

Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO

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THE COLD WAR is over, the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved, the Soviet Union has disappeared and what is left of it is in disarray. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), however, one of the most visible symbols of the cold war, is still alive. For many officials in Western governments this is not surprising. NATO has been not merely a military alliance, they contend, but a community of shared values. Many who accept this view think that NATO's continued existence is desirable,¹ some argue it is also likely.² Others argue that the rationale for the creation of NATO and its persistence was the same that operated for all military alliances of the past: a perceived common threat. Accordingly, the alliance ought to, and will, dissolve, because the Soviet threat has largely disappeared.³

Whether NATO will endure over the medium- and long-term (five to ten years) and in what form is significant for both transatlantic relations and European security. There are three plausible scenarios for the future of NATO. First, the alliance may continue to function as the major institutional framework for the coordination of the security policies of its sixteen members. NATO would not expand its membership or fundamentally alter its mandate, even though minor adaptations to the new security environment may be implemented regarding the specifics of force structure, doctrine, and so forth. Second, NATO may either break up or gradually dissolve because of differences among its members about how to organize for the common security in the post-cold war environment. Most member states would no longer rely on the alliance as the central institution for the coordination of national security policies and the institutional underpinnings of the alliance

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(integrated command, force planning, etc.) would gradually unravel. Whether or not an organization with the name 'NATO' still existed would be irrelevant because the defining norms and principles of the alliance would have ceased to be credible to member governments. Third, NATO may change its mission and possibly its membership. In this scenario the alliance would incorporate new security functions (such as peace keeping, peace making, or other concert mechanisms) and de-emphasize but not formally abolish its traditional mission as a mutual defense pact. This fundamental change, in contrast to the break-up scenario, would result from consultation and agreement among NATO member states. Any of these scenarios would carry far-reaching implications for transatlantic relations, European security, and even the international system as a whole. It is important, therefore, to examine the underlying forces that will affect the long-term future of the alliance.

The future of NATO is important not only for policy. It is also relevant for international relations theory, especially for neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, the two most prominent theoretical perspectives at the systemic level.⁴ Both claim to offer better explanations of international cooperation, both are clearly articulated, and there also appears to be a common understanding of the basic assumptions of each theory.⁵

There are, therefore, four reasons why neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism provide a good base for deducing predictions about the future of NATO. First, both are systemic theories concerned with outcomes that are more amenable to theorizing and prediction than either foreign policy outputs or individual behavior. Because alliances are products of processes at the systemic level of analysis, NATO is an ideal subject for neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theory. Second, scholars on both sides of the neorealist-neoliberal debate agree that too much of the contention between the two perspectives has focused on theoretical arguments. Instead of further debating in theoretical terms the merits and shortcomings of either perspective, they call for more empirical research based on specific competing hypotheses and predictions with the future as acceptable as the past as a testing ground.⁶ Third, making predictions also agrees with the positivist epistemology of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Both agree – at least on a declaratory level – on designing and carrying out hard tests in order to prove the validity of theoretical claims.⁷ In this regard, NATO is a good test for both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, even though it is not the hardest test possible for either.⁸ Finally and most importantly, both perspectives lead to different conclusions about how NATO will evolve in the medium- and long-term. From a neorealist perspective, the break-up scenario is more likely, whereas neoliberal institutionalists would predict either the persistence scenario or the transformation scenario.⁹

It is thus appropriate to submit both theoretical perspectives to the test of the future. In this article we show why a neorealist would predict the break-up or gradual dissolution of NATO while a neoliberal institutionalist would assert that NATO would survive in its present form or be transformed by the consent of its members. Our argument proceeds in five stages. In the first section we briefly review the problems inherent in making predictions. While recognizing these problems, we argue that deducing predictions from neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is in line with the positivist epistemology both share and that such deductions offer important insights regarding policy making and theory building. In the second section we summarize the central assumptions of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, emphasizing points of agreement and disagreement between the two. This discussion leads to the third part of this article in which we deduce hypotheses from both theories regarding the origins, endurance, and decline of a particular type of international institutions – military alliances. We also highlight the areas where these theories lack clarity and show how these deficiencies may be overcome. After explaining how neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism view the persistence and potential decline of alliances, we will, in the fourth section, apply these hypotheses and formulate specific and competing predictions about the future of NATO. In the fifth section we briefly examine how neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism fared thus far in explaining the evolution of NATO since 1989–90. Finally, we summarize our argument and show how policy recommendations differ depending on whether we base our expectations about the future of the Atlantic alliance on neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND PREDICTIONS

In the theoretical international relations literature specific – that is, potentially falsifiable – predictions are rare.¹⁰ One reason why specific predictions are rare is that from an epistemological perspective predictions are inherently difficult because our knowledge of social phenomena is limited and accordingly our theories are “soft.”¹¹ They are soft because social phenomena are the result of multiple causes at different levels of analysis, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine the weight of different causal variables. Moreover, since social systems are open rather than closed as in many natural sciences, there is always room for learning and the emergence of new behavioral patterns which may make theories invalid.¹²

Even scholars who point to the inherent limitations of forecasting in general and the application of international relations theories in particular,

however, often make explicit predictions of their own.¹³ Such predictions are useful for practitioners in foreign policy and they help international relations scholars to refine existing theories.

Explicit forecasting based on international relations theories, however soft, is better than predictions based on intuition. Numerous scholars make statements that amount to implicit predictions about future developments in international relations. John Lewis Gaddis's commendation of the "insights derived from careful narration and thoughtful analogy" in illuminating "even quite distant futures" notwithstanding, we think that this common practice of implicit predictions is problematic because often the underlying theoretical basis is not explicated, and because many of these implicit predictions are not stated in such a way that they can be tested.¹⁴ Such predictions, therefore, are of little use for practitioners and scientists. The practitioner is left guessing as to the expert's assumptions why a certain development will take place, and in choosing how to act upon the advice the practitioner is denied the opportunity to question and judge the quasi-theoretical basis of the analyst's argument. Moreover, predictions that are not stated in such a way that they can be tested do not contribute to the growth of the discipline because the scientist advocating them cannot be proven wrong.

Deducing testable hypotheses and predictions helps practitioners and scientists. It may help the scientist to improve existing theories, especially if the credibility of a particular theory is increased as a result of empirical research. The past and future provide laboratories with different advantages and shortcomings for theory building. One of the advantages of deriving specific predictions from international relations theories is that we may be able to check their accuracy and, therefore, the explanatory power of the theory against the historical record at some specified point in the future. From a scientific point of view, whether a prediction turns out to be right or wrong hardly matters. We may even learn more from theory-based predictions that turn out to be wrong than from those that are right. In any event we will be in a better position to point to the strengths and weaknesses of the respective theories and be able to refine or even reject a theory.

The formulation of theory-based predictions is not only useful to the scientist. Contrary to claims by those who criticize theory as irrelevant to practice, theory-based predictions are more useful to the practitioner than are hidden, non-falsifiable predictions because they enable policymakers to make an informed choice concerning his or her agreement or disagreement with the scientist.¹⁵ If the practitioner agreed with the assumptions and reasons underlying a specific prediction, and if the scientist took care to point out how the predicted event may still be prevented or promoted, the practitioner would be in a position to act upon it.

In sum, we have chosen this path knowing that the future is inherently

unpredictable but realizing at the same time that in shaping this future practitioners and scientists base their judgement on an intuitive understanding of the underlying forces of history. "Predictions can inform policy discourse. They help even those who disagree to frame their ideas by clarifying points of disagreement."¹⁶ Therefore, in order to be useful for practitioners and scientists predictions must be made explicit.

NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism disagree about the chances for international cooperation. The basic disagreement between the two schools concerns the nature of the interaction between states. Neorealists argue that states are predisposed toward conflict and competition and often fail to cooperate even when they have common interests because self-help systems make the cooperation of parties difficult.¹⁷ Neoliberals contend that these pessimistic assumptions are unfounded because neorealists underestimate the influence of international institutions.¹⁸ To the neorealists' argument that international institutions affect the behavior of states only marginally because they are not an independent force,¹⁹ neoliberals reply that international institutions do not just reflect temporary interests of states but also shape those interests and the practices of states.²⁰ Neoliberals claim that institutions can continue to promote international cooperation even when the state interests which led to the institutions' creation no longer exist.²¹

Despite these conflicting predictions, neorealism and neoliberalism share fundamental assumptions. Both schools assume that regularities of international behavior are best explained by the nature of the international system.²² Both theories assume that states are the major players in world affairs and that they are rational unitary actors trying to promote their national interests.²³ Finally, both schools agree that anarchy is one of the underlying forces of the international system because there is no central authority that could force states to comply with international agreements.²⁴

Because of these shared assumptions, neoliberals and neorealists agree that international cooperation is difficult even if states have interests in common because anarchy allows states to defect from international agreements. Neoliberals claim that states can solve this problem successfully by establishing international institutions that diminish the incentives to cheat and increase the attraction of compliance.²⁵ According to neoliberals, institutions do so primarily by distributing information more evenly among potential collaborators, by reducing the costs for monitoring individual compliance, and by making it more cost-effective for states to punish non-compliance.²⁶ Thus, neoliberals argue that international institutions can often overcome

the basic obstacle to international cooperation because states attach great importance to the existence and functioning of international institutions and try to preserve them even when this implies significant opportunity costs.

Neorealism on Cooperation among States

Neorealists argue that neoliberals underestimate the impediments to cooperation because they fail to grasp the full implications of international anarchy. There are two factors that increase the risks of cooperation among states: States have to worry not only that others would cheat but also that their partners will gain more from cooperation than they themselves would. In other words, states care not only about absolute but also about relative gains. From a realist point of view, states are not rational egoists whose utility functions are independent of one another, but “defensive positionalists” who seek to prevent a decline in their relative capabilities.²⁷ Accordingly, when states are confident about their partners’ compliance, they may still forgo gains resulting from cooperation if they expect different gains to shift the relative distribution of capabilities in favor of their partners.²⁸ This diminishes the value that states attach to the functioning and endurance of international institutions.

Neoliberals admit that sometimes states pay more attention to relative gains than to absolute gains, but they claim that states do so only when they expect others to be hostile and deceptive and when states’ margins of survival are small.²⁹ States can afford to focus on absolute gains under conditions in which they expect substantial mutual gains through cooperation and in which they do not expect others to threaten them with force. These expectations depend on the nature of prevailing rules and expectations – that is, on international institutions.³⁰ Institutions thus create and maintain the preconditions of their own existence.

