

Seton Hall University

From the Selected Works of John Buschman

March 13, 2017

Once More Unto the Breach: “Overcoming Epistemology” and Librarianship’s de facto Deweyan Pragmatism

John Buschman



Available at: https://works.bepress.com/john_buschman/32/

“Once More unto the Breach:

‘Overcoming Epistemology’ and Librarianship’s *De Facto* Deweyan Pragmatism”

Abstract

Purpose – To explore an approach to epistemology which allows a portion of library and information science (LIS) to coherently explain its social and intellectual contributions, and to overcome some of the problems of epistemology that LIS encounters.

Design/methodology/approach – Literature-based conceptual analysis of the problems of epistemology in LIS and the productive approach of Deweyan Pragmatism.

Findings – LIS’ problems with epistemology comes from a variety of sources: epistemology itself, the combining of librarianship with information science, and the search for a common grounding of the information professions, their tools and their institutions. No such theoretical foundation is possible, but Deweyan Pragmatism offers a sensible, practical explanation for the historical development and practices of librarianship.

Originality/value – Pragmatism has been deployed in portions of LIS, but the full implications and the “fit” of Dewey’s ideas for librarianship and its epistemology are productive explorations.

Keywords Epistemology, John Dewey, librarianship, Pragmatism, Theory, Critique

Paper type Conceptual paper

Introduction

Library and information science (LIS) has enjoyed a “revival of interest in creating a new ... philosophy” (Jones 2008, p. 482); a “revolution is afoot in theorizing information” such that

there is now a “valid and respectable field of formal information theory based on propositions, algorithms, uncertainty, truth statements, and the like” (Buckland 2005, pp. 684, 686) – which includes a vigorous examination of its epistemology (Furner 2010; Fallis 2006; Carlin 2014). As testament to the validity of these assertions, “epistemology” as a keyword search within this journal alone yields 133 results as of this writing – many of them quite recent and utilizing heretofore novel and inventive approaches in LIS. Briefly, epistemology is that part of philosophy “concerned with ... the nature, origins, scope, and limits of human knowledge, its presuppositions and basis, ... [and] the study of justification ... of beliefs we have on the basis of some given body of evidence” (Dick 1999, p. 306). Or more succinctly, how do we know what we *know*, or *that* we know it? In turn, LIS makes certain claims, produces research and advice which rests on a knowledge base – its way of knowing (or epistemology), and Dick (2013; 1999) rightly claims the importance of epistemological assumptions and raising difficult questions about them in the field. Certainly the number of surveys of epistemological approaches in LIS again validates his point (in addition to the studies cited see for example Benoît 2002; Budd 2001; 2008; Fisher, Erdelez and McKechnie 2005; Harris 1986b; Hjørland 2005; Trosow 2001).

Why “overcoming” epistemology?

If epistemology is an important, interesting and flourishing area of inquiry in what has been widely thought of as an under-theorized LIS research culture, why “overcome” it? There are a number of approaches to that question which build the case in a specific sense. Historically the term refers to much more than the brief definition quoted above, encompassing four different fields or problems: 1) obtaining and justifying knowledge; 2) empirical investigations of

knowing (both human and animal) across a variety of disciplines; 3) philosophical analysis of “knowing” and related ideas (consciousness, belief, etc.); 4) and overcoming the “problem of the external world” (Philipse 2007). Even this is a foreshortened outline, and each of these subdivisions has its own controversies and trajectory (Huemer and Audi 2002). For one instance, there are disagreements over types and how much justification is required for knowledge – and whether under some conditions a justified (“true”) belief “counts” as knowledge (Fallis 2006). Within LIS the “cognitive viewpoint” underwrites much empirical investigation of knowing and obtaining knowledge, and it has been heavily criticized: as excessively and methodologically individualistic (versus a social conception of knowledge) (Hjørland 2005); that it has a strong relationship to positivism (a sender-receiver model of information and knowledge transfer) and a culture-specific form of knowing; it assumes at base that knowledge is “root[ed] in physical things; that there is a unity of perception of the physical world ... [and] that language is genuinely referential (... our statements actually describe the thing itself); and that this ... cognitive information leads to progressive knowledge” (Budd 2008, p. 192; Budd 2001; Dick 2013; Jones 2008). This last item runs afoul of the fourth area of epistemological investigation best exemplified by Descartes and Berkeley and their radical skepticism about mind independent “reality” which remains (philosophically) unsolved: we must come to “simple agreement that [physical realities] exist” and deal with the phenomena of that intellectual gap (Jones 2008, p. 488; Hjørland 2004; Malcolm 2013). Finally, there is continuing philosophical debate over the basic terms related to knowing/epistemology. For instance there is no “agreed upon theory of consciousness, [but] there is a widespread, if less than universal, consensus that an adequate account of mind requires a clear understanding of it and its place in nature” (Van Gulik 2014). Is it a physical/chemical state? Is it a state of

awareness of phenomena? When is consciousness (and thus knowing and thus bedrock of epistemological understanding) present and not present – and how are those described and distinguished? The same doubt applies to central heavily-used concepts in LIS like “information” (Webster 2002).

While these are not fatal (and epistemological thinking has plumbed each much deeper than the all-too-brief précis presented here), they represent baseline difficulties within the trunk of philosophical thinking that LIS draws upon and with which LIS itself must grapple. And therein lay other difficulties. Furner (2004) notes that LIS consistently confuses the everyday *acquisition-of-information-as-knowledge* with an *epistemological conception of knowledge* such as justified belief, and Hjørland (2014) concludes that baseline LIS concepts are understood differently within differing LIS research paradigms, and so researchers use the same term, but are not speaking of the same thing – a severe epistemological problem. Furthermore if we acknowledge, as Anderson (2005) elegantly schematizes, that organized society produces structures and institutions like religion, politics, science, law, commerce, etc., and those generate records (documents, information) which maintain and support social structures, which in turn produces publications and differentiated communicative channels and circumstances, which then generate organizational schemes which structure inquiry, then ineluctably epistemology - as LIS must approach it – is the product of a deeply social (vs. individual/psychological) process. As Budd (2008) put it, “becoming informed is a social, and not solely an individual, phenomenon” (p. viii).

