



'Opening for business'? Neoliberalism and the cultural politics of modernising planning in Scotland

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3 **‘Opening for business’? Neoliberalism and the cultural politics of modernising**
4 **planning in Scotland**
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8 **Abstract**
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11 In this paper I explore how the culture of land-use planning in Scotland has been
12 targeted as an object of modernising reform, exploring how ‘culture change’
13 initiatives played a prominent role in stabilizing a new settlement around ‘open for
14 business’ planning between 2006-12, containing potential tensions between diverse
15 goals to make planning more efficient, inclusive and integrative. This highlights the
16 potentially significant role of governance cultures in containing tensions and securing
17 consent to processes of state restructuring. I therefore argue that greater empirical
18 attentiveness to the cultural micro-politics of state restructuring can improve
19 understanding of complex, contemporary dynamics of change, and the contested role
20 of the neoliberal hegemonic project in reshaping urban governance. I conclude by
21 arguing that the continued power of neoliberal critiques of the inefficiency of land-use
22 planning indicate a need to acknowledge and engage contemporary cultural battles
23 over the purposes of planning and urban governance.
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40 **Keywords:** planning cultures , neoliberalism , planning reform , politics , Scotland
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45 **Introduction: ‘planning cultures’ in neoliberal times?**
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48 Attempts to reform urban planning systems and processes have become commonplace
49 across many states, attesting to a pervasive view of planning as out of step with the
50 requirements of ‘modern’ forms of government. The increasing frequency of such
51 initiatives, and the negative rhetoric that often accompanies them, suggest a
52 widespread loss of faith in the ability of state planning agencies to steer urban
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3 development in the public interest. Explanations of such reforms often suggest that
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5 planning ideas and practices have been under sustained ideological attack, subject to
6
7 hostile processes of neoliberalisation (e.g. Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014;
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10 Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013).

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12 The last forty years have undoubtedly seen a series of distinctive shifts in urban
13
14 governance that have affected states and cities globally, albeit in highly differentiated
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16 ways: commitments to market mechanisms, the fostering of entrepreneurial values
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18 and inter-urban competition have become familiar planks of a new common-sense
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20 that has been widely if unevenly installed across diverse settings and sectors. In the
21
22 global north this has been accompanied by sustained critique of images of the *planned*
23
24 economy and ‘failed’ post-war state settlements that needed to be dismantled,
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26 justifying extended processes of regulatory restructuring, including planning reform.
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28 Yet, neoliberalism remains a contested keyword within contemporary urban
29
30 scholarship where debate continues about its value as a meta-narrative of urban
31
32 political transformation and its capacity to explain (and enable intervention in)
33
34 complex processes of change (e.g. Blanco et al, 2014; Peck, 2013; Brenner et al, 2010;
35
36 Barnett, 2010; Collier, 2012).

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39 Particular concerns have been raised about the tendency for promiscuous use to
40
41 present neoliberalism as a universal and monolithic force, inflating claims about its
42
43 power, efficacy and coherence (Brenner et al, 2010; Peck, 2013). For critics, political
44
45 economy interpretations subsume too much under the rubric ‘neoliberal’, thereby
46
47 obscuring other significant vectors of social and political transformation (Barnett,
48
49 2009; Collier, 2012). Scholars committed to the necessity of neoliberalism as a
50
51 descriptor for both broad historical tendencies and specific local transformations,
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53 stress its uneven and variegated nature, arguing for empirical analyses sensitive to
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3 contingent, contested and geographically diverse trajectories of neoliberalisation (e.g.
4
5 Brenner et al, 2010; Peck, 2013). Notwithstanding certain conceptual tensions, such
6
7 work has sought points of overlap between various distinct theoretical and
8
9 methodological approaches to the study of neoliberalism, e.g. as hegemonic ideology,
10
11 governmental rationality or policy regime (Larner, 2000; Peck, 2013; Newman, 2014).
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15 An increasingly common stress has been placed on exploring neoliberalisation as a
16
17 process rather than an accomplished project, requiring forms of analysis sensitive to
18
19 the ways in which dominant discourses and rationalities interact with older residual,
20
21 or newer emergent ideas and practices, unevenly provoking contestation,
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23 accommodation and evolving hybrid formations in different times and places (Clarke,
24
25 2008; Newman, 2014). This has led to calls for scholarship better attuned to the
26
27 distinctive and complex ways in which various pressures for change, including
28
29 neoliberal logics, come to be articulated together (Peck, 2013), moving beyond: “the
30
31 failure of neoliberal narratives to grapple with the politics of how and why particular
32
33 regimes emerge and become embedded across localities; and point[ing] to the
34
35 possibility of alternative explanations that infuse accounts of neoliberalism with
36
37 agency, politics, meaning and affect” (Blanco et al, 2014: 3130)
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43 There are significant overlaps here, with recent interest in exploring ‘planning
44
45 cultures’ (Sanyal, 2005). Indeed, the concept of planning culture has been framed in
46
47 response to concerns that neoliberalism and globalisation are promoting
48
49 homogenizing changes, prompting questions about the extent to which locally
50
51 embedded cultures –bundles of planning ideas and practices- might variously enable
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53 local resistance or accommodation to global pressures for change (Sanyal, 2005).
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3 Questions about contemporary processes of planning reform, neoliberalization, and
4 their impacts on planning cultures are given further significance in the context of the
5 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) from 2007 onwards. Lovering (2010) points to the
6 complicity of mainstream planning ideas and practices in the production of a crisis
7 that developed from speculative bubbles in land and property, highlighting the
8 importance of understanding of the status of planning cultures and the complex ways
9 in which they are shaped and reshaped within contemporary regimes of spatial
10 governance. That what looked like a profound crisis of neoliberalism came to be
11 widely stabilised around a politics of public austerity heightens the need for such
12 analysis. As yet, however, there has been little attempt to explicitly consider the
13 effects of the GFC and the politics of putatively neoliberal reforms on planning
14 cultures (though see Grange, 2014).
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30 This paper seeks to address this gap by exploring the cultural politics of planning
31 reform in Scotland, examining how two key discourses, 'modernisation' and 'culture
32 change', targeted particular ideas and practices in order to shape a new settlement
33 around the role and purpose of land-use planning in Scotland. Overall, I argue that
34 this new settlement has been strongly disciplined by neoliberal and managerial logics,
35 producing a particular, narrow definition of 'open for business' planning whose
36 dominance was reinforced rather than undermined by the effects of crisis and
37 austerity.
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49 The paper therefore makes three key contributions: Firstly, it provides an empirical
50 case study of the normalisation of neoliberal and managerial disciplines and their
51 impact on cultures of urban planning and governance in post-GFC Scotland. Secondly,
52 the paper highlights important limitations in existing research on i) planning cultures,
53 that has not yet paid sufficient attention to the political (re)construction of planning
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3 ideas and practices, and ii) the neoliberalisation of planning ideas and practices,
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5 which has not yet paid sufficient attention to the cultural dimensions of political-
6
7 ideological change. Thirdly, this leads me to argue more generally for greater
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9 attentiveness to cultural dimensions of state restructuring at micro-political levels
10
11 where the state operates as a ‘peopled process’ (Peck, 2001); providing a means of
12
13 understanding often overlooked dimensions of change, and generating insights into
14
15 how broader hegemonic projects like neoliberalism reshape urban governance. In
16
17 particular I suggest this focus illuminates how consent and resistance to such projects
18
19 are actively produced and managed as part of the process of reshaping local regimes
20
21 or settlements. Whilst this case highlights the significant role governance cultures can
22
23 play in containing what Newman (2014) describes as the ‘landscapes of antagonism’
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25 that characterise local governance, I end by also considering some possible resources
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27 from which resistance to further neoliberalizing reforms might be imagined.
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32 **Politicising planning cultures, ‘culturing’ of the politics of planning**

