

On Naval Power¹

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Abstract

Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the lives of many maritime nations. This is not going to change in the future. Its influence is felt both in time of peace and in time of war. Naval power is one of the key factors in deterring a strong opponent from going to war. In case of war, naval power is a prerequisite for successful conduct of operations on land. And the final outcome of a war is invariably on land; it is there where the humans live. Naval power also plays a critical role across the spectrum of operations short of war.

The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional threats in peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the boundaries of the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the extent of the territorial waters and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit fishing.

Navies and coast guards can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, operations short of war, low-intensity conflict, and high-intensity conventional war. Today and for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly employed in carrying out multiple and diverse missions in what are arbitrarily called "operations short of war." However, a navy, no matter how strong, cannot carry out all the missions alone but needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard.

Naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps vital role in protecting and preserving a nation's interests at sea. This will especially be the case for countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and

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others whose prosperity and economic wellbeing depend on the free and uninterrupted use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country's military and nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or global conflict, forces on land cannot ultimately succeed without secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the oceans are objectives that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval power.

Key words:

naval power, operations short of war, homeland security, foreign policy, support of foreign policy, combating maritime terrorism, combating piracy, counter-insurgency, coercive naval diplomacy, crisis prevention, crisis management, peace operations, irregular warfare, high-intensity conventional war, sea control, obtaining sea control, maintaining sea control, exercising sea control, sea denial, disputing sea control, basing/deployment control, major naval operations, naval tactical actions

Sažetak

Vojno-pomorska moć igrala je vrlo važnu i često vitalnu ulogu za pomorske države. To se neće mijenjati ni u budućnosti. Njen utjecaj osjeća se i u vrijeme mira i u vrijeme rata. Pomorska moć jedan je od ključnih čimbenika u odoraćanju snažnog protivnika od ulaska u rat. U slučaju rata, vojno-pomorska moć preduvjet je za uspješnu provedbu operacija na kopnu. Krajnji ishod rata postiže se, nepromijenjeno, na kopnu, ondje gdje ljudi žive. Vojno-pomorske operacije, isto tako, imaju kritičnu ulogu u cijelom spektru neratnih operacija.

Raspon prijetnji je u pomorskoj domeni širok. Konvencionalne prijetnje u vrijeme mira uključuju i zahtjeve država uz more, vezane za granice zaštićenog ekološko-ribolovnog pojasa, granice teritorijalnih voda, prava neškodljivog prolaska i nezakonitog ribolova. Ratne mornarice i obalna straža mogu biti angažirane na rutinskim aktivnostima u doba mira, neratnim operacijama, sukobima niskog intenziteta i konvencionalnom ratu visokog intenziteta.

Danas i u skoroj budućnosti, vojno-pomorske snage bit će dominantno angažirane u višestrukim i različitim misijama u operacijama koje se arbitrarno nazivaju „neratne operacije“. Međutim, ratna mornarica, bez obzira na jačinu, ne može realizirati sve misije sama nego mora djelovati zajednički s drugim instrumentima vojno-pomorske moći, kao što je obalna straža.

Vojno-pomorska moć nastavit će igrati kritičnu i vjerojatno ključnu ulogu u zaštiti i očuvanju državnih interesa na moru. To će osobito biti slučaj s državama kao što su Sjedinjene Američke Države, Velika Britanija, Japan i Kina, kao i druge čiji prosperitet i ekonomsko blagostanje ovise o slobodnom i neometanom korištenju mora. Vojno-pomorska moć je, bez sumnje, snažan alat u potpori vanjske politike, državne vojne strategije ili strategije vojnog djelovanja u određenom prostoru, kao i različitih vojnih operacija. Ona je sastavni dio domovinske sigurnosti. U suglasju s drugim izvorima državne vojne i nevojne moći, vojno-pomorska moć igra veliku ulogu u odvratanju izbijanja neprijateljstava velikih razmjera. Napokon, u slučaju regionalnog ili globalnog sukoba, kopnene snage ne mogu ostvariti konačnu pobjedu bez sigurne uporabe mora. Stjecanje, održavanje i provedba nadzora nad oceanima, ciljevi su koji se ne mogu postići bez snažne i učinkovite vojno-pomorske moći.

Ključne riječi:

vojno-pomorska moć, neratne operacije, domovinska sigurnost, vanjska politika, potpora vanjskoj politici, borba protiv pomorskog terorizma, borba protiv piratstva, protupobunjeničke operacije, vojno-pomorska diplomacija prisile, prevencija kriza, krizno upravljanje, mirnodopske operacije, neregularni rat, konvencionalni rat visokoga intenziteta, nadzor mora, stjecanje nadzora mora, održavanje nadzora mora, provedba nadzora mora, uskraćivanje korištenja mora, osporavanje nadzora mora, vladanje prostorom baziranja/rasporeda, glavne vojno-pomorske operacije, vojno-pomorske taktičke akcije

Introduction

All too often, the terms naval power and sea power are used interchangeably. But naval power, properly understood, refers to a direct and indirect source of military power at sea. Obviously, the main components of a naval power are the navy, coast guard, and marines/naval infantry and their shore

establishment. The term sea power (coined in 1849) originally referred to a nation having a formidable naval strength. Today, this term's meaning is much broader; it now describes the entirety of the use of the sea by a nation. Specifically, a sea (or maritime) power comprises political, diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of sea use².

Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the lives of many maritime nations. This is not going to change in the future. Its influence is felt both in time of peace and in time of war. Naval power is one of the key factors in deterring a strong opponent from going to war. In case of war, naval power is a prerequisite for successful conduct of operations on land. And the final outcome of a war is invariably on land; it is there where the humans live. Naval power also plays a critical role across the spectrum of operations short of war. This aspect of naval power is not always sufficiently well-known or explained well.

The Threat

The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional threats in peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the boundaries of the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the extent of the territorial waters and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit fishing. Conventional threats include irregular warfare such as insurgencies and the possibility of a high-intensity war in various parts of the world, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan Strait. In addition, unconventional threats in the maritime domain have dramatically increased in diversity and intensity since the early 1990s. They include transnational maritime terrorism and criminal networks involved in illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. Piracy is a growing problem in some parts of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia and off the east and west coasts

² Specifically, a sea power encompasses naval power plus all the nonmilitary aspects of the use of the sea, particularly merchant marine, ports/harbors, fisheries, shipyards/ship repair facilities and all maritime-related industries, oil/gas exploration, and marine-related scientific research (for example, oceanographic research, hydrographic survey, and marine biology).

of Africa. The combination of transnational maritime terrorism and piracy can seriously disrupt the flow of international commerce. The potential impact of such threats on world peace and the global economy is enormous (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.9). There is also a growing danger to ports/bases and coastal facilities/installations from ballistic missiles fired by a rogue state or even transnational terrorist groups.

The threat to port security has increased significantly in the past few decades due to the proliferation of platforms and weapons that can be used against ships and port facilities/installations. Uninterrupted maritime trade is one of the most critical factors for the prosperity of nations. The problem of security against terrorist attack is especially acute at ports located near strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal. Large ports are especially vulnerable to various hostile acts because of the difficulties in providing full, around-the-clock protection. Currently, the greatest threat to the security of major ports is from terrorists, operating individually or in groups.

Navy's Responsibilities

Navies and coast guards can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, operations short of war, and high-intensity conventional war (see table 1). Today and for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly employed in performing multiple and diverse missions in what are arbitrarily called "operations short of war." However, a navy, no matter how strong, cannot carry out all the missions alone but needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard.

In some cases, the coast guard is an integral part of the navy; in other cases, the two are separate. Optimally, a coast guard should be used primarily for maritime policing (or constabulary) duties in peacetime and for carrying out some combat missions in operations short of war and in a high-intensity conventional conflict. In the littorals, the air force and army might be employed jointly with naval forces.

Figure 1: SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AT SEA

PEACETIME	OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR	LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT	HIGH-INTENSITY CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT
<p><u>ROUTINE ACTIVITIES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enforcing Maritime Border Laws & Customs Vessel Traffic Service Search & Rescue Salvage Ordnance Disposal Hydrographic Survey Oceanographic Research <p><u>HOMELAND SECURITY</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Port Security Protection of Critical Installations/Facilities on the Coast Counter Narcotics (Drugs) Counter Illegal Immigration Counter Smuggling of Conventional Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Environmental Protection <p><u>PROTECTION OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protection of Shipping Fishery Protection Protection of Offshore Oil/Gas Installations Protection of Seabed Mineral Deposits 	<p><u>SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperative Naval Diplomacy Coercive Naval Diplomacy Crisis Prevention/Management <p><u>SUPPORT OF MILITARY/THEATER STRATEGY</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nuclear Deterrence Conventional Deterrence Security Cooperation <p><u>ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TREATIES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Freedom of Navigation/Overflight Territorial Waters/EEZ Maritime Boundaries <p><u>COMBATING MARITIME TERRORISM</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anti-Terrorism Counter-Terrorism <p><u>COMBATING PIRACY</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anti-Piracy Counter-Piracy 	<p><u>HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF (HA/DR)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assistance in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters Emergency Medical Assistance Goodwill Activities Refugee Assistance Evacuation of Noncombatants (NEO) <p><u>IRREGULAR WARFARE</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support of Insurgency Support of Counterinsurgency (COIN) <p><u>SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) Expanded Peacekeeping Operations (PKO/PEO) Peace-Making Peace-Building (PB) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Obtaining & Maintaining Sea Control Exercising Sea Control Sea Denial Choke Point Control/Denial Basing/Deployment Area Control Destroying/Weakening the Enemy's Military-Economic Potential at Sea Defense & Protection of Friendly Military-Economic Potential at Sea

A navy also has to interact and work closely with other elements of the country's sea power - specifically, the merchant marine, shipbuilding industries, ocean technology enterprises, and deep-sea mining agencies. Additionally, navies need to cooperate closely with many government agencies. This, in turn, requires smooth and effective interagency cooperation. Additionally, naval forces and coast guards need to work with a large number of nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations ashore.

