



New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands

Author(s): Hanspeter Kriesi

Source: *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, No. 5 (Mar., 1989), pp. 1078-1116

Published by: [The University of Chicago Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780467>

Accessed: 10/10/2013 12:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *American Journal of Sociology*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands¹

Hanspeter Kriesi
University of Geneva

The class base of the so-called new social movements is analyzed using data from the Dutch national election survey of 1986. This analysis is linked to the theory on the "new class," reconceptualized as those in the new middle class who try to defend their relative autonomy against the encroachment of the "technocrats." The analysis shows that, although the Dutch new social movements are supported by broad segments of the population, their inner circles are predominantly constituted by segments of the reconceptualized new class: the young specialists in social and cultural services, and some of the young administrative specialists in public service. In addition, the analysis documents the liberalizing effect of education for the younger cohorts and suggests a profound change of values in the postwar period.

In the United States, the remarkable degree of liberalism and dissent that the educated middle class has expressed since the late 1960s led a number of social thinkers with diverse political orientations to develop a theory of a "new class." According to this theory, a new class of "knowledge workers" has embarked on a struggle for power and status against a still-dominant "old class" of business owners and executives. Brint (1984) has presented a systematic comparison of different concepts of the new class and has tested empirically the degree of liberalism of the groups identified under each definition. The debate on the new class was, however, linked only slightly to the development of a number of contemporary social movements that had a strong appeal to the educated middle class in the

¹ This research used data supplied by the working group of the Dutch National Election studies (NKO). The helpful comments of Ruud Koopmans, Philip van Praag, Jr., and several anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged, as is the coding assistance of Ruud Koopmans. Requests for reprints should be sent to Hanspeter Kriesi, Department of Political Science, University of Geneva, Case Postale 266, CH-1227 Carouge-Genève, Switzerland.

© 1989 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/89/9405-0004\$01.50

1078 *AJS* Volume 94 Number 5 (March 1989): 1078–1116

United States and in Europe.² Under the influence of the resource mobilization approach, American social movements specialists were above all concerned with the strategic and organizational aspects of movements. The social-structural base of contemporary movements received much less attention.

Analysts of social movements in Europe were more concerned with the structurally determined growth of new protest potentials resulting from the development of Western industrial society. In contrast to the resource mobilization approach, the European “new social movement” approach (see Klandermans 1986; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988; Melucci 1984) sought to explain not how, but why, new movements arise. This European approach stressed that the new movements—such as the ecology movement, the antinuclear movement, the women’s movement, the peace movement, and the squatters’ movement—differ from the old movements (the labor movement in particular) in values and issues, action forms, and constituencies. In contrast to the old labor movement, the new social movements (NSMs) have not primarily articulated economic demands but have been more concerned with cultural issues dealing with questions of individual autonomy and with issues related to new, invisible risks affecting people in more or less similar ways, irrespective of their social positions (Brand 1987). Although the mobilization processes of these NSMs have in general been issue specific, their challenges have been intimately related to one another. The different movements have mobilized the same kinds of people, on the basis of shared general value patterns that differ significantly from the dominant ones in Western liberal democracies.³ Insofar as the constituencies of the NSMs have been

² Gouldner (1979) is an exception in this regard. He explicitly mentions the ecology movement and the women’s movement as two of the arenas where the confrontation between the new class and the old dominant class is taking place. In a recent discussion of the future of social movements, Zald (1987, p. 328) also briefly refers to the new class. In contrast to Gouldner, he thinks it hard to believe that the new class represents a base for any substantial social movement. Instead, it is, according to him, more likely to be a base for expressive styles, not systematic policies and ideological programs. Such an opinion is not unique to American theorists. Bourdieu (1982), e.g., maintains that personalizing, psychologizing, and moralizing replace politicizing in what he calls the “new petit bourgeoisie.”

³ Parkin (1968, pp. 21–31) noted the “alienation” from dominant values of activists in the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Later studies confirmed his results: Cotgrove and Duff (1980, 1981), e.g., pointed out how supporters of the environmental movement oppose the dominant value of “economic individualism.” The pronounced postmaterialism of those engaged in or closely associated with NSMs has been documented by a number of studies (see below). Moreover, supporters of NSMs typically tend to identify with leftist or center-Left positions and prefer Green or Leftist parties in all Western European countries, with the exception of Belgium (Müller-Rommel 1984, 1985; Kriesi and van Praag, Jr., 1987).

described in terms of class locations, observers have agreed that their mobilization potential is primarily located in parts of the new middle class. Several empirical studies from different European countries have supported the view that NSMs are above all instances of “middle class radicalism” (see Byrne 1986; Cotgrove and Duff 1981; Diani and Lodi 1988; Kriesi 1985; Parkin 1968). The European discussion of the NSMs has, however, not been linked explicitly to the American discussion of the new class. This paper is an attempt to link the two strands of theory by showing the relevance of the new class for the mobilization of Dutch NSMs.

THE “NEW MIDDLE CLASS” AND THE “NEW CLASS”

To understand the social structural bases of support for NSMs, I begin with a brief general conceptualization of the class structure of modern Western societies and specify my use of the allegedly “muddled concept” (Bell 1979) of the new class. To do so, I make use of Wright’s (1985) construction of classes. Wright defines classes on the basis of their effective control over productive assets. He refers to three types of such assets: assets in the means of production, organizational assets, and skill/credential assets. The owners of the means of production constitute the bourgeoisie/old middle class. Those who do not own any means of production are divided into two broad classes—the new middle class and the working class. Just like the working class, the new middle class is excluded from ownership of the means of production. In contrast to the working class, however, the new middle class exerts some measure of effective control over organizational or skills assets. The relative size of the new middle class depends on the level of organizational and skills assets that is required for membership in the new middle class. Following Wright, the level of skills required for membership in the new middle class is set in such a way that this class includes not only professionals but also semiprofessionals and highly qualified craft workers.⁴ Similarly, the

⁴ Not all occupations can be professions. A strong profession requires a real technical skill that produces demonstrable results and can only be taught. Thus the skill can be monopolized by controlling who will be trained. The skill must be difficult enough to require training and reliable enough to produce results. But it cannot be too reliable, for then outsiders can judge work by its results and control its practitioners by their judgment (see Collins 1979, pp. 132 ff.). Semiprofessions are occupations that make claims to rewards on the basis of formal qualifications but have been unable to secure full professional closure by establishing a legal monopoly or control over the number and quality of entrants (Parkin 1979, p. 102). Teachers are a typical example of a semiprofession.

level of organizational assets required is set to include not only managers but also supervisors of all sorts in the new middle class.⁵

These three broad classes can be further subdivided according to additional criteria. I will focus here on the subdivisions within the new middle class, because the new class is generally thought to be part of the new middle class and because it is to here that we expect the mobilization potential of the NSMs to have its structural roots. First of all, within the new middle class we can distinguish between those who have organizational assets at their disposal and those who do not. As Freidson (1986, p. 152) has argued most convincingly, a basic antagonism of interest exists between managers and the professional rank and file because the former are essentially concerned with the preservation of the integrity of the organization (or organizational unit) as a whole, while the latter are concerned with the preservation of the integrity of their specialized pursuit of a discipline or a profession.⁶

This antagonism between what we could call the “technocrats” and the professional “specialists” overlaps with a second division within the new middle class, the one constituted by different occupational segments. There are important differences between occupational segments in the degree to which their practitioners are oriented toward the preservation and integrity of the organizations to which they belong. Some occupational specialties are rather more “technocratic” than others, in that the type of knowledge at the disposal of their practitioners is more instrumental to the running of organizations than that of others. The practitioners of some occupational specialties typically are more oriented toward running the administration of the large-scale organizations of modern society, while others typically are more client oriented or more oriented toward the body of knowledge of the disciplines they belong to.

I suggest making distinctions among five different occupational segments in order to allow for a more detailed analysis of the ideal-typical

⁵ Delimited in this way, the new middle class also contains what has been called the “new working class.” The concept of the new working class has not entered into discussions about the new class in the United States. It has, however, played a considerable role in earlier French discussions (see Mallet 1963; Touraine 1971). Together with technical specialists, technically trained manual workers and supervisors on the shop floor were thought to form a new working class for which issues of control and alienation, i.e., the issues posed by NSMs, were assumed to be more salient than for ordinary workers.

⁶ Freidson contrasts the interests of “managing professionals” with those of “rank-and-file professionals,” but his argument can be generalized to an antagonism between managers and rank-and-file professionals, because it is precisely Freidson’s argument that managing professionals tend to develop orientations and commitments similar to those of managers.

distinction between technocrats and specialists. The occupational segment that comes closest to the ideal-type of the specialists is the category of “social and cultural specialists.” This category includes semiprofessionals and professionals in medical services, teaching, social work, arts and journalism, and other social and cultural specialists. The other four categories are all supposed to have a more technocratic character. The segment of “administrative and commercial personnel” includes managers, professional economists and lawyers, and administrative and commercial employees with some measure of skill or organizational control in private and public organizations. Although the managers are concentrated in this category, in the other four we also find persons who control organizational assets, because control of such assets has not been used for defining occupational segments. The “technical specialists” segment is made up of technical specialists proper: technical personnel, engineers, natural scientists, and of computer specialists and programmers, who form a large, mainly semiprofessional subgroup within this segment. “Craft specialists” includes highly qualified craft workers, technically trained manual workers, and supervisors on the shop floor. Together with the category of technical specialists, the category of craft specialists constitutes the new working class. Finally, the category of “protective services”—policemen, firemen, and professional military personnel—is included to account for a group that is involved in the “running of the system” in a very special way. Even if they do not hold organizational assets, agents specialized in social control or defense, just as managers, tend to be concerned essentially with the preservation and the integrity of the organizational unit they are working for.⁷

In my view, it is the specialists who form the new class, and it is the antagonism between technocrats and specialists that constitutes the struc-

⁷ To arrive at a complete conceptualization of the class structure, we also need to introduce some distinctions for the other two classes—owners of the means of production and the working class. Given that I took the Marxist criterion of ownership of the means of production as the starting point for the conceptualization, the traditional, self-employed professionals (doctors and lawyers especially) are not taken to be part of the new middle class but are considered to be part of the class of the bourgeoisie or of the old middle class. A second category among the owners of the means of production consists of the farmers. They have often been said to have a relatively high potential for supporting NSMs (see, e.g., Offe 1985). The “large employers” and the rest of the “petit bourgeoisie” form the last two categories of the owners of the means of production. The traditional distinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers is used here not to distinguish between working class and middle class but to subdivide the working class into appropriate categories. Among the blue-collar workers, a further distinction is made between skilled and unskilled workers. Taking our lead from the new class literature, we would expect the traditional professionals to have a high potential for NSMs but not the other segments of the owners of the means of production or of the working class.

tural basis for its formation. The NSMs are one of the arenas of confrontation between these two camps in the new middle class, and the political struggles of the NSMs can be thought of as contributing to the formation of the new class.

