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# 1 Overshooting Tipping Point Thresholds in A Changing Climate

2

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8

9 Paleo-records suggest that the climate system has tipping points, where small changes in forcing  
10 cause substantial and irreversible alteration to Earth system components called tipping elements.  
11 As atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise due to fossil fuel burning, human  
12 activity could also trigger tipping. These would be difficult for society to adapt to. Previous studies  
13 report low global warming thresholds above pre-industrial conditions for key tipping elements such  
14 as ice-sheet melt. If so, high contemporary rates of warming imply that the exceedance of these  
15 thresholds is almost inevitable. It is widely assumed that this means we are now committed to  
16 suffering these tipping events. We show that this conventional wisdom may be flawed, especially  
17 for slow onset tipping elements in our rapidly changing climate. Recently developed theory  
18 indicates that a threshold may be temporarily exceeded without prompting a change of system  
19 state, if the overshoot time is short compared to the effective timescale of the tipping element. To  
20 demonstrate this, we consider transparently simple models of tipping elements with prescribed  
21 thresholds, driven by global warming trajectories that peak before returning to stabilise at 1.5°C of  
22 global warming.

23

## 24 Introduction


25 Multiple strands of evidence indicate that components of the Earth System, called Tipping Elements<sup>1</sup>,  
26 are capable of large and rapid changes in response to relatively small changes to forcings<sup>2</sup>. Tipping  
27 Elements are often irreversible over multiple human generations: the original system state is not  
28 recovered when the forcing is brought back to its original value. The point beyond which a Tipping  
29 Element changes state is called a Tipping Point<sup>3,4</sup>. Tipping points are evident in paleoclimate records<sup>5,6</sup>,  
30 as well as in future projections made with Earth System Models<sup>7</sup>. Tipping points are normally  
31 characterised by the global warming levels at which they occur. These tipping point thresholds  
32 (hereafter thresholds) are often estimated to be at low levels of global warming<sup>8-12</sup>, and it is these  
33 assessments that in part have led to the societal aspiration to restrict global warming to low levels  
34 such as 2.0°C or even 1.5°C above the pre-industrial period<sup>10,13,14</sup>. However, current emission levels  
35 and measured warming rates suggest that keeping below these global warming levels will be difficult  
36 for society to achieve<sup>15,16</sup>. It is therefore important to ask if thresholds could be briefly overshoot  
37 without triggering the transition to an alternative state. Despite the pressing requirement to answer  
38 this question, very few assessments exist of whether the overshoot of thresholds is possible, and if so  
39 what magnitudes and timescales are safe<sup>17-19</sup>. Nevertheless, dynamical systems theory shows that  
40 temporary tipping point overshoot is both possible and can be quantified<sup>20,21</sup>. We combine this theory  
41 with transparently simple models of four potential tipping elements to determine the possible global  
42 warming trajectories that allow for a safe overshoot of the prescribed thresholds.

43

## 44 The importance of timescales

45 Of greatest relevance here are tipping points that may occur in response to a change in global  
46 temperature. Such warming might be over long paleo periods, or as of interest here, at a faster  
47 decade-to-century timescale, largely driven by the human burning of fossil fuels and rising  
48 atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations<sup>22</sup>. Once global warming passes a threshold for the  
49 system, the current state of the system starts to undergo a transition to an alternative state, where  
50 such a state might be vastly different. This transition may occur relatively quickly - we refer to these  
51 as having a fast tipping onset, and hypothetical examples include Amazon forest dieback<sup>23</sup> and

52 disruption to monsoons<sup>24</sup>. Other transitions may take much longer, and these slow onset cases include  
 53 ice sheet loss<sup>25</sup> and the collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC)<sup>26</sup>. A  
 54 transgression of a tipping point threshold does not necessarily cause an instantaneous transition,  
 55 especially for slow onset tipping elements, as illustrated schematically in Figure 1 (and animated with  
 56 stability landscapes in **Video 1**). Instead the system lives on borrowed time<sup>27</sup> before tipping occurs,  
 57 and such inertia might allow for a temporary 'safe' global warming overshoot.  
 58



**Figure 1: Comparison between slow and fast onset tipping elements.** a) Idealised time series of a linear increase in global warming above pre-industrial levels that crosses an illustrative threshold of 2°C (dashed line). b) Time series of system state for a fast onset tipping system (blue) and slow onset tipping system (orange), with the same threshold and the same global warming forcing as in a). c) System state vs global warming for the fast onset tipping element (blue) and slow onset tipping element (orange). Both systems have a desired state, which is the upper solid black curve and represent contemporary conditions. An undesired stable state, given by the lower solid black curve, coexists with the desired state for warming levels below the 2°C threshold, separated by an unstable state (black dashed curve). Above the threshold, only the undesired equilibrium state remains.