Operations in Peacetime

The navies perform diverse missions in peacetime ranging from routine activities and homeland security to protection of the country's economic interests at sea, enforcement of maritime treaties, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In general, routine duties include maritime border laws/customs enforcement, vessel traffic control, hydrographic surveys, oceanographic research, salvage, search and rescue, ordnance disposal, and marine pollution control. For the most part, these tasks are the responsibility of the coast guard, with naval forces employed in a supporting role.

The threats to homeland security from across the sea are increasing in both scope and lethality. Specifically, these threats include ballistic missiles, maritime terrorism, cross-border illegal immigration, illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons, and maritime pollution.

The threat of ballistic missiles against ports/airfields and coastal installations/facilities can be countered by creating sea based ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, as the U.S. Navy is doing. BMD systems detect and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles by physically and electronically attacking bases, launch sites, and associated command and control systems. As part of homeland security, they are intended to provide defense against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their flight (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.22). Maritime terrorism has emerged as a formidable threat to both civilian and naval vessels. Large commercial ships are easy targets for determined

terrorists, and the value of these vessels and cargoes makes them attractive to both regional terrorist groups and international organizations that desire to disrupt the economic lifelines of the industrial world. Compounding the threat is the use of commercial vessels by criminals who are often allied with terrorists. Ports/anchorage and critical coastal facilities/installations are potentially exposed to attacks by terrorists. Security of ports encompasses a series of related actions and measures regarding safety of incoming ships and their cargo during transit on the high seas, through the 200-nautical-mile (nm) EEZ, in the territorial sea (usually the 12-nm zone offshore), and in ports and their approaches. Hence, in a physical sense, three zones of maritime security exist: the international zone (foreign countries, high seas), the border/coastal zone (territorial sea plus EEZ), and the domestic zone (territorial sea plus ports and their approaches). International law fully applies in the international zone, while the country's jurisdiction is exercised over all vessels, facilities, and port security in the domestic and border/coastal zones.

Coast guards are largely responsible for protection of their countries' EEZs. This broad task includes monitoring and surveillance of the fisheries, maritime safety, marine pollution reporting, and protection of marine mineral deposits and gas/oil deposits and installations. The navies are primarily responsible for protecting friendly commercial shipping outside of the EEZ.

A state or territory ruled or controlled by a radical regime and situated close to maritime trade chokepoints might attempt to harass shipping, requiring the response of naval forces. Protection of shipping requires coordinated employment of surface, air, and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable command organization both ashore and afloat. In general, protection of shipping should envisage preemptive or retaliatory strikes or raids against selected targets at sea or ashore. A major operation in protection of shipping would require the execution of a variety of missions to protect merchant vessels from unlawful attack in international waters. This can be accomplished through, among other things, the escort of merchant ships (sometimes of individual ships, for a specific purpose), coastal sea control, harbor defense, and mine countermeasures

Blue water navies such as the U.S. Navy are sometimes involved in disputes with riparian states regarding the rights of innocent passage through international straits, or in contesting these states' excessive claims regarding the extent of territorial waters.

This requires the use of naval forces to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight. Normally, a riparian state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial seas; international law, however, establishes the right of innocent passage of ships of other nations through a state's territorial waters.

Passage is considered innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation. In addition, freedom of navigation through international airspace for aircraft is a well-established principle of international law. Threats to aircraft through extension of airspace control zones beyond international norms, whether by nations or groups, can be expected to result in use of force acceptable under international law to rectify the situation.

Navies are currently extensively employed in enforcing international treaties that prohibit illicit trafficking in weapons and humans. Smuggling and trafficking in humans have increased worldwide in recent years. The problem is exacerbated by the ever increasing involvement of criminal gangs in such trade. Among other things, the smuggling of migrants by organized crime groups disrupts the established immigration policies of destination countries. It also involves human rights abuses; such trafficking is slavery in all but name. If a ship is engaged in this activity, it loses its right of innocent passage. In December 2000, the United Nations (UN) convention against organized crime was also related to the protocol to prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children. This protocol generally justifies interdiction of commercial vessels on counter-trafficking grounds. It also encourages information sharing, interdiction training, and the development of tighter legislative authority to interdict and enforce documentary requirements on shipping (Knights, 2006:p.23).

