

No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955

BARBARA HARFF *U.S. Naval Academy*

This article reports a test of a structural model of the antecedents of genocide and politicide (political mass murder). A case-control research design is used to test alternative specifications of a multivariate model that identifies preconditions of geno-/politicide. The universe of analysis consists of 126 instances of internal war and regime collapse that began between 1955 and 1997, as identified by the State Failure project. Geno-/politicides began during 35 of these episodes of state failure. The analytic question is which factors distinguish the 35 episodes that led to geno-/politicides from those that did not. The case-control method is used to estimate the effects of theoretically specified domestic and international risk factors measured one year prior to the onset of geno-/politicide. The optimal model includes six factors that jointly make it possible to distinguish with 74% accuracy between internal wars and regime collapses that do and those that do not lead to geno-/politicide. The conclusion uses the model to assess the risks of future episodes in 25 countries.

“We must remember not only what happened but why and how it happened.” In remembering the Holocaust “we need to learn its lessons and apply them to contemporary events” (Mattas 1992, 185). What has been learned? We know that genocides and political mass murders are recurrent phenomena; that since WWII nearly 50 such events have happened; that these episodes have cost the lives of at least 12 million and as many as 22 million noncombatants, more than all victims of internal and international wars since 1945;¹ and that human suffering rarely mobilized policymakers into action.

We also know that despite Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, some lessons have been learned. During

recent decades genocide and Holocaust scholars have joined to combat ignorance about the causes of these events, to engage politicians, and to mobilize public empathy. Some have listened. The Clinton Administration, in the aftermath of Rwanda, sponsored the use of social science analysis to explain genocides and ethnic conflict, with an eye to developing early warning systems to detect humanitarian disasters in the making. The study reported here was supported in part by two successive administrations and builds on years of prior research by those involved in the comparative study of genocide and similar phenomena.

During the early 1980s social scientists began to study genocide comparatively (see Fein 1979, 1992; Harff 1987, 1992; Kuper 1981; and Melson 1992). These pioneers, surveyed in Totten and Jacobs 2002, defined the phenomenon, accumulated evidence of past and ongoing cases, and went on to develop explanations for the occurrence of such events (see Fein 1993b, chap. 3, for a review of theoretical approaches). Comparative genocide research has drawn upon conflict analysis. Although a distinct phenomenon, it shares some characteristics and antecedents with ethnic wars and revolutions. Moreover, almost all genocides of the last half-century occurred during or in the immediate aftermath of internal wars, revolutions, and regime collapse. Ideologies that mobilize potential revolutionaries can also incite ethnic hatred and provide incentives to kill real or perceived enemies of the new order. However, despite the explosive growth of the literature, only two published genocide studies systematically test various hypotheses derived from the case and comparative literature (Fein 1993a; Krain 1997).

This article expands on previous theoretical and empirical work by testing the effects of prior conflict, elite characteristics, regime type, and international context on the likelihood of geno-/politicide. The optimum model identifies six preconditions of genocide and politicide (political mass murder) that make it possible, using the case-control procedure and logistic regression, to postdict accurately 74% of episodes that began between 1955 and the late 1990s.

Barbara Harff is Professor, Department of Political Science, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21401 (harff@usna.edu).

This study was commissioned in 1998 by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence in response to President Clinton's policy initiative on genocide early warning and prevention. It was designed by the author and carried out using her data with other data and analytic techniques developed by the State Failure Task Force. Statistical analyses reported here were done by Michael Lustik and Alan N. Unger of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), McLean, Virginia. The author is senior consultant to the Task Force, which was established in 1994 in response to a request from senior U.S. policymakers to design and carry out a data-driven study of the correlates of state failure, defined to include revolutionary and ethnic wars, adverse or disruptive regime transitions, and genocides and politicides (for the latest report on Task Force research see Goldstone et al. 2002). The author acknowledges the advice of other Task Force consultants and analysts throughout the research process. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the U.S. government, the U.S. intelligence community, or the Central Intelligence Agency.

The author especially thanks Ted Robert Gurr for his critiquing early drafts and using the findings to construct the table that identifies high-risk countries and groups. His insistence about the importance of the study prompted me to revise the manuscript a number of times, despite my initial reluctance, given the years of work that had gone into its preparation. It was especially hard to condense this effort from its original 75 pages. The paper also benefited from a careful reading by Mark I. Lichbach of a previous report and from comments of anonymous reviewers for the *American Political Science Review*.

¹ Numbers of geno-/politicides and fatalities are tabulated for the list of cases and fatalities in Table 1, with the addition of episodes that occurred between 1945 and 1954 reported in Harff 1992.

DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING EPISODES OF GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDE

From Legal to Empirical Definition

Genocide, according to Article II of the United Nations (UN) Genocide Convention, refers to “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.” Points b, c, d, and e specifically refer to conditions whose cumulative effects are conducive to a group’s destruction. These points are (b) “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” (c) “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” (d) “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,” and (e) “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” This legal definition provides the basis for an operational definition but has four limitations.

First, the Convention does not include groups of victims defined by their political position or actions. Raphael Lemkin (1944) coined the term genocide and later sought the support of as many states as possible for a legal document that would outlaw mass killings and prescribe sanctions against potential perpetrators. Because the first draft of the Convention, which included political groups, was rejected by the USSR and its allies, the final draft omitted any reference to political mass murder (Le Blanc 1988). The concept of politicide is used here to encompass cases with politically defined victims, consistent with Fein’s (1993b, 12) line of reasoning that “mass killings of political groups show similarities in their causes, organization and motives.”

Second, the phrase “mental harm” in point b is problematic, for it encompasses a vast array of instances of psychological and cultural harm done to groups that have lost their cohesion and identity, but not their lives, as a result of processes of social and economic change. Setting aside this problematic clause, the crime of genocide is delimited to acts that collectively endanger the *physical* life of group members.

Third, the phrase “intent to destroy” raises the question of how observers can reliably infer the intentions of authorities. Perpetrators rarely signal their intentions as clearly as Hutu extremists did in Rwanda in the early 1990s when they characterized Tutsis as vermin and proposed to eradicate them (see Des Forges 1999 and Prunier 1995, chaps. 5, 6). The operational guidelines used here to infer intent and apply them to specific cases are described below.

Fourth, the Genocide Convention does not take into account the possibility that nonstate actors can and do attempt to destroy rival ethnic and political groups. One unambiguous example from the post-Cold War period is the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serb nationalists against Muslims in Bosnia (1992–93). A possible case occurred in Congo (Kinshasa) in late 1996 and early 1997. Suspicions are strong that, during and after the Kabila-led revolution that overthrew Mobutu’s government, Kabila knew of and probably endorsed the systematic killings of Hutu refugees in eastern Congo by Tutsi members of his army. Therefore the opera-

tional definition of genocide and politicide used here is expanded to include episodes that occur during civil wars when a territorially based nationalist or revolutionary movement targets an ethnic or political group for destruction “in whole or in part.” This encompasses situations in which at least one party to a civil war systematically uses deadly force to destroy the civilian support base of its opponents, as in Angola’s civil wars since the early 1970s.

The following definition summarizes the above points and is used to identify the universe of cases for comparative analysis. Genocides and politicides are *the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.* In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups. In common usage the Kurds of Iraq are said to be victims of genocide. In fact many Iraqi Kurds serve in the Iraqi bureaucracy and military and some are members of the ruling Baath Party. The Kurds who were targeted for destruction in the *al Anfal* campaign of 1987 were the mainly rural supporters of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Thus, the event was a politicide (see Makiya 1992).

The definition parallels those developed by other comparative researchers. For example, Fein (1993b, 24) exhaustively reviewed definitional discussions and proposed a sociological definition: “Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectively directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.”² Her definition differs from the one used here mainly in its lack of reference to the identity of the perpetrators, i.e., states or rival authorities (for a similar definition see Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 23).

Operational Guidelines

In genocides and politicides killings are never accidental, nor are they acts of individuals. The key is that they are carried out at the explicit or tacit direction of state authorities, or those who claim state authority. The following guidelines were used to help distinguish cases of genocide and politicide from other kinds of killings that occur during civil conflicts. (1) Is there complicity by the state (or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities) in actions undertaken that endanger human life? (2) Is there evidence, even if circumstantial, of intent on the part of authorities to isolate or single out group members for mistreatment?

² For a detailed analysis of alternative social science definitions and episodes encompassed by them, see Fein 1993b, 8–31, 79–91.

(3) Are victims members of an identifiable group? (4) Are there policies and practices that cause prolonged mass suffering? and (5) Do the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group?

Establishing the Complicity and Intent of Authorities.

Any persistent, coherent pattern of action by the state and its agents (or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities) that brings about the destruction of a collectivity, in whole or part, is prima facie evidence of authorities' responsibility. Note that I do not presume that only states can commit genocide. The Kabila-led revolutionary movement in Congo is a recent case in point. In most historical cases, however, the state or its agents have been the perpetrators.

A related issue concerns the duration of a group's victimization. The physical destruction of a people requires persistent, coherent actions authorized by those in power. Brief episodes of killings are not counted. Thus isolated massacres are not included in the list of episodes, such as massacres of Palestinians in Beirut's Chatilla and Sabra refugee camps in September 1982. The shortest episode on the list is Rwanda, where the killing campaign in spring 1994 lasted about 100 days.

The Question of Intent. Human rights scholars frequently argue that there is no need to include intent among the necessary conditions that lead one to conclude that a genocide is in the making. On the contrary, I think that it is important to look for evidence that allows us to infer intent precisely so that genocide can be distinguished from related phenomena. Moreover, early warning efforts depend on detecting signals of intent rather than waiting for information that widespread killings have taken place. How do we detect intent?

