

1 **Title:** Optimizing COVID-19 testing strategies on college campuses: evaluation of the health
2 and economic costs

3 **Short Title:** Health and economic cost-optimal testing strategies at universities

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24 **Abstract**

25 Colleges and universities in the US struggled to provide safe in-person education
26 throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Testing coupled with isolation is a nimble
27 intervention strategy that can be tailored to mitigate health and economic costs, as the
28 virus and our arsenal of medical countermeasures continue to evolve. We developed a
29 decision-support tool to aid in the design of university-based testing strategies using a
30 mathematical model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Applying this framework to a large
31 public university reopening in the fall of 2021 with a 60% student vaccination rate, we
32 find that the optimal strategy, in terms of health and economic costs, is twice weekly
33 antigen testing of all students. This strategy provides a 95% guarantee that, throughout
34 the fall semester, case counts would not exceed the CDC's original high transmission
35 threshold of 100 cases per 100k persons over 7 days. As the virus and our medical
36 armament continue to evolve, testing will remain a flexible tool for managing risks and
37 keeping campuses open. We have implemented this model as an [online tool](#) to facilitate
38 the design of testing strategies that adjust for COVID-19 conditions, university-specific
39 parameters, and institutional goals.

40 **Author Summary**

41 As a part of the COVID-19 response team at a large public university in the US, we
42 performed an analysis that considered together, the potential health and economic
43 costs of different testing policies for the student body. University administrators had to
44 weigh the up-front effort needed to implement wide scale testing against the potential
45 costs of responding to high levels of disease on campus in the Fall of 2021, after
46 vaccines were widely available but vaccination rates among college students were

47 uncertain. The results presented here are applied to this specific instance, but the [online](#)
48 [tool](#) provided can be tailored to university specific parameters, the epidemiological
49 conditions, and the goals of the university. As we confront newly emerging variants of
50 COVID-19 or novel pathogens, consideration of both the health and economic costs of
51 proactive testing may serve as a politically tractable and cost-effective disease
52 mitigation strategy.

53

54 **Introduction**

55 During the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic, universities throughout the US
56 struggled to provide in-person education while mitigating the health and economic risks
57 of COVID-19. The 2020-2021 academic year was particularly challenging, with many
58 universities severely restricting in-person activities (1,2). Although the roll-out of
59 vaccines to college-aged students in 2021 (3) ultimately allowed universities to restore
60 many of the key elements of the residential campus experience, many spent the
61 summer of 2021 planning for an uncertain future, as new variants emerged and vaccine
62 uptake slowed.

63

64 Initial data on vaccine effectiveness indicated that vaccines available in the US
65 significantly reduced the incidence of symptomatic disease (4), susceptibility to infection
66 (5), and transmissibility if rare breakthrough infections did occur (6). Under this
67 scenario, universities with high levels of vaccine coverage could tentatively relax face
68 mask requirements and other precautionary measures (3,7). However, vaccine efficacy
69 rapidly dropped with immunological waning and the emergence of new variants (8–10).
70 Universities without vaccine mandates had to rely on estimates from vaccination data

71 and surveys, for example in May of 2021, national polls suggested that 49% of 18-24
72 year olds had been vaccinated or planned to get vaccinated, but uptake varied
73 considerably throughout the country (11), with 29% of college-aged students expressing
74 strong hesitancy (12). Thus, many universities looked to face masks and proactive
75 testing as low cost strategies for managing risks while reopening campus.

76
77 While college students, especially those vaccinated, are at a low risk of severe health
78 outcomes, transmission may spillover into the surrounding community leading to surges
79 in cases, hospitalizations and deaths. While we do not explicitly model such indirect
80 effects, mitigating risks to vulnerable populations remains a motivating factor for
81 preventing viral transmission on college campuses.

82
83 Several universities deployed large-scale proactive testing programs to monitor and
84 mitigate SARS-CoV-2 activity during the 2020-2021 academic year (13–15).

85 Retrospective analysis suggests that these programs reduced transmission at
86 universities (16,17) and in the surrounding communities (18). With the increasing
87 availability and decreasing costs of SARS-CoV-2 tests, large-scale proactive testing
88 leading to early detection and isolation of infections has become a viable but
89 underutilized strategy for mitigating surges (17,19,20).