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35 Sanyal (2005) describes planning cultures as complex, emergent formations,
36
37 constantly in flux they are shaped by a wide range of influences, including global and
38
39 local politics. However, interest in planning cultures has tended to focus on the value
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41 and conceptual clarity of the concept for international comparative research and
42
43 explaining planning practices in different national contexts (e.g. Othengrafen and
44
45 Reimer, 2013; Taylor, 2014). Whilst usefully acknowledging the dynamics through
46
47 which planning regimes are related to broader socio-political processes, this work has
48
49 not been centrally concerned with understanding the cultural-political transformation
50
51 of planning ideas and practices in recent decades. As a result it has tended to develop
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53 separately from accounts of the neoliberalisation of planning and urban governance.
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3 Drawing on wider debates from geography and urban studies, analyses of the
4 neoliberalization of planning often posit the clear influence of neoliberal ideology,
5 rationalities and policies but continue to debate the *extent* to which they have
6 transformed planning ideas and practices (e.g. Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014;
7 Allmendinger and Haughton, 2013). Sager (2014) for example highlights the ways in
8 which different ideological influences (neoliberalism, participatory democracy,
9 environmentalism) may be coarticulated in urban plans, problematising any
10 straightforward reading of neoliberal hegemony in planning practice. Whilst
11 recognising that ideas of planning and neoliberalism are not mutually exclusive,
12 Baeten (2012) highlights continued points of tension between neoliberal ideology and
13 contemporary ideas of planning, suggesting the importance of remaining attentive to
14 the complexity of ongoing processes of ideological change (and perhaps explaining
15 the recent ubiquity of attempts to reform planning systems). As yet, however, studies
16 of the neoliberalisation of planning have not foregrounded the *cultural* dimensions of
17 such changes, i.e. whether and how neoliberal ideas have been accepted as a new
18 ruling common-sense. For example, Sager's (2011) comprehensive review of
19 neoliberalism and planning does not explicitly consider the political-cultural
20 transformation of planning ideas and practices as a dimension of neoliberalisation.
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24 The overlooking of cultural dimensions of state restructuring arguably reflects wider
25 tendencies in accounts of neoliberalisation that often either present a largely
26 'unpeopled process' of systemic change or imply a pervasive power to produce
27 compliant neoliberal subjects (Barnet, 2010). This has generated calls to explore the
28 complex and uneven ways in which governance cultures are challenged and changed
29 as various actors exercise agency within the 'fields of antagonism' generated by
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3 interactions between various governmental and political projects (Newman, 2014;
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5 Blanco et al, 2014).
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8 In this section of the paper I have established that: 1. there is a need to (re)politicise
9
10 research on planning cultures and 2. to fully understand the extent and nature of
11
12 neoliberal hegemony there is a need to bring a cultural dimension to analysis of both
13
14 planning reform and wider processes of state restructuring. In the section below I
15
16 outline a set of conceptual tools to analyse the cultural politics of planning reform in
17
18 Scotland.
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21 22 **Approaching the cultural politics of planning in neoliberal times** 23

