

On Protocol Divertibility

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Abstract. In this paper, we establish the notion of divertibility as a protocol property as opposed to the existing notion as a language property (see Okamoto, Ohta [OO90]). We give a definition of protocol divertibility that applies to arbitrary 2-party protocols and is compatible with Okamoto and Ohta’s definition in the case of interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Other important examples falling under the new definition are blind signature protocols. A sufficient criterion for divertibility is presented and found to be satisfied by many examples of protocols in the literature. The generality of the definition can be further demonstrated by examples from protocol classes that have not been considered for divertibility before. For example, we show diverted Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Keywords: interactive protocol, divertibility, zero-knowledge proof, Fiat-Shamir identification, blind signature, Diffie-Hellman key-exchange.

1 Introduction

The idea of divertibility entered the cryptographic literature during the mid 80’s by examples of identification protocols. The basic observation was that some 2-party identification protocols could be extended by placing an intermediate party—called Warden for historical reasons [S84]—between the prover and the verifier so that they cannot distinguish talking directly to each other from talking indirectly through the Warden. Since identification protocols were developed in close relation to interactive zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP), Okamoto and Ohta [OO90] (and later Desmedt and Burmester [BD91] and Ito et al [ISS91]) established the notion of divertibility as a *language property*, i.e., a language is called divertible if it can be recognized by a diverted interactive zero-knowledge proof system.

In this paper, we establish divertibility as a *2-party protocol property*, which is orthogonal to zero knowledge or any other particular protocol property (Section 2). Informally, we call a protocol between Alice and Bob perfectly (computationally) divertible if there exists a Warden W so that Alice and Bob cannot distinguish talking to each other from talking to W when they have unlimited (polynomial) computing power. We suggest a definition of perfect divertibility that is slightly stronger than the earlier one’s. The difference is illustrated by

one of our new examples in Section 5 and is discussed in the Appendix. Our main result is a sufficient criterion for perfect divertibility of 2-party protocols (Section 3). We have found this criterion satisfied by many diverted zero knowledge proofs and other protocols in the literature. Our criterion is constructive in the sense that if it is shown for a given 2-party protocol, then it also gives a diverted protocol, rather than only stating that one exists. So the criterion is helpful both (i) for proving given 3-party protocols to be perfectly diverted and (ii) for designing new perfectly diverted protocols for given 2-party protocols. In Section 4, we demonstrate (i) by applying the criterion to a diverted ZKP protocol that Okamoto and Ohta used for their important result [OO90] and to an interesting blind modified El-Gamal signature by Horster et al [HMP95]. In the literature, little proof of divertedness is given for each. In Section 5, we demonstrate (ii) by showing a perfectly diverted public key encryption protocol. In addition, we show a computationally diverted key exchange protocol. Both illustrate our claim that divertibility is an independent concept rather than a special topic of zero knowledge proof theory.

2 Definitions

In order to deal with protocols of more than two parties, we generalize the notion of *interactive Turing machine* (ITM) by Goldwasser et al [GMR89]. Then we define connections of ITMs and finally give the definition of protocol divertibility.

Definition 1 ((m, n)-Interactive Turing Machine).

An (m, n)-*Interactive Turing Machine* ((m, n) -ITM) is a Turing machine with $m \in \mathbb{N}$ read-only *input tapes*, m write-only *output tapes*, m read-only *random tapes*, a *work tape*, a read-only *auxiliary tape*, and $n \in \mathbb{N}_0$ pairs of *communication tapes*. Each pair consists of one read-only and one write-only tape that serves for reading in-messages from or writing out-messages to another ITM. (The purpose of allowing $n = 0$ will become clear below.) The random tapes each contain an infinite stream of bits chosen uniformly at random. Read-only tapes are readable only from left to right. If the string to the right of a read-only head is empty, then we say the tape is *empty*.

Associated to an ITM is a *security parameter* $k \in \mathbb{N}$, a family $D = \{D_\pi\}_\pi$ of tuples of domains, a probabilistic *picking algorithm* $pick(k)$ and an encoding scheme S . Each member

$$D_\pi = (In_\pi^{(1)}, \dots, In_\pi^{(m)}, Out_\pi^{(1)}, \dots, Out_\pi^{(m)}, Rnd_\pi^{(1)}, \dots, Rnd_\pi^{(m)}, \\ (IM_\pi^{(1)}, OM_\pi^{(1)}), \dots, (IM_\pi^{(n)}, OM_\pi^{(n)}))$$

of D contains one input (output, choice, in-message, out-message) domain for each of the m input (output, random) tapes and n (read-only, write-only) communication tapes. The algorithm $pick(k)$ on input some security parameter k outputs a family index π . Finally, there is a polynomial $P(k)$ so that for each π chosen by $pick(k)$, S encodes all elements of all domains in D_π as bitstrings of length $P(k)$.

ITMs proceed in rounds. During each round, an ITM first reads all its in-messages from its read-only communication tapes, then performs some computations and finally writes a message to each of its write-only communication tapes. It may write an empty string—denoted ε . If, at the beginning of a round, an ITM finds all its input tapes and all its read-only communication tapes empty, then it performs a last computation, writes empty strings to all its write-only communication tapes, writes results to all its output tapes, and then stops. The overall number of reading, writing and computation steps during an execution of an ITM is bound by a polynomial in the security parameter k .