Neorealists and neoliberals thus agree that there is a causal link between the importance of relative gains considerations and the functioning of international institutions, but they emphasize different aspects of that causal connection. Neorealists focus on relative gains considerations as an independent variable because, for them, such considerations crucially affect the relevance and effectiveness of international institutions. Strong relative gains considerations inhibit cooperation and as a result make institutions irrelevant.³¹ Neoliberals place more emphasis on international institutions as an independent variable that determines to what extent relative gains considerations matter. Stable institutions make states less worried about who gains more.³²

These differences between neorealists and neoliberals are a result of their different views regarding what determines state interests. For neorealists the

relative distribution of national capabilities in the international system determines how states conceive of their interests. In anarchy, in which states can only rely on themselves, security is the overriding goal of states. The most important determinant of a state's security is its overall capability in comparison to the capabilities of other states. States regard capabilities as the ultimate basis for their security because of the difficulties in gauging the future intentions of other states.³³ As Waltz writes, "for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key to its survival."³⁴

The importance attached to the distribution of capabilities has profound implications for neorealists' views on international institutions in general and alliances in particular. First, neorealists see alliances as responses to threatening capabilities, and it is the changes in the distribution of capabilities that determine the fate of alliances. Although realists concede that an alliance between states entails an institutional element – otherwise one should only talk of alignment – they maintain that alliance evolution is primarily affected by common interests resulting from the structure of the international system and specific conflicts.³⁵ Second, because states ultimately rely on the distribution of capabilities rather than on their ability to assess other states' intentions, they must always guard against a decline of their national capabilities relative to other states. There is even the danger that today's ally will become tomorrow's enemy.³⁶ Third, because states cannot rely on the benevolent intentions of other states they try to retain a measure of independence even from close allies.³⁷ Thus states seek to avoid any division of labor even if doing so would increase overall efficiency. Moreover, they are loath to having their national capabilities controlled by other states or by supra-national institutions.³⁸

Neoliberalism on Cooperation among States

Neoliberals view state interests differently, asserting that states calculate their interests not only on the basis of the international distribution of capabilities but also with a look to international institutions. International institutions affect a state's interests in two closely interrelated ways: they alter incentives and they influence expectations of other states' behavior by making it less attractive to cheat and therefore less risky to cooperate. The rules, procedures, and information channels of institutions reduce the costs of cooperative behavior and increase the costs of defection.³⁹ More importantly, each state is aware that its partners' incentives are affected in the same way. Therefore, institutions enhance a state's capacity to predict the behavior of other states. By following the rules and standards of international institutions, states "signal their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation, and therefore reinforce expectations of stability."⁴⁰ As a result, states have to pay

less attention to the distribution of capabilities and their changes through unequal gains when they calculate their interests.

Neoliberals thus have a different perspective on institutions such as alliances. First, the evolution of alliances is also shaped by their institutional characteristics.⁴¹ Second, neoliberals challenge the neorealist argument that states pay much attention to relative gains even if they cooperate in the framework of stable institutions. Thus, neoliberals do not agree that strong international institutions necessarily collapse when gains are unevenly divided.⁴² Finally, neoliberals also disagree with the neorealist proposition that states seek to maintain their independence and try to avoid entangling institutions. Rather, states often choose to trade part of their autonomy for the benefit of international cooperation when confronting dilemmas of common aversion. "In these contexts, self-interested actors rationally forgo independent decision making and construct regimes."⁴³ Moreover, when joining an international institution governments sometimes welcome its constraints because they limit the autonomy of a future administration which otherwise might reverse the current administration's foreign policies.⁴⁴

COMPETING HYPOTHESES ON WHY ALLIANCES FORM, EVOLVE, AND DISSOLVE

Neorealism and the Evolution of Alliances

For neorealism, defensive alliances are a means to security against adversaries.⁴⁵ Under conditions of anarchy states have to provide for their own security. Because in anarchy states cannot count on a central authority to provide protection, they worry about the capabilities of other states to make sure that no other state or grouping of states acquires the power to conquer or dominate them. To prevent this from happening states balance against states whose capabilities they perceive as threatening, and as a result balances of power will always be restored if they are, for whatever reason, disrupted.⁴⁶ States can balance by mobilizing their own resources (internal balancing) or by ensuring support from other states (external balancing), that is, by allying with one another.⁴⁷

Even in a self-help system states can expect the support of other states because of their partners' interest to defend each other against a common adversary. States align with others when the protection offered by the other states enhances their own security.⁴⁸ A common threat thus provides the incentive for joining an alliance. Without a common adversary allied states cannot be sure that alliance commitments will be kept.⁴⁹ As Liska writes, "alliances are against, and only derivately for, someone or something."⁵⁰

Who threatens whom is determined by the distribution of capabilities, geographic proximity, and political conflicts. For Waltz, states decide about their alliance relations chiefly on the basis of relative strength. Afraid that stronger states might use their superior capability to dominate them, weak states try to preserve their security by aligning with other weak states to check the power of stronger ones. When faced with two opposing alliances, states prefer to join the weaker one.⁵¹ Others, notably Stephen Walt and to a lesser extent Glenn Snyder, analyze how non-structural factors such as threat perception influence alignment patterns. According to them, states prefer to form alliances with distant states, especially when they do not have serious disputes with them. States are less likely to align with neighboring states and those with which they are in conflict; on the contrary, they will tend to balance against those states because they perceive them as threatening.⁵²

Neorealists assume that states make alliance decisions by comparing the benefits of alignment to its costs, focusing on the effect an alliance has on their security. Security benefits include a reduced probability of being attacked, greater strength in case of attack and prevention of the ally's alliance with one's adversary.⁵³ As to costs, being allied with others might drag a state into a war over the ally's interests that one does not share,⁵⁴ and it constrains a state's foreign policies and military independence. These costs and benefits are a function of the distribution of capabilities and the political conflicts between alliance members and their adversary.⁵⁵

The cohesion of an alliance depends on the cost/benefit calculations of its members, so it is almost exclusively determined by the threat posed by an adversary.⁵⁶ The greater the threat, the greater the cohesion of the alliance.⁵⁷ In a multipolar system alliances are less stable than those in a bipolar system because it is less clear who is threatening whom and alliances are less stable because states have more alliance options.⁵⁸ When the capabilities of its adversary decline, the cohesion of an alliance declines as well.⁵⁹ Other neorealists contend that the unity of an alliance will decrease if its members perceive themselves less threatened by the ambitions of their adversary.⁶⁰

The disintegration of an alliance begins as soon as the reasons which led to its formation no longer operate. New threats or shifts in the balance of power may call for the formation of new alliances to balance against them.⁶¹ A dramatic shift in the balance of power will cause states to leave the stronger alliance and join a weaker one. States may also leave an alliance when the original threat disappears without joining a new alliance.⁶² A case in point is the dissolution of a victorious coalition after the defeat of its enemy.⁶³

A declining threat diminishes the utility of alliance membership because it reduces the dependence on the protection expected from one's partners. It also diminishes the willingness of members to accept the constraints on their freedom of action which membership entails.⁶⁴ When the common threat

recedes cooperation among allies becomes more difficult as alliance partners again worry about each other's capabilities and are less willing to tolerate shifts in relative capabilities favoring their partners.⁶⁵ They bargain harder to secure a greater share of the benefits or forgo cooperation with their alliance partners. The more an alliance affects relative gains considerations of its members and the more it constrains their freedom of action, the quicker it will dissolve when the threat to its members disappears.

There are two other factors rarely discussed by neorealists which could also affect the pace of an alliance's disintegration: the adjustment of defense expenditures and the alignment behavior of third states. Factoring in reductions of defense spending is difficult for neorealists because they lack hypotheses explaining the trade-off between internal and external balancing efforts. If states balance against threatening capabilities by internal or external balancing, it means that they have two options to adapt to a diminishing threat: They can loosen the ties to their alliance partners (what we call external adaptation), or they can reduce their defense expenditures (internal adaptation). Thus it would be consistent with the basic assumptions of neorealism if an alliance would be able to maintain some cohesion despite a reduced threat. This may occur if the member states of an alliance cut their defense expenditures so sharply that the weakening of the threat would not substantially reduce their mutual dependence. Because states cherish their autonomy, however, internal adaptation to a reduction of the threat cannot avert but only slow down the disintegration of an alliance. States will never react only with internal adaptation but also make use of the opportunity to lessen the dependence on their allies. Precisely what mix of these two adaptation options a state would favor cannot be predicted by neorealists because it would require an elaborate theory integrating both internal and external state functions.⁶⁶

Another factor is the alignment of third states. If third states react to the new circumstances by allying *with* the declining power or alliance, the other coalition's disintegration may be slowed down or halted. If these states ally *against* the declining power, the opposing coalition should dissolve even faster. According to structural realism, third states are inclined to ally with the declining power in order to prevent its rising opponents from acquiring preponderant power. It is not clear, however, whether these new alignments are necessary, given the disintegration of the stronger alliance. Waltz seems to assume that successful alliances lose their cohesion so rapidly that balancing against them is hardly required.⁶⁷ According to Walt's balance-of-threat theory, the alignment behavior of third states depends not only on changes in the balance of power but on their overall threat perceptions. Since these perceptions are also influenced by such factors as geographic proximity and threatening intentions, third states may even join the stronger coalition if

they are located close to a decaying power perceived to have territorial ambitions or other aggressive intentions.⁶⁸

Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Evolution of Alliances

Alliances as a subject of study. Military alliances are among the most important institutions shaping international politics. Alliances also fit the widely accepted neoliberal definition of institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations,”⁶⁹ and neoliberal institutionalists explicitly state that “alliances are institutions.”⁷⁰ Despite this recognition, little empirical research on alliances has been done by neoliberal institutionalists.⁷¹ Sound theory building requires hard tests to prove the validity of theoretical claims, and neoliberal institutionalism, claiming to be superior to neo-realism,⁷² has thus far evaded an obvious test of the theory.

In comparison to hundreds of studies on the traditional topics of neoliberal institutionalism (that is, efforts at institutionalizing “low politics”), little conceptual or empirical research has been published on the relevance of neoliberal theory in explaining the rise and fall of alliances.⁷³ This paucity of published research on alliances forced us to deduce hypotheses from the core assumptions of neoliberal theory and other relevant theoretical works of neoliberal institutionalists.⁷⁴

The rise and fall of institutions. Neoliberal institutionalists assert that states operate in an increasingly complex world with multiple issues and multiple contacts among societies, a world in which states face limitations in accomplishing essential tasks on their own. Because of the size or nature of many issues, states are often unable to address the underlying causes of these issues without the cooperation of other states.

There are differences in defining regimes,⁷⁵ but there is agreement among neoliberals as to why international institutions are formed. They reduce transaction costs in interactions among states and, if institutionalized in a more formal way, can act as catalysts for agreement, allowing governments to take advantage of potential economies of scale. Institutions also help to alleviate problems resulting from uncertainty about the intentions of other actors because they reduce the range of expected behavior. Governments are in a better position to assess other governments’ resources and negotiating positions and have more accurate knowledge about whether and to what extent other governments can be trusted to keep their commitments. States are thus in a better position to maximize their long-term gains, offsetting some of the costs they incurred by accepting the constraints associated with membership in an institution.⁷⁶ One of the core arguments of neoliberals

institutionalists is thus that “the *anticipated effects* of the institutions account for the actions of governments that establish them.”⁷⁷ This is the reason why international institutions are formed, but it does not tell us how institutions evolve or whether and why institutions weaken or dissolve. Neoliberal institutionalism is not well developed in this regard.⁷⁸ In comparison to the many scholarly publications on the origins of international institutions, the number of studies on change in institutions, especially about their weakening and strengthening, is limited.⁷⁹

The first challenge, then, is to define institutional strength. We suggest to measure strength by the degree of compliance with institutional principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, particularly when they collide with the pursuit of individual interests of states.⁸⁰ From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, an institution may be said to have weakened if member states refuse to comply in any of these four dimensions. For observing that an institution has collapsed, however, it is necessary that some of the defining norms and principles (substantive rather than procedural) that characterize the institution weaken or are abandoned. If states merely do not comply with rules and decision-making procedures, an institution may weaken but not collapse. If the underlying principles and norms are no longer followed, however, the basic defining characteristics of the institution are undermined. It is not necessary formally or explicitly to abolish an institution or some of its defining principles and norms for these norms or principles to be weakened or abandoned. As some scholars in the liberal tradition point out, principles and norms need to be reinforced regularly and explicitly to be maintained, otherwise they will decay and be transformed by changing practices and circumstances.⁸¹ The decisive criterion in determining whether the principles and norms of an institution are maintained is whether all states concerned perceive them to remain effective.