24
25 If neoliberalism remains a problematic concept, for present purposes I follow Hall
26
27 (2011) in treating it as provisional if rather unsatisfactory shorthand for both a broad
28
29 historical era (from the 1970s onwards), and the uneven roll-out in particular domains
30
31 of a “political-cultural project that *aims at* transnational hegemony” (Clarke, 2008,
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33 137, emphasis added); foregrounding the ways in which neoliberal discourses and
34
35 rationalities interact with planning (or other) ideas and practices, unevenly provoking
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37 contestation, accommodation and new hybrid formations across different times and
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39 places.
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44 If hegemony is understood as the tendency towards dominance of a bundle of ideas,
45
46 producing consent to a ruling common-sense, it is also a process that must be actively
47
48 constructed and reconstructed (Hall, 1988). Hegemonic projects seek to establish new
49
50 settlements in which certain aspects of cultural formations (bundles of ideas, social
51
52 relations, identities and material practices) are problematized whilst others are linked
53
54 together, naturalised and depoliticised. Working to reshape a previously established
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56 settlement is always an uneven process, creating scope for various forms of co-
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3 optation and resistance (ibid). Hegemony is therefore also always an incomplete
4
5 process, as a result, it is important to develop modes of critical analysis that are
6
7 sensitive to challenges, tensions and fractures: the politics of neoliberalization (Clarke,
8
9 2008). It is also therefore important to pay attention to specific local practices, the
10
11 sites where those politics are enacted; not assuming the presence of a stable pattern of
12
13 domination but instead a series of locations where global strategies are being actively
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15 forged and potentially re-worked.
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19 Since the field of government is typically contested, a space where various agendas
20
21 struggle for influence, Newman (2014) and Clarke (2008) argue that analysis must
22
23 remain attentive to the ways in which various governmental projects are assembled
24
25 together. Thus whilst, dominant conceptions of state modernisation have been
26
27 strongly shaped by neoliberal logics that promote, for example, the superiority of the
28
29 private over the public, they have also been influenced by other more or less
30
31 compatible logics. It is therefore crucial to develop modes of analysis that can trace
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33 the complex ways in which such logics are stitched together as part of processes of
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35 state restructuring.
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39 Prevaling definitions of planning are always political-ideological constructs. The role
40
41 and purpose of an activity like planning has historically been strongly influenced but
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43 not necessarily determined by powerful ideas about the nature and appropriate role of
44
45 state intervention in society. These ideas shape particular rationalities about the best
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47 ways to govern, imposing particular forms of discipline that define what is considered
48
49 acceptable and unacceptable. Some discourses, may attain particular power, what Peet
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51 (2002) terms *hegemonic depth* and *extent* through their wide circulation and
52
53 regulatory force, becoming important determinants of a prevailing common-sense.
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3 Planning systems are typically charged with mediating society's contradictory desires
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5 for land-use, reconciling potential tensions between diverse goals, for example, to
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7 enable free-markets in land and property whilst ensuring that spatial development is
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9 subject to democratic control, does not damage valued environments, or can be
10
11 steered to ensure positive social outcomes (Gunder, 2015). As a result they can be
12
13 understood as potential 'fields of antagonism' (Newman, 2014) where different
14
15 governmental projects may co-exist, promoting competing conceptions of state
16
17 intervention in spatial development.
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21 In the rest of the paper I draw on these conceptual guidelines to analyse the reform of
22
23 land-use planning in Scotland which has been presented as a necessary process of
24
25 'modernisation' for a system that was no longer 'fit for purpose'. In the sections that
26
27 follow, I draw on a two-stage research project conducted in 2011-2012 that
28
29 investigated how the 'culture' of planning in Scotland became a particular object of
30
31 governmental attention as reforms were implemented from 2006 onwards.
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35 The first stage involved interviews and documentary analysis conducted at the
36
37 national level to understand how the 'modernisation' and 'culture change' agendas
38
39 were framed, the key influences shaping them, and how key stakeholders understood
40
41 the changes required. In total, twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted at
42
43 this stage with representatives of the Scottish Government and its key agencies,
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45 planning professional and development industry bodies and environmental and
46
47 community organisations.
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51 Following this, a case study was conducted at local government level, examining the
52
53 effects of modernisation and culture change on planning practices in the City of
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55 Edinburgh Council (CEC), chosen as an example of a local authority that positively
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3 embraced a ‘culture change’ in its approach to planning and development (CEC,
4
5 2008a)ⁱ. At this stage a further fifteen interviews were conducted with: local authority
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7 planners working in both plan-making and development management; development
8
9 professionals working in the city; elected officials; community organisations; and
10
11 officers working in other council services (housing, regeneration, economic
12
13 development). In addition documentary analysis of key council publications and local
14
15 and national press reports were used as a means of further verifying and deepening
16
17 the findings.
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20 21 **Examining the discourses of modernisation and culture change**

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23
24 Use of the discourse of ‘modernisation’ positions the planning reform agenda in
25
26 Scotland as part of the wider reform of public administration that has characterised
27
28 state restructuring in many locations in recent years. As Finlayson (2003, 67) argues,
29
30 however, modernisation is a purely performative term that has no fixed real-world
31
32 referent and only becomes meaningful through its articulation in particular concrete
33
34 contexts. It packages change as a positive necessity, validating certain images of what
35
36 modern government looks like. However, in doing so it also acts as a strategy of
37
38 problematisation, contrasting a desirable future state with a status quo that needs to be
39
40 reformed since it is somehow old-fashioned or out of step with the requirements of
41
42 the modern world. Modernisation can therefore be understood as a key discursive
43
44 stake in the reform of ideas of planning in Scotland, where the power to determine
45
46 what constitutes ‘modern planning’ determines necessary change.
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52 The importance of locally situated governance cultures to processes of state
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54 restructuring has been increasingly recognised by those who manage change
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56 programmes within the public sector through ‘culture change’ initiatives (Du Gay,
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3 2000; Hall, 2011). Mirroring developments in other places, it was widely claimed that
4
5 a 'culture change' was required to achieve the goals of planning reform in Scotland,
6
7 particularly amongst professional planners in the public sector (e.g. Scottish
8
9 Government, 2005).
10

