

On the Analysis of Cryptographic Assumptions in the Generic Ring Model

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Abstract

The generic ring model considers algorithms that operate on elements of an algebraic ring by performing only the ring operations and without exploiting properties of a given representation of ring elements. It is used to analyze the hardness of computational problems defined over rings. For instance, it is known that breaking RSA is equivalent to factoring in the generic ring model (Aggarwal and Maurer, Eurocrypt 2009). Do hardness results in the generic ring model support the conjecture that solving the considered problem is also hard in the standard model, where elements of \mathbb{Z}_n are represented by integers modulo n ?

We prove in the generic ring model that computing the Jacobi symbol of an integer modulo n is equivalent to factoring. Since there are simple and efficient non-generic algorithms which compute the Jacobi symbol, this provides an example of a natural computational problem which is hard in the generic ring model, but easy to solve if elements of \mathbb{Z}_n are given in their standard representation as integers. Thus, a proof in the generic ring model is unfortunately not a very strong indicator for the hardness of a computational problem in the standard model.

Despite this negative result, generic hardness results still provide a lower complexity bound for a large class of algorithms, namely all algorithms solving a computational problem independent of a given representation of ring elements. Thus, from this point of view results in the generic ring model are still interesting. Motivated by this fact, we show also that solving the quadratic residuosity problem generically is equivalent to factoring.

Keywords: Generic ring model, Jacobi symbol, subset membership problems, idealized models of computation, quadratic residuosity assumption.

1 Introduction

The security of many cryptosystems relies on assumptions that certain computational problems, mostly from number theory and algebra, are intractable. Therefore it is important to study the validity of these assumptions. Ideally, we would like to show that these assumptions hold in the *standard model*, where algorithms intending to solve a computational problem are modeled as Turing machines with reasonably restricted running time. Unfortunately, proving useful lower complexity bounds in the standard model seems to be impossible with currently available techniques.

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However, many important hardness assumptions are based on computational problems defined over algebraic groups. Famous examples are, for instance, the discrete logarithm problem [12], the RSA problem [21], or the quadratic residuosity problem [14]. A natural approach to analyze these assumptions is to consider algorithms solving a given problem by performing only the abstractly defined group operations, without exploiting specific properties of the representation of group elements. This model is known as the *generic group model* (see [24, 17], for instance).

Indeed, there are group representations, such as for instance certain elliptic curve groups, for which only very few properties beyond the abstractly defined properties of a group are known. For such representations, the generic group model may be seen as a reasonable abstraction. However, important computational problems, such as the RSA problem and the quadratic residuosity problem, are defined over the multiplicative group (\mathbb{Z}_n^*, \cdot) , represented by integers modulo n . This representation exhibits many properties beyond the abstract group definition, such as for instance the fact that the group (\mathbb{Z}_n^*, \cdot) is embedded into the ring $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +, \cdot)$. The generic group model seems too restrictive to provide a tool for a meaningful analysis of such problems.

To reflect the additional algebraic structure of a ring, the notion of generic groups was extended to generic *rings*. A long line of research [6, 7, 8, 16, 18, 3, 1, 2] analyzes cryptographically relevant computational problems and their relationships in the *generic ring model*. This model is a simple extension of the generic group model, which allows to compute an additional algebraic operation, such that the resulting structure forms a ring. Clearly, when considering hardness assumptions defined over rings, then this idealization is much more appropriate than the generic group model.

The RSA problem was studied extensively in the generic ring model [7, 8, 16, 1, 2]. For instance, Aggarwal and Maurer [1] have shown that solving the RSA problem with generic ring algorithms is equivalent to factoring integers. A common conclusion drawn in previous works is that a proof in the generic model supports the conjecture that breaking RSA is also equivalent to factoring integers in a standard model of computation. Is this conclusion reasonable?

1.1 Main Contribution

We prove a main theorem stating that solving certain subset membership problems in \mathbb{Z}_n with generic ring algorithms is equivalent to factoring n . This main theorem allows us to provide an example of a computational problem of high cryptographic relevance which is equivalent to factoring in the generic model, but easy to solve if elements of \mathbb{Z}_n are given in their standard representation as integers. Concretely, we show that in the generic ring model computing the *Jacobi symbol* [26, Chapter 12.2] is equivalent to factoring.

A preliminary version of this paper was published at Asiacrypt 2009 [15]. This version contains several improvements and corrections as well as much simpler and thus more comprehensible proofs.

1.2 Interpretation

For many common idealized models in cryptography it has been shown that a cryptographic reduction in the ideal model need not guarantee security in the “real world”. Well-known examples are, for instance, the random oracle model [9], the ideal cipher model [4], and the generic group model [13, 11]. All these results have in common that they provide somewhat “artificial” computational problems that deviate from standard cryptographic practice.

Note that both the definition and the algebraic properties of the Jacobi symbol are remarkably similar to the *quadratic residuosity problem* [14], which builds the foundation of numerous cryptosys-

tems and is widely conjectured to be hard. Thus, in contrast to previous works, the equivalence of computing the Jacobi symbol generically and factoring is an example of a *natural* computational problem that is provably hard in the generic model, but easy to solve if elements of \mathbb{Z}_n are given in their standard representation as integers modulo n . This is an important aspect for interpreting results in the generic ring model, like [8, 16, 1, 2]. Thus, a proof in the generic model is unfortunately not a very strong indicator that the considered problem is indeed useful for cryptographic applications.

As another application of our main theorem, we also show that solving the well-known *quadratic residuosity problem* [14] generically is equivalent to factoring. Thus, from a cryptanalytic point of view, we cannot hope to find a representation-independent algorithm solving this problem efficiently, unless factoring integers is easy.

1.3 Related Work

Previous work on fundamental cryptographic assumptions in the generic model considered primarily discrete logarithm-based problems and the RSA problem. Nechaev [20] provided a lower complexity bound on solving the discrete logarithm problem generically. This work was extended by Shoup [24] to a broader and more natural class of algorithms. Starting with Shoup’s seminal paper, it was proven that solving the discrete logarithm problem, the Diffie-Hellman problem, and related problems [19, 17, 22] is hard with respect to generic *group* algorithms. Damgård and Koprowski showed the generic intractability of root extraction in groups of hidden order [10].