But this brings forth further difficulties. LIS exists “to collect, organize, and provide access to information” for collectivities, and that access is largely a “process determined by the protocols of a ... system, the structure of ... records [and] ... ignoring [the epistemology inherent

in this] structure ... inhibits the efficacy of any empirical inquiry” into it (Budd 1995, p. 306). Dick (1999) notes that, as a result, LIS often “confus[es the] study of the cognitive contents of the minds of individual[s] ... with the growth of ‘public’ subject domains or ... disciplines” (p. 309). The organization and protocols of access to information are implicated in the claim that LIS has “by accident [or] subtle or overt intention” (Budd 1995, p. 295) adopted unacknowledged epistemologies – among them the much criticized combination of positivism, scientism, empiricism, rationalism and reductionism (Hjørland 2005; Jones 2008) that carry with them biases and consequences very much counter to proclaimed values (Dick 2013). Dick (1999) then raises a series of logical epistemological questions: 1) what does LIS “know” and how is that knowledge justified; 2) what is the particular *type* of knowledge LIS has mastered; 3) how does LIS reconcile the gap between the social meaning of its institutions (what people collectively value about libraries and information resources) and the individual nature of inquiry and interaction with the structures of its use? There are even questions about whether the goal within LIS is (or should be) epistemic growth rather than simply efficacious exposure to information, and whether the multitudinous interests and values people bring to their inquiries can (or should) actually be accommodated (Fallis 2006). In short, the *social* nature of the LIS project adds further complications to its already-considerable epistemological challenges.

As a response, some within the history of philosophy came to the conclusion that epistemology must be overcome. Their project was driven by the realization that, with the scientific revolution, empirical investigation was driving human knowledge and thus the fourth of the fields or problems outlined at the beginning of this section – the “problem of the external world” – subsumed all other epistemological concerns: “the assumption that it is possible to acquire knowledge which transcends immediate experience, and to investigate the conditions

upon which this possibility depends. Conceived in this manner, philosophy is epistemology ... or [the] theory of science” (von Hartmann in Philipse 2007, pp. 339-340). *Not* to be able to overcome the skepticism about verifying the external world and establish *how* we know was a “scandal” and signal failure of philosophy, which was doomed to be left behind by scientific understanding and advancement (Philipse 2007). At its core, this epistemological/philosophical problem/controversy continues to posit a *foundation* of knowledge – or its “presuppositions and basis” as our brief definition of epistemology stated it at the beginning of this paper – that philosophy can/should discover (Philipse 2007). The project here is not to comprehensively survey the interesting and challenging issues of the varieties of epistemology – or even the subset that LIS has tackled; that is far too broad for this paper. Rather, the goal here is stated intentionally provocatively: to borrow the historical phrase and overcome epistemology in a particular and different manner within LIS. This will be conducted in the next section.

Why librarianship, why Deweyan Pragmatism, and why *de facto*?

Broad critiques of LIS’s intellectual bases (or lack thereof) – including its epistemology – have been persistent and fundamental, and go back decades (Harris 1986a; 1986b; Wiegand 1999b; Buschman 2006). Though philosophical and epistemological debate flourish in LIS now, the main early thrust of epistemological critique (of positivism) remains a topic, with two dozen papers addressing it in the pages of this journal in the unfinished second decade of the twenty-first century alone. As noted, the manifest challenges of epistemology, and the layered challenges and confusions of LIS’ epistemology – its social contexts – deepen the problems further, so why bother? Part of an answer is existential and ethical: the desire to define what we

know, do, and stand for – and why those matter – is our small part of the social contract (Budd 2008). The other part of an answer is in the challenge: can these problems be approached differently or broken down so that *some* portion may be located within a coherent and reasonable theory? Theory is important to our project, and here it is simply meant as an “attempt to compose a coherent network of concepts and abstractions in order to analyze what is going on” with important and public issues in the field (Wolin 2004, 504). The idea is not an all-encompassing explanation (or “grand theory”), but rather a “rough pragmatic resemblance to reality” for it to be baseline explanatory and useful (Hofstadter 1989, 114). This will be undertaken in the form of three related, practical moves:

Move 1: separating the “L” from “IS” (why librarianship?)

“LIS” has become the standard way to refer to the information professions and their various associated institutions and venues, but there is a strong argument to disambiguate them – at least here – in the service of a provisional and practical epistemology. Wiegand (1999a) wrote that the “‘information science’ that has developed in the last years of the 20th century constitutes an arena of study in which the technology to which it is harnessed defines the field,” and that it “privileges scientific over ... other cultural forms of information” (31). That gulf largely remains in IS’ focus on “Information Systems Theory, Methodology, Analysis and Design, in Information (Systems) Management, in Database Design and in Decision Theory ... in ... treat[ing] data and information as reified entities (consider ... ‘data mining’ and ‘information management’)” (Floridi 2015). When IS considers humans, it tends to be in terms of human-computer interface and problems/issues such as unlimited aliasing (using all possible indexing terms to describe the content of an information container) or the discriminating power of

indexing to use technology to harness ever-growing information resources (Blair 2003). Saracevis (in Hjørland 2014) notes frankly that “we now have two distinct ... approaches to research They became commonly known as systems-centered and user- (or human-) centered. Both address [information] retrieval, but from very different ends and perspectives” (p. 214). Despite their common concern for access to information, the marriage of LIS has largely replicated the two cultures thesis (Dick 1995), and arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, separating them is a reasonable and practical way to think about them, especially when the combination is viewed historically.

