

Particulate matter (PM_{2.5}) as a potential SARS-CoV-2 carrier

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Abstract

The rapid spread of the SARS-CoV-2 in the COVID-19 pandemic had raised questions on the route of transmission of this disease. Initial understanding was that transmission originated from respiratory droplet from an infected host to a susceptible host. However, indirect contact transmission of viable virus by fomites and through aerosols has also been suggested. Herein, we report the involvement of fine indoor air particulate with the diameter of $\leq 2.5 \mu\text{m}$ ($\text{PM}_{2.5}$) as the transport agent of the virus. $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ was collected over four weeks during a 48 hours measurement intervals in four separate wards containing different infected clusters in a teaching hospital in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Our results indicated highest SARS-CoV-2 RNA on $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ in the ward associated with a lavatory. We suggest a link between the virus-laden $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ and the ward's design. Patients' symptoms and numbers that govern the magnitude of viral shedding may also influence the number of airborne SARS-CoV-2 RNA on $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ in an enclosed environment.

Main Text

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is primarily transmitted via respiratory droplets of various sizes¹⁻³. Large respiratory droplets ($> 5 \mu\text{m}$) transmission occur when a person is in close contact with someone (WHO 2014)⁴ who has respiratory symptoms such as coughing or sneezing⁵, whereas finer virus-laden respiratory droplets and particulate matters ($\leq 5 \mu\text{m}$) can remain in the air for an extended period and be carried over greater distances⁶ $> 6 \text{ m}$ (such as the outbreak of tuberculosis, measles and chickenpox)⁷. Despite numerous studies that have demonstrated the transmission route of SARS-CoV-2 via respiratory droplets, evidence on aerosol-borne transmission remains limited^{1,8,9}. Recently, the transmission of virus via solid aerosols has been reported in several hospitals in Wuhan. The study indicates positive detection of SARS-CoV-2 in a range of particulate matter (PM) from submicrometer and/or supermicrometer^{1,10}, suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 can be transported via solid aerosols. No correlation was found between virus concentration and particulate matter as a function of particles diameter. Nevertheless, positive correlations between $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ and other respiratory viruses such as the influenza virus have been reported¹¹, emphasizing the possibility of particulate matter as a transport carrier for SARS-CoV-2.

$\text{PM}_{2.5}$ is fine solid aerosols with a particle diameter of $\leq 2.5 \mu\text{m}$ that is suspended in ambient air. $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ in indoor environments is largely derived from common outdoor sources such as motor-vehicles, biomass burning, and industrial emissions^{12,13,14}. Prolonged exposure to $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ is particularly detrimental to human health as this fine particulate matter can be easily inhaled and penetrated deep into the lungs^{15,16}. In the air, $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ is known to have a significantly longer lifetime where it can be suspended at an extended period compared to respiratory liquid droplets. This longer lifetime of particles may pose a significant viral exposure to healthcare personnel, especially in indoor environments. $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ can also be deposited in

indoorenvironments such as hospitals' flooring^{17,18} and any surface materials^{19,20}. This fine particulate matter is readily propagated by tiny turbulent eddies in the air that arise from physical activities such as human movements and walking^{21,22}. Considering the fact that the viability of SARS-CoV-2 on many types of surfaces have been reported (e.g., on metals for 48 hours, plastic for 72 hours, cardboard for 24 hours, and copper for 4 hours)^{23,24}, it is likely that the virus on the surface can be potentially lodged on the PM_{2.5} and redistributed/transported back into the air.

Recent findings based on measurements of air particles have suggested that SARS-CoV-2 could be re-suspended in the air when healthcare workers remove their personal protective equipment (PPE)^{2,5}. Furthermore, it is also suggested that suspended tiny dust in the air could couple with microorganisms of diameter < 5 µm during aerosolization⁷. Since the diameter of the SARS-CoV-2 is two orders of magnitude smaller - approximately 70–90 nm²⁵, the mechanism/mode of the airborne transport is still unclear and, therefore, worth exploring. In this study, we hypothesize the possible role of PM_{2.5} as a carrier (or transport agent) for SARS-CoV-2. In this study, we aim to investigate the possible link between PM_{2.5} and SARS-CoV-2 from several wards in a hospital.