The most basic neoliberal hypothesis about the endurance of institutions follows logically from the assumption that they are created because states perceive them to be in their interest: “Institutions should persist as long as, but only as long as, their members have incentives to maintain them.”⁸² This is a function of whether the institution is seen to be an effective instrument for the realization of state interests. Institutions may collapse if the calculation of egoistic self-interest leads states to withdraw from the institution.

There is no fundamental disagreement between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists in this regard, but neoliberal institutionalists assume that, other things being equal, states have greater incentives to maintain institutions than neorealists would accept. They maintain that international institutions are easier to maintain than they are to create⁸³ because they are so difficult to construct that, once created, “it may be rational to obey their rules if the alternative is their breakdown, since even an imperfect (institution)

may be superior to any politically feasible replacement.”⁸⁴ Institutions, therefore, tend to be static and resistant to change, often lacking specific rules and procedures that govern change in their substantive provisions.⁸⁵

Second, once established, an institution benefits from the information that it generates and from the ways in which it makes regime-supporting bargains easier to communicate.⁸⁶ Institutions, therefore, exhibit “considerable staying power of an inertial nature” and tend to perpetuate themselves.⁸⁷

Third, membership in institutions affects the formulation of interests by individual states.⁸⁸ In organizations with highly formalized institutional structures representatives of member states interact continuously. The resulting assessments of the interests of other states will affect the recommendations they feed into the policy formulation by their national governments. These institutionalized structures of communication reduce uncertainty and, by their existence, alter conceptions of national interests favorable to the perpetuation of the institution.

Fourth, governments must fear retaliation if they renege on commitments entered into under the terms of the agreement that led to the creation of an institution. This is especially true when an institution ties states that are highly interdependent across a wide range of issue areas.⁸⁹ Because it is unlikely that the interests of all members of an institution in its survival decline at the same time and with the same intensity, and because governments in most cases interact in different institutional contexts, governments interested in the persistence of the institution will regard the renegeing on commitments on the part of other members as an unfriendly act. They will attempt to enforce compliance by trying to change the minds of those considering leaving or by threatening retaliation if they did so. Retaliation may be specific and authorized under the agreed upon terms of the institution or it may be more general and diffuse in that a government would retaliate in other issue areas. Even if a government saw leaving an institution in its interest, the likelihood that other governments might retaliate may lead that government not to leave. The net benefit for a government from breaking the rules of a regime must thus outweigh the cost of doing so.⁹⁰

Fifth, even in the absence of a threat of retaliation, governments may still have incentives to comply with the rules and principles of an institution if they were concerned about precedent or believe that their reputation might suffer if they do not comply.⁹¹ States are motivated by self-interest to maintain a good reputation and the desire to keep it may deter governments from leaving institutions.⁹²

As the norms underlying international institutions are internalized, they affect the order and intensity of actor preferences,⁹³ in the process developing a self-perpetuating dynamic. Therefore, international institutions evolve rather than die.⁹⁴ Neoliberals grant that there may be special instances when

institutions collapse, especially because of fundamental structural changes in the respective issue area⁹⁵ or breaks arising from the transformation of existing institutional arrangements,⁹⁶ but neoliberals are not specific enough on this to subject their statements to rigorous testing.

The lack of testable hypotheses about the decline of institutions is a major deficiency of neoliberal institutionalism. This is evident with regard to alliances because almost all alliances dissolved once the original threat faded. There is a need, therefore, to reexamine the basic concepts underlying neoliberal theory to see whether they are sufficiently differentiated. It can be argued that alliances are institutions with characteristics different from institutions in the area of low politics. Perceived military threats are for realists and neorealists powerful explanatory factors for the formation, persistence, and decline of alliances, and it is not plausible to argue, as neoliberals implicitly do, that the causes of regime formation, persistence, and decline in the fields of political economy or environmental protection are functionally equivalent to them.⁹⁷

Differences in institutional characteristics should be taken into account. In his earlier writings Keohane distinguished between control-oriented regimes and insurance regimes. The main characteristic of the former is controlling and regularizing patterns of behavior internally among the members of the regime (GATT, Bretton Woods). An insurance regime seeks to regularize behavior not only among the members of the regime but also, and mainly, between them and outsiders. For an insurance regime to be formed member states must conclude that they cannot control their external environment effectively.⁹⁸ Introducing this internal-external distinction does not tell us what different causal patterns may be involved in the formation, persistence, and decline of alliances from a neoliberal perspective but it provides a starting point for further research. In doing so, neoliberal institutionalism may benefit from and refine neorealist theory by building on some of the insights in neorealist alliance theory and by applying it more broadly to low-politics issues.

THE FUTURE OF NATO: DISSOLUTION OR TRANSFORMATION?

Why NATO Will Break Up: Neorealism's Case

When making predictions about the future of NATO, neorealists must consider not only the end of the Soviet threat but also the alignment behavior of third states and the reductions of Western defense expenditures, because the latter factors could mitigate the consequences of the Soviet empire's disintegration.

Neither of these two variables will strengthen the cohesion of NATO for the foreseeable future. Barring a dramatic reversal, Russia's military capabilities will continue to decline at least as fast as those of the major NATO states. According to CIA estimates, Russia's defense spending in 1992 was just one-third of what the Soviet Union spent in its last year of existence.⁹⁹ If the low morale of the former Soviet forces is factored in, it is clear that Russia's military capability is declining faster than the strength of NATO.¹⁰⁰ There is no reason to believe that the internal adaptation of NATO can mitigate the effects of the waning external threat.

The same is true of third powers' alignment behavior. As balance-of-threat theory predicted, Russia's newly independent neighbors currently tend to balance against it instead of allying with it. Since regional powers, according to Walt, balance against regional threats more than they do against global powers or coalitions,¹⁰¹ states such as Poland, the Ukraine, and Belarus are likely to continue to balance against Russia because they perceive it as a greater threat than the Western European members of NATO or even the United States. This would further diminish any Russian threat to the European members of NATO and therefore accelerate the disintegration of the alliance. Third parties' alignment policies are unlikely to slow down this disintegration process.

Neorealists, therefore, must predict the eventual disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance and some of them do just that. Even before the revolutions of 1989 Walt argued that a decline in the Soviet threat would encourage the Western alliance to devote less effort to deterring a direct military challenge, and that members of NATO would worry less about engaging in cooperative relations with East European states. A continued lessening of Western perceptions of threat may eventually lead to the dissolution of NATO.¹⁰² At the end of the 1990s Glenn Snyder predicted that events in Europe may lead to a multipolar world, within which NATO and the Warsaw Pact may collapse or be radically transformed.¹⁰³ Finally, at a Senate hearing in November 1990, Waltz stated that the years of NATO as an effective military alliance were numbered: "NATO is a disappearing thing. It is a question of how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may linger on."¹⁰⁴

These predictions predate the end of the Soviet Union, so we may assume that today these three scholars would unambiguously forecast the eventual dissolution of NATO. More formally we may, therefore, deduce the following predictions from neorealist alliance theory. First, over the short term NATO members will renationalize and reduce their efforts to coordinate their security policies, military strategies, and force planning, with the result that their policies in these areas will become less and less compatible with one another as member states aim to optimize the trade-off between the goals of

security and independence.¹⁰⁵ With a diminished Soviet threat, alliance members would be less willing to accept the constraints of joint planning procedures, and being less dependent on their partners they will pay less attention to their partners' preferences when formulating their own positions. Security policies will increasingly reflect national priorities rather than alliance aims, and doctrines and force postures will be optimized for the defence of national instead of allied territory. National postures would emphasize low-readiness units instead of high-readiness mobile forces optimized for the defence of exposed allies such as Norway and Turkey.

Second, countries will pursue unilateral initiatives on foreign policy issues which used to be regulated by NATO, such as arms control and security relations with Moscow, adopting policies which are not backed by their allies (for example, force deployment to a region in crisis). They will also care less whether a unilateral initiative is compatible with the preferences of their partners.

Third, bargaining among alliance members will become more intense as they pay more attention to relative gains and the distribution of costs associated with alliance policies and projects. NATO members will be more inclined to renegotiate contracts and alliance decisions such as burden sharing arrangements, spending on common infrastructure programs, representation within alliance bureaucracies, they perceive as unfair. They will also bargain harder to ensure that they benefit from new regulations at least as much as their partners.

Fourth, in addition to diverging security policies there will be a decline in military integration and fewer cooperative projects between NATO members. This is to be expected for two reasons: (1) Alliance members will be less willing to join cooperative projects which they perceive as being more advantageous to their partners; (2) Because of their fundamental interest in enhancing their independence, members will shy away from those arrangements and projects which could make them dependent on their NATO partners. Thus, division of labor arrangements between NATO countries will erode and dwindle.

Finally, NATO will eventually dissolve and members of the alliance will no longer expect alliance partners to honor their core commitments. As Walt writes, "Without a clear and present threat, neither European politicians nor U.S. taxpayers are likely to support a large U.S. military presence in Europe. Although the elaborate institutional structure of NATO will slow the pace of devolution, only a resurgence of the Soviet threat is likely to preserve NATO in anything like its present form."¹⁰⁶

This prediction marks the clearest difference between neorealism and neoliberalism. However, it is also vague in that neorealist alliance theory cannot predict at what point NATO will disintegrate. As some neorealists

admit, it is hard to say how long NATO can survive without undermining the plausibility of neorealist alliance theory.¹⁰⁷ The survival of NATO also depends on non-structural factors such as domestic pressures to cash in the peace dividend not covered by the theory. Moreover predictions about the longevity of NATO depend on which version of neorealist alliance theory one prefers, because the theories of Waltz and Walt have different implications for the resilience of NATO.

There are four reasons why Walt's balance-of-threat theory would predict a faster dissolution of NATO than would Waltz's balance-of-power theory. Balance-of-threat theory predicts less balancing effort by NATO members because balancing is a function not only of relative capabilities but also of perceived intentions; to the extent that Russian intentions continue to be perceived as less threatening than those of the former Soviet Union, NATO members would lessen their efforts to balance against Russia. Second, for Walt balancing is also a function of geographic proximity, so NATO would reduce its balancing efforts as Soviet forces are withdrawn to the East. Third, because balancing is also a function of the opponent's offensive capabilities, balancing by NATO would decline as these capabilities are reduced.¹⁰⁸ Finally, because regional powers balance against regional threats more than they do against global powers or coalitions, states such as Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus would balance against Russia because they view the threat it poses to their security to be greater than the threat posed by the Western European members of NATO or even the United States. This would further diminish the threat to NATO and accelerate its disintegration.

Thus, according to both versions of neorealist alliance theory, NATO will not survive for long the end of the Soviet threat. Realists cannot predict precisely when NATO will disintegrate, but the longer it continues to operate as an alliance, the more the plausibility of neorealist alliance theory will suffer. While balance-of-power theory could accommodate the existence of NATO for a while, the reputation of balance-of-threat theory would be increasingly undermined each year the Western alliance carries on.