90
91 Here, we introduce a framework for designing cost effective testing strategies on a
92 college campus that consider the transmission dynamics of a well-mixed, partially-
93 vaccinated student population following a particular testing policy. A positive test drives


94 students into isolation, where they are unable to transmit to others. The overall
95 effectiveness of the testing policy depends on the vaccination rate, immunity from prior
96 infection, transmissibility of the virus, vaccine effectiveness, and compliance with testing
97 and isolation. The economic factors considered include the cost of both the proactive
98 testing and the response and mitigation required for each positive case. These factors
99 include the cost of a confirmatory PCR test, isolation facilities, sequencing, contact-
100 tracing, and the cost incurred to the university of needing to move classes online.
101 Building on prior cost effectiveness analyses of COVID-19 screening policies (21–23)
102 and university COVID-19 policies (7,13,24), we developed this approach to support
103 planning efforts at one of the largest public universities in the US during the summer of
104 2021. Using the University of Texas at Austin as a case study, we derive cost-effective
105 testing strategies to prevent campus closures in a partially-vaccinated community of
106 50,000 students during the emergence of a novel variant (Delta). The model is available
107 as an [online tool](#) to support universities throughout the US in tailoring COVID-19
108 screening programs as novel variants continue to drive waves of infection.

109

110 **Results**

111 In the summer of 2021, we derived an optimal proactive testing strategy for the
112 University of Texas at Austin, an urban public university with 50,000 students, for the
113 upcoming fall semester. Given the uncertainty in vaccination rates that some
114 universities faced, we considered a range of vaccination rates (Figure 1 and Table 1). If
115 60% of students arrive vaccinated, we project that cases could far surpass the CDC's
116 threshold for high COVID-19 activity, potentially triggering a campus closure. With

117 passive testing (only symptom-based care seeking), we estimate that symptomatic case
118 counts would peak between 550 and 830 (median: 700) in mid-October. If 75% of all
119 students test two times per week the expected peak reduces to 40-100 (median: 70),
120 with a 95% guarantee of remaining below the closure threshold. This optimal strategy
121 would require approximately 75,000 tests per week. If 90% of students are vaccinated,
122 however, weekly testing would be sufficient to prevent an overwhelming surge.



123
124 **Figure 1. Projected COVID-19 cases among students under different levels of proactive**
125 **testing, assuming 60% (left) or 90% (right) of students are fully vaccinated.** Graphs project
126 the seven-day total of detected symptomatic cases. Colors indicate testing frequency assuming
127 75% compliance. Shading indicates 90% prediction intervals. Horizontal lines represent the
128 assumed campus closure threshold (twice the CDC's high transmission threshold).

129 **Table 1. Recommended testing levels under three different policy options.** Testing
130 recommendations are based on the minimum amount of testing needed to provide 95%
131 certainty that symptomatic infections will not exceed the campus closure threshold across a
132 range of vaccination rates.


Population of students tested	Percent of students fully vaccinated				
	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%
Number of tests per week					
All	3	2	2	2	1
Unvaccinated at twice the rate of vaccinated	3	3	2	2	2
Only unvaccinated	7	daily	daily	daily	Not possible*
Total number of tests per week					
All	112,500	75,000	75,000	75,000	37,500
Unvaccinated at twice the rate of vaccinated	84,375	78,750	48,750	45,000	41,250
Only unvaccinated	13,1250	105,000	78,750	52,500	Not possible*

133 * Due to the very small size of the population being tested, if vaccination rates are very high and testing only is
 134 occurring in the unvaccinated, it is not possible to ensure that the campus closure threshold won't be exceeded

135

136

137 The optimal testing frequency depends on both vaccine coverage and whether
138 vaccinated students are exempt from testing (Table 1, Figure S4). At 90% vaccine
139 coverage, testing only the unvaccinated would be insufficient, given our assumption that
140 vaccines reduce risks of infection by only 47%. Across vaccination rates, exempting
141 vaccinated students from testing requires frequent (daily) testing of unvaccinated
142 students to prevent a surge, costing more testing resources than if all students
143 regardless of vaccination status were tested. Testing vaccinated students at half the
144 rate as unvaccinated students remains a viable option, as total testing resources are, at
145 most vaccination rates, lower than if all students were tested. At 70% vaccine coverage,
146 testing the unvaccinated 2 times per week and the vaccinated weekly requires 48,750
147 tests per week compared to 75,000 if vaccinated and unvaccinated test at equal rates.
148 Across testing frequencies, the costs and infections associated with either prevention
149 (proactive tests) or outbreak response (contact-tracing, isolation, sequencing,
150 confirmatory PCR) are expected to be significantly higher under 60% vaccine coverage
151 than 90% vaccine coverage (Figure 2, Figure S3).



