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Research Article

Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe

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Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe

Tomáš Sobotka[1]

Abstract

This chapter discusses the concept of the second demographic transition (SDT) and its relevance for explaining the ongoing changes in family and fertility patterns across Europe. It takes a closer look at the shifts in values and attitudes related to family, reproduction, and children, and their representation in different chapters in this collection. It re-examines the link between the second demographic transition and fertility, highlights its strong positive association with fertility at later childbearing ages, and suggests that the transition does not necessarily lead to sub-replacement fertility levels. Subsequently, it provides an extensive discussion on the progression of the SDT behind the former 'Iron Curtain.' To explain some apparent contradictions in this process, it employs a conceptual model of 'readiness, willingness, and ability' (RWA) advocated by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001). It also explores the multifaceted nature of the second demographic transition between different social groups, and points out an apparent paradox: whereas lower-educated individuals often embrace values that can be characterised as rather traditional, they also frequently manifest family behaviour associated with the transition, such as non-marital childbearing, high partnership instability, and high prevalence of long-term cohabitation. This suggests that there may be two different pathways of the progression of the second demographic transition. The concluding section points out the role of structural constraints for the diffusion of the transition among disadvantaged social strata, highlights the importance of the 'gender revolution' for the SDT trends, and discusses the usefulness of the SDT framework.

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1. Introduction: the fluidity of the 'second demographic transition'

The idea of the *second demographic transition* was first suggested by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa in 1986, when it referred to interrelated changes in fertility, family formation, and partnership behaviour, which started in the late 1960s in many countries of Western and Northern Europe. The term *transition*—initially used with a question mark reflecting uncertainty about it (van de Kaa 2002: 9)—shows that its proponents became convinced that a long-lasting change in demographic regime was under way. This change was closely related to substantial shifts in values related to family life and children, and was marked by the weakening of the 'traditional' family as an institution. Decline in fertility rates well below the replacement level, facilitated by the spread of modern contraception, was perceived as the main feature of the transition (van de Kaa 1987: 4). The concept of the second demographic transition (SDT) has been subsequently elaborated upon in numerous publications (e.g., Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 1994, 2001 and 2002; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002 and 2004). It has tentatively incorporated mortality and migration, and has been broadly linked to numerous structural changes (modernization, the growth of the service economy and the welfare state, the expansion of higher education), cultural changes (secularization, the rise of individualistic values, the importance of self-expression and self-fulfilment) and technological changes (the adoption of modern contraception, the advances in assisted reproduction, the explosion of new information technologies) (see van de Kaa 1994). According to van de Kaa (1996: 425), the second demographic transition has become a "quintessential narrative of ideational and cultural change," whose main distinction from the first demographic transition is the "overwhelming preoccupation with self-fulfilment, personal freedom of choice, personal development and lifestyle, and emancipation, as reflected in family formation, attitudes towards fertility regulation and the motivation for parenthood." A stylised discussion of the development over time of the second demographic transition concept, and of associated ideas, is provided by van de Kaa (2002) in a paper entitled "The idea of a Second Demographic Transition in industrialized countries."

The widening scope of the second demographic transition concept and its evolution over time imply that it has become broadly used as a label, description, and even explanation for a plethora of diverse changes in fertility and family-related behaviours and attitudes, to the point where its usage "has escaped the control of its initial proponents" (Billari and Wilson 2001: 3). Considerable ambiguity prevails among demographers about the concept, its main facets and its main underlying mechanisms: to many observers, it remains unclear what the transition really is and

how to define it. Adding to this definition problem, the crucial elements of the transition may change over time: for instance, van de Kaa (2002: 29) suggests that "while below replacement fertility currently is a crucial element of the Second Transition, this need not be a permanent state." Different facets of the SDT idea have attracted considerable amount of criticism. Cliquet argued that there is no apparent discontinuity between the first and the second demographic transition; he views demographic changes of the last decades as "a new acceleration in relational and reproductive patterns, associated to modernization" (Cliquet 1991: 28, see also counter-arguments by Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002 and Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004). The timing of the onset of the SDT can be disputed as well. For instance, van Bavel (2007) has shown using an example of low fertility between the First and Second World Wars that contemporary interpretations of below-replacement fertility centred on the factors frequently associated with the second demographic transition, such as secularisation, changes in the character of marriage, consumerism, increased economic aspirations, and the conflict between employment and motherhood. The idea of a 'transition' seemingly suggests that there is a 'final state,' a new demographic regime on which different societies eventually converge. However, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa neither formally define a starting point, nor envision any quantifiable endpoint of the transition.[2] What matters in their arguments is not an envisioned 'end-of-transition' equilibrium, but rather a direction of changes and trajectories, which are generally shared across countries.

But even the idea of such widely shared behavioural and value changes raises a question about the eventual convergence among countries and diverse social groups in their family patterns and demographic characteristics. While on an individual level the transition may be expected to lead to an increased variability in fertility and family behaviours, and result in a 'pluralisation of family forms,' the notion of common cross-country trends suggests that the differences between countries are likely to diminish. However, many researchers emphasise the persistent diversity in family patterns and living arrangements across Europe (e.g., Kuijsten 1996), which has historical roots (e.g., Reher 1998). Consequently, some scholars argue that different types of changes in family and fertility "cannot simply be interpreted in one model of the second demographic transition" (de Beer, Corijn and Deven 2000: 124, see also Micheli 2004: 80). Micheli (2004) proposes that family patterns in Europe remain strongly regionally embedded, and that, in contrast to Northern Europe, modernisation has led to a revitalisation of the 'kinship-alliance family

[2] Noting that the outcome of the second demographic transition cannot be predicted with any certainty, and that it is unlikely to lead to any sort of equilibrium, van de Kaa (2004b: xiii) suggested that the term 'revolution'—which does not imply a shift from one steady state to another—would probably have been a better label for the ongoing "change in demographic regime."

patterns' in the South.[3] Also, the hypothesised synchronicity between the behavioural and value changes occasionally attracts criticism. Rotariu (2006: 19), for instance, suggests that in Romania the behavioural change manifested by falling fertility rates, fertility postponement, and rising proportion of non-marital births "appears to precede the shift in the system of values and attitudes toward family and children." Another common criticism of the SDT concept is its anchoring in European, or, when viewed from an even narrower perspective, Northwestern European patterns of demographic changes, which make it far from certain that it will spread to other parts of the world (Coleman 2004). Some contributions indicate that the SDT, or at least many of its features, is well underway in non-European advanced societies (see Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006 for the U.S. and Matsuo 2001 and Rindfuss et al. 2004 for Japan), but the differences in family-related behaviours and attitudes between North-western Europe and most advanced Asian countries, like Japan or Korea, remain enormous. Finally, there may be a problem with the term itself: Coleman (2004) claims that the second demographic transition concerns mostly changes in living arrangements, and can therefore hardly be labelled 'demographic.'

The broadness and the fluidity of the transition narrative have, to some extent, hindered empirical studies examining its validity and the spread of the transition in different societies and regions. With a rising acceptance of the concept, the number of articles investigating the SDT in different countries has increased (e.g., de Beer, Corijn and Deven 2000; Sobotka, Zeman, and Kantorová 2003, Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006, Kertzer et al. 2006, Rotariu 2006, Gerber and Berman 2006, and Gerber and Cottrell 2006). Despite valid criticisms of the 'transition' framework, it is worthwhile to discuss the spread of the second demographic transition in Europe, and outline how it is reflected in the country-specific chapters in this collection. The various reasons for focusing on the second demographic transition can be summarised as follows. First, the fact that the SDT has become a rather established concept, which is often used to understand changes in demographic behaviour (Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008) and which is also discussed in many country chapters, warrants specific attention. Second, the significance of a substantial shift in family-related behaviour and attitudes in advanced societies in the last four decades has been recognised not only by numerous demographers, but also by

[3] Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa acknowledge huge cross-country heterogeneity in the SDT progression. Van de Kaa (2002: 31) concludes, nevertheless, that the persistent differences "are variations on the common themes: major changes in fertility, a redefinition of the model of the family, improvements in mortality, and becoming countries of immigration." He then concludes that "[i]t is our inability to explain these changes as a purely temporary disturbance, which convinces me that describing them as a 'Second Demographic Transition' is warranted."

researchers from other disciplines. Some of the well-known sociological books, including Inglehart's (1990) *Culture shift in advanced industrial society,* Gidden's (1992) *The transformation of intimacy,* or Bauman's (2000) *Liquid modernity* provide convincing arguments about the intensity of changes in the character of partnerships, family, and childbearing, and the values attached to them. Many family economists have also recognised that the 'Western' family has entered a period of rapid change (Lundberg and Pollak 2007); Goldin (2006) speaks about the 'quiet revolution' in women's lives, and emphasises the link between the spread of the contraceptive pill, extended education, postponement of marriage, and the change in women's identity and career orientation. Third, an examination of the second demographic transition sheds light on different factors affecting the shifts in demographic behaviour, and on the relation between changing values and attitudes, and changing family-related behaviours. Fourth, the discussion about the second demographic transition is particularly illuminative in the case of the post-communist societies of Central, Eastern, and South-eastern Europe, all of which have experienced numerous 'symptoms' of the SDT behaviour. Scholars disagree, however, on the extent and significance of the diffusion of individualistic value orientation in this region. This debate, which has been often simplistically reduced to 'cultural change' vs. 'economic crisis' arguments (see Overview Chapter 5[*]), may also contribute to our ability to foresee future family changes in the former state-socialist societies. It is not by coincidence that most chapters on Central and Eastern Europe explicitly discuss the relevance of the second demographic transition model for explaining recent changes in family behaviour.

This chapter is closely related to Overview Chapter 4, which outlines changes in family life and living arrangements in Europe since the 1960s, illustrating many trends that constitute the backbone of the second demographic transition. Taking profound family transformation as a starting point, this chapter looks at the relevance of the SDT concept for explaining the ongoing changes in fertility patterns and takes a closer look at the shifts in values and attitudes related to family, reproduction, and children. It re-examines the link between the second demographic transition and sub-replacement fertility, and pays special attention to the 'progression' of the second demographic transition behind the former 'Iron Curtain.' To explain some apparent contradictions in this process, it employs a conceptual model of 'readiness, willingness, and ability' (RWA) advocated by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001). It also discusses the multifaceted nature of the

[*] All overview and country chapters referred to herein are part of Special Collection 7: *Childbearing Trends and Policies in Europe*, and can be found online at: http://www.demographic-research.org/special/7/.

second demographic transition between different social groups, and points out an apparent paradox: whereas lower-educated individuals often embrace values that can be characterised as rather traditional, they also frequently manifest most pronounced features of family behaviour associated with the transition, such as non-marital childbearing, high partnership instability, and high prevalence of long-term cohabitation. The concluding section summarises the main findings, speculates on two possible pathways of the progression of the second demographic transition, and provides notes on selected factors fuelling this transition. Finally, a brief reflection on the usefulness and validity of the SDT concept is provided. Throughout this chapter, I use interchangeably the terms 'transition,' 'second transition,' 'second demographic transition,' as well as an acronym, 'SDT.' I use these terms in a rather broad sense, trying to avoid their narrow deterministic interpretation.

