

Organizational Learning Activities in High-Hazard Industries:
The Logics Underlying Self-Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Organizational learning takes place through activities performed by individuals, groups, and organizations as they gather and digest information, imagine and plan new actions, and implement change. I examine the learning practices of companies in two industries - - nuclear power plants and chemical process plants -- that must manage safety as a major component of operations and therefore must learn from precursors and near-misses rather than exclusively by trial-and-error. Specifically, I analyze the linked assumptions or logics underlying incident reviews, root cause analysis teams, and self-analysis programs. These logics arise from occupational and hierarchical groups that work on different problems in different ways, for example, anticipation and resilience, fixing and learning, concrete and abstract. In organizations with fragmentary, myopic, and disparate understandings of how the work is accomplished, there are likely to be more failures to learn from operating experience, recurrent problems, and cyclical crises. Enhanced learning requires ways to broaden and bring together disparate logics.

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INTRODUCTION

At one nuclear power plant, the Station Manager explained the plant's excellent safety record by saying, "What we do around here doesn't always make sense" (Carroll & Perin, 1993). What he meant is that the ways people achieve and maintain good performance are not easy to articulate within well-understood principles of organization and management. In short, he found it difficult to explain these activities and practices to his bosses (indeed, he might have to hide information to avoid trouble).

But why doesn't it make sense? Why should effective behaviors and activities not be explicable and perhaps not discussible (cf., Argyris and Schon, 1996)? The central argument of this paper is that the difficulty lies in the available "mental models" (e.g., Senge, 1990) or understandings of organizations, people, and technologies. In this paper I use the term "logics" (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 1996; Perin, 1990) to refer to these linked assumptions and ways of thinking that give meaning to experience and guide inference and imagination. When these mental models and associated logics legitimate only certain types of behaviors, and exclude whole classes of effective behaviors, then there is need to broaden the models and modify the logics. When different knowledge bases and viewpoints cannot be negotiated across levels of hierarchy

and occupational specialties, then organizations cannot make sense of events (Weick, 1995) in ways that support performance and learning.

For example, during a visit to a nuclear power plant, a member of our research team asked to see the organization chart, which we use regularly as a way of getting some background context. The chart was dutifully handed over, but the respondent added that the organization chart did not represent the way people really work at the plant. Instead, he drew a set of intersecting circles very different in look and feel from an organization chart (see Figure 1), suggesting that people have to communicate and work across boundaries in more of a network or system. Later that year, at a meeting of the sponsor representatives from our research program[1], I presented these drawings as a way to illustrate a more organic form of organization different from the familiar “machine bureaucracy.” During the next coffee break, a Vice President from another nuclear power utility approached me and expressed concern over the intersecting circles, saying “once you let people out of their boxes, there will be chaos.”

Insert Figure 1

Operating Logics and Executive Logics

These vignettes suggest that employees at different levels in the hierarchy can have different understandings of how a plant operates, and as a result they may not communicate easily. Schein (1996) suggests that there are typically at least three subcultures in organizations: an operator culture or line organization that considers work to involve interconnected systems and cooperation among people; an engineering

subculture that values technical, error-free solutions; and an executive subculture that focuses on the financial bottom line. In the case of the above vignettes, the source of the intersecting-circles description was someone actively engaged in everyday operations at the worker level. The source of concern about lack of control and letting people out of their boxes was a Vice President located at corporate headquarters, a lengthy drive from their nuclear power plant. The Station Manager who said “what we do around here doesn’t always make sense” is located in the middle, at the intersection of the plant and the corporation: he understands what the plant does in order to succeed (the “operating logics” of the operating subculture, Rochlin and von Meier, 1994) yet he perceives that his executive bosses might not accept those activities as legitimate, because they do not fit within their “executive logics.”

The above examples highlight an important issue for organizational learning: what does it mean for an “organization” to “learn” or “know” something, apart from the knowledge of individuals within the organization? Knowledge is more than lists of facts that can be summed together (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Organizational knowledge is embodied in physical artifacts (equipment, layout, data bases), organizational structures (roles, reward systems, procedures), and people (skills, values, beliefs, practices) (cf., Kim, 1993; Levitt and March, 1988; Schein, 1992). Different parts of the organization, such as plant operators and corporate executives, “know” different things about how work is done. This is a necessary feature of complex organizations where no one person can know enough about every specialty, nor appreciate both the “big picture” and the details, yet there must be sufficient coherence or alignment among these parts to operate effectively. Although organizations cannot learn

without people, organizational knowledge exists in the interdependencies among these supporting and conflicting repositories of information.