Piracy has posed a threat to all nations for as long as people have sailed the oceans. The international community has branded piracy as hostile to the human race and treats it as one of the few crimes over which universal

jurisdiction applies. Piracy is punishable by all nations wherever the perpetrators are found and without regard to where the offense occurred. It remains a serious threat to international commerce and safety and is on the increase in many parts of the world, but particularly in the waters of Southeast Asia and Africa. In Southeast Asia, commercial ships are especially vulnerable to piracy due to narrow waterways and countless small islands.

Navies are often involved in nonmilitary actions, such as providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and engaging in goodwill activities. The first broad task includes such actions as emergency medical assistance, large-scale evacuation of civilian populations, noncombatant evacuation, and refugee assistance. Emergency medical assistance often includes transporting civilians in need of medical help from or to relatively remote locations.

Operations Short of War

The navies are also employed for conducting missions that very often require threat of or using a lethal force in the situations short of high-intensity conventional war. In one definition, *operations short of war* are described as the use or threatened use of military capabilities in combination with other sources of national power short of high-intensity conventional war. These operations include the threats of use or actual use of military forces in support of foreign policy, military (and/or theater) strategy, combating piracy, combating maritime terrorism insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN), and peace operations, Navies are an ideal tool for providing *support of foreign policy*. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-sufficient and do not require extensive land support. Naval forces can be employed in support of the country's diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for naval diplomacy actions aimed to create a favorable general and military image abroad, establish one's rights in areas of interest, reassure allies and other friendly countries, influence the behavior of other governments, threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten the use of lethal force.

Deployment of naval forces during times of tension or crisis to back up diplomacy and thereby pose an unstated but clear threat is an example of naval diplomacy, which can also help in coalition building.

Navies are generally much more effective than armies or air forces in terms of their international acceptability and capacity to make the desired impact. They can be used symbolically to send a message to a specific government. When a stronger message is required, naval diplomacy can take the form of employment of carefully tailored forces with a credible offensive capability, signaling that a much more capable force will follow, or it can give encouragement to a friendly country by providing reinforcement. The threat of the use of limited offensive action or coercion might be designed to deter a possible aggressor or to compel him to comply with a diplomatic demarche or resolution.

Naval forces are one of the most effective and flexible tools in applying coercive diplomacy (popularly called gunboat diplomacy), which is the use or threat of limited naval force aimed at securing advantage or averting loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state. Coercive diplomacy is conducted both in peacetime and during operations short of war. Methods used are "show the flag," retaliatory raids, rescue operations, or direct attack to achieve a specific military objective. Visits of warships to foreign ports are one of the most common methods of showing the flag. The aim of such visits can range from demonstrating continuing interest in the area to showing resolve in support of a friendly state against threats by a neighboring state. The ships then act as ambassadors. Normally, the main purpose of such visits is to make a favorable impression on the local populace. The degree to which a show of force can be introduced depends on the political message to be communicated.

Sometimes it can be carried out as a warning to leaders or hostile states. At other times, a show of force by ships can act as a sign of reassurance and a token of support. For example, the United States sent a powerful signal of support to Turkey and Greece by sending the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) for a visit to Istanbul and Piraeus in April 1946. This was followed by a

visit of the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) to Greece in September of the same year. Both countries were under enormous pressure from the aggressive policies of Moscow. The Soviets strongly supported the Greek communists in their civil war and issued demands to Turkey to grant a naval base in the Dodecanese Islands and joint control of the Turkish Straits (Berend, 1996:p.34; Knight, 1975:p.451).

However, in some cases, a show of force has failed to achieve its intended objectives. For example, the employment of three U.S. aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan after the intelligence ship USS Pueblo (AGER-2) with its 83 crew members was captured off *Wönsan* in January 1968 apparently did not offer a great advantage to the United States in subsequent negotiations (Mobley, 2003: pp. 117-118). During the Third Taiwan Crisis (1995-1996), the Chinese conducted series of missile firings and exercises off the coast of Taiwan. However, that show of force only hardened the Taiwanese posture and forced the United States to deploy carrier groups into the Taiwan Strait in March 1996.

Naval forces can be used in *conflict prevention/management*. Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at either preventing escalation of disputes into armed conflict or facilitating resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces. For example, the main purpose of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, Arabian Sea, Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities that might affect the national interests of the United States and its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and decisively.

Under the UN Charter, conflict prevention should be conducted with strict impartiality because all sides in a dispute have to agree to involve other countries as mediators. Naval forces can be deployed in the proximity of a country where hostilities threaten to break out. Aircraft carrier groups and amphibious task forces in particular have a greater chance of success

in disputes among nation-states than in ethnic conflict or civil war. To be effective, such a deployment should be accompanied by a clear willingness on the part of the international community to use overwhelming force if necessary. Otherwise, the preventive deployment of naval forces, regardless of size and capability, will rarely produce the desired effect.

