

New Russian Military Doctrine: Sign of the Times

JAMES H. SLAGLE

United States political leaders have used the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the dramatic changes that have taken place within the Russian Republic to justify the complete restructuring and massive downsizing of US military forces. Analysts have sought to convince themselves and others that by dismantling that vestige of Soviet rule, the Red Army, the Russians effectively eliminated a major threat to peace. In June 1992, however, the Russians produced a draft military doctrine that significantly changed the doctrine of the Gorbachev era.¹ The new doctrine could be seen as too offensively oriented, too overtly nuclear, and too nationalistic. Are these criticisms valid, or is the new doctrine an understandable reaction to the problems Russia faces today?

Just two days prior to the split between Yeltsin and Rutskoi, I asked a Russian general what was to become of the proposed military doctrine. He told me that the Security Council had many things of greater importance to deal with and that eventually the doctrine would be addressed.² On 3 November 1993, shortly after the military supported Yeltsin in his struggle with Parliament, major US newspapers reported that President Yeltsin had approved a doctrine that envisioned “no potential enemies” but which called for Russia to “develop its armed forces in such a manner that would allow it to defend itself and its people.”³ The Russian military now possesses the doctrine it has been waiting for.

Recent changes in Russia, including the results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections, have obvious implications for the perceived stability of the Russian Republic. The new military doctrine reflects the military’s desire to establish a new set of national security objectives. While the military has been unwilling to publish the approved doctrine, the general assessment is that it is little changed from the 1992 draft.⁴ This article examines the historical changes and security problems that have led to a more intimidating Russian military doctrine.

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Russian Perspectives

The advent of government reforms, market-style economies, and increased personal freedoms have led many Russian military leaders to view the reforms as causing serious perceived and actual weaknesses.

Forces deployed in the Moscow Military District aren't combat-ready. None of the most important units is at full strength, while only one in four has over half the personnel actually authorized. District aviation is down to half strength. We're 45 percent short of platoon leaders and company commanders. The last call-up brought in only 25 percent of the quota—only 10 percent in Moscow. . . .

Regiments have just enough fuel for the regimental commander's vehicles and the bread trucks. Discipline is a disaster: 400 criminal proceedings for a variety of crimes had to be instituted last year [1992] alone. Some 20,500 military personnel are without housing.⁵

While this is but one Russian officer's commentary on current conditions in the Army, other data support the notion that the Russian military is not healthy. The problems faced by the military reflect the problems found in the Russian society.

An interview with the commander of the 14th Army in Moldova, Aleksandr Lebed, provided a more senior officer's perspective. General Lebed charged that "the Russian army is in lamentable condition and the assertions by the military leadership to the contrary have no basis in reality."⁶ He also criticized defense-related legislation as useless because there are no provisions for enforcement. He claimed that many units withdrawn from abroad are in disarray and are not combat-capable, and he suggested that the recent draft laws passed by parliament would only exacerbate the conscript problem.⁷ In sum, the problems of the Army of the Russian Federation are many. Morale is low, housing shortages continue to worsen, draft-evasion problems are on the increase, and evidence of corruption plagues the ranks. This is the environment in which the new Russian military doctrine has been introduced.

Russian Military Doctrine

The development and use of military doctrine is important in the normalization of international relations and the atmosphere of reforms taking place within Russia. Briefly, Russian military doctrine provides the current

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“The Russian military now possesses the doctrine it has been waiting for.”

political and tactical views on war, the use of armed forces in war, and, most important, the requirements of the military and the country to prepare for war.⁸ The new doctrine has been shaped by the internal and external constraints on the Russian society. Internally, the state system has been buffeted by disruptive social changes, fluctuating economic conditions, and the evolving process of civil-military reform. Externally, Russians fear the buildup of military forces in former buffer states, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and increased political and economic pressures from other states.

Part of the importance of Russian military doctrine lies in the fact that it has historically been a combination of military and civilian thought. The final product generally indicates dominant Russian thinking regarding perceived threats and prospective changes in force structure. Conservative proposals are often products of the Ministry of Defense, while more radical proposals are produced at the various service academies and liberal civilian institutions. To understand the doctrine, it is important to understand the conditions under which it was formulated and the future in which it must work.