An (m, n) -ITM is called *m-party protocol* if $n = 0$, and linear if $n \leq 2$. The *native functions* of an ITM A are defined as the family

$$\text{nativ}_\pi : \prod_{i=1}^m \text{Rnd}_{\pi,i} \times \prod_{i=1}^m \text{In}_{\pi,i} \times \prod_{j=1}^n \text{IM}_{\pi,j} \rightarrow \prod_{j=1}^n \text{OM}_{\pi,j}$$

of functions that, on input $(\text{rnd}, \text{in}, \text{im})$, return the respective out-messages that A would write to its write-only communication tapes would it read this data from its random, input and read-only communication tapes.

Let A be an (m_A, n) -ITM and B be an (m_B, n) -ITM, which together make up a protocol $P = \langle A, B \rangle$. Let $m^* \leq \min(m_A, m_B)$ be the number of pairs of communication tapes shared by A and B . Then the *view* of A on B on respective inputs, denoted as,

$$\text{view}_B^{(A)} P([\text{in}_{A,1}, \dots, \text{in}_{A,m_A}]^A, [\text{in}_{B,1}, \dots, \text{in}_{B,m_B}]^B) ,$$

is defined as everything that A sees from B , i.e., the probability distribution of all m^* -tuples of pairs of in-messages sent by A to B and out-messages returned from B to A , where the probabilities are taken over the choices of the viewer A .¹ \diamond

In order to enhance readability, we denote in-messages and out-messages of an ITM A by $(r - 1)$ -dimensional column vectors, where r is the number of rounds that A takes. (The dimension of the vectors is one less than the number of rounds because there is no message received in round 1 and no message sent in round r .) Two out-messages are written as an $(n - 1, 2)$ -matrix and so on. For m -party protocols P , we adopt the following interface notation:

$$(\text{out}_1, \dots, \text{out}_m) \leftarrow P(\text{in}_1, \dots, \text{in}_m) ,$$

where the left arrow indicates a probabilistic assignment. If the inputs or outputs consist of several components, we delimit them by square brackets.

Definition 2 (Connections of ITMs).

Let A be an (m_A, n_A) -ITM and B be an (m_B, n_B) -ITM with equal picking algorithm *pick*. Then a connection $C = \langle A, B \rangle$ is any ITM consisting of A and B sharing $c \leq \min\{n_A, n_B\}$ pairs of their communication tapes. The picking algorithm of C is *pick*, and the domains of C are defined as the cartesian products of the respective domains of A and B . \diamond

¹ This is a generalization of the definition given by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89].

Obviously, the linear connection operator $\langle \bullet, \bullet \rangle$ is associative and we can therefore omit brackets in the usual way:

$$\langle A, B, C \rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \langle A, B \rangle, C \rangle = \langle A, \langle B, C \rangle \rangle .$$

All connections we consider in the following are linear and have a small constant number of rounds.

Definition 3 (Divertibility of Protocols).

Let $P = \langle A, B \rangle$ be a two-party protocol with interface $P([y, x_A]^A, [y, x_B]^B)$ and input domains $In_\pi = (Y_\pi \times X_{A,\pi}) \times (Y_\pi \times X_{B,\pi})$. Common inputs y are taken from Y_π , whereas private inputs x_A, x_B are taken from $X_{A,\pi}$ and $X_{B,\pi}$, respectively. The product domain of private inputs is denoted $X_\pi = X_{A,\pi} \times X_{B,\pi}$. Furthermore, let $R = \{R_\pi\}_\pi$ be a family of relations $R_\pi \subseteq Y_\pi \times X_\pi$.

The protocol P is called *perfectly (computationally) divertible* over R iff a (1,2)-ITM W exists such that the following properties hold:

PERFECT (COMPUTATIONAL) EXTENSIBILITY: For all indices π , all common and private inputs $(y, x_A, x_B) \in R_\pi$, the ensembles of views of B on W and on A , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{view}_W^{(B)} \langle A, W, B \rangle ([y, x_A]^A, [y]^W, [y, x_B]^B), \text{ and} \\ & \text{view}_A^{(B)} \langle A, B \rangle ([y, x_A]^A, [y, x_B]^B) \end{aligned}$$

as well as the views of A on W and on B , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{view}_W^{(A)} \langle A, W, B \rangle ([y, x_A]^A, [y]^W, [y, x_B]^B), \text{ and} \\ & \text{view}_B^{(A)} \langle A, B \rangle ([y, x_A]^A, [y, x_B]^B) \end{aligned}$$

are equal (polynomially indistinguishable).