- Potential perpetrators are agents of the state or rival authorities, for example, military or police units, or militias authorized by the state or by revolutionary leaders.
- Elites and groups linked to them often use hate propaganda and attack ethnic and political opponents of the state.
- Government repression in response to opposition activities is greatly disproportionate to opposition acts.
- Authorities and security forces ignore isolated killings and abuse of ethnic and political group members.

Rare is a situation such as Nazi Germany, in which Hitler's *Mein Kampf* clearly advocated elimination of a people. Pol Pot comes close, in the sense that Khmer Rouge ideology explicitly identified its future victims.

Identity of Victims. The question is whether the victims belong to an identifiable ethnic, religious, or political group, either a self-defined collectivity or one authoritatively defined as such. In some cases victims may not see themselves as members of a group but have been ascribed characteristics that led to their victimization. In Nazi Germany, people who changed their religion from Judaism to Christianity were still identified and targeted for elimination as Jews. In Latin Ameri-

can politicides, friends and relatives of leftist activists often were killed even though they themselves were politically inactive.

Threat to Group Survival. It is wrong to assume that most or all members of a group have to be eliminated before one can conclude that a genocide occurred. It is enough to "take the life out of the group"—in other words, to eliminate or intend to eliminate so many people that the group ceases to function as a social or political entity. Thus, in politicides perpetrators typically attempt to destroy the ability of opposition groups to challenge or resist the regime by targeting their potential supporters. Again, this point is closely related to intent. It follows that, in principle, "body counts" do not enter the definition of what constitutes an episode. If an authority's motive is to rid itself of unwanted opposition by destroying a group, and if policies with that intent are sustained over a substantial period of time, then a few hundred deaths constitute as much a genocide or politicide as the deaths of tens of thousands. For example, about 900 Iranian Baha'is were victims of genocide, as defined above, during the Khomeini regime.

Cases of Geno-/Politicide from 1955 to 2001

The general definition and operational rules guided the compilation and successive revisions of a list of genocides and politicides since World War II. This list is widely accepted by researchers, several of whom have used it for comparative research, sometimes adding or deleting a few cases.³ The 37 cases cited in this analysis include all those that began after 1955. Several considerations led to the 1955 starting point. Most episodes in the late 1940s and early 1950s were continuations of prior conflicts, e.g., four cases in the USSR that followed through on Stalin's wartime campaigns against disloyal national peoples and potential dissidents. As a consequence of decolonization, many new, conflict-prone states entered the international system beginning in the 1950s, and as a practical matter, reliable data for most independent variables were sparse or nonexistent before then.

A full list of cases used for the analysis appears in Table 1. Three less-known cases are described briefly below, emphasizing the information supporting the inference that authorities intended the target groups' destruction.

Guatemala from July 1978. Revolutionary conflict began in mid-1966. The military-linked death squads responsible for killing leftists were clearly government sponsored. Their actions became systematic and widespread, rather than episodic, after General Lucas Garcia became president in July 1978. The Carter Administration was well aware of government complicity in the killings and imposed restrictions on U.S. military aid because of human rights violations. The most

³ Comparative empirical studies that use this list of episodes include Fein 1993a, Krain 1997, Licklider 1995, and Schmeidl 1997.

TABLE 1. Genocides and Politicides from 1955 to 2001

Country and Dates	Nature of Episode	Estimated Number of Victims
Sudan, 10/56–3/72	Politicide with communal victims	400,000–600,000
South Vietnam, 1/65–4/75	Politicide	400,000–500,000
China, 3/59–12/59	Genocide and politicide	65,000
Iraq, 6/63–3/75	Politicide with communal victims	30,000–60,000
Algeria, 7/62–12/62	Politicide	9,000–30,000
Rwanda, 12/63–6/64	Politicide with communal victims	12,000–20,000
Congo-K, 2/64–1/65	Politicide	1,000–10,000
Burundi, 10/65–12/73	Politicide with communal victims	140,000
Indonesia, 11/65–7/66	Genocide and politicide	500,000–1,000,000
China, 5/66–3/75	Politicide	400,000–850,000
Guatemala, 7/78–12/96	Politicide and genocide	60,000–200,000
Pakistan, 3/71–12/71	Politicide with communal victims	1,000,000–3,000,000
Uganda, 2/72–4/79	Politicide and genocide	50,000–400,000
Philippines, 9/72–6/76	Politicide with communal victims	60,000
Pakistan, 2/73–7/77	Politicide with communal victims	5,000–10,000
Chile, 9/73–12/76	Politicide	5,000–10,000
Angola, 11/75–2001	Politicide by UNITA and government forces	500,000
Cambodia, 4/75–1/79	Politicide and genocide	1,900,000–3,500,000
Indonesia, 12/75–7/92	Politicide with communal victims	100,000–200,000
Argentina, 3/76–12/80	Politicide	9,000–20,000
Ethiopia, 7/76–12/79	Politicide	10,000
Congo-K, 3/77–12/79	Politicide with communal victims	3,000–4,000
Afghanistan, 4/78–4/92	Politicide	1,800,000
Burma, 1/78–12/78	Genocide	5,000
El Salvador, 1/80–12/89	Politicide	40,000–60,000
Uganda, 12/80–1/86	Politicide and genocide	200,000–500,000
Syria, 4/81–2/82	Politicide	5,000–30,000
Iran, 6/81–12/92	Politicide and genocide	10,000–20,000
Sudan, 9/83–present	Politicide with communal victims	2,000,000
Iraq, 3/88–6/91	Politicide with communal victims	180,000
Somalia, 5/88–1/91	Politicide with communal victims	15,000–50,000
Burundi, 1988	Genocide	5,000–20,000
Sri Lanka, 9/89–1/90	Politicide	13,000–30,000
Bosnia, 5/92–11/95	Genocide	225,000
Burundi, 10/93–5/94	Genocide	50,000
Rwanda, 4/94–7/94	Genocide	500,000–1,000,000
Serbia, 12/98–7/99	Politicide with communal victims	10,000

Note: This list of episodes was compiled in a long-term research effort (see Harff 1992), has been updated and modified for the State Failure Task Force, and is posted on the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management Web platform, <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/stfail>. The list and analysis reported here exclude a few episodes identified in previous studies, for example, in Angola in 1961–62 (because it was then a colony), in Equatorial Guinea in 1969–79 (the country was below the 500,000 population threshold used in the State Failure analyses), in Paraguay against the Ache Indians in 1962–72, and in Nigeria against Ibos living in the North in 1966 (in the latter two cases the government was not complicit in killings carried out by private groups). Estimates of victims are invariably imprecise and often vary widely among scholars, journalists, human rights observers, and spokesmen for the victimized groups. Some of the figures are little more than guesses. If a detailed and reliable study is available, a single figure is used. A single figure is also used when several sources offer similar estimates. When different estimates are reported and there is no basis for choosing among them, a range is shown.

massive rights violations, including multiple massacres and forcible resettlement of Mayan villagers, were carried out by military units whose identities have been publicly identified (a comprehensive bibliography is given in Ball, Kubrick, and Spierer 1999, 135–54; see also Quigley 1999).

Uganda After December 1980. The genocide perpetrated by General Idi Amin's government from 1972 to early 1979 is well known. Less known are events that followed Milton Obote's reinstatement as president in December 1980. His government encouraged massive reprisal killings against ethnic groups that were regarded as loyal to Amin. Killings were carried out by groups allied to Obote as well as by government troops

and militia. From 1983 to 1985 tens of thousands of Bugandan sympathizers of rebel commander Museveni were killed in the "Luwero triangle" north of Kampala (see Kasozi 1994 and Minority Rights Group 1984).⁴

⁴ There were two distinct episodes of genocide in Uganda, each with different perpetrators and victims. But Amin's genocide ended with his overthrow in April 1979, and the onset of Obote's reprisals in late 1980 began less than two years later. For purposes of statistical analysis (below) the events are treated as a single case beginning in February 1972. Similarly in Pakistan, two episodes—against Bengali nationalists in breakaway Bangladesh in 1971 and rebellious Baluchi tribesmen in 1973—were separated by less than two years and are treated in statistical analysis as a single case beginning in January 1971.

Sri Lanka After July 1989. This is one of the very rare contemporary instances of mass murder carried out in a democratic state. The Marxist Sinhalese JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna) organized a revolutionary campaign against the Sinhalese-dominated government in 1971 (which was suppressed) and began again in 1987–89. By mid-1989 they were close to military victory and rejected government efforts to negotiate a settlement. Death squads, made up of military and police and working at night, were authorized in September 1988 to track and execute JVP members but had limited use until July 1989, when the by-now-desperate government gave the military a free hand to do anything necessary to eliminate the JVP. Death squad killings rapidly increased, the targets being Sinhalese youths throughout the poor rural areas where most JVP supporters lived. The leader of the JVP was captured and killed in November and by January 1990 the JVP hierarchy had been eliminated, its support base terrorized into passivity, and the killings stopped (Gunaratna 1990; Human Rights Watch 1991).

Although the last half-century has seen a long-term increase in numbers of geno-/politicides, by the end of 2001 mass killings were ongoing in only two countries, Sudan and Angola, fewer than at any time in the previous 30 years. As Table 1 shows, several countries were responsible for multiple cases. In Burundi the Hutus were victimized in three separate episodes; the Rwandan Tutsis, the Iraqi Kurds, and Southerners in Sudan each were targeted twice. Five other countries, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, had two episodes in which different groups were victimized. Because some countries had multiple episodes, the analysis addresses methodological concerns about the statistical interdependence of cases by estimating alternative models.