When one looks back at the combining of librarianship (or library science, or library studies, or library economy) and information science, historically two factors were at work. First, IS was often introduced in curricular terms as a marriage of convenience in order to raise the status of librarianship: “Because the scientific practices have accrued such prestige, an important strategy for less successful occupational groups has been to present themselves as scientific in nature” (Pawley 1998, p. 136; Harris, Hannah and Harris 1998). Secondly, the affiliation (with information and its presumably masculine technology) was very much an attempt to de-feminize the profession; while the I-School movement speaks of professional transformation, it relies heavily on traditional sources of students seeking to enter librarianship for the backbone of their enrollments (Harris 2009). The fact remains that the combination remains an uneasy one, with naming and identity and status still very much an issue (Hjørland 2014; Dick 1995).

While librarianship certainly deploys and provides an interface for the products of IS – databases, retrieval protocols, structured hierarchies, descriptors, controlled vocabularies, graphic interfaces, and faceted searches for example – its core concerns are clearly human needs

and the interactions to make those products useful for people, which is a very different set of questions, problems, and solutions. A moment's reflection reveals this. In contrast to IS, librarianship is urged to tackle "the liberation of library users from a 'virtual conceptual tyranny over access'," to "improve the critical consciousness of librarians as intermediaries ... 'that serve [users'] interests'," to "assist library educators to appreciate how power inequities are inscribed," and to "inform library administrators of the increasing influence of market mechanisms on the design of library and information services" by one influential author who tackles epistemological issues (Dick 1995, pp. 229-230). Wiegand (1999b) flatly states that IS "has generally failed to construct models of a personal 'information economy' for individuals of both genders, all classes, ages, ethnicities, creeds, and sexual orientations" to see what each values, needs, and uses – and from where – "in efforts to make sense of the world around them in their everyday lives" (p. 24), and that librarianship *does* address those issues. In contrast to theoretical connections to the productions of IS, the *practice* of librarianship is quite different from IS. For instance, the role of reading, place, budgets, planning, scheduling, children's literature and story hours, fiction and "stories" in making sense of one's lives, loans and borrowing, and reference and research instruction as they actually occur in libraries are out of the scope of IS, but very much a part of all public, school, and academic librarians' lives as they encounter their publics and their publics encounter their institutions and services (Buschman forthcoming; Buschman 2016; Leckie 1996; Wiegand 2003; 2015a). Given how thorny the epistemological issues in LIS are, it is little wonder that *one* foundational and explanatory theory is difficult to identify for the disparate halves of LIS. If separating the "L" from "IS" provides a foothold of clarity, it is well worth considering for our purposes here.

Move 2: against epistemological “bases” or “foundations” (why Deweyan Pragmatism?)

While there have been LIS scholars who have deployed Dewey in the service of analyzing and shaping LIS practices (Elmborg 2006), most in the field have deployed his ideas (and Pragmatism in general) in their “everyday, pragmatic sense rather than in [their] philosophical ... sense” (Sundin and Johannisson 2005, p. 31). However the view that “pragmatist epistemology is, like other epistemological positions developed in ... philosoph[y], an abstract view of knowledge that is of limited practical use” (Sundin and Johannisson 2005, p. 33) is deeply at odds with Pragmatism as Dewey formulated and worked through it. In his hands Pragmatism is both a practical method and a belief “that there are better and worse resolutions to human predicaments,” and that to seek those resolutions “we neither have nor require a ‘theory of everything’” (Putnam 1989-1990, pp. 1682-1683). Dewey questioned both the *existence* and the *need* for foundations of knowledge and knowing: “He was a relentless critic of what he took to be the sterility of epistemology and the obsession of ... modern philosophy with ‘the quest for certainty’” (Bernstein 1987, p. 510; 1992). No comprehensive survey of Dewey is possible here, but he clearly states a series of fundamental assertions about human nature and learning – and so many of his ideas flow from those – that they are worth reviewing even if they are somewhat arbitrarily divided out in the following account.

Dewey - and not other Pragmatists – is the choice here for a number of reasons. Peirce was central to his work - “seminal” was his word (in Sidorsky 1977, p. xxxix; Wingo 1974, pp. 205-210), and he acknowledged his debt particularly to William James: Pragmatism for Dewey was essentially “the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ ... and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts” (James in Dewey 1998 [1907], p. 377). But Dewey extended and shaped ideas “first asserted by Peirce in epistemology and James in

metaphysics” and transformed them into actual programs and institutions at work in the world – like the Lab School at the University of Chicago (Sidorsky 1977, pp. xxxix, xlv; Wingo 1974, pp. 154-162). It is this contrast – the “preoccupations with logic in Peirce and the obsessions with individuality in James,” and their mutual and extended attempt to situate religious belief rationally – that contrasts with Dewey’s engagement with the social and political world and especially education – that makes the choice germane and informative for librarianship (West 1999, pp. 146, 361). Dewey was enormously productive and influential in so many areas of intellectual labor and in society. Among those “first things” Dewey (1998 [1917]) analyzed were the consequences of the age-old “theological problem of attaining knowledge of God as ultimate reality [which] was transformed in effect in to the philosophical problem of the possibility of attaining knowledge of reality” (p. 56). The results of this quest were threefold: 1) were we to attain knowledge of God/reality/first things, we would be in possession of absolute truth, and “absolute truth exacts absolute obedience” (Dewey 1970 [1938], p. 52) – philosophical, ecclesial, political, or otherwise – and the defects of the world logically could not (or should not) be changed, making the effort philosophically pointless for our lives; 2) epistemology in turn posited “a self-enclosed island of mind on one side, individual and private and only private; over against this is set a world of objects which are physically or cosmically there – and only there” (Dewey 1998 [1911], p. 104) – the mind-body dualism noted earlier, rooted in the search for ultimate reality/God and certainty in our knowledge of it; and 3) that this dualism begat another – another separation that “cut human nature off from its natural objective relations. It implies first the severance of man from nature and then of each man from his fellows” (Dewey 1998 [1922a], p.47).