In the remainder of this paper, I first lay out a framework for organizational learning. Organizational learning is a vast topic (e.g., Argyris and Schon, 1996; Cohen and Sproull, 1996; Levitt and March, 1988) and this paper restricts our focus in several ways. First, I am less concerned with *what* is learned and *who* does the learning than with *how* that learning is accomplished. This focuses the discussion on specific learning activities. Second, I am more interested in sources of learning from analysis of an organizations' own experiences and internal debates rather than learning by imitation, diffusion of technical innovations, benchmarking, exchange of best practices, or other external sources of information. Third, I draw examples from two high-hazard industries -- nuclear power plants and chemical process plants -- that have to manage the dual goals of safety and profitability. By comparison with typical manufacturing or service industries, they face greater management challenges to maximize actors' abilities to avoid errors, promptly detect and limit the consequences of problems, and learn efficiently from precursors and minor incidents without relying solely on trial-and-error due to the catastrophic costs of severe accidents (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991; March, Sproull, and Tamuz, 1991; Roberts, 1990; Sitkin, 1992; Weick, 1987). Nuclear power plants are the prototypical high-hazard industry because of the potential for catastrophic consequences and the public dread of radiation (Perrow, 1984; Slovic, 1987; Weart, 1988).

In the following two sections of the paper, I analyze closely the incident review program in a nuclear power plant and the root cause analysis of repetitive performance problems in a chemical process plant. The data for these analyses were obtained through

examination of administrative documents, interviews with a wide range of plant personnel, on-site observations of meetings and other work activities, and collaborative workshop discussions. Perspective is provided from additional visits to other plant sites and discussions at conferences with a wide range of industry and academic experts.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING FRAMEWORK

In order to understand organizational learning *outcomes* such as performance improvements, it is important to examine the learning *processes* that are enacted within work *activities* to produce those outcomes, and the learning *resources* that provide capabilities for those activities (cf. resource-based theory of the firm, Penrose, 1968; safety resources, Perin, 1995). These are given schematic form in Figure 2.

Insert Figure 2

Many researchers characterize learning as a generic feedback cycle (e.g., Argyris and Schon, 1996; Daft and Weick, 1984; Kim, 1993; Kolb, 1984; Schein, 1987), and I continue that approach by describing four ordered learning processes that take place within and across individuals, groups, departments, organizations, and institutions.

These four processes are:

- 1) Observing - noticing, attending, heeding, tracking;
- 2) Reflecting - analyzing, interpreting, diagnosing;
- 3) Creating - imagining, designing, planning, deciding; and
- 4) Acting - implementing, doing, testing.

This learning process cycle takes place at individual, group, departmental, organizational, and institutional levels as various kinds of work activities are carried out, for example, in efforts to verify one's own and others' work, plan of the day meetings, incident investigations, post-job critiques, peer visits among plants, exchanges of good practices, and so forth. Each activity requires resources -- such as time, information, know-how, tools, and procedures -- that are continually developed, depleted, renewed, and changed, thus changing learning capabilities along with achieving learning outcomes.

Logics for Designing and Logics for Operating

To promote safe performance, designers rely on a defense-in-depth strategy. Designers anticipate possible threats, and create layers of barriers that back up critical safety functions performed by fallible equipment and people. This safety strategy results in a complicated and highly interdependent arrangement of dozens of major systems, hundreds of subsystems, and tens of thousands of components whose operation, maintenance, and design changes are governed by written procedures and layers of oversight. Such complexity obscures the impact of particular actions, and the invisibility of latent defects (Reason, 1990) masks the state of the entire system (Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1978): Backup systems can be inoperable, oversight can be ineffective, and other vulnerabilities can exist for years without discovery. For example, in 1979 the Davis Besse nuclear power plant management discovered only when the main feedwater failed that their auxiliary feedwater system had been inoperable for many years.

From the beginning of the nuclear power industry, design engineers appear to have understood plant construction as a finite project that results in a production machine. Once built and debugged, the plants were expected simply to run, a belief

echoed by nuclear utilities and regulators: "Technological enthusiasts heading the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] believed most accidents were too unlikely to worry about" (Jasper, 1990, p. 52). The Three Mile Island (TMI) event in 1979 constituted a "fundamental surprise" (Lanir, 1986) for the nuclear power industry that cast doubt on that belief. Neither the equipment nor the people functioned as predicted. A stuck-open valve, coupled with ambiguous indicators of equipment status, additional faulty equipment, and operators who had been trained to take particular actions based on an incorrect model of the system, all led to cooling water being drained from the reactor so that the uranium fuel was exposed and partially melted. Because of this combination of problems, the utility lost the use of a billion-dollar unit. The logic of design was shown to be flawed: the complexity of the production system exceeded the capacity of a priori design strategies.