Briefly the new doctrine:

- Reverts from a defensive position to an offensive “preemptive strike” capability.
- Reverts from a position of no nuclear use to a position that envisions the possible escalatory use of nuclear weapons.
- Places increased emphasis on strategic non-nuclear deterrent forces, including SLBMs, ICBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.
- Places new emphasis on the need for military technology advancements in C⁴I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence), long-range smart weapons, and increased mobility, especially in air and space.
- Draws a line at any retaliation taken against any of the 25 million ethnic Russians living in states of the former Soviet Union.

Four major influences have contributed to the development of this new doctrine. First, it is a departure from the doctrine developed during the Gorbachev era, which generally had diminished the role of the military and its part in public policy.⁹ Second, the lessons learned by Russian military leaders from their analysis of Desert Shield and Desert Storm have inspired changes in their doctrinal thinking. Third, the doctrine reflects the significance of Russia losing control of the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) and the attendant explosion of nationalism in many of those states. In this regard it also addresses the effects of the failure of former Soviet Union republics to return strategic, and possibly tactical, nuclear weapons. Finally, the presence of more than 25 million ethnic Russians (military and civilian) living in other republics has caused the military leaders to be sensitive to anti-Russian activities among the CIS nations.¹⁰

The Gorbachev Legacy

Before and through the Brezhnev era, the military-political doctrine was dominated by the military. Some analysts believe that this fact contributed to the invasion of Afghanistan and other shows of strength by the Soviets. Under Gorbachev, the lack of a threatening large-scale offensive capability drastically altered the Soviet threat. The once-feared Fulda Gap scenario all but disappeared. The strong and sometimes bellicose military leadership was forced to retreat into a supportive and defensive position.¹¹

The Gorbachev doctrine not only rewrote the way the Russian military officer was to fight, it also defined a new role for the military in Soviet society. In 1989, the Soviet Defense Minister, army General Dmitrii Yazov, wrote that there were two new elements in the Gorbachev doctrine. The first was that henceforth doctrine would be written with the expressed goal of preventing war and reinforcing international security. According to Yazov, the Soviets had long recognized the futility of using nuclear weapons and had come to realize that any form of war would be “universal catastrophe.”¹² The second new aspect was that the Russian doctrine would reflect the concept of “military sufficiency” that looked at a military with and without nuclear weapons.¹³ Thus the 1990 doctrine prohibited the development of large-scale offensive capabilities and excluded the option of launching a preemptive strike.¹⁴

The draft 1992 doctrine shows the Russian military moving to a more assertive position than it has taken since the Brezhnev era.

Russia believes that the immediate threat of world nuclear war has been significantly reduced. If it cannot be prevented, it can have catastrophic consequences for all mankind. . . .

The evolution of conventional war into nuclear war is not ruled out. . . .

The armed forces of Russia will conduct retaliatory strikes to deprive the aggressor of the capability to continue large-scale operations, disrupt his ability to reconstitute his armed forces, and weaken his military-economical potential.¹⁵

The current version of Russian military doctrine clearly shows a return to the potential use of nuclear weapons. While the use of nuclear weapons in 1990 was perceived as catastrophic in nature, by 1992 their use was believed to have catastrophic consequences *but* “is not ruled out.” As a

Russian appraisal notes, "Gorbachev's 1987 prohibition against developing large-scale offensive capabilities has decidedly been rejected. The new proposed draft doctrine clearly rejects the long-time civilian call for forces structured solely to conduct defensive operations."¹⁶

The military under Gorbachev watched as their place in the hierarchy of Soviet society and government eroded. As the military became less prominent in official functions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the premier actor in the arms control arena. Civilians began to play a greater role in other policymaking bodies as well. They assumed leadership roles in national security analysis and military affairs. Two organizations that began to take larger advisory roles were the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada. And in a major departure from the Soviet system, the military was no longer above criticism.