Several of the already cited empirical studies point in this direction. Brint's (1984) analysis of the liberal political attitudes of U.S. professionals has shown that the new middle class does not generally have oppositional views. He found a significant split between the social and cultural specialists and the three other occupational segments distinguished by him—the “technical professionals,” the “human service professionals,” and the “managers.”⁸ The first proved to be much more liberal than the three other categories. The split he discovered corresponds to Gouldner's (1979) division between “humanistic intellectuals” and “technical intelligentsia” as two definable segments of the new class. Gouldner, however, downplayed the significance of this split, maintaining that the two segments had common interests based on their common control of “cultural capital” and the culture of critical discourse he thought they shared.⁹

Parkin's (1968) perceptive study of the occupational composition of the supporters of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in the 1960s points in a similar direction. He made a distinction between professionals who are engaged in the “welfare and creative professions”—for example, social work, medical services, teaching, the church, journalism, art, architecture, scientific research, and so on—and professionals who are engaged in the world of business and commerce. His category of welfare and creative professions roughly corresponds to my category of social and cultural specialists. As he had expected, he found the heaviest concentration of CND supporters in the professional welfare and creative occupations, with teaching as the dominant example. Byrne (1986), in a replication of Parkin's study, shows that the CND of the early 1980s was still mainly carried by the same occupational groups. In a study of British

⁸ Brint (1984, pp. 45 ff.) has a more restricted definition of “social and cultural specialists.” He defines them as academics, nonacademic social scientists, arts and culture professionals, architects, clergy, and traditional professionals (primarily doctors and lawyers) working in the public and nonprofit sectors. The three other segments are defined as follows: The “managerial” group includes all salaried managers. “Technical professionals” include all business economic specialists, engineers, college-graduate technicians, private-sector doctors and lawyers, and nonacademic scientists. Finally, “human service professionals” include the lower-status “helping professions” of teaching, social work, librarianship, nursing, and health therapy. My category of “social and cultural specialists” roughly corresponds to the combination of Brint's “human service professionals” and “social and cultural specialists.”

⁹ As is noted also by Brint (1984, p. 44), other observers have emphasized the significance of this split. He explicitly mentions Galbraith and Bell, who noted the cultural dissimilarities between the technical and “literary” intelligentsia.

environmentalists, Cotgrove and Duff (1981) indicate that a little less than half of them (43%) come from “service, welfare and creative” occupations.

To explain why there should be such a clustering of “middle class radicals” in this particular segment of occupations, Parkin suggests that middle-class radicals are highly selective in their choices of occupation, and the welfare and creative professions provide the kind of environment most amenable to their political orientations. These occupations, he goes on, provide a kind of “sanctuary” for the middle-class radicals where they are able to escape direct implication in capitalist economic relations and where they seem to be able to withstand the pressures for political conformity to some extent. In a recent reinterpretation of Brint’s results, Lamont (1987) argues in a similar vein. She suggests that political liberalism varies inversely with the instrumentality of a professional’s knowledge to profit maximization and with the direct dependence of a professional’s job on profit maximization. Jobs in the public sector she considers to be less directly dependent on profit maximization. On the basis of both criteria, we would expect social and cultural specialists to be relatively liberal, because not only is their knowledge not immediately instrumental to profit maximization, but also they are almost exclusively employed by public or semipublic institutions—at least in the Netherlands.¹⁰

Apart from putting too much emphasis on selection mechanisms at the expense of mechanisms of socialization on the job,¹¹ these discussions remain too rooted in the realm of market relations. In my view, it is not the instrumentality of knowledge to profit maximization that is decisive for the political liberalism/radicalism of certain parts of the new middle

¹⁰ Lamont (1987) thinks that the new class theory should not be rejected but rather focused on the opposition between relatively autonomous “knowledge workers” and business interests. In her view, it is in the interest of these relatively autonomous “knowledge workers” to maintain and increase their autonomy and to expand the nonprofit realm by encouraging the development of the public sector. For a similar treatment of the new class, see McAdam (1987), who defines the new class as that wing of the “knowledge elite” whose objective class interests are served by the expansion of government.

¹¹ Social and cultural specialists not only select their profession in part for political reasons, but, once working in their profession, they will also be socialized by their job experiences in a way that differs from the socialization undergone by practitioners of other specialties. Thus, the radicalism of social and cultural specialists may be enhanced by the specific character of their relations to clients. These professionals are in direct contact with their clients, and they depend on the cooperation of their clients to provide their services (Funk et al. 1984, p. 276). A teacher, can transmit knowledge only if his students are prepared to learn. Because of this relatively intimate relationship between these professionals and their clients, they often become advocates of their clients’ interests. Such an advocative stance may, of course, also be one of the reasons why professional positions in these fields had been chosen in the first place.

class, but the instrumentality of knowledge to the running of large-scale organizations in general. This criterion implies an opposition of interests between, on the one hand, the technocrats in private enterprises *and* public bureaucracies who try to manage their organizations most efficiently and, on the other hand, the specialists who try to defend their own and their clients' relative autonomy against the interventions of the "technostructure." Ideal-typically, it is the specialists in the private *and* in the public spheres who constitute the new class and who mobilize in NSMs.

CLASS AND DEMOGRAPHIC/RESIDENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS

In their strong version, class hypotheses maintain the centrality of class for the determination of social and political conflict. In general, this is increasingly seen as an implausible proposition, and there are a number of theoretical arguments that suggest, also with respect to the mobilization of NSMs, that social-structural characteristics other than the new class may play the decisive role. The first argument to be considered is one that points to general processes of social change as causing the dissolution of traditional social ties to families, religious groups, and class. Urbanization, improved transportation facilities, a more cosmopolitan communications system, and successive improvements in physical and economic security (as a result of the rising level of general welfare and the development of the welfare state) have liberated the individual from traditional bonds and have permitted an unprecedented degree of individual autonomy. In the Netherlands, the process of the dissolution of traditional bonds has come to be known as "depillarization." Traditionally, Dutch society has been characterized by a high degree of segmentation based on religious and sociopolitical criteria. Since the second half of the 1960s, individual loyalties to the "pillars" have generally been greatly attenuated.¹² This is documented by the very high degree of secularization characteristic of Dutch society today. By 1986, fully 44% of the national sample (see below) reported no religious affiliation.¹³ We

¹² At the same time, however, the organizational structure of the pillars has not been completely dismantled but has retained an unusual relevance in Dutch society. The Christian parties have been in power—in varying coalitions—uninterruptedly since the end of the First World War, and today's Christian Democrats are still the major party. Moreover, as is pointed out by Scholten (1986, p. 21), many of the essential elements of structural pillarization in the human service sector, i.e., the sector where the social and cultural specialists are employed, did not disappear. Thus, the school system is still organized along pillarized lines, and the same is to a considerable extent still true of the Dutch system of telecommunications.

¹³ As Sasaki and Suzuki (1987) have shown, Dutch society has undergone a long-lasting process of secularization during which the Dutch have gradually been giving up religious affiliation. Unfortunately, the time-series data of Sasaki and Suzuki end in

would expect the liberating effects of these structural processes to have been greatest among the younger generations, especially among those who have been socialized politically after the process of depillarization has started to develop its full force. Those liberated from traditional bonds, in turn, can be expected to be the most likely supporters of NSMs, movements that are, among other things, mobilizing precisely to extend the autonomy of the individual and to defend it against new forms of hierarchical control in ever more complex bureaucratic organizations (Beck 1983, 1986; Brand 1985). This argument suggests that age and religious affiliation are strong determinants of support for NSMs, with both having negative effects on such support.¹⁴

A similar argument is based on Inglehart's (1971, 1977) theory that the rising level of welfare in the postwar period has caused a shift in the value priorities of the younger generations socialized after the war. According to this theory, the younger generations generally place a higher priority on nonmaterialist (or "postmaterialist") values than do those socialized during the periods of the depressions or the war, when material scarcity was a real threat for most people. Postmaterialist values, however, are precisely the values articulated by NSMs or parties close to these movements, as has been documented by a number of studies (Bürklin 1982, 1984; Fietkau et al. 1982; Inglehart 1981; Müller-Rommel 1982, 1985; Reuband 1985). On the basis of this reasoning, too, we would expect the younger generations to be generally more likely to mobilize in NSMs than the older ones, irrespective of class.

