi-dimensional, are various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes differently related to dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?*
3. *Are there differences in the interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (or dimensions thereof) across countries?*
4. *What are the differences between ethnic majority populations from different countries with regard to the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?*
5. *What are the differences between social categories of the ethnic majority population with regard to nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?*
6. *Does the effect of educational attainment on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism vary systematically across types of countries?*
7. *To what extent are the observed differences between social categories and differences between countries in the level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism related to independent individual socio-demographic variables, intervening individual variables, and independent contextual variables?*

7.2 Answering the research questions

I have addressed the research questions through a theoretical and empirical investigation, reported in Chapters 2 through 6. In Chapter 2, I discussed several sociological and social psychological theoretical perspectives. According to realistic group conflict theory, in-group favouritism and out-group hostility are caused by inter-group competition, a proposition supported by several social psychological experiments (Jackson, 1993; Sherif & Sherif, 1979). These experiments gave rise to the question of whether inter-group competition is a necessary condition for in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. Tajfel and his associates (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) ascertained that even where no inter-group conflict existed, in-group favouritism occurred simply as a result of social categorisation, that is, the categorisation of individuals as respectively members of the in-group or out-group. The results from the latter 'minimal group experiments' formed the initial stimulus for the development of social identity theory. According to social identity theory, nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism stem from social identity needs. Individuals strive for a positive social identity, which can only be established through favourable social comparisons between the in-group and relevant out-groups.

In order to achieve such positive in-group distinctiveness, individuals selectively perceive mainly positively valued characteristics among members of the in-group and mainly negatively valued characteristics among members of the out-group. Social identity theory thus locates the source of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in the psychological processes of social identification with the national in-group and one's own country and social contra-identification with ethnic immigrants and minorities. Realistic group conflict theory, on the other hand, relates nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism to the amount of inter-group competition, which may stem from conflicting claims over status, power, privileges, or other scarce resources (socio-economic competition), or conflicting values and belief systems (cultural competition) (Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1988; Coser, 1956). Actual inter-group competition may induce perceived ethnic threat, i.e., the perception that the ethnic out-group threatens the social position of the in-group. Ethnic out-groups may be perceived as a threat to the position of the in-group in general (group threat), and to the position of specific in-group members in particular (personal threat).

Despite the different perspectives of both theories, I have argued that they are complementary to one another. That is, nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism stem from the process of social categorisation, but the cognitive salience of the inter-group boundary is increased by inter-group competition and perceived ethnic threat. Hence, both theories can be synthesised into a general framework labelled as ethnic competition theory. The fundamental assumption of this theoretical model is that nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism are brought about by general social identity needs (*dispositional proposition from social identity theory*), while the intensity of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism varies situationally depending on the amount of actual competition and/or perceived ethnic threat (*situational proposition from realistic group conflict theory*). Therefore, the general proposition of ethnic competition theory reads: the stronger the actual competition between ethnic groups, the stronger the perceived ethnic threat, that in turn reinforces the mechanisms of social (contra-) identification, inducing stronger nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Chapter 2 concludes with this general theoretical-conceptual model of ethnic competition theory. In subsequent chapters, I applied this theoretical model to deduce hypotheses regarding individual and contextual characteristics. Additional theoretical frameworks (socialisation theory and localism theory) were examined in Chapters 5 and 6.

In Chapter 3, I discussed some methodological problems of comparative survey research, and I introduced the International Social Survey Programme that gathered data on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in 1995. I have argued that, notwithstanding some problems and limitations, these data offer a unique opportunity to examine the research questions on a truly large international scale. In this study, I applied data from 22 countries, including Western and Eastern European countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. This large set of countries represented a wide variety in socio-economic, cultural, political, and historical circumstances. Hence, this international dataset offered the possibility for a stringent test of hypotheses regarding general social mechanisms on the causes of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

In this study, only respondents from the ethnic majority population within each country were included in the analyses. Data from East and West Germany were analysed separately, due to their historical differences as well as contemporary differences in the economic domain. This means that the total number of populations was 23.

As addressed in Chapter 3, an important issue in comparative survey-research concerns the comparability of the measurement instrument. In order to make valid cross-national comparisons, the theoretical concepts should be measured in an equivalent manner in the different countries. To assess the degree of cross-national equivalence of the applied measurement of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, I used structural equation modelling and conducted a multi-sample analysis, that is, a simultaneous analysis of independent random samples from several populations (Jöreskog & Sörbom 1993a). To take into account the ordinal scale of the questionnaire items, I analysed the matrix of polychoric correlations with the Generally Weighted Least Squares method with a Correct Weight matrix (Jöreskog, 1990).

The degree of equivalence was assessed for a measurement model of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in 23 populations, consisting of 11 indicators for 5 dependent variables, that is, two dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and three dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. I tested four successive models with an increasing amount of cross-national invariance. The findings, as reported in Chapter 4, indicated that the applied measurement of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism had a fairly high degree of cross-national equivalence with regard to model form and factor loadings. In other words, the measurement model of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in which (a) each indicator referred to the same theoretical concept in each and every country, and (b) the degree to which an indicator referred to the theoretical concept was invariant across countries, showed a fairly high and acceptable goodness-of-fit. This analysis also revealed that, whereas factor loadings were rather invariant across nations, there were large cross-national differences in the interrelations between, and variances of, nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism.

In Chapter 6, I applied the same procedure to assess the degree of cross-national equivalence of the measurement of perceived ethnic threat, the intervening variable in the theoretical-conceptual model of ethnic competition theory. The results indicated that the four indicators could be applied as a cross-national comparable measurement instrument for perceived ethnic threat, since the factor loadings were rather invariant across countries.

Next, I searched for cross-national comparable indicators for the degree of ethnic competition at the national level, in order to examine the impact of the national context on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Chapter 6 contains a detailed discussion of the operationalisation of actual ethnic competition at the macro level, as well as the definition and mode of registration of the applied contextual indicators.

Having established the degree of equivalence in the measurement of independent contextual variables, intervening and dependent individual variables, I present the answers to the research questions formulated above.

7.2.1 Nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism: dimensions and interrelations

Are nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional concepts?

In previous empirical studies on ethnocentrism, both attitudes toward the own country and national in-group, as well as attitudes toward ethnic out-groups, were often conceptualised and operationalised as one-dimensional constructs (Billiet et al., 1996). Several authors have, however, argued that attitudes toward one's own country and the national in-group have multiple dimensions. Authors such as Allport and Mead suggested a distinction between chauvinistic nationalistic attitudes as a cause of war, and patriotism as a healthy national self-concept. For a long time, this theoretical distinction did, however, not receive adequate attention in empirical research, which emphasised the negative consequences of nationalistic attitudes. In this study, I empirically tested the distinction between chauvinism and patriotism. *Chauvinism* is defined as the view of uniqueness and superiority of one's own country and national in-group. It refers to a rather blind and uncritical attachment to one's own country and national in-group and implies a downward comparison of other countries. *Patriotism*, on the other hand, refers to the degree of attachment to the country and the national in-group; that is, the love for and pride in one's people and country.

With regard to ethnic exclusionism, I argued that a conceptual distinction could be made with regard to the target group of exclusionism, differentiating between exclusionism of ethnic newcomers and exclusionism of resident ethnic out-group members. Due to the specific position of political refugees among the former category, a further distinction could be made between ethnic immigrants in general and political refugees in particular. For this reason, I proposed to conceptually distinguish three dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Firstly, *exclusionism of immigrants* refers to the readiness to close the national borders to ethnic newcomers. Secondly, *exclusionism of political refugees* refers to the stance that political refugees should not be allowed to stay in the respondent's country. Thirdly, *exclusionism from group membership* refers to the respondent's subjective definition of the national in-group through typical characteristics of 'true' in-group members. This relates to the question whether – in the view of the ethnic majority – it is possible for a member of an ethnic minority to become a full and equal member of the national community. The more importance ethnic majority respondents attach to exclusive conditions for being a 'true' member of the national in-group (such as one's country of birth and length of residence), the more restrictive their notion of the national in-group, and the more ethnic minorities and immigrants are excluded.

In Chapter 4, these hypotheses regarding the multi-dimensionality of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism were tested by means of structural equation modelling, taking into account the ordinal scale scores of the measurement items. Comparing the goodness-of-fit of the one-dimensional and multi-dimensional models, revealed superior fit indices for the multi-dimensional models. Hence, two dimensions of nationalistic attitudes – chauvinism and patriotism – could be empirically distinguished, as well as three dimensions of ethnic

exclusionism – exclusionism of immigrants, exclusionism of political refugees, and exclusionism from group membership. Furthermore, the finding, to be elaborated upon below, that various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes were differently related to various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, offered additional empirical support for the notion that nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism have different dimensions.

Are various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes differently related to dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?

Chauvinism has been conceptualised as a more aggressive form of nationalistic attitudes, since it encompasses feelings of superiority as well as a blind, uncritical attachment to the country and national in-group. Patriotism, on the other hand, has been regarded as a rather humanistic attachment to the country and national in-group, in which the love for and pride in one's country reflects a more critical attachment. Consequently, I hypothesised that, compared to patriotism, chauvinism would be more positively related to ethnic exclusionism or dimensions thereof. This hypothesis was tested by means of multi-sample structural equation modelling, applying a measurement model of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism with invariant factor loadings.

First of all, the results indicated that, as expected, chauvinism and patriotism were positively interrelated in each of the 23 populations. Furthermore, the three dimensions of ethnic exclusionism were overall also positively interrelated in each population. Chauvinism was overall positively related to ethnic exclusionism. Hence, the more that ethnic majority individuals perceive their own country and national in-group as unique and superior, the more they are inclined to exclude ethnic out-group members.

Comparing the correlations between, respectively, chauvinism and patriotism, and all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, a consistent finding emerged: the correlation between chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism was stronger than the correlation between patriotism and ethnic exclusionism. This applied to each country, as well as to each dimension of ethnic exclusionism.