2. Changes in values and attitudes related to family life, childbearing, and sexuality

Diverse contributions provide strong support for the notion of a profound change in attitudes and values related to childbearing, family life, living arrangements, and sexuality; as well as a relative decline of the importance of family in the hierarchy of values everywhere in Europe. Albania, a country which had been almost isolated from the rest of Europe until 1990, constitutes a notable exception: early marriage and childbearing remain universal, cohabitation is rare, and traditional contraception, especially withdrawal, still constitutes the dominant mode of birth control (Albania chapter).[4] Although the profound change in family-related values appears to be universal, the diversity between countries is enormous, shaped by their culture, history, family policies, and different pace of secularisation. One important aspect of family attitudes provides continuity with the era preceding the SDT: whereas the acceptance of voluntary childlessness and non-family living arrangements has risen rapidly, and marriage and family life have increasingly become 'optional,' attitudes towards parenthood remain overwhelmingly positive in practically all the analysed societies. This is in parallel with similar findings in the United States, where not only parenthood, but also marriage remain valued, desired, and centrally significant to the vast majority of Americans (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001).

[4] As Albania is a notable outlier in many of the trends discussed throughout this chapter, most of the conclusions and generalisations in this chapter do not apply to this country.

The value attached to children and parenthood

Remarkably, children and parenthood continue to be almost universally valued even in societies that have progressed furthest in the second demographic transition (e.g., France chapter; see also Fokkema and Esveldt 2008). A number of chapters in this collection indicate that voluntary childlessness remains rather marginal[5], and parenthood is still at the top of people's life priorities (Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008). Despite rising instability of partnerships, family life often continues to be strongly valued and idealised (the Czech Republic chapter). But behind this general picture, a number of subtle shifts can be recognised. Parenthood gradually ceases to be the main goal in the lives of men and women (e.g., Austria chapter). Concomitant to that, the importance of leisure and friends increases, and the acceptance of voluntary childlessness spreads (Sweden chapter) – having children is no longer considered a precondition to achieving happiness and self-fulfilment (van de Kaa 2004a). The unwillingness to give up leisure activities scores prominently among the reasons for not having a(nother) child, especially among childless women (Austria, Lithuania, and Germany chapters). In line with van de Kaa's (1987) and Ariès' (1980) reasoning, the motivation for parenthood changes profoundly: childbearing is less frequently seen as a 'duty towards society,' and instead becomes a result of a carefully planned decision of a couple, who may consider various potential positive and negative effects of parenthood on their relationship, lifestyle, and economic wellbeing (Slovenia and Sweden chapter; see also Liefbroer 2005). Having children ceases to be a normatively-bound decision, and it increasingly serves individual self-fulfilment and private joy (Fokkema and Esveldt 2008). The Netherlands chapter quotes Beets et al. (2001), who emphasise the importance of modern contraception in this process, which led to the change in the perception of 'having children' to the decision of 'taking children' (*kinderen nemen*). Importantly, this shift also implies more demanding prerequisites of parenthood and a greater emphasis on the norm of responsible parenthood (Slovenia and Spain chapters).[6]

[5] However, Sobotka and Testa (2008) found a significant level of intended childlessness and relatively high uncertainty about parenthood plans among childless women and men of reproductive age in 13 European countries that participated in the Population Policy Acceptance Survey in 2001-2003. The intention to remain childless was most frequently expressed by West German respondents, suggesting an emergence of a 'culture of childlessness' in this region.

[6] These increasing demands on parent's ability to raise a child seem to run contrary to the notion that the second transition implies a shift from 'altruistic' to 'individualistic' motivations for parenthood, i.e., a shift from child-centred to parent-centred perspective (van de Kaa 1987, Ariès' 1980). Present-day parents need to sacrifice a substantial amount of resources (especially time, but also money) to raise and educate their children in conformity to the norm of responsible parenthood. At the same time, successful

Consequently, the stress and the difficulties connected with the proper upbringing of children may emerge as important reasons for not having an additional child (Spain chapter). Finally, the position of children in the family changes as well, as educational practices are based less on strict discipline, and focus more on "rational reasoning with children," who become equal members of the family (Toulemon et al. 2008:524).

More tolerant attitudes towards non-marital childbearing

Across Europe, childbearing outside marriage has experienced an explosive increase (Overview Chapter 4) and is "becoming socially acceptable at all ages and in all social strata" (Zakharov 2008:934). More positive attitudes towards extramarital childbearing are typical of younger persons and the residents of big cities (Poland chapter). Arguably, the enactment of legislation that provided equal rights to married and unmarried parents might have contributed both to an increase in non-marital childbearing, and to a wider acceptance of this phenomenon (Slovenia and Spain chapters). However, a distinction should be made between the acceptance of childbearing within a stable cohabiting union, which often receives general approval, and childbearing among single mothers, which is frequently seen as undesired behaviour linked to an unstable socio-economic situation.

The rising popularity of cohabitation and non-family living arrangements

Unmarried cohabitation, especially as a pre-marital living arrangement, is perceived positively in most European countries, even when the actual prevalence of cohabitation remains relatively low (Pongrácz and Spéder 2008). Liefbroer and Fokkema (2008) have noted that, as early as 1994, a majority of younger respondents (aged 18-35) in 20 countries participating in the International Social Surveys Program agreed that it is acceptable for a couple to live together without intending to get married. Remarkably, at that time cohabitation was rather rare in some of the countries participating in this survey, particularly in Italy, Poland, and Spain. Furthermore, a majority of respondents in all these countries except Poland also agreed that "it is a good idea to cohabit prior to entering marriage." In most cases, the approval of cohabitation further increased between 1994 and 2002,

though demanding childrearing brings satisfaction to parents, and may be seen as a part of an individualistic motivation for 'self-fulfilling' parenthood.

especially in regions where it was relatively low in 1994 (Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008: Table 1).

Despite being granted general approval, cohabitation in many countries is still perceived as a pre-marital stage of a short duration, a sort of 'trial marriage' (chapters on Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain). Some contributions show that, over time, pre-marital cohabitation becomes established as a new norm (the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden chapters), whereas 'direct marriage' becomes a minority option typical of specific religious and ethnic communities.

Even in countries where unmarried cohabitation has become recognized as equal to marriage, a large majority of people do not see marriage as an outdated institution, and most unmarried couples eventually plan to get married. Whereas the superiority of marriage is commonly rejected, marriage remains a desirable and generally preferred living arrangement (Pongrácz and Spéder 2008). Family life continues to be highly and almost universally valued. This pattern is most clearly outlined in the Sweden chapter: although Sweden is frequently categorised as a country with a 'weak family system,' where individualism and residential autonomy play a very important role, Swedes "are somewhat more likely than the 'average European' to say that the family is very important in their life" (Oláh and Bernhardt 2008:1120). Lifelong cohabitation or a 'living apart together' (LAT) relationship is preferred by a relatively small minority of younger respondents (Sobotka and Testa 2008), but there is also evidence of a rising popularity of these living arrangements over time (the Netherlands chapter). In particular, leaving the parental home to live independently without a partner has become increasingly common among young adults (the Netherlands chapter).

Attitudes towards sex and contraception

As Overview Chapter 3 shows, the use of modern contraception has reached relatively high levels in most regions of Europe, and, recently, it has been spreading rapidly in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe. Contraceptive use is broadly accepted by all segments of the population; there is significant opposition to contraception only in some Catholic countries with a large proportion of conservative religious people, such as in Poland and Slovakia. The Poland chapter notes that, for almost one-tenth of respondents, contraceptive use remains unacceptable. Similarly, deeply religious women in Slovakia have negative attitudes towards birth control and premarital sex (Slovakia chapter). In Italy, the strong opposition of the Catholic Church to modern contraception and its continuing

influence on many institutions, including the media, may partly explain a slow diffusion of the pill (Dalla Zuanna, De Rose, and Racioppi 2005).

The spread of modern contraception, especially of the pill, has helped to separate sex, procreation, and marriage; and arguably had a direct impact on the norms regarding sexual and reproductive behaviour (van de Kaa 1987 and 1994). In the majority of 'Western' societies, sexual activity among unmarried people of all ages, including young adults, is now considered a normal part of a satisfactory life. For instance, the Sweden chapter notes a "positive attitude towards sexual activity among young people, including those not living in co-residential partnerships" (see also Bracher and Santow 1998). This seems to be in contrast to the United States, where many people embrace restrictive attitudes towards premarital sex, and towards sex among teenagers in particular (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). However, most people continue to disapprove of extramarital (or extra-partnership) affairs; such sexual contacts have, in fact, become generally less accepted over time (see Kraaykamp 2002 for the Netherlands and Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001 for the U.S.).[7] This trend seemingly goes against the current of rising sexual permissiveness, but it is concomitant with the idealisation of marriage and the shift in the character of intimate partnerships, which have become increasingly based on trust and mutual affection, and on the notion of 'exclusivity' of sexual relationships (Giddens 1992).

3. Is sub-replacement fertility a necessary feature of the second demographic transition?

The concept of the second demographic transition, as formulated by its proponents, is related to fertility levels and trends in three distinct respects. First, the SDT brings a massive postponement of parenthood, which is facilitated by the widespread use of modern contraception, and which enables couples to concentrate on pursuing other goals earlier in life. Second, as a result of spreading cohabitation and rising union instability, the SDT leads to a marked rise in the proportion of non-marital births. Third, the transition leads to "structural long-term subreplacement fertility" (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006: 669). The fall in period fertility rates is first fuelled by a reduction in higher-order fertility, and later by the postponement of

[7] Kraaykamp (2002: Table 1) documents a brief and strong upward shift between 1965 and 1970, and a subsequent gradual decline in the percentage of Dutch respondents agreeing with the statement, "A single affair can do no harm to a good marriage," from a high value of 45% in 1970 to 19% in 1995.

parenthood.[8] Although some fertility recuperation usually occurs once women who had postponed births have children later in life, most often this recovery is not sufficient to bring fertility back to the replacement level and, as a result, the "cohort fertility of currently reproducing women is expected to reach a maximum value well below replacement" (van de Kaa 2002: 10). While the SDT constitutes a complex narrative of demographic change, low fertility is often – and rather simplistically – perceived as a main symptom of this transition. Since this collection primarily focuses on fertility changes and their determinants, I discuss the SDT-fertility link in greater detail.

The relationship between delayed childbearing and the second demographic transition has been relatively firmly established; the onset of the recent long-standing fertility postponement also constitutes a suitable indicator of the onset of the SDT (Sobotka 2004: 58). A number of indicators capturing different aspects of the shift towards late timing of childbearing are closely correlated with the second demographic transition. This can be illustrated with the use of an SDT index constructed on the basis of characteristic changes in values and attitudes, as captured in the 1999 round of the European Values Surveys (data reported in Halman 2001). This index, termed SDT2, ranges from 0 to 10 (10 represents the highest possible score on 'SDT-related' values and attitudes). It is introduced in more detail in Sobotka (2008), and its components are listed in the Appendix. The SDT2 index is relatively closely correlated with the timing of the onset of fertility postponement, with the mean age at first birth (in 1999 and in 2006), and negatively correlated with fertility rates below age 25 (see also below). A close correlation ($r = -0.78$) also emerges with the calendar year when the mean age at first birth among women increased by two years since the onset of first birth postponement (Figure 1; the onset of postponement is measured since the year when the period mean age at first birth started a long-term rise; see Sobotka 2004: 57-58). In other words, the timing of the onset of first birth postponement, combined with the initial pace of this postponement, can serve as rather reliable 'predictors' of SDT-related values in 1999: the earlier the first birth postponement started, and the faster it subsequently progressed, the higher the SDT score that was reached in 1999.