A third line of reasoning relates the protest of the NSMs to the liberalizing effects of education. Parkin (1968) attributed the radicalism of the educated middle class in part to this liberalizing effect of education. According to Brint (1984, p. 61), sociologists have identified five types of effects that may contribute to the net association of education and political liberalism. Except for preexisting background and personality differences, the education variable may reflect, to some extent, the tendency of the educated to be integrated into more sophisticated, cosmopolitan, and critical communications networks; it may reflect the direct transmission of liberal and dissenting ideas from teachers to students; and it may indicate the direct effects of college on cognitive development. In addi-

1969, i.e., just at the moment when the process of depillarization developed its full force. According to their figures, religious nonaffiliation had reached only 23% in 1969, which means that nonaffiliation has approximately doubled in the less than 20 years since.

¹⁴ One might add that the young generally have been shown to have a higher potential to participate in unconventional political activities in different Western liberal democracies, irrespective of the type of goals involved (Barnes, Kaase, et al. 1979).

tion, the expansion of the educational system in the postwar period may be thought to have contributed to the tendency of the higher educated to become politically more radical in yet another way. As Schumpeter ([1942] 1962, pp. 145 ff.) suggested in his sociology of the intellectual, an imbalance between the expansion of the educational system and the growth of the occupational system may lead to an oversupply of the highly qualified. In such a situation, many of them will be unemployed or will be forced to accept mediocre work, which serves to increase their dissatisfaction with their working conditions, in particular, and with "the system," in general. In fact, it is to this type of relative deprivation that Alber (1985) attributes the large measure of support that the German Greens find among the young, highly educated. Following this reasoning, we would expect a particularly high level of support for NSMs not only among the young and among the highly educated but also among the unemployed and among today's students who belong to a cohort of future professionals with particularly poor employment prospects.

Finally, the protest of NSMs may be related to gender. "One of the most thoroughly substantiated" findings of the social sciences (Milbrath 1981, p. 228) has been that men are more likely to participate in politics than women. More recently, however, it has been argued that this finding is much less applicable to new, unconventional forms of politics (Loven-duski 1986, p. 126).¹⁵

Although all these alternative hypotheses serve to undermine the strong version of the class hypothesis, none of them is completely incompatible with a version of the class hypothesis that holds that the antagonism between specialists and technocrats is *one* among several important determinants of mobilization in NSMs. As in the case of political liberalism in the United States studied by Brint (1984), the effect of the different large-scale processes of social change on support for NSMs may not be exclusive, but cumulative. That is, we would expect each one of the different social-structural characteristics introduced here as indicators of these large-scale processes to have a significant effect on the potential for NSMs.

The different social-structural characteristics may, however, combine in yet another way to have an effect on the support of NSMs: they may interact with each other. To understand this interaction more fully, we should first note that the expansion of the category of the specialists has taken place only recently and has not occurred independently of the large-scale processes of social change captured by the variables age, education,

¹⁵ Barnes, Kaase, et al. (1979, p. 110) have shown that, especially among young women, direct action is more popular than conventional forms of political involvement.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF "PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND RELATED WORKERS" OF
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES: 1960-1985

Country	1960	1970	1980	1985
1. Sweden	12.9	19.2	25.8	29.6
2. Denmark	7.8	12.2	17.0	21.5
3. Norway	8.0	12.3	18.6	21.1
4. Netherlands	9.2	13.3	17.3	18.7
5. Finland	8.2	11.9	17.0	...*
6. United Kingdom	8.6	11.1	15.9	...*
7. Switzerland	8.9	12.1	15.1	...*
8. United States	10.8	13.8	15.0	14.8
9. Ireland	7.1	9.3	12.9	14.3
10. France	9.1	11.4	...*	14.1
11. Germany	7.6	9.8	13.4	13.9
12. Austria	6.8	8.7	...*	13.1
13. Italy	5.2	7.3	11.5	...*
14. Greece	3.4	5.7	9.4	10.1
15. Japan	5.5	6.6	9.0	9.0
16. Spain	4.1	5.5	...*	7.2
17. Portugal	2.7	3.6	6.7	...*

SOURCE.—International Labor Office: Year Book of Labor Statistics, Geneva.

* No information. If there was no information for the year in question but information on a year between the two reference years used for the table, I have included that information in the table for the year for which there was no information (e.g., the percentage for Japan given for 1960 is actually the one for 1965, the year closest to 1960 for which information was available in the Year Books used).

and religious affiliation. To give an indication of the size of this recent expansion, table 1 compares the growth in the percentage of "professional, technical and related workers" from 1960 to 1985 for different Western liberal democracies. The occupational categories used in this table are from the International Labor Office and are, of course, not identical to the classifications used here. Nevertheless, the category of the "professional, technical and related workers" comes close to the sum of the categories of the technical specialists and the social and cultural specialists used here. This table makes it clear that this category has expanded in every country over the past 25 years. In the Netherlands in particular, it has roughly doubled. No other category has increased that much in this country over the same period, while the share of the traditional proletariat has been almost halved over the same period of time (from 42.5% in 1960 to 23% in 1985). It is important to note that, as a result of its recent expansion, this category is above all composed of relatively young people.

It is significant that the countries in the first group in table 1 are also the ones with the most highly developed welfare states. The rise of the welfare state has paralleled the expansion of the educational system and has provided job opportunities for an increasing number of professionals, in particular for the category of the social and cultural specialists. At the same time, professionals also have found an increasing number of opportunities in large private corporations. As a consequence of such developments (which cannot, of course, be dealt with here in more detail), the typical "professional" no longer is a self-employed individual selling his services to an individual client. As we shall see, the "traditional professionals" are numerically a comparatively insignificant part of the population as a whole. The typical professional today is employed by a large organization, which reduces his individual market power and his autonomy considerably (Freidson 1986).¹⁶ This is particularly true of the rank-and-file (semi-) professionals. What is more, the sheer number of the new professionals in today's society has reduced the market power and the corresponding status of the individual professional. The "inflationary struggle for credentials" (Collins 1979) and the concomitant struggle of the credentialed for occupational positions have changed their objective situation fundamentally. It is again important to note that above all the younger generations of professionals have been affected by these changes. This means that there are structural reasons why the interests of the younger generations of (semi-) professionals in general, and of (semi-) professionals in the social and cultural services in particular, should be different from those of their older colleagues. We should, in other words, expect an interaction between class and age, with the new class developing its full effect only in the younger generations of those born after the war.¹⁷

After discussing the operationalizations and the bivariate relationship between class structural locations and the potential for NSMs, I will present the results of multivariate analyses that show how the different social-structural characteristics combine to explain support for NSMs.

DATA AND METHODS

The data for this study are taken from the Dutch national election survey, which was conducted in two waves, before and after the last parlia-

¹⁶ Starr (1982, p. 24) remarks with regard to the medical profession: "One reason that the profession could develop market power of this kind was that it sold its services primarily to individual patients rather than organizations."

¹⁷ Inglehart (1981, p. 895) implies such an interaction between age and class when he suggests that the rise of postmaterialism in the postwar period has been a major factor behind the emergence of the new class.

mentary elections in spring 1986. The questions concerning class location were asked in the first wave, which included 1,630 respondents. These questions belong to the standard part of the questionnaire, which had already been used in earlier studies. The questions regarding NSMs were asked in the second wave and were answered by 1,357 of the original respondents. I will briefly discuss the operationalization of class structure and of support for NSMs.

If one wants to operationalize class location, the first problem that has to be solved is that not everybody has a job; that is, there are many who do not control any productive assets at all. There are those who do not work anymore, those who are temporarily out of work, and those who have never worked. Thus, roughly only half (48%) of the sample of the Dutch population was employed at the time of the interview. To solve this problem, I followed the general practice of traditional stratification theory (see Mann 1986). I decided to use the household as the unit of analysis and to code the class location of a respondent on the basis of the present (the last) job of the head of the household (the "breadwinner").¹⁸

To distinguish the new middle class from the bourgeoisie and the old middle class, on the one hand, and from the working class, on the other, I operationalized the three types of productive assets, following the lead of Wright (1985). Self-employment has been treated as the criterion for "ownership of means of production"; large employers are defined as those with 10 or more employees. The only direct question in the election studies dealing with organizational assets asked whether the respondent had authority over others or not. Those who said that they did were considered to be at least supervisors. From among this group, those with real decision-making authority, that is, the managers, were distinguished on the basis of an inspection of occupational titles. Skills/credential assets were operationalized on the basis of formal educational credentials and an inspection of occupational titles. In the case of obvious discrepancies between the two sources of information, the occupational title was decisive. For example, a university graduate who drives a taxi was coded as an ordinary taxi driver. Three levels of skills were distinguished: the

¹⁸ This procedure also provides a feasible, if not entirely satisfactory, solution for the households with more than one employed person. In such cases, it is unsatisfactory partly because it does not take into account the control over productive assets of all the persons employed. The procedure used does not, however, provide a solution for those households where the head of the household himself has never worked. In these cases (6.7% of my sample), the class location assigned is that of the father of the respondent. This construction has drawbacks of its own, because as a result of it, the group of the households with a breadwinner who has never worked turns out to be disproportionately composed of respondents of upper/upper-middle-class origin. Wright (1985, p. 160) avoids all these intricate problems by analyzing only a sample of the working labor force.

“medium level” presupposed at least medium-level vocational training; the “high level,” high-level vocational training or university education; the “low level” included everything else. The new middle class was, then, defined as including all those employees who are at least supervisors or have at least an occupation requiring medium-level education. The coding of the occupational segments on the basis of occupational titles was straightforward.