In almost all countries, a higher degree of patriotism was associated with stronger exclusionism from group membership. But in two thirds of the countries, patriotism was not significantly related to exclusionism of immigrants or exclusionism of political refugees. In five countries, these relationships were even negative: the more patriotism, the less support for exclusionism of immigrants and political refugees. All in all, these findings support the notion that chauvinism is a rather aggressive form of nationalistic attitudes – related to negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups – whereas patriotism was mostly not related to stronger exclusionism of immigrants or political refugees. This latter result indicates that a positive attitude toward one's own country (as expressed through patriotism) is not intrinsically related to negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. Based on these findings, I propose to refine the concept of ethnocentrism (i.e., positive in-group attitudes are accompanied by negative out-

group attitudes): the concept of ethnocentrism does not apply to patriotism, since only chauvinistic in-group attitudes are intertwined with ethnic exclusionism.

Are there differences in the interrelations between nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism (or dimensions thereof), across countries?

The aforementioned results indicated that the interrelations between dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism were not invariant across the 23 countries. Particularly remarkable were the cross-national differences in the relationship between patriotism and, respectively, exclusionism of immigrants and exclusionism of political refugees. Only in (West and East) Germany and Japan, a higher level of patriotism was related to stronger exclusionism of immigrants as well as stronger exclusionism of refugees, whereas in other countries this relationship was mostly absent and sometimes even reversed. The status of Germany and Japan as exceptions to a general social mechanism most likely reflects the nations' troublesome relation with their collective past – the burden of the Second World War – and its impact on the debate on national identity and national pride in Germany and Japan.

What are the differences between ethnic majority populations from different countries with regard to the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?

After having established a cross-nationally comparable measurement instrument of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, in the subsequent analyses in this study, I summarised the indicators of each dependent variable to a Likert-scale sumscore. As a first explorative examination of cross-national differences, I computed the average level of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism among the ethnic majority population in each country. The results from these descriptive analyses were presented at the end of Chapter 4. Overall, Western European populations were less chauvinistic, whereas chauvinism was relatively strong in the traditional immigration societies, as well as in Eastern European countries, with Bulgarians showing the highest level of chauvinism. The average level of patriotism seemed more related to actual national achievements with regard to the national economy and the country's political influence in the world: the United States had the highest average level of patriotism, whereas Eastern Europeans showed remarkably less pride in their country.

On average, Eastern European countries had the highest scores on all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. With regard to exclusionism of immigrants, all populations favoured reducing the number of immigrants, except for the Irish population, who took a neutral position. This overall reluctance to allow in more immigrants contrasted sharply with the overall willingness to admit political refugees, but again, exclusionism was greater in Eastern European countries. Cross-national differences were the smallest with regard to exclusionism from group membership. Among the 23 populations, there was a fair degree of consensus for excluding ethnic residents and newcomers from being 'true' members of the national community as

indicated by the subjective importance attached to restrictive conditions, such as one's country of birth or length of residence.

In Chapter 6, I conducted a confirmatory analysis of the cross-national differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, testing macro-level hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory. These results are summarized in section 7.2.3. First, I present the conclusions from the analyses of Chapter 5, regarding the effect of individual-level variables, in particular education.

7.2.2 Effects of independent individual variables and the varying effects of education

In Chapter 5, I focused on the intra-national differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism, addressing the following research question:

What are the differences between social categories of the ethnic majority population with regard to nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism?

Results from the explorative analyses reported in Chapter 5 indicated that educational attainment was strongly related to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism: lower educated persons had stronger chauvinistic and exclusionistic attitudes. On the other hand, with regard to patriotism, there were only minor differences between educational groups. Again, patriotism stands out against the other attitudinal variables. Patriotism was hardly affected by educational attainment and more positively related to age and church attendance.

With regard to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism, education had the strongest relative effect, controlled for all other individual socio-demographic variables. In addition, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism were more widespread in the lower social classes: compared to higher controllers, higher scores were found among the self-employed; skilled manual workers and supervisors; semi-unskilled manual workers; as well as the unemployed. Furthermore, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism were lower among students, but higher among retired persons, people working in the household, as well as among members of a Catholic or Protestant denomination. Income level had a relatively weak independent negative effect on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Regarding differences between age categories, the elderly showed stronger nationalistic attitudes and exclusionism from group membership. Exclusionism of immigrants was, however, not related to age, and exclusionism of refugees appeared to be stronger among the youngest respondents. Finally, the results regarding church attendance, controlled for other variables such as denomination, were mixed: church attendance was positively related to nationalistic attitudes, but negatively related to exclusionism of immigrants and refugees.

The strong effect of education on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism corresponds with findings from previous studies. Most studies on ethnic in-group and out-group attitudes reported a considerably strong negative relationship between educational attainment and positive in-group

attitudes or negative out-group attitudes. However, it is not known whether this liberalising effect of education is universal, or whether, and to what extent it varies across countries. Hence, the next research question in the present study:

Does the effect of educational attainment on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism vary systematically across types of countries?

In this study, I elaborated upon a previous study by Weil (1985) that indicated that the effect of education might vary systematically across countries. In Chapter 5, I reviewed several theoretical interpretations of the educational effect. In particular, I focused on socialization theory, from which I derived testable hypotheses regarding cross-national variations in the effect of education. A key element in this theory is the thesis that students are exposed to values, norms, and modes of behaviour transmitted by the educational system. In this manner, the educational system brings students into contact with the official norms and values of society (Selznick & Steinberg, 1969). Weil (1985) argued that the values that are transmitted by a country's educational system reflect the official or political culture, which, in turn, is determined by the existing political regime form as well as the length of time a country has had a liberal-democratic regime form. The longer a country has had a long-standing democratic tradition, the more the educational system is assumed to disseminate democratic and tolerant value orientations and, consequently, the stronger the negative effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. Building on studies regarding the role of political elites in conflict resolution in plural societies, Weil also hypothesised that the effect of education would be stronger in plural societies. Therefore, I examined whether the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism varied systematically across countries according to the liberal-democratic tradition, as well as the degree of religious heterogeneity within a country. For a more stringent test of the educational effect, I conducted multivariate regression analyses, controlling for other individual characteristics such as social class position, income, age, church attendance and denomination.

The results showed that, compared to the other individual variables, educational attainment was the single most important predictor of chauvinism and dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Patriotism, on the other hand, was hardly affected by educational attainment. In accordance with the hypothesis, the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism varied systematically across countries: the educational effect was smaller in recently established democracies compared to other countries. No proof, however, was found of a further distinction in the size of the educational effect in interrupted democracies versus prolonged democracies. Furthermore, the hypothesis was also not confirmed with regard to the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes: no difference was found between prolonged democracies and recently established democracies, whereas education had a slightly greater effect in interrupted democracies.

Thus, in prolonged democracies, the effect of education on ethnic exclusionism was greater than in recently established democracies, but no difference was found in the effect of education on nationalistic attitudes. Hence, it seems that in as far as educational institutions

transmit and promulgate the ideals of democracy and tolerance, the focus is more on the lessening of out-group prejudice, than on the lessening of in-group favouritism.

Finally, no support was found for the hypothesis that the effect of education is greater in more religiously heterogeneous countries. This particular hypothesis was derived from assumptions regarding the stances of political elites in religious plural societies. Hence, the refutation of this hypothesis might reflect a discrepancy between the attitudes of the general public, as examined in this study, and the attitudes of the political elite.

In Chapter 6, I systematically tested theoretical explanations for the observed differences between countries (as explored in Chapter 4) and the observed differences between social categories (as explored in Chapter 5), and simultaneously tested the effects of individual and contextual variables. The theoretical-conceptual model of ethnic competition theory is systematically put to the test, by deriving and testing hypotheses regarding independent individual socio-demographic variables, intervening individual variables, as well as independent contextual variables. Some additional hypotheses were derived from localism theory. In this chapter, I confined the analyses of nationalistic attitudes to chauvinism since, as stated, patriotism was hardly affected by educational level, or by social position, and mostly not related to increasing ethnic exclusionism of immigrants and refugees. The final research question therefore addresses the explanation of the observed differences in chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism between social categories and countries, by means of intervening variables and independent variables, both at the individual and the contextual level:

To what extent are the observed differences between social categories and differences between countries in the level of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism related to independent individual socio-demographic variables, intervening individual variables, and independent contextual variables?

Results from the test of hypothesis regarding socio-demographic variables can be summarized as follows. According to ethnic competition theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are stronger among those social categories that hold socio-economic positions similar to most ethnic minorities or immigrants, since they may experience higher levels of inter-group competition and perceived ethnic threat. Overall, these individual level hypotheses from ethnic competition theory were not refuted. Chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism were more prevalent among the lower educated and the lower income groups. Furthermore, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism were generally relatively stronger among the self-employed, manual workers, and the unemployed, compared to the reference category of higher controllers.

According to localism theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are affected by the individual's breadth of perspective: a strong orientation towards the local community is expected to reinforce chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Previous research showed that localistic orientations were more commonly found among the lower educated, elderly persons, churchgoers and members of denominations. The hypotheses derived from localism theory were, however, only partly supported by the empirical findings. As expected, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism were

stronger among the lower educated and people who considered themselves to be a member of a denomination. Age and church attendance were however not consistently related to chauvinism and the various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

7.2.3 Effects of contextual variables

According to ethnic competition theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are intensified as actual ethnic competition increases. In this study, I operationalised the degree of actual ethnic competition at the national level by means of a set of contextual variables, indicative of (a) demographic conditions: that is, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the country, as well as the relative number of asylum seekers; (b) economic conditions, that is, the real Gross Domestic Product per capita as well as the relative unemployment level, summarised in a single index of economic conditions; and, (c) political conditions: the relative social security benefits expenditure, since an extensive social security system is presumed to alleviate the harshness of socio-economic competition. In addition to the effect of contemporary societal conditions, I have argued that recent *changes* in these national conditions might have an additional effect on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Chapter 6 contains a detailed description of the operationalisation and measurement of these contextual variables. To take into account the time lag between factual national conditions at a certain moment in time and opinions related to these national conditions, I measured the national conditions in 1994, that is, one year prior to the measurement of the individuals' attitudes. To indicate changes in contextual circumstances, I applied a 5-year period, comparing the 1994 and 1989 figures.

