



On Mission Drift In Microfinance Institutions

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ABSTRACT

This paper sheds light on a poorly understood phenomenon in microfinance which is often referred to as a “mission drift”: A tendency reviewed by numerous microfinance institutions to extend larger average loan sizes in the process of scaling-up. We argue that this phenomenon is not driven by transaction cost minimization alone. Instead, poverty-oriented microfinance institutions could potentially deviate from their mission by extending larger loan sizes neither because of “progressive lending” nor because of “cross-subsidization” but because of the interplay between their own mission, the cost differentials between poor and unbanked wealthier clients, and region-specific characteristics pertaining the heterogeneity of their clientele. In a simple one-period framework we pin-down the conditions under which mission drift can emerge. Our framework shows that there is a thin line between mission drift and cross-subsidization, which in turn makes it difficult for empirical researchers to establish whether a microfinance institution has deviated from its poverty-reduction mission. This paper also suggests that institutions operating in regions which host a relatively small number of very poor individuals might be misleadingly perceived as deviating from their mission. Because existing empirical studies cannot tear apart between mission drift and cross-subsidization, these studies should not guide donors and socially responsible investors pertaining resource allocation across institutions offering financial services to the poor. The difficulty in tearing apart cross-subsidization and mission drift is discussed in light of the contrasting experiences between microfinance institutions operating in Latin America and South Asia.

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1. Introduction

What is “mission drift”? In answering this question from a microfinance standpoint, we must start by looking into what the microfinance institutions (MFIs) themselves advertize as being their main mission. Suppose for a moment, and for the sake of argument, that a particular MFI states that its main objective is poverty reduction.² And, assume, also for the sake of argument, that a good proxy for poverty is average loan size – the smaller the average loan size, the greater the depth of outreach in the microfinance parlance.³ Then, instead of asking what is mission drift, we could simply ask: What prompts a representative MFI to increase its average loan size over time? There are two straight answers to this question. First, progressive lending, which in the microfinance jargon pertains to the idea that existing clients can reach out higher credit ceilings after observing a clean repayment record at the end of each credit cycle.⁴ Second, cross-subsidization, which consists of reaching out to unbanked wealthier clients in order to finance a larger number of poor clients whose average loan size is relatively small. These two explanations are in line with the MFI mission.

We therefore define mission drift as a phenomenon whereby an MFI increases its average loan size by reaching out wealthier clients neither for progressive lending nor for cross-subsidization reasons. Thus, mission drift may arise because MFIs might find it profitable to reach out to wealthier individuals while at the same time crowding out poor clients. Mission drift can only appear when the announced mission is not aligned with the MFI actual maximization objective. Because this is often the case as a large majority of MFIs tend to maximize outreach, our definition has the advantage of being a rather easily observable outcome, which can be potentially measured empirically.

² This is not an unrealistic assumption as shown in section two of this article.

³ See, for example, Mosley (1996), Armendáriz-Morduch (2005), and Cull *et al* (2008). For a detailed discussion on the merits of this definition of poverty, see Schreiner (2001).

⁴ See Armendáriz-Morduch (2005) for a more complete explanation on progressive lending and the rationale behind it.

Building on a comprehensive literature review from individual MFI experiences by Fidler (1998), on pioneering theoretical work by Copestake (2007) and Ghosh-Van Tassel (2008), and on recent empirical work by Cull *et al.* (2008), this paper sheds light on a poorly understood phenomenon in microfinance which is often referred to as “mission drift”: A tendency reviewed by numerous microfinance institutions to extend larger average loan sizes in the process of scaling – up. We argue that this phenomenon is not driven by transaction cost minimization alone. Instead, poverty – oriented microfinance institutions could potentially deviate from their mission by extending larger loan sizes neither because of “progressive lending” nor because of “cross – subsidization” but because of the interplay between their own mission, the cost differentials between poor and unbanked wealthier clients⁵, and region-specific characteristics pertaining the heterogeneity of their clientele.⁶ Christen (2000) lists several factors such as strategy, portfolio maturity. These may indeed make the loan size become larger without MFIs necessarily deviating from their poverty-reduction mission.

In a simple one-period framework we pin-down the conditions under which mission drift can emerge. Our framework shows that there is a thin line between what constitutes mission drift and cross-subsidization, which in turn makes it difficult for empirical researchers to establish whether a microfinance institution has deviated from its poverty-reduction mission.⁷ This paper also suggests that institutions operating in regions which host a

⁵ Agency problems might also enter the picture (see Aubert *et al.*, 2008, Labie *et al.*, 2009).

⁶ While the focus of this paper is on microfinance institutions which “drift” away from their poverty – reduction mission, where poverty is proxied by average loan size, we could also think of situations where such a drift is triggered by profit-oriented donors. As discussed below, the latter scenario has been analyzed by Ghosh-Van Tassel (2008). Mission drift could also be rooted in shareholders’ pursuit of a self-sustainability objective which might take priority over their poverty-reduction objective.

⁷ One way to assess empirically whether an institution has deviated from its mission is the following: in its growth process does the MFI crowd out the poor as the size of its portfolio grows? However, a clean empirical analysis on this requires a well-defined notion of poverty, which further complicates the picture. As this paper goes to print, empirical researchers tend to associate mission drift with larger average loan size. As we will argue below, this is potentially misleading to begin with. However, by building on the existing empirical literature on the subject, and by showing in its simplest possible manner that the entire mission drift notion does not hold, except in some very peculiar cases, this paper can be viewed as a “warning” on further empirical research without theoretical and empirically sound underpinnings.

relatively small number of very poor individuals might be misleadingly perceived as deviating from their mission. Because existing empirical studies cannot tear apart between mission drift and cross-subsidization, these studies should not guide donors and socially responsible investors pertaining resource allocation across institutions offering financial services to the poor. The difficulty in tearing apart cross-subsidization and mission drift is discussed in light of the contrasting experiences between microfinance institutions operating in Latin America and South Asia.