His critiques of these positions were (and are) thoroughgoing. First, epistemology has framed issues as “specific problems [with] right conclusions to be reached—which means, in effect, ... a difference between ... right and wrong methods of inquiry and testing [and] not a difference between experience and the world,” and as a result we artificially (and nonsensically) separate phenomena; for instance we could thus “invent and discuss [an epistemological] problem of digestion All that would be required would be to conceive the stomach and the food-material as inhabiting different worlds ... leav[ing us] the question of the possibility, extent, nature, and genuineness of any transaction between stomach and food” (Dewey 1998 [1917], p. 56). Second, since “there is no truth which is antecedent to the search for it” for Dewey (Brosio 1972, p. 1) – that is, there are no foundations to find to ground knowledge in certainty, philosophy has “served ideas *forced into* experience, not *gathered from* it” (Dewey 1998 [1917], p. 50). This is his essential critique of the methods of epistemology and its resulting dualism: philosophy has forced experience into its criteria rather than reflected on experience to shape ideas. Third, it follows that Dewey’s theories of knowledge were accordingly pragmatic: “never in the life of a farmer, sailor, merchant, physician or laboratory experimenter, does knowledge mean primarily of store of information aloof from doing” (1944, 185). In turn, reflection on doing and experience included observation, suggestions, the idea that “data and ideas are correlative” (Dewey 1998 [1933a], p. 138) – and key to the process; the resulting judgments are the “constituent units of thought” which “arise from doubt and controversy,” involves selecting facts, evidence and principles, and results in a decision – which should then start the process again (Dewey 1998 [1933b], pp. 145-146). The effect is that practice is the equal of theory for Dewey: building up the civilizational stock of contingent solutions in the form of the social application of the scientific method (Dewey 1944; Wingo

1974; Wolin 2004). Fourth, since Dewey was philosophically dead set against divisions and dualisms of all stripes, his key concept of *experience* was that we encounter “not a combination of mind and world, subject and object, method and subject matter, but [rather] a single continuous interaction of a great diversity” (Dewey 1944, p. 167; Wingo 1974). For Dewey

An experience (as contrasted to a simple undergoing) is had when proposed actions are seen in terms of possible and anticipated consequences. A technical definition of *experience* ... is that particular reconstruction of mere undergoing which adds to the meaning of what has occurred, and which increases one’s ability to direct the course of subsequent events. When that reconstruction occurs, then an *experience* can be said to have been had. A composed tale of meaning replaces the simple undergoing of and being buffeted by raw occurrence. Theory is the placing of what is undergone into a broader and longer course of events. In order to have an *experience* one must by necessity integrate theory and practice.... [T]he reconstruction of occurrence into *experience* is education (Birkel, Brosio and Daunt in Brosio 1975, p. 3).

For Dewey (1960 [1929]) the job of philosophy was restoring the severed connections between the values held by people and the ends and means of society. “Society thus became an epistemological problem: To act in it, one first had to identify it” – highly problematic in the fragmented and fluid modern era (Peters 1989, p. 249). Only purposeful human action brings any order, sense, and continuity to the world (Dewey 1998 [1897]; Bernstein 1987). Philosophy as he reconstructed it was a “general theory of education,” meaning the shaping of “dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow” people (Dewey 1944, 328). Growth and development in society, community and the individual “is the characteristic of life” (Dewey 1944, p. 53) and requires reason and intelligence. Knowing – and how we know we know – is a *process* of interacting with the world, solving problems and reducing uncertainty in a contingent world through experience, producing an organic whole, not an epistemology: “The very point of experience ... is that it doesn’t occur in a vacuum” or as an epistemological dualism (Dewey 1998 [1917], p. 50; 1998 [1897]). Acknowledging the weight he puts on these terms, *knowledge*

is thus *social*, it is *discovered and conducted* (not deducted) through *reflective experience* for Dewey. The former quest to overcome epistemology was conducted philosophically – essentially within the tradition of categorizing thought and experience (Philipse 2007), but Dewey reconstructs philosophy (and thus how we know) with and through experience in his overcoming of epistemology. He takes us a very long way from Gettier problems, sender-receiver encoding models, and consciousness-of-informing issues that an LIS epistemology engages.

Move 3: librarianship's pragmatism (why de facto?)

Floridi (2002) himself sought to separate librarianship from the philosophical search for intellectual bases because it “works at a more fundamental level than epistemology [and] to focus only on knowledge – ... its possibility and nature – introduces epistemological bias inconsistent with the real nature” of librarianship’s work (p. 41). That “real nature” of course is that “the library is both a functional and practical organization that is aimed at helping people accomplish certain things” (Budd 2008, p. 43). The general approach within librarianship inherently “do[es] not value information as an end in itself but rather for its instrumental quality as a means to the ends of knowledge acquisition” (Furner 2010, p. 189). Librarianship has a deeply ingrained regard for “useful knowledge” aimed at helping people in workaday and practical ways (Wiegand 2003, p. 371), and this of course has led to the observation (or accusation) that it is not a scholarly or academic discipline, “but rather a ‘professional’ field based on the teaching of some practical skills” (Hjørland 2014, p. 207). We have now come full circle, because this state of affairs led to coruscating critiques that librarianship is anti-theoretical (or at least blithely indifferent to research) and “relentlessly pragmatic,” often wandering into a

positivist epistemology by default (Harris 1986a, p. 515; Budd 1995). Historically, “the librarian appeared to stand alone in the ‘simplicity of his pragmatism: a rationalization of each immediate technical process by itself’ was challenge enough” (Harris 1972, p. 29). And in turn, this led to the calls referred to earlier for librarianship to become more theoretically sophisticated, including thinking through its epistemological assumptions and positions (Harris 1986a; 1986b; Budd 1995; Wiegand 1999b; Buschman 2006).