The Soviet military suffered a humiliating stalemate at the hands of tribal military forces in Afghanistan. The resulting withdrawal, accompanied by open and harsh public criticism of the Soviet military's performance, was a severe blow to its prestige. Then-Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that "even if the force is superior, more often than not it does not give the aggressor the planned result, and in instances it becomes a sort of boomerang which strikes its own positions."¹⁷ Press coverage from Afghanistan caused other problems for the military. The unaccustomed media spotlight made the Soviet people aware of the uncontrolled violence associated with the hazing of conscripted soldiers. Estimates of 15,000 to 20,000 deaths of young, newly trained soldiers between 1985 and 1990 have been attributed to this failure of discipline, and large numbers of the deaths have now been linked to ethnic violence.¹⁸

The reduction of the military and the rapid pullout of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the Baltic left the military unprepared to handle serious logistical and personnel problems. While there was a mandate to reduce the size of their armed forces, there were no plans for integrating military personnel and their families into Russian society. Many needed social programs for assistance with education and housing—programs which still do not exist. The housing problem, for instance, remains critical. In late 1993, there were more than 150,000 military officers and their families who were homeless, and by 1995 that figure will grow to an estimated 400,000.¹⁹

The role of the military in Russia has changed significantly. The present military leadership faces problems it has never before encountered, as the following excerpt from the 1992 draft doctrine demonstrates:

Manning the armed forces will be accomplished based on a mixture of territorial and extraterritorial principles; a combination of universal military service and voluntary contractual enlistment; social justice and equality before the law of all citizens in military service; [and] maintenance of a sufficient level of professionalization in the armed forces.²⁰

Daniil Proyektor, Doctor of Historical Sciences at the Institute for the World Economy and International Relations, confided in a recent meeting in Moscow: "What do you do with a military that for the last 80 years has been given everything it has asked for?" Dr. Proyektor, a former Soviet army colonel, also expressed deep concern over the many Russian soldiers without work and without proper food and housing—yet who still possessed their weapons. He implied that the military could be expected to endure only so much before it used its weapons to obtain what it needed to survive. He did not know how long the present condition could last.²¹

The military had long been the foundation of the Soviet political-military structure. Unlike any other time in history, the Gorbachev era allowed the military to be publicly scrutinized while the government turned away from it. As citizens of the Russian Republic learned of their military's shortfalls, the world saw a glimpse of the Soviet military that it had not seen before. Russian military leaders, feeling the pressure of reform and the need for change, lacked a model to help them adapt.

The Experience of Desert Storm

The Russian military has studied carefully the coalition's execution of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Russians saw the extensive use of air power as decisive in limiting casualties while permitting a quick ground force victory. The Russians noted that the massed Iraqi armored vehicles were vulnerable once the coalition forces gained air superiority. The Russians watched as the Soviet-style integrated and redundant air defense was dismantled. They have studied the coalition's use of long-range, stand-off precision weapons against a multitude of targets. And finally, they have become aware of the significance of the US-led coalition that not only came together but stayed together.

The following excerpts from the 1992 draft doctrine support the apparent Russian obsession with the Gulf War:

Such a war's initial period, the outcome of which is significantly determined by the readiness of armed forces' border defense formations to repel aggression and by their combat readiness, is decisively important. A specific feature of the initial period may be the fact that the enemy invasion will commence not on land but in air and sea space. . . . The destruction of economic and military targets using precision guided weapons to a great depth will be accompanied by the simultaneous or preemptive use of electronic warfare systems. . . .

In one possible scenario, the outbreak of war is preceded by a prolonged warning period. . . .

In military technical policy, in equipping the forces, the highest priority is on emerging, precision, mobile, highly survivable, long-range weapon systems, which allow combat operations to be conducted primarily without making direct contact with the enemy.²²

“The Russians learned a great deal from observing Desert Shield and Desert Storm.”

A 1992 Rand study of the Russian reaction to Desert Storm and Shield concluded, after reviewing political and military commentary, that the fundamental principles of the former Gorbachev defensive doctrine were no longer valid. The control of air-to-air combat through a procedure known as Ground Control Intercept, the use of hardened aircraft shelters, the use of central command and control without the flexibility of individual initiative, and the absence of stealth technology and standoff precision weapons had made the existing doctrine obsolete.²³ Mary C. FitzGerald, who has extensively studied the new draft doctrine, feels that for the Russians, “operation Desert Storm serves as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operation art, and tactics.”²⁴ She argues that the Russians are not only revising their doctrine, they are identifying technologies that will complement it: advanced electronic warfare devices; improved command, control, communications, and intelligence systems; and advanced conventional munitions.