PRECONDITIONS FOR GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDE: VARIABLES AND INDICATORS

Building and testing a general model of the preconditions for genocide and politicide assume a coherent universe of analysis. The answer is outlined in the previous section: The 37 cases are deliberate and sustained efforts by authorities aimed at destroying a collectivity in whole or in part. The theoretical objective is to identify general conditions under which governments, and rival authorities in internal wars, choose such a strategy. Do genocides and politicides need separate theoretical explanations? Many episodes combine elements of both. The “Cambodian genocide” was both a politicide, because the Khmer Rouge targeted class and political enemies, and a genocide, because they also targeted urban Chinese and the Muslim Cham. The Iraqi regime’s 1987 *al Anfal* campaign aimed to eliminate rural Kurds in rebellious areas but not all Kurds; thus, it was a politicide against some members of an ethnic group. The model tested here combines all cases, although others may choose to test whether the genocide/politicide distinction leads to different results.

Almost all genocides and politicides of the last half-century were either ideological, exemplified by the

Cambodian case, or retributive, as in Iraq.⁵ The scenario that leads to an *ideological genocide* begins when a new elite comes to power, usually through civil war or revolution, with a transforming vision of a new society purified of unwanted or threatening elements. Fein (1984, 18) characterizes such exclusionary ideologies as “hegemonic myths identifying the victims as outside the sanctioned universe of obligation.” The status of the victims is evident in the labels applied to them, such as “class enemies,” “counterrevolutionaries,” and “heretics.” Case studies suggest that the more intense the prior struggle for power and the greater the perceived threat the excluded group poses to the new regime, the more likely they are to become victims of geno-/politicide. Examples of ideologically inspired geno-/politicide occurred in China during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–75, in Marxist Ethiopia in the late 1970s, in Chile after the overthrow of the leftist Allende regime in 1973, and in Iran after the 1981 revolution.

Whereas ideological genocides can be thought of as outcomes of elite succession struggles, *retributive geno-/politicides* are strategies forged during and in the immediate aftermath of civil wars. Some occur during a protracted internal war—whether ethnic or revolutionary or both—when one party, usually the government, systematically seeks to destroy its opponent’s support base. Examples occurred in South Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s; during both phases of the Sudanese civil war; in East Timor after 1975; and in Guatemala, Angola, and Sri Lanka. Some retributive episodes occur after a rebel challenge has been militarily defeated. In Indonesia in 1965–66, for example, a coup attempt supposedly inspired by Communists led to countrywide massacres of party members and other civilians.

Since geno-/politicides almost always occur in the context of violent political conflict and regime change, can they be explained in the framework of theories of revolutionary or ethnic conflict, or of political instability in general? Not directly, because the puzzle addressed here is why some such conflicts lead to episodes of mass murder, whereas most do not. Theories of the etiology of civil conflict, e.g., Goldstone 1991 on revolutions, Horowitz 1985 on ethnic conflict, and Tilly 1978 on political mobilization, do not address this question.⁶ More relevant are analyses of the causes of state repression and maintenance of social order (see Lichbach 1987, 1998). The approach taken here focuses on factors that affect the decision calculus of authorities in conflict situations, in particular, the circumstances that lead to decisions to eliminate rather than accommodate rival groups. Several scholars propose that the greater the threat posed by challengers, the greater the likelihood

⁵ The terms come from Fein (1984, 8–22), who also distinguishes two other historically common types of genocide. *Despotic* episodes were aimed at peoples who resisted the imposition of colonial or imperial rule. *Developmental* genocides targeted indigenous peoples for elimination when they resisted settlement and exploitation of their lands.

⁶ There is no index entry for genocide in any of these books. Nor is there any such entry in a 1980 edited volume that surveys the empirical literature on violent civil and international conflict (Gurr 1980).

that regimes will choose massive repression (Fein 1993; Gurr 1986; Harff 1987). They also argue for the importance of habituation: Successful uses of violence to seize or maintain power establish agencies and dispositions to rely on repression in future conflicts. Krain (1997, 332–37), among others, proposes that regime changes, including those that follow revolutions, open up opportunities for elites to eliminate groups that might challenge them. Numerous researchers point out that democratic norms and political structures constrain elite decisions about the use of repression against their citizens whereas autocratic elites are not so constrained (Gurr 1986; Henderson 1991; Rummel 1995). Others suggest that the international environment is a major source of both incentives for and constraints on the elite's use of repression. Thus a country's peripheral status in the international system can be a permissive condition (Harff 1987), and international war can provide a cover (Melson 1992), whereas international engagement and condemnation can constrain repression. Each of the general factors, below, is interpreted in terms of its likely effects on authorities' choices about whether to resort to mass killings in conflict situations.

Political Upheaval: The Necessary Precondition for Genocide and Politicide

The beginning point is *political upheaval*, a concept that captures the essence of the structural crises and societal pressures that are preconditions for authorities' efforts to eliminate entire groups (Harff 1987; Melson 1992). Political upheaval is defined as *an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries, or defeat in international war*. Types of political upheaval include defeat in international war, revolutions, anticolonial rebellions, separatist wars, coups, and regime transitions that result in the ascendancy of political elites who embrace extremist ideologies.

Empirically, all but one of the 37 genocides and politicides that began between 1955 and 1998 occurred during or immediately after political upheavals, as determined from the State Failure's roster of ethnic and revolutionary wars and adverse regime changes.⁷ 24 coincided with ethnic wars, 14 coincided with revolutionary wars, and 14 followed the occurrence of adverse regime changes. As these numbers imply, several geno-/politicides began after multiple state failures of different types. In addition, four of the 37 sequences of state failure followed the establishment of an independent state, either through decolonization or breakup of an existing state.

⁷ The State Failure project's lists of ethnic and revolutionary wars and adverse regime changes are posted at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail>. The one geno-/politicide that did not coincide with a "failure" is the 1981–82 Syrian case in which the Muslim Brotherhood was targeted because its revolutionary objectives were a threat to the regime. The Brotherhood's rebellion is below the threshold of revolutionary wars used in the State Failure data set. Since it fits the larger pattern of retributive geno-/politicides, it is included in the count of episodes that coincided with revolutionary war.

The key variable in the analysis is the magnitude of political upheaval; the argument is that the greater the extent of violent conflict and adverse regime change, the greater the likelihood that geno-/politicide will occur. There are two rationales. First, the more intense and persisting conflict has been, the more threatened authorities are likely to be, and the more willing to take extreme measures. Second, following Krain (1997), the greater the extent of political disruption, the greater the opportunities for authorities to seek a "final solution" to present and potential future challenges.

Annual magnitudes of each episode of state failure were estimated via ordinal ratings of the scope and intensity of violent conflict and its impact on governance.⁸ The indicator of political upheaval is the sum of magnitudes of all state failures occurring in the 15 years preceding the onset of geno-/politicide. Conceptually, the 15-year specification was intended to capture the extent of disruption due to long-term conflicts; empirically, the 15-year aggregation gave somewhat better analytic results than 10- and 20-year aggregations. Although it may be that revolutions, ethnic wars, and regime collapse have different effects on the likelihood of geno-/politicide, because the purpose here is to estimate an efficient model for a relatively rare kind of event, the aggregate concept and indicator are used.

Prior Genocides: Habituation to Mass Killings?

Recall that ten countries had multiple episodes of geno-/politicide in the last 45 years. Events that began four or more years after the end of a prior event were treated as separate cases in the analyses reported here. I am mindful of Fein's (1993a) observation that perpetrators of genocide often are repeat offenders, because elites and security forces may become habituated to mass killing as a strategic response to challenges to state security and, also, because targeted groups are rarely destroyed in their entirety. To test for "repeat offender" effects, a binary indicator of whether or not a previous genocide had occurred in the country since 1955 was used.

Political Systems: Exclusionary Ideologies and Autocratic Rule

Political upheaval is a necessary but not sufficient condition for geno-/politicide. Between 1955 and 1996 more than 90 state failures did not lead to geno-/politicide within four years of their onset. Two characteristics of political governance have vital intervening effects—the ideological commitments of elites and the extent of democratic constraints on their actions.

Contending elites usually have many strategic and tactical options for defeating or neutralizing opposition groups. Elite ideologies are crucial determinants of their choices. Episodes of genocide and politicide become more likely when the leaders of regimes and

⁸ The scales used to assess magnitudes of each type of conflict and the annual scores assigned to each failure event are posted on the web site given in footnote 7.

revolutionary movements articulate an *exclusionary ideology*, a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people. In effect, an exclusionary ideology increases elites' opportunities to eliminate groups, including those that pose no obvious threat to the elite—like the Cham who were targeted by the Khmer Rouge. Racism and antisemitism are historical examples. Fein (1993a, 95) observes that “ideologies of exclusion are now masked by new goals: socialist utopias, cults of personality, religious messianism, exclusive nationalisms. . . . Ideology is most apt to be a motivating factor during and after revolutionary upheavals or transfers of power. . . .”