Surprisingly, among different demographic manifestations of the SDT, the often emphasised association with (very) low fertility has become most questionable. Whereas the 'model countries' of the spread of the SDT values and behaviour, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, have experienced a prolonged

[8] In addition, an increasing importance of immigrants for childbearing discussed in Overview Chapter 7 may be seen as another, not initially envisioned, trait of the second demographic transition.

Figure 1: Index of the second demographic transition in 1999 (index SDT2) and the year when the mean age of mothers at first birth increased by 2 years since the onset of first birth postponement



SOURCE: Own computations based on Council of Europe (2006), Eurostat (2008), Sobotka (2004), France and Russia chapters, and Halman (2001).

period of first birth postponement and an intensive rise in the proportion of children born outside marriage, their period fertility rates surpass fertility in most other parts of Europe, and their cohort fertility remains relatively close to the replacement level threshold (see also Overview Chapters 1 and 4). Several distinct findings and arguments that cast doubt on the second demographic transition – low fertility connection may be outlined:

- Some countries retain cohort fertility close to the replacement level. The most 'notorious' example is that of the United States, where both period and completed cohort fertility remain around this threshold. Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006) attribute this 'American exceptionalism' mainly to the 'ethnic factor,' namely, high fertility among Hispanic immigrants. Several European countries, including Denmark, France, Norway, and Sweden, also retain completed fertility close to the replacement level (see also Overview Chapter 1). For instance, recent projection of cohort fertility in

France suggests that the cohorts born in the early 1970s will have 2.0 children on average (trend projection in Prioux 2006: 351, T. 5). This finding indicates that the second demographic transition does not necessarily lead to below-replacement cohort fertility levels. This argument, which I further elaborate in another publication (Sobotka 2008), is also reflected in several country chapters. For example, the authors of the chapter on France note that this country has maintained a relatively high level of fertility in spite of experiencing many characteristic social and demographic changes commonly thought as conducive to low fertility, such as delayed entry into parenthood, rising couple instability, increasing number of births outside marriage, or the spread of modern contraception (Overview Chapter 4). Similarly, the Sweden chapter mentions a puzzling contradiction that Sweden, which is often viewed as a forerunner of the second transition, also "exhibits one of the highest fertility levels in Europe, with a completed fertility close to replacement."

- This finding is also linked to another distinct line of reasoning, which emphasises the lack of cross-sectional correlation between the second demographic transition and low fertility in contemporary Europe (Coleman 2004). In fact, my analysis (Sobotka 2008) of cross-country association between selected behavioural and values components of the SDT and fertility indicates that there is a *positive* correlation between the second transition and fertility in contemporary Europe. This positive association emerges most clearly with respect to the period total fertility rate (TFR, Figure 2a), which is a very problematic indicator of the fertility level (Overview Chapter 1, Lutz and Sobotka 2008), but it also holds for the TFR adjusted for changes in the timing of childbearing and, to a smaller extent, for desired family size (Sobotka 2008). In contrast, there was no detectable association between the SDT index based on family-related behaviour (SDT1 index[9]) and the TFR level in 1990 for Europe as a whole (Figure 2b). Only the group of 'Western' countries (i.e., all European countries except the post-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe) exhibited as early as 1990 a positive association between the

[9] The SDT1 index is constructed in analogy to the SDT2 index introduced above. It combines six components of family-related behaviour in 2004: mean age at first birth, mean age at first marriage, teenage fertility rate, proportion of non-marital births, total divorce rate, and total first marriage rate for women (see Appendix). To account partly for the spread of cohabitation, this index was adjusted upward by 0.5 for countries where cohabitating unions account for more than one-tenth of all unions (according to the 2001 census data assembled by Philipov 2006: 31, Table 2 and national data sources).

SDT1 index and fertility, an association which was also found to be strong in 2004. This finding potentially suffers from all the weaknesses linked to such a simple bivariate cross-country analysis conducted at one point of time, such as the danger of ecological fallacy, an ignorance of country-specific trajectories over time, and the lack of adequate controls for important factors affecting this association. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that the recent shift to low and very low fertility in Europe appears to be driven more by the structural factors (family and social policies, economic trends, employment patterns; see also Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008, Sobotka 2008, Adsera 2004), which are only indirectly linked to the second demographic transition.[10]

- The absence of a negative cross-sectional correlation between the second demographic transition and desired family size among younger women (Sobotka 2008) is also significant. Van de Kaa's (2001) analysis showed that, in a number of European countries, young women with a post-materialist value orientation had higher family size ideals than those with 'materialist' values, whereas fertility intentions did not differ between these two groups. Apparently, the spread of the second demographic transition may not lead to the spread of sub-replacement fertility intentions. In most of the countries that made the biggest advances along the SDT trajectory, the fertility desires of younger women remain at or above two, and the two-child family norm continues to enjoy an uncontested popularity. There are countries where fertility intentions declined below the replacement level among the younger cohorts (see, for example, the chapters on the Czech Republic, Poland, and Spain), but it remains unclear to what extent this is a reflection of new values, perceived obstacles to childbearing, or a delay in accommodation to the previous fall in fertility rates.

- Finally, some studies point out that the fall in period fertility rates in numerous countries had preceded changes in the underlying attitudes towards family life and children. This is an especially common assertion in discussions of the former communist countries (see Section 4.2 below).

[10] The association between the second demographic transition and fertility would become more convincing if it were manifested also for cohort fertility. However, the fertility level among the cohorts that are currently close to completing their reproductive life, i.e. those born in the late 1960s, relates to the periods when the SDT had not yet fully taken off in Central, Eastern, but also Southern Europe.

Figure 2a: Index of the second demographic transition ('behavioural' index SDT1) and the total fertility rate in Europe in 2004



Figure 2b: Index of the second demographic transition ('behavioural' index SDT1) and the total fertility rate in Europe in 1990



NOTE: See footnote 9 and the text for a definition of the SDT1 index. More details are provided in the Appendix and in Sobotka (2008).

SOURCES: Own computations based on Council of Europe (2006), Eurostat (2008), Philipov 2006, and national statistical offices.

The surprising positive association between the second demographic transition and fertility can be better understood when the transition is related to fertility rates at younger and older childbearing ages. Specifically, the values and attitudes-based index SDT2 is negatively correlated with fertility rates of women below age 25, and positively correlated with fertility rates above age 35. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which looks at this association in 2000 for young-age fertility, and in 2006 for later-age fertility.[11] The figure excludes Southern Europe and Ireland, where this association was particularly weak, probably because factors other than SDT-linked values and attitudes were more relevant for fertility rates at younger and later childbearing ages. This simple analysis of the SDT-fertility link offers the following interpretation: the second demographic transition leads to a marked decline of fertility at younger ages ('postponement' component), but later becomes positively linked to fertility rates at higher childbearing ages ('recuperation' component). This recuperation is strong enough to bring an overall positive association between SDT and fertility, despite some fertility-inhibiting effects of progressively delayed childbearing. This association becomes clearly manifested only if and when fertility in the analysed countries falls to relatively low levels.

In sum, the low and very low fertility rates in contemporary Europe stand on three legs: fertility postponement, which is a long-lasting trend that should eventually come to an end[12], numerous structural and institutional constraints that negatively influence fertility decisions of individuals, and, in some cases, a shift in family-size norms and desires towards sub-replacement fertility (see also Overview Chapter 4). While the first factor ('postponement') has been losing in importance in many of the countries that advanced the most in the SDT progression, and the third factor ('sub-replacement desires') is far from universal, it seems that the impact of the second set of factors (different 'constraints') constitutes the most important explanation for very low fertility. These factors are not central to the changes in the

[11] The SDT2 index is used here because its demographic (behavioural) counterpart SDT1 includes period TFR that is linked with the analysed age-specific fertility rates. The selection of a later year, 2006, for a comparison of the SDT2 index and fertility rates at higher ages was motivated by the 'recuperation' argument: If the SDT is linked to fertility recuperation of cohorts that had postponed childbearing at younger ages, this link can be established only with a time lag, i.e., at the time when these cohorts actually reach later childbearing ages. If this argument holds, the positive association between SDT and late fertility may become even more apparent in the future.

[12] Recently an increasing number of countries have recorded a slowing-down or even a stopping in an increase of the mean age at childbearing (see also Overview Chapter 1). The Netherlands was the first European country where fertility postponement has, at least temporarily, come to an end in the late 1990s (Sobotka 2004). Consequently, there was a stabilisation of cohort fertility trajectories among women born in the 1970s (Frejka and Sardon 2006: 357).

Figure 3: Association between the 'attitudinal' index of the second demographic transition (SDT 2, 1999) and the sum of age-specific fertility rates below age 25 in 2000 and above age 35 in 2006



NOTES: See the text and the Appendix for a definition of the SDT2 index (see also Sobotka 2008). The figure includes all European countries that participated in the European Values Study survey of 1999, except Ireland, Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and countries with small population size (Luxembourg and Iceland).

SOURCES: Own computations based on Council of Europe (2006), Eurostat (2008), Sobotka (2004), Halman (2001), Russian Federation chapter, and national statistical offices.

values of family and children and, therefore, may not be seen as a part of the SDT 'package'.[13] Their importance may explain an unexpected outcome, namely, the current positive association between the SDT and fertility 'recuperation' at higher childbearing ages, and hence also period fertility rates. This association is consistent with recent research by Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari (2008), who reported a positive association between 'development' (as measured by the widely used human development index, HDI), and period total fertility for the countries that reached high levels of HDI (above 0.8).

However, at least one aspect of low fertility – the rise in childlessness – is closely linked to the transition. As parenthood ceases to be a 'natural' part of individual biographies and the main goal in a woman's life, voluntary childlessness becomes a broadly accepted option. This has led to a rise in the proportion of people who are undecided about whether they will have children later in life. Sobotka and Testa (2008) show that a substantial proportion of childless men and women in Europe do not intend to have a child, or are uncertain about their parenthood intentions. So far, voluntary childlessness has spread most in western Germany, where it has become a broadly accepted lifestyle, and where childlessness, especially among higher-educated women, has reached the highest level in Europe (Germany chapter; see also Overview Chapter 2 and Sobotka 2005). The Germany chapter points out that there is a small group in the population that "does not regard children as an enrichment to life," and for whom "children do not fit with their own identity" (Dorbritz 2008:590).