Blue water navies play a critical role in providing *support to national and military (or theater) strategy* as a part of nuclear and/or conventional deterrence. Credible nuclear deterrence is based on adequate capability and the certitude that one nation can and will inflict unacceptable losses on an enemy who uses nuclear weapons first. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most survivable component of the country's nuclear forces triad. During the Cold War, these submarines conducted extensive patrols in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, in readiness to fire their sea-launched ballistic missiles. Sea based nuclear deterrent forces continue to have an important role in the nuclear deterrence posture of the United States, the Russian Federation, Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China.

The use or threatened use of conventional forces is a critical element in conventional deterrence. Naval forces are highly suitable for conventional deterrence because of their high mobility and combat power. For a blue water navy, the main method of exercising conventional deterrence is the forward deployment of its striking forces. Among other things, forward deployed forces can considerably enhance a nation's influence and prestige in a given sea area. Presence can greatly help coalition-building, enhance stability, and deter hostile actions against one's interests. It also provides an initial crisis-response capability.

Routine forward presence includes permanently based naval forces overseas and periodic deployment of naval forces in the case of crises, port visits, and participation in bilateral and multilateral training exercises. For example, deployment of powerful U.S. carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups in a certain region, such as the eastern Mediterranean or western Pacific, can send a powerful signal to enemies and friends alike in a crisis. It could prevent the outbreak of conflict, shape the security environment, and serve as a basis for regional peace and stability.

The ability to deploy sea based air and missile defenses forward contributes to force self-protection, assured access, and the defense of other forward deployed forces. Forward deployed U.S. naval forces can provide protection against air and missile threats over a large area of a given maritime theater. Also, by engaging enemy ballistic missiles in the boost and midcourse stages of flight, homeland security is greatly enhanced.

Forward naval presence also creates prerequisites for obtaining and then maintaining sea control in certain parts of a maritime theater. A blue water navy should deploy sufficiently strong and combat-ready forces in the area of potential conflict. These forces should be concentrated in such numbers as to be capable of quickly achieving superiority over the potential opponent at sea. A coastal navy or a major navy operating within the confines of a narrow sea normally cannot obtain sea control without naval forces operating from a secure base of operations. In practical terms, this means that the degree of basing/deployment area control must ensure full protection of forces from all types of threats.

Navies are extensively used in carrying out diverse tasks as part of security cooperation in a given maritime theater. Security cooperation in general is aimed to build defense relationships with international partners, promote cultural awareness and regional understanding, and enhance strategic access. Cooperative activities include assisting host nations in freeing or protecting their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; assisting in training; combating illegal activities along their coastlines; and protecting economic infrastructure (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.18).

Navies are also extensively employed in *combating piracy* in certain parts of the world's ocean. Piracy is a form of illegal belligerence. It is not identical to coastal raiding, unarmed theft from ships, maritime terrorism, and maritime aspects of insurgency. It was traditionally universally condemned both in customary international law and in treaty commitments. Piracy has been characterized in the past as *hostis humani generis* – the enemy of the human race. In general, the quickest and most decisive method of combating piracy would be to plan and execute a major naval/joint operation. Such an operation should not include only employment of one's naval forces

but also forces of other services. Land-based aircraft can be employed for maritime reconnaissance/surveillance and for attacking pirate bases and facilities/installations ashore. Special operations teams can be used for diverse tasks ashore ranging from reconnaissance/surveillance to attack on pirate command posts, eliminating pirate leaders, and freeing hostages and captured ships. A small but highly mobile ground force can be used for raids against the pirate bases and basing areas. The actions of all forces taking part in a major counterpiracy operation must be conducted within the same operational framework; otherwise, they would result in a waste of sorely needed time and resources.

Combating maritime terrorism cannot be considered in isolation of the struggle against terrorism in general. Hence, it is only one, and not necessarily the most important task in the employment of one's naval forces in operations short of war. In many cases, coast guard (or border guard) would be employed in conducting counter-terrorist missions within the country's territorial waters. Not only maritime forces, but whenever possible forces of other sister services should be employed in countering maritime terrorism, this is especially the case in the littorals. Countering maritime terrorism is not a problem of a single country no matter how powerful it is, but of the international community as a whole. Hence, cooperation of many navies should be ensured through bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Navies can be employed to carry out diverse tasks in *support of an insurgency/counterinsurgency*. Missions include blockading the coast to prevent an influx of fighters and material to the insurgents; attacking insurgent concentrations in their operating areas or sanctuaries by using surface combatants and carrier-based aircraft; providing gunfire support to friendly troops ashore; and providing close air support, transport of friendly troops and material, and reconnaissance/surveillance. For example, from 1965 to 1970, the U.S. Navy conducted a blockade of South Vietnam's 1,200-mile coastline in an effort to stop fighters and supplies from flowing by sea from North Vietnam to South Vietnam (Operation Market Time). As part of that effort, Operation Sea Dragon aimed to intercept and destroy the Vietcong's waterborne logistics craft. The Navy's riverine forces conducted Operations Game Warden and Sea Lord.