Brown [8] reduced the problem of factoring integers to solving the *low-exponent* RSA problem with *straight line programs*, which are a subclass of generic ring algorithms. Leander and Rupp [16] augmented this result to generic ring algorithms, where the considered algorithms may only perform the operations addition, subtraction and multiplication modulo n , but not multiplicative inversions. Aggarwal and Maurer [1] generalized this result to full RSA and to generic ring algorithms that may also compute multiplicative inverses, and Aggarwal, Maurer, and Shparlinski [2] extended it further to the strong RSA problem. Boneh and Venkatesan [7] have shown that there is no straight line program reducing integer factorization to the low-exponent RSA problem, unless factoring integers is easy.

The notion of generic ring algorithms has also been applied to study the relationship between the discrete logarithm and the Diffie-Hellman problem, and the existence of ring-homomorphic one-way permutations [6, 18, 3].

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

For $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ we write $[\ell]$ to denote the set $[\ell] = \{1, \dots, \ell\}$. We denote with $a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} A$ the action of sampling a uniformly random element a from set A . Throughout the paper we let n be the product of at least two different primes, and denote with $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$ the prime factor decomposition of n such that $\gcd(p_i, p_j) = 1$ for $i \neq j$.

Let $P = (S_1, \dots, S_m)$ be a finite sequence. Then $|P|$ denotes its length, i.e., $|P| = m$. For $k \leq m$, we write $P_k \sqsubseteq P$ to denote that P_k is the subsequence of P that consists of the *first* k elements of P , i.e., $P_k = (S_1, \dots, S_k)$.

2.2 Straight Line Programs

A straight line program P over a ring R is an algorithm performing a fixed sequence of ring operations to its input $x \in R$, without branching or looping, that outputs an element $P(x) \in R$.

In the sequel we are interested in straight line programs over the particular ring $R = \mathbb{Z}_n$, where elements are represented by integers. Note that we can not only compute the ring operations addition, subtraction, and multiplication in the ring \mathbb{Z}_n , but we also know how to compute *division*, that is, multiplication by multiplicative inverses (if existent), efficiently. In order to make the class of considered algorithms as broad and natural as possible, we therefore include an explicit division operation, though it is generally not explicitly defined for a ring.

The following definition is a simple adaption of [8, Definition 1] to straight line programs that may also compute multiplicative inverses. For our purposes it is sufficient to consider straight-line programs that take as input a *single* ring element $x \in R$, a generalization to algorithms with more input values is straightforward.

Definition 1 (Straight Line Programs). A *straight line program* P of length m over R is a sequence of tuples

$$P = ((i_1, j_1, \circ_1), \dots, (i_m, j_m, \circ_m))$$

where $i_k, j_k \in \{-1, \dots, m\}$ and $\circ_k \in \{+, -, \cdot, /\}$ for $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$. The output $P(x)$ of straight line program P on input $x \in R$ is computed as follows.

1. Initialize $L_{-1} := 1 \in R$ and $L_0 := x$.
2. For k from 1 to m do:
 - if $\circ_k = /$ and L_{j_k} is not invertible, then return \perp ,
 - else set $L_k := L_{i_k} \circ L_{j_k}$.
3. Return $P(x) = L_m$.

We say that each triple $(i, j, \circ) \in P$ is a *SLP-step*.

For notational convenience, for a given straight line program P we will denote with P_k the straight line program given by the sequence of the first k elements of P , with the additional convention that $P_{-1}(x) = 1$ and $P_0(x) = x$ for all $x \in R$.

2.3 Generic Ring Algorithms

Similar to straight line programs, generic ring algorithms apply a sequence of ring operations to an input value $x \in R$. In contrast to straight line programs, which perform the same fixed sequence on ring operations to any input value, generic ring algorithms can decide adaptively which ring operation is performed next. The decision is made either based on equality checks or on coin tosses. Moreover, the output of generic ring algorithms is not restricted to ring elements.

We formalize the notion of generic ring algorithms in terms of a game between an algorithm \mathcal{A} and a black-box \mathcal{O} , the *generic ring oracle*. The generic ring oracle receives as input a secret value $x \in R$. It maintains a sequence P , which is set to the empty sequence at the beginning of the game. The oracle implements two internal subroutines `test()` and `equal()`.

- The `test()`-procedure takes a tuple $(j, \circ) \in \{-1, \dots, |P|\} \times \{+, -, \cdot, /\}$ as input. The procedure returns `false` if $\circ = /$ and $P_j(x)$ is not invertible, and `true` otherwise.
- The `equal()`-procedure takes a tuple $(i, j) \in \{-1, \dots, |P|\} \times \{-1, \dots, |P|\}$ as input. The procedure returns `true` if $P_i(x) = P_j(x)$ and `false` otherwise.

Recall here that we have defined $P_{-1}(x) = 1$ and $P_0(x) = x$.

In order to interact with the oracle, the algorithm may ask two types of queries.

- To apply the ring operations to ring elements, the algorithm makes a query of the form

$$(i, j, \circ) \in \{-1, \dots, |P|\} \times \{-1, \dots, |P|\} \times \{+, -, \cdot, /\}$$

to \mathcal{O} . This query is processed as follows. The oracle runs `test(j, \circ)`. If `test(j, \circ) = false`, the oracle returns the error symbol \perp . Otherwise (i, j, \circ) is appended to P .

- To check for equality of computed elements, the algorithm submits a query of the form

$$(i, j) \in \{-1, \dots, |P|\} \times \{-1, \dots, |P|\}.$$

In this case the oracle returns `equal(i, j)`.

We measure the complexity of \mathcal{A} by the number of oracle queries.

2.4 On Adopting Proving Techniques from the Generic Group Model

The generic ring model (GRM) is an extension of the generic group model (GGM), see [24], for instance. Despite many similarities, showing the hardness of computational problems in the GRM seems to be more involved than standard proofs in the GGM. The reason is that a typical proof in the GGM (cf. [24, 17, 16], for instance) introduces a simulation game where group elements are replaced with polynomials that are (implicitly) evaluated with group elements corresponding to a given problem instance. A key argument in these proofs is that, by construction of the simulator, the degree of these polynomials cannot exceed a certain small bound (often degree one or two). Following Shoup's work [24], a lower bound on the success probability of any generic group algorithm for the given problem is then derived by bounding the number of roots of these polynomials by applying the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma [27, 23]. Usually the bound is useful if the number of roots is sufficiently small. Rupp et al. [22] have even been able to describe sufficient conditions for the generic hardness of discrete log type problems, that essentially make sure that there is no possibility to compute polynomials with "too large" degree.