59 Figure 1a considers a scenario where global warming increases linearly with time. We assume two  
 60 tipping elements of the climate system which have the same threshold of 2°C of global warming,  
 61 denoted by the horizontal black dashed line. Figure 1b displays the time series response of the system  
 62 state to this linear warming increase for a fast-onset tipping element (blue) and a slow-onset tipping  
 63 element (orange). Despite both tipping elements having the same threshold, which is transgressed  
 64 after 50 years, only the fast system experiences rapid tipping. In contrast, the slow system maintains  
 65 the initial system state for much longer, with full tipping not occurring until about year 100. Figure 1c  
 66 presents these trajectories, and the equilibrium states, as a function of global warming. Stable states  
 67 are represented by black solid curves and the unstable state by the black dashed curve. For warming  
 68 levels below the threshold, the system is bistable, with a desirable upper stable branch (representing  
 69 current conditions) and an undesirable lower stable system state coexisting. Importantly, beyond the  
 70 threshold, only the undesirable state persists. The trajectories of both the fast and slow systems  
 71 closely track the equilibrium state initially. Once the equilibrium state disappears at the threshold, the  
 72 fast system tips nearly instantaneously, whereas the slow system at first appears unaware of the  
 73 disappeared state. For the parameters in this illustrative example, it is not until the warming has  
 74 exceeded 2.5°C that the slow system begins to tip. We assess if this delay in tipping can be exploited  
 75 to enable safe overshoots of thresholds that do not result in the system tipping to the undesired state.  
 76 Similar delayed tipping phenomena has been observed in numerical runs of an Energy Balance  
 77 Model<sup>28</sup>. A ghost state, also known as an attractor relic, can be another reason for tipping to be

78 delayed<sup>29,30</sup>. Features not included here such as internal variability and seasonal cycles will also have  
79 an influence on the size of delay.

80

81 In our analysis we consider global warming overshoot trajectories,  $\Delta T$ , introduced by Huntingford et  
82 al. (2017)<sup>31</sup>:

$$\Delta T = \Delta T_0 + \gamma t - (1 - e^{-\mu t})[\gamma t - (\Delta T_{Lim} - \Delta T_0)], \quad \mu(t) = \mu_0 + \mu_1 t. \quad (1)$$

83

84 These temperature trajectories contain five parameters. Parameter  $\Delta T_0$ , is the absolute warming since  
85 the preindustrial period. Parameter  $\Delta T_{Lim}$ , is an eventual stabilisation temperature, set to be the long-  
86 term Paris target of 1.5°C<sup>14</sup>. An exponential decay term characterises the transition that moves away  
87 from the current linear growth (and towards stabilisation). The transition timescale,  $\mu(t)$ , can change  
88 linearly in time, described by the parameters,  $\mu_0$  and  $\mu_1$ . Such a time-dependency captures if society  
89 places more effort to lower global warming rates in the near term, or instead many decades ahead.  
90 For relatively slower transitions, the profiles initially overshoot  $\Delta T_{Lim}$ , as used in this study. The  
91 parameter,  $\gamma$ , is chosen to ensure a realistic rate of global warming in the recent past, given the chosen  
92 values of the other parameters. These global temperature trajectories are designed to allow varying  
93 levels of temperature overshoot for varying periods of time, while also matching the contemporary  
94 rate of global warming and asymptoting to the long-term Paris target of 1.5°C.