TMI demonstrated the need to complement design logics with operating logics, including learning-through-practice (Kemeny, 1979; Rogovin and Frampton, 1980). The information needed to prevent the TMI event had been available from similar prior incidents at other plants, recurrent problems with the same equipment at TMI, and engineers' critiques that operators had been taught to do the wrong thing in particular circumstances, yet nothing had been done to incorporate this information into operating practices (Marcus, Bromiley, and Nichols, 1989). In reflecting on TMI, the utility's president Herman Dieckamp said,

To me that is probably one of the most significant learnings of the whole accident [TMI] the degree to which the inadequacies of that experience

feedback loop... significantly contributed to making us and the plant vulnerable to this accident” (Kemeny, 1979, p. 192).

Learning is now a central activity in the nuclear power industry. In response to the reports analyzing TMI, and under pressure of further regulatory action, the U.S. nuclear power industry established the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to promote safety and reliability through external reviews of performance and processes, training and accreditation programs, events analysis, sharing of operating information and best practices, and special assistance to member utilities (see Rees, 1994, for a highly favorable reading of INPO's role). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) share these goals and serve similar functions worldwide.

In high-hazard industries, priority is placed on finding and fixing problems before the regulators discover them or before small problems combine in surprising ways to enable a serious accident (Perrow, 1984). It is understood that the causal factors underlying nonconsequential problems are potentially the source of serious accidents. Although there is debate about the feasibility of preventing all accidents in complex and interdependent systems (LaPorte, 1994; Perrow, 1994b; Sagan, 1993), there is general agreement that organizational practices can enhance reliability and reduce the likelihood of accidents (e.g., Chiba, 1991; LaPorte and Consolini, 1991; Perrow, 1994a; Roberts, 1990; Sitkin, 1992; Weick, 1987). Each plant has ways to reflect on its own operating experience in order to identify problems, interpret the reasons for these problems, and select corrective actions to ameliorate the problems and their causes. This is illustrated and analyzed in the next two sections of the paper, which present an incident review

program at a nuclear power plant and a root cause analysis program at a chemical process plant.

AN INCIDENT REVIEW PROGRAM AT A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Incident reviews are important vehicles for self-analysis, knowledge sharing across boundaries inside and outside specific plants, and development of problem resolution efforts. Incidents vary from seemingly minor slips with no outward manifestations (such as a fire door left open or work carried out without proper clearance or “tagging”) to safety system actuations, unplanned shutdowns, highly consequential damage to equipment, and injuries to employees that must be reported to the regulator. Attention is paid to minor incidents not only because of financial or safety consequences, but because of the potential consequences if the causes of small incidents combine (“when all the holes line up”) to enable a major problem such as Three Mile Island. Both INPO and the NRC issue various letters and reports to make the industry aware of incidents as part of operating experience feedback, as does IAEA's Incident Reporting System.

Despite regulatory requirements, dissemination of best practices, and other mechanisms that serve to establish and improve incident review programs at each plant, each plant seems to carry out incident reviews in its own way. Thus, for example, there are regulatory requirements for reporting more serious incidents, but the threshold for reporting, documenting, and analyzing less serious incidents and whether this is carried out by special staff or regular line employees, and by individuals or groups, is left up to each plant. As illustrated below, plant employees may not recognize fully the assumptions and logics built into their own incident review program which may limit the learning process.

An Incident Review Program

At one nuclear power plant, administrative documents describe the incident review program as a search for “root cause”: “the primary or direct cause(s) that, if corrected, will prevent recurrence of performance problems, undesirable trends, or specific incident(s).” The documents give additional detail about types of causes[2]:

If the incident involved personnel error, the description should include determination of cognitive personnel error (unintentional action perceived to be correct prior to initiation) or procedure error (error in approved procedure)... If the cause(s) is an equipment failure, the description of the root cause should include the failure mode or mechanism (e.g., valve not included in Preventive Maintenance program, therefore stem not being lubricated, and subsequently corroded and broke).

A list of root cause categories is given:

component failure	work control
man-machine interface	work planning, procedure, documentation
communication	work practices, techniques
training	external cause
work organization	environment
work schedule	unknown, needs more investigation

Within each of the above cause categories, there are subcategories and examples given.

However, the detail and extensiveness of these subcategories varies by category: the “component failure” category has pages of subcategories and examples, whereas the category of “work organization” has only a few subcategories. Finally, the documents

specify that for review and approval: “The Root Cause Team will discuss the results of the investigation as soon as possible with the responsible manager. The Team should normally have the concurrence of the manager in determining the corrective action(s).”

Analysis of the Logics Underlying the Incident Review Program

Although the incident review program appears very sensible and is undoubtedly similar to many other programs in this industry and others, there are some issues that are hidden from view by the assumptions and logics that underlie the program. First, the very concept of “root cause” seems to focus attention on a single cause rather than an exploration of multiple causes or chains of events. This has been called “root cause seduction” (Carroll, 1995) because the idea of a singular cause is so satisfying to our desire for certainty and control. In the plant documents, recognition is given in an offhand way that there may be cause(s), but the expectation is that a primary cause will be found. This expectation is even built into the computer system that records root cause reports for tracking and analysis which limits data entry to a single root cause.