4. The second demographic transition in Central and Eastern Europe

4.1 Regional economic and social differentiation and the changes in family-related behaviour after 1989

The discussion on the diffusion of the second demographic transition in the former state-socialist countries of Europe is closely linked to the analysis of the factors responsible for rapid changes in fertility and family patterns observed in this region

[13] However, changes in values and attitudes that take place during the second demographic transition may bring to the fore different structural and institutional factors that had not affected fertility decisions substantially in the past, when a strong normative pressure for parenthood and traditional family norms prevailed. Once the timing of childbearing as well as the choice of parenthood as such become more optional parts of individuals' biographies, many factors that had not played an important role in the past emerge as powerful constraints affecting fertility.

since the early 1990s (see Overview Chapter 5). A number of specific questions regarding the occurrence of the SDT in this region arise repeatedly: Are behavioural changes since the early 1990s qualitatively comparable to those that took place earlier in 'Western' societies? If so, are the underlying mechanisms similar as well, or are there constraining factors related to the political and economic changes prominent in Central and Eastern Europe? Do the typical normative and value changes accompany the changes in family and reproductive behaviour in these countries, or do changes in norms and values 'lag' behind behavioural changes? And, finally, how can shifts in values and attitudes that are typical of affluent societies take place in countries that have often been severely affected by economic crisis and political turmoil? Before delving deeper into any of these issues, it is important to stress the enormous cultural and economic diversity of the region, which is often overlooked in broad comparative studies (Sobotka 2003, Manning 2004). The region consists of countries that are very secularised and culturally rather 'liberal' (e.g., the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, the former GDR or East Germany, and, in many respects, also Hungary) and countries that are more culturally conservative, where people attach higher importance to traditional family values, and where religion often continues to play an important role (e.g., Poland, Romania, or Slovakia). It also consists of societies that are culturally close to Western Europe, and that considered themselves part of the 'Western world' before the Second World War (e.g., the Czech Republic and the Baltic countries); and of countries that had been historically distinct from the 'West', a category that includes most of the predominantly Christian Orthodox and Muslim countries. Finally, the economic restructuring of the 1990s led to widely divergent outcomes and a vast differentiation in the overall economic performance and living standards, despite many comparable pathways and policies, including large-scale economic privatisation, opening of the economy, and market reforms. For instance, the GDP per capita in US Dollars in 2005 (constant 2000 level) varied from 429 in Moldova, to 959 in Ukraine, 2,071 in Bulgaria, and up to 6,515 in the Czech Republic and 11,382 in Slovenia. (World Bank 2007).[14] Keeping this diversity in mind, I review the evidence of the typical changes in fertility, family, and living arrangements, as well as in values and attitudes to children, sexuality, and family life, and subsequently suggest an interpretation of the ongoing second demographic transition in Central and Eastern Europe.

[14] This enormous difference becomes smaller when the GDP level is adjusted for purchasing power parity. Then, the difference between the poorest country, Moldova, and the most affluent country, Slovenia, reduces to 1,908 and 22,292 US Dollars, respectively.

A number of country chapters provide strong evidence of massive behavioural changes typically associated with the second transition. Although some of these changes started well before 1990 (Hungary chapter, Stankuniene and Maslauskaite 2008, Hoem et al. 2007, Katus et al. 2007, Gerber and Berman 2006)[15], the period after 1990 has seen a rapid acceleration of all the characteristic trends: first births and first marriages have been postponed (less intensively in Eastern and South-eastern Europe, more vigorously in Central Europe and the Baltic countries), fertility levels have fallen, the percentage of non-marital births has surged, marriage rates have plummeted, and divorce rates have remained high, or have further increased. Cohabitation has been spreading as well, although its significance differs widely across countries.[16] Whereas in many countries, cohabitation mostly retains the character of a 'trial marriage,' it has been rising fast in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Russia, and Slovenia; often becoming a standard part in a partnership 'career' among younger cohorts (see the respective country chapters, Gerber and Berman 2006, Hoem et al. 2007, Katus et al. 2007, Spéder 2005, Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007). In other countries, such as Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine, the diffusion of cohabitation has been rather slow, and is often typical of people in disadvantaged economic positions (Poland and Romania chapters, Muresan 2007). In almost all countries, however, cohabitation has been spreading most rapidly among younger people below age 30, and it has increasingly replaced marriage as a dominant form of the first union (Czech Republic and Hungary chapters, Spéder 2005, Katus et al. 2007, Hoem et al. 2007). In addition, the duration of cohabitation has risen over time, suggesting that it is gradually becoming a lasting alternative to marriage (Hungary chapter, Spéder 2005, Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007; see also Overview Chapter 4).

Following the collapse of the restrictive state-socialist regime in 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced a full-blown sexual and contraceptive revolution, bringing a boom of information and messages on contraception, sex, and pornography (the Czech Republic chapter). This trend has also affected more traditional and more religious societies. For instance, in 1997,

[15] Some behavioural features typical of the SDT have spread widely in Central and Eastern Europe between the 1960s and the 1980s: premarital sex, marriage instability, and, in some countries, cohabitation (especially among divorced and separated people), and also a one-child family model (especially in urban areas of Russia; see Avdeev and Monnier 1995).

[16] In several countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia, and the former GDR, cohabitation had already become more common during the state-socialist period. In other countries, such as Bulgaria, it was rather common as a very short period of living together before marriage (e.g., Philipov and Jasilioniene 2007), often only once the marriage has been agreed upon. Among the Roma ethnic group, cohabitation (or rather a marriage not officially registered with the authorities) was common prior to 1990 for the reasons entirely unrelated to the second demographic transition (see also Bulgaria chapter).

three-quarters of Slovak women of reproductive age were found to have a positive attitude towards premarital sex (Potančoková et al. 2008:997). An increasing acceptance of sex outside marriage is also noted in the Poland chapter. In many countries, the actual prevalence of premarital sex had already become almost universal during the post-war decades (the Czech Republic chapter) or increased rapidly after 1990: in Romania, the proportion of sexually experienced young adult women who began their sexual life prior to marriage rose from about one-half in 1993 and 1996, to 77% in 1999, and to around 90% in 2004 (RHS 2005). It is important to emphasise, however, that a 'stealthy' liberalisation of sexual morals and behaviour started in Central and Eastern Europe well before 1990, despite the limited spread of modern contraception there. As the Russia chapter notes, this sexual revolution "proceeded more quietly and less noticeably to the observer, by virtue of the taboo placed on the theme for research," and also due to a general avoidance of this subject by the media (see also Binyon 1983). Sexual debut and regular sexual relations occurred at younger ages, and usually prior to marriage. In the absence of proper knowledge and availability of modern contraception, an early start of sexual life led to the surge in premarital conceptions, which gave rise to shotgun marriages at an early age (chapters on Russia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).[17]

4.2 Factors fuelling the changes in family behaviour

Individual chapters take a more nuanced view when discussing the factors responsible for the observed changes in family behaviour. Some of them emphasise the lack of evidence for a marked change in values that would progress in parallel with the changes in family-related behaviour, or that would precede it. The Poland chapter raises the question of whether the transition can explain family-related developments in Poland when "ideational change has not advanced until recently compared with its progress in other European countries" (Kotowska et al. 2008:845). The absence of a link between behavioural and value changes in fertility behaviour has been similarly noted by Rotariu (2006) in the case of Romania, and by Gerber and Cottrell (2006) in the case of Russia. The Romania chapter suggests that both 'post-modern' and conservative values have been advancing there: people

[17] It is remarkable that the officially published advice literature on partnerships, sexuality, and family often provided very little practical information on sex and contraception. Potančoková (2007) shows that in Czechoslovakia this literature often portrayed contraception and pre-marital sexual relations as problematic, and even linked contraceptive use with promiscuity.

started to "adopt Western values and to imitate modern and post-modern behaviour," but, at the same time, material insecurity enhanced the importance of traditional values and favoured "conservative behaviour" (Muresan et al. 2008:895). In the absence of strong evidence of ideational changes, several chapters stress the importance of structural factors for initiating the change in family behaviour (e.g., the Bulgaria, Poland, and Ukraine chapters). The Ukraine chapter suggests that "the new trends may be the result of economic or cultural factors that have little to do with a shift towards SDT" (Perelli-Harris 2008:1165). Gerber and Cottrell (2006) posit that, despite the rapid increase in the proportion of non-marital births in Russia, there is a continuing traditionalism towards fertility (but not towards marriage, see Gerber and Berman 2006), and no clear evidence of a greater tolerance of extramarital childbearing. In contrast, the Hungary chapter points out that specific changes in values affecting family life, such as rise in consumer aspirations and social atomisation, had taken place during the period preceding the change of political regime in 1989. The Czech Republic chapter, on the other hand, emphasises the abrupt and multifaceted nature of social change after 1989, which makes it impossible to separate the contribution of different economic, structural, and cultural factors to fertility changes.[18]

Three distinct findings support the idea that long-lasting changes in both family-related values and behaviour are reinforcing each other. First, both country-level evidence, as well as the research on household positions and value orientations in Central and Eastern Europe, show that, as is the case in 'Western' countries, there is a consistent relationship between changes in family behaviour and value orientations. Countries that have made greater progress on the SDT dimension also exhibit most clearly values and attitudes typical of the SDT (see also Section 4.5 and Figure 4 below). The profiles of 'non-traditional' value orientation are closely patterned by the living arrangements in which individuals live, with those who are divorced or who had ever cohabited displaying the most 'non-conformist' values, both in post-communist countries and in other regions of Europe (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002). Second, as the Russian Federation chapter points out, the end of the economic crisis and an improvement in living conditions beginning in 1999 did not bring any signs of return to the previous pattern of family behaviour. Rather, very low fertility levels persisted, and the trend towards delayed family formation, decline in marriage, and the rise in cohabitation continued (see also Gerber and Cottrell 2006). Similar evidence for other countries casts doubt on the validity of the

[18] Because of the emphasis on different sets of values and attitudes in various country chapters, and also due to a lack of comparable surveys on family-related values prior to 1990, these evaluations of ideational changes in individual countries are to a large extent subjective.

'economic crisis' explanation of the intensive demographic changes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 (see Overview Chapter 5 and Russia chapter). Finally, there are signs of a transformation in values and attitudes towards family and children, and the spread of individualism across the whole region, especially among the younger, better-educated, and urban populations. Lesthaeghe's and Surkyn's (2002: Table 6.7.2) analysis of European Values Study surveys in 1990 and 1999 shows that some of the family-related attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe moved in the expected direction envisioned by the SDT concept (while some other attitudes, especially acceptability of divorce and adultery, remained rather stable). This shift has been particularly notable in the Czech Republic, where the majority of people have become highly tolerant of abortion, premarital sex, divorce, or same-sex partnerships (Sobotka, Zeman, and Kantorová 2003 and the Czech Republic chapter). The Lithuania chapter suggests that Lithuanians have been "absorbing and adopting the life styles, value orientations, and norms of behaviour" typical of Western European societies (Stankuniene and Jasilioniene 2008:706; see also Bulgaria chapter). The Poland chapter has noted that younger generations are "less altruistic, more inclined to strive for self-fulfilment and appreciation outside the family," and they attach less importance to family life and children (Kotowska et al. 2008:837). Several chapters emphasise that the 'value change' explanation best fits the highly educated group of the younger population (Romania and Ukraine chapters; see also below).

How can we reconcile the somewhat conflicting evidence on the progression of the second demographic transition in Central and Eastern Europe? As proposed by de Beer, Corijn, and Deven (2000), there indeed seems to be more than one model of the transition. Moreover, given the complexity and the fluidity of the SDT narrative, the assessment of its progression as reflected in individual country chapters is necessarily rather subjective. The 'Central-Eastern European' model of the transition is as diverse as the post-communist societies and their cultural heritage. Nevertheless, several shared features in their SDT may be outlined:

1) Late occurrence of many of the behavioural and value changes typical of the transition, especially those related to alternative living arrangements;
2) Rapidity with which many features of this transition emerged during the 1990s;
3) The importance of structural and economic factors, especially in the early stage of the transition; and
4) The importance of disadvantaged social groups in the spread of some of the new types of family behaviour, especially non-marital childbearing and, in many cases, unmarried cohabitation.