While our model is static for the sake of simplicity, it does shed light on the profitable scaling-up process whereby, in their efforts to avoid loan arrears and monitoring costs, MFIs tend to target better-off clients in priority. Simply put: wealthier clients cost less. MFIs' excessive focus on (relatively costless) better-off clients might be motivated by profit-oriented donors, and drifting from their mission might be the only way to attract more resources, as in the case of Gosh-Van Tassel (2008). Alternatively, the motivation for MFIs to drift from their mission might be because they wish to attract socially responsible investors. Commercial MFIs are a typical example, which is often invoked in the empirical literature. This literature generally uses as a proxy of mission drift the larger loan sizes that such MFIs offer relative to the size of the loans offered by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Recent empirical work by Cull *et al* (2008) where the proxy for poverty is average loan size suggests that a mission drift results from the recent commercialization trend in microfinance.

Taking average loan size as a proxy for poverty is gaining increasing empirical popularity. This paper will focus on the merits of this approach in hope of offering some guidance for empirical researchers. Our main argument is closest in spirit to what Gonzalez-Vega *et al.* (1997) describe as a "loan size creep". That is, creeping up to larger loans to wealthier clients, rather than growing a larger numbers of small-loan customers. A straightforward interpretation of the loan size creep idea is that increased profitability by MFIs tapping wealthier clients who typically request a larger loan size is triggered by such institutions' efforts to minimize the high transaction costs involved in dealing with small loans, which in

turn hinders self-sustainability. In this paper we dispel this view by showing that transaction cost minimization alone is not at the root of a mission drift phenomenon. Instead, MFIs serving the poor are often constrained by the number of poor clients that can potentially be reached in a particular region, as well as other region-specific parameters, which in turn makes empirical efforts to detect mission drift exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. From a policy standpoint, donors and socially responsible investors should be cautious in taking existing empirical efforts suggesting mission drift. The results from existing empirical studies might bias donors and socially responsible investors' decisions against funding organizations that offer good financial prospects for the poor via cross-subsidization.

The paper is structured as follows. Section two describes some basic stylized facts on the top ten MFIs worldwide, ranked from top to bottom in terms of clients reached and their various missions. Four poverty-reduction mission-driven institutions are in Asia. The three MFIs which are based in Latin America do not advertise themselves as poverty-reduction mission-driven institutions. Section three displays the basic model showing that a mission drift theory based on transaction cost minimization alone can be misleading. Section four shows that the most important region-specific parameters, which might differ quite widely across MFIs, are at the root of a potential mission drift which can be difficult to distinguish from cross-subsidization. In a nutshell, this section shows that heterogeneity across MFIs and regions might explain why some institutions are more prone to deviate from their poverty-reduction objectives. While it remains true that some institutions might give more weight to serving the poor, we show that there are at least two parameters which play an important role: one is the relative cost of serving the poorest relative to that of serving the not so poor, and the other one is the scope for reaching out to larger numbers of poor individuals. The interplay of these key parameters can predict which MFIs will be more prone to deviate from their "outreach" maximization objective. Section five discusses this interplay from the model in light of the contrasting experiences in South Asia and Latin America. Section six concludes and opens new avenues for future research.

2. The Poverty Reduction Mission In Perspective

Table 1 displays the top ten microfinance institutions (MFIs) ranked by the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) market from highest to lowest in terms of number of clients reached. The second column delivers a proxy for outreach as a percentage of the total population which is being served by the MFI in question in a particular country. Bangladesh's Grameen Bank and Viet Nam's VBSP rank highest in terms of outreach, most likely because the number of unbanked poor in those countries is the highest, a parameter to which we shall come back in greater detail later in the analysis.⁸

Table 1. Missions of the ten largest microfinance institutions worldwide

Institution	Outreach (as a percentage of country's population)	Country	Legal Status	Main Mission	Other Mission (s)
Grameen Bank	4.43	Bangladesh	Regulated Bank	Poverty Reduction	Focus on women
ASA	3.31	Bangladesh	NGO	Income Generation	Integrate women
VBSP	5.43	Vietnam	State-Owned Regulated Bank	Poverty Reduction	Low interest rates
BRAC	2.92	Bangladesh	NGO	Poverty Reduction	Literacy & Disease
BRI	1.44	Indonesia	Regulated Bank	Wide Financial Services to small entrepreneurs	Best Corporate Governance & Profits for Stakeholders
Spandana	.08	India	Regulated Financial Institution	Leading Financial Service Provider	Marketable & Equitable Solutions for Benefit of Stakeholders
SHARE	.07	India	Regulated Financial Institution	Poverty Reduction	Focus on Women
Caja Popular Mexicana	.58	Mexico	Regulated Cooperative	Cooperative for Improving Quality of Life of Members	Offer Competitive Financial Products to its Members
Compartamos	.55	Mexico	Regulated Bank	Create Development Opportunities	Develop "trust relationships"
BCSC	1.34	Colombia	Regulated Bank	Leading in "popular" banking	To develop social objectives among community members

Sources: Mix Market 2007 Report, Grameen Foundation

⁸ Note, however, that outreach numbers can be misleading. While they deliver some indication of the number of clients served by institution, those numbers hide market structure considerations. For example, the Grameen Bank, ASA, and BRAC are the three main institutions serving nearly 20 million clients in Bangladesh. Compartamos, on the other hand, faces little competition, and does not even serve 600 thousand clients in Mexico, in the year 2007.

The two last columns show the main mission of each MFI as well as other missions, as stated by the profile of each MFI by MIX.⁹ At one end of the spectrum we find institutions such as Bangladeshi's BRAC, which main mission is not just poverty reduction via the provision of financial services for income-generating activities, but also that of fighting illiteracy and diseases.¹⁰ These three objectives accord well with a more comprehensive notion of poverty, as captured by the Human Development Index (HDI).¹¹ At the other end of the spectrum we find for-profit MFIs such as India's Spandana, which main mission is to become the largest provider of financial services and to maximize stakeholders' welfare – poor clients could be potentially included as stakeholders but their welfare might be equally valued relative to that of wealthier clients.