This technique could be adopted to the generic ring model, by observing that straight line programs are algorithms which compute *rational functions*, which in turn can be represented by tuples of polynomials (as done in [?, 1], for instance). However, here we face a problem. In the GGM the number of roots of polynomials is kept small by performing only addition operations on polynomials of small degree in the simulation game (sometimes also a small bounded number of multiplications, for instance when the model is extended to groups with bilinear pairing map, as done in [5]). However, in the generic ring model we explicitly allow for multiplication operations, and we do not want to put a restriction on the number of allowed multiplications, in order to keep the model as realistic as possible. Thus, by repeated squaring an algorithm may compute polynomials of exponential degree. In this case applying the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma does not yield a useful bound on the number of roots.

2.5 Uniform Closure

By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, for $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$ the ring \mathbb{Z}_n is isomorphic to the direct product of rings $\mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{e_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_\ell^{e_\ell}}$. Let ψ be the isomorphism $\mathbb{Z}_{p_1^{e_1}} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_\ell^{e_\ell}} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$, and for $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ let $\mathcal{C}_i := \{x \bmod p_i^{e_i} : x \in \mathcal{C}\}$ for $i \in [\ell]$.

Definition 2. We say that $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ is the *uniform closure* of $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$, if

$$\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] = \{y \in \mathbb{Z}_n : y = \psi(x_1 \dots, x_\ell), x_i \in \mathcal{C}_i \text{ for } i \in [\ell]\}.$$

Example 1. Let p_1, p_2 be different primes, $n := p_1 p_2$, and ψ be the isomorphism $\mathbb{Z}_{p_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$. For $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ let $x_1 := x \bmod p_1$ and $x_2 := x \bmod p_2$. Consider the subset $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that

$$\mathcal{C} = \{a, b\} = \{\psi(a_1, a_2), \psi(b_1, b_2)\}.$$

The uniform closure $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ of \mathcal{C} is the set

$$\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] = \{\psi(a_1, a_2), \psi(b_1, b_2), \psi(a_1, b_2), \psi(a_1, b_2)\}.$$

In particular note that $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$, but not necessarily $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] \subseteq \mathcal{C}$.

Lemma 1. *Sampling $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ is equivalent to sampling $z_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C}_i$ for $i \in [\ell]$ independently and setting $y = \psi(z_1, \dots, z_\ell)$.*

The above follows directly from the definition of $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.

2.6 Homogeneous Sets

Definition 3. We say that a set $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ is *homogeneous*, if for each $i \in [\ell]$ and for each $c \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_i^{e_i}}$ we have that

$$\Pr[x \equiv c \bmod p_i^{e_i} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C}] = \Pr[y \equiv c \bmod p_i^{e_i} : y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]].$$

Putting it differently, \mathcal{C} is homogeneous, if for each $i \in [\ell]$ and for $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C}$ and $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ we have that $x \bmod p_i^{e_i}$ is identically distributed to $y \bmod p_i^{e_i}$.

Example 2. Again let p_1, p_2 be different primes, $n := p_1 p_2$, ψ be the isomorphism $\mathbb{Z}_{p_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$, and for $c \in \{a, b\} \subset \mathbb{Z}_n$ let $c_1 := c \bmod p_1$ and $c_2 := c \bmod p_2$.

- Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\psi(a_1, a_2), \psi(a_1, b_2), \psi(b_1, b_2), \psi(b_1, a_2)\}$, then $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. Clearly $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ implies that \mathcal{C} is homogeneous.
- Let $\mathcal{C}' = \{\psi(a_1, a_2), \psi(a_1, b_2), \psi(b_1, b_2)\}$, then we have $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}'] = \mathcal{C}$. Note that it holds that

$$\Pr[x \equiv a_1 \bmod p_1 : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C}'] = 2/3 \neq 1/2 = \Pr[x \equiv a_1 \bmod p_1 : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}']].$$

Thus, \mathcal{C}' is not homogeneous.

- Let $\mathcal{C}'' = \{\psi(a_1, a_2), \psi(b_1, b_2)\}$, then again we have $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}''] = \mathcal{C}$. \mathcal{C}'' is homogeneous, since we have

$$\Pr[x \equiv c_i \bmod p_i : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C}''] = 1/2 = \Pr[x \equiv c_i \bmod p_i : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}''']]$$

for all $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $c_i \in \{a_i, b_i\}$.

3 Some Lemmas on Straight Line Programs over \mathbb{Z}_n

In the following we will state some lemmas on straight line programs over \mathbb{Z}_n that will be useful for the proof of our main theorem.

Lemma 2. *Suppose there exists a straight line program P such that for $x, x' \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ we have that $P(x') \neq \perp$ and $P(x) = \perp$. Then there exists $P_j \subseteq P$ such that $P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.*

Proof. $P(x) = \perp$ means that there exists a SLP-step $(i, j, \circ) \in P$ such that $\circ = /$ and $L_j = P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. However, $P(x')$ does not evaluate to \perp , thus it must hold that $P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. \square

The following lemma provides a lower bound on the probability of factoring n by evaluating a straight line program P with a random value $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ and computing $\gcd(n, P(y))$, relative to the probability that $P(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ for randomly chosen $x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$.

Lemma 3. *Let $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$ with $\ell \geq 2$, and let $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ be homogeneous. For any straight line program P , $x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$, and $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ holds that*

$$\Pr [P(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*] \leq \Pr [\gcd(n, P(y)) \notin \{1, n\}].$$

Similar to the above, the following lemma provides a lower bound on the probability of factoring n by computing $\gcd(n, P(y) - Q(y))$ with $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ for two given straight line programs P and Q , relative to the probability that $P(x) \equiv_n Q(x)$ and $P(x') \not\equiv_n Q(x')$ for random $x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$.

Lemma 4. *Let $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$ with $\ell \geq 2$, and let $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ be homogeneous. For any pair (P, Q) of straight line programs, $x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$, and $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ holds that*

$$\Pr [P(x) \equiv_n Q(x) \text{ and } P(x') \not\equiv_n Q(x')] \leq \Pr [\gcd(n, P(y) - Q(y)) \notin \{1, n\}].$$

Before giving proofs for Lemmas 3 and 4, we will give some intuition in the following section.

3.1 Some Intuition for Lemma 3 and 4

Simplifying a little, Lemma 3 and 4 state *essentially* that: if we are given a straight line program mapping “many” inputs to zero and “many” inputs to a non-zero value, then we can find a factor of n by sampling $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ and computing $\gcd(n, P(y))$.¹ At a first glance this seems counterintuitive.