PERFECT (COMPUTATIONAL) INDISTINGUISHABILITY: For all polynomial-time actively adversary ITMs \tilde{A}, \tilde{B} , for all indices π , all common and private inputs $(y, (x_A, x_B)) \in R_\pi$ and all polynomial size strings q representing shared a-priori knowledge of \tilde{A} and \tilde{B} , the ensembles of simultaneous views of \tilde{A} and \tilde{B} upon W and of their views upon honest B and A , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{view}_W^{(\tilde{A}, \tilde{B})} \langle \tilde{A}, W, \tilde{B} \rangle ([y, x_A, q]^{\tilde{A}}, [y]^W, [y, x_B, q]^{\tilde{B}}) \text{ and} \\ & \left(\text{view}_B^{(\tilde{A})} \langle \tilde{A}, B \rangle ([y, x_A, q]^{\tilde{A}}, [y, x_B]^B), \text{view}_A^{(\tilde{B})} \langle A, \tilde{B} \rangle ([y, x_A]^A, [y, x_B, q]^{\tilde{B}}) \right) \end{aligned}$$

are equal (polynomially indistinguishable).^{2 3}

² The notion of *polynomial indistinguishability* of families of random variables is defined, e.g., by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89].

³ Equality (polynomial indistinguishability) is required only for the views on *complete* runs of the diverted protocol, i.e., runs that the warden has not aborted, for example, because he has detected either \tilde{A} or \tilde{B} cheating.

An ITM W that satisfies extensibility and perfect (computational) indistinguishability is said to *perfectly (computationally) divert* protocol P over R . \diamond

Divertibility as defined by Okamoto, Ohta [OO90] and almost equivalently by Itoh et al [ISS91] has been introduced as a *language property*. A language L is called divertible, if there exists a diverted zero knowledge proof system for proving membership in L . In contrast, we define divertibility as a *2-party protocol property*. The main difference between the two definitions is that we ask for a concrete protocol P to be divertible, whereas they ask for existence of a divertible protocol meeting a certain specification S (namely to be a zero-knowledge proof). Consequently, Definition 3 (extensibility) relates the two interfaces of the diverted protocol P' to the interface of the given protocol P , where their definition relates them to S . Another difference is, that we suggest a stronger definition than Okamoto and Ohta's. We require Indistinguishability even for two attackers \tilde{A} and \tilde{B} who *know of each other* (a-priori common knowledge q) and who therefore know which of their views result from the same protocol instance. We illustrate this by an example in Section 4 and discuss it further in Appendix 7.1.

An immediate consequence of the definition is that if a protocol P is divertible, then we can insert second and third wardens and we, again, obtain a diverted protocol.

2.1 Main Divertibility Result

Theorem 4 (Criterion for Perfect Divertibility).

Let $P = \langle A, B \rangle$ be a two-party protocol with interface $P([y, x_A]^A, [y, x_B]^B)$. Let the input domains be $(Y_\pi \times X_{A,\pi}) \times (Y_\pi \times X_{B,\pi})$, the random domains be $\Omega_{A,\pi} \times \Omega_{B,\pi}$, the out-message domains be $OM_{A,\pi} \times OM_{B,\pi}$, and let the native functions of A and B be

$$\begin{aligned} \text{native}_{A,\pi} &: \Omega_{A,\pi} \times Y_\pi \times X_{A,\pi} \times OM_{B,\pi} \rightarrow OM_{A,\pi} \text{ ,} \\ \text{native}_{B,\pi} &: \Omega_{B,\pi} \times Y_\pi \times X_{B,\pi} \times OM_{A,\pi} \rightarrow OM_{B,\pi} \text{ .} \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, let $R = \{R_\pi\}_\pi$ be a family of relations $R_\pi \subseteq Y_\pi \times (X_{A,\pi} \times X_{B,\pi})$, which capture the correspondence between the private and the public inputs.

Then P is perfectly divertible over R if only there exist:

- (i) a family $(\Omega_\pi, \odot, 1)$ of (not necessarily commutative) groups, and
- (ii) three families of functions

$$\begin{aligned} \text{base}_\pi &: Y_\pi \times X_{A,\pi} \times X_{B,\pi} \rightarrow OM_{A,\pi} \times OM_{B,\pi} \text{ ,} \\ \text{join}_\pi &: \Omega_{A,\pi} \times \Omega_{B,\pi} \times Y_\pi \times X_{A,\pi} \times X_{B,\pi} \rightarrow \Omega_\pi \text{ ,} \\ \text{divrt}_\pi &: \Omega_\pi \times Y_\pi \times OM_{A,\pi} \times OM_{B,\pi} \rightarrow OM_{A,\pi} \times OM_{B,\pi} \text{ ,} \end{aligned}$$

with the following properties: Function $\text{divrt}(\omega, y, o_A, o_B)$ is defined only for (o_A, o_B) that live in the respective image $OM_{\pi,y}$ of native_A and native_B , i.e.,

$$OM_{\pi,y} = \text{native}_A(\Omega_A, y, x_A, o_B) \times \text{native}_B(\Omega_B, y, x_B, o_A) \text{ ,}$$

where $(y, x_A, x_B) \in R_\pi$.⁴ Second, for each fixed $\alpha, \beta, y, x_A, x_B \in R_\pi$, the functions,

$$\text{join}_\pi(\alpha', \beta, y, x_A, x_B) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{join}_\pi(\alpha, \beta', y, x_A, x_B) ,$$

are each bijective on Ω_A and Ω_B , respectively.