11
12 The discourse of culture change is drawn from theories of organisational change, part
13
14 of the translation of private sector managerial practices into the public sector in recent
15
16 decades. It is premised on the idea that successful organisations secure commitment to
17
18 their goals by shaping a shared sense of purpose. In this regard the culture change that
19
20 accompanied reform of the planning system in Scotland can be interpreted as an
21
22 attempt to shape consent to the common-sense of a modernized planning system.
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26 Culture change therefore entails the definition of 'culture' as an object of
27
28 governmental attention. As with the logic of modernisation, this involves the
29
30 construction of a particular set of problems (the old planning culture), images of a
31
32 desirable end state (the modern planning culture) and a series of mechanisms to
33
34 generate the changes required. Whilst presented as a politically neutral managerial
35
36 technology, culture change is perhaps better viewed as an extension of the politics of
37
38 modernisation - a means of bringing the ideas, practices and identities of planners,
39
40 particularly the public sector workforce, into line with the rationalities of 'modern
41
42 planning'.
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46 If the discourses of modernisation and culture change operate to redefine how
47
48 different planning ideas and practices are constructed and understood, a key task
49
50 for critical analysis is to explore how these stakes have been shaped and the
51
52 extent to which they have succeeded in forging a new common-sense, securing
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54 commitment to new ways of thinking and acting. In the sections below I therefore
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1
2
3 go on to examine how modernisation and culture change came to be defined
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5 through the planning reform process in Scotland.
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8 **Devolution, neoliberalisation and governance cultures in Scotland**

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11 A failed independence referendum in September 2014, devolution and the
12 reopening of a Scottish Parliament at Holyrood in 1999 have generated
13 considerable debate about the extent to which patterns of governance change in
14 Scotland have converged or diverged from a set of shared historical roots as part
15 of the United Kingdom (UK) (e.g. Keating, 2005). It has been widely asserted
16 that Scotland has a distinctive governance culture, relatively more corporatist,
17 interventionist and politically pluralistic than the rest of the UK (Lloyd and Peel,
18 2009). However, this broad characterisation is contested, with critics arguing that
19 a myth has grown up about Scotland's continued commitment to an
20 interventionist public sector and welfare state.
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34 Miller (2010), for example, argues that assertions of national distinctiveness have
35 prevented effective analysis of the neoliberalisation of government and society in
36 Scotland; drawing attention away from how successive 'modernising
37 governments' in both Westminster and Holyrood have emphasised economic
38 competitiveness as an overriding goal. This approach has continued under
39 Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) governments since 2007, where despite social
40 democratic rhetoric, government policy has arguably deepened neoliberal
41 commitments in key ways (e.g. through the pursuit of economic competitiveness
42 and commitment to low corporation tax rates) (Davidson et al, 2016).
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55 These debates highlight that the disarticulation of a previous social democratic
56 settlement and its replacement by any putative neoliberal settlement remains a
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3 politically significant question in a devolved Scotland and provide some broad
4
5 context within which to consider the cultural politics of planning reform.
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8 **Landscapes of antagonism and the definition of a ‘modern’ planning culture**

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11 In Scotland, planning reform began to be discussed before devolution and continues
12
13 to the present, encompassing the first primary planning legislation passed by the
14
15 Scottish parliament in 2006 (Lloyd and Peel, 2009, 110 contains a useful summary
16
17 table of key events).
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21 By comparison with successive waves of planning reform in England which have
22
23 been marked by strong, negative rhetoric and repeated attempts to deal with a
24
25 “broken system” (e.g. Inch, 2012), language in Scotland has generally been less
26
27 strident, perhaps indicating a broader acceptance of the value of the planning
28
29 system as a part of the governance landscape. However, the need for reform was
30
31 also widely accepted:
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35 The commitment to modernisation stemmed from a common perception...that
36
37 the planning system is not serving Scotland well. (Scottish Government, 2005)
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41 If reform reflected a view amongst a wide range of stakeholders that the system
42
43 required change, how to interpret that change was nonetheless contested.
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47 In the build up to the passing of new legislation three key justifications were
48
49 presented for ‘modernisation’, each corresponding to key principles of wider public
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51 service and planning reform – *efficiency, integration and inclusion* - and responding
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53 to distinctive political pressures:
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3 1. Drawing on the hegemonic depth and weight of powerful neoliberal critiques
4 of state planning, right-wing think tanks and the development industry had
5 lobbied strongly that the key problem with the existing system was its
6 *inefficiency*, lack of responsiveness to market pressures and overly-restrictive
7 regulatory approach (e.g. McKay, 2004).
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- 9
10 2. From within the public sector, including elements of the planning profession
11 meanwhile, others argued that the planning system had become too inward-
12 looking and insufficiently responsive to the spatial needs of other government
13 services. In response it needed to become a proactive force for strategic
14 *integration* of the spatial impacts of public and private decision-makers.
15
- 16 3. Finally, community groups and environmental lobbies argued that the system
17 was remote and unresponsive to wider democratic pressures. They therefore
18 argued for a heightened commitment to the inclusion of wider publics in
19 decision-making.
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35 Efficiency, integration and inclusion therefore provided distinctive problematisations
36 of the existing planning system and concrete images of what a modernised planning
37 system and culture might look like. Each of these keywords, also however, *potentially*
38 pointed towards different interpretations of modern planning, entailing the
39 development of distinctive and potentially incompatible planning cultures, depending
40 on how they were interpreted and combined together.
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49 For example, neoliberal commitments to enabling free-markets are not necessarily
50 incompatible with limited forms of tokenistic public participation to legitimate
51 decisions with a veneer of inclusion. However, the aim of speeding up decision-
52 making in the interests of economic efficiency is likely to work against more
53 substantive commitments to participatory (and representative) democratic processes,
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3 potentially generating political tensions. The interpretation of these terms would
4
5 therefore prove crucial to the shaping of a new settlement to govern planning's field
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7 of potential antagonisms.
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10 **'Open for business' planning: towards a settlement around efficiency?**