4.3 Explaining the peculiar progression of the SDT using the *Readiness – Willingness – Ability* framework

To get a better understanding of the peculiar and, at times, puzzling progression of the SDT in Central and Eastern Europe, I adopt a conceptual model proposed by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001), which elaborates on an idea first put forward by Coale (1973).[19] This model, called *RWA* (an acronym for *Ready*, *Willing,* and *Able*), is built around the idea that widespread behavioural change occurs only if three different preconditions are simultaneously met. 'Readiness' (*R*) reflects the 'cost-benefit calculation,' namely, the economic, social, and psychological advantages of adopting a new behaviour. 'Willingness' (*W*) refers to the cultural and ethical acceptability, and thus also the legitimacy of the new form of behaviour. Finally, the 'ability' (*A*) refers to the technical or legal means that enable individuals to adopt new behaviour. The attractiveness of this model lies in its recognition of the joint importance of economic/structural factors (*R*), norms, values, and attitudes (*W*), as well as technology and legal regulation (*A*). This makes it particularly appropriate for understanding recent shifts in fertility and family behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe.

The RWA scheme makes it possible to outline the factors that had been conducive to the SDT, and that had already spread in the state-socialist countries between the 1950s and the 1980s, as well as the factors that had prevented the onset of a full-blown second demographic transition prior to 1990. With respect to *readiness*, the creation of a relatively broad social security net during the decades following the Second World War had diminished in many countries the economic consequences for women of divorce or single motherhood. Similarly, the shift towards an almost universal employment of women enhanced their economic position, and reduced their dependence on male partners and relatives. On the other hand, the stalled expansion of tertiary education, the lack of alternatives for self-realisation outside the family, as well as the peculiar system of preferential housing distribution to married couples with children, discouraged cohabitation and supported early marriage and childbearing (see also Overview Chapter 4 and Chapter 8 in Sobotka 2004). Women's emancipation had stalled halfway between tradition and modernity. On the one hand, women gained similar levels of education as men, they were entitled—and even pressed[20]— to participate in paid labour, and

[19] Most recently, Lesthaeghe, Neidert and Surkyn (2006) have used this model to explain spatial differences in the second demographic transition in the United States.

[20] This pressure for employment was circumstantial, motivated by 'financial necessity,' as one income could not secure a decent standard of living in the families, but also ideologically motivated (the

their economic activity was "ideologically supported by equating emancipation with employment" (Kotowska et al. 2008:825). On the other hand, they were confronted with very traditional norms and expectations about their family and childrearing roles, and they were expected to take care of the household, shopping, cleaning, cooking, and childcare. Despite gaining more economic independence, women frequently worked in low-pay occupations (Bulgaria chapter) and they faced multiple burdens that were a far cry from the ideas of gender equality and 'women's liberation.' Family life became highly idealised. Family relationships enhanced the well-being of individuals, as the mutual help of family members substituted for a deficient service economy (the Czech Republic and Hungary chapters). Moreover, family life provided a "shelter from the politicised public scene" (Potančoková et al. 2008:1001), and from the omnipresent eyes of the state (see also Sobotka 2004).

Concerning *willingness*, the official Communist ideology was strongly anti-religious, and thus helped to erode some of traditional norms related to marriage, family, and sexuality, which had previously been anchored in religious teachings. The destruction of various religious and civic organisations led to an 'atomisation' of the society (Hungary chapter). Despite the shortage of consumer goods, consumerist orientation had spread well before 1990 (Spéder 2005; Sobotka 2004). Moreover, even the media censorship and the limits placed on travel to 'Western' countries were not sufficient obstacles against the spread of new fashions, ideas, and aspirations associated with 'Western' culture, often progressing in a rather bizarre and deformed way.[21] However, the new values were embraced in a selective fashion. Even the relatively 'conservative' official ideology supporting traditional family values could not prevent the stealthy progress of the sexual revolution and the increase in family instability. At the same time, official 'puritanism' related to sexuality, gender roles, and the family probably helped to preserve the overwhelmingly positive image of marriage, childbearing, and family life, as well as widespread negative attitudes to feminism, homosexuality, and extramarital childbearing. This led to the development of a special form of secularised and pragmatic familism: family was of a paramount importance to individuals, but family dissolution through divorce or separation was increasingly accepted.

'emancipation' argument), and economically motivated by the permanent shortage of labour in an ineffectively organised economy (e.g., Poland chapter).

[21] The spread of 'Western' culture can be best illustrated by a widespread adoration of 'Western' pop music and fashion among teenagers and young adults. In Russia, for instance, teenagers were willing to invest enormous amount of money to obtain a pair of jeans that were neither produced in state-socialist countries, nor available in ordinary shops (Binyon 1983). Jeans thus constituted a powerful symbol of 'Western' fashion and affluence, and jeans ownership gave teenagers higher status among their peers.

The picture is similarly mixed with respect to the *ability dimension*. On the one hand, legislative changes enabled some of the family changes typical of the SDT, for example, through relatively good access to divorce, and a wide availability of abortion in most state-socialist countries. At the same time, the widespread reluctance towards the production and distribution of the contraceptive pill, combined with a discouragement of abortion among childless young women (often explained on the grounds of the potential pregnancy complications later in life), and a lack of comprehensive education on sexuality and contraception, helped to sustain a pattern of early pregnancies and shotgun marriages, and of overall higher fertility due to unwanted and mistimed pregnancies.

On balance, the peculiar combination of the *R-W-A* factors during state socialism helps to explain why some types of family-related changes, such as an increase in divorce, had spread rapidly in many countries, while other behaviours typical of the SDT could not spread much because at least one factor of the *R-W-A dimension* acted as a bottleneck, preventing the diffusion of the new behaviour. For example, a combination of preferential housing distribution and special marriage loans (*R dimension*), the strong persistence of norms supporting traditional family (*W dimension*), and the low access to modern contraception, especially the pill (*A dimension*) helped to sustain an early and almost universal pattern of first marriage and first birth, with a pronounced peak among women in their late teens and early twenties.

A specific combination of *R-W-A* factors in Central and Eastern Europe prior to 1990 also affected the changes in family behaviour after the collapse of communism. The early erosion of some traditional norms related to the family helps to explain why the new demographic trends have spread with such intensity after the breakdown of the state-socialist system.[22] In an environment in which traditional norms had diminished, and the more recent communist ideology had been discredited, there was relatively little resistance to forms of behaviour that would have been deemed inappropriate in more traditional settings. Philipov (2003) stresses the importance of discontinuity and the resulting disorientation and anomie (normlessness) after the regime change around 1990. The lack of generally recognised norms of behaviour supported the diffusion of the less stable forms of partnership, and the postponement of union formation and parenthood (see also Bulgaria chapter). These factors explain why the *W dimension* did not constitute a

[22] It should be noted, however, that the official Communist ideology gradually espoused a rather conservative model of the family, pursuing the idea of parental 'duty' and the responsibility of women to the society to bear children. Paradoxically, this ideology has in some instances developed into a morality similar to the orthodox teachings of the Catholic Church (Ferge 1997).

strong barrier to the spread of many new forms of behaviour. As was the case in Western and Northern Europe, many 'traditional' family norms had already eroded or had diminished in importance during the decades following the Second World War, or their importance had weakened significantly during the turbulent period of the late 1980s and the early 1990s.[23] In this environment, many people openly embraced values and living standards characteristic of Western European countries (see also below).

4.4 Emerging cultural and family divides in Central and Eastern Europe

A new family divide has (re-)emerged among post-communist countries after 1990, reflecting varying degrees of secularisation, modernisation, and traditionalism (especially in countries with a predominantly Roman Catholic tradition), as well as historical regional divisions (e.g., Fux 2008).[24] These differences appear to have a lasting impact on the progression of the second demographic transition, and, more generally, on demographic patterns there. Selected chapters express a contrasting evaluation of the importance of religion, and the reputation enjoyed by religious authorities in the respective countries. On the one hand, a majority of the population in Romania believes that the (Orthodox) church provides the "right answers to family issues" (Muresan et al. 2008:895), the Catholic Church in Poland continues to enjoy "the highest ranks of social trust" (Kotowska et al. 2008:838), and the Catholic Church in Slovakia "plays an important role in the society and has an influence on reproductive behaviour" (Potančoková et al. 2008:1007). On the other hand, in Slovenia, the "position of the [Catholic] Church and the clergy on the confidence scale is low" (Stropnik and Šircelj 2008:1039) and religious affiliation, church attendance and the support of traditional religion are at very low levels in the Czech Republic (Sobotka et al. 2008:436; see also Stankuniene and Maslauskaite 2008). On an individual level, religiosity still exerts a substantial impact on the attitudes to marriage and childbearing. Less religious people in Europe tend to reject

[23] Unfortunately, very little comparable data exist on family-related values and attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe during the state-socialist era. Thus, most of the literature on changes in values and attitudes in this region take the early 1990s as a starting point, often implicitly assuming that the surveys conducted in the early 1990s also provide a portrait of values prevalent before the collapse of state socialism.

[24] Fux (2008) discusses the links between historically dominant religious traditions, developments of welfare state, modernisation, and differentiation in demographic behaviour in Europe. His study is one of the few that address emerging differences in welfare regimes and family patterns in Central and Eastern Europe.

the benefits and exclusivity of marriage as a form of partnership (Pongrácz and Spéder 2008), and consider children less essential to their lives (Fokkema and Esveld 2008).

On a country level, the prevalence of different family trajectories can be interpreted in conjunction with different levels of secularisation. Stankuniene and Maslauskaite (2008), while cautioning against simply equating religiosity with 'conservative' attitudes towards family changes, also attribute the huge differences in the acceptance of the changes in family formation in Central and Eastern Europe to a combination of the early onset of these changes, and different levels of individualisation and secularisation. Among the six societies analysed, respondents were found to evaluate selected family changes most positively in highly individualised, secularised and non-Catholic East Germany, and, to a lesser extent, in the strongly secularised Czech Republic. On the other hand, respondents in religious and conservative Polish society assessed recent changes in family formation most negatively. The correlation between religiosity and family behaviour is often clearly detectable on a regional level. In the Czech Republic, for example, the proportion of people who declare their religious affiliation is negatively linked to the proportion of extramarital births on a district level (Czech Republic chapter). Thus, the new family behaviour spreads most intensively in the most secularised regions, where it meets little resistance. In the more religious regions, church and other moral authorities, as well as a significant portion of the population, oppose the new family behaviour. In these countries, the *W factor* may constitute a bottleneck that slows down the spread of the second demographic transition.[25]

With a general decline in the importance of the *willingness dimension* before 1990, the *readiness factor* increased in prominence. A number of chapters emphasise the role of economic and structural constraints as the main driving forces of the SDT behaviour among post-communist countries during the 1990s (e.g., Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine chapters). Although the initial spread of rapid behavioural changes was indeed primarily facilitated by structural and economic factors in many societies, these shifts have in part rested on peculiar 'atomisation' of society progressing before 1990 (Hungary chapter). Emerging