Contrary to the “received wisdom”, MFIs' legal status does not seem to appear as an important determinant of a poverty-reduction mission. The institutional characteristics are shown in column four. A case in point is the well-known Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, which does not advertise itself as an NGO despite the fact that its main mission is to alleviate poverty. In theory, the Grameen Bank is a cooperative, although the bulk of the funds it mobilizes does not come from its members.¹² The Grameen Bank, quite independently of its legal status, is not the only MFI advertising itself as having poverty-reduction as its main mission. In particular, four out of the top ten MFIs state quite explicitly that exact same poverty-reduction mission. Interestingly, the four of them are located in

⁹ A notable example is that of the Grameen Bank, which mission statement, as reported by MIX is N/A. The mission statement for this particular institution was obtained from the website of Grameen Foundation, headquartered in the United States.

¹⁰ Our argument at this stage is on the main missions, as advertized by the institutions themselves, not on the means to attain those objectives. In the particular case of BRAC, the main mission is poverty reduction. The other missions are however advertized by BRAC itself even though it uses affiliates like Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA).

¹¹ The Human Development Index (HDI) delivers a broader notion of poverty involving income, health and education. For more on how this index is derived, see the Human Development Reports, published annually by the United Nations.

¹² We should note that the case of the Grameen Bank is rather peculiar in that it advertizes itself as a fully-regulated bank. In reality, however, while the Grameen Bank belongs to its members and it can therefore be defined as a cooperative, the little savings it mobilizes from its members makes it look like a “hybrid”, that is, a bank-cooperative institution.

South Asia. In particular, and according to recent estimates by the World Bank, South Asia continues to host the largest number of individuals living in poverty, and this fact alone should, in principle, attract massive numbers of unbanked poor into the industry. In addition, poor and middle-income countries in, for example, Latin America are known to have underdeveloped financial systems making MFIs an attractive source of funding for unbanked wealthier clients in such countries.

Identifying the notion of poverty with average loan size dates back to Mosley (1996) who explains that Bolivia's Bancosol deviates from its mission by serving larger loans to wealthier clients for the sake of self-sustainability, but at the expense of deviating resources away from the poor who request smaller loans.¹³ Ever since, average loan size has become the most widely used proxy in quantitative studies showing that some MFIs like Bancosol might prioritize self-sustainability at the expense of their poverty-reduction mission. Moreover, MFIs often advertize average loan size as an important indicator pertaining outreach, and as a reinforcing signal for their main mission. Mix (2008), for example, reports that the average loan size for the four poverty-reduction MFIs displayed in Table 1 for the year 2007 was estimated to be of around 175 US\$ compared with 1,065 US\$ for the remaining six.¹⁴

Somewhat surprisingly, the literature on mission drift leaves aside interest rate considerations¹⁵. We should nevertheless note, however, that the four poverty-reduction-driven MFIs shown in Table 1 review an estimated average interest rate of approximately 17

¹³ More precisely, we should take the ratio of average loan size, and per capita GDP. For a very comprehensive discussion on this, see Schreiner (2001) and Dunford (2002).

¹⁴ Clearly, a per capita comparison is more meaningful. Mix does not report per capita average loan size for the year 2007. For the year 2006, however, percentage average loan size per capita for the four poverty-reduction MFIs was 24.94 compared to 34.6 for the remaining six. This approximation shows that while the gap is reduced, as expected, the 10 percentage points higher for the non-poverty reduction MFIs is not negligible. Interestingly, region-wise, the percentages for the year 2006 show consistency. In particular, the four poverty-reduction MFIs shown in Table 1, all in Asia, review an average per capita loan size of 23.94 compared to 28.31 for their non-poverty reduction counterparts, also in Asia. Not surprisingly, the average for three Latin American MFIs, namely, 40.89, is the highest of all.

¹⁵ For a comprehensive review on interest rates, see Hudon (2007).

percent. In comparison, the remaining six charge an average of 28 percent.¹⁶ Out of these six, four are commercial MFIs.¹⁷ We shall come back to this later in the paper, even though interest rate considerations are beyond the scope of our analysis on mission drift.

Thus, assuming that a good proxy of mission drift relates to the tendency by MFIs to serve wealthier clients who request relatively large average loan sizes can be a stretch indeed, but this is what empirical researchers do. And they might not be totally wrong. Table 1 appears to strengthen what empirical researchers might have in mind. At one extreme is Bangladeshi's ASA, which reviews an average loan size (the lowest among all ten) of about 67 US\$ which has remained pretty stable over the past four years. At the other extreme is Mexico's Banco Compartamos which is above average in terms of loan size set at 450 US\$. Banco Compartamos is often portrayed as an example of a commercial MFI which experienced a mission drift. ASA, on the other hand is often praised as a cost-minimization institution, which has managed to be highly efficient while serving massive numbers of poor clients.

The above example illustrates rather well the meaning of mission drift so far. Generally speaking, mission drift is observed when an MFI transits from being an NGO to a commercial for-profit bank, and when during this process it increases its average loan size.¹⁸ A typical case in point is Banco Compartamos. The question as to why Banco Compartamos

¹⁶ The proxy for interest rates was obtained from MIX MFIs profile. It is stated as "financial revenue ratio". This is roughly cash financial revenue divided by average gross portfolio, which is the proxy for average interest rate use by, for example, Cull *et al* (2008). We should note, however, that unlike the MFIs that state poverty reduction as their main mission, the interest rate range for the remaining six is huge (16.12% for Caja Popular Mexicana to 68.48% for Compartamos).