95

96 Steffen et al. (2018)<sup>11</sup> characterised global warming ranges at which the climate tipping elements  
97 would undergo state changes if exceeded for sufficiently long. However, the models for the climate  
98 tipping elements we consider in this study (detailed in Boxes 1 and 2) have their individual forcing  
99 parameters and thresholds that cause the systems to undergo state changes if exceeded for  
100 sufficiently long. For clarity, these forcing parameters are: local temperature for forest dieback; solar  
101 constant for ice cap loss; planetary albedo for monsoon disruption; and freshwater forcing for AMOC  
102 collapse. We assume that each of these forcing parameters  $p$  are proportional to the global warming  
103  $T$ , therefore

$$T = T_{TP} + (p - p_{TP}) \frac{T_{TP} - T_{ref}}{p_{TP} - p_{ref}},$$

104

105 where the subscript  $TP$  refers to the threshold (for temperature these are chosen at the centre of the  
106 ranges given by Steffen et al. (2018)<sup>11</sup>). The subscript  $ref$  is a reference level related to the current  
107 climate.


108

109 We now move to specific examples of tipping elements. Figure 2 (animated with stability landscapes  
110 in **Video 2**) demonstrates the concept of overshooting a threshold for a model of the AMOC<sup>32-34</sup> – see  
111 Box 2 for details of the AMOC model. The potential collapse of the AMOC is one example of a slow  
112 tipping onset where the transitional timescale is assumed to be of the order of centuries<sup>1</sup>. Steffen et  
113 al. (2018)<sup>11</sup> have characterised the critical global warming for the collapse of the AMOC to be in the  
114 range of 3-5°C. In our model, we set the threshold to be at the centre of this warming range, namely  
115 at 4°C of global warming above pre-industrial.

116

117 In Figure 2a we consider two different overshoots of the AMOC threshold; the first trajectory (blue  
118 curve) represents a relatively small peak overshoot of 1°C but takes approximately 3,500 years to  
119 stabilise at 1.5°C. The second trajectory (orange curve) overshoots the threshold by 2°C but stabilises  
120 much faster (1,150 years) at the same level. Conventional wisdom suggests that both trajectories  
121 would lead to the AMOC tipping to the ‘off’ state, because in both cases the threshold has been  
122 exceeded. However, these trajectories have very different and rather counterintuitive risks of tipping  
123 when timescales are taken properly into account.

124



**Figure 2: Illustration of overshooting a threshold in a model for the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC).** **a)** Two time series of contrasting sample overshoot trajectories are shown in global warming given by Equation (1). The blue curve (parameter values:  $\mu_0 = 1.8 \times 10^{-3}$ ,  $\mu_1 = 2.0 \times 10^{-7}$  per year,  $\gamma = 0.0191^\circ\text{C per year}$ ) is a small and long overshoot, while the orange curve (parameter values:  $\mu_0 = -1.3 \times 10^{-3}$ ,  $\mu_1 = 7.0 \times 10^{-6}$  per year,  $\gamma = 0.02065^\circ\text{C per year}$ ) is a much larger yet quick overshoot. The black dashed line indicates the threshold, above which if global warming is fixed, the AMOC would eventually collapse. **b)** Time series response of ocean flow strength corresponding to the warming overshoot trajectories presented in **a)**. **c)** Flow strength vs global warming for short, long overshoot and big fast overshoot (colours as in **a)** and **b)**). An AMOC 'on' state (upper solid black curve) and an AMOC 'off' state (lower solid black curve) both coexist for warming levels below the threshold of  $4^\circ\text{C}$  and are separated by an unstable state (black dashed curve). Above the threshold only the AMOC 'off' state remains.

125 The AMOC is characterised by its north-south flow strength, measured in Sverdrups (Sv). In Figure 2b  
 126 the blue time series shows that a small but long-lasting overshoot does not prevent the system tipping,  
 127 and instead causes the flow strength to drop from 9Sv to only 2Sv, indicating a sustained collapse of  
 128 the circulation. The flow rate remains severely weakened, even as global warming decreases. In  
 129 contrast, the larger but shorter overshoot allows the flow strength to recover after a strong initial  
 130 weakening (orange time series). The AMOC has been able to recover in this scenario because the  
 131 reversal in global warming has been sufficiently fast.