Naval forces are most extensively used in *support of peace operations*, which are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. These actions are conducted in conjunction with diplomacy as necessary to negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. They may be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the end of the hostilities.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace operations. Peacekeeping operations are designed to contain, moderate, or terminate hostilities between or within states, using international or impartial military forces and civilians to complement political conflict-resolution efforts and restore and maintain peace. These actions take place after the sides in a conflict agree to cease hostilities; impartial observers are normally sent to verify the implementation of the ceasefire or to monitor the separation of forces.

Peace-enforcement operations involve diverse tasks as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions that have been adopted to maintain or restore peace or order. The tasks of peace enforcement include implementation of sanctions, establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents. The aim is to establish an environment for a truce or ceasefire. In contrast to peacekeeping operations, peace-enforcement operations do not require the consent of the warring factions involved in a conflict. When used for peace enforcement, naval forces should have at least limited power projection capabilities and be ready to engage in combat.

Naval forces may also be involved in expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. These operations are larger than peacekeeping operations and can involve over 20,000 personnel. The consent of the sides in the conflict is usually nominal, incomplete, or nonexistent. These operations include more assertive mandates and rules of engagement, including the use of force under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Binnendijk, 1996:p.135). Expanded peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations are conducted with strictly limited objectives, such as protecting safe-flight or

no-fly zones or relief deliveries. If too intrusive, the operations are likely to draw multinational forces into open hostilities; the naval forces would then have to be either pulled out or committed to full-scale combat (Binnendijk, 1996:p.138).

The principal *methods of combat employment of naval forces in operations short of war* are major and minor tactical actions. Major naval operations are planned and conducted only in exceptional circumstances. One's naval forces are largely employed as part of the sea and/or air exclusion zone and maritime intercept operations (MIOs). Exclusion zones can be established in the air, at sea, or on land to prevent the transit of oil or other cargo and weapons.

An exclusion zone is usually imposed by the United Nations or some other international body, but it may also be established by individual countries. Exclusion zones can be authorized by UN Security Council resolution and offer a means of simplifying sea control through the promulgation of an intention to maintain sea denial to cover a specific area. In diplomatic terms, they are a way of enhancing coercive action by declaring a resolve to use combat if necessary. To be credible, they must be enforceable, and the rights and security of third parties need to be ensured. Maritime intercept operations are usually conducted as part of the enforcement of sanctions by an international body such as the UN or some regional body. The political objective is usually to compel a country or group of countries to conform to the demands of the initiating body. They include coercive measures aimed to interdict the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or a specific sea area. MIOs can also be applied by a major naval power or group of powers to prevent maritime terrorism or illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. Normally, these operations require the employment of both surface and air forces (Boyce, 1999:p.26). For example, UN-mandated MIOs were conducted against Iraq by the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners between August 1990 and March 1993.

High-intensity Conventional War

Navies will play a major role in providing direct and/or indirect support to ground forces in the case of a regional or global conflict. War at sea has almost never taken place alone but has been conducted in conjunction with war on land and, in the modern era, in the air. The objectives of naval warfare have been an integral part of war's objectives. These, in turn, are accomplished by the employment of all the services of a country's armed forces. In contrast to war on land, the objectives in war at sea are almost generally physical in character.

The main objective for a stronger side is to obtain sea control in the whole theater or a major part of it, while the weaker side would try to deny that control. After desired degree of sea control is obtained, it must be maintained. In operational terms, this phase equates to consolidation of strategic or operational success. Exercising sea control is the ultimate purpose of the struggle for sea control by a stronger side at sea. In operational terms, it equates to exploitation of the strategic or operational success. Obtaining/maintaining and exercising control are not clearly delineated in terms of the factors of space and time. In practice, a stronger side would start to exercise control while the efforts to obtain and maintain sea control are still under way. Sometimes, methods for obtaining and exercising sea control are applied simultaneously, as in the case of naval/commercial blockade.