Why NATO Will Survive: Neoliberal Institutionalism's Case

Neoliberal institutionalists do not emphasize the tendency of states to maximize autonomy whenever possible. They argue that the end of the Soviet threat would not suffice to cause the disintegration of NATO. The calculation of self-interest of NATO members would have to change fundamentally for the alliance to disappear. Most importantly, member states would have to have important incentives to abandon their commitments. Neoliberalism does not offer clear indications which incentives could have this effect and whether such incentives were created by the end of the Soviet

threat. Conceivably such incentives may be provided if most, if not all, other members of NATO would see their interests served by weakening or abandoning the alliance, perhaps because they see other existing or newly designed institutions serving their interests better. Still, neoliberal writings provide no specific insights as to when and on what grounds states choose among different institutions competing in the same issue area.

Even though neoliberal institutionalists would not exclude the possibility that NATO might weaken or collapse, their theory predicts that this will be a slow process if it happens at all. There are few neoliberal hypotheses that would predict the alliance's dissolution. From a neoliberal perspective, for NATO to collapse would require a fundamental structural change in the distribution of power concerning European security,¹⁰⁹ or a sharp break in relations between the states concerned.¹¹⁰ Neoliberal institutionalists concede that the distribution of power between the United States and Europe has changed during the last few years, but they reject the notion that this would lead to a deterioration of relations among NATO member states or to the alliance's collapse. They expect that NATO, for a variety of reasons, would adapt to its new environment.¹¹¹

First, the fact that NATO exists will make it unlikely to disappear. During the past forty years the alliance has set up an intricate web of institutional structures and bureaucracies.¹¹² Although NATO is not a supranational organization and decisions by the alliance depend on the consent of its sixteen members, there are elements of supranational power in the alliance's institutional structures. In addition to precise rules and procedures for the coordination of security policies and the assignment of forces to the integrated military command, NATO has also developed elaborate processes of policy coordination. The alliance has developed both a civilian and military bureaucracy, with some 2,640 people employed at its headquarters,¹¹³ and established elaborate norms of consultation and cooperation. The Alliance norms of consultation were helpful in the process of German unification. Also, the increasing involvement of NATO in the Balkans shows that bureaucratic organizations search and find new missions when old ones are accomplished.¹¹⁴ Thus, the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty *Organization* exists will make it unlikely to disappear.¹¹⁵

Second, NATO is considered one of the more successful international institutions of the post-war era, and neoliberal institutionalism argues that successful organizations are unlikely to be abandoned. Success reinforces institutions, especially during periods of uncertainty, when the international system is being transformed. As problems multiply in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, governments will turn to established institutions such as NATO. The continuing function of NATO in reducing uncertainty also applies to its historic function of binding German power in the center of

Europe. NATO statements about “keeping the balance of power in Europe” certainly relate as much to German power as they do to Russian power.

Third, NATO is the only institutionalized framework of transatlantic relations. Although the United States and the Western European members of NATO participate in other institutions such as CSCE, NATO remains the only institution for American and European officials to communicate daily at all levels of government. These channels of communication will ensure that decisionmakers take the interests of other states into account when formulating their policies.

Fourth, alliance members depend on each other’s cooperation on issues beyond NATO, and they will be wary of jeopardizing the alliance link because of the negative repercussions in other areas. Even if member states preferred to weaken or dissolve the alliance, they would hesitate to do so if powerful members opposed it, especially if the latter threatened retaliation. Neoliberals would thus predict that the institutional set-up of NATO would not be fundamentally altered unless states in a position to retaliate agreed to it.

Neoliberal institutionalists do not ignore the strains and challenges the organization faces. Keohane states he is unwilling to predict that NATO will still be around in the year 2000 because it is not clear that both the United States and Europe will regard NATO as continuing to be in their interests,¹¹⁶ but argues that institutionalists would expect NATO to use its organizational resources to persist, by changing its tasks.¹¹⁷ Neoliberals thus do not emphasize the disappearance of the Soviet threat as a decisive factor leading to the dissolution of the Western alliance. Economic interdependence between Western Europe and North America provides incentives for cooperative solutions, leading to the continued existence of NATO with its underlying principles and norms, mainly the indivisibility of threats, unaltered. With the consent of the major states, NATO could also incorporate new security functions, such as peace keeping, peace making, and other concert mechanisms, in order to meet the challenges of a new security environment.

NATO AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORIES’ PERFORMANCE

It is too early for a conclusive evaluation of the theories’ predictive power. What follows is a sketchy and impressionistic comparison of the theories’ predictions regarding the performance of NATO since the end of the Cold War.

Neorealism’s Predictions

As neorealists expect, some member states pay less attention to NATO rules and

procedures when deciding on their defense policies. The United States designed its base force concept with little consideration to the allies' concerns. NATO partners were informed only after force reductions had been decided in Washington.¹¹⁸ No prior consultations preceded the British decision to reduce and restructure its force.¹¹⁹ Canada's announced withdrawal of its troops from Europe by 1994 was described by one NATO official as a "very unpleasant surprise".¹²⁰ Also, when Belgium surprised its allies with a plan to cut its army by half and to abolish conscription, Secretary-General Wörner of NATO felt compelled to remind Brussels of its alliance commitments, warning that the planned reductions could harm the alliance's cohesion to the extent that they might prevent the Belgian army from meeting the needs of NATO.¹²¹ Finally, in February of 1993 German chancellor Helmut Kohl announced his government's intention to cut the Bundeswehr below the 370,000 troops allowed for by the Two-plus-Four treaty.¹²² As a result of these unilateral force reorganizations,¹²³ the plan of NATO to maintain five corps for its main defense forces is no longer realistic.¹²⁴ There is thus evidence that the rules and procedures of NATO are increasingly ignored by member states, and as a result the alliance's force planning process, one of its most cherished accomplishments, has come under pressure.¹²⁵

From a neorealist perspective what is striking, however, is the direction some of these force changes take. As the common threat vanishes, realists expect NATO members to reorient their armed forces to the defense of the national territory, relying on heavy mechanized forces and a large pool of reservists only a conscript army can provide. Developing force trends point in the opposite direction. In accordance with the decision of NATO to establish an allied rapid reaction corps, many member states are setting up intervention forces for deployment to distant regions. The professionalization and mobility of forces is enhanced at the expense of their firepower and potential for reconstitution. Forces are optimized for the defense of far-away allies rather than for the protection of national borders.¹²⁶ It remains to be seen whether these ambitious plans for reorganization will be implemented in times of shrinking defense budgets, but the fact that these plans were made is at odds with neorealist expectations. Their implementation would cast doubts on neorealist alliance theory.

Neorealism's second prediction, that NATO members would pursue unilateral *Ostpolitik*, is difficult to assess without access to the consultations in the North Atlantic Council. There were only a few significant initiatives which were not preceded by NATO consultations, one being German unification. Chancellor Kohl announced his Ten-Point plan for a confederation between the FRG and the GDR without prior consultation with NATO allies; during the Two-plus-Four talks, the details of unification and some of united Germany's obligations as NATO member were settled directly between Kohl

and Gorbachev.¹²⁷ Another example was Britain's and France's proposal for a three-power meetings on the future of Soviet nuclear weapons. Before 1989 the Soviet nuclear threat was dealt with in the context of the alliance, but after the 1991 coup France and Britain wanted to discuss these problems only among the alliance's three nuclear powers. At U.S. insistence these meetings eventually were confined to experts, without involving senior officials.¹²⁸ Also, in spite of the outward appearance of a joint stance with regard to the future of CSCE, the positions of NATO members increasingly diverge as to the long-term potential of this institution. Whereas in the past the main lines of conflict were drawn between East and West, the main disagreements today are located within the alliance.¹²⁹ In crises such as the Balkan wars, member states had different assessments of the causes and partially incompatible approaches to settle the conflict,¹³⁰ but they refrained from taking unilateral actions.

Regarding neorealism's third prediction, there is evidence of increasing disputes among NATO members about the distribution of common gains and benefits. Quarrels about the distribution of spoils are common among victorious allies, but there were few spoils to argue about after the end of the cold war. The absence of disputes about territorial ambitions or spheres of influence thus does not contradict realist expectations. Bargaining about the distribution of the costs and benefits of alliance programs such as the NATO infrastructure fund has, however, become more intense. In 1991 Turkey and Greece blocked the implementation of the infrastructure program by vetoing NATO projects on each other's territory. Turkey and Greece thus preferred to sacrifice an alliance-funded improvement of their own national infrastructure rather than accept parallel improvements in the other country.¹³¹ The resulting impasse was removed by an agreement to exempt projects in Greece and Turkey from the common budget.¹³² Another dispute arose when France claimed a right to compete for contracts funded out of the common infrastructure budget. The United States insisted that French companies could only compete for projects in areas where France contributes to the common fund of NATO, and the resulting feud blocked progress in a number of the command, control, and communications programs of NATO.¹³³ There have also been growing discussions about the distribution of costs for the common infrastructure programs. During the last years, the U.S. Congress has repeatedly cut the American contribution to the fund. In 1991 the Congress cut the administration's request from \$425 million to \$192.7 million. In response the Bush administration asked its NATO allies to extend joint financing of infrastructures to the costs arising from the prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe. In both cases the alliance failed to build a new consensus on the distribution of costs and benefits of the infrastructure program.¹³⁴

There are also indications of a decline of military integration and a decrease in cooperative projects – neorealism’s fourth prediction – although there is also evidence to the contrary. If Germany went ahead to establish an independent national command structure for the Bundeswehr,¹³⁵ the military integration of NATO would be weakened. The Federal Republic has so far lacked command structures above corps level, as NATO commanders were supposed to control the German corps in war time. With a national general staff Germany would be in a position to act independently. For a number of reasons, it is doubtful that the planned new multinational corps will compensate for this loss of military integration.¹³⁶ First, as explained above, unilateral force cuts are already unravelling the new force structure of NATO. Second, only the new rapid reaction corps is planned to be functionally integrated with a multinational staff. The other corps will have national corps commands which will assume operational control over assigned foreign divisions only in time of war.¹³⁷ Even in the case of the rapid reaction corps, however, renationalization of the assigned units will be easy because participating nations will provide their own logistics and role specialization will be avoided.¹³⁸ Examples for a decline of division of labor arrangements include the disintegration of the common surface-to-air missile belt in Germany; the Dutch and German plans to provide for their own national air defense without U.S. support; and the Netherland’s decision to acquire a transport ship for marines which in the past were to be carried by a British vessel.¹³⁹ Cooperative armaments and infrastructure programs are also in decline. The common infrastructure budget dropped by 40 percent from some \$2 billion in the late 1980s to about \$1.2 billion. In light of the ongoing quarrels about national contributions the future of the fund is now in doubt.¹⁴⁰ The joint armament programs of NATO are also facing increasing problems. As of early 1993 all of them have been frozen at the planning stage.¹⁴¹ Still, there is also evidence of efforts to free the weapons market within the alliance. In the fall of 1992 the armaments directors of the sixteen member states reached agreement on a code of conduct that marks the first real step towards opening up the protected and secretive defense business within the alliance. Although the code is not legally binding and allows many exemptions, it commits alliance members to aim for a progressive elimination of barriers to defense trade, to provide for cross-border competition, and to avoid subsidies that distort the arms market.¹⁴²