We are not however, at an aporia. So far Deweyan Pragmatism has been deployed here in its role in critiquing the history and trajectory of philosophy, and especially epistemology – and that this is of particular value to librarianship. If Pragmatism was only that, the critique that “as a philosophical tradition [it] is nothing but a method” (Wingo 1974, p. 227) would have real credibility. It is not however, and to bring this point out a (very) brief sketch of what Deweyan Pragmatism is *for* is in order. Foremost, Dewey embraced Pierce’s pragmatic rule: “any concept H means whatever consequences ensue when some operations are performed.” If there are no consequences, then the concept or term “has no meaning. To this may be added ... that if two terms involve the same consequences, they are ... identical” (Wingo 1974, p. 207). The focus on consequences emphasized “not ... the precedents but ... the possibilities of action [and] ... the value of consequences leads us to take the future into consideration” (Dewey 1998 [1925], p. 8) – future good clearly being a normative position. The whole point of philosophy was to address “how intelligence may inform action, and how action may bear the fruit of increased insight into meaning: a clear view of the values that are worth while and of the means by which they are to be made secure in experienced objects” (Dewey 1960 [1929], p. 222) – in other words, how to improve life. A method for Dewey “is simply an effective way of using material to realize some objective” (Wingo 1974, p. 182). If meaning is made in interaction and

experience, and to survive all beings must adapt by acting on their environment and responding to the consequences, consequently “to exist is to be in process, in change” (Dewey 1998 [1930], p. 24), meaning that reason/intelligence is a *process* of interacting with the world, solving problems and reducing uncertainty in it through experience producing contingent understanding (Dewey 1944; Dewey 1998 [1897]). Dewey’s epistemology as such consists of *inquiry*, conducted through beliefs (“a tentatively used tool,” “an untested and unreliable resource”), meaning (the use of tools defines and invests the tool with meaning), and concepts (“ideas that have performed reliably in prior inquiry”), moving from the less-settled to the more-settled, but always acknowledging the fallibilism of our knowledge (Nelson and Seaman 2011, p. 565).

“[S]ocial life is identical with communication” (Dewey 1944, p. 5), and humans accomplish all of this through it, so for Dewey (1998 [1897]), society as an “organic union of individuals” (p. 230) is highly dependent on cooperation and communication. The individual is realized through cooperation and community; community in turn is realized through the nurturing and growth of individuals. The conclusions for which Dewey is justly famous then follow from this construction: 1) education (conducted through thinking and reflecting on experience as he meant the terms) was our best way of de-isolating the individual by building community *and* intelligence (individual and social) together; 2) the school is thus equated with “a form of community life” and “education is the fundamental method of social progress” – growth and change being fundamental characteristics of life (Dewey 1998 [1897], pp. 230, 234); 3) “the public school should [therefore] aspire to be a microcosm of democratic community at its best” (Callan and White 2003, p. 104) because democracy has been the best means (so far) of realizing human freedom; 4) and democracy meant “freeing intelligence for independent effectiveness” through a purposeful, democratic education (Dewey 1995 [1903], p. 337).

Dewey's most famous statement on democracy is his most eloquent: "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (1944, p. 87). At a stroke, he associated democracy with his (so-called) epistemology, his concept of experience, the value of community, and a communicative, participatory concept of democracy.

What then is librarianship's Deweyan Pragmatism, and why is it *de facto*? To begin, there are those in the field of education that deploy Deweyan inquiry to unpack assumptions about educational institutions, practices, and concepts – from student records to curricula and standardized tests (Nelson and Seaman 2011). So if Dewey can be used to critique a set of institutional practices, it follows that he can be used to describe a trajectory of institutional practices if it fits the experience. Second, with full credit to the tonic of the epistemological and other critiques of LIS and librarianship noted here, there are in some of them presentist perspectives on professional habits, values and practices that appear differently – more positively – in our neoliberal age, such as equalization of resources, community, distributive justice and civic/public ends (Buschman 2003; 2012). Aside from the long tradition of practical measures like efficiency and standardization implicitly critiqued earlier, Wiegand (2015b) extensively documents the case for a Dewey-like approach in librarianship of pragmatic adaptation succinctly: "Because people do not have to use a ... library, what patrons want – and by their definition, what they need – gives them a power other civic institutions deny them and forces ... libraries to mediate competing community desires" (p. 363). In other words, librarianship interacted with its publics with a set of ideas and values, and to survive, changed them in good Deweyan fashion in light of experience. This happened time and time again, and Wiegand (2015a) extensively traces the history of these innumerable adaptations of the profession and the

institution to its publics and environment: instituting telephone and copying services in the early 20th century, collections and services to children, relenting on the discouragement of light reading like novels and adventure stories, and inventing and protecting privacy rights in the use of libraries, and navigating the inclusion over time of Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Russian, Mexican, Croatian, German, Chinese, African American, Native American, and gay, lesbian and transgender issues and literatures and stories and programs, the internet, and adapting to severe economic downturns to name only a few. “Libraries multiplied, survived, and regularly prospered ... because they perpetuated practices ... on which their users insisted” (Wiegand 2015a, p. 265). In terms of terms of professional materials and practices, “library card catalogs have mostly disappeared, all replaced by online catalogs patrons can access from home computers, iPads, and mobile phones. ... [C]omputers link patrons to huge databases of information previously scattered in ... reference books, newspapers, and periodicals” (2015a, p. 250), but there are still continuities (general quiet, Sunday as the busiest day, children’s books and services, newspapers). All of these are widespread and pragmatic adaptations to the desires of the public, and Deweyan Pragmatism best helps us to understand them.

Our history with Google reveals much the same pattern. In the early part of the 21st century librarians confronting this new resource reverted to “broccoli librarianship”: “imparting knowledge in a way that is ‘good’ (as defined by the librarian) for the patron” and falling back on bibliographic modes of thought and analysis (Benges and Brown in Vaughn and Callicott 2003, p. 11). Then came a “If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” response that recognized Google’s enormous popularity and influence and the danger of being “the 21st-century equivalent of buggy-whip makers” (Bell 2005, p. 68). Then came more soul searching over Google Scholar and its efficacy, seen as a direct threat to access to serious, scholarly information – with real

potential to democratize and open up access and teach knowledge and searching structure (Cathcart and Roberts 2005). Now, the primary resource searching capacities of Google Books is acknowledged (Mays 2015), but there are continuing worries that Google is thought of as *the* information resource, plays to student impatience, but providing good results at times that they do not sort well (Bloom and Deyrup 2015). Pragmatic accommodation and adaptation continue within the pattern of intelligent experimentation and responding to results that is the heart of Dewey's approach.

Dewey himself did not write extensively about libraries, but what he did write revealed a clear integration of their practical function and meaning within that of education in a democracy. Libraries were fully a part of the educative processes that discouraged isolation, encouraged community, knowledge growth and democracy.

Social organization depends increasingly on the ability to utilize organized knowledge competently.... The modern library stands at the cross-roads where meet together the two great currents of intellectual integration and practical application in the interests of a more unified social life. ... [A] library is not a mere depository of books, ... [it] serves a practical end, but it serves it best when practical tools and instrumentalities ... [are] sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to new and unforeseen growths. [T]he problem of ... library organization is the educational service it should render both to the general public and to the workers in special fields. But it is also connected with what goes on in schools (Dewey 1984 [1929], pp. 404-406).

In true anti-dualist fashion Dewey (1990 [1901]) clearly advocated the “cooperation of the library and the school” in the educative mission, and that “museums and art galleries [be] intermingled” with the school and library in a community (p. 234), and he largely and simply assumed that libraries and public education were fused in terms of the educative purposes in a democracy. In seeking to revise this theme, Wiegand (2015a; 2015b) acknowledges its historical centrality to the field's purpose. This is not to pound the historical experience of librarianship

into the shape of Dewey's Pragmatism (that would be antithetical to his project), but rather to recognize a fundamental set of parallels or affinities of the history of the field with his ideas.

Dewey's Pragmatism is a good fit for – and makes epistemological sense of – librarianship's history of practices and adaptations, and his thinking allows us to overcome epistemology in a partial sense. If librarianship does have an epistemology so-called, it can fairly be called

Deweyan Pragmatism, the practice of which largely continues in the workaday operations of the field.

Conclusion

Dewey certainly had his critics, and a few of the strains of criticism are acknowledged here. The first is that, in advocating a practical and scientific approach, Dewey's (1998 [1922b]) ideas veered toward a distorting “commercialism of which pragmatism is the philosophical expression” (Mumford in p. 29; Johnston 2004). In other words, an industrial and consumption-based economy fit well with his ideas, obviating his commitments to integration and democracy. The second is that, in cutting philosophy and epistemology off from the hard won knowledge of the past, it becomes ethically unmoored (Johnston 2004). There is a third strain of implicit critique. Alert readers will have noted that a choice was made in favor Dewey's Pragmatism over later the development of neo-pragmatism which honors his legacy, but takes a linguistic turn. Neo-pragmatism broadly deals with the “linguistic descriptions of [the] relations ... between beliefs, knowledge and actions,” and an anti-essentialism “which focuses on the relational character of the construction of identity” – with strong affinities to postmodernist and poststructuralist modes of thinking (Sundin and Johannisson 2005, pp. 28, 30). The claim by

Rorty, the premier neo-pragmatist, is that Dewey surreptitiously maintained a metaphysics (Curtis 2004).

Are we at a theoretical closure with Dewey? Can we be “naturalistic and pragmatic and still aspire to ‘theory’ in one or more ... senses” (McCarthy 1996, p. 340) as Deweyans? In answering, there is no question that industrial capitalism swamped Dewey’s efforts; his valorization of science-as-social-method became Big Science, with its role in the global economy to give one instance. But there is equally no question that Dewey maintained his commitments to democracy and severely critiqued the results of industrial capitalism in his day. For Dewey, commitment to democracy and community, growth and experience, education and communication *were the ethical commitments*; the philosophy and the epistemology of the past were his targets (Buschman 2012; Brosio 1972). At a theoretical level, Wiegand (2015b) makes a similar case that libraries “allow users to manifest cultural tastes that personalized the formation of morals and self-discipline and, within a larger cultural environment, contained enough room for most people to be selective in the kinds of stories and cultural forms they want” (p. 364) – again, contrasted with the priorities of IS. As for neo-pragmatism, the emphasis on language tends to evacuate any meaning from Deweyan democracy as social problem solving, along with education and epistemology-as-inquiry (Curtis 2004), tending to end up in an endless circularity of discourse analysis leading to more discourse analysis (McCarthy 1996; Buschman 2007). “Initially ... characterized by gestures of transgression, negativity, and rejection,” neo-pragmatist approaches have moved back *toward* Deweyan goals of responsibly addressing structural injustices (Bernstein 1992, p. 838). It is in that spirit that the neo-pragmatist Putnam (1989-1990) returns to the basics: Dewey believed

that there are better and worse resolutions to human predicaments [and] ... the scientific method is simply the method of experimental inquiry combined with

free and full discussion – which means in the case of social problems, the maximum use of the capacities of citizens for proposing courses of action, for testing them, and for evaluating the results. And, in my view, that is all that Dewey really needs to assume (p. 1682).

Dewey gives us a practical theory in librarianship that both describes the operation of the field in historical and contemporary terms, but also plausibly justifies its *raison d'État* and overcomes – at least contingently – many of the thorny problems of LIS epistemologies.