Interestingly, at this plant there was a difference of opinion regarding the proper number of causes to include in a root cause report. The majority believed that there should be only a few root causes, two or three at most, in order to avoid “diluting” the impact of the report. The minority believed that a more extensive list of causes would be helpful for learning and improvement.

Second, some kinds of causes are given more attention than others, based on how well they are understood. The “component failure” designation has extensive detail, serves as the source of many illustrative examples, and has special requirements for interfacing with component problem tracking systems. Procedures and individual human

error are also called out for attention by serving as sources of examples and detailed instructions. These causes tend to be more immediate to the emergence of problems (at the “sharp end” of systems, Reason, 1990) and better understood as causes and for selecting corrective actions, i.e., we have an available “fix” for these problems (solution-driven search, Carroll, 1995). In contrast, more systemic and organizational causes that are further back in time (e.g., programmatic, managerial, and cultural issues) are left more vague; the documents express a lesser understanding and lesser salience of these causes by their lack of detail, lack of examples, and lack of familiar corrective actions. Reliance on ready-made and available solutions can become a trap when “band-aids” are used to fix symptoms or offer symbolic value but fail to address underlying causes.

The fixing orientation is consistent with American managers' desires for certainty and action. People are not encouraged to look at the linkages among problems and issues, because it creates a feeling of overwhelming complexity and hopelessness in the face of pressure to do something quickly. For example, one engineering executive at a U.S. nuclear power plant commented that, "it is against the culture to talk about problems unless you have a solution." The question is whether this approach works successfully with complex, ambiguous issues that lack ready answers, or with diffuse organizational and cultural processes that are poorly understood, or whether a different approach is needed.

Third, the review and approval process forces the Root Cause Team to negotiate with line management over the content of the report. The virtue of this requirement is that since line management is supposed to take responsibility for implementing change, they should therefore have opportunities to provide input and commit to the new actions.

Everyone recognizes that it is easier to produce reports and analyses than it is to create effective change (Langley, 1995). However, the danger of this approach is that needed change may get buried in politics: the power resides in line management, who may fail to acknowledge issues that reflect badly on them, diminish their status or power, or have solutions that are risky to their own agendas. Key team members may be from the same department as a manager whose role is under investigation. The anticipation of resistance from line management can lead to sanitizing the report, which is a kind of “acceptability heuristic” (Carroll, 1995; Tetlock, 1985).

If we analyze the incident review program more deeply, the underlying cultural values and assumptions begin to emerge (cf. Schein, 1992). The culture of nuclear power plants, as in most technological organizations, emphasizes the importance of avoiding problems through engineering design and managerial controls and, when necessary, fixing problems. Typically, people who operate the technology are seen as a potential source of trouble that must be controlled by designing people out of the system or providing procedures and training to minimize human error. A joke is told about the new control room staffing plans for the advanced design nuclear power plants. It consists of an operator and a dog. The operator has one job: feed the dog. The dog has two jobs: keep the operator company and, in case of emergency, keep the operator away from the control panel.

There is a presumption that organizations are like machines whose problems can be decomposed into parts, the causes identified, and fixes put in place. The "fixing" orientation looks for linear cause-effect relationships, simplifies problems by decomposing them into well-understood components, and applies specialized knowledge

to create technical solutions. This is most clearly represented in Probabilistic Safety Analyses (PSA) which vividly reveal the expectation that events are enumerable, predictable, and additive, like a complex wiring diagram. Although extremely useful for some purposes, PSAs do not mirror the actual plant: for example, serious accidents nearly always involve being outside the “design basis” or modeling assumptions in PSA (Rasmussen, 1990). The major thrust of regulation is to require plants to be maintained and operated in a manner consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

Rochlin and von Meier (1994) associate these assumptions and ways of thinking with the engineering occupational subculture. Indeed, safety has traditionally been conceptualized as an engineering specialty, and most of the literature on safety focuses on equipment and other technical concerns. In contrast, the operating subculture (of occupations that carry out hands-on, real-time functions) has a less formal, more organic, and more dynamic view of the plant. For example, Plant Managers may be more likely to write about safety from a social and organizational perspective (e.g., Chiba, 1991).

I held a workshop at the plant that explored the incident review process with about a dozen employees from engineering, operations, maintenance, and other groups, varying in hierarchical level. We analyzed a recent incident in which a hot water pump was taken out of service to repair an oil leak and then returned to service without reconnecting the pump motor. The root cause analysis report listed as the root cause that the Electrical Foreman, who is administratively responsible for reading the work order, had failed to verify the work complete before giving up clearance to run the pump[3]. Although this was a visible recent incident at the plant that everyone had heard about, it

became evident that different participants knew bits of additional information that generated a lively exchange of details, history, and viewpoints.