152

153 **Figure 2. Projected health and economic costs over one semester under different levels**
154 **of proactive testing, assuming 60% (left) or 90% (right) of students are fully vaccinated.**

155 Upper graphs indicate the median and 90% predictive interval of projected cumulative
156 infections. Lower graphs indicate the projected costs, broken down by the source (colors). The
157 green shading indicates testing frequencies that ensure the university would not exceed its
158 closure threshold.

159

160 At 60% vaccine coverage, proactive testing of all students two times per week is

161 sufficient to avoid exceeding the campus closure threshold at an estimated cost of

162 around \$9.1 million (Table 2). At 90% vaccine coverage, proactive testing of all students
 163 weekly is sufficient to avoid closure at a cost of \$4.7 million (Table 2). We note that it
 164 costs nearly twice as much (\$9.1 million vs \$4.7 million, Figure 2, Table 2) to avoid
 165 campus closure at 60% vaccine coverage than at 90% vaccine coverage.

166 **Table 2. Estimated level of proactive testing required to provide a 95% guarantee that**
 167 **detected symptomatic cases will remain below the campus closure threshold.** The total
 168 cost includes the cost of the minimum proactive testing needed to stay under the threshold, plus
 169 the cost of pandemic related expenses (i.e., confirmatory testing, isolation, contact-tracing,
 170 sequencing).

	Percent of students fully vaccinated				
	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%
Minimum frequency (in all students)	3 times per week	2 times per week	2 times per week	2 times per week	weekly
Total proactive tests per week	112,500	75,000	75,000	75,000	37,500
Total cost to university (\$ if testing implemented)	\$12.5 million	\$9.1 million	\$8.7 million	\$8.4 million	\$4.7 million
Cost of testing per student	\$218	\$145	\$145	\$145	\$73
Number of infections expected if only symptomatic testing is	25,600	23,600	20,400	17,000	10,800

offered					
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171

172 At both the 60% and 90% vaccination rates, providing the optimal amount of testing
173 would be cost saving or nearly equivalent to the cost of the resources needed for
174 outbreak response. At insufficient testing levels, the cost of outbreak response (i.e.,
175 contact-tracing, isolation, confirmatory PCR, and sequencing) match if not exceed the
176 cost of proactive testing. If we assume that crossing the campus closure threshold
177 triggers a costly move to online instruction, then proactive testing at the necessary
178 levels is always cost-saving. When considering health costs, failing to provide sufficient
179 testing results in significantly higher infection rates, for example, at 60% vaccination
180 sufficient testing of 2 times per week results in 2,280 infections compared to 23,700
181 infections if only symptomatic testing is offered (Table 2).

182 Discussion

183 At large US universities, large-scale proactive testing can help to suppress transmission
184 and be cost saving overall. Although the upfront costs of proactive testing and
185 personnel may be large, it may ultimately avert the higher costs of outbreak response
186 and campus closure. In the fall 2021 scenarios analyzed, the costs of an effective
187 proactive testing program per student per semester are relatively low, ranging from \$73-
188 218\$ per student, depending on the vaccination rate. As we confront newly emerging
189 variants of COVID-19 or novel pathogens, proactive testing may serve as a politically
190 tractable and cost-effective mitigation strategy in college communities with low levels of
191 population immunity.

192 Our projections suggest that, even at high vaccination rates, testing only unvaccinated
193 students is insufficient to avoid a surge. The two other policies considered—testing all
194 students equally and testing unvaccinated students at twice the rate of vaccinated
195 students—are expected to exact similar overall costs and require comparable testing
196 resources.

197 Large-scale asymptomatic testing is a nimble mitigation tool for universities facing novel
198 variants, changing levels of immunity, and shifting attitudes towards face masks and
199 intrusive social distancing measures. Testing levels can be tuned to match the changing
200 risks and achieve university goals. When community-wide immunity is high and
201 transmission is low, universities can reduce testing levels. As immune-evasive variants
202 emerge and immunity wanes, universities can scale up testing to safeguard in-person
203 activities.