132  
 133 Plotting this as a function of warming (Figure 2c), reveals a clearer picture of the underlying dynamics  
 134 taking place. For the small overshoot (blue trajectory), the substantial amount of time spent over the  
 135 threshold means that once global warming is back below the threshold, the circulation has almost  
 136 reached its collapsed state. Hence the circulation does not recover and is destined to remain 'off'  
 137 regardless of how far warming is further reduced. For the faster reversal in global warming (orange  
 138 trajectory), resulting in less time over the threshold once warming is brought back below  $4^\circ\text{C}$  the  
 139 collapsed state has yet to be reached. Therefore, with a continued fast reduction in warming, the  
 140 trajectory is able to cross the unstable state (black dashed curve) – also known as a melancholia  
 141 state<sup>28</sup>, after which the flow strength begins to recover, preventing the tipping. It is important to note,  
 142 in Figure 2c, that such crossing occurs at a warming below  $4^\circ\text{C}$ . Hence safely returning to the initial  
 143 state requires a period of time when global warming is below the threshold.

144  
 145 **Theoretical basis**

146 We now provide a more theoretical basis to the numerical findings presented in Figure 2. For a fixed  
 147 stabilisation level, there are two attributes that determine whether a system can safely overshoot a

148 threshold. These are the amount by which the threshold is exceeded relative to the difference  
 149 between the threshold and the stabilisation level,  $\chi$ , and the time spent over that threshold,  $t_e$ . For  
 150 symmetric parabolic overshoots, it has been shown that a system will not tip if  $\chi < 16\tau^2/t_e^2$ , where  
 151  $\tau$  is the effective timescale of the system<sup>20</sup>. Here we define the effective timescale of a tipping element  
 152 as the recovery time from perturbations in the equilibrium state at 1.5°C global warming. The effective  
 153 timescale depends on the distance to the threshold and can be determined from the lag-1  
 154 autocorrelation statistic (see Ritchie et al., 2019<sup>20</sup> for further details). In Figure 3 we show how the  
 155 theory compares against four tipping elements of the climate system<sup>1,11</sup>: collapse of the AMOC<sup>32</sup>;  
 156 melting of the ice cap<sup>35</sup>; disruption to the Indian Summer Monsoon<sup>24</sup>; and forest dieback<sup>23</sup>. The simple  
 157 models used to represent these fast tipping elements and slow tipping elements are presented in  
 158 Boxes 1 and 2 respectively.

159  
 160 Figure 3a shows the boundaries of safe and unsafe overshoots for each of these potential tipping  
 161 elements, in a regime diagram defined by the peak overshoot and exceedance time of each threshold.  
 162 There is a clear separation between tipping elements that can be classified as fast onset and those  
 163 classified as slow onset tipping elements. The slower onset tipping elements are ice cap melt and  
 164 AMOC collapse, and it is possible to safely overshoot their thresholds for multiple centuries before  
 165 returning and stabilising at the 1.5°C level. In contrast, for the faster onset tipping elements of  
 166 monsoon disruption and Amazon forest dieback, overshoot is possible only for decades or even just  
 167 years before tipping would be induced. In Figure 3a, we present the boundaries derived numerically  
 168 from the temperature overshoots defined by Huntingford et al. (2017)<sup>31</sup> (solid curves) and analytically  
 169 from the inverse square theory (dashed curves). Normalising the time over the threshold with the  
 170 effective timescale of each system, and also the peak warming overshoot with the distance from the  
 171 threshold at 1.5°C, collapses the theoretical curves onto a single curve (Figure 3b). This panel shows a




**Figure 3: Boundary curves separating safe and unsafe overshoots that start at current warming levels and return to stabilise at the 1.5°C Paris Climate Agreement Target. a)** Four climate tipping elements are shown (as marked), based on the peak warming overshoot and time over individual thresholds. Above and right of boundary curves represents where tipping occurs while below and left provides the safe overshoots of the threshold for each tipping element. Solid boundary curves are calculated numerically and give the exact boundary, and dashed curves represent the inverse square law theory. **b)** Same as **a)** but with the peak warming overshoot normalised by the threshold distance beyond the 1.5°C Paris Target and the time over the threshold normalised by the effective timescale of the individual systems. Presented in this way, the theoretical curves for each tipping element collapse onto one curve given by the black dashed curve.

172 good agreement between the boundary calculated numerically for our temperature overshoots and  
 173 the theoretical inverse square boundary (which assumes a parabolic overshoot), for all four climate  
 174 tipping elements.

175  
 176 **Safe and unsafe overshoots**

177 Instead of considering the peak and time over the specific thresholds, Figure 4a displays the numerical  
 178 boundaries of safe overshoots for absolute peak global warming and time to stabilisation at the Paris  
 179 Climate Agreement target of 1.5°C. The grey shaded region indicates all overshoots of the 1.5°C target  
 180 that would not result in tipping for any of the four chosen tipping elements of the climate system.  
 181 Figure 4a indicates that the ice cap could be preserved if peak warming is limited to 3°C instead of the  
 182 more conventional 2°C threshold (i.e. an overshoot of 1°C) if the time taken to stabilise at 1.5°C is  
 183 under 400 years. It is important to note that, overshooting slightly more than intended can be offset  
 184 by stabilising at some lower level. Similarly, the AMOC can be maintained up to a peak warming of 6°C  
 185 provided the time to converge to 1.5°C is less than 1,200 years, despite the assumed 4°C threshold.  
 186 Significantly, for the faster onset tipping elements, there is little opportunity for safe overshoot.

187  
 188 We present a more detailed comparison between a slow onset tipping element (ice cap melt) with a  
 189 low threshold, and a fast onset tipping element (Amazon forest dieback) with a higher threshold in  
 190 Figure 4c. We consider two overshoot scenarios, as marked by a cross and a circle in Figure 4a, of the  
 191 1.5°C target before returning to stabilise at that level. The time evolution of these scenarios is shown  
 192 in Figure 4b. One scenario considers a peak global warming of 3.5°C that stabilises at 1.5°C after 350  
 193 years (solid curve with circles) and the other has a higher peak warming of 5°C but takes 120 years to  
 194 converge to 1.5°C (dotted curve with crosses). The responses to these overshoot scenarios are  
 195 displayed in Figure 4c, where colour differentiates between the latitude of the ice cap boundary (blue)  
 196 and vegetation fraction characterising forest dieback (green), and the line style and marker separates  
 197 the overshoot scenarios. For a small but long overshoot of the 1.5°C target, the ice cap tips to an ice-



**Figure 4: Boundaries of safe overshoots for multiple tipping points.** a) Boundary curves separating safe and unsafe overshoots for four climate tipping elements considered (see Boxes 1 and 2), based on the peak global warming and time to stabilisation at 1.5°C warming. Above and right of the individual coloured boundary curves represents where tipping is not avoided, whilst below and left provides the safe zone for each particular tipping element. The grey shaded region indicates the safe zone for all tipping elements. Each different grey shade indicates the boundary of this safe zone if the threshold for all tipping elements were 0.1°C lower. Cross and circle markers indicate parameter values of contrasting sample warming overshoot trajectories considered in b) and c). b) Time series of sample overshoot trajectories in global warming, differentiated by line type and marker. Horizontal blue and green dashed lines denote thresholds for the ice cap and forest dieback respectively. c) Time series of ice cap boundary (blue) and Amazon vegetation fraction (green) response to the two overshoot trajectories presented in b). Line type and symbols identical between b) and c).

198 free state because its threshold has been transgressed for a sufficiently long time. However, in this  
199 scenario, there has been no forest dieback simply because its threshold has not been crossed.  
200 However, the opposite behaviours are observed for a higher peak global warming with a quick  
201 convergence to 1.5°C. In this scenario the ice cap boundary is maintained at close to 60°N. Although  
202 there is a large exceedance of the threshold it is possible to return to the initial state because the time  
203 over that threshold is sufficiently short compared to the effective timescale of the system. Forest  
204 dieback is induced due to the fast onset of the tipping permitting only very limited overshoots of the  
205 threshold. Scenarios with a high peak warming and a fast convergence to the 1.5°C stabilisation level  
206 do however imply a fast reduction in temperature, which may not be possible with available  
207 technologies. The ‘point of no return’ is therefore also practically constrained by the rate at which  
208 global warming can be reduced.

209

## 210 **Discussion**

211 Our analysis reveals that for many climate tipping points it is possible to cross a threshold temporarily  
212 without triggering tipping to a new state. This finding is particularly relevant for potential slow-onset  
213 tipping elements such as ice-sheet melt or collapse of the AMOC. Hence, the ‘point of no return’ for a  
214 slow onset tipping element is not the threshold but a point beyond the threshold. How far this point  
215 is beyond the threshold is determined by three factors: 1) the effective timescale of the system 2) how  
216 fast global warming can be reduced and 3) the level at which warming stabilises.

217

218 In this study we have used transparently simple models for four climate tipping elements, with a  
219 prescribed choice of threshold in each case based-on previous studies<sup>11</sup>. In particular, with the  
220 exception of the monsoon model, the models used are first order with a single timescale. Further work  
221 is required to demonstrate that similar behaviour is present in more complex models, in which  
222 multiple variables act on multiple timescales and the dynamics around the threshold is much more  
223 complex. While the thresholds for climate tipping points are highly uncertain, we have assumed the  
224 central estimates as published by Steffen et al. (2018)<sup>11</sup> and focussed specifically on the impact of  
225 timescales on top of these prescribed thresholds. The tipping element with the earliest threshold is  
226 also the one with the longest timescale (ice sheet melt), whereas faster tipping elements tend to have  
227 higher thresholds (e.g. tropical forest dieback). This means that safe levels of peak warming are set by  
228 faster onset tipping points, but the safe stabilisation warming level is set by the slower onset tipping  
229 points.

230

231 In our analysis we have considered the safe and unsafe boundaries for each tipping element  
232 individually. However, recently it has been proposed that tipping elements are coupled and that  
233 tipping cascades are possible<sup>36,37</sup>. The timescales and coupling strength between tipping elements,  
234 could result in the overall threshold being lower. Therefore, further research is required to calculate  
235 ‘safe’ overshoots for coupled tipping elements.

236

237 This study highlights the importance of timescales for possible tipping points in a changing climate.  
238 Slow onset tipping elements permit temporary overshoots of a threshold without triggering tipping to  
239 a new state. Both the approach rate to any tipping point threshold, and actions taken to reverse  
240 warming once over that threshold, will therefore determine if climate remains safe from unwelcome  
241 state changes. state

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## Box 1: Models of fast tipping elements

### Forest dieback model

Forest dieback is represented by a modified version of the TRIFFID model<sup>23</sup> for a single vegetation type. Vegetation fraction  $v$  is modelled by a Lotka-Volterra equation:

$$\frac{dv}{dt} = gv(1 - v) - \gamma v,$$

where  $\gamma$  is a disturbance rate and  $g$  is a growth term which is assumed to be parabolic in the local temperature,  $T_l$ :

$$g = g_0 \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{T_l - T_{opt}}{\beta} \right)^2 \right].$$

There is an optimal temperature  $T_{opt}$  for which growth is maximal and equal to  $g_0$ . The parameter  $\beta$  determines the temperature half-width for which vegetation grows. A negative growth-rate implies additional tree mortality. However, there is an additional feedback on the local temperature,  $T_l$ , a decline in vegetation results in an increase in temperature:

$$T_l = T_f + (1 - v)\alpha.$$

The temperature  $T_f$  is used as the forcing parameter and defines the temperature if there was total forest cover. The temperature difference between total forest and bare soil is defined by the parameter  $\alpha$ . Table 1 lists all the parameters and their values used in the forest dieback model.

**Table 1:** Table of parameters used in vegetation dieback model

Parameter	Value	Unit	Description
$\alpha$	5	°C	difference between surface temperature of bare-soil and forest
$\beta$	10	°C	half-width of the growth versus temperature curve
$g_0$	2	$yr^{-1}$	maximum growth-rate
$\gamma$	0.2	$yr^{-1}$	disturbance rate
$T_{opt}$	28	°C	optimal temperature for plant growth

### Indian Summer Monsoon model

The summer temperature gradient generates monsoon winds over the Indian subcontinent which hold moisture having emanated from the Indian Ocean. Once over the land the moisture falls as precipitation, which in turn releases heat, amplifying the temperature gradient and generating stronger winds<sup>38</sup>. This key feedback mechanism of the monsoon is captured in a reduced form model introduced by Zickfeld et al. (2005)<sup>24</sup>. Zickfeld et al. (2005)<sup>24</sup> identified a threshold in the planetary albedo  $A_{sys}$ , such that if it was exceeded for sufficiently long, the monsoon season would be disrupted. Ritchie et al. (2019) made further reductions to the model though retained the key mechanisms of the monsoon. We adopt the same version of the model as Ritchie et al. (2019)<sup>20</sup>, which models the time evolution of the land temperature  $T$ , and specific humidity  $Q$ :

$$\frac{dQ}{dt} = \frac{E(Q, T) - P(Q) + A_v(Q, T)}{I_Q},$$

$$\frac{dT}{dt} = \frac{\mathcal{L}(P(Q) - E(Q, T)) + F_l(1 - A_{sys}) - F_\uparrow(T) + A_T(Q, T)}{I_T}.$$

For further details of variables and a table of the parameter values used, we ask the reader to refer to Ritchie et al. (2019)<sup>20</sup>. The increase in planetary albedo required to cause a tipping in the monsoon is arguably more likely to occur due to increases in reflective anthropogenic aerosols rather than increases in greenhouse gases. We follow Steffen et al. (2018)<sup>11</sup> in assuming that this threshold corresponds to about 4°C of global warming.

## Box 2: Models of slow tipping elements

### Ice cap model

North (1984)<sup>39</sup> devised a model to offer an interpretation of the small ice cap instability. It was found that simple climate models, which employ heat diffusion and the ice-albedo feedback, show that ice caps smaller than a finite size are unstable. Specifically, for a given range in the solar constant  $S_0$  (a proxy for temperature) a large ice cap state and an ice-free state could coexist. The small ice cap instability is assumed to play a key role in the formation of large ice sheets such as Greenland. In this study we use a model, introduced by Herald et al. (2013)<sup>35</sup>, that models the sine of the latitude of the ice cap boundary  $x$ , and captures the key mechanisms of the North model, namely the bistable regime:

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = -0.003 + (1 - x) \left[ \frac{S_0}{4} - 355 + 3 \left( \frac{x - 0.89}{0.09} \right)^2 \right].$$

### Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) model

Analysing the flow between two boxes of water connected by an overflow and a capillary tube, Stommel (1961)<sup>34</sup> devised the first model of the AMOC. The model measures the evolution of salinity and temperature fluxes between the two boxes, where one box was used to represent the cold salty waters of the North Atlantic and the other the warm fresh waters of the Tropics. Cessi (1994)<sup>32</sup> made the additional assumption that the diffusion timescale is much larger than the temperature restoring timescale. This assumption means that temperature can be assumed constant and so the model can simply be written in terms of a rescaled salinity flux,  $y$ :

$$\frac{dy}{dt} = F - y[1 + \mu^2(1 - y)^2],$$

where  $\mu^2$  is the ratio of the diffusive and advective timescales. The AMOC is a temperature and salinity driven circulation and hence, the rescaled salinity flux  $y$  acts as a proxy for the strength of the flow  $Q$ :

$$Q = \frac{\eta V [1 + \mu^2(1 - y)^2]}{t_d}.$$

See Table 2 for a description of the parameters and their values, which are the same as those used in Dijkstra (2013)<sup>33</sup>. The freshwater forcing  $F$  represents freshwater added to the North Atlantic and has a threshold such that maintained freshwater forcing above this level will eventually lead to a collapse of the AMOC.

**Table 2:** Table of parameters used in AMOC model.

Parameter	Value	Unit	Description
$\mu^2$	6.2	1	Ratio of diffusive and advective timescales
$t_d$	180	<i>yr</i>	Diffusion timescale
$V$	$300 \times 4.5 \times 8,250$	$km^3$	Ocean volume
$\eta$	$3.17 \times 10^{-5}$	$Sv \text{ yr } km^{-3}$	Scaling factor

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361 P.D.L.R., and P.M.C. designed and directed the research. All authors helped to shape the research and  
362 drafted the manuscript through weekly virtual meetings. P.D.L.R. performed the analysis and  
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365 **Competing interests**

366 The authors declare no competing interests.