Elites with “exclusionary ideologies” were operationally defined to include the following.⁹

- Adherents of strict variants of Marxism–Leninism, as in the German Democratic Republic throughout its history. Laos, Vietnam, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea all are coded as Marxist–Leninist through 1998. State socialist regimes that tolerated some civil society organizations and/or allowed significant free enterprise are not coded as “exclusionary”; examples are Hungary after the 1960s and Poland throughout the period of Communist rule.
- Rulers of Islamic states governed on the basis of Shari’a law, as in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Islamic states such as Bahrain and Oman that permit some expression of other religions are not coded as exclusionary.
- Advocates of rigid anticommunist doctrines such as those advanced by military-dominated elites in Taiwan and South Korea until the 1980s and “national security” regimes in some Latin American countries during the 1960s and 1970s (see Lopez 1986 for an analysis of national security ideology and identification of regimes motivated by it).
- Advocates of doctrines of ethnic and ethnonationalist superiority or exclusivity, as in Iraq, South Africa during Apartheid, Serbia, and Bhutan. In Indonesia the Suharto regime’s doctrine of “Pancasila Democracy” also was treated as an exclusionary ideology.
- Advocates of doctrines of strict secular nationalism that exclude political participation of religious movements, as in Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria (note that Turkey and Egypt exclude only movements that explicitly use Islamic symbols in their advertisements or party platforms).

Democratic and quasi-democratic regimes have institutional checks on executive power that constrain elites from carrying out deadly attacks on citizens, as noted above. Moreover, the democratic norms of most contemporary societies favor the protection of minority

rights and the inclusion of political opponents, while competitive elections minimize the chances for adherents of exclusionary ideologies to be elected to high office. This is the domestic equivalent of the “democratic peace” argument (see Davenport 1999 and Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001). There are, however, historical and contemporary instances of geno-/politicide being carried out by governments with a semblance of democratic institutions. Ideologies that excluded indigenous peoples from the universe of obligation and justified their destruction coexisted with democratic institutions for white majorities in nineteenth-century Australia and the United States. Sri Lanka’s democratic government carried out a politicide against JVP supporters at a time when the governing elite was seriously challenged. These exceptions aside, the general proposition is that a state that maintains democratic governance in the face of state failure is much less likely to commit geno-/politicide than autocratic regimes.

Autocracy and democracy were indexed using the Polity global data set’s 0- to-10 point scales based on coded information on political institutions (Jagers and Gurr 1995). Full democracies have a democracy-minus-autocracy score of 7 to 10, and partial democracies have a score of from 1 to 7; i.e., they have some democratic features but lack others. In autocracies citizens’ participation is sharply restricted; chief executives are selected within the political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with few or no institutional constraints. Full democracies rarely fail, and thus have virtually no risk of geno-/politicide, whereas partial democracies, especially poor ones, have a substantially higher risk of failure than autocracies (Esty et al. 1999, 52–55; Goldstone et al. 2002).¹⁰ The question in this study is whether failed states with partial democracies have been less likely than autocratic regimes to commit geno-/politicides since 1955.

Ethnic and Religious Cleavages

Ethnic and religious divisions are often identified as preconditions of civil conflict in general (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), ethnic conflict (Gurr 2000; Kuper 1977), and geno-/politicide specifically (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kuper 1981). I showed above that violent ethnic

⁹ This and other indicators described below are included in the State Failure Task Force’s data dictionary and data set posted at the website given in footnote 7. The categories were developed and applied by the author, using information in standard political handbooks; the coding was later replicated by an independent team of coders and discrepancies were resolved by reference to additional sources.

¹⁰ Updated and validated Polity data are posted at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity>. Other indicators of democracy and autocracy have been developed (see Munch and Verkuilen 2002) but lack, in varying degrees, the conceptual distinctions and temporal and geographic coverage of Polity. Validation studies by the State Failure Task Force used Arthur S. Banks’s updated time-series data on variables such as legislative effectiveness (coding categories in Banks 1971) separately and jointly with the Polity data (including individual dimensions of Polity such as constraints on the chief executive) to assess the effects of various aspects of democracy and autocracy on various types of state failure. The Task Force also experimented with alternative cutting points on the Polity scales to assess the susceptibility of full and partial democracies and full and partial autocracies to various types of state failure (see Goldstone et al. 2002). A number of these alternatives were used for estimating the geno-/politicide model. Results using the most efficient predictor are reported here.

conflict was a precursor to nearly two-thirds (24 of 37) of the geno-/politicides of the last half-century. But what are the most direct linkages? One possibility is sheer diversity: The greater is ethnic and religious diversity, the greater the likelihood that communal identity will lead to mobilization and, if conflict is protracted, prompt elite decisions to eliminate the group basis of actual or potential challenges. A plausible alternative is that small minorities in otherwise homogeneous societies are at risk, especially when a regime is committed to an exclusionary ideology.¹¹ To test these and similar arguments, indicators of diversity were constructed from a cultural data set that records the size of ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups for each state from 1820 through the 1990s, compiled by Philip Shafer of the Correlates of War (COW) project.

A second and more complex connection begins with differential treatment of some groups. Discrimination against a communal (religious or ethnic) minority is likely to increase the salience of group identity and its mobilization for political action (Gurr 2000, 66–72). If political action takes the form of persistent communal rebellion, regimes are likely to respond with repression, which, when other predisposing structural variables are present, can escalate into campaigns to eliminate the group. A country-level binary indicator of active discrimination was constructed for the State Failure project from group-level data collected by the Minorities at Risk project: If any group in a country was subject to active political or economic discrimination in a given year, the country received a positive score.

A third possible connection is the ethnic and religious composition of the political elite. If the elite disproportionately represents one segment in a heterogeneous society, two consequences follow that may lead to genocidal outcomes. Underrepresented groups are likely to challenge the elite's unrepresentativeness, and elites fearing such challenges are likely to define their interests and security in communal terms, e.g., by designing policies of racial exclusion, like the Afrikaner elite in South Africa, or advocating exclusive nationalism, like Serbs and Croats in the Yugoslav successor states. The narrower the ethnic base of a regime, the greater the risks of conflict that escalates to genocidal levels.

A new indicator of *elite ethnicity* was designed to test the latter argument. This variable was coded based on information about interethnic disputes over access to political power. Elite ethnicity is politically salient if the ethnic or religious identity of presidents, prime ministers, and other high officials is a recurring issue of political contention or conflict. If elite communal identity is politically salient, a further distinction is made according to whether the political leadership in a given period represents the largest communal group in a country or a smaller one, using these summary codes:¹² 0 = elite

ethnicity is not salient; 1 = elite ethnicity is salient—the political leadership is representative of the largest communal group or a coalition of several groups that together constitute a majority; and 2 = elite ethnicity is salient—the political leadership is representative of a minority communal group or a coalition of small groups that together constitute less than a majority.

Low Economic Development

The State Failure project has consistently found that armed conflicts and adverse regime changes are more likely to occur in poor countries. This is true globally and for sub-Saharan Africa, Muslim countries, and countries with ethnic wars (Goldstone et al. 2002). The fact that most geno-/politicides of the last 50 years occurred in Africa and Asia suggests that a similar relationship should be included in this structural model. The hypothesis is tested using an indicator of infant mortality: reported deaths to infants under one year per 1,000 live births. Extensive validation analyses by the Task Force suggest that infant mortality rates are a good surrogate for a wide range of indicators of material standard of living and quality of life. They have greater reliability and give somewhat better empirical results in models of risks of state failure than indicators of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/Gross National Product (GNP).

International Context: Economic and Political Interdependence

International context matters for geno-/politicides. Shifting global alliances like those that followed the end of the Cold War decreased the predictability of international responses to instability and gross human rights violations. Post-Cold War international responses to genocidal situations have become more immediate and forceful, but it seems that Bosnian Serb nationalists and Rwandan militants, among others, concluded early in the 1990s that mass killings were not likely to have costly international repercussions.

It also is evident that both during and after the Cold War, major powers and the UN system were selective about the humanitarian crises in which to engage. There was very little international concern with genocides in Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi in the 1970s and 1980s—countries of low economic status in which the security interests of the major powers were not threatened. At the other end of the scale, many international actors were concerned about crises in Tibet and Kashmir but lacked means of effective engagement. In the middle were Cold War-linked conflicts with genocidal consequences—in Vietnam, Cambodia,

¹¹ A recent discussion of the human rights consequences of cultural diversity and analysis of alternative indicators is Walker and Poe 2002.

¹² Note that religiously defined communal groups are included in the scope of "ethnicity" (for example, Alawites in Syria). The elite

ethnicity categories were developed and applied by the author, using information in the Minorities at Risk chronologies, political handbooks, and country studies. The coding was later replicated by an independent team of coders and discrepancies were resolved by reference to additional sources. The indicators are included in the State Failure Task Force's data dictionary and data set (see footnote 7).

Afghanistan, Angola, and Central America—in which international rivalries trumped humanitarian concerns.

One underlying principle encompasses the specifics mentioned above: The greater the degree to which a country is interdependent with others, the less likely its leaders are to attempt geno-/politicides. The converse is that leaders of isolated states are more likely to calculate that they can eliminate unwanted groups without international repercussions. Interdependency has two dimensions, economic and political. The State Failure studies have consistently shown that countries with a high degree of trade openness—indexed by exports plus imports as a percentage of the GDP—have been less likely to experience state failures. The relationship holds when controlling for population size and density and for productivity indicators. It also has the same effect at the global and regional level. Moreover, trade openness is weakly correlated with other economic and trade variables. The interpretation is that trade openness serves as a highly sensitive indicator of state and elite willingness to maintain the rules of law and fair practices in the economic sphere. In the political sphere a high degree of trade openness implies that a country has more resources for averting and managing political crises (Goldstone et al. 2002).