Hence, I tested whether chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism were more prevalent in countries with (a) poor economic conditions, (b) declining economic conditions, (c) a less extensive social security system, (d) high ethnic heterogeneity, (e) a large relative number of asylum applications per capita, (f) a sharp increase in the relative number of asylum applications, and, finally, in countries where (g) the aforementioned demographic, economic, or political conditions coincide. The latter interaction hypothesis rests on the assumption that the effects of contextual conditions reinforce one another. Furthermore, some authors have argued that actual ethnic competition – in particular the relative size of the ethnic out-group population – might be curvilinearly related to ethnic exclusionism. To test this proposition, I included quadratic terms in the analyses.

The hypotheses were tested by means of multi-level analyses, in which the effects of individual and contextual variables were simultaneously estimated. In this section, I summarise the findings of multi-level analyses in which all contextual characteristics were included. Hence, the effect of each contextual variable was controlled for all other contextual as well as individual effects. These findings revealed only partial empirical support for the contextual hypotheses. The following effects were in accordance with ethnic competition theory:

(1) It turned out that the poorer the economic conditions, the more ethnic majority respondents are inclined to exclusionism of immigrants. (2) A deterioration in national economic

conditions was accompanied by stronger exclusionism of immigrants, exclusionism from group membership, as well as by stronger chauvinism. (3) The less extensive the social security system, the stronger the exclusionism of immigrants and political refugees. (4) The effect of ethnic heterogeneity was rather consistent across dimensions of ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism: the higher the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the stronger the exclusionism of refugees, exclusionism from group membership, as well as chauvinism. Only exclusionism of immigrants was not significantly related to ethnic heterogeneity. (5) The higher the inflow of asylum seekers, the stronger the exclusionism of immigrants. (6) The greater the increase in asylum seekers, the greater the degree of chauvinism. (7) Finally, there were two significant interaction effects between contextual variables. In accordance with ethnic competition theory, ethnic heterogeneity had a stronger positive effect on exclusionism from group membership in those countries where the social security system was less extensive. Furthermore, the curvilinear effect of asylum applications on exclusion of refugees was stronger when the economic conditions had worsened: the stronger the decline in economic conditions, the stronger the effect of the (squared) number of asylum applications.

In addition to these findings, other contextual effects were mostly not significant. In particular, there were hardly any significant interactions between economic, demographic, or political contextual variables. A few contextual effects were significant, but not in line with the hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory. In contrast to expectations, exclusionism from group membership was positively related to the relative number of asylum seekers. Also, chauvinism was positively related to better economic conditions and a higher number of asylum applications. Furthermore, the main effect of social security expenditures on exclusionism from group membership was positive, although, as discussed, the interaction effect of social security expenditures and ethnic heterogeneity on exclusionism from group membership was in line with the expectation.

With regard to ethnic exclusionism, two significant curvilinear effects were observed: the relative number of asylum seekers was curvilinear related to exclusionism of refugees, and the change in the relative number of asylum seekers was curvilinearly related to exclusionism of immigrants. In both instances, the form of the relationship was rather similar. That is, when the number of asylum applications or the change in the number of applications was rather small, the specific dimension of ethnic exclusionism was – in contrast to ethnic competition theory – not positively related to higher or increasing numbers of asylum applications. However, when the number of asylum applications or the change in the number of applications was very high, higher or increasing numbers of asylum applications were associated with stronger ethnic exclusionism.These findings suggest a threshold, therefore: the assumed positive relation between asylum applications or the change in asylum applications and some dimension of ethnic exclusionism, only holds for strong – and thus prominently visible – inflows, or changes in the inflows of asylum seekers.

7.2.4 Effects of intervening individual variables

Finally, I examined the effect of two intervening variables on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. According to ethnic competition theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are intensified by perceptions of ethnic threat, which in turn vary between individuals or contexts. Indeed, perceived ethnic threat was strongly related to chauvinism, as well as to the three dimensions of ethnic exclusionism: the more that ethnic immigrants are perceived as a threat, the higher the level of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Compared to other variables, perceived ethnic threat had the strongest effect on chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

Furthermore, perceived ethnic threat was relatively strong among the lower educated, the self-employed, manual workers, the unemployed, and the lower income categories. These findings support the presumed link between actual ethnic competition on the one hand, and chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism on the other hand. Actual ethnic competition at the individual level – as indirectly measured by the aforementioned socio-demographic variables – was related to perceptions of ethnic threat, which in turn were related to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism.

Remarkably, most contextual variables were not related to perceived ethnic threat. This finding indicates that perceptions of ethnic threat only partly reflect the actual amount of inter-group competition at the national level. Stated differently, perceptions of ethnic threat were partly autonomous. However, in accordance with ethnic competition theory, perceived ethnic threat was affected by the change in economic conditions, as well as by the interaction between economic conditions and ethnic heterogeneity. The stronger the recent decline in economic conditions, the stronger the perception of ethnic threat. Furthermore, the worse the economic conditions, the stronger the positive interrelation between ethnic heterogeneity and perceived ethnic threat. Thus, perceived ethnic threat arises from declining economic conditions, and from poor economic conditions accompanied by high ethnic heterogeneity.

Hypotheses regarding a second intervening variable were deduced from localism theory. According to localism theory, chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are stronger among individuals with a small breadth of perspective. Indeed, a localistic orientation was positively related to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. Furthermore, in accordance with localism theory, a localistic orientation was more strongly prevalent among the lower educated, elderly people, persons who considered themselves to be a member of a denomination as well as among church-goers. Finally, I tested whether individuals in countries with a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity (i.e., a cosmopolitan environment), were less localistic. Indeed, localism was negatively related to the degree of ethnic heterogeneity of a country.

7.3 Discussion: theoretical and methodological progress

Now that the research questions of this study have been recapitulated and the main findings have been summarized, the final step is to review the theoretical and methodological relevance and the merits of this study.

In this study, I focused on nationalistic and ethnic exclusionistic attitudes of ethnic majority populations in 22 countries. I tested hypotheses derived from various sociological and social psychological theoretical frameworks. In this manner, this study improves upon previous research in several ways.

(1) Up till now, little cross-national comparative research on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism had been undertaken. In this study, I applied survey data from 1995, covering the ethnic majority populations of 22 countries. I described differences in nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism on a large cross-nationally comparative scope, and tested hypotheses derived from various theoretical perspectives.

To enhance international comparisons of survey data, I examined the cross-national equivalence of the measurement instrument of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. It turned out that the applied measurement of dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism had a fairly high degree of cross-national equivalence.

(2) In previous empirical research on ethnocentrism, both the attitude toward the in-group and the attitude toward out-groups were often conceptualised as two one-dimensional phenomena (Billiet, Carton, & Huys, 1990; Billiet et al., 1996; Scheepers et al., 1989). Some single-country studies (Blank & Schmidt, 1993; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) did propose, and moreover empirically assessed, a multi-dimensional conceptualisation; however, the results from these studies did not allow for generalisation, since the data were derived from sub-samples of the population. In the present study, based on nationwide samples of the adult population in a wide variety of countries, I have shown that it is necessary, and moreover possible, to distinguish between various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. With regard to ethnic exclusionism, a distinction was made concerning the target out-group. With regard to nationalistic attitudes, a distinction was made between chauvinism as a blind and uncritical attachment to the country and the national in-group, and patriotism, as a critical attachment to the country and the national in-group.

(3) The concept of ethnocentrism has often been applied in previous research (Eisinga & Scheepers, 1989; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Ethnocentrism has generally been defined as the combination of positive attitudes toward the in-group *and* negative attitudes toward the out-group. However, in this study, I have shown that various dimensions of nationalistic attitudes are differently related to ethnic exclusionism, a finding that offered additional empirical support for the aforementioned multi-dimensional conceptualisation. That is, it turned out that chauvinism was positively related to dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, whereas overall, higher levels of patriotism were not accompanied by stronger exclusionism of immigrants and refugees. Hence, the concept of ethnocentrism should be refined, since not all aspects of a positive in-group attitude are intrinsically related to ethnic exclusionism: a positive attitude toward one's own country and

national in-group (as expressed by a high degree of patriotism) is generally not related to ethnic exclusionism of immigrants and refugees.

(4) Sociological and social psychological research on attitudes toward in-group and out-groups has been dominated by two theoretical frameworks: social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory. Both theoretical traditions have mostly developed independent of one another, without any fruitful interaction. In this study, I have argued that despite their different focus, these two frameworks are complementary to one another. Consequently, I have synthesised these theories in a general theoretical framework of ethnic competition theory. This theory connects the dispositional core proposition of social identity theory with the situational core proposition of realistic group conflict theory. Hence, I was able to specify under which conditions the mechanisms of social identification and social contra-identification were intensified.

(5) Previous theoretical and empirical research was often confined to an explanation at the individual level, ignoring the context of individuals. In this study, I developed a theoretical-conceptual model incorporating macro-to-micro propositions, which link the national context to the attitudes of individuals. I have stressed that the ethnic competition theory is a multi-level theory, from which hypotheses regarding individual as well as contextual characteristics can be derived, and I have systematically tested these individual level and macro level hypotheses. The effects of individual characteristics were overall in line with ethnic competition theory, whereas the results regarding contextual characteristics revealed only partial support for ethnic competition theory.

(6) According to ethnic competition theory and realistic group conflict theory, in-group and out-group attitudes are affected by the level of inter-group competition. Some previous studies acknowledged that this relationship is intervened by the individual's perceptions of ethnic threat: actual competition affects perceptions of ethnic threat, which in turn intensify in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. In most studies, however, this intervening link remained an implicit theoretical factor, and even more so, was not assessed empirically.

In this study, I have explicated the intervening effect of perceived ethnic threat by means of a conceptual distinction between actual competition and perceived ethnic threat. Perceptions of ethnic threat were operationalised and measured by a set of survey questions that together formed a measurement with an acceptable degree of cross-national equivalence. As expected, perceived ethnic threat was strongly related to chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism, and had a strong intervening effect on the relation between socio-demographic characteristics on the one hand and chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism on the other hand. These socio-demographic characteristics were applied as indirect measures of actual competition at the individual level. With regard to contextual variables, indicative of actual competition at the national level, I showed that perceived ethnic threat is related to declining economic conditions, as well as to poor economic conditions that coincide with high ethnic heterogeneity. Other contextual variables were not related to perceived ethnic threat. Perceptions of ethnic threat are therefore partly autonomous, that is, they only partly reflect the actual amount of inter-group competition at the national level.