With minimal prompting to look for causes beyond the immediate circumstances of the incident, workshop participants were readily able to focus on why the Foreman and several others had failed to prevent the incident, and to draw insights about organizational and cultural issues. This included: (a) the complexity revealed in the numerous hand-offs and layers of management, (b) the use of the same work order form to handle changed job content, (c) the perceived time pressure from Daily Planning that was unnecessary, (d) the fact that the Electrical Supervisor was standing over the Electrical Foreman holding the work order so the Foreman assumed the Supervisor had checked, (e) the Supervisor was new in the job and rank and politeness may have interfered with their communication, and (f) the ways in which specialties optimize their own work without considering their impact on overall plant goals. Each of these issues held lessons for the plant and suggestions for ways to improve work practices.

ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AT A CHEMICAL PROCESS PLANT

Chemical process plants, like nuclear power plants, are continuous process technologies with significant hazards arising from toxic chemicals, high temperatures, explosions, etc. At one chemical process plant, management was concerned enough about a long history of costly operating problems, and enlightened enough, to request a root cause analysis intervention that had begun recently to be offered by corporate employees.

The Root Cause Analysis Intervention

The Root Cause Analysis intervention involved several trainers and two dozen employees assembled for two weeks of effort; half the employees were from the plant,

and half had traveled from other operating units to participate in the intervention. These employees were selected to span several different levels of hierarchy and kinds of functional specialties ranging from experienced engineers to nontechnical administrative staff. The intervention consisted of systematic training on how to analyze performance problems and develop a root cause report, taught in the context of analyzing actual problems at the plant and making recommendations to plant management and other important managers (this was a visible event in the company).

This process began with an analysis of all the production losses that could be identified and classified, and selection of six problems that had real “bottom-line” importance to the plant. The typical problem was an intermittent but repetitive deviation from a designed chemical or physical process that cost the company thousands or tens of thousands of dollars for each occurrence. Each single incident was tolerated and small adjustments were made locally by a particular operator, engineer, or maintenance worker. The combined impact of these incidents was hardly considered until the root cause intervention.

Each problem was assigned to one of six teams from the group, selected to have both insiders and outsiders, technical and nontechnical members. Each team’s task was to analyze their problem and develop a report to management. The teams received instructions each day in concepts and methods, coordinated to be most useful to them as they proceeded in their analysis. Teams regularly reported their progress to the whole group including tours of the workspace of each team (teams were encouraged to “cheat” or learn from each other). After a week of training and work on the problems, they returned to their jobs for a week and percolated their thinking. They then reconvened for

the second week with continued training and analysis culminating in a formal round of presentations from each team made to each other and to plant management on the last day of the workshop.

Analysis of the Logics Underlying the Root Cause Intervention

The root cause analysis training appears to offer a set of simple ideas and tools. For example, there is a careful separation of facts vs. beliefs or what is sometimes called the ladder of inference (Argyris, 1990). Participants are exhorted to be factual, i.e., to anchor their analyses so that every argument can be demonstrated factually. A second tool is to use a list divided into “is/is not” parts (Kepner and Tregoe, 1981). For example, if some motors are wearing out too rapidly, an extensive list of characteristics associated with the motors that are wearing out (“is”) is developed and compared against a list of characteristics associated with motors that are not wearing out (“is not”). A third technique is to keep asking “why?” with the expectation that this question will have to be answered six or more times (a classic Total Quality Management technique, Ishikawa, 1982). Similarly, instructions are given for developing time lines, drawing flow charts, conducting interviews, and writing reports, lists of possible causes are described to help stimulate thinking and provide shared categories, and the root cause process itself is described in phases so that teams know where they are going, how to get there, how to assess their progress, and how to anticipate and cope with the frustration that often accompanies the process.

Although the training appears simple, the application of those ideas to complex and ambiguous problems is very difficult. The ideas and tools actually build into a discipline with rigorous logic and surprising leverage. Root cause analysis is not taught

as a formula, but as a kind of practice: it is the emergent connection of principles to the details of a particular context. Although directed at concrete problems that need solutions, the real value of root cause analysis training is achieved by changing the way people think about work and the way they seek information and communicate with others. This has the benefit of reducing the introduction of new problems and solving problems more quickly. Indeed, I was told that other plants had experienced substantial improvements following a root cause intervention *before* solutions to the analyzed problems were even implemented! We might hypothesize that becoming alert to a wider range of plant conditions, developing a questioning attitude, thinking in more systemic ways, communicating more readily with other groups, and believing that problems can be addressed effectively were sufficient to introduce changes in behavior apart from specific “fixes.”