An indicator of political interdependence is a country's memberships in regional and intercontinental organizations. Countries with greater-than-average memberships in such organizations should be subject to greater influence, and get more political support, when facing internal challenge, and their regimes should be less likely to resort to geno/politicide. Analysis of the preconditions of ethnic war—a common precursor of geno-/politicide—shows that countries with below-average numbers of regional memberships are three times more likely to have ethnic wars than countries with above-average numbers of memberships (Goldstone et al. 2002).¹³

ESTIMATING A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF GENOCIDE AND POLITICIDES

The empirical work reported here was undertaken in the context of the State Failure project, which uses a case-control research design common in epidemiological research but rare in empirical social science (an exception is King and Zeng 2001b). The basic procedure is to match problem cases—people (or countries) affected by a disorder—to a set of controls that do not have the disorder (see Breslow and Day 1980 and Schlesselman 1982). The State Failure project's researchers selected a set of controls by matching each problem case, in the year it began, with three countries that did not experience failures that year or in the preceding or ensuing several years. In effect, cases are selected on the dependent variable: Those experiencing failure are matched with otherwise similar cases that did not experience failure. Logistic regression is

¹³ The Regional (CIOD) and Intercontinental (CIOC) indicators of shared memberships were normalized to annual medians to eliminate time-trend effects.

then used to analyze data on conditions in “problem” countries shortly before the onset of state failure with conditions in the controls.¹⁴ The results are expressed as regression coefficients and as odds ratios that approximate the relative risks associated with each factor.¹⁵

The task here is to distinguish countries where state failures led to genocides from those where they did not. The case-control method was adapted to the estimation of a structural model of geno-/politicide in this manner. First, the universe of analysis consists of all countries already in state failure. The dependent variable represents the conditional probability that a genocide or politicide will begin one year later in a country already experiencing failure. This avoids the problem of comparing the risks of genocide in Rwanda and Sudan with, say, the negligible risks in France and Canada. Instead, the objective is to examine countries experiencing episodes of internal wars and regime collapse and determine why geno-/politicide occurred during such events in Rwanda and Sudan but not, say, in Liberia or Nigeria. Second, the model is estimated using as cases all geno-/politicides since 1955, including multiple episodes that occurred in the same country. Two of the 37 episodes were not sufficiently separated in time to be considered distinct incidents for analytic purposes (see footnote 4).

Results: The Final Structural Model

The general procedure was to estimate a best-fit model that included a limited set of theoretically important variables, then to seek to improve it by testing the effects of adding other variables and alternative indicators. The six-variable model summarized in Table 2 is the culmination of a long process of model estimation and indicator validation. All six variables have significant effects at the .10 probability level; three have significant effects at the .5 level.

¹⁴ In logistic regression binary indicators are used. In practice the analyses reported here use a mixed strategy in which most indicators—including state failures—are binary, but others—magnitudes of upheaval, trade openness, and shared memberships—are analyzed as continuous variables.

¹⁵ There are two widely used alternatives to the case-control method for the analysis of cross-sectional time-series data on conflict. One is simple logit analysis of pooled country-year data, both war and peace (a recent application to civil war data is Sambanis 2001). This approach is widely criticized because cross-national time-series conflict data do not meet major requirements of the method, including nonheterogeneity and temporal independence of the observations. It also is not well suited to analyzing rare events such as the outbreak of armed conflict or, even more rare, geno-/politicide. A better alternative has been proposed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), using logistic regression with dummies to achieve the equivalent of event-history analysis, focusing only on intervals of peace and the risks of transition to armed conflict. Goldstone, in a prepublication paper (2002), applies both the Beck, Katz, and Tucker and the case-control method to hypothetical and real-world data, concluding that the latter appears to be more robust in dealing with unit and temporal heterogeneity and unknown lags—which characterize the State Failure research design and data. King and Zeng (2001a) report a reanalysis of preliminary State Failure data that focuses on problems of drawing inferences from regression coefficients generated in case-control analyses. Subsequent State Failure studies, including this one, base their assessment of risks of failures on odds ratios.

TABLE 2. Final Genocide Model Results

Variable	Countries at Greater Risk	Countries at Lesser Risk	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	p Value	Probability of genocide given a single risk factor
Political upheaval excluding prior genocides	Higher	Lower	1.70	.048	.05	.047
Prior genocide	Prior post-1955 genocide	No prior genocide	3.39	1.220	.09	.090
Ideological orientation of ruling elite	Exclusionary ideology	No exclusionary ideology	2.55	.937	.07	.069
Regime type	Autocracies	Partial or full democracies	3.50	1.223	.03	.090
Ethnic character of ruling elite	Represents an ethnic minority	Represents most or all groups	2.56	.939	.09	.069
Trade openness	Lower	Higher	2.58	-1.242	<.01	.070
Model Summary Statistics						
c	.83					
Number of problems	35					
Number of controls	91					
Threshold	.25	Setting the threshold at .25 rather than .26 increases by one the number of correctly classified genocides				
% of genocides correctly classified	74% (26 cases)	Misclassified genocides: Afghanistan 1978, El Salvador 1980, Chile 1973, Uganda 1972, Iraq 1963, Yugoslavia, 1992, Sudan 1956, Philippines 1972, Sri Lanka 1989				
% of nongenocides correctly classified	73% (66 cases)	Highest-risk nongenocides: Pakistan 1983, Brazil 1961, Algeria 1991, China 1988, Mozambique 1976, Bangladesh 1974, Indonesia 1997				
<p><i>Note:</i> Political upheaval and trade openness coefficients are calculated using interval data on the full range of scores; other variables are dichotomous. The odds ratio for upheaval is based on the odds associated with the seventy-fifth percentile of upheaval scores relative to the twenty-fifth percentile. The odds ratio for trade openness is based on the odds associated with the twenty-fifth percentile of openness scores relative to the seventy-fifth percentile. The probability of geno-/politicide for a country with no risk factors is .028. Probabilities assume that a country is currently in state failure. The <i>c</i> statistic is used to compare models in case-control analysis without limiting the comparison to one particular choice of model thresholds (Green and Swets 1966; Harrell et al. 1984). It is the fraction of concordant pairs in the data, i.e., the fraction of all possible problem and control pairs for which the model assigns a higher score to the problem than the control.</p>						

Political Upheaval. Consistent with the theoretical argument, the greater the magnitude of previous internal wars and regime crises, summed over the preceding 15 years, the more likely that a new state failure will lead to geno-/politicide. When the magnitude of past upheaval was divided between high and low, in high-magnitude cases the risks of geno-/politicides were nearly two times greater. Similar results were obtained using other indicators of upheaval, e.g., the magnitudes of armed conflict within states.¹⁶

Prior Genocides. Arguments about the recurrence of geno-/politicide also are supported. The risks of new episodes were more than three times greater when state failures occurred in countries that had prior

geno-/politicides. The effects of magnitude of political upheaval were weaker than those of prior genocide—it appears that habituation to genocide adds more to the risks of future genocide than the magnitude of internal war and adverse regime change per se.

Elite Ideology and Regime Type. Theoretical arguments about the importance of elite ideologies and regime type are supported. Countries in which the ruling elite adhered to an exclusionary ideology were two and a half times as likely to have state failures leading to geno-/politicide as those with no such ideology. Failures in states with autocratic regimes were three and a half times more likely to lead to geno-/politicides than failures in democratic regimes. These events, if they occur in the context of other risk factors identified in the model, substantially raise the risks of massive human rights violations.

Ethnic and Religious Cleavages. Numerous indicators of ethnic and religious cleavages were evaluated but only one was significant in the final model. The

¹⁶ A number of alternative indicators of political upheaval were tested. The best results are obtained using the full range of values on an indicator that sums annual magnitudes of state failure for the previous 15 years. The range of the indicator is 0 to 46 (mean, 8.0; median, 4.5). To facilitate interpretation Table 2 reports an odds ratio based on the odds of geno-/politicide associated with the seventy-fifth percentile of upheaval scores relative to the twenty-fifth percentile.

risks of geno-/politicide were two and a half times more likely in countries where the political elite was based mainly or entirely on an ethnic minority.

International Interdependences. Countries with low trade openness had two and a half times greater odds of having state failures culminate in geno-/politicide.¹⁷ High trade openness (and the underlying economic and political conditions it taps) not only minimizes the risks of state failure in general, as shown in other State Failure analyses, but reduces substantially the odds that failures, if they do occur, will lead to geno-/politicides. The results support arguments about the importance of a country's international economic linkages in inhibiting gross human rights violations. Results of analyses using indicators of political interdependence are presented below.

The overall accuracy of the model is shown in the summary statistics and notes. The *c* statistic is used to summarize and compare the discriminatory power of different models in case-control analysis. It is the proportion of all possible problem and control pairs for which the model generates a higher score for the problem than the control. Coefficients from case-control regression analysis are used to generate model scores. Typically a threshold is chosen for the range of model scores that equalizes the proportions of correctly classified problems and controls. The model correctly classifies 74% of all cases as genocides or nongenocides.

The right-hand column in Table 2 shows the conditional effects of each variable on the probability of geno-/politicide in a country with an internal war or regime crisis. Note that, since the analyses include all cases of state failure and all instances of geno-/politicide, issues of sampling error do not arise. The probability of genocide for a country in failure with no risk factors is .028. If the country is an autocracy but has no other risk factors, the probability is increased by .090. If the country has a minority elite but no other risk factors, the probability is increased by .069.