[25] Two countries positioned on the western side of the former Soviet Bloc, the Czech Republic and Poland, illustrate this point. In the secularised Czech Republic, cohabitation and non-marital childbearing have spread rapidly after the regime change in 1989, births and marriages have been postponed massively, the divorce rate has further increased, the contraceptive pill soon became the dominant means of birth control, and, since 2006, homosexual couples may register their partnerships (the Czech Republic chapter). In contrast, in Poland, which remains a highly religious society where the Catholic Church retains considerable influence, abortions were severely restricted since 1993, the use of the contraceptive pill has only spread gradually, cohabitation remains relatively marginal, and acceptance of cohabitation is lower than in most other countries (Poland chapter).

changes in family behaviour have in turn greatly contributed to the rising acceptance and popularity of the new partnership and family forms (thus leading to a further decline in the importance of *W dimension*). Consequently, even when many constraints typical of the transition era diminished, the new trends had become firmly established, and were preferred, or were at least accepted, by a majority of young people. As Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002: 215) posited, "[R]ather than the economic crisis per se, it is the entire restructuring of society that is the accelerator of the ideational and demographic changes." This argument suggests that the distribution of the *R dimension* has shifted in favour of the new family behaviour, marked by delayed family formation, rising popularity of less stable types of partnerships, rising numbers of childless individuals and one-child families, and the decline in the importance of marriage. The disappearance of specific factors sustaining the early and almost universal pattern of childbearing and marriage (e.g., the system of preferential housing distribution and pronatalist policies), together with the emergence of many new structural factors favouring late family formation and less traditional living arrangements (e.g., an expansion of tertiary education, delayed home leaving, rapid rise of economic uncertainty in early adulthood, and low availability of housing), have shifted the cost-benefit calculation in favour of the less traditional family behaviour typical of the second demographic transition. As Overview Chapter 5 argues, this shift is long-lasting and cannot be explained by a temporary economic crisis in the early 1990s; rather, it is consistent with the whole transition towards a market economy and adoption of democratic institutions. An additional important element further reinforcing the diffusion of the new family patterns was a conscious adoption and imitation of 'Western' lifestyles and social norms, facilitated partly by the belief that such norms are intrinsically linked to modern life and the economic affluence typical of Western and Northern Europe (Thornton and Philipov 2007).[26] An increasingly common experience of working or studying abroad has further supported the diffusion of new values and lifestyles among the younger population.

As for the *ability dimension*, the rapid spread of modern contraception, especially the pill (see Overview Chapter 3 and some country-specific chapters) has further facilitated the delay of family formation and the rise of cohabitation and other non-traditional living arrangements. Teenagers and young adults are also far

[26] Using the example of Albania, writer Slavenka Drakulić (1996: 56) notes the crucial role of foreign TV channels, which were frequently received through satellite dishes, in transmitting idealised images of the life in the 'West' to a population that has never travelled outside the country: "This is where the vision of the future life came from, as well as the idea of what revolution is all about: it should bring not only a change in political power, but also better standard of living."

better informed and educated about contraception and sexuality than their older counterparts growing up in the 1970s and 1980s.

4.5 Diversity in the second demographic transition in Central and Eastern Europe

Overall, the huge differences between Central and Eastern European countries in the current spread and acceptance of SDT behaviours, and of 'post-modern' value orientations, can be explained by a combination of many factors, of which the level of secularisation, the actual welfare and family policies, and historical family patterns appear to be most important. Economic prosperity and affluence are also among the obvious candidates for explaining the cross-country differences in the spread of the SDT. Individualistic values of self-expression and self-fulfilment can thrive only in societies where people experience sufficiently high levels of affluence so that they do not need to worry much about the satisfaction of their basic needs. Finally, the importance of history cannot be overstated. In several Central European countries, 'history' may be seen as a factor explaining the 'return' to the late marriage, late childbearing, and higher childlessness pattern, typical in the past of the populations positioned to the west of Hajnal's (1965) line running between Trieste and St. Petersburg. Such a 'return' to the previous ('Western') demographic patterns has been mentioned by Možný and Katrňák (2005) as an important explanation of demographic changes in the Czech Republic. The breakdown of the 'Eastern Bloc' has led to an emergence of new regional demographic divides (Sobotka 2003), some of which may lead to a reappearance of historical cleavages across Europe (e.g., Fux 2008). But 'history' may also refer to the influence of cultural changes and policies during communism. For instance, Salles (2006) has argued that the policies enacted to help lone mothers, but also to promote marriage in East Germany since the 1970s, eventually had a negative effect on marriage in the long run: "East German family policy instrumentalized marriage and stripped it of all the appeal once the associated material advantages were withdrawn. The family policy of the GDR thus played a key part in weakening of the role of marriage in the family and in East German society" (Salles 2006: 149).

Commenting on the pervasive character of changes in Central and Eastern Europe, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2004: 10) concluded that the SDT is emerging there "as a feature that is here to stay, just as in the West. Once more it is emerging as a salient characteristic of capitalist economies and of cultures that recognize the primacy of individual autonomy and that develop the higher order needs." While the findings on behavioural trends—and, to some extent, also on value changes—

generally support this view, it is also important to reiterate vast cross-country differences in the progress of the SDT in this region, and the complexity of different structural and cultural factors fuelling changes in family behaviour (see also the concluding section). Figure 4, showing the score of selected behavioural components of the SDT (SDT1 index), as well as the attitudinal and values components of the SDT (SDT2 index) in 29 European countries, show that the differences in the second demographic transition between post-communist countries of Europe have become large enough to blur any clear distinction between the 'East' of Europe and the other European regions (see Appendix and Section 3 for the definition of SDT indexes). Whereas some post-communist societies reach the lowest SDT score with respect to the behavioural component (Romania and Belarus) and the values component (especially Poland and Latvia), three central European societies (Estonia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) occupy an intermediate position, while Slovenia scores high on both the behavioural and values component of the SDT. In contrast with this diversity, the clustering of the Nordic countries, German-speaking countries (only data for Austria and Germany are available), and Southern and Western European countries is considerably more compact, broadly corresponding to welfare state typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990; see also Liefbroer and Fokkema 2008). Remarkably, the behavioural and the values factors are strongly correlated, suggesting that, in line with the theoretical arguments, changes in family and reproductive behaviour progress hand in glove with the characteristic changes in values and attitudes in practically all the countries in which the second demographic transition emerges.

5. Social status differences in behavioural and value changes typical of the transition

Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1998) stress the importance of education for the spread of post-materialist values that form an essential component of the second demographic transition. Education, when perceived as a proxy for cultural endowment, is linked to non-conformism, decline of traditional religious beliefs, higher permissiveness in personal matters (such as homosexuality or abortion), openness about sexuality, and high values placed on personal self-fulfilment from work (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1998: 18). Some earlier studies, especially those conducted in the Low Countries, provided strong support for the idea that highly educated individuals have been the forerunners in the values and behaviour associated with the transition. De Feijter (1991) showed that, alongside age and religious affiliation, having a high level of

Figure 4: Behavioural (SDT1) and values (SDT2) components of the second demographic transition in Europe



NOTES: A brief description of the SDT indexes is provided in Appendix; see also Section 3 and Sobotka (2008).
SOURCES: Own computations based on vital statistics data in 2004 for the SDT1 index (Council of Europe 2006 and Eurostat 2006) and the data from the European Values Study in 1999-2000 for the SDT2 index (Halman 2001).

education was a powerful determinant of more liberal attitudes towards cohabitation, sexuality, and parenthood in the Netherlands. Cohabitation and voluntary childlessness there were initially most typical of women with higher levels of education. These findings conformed well to the 'classic' theories of cultural innovation, whereby higher-educated and economically advantaged social strata first adopt a new behaviour, which subsequently spreads through 'imitation' to other social groups (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). Contemporary research documents wide and often increasing social status heterogeneity in the timing and trajectories of parenthood, union formation and family life (see England and Wales chapter). These trajectories do not, however, always follow a predictable pattern. One paradox, discussed below, appears puzzling: while, as expected, the lower-educated individuals display more 'traditional' or 'conservative' values, they are often the early adopters in the spread of cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and unstable living arrangements. This is especially true in the case of the post-communist countries of Europe.

If the concept of the second demographic transition is understood as predicting greater diversity in individual behaviour as a result of increased freedom from traditional norms and constraints, then such diversity is closely following educational lines. The connection between different events that typically took place in young adulthood (finishing education, leaving home, entering first job, marrying, and having a first child) has weakened considerably in the Western countries among the post-1950 cohorts. Consequently, a "large majority of individuals do not follow the 'normal' succession of events and ages" (Bourdelais and Gordon 2006: 257). Among younger cohorts higher education implies a progressive delay of most early life transitions, especially of parenthood, while lower-educated women often become parents as teenagers (chapters on the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Ukraine; see also McLanahan 2004). In addition, highly educated women still frequently follow the normatively preferred path to childbearing, marked by the succession of school graduation, work, marriage, and first birth. In contrast, women with lower levels of education often "go through shorter routes to motherhood," frequently 'bypassing' regular work and marriage (Ravanera and Rajulton 2004: 11).

In most countries, ultimate family size and childlessness are also clearly differentiated by education, with higher-educated women having the highest levels of childlessness and the lowest levels of fertility.[27] This pattern is most pronounced in countries where career attachment, which is stronger among the higher-educated women, is incompatible with motherhood due to lack of childcare facilities, low level of labour flexibility, low gender equality within the family, or the prevailing normative pressure on mothers to interrupt their work career. The work-childrearing incompatibility, as well as an institutionalised pattern of an extended withdrawal from work among mothers of small children, are frequently cited as the reasons for particularly high childlessness among university-educated women in Austria and Germany (see the respective country chapters). In contrast, in countries where the 'motherhood penalty' is less pronounced, there are smaller or narrowing educational differentials in childlessness and family size (France and Sweden chapter; see also Ekert-Jaffé et al. 2002).[28] In France, childlessness is somewhat higher among the more educated women, but once they become mothers they are more likely to have three children than women of medium educational levels (France chapter). In sum, there seems to be a consistent pattern of fertility differentials by education, which

[27] In contrast to women, highly educated men frequently have the lowest level of ultimate childlessness (Sweden chapter).

[28] The Sweden chapter also emphasizes the importance of the field of education, which has a greater impact on fertility than the level of education or the length of education (Hoem, Neyer and Andersson 2006).

are conditional on entering parenthood: the structural and cultural incompatibility of childbearing and pursuing a career usually leads to pronounced education differentials in fertility that are typically attributable to higher childlessness among the more educated women. Once they have their first child, higher-educated women usually display equally high, or even higher, progression rates to second and third births than their less-educated counterparts (e.g., Neels 2006 for Flanders; Rendall and Smallwood 2003 for England and Wales).

Data on fertility intentions suggest that the gap in intended fertility between the higher- and the lower-educated women might become narrower among the 1970s cohorts (see de Graaf and van Duin 2007 for the Netherlands). When controlling for factors like partnership and employment status, and the partner's characteristics, the association of higher levels of education with lower fertility intentions disappears altogether: van Peer and Rabušic (2008) have found that highly educated people in Europe desire a larger family size. Similarly, Sobotka and Testa (2008) show that, net of selected factors[29], an intention to remain childless is expressed most frequently by the lower-educated women.