Observation of the team interactions as they progressed during their two weeks of analysis revealed some interesting features of the intervention. First, analyzing any event deeply enough into the chain of causes reveals a lot about how the organization really works. Each of the six problems initially was defined and organized around equipment or particular points in a chemical process, such as a pH control problem or a high failure rate in centrifuge motors. As the investigations proceeded, the analysis led back into the organizational and cultural systems of the plant, such as operators in different shifts not informing each other of their idiosyncratic practices for adjusting the equipment or taking equipment down for service.

Second, as they gathered information about the presenting problem, its context and history, teams uncovered many other problems that turned out to be unrelated, but

could be listed and later addressed. In simply identifying the way a particular process worked and laying out a diagram, which typically involved consulting manuals and diagrams and interviewing knowledgeable employees, numerous examples were found where people thought they knew the chemistry of the system, the current physical layout of equipment, how people actually work with the equipment, etc., but they were mistaken. More importantly, issues surfaced around how designers and operators live in different "thought worlds" (Dougherty, 1990; Schein, 1996) and rarely communicate; even different operators failed to tell each other (or to ask) what they needed to know. Incomplete and incorrect procedures were used until a serious problem cropped up. These work practices and ways of thinking affect many aspects of plant performance, so their recognition and change has potential broad impact.

Third, data accessibility is absolutely critical for effective root cause analysis, and effective operations in general. Investigations are done immediately in the nuclear power industry, with a rule-of-thumb that people start to forget or misremember important detail in two days. The root cause teams in the chemical plant were investigating events that were weeks, months, or years old. Key informants change jobs, forget details, and even the physical information changes. For example, for one of the team investigations it turned out that a key source of information was continuous process data stored in the plant computers. However, the computers store that information for only one week and then erase the information, maintaining in permanent storage only less informative averages. This particular team got very lucky when a repeat event occurred during their analysis.

Fourth, the composition of teams that crossed disciplinary and hierarchical boundaries conveys an implicit message that no one person or group knows everything needed to solve the problems of the plant. There is a necessary strength to bringing the information and viewpoints of multiple kinds of people to bear on problems, and there are additional payoffs in the form of information exchange, new working relationships, and mutual respect. For example, because the teams began with problems organized around technical features of the equipment, it was natural for team members with technical competence to take their normal role as “expert” and assume that they and only they can provide answers for the plant. In the early interaction of several teams, there were particular engineers whose behavior could only be characterized as arrogant: they assumed there was a technical answer and that nontechnical team members were unable to contribute to the discussion and could only waste their time. Not surprisingly, there were some unpleasant team interactions. Yet, over the course of the analysis, these engineers began to realize that obvious technical “fixes” were not emerging; as problems were traced back they turned out to have underlying causes in work practices and culture involving designers, operators, maintainers, and managers. For these problems, the engineers were not the experts and, in fact, might be myopic in their understanding of human behavior and in need of insights from others on the team. This is a humbling but potentially very powerful experience.

DISCUSSION

An Analysis of the Logics

The discussions of incident review and root cause programs in high-hazard industries has illustrated a variety of “logics” and how these logics not only offer insights but also

create unintended gaps. Although I cannot offer a deep theory of logics, bringing these examples together suggests some interesting relationships. The major sources of my lists of categories are occupational groups such as engineers, operators, and executives (Rochlin and von Meier, 1994; Schein, 1996), the distinctions that emerge in organizational problem solving between a fixing orientation and a learning orientation (Carroll, 1995), and the analysis within the organizational learning literature between adaptation and learning, or between single loop and double loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1996).

The above categories can be assembled together according to two dimensions: anticipation vs. resilience (Wildavsky, 1988) and concrete vs. abstract, shown in Figure 3. Design engineers are working with logics that help them anticipate and therefore defend against problems in concrete objects. Their world is very visual, consisting of schematics, drawings, flowcharts, and pictures. When problems arise, the natural reaction is to fix the problem and put everything back in its original state. Executives are similarly focused on anticipation, models, strategic plans, and control, except they are dealing with financial issues that are more abstract, longer term, and primarily numerical (the “bottom line”) rather than visual. Operators and craftspeople who have their hands on the equipment are concerned with resilience, coping with the expected and unexpected deviations from the designers’ image of perfection. Their world is manual or tactile, as exemplified by the auxiliary operators whose job is to tour the plant, take readings, manipulate valves and switches, and literally feel the vibrations to sense malfunctions. Operators develop a variety of local adaptations in order to enact their assignments, including “workarounds” to cope with design errors, malfunctioning equipment and

inconsistent written procedures. Finally, the abstract concept of learning from experience and creating learning organizations seems to be advocated by social scientists as well as by management consultants and human factors experts in industry. Theirs is a verbal world of ideas, written publications, and persuasive conversations. The academics in particular take a long-term view of experimentation and learning in the abstract (e.g., Cohen and Sproull, 1996).