¹⁷ Cull *et al* (2008) distinguish commercial MFIs and NGOs, however, showing that the latter charge higher interest rates. Their explanation relies on the fact that NGOs face higher costs while serving a relatively poorer clientele. In contrast, Ghosh-Van Tassel (2008) suggest that NGOs charge higher interest rates because these type of MFIs are funded by profit-oriented donors.

¹⁸The passage of an MFI from an NGO to a fully-regulated bank is not a necessary condition for an institution to deviate from its mission. As documented by González-Rosenberg (2006), and Cull *et al* (2008), relative to fully-regulated commercial MFIs, NGOs often charge higher interest rates. Interest rate considerations should indeed be part of a more comprehensive notion of mission drift, as suggested by Ashta-Hudon (2009) in their work on Banco Compartamos. From a purely theoretical standpoint, and for the sake of simplicity, however, interest rate considerations are beyond the scope of our analysis. We nevertheless raise this important issue in the conclusion of this paper.

and, more generally, Latin American MFIs have a tendency to be more commercially – oriented relative to those MFIs which are base in Asia, has never been raised in scholarly articles. We will try to elaborate on this question in Section 6.¹⁹

Column six in Table 1 shows that MFIs might have other missions, such as prioritizing women clients. This fits well with UNDP reports showing that women in developing economies are the poorest of the poor.²⁰ Thus, yet another indicator to assess if MFIs are being faithful to their poverty-reduction mission is related to gender. Both average loan size and gender are being considered in Cull *et al* (2008) empirical investigation on the commercialization of microfinance, and its effects on poverty-reduction. The authors conclude that recent commercialization trends are “bad” news for the poor because commercialization is being accompanied by larger loan sizes and less focus on women. Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008), on the other hand, suggest that the most accurate approach to deal with the mission drift issue is neither loan size nor gender, but the poverty gap ratio. Ghosh and Van Tassel’s model is most adequate for clarifying the notion of poverty reduction and mission drift. Their approach, however, delivers little guidance for empirical researchers, if only because poverty is more difficult to measure in practice, and because the poverty gap ratio is based on poverty line estimates which are already highly controversial among econometricians, to say the least.

Another difference between the Cull *et al.* (2008) and the Ghosh-Van Tassel (2008) articles deserves attention. The former emphasizes commercial MFIs, and suggests that mission drift takes place because such institutions wish to attract more socially-responsible investors. The latter emphasizes for-profit NGOs, and suggests that mission drift results from MFIs’ efforts to attract more capital from for-profit oriented donors. In both papers mission drift is perceived as a device for attracting more capital to fund MFIs. But the presence of a third party, socially responsible investors in the case of Cull *et al* (2008), and

¹⁹ A notable example can be found in Rhyne (2001). However, her historical analysis focuses mostly on Bolivia on the one hand, and is not viewed through the lens of theory, on the other hand.

²⁰ See, for example, Armendáriz -Vanroose (2009)

for-profit donors in the case of Ghosh – Van Tassel (2008) is key. In what follows we will argue that there is no need to complicate the picture by including donors or socially-responsible investors in order to explain why MFIs may deviate from their poverty-reduction mission. Simply put, the notion of mission drift can be rationalized even without the presence of a “third party” – be these donors or socially responsible investors.

3. Mission Drift From A Theoretical Standpoint

Somewhat surprisingly, the notion of “mission” in economics is rarely used and studied in great detail. Instead, the literature tends to identify mission with objective. A notable exception is the distinguished tradition in public policy, which was first started by Wilson (1989). His work focuses on incentives for government officials to adhere to an institution’s mission. Following this tradition, Dewatripont *et al.* (1999) use a principle-agent model à la Holmstrom - Milgrom (1991) where agents pursue multiple missions. They show that while organizations might gain from pursuing multiple missions, they can lose focus leading to less autonomy being delegated to government officials (or agents).

With the notable exception of Ghosh - Van Tassel (2008), modeling MFIs’ objective function adopts a principal – agent approach highlighting adverse selection and moral hazard issues which can be potentially circumvented via contract design. Examples on this type of approach abound. See, for example, Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee-Besley-Guinnane (1994), Besley-Coate (1995), Armendáriz (1999), Armendáriz-Gollier (2000), Ghatak (1999), Ghatak (2000), Conning (1999), Jain and Mansuri (2003), and Tedeschi (2006), among many others.

Without underestimating the merits of the principal-agent approach adopted by the vast majority of authors who have written sophisticated models in order to gain important insights into optimal financial contracting in the absence of collateral, our approach in this article differs widely in at least three ways. First, and in contrast with Ghosh-Van Tassel (2008), our focus is in just one mission or objective to be maximized, and this maximizing

objective function involves one and only one entity, namely, the MFI itself.²¹ Second, that particular mission or objective is well-defined, namely, a representative MFI is assumed to have a poverty-reduction mission (henceforth: the representative MFI is assumed to maximize outreach).²² Last but not least, our model shows that mission drift is the result of an optimization process by an outreach – maximizing MFI facing different costs while serving a heterogeneous clientele of poor and wealthier borrowers.

4. The Absence of A Transaction-Cost Driven Mission Drift

Transaction costs are typically at the heart of most discussions on mission drift. Using loan size as a proxy for the poverty level of clients, Cull *et al.* (2008) recent findings indicate that MFIs with the highest profit levels perform the weakest in terms of outreach. Also, larger loan sizes are associated with lower average costs, which supports the idea that those institutions that target poorest borrowers struggle more with financial viability. Do transaction costs play a crucial role at explaining why MFIs might drift from their outreach maximization objective? In what follows we will show that a mission drift phenomenon, which is solely based on transaction costs, lacks theoretical support, and can therefore be potentially misleading.

Consider a typical MFI which is endowed with an amount of capital, K , as its only source of funds for extending loans to poor clients. Suppose that the MFI serves N clients via loans of an identical amount s . Assume that the MFI faces fixed costs F (with $F < K$) and variable transaction cost $T(N)$. It follows that the total cost function is given by:

²¹ Simply put, donors or socially responsible investors do not play any role in our framework. While introducing them might help us gain important principal-agent insights in microfinance, our conjecture is that our main results will remain fundamentally the same.