Regarding neorealism’s fifth and central prediction, there is little evidence as of now that NATO will eventually dissolve. The alliance’s institutional structures are intact and working and there are few indications that member states no longer intend to honor their core commitments. Neorealist alliance theory, however, does not say that an alliance would dissolve immediately after victory. Moreover, since the end of the cold war there has been but one

test of NATO members' commitment to the principle of collective defense. The only instance – the latent Iraqi threat to Turkey during the Gulf War – revealed that some NATO members did not show unambiguous support for their ally.¹⁴³

Neoliberal Institutionalism's Predictions

Thus far neoliberalism has not fared worse than neorealism. The alliance is still alive and member states have not questioned the validity of its central norms. NATO members negotiated a substantial reform of the alliance, agreeing to reorganize the common force structure and adopt a new strategy and a new strategic concept. NATO governments, including France, agreed to maintain NATO as a forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington treaty.¹⁴⁴ During the past two years Paris concurred with the main features of the alliance's reorganization and indicated its interest in stepping up participation in NATO consultations.¹⁴⁵

NATO also adapts to the new environment, as neoliberals expected. It shifted its focus from the defense of Western Europe to the stabilization of the continent as a whole by assigning existing structures new tasks. Building on its political bureaucracy in Brussels the alliance founded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as an institutionalized forum for a security dialogue between the alliance and its former adversaries.¹⁴⁶ The NACC illustrates the alliance's skill at devising new institutional structures to draw former enemies closer to the alliance while at the same time keeping them sufficiently at bay in order not to jeopardize the cohesion of the alliance. An indicator of the continuing significance of NATO is the eagerness of its former adversaries to become full members. Initially alliance members reacted cautiously to such appeals¹⁴⁷ because of fears of a backlash in Russia, but recently support has increased for closer relations and even membership for the Central European countries bordering NATO territory.¹⁴⁸

NATO is also playing a more prominent role in international peacekeeping operations. In 1992 the alliance decided to offer its military to the UN or CSCE on a case by case basis.¹⁴⁹ NATO was already contributing to the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when in March 1993 it also NATO offered air-borne surveillance systems to monitor the no-fly zone.¹⁵⁰ The alliance also stepped up efforts in early 1993 to prepare for the largest UN peace-keeping operation.¹⁵¹ Such an operation would mark a departure from the traditional role of NATO, and it carries risks even if the operation were successful. The alliance would be pressed to respond if a crisis threatened NATO territory because the forces of its important member states are already overstretched.¹⁵² The cohesion of the alliance would suffer if some allies were

perceived to evade participation. Germany will not contribute in a significant way to a peace-keeping operation in Bosnia even if constitutional obstacles were removed.

Despite successes in transforming and adapting the institutional structures NATO, renationalization increasingly hamper and weaken the alliance, a fact which contradicts neoliberal forecasts. Norms and procedures of prior consultations among NATO members have lost some of their force to shape national decisions, with unilateralism on the rise in defense planning and foreign policy. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the alliance's decision to use its forces for new missions will lead to effective action.¹⁵³ NATO members showed great reluctance to incur military risks in support of other European states.¹⁵⁴ While the alliance's stated intention to perform new functions is thus in line with neoliberal forecasts, it is still not clear whether NATO will follow through instead of pursuing only symbolic security politics.¹⁵⁵

The performance of NATO since the end of the cold war has thus far not provided unambiguous support for either theoretical perspective. The trend towards renationalization of defense policies among NATO members is an ominous development and there is little evidence that it will be arrested. If we base our prediction on current developments we can rule out the persistence scenario, that is, that NATO will remain an alliance committed only to the defense of its members. The question for the alliance is whether the continuing decline of cohesion in its traditional domain can be compensated by increasing cooperation in its new domain, that is, the stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe (the adaptation scenario).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKING

We may draw four conclusions from this analysis. First, in spite of their similar origins, neorealism and neoliberalism offer differing perspectives on the future of NATO.¹⁵⁶ Neorealist alliance theory predicts that the cohesion of the alliance would weaken as the threat from the former Soviet Union wanes, and that it is only a matter of time before NATO ceases to be an effective alliance. Neoliberals assert that the high degree of the institutionalization of NATO guarantees its survival in some form. The Alliance will either persist in its current form or adjust to the new security environment by cooperative arrangements among its members.

These diverging predictions are a valuable test of the predictive power of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. It is especially valuable because the future of NATO is open. In contrast to the analysis of historical cases, scholars, in addressing the future evolution of NATO, cannot use ad hoc hypotheses to make their theories compatible with their case. The openness

of the future of NATO, therefore, provides neorealist and neoliberal scholars with the opportunity to substantiate their theoretical claims by putting forward sufficiently precise predictions now.

Second, this test is relevant because the debate between the two perspectives is important for practitioners in the field of international security. If we base our expectations on the neoliberal perspective, we need not worry about the future of NATO. As long as there is agreement on the meaning of the basic norms and principles of the alliance, the existence of NATO will not be threatened. To maintain this consensus members should address differences of interpretations brought about by the new international environment, and if institutional changes are necessary, they should be framed in ways acceptable to all member states. The recent resolution of the dispute surrounding the Franco-German corps is a case in point.¹⁵⁷

If we base our expectations on the neorealist perspective, we would recommend a different policy. Politicians attempting to slow down the disintegration of NATO should abstain from adding new commitments such as peace-keeping or out-of-area operations to the alliance's agenda because these commitments would speed up disintegration by restricting national autonomy in ways unacceptable to member states. Even skillful strategies, however, will not save the alliance in the absence of a threat. Decisionmakers should have no illusions that they can prolong the alliance's existence for longer than a few years, and should no longer insist on an alliance-wide consensus on issues where member states' interests increasingly diverge. Such efforts would unnecessarily strain relations among them and affect their cooperation on other issues in which cooperation remains vital to them individually. Rather than invest their energies to preserve a doomed alliance, NATO members should devise new instruments and mechanisms such as a contractual relationship between the EC and the United States that would enable them to base their relationship on a new foundation.¹⁵⁸

The two theoretical perspectives suggest different recommendations with regard to the building of new European security institutions, such as the European defense identity or a collective security system based on the CSCE. For neorealists it is not advisable to create such institutions unless they are directed against specific threats, because member states will disregard support obligations unless they perceive an aggressor as a threat to their own national security. As Waltz quotes Thucydides, "mutual fear is the only solid basis of alliance."¹⁵⁹ Neoliberals claim that states, having entered into security commitments, tend to refrain from renegeing on them because they fear retaliation and damage to their reputation as reliable partners. Security institutions such as a European defense identity or collective security mechanisms can work, provided mutual security interests exist, even if its members do not perceive a specific and common threat to their security.

Neorealism appears to be the superior perspective in that its predictions are more specified than those of neoliberal institutionalism. The most obvious weakness of the neoliberal perspective is that it has not yet advanced sufficiently precise hypotheses about the rise and decline of international institutions which take into account the differences between issues in the realms of low politics and security. Neoliberals have focused on theorizing about the consequences and endurance of institutions in the face of changing state interests, while neglecting to examine the collapse of international institutions. They should now advance hypotheses covering the entire life cycle of institutions. As long as they fail to do so, neorealism should be considered the richer perspective with regard to alliance dynamics.

Neorealism, too, shows weaknesses. Its structural version in particular is troubled by a vague concept of power¹⁶⁰ and by its limited ability to predict the interplay between the disintegration of winning alliances and the alignment tendencies of neutral states. Both weaknesses are redressed by less parsimonious versions of neorealist alliance theory, notably by Walt's balance-of-threat theory. Walt's theory, however, shares one deficiency with Waltz's in that it provides few hypotheses as to how states react to the trade-off between internal and external balancing. In its current form, balance-of-threat theory does not tell us how the preferences of states are affected with regard to internal and external adaptation to waning threats. This weakness warrants further attention in refining neorealist alliance theories.

NOTES

1. This is the dominant view among officials of Western governments and analysts. For a sample of official statements, see "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," issued by the heads of state and government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7–8 November 1991, *NATO Review* 39, no. 6 (December 1991): 19–22; Speech by President Bush at the NATO summit, 7 November 1991, *U.S. Policy Information and Texts*, no. 150, 8 November 1991, pp. 21–24; "Erklärung der Bundesregierung," *Bulletin, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, no. 124, 7 November 1991, pp. 985–87; John R. Galvin, "From Immediate Defence Towards Long-term Stability," *NATO Review* 39, no. 6 (December 1991): 14–18; Klaus Kinkel, "NATO's Enduring Role in European Security," *NATO Review* 40, no. 5 (October 1992): 3–7; Manfred Wörner, "A Vigorous Alliance – A Motor for Peaceful Change in Europe," *NATO Review* 40, no. 6 (December 1992): 3–9; speech by the secretary-general of NATO Manfred Wörner at the Munich Conference for Security, 7 February 1993, in which Wörner characterized the alliance as "a source of stability, if not *the* major source of stability" in Europe and "even globally" (*NATO Press Service*). For a sample of views among members of the strategic studies community see Paul H. Nitze, "America: An Honest Broker," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 9;

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Kurt Biedenkopf, Motoo Shiina, *Global Cooperation After the Cold War. A Reassessment of Trilateralism* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1991), 36–38, 45; *The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe. A Report by the Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991); Robert A. Levine, "Introduction," in Robert A. Levine, ed., *Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Crane Russak, 1992), 11; Stanley R. Sloan, "U.S. Needs New NATO Vision," *Defense News*, 6–12 April 1992, p. 28; Steve Weber, "Does NATO Have a Future?" in Beverly Crawford, ed., *The Future of European Security* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 360–95. Public opinion data generally seem to support this view. For a summary of pre-1990 patterns of American attitudes toward NATO see Thomas W. Graham, "Mass Publics and Elite Politics: American Attitudes on NATO and European Security," in Wolfgang F. Dankspeckgruber, ed., *Emerging Dimensions of European Security Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), 303–16. For more recent data see the appendix in Stanley R. Sloan and Catherine Guicherd, "NATO's Future: A Congressional-Executive Dialogue," *Congressional Research Service*, 23 January 1992, for Western European attitude toward NATO in the late 1980s see Philip A. G. Sabin, "Western European Public Opinion and 'Defense Without the Threat'," in Dankspeckgruber, *Emerging Dimensions of European Security Policy*, 290–302; for a more recent survey see Steven K. Smith and Douglas A. Wertman, "Redefining U.S.-West European Relations in the 1990s: West European Public Opinion in the Post-Cold War Era," *PS Political Science and Politics* 25, no.2 (June 1992): 188–95; for evidence that public support for NATO is slightly decreasing in some countries see Erika v. C. Bruce, "NATO's Public Opinion Seminar Indicates Continuing, but Not Unshakable, Support," *NATO Review* 40, no. 2 (April 1992): 3–8; and "French Support Is Eroding for NATO Alliance," *International Herald Tribune*, 16 October 1992, p.2. Recent developments in German attitudes toward NATO (which represent a special case because of the incorporation in NATO of a former Warsaw Pact member state) is presented in Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence*, RAND Note N-3522-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992); and for an update, Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany's Geopolitical Maturation. Strategy and Public Opinion after the Wall," *RAND Issue Paper* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, February 1993).