(7) In the scientific debate as well as in the public debate, it has often been suggested that chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism are affected by societal circumstances, such as the economic

prosperity of a country, or the proportion of ethnic residents. However, these contextual propositions have mostly not been put to the test: neither by means of a large-scale international comparison of the level of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism in various countries, nor by means of multivariate analyses, controlling for the effects of other relevant contextual characteristics. In this study I gathered additional data at the contextual level, and tested the effects of contextual characteristics in multivariate multi-level analyses of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism in 22 different countries.

(8) Commonly, theoretical frameworks assume linear relationships between theoretical concepts. In this study, I found that some contextual variables were curvilinearly related to some dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Below a certain threshold, a dimension of ethnic exclusionism was negatively related to an indicator of actual ethnic competition (i.e. the number of asylum applications or the change in asylum applications). The initial presumed positive relationship between ethnic competition and ethnic exclusionism only stood the test for levels of ethnic competition above this threshold. The existence of thresholds can be interpreted by notions from ethnic competition theory. According to this theory, the effect of actual competition is mediated by the psychological processes of social categorisation and social (contra-)identification. That is, actual competition increases the cognitive salience of the boundary between in-group and out-group. However, in order to serve as a relevant out-group for categorisation and social contra-identification, the out-group should have a certain degree of visibility in the context that surrounds the individual in-group member. A larger and growing population size enhances the visibility of the out-group, and as a certain threshold is exceeded, this out-group serves as a relevant out-group for social categorisation and social contra-identification.

(9) Regarding the effect of the national context, the results showed mixed support for the contextual hypotheses from ethnic competition theory. However, two contextual variables showed overall rather consistent effects on ethnic exclusionism and chauvinism, which were in accordance with ethnic competition theory. Firstly, it turned out that, overall, the higher the degree of *ethnic heterogeneity* within a country, the stronger the average level of chauvinism and ethnic exclusionism. The effect of ethnic heterogeneity on exclusionism of immigrants was however not significant. Secondly, it turned out that, overall, the stronger the *decline in economic conditions* within a country, the stronger the average level of chauvinism, ethnic exclusionism, as well as perceptions of ethnic threat, although it is interesting to note that the stance toward admission of political refugees was not related to a decline in economic conditions.

Appendices

Appendix A National samples

Within each of the 22 countries, only respondents from the ethnic majority group were included in the analyses. In most of the samples, the ethnicity of respondents was measured by one of the following two strategies: a list of the major ethnic groups of the country was constructed and respondents were asked to place themselves on this list, or the question was asked "From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?" In some countries, however, the national research team applied its own standard background variable as included in the demographic part of the national questionnaire. The percentage of respondents from the ethnic majority group as well as other sample characteristics are displayed in Table A1 on the next page.

Table A1 *Characteristics of national samples: sample size, percentage of respondents from the ethnic majority group in national sample, and final sample size after selection of ethnic majority groups*

Country	Sample size[a]	Ethnic majority group	(%)	Final sample size
Australia	2,261	Parents citizens of country [b]	72.5	1,640
Austria	939	Austrian	88.1	827
Bulgaria	1,037	Bulgarian	83.4	865
Canada	1,413	West-Europe [c]	81.5	1,151
Czech Republic	1,055	Czechian	78.6	829
Germany (West)	1,214	German	91.5	1,111
Germany (East)	581	German	96.7	562
Great Britain	987	White, British	92.1	909
Hungary	939	Hungarian	98.5	925
Ireland	942	Parents citizens of country [b]	95.8	902
Italy	1,094	Parents citizens of country [b]	98.2	1,074
Japan	1,149	Japanese	98.6	1,133
Latvia	1,011	Latvian	59.1 [d]	598
Netherlands	1,952	Dutch	96.5	1,883
New Zealand	968	Western industr. societies [c]	76.4	740
Norway	1,428	Norwegian	95.6	1,365
Poland	1,518	Polish	97.0	1,473
Russia	1,552	Russian	83.0	1,288
Slovak Republic	1,362	Slovakian	87.4	1,191
Slovenia	1,021	Slovenian	91.9	938
Spain	1,161	Parents citizens of country [b]	98.6	1,145
Sweden	1,283	Swedish	92.6	1,188
U.S.A.	1,294	White [e]	80.4	1,041
Total	28,161	Ethnic majority group	88.0	24,778

[a] Age limits differed between the original samples. For comparability, only respondents between 18 and 75 years of age were included in the analyses.

[b] Since the variable 'racial/ethnic group' was not available in this sample, alternatively, respondents were selected for whom both parents were citizens of the specific country at the time the respondent was born.

[c] Multiple categories.

[d] 30.2% of the respondents in the Latvian sample were Russians.

[e] For the U.S.A. sample, the number of missings on the variable 'racial/ethnic group' was extremely high (21.2 %). Fortunately, the original U.S.A. questionnaire – in which the ISSP1995 questionnaire was incorporated – contained an additional variable 'Racial-ethnic group of respondent' with the categories 'Black / white / other'. I matched this item to the ISSP 1995 dataset and applied this item to select respondents who define themselves as 'whites'.

Appendix B Overview of questionnaire items referring to nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism

NATIONALISTIC ATTITUDES

Chauvinism

v22 *I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world*

v23 There are some things about [country] today that make me feel ashamed of [country]

v24 *The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [nationality]*

v25 Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries

v26 *People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong*

Patriotism

v27 When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [nationality]

v28-37 How proud are you of [country] in each of the following? (very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all)

v28 *the way democracy works*

v29 *its political influence in the world*

v30 *[country's] economic achievements*

v31 its social security system

v32 its scientific and technological achievements

v33 its achievements in sports

v34 its achievements in the arts and literature

v35 [country's] armed forces

v36 its history

v37 its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society [a]

ETHNIC EXCLUSIONISM

Exclusionism of immigrants

v51 *Do you think the number of immigrants to [country] nowadays should be...(increased a lot; increased a little; remain the same as it is; reduced a little; reduced a lot)*

v42 Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [country]

v71 [Country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants [a]

Exclusionism of political refugees

v52 *How much do you agree or disagree that refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in [country]?*

Exclusionism from group membership

Some people say the following things are important for being [truly British]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…(very important, fairly important, not very important, not important at all)?

v15 *To have been born in [country]*

v16 To have [nationality] citizenship

v17 *To have lived in [country] for most of one's life*

v18 *To be able to speak [national language(s)]*

v19 To be a [Catholic / Protestant / Christian, etc: dominant religion]

v20 To respect [country's] political institutions and laws

v21 To feel [British]

Note: item formulations between brackets are country-specific. Items in italic are indicators applied in the final measurement model. Unless otherwise indicated, items have 5 response categories, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. [a] Not available in all samples.

Appendix C Reliability coefficients of indicators of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism

Item	AUS	A	BG	CDN	CZ	D-W	D-E	GB	H	IRL	I	J
Ratherbe	.38	.56	.41	.41	.40	.58	.53	.49	.38	.33	.52	.39
Morelike	.29	.42	.31	.31	.30	.44	.40	.37	.29	.25	.39	.29
Support	.24	.35	.25	.25	.25	.36	.33	.31	.24	.20	.32	.24
Prouddem	.52	.46	.61	.51	.59	.53	.48	.54	.47	.45	.51	.39
Proudpol	.61	.55	.73	.61	.70	.63	.57	.65	.56	.53	.61	.47
Proudeco	.47	.42	.56	.46	.53	.48	.43	.49	.43	.41	.47	.36
Memborn	.75	.69	.67	.69	.57	.64	.74	.71	.55	.51	.58	.66
Memlife	.78	.71	.69	.71	.59	.66	.76	.73	.57	.53	.60	.68
Memlang	.51	.47	.46	.47	.39	.44	.50	.48	.38	.35	.40	.45

Note: Reliability coefficients of indicators in structural equation measurement model with cross-national invariant factor loadings. Countries indicated by international automobile identification codes.

Item	LV	NL	NZ	N	PL	RUS	SK	SLO	E	S	USA
Ratherbe	.35	.50	.37	.40	.44	.33	.51	.44	.47	.37	.45
Morelike	.27	.38	.28	.30	.33	.25	.38	.33	.36	.28	.34
Support	.22	.31	.23	.25	.27	.21	.31	.27	.29	.23	.28
Prouddem	.57	.38	.48	.46	.49	.54	.60	.48	.61	.46	.55
Proudpol	.67	.46	.57	.55	.58	.64	.72	.57	.73	.55	.65
Proudeco	.51	.35	.43	.42	.44	.49	.55	.43	.56	.42	.50
Memborn	.61	.52	.59	.61	.68	.58	.50	.60	.72	.64	.76
Memlife	.63	.54	.61	.63	.70	.60	.52	.62	.74	.66	.79
Memlang	.41	.36	.40	.42	.46	.39	.34	.41	.49	.43	.52

Note: Reliability coefficients of indicators in structural equation measurement model with cross-national invariant factor loadings. Countries indicated by international automobile identification codes.

Appendix D Mode of questionnaire administration and average scores

Although the ISSP module was intended as a self-administered questionnaire, in only 10 countries was the questionnaire indeed administered in a self-completion form, either delivered by post or by the interviewer. In other countries, face-to-face interviews were conducted. In the latter mode of questionnaire administration, respondents may feel more inclined to give social desirable answers to the interviewer. Due to this presumed mode effect, the average scores on nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in face-to-face interviews would be presumably lower, compared to the average scores in self-administered questionnaires. The effect of the different mode of questionnaire administration cannot be fully assessed, since the mode of administration varied across countries. For a stringent test of this mode effect, the mode of questionnaire administration should be varied within countries.

As a preliminary analysis, I tested whether the average level of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism in each country was related to the applied mode of administration. For each country, I computed the average score on each dimension of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism. The results are presented in Table D1. Despite the presumably stronger tendency to give social desirable answers in a face-to-face interview, Table D1 shows that with regard to four out of five dependent variables, the average scores in countries with face-to-face interviews were just as high, or even higher compared to countries where a self-completion questionnaire was applied. Due to the small number of cases (23 samples) only one of these differences was significant. Hence, the results from this preliminary analysis suggest that the different modes of administration did not severely affect the comparability of the results.