²² Outreach and poverty are different notions. However, we use these two terms interchangeably for two reasons: First, the notion of outreach is closely related to microfinance while poverty is much more general, and we wish to derive some testable implications which are simpler to deal with using the notion of outreach. Second, entering into a discussion on what is the most accurate definition of poverty and measures relying on fussy concepts such as the poverty line are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion, see Sen (1999).

$$C = F + T(N) = f(N), \text{ with } f(0) = F \text{ and } f'(\cdot) \geq 0.$$

Assume that the MFI's objective is to maximize outreach via micro-loans, that is, the MFI maximizes outreach, N , by controlling the loan size, s , subject to a budget constraint. Specifically, the MFI's maximization program is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{s \geq 0}{\text{Max}} N \\ & \text{s.t. } K = sN + f(N) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

In the absence of costs, $f(N) = 0$, and the MFI's optimization function is simply:²³

$$\underset{s \geq 0}{\text{Max}} \frac{K}{s} \quad (2)$$

and the trivial solution, for all possible values of K , is a corner solution: $s^* = 0, N^* = +\infty$.

Clearly, when $f(N) \neq 0$, total costs increase and, all things equal, higher costs reduce the amount of resources that the MFI can use for serving its clientele. Consider for example the case where transaction costs are linear, that is: $f(N) = F + \gamma N, \gamma > 0$. Then, the MFI's objective function becomes:

$$\underset{s \geq 0}{\text{Max}} \frac{K - F}{s + \gamma}$$

And the optimal solution is again reached at $s^* = 0$. We should note, however, that under this particular scenario, as $K = sN + F + \gamma N$, the number of (tiny) loans is finite²⁴. In particular:

$$N^* = \frac{K - F}{\gamma}. \text{ Thus, while linear transaction costs reduce outreach, such costs alone do not}$$

²³ Note that even if the MFI is an NGO receiving grants with amount linked to the size of its loans: $K = K(s), K'(\cdot) \leq 0$, the solution remains the same.

²⁴ The capital available for loans, K , is exogenous. Moreover, we ignore the repayment probability which, in a steady-state perspective, could increase the value of K . Actually, at the optimum; we have a finite number of infinitesimal loans, resulting in negligible repayments.

alter the optimal loan size. Moreover, as we show in the Appendix, this result is robust for quadratic and other types of transaction cost functions. We thus have the following:

Result 1: When all loans are identical, transaction costs reduce the number of loans but do not increase their size. Therefore, the standard argument that a mission drift phenomenon is a direct consequence of transaction costs alone does not seem to be supported by theory.

Now suppose that the MFI can choose between two types of clients or, equivalently, between two types of financial products, 1 and 2, respectively. Product 1 is available to the poor, its size, $s_1 \geq 0$, which is assumed to be chosen by the MFI.²⁵ Product 2, on the other hand, is made available to unbanked wealthier clients. We assume that the latter clients require a minimal size: $s_2 > \underline{s}$ to start-up an investment project which in principle can only be financed by the MFI.²⁶ The cost function $f(N_1, N_2)$ now depends on the number of loans for each product: N_1 for type 1 clients, and N_2 for type 2 clients. The MFI's objective function in this case is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{s_1, s_2 \geq 0}{\text{Max}}(N_1 + N_2) \\ \text{s.t. } & K = s_1 N_1 + s_2 N_2 + f(N_1, N_2) \\ & s_2 > \underline{s} \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

As in the previous case, when $f(N_1, N_2) = 0$, the MFI's optimal solution is reached via extending an infinite number of tiny loans. But as type 2 loans are bounded by \underline{s} , the MFI will only serve type 1 clients, i.e. the poorest of the poor. Note that, in the current setting

²⁵ Implicit in this assumption is that the MFI has all the bargaining power. This might be true for several large MFIs that enjoy monopoly power. An alternative justification to this assumption is that the size of the loan offered by the MFI is incentive compatible.

²⁶ Implicit in this assumption is that there is only one MFI serving all clients in the loan market. Our results will not be altered if we were to assume that the MFI is perfectly competitive, and, as long as the loan contract is incentive compatible, both types of clients will face the exact same loan contract from all MFIs operating in the market.

where outreach is being maximized, the optimal solution pertaining loan size results from the model, and not from the MFIs' mission as such.²⁷

The one reason which is often invoked to justify the existence of a shift from type 1 clients to type 2 clients seems to be intimately related to cost considerations. We consider here an asymmetric cost function making the clients of type 2 less costly to the MFI. We formalize this argument by assuming an additive cost function in which loans of type 1 have a higher weight.²⁸

$$f(N_1, N_2) = \gamma_1 N_1 + \gamma_2 N_2, \quad \gamma_1 \geq \gamma_2 > 0 \quad (5)$$

And the objective of the MFI in this case is:²⁹

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{s_1, s_2 \geq 0}{\text{Max}}(N_1 + N_2) \\ \text{s.t. } & K = (s_1 + \gamma_1)N_1 + (\gamma_2 + s_2)N_2 \\ & s_2 > \underline{s} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Clearly, the MFI now faces a trade-off: it can benefit by adhering to its mission via the provision of a large number of tiny loans to the poor clients at a unit cost γ_1 on the one hand, or it can profitably serve a clientele of wealthier clients who require larger loans at a lower unit cost γ_2 at the expense of drifting from its poverty-reduction mission on the other. Serving clients of type 1 only will deliver, as before, a situation where s_1 is infinitesimal

²⁷ It could not be otherwise because mission drift (larger loan) is only conceivable when the optimization is held on another objective function.