Insert Figure 3

The above analysis is not intended to suggest that engineers are only visual, concrete “fixers,” or that executives are only number-crunchers. I hope to suggest through this simple analysis that subcultures have somewhat distinctive logics (particular tasks and individuals may carry their own logics as well), and that these distinctions may help illuminate some of the conflicts and communication problems that organizations experience across occupational and hierarchical boundaries.

Political Logics

As I reflect on the logics in Figure 3, there is at least one gap in this overly-neat picture. Political logics, illustrated by the acceptability heuristic (Tetlock, 1995), shift us further away from the physical equipment and more toward the human and cultural context. For example, many nuclear power plants complain that they have wonderful written analyses but nothing changes (cf. Langley, 1995). There are difficult "hand-offs" between the root cause team and the line managers who must take action. There are problems in recommending quick fixes that do not address the real causes; sometimes that is what

management is demanding of the teams. There are shortages of resources and an unwillingness to commit to longer-term efforts in the face of daily demands. There is resistance to change and cynicism about the "program of the month." Sometimes it takes a major personnel change (such as firing a plant manager or vice president) to unfreeze people and open the space for new actions.

At one troubled nuclear power plant, senior management commissioned a Self-Assessment Team to work full-time for several months re-analyzing the reports from over 20 serious recent incidents, and then to act as "change agents" to jump start corrective actions. The team developed a detailed set of causal categories and a list of issues, which were investigated further through semi-structured interviews with over 250 employees of the utility. From these data, the team created a list of 15 problems organized in three groupings: (1) Management Philosophy, Skills and Practices; (2) People Performing the Work; and (3) Problem Solving and Follow-Up. In particular, two items within the Management grouping were considered highest priority and most fundamental: supervisory practices and risk assessment and prioritization. The Team was careful to illustrate each problem statement with concrete examples of events and interview quotations, and to link the problem statements back to the original symptomatic events.

Each problem statement was then turned over to an action group comprising one or more "customer," "suppliers," executive sponsors, and team member change agents. The roles of customer and supplier, a relatively new terminology for this organization, were drawn from its quality improvement process. However, the problems in the Management grouping were *not* turned over to an action group; instead, management

collectively took responsibility for these issues. Although this was described as a legitimate strategy to force management “buy-in” and ownership, it is also a way for management to close ranks and prevent other employees from exerting control. Subsequently, this initiative dissipated in the face of new problems and wholesale changes in top management.

The Need for More Comprehensive Logics

The above analysis implies that each of the logics has its use for particular types of problems or situations. Each has developed, in effect, because it has been successful at dealing with an important problem and has therefore become part of the culture of groups who succeed by dealing with that problem (Schein, 1992). The “fixing” logic, for example, is extremely useful for dealing with problems that are familiar, well-structured, decomposable, and loosely coupled to other systems.

Since TMI, the nuclear power industry has worked very hard to correct equipment problems and train operators intensively. Equipment that could not be fixed was replaced or redesigned. Many more employees were hired to do more designing, more maintenance, have additional operators on every shift with engineering backgrounds and responsibility for the big picture, quality control, regulatory compliance, and management. One plant that ran with 150 employees in 1975 had 950 employees in 1992, which in the context of deregulation has created enormous new financial pressures. The result is that fewer problems are now occurring (but more attention is paid to less serious ones) but those that do occur are more difficult to understand, involve combinations of causes, almost always have human errors, programmatic issues, and

managerial deficiencies, and have far less objective data associated with them. The same logics and fixes are less likely to fit these problems.

In any industry, well-intentioned, commonplace solutions can fail to help, have unintended side effects, or even exacerbate problems. When complex, interdependent problems are understood in linear cause-effect terms that results in a search for “fixes,” it is common to find a "fixes that fail" scenario (Senge, 1990), as exemplified in Figure 4. Consider that a plant has an increased number of equipment breakdowns, and that these are attributed to poor quality maintenance. It is typical to “fix” this problem by writing more detailed procedures and monitoring compliance more closely, in order to ensure the quality of work. The more detailed procedures usually result in fewer errors on that particular job, however the increased burden of procedures and supervision can be perceived by maintenance employees as mistrust and regimentation. This may result in loss of motivation, blind compliance to procedures that may still be incomplete, malicious compliance when workers know the right thing to do but also know that only rote compliance is safe from disciplinary action, the departure of skilled workers who find more interesting work elsewhere, and, ultimately, more problems. Similarly, blaming and disciplining particular individuals, intended to encourage accountability, can create an environment in which people do not report problems. For example, when the Federal Aviation Administration provided immunity from prosecution for pilots who reported near midair collisions, the number of reports tripled; when immunity was retracted, the number of reports dropped by a factor of six (Tamuz, 1994). Under such conditions, problems cannot be addressed early, trending is incomplete, and the result can be more problems.