Table D1 *Mode of questionnaire administration and average score on dimensions of nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism*

	Average scores				
Mode of administration	Chauvinism	Patriotism	Exclusionism of immigrants	Exclusionism of refugees	Exclusionism from group membership
Self-completion (n=11) [a]	3.19	2.69	3.92	2.49	3.08
Face-to-face (n=12) [b]	3.36	2.29	3.91	2.83	3.23
F-value	2.53	8.04 **	0.08	3.16	5.91 *

[a] Australia, Canada, Germany (East and West separately analysed), Great Britain, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United States.

[b] Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain.

* $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix E Reliability of Likert scales for perceived ethnic threat and localistic orientation

	Perceived ethnic threat[a]	Localistic orientation[b]
Australia	0.759	0.436
West Germany	0.710	0.404
East Germany	0.706	0.344
Great Britain	0.735	0.343
United States	0.756	0.308
Austria	0.723	0.425
Hungary	0.681	0.592
Italy	0.699	0.473
Ireland	0.595	0.455
Netherlands	0.690	0.408
Norway	0.754	0.479
Sweden	0.754	0.236
Czech Republic	0.595	0.417
Slovenia	0.616	0.405
Poland	0.496	0.364
Bulgaria	0.432	0.557
Russian Federation	0.558	0.231
New Zealand	0.717	0.432
Canada	0.792	0.443
Japan	0.489	0.474
Spain	0.615	0.270
Latvia	0.549	0.239
Slovak Republic	0.617	0.332
All countries	0.713	0.433

Note: Inter-item reliability measured by Cronbach's alpha, total N=24,247.

[a] Scale consists of 4 items. [b] Scale consists of 2 items.

Appendix F Correlations between contextual characteristics

	Real GDP per capita (PPP$) 1994	Change in GNP per capita (US$) 1989-1994	Unemploy-ment level 1994	Change in unemploy-ment 1989-1994	Economic conditions 1994	Change in economic conditions 1989-1994	Social security benefits expenditure	Ethnic hetero-geneity	Asylum applications 1994 per 1,000 capita
Change in GNP 1989-94	.29								
Unemployment 1994	–.53 **	–.15							
Change in unemployment 1989-94	–.64 **	–.26	.06						
Economic conditions	.87 **	.25	–.87 **	–.40 *					
Change in economic conditions 1989-94	.59 **	.79 **	–.13	–.79 **	.41 *				
Social security expenditure	.09	–.03	.07	.00	.01	–.02			
Ethnic heterogeneity	.17	–.17	–.03	–.18	.12	.01	-.02		
Asylum applications 1994	.37 *	.09	–.20	–.15	.33	.15	.66 **	.01	
Change asylum applications 1989-94	–.55 **	–.16	.40 *	.33	–.54 **	–.31	.02	–.37 *	–.29

Note: N = 23. * $p < 0.10$. ** $p < 0.05$. (two-tailed)

Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)

Inleiding

In de afgelopen decennia is er wereldwijd een groot aantal etnische conflicten geweest. In sommige landen, zoals Burundi, Ruanda en Indonesië, leidden de spanningen tussen etnische groepen tot extreme gewelddadigheden. Na het uiteenvallen van de voormalige Joegoslavische republiek werden Bosnië en Kosovo het toneel van etnische zuiveringen. Hoewel etnische identificatie soms beschouwd wordt als een anachronisme in een gemoderniseerde samenleving, zijn deze gewelddadigheden het gruwelijke bewijs dat ook heden ten dage etnische scheidslijnen een belangrijke rol spelen in het denken en handelen van individuen.

Ook in andere landen zijn er, hoewel in minder extreme mate, zichtbare spanningen tussen etnische groepen. In West Europa zijn etnische minderheden, immigranten en asielzoekers meer dan eens het slachtoffer geweest van bedreigingen en geweld. Dit geweld richtte zich ook tegen moskeeën en asielzoekerscentra. Daarnaast boekten extreemrechtse partijen van tijd tot tijd electorale successen in onder meer België, Duitsland, Oostenrijk, Frankrijk, evenals Australië.

Als gevolg van internationale migratie is de bevolkingssamenstelling van veel samenlevingen in relatief korte tijd ingrijpend veranderd. Daardoor is er in maatschappelijke en wetenschappelijke discussies in toenemende mate aandacht voor de problematiek van interetnische relaties in het algemeen, en negatieve reacties tegenover etnische nieuwkomers in het bijzonder.

In deze studie staan de attitudes van de etnische meerderheidsgroep centraal, waarbij zowel de attitudes tegenover de eigen etnische groep als de attitudes tegenover etnische minderheden en nieuwkomers geanalyseerd worden. Daarmee biedt deze studie inzicht in de latente conflicten tussen de etnische meerderheidsgroep en etnische minderheidsgroepen.

Het sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar etnische attitudes kent een lange traditie. Internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek is echter relatief schaars. Bovendien zijn er enkele tekortkomingen aan te wijzen in het bestaande internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek. Ten eerste zijn deze studies vaak gebaseerd op een vergelijking van een gering aantal landen, waardoor het slechts in beperkte mate mogelijk is om de effecten van de nationale context systematisch in

kaart te brengen. Ten tweede zijn internationaal vergelijkende empirische studies vaak beschrijvend van aard en wordt er weinig aandacht besteed aan theorie-ontwikkeling of empirische toetsing van bestaande theorieën over etnische attitudes. Ten derde zijn studies die een groot aantal landen bestrijken vaak gebaseerd op data van subpopulaties, zoals adolescenten of studenten, zodat het de vraag blijft in hoeverre de resultaten gegeneraliseerd mogen worden naar de gehele populatie van de diverse landen.

In het onderhavige onderzoek wordt vooruitgang geboekt door een systematische empirische toetsing van hypothesen, afgeleid uit diverse sociologische en sociaal-psychologische theorieën, aan de hand van gegevens afkomstig uit nationale steekproeven in 22 landen. In de analyses werd tevens een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de bevolking van (voormalig) West- en Oost-Duitsland, zodat de conclusies betrekking hebben op 23 onderzochte populaties.

Zoals gezegd beperkt het onderzoek zich tot de attitudes van de etnische meerderheidsgroep van elk land. Positieve attitudes tegenover het eigen land en de nationale groep worden in deze studie aangeduid als nationalistische attitudes. Negatieve attitudes tegenover etnische minderheden en immigranten worden aangeduid als etnisch exclusionisme.

Probleemstelling

De onderzoeksvragen die centraal staan in deze studie komen voort uit enkele lacunes in het bestaande theoretische en empirische onderzoek. Vaak wordt verondersteld dat positieve attitudes tegenover de eigen etnische groep (de zogenaamde 'in-group') gepaard gaan met negatieve attitudes tegenover andere etnische groepen (de 'out-groups'). Dit complex van gerelateerde attitudes wordt aangeduid als etnocentrisme. Uit eerder empirisch onderzoek in onder meer Nederland, België en de Verenigde Staten, blijkt inderdaad dat een positieve attitude tegenover het eigen land en de nationale in-group vrij sterk samenhangt met een negatieve attitude tegenover etnische minderheden. In deze onderzoekstraditie worden zowel de attitude tegenover het eigen land en de nationale in-group als de attitude tegenover etnische minderheden geconceptualiseerd als unidimensionele concepten. Andere auteurs veronderstellen daarentegen dat er meerdere dimensies te onderscheiden zijn in de attitudes tegenover het eigen land en de nationale in-group, en bovendien, dat deze diverse dimensies op verschillende wijze samenhangen met out-group attitudes. Daarnaast bestaat er een onderzoekslijn waarin geopperd wordt dat er verschillende vormen van negatieve attitudes tegenover etnische minderheden en immigranten bestaan. In het laatstgenoemde onderzoek gaat de aandacht uit naar verschillen ten aanzien van de inhoud of het object van deze attitudes. In onderhavige studie wordt daarom nagegaan welke dimensies in nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme onderscheiden kunnen worden en op welke wijze deze dimensies met elkaar samenhangen. Bovendien wordt nagegaan in hoeverre er internationale verschillen bestaan in de interrelaties tussen (dimensies van) nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme.

Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat er aanzienlijke verschillen in in-group en out-group attitudes bestaan tussen individuen, al naar gelang hun opleidingsniveau, beroepsstatus,

inkomen, leeftijd of kerklidmaatschap. Wellicht de meest consistente bevinding is het effect van opleiding: hoe hoger het opleidingsniveau, des te geringer de mate van etnische intolerantie en des te geringer de mate van superioriteitsgevoelens ten aanzien van de eigen groep. Door het gebrek aan grootschalig internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek is echter niet bekend in hoeverre dit opleidingseffect, gecontroleerd voor het effect van overige individuele kenmerken, systematisch varieert over landen.

Naast de invloed van individuele kenmerken, besteedt deze studie veel aandacht aan de invloed van contextuele kenmerken. Hoewel er vaak verondersteld wordt dat de nationale context van groot belang is, blijkt er weinig empirisch onderzoek te zijn verricht naar de daadwerkelijke effecten van de nationale economische, demografische en politieke omstandigheden op de etnische attitudes van de bevolking. Met de onderhavige studie wordt beoogd deze lacune op te vullen.