In line with Lesthaeghe and Surkyn's (1998) argument, individuals with a higher level of education usually display higher acceptance of non-traditional family forms. For instance, Pongrácz and Spéder (2008) show that the attitudes towards unmarried unions are most positive among highly educated men and women, and Fokkema and Esveldt (2008) find that the value attached to children declines with the level of education. For the United States, Pagnini and Rindfuss (1993) found that better-educated women were more tolerant toward non-marital childbearing when responding to three different questions related to it. Several chapters in this collection, especially those on the more 'conservative' societies of Central and Eastern Europe, suggest that young, urban, and better-educated people have developed more positive attitudes towards cohabitation and 'alternative lifestyles' (Poland and Romania chapters), have embraced individualistic values (Lithuania chapter), and spearheaded fertility postponement (Slovakia and Ukraine chapters).

The role of education in the spread of cohabitation differs greatly between countries. Historically, cohabitation in Europe had been practised especially by working-class people and by the poor (Kiernan 2004). More recently, some countries have seen cohabitation spreading as a new lifestyle, especially among the highly educated, and later being adopted by the lower-educated couples.[30] This

[29] The model controls for the following factors: Partnership status, employment, religiosity, attitudes towards children, preferred living arrangement, and partner's employment and educational level.
[30] Kalmijn's (2007) cross-country analysis of cohabitation, marriage, and divorce in Europe in the 1990s found a positive effect of tertiary education on cohabitation, but, at the same time, also on marriage rates.

pattern of a modern diffusion of cohabitation, documented for the Netherlands (de Feijter 1991), England and Wales (England and Wales chapter), Italy (Rosina and Fraboni 2004), and Spain (Baizán, Aasve, and Billari 2003), supports the notion of highly educated individuals as open-minded forerunners heralding the changes in family formation.[31] However, in a number of other societies, cohabitation had initially spread among the less-educated and economically disadvantaged people. In Sweden, cohabitation has spread first in the working-class environment, rather than as a 'campus movement' (Hoem 1986). In the United States, cohabitation had been historically most common among the lower-educated (Bumpass and Sweet 1989), and in the 1980s and the 1990s it still remained more prevalent among women who had not completed high school (Bumpass and Lu 2000).[32] Similarly, in a number of Central and Eastern European societies, cohabitation had initially proliferated among the lower-educated, particularly after divorce (see Spéder 2005 for Hungary and Romania chapter). This pattern was also evidenced for Bulgaria, where, according to the Bulgaria chapter, cohabitation had spread in the 1990s as an an arrangement without a long commitment, especially among lower-educated women, who typically have disadvantaged occupational and earning status, and are thus less attractive on the marriage market (Koytcheva and Philipov 2008:377). Such diversity in the spread of cohabitation can be partly explained by the diversity of cohabitation as a living arrangement (see Overview Chapter 4). A cross-country comparison of divorce by Härkönen and Donkers (2006) shows that divorce rates among women are also not systematically patterned by education. Whereas nine out of 17 analysed countries did not have a significant education gradient of divorce, five countries (France, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain) had higher divorce rates among higher-educated women, whereas three countries (Austria, Lithuania, and the United States) had higher divorce propensity among lower-educated women. In addition, higher prevalence of divorce and non-traditional family behaviour (cohabitation and extramarital births) was associated with a shift towards a negative educational gradient.

Whereas the role of higher levels of education in the diffusion of cohabitation and prevalence of divorce differs across countries, the evidence on the spread of non-marital childbearing and lone motherhood, in particular, is relatively uniform:

This suggests that educational expansion may be positively linked to the diffusion of cohabitation, but does not necessarily lead to a decline in the popularity of marriage.

[31] Rosina and Fraboni (2004) have also detected a strong significant effect of father's education on a young woman's propensity to enter cohabitation before marriage (model based on data for Northern and Central regions of Italy).

[32] However, in line with the SDT arguments cohabitation in the U.S. is also linked to less traditional value orientation. It is more typical of people who are "slightly more liberal, less religious, and more supportive of egalitarian gender roles and nontraditional family" (Smock 2000: 4).

highly educated women have the highest propensity to marry before childbearing, and therefore have the lowest ratio of extramarital births. Even in a country like Sweden, where cohabitation has become almost indistinguishable from marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004), and where more than half of all births take place outside marriage, women and men with a university degree have the highest rates of marriage (Bracher and Santow 1998). This finding holds irrespective of whether they are cohabiting or not, although the latter case – direct marriage – is rather unusual there (Sweden chapter). The association of low educational levels with a high frequency of extramarital childbearing is illustrated in Table 1 with data from selected countries of Central Europe (Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Except in Austria, the educational gradient is very steep: for women with the lowest levels of education, non-marital childbearing has become a common experience and the percentage of out-of-wedlock births among this group exceeds by a factor of 5-10 the share among university-educated women. In Austria, where unmarried parenthood has a long tradition in many Alpine regions (Austria chapter), this educational gradient is only moderate, and women who achieved only a primary level of education have a below-average percentage of extramarital births. This finding is attributable to a high proportion of immigrant women with more traditional and religious background among the lowest-educated group, for whom extramarital childbearing is not morally acceptable.

Table 1: Percentage of extramarital births by the highest educational attainment of mother in selected countries of Central Europe, 1990-2005

		Highest educational attainment					
	Year	Basic (including incomplete)	Apprentice-ship and basic vocational	Lower secondary	Higher Secondary	Tertiary	Total
Austria	1996	26.9	32.6	25.7	24.7	19.7	28.0
Austria	2005	28.7	43.3	38.6	35.3	30.6	36.5
Czech Republic	1990	26.6	7.7		4.1	3.3	8.6
Czech Republic	1995	44.5	14.4		7.8	5.7	15.6
Czech Republic	2005	67.6	37.2		23.8	13.7	31.7
Poland	2003	39.4	16.9		12.6	6.6	15.8
		Completed years of education					
		0-7	8	9-12	13+		Total
Hungary	1990	49.1	16.2	6.3	4.5		13.1
Hungary	1998	63.5	33.0	16.9	10.4		26.6

SOURCES: Statistics Austria 1997 and 2006, FSO 1991, CZSO 1996 and 2006, GUS 2004 and Pongrácz 2002 (Table 3)

However, in all cases, the trend over time is uniform, towards a higher share of non-marital births among women of all educational levels. Thus, extramarital childbearing (and, frequently, also cohabitation) constitutes a peculiar feature of the second demographic transition, which spreads from the lowest-educated population to the more affluent and higher-educated social groups. It is plausible that, among the higher-educated women, non-marital childbearing usually takes place in the context of stable cohabiting unions, whereas lower-educated women frequently experience lone motherhood or childbearing within unstable partnerships. Kiernan's (1999) analysis of the FFS data indicates that non-graduate women are more likely than graduate women to have a child before experiencing any partnership. Numerous studies conducted in the United States show that non-marital childbearing and unstable unions are concentrated especially among the women at the bottom of the educational and income distribution, and that this group increasingly differs from the higher-income and higher-educated group (Lundberg and Pollak 2007). McLanahan (2004) argues that the rising divergence in partnership, family, and work trajectories of lower-educated and higher-educated women and their partners is linked to an increasingly disadvantaged economic position of the former group. This argument, which is likely to hold for most societies of Europe as well, suggests that some behaviours associated with the STD spread first as a reaction or an accommodation to economic and social disadvantages, rather than as an alternative lifestyle of highly educated individuals.

6. Summary and conclusions

The progression of the characteristic changes in family behaviour

Chapters in this collection demonstrate that wide-sweeping changes in partnership and family behaviour have spread to all parts of Europe. More recently, this trend has been particularly pronounced in Southern Europe and in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see also Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004), which had been often perceived as rather 'immune' to the rapid diffusion of the transition. In country after country, births and marriages have been postponed intensively. Cohabitation has become a common choice for a first union, and has increasingly emerged as a substitution for marriage. Meanwhile, marriage rates have plummeted, and the connection between marriage, sexual life, and childbearing has rapidly eroded. The spread of cohabitation and LAT arrangements have been connected with an increase in partnership instability, which is also signalled by persistently high or increasing divorce rates. Some 'traditional' pathways to first

partnership and first birth have become unusual in the countries that have progressed furthest in the second demographic transition (see Overview Chapter 4). Sexual initiation takes place well before the formation of a first partnership, not only because of an earlier onset of sexual activity, but also owing to a postponement of partnership formation. 'Direct' marriage not preceded by cohabitation has become in some countries an unusual pathway typical of specific religious and ethnic groups. Furthermore, having a first child within marriage is becoming a 'minority experience' in a rising number of countries. Symptomatic of this change is a marked decline in the normative pressure to marry in the case of out-of-wedlock pregnancies, leading to a gradual disappearance of the once relatively common phenomenon of 'shotgun marriages.' If not permanent, the new family behaviour appears to be a long-standing trait of the European demographic landscape, which is here to stay for many decades.

In the post-communist countries of Europe, where the new behavioural trends are often thought of as arising in response to the economic crisis and 'anomie' of the early 1990s, these changes have been further intensifying during the recent period of higher prosperity and economic recovery. While fertility and marriage postponement, as well as voluntary childlessness, have been heralded by higher-educated women, lower-educated individuals are often at the forefront of the rise of unstable living arrangements and non-marital fertility. Paradoxically, higher-educated people, who have generally more positive attitudes towards the new family forms, resist longest the erosion of the 'bourgeois family,' especially when they decide to have children.

Changes in family-related values and attitudes

Attitudes towards children, family, and sexuality remain widely differentiated across Europe, to an extent which is impossible to portray accurately in this review. However, a common direction of changes can be clearly detected across all countries (perhaps with the exception of Albania), which is generally in agreement with the second demographic transition hypothesis:

- a move towards tolerant and generally positive attitudes regarding intimate relationships among unmarried and un-partnered people, including young adults and teenagers
- a positive regard for cohabitation as a specific premarital stage, and its rising recognition as an alternative to marriage

- a higher tolerance of non-family living arrangements and voluntary childlessness

Marriage and childbearing have increasingly become optional parts of individual biographies, even in countries that have been until recently considered rather 'conservative.' For example, the Spain chapter emphasises the increasing freedom in the design of individual life projects: "inherited models of family organization have ceased to be binding; the form that family life eventually adopts have thus come to depend on the negotiation" (Delgado et al. 2008:1087). These shifts do not imply, however, that family has become an obsolete institution. It has undergone a remarkable transformation: "feelings and love have become the centre of the family, a trend that explains the weakening of the conjugal bond, the loss of popularity of marriage, and the growing complexity of marital trajectories" (Toulemon et al. 2008:524). At the same time, the family appears to have adapted well to the increase in individual autonomy (France chapter). Perhaps the most important indication of the continuing strength of the family is the persistent high value attached to family and children and the overwhelmingly positive attitude towards parenthood. This may partly explain the absence of a negative association between the second demographic transition, and fertility level as well as childbearing intentions in contemporary Europe.

Structural constraints may facilitate some SDT trends among disadvantaged social groups

The experience of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe highlights the importance of structural factors in facilitating the trends associated with the SDT. The initial contributions (e.g., van de Kaa 1987) tended to emphasise the prominence of normative and value changes for an initiation of the second demographic transition. When economic factors entered the SDT narrative, economic prosperity was perceived as an engine of cultural dynamics: it leads to an increase in individual aspirations and to the accentuation of higher-order needs and individual self-fulfilment (for a more detailed elaboration see Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). This mechanism seems to be instrumental for explaining value changes symptomatic of the SDT. However, some characteristic behavioural changes, such as the rapid rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing, can also be driven by the emergence of new structural factors that make such behaviour more attractive for people with a socially disadvantaged background. This was often the case during the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe: the rapid

restructuring of society towards a capitalist market economy led to much social and economic turbulence, as well as to increased anomie, which most affected the lowest-educated individuals. As many structural characteristics of capitalist economies, such as huge income disparities, unstable working conditions, and a need for more lifestyle flexibility (see also Mills and Blossfeld 2005) are not compatible with the 'bourgeois ideal' of a stable family consisting of a married couple with (a) child(ren), lower-educated individuals were often at the forefront of a shift towards extramarital childbearing and cohabitation. Perhaps unwillingly, disadvantaged segments of the population may thus become trendsetters of new behaviour, paving the way to a wider legitimisation and acceptance of the new family forms, which are later openly embraced by the rising number of highly educated individuals.

Two pathways of the SDT diffusion

Such a mechanism of change is consistent with the *Ready-Willing-Able* (*RWA*) model of diffusion of new behaviour, which has been advocated by Lesthaeghe and his colleagues (e.g., Lesthaeghe, Neidert and Surkyn 2006), and which has also been adopted in this chapter for explaining the diffusion of the second demographic transition in the post-communist countries of Europe. If the arguments sketched above are valid, we are left with two pathways of behavioural and value changes in the course of the second demographic transition. The first one, consistent with the 'classical' narrative of the SDT, sees cultural and value changes as factors driven by economic affluence and characterised by secular individualism, and by an orientation towards personal self-fulfilment as a precondition to large-scale changes in family behaviour. In this case, the new behaviour is first heralded by the more educated and economically more privileged social groups, who adopt new preferences with respect to their living arrangements and childbearing and their 'coordination' with other domains of life (education, employment, leisure). The second pathway may first lead to an emergence of new family behaviour, especially among the disadvantaged strata, as a response to changed structural conditions in the society, frequently marked by economic crisis. In this case, the new behaviour is less driven by new choices and personal preferences, and may constitute a reaction to adverse life circumstances. Consequently, as this behaviour spreads, it gradually becomes accepted and adopted by other social groups, which in turn leads to the changes in attitudes towards it and its continuous diffusion. This diffusion becomes self-reinforcing and continues even at the time when the conditions which had facilitated an emergence of the new behaviour decline in importance (Kohler,

Billari, and Ortega 2002). Needless to say, changes in values and behaviour are reinforcing each other (e.g., Rindfuss et al. 2004), and none of these pathways occurs in a 'pure form.' In real life, a mixture of cultural and structural changes may lead to differentiated responses and feedback effects among various social groups, whose values and life histories may also differ markedly.

The importance of the 'gender revolution' for the spread of SDT and for fertility recuperation

The **'***gender revolution*' was marked by a huge expansion of higher education among women, their increasingly perfect ability to prevent unwanted pregnancies, women's massive and almost universal participation in the labour market and their resulting economic independence, and also their higher aspirations, in which an employment career constitutes an expected and essential part of their life biographies (Goldin 2006). This 'revolution' ended what Keyfitz (1986) described as a societal 'conspiracy' that maintained the image of women as mothers and wives, enforced a strong socialisation of girls towards these roles and where various elements converged to "maintain women in a position where their time was available for reproduction and for not much else" (Keyfitz 1986: 150). The gender revolution in a broad sense appears to be one of the most important factors driving the trends associated with the second demographic transition. Countries that were first to embrace the principles of gender equality, particularly the Nordic countries, now score highest in the SDT progression (Sweden chapter). Macro-level analysis by Kalmijn (2007) shows that the proportion of women in paid employment is linked to lower marriage rates, higher divorce rates, and higher levels of cohabitation. 'Women's liberation' might possibly also explain the positive association between the second demographic transition and fertility. Countries where many people adhered early to egalitarianism and women's emancipation also enacted at an early stage different policies supporting gender equality, which subsequently reduced the incompatibility of work and childrearing. These policies are conducive for the 'recuperation' of fertility at later childbearing ages, especially among more-educated women, which I found to be strongly associated with the transition. In addition, the ideology of gender equality nurtures more equal division of household and childcare tasks between partners, reducing gender asymmetries within the family that may strongly contribute to low fertility in many parts of Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe (Esping-Andersen 1999, McDonald 2000; see also Lithuania chapter).

As women increasingly outnumber men in tertiary education in most OECD countries (OECD 2005), their economic and employment position is poised to improve further in the future, whereas more men will probably become unemployed, unemployable, and economically disadvantaged. This may bring yet unforeseen consequences for the course of future family and fertility change, some of which may be linked to the rising inability of many women to find a suitable partner matching their level of education and income.

Further progression of the transition and the likely future trends in fertility

The experiences of the Nordic countries, of France, and also of the United States, indicate that the SDT does not inevitably lead to long-term sub-replacement fertility, especially when fertility rates are analysed in a cohort perspective. The future of the fertility – SDT relationship remains open. It is possible that the progression of the SDT in countries with currently very low fertility, such as Italy and Spain, will lead to a wider acceptance and the further spread of very low fertility, and of a one-child family norm even when the structural constraints initially responsible for a pronounced fertility decline eventually diminish. In other words, low fertility rates in the last two decades would engender low family size preferences among younger cohorts that were socialised under the new low-fertility regime, a possibility envisioned by Lutz, Skirbekk, and Testa (2006). But an alternative outcome is possible as well: some structural factors that are arguably affecting fertility behaviour in many countries may be seen as an outcome of a delayed societal adaptation to the progressing second demographic transition. In this view, the persistence of the traditional family norms and expectations, the continuation of family policies tailored to support the 'male breadwinner model,' and the persistence of marked gender inequality within the family in many low-fertility societies may be seen as temporary features of societies that failed to adapt to the changing character of family and partnership behaviours. Then, the very low fertility observed in Southern Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, and the German-speaking countries may be perceived as a temporary outcome of the second demographic transition (see also Sobotka 2008), whose importance may diminish if the society embraces gender equality and adapts to the new patterns of family behaviour. This view is voiced in the chapter on Italy, which suggests that the slow spread of non-marital fertility in Italy is a syndrome of an "uncompleted second demographic transition," (De Rose et al. 2008:678) which is in part responsible for very low fertility in Italy. More generally, the authors view "a lack of modernity" as "a main cause of the current depressed childbearing level" (De Rose et al. 2008:679).

On the usefulness of the second demographic transition concept

In conclusion, the second demographic transition seems to be particularly useful as an umbrella concept that encompasses a broad range of interrelated changes in sexuality, family, and partnership behaviours and attitudes, as well as a massive postponement of parenthood. This chapter has shown that, despite widely different social and economic contexts, the SDT provides a powerful narrative reflecting well the shared trajectories in the evolution of the new model of family and reproduction in Europe during the last four decades. As the relationship of the SDT to fertility levels is shown to diverge from the originally envisioned negative association, the term itself may be seen as problematic—it is too suggestive of an irreversible and predictable shift in reproductive behaviour, similar to the concept of the (first) demographic transition. However, as the term has become firmly established, it would be fruitless to attempt to change it. The SDT is also potentially problematic as a scientific theory. On one hand, it appears to hold quite well on a very general level: if, for instance, the SDT concept were used to foresee the trends in family and fertility behaviours after the establishment of democracy and market capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, it would have provided a very sound projection of general change. On the other hand, the SDT is too fuzzy as a theory when scrutinised on a finer level. By definition, historical contingency, context-specific institutions, and multiple interactions between ideational and behavioural changes always make it extremely difficult to construct a theory that can precisely specify conditions under which a certain change in behaviour takes place. But the experience of many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which can be seen as a giant demographic laboratory, indicates that much more research needs to be done in order to pinpoint the most important structural and cultural factors that stand at the root of the SDT in diverse settings, and to specify how different facets of SDT behaviour are initiated, and later progress across social groups.

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Appendix

Construction of the SDT indexes used in the analysis

Note that country-specific values of SDT1 and SDT2 indexes are displayed in Sobotka (2008, Table AP-1, pp. 86-87).

SDT1 index (behavioural dimension)

This index, composed for 34 countries, is based on the following indicators for 2004 (or the latest year available):

1) Mean age of mother at birth of first child (MAFB);
2) Sum of age-specific fertility rates below age 20, per 1000 women (TEENFERT);
3) Percentage of non-marital births (NONMAR);
4) Total first marriage rate (TFMR);
5) Mean age at first marriage (MAFM);
6) Total divorce rate (TDR).

Finally, the index is adjusted upwards by 0.5 if more than 10 per cent of co-residential unions were made up by cohabiting couples (data for 2001 based on Philipov 2005 and national data sources). Maximum, minimum and mean values of these indicators and the assigned SDT scores are displayed in table AP-2.

SDT2 index (attitudes and values dimension)

This index is based on the 1999/2000 results of the European Values Study, published in Halman (2001). It is based on the responses in 29 countries to the following questions and statements:

1) "…how important it is in your life: leisure time" (LEISURE, % "very important")
2) "How often do you spend time in church, mosque, or synagogue" (CHURCH, % "every week");
3) "Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?" (CONTROL, mean value on the scale of 1 (=none control at all) to 10 (= a great deal of control));

4) "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" (NEED_KIDS, % responses "not necessary");
5) "Marriage is an outdated institution" (MARRIAGE, % "agree");
6) "A job is alright, but what women really want is a home and children" (F_HOME, % "agree strongly");
7) "One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes" (PAR_RESPECT, % "agree");
8) "Do you approve or disapprove abortion (…) where a married couple does not want to have any more children?" (ABORTION, % "approve").

Several questions were not asked in all the participating countries; the SDT2 index for these countries was based on the mean score of the responses to the remaining items. Maximum, minimum and mean values of these indicators and the assigned SDT scores are displayed in table AP-2.

Table AP-1: **Variables used for computing the SDT indexes: Mean, maximum, minimum and threshold values for selected SDT scores (0, 5, and 10)**

	Values of SDT scores			Observed values			Mean
Variable	SDT score=0	SDT score=5	SDT score=10	MIN	MAX	MEAN	SDT score
Index SDT1							
MAFB	<24	27	>30	23.29	29.30	26.60	4.3
TEENFERT	>180	90	0	26.0	209.3	84.4	5.3
NONMAR	0	30	>60	4.9	63.7	32.0	5.3
TFMR	>0.80	0.60	<0.40	0.405	0.826	0.577	5.6
MAFM	<23	27	>31	22.91	30.90	26.72	4.6
TDR	<0.15	0.35	>0.55	0.11	0.55	0.36	5.2
Index SDT2							
LEISURE	<16	32	>48	15.5	54.2	31.5	4.8
CHURCH	>30	15	0	3.1	34.2	14.8	5.2
CONTROL	<5.3	6.4	>7.5	5.4	7.6	6.7	6.2
NEED_KIDS	<5	45	>85	5.9	92.9	45.9	5.1
MARRIAGE	<6	20	>34	8.3	36.3	18.7	4.5
F_HOME	>35	20	<5	3.0	34.1	17.4	5.8
PAR_RESPECT	0	30	>60	13.5	67.3	29.6	4.9
ABORTION	<20	55	>90	15.2	85.1	56.9	5.3