(iii) a (1, 2)-ITM W that on input two in-messages o_A, o_B computes two out-messages o'_A, o'_B such that

$$(o'_A, o_B) = \text{divrt}(\omega, y, (o_A, o'_B)) .$$

Now, for every π , for all random choices $\alpha \in \Omega_{A,\pi}, \beta \in \Omega_{B,\pi}$, all common and corresponding private inputs $(y, x_A, x_B) \in R_\pi$, and all out-messages $o_A \in OM_{A,\pi}, o_B \in OM_{B,\pi}$ the following three conditions must hold:

DECOMPOSITION:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{nativ}_A(\alpha, y, x_A, o_B), \text{nativ}_B(\beta, y, x_B, o_A)) \\ &= \text{divrt}(\text{join}(\alpha, \beta, y, x_A, x_B), y, \text{base}(y, x_A, x_B)) , \end{aligned}$$

GROUND:

$$\text{divrt}(1, y, (o_A, o_B)) = (o_A, o_B) ,$$

MIXED ASSOCIATIVITY:

$$\text{divrt}(\omega', y, \text{divrt}(\omega, y, (o_A, o_B))) = \text{divrt}(\omega \odot \omega', y, (o_A, o_B)) .$$

◇

Proof. First observe that if divrt satisfies the premises GROUND and MIXED ASSOCIATIVITY, then it is injective as a function of ω : For all $(o_A, o_B) \in OM_{\pi,y}$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} (o_A, o_B) &= \text{divrt}(1, y, (o_A, o_B)) \\ &= \text{divrt}(\omega \odot \omega^{-1}, y, (o_A, o_B)) \quad (\text{for any } \omega) \\ &= \text{divrt}(\omega^{-1}, y, \text{divrt}(\omega, y, (o_A, o_B))) . \end{aligned}$$

So, function divrt turns out to be bijective on Ω_π for the entire parameter domain $OM_{\pi,y}$. We may thus write: $\text{divrt}^{-1}(\omega, \bullet) = \text{divrt}(\omega^{-1}, \bullet)$.

In order to infer extensibility and indistinguishability of P , we look separately at the out-messages between $\langle A, W \rangle$ and B and those out-messages between A and $\langle W, B \rangle$. We deal with the former case in detail and argue that the latter case can be handled analogously due to symmetry reasons. Using DECOMPOSITION

⁴ Note that the input variables o_A and o_B in the definition of $OM_{\pi,y}$ refer to the output of nativ_B and nativ_A , respectively. This recursion is guaranteed to terminate by the following requirement (iii) below.

and MIXED ASSOCIATIVITY, we rewrite the above mentioned out-messages as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
& (\text{nativ}_{\langle A, W \rangle}(\omega, \alpha, y, x_A, o_B), \text{nativ}_B(\beta, y, x_B, o_A)) \\
&= \text{divrt}(\omega, y, (\text{nativ}_A(\alpha, y, x_A, o'_B), \text{nativ}_B(\beta, y, x_B, o'_A))) \\
&= \text{divrt}(\omega, y, \text{divrt}(\omega', y, \text{base}(y, x_A, x_B))), \text{ where } \omega' = \text{join}(\alpha, \beta, y, x_A, x_B) \\
&= \text{divrt}(\omega' \odot \omega, y, \text{base}(y, x_A, x_B)) \\
&= (\text{nativ}_A(\alpha', y, x_A, o_B), \text{nativ}_B(\omega, \beta', y, x_B, o_A)) , \\
&\quad \text{where } (\alpha', \beta') = \text{join}^{-1}(\omega' \odot \omega, y, x_A, x_B) .
\end{aligned}$$

It then follows from the bijectiveness of *join* and the fact that \odot is a group operation that the probability of each pair of out-messages is the same over Bob's choices β and over β' . Together with the analogous result for out-messages between A and $\langle W, B \rangle$ (this is where invertibility of *divrt* is needed), this settles extensibility.

For perfect indistinguishability, we need to deal with arbitrary attackers \tilde{A}, \tilde{B} , instead. Assume, these attackers produce their out-messages with a certain distribution D that respects the domain of function *divrt*. Otherwise, *divrt* is undefined and the distribution could be ignored according to indistinguishability. Then by decomposition, we see that this given distribution D can also be achieved by honest Alice and Bob if Bob would chose his β according to some appropriate distribution d . Following the above rewriting, and again taking into account that *join* is bijective and \odot is a group operation, we conclude, that the distribution of $\omega' \odot \omega$ is d because, by presumption, the warden is honest and therefore ω is uniformly distributed. Hence, the out-messages of $\langle A, W \rangle$ and B are also distributed according to D , if the probabilities are taken over β' . Together with the analogous result for out-messages between A and $\langle W, B \rangle$, this in addition settles perfect indistinguishability and therefore perfect divertibility. \square

3 Known Examples of Diverted Protocols

The most prominent examples of diverted protocols in the literature are diverted interactive proofs and blind signatures. Since divertibility has been introduced only in the former context, blind signatures are a good example to illustrate the more general concept of divertibility of protocols as proposed in Definition 3. In this Section, we investigate two examples in more detail: (i) the diverted ZKP that Okamoto and Ohta used to prove their main theorem [OO90] and (ii) a blind modified El-Gamal Signature, which was presented by Horster, Michels and Petersen [HMP95] who built on ideas of Camenisch, Piveteau and Stadler [CPS95]. More examples, all satisfying the divertibility criterion, can be found in Appendix 7.2.