In deze studie worden hypothesen getoetst die afgeleid zijn uit diverse sociologische en sociaal-psychologische theorieën. Daarbij wordt onder meer aandacht besteed aan de perspectiefbreedte en de gepercipieerde dreiging van etnische minderheden als mogelijke verklaringen voor de relatie tussen individuele en contextuele kenmerken enerzijds, en etnische attitudes anderzijds. Op basis van de bovenstaande overwegingen zijn de volgende onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd:

1. *Zijn er diverse dimensies te onderscheiden in nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?*
2. *Zo ja, zijn de diverse dimensies van nationalistische attitudes op verschillende wijze gerelateerd aan etnisch exclusionisme?*
3. *Welke verschillen bestaan er tussen landen in de relaties tussen (dimensies van) nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?*
4. *Welke verschillen bestaan er tussen de etnische meerderheidsbevolking van diverse landen in de mate van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?*
5. *Welke verschillen bestaan er tussen sociale categorieën van de etnische meerderheidsbevolking in de mate van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?*
6. *Varieert het effect van opleiding op nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme systematisch over diverse typen landen?*
7. *In welke mate zijn de geobserveerde verschillen tussen sociale categorieën en tussen landen in de mate van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme gerelateerd aan sociaaldemografische variabelen, intermediaire individuele variabelen en contextuele variabelen?*

Antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen

In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de ontwikkeling van twee theoretische perspectieven op etnische attitudes beschreven: de realistische conflicttheorie en de sociale identiteitstheorie. In de realistische

conflicttheorie worden positieve in-group attitudes en negatieve out-group attitudes toegeschreven aan de mate van competitie tussen etnische groepen. Deze competitie kan betrekking hebben op conflicterende economische belangen, op macht of status en/of op conflicterende culturele waarden en opvattingen. In deze studie ligt de nadruk op de economische competitie die beschouwd wordt als de katalysator van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme. De relatie tussen feitelijke omstandigheden en attitudes van individuen wordt geïntervenieerd door de perceptie van etnische dreiging: hoe sterker de feitelijke competitie, des te groter de gepercipieerde etnische dreiging, en des te sterker de mate van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme. Etnische out-groups zouden gepercipieerd kunnen worden als een bedreiging voor de sociale positie van de in-group in het algemeen (groepsdreiging) en voor de sociale positie van specifieke sociale categorieën van de in-group in het bijzonder (individuele dreiging).

De sociale identiteitstheorie schrijft nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme toe aan de psychologische processen van sociale identificatie en sociale contra-identificatie. Volgens deze theorie hebben individuen een fundamentele behoefte aan een positieve sociale identiteit. Individuen vergelijken derhalve de sociale groep(en) waarvan zij zich als lid beschouwen op een dusdanige wijze met andere sociale groepen, zodat zij zich op een positieve wijze onderscheiden van de buitenstaanders. Daartoe percipiëren zij op selectieve wijze overwegend positieve karakteristieken bij leden van de in-group en overwegend negatieve karakteristieken bij leden van out-groups.

In hoofdstuk 2 wordt uiteengezet dat beide theoretische perspectieven complementair zijn, zodat de kernproposities geïntegreerd kunnen worden in een algemeen theoretisch model. Deze *etnische competitie theorie* veronderstelt dat nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme hun oorsprong vinden in het proces van sociale categorisatie, identificatie en de behoefte aan een positieve sociale identiteit, waarbij de cognitieve saillantie van de scheidslijn tussen in-group en out-group versterkt wordt door feitelijke competitie en gepercipieerde dreiging. De algemene propositie van etnische competitie theorie luidt als volgt: hoe sterker de feitelijke (sociaal-economische, sociaal-culturele of sociaal-historische) competitie tussen etnische groepen, des te sterker de gepercipieerde etnische dreiging, waardoor de mechanismen van sociale (contra-) identificatie versterkt worden, die op hun beurt weer leiden tot sterkere nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme.

In de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 wordt dit theoretisch raamwerk gebruikt om hypothesen af te leiden over de effecten van individuele en contextuele kenmerken. Daarnaast wordt in hoofdstuk 5 en 6 gebruik gemaakt van additionele theorieën.

De gehanteerde survey data zijn in 1995 door het International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) verzameld in 22 landen, te weten 9 West-Europese landen, 8 Oost-Europese landen, de VS, Canada, Australië, Nieuw Zeeland en Japan. Deze grootschalige dataset biedt de mogelijkheid tot een stringente toets van hypothesen aangaande algemene sociale determinanten van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme.

Alvorens de hypothesen worden getoetst, wordt in hoofdstuk 3 aandacht besteed aan de methodologische problemen van internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek, en in het bijzonder

survey-onderzoek. Daarbij wordt aangegeven op welke wijze binnen het ISSP – en in het bijzonder in onderhavige studie – getracht is tegemoet te komen aan de vermelde problemen van internationaal vergelijkend survey onderzoek.

Een belangrijk probleem betreft de internationale vergelijkbaarheid van de meetinstrumenten. Om vast te stellen in welke mate de gebruikte survey meetinstrumenten internationaal equivalent zijn, wordt in deze studie gebruik gemaakt van structurele modellen analyse. De totstandkoming van het meetinstrument voor nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme, alsmede de test ten aanzien van internationale equivalentie, wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 4. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt deze procedure herhaald voor het meetinstrument voor gepercipieerde etnische dreiging.

De resultaten van deze analyses wijzen uit dat meetmodellen met invariante modelvorm en factorladingen een redelijk hoge en acceptabele goedpassendheid hebben. Met andere woorden, zowel het meetinstrument voor nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme als het meetinstrument voor gepercipieerde etnische dreiging hebben een redelijk sterke mate van equivalentie en kunnen dus gebruikt worden voor betekenisvolle internationale vergelijkingen.

De informatie over individuele kenmerken en attitudes, zoals gemeten in de surveys, wordt gecomplementeerd met informatie over de nationale economische, demografische en politieke omstandigheden. Internationale statistische gegevens worden verzameld die gebruikt kunnen worden als indicatoren van de feitelijke competitie op het contextuele (nationale) niveau. In hoofdstuk 6 worden de definities, operationalisaties, registraties en de internationale vergelijkbaarheid van deze contextuele kenmerken uitvoerig toegelicht. Na deze bespreking van de dataverzameling en de meetinstrumenten voor individuele en contextuele kenmerken, worden nu de antwoorden op de geformuleerde onderzoeksvragen gepresenteerd.

1. Zijn er diverse dimensies te onderscheiden in nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?

De attitude tegenover het eigen land en de nationale groep en de attitude tegenover etnische out-groups werden in eerder onderzoek vaak als twee eendimensionale constructen geconceptualiseerd en geoperationaliseerd. De resultaten toonden aan dat beide attitudes onderling samenhangen: een positieve attitude tegenover de eigen groep ('in-group') gaat gepaard met een negatieve houding tegenover andere groepen ('out-groups'), een verschijnsel dat aangeduid wordt als etnocentrisme. Het concept etnocentrisme werd geïntroduceerd door Sumner. Op basis van Sumners these over het universele karakter van etnocentrisme alsmede de noties van de sociale identiteitstheorie kan men veronderstellen dat er in alle landen een positieve samenhang bestaat tussen nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme.

De relatie tussen nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme zou echter ook complexer kunnen zijn. Diverse auteurs veronderstellen dat nationalistische attitudes multi-dimensioneel zijn en dat de onderscheiden dimensies op verschillende wijze samenhangen met etnisch exclusionisme. In het bijzonder wordt er een theoretisch onderscheid gemaakt tussen chauvinistische en patriottistische nationalistische attitudes. Deze notie van multi-

dimensionaliteit is zeker niet nieuw, maar heeft lange tijd relatief weinig aandacht gekregen in empirisch onderzoek.

In deze studie wordt *chauvinisme* omschreven als de zienswijze dat de eigen nationale groep en het eigen land uniek en superieur zijn. Deze nationale superioriteitsgevoelens gaan gepaard met een onvoorwaardelijke en kritiekloze positieve houding tegenover de eigen nationale groep en het eigen land. *Patriottisme* daarentegen verwijst naar de mate van trots op en liefde voor de eigen nationale groep en het eigen land, en kenmerkt zich door een voorwaardelijke en kritisch positieve houding. Met betrekking tot etnisch exclusionisme wordt er in deze studie een conceptueel onderscheid gemaakt naar het object van uitsluiting, te weten uitsluiting van reeds aanwezige etnische minderheden en uitsluiting van nieuwkomers. Onder de laatstgenoemde brede categorie van immigranten, nemen mensen die uit angst voor politieke onderdrukking of geweld hun land zijn ontvlucht, een specifieke positie in. Er worden daarom drie dimensies van etnisch exclusionisme onderscheiden. *Exclusionisme van immigranten* verwijst naar de wens om de landsgrenzen te sluiten voor nieuwkomers. *Exclusionisme van politieke vluchtelingen* verwijst naar de opvatting dat politieke vluchtelingen niet in het gastland zouden mogen verblijven. De derde vorm van uitsluiting betreft de vraag of leden van etnische minderheidsgroepen – in de ogen van de etnische meerderheid – als een volledig en gelijkwaardig lid van de nationale gemeenschap beschouwd worden. *Exclusionisme van groepslidmaatschap* verwijst daarmee naar de subjectieve scheidslijn tussen etnische meerderheidsgroep en minderheidsgroep(en) en de kenmerken die als typerend worden gezien voor 'echte' leden van de nationale in-group. Hoe sterker dit groepslidmaatschap gedefinieerd wordt in termen van restrictieve condities zoals geboorteplaats en verblijfsduur, des te sterker worden etnische minderheden uitgesloten van deze gemeenschap.

In hoofdstuk 4 wordt allereerst nagegaan of het conceptuele onderscheid in diverse dimensies van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme empirisch ondersteuning vindt. Daartoe wordt een structurele modellen analyse uitgevoerd waarbij rekening gehouden wordt met het ordinale meetniveau. Het blijkt dat er inderdaad een empirisch onderscheid gemaakt kan worden tussen twee dimensies van nationalistische attitudes – chauvinisme en patriottisme – die onderling positief met elkaar samenhangen. Tevens kan er een empirisch onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen de drie genoemde dimensies van etnisch exclusionisme, die eveneens onderling positief met elkaar samenhangen. Het conceptuele onderscheid tussen diverse dimensies wordt tevens empirisch ondersteund door de analyses in hoofdstukken 5 en 6, waaruit blijkt dat de diverse dimensies op verschillende wijze gerelateerd zijn aan individuele en contextuele kenmerken. Tenslotte wordt de veronderstelde multi-dimensionaliteit tevens empirisch ondersteund door het onderstaande antwoord op de tweede onderzoeksvraag.