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13 Many of those interviewed recognised efficiency concerns as the primary driver of
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15 modernisation:
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18 When we started the planning reform journey, our perception was that
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20 planning was seen as a barrier to development – full stop (National Civil
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22 Servant)
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26 Driven by a strong critique of the cost and inefficiency of public-sector bureaucracies,
27
28 the discourse of efficiency has been a key driver of reforms to public services and
29
30 planning systems across the worldⁱⁱ. Though the pursuit of efficiency is not
31
32 necessarily neoliberal, it has been a key strategy of neoliberal problematisation that
33
34 has arguably attained both hegemonic depth and extent (c.f. Gunder, 2015). Its logic
35
36 suggests that making planning processes more efficient by reducing unnecessary 'red-
37
38 tape' will free the market to deliver the development on which sustainable economic
39
40 growth relies (though, despite being consistently asserted, evidence that inefficiency
41
42 is a major issue or that this strategy has led to more or better development is limited,
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44 see Adams and Watkins, 2014).
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49 Scottish Governments have consistently sought to present themselves as "*open for*
50
51 *business*" and have therefore been concerned to address perceived barriers to
52
53 economic competitiveness. Increasingly well-organised development industry lobbies
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55 were therefore well-placed to raise concerns about the planning system:
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3 In the last few years we've established direct communication with... the
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5 Ministers who in the SNP understand how important planning is, also
6
7 understand how important construction and house building is as a part of the
8
9 economy... So we've gone from a position 10 or 15 years ago of being the
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11 outsider... seen as the enemy of the system, to being part of the fabric of how
12
13 the system's run. (Development Industry Representative)
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17 The efficiency of the planning system was given particular priority following the
18
19 election of the first SNP minority administration in 2007 and the onset of the GFC.
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21 First Minister Alex Salmond's newly appointed Scottish Council of Economic
22
23 Advisors devoted their first session to investigating planning as a potential blockage
24
25 to the government's key priority of fostering "*sustainable economic growth*".
26
27
28

29 The long-standing equation of public sector practices with inefficiency and waste
30
31 meant there were a range of managerial technologies available through which the
32
33 problem of *inefficiency* could be addressed (arguably contrasting with a lack of tools
34
35 for addressing the challenges of inclusion and integration). For example, planners and
36
37 local authority managers were familiar with the idea that their work was a 'service'
38
39 that needed to be responsive to the needs of its 'customers' and whose 'performance'
40
41 could (and even should) be measured and rendered subject to disciplinary pressures
42
43 for 'continuous improvement' in various ways, including, through attentiveness to
44
45 performance targets that principally measured the speed of decision-making:
46
47
48

49 What it does do is, it puts pressure on us to perform. Again, personally I don't
50
51 have a big problem with that. I think as with any kind of profession, we need
52
53 to continue to improve our performance – as simple as that. Some of the
54
55 figures we've got are pretty bad... I personally think we've got a five-year
56
57
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1
2
3 window to try and show that we actually can make that progress. (Planning
4
5 Profession Representative)
6
7

8 As the quotation suggests, the discourse of efficiency assumed a powerful disciplinary
9
10 role, intensified by a perception that the political status of planning in Scotland was
11
12 fragile, under threat if not under attack.
13
14

15 A key symbol of the dominance of efficiency concerns as a means of proving that
16
17 planning was ‘open for business’ was its effect on ideas of inclusion and integration.
18
19 This was evident before the passing of legislation in 2006 when the then Labour-
20
21 Liberal Democrat coalition government chose not to introduce a third party right of
22
23 appeal against the grant of planning permission as a means of strengthening the
24
25 inclusion of affected publics in planning decision-making. The measure was strongly
26
27 promoted by environmental lobbies (and backed by the SNP in opposition). The main
28
29 reason cited for this decision was that extending appeal rights from developers to
30
31 communities would be inefficient, empowering NIMBY opposition, slowing
32
33 development and deterring private investment (a decision the SNP has backed in
34
35 Government). This disciplinary effect was also evident in a tendency to view
36
37 integration through the lens of efficiency, as a means of producing more proportionate
38
39 and cost-effective regulation rather than as a potentially more ambitious commitment
40
41 to integrate the spatial impacts of a wide-range of public and private service providers.
42
43 In the next section below I go on to explore how the culture change agenda became a
44
45 key mechanism for consolidating this settlement and containing potential tensions
46
47 between divergent understandings of efficiency, integration and inclusion.
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54 **‘Culture change’ and the making of ‘open for business’ planning**
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1
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3 Culture change became a prominent goal for the modernisation agenda once
4
5 minds turned towards implementing the 2006 Act (e.g. Scottish Government,
6
7 2005), and was a particular emphasis as new regulations were being introduced:
8
9

10 [culture change] was very much a buzzword in 2006/2007, I think it's not
11
12 quite as bad as it was, but yeah, it was...bandied around for all sorts of
13
14 new bits and pieces (CEC Planning Policy Officer)
15
16

17
18 The dominance of efficiency concerns was apparent in the ways the culture
19
20 change agenda was developed by the government. Of 34 action points identified
21
22 in a 'Progress Report' on *Delivering Planning Reform* in March, 2010, thirty-two
23
24 related to public sector practices (the other two were addressed to the private
25
26 sector; no points were addressed to communities or non-governmental bodies).
27
28 Around half related directly to identifiable efficiency goals like streamlining of
29
30 process and speeding up of plans and decisions. The document therefore
31
32 reinforced a view of culture change as being primarily concerned with the
33
34 efficiency of public sector practices and particularly with those directly related to
35
36 the speed of the development management process through which planning
37
38 consents are granted:
39
40
41
42