204 Although the quantitative results of this study pertain to a specific university in the fall of
205 2021, the qualitative findings and modeling framework can broadly inform COVID-19
206 planning at US colleges and universities. We acknowledge the limitation that the cost
207 parameters used in this analysis are based on the situation at this specific university,
208 rather than from nationally representative cost estimates. Because these costs, as well
209 as the epidemiological and university specific parameters, will vary widely over time and
210 space, we have developed an interactive online tool (28) to facilitate generalizability of
211 the analysis. The spread and costs of COVID-19 will depend not only on the factors
212 considered here, but also on university policies, student behavior, vaccine uptake
213 throughout the semester, and the emergence of variants with different levels of
214 transmission, immune evasiveness, and severity.

215 We note that our projections assume a high and constant transmission rate throughout
216 the simulation period, and thus do not account for changes in face mask usage, social
217 distancing, and contact tracing efforts. The model assumes that 75% of students would
218 participate in proactive testing, which would require aggressive health communication
219 and outreach. The model also assumes that individuals fully isolate following a positive
220 test, which may require the provision of additional isolation rooms, paid sick-leave, and
221 removal of academic penalties for missed classes. Additionally, the model does not
222 explicitly consider the effects of waning immunity (from vaccination or prior infections),
223 though we address this in the shiny app by allowing the user to input the percent of
224 students optimally immunized (i.e. up to date on their booster shots). We have not
225 considered the health or economic costs of severe disease, long COVID, or death within
226 the university community nor how these risks may differ between students, faculty, and
227 staff, nor do we consider the cost to the individual of missing class due to isolation
228 resulting from a positive test.

229 Prior studies have demonstrated that frequent rapid testing can reduce transmission
230 (7,13,17,20) and is cost-effective (21–23). A similar decision-support tool helps
231 universities optimize testing while keeping cumulative cases below 5% of the population
232 (7). The CDC (29) and ACHA (3) have continually released guidance to help universities
233 navigate the rapidly changing COVID-19 situation. Building on these contributions, our
234 study offers a tool that incorporates the health effects, and also the economic effects,
235 not just of the cost of the testing program but also the costs of responding to positive
236 COVID-19 cases in a university setting.

237

238 **Materials & Methods**

239

240 **Transmission model**

241 We analyzed a compartmental model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission that incorporates
242 vaccination and isolation following a positive test. A full description of the model
243 structure and parameters are provided in the Supplement (Section S1). In our case
244 study, we modeled COVID-19 during the summer of 2021, immediately after the Delta
245 variant rose to dominance. We assumed that vaccines reduce the risks of infection by
246 47% [95% CI: 37-50%] (8,25), reduce the likelihood of developing symptoms by 64%
247 [95% CI: 63-73%] (25), and reduce transmission to others by 20% (10). We assumed a
248 reproduction number (R_0) of 5, without interventions, that 75% of students comply with
249 testing policies, and that students who test positive isolate for 7 days. We did not
250 explicitly model the effect of quarantining close contacts on reducing transmission.
251 Finally, we assumed that 25% of symptomatic individuals infected with SARS-COV-2
252 would seek testing. We tracked the rolling seven-day total detected symptomatic cases,
253 where cases are detected through both proactive (antigen) testing and symptom-based
254 care seeking.

255

256 **Economic model**

257 To estimate the costs of testing, we considered both testing supplies and the personnel
258 needed to administer tests, collect data, and process results. All proactive testing was
259 assumed to be performed via antigen testing, at a significantly reduced cost than PCR
260 tests. We assumed that all positive proactive tests received a PCR confirmatory test.

261 Symptom-based care seekers received only a PCR test. PCR confirmation was then
262 followed by contact tracing, molecular sequencing of the test specimen, and a seven-
263 day isolation period. At the time of the case study, contact-tracing was being performed
264 to encourage students who were close contacts of positive cases to get tested. We
265 assumed that 20% of positive cases require a campus-provided isolation room, based
266 on internal data from the university. Finally, we considered the costs of campus closures
267 triggered by large surges. Based on conversations with university leadership, we
268 assumed that on-line instruction incurs additional costs totalling \$100,000 per day. We
269 do not explicitly consider educational losses (i.e. missed class) or administrative costs
270 of coordinating COVID-19 responses, nor do we directly consider the healthcare costs
271 associated with student illness

272

273 **Campus closure thresholds**

274 We assumed that universities would revert to hybrid or online instruction when case
275 counts surpassed the following public health thresholds (26).

- 276 ● High risk: 100 detected symptomatic cases per 100,000 people in a seven-day
277 period, corresponding to the original CDC red (high) alert level.
- 278 ● Higher risk: 150 detected symptomatic cases per 100,000 people in a seven-day
279 period, corresponding to the 1.5 times the original CDC red (high) alert level.
- 280 ● Very high risk: 200 symptomatic detected cases per 100,000 people in a seven-
281 day period, corresponding to double the original CDC red (high) alert level.

