Research Article

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On a class of strongly asymmetric PKA algorithms

Abstract: In the papers [1, 2] a new scheme to produce public key agreement (PKA) algorithms was proposed and some examples based on polynomials (toy models) were discussed. In the present paper we introduce a non-commutative realization of the above mentioned scheme and prove that non-commutativity can be an essential ingredient of security in the sense that, in the class of algorithms constructed, under some commutativity assumptions on the matrices involved, we can find a breaking strategy, but dropping these assumptions we can not, even if we assume, as we do in all the attacks discussed in the present paper, that discrete logarithms have zero cost.

Keywords: PKA algorithm, asymmetric algorithm

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1 Strongly asymmetric algorithm-3 (SAA-3)

Public key agreement (PKA) algorithms play an important role in contemporary asymmetric cryptography. The term *asymmetry* here refers to the difference of information between sender and receiver: each of them ignores the secret key of the other one. However, in the most used asymmetric algorithms the operations executed by sender and receiver are very similar. The main idea of strongly asymmetric cryptography is to further break this symmetry introducing multiple secret and public keys for the sender. This allows to split public information into several pieces, thus making attacks more difficult.

In the present paper we will keep the distinction between *public parameters* and *public keys* even if in PKA algorithms this distinction is not sharp because any public parameter can become a public key of one of the interlocutors.

1.1 Public parameters

The public parameters of the algorithm are

- a natural integer $d \in \mathbb{N}$,
- a large prime number $p \in \mathbb{N}$,
- the finite field $\mathbb{F}$ (typically $\mathbb{F} := \mathbb{Z}_p$),
- a fixed matrix $\alpha \in M(d;\mathbb{F}) := \{d \times d \text{ square matrices with entries in } \mathbb{F}\}$,
- a finite set $I \subset \mathbb{N}$.

In the following, all scalar multiplications (in particular exponentiations) are meant in $\mathbb{F}$ and we use the convention

$$0^x := 0 \quad \text{for all } x \in \mathbb{F}.$$

The term matrix will be used as a synonym of *element of* $M(d;\mathbb{F})$; all matrix multiplications are meant in the standard sense while matrix exponentiations are meant in the Schur sense, i.e. elementwise: if c is either an

element of $\mathbb{F}$ or a matrix $c = (c_{ij})$ and $M = (M_{a,b})$ is a matrix, the symbol $c^{\circ M}$ denotes the matrix

$$\left(c^{\circ M}\right)_{a,b} := \begin{cases} c^{M_{a,b}} & \text{scalar case,} \\ c_{a,b}^{M_{a,b}} & \text{matrix case,} \end{cases} \qquad a, b \in \{1, \dots, d\}.$$

Secret keys of B. The main secret key of B is

$$x_{B,3} \in M(d; \mathbb{F}).$$

Additional secret keys of B are

$$\{A_j \in M(d; \mathbb{F}) : j \in I\}, \quad N_{B,3} \in M(d; \mathbb{F}), \quad c \in \mathbb{F}.$$

The conditions to be satisfied by these secret keys of B are

$$[x_{B,3}, \alpha] = 0, \tag{1}$$
$$[x_{B,3}, N_{B,3}^{-1} \log y_A] = 0, \tag{2}$$
$$[N_{B,3}^{-1} \log y_A, A_j] \neq 0 \quad \text{for all } j \in I, \tag{3}$$
$$[\log y_{B,3;j}, N_{B,3}] \neq 0 \quad \text{for all } j \in I,$$
$$[\log y_{B,3;j}, A_j] \neq 0 \quad \text{for all } j \in I, \tag{4}$$
$$[x_{B,3}, A_j] \neq 0 \quad \text{for all } j \in I.$$

Here and in the following, if $x \equiv (x_{ij}) \in M(d; \mathbb{F})$, then $\log x$ denotes the Schur logarithm of x, i.e.

$$(\log x)_{ij} := \log x_{ij}.$$

Clearly, $N_{B,3}$ must be invertible and, for the reasons explained in Section 1.4, it is convenient to choose the A_j non-invertible.