The concept of sea control is at the same time both simple and complicated. In its simplest definition sea control can be described as *one's ability to use a given part of the sea/ocean and associated air (space) for military and nonmilitary purposes and deny the same to the enemy in time of open hostilities*. However, this definition does not reflect that sea control exists in various states and degrees. Sea control implies sufficient and extensive control of a major part of a given maritime theater. It does not mean that all hostile ships, submarines, or aircraft are unable to operate. It only means that the enemy does not have significant capabilities to interfere seriously with one's use of the sea for military and nonmilitary purposes. An ocean or sea area may be considered under control when one's naval/air forces can operate freely and conduct seaborne traffic while the enemy cannot do the same except

at considerable risk. Control of a specific sea/ocean area ensures one's naval forces exercise that control. At the same time, the weaker opponent is forced to contest control by conducting sporadic actions of limited duration (Cutts, 1938:pp.8, 4-5). In a typical narrow sea if a stronger side obtained sea control, the weaker side could make that control increasingly difficult and ultimately obtain control for itself. Even in the areas where a stronger side at sea possesses a substantial degree of control of the surface and subsurface, the weaker side can still operate under certain conditions provided that it enjoys air superiority (Poeschel, 1982:p.42). Sea control is obtained primarily by the employment of maritime forces in the form of major naval operations. In the littorals, these operations will be joint or combined – that is, not only naval forces but also combat arms/branches of other services will take part.

In strategic terms, obtaining or losing sea control on the open ocean would normally have an indirect effect on the war situation on land. This effect is far more direct and immediate in enclosed or marginal seas, where in many cases the loss of sea control can lead to the collapse of one's front on land and thereby considerably affect the outcome of the war. The opposite is also true: obtaining or losing sea control in a marginal sea or enclosed seas is considerably influenced by the course of events in the war on land (Poeschel, 1982:p.41). In contrast to the open ocean, sea control in a typical narrow sea usually cannot be obtained and then maintained without the closest cooperation among all the services. Even when the navy is the principal force, it should be directly or indirectly supported by the other services. Very often, naval forces would have a relatively higher degree of independence in carrying out tasks to obtain sea control (Poeschel, 1982:p.41, 45).

Sea control is inextricably linked with armed struggle at sea. In other words, one does not possess control of the sea by virtue of having forces deployed in the proximity of the area of potential conflict or crisis in peacetime. In peacetime, any navy, regardless of its size or combat strength, has almost unlimited access to any sea area. Forward presence is conducted with full respect for international treaties and conventions and without violating the territorial waters of other countries. Yet this does not in any way preclude starting the struggle for sea control in peacetime because preconditions must be created to quickly attain sea control after the start of hostilities (Poeschel,

1982:p.44). By obtaining sea control, the stronger side would create favorable conditions for carrying out other important tasks at sea.

Sea control and disputed (or contested) sea control can be strategic, operational, and tactical in scale. Strategic sea control pertains to the entire maritime theater, while control of a major part of a maritime theater represents operational sea control. Tactical control refers to control of a maritime combat sector or zone but sometimes can encompass a maritime area of operations. However, in practical terms, the focus should invariably be on strategic or operational sea control or disputed control, not tactical sea control.

Sea control can encompass control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace or of any combination of these three physical media. In the era of sail, command of the sea was limited to command of the surface. After the advent of the submarine and aircraft, the two other dimensions emerged. The degree of overall control of a given sea area depends on the degree of control of each of the three dimensions (Poeschel, 1982:p.42). However, experience shows that, during war between two strong opponents at sea, it is not possible to obtain or maintain control of all three physical media to the same degree or for extended times.

Because of the rather large differences in the size of the physical environment and the proximity of the continental landmass, there is a considerable difference between obtaining sea control on the open ocean and in the littorals. Obtaining sea control in the littorals is highly dependent on the ability to obtain air superiority. Because of the ever-increasing range, endurance, and speed of modern aircraft, ever-larger ocean areas are becoming the areas of employment for both naval forces and land-based aircraft. Today, no part of the littoral is beyond the reach of land-based attack aircraft. Land- or carrier-based aircraft play an extraordinary role in obtaining sea control in the littorals. Without air superiority, sea control simply cannot be obtained. Depending on capabilities, naval forces can take part in the struggle for air superiority. Yet they are not the main means of accomplishing that objective, especially in the sea areas within effective range of land-based aircraft. If one side at sea possesses air superiority, it can be very difficult for the other side

to use some aspects of sea control for its own purposes. Air superiority over a given ocean area can compensate for those aspects of sea control that naval forces failed to obtain. Nevertheless, for all its value, air superiority cannot replace control of the surface and subsurface (Poeschel, 1982:p.43).

In general, sea control cannot be expressed in quantitative terms or various metrics (as the U.S. Navy is trying to do); it can be recognized only in its effects. Sea control is always relative in spatial terms. It pertains to the specific part of the theater in which a certain degree of control must be obtained. Sea control is also relative in terms of the factor of time. It is also relative in terms of the factor of force. The relatively strong enemy always has the ability to dispute the sea control obtained by the stronger side (Poeschel, 1982:p.80).

Exercising sea control is the ultimate purpose of the struggle for sea control by a stronger side at sea. In generic terms, the main methods in exercising sea control are defense/protection of friendly and destruction of the enemy's maritime trade, amphibious landings on the opposed shore, destruction/neutralization of the enemy forces and facilities/installations in the coastal area, and providing support to friendly ground forces in their offensive (or defensive) operations on the coast.