References

- Andersen, J. (2005), “Information criticism: where is it?”, *Progressive Librarian*, Issue No. 25, pp. 12-22.
- Bell, S. (2005), “Submit or resist: librarianship in the age of Google: we must put user education at the forefront of our efforts to avoid marginalization”, *American Libraries*, Vol. 36 No. 9, pp. 68-71.
- Benoît, G. (2002), “Toward a critical theoretic perspective in information systems”, *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 72 No. 4, pp. 441-471.
- Bernstein, R.J. (1987), “The varieties of pluralism”, *American Journal of Education*, Vol. 95 No. 4, pp. 509-525.
- Bernstein, R.J. (1992), “The resurgence of Pragmatism”, *Social Research*, Vol. 59 No. 4, 813-840.
- Blair, D.C. (2003), “Information retrieval and the philosophy of language”, *Annual Review of Information Science and Technology*, Vol. 37 No. 1, pp. 3-50.
- Bloom, B., and Deyrup, M.M. (2015), “The SHU research logs: student online search behaviors trans-scripted”, *Journal of Academic Librarianship*, Vol. 41 No. 5, pp. 593-601.
- Brosio, R.A. (1972), *The Relationship of Dewey's Pedagogy to his Concept of Community*, University of Michigan School of Education, Ann Arbor.
- Brosio, R.A. (1975), *Professors, Students, and Some Enduring Concerns in the West*, Ball State University, Muncie, IN.

- Buckland, M.K. (2005), Review of The Philosophy of Information, Special issue of *Library Trends* edited by Ken Herold, *Journal of Documentation*, Vol. 61 No. 5, pp. 684-686.
- Budd, J.M. (1995), "An epistemological foundation for library and information science", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 65 No. 3, pp. 295-318.
- Budd, J.M. (2001), *Knowledge and Knowing in Library and Information science: A Philosophical Framework*, Scarecrow Press, Lanham, MD.
- Budd, J.M. (2008), *Self-examination: The Present and Future of Librarianship*, Libraries Unlimited, Westport, CT.
- Buschman, J. (2003), *Dismantling the Public Sphere: Situating and Sustaining Librarianship in the Age of the New Public Philosophy*, Libraries Unlimited, Westport, CT.
- Buschman, J. (2006), "The integrity and obstinacy of intellectual creations': Jürgen Habermas and librarianship's theoretical literature", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 76 No. 3, pp. 270-299.
- Buschman, J. (2007), "Transgression or stasis? Challenging Foucault in LIS theory", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 77 No. 1, pp. 21-44.
- Buschman, J. (2012), *Libraries, Classrooms, and the Interests of Democracy: Marking the Limits of Neoliberalism*, Rowman & Littlefield/ Scarecrow, Lanham, MD.
- Buschman, J. (2016), "On the political nature of library leadership", *The Political Librarian*, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 28-40, available at: <http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/pollib/vol2/iss1/9> (accessed April 29, 2016).
- Buschman, J. (forthcoming), "The library in the life of the public: implications of a neoliberal age", *Library Quarterly*.
- Callan, E. and White, J. (2003), "Liberalism and communitarians", in Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R.D., and Standish, P. (Eds.), *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education*, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 95-109.
- Carlin, A.P. (2014), Review of *Theories of Information, Communication, and Knowledge: A Multidisciplinary Approach* edited by Fidelia Ibekwe-SanJuan and Thomas M. Dousa, *Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology*, Vol. 65 No. 6, pp. 1299-1302.
- Cathcart, R., and Roberts, A. (2005), "Evaluating Google Scholar as a tool for information literacy", *Internet Reference Services Quarterly*, Vol. 10 No. 3/4, pp. 167-176.
- Curtis, D.B. (2004), "The philosopher as intellectual historian and the irony of Rorty's hypothetical Dewey", *Journal of Thought*, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 27-41.

- Dewey, J. (1944), *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, Free Press, New York.
- Dewey, J. (1960 [1929]), "The construction of good", in Konvitz, M.R. and Kennedy, G. (Eds.), *The American Pragmatists: Selected Writings*, Meridian Books, New York, pp. 201-225.
- Dewey, J. (1970 [1938]), "Ultimate values or aims", in Brown, L.M. (Ed.), *Aims of Education*, Teachers College Press, New York, pp. 50-56.
- Dewey, J. (1984 [1929]), "Introduction to Henry Evelyn Bliss's *The Organization of Knowledge and the System of the Sciences*", in Boydston, J.A. (Ed.), *The later works, 1925-1953, Vol. 5*, by John Dewey, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, IL, pp. 404-406.
- Dewey, J. (1990 [1901]), "Social aspects of education", in Boydston, J.A. (Ed.), *The later works, 1925-1953, Vol. 17*, by John Dewey, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, IL, pp. 226-241.
- Dewey, J. (1995 [1903]), "Democracy in education", in Stevens, E. and Wood, G.H. (Eds.), *Justice, Ideology, and Education: An Introduction to the Social Foundations of Education*, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, pp. 337-344.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1897]), "My pedagogic creed", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 229-235.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1907]), "What Pragmatism means by 'practical'", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 377-386.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1911]), "The problem of truth", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 101-130.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1917]), "The need for a recovery of philosophy", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 46-70.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1922a]), "The place of habit in conduct", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 24-49.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1922b]), "Pragmatic America", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 29-32.

- Dewey, J. (1998 [1925]), "The development of American Pragmatism", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 3-13.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1930]), "What I believe", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 22-28.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1933a]), "Analysis of reflective thinking", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 137-144.
- Dewey, J. (1998 [1933b]), "The place of judgment in reflective activity", in Hickman, L.A. and Alexander, T.M. (Eds.), *The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp. 145-150.
- Dick, A.L. (1995), "Library and information science as a social science: neutral and normative conceptions", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 65 No. 2, pp. 216-235.
- Dick, A.L. (1999), "Epistemological positions and library and information science", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 69 No. 3, pp. 305-323.
- Dick, A.L. (2013). "Why epistemology matters", *Information Development*, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 7-9.
- Elmborg, J. (2006), "The other Dewey: John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*", in Gibson, C. (Ed.), *Student Engagement and Information Literacy*, Association of College and Research Libraries, Chicago, pp. 1-15.
- Fallis, D. (2006), "Social epistemology and information science", *Annual Review of Information Science and Technology*, Vol. 40 No. 1, pp. 475-519.
- Fisher, K.E., Erdelez, S., and McKechnie, L. (2005), *Theories of Information Behavior*, Information Today, Medford, NJ.
- Floridi, L. (2002), "On defining library and information science as applied philosophy of information," *Social Epistemology*, Vol 16 No. 1, pp. 37-49.
- Floridi, L. (2015), "Semantic conceptions of information", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, in Zalta, E.N. (Ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/information-semantic/> (accessed March 27, 2016).
- Furner, J. (2004), "Information studies without information", *Library Trends*, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 427-446.