282 Our case study assumed that the university would close when the seven-day new
283 symptomatic case count exceeded the very high risk threshold. In our online tool, we
284 provide even higher thresholds to support universities in mitigating highly transmissible
285 variants with lower severity, like Omicron (27) .

286 **Identification of optimal testing levels**

287 We considered a range of vaccination rates, from 50% to 90% vaccinated in 10%
288 increments. For a given level of vaccination, we identified the minimum amount of
289 proactive testing required to ensure that the university does not exceed its closure
290 threshold, with a 95% guarantee. For each candidate policy, we ran 100 deterministic
291 simulations, each with parameters randomly selected from their specified distributions
292 (Table S2), and identified the policy with the least amount of testing in which 95% of
293 simulations remain under the closure threshold. We note that we identified the optimal
294 policy conditioned on the vaccination rate; across vaccination rates, the costs
295 associated with either proactive testing or outbreak response generally increase as the
296 vaccination rate decreases.

297

298 **Sensitivity analyses**

299 Beyond vaccination rates, testing frequencies, and risk tolerances, several other factors
300 influence the projections. To elucidate their impact, we conducted a sensitivity analysis
301 with respect to vaccine effectiveness against infection (ranging from 40%-90%, base
302 case at 47%), vaccine effectiveness against onwards transmission if infected (ranging
303 from 50% to 0% effective, base case at 20%), and the testing policy (only unvaccinated,

304 unvaccinated at double the rate of vaccinated, and all students equally). The results are
305 provided in the Supplement (Figure S5).

306 **Data availability statement**

307 All code and data used to make the manuscript figures are available at this [Github repo](#).
308 A separate [Github repo](#) is available here to deploy the latest version of the Rshiny app.

309 **Acknowledgments**

310 We acknowledge the financial support from NIH Grant R01 AI151176, CDC Grant
311 U01IP001136, and funding from Tito's Handmade Vodka. All authors declare no
312 conflicts of interest. We would like to thank all of the individuals involved in the Proactive
313 Community Testing team at the University of Texas at Austin.

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411 **Supporting Information Captions**

- 412 S1 Text. COVID-19 Transmission model with vaccination and testing
- 413 S1 Figure. Compartmental model of COVID-19 transmission incorporating testing and
414 vaccination.
- 415 S1 Table. Initial conditions
- 416 S2 Table. Transmission model parameters
- 417 S3 Table. Cost parameters
- 418 S2 Text. Results for vaccination coverage ranging from 50% to 90% with all students
419 tested
- 420 S2 Figure. Projected COVID-19 cases among students under different levels of
421 proactive testing, assuming 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% vaccination coverage
422 amongst students.
- 423 S3 Figure. Projected health and economic costs through December 16, 2021 under
424 different levels of proactive testing, assuming 50%, 60%, 70%, 80% or 90% of students
425 are fully vaccinated
- 426 S3 Text. Results for vaccine coverage ranging from 50% to 90% and different
427 populations tested
- 428 S4 Figure. Projected COVID-19 cases among students under different levels of
429 proactive testing, assuming 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% vaccination coverage and
430 in testing policies for all students, testing vaccinated at half the rate, and testing in the
431 unvaccinated only.
- 432 S4 Table. Estimated level of proactive testing to provide 95% guarantee that
433 symptomatic cases will remain below the *very high risk threshold* if testing at half the
434 rate in vaccinated vs unvaccinated.
- 435 S5 Table. Estimated level of proactive testing to provide 95% guarantee that
436 symptomatic cases will remain below the *very high risk threshold* if only the
437 unvaccinated are tested.
- 438 S3 Text. Sensitivity analysis: vaccine efficacy against infection and transmission
- 439 S5 Figure. Projected COVID-19 cases among students as a function of the vaccine
440 efficacy against infection and symptomatic disease assuming 50%, 60%, 70% or 80% of
441 students are fully vaccinated.

442 S6 Figure. Projected COVID-19 cases among students as a function of the vaccine
443 efficacy against transmission assuming 50%, 60%, 70% or 80% of students are fully
444 vaccinated.

445 S4 Text. Modifications to framework/Rshiny app for future variants

446 S6 Table. Rshiny app default settings and suggested adjustments for Omicron.

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