The incremental effects of each risk factor are relatively small; their cumulative effect is large. Analysis of various combinations of risk factors shows that, if all risk factors are present in a failed state, the conditional probability of geno-/politicide is .90, with a 95% confidence interval of .66 to .98. The only such country with all six factors in 2001 is Iraq, as shown in Table 5. A hypothetical country with the following combination of four risk factors—a high magnitude of past upheaval, a minority elite, low trade openness, and autocracy—has a conditional geno-/politicide probability of .52 (confidence interval, .27 to .77). Sierra Leone is a contemporary example. If such a failed state also had a past genocide, the probability increases to .79 (confidence interval, .43 to .95). Contemporary Rwanda and

Burundi fit this pattern, i.e., they are challenged by rebels (are in failure) and have all risk factors except an exclusionary ideology. An example in the lower range of risks is a hypothetical failed state with high political upheaval and low trade openness but no other risk factors: The conditional probability of geno-/politicide in such a state is .11 (confidence interval, .04 to .27). Both Colombia and India have this pattern. If such a state is also autocratic, the conditional probability increases to .30 (confidence interval, .16 to .50).

Efforts to validate the model in Table 2 included refining the list of problem and control cases (not reported here), assessing the effects of interdependence of cases of geno-/politicides, probing the robustness of theoretical findings with different data and alternative indicators, and testing the effects of additional risk factors. The final model that emerges from this process displays less classificatory accuracy than some prior models but engenders greater confidence in terms of theoretical plausibility, accuracy, and reliability as an instrument for generating risk assessments.

The purpose of posting the State Failure data set and dictionary on a web site (see footnote 7) is to enable other researchers to apply other techniques and test alternative models—a number of which have already been done by the Task Force. Following are the results of a few of the alternative case-control analyses done to assess the validity of the geno-/politicide model.

Probing Effects of Interdependence

Interdependence among independent variables and among cases of geno-/politicide are potential threats to the stability of the model. Bivariate tests of relationships among the independent variables showed few significant associations. The exceptions were that exclusionary ideologies were twice as common among autocracies as among democracies, and the magnitude of past upheaval was significantly higher in autocracies and in regimes with exclusionary ideologies. However, these exceptions are not strong enough to affect the stability of the model.

The fact that multiple genocides occurred in ten countries raises questions about the statistical independence of cases. This was tested by reestimating the model with a reduced set of cases: Only the first geno-/politicide in a country was included; subsequent cases were excluded. This had virtually no effect on odds ratios, the *c* statistic, or the classification accuracy. The conclusion from these and other analyses not reported here is that the model is not significantly affected by interdependencies.

Probing Societal Cleavage and Elite Ethnicity Effects

The study is particularly concerned with the effects of alternative patterns of ethnic diversity and ethnic discrimination on the risks of geno-/politicide. For example, the (COW) Cultural data set was used to construct dichotomous indicators of low, medium, and

¹⁷ Trade openness is used as a continuous variable for calculating coefficients and estimating model scores. The range of the indicator is 7 to 137 (mean, 49; median, 43). For purposes of reporting odds ratios in Table 2 for this variable the odds of geno-/politicide associated with the twenty-fifth percentile of openness scores are shown relative to the seventy-fifth percentile.

TABLE 3. Probing the Structural Model: Testing Effects of Alternative Elite and Societal Cleavage Indicators

Variable and Predicted Direction of Effect	Model with Salient Elite Ethnicity		Model with Minority Elite		Model with Ethnic Discrimination	
	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value
Political upheaval excluding prior genocides (+)	1.65	.05	1.70	.05	1.66	.08
Prior genocide (+)	3.30	.11	3.39	.09	2.71	.17
Exclusionary elite ideology (+)	2.26	.11	2.55	.07	2.35	.10
Autocracy (+)	3.38	.03	3.40	.03	3.66	.03
Elite ethnicity is salient (+)	(1.48)	(.53)				
Elite is ethnocultural minority (+)			2.56	.09	2.59	.09
Active ethnic discrimination					(2.08)	(.24)
Trade openness (–)	2.43	<.01	2.56	<.01	2.53	<.01
Model Summary Statistics						
<i>c</i>	.83		.83		.84	
Number of problems	35		35		35	
Number of controls	91		91		91	
Threshold	.24		.25		.26	
% of genocides correctly classified	74% (26 cases)		74% (26 cases)		77% (27 cases)	
% of nongenocides correctly classified	76% (69 cases)		73% (66 cases)		75% (68 cases)	
<i>Note:</i> See Table 2 for explanatory notes. Only odds ratios and <i>p</i> values are shown here to simplify comparison across alternative models.						

high ethnic diversity. The low-diversity indicator tests whether small ethnic groups are likely to be targeted; the medium-diversity indicator provides a test of the thesis that the presence of several relatively large ethnic groups is associated with relatively intense interethnic contention and genocide. Bivariate analyses showed that neither pattern of ethnic diversity had any effect on the likelihood of geno-/politicide. This supports Krain's (1997) empirical finding that ethnic fractionalization was uncorrelated with the onset of geno-/politicide. It is also consistent with Walker and Poe's (2002) cross-national analysis showing that cultural heterogeneity was not related to political repression.

But two other indicators of ethnic cleavage did correlate significantly (in bivariate analysis) with geno-/politicide: active ethnic discrimination and elite ethnicity. To assess their effects better, three alternative models were estimated as shown in Table 3. The first two models differ in that the first uses the "elite ethnicity is salient" indicator, while the second uses the "elite represents an ethnic minority" indicator. "Elite represents an ethnic minority" is significant, whereas the "salience" indicator is not. Ethnic discrimination is added to the model in the last column in Table 3. It has weak effects in the predicted direction ($p = .24$). Thus the final model includes only the "elite ethnic minority" indicator. The theoretical implication is important: Ethnic heterogeneity is likely to lead to geno-/politicide only if an ethnic minority dominates the elite.

Probing International Interdependence and Quality-of-Life Effects

Genocide scholars almost invariably advocate international action including preventive diplomacy by the UN and major powers, engagement by nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs), and reactive or preventive military action (see Heidenreich 2001, Kuper 1985, and Riemer 2000). To test whether international political linkages are more important than economic interdependency in checking the escalation of internal wars and adverse regime changes into geno-/politicide, two indicators of countries' shared membership in international organizations were constructed. The assumption is that the greater a country's international political connections, the more likely it is to accept help in managing conflict and the more susceptible it is to pressures to minimize human rights violations. Indicators of country memberships in regional and intercontinental (i.e., global) organizations were substituted in the structural model for trade openness, with the results shown in Table 4. Neither is statistically significant, and neither adds to the classificatory accuracy of the model, but both reduce the impact of the minority elite indicator. This suggests that minority elites are less likely to have dense networks of political ties with other countries, and thus are more free to commit human rights violations, but the direction of causality is uncertain.

This does not mean that political linkages are irrelevant to the analysis and prevention of geno-/politicide. The critical question, in my view, is whether states and international organizations do in fact engage in preventive actions in the early stages. What counts is the political will to engage—and as Powers (2002) shows in her recent study, major international actors have repeatedly chosen not to do so.

Finally, the indicator of infant mortality was evaluated in the model because other analyses consistently show that high infant mortality rates contribute to the risks of state failure (Goldstone et al. 2002). The results in the last two columns in

TABLE 4. Revising the Structural Model: Testing Effects of International Political Interdependencies and Quality of Life

Variable and Predicted Direction of Effect	Regional IOs Replaces Trade Openness		Intercontinental IOs Replaces Trade Openness		Infant Mortality Added to Model with Trade Openness	
	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value	Odds Ratio	<i>p</i> Value
Political upheaval excluding prior genocides (+)	1.53	.10	1.60	.06	1.65	.08
Prior genocide (+)	3.93	.05	3.78	.05	3.50	.08
Exclusionary elite ideology (+)	2.47	.07	2.47	.07	2.47	.09
Autocracy (+)	2.93	.05	2.85	.06	3.45	.04
Elite is ethnocultural minority (+)	(1.66)	(.33)	(1.73)	(.30)	2.64	.10
Trade openness (-)					2.60	<.01
Intercontinental IO memberships (+)	(1.00)	(.99)				
Regional IO memberships (+)			(1.38)	(.33)		
Infant mortality (-)					(.94)	(.89)
Model Summary Statistics						
<i>c</i>	.79		.80		.83	
Number of problems	35		35		34	
Number of controls	91		91		91	
Threshold	.25		.23		.26	
% of genocides correctly classified	71% (25 cases)		71% (25 cases)		74% (25 cases)	
% of nongenocides correctly classified	71% (65 cases)		71% (65 cases)		72% (66 cases)	
<i>Note:</i> See Table 2 for explanatory notes. Only odds ratios and <i>p</i> values are shown here to simplify comparison across alternative models. IO, international organization.						

Table 4 show that, unlike trade openness, infant mortality (and the basket of quality-of-life indicators it represents) has no independent effects on the odds of geno-/politicide once a state failure has occurred. The conclusion is that low development is a generic risk factor for civil conflict and regime instability, whereas the effects of economic interdependence are both global and specific to the risks of geno-/politicide.

False Negatives, False Positives

The nine misclassified cases identified at the bottom of Table 2 (“misclassified genocides”) are diagnostic of problems with data error and model specification. Sudan 1956 is misclassified, probably because the genocide is dated from the beginning of the Southern rebellion, whereas mass killings began an indeterminate number of years later. If the onset of genocidal policies were dated from the mid-1960s, when the regime was no longer democratic and the magnitude of upheaval was high, it would be correctly classified. There were similar lags before the onset of geno-/politicides in Afghanistan (1978) and El Salvador (1980). Two other cases are misclassified because of the lag structure in the data used to estimate the model: Chile 1973 (targeting the left) and the Philippines 1972 (targeting rebellious Moros). Both regimes are classified as democracies because all model variables are measured one year prior to the onset of geno-/politicide. In fact, both geno-/politicides were carried out by authoritarian leaders after they suspended democratic rule: General Pinochet overthrew the democratic Allende government, and Marcos effec-

tively ended Philippine democracy by declaring martial law.