As an example let us consider the case $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_n$ with $n = p_1 p_2$, where p_1 and p_2 are not necessarily prime, but $p_1, p_2 > 1$ and $\gcd(p_1, p_2) = 1$. Note that we have $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] = \mathbb{Z}_n$. Assume a straight line program P mapping about one half of the elements of \mathbb{Z}_n to 0, and the other half to 1. Then P maps “many” inputs to zero and “many” inputs to a non-zero value, but clearly computing $\gcd(n, P(y))$ for any $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ yields only trivial factors of n . This seems to be a counterexample to Lemma 3 and 4. However, in fact it is not, since there exists no straight line program P satisfying the assumed property, if n is the product of at least two different primes.

¹In case of Lemma 3 note that $P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $P(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ means that $P(x')$ is zero modulo *at least one* prime factor of n , while $P(x) \not\equiv 0$ modulo *all* prime factors of n . In case of Lemma 4 observe that if we have $P(x) - Q(x) \equiv 0 \pmod n$ and $P(x') - Q(x') \not\equiv 0 \pmod n$, then x is mapped to zero and x' is not mapped to zero by the straight line program $S(x) := P(x) - Q(x)$.

The reason for this is a consequence of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which states that the ring \mathbb{Z}_n is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}_{p_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}$. Let $\psi : \mathbb{Z}_{p_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$ denote this isomorphism. Assume $x, x' \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and a straight line program P such that $P(x) \equiv 0 \pmod n$ and $P(x') \equiv 1 \pmod n$. Since ψ is a ring-isomorphism and P performs only ring operations, it holds that

$$P(x) = \psi(P(x) \bmod p_1, P(x) \bmod p_2) = \psi(0, 0)$$

and

$$P(x') = \psi(P(x') \bmod p_1, P(x') \bmod p_2) = \psi(1, 1).$$

The crucial observation is now that for each pair $(x, x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^2$, there exist $c, d \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that $c = \psi(x' \bmod p_1, x \bmod p_2)$ and $d = \psi(x \bmod p_1, x' \bmod p_2)$. Evaluating P with c or d yields

$$P(c) = \psi(P(x') \bmod p_1, P(x) \bmod p_2) = \psi(1, 0)$$

or

$$P(d) = \psi(P(x) \bmod p_1, P(x') \bmod p_2) = \psi(0, 1).$$

We therefore have $\gcd(n, P(c)) = p_2$ and $\gcd(n, P(d)) = p_1$.

In this example we have $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] = \mathbb{Z}_n$, and we assume that P has the property that $P(x) = \psi(0, 0)$ and $P(x') = \psi(1, 1)$ with “high” probability for *uniformly random* $x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_n$. The crucial observation is now that the Chinese Remainder Theorem implies that if we sample $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_n$ uniformly random, then we also have with “high” probability that $P(y) = \psi(0, 1)$ or $P(y) = \psi(1, 0)$. A factor of n can therefore be found by sampling y and computing $\gcd(n, P(y))$.

Generalizing this idea to subsets $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathbb{Z}_n$. The proofs of Lemma 3 and 4 generalize the above idea to the case where \mathcal{C} is a *subset* of \mathbb{Z}_n . This generalization made it necessary to define the *uniform closure* $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ and *homogeneous sets*.

For instance, consider a subset $\mathcal{C} = \{x, x'\}$ with $x = \psi(x_p, x_q)$ and $x' = \psi(x'_p, x'_q)$. Suppose we are given a straight line program P such that $P(x) = 0$ and $P(x') = 1$. We can factor n using this straight line program by computing $\gcd(n, P(y))$, if we can find a suitable y such that $y \in \{\psi(x_p, x'_q), \psi(x'_p, x_q)\}$.

The uniform closure $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ is defined such that we know that it contains such a suitable $y \in \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. Moreover, as we show in the proofs of Lemma 3 and 4, if \mathcal{C} is homogeneous, then we can find a suitable y with sufficiently high probability simply by sampling $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ uniformly random.

Finally, in order to obtain an *efficient* factoring algorithm, we will need to require that there exist efficient sampling algorithms for \mathcal{C} and $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. We will have to show this separately for each considered subset membership problem.

3.2 Proof of Lemma 3

First, observe that $P(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ implies, that there exists at least one $i \in [\ell]$ such that $P(x') \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i}$, while $P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ implies that $P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*$ for all $j \in [\ell]$. Thus, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[P(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } P(x') \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^* \text{ for all } j \in [\ell]] \\ &\leq \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(x') \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*]. \end{aligned}$$

Note furthermore that we have $P(x) \equiv P(x \bmod p_i^{e_i}) \pmod{p_i}$, since P performs only ring operations. Thus we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(x') \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(x'_i) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(x_j) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*], \end{aligned}$$

where $x'_i := x' \bmod p_i^{e_i}$ and $x_j := x \bmod p_j^{e_j}$.

Since \mathcal{C} is homogeneous, we have that sampling $x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C}$ and computing $x'_i = x' \bmod p_i^{e_i}$ and $x_j = x \bmod p_j^{e_j}$ is equivalent to sampling $z, z' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ and setting $z'_i := z' \bmod p_i^{e_i}$ and $z_j := z \bmod p_j^{e_j}$. Thus we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(x'_i) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(x_j) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(z'_i) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(z_j) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*] \end{aligned}$$

for $z, z' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$.

Now Lemma 1 states that for $z, z', y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(z'_i) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(z_j) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(y_i) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(y_j) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*], \end{aligned}$$

where $y_i = y \bmod p_i^{e_i}$ and $y_j = y \bmod p_j^{e_j}$.