To operationalize support of NSMs, I used the Eurobarometer questions about sympathy with and participation in NSMs (see Müller-Rommel 1985). Respondents were asked whether they had “much,” “some,” or “no” sympathy with five different NSMs—the ecology movement, the antinuclear movement, the women’s movement, the peace movement, and the squatters’ movement. Then they were asked, for every one of these five movements, whether they had “ever participated” in it, whether they were “ready to participate” in it, or whether they “would never participate” in such a movement. These two questions permit the identification of several levels of mobilization potentials. The broadest possible potential of a movement consists of all those who feel “much” sympathy for it. A more restricted level of potential includes everyone who not only feels sympathy but also is ready to participate. And, on an even more limited and more reliable level, the potential is constituted by those whose readiness to participate is confirmed by their having already participated in the movement. On the basis of these two questions I have, finally, constructed a summary index for the overall mobilization potential for NSMs in the following straightforward manner: a respondent received two points for every movement for which he felt “much” sympathy and another two points for every movement he had “ever participated” in. For every movement for which a respondent felt “some” sympathy, he received one point and another point for every movement he was “ready” to participate in. The summary index has a range from 0 to 20, given that there are five possible movements.

The chances of our finding a large number of activists of NSMs in a representative national survey such as the one used here are, of course, rather small. We will get an idea primarily of the class composition of the outer circles of the sympathizers of, and the (potential) participants in, the movements considered. For the peace movement, it is possible, however, to present data on a sample of core activists who were interviewed with written questionnaires in fall 1985, that is, half a year before the national survey used here.¹⁹

¹⁹ These activists come from six selected locations in the Netherlands, but they can be considered as representative of the peace movement activists in this country. For a fuller description of this sample of peace movement activists, see Kriesi and van Praag, Jr. (1987) and Kriesi (1988).

TABLE 2

OVERALL MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL FOR NSMs: AVERAGE INDEX VALUES

Class Location	Whole	Sample	Private	Public	N (whole sample)
	Sample	without Special Cases†	Wage Earners	Wage Earners	
Bourgeoisie/old middle class:					
1. Farmers	4.3	4.2	38
2. Large employers	5.0	4.7	22
3. Petit bourgeoisie	6.8	6.6	83
4. Traditional professions	9.6	8.9	8
New middle class:					
5. Protective services	5.2	5.2	...	5.2	25
6. Craft specialists	6.6	6.5	6.5	7.2	106
7. Technical specialists	6.5	6.4	7.1	5.3	66
8. Administrative/commercial	6.6	6.4	6.1	7.4	196
9. Medical services	8.4	8.3	...*	8.4	37
Teaching	9.1	9.1	...*	9.2	66
Other social/cultural	10.3	10.4	...*	10.3	43
Working class:					
10. Lower-level employee	6.9	6.9	7.3	6.6	161
11. Skilled workers	6.7	6.6	6.7	6.4	141
12. Unskilled workers	5.9	5.8	5.8	6.7	138
Overall averages	6.8	6.7	6.3	7.6	
N	1,130	1,068	795	395	

* Not sufficient cases.

† Sample without heads of households who have never been employed; see n. 3.

THE OVERALL MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL FOR NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Column 1 in table 2 presents the overall mobilization potential for NSMs of the different class locations. If we first turn our attention to the new middle class, we immediately notice the split between the three sub-categories of the social and cultural specialists, on the one hand, and the remaining occupational segments, on the other. In line with the earlier results of Brint, Parkin, and others, it is above all the social and cultural service sector that turns out to be a structurally given potential for the NSMs.²⁰ The overall mobilization potential of the craft specialists, of the

²⁰ There is a difference between these results and those of Brint, because the social and cultural services include here the human services, too. As Brint (1985) observes with respect to this group, empirical results for the United States are not as clear-cut as those found here. In his earlier study (Brint 1984, pp. 402–3), he found that the

technical specialists, and of the administrative and commercial personnel does not differ from that of the population at large. This result indicates that Gouldner's concept of a new class, made up of "humanistic intellectuals" and the "technical intelligentsia" and unified by a culture of critical discourse, does not hold for the Netherlands. In contrast to the other occupational segments in the new middle class, the protective services even have a clearly below-average potential for participation in NSMs. This finding is in line with my expectations. It underscores the lack of coherence of the political stance of the new middle class taken as a whole, and it serves as a first indication that the politically distinctive segment of the new class is constituted by the social and cultural specialists, who are politically more liberal or radical than the other members of the new middle class.

Turning to the bourgeoisie and the old middle class, we also find large differences among the four categories that have been distinguished (see n. 7). The traditional professionals are shown to have a remarkably high degree of readiness to participate in NSMs, one that is surpassed only by the "other social and cultural specialists." Since they form a very small group in absolute terms in this sample ($N = 8$), this result has to be interpreted with caution. But we shall see in the subsequent analyses that the high degree of support for NSMs of traditional professionals persists if we control for the influence of other variables. In contrast to traditional professionals, large employers and farmers hardly form a potential for NSMs at all. The remaining petit bourgeoisie is characterized by an average potential for NSMs. It is of some interest that the mobilization potential for NSMs of the traditional working class is not lower than that of the new working class of the French theorists (see n. 5). In the working class, only the unskilled workers have a rather low level of support for NSMs. Summarizing these overall results, I do not think it possible to view the new middle class in general as the privileged structural recruiting ground for NSMs and to dismiss the other class locations as insignificant for the mobilization of these movements.

Eliminating from my sample the cases with heads of households who have never been employed—a group of cases for which the operationalization of the class location remains relatively unsatisfactory (see n. 18)—does not change the results in any significant way, as can be seen from a

"human services occupations were the most conservative of all occupational categories on personal morality issues, but were comparatively liberal on welfare state and confidence-in-business issues." While social workers have been found to be politically liberal in the United States, teachers in the United States have been shown to be relatively conservative. Teachers in the Netherlands seem to be quite different from those in the United States.

comparison of the first two columns in table 2. On these grounds, I have included these cases in the subsequent analysis.

The last two columns in table 2 show the average mobilization potential for wage earners in the private and public sectors. In two of the three occupational segments of the new middle class, where we find larger numbers of wage earners in both sectors, the employees in the public sector are somewhat more supportive of NSMs than those in the private sector. While this tendency is slight among the craft specialists, it appears to be quite pronounced among the administrative and commercial personnel. The largest differences between the two sectors can be found among the professional economists and lawyers, who form a small subgroup within the administrative personnel. They turn out to be rather hostile to NSMs if they work in the private sector (average index value of 4.9), while they are among their most enthusiastic supporters if they work in the public sector (average index value of 8.1). It is possible that members of public administrations in general, and economists and lawyers who work in the nonprofit sector in particular, choose their employers for much the same reasons as social and cultural specialists choose their specialties.

In general, however, Lamont's expectation that (semi-) professionals in the public sphere prove to be more oppositional than those in the private sector does not hold. The technical specialists provide a counterexample. If one looks more closely at this group, one finds computer specialists to be generally quite hostile to NSMs (average overall index of 5.2, no difference between sectors), while the technical specialists and natural scientists have a much higher potential for NSMs if they work in the private sector (average index of 8.1) than if they work for the government (average index of 5.3).²¹ Other counterexamples come from the working class, where the lower-level employees and the skilled workers lean somewhat more toward NSMs when working in the private sector.

To assess the net effects of occupational segments, organizational assets, skills, and sector of employment and to identify possible interaction effects among these aspects of class location, I performed an analysis of variance for new middle-class respondents. The results are reported in table 3. Two of the four main effects turn out to be significant, one for occupational segments and the other for organizational assets. Both ef-

²¹ This difference is most pronounced among the technical specialists and scientists without organizational assets and with a high level of education (average index values of 9.1 and 4.3, respectively). When one breaks down the occupational groups to such a level, the number of cases involved is, of course, very small, which means that the conclusions to be drawn from such comparisons can only be very tentative. The numbers involved here are $N = 8$ for the private sector and $N = 4$ for the public sector.

TABLE 3
 OVERALL MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL FOR NSMs OF NEW MIDDLE CLASS:
 ANOVA RESULTS

Source of Variation	<i>F</i>	<i>df</i>	Sign of <i>F</i>
Main effects	8.688	8	.001
Occupational segment	4.593	4	.001
Organizational assets*	7.961	1	.001
Sector (private/public)	1.661	1	N.S.
Skills	1.103	2	N.S.
Two-way interactions:			
Skills by organizational assets	3.657	1	.06
All other two-way interactions	N.S.
All higher-order interactions	N.S.

NOTE.—*N* = 487.

* Managers and supervisors have been combined into one category because of too few cases in the category of the managers.

fects corroborate the assumed antagonism between technocrats and specialists. In addition to the differential effect of occupational segments already discussed, those in authority positions turn out to be generally less likely to support NSMs than those who do not control organizational assets. Contrary to my expectations, however, the effect of organizational assets, although significant, is weak. Employment sector and skills do not make any significant difference, net of the effect of occupational segment and hierarchical position. In line with the general argument, this indicates that it is not occupational skills as such that are important for the mobilization in NSMs; it is the *type* of skills as operationalized by the occupational segment variable. Similarly, the insignificant effect of the employment sector indicates that the relevant antagonism articulated by NSMs cuts across the public/private division. Finally, only one of the interaction effects comes close to being significant, the one for the two-way interaction between skills and organizational assets. The exceptionally high potential (9.6) of those who have a high degree of skills, but no organizational assets at their disposal, is responsible for this effect.

THE MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL FOR SPECIFIC NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

According to the reasoning in the introduction, all NSMs articulate the same underlying values and attitudes and are supposed to be rooted in the same social-structural locations. Whether this is, indeed, the case will be considered in this section. In dealing with specific movements, this sec-

tion also tries to show how the potential for NSMs of different class locations varies with the level of the potential. Table 4 presents the mobilization potential of the different class locations for the peace movement at four levels. Three of the four levels have been mentioned above, the ones of the strong sympathizers, of the potential participants, and of the participants.²² In the Dutch peace movement, one additional level can be distinguished: the level of support for the people's petition. In late 1985, the Dutch peace movement had organized a petition against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands, which was signed by about 3.8 million people.