Not all Russian military leaders feel as strongly about the influences of Desert Shield and Storm. Lieutenant General N. P. Klokov, Chief of the Strategy Faculty at the Military Academy of the General Staff, stated in a May 1992 presentation:

I would like to emphasize here that the Persian Gulf war was taken as the standard in studying the strategic nature of possible war. It would appear that this position, adopted in the draft “Fundamentals of Russian Military Doctrine,” is dangerous. The fact is that this war [was] “strange” in all respects [and] cannot serve as a standard.²⁵

General Klokov went on to criticize Iraqi goals, and particularly Saddam Hussein’s decision not to deliver a “preventive strike” during the buildup of the multinational force.²⁶ In the final analysis, however, the Gulf War has significantly affected Russian military thinking.

At a recent meeting at the Gagarin Air Academy on Monino Air Base, east of Moscow, the faculty and students showed interest in the employment of US air power, precision weapons, and the employment of electronic warfare tactics.²⁷ Individually, the Russian faculty and students expressed an appreciation for what the US air campaign had accomplished. However, the Russians were not willing to admit that the US equipment or the proficiency of the US pilots was superior. General Major Korol’kov, Gagarin Academy commandant, reminded his students and faculty that while weapon systems are important to a battle, it is the superior intellect of the operator that decides

the outcome.²⁸ The Russians learned a great deal from observing Desert Shield and Desert Storm, yet they continually tell themselves that if they had been the adversary, the outcome would have been different.

External Pressures

There are a number of external influences on the new military doctrine. The speed with which the Soviet Union transformed into the Russian Republic left most former Soviet neighbors to develop their own identities. While some continued to follow the lead of the new Russian leadership, others quickly took advantage of the opportunity to declare their independence. Former Warsaw Pact nations and former Soviet republics were left with infrastructures filled with Soviet bureaucrats and soldiers. Some families had lived and worked for generations outside the Soviet Union. Many had not bothered to learn the native tongue or recognize their host country's culture. They were Russian, living as Russians, and saw no need to change. A visit to Ukraine makes clear how Russian domination fueled Ukrainian desire for independence, and tempered it with a feeling of distrust.

A recent analysis of Russian-Ukrainian relations produced a poll which showed that 65 percent of the respondents felt that Russian-Ukraine relations were uneasy: "The most frequently cited reasons for this state of affairs were Russia's oil and gas 'blackmail' (34 percent), the Russian leadership's 'imperial ambitions' (31 percent), and Russia's refusal to part with the Black Sea Fleet (28 percent)."²⁹ Senior officers at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Department of Military Education recently expressed concern over the new Russian military doctrine. The Ukrainian military officers wondered about a possible future Russian intervention directed against Ukraine sovereignty. They asked whether the United States had a position on helping the Republic of Ukraine should it be threatened.³⁰ During frank discussions, there was never a question about whom the potential adversary of the Ukrainian military would be. In a classroom at the Kiev Military Institute for the Air Force, models of aircraft simulated air-to-air problems. The aggressor aircraft displayed Russian markings. It became readily apparent why the Republic of Ukraine has required all officers to take an oath of loyalty in order to serve in the Ukrainian military.³¹

Another external problem is the quarter of a million Russian military personnel and the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside Russia.³² For the military, going home means giving up a lifestyle far better than they can expect to have in Russia. The end of duty in a former Warsaw Pact nation often means a severe drop in standard of living, especially for those being demobilized. As for the civilian ethnic Russians, many have lived in other republics for decades. Some—Moscow estimates as many as 60 percent—are representatives of the former Soviet government, "dispatched to promote power and uninterested in and unsympathetic toward the local population."³³ The presence of these ethnic Russians—the so-called "near abroad"—has

created unrest in those countries and a difficult problem for Moscow. Moscow's senior leaders have openly warned the former republics against any form of reprisal against either the military or civilians. Russian presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich repeated that "Russia is responsible" for the fate of Russians living in the new states, warning the West not to think that on this issue it was dealing with Russia as "a devastated empire."³⁴