Using again that P performs only ring operations, we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(y_i) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(y_j) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(y) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(y) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*]. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, we find a factor of n by computing $\gcd(n, P(y))$ if there exists $i, j \in [\ell]$ such that $P(y) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i}$ and $P(y) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*$. Thus we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\exists i, j \in [\ell] \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } P(y) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i} \text{ and } P(y) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_j}^*] \\ & \leq \Pr[\gcd(n, P(y)) \notin \{1, n\}]. \end{aligned}$$

3.3 Proof of Lemma 4

Let $x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C}$ and $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$, and let us write $a_i := a \bmod p_i^{e_i}$ for all $a \in \{x', x, y\}$. Let $\Delta(x) := P(x) - Q(x)$. Then, with the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\Delta(x') \not\equiv_n 0 \text{ and } \Delta(x) \equiv_n 0] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i \text{ s.t. } \Delta(x') \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_i^{e_i}} \text{ and } \Delta(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_j^{e_j}} \text{ for all } j \in [\ell]] \\ &\leq \Pr[\exists i, j \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } \Delta(x') \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_i^{e_i}} \text{ and } \Delta(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_j^{e_j}}] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i, j \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } \Delta(x'_i) \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_i^{e_i}} \text{ and } \Delta(x_j) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_j^{e_j}}] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i, j \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } \Delta(y_i) \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_i^{e_i}} \text{ and } \Delta(y_j) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_j^{e_j}}] \\ &= \Pr[\exists i, j \text{ s.t. } j \neq i \text{ and } \Delta(y) \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_i^{e_i}} \text{ and } \Delta(y) \equiv 0 \pmod{p_j^{e_j}}] \\ &\leq \Pr[\gcd(n, \Delta(y)) \notin \{1, n\}]. \end{aligned}$$

4 Subset Membership Problems in the Generic Ring Model

Definition 4. Let $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ and $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ with $|\mathcal{V}| > 1$. The *subset membership problem* defined by $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ is: given $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$, decide whether $x \in \mathcal{V}$.

In the sequel we will consider only subset membership problems such that $|\mathcal{C}| = 2 \cdot |\mathcal{V}|$.

We formalize the notion of subset membership problems in the generic ring model in terms of a game between an algorithm \mathcal{A} and a generic ring oracle \mathcal{O}_{smp} . Oracle \mathcal{O}_{smp} is defined exactly like the generic ring oracle described in Section 2.3, except that \mathcal{O}_{smp} receives a uniformly random subset membership challenge $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$ as input. We say that \mathcal{A} wins the game, if $x \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \mathcal{V}$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}}(n) = 0$, or $x \in \mathcal{V}$ and $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}}(n) = 1$.

Note that $\Pr[x \in \mathcal{V} : x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}] = 1/2$, since x is chosen uniformly random and we have $|\mathcal{C}| = 2 \cdot |\mathcal{V}|$. Note also that any algorithm for a given subset membership problem $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ has at least the trivial success probability $1/2$ by guessing. For an algorithm solving the subset membership problem given by $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ with success probability $\Pr[\mathcal{S}]$, we denote with

$$\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}}(n)) := |\Pr[\mathcal{S}] - 1/2|$$

the *advantage* of \mathcal{A} .

Theorem 1. Let $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$. Let $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ be a subset membership problem such that \mathcal{C} is homogeneous and $2 \cdot |\mathcal{V}| = |\mathcal{C}|$. For any generic ring algorithm \mathcal{A} solving the subset membership problem with advantage $\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}}(n))$ by performing m queries to \mathcal{O}_{smp} , there exists an algorithm \mathcal{B} that outputs a non-trivial factor of n with success probability at least

$$\frac{\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}}(n))}{2(m^2 + 4m + 3)}$$

by running \mathcal{A} once, performing at most $2m$ additional operations in \mathbb{Z}_n and at most $(m + 2)^2$ gcd-computations on $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil$ -bit numbers, and sampling each one uniformly random element from \mathcal{C} and $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$.

Note that the factoring algorithm \mathcal{B} from the above theorem is efficient *only if* we can efficiently sample uniformly random elements from \mathcal{C} and $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. In general such an algorithm need not exist for any subset $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$. There are simple examples for sets \mathcal{C} where sampling uniformly random from $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ is already equivalent to factoring.² Thus, in order to apply the above theorem to show that factoring reduces efficiently to solving a given subset membership problem $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ in the generic ring model, we will also have to show that there exists efficient sampling algorithms for \mathcal{C} and $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$.

Proof Outline. We replace \mathcal{O}_{smp} with a simulator \mathcal{O}_{sim} . Let \mathcal{S}_{sim} denote the event that \mathcal{A} is successful when interacting with the simulator, and let \mathcal{F} denote the event that \mathcal{O}_{sim} answers a query of \mathcal{A} different from how \mathcal{O}_{smp} would have answered. Then \mathcal{O}_{smp} and \mathcal{O}_{sim} are indistinguishable unless \mathcal{F} occurs. Therefore the success probability $\Pr[\mathcal{S}]$ of \mathcal{A} in the simulation game is upper bound by $\Pr[\mathcal{S}_{\text{sim}}] + \Pr[\mathcal{F}]$ (cf. the Difference Lemma [25, Lemma 1]). We derive a bound on $\Pr[\mathcal{S}_{\text{sim}}]$ and describe a factoring algorithm whose success probability is lower bound by $\Pr[\mathcal{F}]$.

²For instance, if $n = pq$ is the product of two primes and $\mathcal{C} := \{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{Z}_n$, then the uniform closure of \mathcal{C} is equal to $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] = \{0, 1, p(p^{-1} \bmod q), q(q^{-1} \bmod p)\}$. Clearly computing $\text{gcd}(n, p(p^{-1} \bmod q)) = p$ or $\text{gcd}(n, q(q^{-1} \bmod p)) = q$ reveals a non-trivial factor of n .

Remark. The idea of making the computations of the generic ring algorithm independent of the challenge input value was introduced by Leander and Rupp [16, Lemma 2] for the case where $n = pq$ is the product of two primes, $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_n$, and generic ring algorithms that do not compute multiplicative inverses. This was generalized in [?, Chapter 5.3.2] and independently in [1, Lemma 7] to generic ring algorithms that may also compute inverses, still for the case $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_n$ with n the product of two primes. To prove our theorem we have to generalize this to the general case where algorithms may compute inverses, $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$ is the product of at least two different primes, and where $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ may be a subset of \mathbb{Z}_n .

4.1 Introducing a Simulation Oracle

We replace oracle \mathcal{O}_{smp} with a simulator \mathcal{O}_{sim} . \mathcal{O}_{sim} receives $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$ as input, but never uses this value throughout the game. Instead, all computations are performed *independent* of the challenge value x . Note that the original oracle \mathcal{O}_{smp} uses x only inside the `test()` and `equal()` procedures. Let us therefore consider an oracle \mathcal{O}_{sim} which is defined exactly like \mathcal{O}_{smp} , but additionally samples a random value $x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$ at the beginning of the game. Moreover, it replaces the procedures `test()` and `equal()` with procedures `testsim()` and `equalsim()`.

- The `testsim()`-procedure returns `false` if $\circ = /$ and $P_j(x') \notin \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, and `true` otherwise (note that we may have $P_j(x') = \perp$, where $\perp \notin \mathbb{Z}_n^*$).
- The `equalsim()`-procedure returns `true` if $P_i(x') = P_j(x')$ and `false` otherwise.