Table 4 confirms that the Dutch peace movement enjoys an enormous amount of sympathy throughout the population. Even among the farmers, the class location with the least support for NSMs in general and for the peace movement in particular, there is still a fourth that feels strong sympathy for this movement. For the sympathizers of the peace movement, the discrepancies among class locations generally reflect the discrepancies in the overall mobilization potential for NSMs quite accurately. As we move to levels involving more commitment to the peace movement, the size of the potential decreases for all class locations, but in an uneven way, which serves to accentuate the discrepancies among class locations. A comparison between the level of sympathizers and the level of participants shows that the rate of transforming sympathy for the peace movement into participation in peace movement activities differs from one class location to the other. Those in class locations with a relatively limited amount of sympathy for the movement are especially unlikely to act on their sympathies. Thus, no large employer, no protective agent, no computer specialist, and virtually no farmer and no unskilled worker have ever participated in the peace movement, while more than half of those engaged in other social and cultural services, half of the traditional professionals, more than a third of the medical personnel, and more than a fourth of the teachers have done so. In other words, there seem to be class-specific barriers to a heavier involvement in the peace movement. The large employers, for example, have considerable sympathy with the movement, but even as little as signing the people's petition is one step too far for most of them. Skilled and unskilled workers who have strong sympathy with the movement, on the other hand, would generally sign a petition; their limits of involvement are reached, however, when it comes to more active forms of participation. Social and

²² Potential participants are defined as all those who say that they are ready to participate. The question used in the survey asked whether one had already participated in a specific movement *or* was ready to participate, implicitly assuming that everyone who had already participated in the past was also ready to participate at the time of the interview. Perforce, this assumption is also made here.

TABLE 4
MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL OF THE DIFFERENT CLASS LOCATIONS BY MOVEMENT

Class Location	Percentage with Much Sympathy	Percentage Ready to Participate	Percentage Who Signed Petition	Percentage Who Ever Participated	N
Bourgeois/old middle class:					
1. Farmers	28	14	12	2	42
2. Large employers	44	27	9	0	22
3. Petit bourgeoisie	43	38	26	13	93
4. Traditional professions	63	87	50	50	8
New middle class:					
5. Protective services	37	23	12	0	26
6. Craft specialists	50	30	45	9	115
7. Technical specialists	46	39	39	13	71
8. Administrative/commercial	44	38	39	16	211
9. Medical services	51	59	47	36	39
Teaching	53	61	48	30	70
Other social/cultural	78	71	69	52	48
Working class:					
10. Lower-level employees	53	38	43	12	164
11. Skilled workers	52	35	48	10	158
12. Unskilled workers	50	23	37	5	152
Overall averages	49	37	40	14	

cultural specialists are particularly notable for their low barriers to active participation.²³

In tables 5 and 6, the potentials for all five NSMs are compared on the level of potential participants (table 5) and of participants (table 6). In turning, first, to table 5, we see that on the level of potential participants, the ecology movement can count on an even broader potential than the peace movement in the Netherlands—43% of the total population are ready to participate in the ecology movement as compared with 37% who say they would participate in the peace movement. The antinuclear movement, too, enjoys much support on this level, a third of the population being ready to participate in it. The women's movement with 14% potential participants, and, above all, the squatters' movement with a mere 4% of potential participants, lag far behind. The squatters' movement lost much of the sympathy it had at the beginning of the 1980s (Boon 1987).

When we compare the potentials of the different class locations for the five movements on this level, the overall rank order of the movements is replicated, apart from one minor exception for every location. Moreover, the pattern of differences in the overall mobilization potential among the categories is also more or less replicated for each one of the five movements. In all instances, it is the social and cultural specialists and the traditional professionals who have the highest potential. In all instances, too, craft specialists, technical specialists, and administrative and commercial personnel have comparable average mobilization potentials for the different movements. Third, for all the movements, farmers, large employers, protective services employees, and unskilled workers rank lowest. It can also be shown that for all the movements, those who control organizational assets form a somewhat smaller potential than those who do not. These differences are, however, quite small, and for the ecology movement and the women's movement they tend to be negligible, which is again contrary to the expectations under the new class hypothesis.

On the level of participants (table 6), the peace movement turns out to be the one with the largest number of grass-roots participants in the total population (14% have participated in activities of this movement), followed by the antinuclear movement (13%). The ecology movement takes only third place (11%), while the women's movement and the squatters'

²³ Strangely enough, many more people say they have signed the petition than indicate they have participated in the movement, and there are even somewhat more people who say they have signed the petition than people who are ready to participate in the movement. Apparently, signing the petition was not always perceived as a form of participation in a peace movement activity, at least not by a majority of those who signed.

TABLE 5
 PERCENTAGE READY TO PARTICIPATE BY MOVEMENT

Class Location	Ecology Movement	Peace Movement	Antinuclear Movement	Women's Movement	Squatter's Movement	N
1. Farmers	14	14	9	4	0	43
2. Large employers	35	27	17	5	5	22
3. Petit bourgeois	43	38	28	18	3	91
4. Traditional professions	75	87	50	25	13	8
5. Protective services	35	23	19	4	0	27
6. Craft specialists	39	30	36	13	3	118
7. Technical specialists	49	39	31	11	3	70
8. Administrative/commercial	48	38	32	12	2	215
9. Social-cultural	72	63	57	29	12	188
10. Lower-level employees	42	38	30	17	3	170
11. Skilled workers	32	35	30	10	7	165
12. Unskilled workers	29	23	22	9	2	135
Overall averages	43	37	32	14	4	

TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE WHO HAVE EVER PARTICIPATED BY MOVEMENT

Class Location	Peace Movement	Antinuclear Movement	Ecology Movement	Women's Movement	Squatter's Movement	N
1. Farmers	2	2	7	2	0	43
2. Large employers	0	0	4	0	5	22
3. Petit bourgeoisie	13	28	14	7	3	91
4. Traditional professions	50	38	25	0	0	8
5. Protective services	0	0	19	0	0	27
6. Craft specialists	9	18	9	2	1	118
7. Technical specialists	16	13	11	2	1	70
8. Administrative/commercial	13	13	10	3	1	215
9. Social-cultural	38	26	20	8	6	158
10. Lower-level employees	12	12	10	5	1	170
11. Skilled workers	10	11	8	3	2	165
12. Unskilled workers	5	5	5	2	1	155
Overall averages	14	13	11	4	2	

movement again trail far behind (4% and 2% participants, respectively). In general, the amount of participation in the various movements reflects the level of mobilization of the respective social movement organizations.²⁴

Again, the overall rank order of the movements is generally replicated for every class category,²⁵ and the pattern of differences *among* class categories is also more or less replicated for each of the five movements. Although the five movements considered differ in the absolute amount of support they receive from the population, the similarity of the patterns of support for the different movements with regard to class location is striking. On different levels of mobilization potential and for different movements, we find patterns of support that are analogous to the pattern for the overall mobilization potential.²⁶ This is a strong indication that we are dealing with five instances of the same behavior.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE NEW CLASS FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF NSMs

If we compare the class composition of the outer circles of the different movements with that of the general population, we note that these outer circles resemble the composition of the Dutch population quite closely. Thus, the strong sympathizers for the peace movement form an almost representative cross section of the Dutch population. The same is to a large extent true of those who signed the petition. Only the farmers, the large employers, and the protective services employees are clearly underrepresented among the signers of the petition, and the social and cultural specialists turn out to be somewhat overrepresented among them. The working class does not turn out to be underrepresented on these less involving levels of the mobilization potential for the peace movement. In combination with the generally high level of sympathy noted above (table 4), we can conclude that the peace movement in particular is very broadly based in the Dutch population.

²⁴ The large number of declared participants in the antinuclear movement is somewhat puzzling, however, because this movement has not been mobilizing much in recent years. A rather unattractive possible explanation for this result is that a number of respondents mixed up the struggle of the peace movement against nuclear *weapons* with the struggle of the antinuclear movement against nuclear *energy*.

²⁵ There are, however, several exceptions to this general pattern—one significant and several minor ones. The significant deviation from the general pattern concerns the potential of protective services personnel for the ecology movement. This movement is the only one in which protection specialists have participated. If this does not seem unlikely, it is very surprising to find them among the three categories that have participated most in the ecology movement. Given that the numbers involved are rather small, this figure could be subject to some error.

²⁶ The same is true of the level of sympathizers for which no data comparing all five movements are presented here.

As we move closer to the core of the movement, however, the class composition of the potential changes drastically. Table 7 presents the class composition of the total population and of the participants in the five NSMs. In every case, the new middle class provides close to a majority or a majority of the participants. In every case, moreover, it is above all the social and cultural specialists who are most heavily overrepresented among the participants. In the peace movement; more than a third of the participants come from this occupational segment. If we move one step nearer the core of the movement and consider the class composition of the group of activists who have organized the people's petition in the six localities in the Netherlands we have studied in detail, the results are even more striking. The specialists in the social and cultural services make up fully one-half of these activists. Among the peace movement activists, all other groups turn out to be underrepresented. In the other movements, too, the social and cultural specialists are the strongest group among the participants.

In every case, with the exception of the squatters' movement, the administrative and commercial personnel also form an important part of the participants. Because of its large size, this occupational segment is important, even if it is not overrepresented. Other sizable groups in the movements come from the upper reaches of the working class and from the petit bourgeoisie. From these results, we can conclude that the NSMs are supported by broad parts of the population but that their active participants and their leaders in particular have their social-structural roots mainly in the segments of the new middle class that are most closely associated with the new class as conceptualized here—the specialists in social and cultural services.