²⁸ What we have in mind here is that serving the poor is more costly because more monitoring effort is needed, and this additional effort is costly for the MFI. More generally, this assumption may summarize all the reasons that make poorer clients less lucrative; i.e., the poor are financially illiterate, health-wise are less productive, have limited savvy business, require training sessions, etc. Because our model does not explicitly spell out loan – repayments, a simple and realistic way of interpreting this assumption is that the additional cost incurred by an MFI that serves the poorest comes at the expense of less capital for financial intermediation.

²⁹ In order to avoid cumbersome notations, we assume here that $F = 0$, or alternatively, that K stands for $K - F$.

and $N_1 = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}$. At the other extreme, focusing on clients of type 2 only will result in $s_2 = \underline{s}$

(the threshold required by wealthier borrowers) and $N_2 = \frac{K}{\gamma_2 + \underline{s}}$. In this simple linear set-up,

either solution is optimal, depending on the value of the parameters. In particular, if

$\frac{K}{\gamma_2 + \underline{s}} > N_1 = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}$, or equivalently $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} < \gamma_1$, then, the MFI will only serve clients of type 2:

$$N_1^* = 0, N_2^* = \frac{K}{\gamma_2 + \underline{s}} \quad (7)$$

Clearly, this case results from a situation where serving poor clients is exceedingly expensive. The number of wealthier clients served, on the other hand, decreases with the cost of serving these borrowers, and with the start-up cost that each better-off borrower requests to make a profitable investment. But it increases with the amount of capital that the MFI can raise from donors or socially responsible investors.

On the other hand, when $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} > \gamma_1$, that is, when serving the poor is not too costly, we have:

$$N_1^* = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}, N_2^* = 0 \quad (8)$$

And the number of poor clients that the MFI will serve at the optimum will again decrease with the cost of serving the poor, but increase with the amount of capital that the MFI can raise. This in turn brings us to the following:

Result 2: *In the presence of two types of clients, poor clients and unbanked wealthier clients, an MFI facing different transaction costs, high for the poor and low for the unbanked wealthier, will end-up serving either the poor or the unbanked wealthier, but not both. Thus, MFIs that are faithful to their outreach maximization objective, do not derive*

any benefit from having a portfolio of poor and unbanked wealthier clients. Quite simply, MFIs do not gain anything from serving poor and unbanked wealthier clients simultaneously. Note that, when $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} = \gamma_1$, the MFI might be indifferent between serving either type of clients, but serving the unbanked wealthier might be detrimental to its poverty-reduction mission. Hence, mission drift cannot result from just transaction cost differentials between the poor and unbanked the unbanked wealthier clients.

4. MFI Heterogeneity-Driven Mission Drift

In the previous model, the two types of clients were identified with two different cost functions (high for the poor and low for the unbanked wealthier), but both type of clients' contributions to outreach maximization is identical. In other words, in the scenario described in the previous section, the MFI does not resolve its trade-off between serving poor and wealthier clients by having a “mixed” portfolio. While wealthier clients are cost-effective, these clients do not tangibly contribute *less* to the MFI's outreach maximization objective. Now suppose that unbanked wealthier clients weight less in a particular MFI's objective function. Then, unbanked wealthier customers are more cost effective and therefore more profitable in that $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} < \gamma_1$ but they are also more burdensome. As we shall soon show, simple characterization of the MFI objective function can lead to mission drift and to cross-subsidization. Moreover, such an objective function is deliberately constructed with the use of quantifiable and observable variables such as the number of clients and average loan size. Specifically, the MFI maximization program is:

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{s_1, s_2 \geq 0}{\text{Max}} (N_1 + \delta N_2), 0 \leq \delta \leq 1 \\ & \text{s.t. } K = (s_1 + \gamma_1)N_1 + (\gamma_2 + s_2)N_2 \\ & \quad s_2 > \underline{s} \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where the parameter δ captures *the degree of concern that the MFI has as it deviates from its mission* via the inclusion of wealthier clients. While such concern is MFI-specific, it can be easily captured by differences in MFIs' profiles (see Table 1). Clearly, (9) is equivalent

to the (6) if one replaces N_2 by $\tilde{N}_2 = \delta N_2$. Then: $(\gamma_2 + s_2)N_2$ is to be replaced by $\frac{(\gamma_2 + s_2)}{\delta} \tilde{N}_2$, which boils down to increasing the cost that the MFI incurs as it includes wealthier clients in its portfolio. In the particular case where δ is chosen such that $\frac{\gamma_2 + \underline{s}}{\delta} = \gamma_1$, then both types of clients may coexist. And one might find it difficult in practice to distinguish if such co-existence of poor and unbanked wealthier clients is due to cross – subsidization or to mission drift.

If, on the other hand, we allow for wealthier clients to be less costly, that is, if $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} < \gamma_1$ the inequalities linking the cost function parameters become $\gamma_1 \geq 0, \gamma_1 > \gamma_2$, and the sign of $\gamma_2 + \underline{s}$ could even be negative.³⁰ When $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} < 0$, then cross-subsidization is indeed possible. So, a plausible explanation of what is referred to as “cross-subsidization” for an outreach maximizing MFI could be attributed to a deliberate bias in favour of wealthier borrowers because they create a positive externality on poor borrowers.

Typically, urban poor are more literate, fill in easily the paperwork on their own and can even offer some collateral when requesting a loan to the MFI. Because their presence is not burdensome to the institution’s mission, an overwhelming presence of unbanked wealthier borrowers in, for example, urban areas might not necessarily mean that MFIs deviated from their poverty-reduction mission. Distinguishing between mission drift and cross-subsidization in practice, however might be difficult if not impossible.

³⁰ This could well be the case if the credit risk is negligible because the borrowers are wealthy enough and the bank officers do not even bother spending time screening or monitoring their actions. In that case, these clients offer benefit to the MFI rather than costs. More generally, as our simplistic model considers K as a fixed exogenous budget, one can interpret γ_1 and γ_2 as net costs, i.e. the costs minus the benefits associated to expected reimbursements in a steady-state risk-neutral perspective. According to that view, assuming $\gamma_1 \geq 0$ and $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} < 0$ means that the very poor clients are costly and served solely because of the MFI social mission while less poor clients are profitable to the MFI.