2. See Robert Hunter, "Europe, the United States and the End of the Cold War," *International Spectator* 26, no. 1 (January–March 1991): 40–41; Ernst-Otto Czempel, *Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Das Internationale System nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts* (München: Beck, 1991), 62; James Goodby, "Commonwealth and Concert: Organizing Principles of Post-Containment Order in Europe," *Washington Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 80; Hans Binnendijk, "The Emerging European Security Order," *Washington Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (Autumn 1991): 73; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 9; Gregory Vistica, "Military Chairman of NATO Sure the Alliance Will Survive," *San Diego Union*, 18 September 1991, p. 3.
3. Those who argue that NATO should be dissolved are still a minority. See Michael Vlahos, "The Atlantic Community: A Grand Illusion," in Nils H. Wessel, ed., *The New Europe, Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science* 88, no. 1 (Toronto 1991): 187–201; Doug Bandow, "NATO: Who Needs It?" *Defense and Diplomacy* 9, nos. 9–10 (August–September 1991): 22–23; Daniel T. Plesch and

David Shorr, "NATO: A Dinosaur in Tomorrow's Europe?" *International Herald Tribune*, 25/26 July 1992, p. 8; see also Robert Keatley "Mission Unknown. As NATO Struggles with Identity, Some Ask, Who Needs It?" *Wall Street Journal*, 2 June 1992. The number of those who think that NATO survival is in doubt or even unlikely is much larger than that, even though many of the analysts who are either sceptical or pessimistic disagree as to the reasons for their assessments; for a sample see Henry Kissinger, "The End of NATO?" *Washington Post*, 24 July 1990, p. A23; Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Needs Renewal in a Changed World," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 March 1992, p. 5; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5–6; Hugh de Santis, "The Graying of NATO," *Washington Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (Autumn 1991): 51–65; Pierre Hassner, "Europe Beyond Partition and Unity: Disintegration or Reconstitution?" *International Affairs* 66, no. 3 (July 1990): 461–75; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe," *Survival* 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 47; Richard Ullman, *Securing Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 54; Stephen D. Krasner, "Power, Polarity, and the Challenge of Disintegration," in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., *America and Europe in an Era of Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security," *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (July 1991): 436. Buzan's argument is particularly interesting because he sees "the traditional alliance structures of the Cold War (to) dissolve into irrelevance" while the OECD countries will at the same time form a "capitalist security community."

4. We avoid using the term 'paradigm' in addressing neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as theoretical perspectives. Because both perspectives agree on the basic concepts such as "state," "power," and "institutions," and because they also agree on the major methodological issues, we consider the two approaches based on a shared paradigm.
5. Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), 7–9; and Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 3–11. Two of the best recent overviews of agreements and differences in the debate between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are provided by Robert O. Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Working Paper no. 92–7; and Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3–6 September 1992). Both papers will appear in David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
6. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 16; Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 227–32.
7. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 15–16; Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics*," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 335–36; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 8 and 167; Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 2; Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions," in Ernst-Otto

Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 165–66.

8. For neorealism a harder-than-average test may be found in the field of political economy. If neorealists could provide a better explanation for the success and failure of cooperation in the GATT talks (what Grieco claims to have accomplished), then their case would be strengthened. Because NATO is a military alliance and because security issues have traditionally been the most favorable issues for neorealism, it should be at an advantage relative to neoliberal institutionalism. This advantage is balanced by the fact that NATO is not a “normal” alliance. It is highly institutionalized, which should confer an advantage to neoliberal institutionalists. For neoliberal institutionalists a harder-than-average test would be in the field of security relations, particularly with regard to security issues where institutionalization can be observed at a low level. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism thus appear to have different though equally strong advantages and disadvantages when put to the test of predicting NATO future.
9. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact may also be a good test for both theories because this alliance was highly institutionalized too. See Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in Theory and Practice. What Lies Ahead?” *Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1989): 11. In comparison to NATO and other alliances, however, the Warsaw Pact was special as it was primarily a device for Soviet dominance over its satellites. Its disintegration was caused by changes in the domestic structure of the member states. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism do not offer testable hypotheses in which change in domestic regime figures as an independent variable.
10. For recent exceptions see Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”; Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 7–57; and Keohane, “Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge.” Even though we use the terms “prediction” and “forecasting” interchangeably, we attach to both the specific meaning which John Freedman and Brian Job reserved for the latter: “a *forecast* is a statement about unknown phenomena based upon known or accepted generalizations and uncertain conditions (‘partial unknowns’), whereas a *prediction* involves the linkage of known or accepted generalizations with certain conditions (knowns) to yield a statement about unknown phenomena.” John R. Freedman and Brian L. Job, “Scientific Forecasts in International Relations: Problems of Definition and Epistemology,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 23, no. 1 (March 1979): 117–18, cited John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 6, n. 2. Emphasis in original. In his criticism of the failure of international relations theories to forecast the end of the cold war, Gaddis focuses only on forecasting, because few international relations scholars would make predictions according to the definition outlined above. See Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 10, n. 23.
11. For recent overviews of the literature and discussions of the difficulties of forecasting on the basis of theories in international relations see Robert Jervis, “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” *International Security* 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92): 39–73; and Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” 5–58. Mearsheimer argues for using “the

world as laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics." See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 8–10, 9. For a discussion of fundamental problems see Gerhard Bruckmann, ed., *Langfristige Prognosen. Möglichkeiten und Methoden der Langfristprognostik komplexer Systeme* (Würzburg, Wien: Physica Verlag, 1977); Nazli Choucri and Thomas W. Robinson, eds., *Forecasting in International Relations. Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1978), esp. Nazli Choucri, "Key Issues in International Relations Forecasting," 3–22; and Thomas W. Milburn, "Successful and Unsuccessful Forecasting in International Relations," 79–91; Hans Lenk, "Keine allgemeine logische Strukturgleichheit von Erklärung und Voraussage," in Hans Lenk, *Zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie und Sozialwissenschaft* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 40–51.

12. These are the often cited substantive reasons why social scientists should refrain from making predictions. There are other reasons. Being proven wrong is often considered synonymous with failure. We agree with Gaddis that "that is why so many theorists – however confident they may be about the validity of their theories – avoid that exercise altogether. It is also the case that failed forecasts can provide insights into the causes of failure: in that sense, they can be just as valuable as forecasts that succeed." Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," 37.
13. See, for instance, Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," 46–61. Even Gaddis tries to preempt the charge of pharisaism by pointing to some failed forecasts of his own. See Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," 51, n. 192; and 56, n. 213. For a recent contribution of his to the post-cold war wave of forecasting, see his "Toward the Post-Cold War World," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 102–22.
14. In his critique of international relations theories, Gaddis emphasizes the modesty of "novelists and historians" for "never advertis(ing) their forecasting abilities with the frequency and self-confidence once common among political scientists." He suggests that George Kennan's and James Billington's observations about the future of the Soviet Union – made in the 1940s and 1960s respectively – may be as valuable as explicit theorizing and forecasting, even though he admits that the specific examples he cites "hardly qualify as forecasts" because they were "vague, impressionistic, and would certainly have been maddeningly elusive for anyone trying to pin down exactly what they were anticipating or when it would occur." It is difficult to guess how scholars preferring "admittedly imprecise and necessarily intuitive" approaches would fare if their forecasts were subject to the test Gaddis proposes for international relations theories. See Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," 18, for the test criteria. Many historians fall prey to the many fallacies Gaddis complained about in an earlier article. See Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base. Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," *International Security* 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 3–21. Gaddis says that to anticipate the future we should include "not just theory, observation, and rigorous calculation, but also narrative, analogy, paradox, irony, intuition, imagination, and – not least in importance – style." Gaddis, "International Relations Theories and the End of the Cold War," 57, 58. His criticism is valid, but his alternative is unconvincing.
15. One requirement is that to be policy-relevant, these predictions have to be stated free of jargon.

16. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 9.
17. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 4; Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*," 336.
18. Keohane, *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 13; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 2; Robert O. Keohane, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II. International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," *International Security* 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 193.
19. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 4, 32; Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe" *International Security* 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 198.
20. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 63; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 8, 11.
21. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 100–101.
22. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 79–128; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 7.
23. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 29; Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 29; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 8.
24. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 102–4; Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 62.
25. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 89–90.
26. *Ibid.*, 92–100.
27. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 35, 41.
28. *Ibid.*, 44.
29. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 10.
30. *Ibid.*, 10–11.
31. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II," 197–98.
32. Keohane, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II," 193.
33. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 105; Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 39, 45.
34. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 210.
35. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 116–28; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990): 104–5; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 123–25.
36. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 47; also Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 167.
37. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 29.
38. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 105–7.
39. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 89–109.
40. Keohane, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II," 193.
41. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 15.
42. Keohane, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II," 193.
43. Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 54; see also Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 257–59.
44. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 117.
45. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," 106.
46. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 128.

47. Ibid., 161–76.
48. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” 106.
49. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” 125.
50. George Liska, *Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 12.
51. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126–27.
52. Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 465; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 32; Walt claims that by integrating these additional factors into the traditional balance-of-power theory he has offered a new and improved version of realist alliance theory, which he labels balance-of-threat theory. Walt’s approach leads to slightly different predictions about the future of NATO from those of alliance theory based on structural realism. Walt’s integration of non-structural factors should be regarded as a variation in emphasis. As Waltz points out, integrating sub-systemic variables “is fully in accord with, rather than a departure of, realist assumptions.” (Waltz, “Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*,” 331). Therefore, for most of this article we do not distinguish between these two versions. For follow-up research and a debate of Walt’s balance-of-threat theory, see Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” *International Organization* 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 275–316; Eric J. Labs, “Do Weak States Bandwagon?” *Security Studies* 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 383–416; Robert G. Kaufman, “To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe,” *Security Studies* 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 417–47; Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs,” *Security Studies* 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 448–82; Robert G. Kaufman, “The Lessons of the 1930s, Alliance Theory, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Stephen Walt,” *Security Studies* 1, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 690–96; and Joao Resende-Santos, “System and Agent: Comments on Labs and Kaufman,” *Security Studies* 1, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 697–702.
53. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” 110.
54. Ibid., 113.
55. Ibid., 110.
56. Ibid., 116–117.
57. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” 125.
58. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 167–68.
59. Ibid., 126; Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 46.
60. Walt, “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” 8–9.
61. Joseph Joffe, “NATO and the Dilemmas of a Nuclear Alliance,” *Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1989): 39–40.
62. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126.
63. Ibid.; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 32.
64. Snyder, “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut,” 112–17.
65. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations*, 46–47.
66. For an interesting first step toward such a theory see Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 457–74. Waltz sees no need for such an effort as he regards the trade-off between internal and external balancing as an empirical question (correspondence with the authors, 4 September 1992).

67. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126.
68. To understand the dynamics of the rise and fall of alliances increased attention ought to be paid to non-structural factors such as security dilemma variables, perceptions, and domestic variables, in addition to those mentioned by Walt and Snyder. For different approaches along these lines see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137–68; Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73" *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 369–95; Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 285–306; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Cooperation Among Democracies: Norms, Transnational Relations, and the European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy" (Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 31 March–4 April 1992). For criticism of the weaknesses of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism with regard to domestic variables see Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations. Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics* 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 481, 488–95.
69. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 163. For an alternative definition of institutions see Oran R. Young, *International Cooperation. Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 32. The different definitions offered by neoliberal scholars suggest that an alliance such as NATO can at the same time be called a "regime" or an "organization." Young, defining organizations as "material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets," explicitly calls NATO an organization (Young, *International Cooperation*, 32, 33). According to Stephen Krasner's classic definition regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2). For an overview of differing concepts of regimes see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 493–96; Manfred Efinger, Volker Rittberger, Klaus Dieter Wolf, Michael Zürn, "Internationale Regime und internationale Politik," in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), 264–67; and Otto Keck, "Der neue Institutionalismus in der Theorie der Internationalen Politik," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 32, no. 4 (December 1991): 637–38. The definition of regime used in Krasner's 1983 volume is still widely shared among regime analysts. See *Regimes Summit*, Workshop Report of a Conference held at the Minary Center, Dartmouth College, 22–24 November 1991, Hannover: Dartmouth College, 2 December 1991, p. 2. Our definition of alliance falls between what Keohane calls "formal organizations" and "international regimes" (Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 3–4). Whether an institution resembles a more formal organization or a regime depends on the degree of institutionalization (bureaucratic structure, independent capabilities for monitoring activities, etc.). Definitions, however, are not the crucial issue. Keohane, for example, states that

- organization and regime “may be distinguishable analytically, but in practice they may seem almost coterminous” (Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 5). What is more important from a neoliberal perspective is that many of the hypotheses about the formation, persistence, and decline of any specific form of institutions equally apply to organizations and regimes. See Keohane, “The Analysis of International Regimes: Toward a European-American Research Programme,” in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, forthcoming).
70. Robert O. Keohane, “Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism,” *International Security* 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 174. Emphasis in the original. See also Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 15–16.
 71. For a recent application of regime theory to intra-alliance relations see John S. Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliances Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels,” *International Organization* 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 819–55. Elements of institutionalist theory are also present in the work of Steve Weber. See his “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 633–80; and Weber, “Does NATO Have a Future?”
 72. Neoliberal institutionalism, it is said, “is not simply an alternative to neorealism, but, in fact, claims to subsume it.” Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 15. According to Keohane, “a comparison of neorealist interpretations of alliances with a sophisticated neoliberal alternative would show that neoliberal theory provides richer and more novel insights, without sacrificing the valuable arguments of neorealism.” *Ibid.* In this sense the verb ‘subsume’ comes close to the triple (Hegelian) meaning of the German verb *aufheben*: neoliberals claim that they have preserved important neorealist insights, eliminated inadequate assumptions, and thereby improved realist and neorealist theory.
 73. Even proponents of institutionalist theory concede that research has been lacking in this regard. See Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, and Michael Zürn, “Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives,” in Rittberger, *Regime Theory and International Relations*. The difficulties of creating or maintaining security regimes have been addressed in Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, *International Regimes*, 173–94; Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58–79; Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” *World Politics* 37, no. 1 (October 1984): 1–23; Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” *International Journal* 40 (Autumn 1985): 599–627. These conceptual articles focused explicitly on security cooperation or security regimes, so it is surprising that none examines alliances.
 74. Keohane asserts that neoliberal institutionalist theory “implies hypotheses” about the creation or demise of international institutions which can be “submitted to systematic, even quantitative, examination.” Keohane *International Institutions and State Power*, 167. We have, therefore, allowed neoliberal institutionlists to speak for themselves whenever possible. However, when, in formulating testable hypotheses, we were not satisfied with the explicitness of neoliberal writings, we stated the hypotheses ourselves.
 75. The classical works are Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University

- Press, 1971); and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). Explaining the formation of international institutions, scholars place different emphasis on different types of institutions and stress different causal variables. Keohane, for example, argues that international regimes are formed because they fulfil particular functions. This is why in his earlier writings Keohane called his approach a “functional theory of regimes.” Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 85. Others conceive of regimes more broadly and reject an exclusively contractarian perspective. Oran Young argues that “self-generating” or “spontaneous” arrangements qualify as do “imposed” arrangements. Young, *International Cooperation*, 84–92, 202.
76. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 94; Young, *International Cooperation*, 199.
 77. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 88. Emphasis in the original.
 78. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 167; Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” 496; Efinger et al., “Internationale Regime und internationale Politik,” 281, n. 8.
 79. See Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” 496, for exceptions. Regarding the recent surge in studying regime effectiveness and regime robustness, see especially Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions”; and Harald Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes,” in Rittberger, *Regime Theory and International Relations*.
 80. This is similar to, but not identical with the definition provided by Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” 496. They suggested to measure strength “by the degree of compliance with regime injunctions, particularly in instances where short-term or ‘myopic’ self-interests collide with regime rules.” See also Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” 5, where he suggests that a regime should be considered to have weakened if the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the regime “become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures.
 81. Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, *When Trust Breaks Down. Alliance Norms and World Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 15, 27.
 82. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 167.
 83. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 100; see also Young, *International Cooperation*, 203.
 84. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 100; Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, 52.
 85. Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions,” 180–83.
 86. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 100.
 87. Young, *International Cooperation*, 203.
 88. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 5–6; and Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions,” 166–75.
 89. Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions,” 188–190.
 90. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 103–4; see also Young, *International Cooperation*, 203; and Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions,” 188–90.
 91. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 105.
 92. *Ibid.*, 108; Young, *International Cooperation*, 203; Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms” *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1107–8.
 93. On the internalization of institutional norms see Axelrod, “An Evolutionary

- Approach to Norms," 1104 and Müller, "The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments."
94. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 107.
 95. Efinger et al., "Internationale Regime und internationale Politik," 275.
 96. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions," 183.
 97. For a similar view see Celeste A. Wallander, "International Institutions and Modern Security Strategies," *Problems of Communism* 41, nos. 1–2 (January–April 1992): 51. For earlier discussions of the differences between security issues and political economy issues with regard to regime formation see Jervis, "Security Regimes," 174–76; Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," 12–18; Stein, "Detection and Defection," 611–15.
 98. Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Krasner, *International Regimes*, 167–70. Keohane characterized military alliances as "an extreme case of attempts at environmental control" (p. 168); see also Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 193; and Michael Zürn, who distinguishes between "internal" and "external regimes," in his *Gerechte internationale Regime. Bedingungen und Restriktionen der Entstehung nicht-hegemonialer Regime untersucht am Beispiel der Weltkommunikationsordnung* (Frankfurt: Verlag Haag und Herchen, 1987), 39–40.
 99. "Gates Warns On Stresses In Moscow's Atomic Arsenal," *International Herald Tribune*, 26 February 1992, p. 1.
 100. On morale problems in the former Soviet forces see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *The Fading Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline*, Report of the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 9 July 1990 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 9–14; Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Military Reshapes in Response to Malaise," *Orbis* 35, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 179–94; John D. Morrocco, "Soviet Military Breakdown Worries U.S. As Control Over Nuclear Arms Splinters," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 16–23 December 1991, p. 20; Jim Hoagland, "Red Army Retreats From Empire to Face New Battles at Home," *International Herald Tribune*, 22 June 1992, pp. 1 and 4; Manfred Rowold, "Der schleichende Zerfall der Sowjet-Armee," *Die Welt*, 3 March 1993; Michael Evans, "A Russian Army out of Orders," *Times* (London), 10 March 1993.
 101. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 264.
 102. Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 8–9.
 103. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," 121.
 104. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Relations in a Multipolar World*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 26, 28, and 30 November 1990 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 210.
 105. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," 116–17.
 106. Walt, preface to the paperback edition of *The Origins of Alliances*, vii.
 107. Waltz, in particular, points out that skillful diplomacy can retard the alignment effects of structural shifts. See Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*," 343.
 108. On defensive restructuring of the forces of the former Soviet Union see U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 29, 73, 77, 80–81; see also *The Military Balance 1991–1992* (London: Brassey's, 1991), 30–36.
 109. As Keohane states, changes in the distribution of power will "create pressures on

- (...) regimes and weaken their rules." Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, 168; see also Efinger et al., "Internationale Regime und internationale Politik," 275.
110. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions," 183.
 111. Adaptation (or "evolution," as Keohane states) can mean different things. With regard to the strengthening or weakening of the degree of institutionalization it can mean both. However, the thrust of neoliberal institutionalism implies that whether or not the degree of institutionalization is increased or reduced, this will be a process perceived to be in the interests of most states concerned, especially the major powers.
 112. See *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), 317–64, for an official and detailed description of institutional structures.
 113. *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), 83.
 114. On one of the more telling recent examples about the redesignation of NATO working groups see Rolf Hallerbach, "Von den Schwierigkeiten, eine Arbeitsgruppe zu stoppen. Parkinsons Gesetz waltet auch in der NATO," *Europäische Sicherheit* 41, no. 12 (December 1992): 666.
 115. Even neorealists such as Walt note the significance of the high level of institutionalization of NATO. In an article that was completed before the Eastern bloc started to crumble, he predicted that although the strains on NATO and the Warsaw Pact would increase due to a second phase of détente in East-West relations, alliance relationships would not be fundamentally altered on either side because of "their high level of institutionalization." Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 11. Emphasis in original. Walt emphasized one of the central arguments of neoliberal institutionalism by arguing that NATO and WTO would remain basically unchanged because "these alliances feature tightly integrated military command structures governed by elaborate, partly autonomous transnational bureaucracies." Even though Walt appeared to accept neoliberal premises he left open the possibility that NATO might dissolve as the result of a "campaign" to reduce "perceptions of a 'Soviet threat'." *Ibid.*, 8–9.
 116. Keohane, *Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War*, 31, n. 16.
 117. *Ibid.*, 25.
 118. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1991*, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 168.
 119. Richard Mottram, "Options for Change: Process and Prospects," *RUSI Journal* 26, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 22–26; Colin Brown, "Cuts May Hit Defence Commitments," *Independent*, 9 October 1992.
 120. The pullout was proclaimed by the Canadian finance minister. See John Best and Michael Evans, "Canada to Withdraw All Troops from Europe," *Times* (London), 24 February 1992; see also Hella Pick and David Fairhall, "NATO Dismay at Canada's Pullout from Europe," *Guardian*, 27 February 1992.
 121. "Restructuring/Belgium: Planned 50% Reductions Could Undermine NATO Cohesion," *Atlantic News*, 11 December 1992, p. 3; see also "Die belgische Armee wird halbiert," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 February 1993.
 122. "Die Bundeswehr wird erheblich kleiner. Aber bei der Wehrpflicht soll es bleiben," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 February 1992, pp. 1, 2; Joseph Fitchett, "Bonn Takes Heat on Troops," *International Herald Tribune*, 8