43 So although there were other objectives...you look at the government's
44
45 culture change page on their website...there are lots of touchy feely soft
46
47 objectives in there... but it became quite a process driven operation...
48
49 (Development industry representative)
50
51

52
53 However, 'open for business' planning was not a straightforward translation of
54
55 development industry concerns for efficiency. This was evident in professional and
56
57 governmental attempts to develop alternative ways of measuring the performance of
58
59
60

1
2
3 planning, moving beyond a straightforward focus on speed to also consider quality of
4
5 decision-making (HOPS, 2012). Notwithstanding a broad acceptance of managerial
6
7 discipline, this suggested a continued level of resistance to the idea that planning was
8
9 only a regulatory burden.
10

11
12 Following extensive discussion about the need for culture change, ‘open for business’
13
14 planning was interpreted and enacted within the public sector through a particular
15
16 emphasis on developing improved collaborative relations with all stakeholders, but
17
18 with a particular emphasis on the development industry. This was understood as an
19
20 extension of the Scottish Government’s approach to engaging stakeholders in the
21
22 planning reform process (and arguably reflected longer-standing corporatist relations
23
24 within the small and highly professionalised planning community in Scotland).
25
26

27
28
29 In practice, ‘open for business’ planning therefore meant a strong emphasis on
30
31 improving communication to proactively facilitate development:
32

33
34 Do [planners] do things differently – yes I would say. On the whole I think
35
36 people have embraced that and I think they do understand they need to deal
37
38 with people in a different way, particularly to get out a message about being
39
40 responsive to development, that we’re not seen to be presenting a negative
41
42 image. (CEC Planning manager)
43
44

45
46 Fostering a pro-development culture was understood by interviewees in both the local
47
48 authority and private sector as a particular challenge in Edinburgh which, perhaps as a
49
50 result of its strong economy and historic built environment, had a reputation as a
51
52 difficult place to invest and develop:
53
54

55
56 Yeah I think the perception that, you know “Edinburgh’s not open for
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 business”, that’s one that we’re always fighting and, you know, I think it’s
4
5 wrong...we would really like to change that but that’s a real uphill struggle.

6
7 (CEC Development Management Officer)
8
9

10 The local authority’s commitment to challenging this perception was symbolized by
11
12 two key developments: First, the setting up of the *Edinburgh Development Forum*, a
13
14 regular meeting of industry stakeholders to discuss issues of common concern, and;
15
16 secondly, the *Edinburgh Planning Concordat*, a protocol for processing major
17
18 development applicationsⁱⁱⁱ:
19
20
21

22 I would argue that the job has fundamentally changed, and certainly from my
23
24 perspective there is far more outward engagement than we ever had before. So
25
26 things like the Edinburgh Development Forum didn’t exist before. We’re
27
28 engaging with the stakeholders and the development industry (CEC Planning
29
30 Manager)
31
32
33

34 The development forum’s done a bit of work on how Edinburgh’s perceived
35
36 by the development community in comparison to other cities, so they are
37
38 aware of the need to present themselves as, you know “...we are up for
39
40 business, we want you to come here and invest” (Planning Consultant)
41
42
43

44 The attempt to transform relations with the development industry through dialogue
45
46 was therefore presented as a means of responding to concerns that planning was
47
48 negative and reactive whilst also shaping a more positive role for public sector
49
50 planners as enablers of development, retaining some commitment to inclusion of
51
52 other stakeholders and better integrated development.
53
54
55

56 **‘Open for business’ planning as a new common-sense**
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1
2
3 The commitment to ‘facilitating development’ was commonly contrasted with the
4
5 problematic old culture it was replacing:
6
7

8 ...some people saw themselves as what used to be called development control
9
10 and there was I think a negative attitude. You were there to stop things
11
12 happening if they weren’t acceptable. You weren’t necessarily able to say to
13
14 people “Well look effectually if you’d come in and talked beforehand we
15
16 could have worked out the best way through this” and you could in fact have
17
18 taken a much more positive and enabling role... (CEC Development
19
20 Management Officer)
21
22

23
24
25 Some planners felt that they had been working in this new way as “*relationship*
26
27 *managers*” for some time. As a result one suggested that the culture change agenda,
28
29 whilst welcome, was “*a little bit insulting*”.
30
31

32
33 Others also expressed scepticism about the culture change agenda, however, the
34
35 majority described new ways of working in positive terms, with many of those
36
37 interviewed actively identifying with the principle of facilitating development in the
38
39 name of sustainable economic growth:
40
41

42 And I think the notion of development has been a bit of a dirty word. That’s
43
44 actually what we’re all here to do, is to manage the environment in which
45
46 we’re working. (National Agency Manager)
47
48

49
50 In this way, a broadly shared understanding of the aims of culture change seemed to
51
52 have developed, a new common-sense, equated with the negotiated model of ‘open
53
54 for business’ planning and entailing particular changes in the forms of knowledge,
55
56 practices, relations and subject positions involved in professional planning (see table
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 1). This was particularly strong in the public sector but was also acknowledged by the
4
5 development industry. It was, however, accepted that progress towards the new
6
7 culture remained uneven, with public sector managers admitting to pockets of
8
9 resistance:
10

11
12 We've got a few dinosaurs...you know people who find it difficult to change
13
14 and leave their old working practices behind (CEC Planning manager)
15
16

17
18 Development industry representatives, meanwhile, cautiously welcomed the direction
19
20 of change but were clear that there remained "*ailments of trust*" between the public
21
22 and private sectors. They argued that the public sector needed to go further in
23
24 accepting market-defined "*realities*" and ensuring certainty of decision-making. The
25
26 latter concern was sometimes related to political interference by obstructive, self-
27
28 interested publics or elected officials who needed to be trained to see planning
29
30 decisions as 'quasi-judicial' rather than political choices.
31
32