From a theoretical standpoint, however, we have just argued that cross-subsidization is only possible when unbanked wealthier clients are profitable. Moreover, it can also be the case that the population of potential clients that are very poor and unbanked is relatively small. Then, when looking at an MFI's profile which is serving a large number of unbanked wealthier clients does not necessarily mean that such an MFI is drifting from its mission. It may well be the case that, cost-wise, there is an upper bound to the number of poor that the institution can serve. Unbanked wealthier are relatively more abundant than unbanked poor in many middle income regions.³¹

Consider the limit case where $\delta = 0$, that is, a situation where the objective is serving the very poor only. Then, either wealthier represent a profitable side-business ($\gamma_2 + \underline{s} < 0$) that does not contribute to the mission but offers additional capital for reaching the poor, or wealthier clients are not profitable ($\gamma_2 + \underline{s} > 0$) and are simply neglected. In the polar case where $\delta = 1$, the MFI gives equal weight to both types of clients. This brings us back to equation (6). For intermediate cases, $\delta \in (0,1)$, the MFI decision pertaining the type of clients to be served depends on the direction of the inequality between the weight δ attributed to wealthier clients in the MFI's objective function, on the one hand, and on the cost ratio $\frac{\gamma_2 + \underline{s}}{\gamma_1}$, on the other.

For any given value of $\delta \in (0,1)$, in populations with a relatively large number of poor people, the size of the MFI's clientele in terms of depth of outreach can be potentially large indeed. In contrast, in regions where the number of unbanked poor is relatively small, depth of outreach is limited, and the poor might be more costly to reach. Consequently, the threshold required to move from very poor to wealthier clients may be region-specific. On

³¹ In particular (see Table 1), at the one end of the spectrum, we have low-income countries like Bangladesh where income per head in 2007 was \$1,400. At the other end of the spectrum, there are upper middle-income countries like Mexico where income per head in 2007 was \$14,500. Not surprisingly, and according to the data published by MIX for that particular year, Grameen Bank Bangladesh alone had over six million active clients compared to just over eight hundred thousand for the case of Banco Compartamos in Mexico. Average loan size for the Grameen Bank was \$79, and for Compartamos was \$450. (As explained in footnote 9, MIX does not publish data on average loan size in per capita for the year 2007 and beyond.)

the surface, outreach penetration looks considerably larger in countries such as Bangladesh where the the Grameen Bank alone reaches out to over 6 million clients whose average loan size is small, relative to, for example, Banco Compartamos in Mexico, which reaches out ten times less clients with an average loan size which is three times larger. Thus, if we are to take at face value the idea that a good proxy for an institution being faithful to its mission is given by average loan size alone, then all MFIs, except for those operating in South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa have deviated from their mission, which is preposterous.³²

Table 2 summarizes the results. A good benchmark is provided by the set of points where the MFI is indifferent between its two types of clients: $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} = \gamma_1 \delta$. In this set, when δ increases, the cost for the MFI as it deviates from its mission is offset by its gain in terms of the number of poor whose investment projects can be financed. For a given δ , increasing γ_1 (or alternatively, decreasing $\gamma_2 + \underline{s}$) makes the MFI deviate from its mission to finance the increasing costs of reaching the poor.

What table 2 shows is that the interplay between the weight that the MFI gives to serving the poor, as captured by δ , which is MFI specific, the cost parameters γ_1, γ_2 , and \underline{s} which are region-specific, deliver various outcomes. Chief amongst them is mission drift, no mission drift, and cross-subsidization.

³² Pro Mujer in Latin America, for example, is one of the most poverty-oriented MFIs in the world.

Table 2: Possible Outcomes Depending on MFIs' Concerns and region-specific parameters

	$\gamma_2 + \underline{s} < 0$	$\gamma_2 + \underline{s} = 0$	$0 < \gamma_2 + \underline{s} < \gamma_1 \delta$	$\gamma_2 + \underline{s} = \gamma_1 \delta$	$\gamma_2 + \underline{s} > \gamma_1 \delta$
$\delta = 0$	$N_1 = +\infty$ $N_2 = +\infty$	$N_1 = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}$ N_2 undeterm.	impossible	$N_1 = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}$, $N_2 = 0$	$N_1 = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}$, $N_2 = 0$
	Cross-subsidization	Possible mission drift (up to discretion)		No mission drift	No mission drift
$0 < \delta \leq 1$	$N_1 = +\infty$ $N_2 = +\infty$	$N_1 = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}$ $N_2 = +\infty$	$N_1 = 0$ $N_2 = \frac{K}{\gamma_2 + \underline{s}}$	$N_1 \in \left[0, \frac{K}{\gamma_1}\right]$ $N_2 = \frac{K - \gamma_1 N_1}{\gamma_2 + \underline{s}}$	$N_1 = \frac{K}{\gamma_1}$, $N_2 = 0$
	Cross-subsidization	Mission drift	Full mission drift	Possible mission drift (up to discretion)	No mission drift

Figure 1: A representation of the possible outcomes




Figure 1 represents the three possible outcomes of the model. In this figure, the parameter γ_1 has a fixed positive value while $\gamma_2 + \underline{s}$ can take any real value, positive or negative, and δ varies in $[0,1]$. The cost of burdensome wealthier clients ($\gamma_2 + \underline{s}$ on the vertical axis) is a crucial determinant of how far the MFI can go on serving the poor. The cross-subsidization zone corresponds to negative values of $\gamma_2 + \underline{s}$, or “profits” which the MFI can extract from unbanked wealthier clients. With the exception of the indifference line $\gamma_2 + \underline{s} = \gamma_1 \delta$, the cross-subsidization zone is the only place in the graph where the two types of clients can coexist. An important prediction of our model can therefore be stated in the following:

Result 3. *Microfinance institutions which serve a significant number of unbanked poor and unbanked wealthier clients are not necessarily mission-drifting institutions. These institutions’ commitment to contribute to poverty – reduction may be compatible with having a core business with unbanked wealthier clients, as these latter clients allow for cross-subsidization for the sake of MFIs’ outreach maximization objectives.*

5. Contrasting Latin America and Asia

Microfinance started in the mid-1970s from in parallel movements in sparsely populated Latin America and densely populated Asia (Armendáriz – Morduch (2005)). It has recently been established that the two regions where microfinance activity is the highest are also Latin America and Asia (Armendariz – Vanroose (2009)). This is somewhat captured by Table 1 above where the top ten MFIs in terms of number of clients served are all located in either Asia or Latin America³³. With regards to poverty, recent estimates by the World Bank (2004) suggest that South Asia hosts approximately thirty-one percent of the world's poor while a similar estimate for Latin America is only eight percent.

As seen in the previous section, when serving the poor is not too costly, an outreach maximizer MFI is unlikely to drift from its mission. This might be the case of South Asia where, relative to Latin America, the poor are easily accessed, if only because the number of individuals considered to be poor are four times higher.³⁴ The relative abundance of poor individuals make γ_1 to be considerable smaller in Asia relative to the γ_1 in Latin America. This means that for the same δ , an MFI in Asia will find it far easier to portray itself as an MFI with a considerably higher depth of outreach penetration.

On the other hand, the scope for cross-subsidization in Latin America is much higher, because all countries in Latin America (with the exception of Haiti and Nicaragua) have a GDP per head which is, on average, six times higher than the one observed in South Asia. Latin America as a whole remains a middle-income region. Its banking sector, however, is highly underdeveloped. Hence, our conjecture is that the relatively wealthier but unbanked individuals in Latin America are, by and large, being served by MFIs. And the prediction of our model is that if those wealthier individuals are costless or profitable, there is ample scope for cross-subsidization, a conjecture worth exploring empirically. This in turn

³³ Christen (2000), however, point out that there is a huge difference across the very diverse Latin-American countries, some, like Nicaragua and Haiti, might be just as poor as some of their Asian counterparts.

³⁴ Vanroose (2009) finds that a population density coefficient which is positive and significant in determining outreach.

suggests that judging an institution as having mission-drifted by looking at the average loan size alone can be misleading. More information is needed. Are such institutions a priori labeled mission-drifted institutions keeping an important number of poor clients in their portfolio? Are poorer clients being crowded out by wealthier clients?

More generally, we would need a dynamic analysis in order to assess empirically if MFIs in Latin America are scaling up *and* crowding out poor clients. We strongly believe that this observation can be worth exploring and that empirical analysis can deliver a much clearer picture of whether MFIs are indeed deviating from their missions. Is the current commercialization of microfinance truly biased against the poor as the recent Cull *et al* (2008) paper suggests?

6. Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have delivered an exceedingly simple model where outreach maximization MFIs can deviate from their missions. The model predicts that mission drift will result from the interplay of MFI specific parameters, such as the weight that the MFI gives to serving the poor, and from country specific parameters pertaining the cost of reaching the poorest. From a policy standpoint, our model highlights that donors and socially responsible investors can be easily misled by MFIs which are serving unbanked wealthier populations.

While our model is purposely simple to guide future empirical research in the subject, a more complete picture of mission drift should include interest rates and market structure considerations.

Interest rate might be relatively high due to country – specific considerations. The fact that Sub Saharan countries host a much larger population of poor individuals relative to Latin America, and that outreach is higher in the latter is a clear example. This might call for subsidies for MFIs which are operating in those sparsely populated regions where access to poor households is time-consuming, where the scope for profitable projects is limited, and where microfinance expertise is lacking.

But interest rate might be also high due to monopoly power. And this raises the question as to whether the notion of mission drift is, once more, misleading empirical research. Monopolistic interest rates together with low average loan size might be an indication of mission drift. This notion of mission drift merits further consideration. Ethical considerations aside, monopolistic pricing of microfinance products creates adverse selection and moral hazard inefficiencies, and should be part of a mission drift notion. From an empirical standpoint, going beyond average loan size as a proxy for mission drift by at least integrating interest rates into the picture while controlling for market structure is a step in the right direction.

Last but not least, insights can be gained by constructing a dynamic model. In a dynamic model, key questions as to why MFIs transit from being NGOs prioritizing poverty to commercial MFIs prioritizing profitability can be tackled. Is this truly the case? Is client heterogeneity a necessity that emerges over time? Why MFIs wish to scale-up in the first place if their might indeed risk deviating from their poverty-reduction objectives? Region-specific considerations aside, should MFIs deliberately tapped wealthier clients in their scaling-up process? Is this a viable solution for outreach growth for MFIs to fence themselves from a situation where donor's aid dries-up? Is donor's aid itself a variable which depends on outreach growth?

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Appendix

We consider the problem:

$$\text{Max}_{s \geq 0} N$$

$$\text{s.t. } K = sN + f(N)$$

The equation $G(s, N) = K - sN - f(N) = 0$ implicitly defines the function g such that: $N = g(s)$ that is to be maximized. Therefore, thanks to the Theorem of implicit

$$\text{functions: } g'(s) = -\frac{\frac{\partial G}{\partial s}}{\frac{\partial G}{\partial N}} = \frac{N}{s + f'(N)} > 0$$

Consequently, for the maximization problem, the solution will always be the corner solution $s^* = 0$ leading to:

$$K = f(N) \Rightarrow N^* = f^{-1}(K).$$

For example, with a quadratic transaction cost, $f(N) = F + \alpha N^2, \alpha > 0$, the optimum is

$$\text{obtained for } s^* = 0 \text{ and } K - F = \alpha N^2 \Rightarrow N^* = \sqrt{\frac{K - F}{\alpha}}.$$