- Furner, J. (2010), "Philosophy and information studies", *Annual Review of Information Science and Technology*, Vol. 44 No. 1, pp. 159-200.
- Harris, M.H. (1972), "The purpose of the American public library in historical perspective: a revisionist interpretation", [Microfiche]. ERIC Document: ED071668.
- Harris, M.H. (1986a), "The dialectic of defeat: antimonies in research in library and information science", *Library Trends*, Vol. 34 No. 3, pp. 515-531.
- Harris, M.H. (1986b), "State, class, and cultural reproduction: toward a theory of library service in the United States", *Advances in Librarianship*, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 211-251.
- Harris, M.H., Hannah, S.A. and Harris, P.C. (1998), *Into the Future: The Foundations of Library and Information Services in the Post-Industrial Era*, 2nd ed., Ablex Pub. Corp., Norwood, N.J.
- Harris, R. (2009), "'Their little bit of ground slowly squashed into nothing': technology, gender, and the vanishing librarian", in Leckie, G.L. and Buschman, J.E. (Eds.), *Information Technology in Librarianship: New Critical Approaches*, Libraries Unlimited, Westport, CT, pp. 165-179.
- Hjørland, B. (2004), "Arguments for philosophical realism in library and information science", *Library Trends*, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 488-506.
- Hjørland, B. (2005), "Empiricism, rationalism and positivism in library and information science", *Journal of Documentation*, Vol. 61 No. 1, pp. 130-155.
- Hjørland, B. (2014), "Information science and its core concepts: levels of disagreement", in Ibekwe-SanJuan, F. and Dousa, T.M. (Eds), *Theories of Information, Communication and Knowledge: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 205-235.
- Hofstadter, R. (1989), *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It*, Knopf, New York.
- Huemer, M., and Audi, R. (2002), *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings*, Routledge, London.
- Johnston, J.S. (2004), "Authority, inquiry, and education: a response to Dewey's critics", *Educational Studies*, Vol. 35 No. 3, pp. 230-247.
- Jones, B. (2008), "Reductionism and library and information science philosophy", *Journal of Documentation*, Vol. 64 No. 4, pp. 482-495.
- Leckie, G. J. (1996), "Desperately seeking citations: uncovering faculty assumptions about the undergraduate research", *Journal of Academic Librarianship*, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 201-208.

- Malcolm, N. (2003), "The groundlessness of belief", in Pojman, L.P. (Ed.), *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology*, Wadsworth/Thomson, Belmont, CA, pp. 391-399.
- Mays, D. A. (2015), "Google Books", *Public Libraries*, Vol. 54 No. 5, pp. 23-26.
- McCarthy, T. (1996), "Critical theory and postmodernism: a response to David Hoy", in Rasmussen, D.M. (Ed.), *Handbook of Critical Theory*, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 339-368.
- Nelson, P. and Seaman, J. (2011), "Deweyan tools for inquiry and the epistemological context of critical pedagogy", *Educational Studies*, Vol. 47 No. 6, pp. 561-582.
- Pawley, C. (1998), "Hegemony's handmaid? The library and information studies curriculum from a class perspective", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 68 No. 2, pp. 123-144.
- Peters, J.D. (1989), "Satan and savior: mass communication in Progressive thought", *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 247-263.
- Philipse, H. (2007), "Overcoming epistemology", in Leiter, B. and Rosen, M. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 334-379.
- Putnam, H. (1989-1990), "A reconsideration of Deweyan democracy", *Southern California Law Review*, Vol. 63 No. 1, pp. 1671-1697.
- Sidorsky, D. (1977), "Introduction", in Sidorsky, D. (Ed.), *John Dewey: The Essential Writings*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, pp. vii-lv.
- Sundin, O., and Johannisson, J. (2005), "Pragmatism, neo-pragmatism and sociocultural theory: communicative participation as a perspective in LIS", *Journal of Documentation*, Vol. 61 No.1, pp. 23-43.
- Trosow, S. E. (2001), "Standpoint epistemology as an alternative methodology for library and information science.", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 71 No. 3, pp. 360-382.
- Van Gulick, R. (2014), "Consciousness", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, in Zalta, E.N. (Ed.), available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consciousness> (accessed March 27, 2016).
- Vaughn, D., and Callicott, B. (2003). "Broccoli librarianship and Google-bred patrons, or what's wrong with usability Testing?", *College & Undergraduate Libraries*, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 1-18.
- Webster, F. (2002), "The information society revisited", in Lievrouw, L. and Livingstone, S. (Eds.), *Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping and Consequences of ICTs*, Sage, London, pp. 22-33.
- West, C. (1999), *The Cornel West Reader*, Basic Books, New York.

- Wiegand, W.A. (1999a), "The structure of librarianship: essay on an information profession," *Canadian Journal of Information and Library Science*, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 17-37.
- Wiegand, W.A. (1999b), "Tunnel vision and blind spots: what the past tells us about the present; reflections on the twentieth-century history of American librarianship", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 69 No. 1, pp. 1-32.
- Wiegand, W.A. (2003), "To reposition a research agenda: what American Studies can teach the LIS community about the library in the life of the user", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 73 No. 4, pp. 369-382
- Wiegand, W.A. (2015a), *Part of Our Lives: A People's History of the American Public Library*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Wiegand, W.A. (2015b), "'Tunnel vision and blind spots' reconsidered: *Part of Our Lives* (2015) as a test case", *Library Quarterly*, Vol. 85 No. 4, pp. 347-370.
- Wingo, G.M. (1974), *Philosophies of Education: An Introduction*, D.C. Heath, Lexington, MA.
- Wolin, S.S. (2004), *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.