Since all the following protocols are based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms, the following definitions are useful. Let p be a k -bit prime ($k \in \mathbb{N}$), q be a large prime divisor of $p-1$ and G_q be the unique (multiplicative)

subgroup of order q in \mathbb{Z}_p^* . Furthermore, $g \neq 1$ denotes a randomly chosen element of G_q . (The restriction to $g \neq 1$ asserts that g generates G_q). Arithmetic operations are either in G_q , i.e., multiplication mod p or in \mathbb{Z}_q , i.e., addition and multiplication mod q . We dare to omit the “(mod p)” and “(mod q)” whenever they are clear from the context.

3.1 Okamoto-Ohta ZKP

In their seminal paper [OO90] (Theorem 1, p138), Okamoto and Ohta used a diverted zero knowledge proof protocol in order to prove that any commutative random self-reducible language has a diverted perfect zero knowledge proof. We reconsider their diverted protocol and show that it satisfies our divertibility criterion. A side-effect of this analysis is a tightening of their result: In fact, every commutative random self-reducible relation has a *perfectly* diverted perfect zero-knowledge proof.

The diverted proof protocol is restated in Figure 1. Only the prover has a private input, namely her secret x , whereas the common input is $y = g^x \bmod p$. Note, that in their protocol, Okamoto and Ohta named the secret y and the common input x ! In order to keep a somewhat harmonised presentation throughout this paper, we instantiate their meta-protocol for discrete logarithms. This is what they singled out as their example E2. With this choice, their bullet and power operation, i.e. “ \bullet ” and “ a^b ” in \mathbb{Z}_q , instantiate to addition and multiplication mod q . Although we show our result for a particular instantiation, it generalizes to all commutative random self-reducible relations.




Fig. 1. Diverted Okamoto-Ohta ZKP

Proposition 5. *The Warden in protocol DOO perfectly diverts the 2-party protocol between Alice and Bob over $R = \{(y, x) \mid y = g^x \pmod p\}$.* \diamond

Proof. The native functions of Alice, Bob and Warden follow immediately from protocol DOO in Figure 1. We choose the injective functions *join* and *base* as given below. We deduce the function *divrt* by expressing the out-messages of Warden to Bob and back as a function of the out-messages of Alice to Warden and back (and, of course, the common input and choices of Warden):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{nativ}_A(r, y, x, o_B) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} g^r y \\ \varepsilon \\ r + x o_{B2} \end{pmatrix}, & \text{nativ}_B(\beta, o_A) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon \\ \beta \\ \varepsilon \end{pmatrix}, \\ \text{base}(y, x) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} y^{\frac{1}{2}} \varepsilon \\ \varepsilon \ 0 \\ -\frac{x}{2} \varepsilon \end{pmatrix}, & \text{join}(r, \beta, x) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\beta, r + \frac{x}{2}), \\ \text{divrt}((e, u), y, (o_A, o_B)) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} g^u y^e o_{A1}^{1-2e} & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & o_{B2} \oplus e \\ u + o_{A3}(1 - 2e) & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, we define the non-Abelian group $(\{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{Z}_q, \odot, (0, 0))$, where

$$(e_1, u_1) \odot (e_2, u_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (e_1 \oplus e_2, u_1(1 - 2e_2) + u_2).$$

Associativity of the operation \odot is not trivial yet immediate from the definition. The inverse of (e, u) is $(e, u(2e - 1))$. (Here, we make use of the fact that for all $q > 1$ the following equation holds: $e_1 + e_2 - 2e_1e_2 \pmod q = e_1 \oplus e_2$. So, the GROUND premise of Theorem 4 is immediately satisfied, and the other two premises are checked as follows:

DECOMPOSITION:

$$\begin{aligned} (\text{nativ}_A(r, y, x, o_B), \text{nativ}_B(\beta, o_A)) &= \begin{pmatrix} g^r y & \varepsilon \\ \varepsilon & \beta \\ r + x\beta & \varepsilon \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \text{divrt}(\text{join}(r, \beta, x), y, \text{base}(y, x)). \end{aligned}$$