Thus, five of the nine misclassified cases can be accounted for by variables within the model. An example of an exception is Iraq in 1963, when the military first resorted to indiscriminate violence to suppress a rebellion by separatist Kurds; it may be questioned whether the case meets the key criterion of intent to destroy the group. If five cases that are misclassified because of temporal inconsistencies in the data and research design are added to the 26 correctly classified geno-/politicides, the classification accuracy increases to a very substantial 89%.

The false positives, in contrast, are the control cases of state failure incorrectly classified as impending genocides. Case-by-case inspection suggests that several could easily have escalated into politicides. Algeria after the onset of militant Islamic insurgency in 1991 is a case in point. Algeria’s Islamic militants, a rival authority in a civil war situation, carried out a campaign of murder against civilians but seem not to have targeted any specific group; therefore the campaign does not qualify as a politicide. Similarly, in Mozambique in 1976, widespread killings were carried out by Renamo rebels, but they did not target a definable communal group. The most intriguing of the recent false positives is Indonesia. The failure was the dissolution of the Suharto regime in 1997 and the model shows a high risk of impending genocide. In fact, it took international intervention in East Timor to prevent a resumption of genocidal killings following the independence referendum of 1999, and the risks of a future episode in Aceh province remain high (see Genocide Prevention Center 2001).

CONCLUSION: USING THE MODEL TO ASSESS RISKS OF FUTURE GENOCIDES AND POLITICIDES

All episodes of genocide and political mass murder of the last half-century have been carried out by elites or rival authorities in the context of internal war and regime instability. The motive common to such elites is the destruction “in whole or part” of collectivities that challenge their claim to authority or stand in the way of an ideology-driven desire to create a society purified of undesirable classes or communal groups. The structural model tested here identifies six causal factors that jointly differentiate with 74% accuracy the 35 serious civil conflicts since 1955 that led to episodes of genocide and politicide from 91 others that did not have genocidal consequences. The risk factors include the extent of political upheaval and the occurrence of prior geno-/politicides. The probability of mass murder is highest under autocratic regimes and is most likely to be set in motion by elites who advocate an exclusionary ideology, or represent an ethnic minority, or both. International economic interdependencies sharply reduce the chances that internal war and regime instability will have genocidal consequences.

Implications for Theory

Some theoretical arguments about the causes of genocide are called into question by the results. First, indicators of ethnic and religious cleavages had ambiguous effects in the final model. Active discrimination against ethnic minorities is a significant causal factor leading to ethnic war, consistent with theories of ethnic conflict (Gurr 2000; Horowitz 1985), but once ethnic and other civil wars have begun, discrimination does not help explain which of them are likely to lead to geno-/politicide. Second, levels of economic development, indexed here by infant mortality, make no difference in the likelihood of geno-/politicide once internal wars and adverse regime changes have begun. Low economic development and societal cleavages may predispose societies to intense conflict but it is characteristics of the political system and elites, and a country’s international linkages, that determine whether those conflicts culminate in geno-/politicide. It was also found, contrary to expectations, that economic interdependence is more important than international political linkages. The reason, I suggest, is that the international will to act is more important than political linkages in preventing escalation to geno-/politicide.

The findings are all the more significant in light of the fact that it was not possible to test effects of some other causal factors postulated by genocide scholars for which comparative historical data are currently lacking. In future structural analyses it would be desirable to assess the presence and expansion of private militias, paramilitary units, and state security agencies that operate with few restraints. Such entities often are implicated in the targeting of civilians. External support for a targeted group also has complex effects that merit closer analysis. Material support for politically

active groups is likely to prolong internal wars and may increase the risks of geno-/politicide. Also, empty threats from the international community against perpetrators may signal to elites that they can get away with mass murder without international repercussions. Another promising avenue for research is the “accelerator” approach in which event data analysis is applied to pregenocidal situations to identify patterns and sequences of political events that signal the onset of mass killings (see Harff 2001 and Harff and Gurr 1998).

Policy Implications

The model provides a framework for assessing and comparing the vulnerability of countries with state failures to genocide and politicide. When the model is applied to current information, it provides the basis for a global “watch list” that identifies countries in which the conditions for a future episode are present.

Table 5 provides an illustration. It lists 25 countries with armed conflicts circa 2001, based on an ongoing survey by Marshall (see Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001). Each country is categorized on the six risk factors using data for the year 2000 compiled by the State Failure project. Possible victim groups are identified based on country-specific information on civil conflicts, minority groups, and political opposition movements. The countries are ranked according to their numbers of positive risk factors.

Eleven countries currently are high on four or more of the risk factors for genocide and politicide. Iraq is the only one in which all six risk factors are present; Afghanistan also had all six factors prior to the overthrow of the Taliban regime but still faces considerable risks depending on the outcome of efforts to reconstruct a nonideological coalition government. The three countries with five factors are Burma, Burundi, and Rwanda. Another five African countries have four factors, as does Algeria. China, responsible for three previous episodes, has three risk factors, along with Liberia and Pakistan. For this approach to be useful for policy analysis, tabulation of risk factors must be complemented by assessment of the political circumstances in which they might be activated, as suggested in the following sketches of Burma and China.

Burma. The SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council), the military council that controls Burma, has relied mainly on repression to control its domestic opponents, including communal separatists such as the Karen and Shan and the urban-based democratic opposition. The government also targeted the Muslims of the northwest Arakan region for destruction or expulsion in 1978 and, again, in the early 1990s, precipitating large-scale refugee flows. The potential that any of these conflicts might escalate into geno-/politicide is moderated by several factors. First, the SLORC has sought negotiated settlements with most regional separatists, indicative of a shift away from exclusive reliance on repression. Second, it is seeking an accommodation with the democratic opposition, partly in response to international pressures. Finally, the country is being

TABLE 5. Risks of Genocide and Politicide in Countries with Armed Conflicts in 2001

Countries (No. of Risk Factors) ^a	Prior Geno-/Politicides	Upheaval since 1986 ^b	Risk Factor			Trade Openness ^c	Possible Target Group(s)
			Minority Elite	Exclusionary Ideology	Type of Regime		
Iraq (6 of 6)	Yes: 1961–75, 1988–91 Yes: 1978–89	High	Yes: <i>Sunni Arabs dominate</i> Yes: <i>Pushituns dominate</i>	Yes: <i>Secular nationalist</i> Yes: <i>Islamist</i>	Autocracy	Very low	Kurds, Shi'a, political opponents of Hussein Hazaris, Tajiks, Uzbeks
Afghanistan 2000 (6 of 6)	Yes: 1978–89	Very high	No: Coalition in formation No: Burman majority dominates	No	No effective regime	Very low	Supporters of Northern Alliance
Afghanistan 2002 (4 of 6)	Yes: 1978	High	No: Burman majority dominates	Yes: Nationalist	Autocracy	Very low	Democratic opposition; Karen, Shan, Mon; Arakenese Muslims
Burundi (5 of 6)	Yes: 1965–73, 1993, 1998	Very high	Yes: <i>Tutsis dominate</i>	No	Autocracy	Low	Hutus
Rwanda (5 of 6)	Yes: 1963–64, 1994	High	Yes: <i>Tutsi dominate</i>	No	Autocracy	Low	Supporters of exiled Hutu militants
Congo-Kinshasa (4 of 6)	Yes: 1964–65, 1977	Very high	Yes: <i>Narrow coalition of Kabila supporters</i>	No	No effective regime	Medium	Hutus, Tutsis, political and ethnic opponents of Kabila regime
Somalia (4 of 6)	Yes: 1988–91	Very high	No: Clan rivalries	No	No effective regime	Very low	Isaaq in Somaliland; clan rivals in South
Sierra Leone (4 of 6)	No	Very high	Yes: <i>Mende dominated</i>	No	No effective regime	Low	Supporters, opponents of Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Ethiopia (4 of 6)	Yes: 1976–97	High	Yes: <i>Tigreans dominated</i>	No	Autocracy	Medium	Supporters of Oromo, Somali secessionists
Uganda (4 of 6)	Yes: 1972–79, 1980–86	High	No	No	Autocracy	Low	Supporters of Lords Resistance Army
Algeria (4 of 6)	Yes: 1962	Very high	No	Yes: Secular nationalist	Autocracy	Medium	Islamists, government supporters
Liberia (3 of 6)	No	High	No	No	Autocracy	Low	Krahn, Mandingo; political opponents of Taylor regime
Pakistan (3 of 6)	Yes: 1971, 1973–77	Medium	No: Punjabi majority dominates	No	Autocracy	Low	Sindhis, Hindus, Shi'a, Christians
China (3 of 6)	Yes: 1950–51, 1959, 1956–75 Yes: 1989–90	Medium	No	Yes: Marxist	Autocracy	Medium	Uighers, Tibetans, Christians
Sri Lanka (2 of 6)	Yes: 1989–90	High	No: Sinhalese majority dominates	No	Partial democracy	High	Supporters of Tamil separatists
Philippines (2 of 6)	Yes: 1972–76	Very high	No	No	Democracy	High	Supporters of militant Moros, NPA
Colombia (2 of 6)	No	Very high	No	No	Partial democracy	Low	Peasants in FARC-controlled areas
Turkey (2 of 6)	No	High	No	Yes: Secular nationalist	Partial democracy	Medium	Kurds, Islamists
India (2 of 6)	No	High	No	No	Democracy	Low	Muslims; Christians
Israel (2 of 6)	No	Very high	No	Yes: Ethnic nationalism	Democracy	High	Palestinians, Arab-Israelis
Indonesia (1 of 6)	Yes: 1965–66, 1975–92	Medium	No: Javanese dominate	No	Partial democracy	Medium	Aceh, Chinese, Christians
Russia (1 of 6)	Yes: 1943–45, 1947–50	Low	No	No	Partial democracy	Medium	Chechens
Nigeria (0 of 6)	No	Low	No: Muslim majority dominates	No	Partial democracy	High	Christians in North; Niger Delta peoples
Nepal (0 of 6)	No	Medium	No	No	Partial democracy	Medium	Maoist insurgents and supporters
Macedonia (0 of 6)	No	None	No: Macedonian majority dominates	No	Partial democracy	High	Ethnic Albanians

^a Countries are listed according to their number of risk factors, as identified in the final model in Table 2. Prior genocides are from Harff 1992; other data are from the State Failure data set. All indicators use 2000 information except that trade openness is for 1999. Boldface italic entries are high-risk conditions. The table includes most countries with armed conflicts circa 2001 (from Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001) but excludes Angola and Sudan because they had ongoing geno-/politicides in 2001. Possible victim groups are identified based on country-specific information from case files on countries, minority groups, and political opposition movements.