33 34 **Economic crisis and 'open for business' planning** 35

36
37 It was widely accepted that the effects of the GFC had played an important role in
38
39 shaping acceptance of the new 'open for business' planning culture, strengthening the
40
41 equation of development activity with the public interest and creating opportunities to
42
43 reshape relations between public authorities and the development industry. This was
44
45 particularly true in Edinburgh, where the crisis had initially been interpreted as a
46
47 serious threat to a city with a large concentration of financial services, leading to the
48
49 production of an Economic Resilience Action Plan (ERAP) in 2008 (CEC, 2008b):
50
51

52
53 ...we've linked with city development who have the [ERAP], really sort of
54
55 Edinburgh's approach to the credit crunch [GFC], to say we want to be pro-
56
57
58
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1
2
3 delivery, we want jobs, we want economic activity... that [ERAP] that created
4
5 a culture change almost. (Housing/Planning Project Officer)
6
7

8
9 The GFC had been interpreted as intensifying disciplinary pressures on the planning
10
11 system to prove it could deliver on broader corporate commitments to growth (the
12
13 five-year window of opportunity referred to above). However, it was also seen to have
14
15 enabled new, more flexible practices. For example through the ERAP, CEC
16
17 committed to negotiate with developers on sites stalled by the crisis to ensure the
18
19 construction of affordable housing, using various national subsidies and other
20
21 incentives to ensure construction of affordable units. By 2010/11 this approach had
22
23 led to the construction of affordable housing exceeding private supply for the first
24
25 time (CEC, 2011).
26
27

28
29 Both public and private sector actors agreed that the downturn in development
30
31 activity had led to greater willingness amongst developers to accept a negotiated
32
33 mode of “*consensus planning*”. No-one was sure whether this would last if (or when)
34
35 the market ‘returned’. There were also concerns that this approach would prove
36
37 difficult to resource in the event of an upturn in development. Perhaps ironically the
38
39 negotiated model of ‘open for business’ planning, shaped as a response to concerns
40
41 about the inefficiency and unresponsiveness of public sector planning, was not
42
43 necessarily cost efficient for local planning authorities facing serious resource
44
45 shortages as public sector austerity took hold:
46
47
48

49
50 The issue is...how...the delivery of that service is resourced and if you’re
51
52 going to engage with all the people... It’s all very well changing your attitude
53
54 and your culture and all the rest of it but it will only work if there is an
55
56 adequate resourcing (CEC Development Management Officer)
57
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Analysis: culture governance as a peaceful path to neoliberalisation?

The modernisation of the land-use planning system in Scotland was framed as an attempt to address concerns related to efficiency, inclusion and integration. This highlights the extent to which the purpose and role of planning activity remains complex and contested, forming a potential 'landscape of antagonism' between alternative aspirations for planning (Newman, 2014).

Driven by the hegemonic depth and weight of neoliberal concerns that planning was acting as a barrier to economic growth, efficiency concerns assumed particular power in Scotland, both as a problematisation of existing planning practices and an articulation of the form that a *modern* planning culture should assume. This was reinforced by the ready availability of managerial techniques designed to discipline public sector practices. It was also notably strengthened by the ways the GFC had been interpreted, intensifying pressure to support development activity. The dominance of efficiency concerns also shaped the definition of goals associated with inclusion and integration.

The need for improved efficiency was partly recognised as an external threat, introducing pressures to perform. However, it was widely accepted within the planning professional community. Prevailing definitions of efficiency were subject to some subtle reworking as they were translated into 'open for business' planning, premised on enhancing collaboration between planning authorities and developers. This enabled public sector planners to claim a positive role as facilitators of development, a subject position many of those interviewed identified with.

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2
3 Extended discussion about the need for a new planning culture and explicit
4 culture change mechanisms were important in securing acceptance of this new
5 approach, which targeted and was more positively embraced in the public sector.
6
7

8
9 Working on the grounds of preexisting corporatist governance relations, a
10 dominant planning and governance culture therefore emerged that played a
11 significant role in stabilising the meaning of modernisation, securing active
12 consent to this new common-sense. This change was symbolised by the
13 description of those planners who did not accept its terms as “dinosaurs” whose
14 commitments and practices were problematically wedded to outmoded ways of
15 working.
16
17

18
19 Modernisation therefore generated wide-spread acceptance of central tenets of a
20 broadly neoliberal conception of market-supportive planning, with culture change
21 helping secure a relatively peaceful path towards this new settlement around
22 ‘open for business’ planning for sustainable economic growth. The story of
23 modernisation and culture change in the land-use planning system in Scotland
24 therefore suggests the importance of paying attention to the cultural dimensions
25 of state restructuring processes, particularly when ‘culture’ itself becomes an
26 object of governmental attention, mobilized to secure consent to ‘peopled’
27 processes of change.
28
29

30
31 The study also suggests the significant role locally situated (planning) cultures
32 can play in managing potential antagonisms between different aspirations within
33 the contested fields of local governance (cf. Newman, 2014). In this case potential
34 tensions between different interpretations of efficiency, integration and inclusion
35 were minimized, as dominant meanings were established and consolidated.
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3 It would, however, be misleading to argue that reform represented the wholesale
4 neoliberalisation of planning in Scotland. Whilst there was broad acceptance that
5 the public interest was now defined in terms of sustainable economic growth and
6 that this was best achieved through better public sector understanding of the needs
7 of the development industry, the ways in which ‘open for business’ planning was
8 interpreted suggest some level of continued cultural resistance to any narrow
9 interpretation of efficiency concerns. Albeit often in limited ways, goals of
10 inclusion and integration also continued to be pursued. Light-touch, pro-growth
11 planning had therefore become normalized, narrowing planners’ ‘acting space’
12 (Grange, 2014) but not entirely displacing other concerns from the field,
13 providing further evidence of the particular hybrid, trajectories that
14 neoliberalisation takes in different places at different times (pace Brenner et al,
15 2010; Peck, 2013; Newman, 2014 etc).