MIXED ASSOCIATIVITY:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{divrt}((e_2, u_2), y, \text{divrt}((e_1, u_1), y, (o_A, o_B))) \\ &= \text{divrt}((e_2, u_2), y \begin{pmatrix} g^{u_1} y^{e_1} o_{A1}^{1-2e_1} & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & o_{B2} \oplus e_1 \\ u_1 + o_{A3}(1 - 2e_1) & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix}) \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} g^{u_2} y^{e_2} (g^{u_1} y^{e_1} o_{A1}^{1-2e_1})^{1-2e_2} & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & o_{B2} \oplus e_1 \oplus e_2 \\ u_2 + (u_1 + o_{A3}(1 - 2e_1))(1 - 2e_2) & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \begin{pmatrix} g^{u_1(1-2e_2)+u_2} y^{e_1 \oplus e_2} o_{A1}^{1-2(e_1 \oplus e_2)} & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & o_{B2} \oplus e_1 \oplus e_2 \\ u_1(1-2e_2) + u_2 + o_{A3}(1-2(e_1 \oplus e_2)) & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix} \\
&= \text{divrt}((e_1 \oplus e_2, u_1(1-2e_2) + u_2), y, (o_A, o_B)) \\
&= \text{divrt}((e_1, u_1) \odot (e_2, u_2), y, (o_A, o_B)).
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, the claim follows from Theorem 4. \square

3.2 Modified El-Gamal Signature

The blind version of a modified El-Gamal signature protocol according to Horster, Michels and Petersen [HMP95] is restated in Figure 2. Here, both the signer and the recipient have a private input, namely her private signing key x and his message m to be signed, respectively. The common input is the public verification key $y = g^x \bmod p$.

| $([a', b']^B) \leftarrow \text{DMEG}([y, x]^A, [\cdot]^W, [y, m]^B)$ | | | |
|--|---|--|---|
| | Alice | Warden | Bob |
| (1) | $\alpha \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ | $\omega \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*, \phi \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ | |
| (2) | $a \leftarrow g^\alpha$ | | |
| (3) | \xrightarrow{a} | $a' \leftarrow a^\omega g^\phi$ | |
| (4) | | | $\xrightarrow{a'} c' \leftarrow h(m, a')$ |
| (5) | | $c \leftarrow \frac{\omega a}{a'} c' \bmod q$ | $\xleftarrow{c'}$ |
| (6) | $b \leftarrow ax + \alpha c \xleftarrow{c}$ | | |
| (7) | \xrightarrow{b} | $b' \leftarrow \frac{a'}{a} b + c' \phi$ | |
| | | proceed iff $g^b \stackrel{?}{=} y^a a^c$ | |
| (8) | | | $\xrightarrow{b'} \text{accept iff } g^{b'} \stackrel{?}{=} y^{a'} a'^{c'}$ |

Fig. 2. Diverted Modified El-Gamal Signature

Proof. The hash function h applied in step 4 is assumed to be pseudo-random. Since it is also used by verifiers of these signatures, we assume there is no other way for Bob to choose his challenge c' than as in step 4. Adopting the random oracle assumption as a model for h , we consider the idealized protocol DMEG^* , where Bob chooses the challenge $c' = \beta \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ uniformly at random. This idealized protocol takes no private input m for Bob, and so we end up with the same simple input relation as in Section 3.1.

Proposition 6. *The Warden of protocol DMEG^* perfectly diverts the underlying 2-party protocol of Alice and Bob over $R = \{(y, x) \mid y = g^x \bmod p\}$. \diamond*

Below we give the native functions of Alice, Bob and Warden for $DMEG^*$ and the injective functions $join$ and $base$. We deduce the function $divrt$ analogously as in Section 3.1.

$$\begin{aligned} nativ_A(\alpha, x, o_B) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} g^\alpha \\ \varepsilon \\ g^\alpha x + \alpha o_{B2} \end{pmatrix}, & nativ_B(\beta) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon \\ \beta \\ \varepsilon \end{pmatrix}, \\ base(x) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \ \varepsilon \\ \varepsilon \ 1 \\ x \ \varepsilon \end{pmatrix}, & join(\alpha, \beta) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\beta^{-1} g^\alpha, \alpha), \\ divrt((\omega, \phi), (o_A, o_B)) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{pmatrix} o_{A1}^\omega g^\phi & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & \frac{1}{\omega} o_{B2} o_{A1}^{\omega-1} g^\phi \\ (o_{A3} + \frac{\phi}{\omega} o_{B2}) o_{A1}^{\omega-1} g^\phi & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, we define the non-Abelian group $(\mathbb{Z}_q^* \times \mathbb{Z}_q, \odot, (1, 0))$, where

$$(\omega_1, \phi_1) \odot (\omega_2, \phi_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\omega_1 \omega_2, \phi_1 \omega_2 + \phi_2).$$

Associativity of operation \odot is again immediate from the definition, and the inverses are as follows: $(\omega, \phi)^{-1} = (\omega^{-1}, -\phi \omega^{-1})$. Now, the GROUND premise of Theorem 4 is immediately satisfied, and the other two premises are checked as follows:

DECOMPOSITION:

$$(nativ_A(\alpha, x, o_B), nativ_B(\beta)) = \begin{pmatrix} g^\alpha & \varepsilon \\ \varepsilon & \beta \\ g^\alpha x + \alpha \beta & \varepsilon \end{pmatrix} = divrt(join(\alpha, \beta), base(x))$$