^b Categories used for upheaval scores: low, 1–9; medium, 10–20; high, 21–34; very high, 35–60.

^c Categories used for trade openness scores: very low, 2 or less; low, 21–40; medium, 41–70; high, 71–100; very high, >100.

opened up to foreign investment in ways that will continue to reduce its rulers' future options about how to deal with opponents.

China. Three geno-/politicides have been carried out during Communist rule in China, one after the Communists took power in 1950–51, the second in Tibet in 1959, and the last during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1975. Some risk factors remain high but appear to be declining. Beijing's rulers are more pragmatic in doctrine and practice than their predecessors. China is more engaged economically with the rest of the world, with the likely long-term result of constraining domestic policies that offend trading partners and investors. Nonetheless, the regime has responded harshly to resistance by Tibetans and by Muslim Uighers in Xinjiang province and to imagined security threats from Christians and the Falun Gong movement. Unless the Chinese government becomes more willing to accommodate national minorities and unauthorized religious sects, the risk remains that repression may escalate into policies aimed at eliminating the offending groups.

These two sketches help make another point about the policy implications of the structural model. Some factors are historically inescapable, including the occurrence of prior genocides, but most are susceptible to external influence. For example, promoting the observance of minimal human rights standards and the practice of inclusiveness should continue to be on the policy agenda of governments and organizations that care what happens in countries such as Burma and Burundi. Attempts to force democratization are problematic because such attempts in poor, heterogeneous countries often fail. Nevertheless, those failures usually prompt efforts to redesign and rebuild democratic institutions. Once in place, democratic institutions—even partial ones—reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and all but eliminate the risk that it will lead to geno-/policide. Moreover, economic connectedness appears to have at least one positive effect in poor countries: The greater their interdependence with the global economy, the less likely that their elites will target minorities and political opponents for destruction.

The risk assessments generated using this approach not only signal possible genocides, but flag the actual and potential victims of human rights abuses in conflict-ridden countries everywhere. Timely and plausible assessments of these situations should make it easier to convince policymakers of the need to engage proactively in high-risk situations. Anticipatory responses should save more lives at less cost than belated responses after killings have begun.

REFERENCES

- Ball, Patrick, Paul Kubrick, and Herbert F. Spierer. 1999. *State Violence in Guatemala, 1960–1996: A Quantitative Reflection*. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science.
- Banks, Arthur S. 1971. *Cross-Polity Time-Series Data*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Beck, Nathaniel J., Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable." *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (4): 1260–88.
- Breslow, N. E., and N. E. Day. 1980. *Statistical Methods in Cancer Research. Volume I: The Analysis of Case-Control Studies*. Lyon: IARC Scientific Publications No. 32.
- Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. 1990. *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Davenport, Christian. 1999. "Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (1): 92–116.
- Des Forges, Allison. 1999. *Leave None to the Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Esty, Daniel C., Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger. 1999. "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings." *Environmental Change & Security Project Report* 5 (Summer): 49–72.
- Fein, Helen. 1979. *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust*. New York: Free Press.
- Fein, Helen. 1984. "Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses." In *Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide*, ed. Israel W. Charny. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 3–31.
- Fein, Helen. 1993a. "Accounting for Genocide After 1945: Theories and Some Findings." *International Journal on Group Rights* 1: 79–106.
- Fein, Helen 1993b. *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*. London and Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Genocide Prevention Center. 2001. *Aceh: Indonesia Report. Impending Clash May Result in Crimes against Humanity*. Alexandria, VA: Improve the World International.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 2002. "The Case for Case Control: Substantive Issues in the Study of Rare and Calamitous Events." University of California, Davis. Unpublished paper prepared for the State Failure Task Force.
- Goldstone, Jack A., Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert Bates, David Epstein, Colin Kahl, Mark Woodward, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger. 2002. *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings*. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation. At <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail>.
- Green, D. M., and J. A. Swets. 1966. *Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Gunaratna, Rohan. 1990. *Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP*. Kandy: Sri Lanka Institute of Fundamental Studies.
- Gurr, Ted Robert, ed. 1980. *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research*. New York: Free Press.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1986. "Persisting Patterns of Repression and Rebellion: Foundations for a General Theory of Political Coercion." In *Persistent Patterns and Emergent Structures in a Waning Century*, ed. Margaret P. Karns. New York: Praeger, 149–68.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
- Gurr, Ted Robert, Monty G. Marshall, and Deepa Khosla. 2001. *Peace and Conflict 2001: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.
- Harff, Barbara. 1987. "The Etiology of Genocide." In *The Age of Genocide*, ed. Michael N. Dobkowski and Isador Wallimann. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 41–59.
- Harff, Barbara. 1992. "Recognizing Genocides and Politicides." In *Genocide Watch*, ed. Helen Fein. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 27–41.
- Harff, Barbara. 2001. "Could Humanitarian Crises Have Been Anticipated in Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire? A Comparative Study of Anticipatory Indicators." In *Journeys through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*, ed. Hayward Alker, Ted Robert Gurr, and Kumar Rupesinghe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 81–102.
- Harff, Barbara, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1998. "Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies." *Journal of Peace Research* 35: 551–79.

- Harrell, F. E., Jr., K. L. Lee, R. M. Califf, D. B. Pryor, and R. A. Rosati. 1984. "Regression Modeling Strategies for Improved Prognostic Prediction." *Statistics in Medicine* 3 (2): 143–52.
- Heidenreich, John G. 2001. *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change and Civil War, 1916–1992." *American Political Science Review* 95 (March): 33–48.
- Henderson, Conway. 1991. "Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35: 120–42.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Human Rights Watch. 1991. "Sri Lanka." In *World Report 1990*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Jagers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (November): 469–82.
- Kasozi, A. B. K. 1994. *The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964–1985*. Montreal: McGill–Queen's University Press.
- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001a. "Improving Forecasts of State Failure." *World Politics* 53 (July): 623–58.
- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001b. "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data." *Political Analysis* 9 (Spring): 137–63.
- Krain, Matthew. 1997. "State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41: 331–60.
- Kuper, Leo. 1977. *The Pity of It All: Polarization of Racial and Ethnic Relations*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kuper, Leo. 1981. *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kuper, Leo. 1985. *The Prevention of Genocide*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Le Blanc, Lawrence J. 1988. "The United Nations Convention and Political Groups: Should the United States Propose an Amendment?" *Yale Journal of International Law* 13: 268–94.
- Lemkin, Raphael. 1944. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Lichbach, Mark I. 1987. "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31: 266–97.
- Lichbach, Mark I. 1998. "Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and the Structure-Action Problem of Social Order." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 401–24.
- Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993." *American Political Science Review* 89: 681–90.
- Lopez, George A. 1986. "National Security Ideology as an Impetus to State Violence and State Terror." In *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, ed. George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 73–95.
- Makiya, Kanan. 1992. "The Anfal: Uncovering an Iraqi Campaign to Exterminate the Kurds." *Harper's Magazine* 284, No. 1704 (May): 53–61.
- Mattas, David. 1992. "Remembering the Holocaust." In *Genocide Watch*, ed. Helen Fein. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Melson, Robert. 1992. *Revolution and Genocide*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Minority Rights Group. 1984. *Uganda and Sudan—North and South*. Report No. 66. London: Minority Rights Group.
- Munck, Gerardo L., and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices." *Comparative Political Studies* 35: 5–34.
- Powers, Samantha. 2002. *"A Problem from Hell": American and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books.
- Prunier, Gerard. 1995. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Quigley, T., trans. (1999). *Guatemala: Never Again*. Report of the Guatemalan Roman Catholic Church's Inter-Diocesan Recuperation of the Historical Memory Project (REMHI). Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1972. *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
- Riemer, Neil, ed. 2000. *Protection Against Genocide: Mission Impossible?* Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Rummel, Rudolph J. 1995. "Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39: 3–26.
- Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part I)." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (3): 259–82.
- Schlesselman, J. J. 1982. *Case-Control Studies: Design, Conduct, Analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schmeidl, Suzanne. 1997. "Exploring the Causes of Forced Migration: A Pooled Analysis, 1971–1990." *Social Science Quarterly* 78: 284–308.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Totten, Samuel, and Steven Jacobs, eds. 2002. *Pioneers of Genocide Studies: Confronting Mass Death in the Century of Genocide*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Walker, Scott, and Steven C. Poe. 2002. "Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries' Respect for Human Rights?" *Human Rights Quarterly* 24: 237–63.