Disputed (or contested) sea control is usually the principal objective of a weaker but relatively strong navy in the initial phase of a war at sea. When command is in dispute, the general conditions might give a stable or unstable equilibrium. Then the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the command lies with the opponent (Corbett, 1918:p.91). The objective then can be strategic, encompassing the entire theater, or operational, when control is disputed in a major part of the theater.

Disputed sea control exists when the opposing sides possess roughly equal capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or in one of its parts) and there is neither significant change in the ratio of forces nor a change of the initiative to either side (Poeschel, 1982:p.71). Once disputed control is obtained, the initially weaker side can possibly try to obtain sea control of its own. Denying the use of the sea to an opponent has often been regarded as the opposite of sea control, but this is an oversimplification. If

a weaker side denies control of the sea to a stronger opponent, this does not mean that it necessarily obtains control itself (Simpson, 1977:p.xix.). Sea control and sea denial are often complementary objectives. For example, sea denial may be conducted to help secure use of the sea, either in the same geographical area or elsewhere. A fleet operating in one or more enclosed or marginal seas might opt for, or be forced by circumstances to accomplish, a combination of objectives – general sea control in the enclosed sea theater, and contested control in a semi-enclosed sea or parts of the adjacent oceans.

Disputed sea control often occurs in the initial phase of a war and is characterized by an almost-continuous struggle for control of certain ocean areas. Once control is obtained, however, it is usually not maintained for a long period, but may be lost from time to time and then regained. In coastal or offshore waters, sea control by a stronger fleet can be disputed even if the major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed.

When control is in dispute, both sides usually operate at high risk because their strength is approximately in balance. One side usually controls one or more parts of a given theater, while its opponent controls the remaining part. Each side's control of a specific sea area is usually limited in time. In the littorals, however, contesting sea control is primarily carried out by submarines, small surface combatants, coastal missile/gun batteries, land-based aircraft, and mines. In general, naval forces can carry out operations aimed to secure control of the sea areas, operations in areas not under command, and operations in the sea areas under command (Turner, 1938: p.8).

A unique feature of the struggle for sea control in the narrow seas is control of the straits/narrows or *chokepoint control*. The objective for a weaker side, then, is just the opposite: chokepoint control denial. In either case, but particularly for a weaker side, this objective would normally require the highest degree of cooperation among naval forces and the combat arms of other services.

The sea's exits are critically important for control of the movements of naval forces and military/commercial shipping. They also often serve as the highways for large-scale invasions. Control of a strait/narrows or several straits can cut off or isolate enemy forces in an adjacent theater of war. The

loss of control of an important chokepoint on whose shores a land campaign is in progress is often fraught with danger for naval forces. For a major navy, general sea control is hardly possible without establishing not only control on the open ocean but also direct or indirect control of several critical passages of vital importance to the world's maritime trade, or by obtaining control of a given narrow sea.

Another operational objective for both the stronger and weaker sides at sea is to establish and maintain *basing/deployment area control* for their naval forces and aircraft, thereby creating prerequisites for planning, preparing, and executing naval/joint major operations. Without securing control of a basing and deployment area first, it is difficult if not impossible to prepare and execute major naval/joint operations and naval tactical actions. This objective is especially critical for naval forces operating in a typical narrow sea. Optimally, control of basing and deployment areas should be established and maintained in peacetime. It is an integral part of the theater-wide or operational protections. The operational commander should be solely responsible for ensuring sufficient degree of basing/deployment area control.

The principal elements of basing/deployment area control are coastal reconnaissance/surveillance, airspace control/air defense, missile defense, anti-combat craft defense, anti-submarine defense, defensive mining, offensive and defensive mine counter-measures, defense of naval bases/ports and airfields, defense of the coast, defense and protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), defense and protection of information systems, defense against terrorist acts, and cover and concealment. Basing/deployment area control is accomplished through the series of tactical actions at sea, subsurface, air, and land. The operational objective is accomplished over time.

Control of basing/deployment area must be maintained and if possible expanded during a war. The physical scope of this control depends on the degree of sea control obtained in a given sea or ocean area. Without sea control, one cannot maintain control of basing/deployment areas. At the same time, actions to obtain sea control are far easier if forces operate from

secure basing and deployment areas. This, of course, does not preclude obtaining sea control in an area where control of basing and deployment areas does not exist. This is especially true in the operations of naval forces in enemy-controlled sea areas. Then the basing and deployment area is gradually extended by establishing new bases and facilities on the conquered territories (Poeschel, 1982:p.74).

Conclusion

As in the past, naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps vital role in protecting and preserving a nation's interests at sea. This will especially be the case for countries such as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and others whose prosperity and economic wellbeing depend on the free and uninterrupted use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country's military and nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or global conflict, forces on land cannot ultimately succeed without secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the oceans are objectives that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval power.

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