MIXED ASSOCIATIVITY:

$$\begin{aligned} &divrt((\omega_2, \phi_2), divrt((\omega_1, \phi_1), (o_A, o_B))) \\ &= divrt((\omega_2, \phi_2), \begin{pmatrix} o_{A1}^{\omega_1} g^{\phi_1} & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & \frac{1}{\omega_1} o_{B2} o_{A1}^{\omega_1-1} g^{\phi_1} \\ (o_{A3} + \frac{\phi_1}{\omega_1} o_{B2}) o_{A1}^{\omega_1-1} g^{\phi_1} & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix}) \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} (o_{A1}^{\omega_1} g^{\phi_1})^{\omega_2} g^{\phi_2} & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & \frac{1}{\omega_2} (\frac{1}{\omega_1} o_{B2} o_{A1}^{\omega_1-1} g^{\phi_1}) \\ \left((o_{A3} + \frac{\phi_1}{\omega_1} o_{B2}) o_{A1}^{\omega_1-1} g^{\phi_1} \right) (o_{A1}^{\omega_1} g^{\phi_1})^{\omega_2-1} g^{\phi_2} & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix} \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} o_{A1}^{\omega_1 \omega_2} g^{\phi_1 \omega_2 + \phi_2} & o_{B1} \\ o_{A2} & \frac{1}{\omega_1 \omega_2} o_{B2} o_{A1}^{\omega_1 \omega_2 - 1} g^{\phi_1 \omega_2 + \phi_2} \\ (o_{A3} + (\frac{\phi_1}{\omega_1} + \frac{\phi_2}{\omega_1 \omega_2} o_{B2}) o_{A1}^{\omega_1 \omega_2 - 1} g^{\phi_1 \omega_2 + \phi_2}) & o_{B3} \end{pmatrix} \\ &= divrt((\omega_1 \omega_2, \phi_1 \omega_2 + \phi_2), (o_A, o_B)) \\ &= divrt((\omega_1, \phi_1) \odot (\omega_2, \phi_2), (o_A, o_B)). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the claim follows from Theorem 4. \square

4 Diverting Other Sorts of Cryptographic Protocols

Next, we look at two other sorts of cryptographic protocols, namely encryption and key exchange and discuss their divertibility.

4.1 Encryption

In principle, we would not expect that encryption protocols could be divertible, be it perfectly or computationally. The very reason is that the secrecy property of any encryption protocol implies that any diverted encryption protocol establishes a (large) subliminal channel through the warden. This observation suggests that for encryption protocols extensibility and indistinguishability are not achievable at the same time.

Theorem 7. *Let $[m']^B \leftarrow P([y, m]^A, [y, x]^B)$ be a symmetric or asymmetric encryption protocol with common input an encryption key y , Alice's private input a plaintext m , Bob's input the decryption key x and Bob's output the message m' . Let R denote the family of relations $R_\pi \subseteq Y_\pi \times X_\pi \times M_\pi$ between private and public inputs. If P is symmetric, then the encryption and decryption keys coincide ($x = y$) and are both private, otherwise, x is Bob's private input. No such protocol P can be diverted over R , neither perfectly nor computationally.* \diamond

Proof. It follows from EXTENSIBILITY (Def. 3) that any warden who takes out-messages from Alice on input y and a message m produces out-messages that may have resulted from Alice directly while she used inputs y and m . Therefore, no warden can produce an out-message that carries another plaintexts than the in-message he receives. It is now crucial to see that for a given common input y , the input relation does not restrict Alice in choosing her input component m . This inherent freedom in any encryption protocol allows a dishonest Alice \tilde{A} to violate Indistinguishability in Def. 3. In particular, A can choose different inputs $x_{A1} = (y, m_1)$ and $x_{A2} = (y, m_2)$ in the two protocols $\langle \tilde{A}, W, \tilde{B} \rangle$ and $\langle \tilde{A}, B \rangle$, respectively. The existence of a polynomial-time decryption method then assures that the probability distributions of the resulting views are not only different but distinguishable in polynomial time. \square

Obviously, this impossibility result carries over to any class of protocols where either Alice or Bob has a “free choice” in her or his private input and there is a polynomial-time algorithm for the other to recognize which input component she or he used.

4.2 Key Exchange

We propose diverted Diffie-Hellman key-exchange [DH76] in Figure 3. In general, the participants of a key exchange protocol may take private input, but they certainly do not take common input (it is the purpose of key exchange to establish this in the first place). In our example, neither Alice nor Bob take input at all.




Fig. 3. Diverted Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Proposition 8. *The warden of protocol DDH computationally diverts the Diffie-Hellman protocol between Alice and Bob over $R = \emptyset$.* \diamond

Proof (Sketch). If for given (a, b) , an attacker could distinguish valid from invalid diverted out-messages (a', b') with non-negligible probability, i.e., probability $\geq \frac{1}{P(k)}$ for some polynomial P , then he had broken the simultaneous discrete log assumption [CEG88]. \square

5 Conclusions and Open Questions

We have introduced the notion of perfect and computational protocol divertibility, and have given a sufficient criterion for the former. All diverted protocols we have found in the literature (see Appendix 7.2) turned out to satisfy this criterion. The first example of a diverted key distribution protocol was given. This is also the first computationally divertible protocol we know of. Interesting open questions remain: (i) Is the divertibility criterion necessary? (ii) Is there an analogous criterion for computational divertibility? (iii) Are there (at least computationally) diverted protocols whose diverting function is significantly less complex than one of the native functions? (iv) Are there applications for diverted key-exchange or other sorts of cryptographic protocols?