The Baltics have reacted strongly to the ethnic Russian problem. Not only have Baltic republic governments demanded immediate troop withdrawals, they continue to impose conditions which the Russians who remain find unacceptable. Moscow views these tactics as irritants and harassment. Latvia has a population composed of 52 percent ethnic Latvians and 34 percent ethnic Russians. In February 1993, the Latvian Parliament voted to remove the remains of Soviet army soldiers from a military cemetery in Riga, saying their presence offended nationalist sentiment in the Baltic republic.³⁵ Lithuania, meanwhile, finally agreed not to pursue claims against the Russian government for World War II damages if Russia would agree to remove its military personnel.³⁶

Russia sees the involvement of Russians in other areas of the former Soviet Union as having varying degrees of desirability. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev recently addressed Russian troops in Tajikistan and stated the need for more troops, "because the region was strategically important to Moscow and . . . Russian troops served as a bulwark against Islamic Fundamentalism."³⁷ President Yeltsin continues to argue that the presence of Russia's 14th Army in Moldova acts as a deterrent and serves in a peacekeeping function.³⁸ These actions and statements could be genuine peacekeeping and security measures, or they could indicate interventionist interpretations of the new military doctrine.

Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in former Soviet republics may be the most serious problem for the Russians. The proposed agreement between Ukrainian President Kravchuk and President Yeltsin for Ukraine to turn over its nuclear warheads and the Black Sea fleet leaves many unanswered questions. Is the need for uranium fuel and debt relief a vital interest to Ukraine? Is there a deeper threat of future loss of Russian oil and gas? Is this agreement by the President of Ukraine a betrayal of Ukraine's national interests? Or, is there "an emerging perception in Kiev that the West, above all the United States, is unable or unwilling fully to comprehend the geopolitical realities after the collapse of the Soviet Union?"³⁹ Some in Kiev feel that Washington has relegated Ukraine to a position of secondary importance. Time will tell whether Ukraine will easily rid itself of the nuclear weapons.

There may be another nuclear fear that has yet to be openly addressed. During a 1991 meeting at the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Alexander Kononov, Chief of the General Purpose Forces and Arms Control Section, stated that there was a significant difference between

measures taken for the security and accountability of strategic nuclear weapons and those taken for tactical nuclear weapons. He stated that his confidence was very low that the military had accurate knowledge of the numbers, storage, control, and accountability of tactical weapons.⁴⁰ With the vast numbers of smaller nuclear weapons produced, it is feasible that the former republics might still be holding tactical weapons. Against this background of uncertainty, the Russians have reported that all tactical nuclear weapons have been accounted for.

Clearly, the withdrawal of military personnel from former Soviet states, the 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the borders of Russia, and the issue of nuclear weapons remaining in the former republics have influenced the content of the latest draft doctrine. Concerning the "possible causes of war and its sources," the doctrine states:

The violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of individuals who ethnically and culturally identify themselves with Russia in the former republics of the USSR could be a serious source of conflicts. . . .

Until the nuclear arsenals have been destroyed by all states . . . we cannot rule out the threat of nuclear war. The tendency toward reducing the probability of unleashing a large-scale conventional war is getting stronger. The possibility of the outbreak of local wars and military conflicts is coming into the foreground. . . .

Russia believes that under conditions in which excess nuclear and conventional weapons are preserved, and individual states refuse to renounce first use of nuclear weapons and of military force in general, political efforts to prevent war can be effective only if they are backed up with sufficient military power for defense. Nuclear weapons and the inevitability of retaliation which they provide remain a real means of preventing nuclear attack.⁴¹

An Assessment

Russian political and military leaders have drafted a military doctrine that reflects their awareness of constraints on Russian political, economic, and military capabilities. The doctrine shows a decided emphasis upon threats that may challenge Russia's borders rather than upon power projection. Confronted with sharp reductions of both personnel and budget, the Russian military faces a larger struggle. Russia must shed 80 years of experience with Marxist theory and Leninism and begin a process of democratization and market reform. Russia's leaders fear that Russia eventually could be isolated from other parts of the world during this transition and that it could lose stature globally in the areas of politics, economics, science, and culture.

