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OVERVIEW OF MICROBIAL RISKS IN WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS AND THEIR HEALTH CONSEQUENCES: QUANTIFICATION, MODELLING, TRENDS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

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**OVERVIEW OF MICROBIAL RISKS IN WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
AND THEIR HEALTH CONSEQUENCES: QUANTIFICATION, MODELLING,
TRENDS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS**

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Draft

Abstract. The water distribution network (WDN) is usually the final physical barrier preventing contamination of the drinking water before it reaches consumers. Because the WDN is at the end of the supply chain, and often with limited online water quality monitoring, the probability of an incident to be detected and remediated in time is low. Microbial risks that can affect the distribution network are: intrusion, cross-connections and backflows, inadequate management of reservoirs, improper main pipe repair/maintenance work, and biofilms. Epidemiological investigations have proven that these risks have been sources of waterborne outbreaks. Increasingly since the 1990s, studies have also indicated that the contribution of these risks to the endemic level of disease is not negligible. To address the increasing health risks associated to WDNs, researchers have developed tools for risk quantification and risk management. This review aims to present the recent advancements in the field involving epidemiological investigations, use of quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) for modelling, risk mitigation and decision-support. Increasing the awareness of the progress achieved, but also of the limitations and challenges faced, will aid in accelerating the implementation of QMRA tools for WDN risk management and as a decision-support tool.

Keywords: *microbial risk, water distribution network, waterborne outbreak, gastrointestinal illness, QMRA*

Draft

1 **Introduction**

2 The provisioning of safe drinking water is the main goal for any water supplier. Drinking water is considered safe when
3 it does not represent a health risk to the consumers (WHO 2011). The water distribution network is usually the final
4 physical barrier preventing contamination of the drinking water before it reaches the consumers (Risebro et al. 2007).
5 Since the distribution network is at the end of the supply chain, it is less probable that an incident can be detected and
6 remediated in time. Therefore, maintaining the integrity of the network is essential in preventing contamination of the
7 treated water delivered to consumers.

8 The National Research Council (2006) divides the integrity of the distribution network into three components:
9 physical, hydraulic and water quality. Physical integrity refers to the ability of the distribution system to act as a physical
10 barrier against external contamination. The physical integrity can be lost if, for example, there are cross-connections with
11 non-potable water pipes or due to cracks and holes in the pipes. Hydraulic integrity is the capacity of the system to
12 maintain adequate flow, pressure and water age. Certain events, e.g., pump shutdown and main breaks, can affect the
13 hydraulic integrity of the system. Water quality integrity deals with internal chemical processes inside the pipes that can
14 lead to a deterioration of the drinking water quality. An example of water quality integrity breach is the complete decay
15 of the disinfectant residual. For a contamination event to occur, it is expected that both physical and the hydraulic integrity
16 are lost (Ercumen et al. 2014).

17 Deficiencies in the distribution network that lead to contamination of the drinking water poses a serious health risk
18 to consumers. Cases where failures in the distribution network have been linked with waterborne disease outbreaks are
19 well documented (Craun et al. 2010; Guzman-Herrador et al. 2015; Hrudey and Hrudey 2004; Schuster et al. 2005).
20 Studies on the distribution network's contribution to background level gastrointestinal illness (GI), on the other hand,
21 have had mixed results (Colford et al. 2005; Hellard et al. 2001; Hunter et al. 2005; Malm et al. 2013; Nygard et al. 2007;
22 Payment et al. 1991; Payment et al. 1997; Säve-Söderbergh et al. 2017a). However, there is evidence that malfunctioning
23 distribution networks in general, as well as specific system deficiencies (i.e., pipe breaks, water outages and inadequate
24 residual disinfectant), increase the risk of endemic GI (Ercumen et al. 2014).

25 In the United States, both the total number of reported outbreaks and number of outbreaks caused by distribution
26 system failures have decreased; on the other hand, the proportion of outbreaks caused by distribution network deficiencies
27 has increased (from approximately 30% between 1971-1974 to almost 60% between 2001-2002) (National Research
28 Council 2006). In a study of the factors that caused waterborne disease outbreaks in water supply systems of the European
29 Union it was found that distribution system deficiencies contributed in 31% of the outbreaks (Risebro et al. 2007). In the

30 Nordic countries, approximately 10% of all reported outbreaks are due to distribution network deficiencies (Guzman-
31 Herrador et al. 2015). In Sweden, though, the reported proportion is much higher since 34% of outbreaks with known
32 causes are associated with the distribution network (Malm et al. 2010). This highlights that the distribution network has
33 a significant contribution to the burden of disease of waterborne origin.

34 Distinct kinds of models have been used to study the microbial risks and their consequences in the distribution
35 network. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models have been developed to simulate intrusion events and to study the
36 level of contamination that can enter into the system (Mansour-Rezaei and Naser 2013; Mansour-Rezaei et al. 2013;
37 Mora-Rodríguez et al. 2014). Quantitative microbial risk assessment models have been used in conjunction with hydraulic
38 models to quantify the consequences of different microbial risks (Blokker et al. 2014; Teunis et al. 2010b; Yang et al.
39 2011). Most of these models have important limitations that restrict their use, e.g., uncertainties in the input data,
40 assumptions made about the conditions in the distribution network (turbulent flow, instantaneous mixing, etc.) (Besner et
41 al. 2011). However, they are useful for evaluating and assessing risk reducing measures that can be chosen to manage the
42 specific risks addressed in the model.