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33 The existence of “dinosaurs” within the planning profession also suggests the
34 presence of residualised sub-cultures, potentially resistant to the new planning
35 culture. One significant limitation of the work presented here is that it has focused
36 more on dominant representations of the culture of planning, rather than
37 examining how street-level actors may have resisted change in various ways. The
38 presence of sub-cultures of resistance and, albeit limited, debate over the proper
39 interpretation of efficiency, integration and inclusion potentially point towards
40 alternative understandings of the role and purpose of planning in a modern
41 Scotland, and therefore provide resources from which political challenges could
42 be raised in the future. Any such challenges are unlikely to take the form of
43 wholesale challenges to neoliberalism, but could instead coalesce around
44 particular challenges to aspects of the post-2006 settlement and the ways in which
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3 it has framed Scotland's planning culture. Perhaps, for example, contesting claims
4 that planning processes are inefficient by questioning the *inefficient* outcomes of
5 market-led planning (Adams and Watkins, 2014). Or asserting the potential
6 contribution of the planning system to governmental priorities other than the
7 efficient pursuit of market-led growth, in Scotland this might include agendas
8 around land reform, shaping healthy and sustainable places or community
9 empowerment. These possibilities further highlight the value of thinking about
10 change at micro-political levels as a means of challenging any tendency towards
11 disempowering accounts of neoliberalism, restoring albeit modest possibilities for
12 agency (Blanco et al, 2014).
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26 In the meantime, however, the settlement around 'open for business' planning in
27 Scotland seems itself to be under strain. The context created by the GFC arguably
28 created the material conditions within which the negotiated model of development
29 could become broadly accepted. However, subsequent cuts to local authority
30 budgets and an upturn in development activity have destabilised this settlement.
31
32 In a move that was widely interpreted as a response to the continued concerns of
33 the housebuilding industry about the efficiency of decision-making, Alex Neill
34 the government minister responsible announced a further "gamechanging" review
35 of the planning system in Scotland in September 2015. It remains to be seen what
36 the outcome of the review will be, however it seems likely the respondent who
37 described a "5-year window" to prove planning could deliver may be proved
38 prescient. The hegemonic depth and weight of the discourse of efficiency
39 therefore continues to function as a powerful problematisation of planning ideas
40 and practices, not just disciplining prevailing practices but also generating
41 pressure for further cycles of neoliberalising reform.
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Conclusions

In this paper I have explored how the culture of land-use planning in Scotland was targeted as an object of governmental attention, shaping an unstable settlement around the idea of 'open for business' planning. In doing so I have suggested that planning and governance cultures can play a significant role in stabilising the 'fields of antagonism' that characterise contemporary local governance, potentially securing consent to neoliberalising change. The paper therefore highlights the importance of paying more detailed empirical attention to cultural dimensions of state restructuring at micro-political levels where the state operates as a 'peopled process' (Peck, 2001); providing a means of improving understanding of complex, contemporary dynamics of change and the contested role of various political projects, including neoliberalism, in reshaping urban governance. In particular I have suggested this illuminates how consent (and resistance) to such projects are actively produced and managed as part of the process of reshaping local regimes or settlements, highlighting the potential value of further research on the political-ideological reconstruction of planning and governance cultures as a means of deepening understanding of the depth and extent of neoliberal hegemony.

With planning ideas and practices continuing to be questioned across many states, this is a political as much as an academic imperative. Ultimately, if more positive ideas of planning and urban governance are to be shaped, even in neoliberal times, an essential starting point is to acknowledge that cultural battles are being waged and need to be actively engaged.

Funding

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Notes

ⁱ CEC is the local authority responsible for Scotland's capital city. The total population of Edinburgh was 486,120 in 2010, with growth rates outstripping the rest of the country over the previous three decades. Growth was premised on a strong economy, with concentrations in financial services, higher education, and public services (including the Scottish Government) as well as tourism drawn to the city's historic built environment. At the time the research was conducted in 2012 the Council was led by a Labour – SNP coalition. Despite changes in political control, and the politicisation of certain issues, there remained a reasonably stable settlement over key priorities, particularly the need to pursue a strategy of economic growth.

ⁱⁱ This section of the paper draws on *Author, forthcoming*

ⁱⁱⁱ The Forum was set up to improve relations between CEC and key stakeholders, particularly the development industry. Meeting quarterly, it led to efforts to develop a shared evidence base about development needs in the city. The concordat emerged from the Forum as an agreed process for managing major development proposals, particularly through processing agreements intended to give developers certainty about decision-making timescales (see Lloyd and Peel, 2012).

Element of planning culture	Old system culture (pre-2006)	'Modern' system culture (post-2006)
Knowledges and practices	Knowledge of statutory system. Bureaucratic processes and practices. Limited engagement with other stakeholders	Knowledge of how to use statutory system to make facilitate development. Emphasis on improved project management/ knowledge of development economics
Relations of practice	Formal and bureaucratic, remote, quasi-legal	Outward looking, engagement with all stakeholders, willing to negotiate
Roles and identities for public sector planners	Bureaucratic, regulator, inhibitor of development, guardian of public interest by regulating private sector	Dynamic facilitator of development; proactive seeking solutions; guardian of public interest defined by collaboration with private sector

Table 1: Representations of the 'old' and the 'new' planning culture pre and post-2006