Note that the simulator \mathcal{O}_{sim} proceeds exactly like \mathcal{O}_{smp} , except that it samples a random x' at the beginning of the game, and uses x' instead of x in invertability and equality tests. Therefore all computations of \mathcal{A} are independent of the challenge value x when interacting with \mathcal{O}_{sim} . Hence, any algorithm \mathcal{A} has at most trivial success probability in the simulation game, and therefore

$$\Pr[\mathcal{S}_{\text{sim}}] = 1/2.$$

4.2 Bounding the Probability of Simulation Failure

We say that a *simulation failure*, denoted \mathcal{F} , occurs if \mathcal{O}_{sim} does not simulate \mathcal{O}_{smp} perfectly. Observe that an interaction of \mathcal{A} with \mathcal{O}_{sim} is perfectly indistinguishable from an interaction with \mathcal{O}_{smp} , unless at least one of the following events occurs.

- The `testsim()`-procedure fails to simulate `test()` perfectly. This means that `testsim()` returns `false` on a procedure call where `test()` would have returned `true`, or vice versa. Let $\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}$ denote the event that this happens on at least one call of `testsim()`.
- The `equalsim()`-procedure fails to simulate `equal()` perfectly. This means that `equalsim()` has returned `true` where `equal()` would have returned `false`, or vice versa. Let $\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}}$ denote the event that this happens on at least one call of `equalsim()`.

Since \mathcal{F} occurs if and only if at least one of the events $\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}}$ occurs, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{F}] &= \Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}} \cup \mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}}] \\ &\leq \Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}] + \Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}} \mid \neg \mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}]. \end{aligned}$$

In the following we will bound $\Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}]$ and $\Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}} \mid \neg \mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}]$ separately.

4.2.1 Bounding the Probability of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}$

The `testsim()`-procedure fails to simulate `test()` only if either `testsim()` has returned `false` where `test()` would have returned `true`, or vice versa. This happens only if there exists $P_j \sqsubseteq P$ such that

$$(P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x') \notin \mathbb{Z}_n^*) \text{ or } (P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x) \notin \mathbb{Z}_n^*).$$

Note that we may have $P_j(\tilde{x}) = \perp \notin \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ for $\tilde{x} \in \{x, x'\}$. However, we can simplify our analysis a little by applying Lemma 2. The existence of $P_j \sqsubseteq P$ such that $P_j(\tilde{x}) = \perp$ implies the existence of $P_k \sqsubseteq P_j$ such that $P_k(\tilde{x}) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. Hence, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}$ occurs only if there exists $P_j \sqsubseteq P$ such that

$$(P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*) \text{ or } (P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^*).$$

Note that for one *fixed* P_j we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[(P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*) \text{ or } (P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*) : x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C} \right] \\ & \leq 2 \cdot \Pr \left[P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, by taking the maximum probability over all P_j , we get

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}] & \leq 2 \cdot \sum_{j=0}^m \Pr \left[P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C} \right] \\ & \leq 2(m+1) \max_{0 \leq j \leq m} \left\{ \Pr \left[P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C} \right] \right\} \end{aligned}$$

4.2.2 Bounding the Probability of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}}$

The `equalsim()`-procedure fails to simulate `equal()` only if either `equalsim()` has returned `false` where `equal()` would have returned `true`, or vice versa. This happens only if there exists $P_i, P_j \sqsubseteq P$ such that

$$(P_i(x) = P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \neq P_j(x')) \text{ or } (P_i(x) \neq P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') = P_j(x')). \quad (1)$$

Note that we want to consider the event $\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}}$, conditioned on that event $\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}$ did not occur. Therefore we may assume that there exists no straight line program $P_k \sqsubseteq P$ such that $P_k(x) = \perp$ and $P_k(x') \neq \perp$, or vice versa. This allows us to simplify our analysis slightly, since in this case (1) is equivalent to

$$(P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x')) \text{ or } (P_i(x) \not\equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \equiv_n P_j(x')).$$

Thus, like in the previous section, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}} \mid \neg \mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}] & \leq \sum_{-1 \leq i < j \leq m} 2 \cdot \Pr \left[P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x') : x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C} \right] \\ & \leq 2(m+2)(m+1) \max_{-1 \leq i < j \leq m} \left\{ \Pr \left[P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x') : x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C} \right] \right\} \\ & = 2(m^2 + 3m + 2) \max_{-1 \leq i < j \leq m} \left\{ \Pr \left[P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x') : x, x' \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{C} \right] \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

4.2.3 Bounding the Probability of \mathcal{F}

Summing up, we obtain that the total probability of \mathcal{F} is at most

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{F}] &\leq \Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}] + \Pr[\mathcal{F}_{\text{equal}} \mid \neg \mathcal{F}_{\text{test}}] \\ &\leq 2(m+1) \max_{0 \leq j \leq m} \left\{ \Pr \left[P_j(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_j(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C} \right] \right\} \\ &\quad + 2(m^2 + 3m + 2) \max_{-1 \leq i < j \leq m} \left\{ \Pr \left[P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x') : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C} \right] \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

4.3 Bounding the Success Probability

Since all computations of \mathcal{A} are independent of the challenge value x in the simulation game, any algorithm has only the trivial success probability when interacting with the simulator. Thus the success probability of any algorithm when interacting with the original oracle is bound by

$$1/2 + \text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smP}}}) = \Pr[\mathcal{S}] \leq \Pr[\mathcal{S}_{\text{sim}}] + \Pr[\mathcal{F}] \leq 1/2 + \Pr[\mathcal{F}],$$

which implies

$$\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smP}}}) \leq \Pr[\mathcal{F}].$$

4.4 The Factoring Algorithm

Consider a factoring algorithm \mathcal{B} which samples a random element $x \in \mathcal{C}$ and runs \mathcal{A} as a subroutine by implementing the generic ring oracle for \mathcal{A} . That is, it performs all computations queried by \mathcal{A} to $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

In parallel, \mathcal{B} applies all queried operations to $y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, where $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ is chosen uniformly random at the beginning of the game. Moreover, each time a triple (i, j, \circ) is appended to P , \mathcal{B} computes

- $\text{gcd}(P(y), n)$, and
- $\text{gcd}(P(y) - P_i(y), n)$ for all $i \in \{-1, \dots, |P| - 1\}$.