CLASS AND DEMOGRAPHIC/RESIDENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS

A number of demographic/residential characteristics are now introduced to test the relative merits of the new-class hypothesis and its alternatives. These characteristics include age, education, religious affiliation, urban location, unemployment, student status, and gender. The operationalization of these characteristics is straightforward, with the possible exception of religious affiliation. In addition to the present-day religious commitment of the respondent, the religious affiliation of the parents has also been operationalized to assess the separate effect of primary religious socialization.²⁷

²⁷ The correlation between current participation in church and primary socialization in an unaffiliated family is particularly high ($R = -.41$). For the three denominations, the corresponding correlations turn out to be much lower: .21 for Catholic parental families, .14 for orthodox Protestant families, and .06 for Protestant families.

TABLE 7
CLASS COMPOSITION OF PARTICIPANTS IN FIVE NSMs

Class Location	Population (%)	Peace Movement (%)	Antinuclear Movement (%)	Ecology Movement (%)	Women's Movement (%)	Squatter's Movement (%)
1. Farmers	3	2	2	7	2	0
2. Large employers	2	0	0	4	0	5
3. Petit bourgeoisie	8	7	8	10	14	13
4. Traditional professions	1	2	2	2	0	0
5. Protective services	2	0	0	4	0	0
6. Craft specialists	9	6	13	8	5	4
7. Technical specialists	6	5	6	5	5	4
8. Administrative/commercial	17	20	17	17	11	4
9. Social-cultural	12	35	26	23	27	44
10. Lower-level employees	14	12	13	13	18	4
11. Skilled workers	14	9	11	10	11	17
12. Unskilled workers	13	4	5	5	7	4
Total sample	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	1,514	179	166	133	45	25

To control systematically for the effect of all the background characteristics discussed, I performed a number of regression analyses. In these analyses, dummy variables were used as indicators for the different class locations. The location with the lowest potential for NSMs, the farmers, was assigned as base category. The corresponding regression coefficients will, therefore, indicate to what extent people in different class locations are more likely to mobilize in NSMs than are farmers. In addition to these dummies, an ordinal indicator for organizational assets, the only other significant aspect of class location in the present context, is introduced. Dummy variables have also been used to indicate gender, student status, unemployment, and the religious affiliation of parents. For the last characteristic, a dummy is introduced for affiliation with each of the three major Dutch churches—the Catholic, Protestant, and traditional Protestant—and for the nonaffiliated. The remaining group of miscellaneous affiliations forms the base category. Ordinal variables were used to indicate education, degree of urbanization of the place where one lives, and church attendance. Table 8 presents the results of the regression analysis for the overall mobilization potential for NSMs. It gives the standardized regression coefficients and adjusted R^2 s.

Regression (1) in table 8 represents an attempt to predict the overall mobilization potential for NSMs on the basis of class structure alone, using the two indicators of class location that turned out to be significant in table 3—organizational assets and occupational segments. As is indicated by the R^2 , only a small part of the variance of the overall mobilization potential can be explained in this way. Nevertheless, the pattern of the coefficients is instructive: organizational assets are once again shown to have only a small, negative, albeit significant, effect on support for NSMs. The hierarchical position seems to be of less importance than suggested by the main hypothesis, which opposes “technocrats” and “specialists.” The relevance of this distinction is, however, again brought out if we turn to the effects of the different occupational segments: independent of one’s position in organizational hierarchies, all the class locations except those of large employers and protective services are shown to have a significantly higher potential than the farmers. However, the effect of the social and cultural specialists is shown to be by far the strongest one. Also in line with the results presented earlier are the relatively large net effect for the administrative and commercial personnel and the relatively small net effect for technical specialists. Administrative and commercial personnel on the lower hierarchical levels apparently have a relatively large potential for NSMs.

In regression (2), education is added to the set of independent determinants. The liberalizing effect of education is, indeed, substantiated. Education has a very significant effect on the potential for NSMs, net of class

TABLE 8
 OVERALL MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL BY SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS:
 STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

Independent Variables	1	2	3	4
1. Organizational asset	-.09*	-.08*	-.05	-.07*
2. Large employers03	.02	.01	.03
3. Petit bourgeoisie15***	.13***	.12***	.10**
3. Traditional professionals10***	.07**	.07**	.06*
5. Protective services04	.02	.00	.00
6. Craft specialists16***	.16***	.12***	.10**
7. Technical specialists11***	.06	.05	.04
8. Administrative/commercial21***	.15***	.11**	.11**
9. Social-cultural37***	.28***	.26***	.25***
10. Lower-level employees18***	.18***	.14**	.11**
11. Skilled workers15***	.19***	.15***	.13***
12. Unskilled workers09*	.14***	.11**	.09*
13. Education22***	.12***	.11***
14. Age			-.19***	-.12***
15. Gender00	.01
16. Student02	.02
17. Unemployment			-.02	-.02
18. Urban location12***	.07**
19. No religious parents14**
20. Catholic parents12*
21. Protestant parents01
22. Traditional Protestant parents04
23. Church attendance				-.19***
R ² adjusted08	.11	.15	.20

NOTE.—*N* = 1,158.

* *P* = .05.

** *P* = .01.

*** *P* = .001.

location. It is interesting to note the effect the addition of education has on the effects of the different class locations: while the addition of education attenuates the effects of locations in the new middle class, it enhances the effects of those in the working class. On the one hand, this is to say that some of the overall potential for NSMs in the new middle class can be attributed to the general liberalizing effect of education alone. In the case of the technical specialists, this is in fact the only reason why their potential is somewhat larger than that of the farmers. On the other hand, this also means that the working class has a relatively large potential for NSMs if we take its rather low educational level into account. This rather unexpected result may be explained by the tradition of dissent that has characterized the Dutch working class and by the close ties that exist between the organizations of the labor movement—unions and parties on

the Left—and the NSMs (see Kriesi and van Praag, Jr., 1987). Traditional working class ties apparently still serve a mobilizing function, even for NSMs.

In regression (3), all the other background characteristics, with the exception of religious affiliation, are added. This regression documents the strong effect of age. The younger one is, the larger one's mobilization potential for NSMs. The effect of urban location also turns out to be highly significant, as expected. The expectations concerning the unemployed and the students were not, however, met: the students and the unemployed are not significantly *more* likely to support NSMs than the rest of the population. This is an indication that Alber's hypothesis of a radicalizing academic proletariat forming the main recruiting ground of NSMs may be somewhat off the mark, at least for the Netherlands. Women, in turn, are not shown to be significantly *less* likely to support NSMs, which provides support for the idea that the barriers to women's participation in NSMs are significantly lower than in traditional politics. Introducing these additional characteristics considerably attenuates the effect of education—younger people and people living in urban locations are not only more likely to participate in NSMs but generally also better educated²⁸—and also decreases the effects of class locations to some extent, without, however, changing the overall pattern.

In regression (4), religious affiliation is added. Church attendance is shown to have the expected strong negative effect on the potential for NSMs: the more one is integrated into church life, the less one is ready to participate in NSMs. This effect is stronger than that of one's religious socialization during childhood. Still, the latter is nonnegligible in some cases: people from religiously unaffiliated families or of Catholic origin seem to be somewhat more ready to participate in these movements than those from other religious denominations. Adding these indicators raises the adjusted R^2 to 20%, which means that the joint explanatory power of the additional social-structural characteristics is larger than that of class.

Adding religious affiliation does not, however, change the general pattern of determinants either. Most important, the indicator for social and cultural specialists remains the strongest determinant of support for NSMs even if we add all the other background characteristics. A number of other class locations also retain their significance. The working class in general, and the skilled workers in particular, are still shown to have a relatively large potential for NSMs. Among the self-employed, the traditional professionals and, quite unexpectedly, the petit bourgeoisie give significantly more support to these movements than farmers. In the new middle class, on the other hand, next to social and cultural specialists it is

²⁸ The correlation between education and age is $R = -.38$.

only the administrative and commercial personnel whose support differs significantly from that of the farmers if all the other background characteristics are controlled. Finally, adding religious affiliation considerably attenuates the effect of age. The younger generations are less tied to traditional religious culture and have, therefore, a lower potential for NSMs.²⁹ The direct effect of age, net of affiliation with one of the religious denominations, is still highly significant but much more restricted than appeared at first sight.

Similar regressions have been performed for the mobilization potential of each of the five NSMs. The structure of determinants for the five specific movements closely resembles the one described. Table 9 presents the results for the peace movement. For this movement, the percentage of variance explained, too, is comparable to the one for the overall potential. For the other movements, the percentage of variance explained ranges from 17% for the ecology movement to 5% for the squatters' movement. For the peace movement, but also for the ecology movement and the antinuclear movement, the indicator for social and cultural specialists remains the strongest determinant. For the women's movement, gender and education are stronger; for the squatters' movement, urban location, education, and church attendance are the only determinants of some significance.

The regression analysis performed so far implies a cumulative pattern of causation. The question still to be answered is whether class and demographic/residential characteristics, in particular class and age, interact in determining the potential for NSMs. An analysis of variance reveals that this is, indeed, the case. As expected, both the effects of age and of class turn out to be highly significant, and there also is an interaction effect, significant at the .01 level.³⁰ For an analysis of this interaction effect in more detail, it is not advisable to introduce an interaction term into the previous regression equations because of multicollinearity problems and problems of interpretation.³¹ A different, more promising ap-

²⁹ The correlation between age and church attendance is .24. For the different parental church affiliations, the correlations with age are: for Catholics, $-.03$; for the orthodox Protestants, $-.07$; and for the Protestants, $.21$, which indicate that it is among the Protestants that the erosion of traditional church culture has been particularly far-reaching.