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7 Appendix

7.1 Why the Previous Definition of Divertibility is a Little too Weak

The previous definition of divertibility by Okamoto and Ohta [OO90], and by Itoh et al [ISS91] as well, requires that two attackers \tilde{A}, \tilde{B} who on the one

hand form a linear 3-party protocol P' with an intermediate Warden and on the other hand form 2-party protocols $P_{\tilde{A}}$ with an honest B and $P_{\tilde{B}}$ with an honest A cannot distinguish their views in $\langle \tilde{A}, B \rangle$ and $\langle A, \tilde{B} \rangle$ from those in *separate* instances of $\langle \tilde{A}, W, \tilde{B} \rangle$. More formally, they require indistinguishability of the two ensembles (protocol inputs exactly as in Definition 3) before:

$$(\text{view}_W^{(\tilde{A})} \langle \tilde{A}, W, \tilde{B} \rangle, \text{view}_W^{(\tilde{B})} \langle \tilde{A}, W, \tilde{B} \rangle) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{and } (\text{view}_B^{(\tilde{A})} \langle \tilde{A}, B \rangle, \text{view}_A^{(\tilde{B})} \langle A, \tilde{B} \rangle). \quad (2)$$

However, the attacker model that seems to underly the literature on divertibility is stronger than expressed by the above requirement. The attackers A and B are considered to know when they engage in a protocol with the Warden and so they know which of their views result from the same protocol instances.

A good example to illustrate this difference is protocol *DDH* in Section 4.2. The two ensembles according to (1) and (2) above are equal and thus protocol *DDH* would have to be regarded as perfectly diverted. This is counterintuitive because the warden in *DDH* uses less random coins than Alice and Bob together. On the other hand, according to Definition 3, *DDH* is only computationally diverted, which is the most we would expect.

7.2 More Known Examples

In the following, we list more known examples of perfectly diverted protocols from the cryptographic literature. All of them satisfy the divertibility criterion in Theorem 4, but due to the page limit we do not unfold them completely. We only show how the group must be chosen in order to apply the divertibility criterion. We use precisely the variable names from the original presentations. Where present, $k \in \mathbb{N}$ denotes some global system parameter—not the security parameter.

A simple early example of a perfectly diverted signature protocol was presented by Chaum [C85]. The group can be chosen to be $(\mathbb{Z}_N^*, 1)$, where $N = pq$ is some RSA modulus.

Also well before the formal definition of divertibility [OO90] appeared, Desmedt, Goutier and Bengio [DGB88] suggested a perfectly diverted interactive proof of knowledge of square roots modulo a composite $N = pq$, where the prime factors p, q are known only to the prover (Fiat-Shamir identification protocol). They provided no proof of divertibility, but the criterion applies if the group is chosen as follows: $(\{0, 1\}^k, \mathbb{Z}_n, \odot, (0, 1))$, where $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and:

$$(\mathbf{f}_1, r_1) \odot (\mathbf{f}_2, r_2) = (\mathbf{f}_1 \oplus \mathbf{f}_2, r_1 r_2 \prod_{i=1}^k y_i^{-f_{1i} f_{2i}}),$$

In her thesis [C94], Sect. 3.4.1, Chen showed an alternative and slightly more flexible way of diverting the protocol of Okamoto and Ohta (Section 3.1). The divertibility criterion applies to her protocol as well.

In [B93], Sect.16.1, Brands gave a diverted interactive proof of knowledge of discrete representations, which built on previous work of Chaum, Evertse, van de

Graaf [CEG88]. For a given tuple of generators (g_1, \dots, g_k) and a residue $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the prover demonstrates knowledge of a discrete representation (x_1, \dots, x_k) of $y = \prod_{i=1}^k g_i^{x_i}$. We can choose the following non-commutative group: $(G_q^k \times G_q^k \times \mathbb{Z}_q, \odot, (0, 0, 0))$, where the operation is:

$$(\mathbf{x}'_1, \mathbf{w}_1, d_1) \odot (\mathbf{x}'_2, \mathbf{w}_2, d_2) = (\mathbf{x}'_1 + \mathbf{x}'_2, \mathbf{w}_1 + \mathbf{w}_2 + d_2 \mathbf{x}'_1, d_1 + d_2) .$$

In [B93,B94], Brands has also proposed a (restrictive) blind signature protocol for an untraceable electronic coin system. The only difference between the signature protocols is that in [B93], Sect. 11.2, the message is taken to be $m = Id$, whereas in [B94] it is $m = Ig_2$, where I is the account holder's identity and d, g_2 are global constants. Here, we can choose the non-commutative group $(\mathbb{Z}_q^{*2} \times \mathbb{Z}_q, \odot, (0, 1, 0))$ with

$$(s_1, u_1, v_1) \odot (s_2, u_2, v_2) = (s_1 s_2, u_1 u_2, v_1 u_2 + v_2) .$$