Public keys of B. The public keys of B are given by the finite set of matrices

$$\{y_{B,2;j},\ y_{B,3;j} \in M(d; \mathbb{F}) : j \in I\},$$

constructed using the secret keys of B, as follows. For all $j \in I$ and $a, b \in \{1, \dots, d\}$ set

$$y_{B,2;j;a,b} := c^{(N_{B,3} A_j)_{a,b}} = \left(c^{\circ N_{B,3} A_j}\right)_{a,b},$$
$$y_{B,3;j;a,b} := c^{(A_j x_{B,3})_{a,b}} = \left(c^{\circ A_j x_{B,3}}\right)_{a,b}.$$

Notice that, once given the $(A_j)_{j \in I}$ and any matrix $x \in M(d; \mathbb{F})$, the polynomial $Q \equiv (A_j)_{j \in I}$,

$$Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x}) := \sum_{j \in I} A_j \, (\alpha^{\circ x})^j,$$

of degree $|I|$ in the matrix $\alpha^{\circ x}$ is uniquely determined.

Secret key of A. A matrix $x_A \in M(d; \mathbb{F})$.

Public key of A. The public key of A is given by the matrix $y_A := (y_{A;a,g}) \in M(d; \mathbb{F})$ constructed as follows. For each $a, g \in \{1, \dots, d\}$ set

$$y_{A;a,g} = c^{[N_{B,3} Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})]_{a,g}} = \left(c^{\circ N_{B,3} Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})}\right)_{a,g}.$$

y_A can be computed uniquely in terms of the public keys of B, the public parameter α and the secret key of A as follows. For each $a, g \in \{1, \dots, d\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} y_{A;a,g} &= \prod_{j \in I} \prod_{b \in \{1,\dots,d\}} (y_{B,2;j;a,b})^{[(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{b,g}} = \prod_{j \in I} \prod_{b \in \{1,\dots,d\}} \left(c^{(N_{B,3} A_j)_{a,b}}\right)^{[(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{b,g}} \\ &= c^{\sum_{j \in I} \sum_{b \in \{1,\dots,d\}} (N_{B,3} A_j)_{a,b} [(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j)]_{b,g}} = c^{\sum_{j \in I} [N_{B,3} A_j \, (\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{a,g}} \\ &= c^{[N_{B,3} \sum_j A_j \, (\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{a,g}} = c^{[N_{B,3} Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})]_{a,g}} = \left(c^{\circ N_{B,3} Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})}\right)_{a,g}. \end{aligned}$$

SSK. The matrix

$$\kappa_{a,g} := c^{[Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3}]_{a,g}} = \left(c^{\circ Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3}}\right)_{a,g}, \quad a, g \in \{1, \dots, d\}.$$

B computes the SSK using the public key of A and his own secret keys.

First step. B uses his secret key $N_{B,3}$ to *clean the noise*, calculating, for each $a, g \in \{1, \dots, d\}$,

$$\begin{aligned}\prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} \left(y_{A;b,g}\right)^{(N_{B,3}^{-1})_{a,b}} &= \prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} \left(c^{[N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})]_{b,g}}\right)^{(N_{B,3}^{-1})_{a,b}} \\ &= \prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} \left(c^{(N_{B,3}^{-1})_{a,b}[N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})]_{b,g}}\right) = c^{\sum_b (N_{B,3}^{-1})_{a,b}[N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})]_{b,g}} \\ &= c^{(N_{B,3}^{-1}[N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})])_{a,g}} = c^{(Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A}))_{a,g}} = \left(c^{\circ Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})}\right)_{a,g}.\end{aligned}$$

Second step. B inserts his main secret key, calculating, for each $a, g \in \{1, \dots, d\}$,

$$\begin{aligned}\prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} \left(c^{(Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A}))_{a,b}}\right)^{(x_{B,3})_{b,g}} &= \prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} c^{(Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A}))_{a,b}(x_{B,3})_{b,g}} \\ &= c^{\sum_b (Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A}))_{a,b}(x_{B,3})_{b,g}} = c^{(Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3})_{a,g}} = \left(c^{\circ Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3}}\right)_{a,g} = \kappa_{a,g}.\end{aligned}$$

A computes the SSK using the public key of B and her own secret key, and calculating, for each $a, g \in \{1, \dots, d\}$,

$$\begin{aligned}\prod_{j\in I}\prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} \left(y_{B,3;j;a,b}\right)^{[(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{b,g}} &= \prod_{j\in I}\prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} \left(c^{(A_j x_{B,3})_{a,b}}\right)^{[(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{b,g}} \\ &= \prod_{j\in I}\prod_{b\in\{1,\dots,d\}} c^{(A_j x_{B,3})_{a,b}[(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{b,g}} = \prod_{j\in I} c^{\sum_b (A_j x_{B,3})_{a,b}[(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{b,g}} \\ &= \prod_{j\in I} c^{[A_j x_{B,3}(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j]_{a,g}}.\end{aligned}$$

Since (1) implies $x_{B,3}(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j = (\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j x_{B,3}$ for each $j \in I$, this becomes equal to

$$\prod_{j\in I} c^{[A_j(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j x_{B,3}]_{a,g}} = c^{[(\sum_j A_j(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j)x_{B,3}]_{a,g}} = c^{[Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3}]_{a,g}} = \left(c^{\circ Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3}}\right)_{a,g} = \kappa_{a,g}.$$

1.2 Attacks

The eavesdropper E knows the following:

(i) the public parameters:

$$d \in \mathbb{N}, \quad \mathbb{F}, \quad \alpha \in M(d;\mathbb{F}), \quad I \subseteq \mathbb{N},$$

(ii) the public keys of B:

$$y_{B,2;j},\ y_{B,3;j} \in M(d;\mathbb{F}), \quad j \in I,$$

(iii) the structure of the public keys of B:

$$\begin{aligned}y_{B,2;j;a,b} &:= c^{(N_{B,3}A_j)_{a,b}} = \left(c^{\circ N_{B,3}A_j}\right)_{a,b}, \quad j \in I,\ a, b \in \{1, \dots, d\}, \\ y_{B,3;j;a,b} &:= c^{(A_j x_{B,3})_{a,b}} = \left(c^{\circ A_j x_{B,3}}\right)_{a,b},\end{aligned}$$

(iv) the public key of A:

$$y_A \in M(d;\mathbb{F}), \quad y_{A;a,g} = c^{[N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})]_{a,g}} = \left(c^{\circ N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})}\right)_{a,g},$$

(v) the constraints (1).

E wants to know the SSK:

$$\kappa_{a,g} := c^{[Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3}]_{a,b}} = \left(c^{\circ Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})x_{B,3}}\right)_{a,b}, \quad a,b \in \{1,\dots,d\}.$$

Assuming zero cost logarithms, E can compute for each $a,b \in \{1,\dots,d\}$

$$\begin{aligned}
\log y_{B,2;j;a,b} &= (N_{B,3}A_j)_{a,b} \log c, \qquad j \in I,\\
\log y_{B,3;j;a,b} &= (A_j x_{B,3})_{a,b} \log c, \qquad j \in I,\\
\log y_{A;a,b} &= \left(N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A})\right)_{a,b} \log c.
\end{aligned}$$

In addition E knows that the logarithm of the SSK is

$$\log \kappa_{a,b} = \left(x_{B,3}Q(\alpha^{\circ x_A})\right)_{a,b} \log c, \quad a,b \in \{1,\dots,d\}.$$

This gives the following matrix equations:

$$\log y_{B,2;j} = N_{B,3}A_j \log c, \qquad j \in I, \tag{5}$$

$$\log y_{B,3;j} = A_j x_{B,3} \log c, \qquad j \in I, \tag{6}$$

$$\log y_A = N_{B,3}Q_n(\alpha^{\circ x_A}) \log c, \tag{7}$$

$$\log \kappa = x_{B,3}Q(\alpha^{\circ x_A}) \log c. \tag{8}$$

E knows that $N_{B,3}$ is invertible and, even not knowing $N_{B,3}^{-1}$, E knows from (7) that

$$N_{B,3}^{-1} \log y_A = Q(\alpha^{\circ x_A}) \log c$$

must hold. From this and (8), even not knowing $\log \kappa$, E knows that the following relation must hold:

$$\log \kappa = x_{B,3}N_{B,3}^{-1}(\log y_A). \tag{9}$$

1.3 Solutions of the system (5), (6), (9)

In order to study the system (5), (6), (9), let us introduce the simplifying notations

$$Q(\alpha^{\circ X_A}) \log c =: x, \tag{10}$$

$$N_{B,3} =: y, \tag{11}$$

$$A_j \log c =: z_j, \quad j \in I,$$

for the unknowns to E, and

$$\log y_{B,n,j} =: a_{n,j}, \quad j \in I,\ n = 2,3, \tag{12}$$

$$\log y_A =: a \tag{13}$$

for the known matrices. Then the system (5), (6), (9) becomes equivalent to the system

$$a_{2,j} = yz_j, \qquad j \in I, \tag{14}$$

$$a_{3,j} = z_j x_{B,3}, \quad j \in I, \tag{15}$$

$$\log \kappa = x_{B,3}y^{-1}a. \tag{16}$$

Since no z_j appears in equation (16), the only possibility to solve the system (14), (15), (16) is to deduce y and $x_{B,3}$ from (14), (15) and to replace them in (16). Equations (14), (15) are a system of $2|I|$ quadratic equations in the $|I| + 2$ matrix unknowns (for E):

$$z_j, y, x_{B,3}, \quad j \in I.$$

However, to find the SSK, E does not need to know all the z_j. It is sufficient to know one of them, let us call it z_1. Clearly, up to a relabeling, z_1 can be replaced by any z_j with $j \in I$. Notice that z_j is invertible if and only if A_j is invertible.

1.4 Attacks if A_1 is invertible

First attack. Since y is invertible, (14) implies that z_1 (equivalently A_1) is invertible if and only if $a_{2,1}$ is invertible. Suppose that z_1 is invertible. Then, in the notations of Section 1.3, we have

$$y = a_{2,1} z_1^{-1}, \tag{17}$$

$$x_{B,3} = z_1^{-1} a_{3,1}. \tag{18}$$

Hence, using (17), (18) and (16), E can compute

$$\log \kappa = x_{B,3} y^{-1} a = z_1^{-1} a_{3,1} z_1 a_{2,1}^{-1} a. \tag{19}$$

Therefore, if E knows z_1, then she knows $\log \kappa$, hence the SSK κ.

Second attack. E may deduce z_1 from (14) obtaining

$$z_1 = y^{-1} a_{2,1}.$$

Then, using (18) and the invertibility of $a_{2,1}$, she finds

$$x_{B,3} = a_{2,1}^{-1} y a_{3,1}$$

and from this she deduces

$$\log \kappa = x_{B,3} y^{-1} a = a_{2,1}^{-1} y a_{3,1} y^{-1} a. \tag{20}$$

Third attack. From (5) and (6), if A_1 is invertible, E obtains

$$\begin{aligned}(\log y_{B,2;1})^{-1} (\log y_A)(\log y_{B,3;1}) &= (N_{B,3} A_1 \log c)^{-1} (\log y_A)(A_1 x_{B,3} \log c) \\ &= (A_1 \log c)^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1} (\log y_A)(A_1 \log c) x_{B,3} \\ &= A_1^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1} (\log y_A) A_1 x_{B,3}.\end{aligned}$$

Equivalently, in the notations (10), (11), (12), (13):

$$a_{2,1}^{-1} a a_{3,1} = (y z_1)^{-1} a z_1 x_{B,3} = z_1^{-1} y^{-1} a z_1 x_{B,3}. \tag{21}$$

Fourth attack. From (21) it follows that, if

$$[z_1, y^{-1} a] = 0, \tag{22}$$

then

$$(\log y_{B,2;1})^{-1} (\log y_A)(\log y_{B,3;1}) = a_{2,1}^{-1} a a_{3,1} = y^{-1} a x_{B,3} = N_{B,3}^{-1} (\log y_A) x_{B,3}.$$

Comparing this with (9), we see that, if in addition to (22) one has (2), then

$$(\log y_{B,2;1})^{-1} (\log y_A)(\log y_{B,3;1}) = x_{B,3} N_{B,3}^{-1} (\log y_A),$$

hence E can express the key in terms of the public parameters:

$$\log \kappa = x_{B,3} N_{B,3}^{-1} (\log y_A) = \log \kappa.$$

In conclusion: if in addition to the invertibility of A_1 we also suppose that condition (3) is not satisfied, i.e. that

$$[A_1, N_{B,3}^{-1} \log y_A] = 0,$$

and that (2) holds, then E can reconstruct the SSK.

Fifth attack. From (5) and (6), if A_1 is invertible, E obtains

$$\begin{aligned}(\log y_{B,3;1})(\log y_A)(\log y_{B,2;1})^{-1} &= (A_1 x_{B,3} \log c)(\log y_A)(N_{B,3} A_1 \log c)^{-1} \\ &= (A_1 x_{B,3} \log c)(\log y_A)(A_1 \log c)^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1} \\ &= A_1 x_{B,3} (\log y_A) A_1^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1}\end{aligned}$$

or, equivalently,

$$(\log y_{B,3;1})(\log y_A)(\log y_{B,2;1})^{-1} = z_1 x_{B,3} a z_1^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1}.$$

If

$$[z_1, x_{B,3} a] = 0,$$

then the above identity is equivalent to

$$(\log y_{B,3;1})(\log y_A)(\log y_{B,2;1})^{-1} = x_{B,3} (\log y_A) N_{B,3}^{-1}.$$

Comparing this with (9), we see that, if in addition to

$$[A_1, x_{B,3}] = [A_1, \log y_A] = 0$$

one has

$$[N_{B,3}, y_A] = 0,$$

then E can express the SSK in terms of the public parameters:

$$(\log y_{B,3;1})(\log y_A)(\log y_{B,2;1})^{-1} = x_{B,3} N_{B,3}^{-1} (\log y_A) = \log \kappa.$$

Sixth attack. Suppose that the $y_{B,2;j}$ are invertible, so that E can form the product

$$(\log y_{B,2;j})^{-1} (\log y_{B,3;j}) = (\log c)^{-1} A_j^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1} A_j \, x_{B,3} (\log c).$$

If c is a scalar, this is equivalent to

$$(\log y_{B,2;j})^{-1} (\log y_{B,3;j}) = A_j^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1} A_j \, x_{B,3}.$$

So E can compute

$$(\log y_{B,2;j})^{-1} (\log y_{B,3;j}) \log y_A = A_j^{-1} N_{B,3}^{-1} A_j \, x_{B,3} \log y_A.$$

Thus, if

$$[A_j, N_{B,3}] = 0, \tag{23}$$

this expression can be simplified obtaining

$$(\log y_{B,2;j})^{-1} (\log y_{B,3;j}) \log y_A = N_{B,3}^{-1} x_{B,3} \log y_A.$$

Comparing this with (9), we see that, if in addition to (23) one has

$$[x_{B,3}, N_{B,3}] = 0,$$

then E can express the SSK in terms of the public parameters:

$$(\log y_{B,2;j})^{-1} (\log y_{B,3;j}) \log y_A = x_{B,3} N_{B,3}^{-1} \log y_A = \log \kappa.$$

1.5 The role of commutativity

First attack. If z_1 commutes with $a_{3,1}$,

$$[a_{3,1}, z_1] = 0,$$

then in equation (19) the variable z_1 disappears and (19) becomes

$$\log \kappa = a_{3,1} a_{2,1}^{-1} a$$

or, equivalently, in view of (10), (11), (12), (13),

$$\log \kappa = \log y_{B,3,1} (\log y_{B,2,1})^{-1} \log y_A,$$

which expresses the SSK in terms of the public parameters.

In conclusion: if in addition to the invertibility of A_1 we also suppose that condition (4) is not satisfied, i.e. that

$$[\log y_{B,3;1}, A_1] = 0, \tag{24}$$

then E can reconstruct the SSK.

Second attack. Similarly, if y commutes with $a_{3,1}$,

$$[a_{3,1}, y] = 0,$$

then in equation (20) the variable y disappears and (20) becomes

$$\log \kappa = a_{2,1}^{-1} a_{3,1} a$$

or, equivalently, in view of (10), (11), (12), (13),

$$\log \kappa = (\log y_{B,2,1})^{-1} \log y_{B,3,1} \log y_A,$$

which again expresses the SSK in terms of the public parameters.

In conclusion: if in addition to the invertibility of A_1 we also suppose that condition (4) is not satisfied, i.e. that

$$[\log y_{B,3;1}, y] = 0, \tag{25}$$

then E can reconstruct the SSK.

Remark. Notice that the conditions (24) and (25) are always satisfied in the one-dimensional case.

1.6 Attacks under strong invertibility conditions

In the present section we suppose that the A_j (equivalently all the z_j) are invertible for each $j \in I$. Moreover, we fix, as always possible, a numeration of I which identifies it with a set of the form $I \equiv \{1, \dots, N\}$. Then equations (14), (15) become, respectively,

$$\begin{aligned} a_{2,j} z_j^{-1} &= y \qquad \text{for all } j \in I, \\ a_{3,j} z_j^{-1} &= x_{B,3} \quad \text{for all } j \in I. \end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

Equation (26) implies in particular that

$$a_{2,j} z_1^{-1} = \cdots = a_{2,d} z_d^{-1}. \tag{27}$$

If a_{22} is invertible, we deduce from

$$a_{2,j} z_1^{-1} = a_{2,2} z_2^{-1}$$

that (27) is equivalent to

$$z_2^{-1} = a_{22}^{-1} a_{21} z_1^{-1}.$$

If a_{23} is invertible, we deduce from

$$a_{22} z_2^{-1} = a_{23} z_3^{-1}$$

that

$$z_3^{-1} = a_{23}^{-1} a_{22} a_{22}^{-1} a_{21} z_1^{-1} = a_{23}^{-1} z_1^{-1}.$$

Suppose that a_{2j} is invertible for each $j \in I$ and, by induction, that

$$z_j^{-1} = a_{2,j}^{-1} a_{2,1} z_1^{-1}. \tag{28}$$

Then from

$$a_{2,j} z_j^{-1} = a_{2,j+1} z_{j+1}^{-1}$$

we deduce that

$$z_{j+1}^{-1} = a_{2,j+1}^{-1} a_{2,j} z_{2,j}^{-1} = a_{2,j+1}^{-1} a_{2,j} a_{2,1} z_1^{-1} = a_{2,j+1}^{-1} z_1^{-1}.$$

Therefore, by induction (28) holds for each $j \in I$.

From the same argument, with $a_{2,j}$ replaced by $a_{3,j}$, we deduce that

$$z_j^{-1} = a_{3,j}^{-1} a_{3,1} z_1^{-1}. \tag{29}$$

Combining (28) and (29), we obtain the system of $|I|-1$ homogeneous linear equations in the unknown matrix z_1^{-1}:

$$(a_{3,j}^{-1} a_{3,1} z_1^{-1} - a_{2,j}^{-1} a_{2,j}) z_1^{-1} = 0, \quad j \in I \setminus \{1\}. \tag{30}$$

Remark. We know a priori that at least one matrix solution of the system (30) exists. However, if $|I| < d^2 + 1$, then $(d^2 + 1) - |I|$ coefficients of this solution are indeterminate.

1.7 Computational complexity

Computation of y_A.

- Computation of $\alpha^{\circ x_A}$:
  - x_A-scalar: $\log x_A$ matrix multiplications: each matrix multiplication, d^3 scalar multiplications.
  - x_A-matrix: d^2 scalar exponentiations.
- Computation of $(\alpha^{\circ x_A})^j$ (no difference between x_A-scalar or x_A-matrix): $\log j$ matrix multiplications for each $j \in \{1, \dots, |I|\}$.

  Total number of matrix multiplications:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{|I|} \log j = \log(|I|!) \sim |I| \log |I|.$$

  In conclusion, we have $(\log x_A + |I| \log |I|) d^3$ multiplications.

  Number of exponentiations: d^4.

  Multiplications for each entry of y_A: $|I| \cdot d$.

  In total, we have $d^2((\log x_A + |I| \log |I|) d^3 + |I| d)$ multiplications to produce y_A, plus d^4 exponentiations.

  The complexity of the number of exponentiations is of order $\log e$, where e is the exponent. This gives $(\log e) d^4$ multiplications.

Computation of $y_{B,2}$. One matrix multiplication, i.e. d^3 multiplications, and d^2 exponentiations, i.e. an order of $d^2 \log e$ multiplications.

In total, we have $d^3 + d^2 \log e$ multiplications.

Computation of $y_{B,3}$. The same order of complexity as $y_{B,2}$.

Computation of the SSK: B. For a single entry of the SSK, we have d^4 exponentiations, i.e. order of $d^4 \log e$ multiplications plus d multiplications, and additional d^4 exponentiations for a total of $d^4 \log e$ multiplications plus d multiplications.

In total, we have $2d^4 \log e + d$ multiplications for a single entry of the SSK.

For the whole SSK, we have $d^2(2d^4 \log e + d)$ multiplications.

Computation of the SSK: A. We have d^4 exponentiations and $2d$ multiplications for each entry in the SSK.

In total, we have $d^2(d^4 \log\ e + 2d)$ multiplications.

2 Conclusions

Strongly asymmetric cryptography is a program, rather than a single algorithm, based on an idea briefly described in Section 1. The realization of this program depends on the construction of concrete algorithms based on this idea. In the present paper the structure of one of these algorithms is discussed in detail and some possible attacks, and constructive complexity estimates are described. The software implementation of this algorithm, as well as the construction of new algorithms based on the same idea are now under investigation. The authors hope to come back to this point soon.

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