³⁰ The F -value of the main effect of age is 86.908, 1 df , $P = .001$; the F -value of the main effect of class is 7.096, 11 df , $P = .001$; the F -value of the interaction effect is 2.232, 11 df , $P = .011$.

³¹ Multiplicative interaction terms correlate highly with the original variables, which causes large standard errors of the estimates. If one works with standardized coefficients, as I do in this analysis, the use of interaction terms has the disadvantage that the relative importance of the main effects and interaction can no longer be determined (Allison 1977).

TABLE 9

PEACE MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL BY SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS: STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

Independent Variables	1	2	3	4
1. Organizational asset	-.09**	-.08*	-.05	-.07*
2. Large employers04	.02	.02	.03
3. Petit bourgeoisie12***	.10***	.09***	.09***
4. Traditional professionals13***	.10***	.11***	.10***
5. Protective services02	.00	-.02	-.02
6. Craft specialists08*	.08*	.04	.04
7. Technical specialists08**	.04	.03	.03
8. Administrative/commercial18***	.13**	.10*	.10*
9. Social-cultural34***	.25***	.25***	.25***
10. Lower-level employees10**	.11*	.08	.07
11. Skilled workers09*	.13**	.10*	.09*
12. Unskilled workers01	.05	.03	.02
13. Education22***	.10**	.09**
14. Age			-.21***	-.16***
15. Gender01	.02
16. Student05	.05
17. Unemployment			-.05	-.05
18. Urban location06*	.03
19. No religious parents07
20. Catholic parents00
21. Protestant parents				-.05
22. Traditional Protestant parents03
23. Church attendance				-.11***
R ² adjusted09	.12	.16	.18

NOTE.—N = 1,158.
 * P = .05.
 ** P = .01.
 *** P = .001.

proach to analyzing the interaction between age and class is to run separate regressions for the younger cohorts born after the war and for the older cohorts. Table 10 presents the results of two cohort-specific regressions corresponding to the first and the last columns in the previous tables.

These results clarify a number of points. First of all, it becomes quite clear that class explains virtually nothing about the political potential of the older cohorts, while its explanatory power is nonnegligible in the younger age group. Second, in the younger cohorts, the pattern of the different class effects obtained closely parallels the general pattern found in table 8, but the effects are stronger. This implies that the general pattern displayed in the previous tables is essentially a result of the associ-

TABLE 10
 OVERALL MOBILIZATION POTENTIAL BY SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND COHORT:
 STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	COHORTS		COHORTS	
	- 40	40 +	- 40	40 +
1. Organizational asset	-.08	.03	-.10*	.00
2. Large employers	.04	-.01	.03	.02
3. Petit bourgeoisie	.22***	.06	.17***	.04
3. Traditional professionals	.13**	.08	.08**	.04
5. Protective services	.02	.04	.00	.04
6. Craft specialists	.13*	.16***	.11	.14**
7. Technical specialists	.13*	.07	.07	.03
8. Administrative/commercial	.26***	.12	.17**	.08
9. Social-cultural	.48***	.19***	.35***	.17**
10. Lower-level employees	.20**	.18**	.17**	.13*
11. Skilled workers	.17*	.16**	.20**	.13*
12. Unskilled workers	.10	.12	.12	.12*
13. Education			.22***	.02
14. Age			.04	-.05
15. Gender			.07	-.03
16. Student			.02	
17. Unemployment			.03	-.08
18. Urban location			.07*	.04
19. No religious parents			.24**	.08
20. Catholic parents			.20**	.05
21. Protestant parents			.06	-.08
22. Traditional Protestant parents			.10	.00
23. Church attendance			-.19***	-.17***
R ² adjusted	.12	.02	.22	.07
N	570	588	570	588

* $P = .05$.

** $P = .01$.

*** $P = .001$.

ations that obtain in the younger cohorts. In particular, the effect of the social and cultural specialists is very strong for the younger cohorts. In the older cohorts, too, social and cultural specialists have an above average potential for NSMs, but their support remains much more limited. In addition to the social and cultural specialists and craft specialists, only the working-class locations have a significant effect on support for NSMs in the older cohorts, which substantiates the radicalizing effect of traditional working-class culture.

Third, the introduction of the demographic/residential characteristics attenuates the class effects somewhat, but they remain by far the

strongest for the younger generations. For the older generations, church attendance seems to be the strongest determinant of support for NSMs, but the overall explanatory power of social-structural characteristics turns out to be rather limited. Fourth, these results also reveal an interaction between age and education for the support of the movements in question: the liberalizing effect of education can be confirmed only for the younger cohorts. For these cohorts, it is, however, highly significant.³² Fifth, church attendance has a strong negative effect in both age groups. The younger cohorts may be generally less integrated into traditional religious culture, but those among them who still are, turn out to be as little likely to support NSMs as church members in the older cohorts. There is, however, also an interaction with regard to the effects of primary religious socialization. These effects can be established only for the younger generations, which enhances the notion of a profound value change after the war.³³ This notion is also corroborated by the fact that age is no longer of any significance in the two sets of cohorts. The effect of age on the support of NSMs is, in other words, essentially captured by the distinction between prewar and postwar cohorts.

DISCUSSION

This analysis of the mobilization potential of Dutch NSMs has shown that the idea of the rise of an oppositional new middle class is both too narrow and too broad. It turns out to be too narrow because dissent in the sense of readiness to support NSMs is not restricted to the educated new middle class. The results of the present analysis have shown that in the Netherlands the NSMs are supported by broad segments of the Dutch population. The composition of the outer circles of the peace movement, the broadest of all NSMs in the Netherlands, was shown to come close to

³² These results are in line with Ladd's (Ladd and Lipset 1975, pp. 212–31; Ladd 1978, 1979) extensive analyses of American polling data from 1936 through the mid-1970s, which "showed that college graduates (and those with higher level degrees) reversed their previous conservative preferences in the 1960s and 1970s to become one of the most liberal strata on issues involving government activism, spending on social programs, regulation of business, extending opportunities to minorities and women, and relaxation of restrictions on sexual morality" (Brint 1985, p. 391).

³³ More specifically, it is shown that people with nonaffiliated or Catholic parents have a higher potential for NSMs. In n. 29, I note that the process of disaffiliation has above all affected the Protestants. In combination, these two results suggest that the process of depillarization has had different effects on Protestants and Catholics. While the Protestant church has weakened in the process of liberalization, the Catholic church has gone through the same process of liberalization without, however, weakening to the same extent. The orthodox Protestants, finally, seem to have been least affected by the structural and cultural change.

being a representative cross section of the Dutch population. In particular, the working class turned out to have an unexpectedly high level of support for these movements if the relatively low level of education of workers was taken into account. Also unexpected was the relatively high degree of support of NSMs among the *petit bourgeoisie* (excluding farmers). In the class locations outside the new middle class, the largest measure of support was found among traditional professionals—the type of knowledge they control seems to be more important to their politics than the fact that they are self-employed.

The concept of an oppositional new middle class, on the other hand, is too broad, because only part of the new middle class seems to support oppositional tendencies such as those articulated by the NSMs. There is a split in the new middle class that is reflected in the support for the NSMs. More specifically, there is a split in the younger generations of this new middle class. This split, which was found by Brint and Parkin as well, separates the social and cultural specialists from the technocrats made up of the managers (i.e., those controlling organizational assets in general), of the technical specialists, of the craft specialists, and of the protective services. While the young social and cultural specialists form the *avant-garde* of the NSMs, the technocrats support these movements only to a limited extent, which is, moreover, entirely attributable to background characteristics other than their positions in the production process. In contrast to my expectations, the managers are generally not shown to be hostile to NSMs. But they are not among their more enthusiastic supporters either. Also in contrast to what I had expected, the administrative and commercial personnel as a whole are to be placed somewhere in between the two camps. The detailed results for this occupational segment, however, fit the general idea of a split between specialists and technocrats in the new middle class quite well: the administrative and commercial personnel are themselves split internally. Certain parts of this occupational segment tend to belong to the camp of the social and cultural specialists (the younger public employees in general, and the professional economists and lawyers in public services in particular), while others (the older employees, and economists and lawyers in private profit-oriented organizations) tend to belong to the camp of the technocrats.

Taken together, these results corroborate the proposed concept of a new class of specialists opposing technocrats who encroach on their relative autonomy, and they suggest that the confrontation between these two camps is taking place within the context of the mobilization of NSMs. The struggle of these NSMs for individual autonomy and against new, invisible risks can, in part at least, be interpreted as the struggle of the new class against the technocrats executing systemic imperatives (the

“iron cage” of Max Weber) and against the unintended consequences of their authoritative decisions.³⁴

The analysis has also shown that the new class is not the only determinant of the mobilization in NSMs. Education exerts a liberalizing effect in the younger generations that cuts across the split between technocrats and specialists. I also found indications that the profound value changes that have taken place in the postwar period contribute to the mobilization potential of NSMs irrespective of class. To what extent these value changes are related to the distinction between technocrats and specialists could not be analyzed here because I did not have independent measures for individual value patterns at my disposal. The detailed study of the interrelationship between individual value patterns and the various class locations distinguished here seems to be a promising line of further analysis. Finally, the results presented are not incompatible with an interpretation emphasizing the dissolution of traditional ties and an increase in individual autonomy. Although it may seem so at first sight, an increase in individualization and the formation of a new class may not be mutually exclusive developments. Even if the members of this new class put a heavy emphasis on individual autonomy, and even if they have ended up as members of this class primarily as a result of self-selection, this does not mean that they could opt out of it at any moment. Given the high degree of specialization of their skills, and given the constraints of the job market, they may discover that they form “a group of people who by virtue of what they possess are compelled to engage in the same activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments.”³⁵

The mobilization of NSMs has predominantly been interpreted as a cultural phenomenon or as the result of a unique political conjuncture.³⁶ With the passing of that unique historical moment, it is suggested, the NSMs will lose their mobilization capacity and eventually disappear. The weakening of all, and the virtual disappearance of some of, these movements in the course of the 1980s is taken as proof of this interpretation. Nevertheless, the data presented here show, at least for the Netherlands,

³⁴ In discussing the issues articulated by the student movement—in my view the movement from which all the NSMs originated, Mann (1973, p. 56) noted years ago that the “social contradiction” involved seemed “to be less between the technology of knowledge and private property than between the technocratic and cultural functions of education.”