4.4.1 Running time

\mathcal{B} samples random values $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}$ and $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. Since by assumption \mathcal{A} submits m queries, \mathcal{B} has to perform at most $2m$ operations in \mathbb{Z}_n in order to perform all computations queried by \mathcal{A} simultaneously on $x \in \mathcal{C}$ and $y \in \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. In addition, \mathcal{B} performs at most $(m+2)^2$ gcd-computations on $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil$ -bit numbers.

4.4.2 Success probability

\mathcal{B} evaluates any straight line program P_k with a uniformly random element y of $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. In particular, \mathcal{B} computes $\text{gcd}(P_k(y), n)$ for $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ and the straight line program $P_k \sqsubseteq P$ satisfying

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr \left[P_k(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_k(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C} \right] \\ &= \max_{0 \leq k \leq m} \left\{ \Pr \left[P_k(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_k(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C} \right] \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Let $\gamma_1 := \max_{0 \leq k \leq m} \{\Pr[P_k(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus \mathbb{Z}_n^* \text{ and } P_k(x') \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}]\}$, then by Lemma 3 algorithm \mathcal{B} finds a factor in this step with probability at least γ_1 .

Moreover, \mathcal{B} evaluates any pair P_i, P_j of straight line programs in P with a uniformly random element $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$. So in particular \mathcal{B} evaluates $\gcd(P_i(y) - P_j(y), n)$ with $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}]$ for the pair of straight line programs $P_i, P_j \subseteq P$ satisfying

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x') : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C} \right] \\ &= \max_{-1 \leq i < j \leq m} \left\{ \Pr \left[P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x') : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C} \right] \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Let $\gamma_2 := \max_{-1 \leq i < j \leq m} \{\Pr[P_i(x) \equiv_n P_j(x) \text{ and } P_i(x') \not\equiv_n P_j(x') : x, x' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C}]\}$, then by Lemma 4 algorithm \mathcal{B} succeeds in this step with probability at least γ_2 .

So, for $\gamma := \max\{\gamma_1, \gamma_2\}$, the total success probability of algorithm \mathcal{B} is at least γ .

4.4.3 Relating the success probability of \mathcal{B} to the advantage of \mathcal{A}

Using the above definitions of γ_1, γ_2 , and γ , the fact that $\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}(n)}) \leq \Pr[\mathcal{F}]$, and the derived bound on $\Pr[\mathcal{F}]$, we can obtain a lower bound on γ by

$$\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}(n)}) \leq \Pr[\mathcal{F}] \leq 2(m+1)\gamma_1 + 2(m^2 + 3m + 2)\gamma_2 \leq 2(m^2 + 4m + 3)\gamma,$$

which implies the inequality

$$\gamma \geq \frac{\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}(n)})}{2(m^2 + 4m + 3)}.$$

Therefore the success probability of \mathcal{B} is at least

$$\frac{\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}(n)})}{2(m^2 + 4m + 3)}.$$

5 Applications

In this section, we apply our general theorem to two specific subset membership problems with high cryptographic relevance. The first application shows that computing Jacobi symbols modulo n with generic ring algorithms is as hard as factoring n .

Then we apply our main theorem to the well-known quadratic residuosity problem. It is unknown whether there exists an efficient algorithm for this problem, and it is widely conjectured that this problem is hard if factoring the modulus n is hard. We show that any algorithm solving this problem efficiently needs to exploit specific properties of the representation of elements of \mathbb{Z}_n (possibly in a way similar to the known algorithms for computing Jacobi symbols).

5.1 Computing the Jacobi Symbol with Generic Ring Algorithms

In order to define and analyze the *Jacobi symbol* we need the *Legendre symbol*. For an integer x and a prime p the Legendre symbol $(x | p)$ of x modulo p is defined as

$$(x | p) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \gcd(x, p) \neq 1, \\ 1, & \text{if } \gcd(x, p) = 1 \text{ and } x \text{ has a square root modulo } p, \\ -1, & \text{if } \gcd(x, p) = 1 \text{ and } x \text{ has no square root modulo } p. \end{cases}$$

The Jacobi symbol generalizes the Legendre symbol from prime to composite moduli. If $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$ is the prime factor decomposition of n , then the Jacobi symbol $(x | n)$ of an integer x modulo n is defined as

$$(x | n) := \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} (x | p_i)^{e_i}, \quad (2)$$

where $(x | p_i)$ is the Legendre symbol. There exists an algorithm computing the Jacobi symbol $(x | n)$ efficiently, even if the factorization of n is not given, using the law of quadratic reciprocity. See [26, Chapter 12.3], for instance.

Properties of the Jacobi symbol. In the sequel we will consider the problem of computing the Jacobi symbol as a subset membership problem over \mathbb{Z}_n . To this end, let us summarize some properties of the Jacobi symbol, which will become relevant.

1. Note that for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ we have $(x | n) \in \{1, -1\}$. Let

$$J_n := \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : (x | n) = 1\}$$

be the set of elements of \mathbb{Z}_n having Jacobi symbol 1. Thus, we can perceive the problem of computing the Jacobi symbol as a subset membership problem $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ over \mathbb{Z}_n with $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $\mathcal{V} = J_n$.

2. The cardinality $|J_n|$ of the set of elements having Jacobi symbol 1 depends on whether n is a square in \mathbb{N} . We have

$$|J_n| = \begin{cases} \varphi(n)/2, & \text{if } n \text{ is not a square in } \mathbb{N}, \\ \varphi(n), & \text{if } n \text{ is a square in } \mathbb{N}, \end{cases}$$

where $\varphi(\cdot)$ is the Euler totient function [26, Chapter 2.6]. This is an immediate consequence of the definition of the Jacobi symbol.

Now we are ready to apply our main theorem to show that there is no efficient *generic* ring algorithm computing the Jacobi symbol efficiently, unless factoring n is easy.

Theorem 2. *Let $n = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i^{e_i}$. Suppose there exist a generic ring algorithm \mathcal{A} solving the subset membership problem given by $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ with $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $\mathcal{V} = J_n$ with advantage $\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}}(n))$ by performing m ring operations. Then there exists an algorithm \mathcal{B} finding a non-trivial factor of n with probability at least*

$$\frac{\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}}(n))}{2(m^2 + 4m + 3)}$$

by running \mathcal{A} once, performing at most $2m$ additional operations in \mathbb{Z}_n and at most $(m + 2)^2$ gcd-computations on $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil$ -bit numbers, and sampling two random elements from \mathbb{Z}_n^ .*

Proof. If n is a square in \mathbb{N} then the theorem is trivially true, since in this case it is easy to find a factor of n . Therefore we only need to consider the case where n is not a square.