This new proposed doctrine directly affects the political and military environment in Russia. It is not a doctrine that returns the Russian Republic to previous goals of hegemony and global domination. It is a doctrine that reflects the real problems associated with the demise of the Soviet Union and

the emergence of neighboring states, some of which are nuclear powers, that seek independence. It also reflects the insecurity of the current military leaders as they build a new identity for the Russian military and attempt to return it to something resembling its former place in Russian society. While this doctrine is hardly good news to US planners, it is important to understand the sensitivities and frailties that are the basis for the doctrine's formation. Governments that support Yeltsin's domestic agenda may well find themselves ensnared in the complexities of his new military doctrine. As the Russian military continues to be downsized and restructured, it will be important to watch for changes in political-military thinking that shape the framework of the Russian military of the future.

NOTES

1. *Voyennaya Mysl*, Special Edition, May 1992.
2. During my visit to the Gagarin Academy on 20 September 1993, the Deputy Commandant, General Major Zakharov, stated that the military was comfortable without an approved doctrine, but that the doctrine would eventually be approved. Problems between the executive and legislative branches had taken priorities over doctrine approval.
3. On 6 October 1993, *Izvestiya* reported that the doctrine could be approved by the Security Council by the end of the month. The paper reported that the doctrine had not been approved since it was felt that the Parliament would use the doctrine to reproach Yeltsin. However, without Parliament, the military could pressure Yeltsin to show his support for them. On 3 November 1993 *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* announced the approval of the new guiding principles for the Russian army. There have been reports that the final version was a "milder version" (military consultant John Hines in the 15 November 1993, *Newsweek*), but most reports have the final version closely resembling the draft doctrine published in May 1992.
4. Serge Schmemmann, "Moscow Outlines 'Doctrine' For its Military of the Future," *The New York Times*, 3 November 1993, p. A-6. According to this article the new doctrine included the use of army and other forces against hostilities by nationalist and separatist groups that threaten Russia and "any attempts to undermine the constitutional order by force, attacks on nuclear or chemical installations, or the creation of illegal armed groups." This clearly sanctions the use of military forces for activities such as the attack on the Parliament.
5. Yevgeniy Morozov, "Officers Against Yeltsin," *Der Spiegel*, No. 13, 29 March 1993, p. 169. Many articles describe the loss of capability and the current dismal conditions of the Russian military. Two such articles are: US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, *Morale of the Russian Army*, September 1992; and John W. R. Lepingwell, "Is the Military Disintegrating From Within?" *RFE/RL Research Report*, 18 June 1993.
6. *Pravda*, 24 August 1993. That Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed is viewed as a strong supporter of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev lends credibility to this controversial criticism.
7. *Ibid.*
8. N. P. Klokov, "Threat Perception for Russia," *Voyennaya Mysl*, published in *Central Eurasia Military Thought*, July 1992 Special Edition, pp. 18-19.
9. *The Soviet Union* (3d ed.; Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1990), p. 194; Stephen Foye, "Gorbachev's Return To Reform: What Does It Mean for the Armed Forces?" *Report on the USSR*, RFE Research Institute, Vol. 3, No. 28, 12 July 1991.
10. Paul H. Goble, "The Russian Military Under the Guise of A Commonwealth," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 27 July-2 August 1992, p. 24; Prudencio Garcia, "Armed Forces in a Transition form a Totalitarian to a Democratic State," *Voyennaya Mysl*, published in *Central Eurasia Military Thought*, July 1992 Special Edition.
11. *The Soviet Union*, p. 93. Philipp Peterson, "Factors of Military Security and Stability in Euro-Asiatic Regions," *Voyennaya Mysl*, published in *Central Eurasia Military Thought*, No. 6-7, June-July 1992.
12. Dmitrii T. Yazov, "On Soviet Military Doctrine," *RUSI Journal*, 134 (Winter 1989), 91.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
14. Mary C. FitzGerald, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," *RUSI Journal*, 137 (October 1992), 45. FitzGerald has published several articles which tend to review the draft doctrine as having interventionist undertones. See, for example, Mary C. FitzGerald, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," *Air Force*, September 1992.
15. "Principles of Russia's Military Doctrine (Draft)," *Monthly Military-Theoretical Journal*, May 1992, p. 45. On 2 November 1993 the government announced that it had approved the military doctrine. The exact

content of this doctrine has not been published. The approval of this doctrine (or at least major parts of the doctrine, since quite possibly there are still areas that have not been agreed upon) is an indication that the military has pressured President Yeltsin for reciprocal support. Yeltsin will continue to pay a high price for the military's use of force on 4 October.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

17. Stephen J. Blank, "Soviet Military Doctrine's Requirements for a Space TVD," *Gorbachev and His Generals*, ed. William C. Green and Theodore Karasik (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 128.