Insert Figure 4

From this viewpoint, the incident review process should be based on more comprehensive logics that include learning as well as fixing as goals. For example, incidents would not be approached with the expectation of always finding the single "root" cause of the problem, nor is there a "solution" to every problem. Instead, the incident becomes an occasion to identify and discuss issues, to encourage new insights, and to explore possibilities for change and their consequences. I believe that an important reason for the success of benchmarking, total quality management, quantitative indicator tracking, and business process reengineering is that the veneer of quantitative modeling legitimates their hidden function of promoting discussion and collaborative learning. This suggests why, all too often, these approaches become new "fixes" that apply limited solutions with disappointing results. Antidotes to this myopia depend upon broader participation and discussion among specialized groups, and can be facilitated by new conceptual lenses (theories), modeling tools to organize dynamic interdependencies, and feedback about effectiveness (Senge and Sterman, 1991).

One example of the value of a learning orientation to promote collaboration of theorists, researchers, and operating personnel comes from Du Pont Chemicals (Carroll, Sterman, and Marcus, in press), whose chemical process plants were plagued with equipment failures. In the context of company-wide cost-reduction efforts, a benchmarking study showed that Du Pont spent more than its competitors on maintenance, yet had worse equipment availability. A culture of reactive fire-fighting

had developed, with workers regularly pulled off jobs to do corrective maintenance. Responding to the benchmarking study, a series of cost-cutting initiatives were undertaken that had no lasting impact. Finally, one team questioned the basic assumption that reducing maintenance costs could help reduce overall manufacturing costs; they thought that the effects of maintenance activities were tightly linked to so many aspects of plant performance that no one really understood the overall picture.

Du Pont was able to improve maintenance only after a collaborative conceptual breakthrough. An internal team developed a dynamic model of the system of relationships around maintenance (a "modeling for learning" exercise with the assistance of a researcher/consultant, Senge and Sterman, 1991). However, they were unable to transmit the systemic lessons of the model through ordinary means. Instead, the team created an experiential game in which plant employees play the roles of functional managers and discover new ways to think about plant activities, share their experiences and ideas, and test programs and policies. Having a broad range of employees with a system-wide understanding of the relationships between operations, maintenance, quality, and costs laid the groundwork for a successful pump maintenance pilot program.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has described some organizational learning activities, specifically the self-analysis of operating problems, in the nuclear power and chemical process industries. The analyses and examples illustrate that the logics underlying these learning activities appear to emerge from particular social and cultural contexts: occupational groups and hierarchical levels that deal with characteristic tasks and problems.

In high-hazard industries, the level of complexity and tight coupling among problems and issues seems to require more comprehensive logics than those typically employed. In self-analysis activities, people are rarely encouraged to look at the linkages among problems and issues, because it creates a feeling of overwhelming complexity and hopelessness. Everyone is struggling with how to understand and make improvements to organizational and cultural factors. Especially when faced with pressure to do something quickly, it is difficult to argue for a slow and uncertain approach.

The analysis of the logics underlying these learning activities suggests that attention must be directed to resilience and learning as well as anticipation and fixing, to abstract as well as concrete issues, and to organizational power and politics. Given encouragement, resources, communication across groups who use different logics, and helpful conceptual lenses, it is possible to consider multiple issues rather than a single root cause, to look beyond individuals who made errors to the organizations and systems that set them up for errors, and to raise issues about accepted practices and powerful, high status groups. These are difficult challenges for theory and practice. That is why it is so instructive to participate with companies that are trying to take a deeper look at themselves and to initiate lasting change, even though it is a lengthy and uncertain process.

NOTES

*Many of the ideas in this paper came directly or indirectly from Dr. Constance Perin during our collaborative research. I also benefitted from comments by Dr. William R. Corcoran, Ed Schein, and Steve Hart on earlier drafts of the paper. A version of this paper was presented under the title “Failures to Learn from Experience: An Analysis of Incident Reviews in Nuclear Power Plants and Chemical Process Plants” in the Symposium “High Stakes Learning: Making Sense of Unusual, High-Hazard Events” at the Academy of Management meetings, Cincinnati, August, 1996.

[1] The MIT International Program for Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety was supported by a consortium of utilities, suppliers, vendors, and foundations from the U.S. and other countries, who provided financial resources, access to sites and staff, and collaboration.

[2] The language is very similar to federal regulations (e.g., 10CFR50.73) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission documents on incident investigation.

[3] Of course, “failure to verify” cannot be the sole “root cause” of pump inoperability, since some prior process failed to enable operability (Corcoran, 1997).

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Figure 1

Two Images of Organization





Figure 2

Organizational Learning Framework




Figure 3

Fixes That Fail