Note that in this case we have $2 \cdot |J_n| = \varphi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*| = |\mathcal{C}|$. Furthermore, it holds that $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] = \mathcal{U}[\mathbb{Z}_n^*] = \mathbb{Z}_n^* = \mathcal{C}$, which implies that \mathcal{C} is homogeneous. The result follows by applying Theorem 1. \square

5.2 The Generic Quadratic Residuosity Problem and Factoring

Let us denote with $\text{QR}_n \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n$ the set of *quadratic residues* modulo n , i.e.

$$\text{QR}_n := \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : x \equiv y^2 \pmod{n}, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*\}.$$

It holds that $\text{QR}_n \subseteq J_n$, and therefore given $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \setminus J_n$ it is easy to decide that x is not a quadratic residue by computing the Jacobi symbol.

Definition 5. The *quadratic residuosity problem* [14] is the subset membership problem given by $\mathcal{C} = J_n$ and $\mathcal{V} = \text{QR}_n$.

If $n = pq$ is the product of two different odd primes, then it holds that $|\text{QR}_n| = \varphi(n)/4$ and $|J_n| = \varphi(n)/2$ (see for instance [26, p.348]). Thus, for $n = pq$ we have $2 \cdot |\mathcal{V}| = |\mathcal{C}|$.

Given the factorization of an integer n , the quadratic residuosity problem in \mathbb{Z}_n can be solved easily by a generic ring algorithm. Thus, in order to show the equivalence of generic quadratic residuosity and factoring, we have to prove the following theorem.

Theorem 3. *Let $n = pq$ be the product of two different odd primes. Suppose there exist a generic ring algorithm \mathcal{A} solving the subset membership problem given by $(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})$ with $\mathcal{C} = J_n$ and $\mathcal{V} = \text{QR}_n$ with advantage $\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}(n)})$ by performing m ring operations. Then there exists an algorithm \mathcal{B} finding a non-trivial factor of n with probability at least*

$$\frac{\text{Adv}_{(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V})}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{smp}}(n)})}{2(m^2 + 4m + 3)}$$

by running \mathcal{A} once, performing at most $2m$ additional operations in \mathbb{Z}_n and at most $(m + 2)^2$ gcd-computations on $\lceil \log_2 n \rceil$ -bit numbers, and sampling each one random element from J_n and \mathbb{Z}_n^ .*

Proof. If $n = pq$ is the product of two different odd primes, then we have $\mathcal{U}[\mathcal{C}] = \mathcal{U}[J_n] = \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $|\mathcal{C}| = |J_n| = 2 \cdot |\text{QR}_n| = 2 \cdot |\mathcal{V}|$. It is easy to see that J_n is homogeneous, cf. Appendix A. The result follows by applying Theorem 1. \square

To show that \mathcal{B} factors n efficiently, it remains to show that \mathcal{B} can efficiently sample uniformly random elements of J_n . Consider an algorithm \mathcal{B} which samples uniformly random elements x from \mathbb{Z}_n until $x \in J_n$ (note that \mathcal{B} can test efficiently whether $x \in J_n$ by running the algorithm from [26, Chapter 12.3]). Moreover, for $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_n$ and large n , we have

$$\Pr[x \in J_n] = \frac{|J_n|}{|\mathbb{Z}_n|} = \frac{\varphi(n)/2}{n} \approx \frac{1}{2}$$

thus we may expect that \mathcal{B} finds a suitable x very quickly.

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A J_n is Homogeneous

Lemma 5. *Let $n = p_1 p_2$ be the product of two different odd primes. Then J_n is homogeneous.*

Proof. We have to show that for each $c_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}$ and $c_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}$ holds that

$$\Pr[x \equiv c_1 \pmod{p_1} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} J_n] = \Pr[x \equiv c_1 \pmod{p_1} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_n^*] \quad (3)$$

$$\text{and } \Pr[x \equiv c_2 \pmod{p_2} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} J_n] = \Pr[x \equiv c_2 \pmod{p_2} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_n^*]. \quad (4)$$

In the sequel we will consider case (3), case (4) is identical.

Note first that we have $\Pr[x \equiv 0 \pmod{p_1} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_n^*] = 0$, and for each $c_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}^*$ with $c_1 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_1}$ we have

$$\Pr[x \equiv c_1 \pmod{p_1} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_n^*] = 1/(p_1 - 1).$$

Since $J_n \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ we have $\Pr[x \equiv 0 \pmod{p_1} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} J_n] = 0$, thus it only remains to show that

$$\Pr[x \equiv c_1 \pmod{p_1} : x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} J_n] = 1/(p_1 - 1)$$

holds for all for all $c_1 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_1}$.

Let ψ denote the isomorphism $\psi : \mathbb{Z}_{p_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{p_2} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$. Then the set J_n consists of all elements $x = \psi(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ such that $(x_1 \mid p_1) \cdot (x_2 \mid p_2) = 1$, which is equivalent to $(x_1 \mid p_1) = (x_2 \mid p_2)$. Thus we have

$$\begin{aligned} J_n &= \{x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : (x \mid n) = 1\} \\ &= \{\psi(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : (x_1 \mid p_1) \cdot (x_2 \mid p_2) = 1\} \\ &= \{\psi(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* : (x_1 \mid p_1) = (x_2 \mid p_2)\} \end{aligned}$$

It is well-known that for each odd prime p_2 holds that

$$|\{x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}^* : (x_2 \mid p_2) = 1\}| = |\{x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}^* : (x_2 \mid p_2) = -1\}| = (p_2 - 1)/2.$$

Therefore for each element $x_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}^*$ there are exactly $(p_2 - 1)/2$ elements $x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_2}^*$ such that $(x_1 \mid p_1) \cdot (x_2 \mid p_2) = 1$, and thus $\psi(x_1, x_2) \in J_n$. Thus we have

$$|\{x \in J_n : x \equiv c_1 \pmod{p_1}\}| = (p_2 - 1)/2.$$

This yields that for each $c_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_1}^*$ with $c_1 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p_1}$ we have

$$\Pr[x \equiv c_1 \pmod{p_1} : x \xleftarrow{s} J_n] = \frac{|\{x \in J_n : x \equiv c_1 \pmod{p_1}\}|}{|J_n|} = \frac{(p_2 - 1)/2}{(p_1 - 1)(p_2 - 1)/2} = \frac{1}{p_1 - 1}.$$

□