18. Stephen Foye, "Rebuilding the Russian Military: Some Problems and Prospects," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 6 November 1992, p. 52. This failure to control behavior in the barracks, known as "dedovshchina," not only resulted in needless deaths but resulted in a great many anti-military public demonstrations. As these demonstrations were picked up by the Soviet media, military status began to drop to an all-time low.

19. Stephen Foye, "Grachev On Russian Military Reform," *RFE/RL Military and Security Notes*, 8-12 February 1993, p. 1.

20. *Monthly Military-Theoretical Journal*, p. 10.

21. Notes from meeting with Dr. Daniil Proyektor, Professor Doctor and Soviet Army Colonel (retired) at the USSR Institute of World Economy and Foreign Relations, 20 September 1992. Proyektor felt that the military's stance was conservative, which would not allow the military to be used to solve the internal problems of Russia. He saw no evidence of a prospective military government takeover. See also, "Russian Officers Called Demoralized," *The Sun* (Baltimore), 11 February 1993.

22. *Monthly Military-Theoretical Journal*, pp. 9-11.

23. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Gulf War and the Prospects for Military Change in the New Russia," Rand Corporation, December 1991.

24. FitzGerald, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," p. 40.

25. Klokotov, p. 19. While General Klokotov is right to question the leadership decisions of Saddam Hussein, there is no doubt that the Russians have learned a great deal from studying Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In separate meetings with members of the Russian and Ukraine military forces, there were many specific questions as to tactics, performance, use of stand-off missiles, and the employment of electronic countermeasures. Both militaries are well versed in the Gulf War.

26. Klokotov, p.20.

27. Notes from meeting at Gagarin Academy, Monino Air Base, Russian Republic, 18 September 1992.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Romann Solchanyk, "Ukraine's Search for Security," *International Relations*, 21 May 1993, p. 1.

30. Notes from meeting at Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Military Education, Ukraine, 22 September 1992. The Ukrainians have adopted a defensive doctrine and are trying to determine what force is required for "defensive sufficiency." See also, "Future of Ukrainian-American Relations," *The Atlantic Council of the United States*, 27 October 1992.

31. Notes from meeting at Kiev Military Institute for the Air Force, Ukraine, 23 September 1992. The Ukrainian Commandant was very open concerning answering questions about specific weapon systems and allowed both video and still photos of any equipment displayed. When I thanked him for his openness, he replied that there was no problem, since all of the equipment "was Russian." Also, Serge Schmemann, "Friction Rises As Ukraine and Russia Clash Over Ex-Soviet Armed Forces," *The New York Times*, 5 March 1992.

32. Goble, p. 23.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

34. *Ibid.*

35. "Latvians to Move Remains of Soldiers of Red Army," *The New York Times*, 3 February 1993, p. 6.

36. S. Girnius, "Troops Leave Lithuania," *RFE/RL Military and Security Notes*, 31 August 1993, p. 9.

37. Foye, "Grachev On Russian Military Reform," p. 4.

38. *Ibid.*

39. Solchanyk, p. 2.

40. Notes from meeting with Alexander Kononov, Soviet Academy of Sciences, Institute of USA and Canada, 23 September 1991. Concerning the status of strategic nuclear weapons, Kononov emphasized the fact that the Soviet inventory included more than 30,000 nuclear weapons of various sizes and delivery. He indicated that the Russian military was willing to divest itself of 90 percent of its strategic nuclear weapons because the military was more fearful of internal instability than it was of keeping nuclear weapons for status. Downsizing, restructuring, and the attendant morale decline in Soviet nuclear forces made it imperative that the numbers of strategic as well as tactical weapons be reduced quickly. Safety, security, and maintainability of all such weapons could no longer be assured. Also, Rose Gottemoeller, "Future Options for the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal: Three Scenarios," *New Outlook*, vol. 3, nos. 1&2 (Winter-Spring 1992).

41. *Monthly Military-Theoretical Journal*, pp. 6-7.