2. *Zo ja, zijn de diverse dimensies van nationalistische attitudes op verschillende wijze gerelateerd aan etnisch exclusionisme?*

Patriottisme werd geconceptualiseerd als een positieve binding met het eigen land en de nationale in-group, waarbij deze gevoelens van nationale trots op en liefde voor het land en de

nationale in-group verbonden zijn met een voorwaardelijke, kritisch positieve houding. Chauvinisme daarentegen wordt gekenmerkt door superioriteitsgevoelens en een onvoorwaardelijke, kritiekloze positieve houding tegenover het eigen land en de nationale in-group. Op basis van dit conceptuele onderscheid wordt de hypothese geformuleerd dat de samenhang tussen chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme sterker is dan de samenhang tussen patriottisme en etnisch exclusionisme.

De samenhang tussen dimensies van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme wordt in hoofdstuk 4 vastgesteld middels een multi-sample structurele modellen analyse. Omdat er 22 landen zijn en de bevolking van West- en Oost-Duitsland als twee afzonderlijke populaties beschouwd worden, zijn de polychorische correlaties in 23 populaties berekend. In het algemeen blijkt er een positieve samenhang te bestaan tussen chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Hoe sterker de gevoelens van nationale superioriteit, des te sterker is men geneigd om etnische minderheden en migranten uit te sluiten. De toetsing van de bovenstaande hypothese levert een consistente bevinding op: de samenhang tussen chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme is sterker dan de samenhang tussen patriottisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Dit geldt voor elk land en voor elke dimensie van etnisch exclusionisme.

In bijna alle landen blijkt patriottisme positief samen te gaan met exclusionisme van groepslidmaatschap. Maar in twee op de drie landen is patriottisme niet significant gerelateerd aan exclusionisme van immigranten of exclusionisme van politieke vluchtelingen. In 5 landen blijkt een hoge mate van patriottisme zelfs samen te gaan met een geringere mate van exclusionisme. Kortom, deze bevindingen ondersteunen de propositie dat chauvinisme een agressievere dimensie van nationalistische attitudes is, die gepaard gaat met etnisch exclusionisme. Uit het feit dat patriottisme meestal niet gepaard gaat met exclusionisme van immigranten en vluchtelingen, kan men concluderen dat een positieve attitude tegenover het eigen land en de nationale in-group niet intrinsiek verbonden is met negatieve attitudes tegenover immigranten en vluchtelingen. Dit resultaat indiceert dat de notie van etnocentrisme – positieve in-group attitudes gaan gepaard met negatieve out-group attitudes – verfijnd moet worden: alléén chauvinistische attitudes gaan gepaard met etnisch exclusionisme.

3. *Welke verschillen bestaan er tussen landen in de relaties tussen (dimensies van) nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?*

Zoals uit het voorafgaande reeds naar voren kwam, varieert de samenhang tussen dimensies van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme per land. Opvallend zijn de sterke internationale verschillen in de relatie tussen patriottisme enerzijds en exclusionisme van immigranten en politieke vluchtelingen anderzijds. In het merendeel van de landen is er geen significante samenhang, terwijl in een vijftal landen de samenhang zelfs negatief is. Alleen in (West- en Oost-) Duitsland en Japan er is een positieve samenhang tussen patriottisme enerzijds en exclusionisme van immigranten en exclusionisme van politieke vluchtelingen anderzijds. Het feit dat Duitsland en Japan een uitzonderingspositie innemen kan waarschijnlijk verklaard worden door de moeizame relatie die beide landen hebben met het collectieve verleden van de

Tweede Wereldoorlog. Het discourse over nationale identiteit en nationale trots wordt daardoor in Duitsland en Japan gekenmerkt door sterkere negatieve connotaties.

4. *Welke verschillen bestaan er tussen de etnische meerderheidsbevolking van diverse landen in de mate van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?*

In hoofdstuk 4 is vastgesteld dat de survey items ter indicering van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme gehanteerd mogen worden als een betekenisvol meetinstrument in internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek. In de daarop volgende analyses is voor elke afzonderlijke dimensie een Likert-schaal geconstrueerd. Als een eerste exploratieve analyse van de internationale verschillen in nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme worden in hoofdstuk 4 de gemiddelde somscores per populatie berekend. Over het algemeen zijn chauvinistische gevoelens in mindere mate aanwezig onder de bevolking van West-Europese landen. Nederlanders zijn gemiddeld genomen het minst chauvinistisch, gevolgd door West- en Oost-Duitsers. Nederland en Duitsland zijn overigens de enige landen waar gemiddeld genomen de in de enquêtevragen verwoorde superioriteitsgevoelens en onvoorwaardelijke vaderlandstrouw geen instemming onder de bevolking vinden. In Oost Europa en in de traditionele immigratielanden is chauvinisme relatief sterk aanwezig. Bulgaren blijken gemiddeld genomen het sterkst chauvinistisch. Opmerkelijk is dat de relatief hoge score in Bulgarije alsmede in enkele andere Oost-Europese landen niet overeenstemt met het internationale prestige en de invloed van het land op economisch en politiek terrein. Blijkbaar zijn superioriteitsgevoelens slechts marginaal afhankelijk van de feitelijke internationale prestaties van het land. Patriottisme daarentegen lijkt in sterkere mate een afspiegeling te zijn van de economische prestaties en de politieke invloed van het land: Amerikanen zijn het sterkst patriottistisch, terwijl Oost-Europeanen gemiddeld genomen weinig patriottisme vertonen.

In het algemeen is etnisch exclusionisme het sterkst in Oost Europa. Met betrekking tot exclusionisme van immigranten zijn alle onderzochte populaties, met uitzondering van de Ieren, van mening dat het aantal immigranten beperkt moet worden. In scherp contrast met de uitgesproken voorkeur om immigratie in het algemeen te beperken, is er een verrassend grote bereidwilligheid om politieke vluchtelingen toe te laten. Opnieuw scoren Oost-Europeanen relatief hoog op exclusionisme. Met betrekking tot exclusionisme van groepslidmaatschap zijn er relatief weinig verschillen tussen de populaties. In het algemeen hanteren leden van de etnische meerderheidsgroep in alle landen strikte criteria in hun subjectieve definitie van 'echte' leden van de nationale gemeenschap. Degenen die niet in het land geboren zijn, er niet langdurig wonen, of de taal niet machtig zijn, worden als buitenstaanders beschouwd.

5. *Welke verschillen bestaan er tussen sociale categorieën van de etnische meerderheidsbevolking in de mate van nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme?*

De verschillen tussen sociale categorieën staan centraal in hoofdstuk 5. Chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme hangen relatief sterk samen met het genoten opleidingsniveau: lager opgeleiden scoren gemiddeld genomen hoger op chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme dan hoger opgeleiden. Daarentegen zijn er nauwelijks verschillen tussen hoger en lager opgeleiden in de mate van patriottisme.

Gecontroleerd voor alle overige sociaaldemografische kenmerken, heeft opleiding het sterkste effect op chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Daarnaast treft men chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme in relatief sterke mate aan onder kleine zelfstandigen, handarbeiders en werklozen, evenals onder gepensioneerden en mensen die werkzaam zijn in het eigen huishouden. In vergelijking met onkerkelijken, scoren katholieken en protestanten hoger op chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Leeftijd en kerkbezoek zijn niet eenduidig gerelateerd aan chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Nationalistische attitudes en exclusionisme van groepslidmaatschap zijn sterker onder ouderen, terwijl exclusionisme van politieke vluchtelingen relatief sterker is onder jongeren. Leeftijd heeft daarentegen geen effect op exclusionisme van immigranten. Het effect van kerkbezoek, gecontroleerd voor kerklidmaatschap, is eveneens niet eenduidig: kerkbezoek hangt positief samen met nationalistische attitudes, maar negatief met exclusionisme van immigranten en vluchtelingen.

De bevinding dat opleiding het sterkste effect heeft op chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme correspondeert met eerder onderzoek waarin telkenmale een sterke relatie gevonden wordt tussen opleidingsniveau en positieve in-group attitudes of negatieve out-group attitudes. Daarom wordt in deze studie het effect van opleiding nader bestudeerd.

6. *Varieert het effect van opleiding op nationalistische attitudes en etnisch exclusionisme systematisch over diverse typen landen?*

Hoofdstuk 5 biedt een overzicht van verschillende theoretische interpretaties van het opleidingseffect, in het bijzonder de socialisatietheorie. Volgens deze theorie verspreidt het onderwijssysteem waarden en normen die een afspiegeling zijn van de politieke cultuur van het land. Deze politieke cultuur is op haar beurt een afspiegeling van het politieke regime. Het effect van opleiding op etnische attitudes wordt aldus toegeschreven aan de verspreiding van democratische waardenoriëntaties in het onderwijssysteem. De eerste hypothese luidt daarom dat het effect van opleiding groter is in landen met een liberaal-democratische traditie dan in voormalige socialistische landen. Weil veronderstelt verder dat het effect van opleiding groter is in landen met een langdurige en stabiele liberaal-democratische traditie, dan in landen die tijdelijk een niet-democratisch regime hebben gekend. Om deze hypothesen te toetsen, worden de landen ingedeeld in 3 categorieën: landen met een langdurige liberaal-democratische traditie, landen met een onderbroken liberaal-democratische traditie (Duitsland, Oostenrijk, Italië, Spanje en Japan) en landen met een korte liberaal-democratische traditie (de voormalige Oostblok landen).

Het effect van opleiding op etnisch exclusionisme varieert inderdaad systematisch over landen: in recent gevestigde democratieën is het opleidingseffect kleiner. Er is echter geen

verschil in de grootte van het opleidingseffect tussen landen met een langdurige of onderbroken liberaal-democratische traditie. Dit suggereert dat anno 1995 de bevolking in landen met een onderbroken liberaal-democratische traditie in dezelfde mate is gesocialiseerd in democratische waarden als de bevolking in landen met een langdurige liberaal-democratische traditie.

De grootte van het opleidingseffect op nationalistische attitudes is niet in lijn met de verwachting: er bestaat geen verschil tussen landen met een langdurige of korte liberaal-democratische traditie. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat voor zover het onderwijssysteem inderdaad de waarden van democratie en tolerantie verspreidt, de aandacht vooral gericht is op het verminderen van negatieve out-group attitudes en niet zozeer op het verminderen van nationalistische attitudes.