Indoor PM_{2.5}: We measured PM_{2.5} using an in-house air quality sensor^{12,26}, *AirBOXSense* (see SI for specifications). This was in tandem with sampling of PM_{2.5} on filter papers using a Low Volume Sampler (LVS) (see SI for details). Air samplings were done for 48 hours in this study to maximise the potential capture of virus loading on PM_{2.5}. Typically, PM_{2.5} measurements are taken in lesser intervals (e.g., 8 and 24 hours)²³. We also used quartz microfiber filters (pore size of 0.6–0.8 µm) in this study instead of nanofiber filters (commonly used in virus filtration) to enable us to link SARS-CoV-2 transmission via PM_{2.5} (see SI for details).

All PM_{2.5} measurements and samplings were taken in COVID-19 wards. General details of patients and how they were segregated in wards are described in Table 1 and SI. The highest concentration of indoor PM_{2.5} was measured in general ward B (Table 1) (13.27 µg m⁻³), while the lowest concentration was measured in general ward D (2.63 µg m⁻³). General ward B was occupied by a cluster of patients from the same institution and was observed to have the most activity among the patients. Higher PM_{2.5} concentrations can be contributed by physical activities such as movements of health workers and patients^{21,28,29}. The PM_{2.5} concentrations measured in this study are slightly lower than reported in a European urban hospital³⁰.

Virus RNA analysis: Filter membranes collected from the LVS from different wards were used in the detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA. The results from the Reverse Transcription Quantitative Real Time Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-qPCR) showed positive detection of the SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid (N) gene. Only the N1 nucleocapsid gene was successfully detected. According to the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)³¹, detection of either the N1 or N2 gene is considered positive for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 (Orig3n, Inc. 2020). We detected positive results for SARS-CoV-2 genes in the single room

Ward A (74 ± 117.1 copies μL^{-1}) and General Ward B (10 ± 7.44 copies μL^{-1}). The viral genomes extracted consist of the total viral genome from the filter paper. Therefore, the high standard deviation reported may be a result of the heterogeneous mixture of genomic RNA in the RT-qPCR template and the presence of the relatively low SARS-CoV-2 genome. Nonetheless, the cycle threshold (CT) value was <40 (Orig3n Inc. 2020), confirming the positive detection of SARS-CoV-2 in our samples (Table 1). Due to operational restriction imposed by the hospital, the sample size was limited and a very low viral RNA yield was recovered. The uniqueness in the result is that viral RNA was still able to be detected in the single occupancy ward (Ward A). Ward A is a small enclosed room (22 m^2) with a lavatory attached. The frequent use of the lavatory resulted in the increase of viral shedding activity. We suspect that virus-laden $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ generated from the shedding activity circulated within the enclosed room despite low $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ concentration ($11.25 \mu\text{g m}^{-3}$), thus explaining the spike in the data. The degree of viral shedding (from the patients) due to symptoms such as coughing, sneezing, diarrhoea, etc. has been reported to influence the number of virus particles in the environment^{1,5}. It is suggested that the increased virus particles (due to shedding) in a poorly ventilated environment might increase the virus- $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ assemblage^{9,19,34}. A study done by⁵ reported that they were not able to detect SARS-CoV-2 in all of their tested air samples. However, they highlighted that their short sampling time of 15 min - 4 h might not represent total air volume in the ward and the presence of SARS-CoV-2 might have possibly been diluted during air exchanges in the ward. This limitation was modified in our study by extending the air sampling duration.