- February 1993. While NATO officials apparently had not been informed in advance, the German chancellor in a subsequent news conference promised not to reduce the Bundeswehr without prior consultations with the allies. According to the well-informed German newspaper *Die Welt*, defense planners in Bonn thought that a reduction to 300,000 troops would be acceptable, see "Nur noch 300,000 Soldaten," *Die Welt*, 10 February 1993. For a background to the decision-making process, see Rüdiger Moniac, "Ruhe: 300,000 Soldaten sind für den Kanzler akzeptabel," *Die Welt*, 15 February 1993; for reactions at NATO headquarters see also Michael Binyon, "German Cuts Deepen Concern Over NATO's Dwindling Ranks," *Times* (London), 10 February 1993; and Heinz Schulte, "Speak Loudly and Drive a Small Tank," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 February 1993, p. 10.
123. For an overview of troop cuts in all NATO member countries see Rainer Koch, "Immer weniger Soldaten: Die NATO schrumpft auf breiter Front," *Die Welt*, 11 February 1993; and Karl Feldmeyer, "In der NATO beginnt das große Sparen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 February 1993; if implemented, these troop cuts would reduce NATO forces in Western Europe from 2.5 million to 1.9 million.
 124. Martin du Bois, "Crumbling Pillar: Rush to Cut Military Leaves NATO's Plans For Europe in Disarray," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 January 1993; Binyon, "German Cuts Deepen Concern Over NATO's Dwindling Ranks."
 125. See also Jan Willem Honig, "The 'Renationalization' of Western European Defense," *Security Studies* 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 128.
 126. See the worries of NATO secretary-general Manfred Wörner that member countries are modernizing mobile reaction forces at the expense of their main defense forces. "Woerner: Discussion on Peacekeeping at NATO on Tuesday – Concept of 'Interlocking Institutions' Enlarged upon – Warning against Over-Reduction," *Atlantic News*, 27 January 1993.
 127. Gunther Hellmann, "Die Westdeutschen, die Stationierungstruppen und die Vereinigung: Ein Lehrstück über den 'Totalen Frieden?'" in Gunther Hellmann, ed., *Alliierte Präsenz und deutsche Einheit: Die politischen Folgen militärischer Macht* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, forthcoming). For a detailed first hand account of the negotiations between Kohl and Gorbachev in July 1990, see Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1991), 307, 319–27, 333–42.
 128. "Soviet Arms Issue, Latest Test of EC Unity," *International Herald Tribune*, 10 December 1991, p. 3.
 129. Ingo Peters, "Normen- und Institutionenbildung der KSZE im Wettstreit politischer Interessen", in *Internationales Umfeld, Sicherheitsinteressen und nationale Planung der Bundesrepublik* (Sonderforschungsvorhaben "Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV", SWP-S 383/7, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993), 25–33.
 130. William H. Taft, "It's Time to Bring Back NATO", *Wall Street Journal*, 1 July 1993.
 131. Both countries had been vetoing these projects since 1988. By 1991, however, their NATO partners were no longer prepared to work around this impasse on a project-by-project basis. See Theresa Hitchens, "NATO Hopes to Solve Budget Fray," *Defense News*, 8 July 1991, pp. 1, 29.
 132. Theresa Hitchens, "NATO May Hike Military's Role in Budget," *Defense News*, 15 July 1991, pp. 1, 28.

133. Theresa Hitchens, "U.S. and France Quarrel over NATO C³ Funding," *Defense News*, 8 July 1991, p. 29.
134. Theresa Hitchens, "NATO Plans to Finance U.S.-Based Projects", *Defense News*, 15 July 1991, p. 10; Theresa Hitchens and Neil Munro, "NATO Officials Fret Possible U.S. Cut to Infrastructure Fund", *Defense News*, 17 August 1992, p. 6; "Infrastructure: United States Reiterates Support for Extending Financing to Cover Equipment Storage", *Atlantic News*, 20 May 1992, p. 1.
135. See Christian Tuschhoff, "Machtverschiebungen und zukünftige Bruchstellen im Bündnis. Die politischen Folgen der Truppenpräsenz nach den NATO-Reformen," in Hellmann, *Alliierte Präsenz und deutsche Einheit* (forthcoming); Honig, "The 'Renationalization' of Western European Defense," 126–27.
136. For an assessment of the Bundeswehr's role in this regard see Tuschhoff, "Machtverschiebungen und zukünftige Bruchstellen im Bündnis."
137. Karl Feldmeyer, "Friedenssicherung und Krisenmanagement als neue Aufgaben," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1991, p. 5; "Final Communiqué of the Defence Planning Committee," *Atlantic News*, 30 May 1991. One German-Dutch corps and two U.S.-German corps are already in the process of being formed, see Karl Feldmeyer, "Deutsch-holländisches Korps vereinbart," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 March 1993, p. 4; and "Restructuring: Aspin and Ruehe Announce Creation of Two U.S.-German Corps, New Transatlantic Partnership," *Atlantic News*, 19 February 1993.
138. Schulte, "Speak Loudly and Drive a Small Tank"; Honig, "The 'Renationalization' of Western European Defense," 129.
139. Honig, "The 'Renationalization' of Western European Defense," 129.
140. Theresa Hitchens, "Shalikashvili: U.S. Must Fund NATO Facilities", *Defense News*, 31 August – 6 September 1992, p. 20; Johan Jorgen Holst, "Ambiguity and Promise. The Security Order in Europe in a Period of Transition: Patterns and Trends," in: *Internationales Umfeld, Sicherheitsinteressen und nationale Planung der Bundesrepublik*, 141.
141. Joseph Fitchett, "Balkans Crisis Forces Europe to Reconsider Defense Cuts," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 February 1993, p. 2.
142. Reuter report from NATO headquarters, 26 October 1992, reprinted in *WEU Press Review*, 26 October 1992; see also Giovanni de Briganti, "Scheme for European Arms Agency Falter", *Defense News*, 12 October 1992; William H. Taft, IV, "NATO Opens the Door to Defense Trade", *Wall Street Journal*, 7 May 1992; Theresa Hitchens, "France, Allies Differ on NATO Weapons Trade Issue", *Defense News*, 20 April 1992.
143. When the Gulf War escalated in January 1991 it took allied persuasion to get Belgium and Germany to deploy their national contingent of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF) to Turkey. Even after the requested forces had been deployed there were public debates about commitments under the NATO treaty in case of an Iraqi attack on Turkey. The Belgian government declared that it would not automatically support its ally but decide only after an attack had taken place whether to send its AMF contingent into combat; see David Fairhall, "Belgium Rejects UK Plea for Gulf Ammunition," *Guardian*, 3 January 1991; "L'OTAN va envoyer des avions allemands, belges et italiens en Turquie," *Le Monde*, 4 January 1991; "Bonn nicht im Einklang mit dem NATO-Generalsekretär," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 January 1991, p. 1.
144. Paragraph 22 of the new strategic concept of NATO, in *Europe Documents*, 9 November 1991. On France's role during the negotiations leading to the Rome

- agreements, see Helga Haftendorn, "Herausforderungen an die europäische Sicherheitsgemeinschaft. Vom Harmel-Bericht zur Erklärung von Rom: Ein neuer Konsens über die künftigen Aufgaben der Allianz?" *Schweizer Monatshefte* 72, no. 6 (June 1992): 473–87.
145. On France's gradual reorientation towards the alliance see Alan Riding, "Paris Moves to End Isolation in NATO," *International Herald Tribune*, 30 September 1992, p. 2; and Daniel Vernet, "Nouveau pas de Paris vers l'OTAN," *Le Monde*, 11 March 1993.
 146. "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation," *NATO Press Service*, 20 December 1991. On the origins and development of NACC, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1992): 141–51; John Barrett and Hans Jochen Peters, "NACC and the CSCE: A Contribution in the Context of the Concept of Interlocking Institutions," in *Internationales Umfeld, Sicherheitsinteressen und nationale Planung der Bundesrepublik*, Sonderforschungsvorhaben Analysen Sicherheits-/Verteidigungspolitik IV, SWP-S 383/7 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993), 69–81; see also William Drozdiak, "NATO to Establish Closer Ties to East," *International Herald Tribune*, 4 October 1991, p. 3; William Drozdiak, "NATO Welcomes Ex-Soviet States to New Council," *International Herald Tribune*, 11 March 1992; John Palmer, "NATO Agrees to Army Plan With East," *Guardian*, 2 April 1992; Günther Gillessen, "Die NATO übt sich an neuen Aufgaben," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 June 1992, p. 14; Karl Feldmeyer, "NATO unter dem Druck der Osteuropäer," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 December 1992, p. 2.
 147. See Joseph Fitchett, "NATO Must Prepare to Open Membership to the East, U.S. Says," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 November 1991, p. 1, 4.
 148. See "Wir müssen den großen Balkankrieg verhindern" (Interview with NATO secretary-general Manfred Wörner), *Die Welt*, 25 January 1993; see also recent statements by the foreign and defense ministers of Germany, Klaus Kinkel and Volker Rühle: Karl Feldmeyer, "Auf der Suche nach einem Mittelweg. Kinkel: Die NATO soll sich Mittel- und Osteuropa stärker öffnen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 March 1993, p. 5; and "Rühle für Erweiterung der NATO nach Osten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 April 1993, p. 4.
 149. Paragraph 11 of the "Communiqué of the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June 1992," *NATO Review* 40, no. 3 (June 1992): 31; see also Karl Feldmeyer, "Die NATO bereitet sich auf friedenserhaltende Maßnahmen vor," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 October 1992, p. 6.
 150. Paragraphs 3–5 of the "Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," *Atlantic News*, 19 December 1992.
 151. Theresa Hitchens and George Leopold, "NATO Eyes Plan for Peacekeeping Force in Bosnia," *Defense News*, 15 March 1993. Also, in early 1993 NATO reached agreement with the Eastern European members in the context of NACC on a document which for the first time set out concrete steps to be taken by all NACC member states to "compare and harmonize planning methods and procedures" and start discussing "assets and capabilities required for peacekeeping", cited according to Reuter (from Brussels), reprinted in *WEU Press Review*, 18 March 1993.
 152. See Colin Brown, "Cuts May Hit Defence Commitments," *Independent*, 9 October 1992; Bill Frost, "Army Overstretched by the World-Wide Call to

- Arms," *Times* (London), 29 January 1993; "Paris und London wären von Bosnien-Einsatz überfordert," *Die Welt*, 25 February 1993.
153. For disputes about the no-fly zone in Bosnia, see John M. Goshko, "NATO Officials Fail to Reach Accord on Balkans," *Washington Post*, 11 December 1992, p. A52; and Karl Feldmeyer, "NATO uneinig über Eingreifen in Bosnien," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 December 1992, p. 5; for some background to the final agreement see Don Oberdorfer, "Allies Approve Operation To Back Serb Flight Ban," *Washington Post*, 19 December 1992, pp. A39, A45.
154. See the candid remarks made by former U.S. secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger when asked about Western inaction in Bosnia: "None of the parties that I know about is prepared to take that kind of chance [of military escalation]. Maybe the new administration will be. Whether they can convince the allies is another thing ... [The fighting in the Balkans] is a problem for which at this stage there is no answer that is within the realm of what any of the major powers are prepared to do." Cited in Norman Kempster, "U.S. Unwilling to Take Risks for Bosnia, Eagleburger Says," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 January 1993, p. 2.
155. Jim Hoagland, "Security – Or Symbols?" *Washington Post*, 27 October 1992, p. 19.
156. The analysis of differing predictions derived from neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is valuable even if Boris Yeltsin and the reform forces are deposed. Even if nationalistic forces seized power in Russia, it would not invalidate the examination of competing neorealist and neoliberal predictions. Only the resurgence of a threat to NATO similar in magnitude to that posed by the former Soviet Union would make it difficult to distinguish the forecasts of the two theoretical perspectives.
157. Michael Inacker, "Eurokorps wird NATO-Befehl unterstellt," *Welt am Sonntag*, 29 November 1992; Joseph Fitchett, "Paris Concedes to NATO on French-German Corps," *International Herald Tribune*, 1 December 1992; Herbert Kremp, "Frankreich unterstellt seine Truppen im Eurokorps der NATO," *Die Welt*, 3 December 1992; David Buchan, "NATO Blessing for Eurocorps," *Financial Times* 22 January 1993.
158. See for instance "Declaration on U.S.-EC Relations," 23 November 1990, *U.S. Policy Information and Texts*, no. 161, 26 November 1990, pp. 22–25; and for further initiatives along these lines Claus Gennrich, "Bonn will die Bindung zwischen EG und Nordamerika stärken," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 June 1992, pp. 1, 2; Julie Wolf, "EC Aims to Broaden Scope of Relations With the U.S.," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 March 1993.
159. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 211, citing Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, bk. 3, par. 11.
160. See also Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*," 333.