Naar aanleiding van studies omtrent de rol van politieke elites in pluralistische samenlevingen, veronderstelt Weil voorts dat het opleidingseffect groter is in pluralistische samenlevingen. Deze hypothese wordt getoetst door na te gaan of het opleidingseffect varieert met de mate van religieuze heterogeniteit van een land. Deze hypothese wordt echter weerlegd, hetgeen mogelijk op een discrepantie wijst tussen de attitude van de politieke elite en de attitude van de gehele bevolking.

In hoofdstuk 6 worden theoretische verklaringen voor de geobserveerde verschillen tussen landen (zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 4) en verschillen tussen sociale categorieën (zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 5) systematisch getoetst. In dit laatste empirische hoofdstuk wordt patriottisme buiten beschouwing gelaten. In hoofdstuk 5 is immers vastgesteld dat patriottisme nauwelijks samenhangt met opleiding of sociale klasse, en in hoofdstuk 4 is vastgesteld dat patriottisme – in tegenstelling tot chauvinisme – meestal niet gerelateerd is aan etnisch exclusionisme. De laatste onderzoeksvraag luidt dan als volgt:

7. *In welke mate zijn de geobserveerde verschillen tussen sociale categorieën en tussen landen in de mate van chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme gerelateerd aan sociaaldemografische variabelen, intermediaire individuele variabelen en contextuele variabelen?*

In multilevel analyses worden de effecten van individuele en contextuele kenmerken simultaan geschat. De effecten van individuele kenmerken kunnen als volgt worden samengevat. Sociale categorieën van de etnische meerderheidsgroep die vergelijkbare sociale posities innemen als etnische minderheden zullen volgens de etnische competitie theorie in sterkere mate chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme vertonen. Immers, deze sociale categorieën zullen meer dan het gemiddelde lid van de etnische meerderheidsgroep moeten concurreren met etnische minderheden en dientengevolge zullen zij in sterkere mate etnische dreiging ervaren. Over het algemeen hebben etnische minderheden een relatief slechte sociaal-economische positie. Daarom wordt verwacht dat lager opgeleiden, kleine zelfstandigen, hardarbeiders, werklozen, en mensen met een laag inkomen gemiddeld hoger scoren op chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Op

enkele kleine uitzonderingen na, die betrekking hebben op specifieke dimensies van etnisch exclusionisme, worden deze hypothesen niet weerlegd.

Naast de etnische competitie theorie worden in hoofdstuk 6 hypothesen getoetst die afgeleid zijn uit de lokalisme theorie. Volgens deze theorie hangen positieve in-group en negatieve out-group attitudes samen met de perspectiefbreedte van individuen, ofwel, de mate waarin een individu zich richt op de lokale gemeenschap. Eerder onderzoek toont aan dat vooral lager opgeleiden, ouderen, kerkleden en frequente kerkbezoekers een sterke lokalistische oriëntatie hebben. De hypothesen die afgeleid zijn uit de lokalisme theorie worden echter maar ten dele niet weerlegd. Chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme zijn inderdaad sterker onder lager opgeleiden en kerkleden. Leeftijd en kerkbezoek zijn echter niet eenduidig gerelateerd aan chauvinisme en de verschillende dimensies van etnisch exclusionisme.

Volgens de etnische competitie theorie is de mate van etnische competitie in een land bepalend voor de mate van chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme onder de etnische meerderheidsbevolking van het land. In deze studie is de mate van etnische competitie op het nationale niveau geoperationaliseerd aan de hand van de volgende indicatoren: (a) demografische condities: de mate van etnische heterogeniteit in een land en het aantal asielaanvragen per capita; (b) economische condities: een index bestaande uit het bruto nationaal product per capita en het werkloosheidspercentage; en, (c) politieke condities: de relatieve omvang van de sociale zekerheidsuitgaven. De laatstgenoemde indicator is gekozen omdat een omvangrijk sociaal zekerheidssysteem voor een sociaal vangnet kan zorgen zodat de risico's in de sociaal-economische competitie relatief beperkt blijven. Om het effect van deze nationale omstandigheden te bepalen, wordt gebruikt gemaakt van cijfers uit 1994. Tevens wordt nagegaan in hoeverre veranderingen in deze indicatoren over een periode van 5 jaar (1989 tot 1994) gerelateerd zijn aan chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Kortom, in deze studie wordt getoetst of chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme in sterkere mate aanwezig zijn in landen met slechte en/of verslechterende economische omstandigheden; een beperkt sociaal zekerheidssysteem; een hoge mate van etnische heterogeniteit; en een groot aantal en/of een toename in het aantal asielaanvragen per capita. Tevens wordt nagegaan of de effecten van deze factoren elkaar kunnen versterken (interactie-effecten) en wordt er rekening gehouden met mogelijke curvilineaire effecten.

Deze hypothesen vinden slechts ten dele empirische ondersteuning. Voor het merendeel van de contextuele kenmerken geldt dat de effecten sterk variëren al naar gelang de betreffende afhankelijke variabele. Twee contextuele kenmerken hebben echter redelijk consistente effecten op chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme: (1) Een *verslechtering van de economische omstandigheden* gaat gepaard met een sterkere mate van chauvinisme, exclusionisme van immigranten, en exclusionisme van groepslidmaatschap. Opvallend is dat exclusionisme van politieke vluchtelingen daarentegen niet gerelateerd blijkt te zijn aan de economische omstandigheden, noch de recente economische veranderingen, noch de huidige economische omstandigheden. (2) In landen met een *hoge mate van etnische heterogeniteit*, is de gemiddelde mate van chauvinisme, exclusionisme van politieke vluchtelingen en exclusionisme van

groepslidmaatschap hoger. Het effect van etnische heterogeniteit op exclusionisme van immigranten is echter niet significant.

De relatie tussen demografische condities en etnisch exclusionisme is soms curvilineair van aard. Dit geldt voor het effect van het aantal asielaanvragen op exclusionisme van politieke vluchtelingen en voor het effect van de verandering in asielaanvragen op exclusionisme van immigranten. In beide gevallen geldt dat de theoretisch verwachte positieve effecten slechts optreden wanneer het aantal asielaanvragen of de verandering in asielaanvragen een bepaalde drempel overschrijdt. Deze curvilineaire effecten indiceren een specificatie van de etnische competitie theorie. Volgens deze theorie versterkt competitie het proces van sociale categorisatie en sociale (contra-)identificatie omdat competitie de cognitieve sailliantie verhoogt van de scheidslijn tussen in-group en out-groups. Het feit dat de theoretisch verwachte effecten pas optreden boven een bepaald drempelniveau, duidt erop dat alléén duidelijk zichtbare out-groups als een relevante out-group voor sociale categorisatie en identificatie kunnen fungeren. Deze zichtbaarheid van out-groups hangt samen met de omvang of de toename in omvang van de out-group.

Tot slot wordt het effect onderzocht van twee intermediaire attitudes – lokalisme en gepercipieerde etnische dreiging – die de relatie tussen individuele en contextuele kenmerken enerzijds en chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme anderzijds mogelijk inzichtelijk kunnen maken. Lokalisme blijkt inderdaad volgens verwachting positief samen te gaan met chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Een lokalistische oriëntatie treft men vooral aan onder lager opgeleiden, ouderen, kerkleden en kerkbezoekers. Bovendien geldt dat individuen in een land met een hoge mate van etnische heterogeniteit (oftewel, een kosmopolitische omgeving) in mindere mate lokalistisch zijn.

De perceptie van etnische dreiging is een centraal concept in etnische competitie theorie: hoe sterker de feitelijke competitie, des te groter de gepercipieerde etnische dreiging, en des te sterker de mate van chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Inderdaad blijkt de meting van gepercipieerde etnische dreiging een sterk effect te hebben op chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme: des te sterker etnische immigranten beschouwd worden als een economisch of culturele dreiging, des te hoger de mate van chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme. Ook de relatie tussen sociaaldemografische achtergrondkenmerken en de mate van etnische dreiging komt overeen met de theoretische verwachting: lager opgeleiden, kleine zelfstandigen, handarbeiders, werklozen, en lagere inkomensgroepen voelen zich in sterkere mate bedreigd door etnische minderheden. Deze bevindingen zijn een empirische ondersteuning van de theoretisch verwachte link tussen feitelijke competitie (indirect gemeten door sociaaldemografische achtergrondkenmerken), gepercipieerde dreiging, en chauvinisme en etnisch exclusionisme.

De contextuele variabelen, die de feitelijke competitie op het nationale niveau indiceren, zijn echter merendeels niet significant gerelateerd aan gepercipieerde dreiging. Er zijn slechts twee significante effecten. Hoe groter de recente verslechtering van de economische omstandigheden in een land, des te groter de mate van gepercipieerde etnische dreiging. Verder geldt dat hoe slechter de economische omstandigheden in een land, des te sterker de positieve

relatie tussen etnische heterogeniteit en gepercipieerde etnische dreiging. Percepties van etnische dreiging worden dus versterkt door een economische achteruitgang en door de combinatie van slechte economische omstandigheden en een hoge etnische heterogeniteit. Het feit dat de overige contextuele kenmerken geen significante invloed hebben duidt erop dat percepties van etnische dreiging slechts in beperkte mate een afspiegeling vormen van de mate van etnische competitie op het nationale niveau.

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Curriculum Vitae

Marcel Coenders was born in Sevenum, the Netherlands, on December 17, 1970. He completed his secondary education in 1989, and studied from 1989 to 1991 engineering at the Technical University in Eindhoven. From 1991 to 1995, he studied sociology at the University of Nijmegen, where he obtained his Master's degree *cum laude*. He received the University Study Award of the Faculty of Social Sciences for his Master thesis. After finishing his Master's degree, he became a Ph.D. student at the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) and the Department of Sociology of the University of Nijmegen. There, he worked on a project subsidized by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), which resulted in this book. In 1997, he spent a two-month research period at the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung in Cologne, Germany. From September 2000 to August 2001 he worked as an assistant professor at the Department of Social Research Methodology of the Faculty of Socio-Cultural Sciences at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Currently, he is employed as an assistant professor at the Department of Social Research Methodology of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Nijmegen.

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