SARS-CoV-2 RNA was also detected in General Ward B. General Ward B is a larger room (100 m^2) consisting of 18 occupied beds with two air purifying units installed at a distance of 8 m away from the LVS. The amount of SARS-CoV-2 collected in the particulate matter is significantly lower than from Ward A despite the higher number of patients and concentration of $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ ($17.58 \mu\text{g m}^{-3}$). Such a low concentration of viral load in the aerosol could be attributed to the fact that all the leading to minimal virus shedding; although higher particulate matter reading in relation to the occupants' activities that promotes their suspension of $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ from the floor and surfaces^{35,36}.

Virus-laden $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ was not detected in Wards C and D despite having similar ward size. The number of patients in Ward C is similar to Ward B, whereas the number of patients in Ward D is half of that of Ward C. The patients in Ward C and Ward D were also diagnosed with mild symptoms. The non-detection of the virus in these wards may be due to very low virus shedding from the patients. Another possible factor to explain the absence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ is that the LVS in Ward C (and also Ward D) was positioned adjacent to an air purifier. Although the effectiveness of air-purifier in removing $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ remains unclear, air-filtration has been reported to reduce viral loading in air^{35,36}.

Our results clearly indicated that SARS-CoV-2 RNA is present within $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ particles. Hence, it is crucial to determine whether these RNAs came from intact virus particles or are merely RNA from non-infectious virus particles. The detection of SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA on surfaces was previously reported on a cruise ship, the Diamond Prince, even after 17 days after the evacuation of passengers³⁷. In addition, the Centres

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) pointed out that the infectivity of the detected particles was still uncertain. A study carried out in a CDC facility showed that SARS-CoV-2 was able to remain infectious up to 72 hours on some surfaces²⁴. Thus, it is suggested that infectious virus be determined by culturing of virus residing on the PM_{2.5} onto appropriate cell culture. Although our study could not show a direct link between the concentration of PM_{2.5} and SARS-CoV-2. We did find that PM_{2.5} generated from human activities in healthcare facilities can influence the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in indoor environments. Furthermore, the degree of viral shedding from symptomatic patients may also influence the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA on PM_{2.5}. Therefore, we recommend that all possible precautions against airborne transmission in indoor environments should be taken seriously.

Declarations

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Author contributions M.S.M.N conceptualized the idea. M.S.M.N, N.S.M.N, N.I and Z.Z.R aided in the study design. M.S.M.S performed the indoor air sampling procedures. N.S.M.N, Y.C.W and N.I did the qRT-PCR and rRT-PCR analyses. M.S.M.N, N.S.M.N, Y.C.W and L.C.Y wrote the early versions of the manuscript. All authors contributed equally to the data analysis and interpretations. All authors co-wrote the final version of the paper.

Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests.

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Table

Table 1 | Summary of the data collected at HCTM.

Ward ^a	PM _{2.5} (µg·m ⁻³) ^b	SARS-CoV-2 RNA ^c	No. of occupied beds	Area ^d	Remarks ^e
Single room Ward A	11.25 ±2.05	Detected	1	~ 22m ²	Without air purifier
General Ward B	17.58 ±4.27	Detected	18	~ 100m ²	Two air purifiers (LVS sampler located far from the air purifier)
General Ward C	14.66 ±5.59	Not detected	17	~ 100m ²	One air purifier
General Ward D	7.57 ±1.37	Not detected	8	~ 100m ²	One air purifier

^a Selected wards that were sampled consisting of different patient clusters: Single room ward A, an executive ward that hosts only one COVID-19 patient; General ward B was occupied an institutional cluster; General Ward C was occupied by patients arriving from overseas; and General Ward D was occupied by migrant workers (see SI for details).

^b Average 48 hourly concentrations (with standard deviation) of PM_{2.5} measured in different wards at HCTM.

^c Detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA on captured PM_{2.5} at different wards.

^d Ward area is an approximate measurement and not the official measurement.

^e See SI for details on air purifiers.

Figures




Figure 1

Characteristics of the wards and instrumentation deployment in this study a) Single room A and b) General ward B c) General ward C d) General ward D.

Supplementary Files

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