43 Reviews for the specific risk of intrusion already exist (Besner et al. 2011; Islam et al. 2015). Broader reviews also
44 exist (National Research Council 2006; WHO 2014); however, these reviews do not include recent advancements in the
45 field. Therefore, we performed an extensive literature review of the available research on microbial risks in the distribution
46 network to provide a more accessible and updated depository to experts in the field of drinking water engineering that
47 would like to inform themselves about the current state-of-the-art, with a special focus on health-related aspects of
48 microbial risk. This review focuses on centralized drinking water distribution networks within mainly four areas: (i)
49 associated microbial risks, (ii) studies of the influence of the distribution network in the burden of disease, (iii) models
50 available to quantify the microbial risks and their consequence on health, and (iv) discussions and suggestions for future
51 research.

52 **Microbial risks in the distribution network**

53 The main events associated with the water distribution network that could potentially cause microbial contamination of
54 the drinking water include cross-connections and backflows; unhygienic practices during installation, rehabilitation and
55 repair of water mains; improper management of reservoirs/storages; combination of adverse pressure and physical
56 breaches (i.e., intrusion) events; and biofilms (National Research Council 2005). Most of these events have been identified
57 as the causes of waterborne disease outbreaks (Hrudey and Hrudey 2004; Hrudey and Hrudey 2007; Risebro et al. 2007).
58 Additionally, there is evidence that these events also contribute to the endemic level of GI in the population (Säve-

59 Söderbergh et al. 2017a)

60 Cross-connections imply points in the distribution network where non-potable water elements can come into contact
61 with the drinking water (USEPA 2002). When the pressure in the non-potable water source is greater than in the
62 distribution system and there are inadequate cross-connections controls present (e.g., absence of backflow prevention
63 valve), a backflow can occur (WHO 2014). Cross-connections are considered one of the most serious public health risks
64 in the distribution network (National Research Council 2006; WHO 2014).

65 Routines exist to ensure correct hygienic procedures during installation, rehabilitation and repair of water mains, in
66 addition to properly inspecting reservoirs/storages (Säve-Söderbergh et al. 2013; WHO 2011, 2014). However,
67 contamination can occur if these routines are not carried out (e.g., inadequately disinfecting newly laid pipes, lacking an
68 inspection routine for reservoirs). Unhygienic practices during installation, rehabilitation and repair of water mains; and
69 improper management of reservoirs/storages were considered high priority issues based on their potential health risks
70 (National Research Council 2005).

71 Intrusion has had different definitions since the term was first introduced by Kirmeyer et al. (2001). For the purpose
72 of this review, intrusion will be defined as in Besner et al. (2011), i.e., contamination of the drinking water due to adverse
73 pressure conditions and physical breaches in the system. In order for microbial contamination to occur from intrusion,
74 three conditions are necessary: presence of pathogens surrounding the distribution system (*source*); occurrence of pressure
75 transients or low-pressure events (*adverse pressure conditions*); and deteriorated physical conditions of the pipes
76 (*physical breach*) (Hooper et al. 2008; Lindley and Buchberger 2002). Intrusion was considered a medium priority issue
77 by the National Research Council (2005); however, awareness has increased substantially since then (Besner et al. 2011).

78 Biofilms are a complex collection of microorganisms, extracellular polymeric substances, organic and inorganic
79 matter (Kauppinen et al. 2012). They are known to serve as potential reservoirs for pathogens inside the distribution
80 system (Berry et al. 2006; Nocker et al. 2014; Wingender and Flemming 2011). Pathogenic organisms that manage to
81 intrude the distribution network (e.g., via intrusion of contaminated water surrounding the pipes) can become attached to
82 biofilms and, afterward, become detached through erosion due to the water flowing. Pathogens that can be found in
83 biofilms include *Cryptosporidium* oocysts (Angles et al. 2007; Howe et al. 2002); enteric viruses (Skraber et al. 2005;
84 Storey and Ashbolt 2003); opportunistic pathogens (Farkas et al. 2012; Pryor et al. 2004) and bacterial pathogens
85 (September et al. 2007; Wingender 2011). Biofilms were classified as a medium priority issue due to their lesser health
86 risks than other known issues (National Research Council 2005).

87 **Influence of the distribution network on waterborne diseases**

88 Contamination of the drinking water can pose a serious health risk to consumers, either by causing (detected) outbreaks
89 of waterborne diseases or contributing to the endemic level of (undetected) disease in the population (Braeye et al. 2015).
90 The effect of contamination in the distribution network is usually expressed in relation to the amount of people
91 experiencing GI.

92 *Waterborne Disease Outbreaks*

93 Deficiencies in the drinking water distribution network are known to contribute to waterborne disease outbreaks (Craun
94 et al. 2010; Guzman-Herrador et al. 2015; Hrudey and Hrudey 2004; Schuster et al. 2005). In a retrospective survey of
95 waterborne outbreaks in Canada, the distribution network was considered to have contributed in 18% of the cases as a
96 cause (Wilson et al. 2009). Broken pipes (7%) and post-treatment contamination (11%) were the two main contributing
97 factors, while cross-connections were not considered as a cause in any of the outbreaks reported. In Sweden, 27 (34%)
98 waterborne outbreaks were reported between 1980-2007 due to distribution network deficiencies (Malm et al. 2010). The
99 most common deficiencies included cross-connections (n=5), reservoir contamination (n=4) and backflows (n=4).
100 Descriptions of selected outbreaks from peer-reviewed articles are consecutively presented in this section to illustrate the
101 distinct mechanisms of failure that lead to contamination in the distribution network (defined in the previous section) and
102 possible consequences.

103 Swerdlow et al. (1992) investigated the extent of an *E. coli* 0157:H7 outbreak in Cabool, Missouri during the period
104 December 1989 to January 1990. There were 243 cases of diarrhea, 32 hospitalizations and 4 deaths. Geldreich et al.
105 (1992) carried out additional sampling and investigated the involvement of the water distribution network causing the
106 outbreak. The authors used a distribution network model to identify how the water flowed and the possible contaminant
107 transport in the system. This was the first time this model was used for an outbreak investigation (Geldreich et al. 1992).
108 It was theorized that unhygienic practices while replacing 43 water meters and repairing two main breaks caused the entry
109 of the contaminants into the distribution network (Swerdlow et al. 1992).

110 A cohort study carried out in the Norwegian town of Røros confirmed a campylobacteriosis outbreak in 2007
111 (Jakopanec et al. 2008). Approximately 1 500 people were infected with *Campylobacter* and the investigation concluded
112 that the consumption of tap water increased the risk of illness for the consumers. Potential mechanisms for the
113 contamination of the drinking water were identified: at least two low-pressure events were documented around the time
114 of the outbreak and in the vicinity of a dairy and slaughterhouse.

115 Laine et al. (2011) reported on the largest waterborne outbreak in Finland, which occurred in Nokia in November -
116 December 2007. A cross-connection allowed effluent water from the wastewater treatment plant to enter the distribution
117 system (Maunula et al. 2009). Pathogens were detected in patient stool samples, and in water samples taken from the
118 drinking water distribution network and the wastewater effluent. *Campylobacter*, norovirus and *Giardia* were considered
119 the main causative agents (Laine et al. 2011; Maunula et al. 2009; Rimhanen-Finne et al. 2010). The excess cases of
120 illness due to the outbreak were estimated at 6 500.

121 A *Salmonella* outbreak occurred in Alamosa, Colorado, USA in March-April of 2008 (Falco and Williams 2009).
122 The outbreak investigation reported about 440 cases of GI and one death. The authors proposed the main pathway for the
123 pathogen was a storage reservoir that supplied the entire town. The storage reservoir was, according to Falco and Williams
124 (2009), in poor conditions, with visible cracks and holes in the structure.

125 A viral gastroenteritis outbreak was identified in Podgorica, Montenegro in August – September 2008, with 1 700
126 reported cases of gastroenteritis and an estimation of 10 000 to 15 000 inhabitants being affected (Werber et al. 2009).
127 Norovirus was identified as the most likely causative pathogen, however the authors acknowledged that other agents
128 could not be dismissed (e.g., rotavirus). It was suspected that a series of pump failures caused low pressures inside the
129 distribution system, allowing contaminated water to enter into the network.

130 Another retrospective cohort study was performed in Hemiksem, Belgium in 2010 by Braeye et al. (2015). High
131 amounts of faecal indicators were detected in the tap water and multiple pathogens (i.e., norovirus GI and GII, *Giardia*
132 *lamblia*, rotavirus and *Campylobacter*) were detected in stool samples collected from residents seeking medical attention.
133 The source of the contamination was hypothesized to be intrusion of river water into the network while firefighters were
134 extinguishing a fire. The water used for firefighting was collected from a pressurised storage unit, which was supplied
135 from two hydrants connected to the distribution system and from a surface water pump unit. A low-pressure event in the
136 distribution network could have permitted the intrusion of the river water being collected in the unit into the system and
137 transported to the consumers.

138 *Endemic Level of Gastrointestinal Illness*

139 Results from studies linking the consumption of tap water to GI, on the other hand, have had mixed results. Some studies
140 have found that tap water contributes significantly to the endemic level of GI, while other studies have not shown such
141 association. In the following section we select relevant studies of contribution of the distribution network to the endemic
142 level of GI that will be briefly described to highlight these contrasting results (summarized in Table 1).

143 A randomized, unblinded trial was performed in a suburban area of Montréal, Canada to determine the relationship
144 between consuming drinking water and GI illness incidence (Payment et al. 1991). In total, 607 households were enrolled,
145 with 299 families in the filtered water group and 308 in the unfiltered water group. Commercial reverse-osmosis devices
146 were installed in the filtered water households and one person per household was selected to note any incident of GI
147 symptoms during a 15-month period. Between 32.8% and 35% of the excess cases of GI during the studied period was
148 found to be linked to the consumption of drinking water from the tap.

149 Payment et al. (1997) re-evaluated the incidence of GI due to drinking water in the same study area in Montreal as
150 the previous study by Payment et al. (1991). Participants were divided into four groups: unmodified tap water, tap water
151 with a purge valve, bottled treatment plant water and purified bottled water. 350 families per group were followed for a
152 period of 16 months. The authors determined that tap water consumption contributed between 14%-19% of excess cases
153 of GI. The fraction increased when only evaluating the age group 2-5 years, where the attributable fraction was between
154 17%-40%.

155 In Australia, Hellard et al. (2001) conducted a randomized, blinded, controlled trial in a system with high quality
156 source water. Six hundred households were randomly assigned an active (real) treatment device or a sham device.
157 Participants reported any GI symptoms in a health diary for 68 weeks. The authors found no evidence of an increased
158 incidence of GI between users of the active and sham device, therefore concluding that waterborne pathogens did not
159 contribute significantly to GI in the studied system.

160 Nygard et al. (2004) carried out an ecological study to investigate associations between potential risk factors related
161 to water and incidence of campylobacteriosis in Sweden. The study found an association between longer distribution
162 network pipes and increased risk of *Campylobacter* infection. Two mechanisms were considered as main contributors:
163 intrusion of contaminated water during low pressure events and presence of cross-connections. According to the authors,
164 the positive association between incidence of *Campylobacter* infection and distribution pipe length indicated that
165 contamination in the distribution system may be a more significant factor of campylobacteriosis in Sweden than
166 previously thought.

167 A questionnaire-based study conducted in England and Wales found a very strong association between pressure loss
168 events and GI (Hunter et al. 2005). The majority of the pressure loss events were attributed to breaks of water mains.
169 According to the authors, up to 15% of the cases of GI in the United Kingdom could be associated with drinking tap water
170 contaminated during loss of pressure events in the distribution system.

171 Colford et al. (2005) performed a randomized, controlled, triple-blinded trial in Iowa, USA using combined
172 filtration/UV units in a well-managed system with challenged source water. 1 296 persons distributed in 456 households
173 participated in the study, which was divided in two cycles. During the first cycle, one group was randomly allocated an
174 active device and the other group a sham device for 6 months; afterwards, each group switched to the opposite device for
175 another 6 months. The study did not find any significant difference in GI among the groups when switching from the
176 active device to the sham device or vice versa.

177 Nygard et al. (2007) carried out a cohort study in seven urban areas in Norway supplied by large waterworks. The
178 main objective was to assess the relationship between main breaks or maintenance work that generated a pressure loss
179 event in the system and GI among consumers affected by the event. Low pressure events (n=88) were recorded in the
180 study where 1159 households were interviewed (612 exposed to the event and 547 unexposed). The attributable fraction
181 of GI illness due to main breaks or maintenance work was 37%. Chlorination and flushing were found to reduce the risk

182 Tinker et al. (2009) studied the relationship between the average water residence time in the distribution network
183 and visits to the emergency department for GI illnesses in Atlanta, USA. The residence time was calculated using two
184 hydraulic models from two of the largest utilities that serve the city. The authors found that people living in areas with
185 long residence times ($t \geq 90$ th percentile estimated residence times) were more likely to visit the hospital with GI
186 symptoms than the residents of areas with intermediate ($t = 11$ th to 89th percentile) or short residence times ($t \leq 10$ th
187 percentile) In a subsequent study, Tinker et al. (2010) studied drinking water turbidity and emergency visits for GI illness
188 in the same city and including four more water treatment plants. In this study, no relationship could be found between
189 turbidity after treatment and emergency department visits.

190 Malm et al. (2013) studied the relationship between disturbances in the drinking water supply system and frequency
191 of calls to report GI to the Health Call Centre in the city of Gothenburg, Sweden. More than 55 000 calls were recorded
192 during the period 2007-2010, of which 13.5% were due to GI. In this study it was concluded that there was no statistically
193 significant variation of calls to report GI during or after disturbances in the distribution system or at the treatment plant.

194 Säve-Söderbergh et al. (2017a) carried out a study in five Swedish municipalities, of varying sizes, to determine the
195 contribution of incidents in the distribution network to risk of GI. The study took into account demographics, seasonal
196 variation, source water, incidents in the network, mitigation measures performed after the incident. Questionnaires were
197 sent to water suppliers to report incidents where at least 20 households were affected. Households (n = 3238) were
198 interviewed 1-2 weeks after a reported incident to find out if any household member had fallen ill. The authors found an

199 increased risk for vomiting and acute gastrointestinal illness (AGI) but not for GI. The risk was elevated even after
200 flushing the newly laid pipes.

201 *Economic costs of waterborne diseases*

202 Globally, waterborne GI represents a significant economic and health burden to society. Waterborne disease outbreaks
203 cause considerable losses in productivity and medical costs (Corso et al. 2003; Lindberg et al. 2011; National Research
204 Council 2006; USEPA 2007). Since distribution network deficiencies can lead to waterborne disease outbreaks, a portion
205 of these costs can be directly attributed to these deficiencies.

206 In two of the outbreaks described in the previous section, their costs associated with them were estimated using
207 different methodologies (see Table 2). Huovinen et al. (2013) calculated the total excess healthcare costs incurred due to
208 the Nokia outbreak in Finland 2007 to be EUR 354 000. Moreover, the indirect costs (i.e., sick leaves and lost workdays)
209 in the public sector alone were estimated to be in the range of EUR 1.8 – 2.1 million (Halonen et al. 2012). The *Salmonella*
210 outbreak in Alamosa, Colorado, USA 2008 was estimated to have caused expenses totalling USD 2.6 million (≈EUR 2.4
211 million) [range: USD 1.1 – 7.8 million] (Ailes et al. 2013). This amount included healthcare costs, business losses, and
212 outbreak response costs, among others. One unforeseen consequence of the outbreak was the loss of trust among the
213 consumers of the public water supply, though this was not represented monetarily in the cost estimate.

214 In addition to outbreaks, some authors have tried to monetize the disease burden related to the endemic level of
215 disease. Payment (1997) estimated the annual cost of water related disease in Canada to be in the range of USD 309 –
216 900 million (≈EUR 330 – 975 million). According to Hunter et al. (2005), the contribution of low-pressure events in the
217 distribution network to the cost of illness in the United Kingdom could be over GBP 100 million [≈EUR 115 million]
218 (15% of the total annual cost of diarrheal disease). Edelstein et al. (2016) estimated the total annual cost for AGI in
219 Sweden to be more than EUR 1 billion (95% CI: EUR 754 – 1 257 million); of which EUR 150 to 400 million could
220 theoretically be associated to distribution network deficiencies (using a range of incidence rates available from studies in
221 Sweden and abroad).

222 **Modelling tools to quantify risk and potential health effects**

223 A wide array of models have been developed to quantify microbial risks in the network, especially pathogen intrusion.
224 CFD models have been developed to more accurately describe intrusion rates in the network (Collins and Boxall 2013;
225 Mansour-Rezaei and Naser 2013; Mora-Rodríguez et al. 2014; Mora-Rodríguez et al. 2012; Yang et al. 2016), and to
226 model intrusion and contaminant transport in the network (Mansour-Rezaei et al. 2013). An extension to the EPANET
227 model, called EPANET-MSX, was developed to simulate the interaction of multiple species in the distribution network

228 (Shang et al. 2008). The extension allows for more complex scenarios to be evaluated, for example, interaction between
229 pathogen and disinfection residual, biofilms, etc. Recent developments also enable the possibility of modelling
230 multispecies interactions in dynamic hydraulic conditions (Seyoum and Tanyimboh 2017). An extensive review on
231 modelling of contaminant intrusion in the distribution network can be found in Islam et al. (2015).

232 Additionally, different risk assessment approaches can be used to identify and estimate risk levels in distribution
233 networks. Qualitative assessments, such as sanitary surveys or risk matrixes, require few resources, are simple to use and
234 can provide reasonable estimates of risk. Semi-quantitative assessments, such as more-detailed risk matrixes, can provide
235 more comprehensive assessments of the hazards in the network. Moreover, quantitative methods can be used to explicitly
236 quantify health risks, e.g., in terms of annual risk of infection for consumers (Pettersen and Ashbolt, 2016). One of the
237 most used frameworks for quantification of health effects of microbial risks is the quantitative microbial risk assessment
238 (QMRA). This methodology has been used in varying contexts, including North America (Pettersen and Ashbolt 2016;
239 Tfaily et al. 2015), Europe (Pettersen and Ashbolt 2016; Schijven et al. 2011) and developing regions (Pettersen 2016).

240 A QMRA consists of four basic steps (WHO 2016):

- 241 - Problem formulation: the scope and purpose of the assessment is determined at this stage. Hazards,
242 exposure pathways and health outcomes are investigated;
- 243 - Exposure assessment includes quantifying pathogen sources, magnitude and frequency of the exposure for
244 the different scenarios being analysed;
- 245 - Health effects assessment involves estimating the health impact from the identified hazards and the
246 population of the study (e.g., drinking water consumers);
- 247 - Risk characterization combines the exposure and health effects assessments to quantify the risk of infection.
248 This can be represented as number of consumers infected per year, DALYs. A sensitivity analysis can also
249 be performed in this step to determine which parameters influence the most the QMRA results.

250 It is important to note that in order to perform a valid assessment, uncertainties must be taken into account in
251 each step, otherwise the results will not be representative of reality (Bouwknegt et al. 2014). These uncertainties
252 could be due to different reasons such as: natural variability of pathogen concentrations and limitations in the
253 detection methods (Ramírez-Castillo et al. 2015), water consumption behavior of the population (volume, times,
254 etc.) (Roche et al. 2012), choice of dose-response model (Van Abel et al. 2017), among others.

255 A QMRA model can be used to estimate the risk of infection after a contamination event in the distribution network,
256 the expected number of illnesses, maximum number of illness existing at a given time and upper confidence intervals for
257 infection risks (Haas et al. 2014). Additionally, other models can be combined with the QMRA to obtain more accurate
258 probabilities of infection, e.g., hydraulic model to simulate transient pressure events, quality models to simulate
259 interaction between disinfection residual and inactivation, among others (Blokker et al. 2014; Teunis et al. 2010b; Yang
260 et al. 2011). Table 3 summarizes the QMRA models done for the distribution network. A conceptual QMRA model for
261 intrusion has been developed (Besner et al. 2011), as well as a simplistic approach for quantifying infection risk for
262 *Legionella* (Storey et al. 2004). Mena et al. (2008) used an experimental study to evaluate the infection risk of a sewage
263 cross-connection and compared it to an actual outbreak case. Brief descriptions of studies performed with QMRA to
264 evaluate the risk of microbial contamination in the distribution network and its consequences are presented in the
265 following paragraphs.

266 Using faecal indicator information, van Lieverloo et al. (2007) estimated possible pathogen concentrations and
267 calculated the risk of infection to consumers in areas affected by a contamination event. Pathogen to faecal indicator ratios
268 were calculated for three common contamination sources: sewage, surface water and soil/shallow groundwater
269 surrounding the pipes. The authors determined that the risks of infection might be considerable, but were also highly
270 uncertain. This uncertainty limited the applicability of the method using faecal indicators to estimate infection risks during
271 contamination events.

272 Teunis et al. (2010b) studied the health effects of virus intrusion in the distribution network. A combination of Monte
273 Carlo simulations for initial virus concentrations, hydraulic modelling of water flow and contaminant transport, and dose-
274 response model were used for estimating the infection risk. The most influential parameters in this model were the
275 combination of a pressure event occurring simultaneously as the user consuming water. Another important parameter was
276 the duration of the pressure transient event.

277 Yang et al. (2011) evaluated the different factors influencing the risk of norovirus infection from a pressure transient
278 event to propose mitigation strategies to address this risk. The factors considered in this study included virus
279 concentrations located in the vicinity of the distribution pipes, presence of a disinfectant residual, the sizes of the leak
280 orifices, the duration and the number of nodes drawing negative pressures. In their model, the most sensitive factor was
281 the duration of the negative pressure. Therefore, the most important risk mitigation strategy would be an optimized
282 pressure management to control negative pressure transients. Additional measures that were beneficial to reduce the risk
283 of infection included maintaining free chlorine residual of at least 0.2 mg/l and prioritizing cross connection and leak
284 detection in vulnerable areas.

285 Blokker et al. (2014) used a QMRA model, coupled with a hydraulic model, to estimate the risk of infection after a
286 main break repair. Previously, the model was used to calculate the risk of enteric virus infection during an intrusion event
287 (Teunis et al. 2010b; Yang et al. 2011). However, the assumption that the tap water consumers consumed the full volume
288 of water in a single instance was modified to include ingestions at different times during the day. The authors concluded
289 that the infection rate was highly influenced by the initial concentration of the contamination; and to a lesser extent, but
290 still relevant, by the time of consumption.

291 A more detailed main break repair scenario and evaluation of mitigation measures was done subsequently by Yang
292 et al. (2015) and Blokker et al. (2018). Yang et al. (2015) used a simplified version of an intrusion model developed
293 previously (Teunis et al. 2010b) to investigate the effect of flushing and disinfection after repairing a water main. This
294 study found that virus was the pathogen group with highest infection risk after a main break, and that a combination of
295 flushing and disinfection (free chlorine) would be needed to achieve an acceptable risk level (according to National
296 Research Council (2006) this would be equal to an infection risk of to 1×10^{-4}).

297 **Discussion**

298 *Waterborne Disease Outbreaks*

299 Outbreak investigations have methodological limitations which can influence or limit the usefulness of the results (Hrudey
300 and Hrudey 2007). One of these limitations is related to finding evidence of the relationship between drinking water and
301 disease. Using the level of strength of epidemiological and microbiological evidence, Schuster et al. (2005) categorized
302 Canadian waterborne outbreaks in: definitely waterborne, probably waterborne and possibly waterborne. Of the 99
303 outbreaks in public water systems identified in this study, 40% did not have adequate epidemiological proof for being the
304 cause of the outbreak. For semi-public and private systems, the proportion without adequate evidence was higher (80%
305 and 76% respectively). Using a similar three-tier classification scheme proposed by Tillett et al. (1998), only 18% of the
306 outbreaks in the Nordic countries could be strongly associated to drinking water, while the same proportion had no known
307 level of association (Guzman-Herrador et al. 2015). Most of the outbreaks in the unknown category had a small number
308 of cases reported. This reflects the limitations of outbreak investigations to find conclusive proof of the contribution of
309 the contamination event in the water supply system to the outbreak, especially when the size of the outbreak is not large
310 enough. Furthermore, Craun and Frost (2002) found evidence of bias during an outbreak investigation, which led to a
311 misclassification of the association between drinking water and disease. The circumstances for the misclassification were
312 not unique to this outbreak investigation; hence, health officials conducting studies during an outbreak should be aware
313 of possible issues that could affect their results, e.g., range of the confidence interval for associations and statistical

314 significance, recall bias of questionnaires and effect of the publicity of the outbreak in the population (Craun et al. 2001).
315 Taking these measures into account, in turn, could lead to more reliable results from outbreak investigations.

316 *Endemic Level of Gastrointestinal Illness*

317 As previously mentioned, the results from studies linking distribution network deficiencies to endemic level of GI have
318 had mixed results. The cause for the conflicting results reached in these studies has not been conclusively established
319 (National Research Council 2006). Most studies do not have enough information on the drinking water systems to
320 determine the exact causes for an increase in the risk of GI. Sinclair and Fairley (2000) recommended precaution when
321 interpreting results from epidemiological studies due to their methodological limitations. Bylund et al. (2017) found that
322 many epidemiological studies lack statistical robustness and local variations between the systems studied hinder
323 generalizing the results. Nonetheless, recent evidence suggests that malfunctioning distribution networks, as well as
324 specific system deficiencies (i.e., pipe breaks, water outages and inadequate residual disinfectant), increase the risk of
325 endemic GI (Ercumen et al. 2014). Providing more detailed descriptions of system parameters (e.g., extent of leaks and
326 cracks, better characterization of the faecal contamination surrounding the pipes, etc.) could improve the interpretation
327 and comparison of the results in the future studies. Additionally, Payment et al. (1997) was the only study to distinguish
328 the effect of contamination in the distribution network on GI incidence from other sources of contamination at the source
329 or treatment plant. Using similar design methods could also improve the interpretation of future studies.

330 *QMRA model*

331 QMRA models have been used by water suppliers to perform risk assessments for their raw water source and treatment
332 plants (Pettersen and Ashbolt 2016; Schijven et al. 2011). For example, QMRA was used to evaluate the performance of
333 17 water treatment plants in Canada, calculating risk estimates using different approaches (Tfaily et al. 2015). So far,
334 QMRA models used by water suppliers at a water supply system level do not include the distribution network. The models
335 presented in the previous section could be seen as first attempts at bridging this gap. The following section will highlight
336 important limitations that restrict their current applicability.

337 A thorough description of the parameters used to create a QMRA model, the assumptions made for each and
338 limitations to take into account, is available in Besner et al. (2011). This conceptual model has been developed specifically
339 for intrusion, nonetheless, the limitations presented are valid for other microbial risk models that use similar parameters
340 for their risk estimations. One common assumption for calculating intrusion volumes is the use of the orifice equation (
341 $Q = \frac{\pi}{4} C_d d^2 \sqrt{2g\Delta H}$; where Q is the intrusion volume, C_d is the discharge coefficient, d is the orifice diameter, g is the
342 gravitational acceleration and ΔH is the difference between external and internal pressure head). A limitation of this

343 equation is that it does not take into account the soil media surrounding the pipes (Yang et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2016).
344 Experimental tests for intrusion reported that the volume of soil water intrusion would be lower than the estimated with
345 the orifice equation; this equation would provide an estimate of the maximum volume of intrusion (Collins and Boxall
346 2013; Fox et al. 2016). Hence, the risk of exposure due to intrusion would most likely be lower than the models'
347 predictions.

348 Dose-response models are currently available for relevant waterborne pathogens: *Campylobacter* (Teunis et al. 2005;
349 Teunis et al. 1999); *Salmonella* (Teunis et al. 1999; Teunis et al. 2010a); *E. coli O157:H7* (Teunis et al. 2004; Teunis et
350 al. 2008b); adenovirus (Teunis et al. 2016); norovirus (Messner et al. 2014; Teunis et al. 2008a); *Cryptosporidium* (Teunis
351 et al. 1999; Teunis et al. 2002); and *Giardia* (Teunis et al. 1996; Zmirou-Navier et al. 2006). These models have mainly
352 been developed using healthy, adult individuals; which might underrepresent the risk of infection in a population with
353 more susceptible individuals (i.e., children, elderly, pregnant women and immunocompromised individuals) (Gerba et al.
354 1996; Nwachuku and Gerba 2004). Choosing the appropriate dose-response model will also have an impact in the risk
355 estimate calculated with QMRA (Van Abel et al. 2017). Therefore, careful considerations are necessary when deciding
356 which dose-response models to use and the implications carried.

357 Another assumption in QMRA models is the consumption pattern of individuals (Hynds et al. 2012; Roche et al.
358 2012; Säve-Söderbergh et al. 2017b; Van Abel et al. 2014). Some models assume the person consumes water once per
359 day (Teunis et al. 2010b; Yang et al. 2011). However, it has been shown that the probability of infection is higher if the
360 consumption pattern is modified to include the possibility of consuming water at different times throughout the day (Van
361 Abel et al. 2014). This has been addressed in the model used by Blokker et al. (2018); although it could also be relevant
362 to consider consumption of alternative water sources when carrying out risk assessments (Jones et al. 2007; Roche et al.
363 2012). An additional layer of simulation could be considered for the consumption pattern: the impact on consumption due
364 to alerts issued by water suppliers during a contamination event (Zechman 2011). Changes in the consumer demand could
365 affect the hydraulic conditions in the distribution network, influencing the contaminant transport inside the system and,
366 hence, the exposure to the contaminant (Rasekh et al. 2014; Shafiee and Zechman 2013). On the other hand, QMRA
367 models are already quite complex, requiring a large amounts of input data with limited availability. Therefore, adding
368 another layer of complexity seems excessive at this stage of development of distribution network QMRA models.
369 Nevertheless, it could be useful to consider after a mature version of a QMRA tool for the distribution network exists.

370

371 *Microbial risks in the distribution network*

372 Knowledge about the distinct microbial risks in the distribution network are at different levels of certainty, with research
373 on intrusion being carried out extensively compared to other risks. Potential sources of contamination surrounding the
374 pipe network have been characterized to some extent (Besner et al. 2010; Karim et al. 2003); yet these characterization
375 studies have only been carried out in North America. Pressure monitoring of distribution networks using pressure loggers
376 have recorded adverse pressure events in the system (Besner et al. 2010; Gullick et al. 2005; Gullick et al. 2004). Recent
377 experiments have studied contaminant intrusion during a pressure transient in a laboratory setting (Fontanazza et al. 2015;
378 Fox et al. 2014; Fox et al. 2016). These experiments have confirmed long-held views about the risk of intrusion into the
379 distribution network during adverse pressure conditions. On the other hand, the level of association of biofilms to
380 waterborne disease and its role harbouring pathogens after a contamination event (e.g., intrusion) is not well-understood
381 (Fox et al. 2016; Messner et al. 2006) and must be addressed in future research. This could be especially significant during
382 waterborne outbreak crises, since abnormally large amount of pathogens are present for some duration of time in the
383 system.

384 Studies such as Nygard et al. (2007) and Van Abel (2014) are helpful in informing the estimation of risk associated
385 with the distribution network and ageing infrastructure. However, more work is needed to better characterize the
386 distribution network risk. There is minimal data on the prevalence of enteric pathogens in water sources, which is essential
387 to carry out a QMRA (Murphy et al. 2014). Improved modelling capabilities, such as the creation of better water quality
388 models (Yang and Boccelli 2016), represent an opportunity to increase the usefulness of the models as decision support
389 tools.

390 Events in the distribution network can represent a health risk to consumers to varying degrees. Most of the health
391 risks associated with deficiencies in the system can be controlled if proper management of the network is carried out.
392 Hence, health risks to the consumers can be minimized by implementing appropriate methods of risk management, such
393 as Water Safety Plans (Dunn et al. 2014; WHO 2011, 2014) or control strategies for the distribution network (Kirmeyer
394 et al. 2014). Adapting methods from other risk schemes could also prove beneficial in mitigating microbial risks in the
395 distribution network, e.g., risk-based economic decision model (Bergion et al. 2018); sociotechnical risk assessments
396 (Busby et al. 2016; Rasekh and Brumbelow 2014; Rasekh et al. 2014; Shafiee and Berglund 2017; Shafiee and Zechman
397 2013; Vicente and Christoffersen 2006; Woo and Vicente 2003).

398 McInnis (2004) and Teunis et al. (2010b) developed similar risk-based frameworks to evaluate the risk reduction
399 for intrusion achieved by implementing different mitigation measures. This was also done for main breaks and repairs

400 (Blokker et al. 2018; Yang et al. 2015) These types of frameworks can be useful to aid water supply operators in managing
401 their networks and can be used to complement WSPs. However, information about the economic aspect of risk-reducing
402 measures is needed if the QMRA framework is to be implemented in a strategic renewal planning context.

403 **Conclusion**

404 Epidemiological investigations have shown that the distribution network can cause waterborne outbreaks and, in some
405 respect, indicate a contribution to the endemic level of disease in the population. To complement epidemiological data,
406 models can be used to estimate site-specific risks. QMRA models have been developed to calculate risk estimates for
407 specific distribution networks; hence, they can be used to aid water suppliers in areas such as renewal planning and normal
408 operation of their network. In order to develop a comprehensive microbial risk management framework, limitations of
409 QMRA models need to be addressed with better input data and increased understanding of other microbial risks, e.g., role
410 of biofilms during a waterborne outbreak. Additionally, monetization of health effects is crucial, where QMRA can be
411 very useful for decision support in the management of distribution networks.

412

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Table 1. Selected epidemiological studies that have addressed the contribution of tap water to endemic level of disease.

Study	Location	Study design	Blinding	Size of the study*	Follow-up period	Results†	Attributable Risk
Payment et al (1991)	Canada	Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial	No	607 / 2 408	12 months	IRR = 1.5 (p <0.01)	≈35% excess GI in the tap water group compared to control
Payment et al (1997)	Canada	Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial	No	1 369 / 5 253	16 months	IRR = 1.15 (p <0.01)	14% - 19% excess risk of GI; 17% - 40% in children 2-5 years old
Hellard et al (2001)	Australia	Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial	Yes	600 / 2 811	12 months	IRR = 0.99 [0.85 - 1.10]	No association found
Nygård et al (2004)	Sweden	Ecological	n.a.	-- / 7 280	n.a.	1. IRR = 1.11 [1.08 - 1.15] 2. IRR = 1.12 [1.08 - 1.16] 3. IRR = 1.13 [1.09 - 1.17]‡	Significant association of length of pipe directly proportional to increased risk of infection
Colford et al (2005)	United States	Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial	Yes	456 / 1 296	12 months	IRR = 0.98 [0.87- 1.10]	No association found
Hunter et al (2005)	United Kingdom	Case-control	n.a.	-- / 427	n.a.	OR = 12.5 [3.5 - 44.7]	Significant association between low pressure event and disease (p <0.01)
Nygård et al (2007)	Norway	Cohort	n.a.	1 159 / --	n.a.	IRR = 1.58 [1.1 - 2.3] 1. OR = 1.00 [0.96 - 1.03] 2. OR = 0.99 [0.96 - 1.03]	Attributable fraction of 37% one week after exposure Slight association directly proportional to the residence time and increased risk of disease
Tinker et al. (2009)§	United States	Ecological	n.a.	-- / 1 700 000	n.a.	3. OR = 1.07 [1.03 - 1.10] 4. OR = 1.05 [1.02 - 1.08]	proportional to the residence time and increased risk of disease
Malm et al (2013)	Sweden	Ecological	n.a.	-- / 500 000	n.a.	SIR = 1.08 [0.86 - 1.32] GI: OR = 1.1 [0.9 - 1.5]	No association found due to low pressure events
Säve-Söderbergh et al. (2017a)	Sweden	Cohort	n.a.	3 238 / 7431	n.a.	AGI: OR = 2.0 [1.2 - 3.3] Vomiting: OR = 1.9 [1.2 - 3.0]	Significant association for AGI and vomiting

*Sample size is given by No. of households / No. of individuals

†IRR: Incidence Risk Ratio. OR: Odds Ratio. SIR: Standardized Infection Ratio.

‡Result 1 is from univariate analysis; results 2 and 3 are from multivariate analyses

§Included more water suppliers in a subsequent study Tinker et al. 2010

|| (1) OR between intermediate and short residence times and utility 1, (2) OR between intermediate and short residence times and utility 2, (3) OR between intermediate and long residence times and utility 1, (4) OR between intermediate and long residence times and utility 2

Table 2. Economic costs of waterborne disease outbreaks associated to the distribution network.

Study	Outbreak location, year	No. of cases	Total Economic cost of outbreak [MEUR]	Cost of outbreak per person infected [EUR/person]	Economic impact assessed
Halonen et al, 2012; Huovinen et al, 2013	Nokia, Finland 2007	6 500	2.3 [2.15 – 2.45]	354 (331 – 377)	Total excess healthcare costs, in addition to sick leaves and lost workdays
Ailes et al, 2013	Alamosa, Colorado 2008	440	2.3 [1.03 – 7.28]	5 227 (2 341 – 16 546)	Healthcare costs, lost productivity, business losses, outbreak response costs

Table 3. QMRA performed for distribution networks

Study	Network site	Risk event	Pathogen	Methodology
McInnis 2004	City in North America	Intrusion	Giardia, faecal streptococci	QMRA coupled with hydraulic modelling. QMRA modelling
Storey et al. 2004	Sweden	Biofilm	Legionella	Detachment of Legionella was determined experimentally, as well as disinfection data. Monte Carlo simulations were used for risk characterization
van Lieverloo et al. 2007	Netherlands	Multiple contamination events	Giardia, Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium and enterovirus	QMRA coupled with hydraulic modelling. QMRA coupled with hydraulic modelling.
Mena et al. 2008	United States	Cross-connection	Salmonella	Used a distribution network simulator to estimate transport of contaminated water and Monte Carlo simulations for risk characterization QMRA coupled with hydraulic modelling.
Teunis et al. 2010b*	United States	Intrusion	Rotavirus, norovirus	Used commercial software to do surge modelling, EPANET-MSX for water quality modelling coupled with Monte Carlo simulations for risk characterization QMRA coupled with hydraulic modelling.
Blokker et al. 2018†	Netherlands	Main repair	Giardia, Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium and enterovirus	Used EPANET to simulate transport of contaminated water, SIMDEUM for consumption patterns, and Monte Carlo simulations for risk characterization QMRA coupled with hydraulic modelling.
Yang et al. 2015	United States	Main repair	Norovirus, E. coli O157, Cryptosporidium	Simplified model from Teunis et al. 2010b

*Complemented by Yang et al 2011.

†Originally developed in Blokker et al. 2014