³⁵ This is Elster’s (1985, p. 331) definition of class.

³⁶ The work of the authors cited in the course of this paper form exceptions to this general observation. Another important exception is Boudon (1971, 1976), who stressed the radicalizing consequences of imbalances between the educational system and the occupational system. He presented data (1971) that indicate that as early as May 1968 such imbalances played an important role in the mobilization of French students.

that the mobilization potential of these movements had not disappeared by the mid-1980s and that this potential has a structurally determined core. There are a number of indications that the structural situation of this core has undergone considerable change over the past few years under the influence of the economic crisis and the squeeze of the welfare state. The squeeze of the welfare state is of particular relevance here because it implies an increase in hierarchical control and an increase in the control accorded to market forces, which spell a reduction in the autonomy of the individual professional employed by the state and a reduction in the sphere of influence of the state in general.³⁷ The situation of these “servants of the state” is further worsened by the widespread recognition on the political Left that the state was not able to do what it had promised to do or what one had expected it to be able to do (Wijmans 1987, p. 268). The question is of what kind of effect these structural changes have on the readiness of the professional employees in the core of the mobilization potential to support future challenges of NSMs.

In contrast to what is suggested by Brint, it may be assumed that the increased threats to the individual autonomy in the large-scale organizations of the state, and the disillusionment about the possibilities of acting within and through the state, may cause new cohorts of social and cultural specialists and new cohorts of administrative specialists employed by the state to be particularly strong supporters of the goals of NSMs struggling for individual autonomy and against the risks of technocratic decision making. And the struggle of such NSMs might possibly contribute to the formation of what has been here conceptualized as the new class.

REFERENCES

- Alber, Jens. 1985. “Modernisierung, neue Spannungslinien und die politischen Chancen der Grünen.” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 26:211–26.
- Allison, Paul D. 1977. “Testing for Interaction in Multiple Regression.” *American Journal of Sociology* 83:144–54.
- Barnes, Samuel, Max Kaase, et al., eds. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. London: Sage.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1983. “Jenseits von Stand und Klasse?” Pp. 35–74 in *Soziale Ungleichheiten*, edited by R. Kreckel. *Soziale Welt*, Sonderband 2. Göttingen.
- . 1986. *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

³⁷ Parkin (1979, p. 106) opposes the “squeeze of the welfare state” to an alleged “loss of autonomy” of the (semi-) professionals. I do not see how he can maintain that a “squeeze of the welfare state” does not imply a “loss of autonomy” of those employed in (semi-) professional positions of the welfare state. Think, e.g., of the consequences of the increased threat of being dismissed.

- Bell, Daniel. 1979. "The New Class: A Muddled Concept." Pp. 169–90 in *The New Class?* edited by B. Bruce-Briggs. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction.
- Boon, Arie den. 1987. *Perceptie van anderen*. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Amsterdam.
- Boudon, Raymond. 1971. "Sources of Student Protest in France." *Annals of the AAPSS* 395:139–49.
- . 1976. *Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society*. New York: Wiley.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1982. *Die feinen Unterschiede*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Brand, Karl-Werner, ed. 1985. *Neue soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA: Ein internationaler Vergleich*. Frankfurt: Campus.
- . 1987. "Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in den neuen sozialen Bewegungen." Pp. 30–44 in *Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht. Frankfurt: Campus.
- Brint, Steven. 1984. "New Class' and Cumulative Trend Explanations of the Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals." *American Journal of Sociology* 90:30–71.
- . 1985. "The Political Attitudes of Professionals." *Annual Review of Sociology* 11:389–414.
- Bürklin, Wilhelm. 1982. "Die Grünen und die 'Neue Politik.'" *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 22:360–75.
- . 1984. *Grüne Politik*. Opladen: Westdeutscher.
- Byrne, Paul. 1986. "The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: The Growth of a Protest Group." Paper presented to the workshop on political protest, ECPR Joint Sessions, Gotheburg.
- Collins, Randall. 1979. *The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification*. New York: Academic.
- Cotgrove, Stephen, and Andrew Duff. 1980. "Environmentalism, Middle Class Radicalism and Politics." *Sociological Review* 28:333–51.
- . 1981. "Environmentalism, Values and Social Change." *British Journal of Sociology* 32:92–110.
- Diani, Mario, and Giovanni Lodi. 1988. "Three Faces of Environmentalism." In *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI (in press).
- Elster, Jon. 1985. *Making Sense of Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fietkau, Hans-Joachim, et al. 1982. *Umwelt im Spiegel der öffentlichen Meinung*. Frankfurt: Campus.
- Freidson, Eliot. 1986. *The Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Funk, Albrecht, Heinz Gerhard Haupt, Wolf-Dieter Narr, and Falco Werkentin. 1984. *Verrechtlichung und Verdrängung: Die Bürokratie und ihre Klientel*. Opladen: Westdeutscher.
- Gouldner, Alvin. 1979. *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*. New York: Seabury.
- Ingelhart, R. 1971. "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies." *American Political Science Review* 65:991–1017.
- . 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1981. "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity." *American Political Science Review* 75:880–900.
- Klandermans, Bert. 1986. "New Social Movements and Resource Mobilization: The European and the American Approach." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 4:13–37.

- Klandermans, Bert, and Sidney Tarrow. 1988. Introduction. In *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI (in press).
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, ed. 1985. *Bewegung in der Schweizer Politik: Fallstudien zu politischen Mobilisierungsprozessen in der Schweiz*. Frankfurt: Campus.
- . 1988. "Local Mobilization for the People's Petition of the Dutch Peace Movement." In *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation across Cultures*, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI (in press).
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Philip van Praag, Jr. 1987. "Old and New Politics: The Dutch Peace Movement and the Traditional Political Organizations." *European Journal for Political Science* 15:319–46.
- Ladd, E. C., Jr. 1979. "Pursuing the New Class: Social Theory and Survey Data." Pp. 101–22 in *The New Class?* edited by B. Bruce-Briggs. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction.
- . 1978. "The New Lines Are Drawn." *Public Opinion* 1:14–20.
- Ladd, E. C., and S. M. Lipset. 1975. *The Divided Academy*. New York: Norton.
- Lamont, Michèle. 1987. "Cultural Capital and the Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals: Comment on Brint." *American Journal of Sociology* 92:1501–5.
- Lovenduski, Joni. 1986. *Women and European Politics: Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy*. Brighton: Harvester.
- McAdam, John. 1987. "Testing the Theory of the New Class." *Sociological Quarterly* 28:23–49.
- Mallet, Serge. 1963. *La nouvelle classe ouvrière*. Paris: Ed. du Seuil.
- Mann, Michael. 1973. *Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class*. London: Macmillan.
- . 1986. "A Crisis in Stratification Theory?" Pp. 40–56 in *Gender and Stratification*, edited by R. Crompton and M. Mann. Cambridge: Polity.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1984. "An End to Social Movements?" *Social Science Information* 24:819–35.
- Milbrath, Lester W. 1981. "Political Participation." Pp. 197–240 in *The Handbook of Political Behavior*, vol. 4. Edited by S. L. Long. New York: Plenum.
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. 1982. "'Parteien neuen Typs' in Westeuropa: Eine vergleichende Analyse." *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 13:369–90.
- . 1984. "Zum Verhältnis von neuen sozialen Bewegungen und neuen Konfliktdimensionen in den politischen Systemen Westeuropas: Eine empirische Analyse." *Journal für Sozialforschung* 24:441–54.
- . 1985. "New Social Movements and Smaller Parties: A Comparative Perspective." *West European Politics* 8:41–54.
- Offe, Claus. 1985. "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics." *Social Research* 52:817–68.
- Parkin, Frank. 1968. *Middle Class Radicalism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- . 1979. *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*. London: Tavistock.
- Reuband, Karl-Heinz. 1985. "Politisches Selbstverständnis und Wertorientierungen von Anhängern und Gegnern der Friedensbewegung." *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 25–45.
- Sasaki, Masamichi, and Tatsuzo Suzuki. 1987. "Changes in Religious Commitment in the United States, Holland, and Japan." *American Journal of Sociology* 92:1055–76.
- Scholten, Ilja. 1980. "Does Consociationalism Exist? A Critique of the Dutch Experience." Pp. 329–54 in *Electoral Participation*, edited by Richard Rose. London: Sage.

American Journal of Sociology

- . 1986. "Introduction: Corporatist and Consociational Arrangements." Pp. 1–38 in *Political Stability and Neo-Corporatism*. London: Sage.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942) 1962. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Starr, Paul. 1982. *The Social Transformation of American Medicine*. New York: Basic.
- Touraine, Alain. 1971. *The Post-Industrial Society*. New York: Random House.
- Visser, Jelle. 1986. "Die Mitgliederentwicklung der westeuropäischen Gewerkschaften: Trends und Konjunkturen, 1920–1983." *Journal für Sozialforschung* 26:3–34.
- Wijmans, Lucas L. 1987. *Beeld en Betekenis van het Maatschappelijke Midden*. Amsterdam: Van Gennep.
- Wright, Erik O. 1985. *Classes*. London: Verso.
- Zald, Mayer N. 1987. "The Future of Social Movements." Pp. 319–36 in *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*, edited by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction.