

10-1-1999

Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts

Susan Bandes

DePaul University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview>



Part of the [Criminal Law Commons](#), and the [Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Susan Bandes, *Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts*, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1275 (1999).

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol47/iss3/4>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts

SUSAN BANDES†

INTRODUCTION

Legal consequences often hinge on whether events or incidents are categorized as isolated or connected, individual or systemic, anecdotal or part of a larger pattern. Courts tend to portray incidents of police brutality as anecdotal, fragmented, and isolated rather than as part of a systemic, institutional pattern. Though numerous doctrines—including federalism, separation of powers, causation, deference, discretion, and burden of proof—provide partial explanations for the judicial fragmentation of police misconduct, it seems clear that courts cannot or do not choose to see systemic patterns for reasons that transcend doctrinal explanations. This article explores those reasons, which, ultimately, are relevant not only to police brutality, but to the larger judicial tendency to anecdotalize systemic government misconduct.

It is inevitable that courts must decide which details, events, and persona are relevant to a particular story of police conduct. Every narrative highlights some details, and downplays or discards others that seem to threaten its

†Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to Albert Alschuler, Erwin Chemerinsky, Paul Chevigny, John Conroy, Barry Friedman, Tom Geraghty, Jeffrie Murphy, Judith Resnik, Sharon Rush, Carol Sanger, Austin Sarat, Stephen Siegel, David Sklansky, Welsh White, and George Wright for their comments on drafts of this paper. I also received very helpful comments at faculty workshops at the Cornell, University of Colorado and DePaul Law Schools, at the 1998 meeting of the Working Group on Law, Culture and the Humanities at Georgetown Law Center, and at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Aspen, Colorado. Thanks are also due to Michael Carter, Patty Galvan, Tom McGuire, Rebecca Morse, and Manuel Rupe for their excellent research assistance, and the DePaul Law School Faculty Research Fund for its support.

coherence. However, the particular decisions courts make are neither inevitable nor mechanically made. These decisions are influenced, explicitly and implicitly, by factors that are political, social, psychological, and cultural. There are many such factors that lead courts to mask or discount systemic harm. Sometimes, courts cannot see connections because of conscious or preconscious assumptions and expectations about how the story should be told, what ought to be part of the story, or how the characters will behave. This article will seek to explore some of those assumptions.

The question I want to address is why *this* particular story, the story of police brutality, is so often anecdotalized. Police brutality is different in kind and degree from police misconduct, examples of which include conducting an unlawful search or using unnecessary force. Police brutality is conduct that is not merely mistaken, but taken in bad faith with the intent to dehumanize and degrade its target. It is described as "conscious and venal, . . . directed against persons of marginal status and credibility," and "committed by officers who often take great pains to conceal their conduct."¹ Police brutality is longstanding, pervasive, and alarmingly resilient. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of its resilience is the extent to which it depends on the complicity of multiple governmental actors, including the courts.

Consider the example of ongoing police torture in the City of Chicago. During a period of at least thirteen years, more than sixty men, all of them black, have alleged that they were physically abused, and in fact, tortured, by several named officers in the Area Two Violent Crimes Unit on Chicago's South Side.² Certain types of torture, by certain officers, were alleged repeatedly, including suffocation with a typewriter cover, electroshock with a specially constructed black box, hanging by handcuffs for hours, a cattle prod to the testicles, and Russian roulette

1. JAMES SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 19 (1993).

2. See John Conroy, *Poison in the System*, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE WEEKLY, June 25, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Conroy, *Poison*]; John Conroy, *The Shocking Truth*, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE WEEKLY, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Conroy, *Shocking Truth*]; John Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE WEEKLY, Jan. 12, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Conroy, *Town Without Pity*]; John Conroy, *House of Screams*, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE WEEKLY, Jan. 26, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Conroy, *House of Screams*].

with a gun in the suspect's mouth.³ The allegations were corroborated not only by defense attorneys and emergency room physicians, but by several other respected groups including a broad-based Chicago citizens' coalition, an investigative group from the internal police review agency, and Amnesty International.⁴ In a number of cases, defendants alleged that they were tortured into confessing. Yet despite the fact that the same group of Area Two officers was named again and again, and despite the startling similarity in methods alleged, the courts, with few exceptions, failed to see a pattern.⁵ Indeed, appellate courts upheld several rulings that prevented the identification of just such a pattern.⁶ Ten of the defendants are on death row today.⁷ In civil cases against the officers and the City of Chicago, the failure to introduce prior acts of brutality paved the way for a rejection of a finding of municipal liability.⁸ Although one of the officers, Commander John Burge (the creator of the infamous black box), was

3. See *infra* text accompanying notes 111-39.

4. See Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 14, 21.

5. See, e.g., *People v. Hogley*, 637 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. 1994); *People v. Patterson*, 610 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. 1992); *People v. Howard*, 588 N.E.2d 1044 (Ill. 1991); *People v. Hinton*, 1998 WL 909738 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); *People v. Holmes*, 556 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), *appeal denied*, 564 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1990). *But see* *People v. Cannon*, 688 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (reversing prior opinion upholding conviction, at 502 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) and allowing a rehearing to suppress a defendant's confession based on prior allegations of police brutality at Area Two because this evidence was deemed "relevant to Cannon's claim that he was tortured"); *People v. Bates*, 642 N.E.2d 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that a defendant's confession would be suppressed based on "alleged systematic abuse of suspects in custody at Area Two police headquarters, where the defendant was interrogated"); *People v. Banks*, 549 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that evidence that same officers had used same coercive techniques on another suspect was inadmissible at suppression hearing).

6. See, e.g., *People v. Orange*, 659 N.E.2d 935, 941 (Ill. 1995) (refusing to find ineffectiveness of counsel when attorney failed to investigate reports that officers who had allegedly tortured the suspect he represented had engaged in a pattern of such torture in similar cases); *People v. Patterson*, 610 N.E.2d 16, 37 (Ill. 1993) (upholding exclusion of police disciplinary files showing pattern of similar complaints against same officer).

7. See Editorial, *Probing Burge*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999 at 35. See also Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, *A Tortured Path to Death Row*, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1999, at 1 (noting that the city has yet to undertake a full-scale investigation of the Area Two tactics and whether they led to wrongful convictions).

8. See *Wilson v. City of Chicago*, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).

ultimately expelled from the force, other officers involved continued to progress through the ranks, garnering nothing but commendations and promotions.⁹

It would be comforting to dismiss the story of Area Two as unusual, anecdotal, and unrepresentative. Unfortunately, in many significant respects, what happened at Area Two represents business as usual in Chicago and throughout the United States.¹⁰ Official reactions to police brutality fall into a familiar pattern. The violence inflicted on Rodney King,¹¹ Malice Green,¹² Abner Louima¹³ and Amadou Diallo¹⁴ (the unarmed West African immigrant in New York City who died in a hail of 41 police bullets) was, predictably, followed by police assurances that it was an aberration, the work of a few rotten apples, a criminal act rather than routine police conduct.¹⁵

In most cases, the view of police brutality as aberrational (or even justified) shapes the conduct of every institution responsible for dealing with the problem, including police command, review boards, administrative agencies, city, state and federal government, and the courts. This view allows police brutality to flourish in a number of ways, including making it easier to discount individual stories of police brutality, and weakening the case for any kind of systemic reform. The fragmentation of systemic police brutality needs to be addressed at many institutional levels. This article is particularly, though not exclusively, concerned with how and why that fragmentation occurs in the courts.

The fragmentation takes several forms and is accomplished through numerous doctrinal means. Often, police engaged in incidents of brutality have a history of

9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES* 155 (1998) [hereinafter *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*].

10. The existence of a longstanding police torture ring is unusual in the present-day United States. However, many aspects of the brutality and the institutional response to it were not at all unusual. See text accompanying notes 198-221.

11. See *infra* text accompanying notes 39-47.

12. See *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*, *supra* note 9, at 175-77.

13. See *infra* text accompanying notes 52-63.

14. See *infra* text accompanying notes 64-65.

15. See *infra* notes 65-71; see also *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*, *supra* note 9, at 25, 46-47.

such incidents,¹⁶ departments house several officers engaged in similar types of brutality or corruption, or the brutality is concentrated in a single neighborhood.¹⁷ However, there are innumerable hurdles to identifying or documenting such patterns. Complaints are discouraged,¹⁸ confessions are not videotaped,¹⁹ record keeping is lax or nonexistent,²⁰ records are sealed or expunged,²¹ patterns are not tracked,²² and police files are deemed undiscoverable.²³ If a history of past incidents does exist and, despite these hurdles, becomes known to the brutality victim, he faces additional hurdles introducing evidence of the brutality in court, including restrictive evidentiary rulings,²⁴ protective orders,²⁵ judicial toleration of police perjury or of "the blue wall of silence,"²⁶ assumptions about credibility that favor police officers,²⁷ the absolute immunity of testifying officers,²⁸ substantive constitutional doctrines insulating

16. See *infra* Part I.A.

17. For example, the Mollen Commission reported on several situations in which virtually an entire police precinct was engaged in patterns of corruption and brutality directed at particular neighborhoods. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Clifford Krauss, *Command Failures: Mollen Report Blames Gap in Responsibility for Rogue Officers*, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at A1.

18. See *infra* notes 85-91.

19. See Editorial, *Let the Cameras Roll*, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1999, at 16 (calling on Chicago Police Department to begin videotaping confessions); Lorraine Forte, *Cops Prepare to Videotape Confessions*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at 1 (detailing plan to institute limited videotaping of confessions in Chicago, in the wake of allegations that two young boys, later exonerated, were coerced into confessing in the absence of parents or attorneys).

20. See *infra* notes 101-04, 209, 214.

21. See *id.*; see also SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 46-49 (discussing barriers to obtaining investigative and personnel records documenting prior incidents of brutality).

22. See *infra* notes 209, 214 and accompanying text.

23. See Alison L. Patton, *The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 USC § 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality*, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 761-62 (1993).

24. See *infra* Part I.A.

25. See *infra* note 349.

26. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, *The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury*, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 232 (1998); Morgan Cloud, *Judges, "Testilying" and the Constitution*, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996); *infra* notes 324-329.

27. See *infra* notes 289-91, 316, 355-63.

28. See *Briscoe v. LaHue*, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).

failures to act²⁹ or demanding an exceptionally high level of proof of wrongdoing,³⁰ restrictive municipal liability standards coupled with a lack of receptivity to evidence of systemic wrongdoing,³¹ and standing doctrines that make injunctive relief nearly impossible to obtain.³²

In police brutality cases, the routine categorizing of incidents as isolated rather than systemic has had terrible consequences. Systematic police brutality has been masked, insulated, and implicitly condoned because courts have failed to make connections among incidents; failed to make causal links between police conduct and the injuries and confessions of suspects; denied litigants or juries access to information which would enable linkages to be discovered; and in general persisted in defining encounters as separate from—and irrelevant to—any overarching systemic patterns that need to be addressed.

Part I examines the phenomenon of police brutality, paying particular attention to the ways in which patterns are masked. Section A takes a highly detailed look at one “pocket” in which police brutality and even torture have long thrived—Chicago’s Area Two Violent Crimes Unit. I offer the detailed description in order to move beyond abstractions about the conditions in which police brutality thrives, and to facilitate an examination of the ways in which multiple institutions, including the courts, permit such conduct to continue and its practitioners to prosper. Section B asks whether the story told about Area Two is itself anecdotal, or is representative of a larger pattern. To assist in placing the Area Two story in context, this section describes more generally the attributes of police brutality as practiced in the United States.

Part II seeks to understand the pattern of fragmentation that characterizes the judicial reaction to police brutality. Section A suggests that the literary notion

29. See *DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).

30. See Rob Yale, *Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality*, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1841, 1846-51 (1997) (discussing the “significant injury” requirement that is sometimes used to supplement the requirement of objectively unreasonable police conduct).

31. See *Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); see also David Hamilton, *The Importance and Overuse of Policy and Custom Claims: A View from One Trench*, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 723 (1999).

32. See *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

of anecdote, with its concerns about irrelevant detail, the linkages among seemingly disparate acts, and the problem of judging representativeness, can help us think about the patterns of police brutality and why they are so often anecdotalized. It suggests that judicial decisions about what details are connected, relevant, or representative are not merely mechanical, but rather are informed by cultural, social, and political assumptions. Section B posits several such assumptions that may lead judges to view patterns of police brutality as a series of disconnected events.

I. POLICE BRUTALITY: THE IRRELEVANT IS THAT WHICH FAILS TO PRESERVE OUR LAWS

What accounts for the terrible resilience of police brutality? There have been a few success stories, such as the fact that the use of the third degree is no longer acceptable or prevalent,³³ and the steep decline in police shootings of non-dangerous fleeing felons.³⁴ These success stories are, however, informative mostly against the backdrop of the much larger failure to control an endemic pattern of police lawlessness and violence, directed largely at the poor, minorities, and in general the least powerful members of our society.³⁵

33. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, *THE EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS* 7 (1995).

34. See *id.*

35. The Bureau of Justice Statistics, in its first survey of police/citizen interactions pursuant to 1994 crime control legislation, see *infra* note 214, reported that in 1996 Hispanics and African Americans constituted about half of the people subjected to police force, though they represented only one fifth of the relevant population. The kinds of force reported included being hit, pushed, choked, threatened by a flashlight, restrained by a dog, and threatened by a gun. See Robert Suro, *Study Says Cops Used Force v. 500,000*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at 21; see also David Lester, *Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force*, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 180, 183 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) [hereinafter POLICE VIOLENCE] ("The presumed moral inferiority and the race of suspects leads the police to see them as less than human, thereby justifying brutality."); Tracey Maclin, *Race and the Fourth Amendment*, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 390 (1998) (citing Amnesty International report's findings that police brutality victims in New York City are largely minority, and that nearly all victims in cases of death in custody were members of racial minorities); Bob Herbert, *What's Going On?*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, § 4, at 13 (noting that New York police treat young black and Hispanic residents as lesser beings, without the same rights as whites, while the Mayor, Police Commissioner, and other top

Under what conditions does change occur? The explanations in the cases of the third degree and deadly force are complex and various. They include the dissemination of effective empirical data, and the cooperation and leadership of police chiefs and other high ranking officials.³⁶ Other factors include judicial acceptance of responsibility and the evolution of societal norms.³⁷ As a nation, we recently observed how change may begin through a galvanizing anecdote.³⁸ The George Halliday videotape of Rodney King's beating set off a national wave of revulsion, which led to an increased consciousness of police brutality.³⁹ It also led, eventually, to the Christopher and Kolts Commissions' reports, some of whose recommendations have become law.⁴⁰

officials look the other way); Seth Mydans, *Seven Minutes in Los Angeles - A Special Report: Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, § 1, at A1 (stating that court documents indicate that nearly all the victims of maulings by Los Angeles police dogs in the last seven years were black or Hispanic, though whites committed nearly a third of the crimes in which dogs are usually deployed).

36. The influence of a police chief on police culture, as in the well known case of the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) Daryl Gates, is obvious. But higher officials also send clear messages about what conduct is acceptable. For example, police brutality flourished in Philadelphia when Frank Rizzo was mayor, and dropped significantly under his successor, who set a different tone for the administration. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 138-42. Similarly, the Giuliani administration in New York is often accused of achieving its drop in crime through an accompanying increase in aggressive police tactics. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 268. The tone Giuliani sets for the NYPD is being widely blamed for incidents like the killing of Amadou Diallo. See Patrick Cole, *NYC Shooting Renews Outcry on Police Brutality*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1999, at 1; see generally Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Comment, *Just Another Gang: When the Cops Are Crooks Who Can You Trust?*, 41 HOW. L.J. 383, 408 (1998) (noting that the Reagan and Bush administrations' war on drugs sent the message that police brutality was an acceptable cost of the 'war').

37. See CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 132; 261-62.

38. Widespread outrage has followed the Louima and Diallo incidents in New York City. See, e.g., Editorial, *Citizens and the Police*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at A20 (discussing protests in the aftermath of the Diallo shooting). The difficulty is in moving from the initial outrage to lasting reform; See Bob Herbert, *After the Protests*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A31; Editorial, *When Cops Are Killers*, THE NATION, Mar. 8, 1999, at 6 (discussing problem of the "symbolology of outrage," generating "a thousand headlines and no victory"); Editorial, *The Diallo Legacy*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999; § 4, at 18.

39. See LOU CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE: HOW RODNEY KING AND THE RIOTS CHANGED LOS ANGELES AND THE LAPD (1997).

40. See JAMES G. KOLTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL ON THE LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (1992) (KOLTS COMMISSION); INDEPENDENT

When King's beating first became public, Police Chief Daryl Gates and others dismissed it as an aberration⁴¹ (or alternatively, as fully deserved, and not an example of brutality at all). What they could not do—this time—was to deny that it had happened at all.⁴² The video itself suggested that the beating was not an aberration. The officers who beat King repeatedly with clubs and stunned him with tasers did so in full view of eleven officers, some of supervisory rank, and in full view of at least twenty local residents standing barely sixty feet away.⁴³ These officers conducted themselves as if they expected there would be no price to pay for their conduct. Their subsequent behavior—including their jocular boasting over the police radio about their conduct⁴⁴—bears out this conclusion. The behavior of their colleagues at the station, who refused to accept complaints about their misconduct,⁴⁵ exemplifies the solidarity they expected and received. Indeed, in their criminal trial, Officers Koon, Powell, Wind and Briseno moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that they were being discriminatorily prosecuted for acts that were common in the department.⁴⁶ Yet it took a public outcry, the resignation of a powerful police chief, and the appointment of a commission to even begin to unravel the fiction of the solitary rotten apple. And there is a long way to go, in Los

COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991) (CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION); CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 32 (discussing reports).

41. See CANNON, *supra* note 39, at 23.

42. See *id.* Cannon's book, however, suggested that even the Halliday videotape was susceptible to the dangers of fragmentation and decontextualizing. He notes that the videotape that received so much airplay did not include an initial three seconds in which King was shown charging Officer Powell, and a subsequent ten seconds which were initially very blurred, and later enhanced by the FBI. See *id.* at 194, 431. He argues that the additional footage was a double-edged sword, in that it confirmed a head blow to King by Powell, but also suggests that it was in response to King's charge. See *id.* at 431.

43. See Mydans, *supra* note 35.

44. The officers' boasts about the incident were received with similar jocularly. For example, Sergeant Koon sent a message saying "You just had a big-time use of force." The reply from the police communications desk was "Oh well. I'm sure the lizard didn't deserve it. Ha, ha. I'll let them know, O.K." Seth Mydans, *In Messages, Officers Banter After Beating in Los Angeles Beating*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at A1.

45. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 3.

46. See Seth Mydans, *Officers in Beating Case File 30 Pretrial Motions*, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1991, at A23.

Angeles and elsewhere.⁴⁷

The persistence of police brutality is a case study in the dangers of fragmenting systemic problems. There is no lack of anecdotes. And each one, no matter how shocking, no matter how typical, comes accompanied by the official statement that it was merely an aberration (if indeed, it happened at all). In each case, officials hasten to assure us that the conduct was not part of any greater problem that could or should be addressed on an institutional level.⁴⁸ A recent comprehensive report by Human Rights Watch found widespread patterns of police brutality nationwide and an equally widespread failure to address them.⁴⁹ It found that in general police departments have been unwilling to acknowledge shortcomings and instead dismiss any criticisms as anecdotal.⁵⁰ In response, the National Association of Chiefs of Police called the study "unfair" and "uninformed," stating: "We're not saying there aren't a few bad cops. . . . What we're saying is that the report presents an inappropriately broad-brushed impression."⁵¹

When Abner Louima was sodomized by police with a plunger, suffering a torn colon and a ruptured bladder, while being subjected to racial epithets, Police Commissioner Safir said he did not consider it "an act of police brutality[,]" but rather "a criminal act committed by

47. See, e.g., *60 Minutes* (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 30, 1994) (quoting former New Orleans Police Officer Michael Thames: "I don't know what the big deal is about the Rodney King beating. It was a kiddie-land beating. And the only thing bad about those cops is, like, they had a video camera. It goes on every day, especially in New Orleans").

48. See, e.g., the Mollen Commission's finding that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) maintained that "police corruption was not a serious problem, and consisted primarily of sporadic, isolated incidents," quoted in Bob Herbert, *The Stone Wall of Silence*, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at A25; *infra* text accompanying notes 52-67.

49. See generally SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9.

50. See *id.*

51. Ronald Powers, *Big-City Police Faulted in Human Rights Study; Chicago Among Cities Cited; Police Chiefs Rebut Report*, PEORIA J. STAR, July 8, 1998, at B5. Presciently, in light of this criticism, the Human Rights Watch reported that often police officials criticize reports on police abuse as misinformed or biased instead of considering their findings. The Report recounted that when the police denied Amnesty International the statistics and case information the organization requested, the police then criticized the report as incomplete, largely because of the information they themselves withheld). See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 46.

people who are criminals.”⁵² He also opined: “Although it’s a horrific event, it’s a rare event.”⁵³ Almost two years later, Officer Justin Volpe pled guilty in federal district court to sodomizing Louima,⁵⁴ and shortly thereafter Officer Charles Schwarz was convicted of holding him down.⁵⁵ Mayor Giuliani hailed the verdict as evidence that the blue wall of silence is a myth and that police officers found the conduct “reprehensible and perverse.”⁵⁶ Yet several other officers face internal investigations and federal obstruction of justice charges.⁵⁷ According to court testimony, several officers watched Volpe brag about the sodomy and brandish an excrement-soiled stick immediately after the incident,⁵⁸ turned away as he appeared ready to toss the stick in the garbage,⁵⁹ watched Volpe lead Louima from the bathroom to a holding cell with his pants around his ankles,⁶⁰ and in one case lied about the incident.⁶¹ In all cases, these officers failed to come forward until after Volpe’s arrest and after learning about a police internal affairs investigation which also put them at risk.⁶² Volpe himself testified that although

52. Bob Herbert, *Living in Denial*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at A31.

53. Joseph P. Fried, *U.S. Takes Over the Louima Case; 5th Suspect, a Sergeant, Is Indicted*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at A1.

54. See Mark Hamblett, *Plea in Louima Trial Alters the Landscape; Departure Cuts Both Ways for Defendants*, N.Y.L.J., May 26, 1999, at 1.

55. See Editorial, *Verdict Shatters Blue Wall*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 9, 1999, at 34 [hereinafter *Shatters Blue Wall*].

56. *Id.* See also Leonard Levitt, *The Louima Verdicts, Some Splits, But Blue Wall Stands*, NEWSDAY, June 9, 1999, at A4.

57. See Jim Dwyer, *Louima Jury Still Wonders*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 13, 1999.

58. See Gregory Kane, *Sergeant: Louima’s Torturer Boasted; Surprise Witness Says Cop Showed Off Stick*, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 20, 1999, at A1 (stating that Officer Kenneth Wernick testified that when he was told the stick contained human excrement, he laughed).

59. *Id.*

60. Karen Hunter, *Louima Case Leaves Some Big Questions*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 21, 1999, at 29.

61. Michael Schoer initially told investigators he had not seen anything. See Levitt, *supra* note 42.

62. See Gregory Kane, *Louima Trial Failed to Dent the Blue Wall of Silence*, THE NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, June 6, 1999, at 3; Levitt, *supra* note 56 (reporting that Officer Kenneth Wernick came forward after being told he would be questioned in a hearing in which his failure to testify truthfully would mean dismissal, that Officer Mark Schofield came forward after his gun and shield had been taken from him, that Officer Michael Schoer initially lied to police before eventually telling the truth to the FBI, and that Officer Eric Turetzky did not come forward until six days after the incident, only hours before he was

there had been another officer in the bathroom with him during the attack on Louima, "it was understood . . . that that police officer would do nothing to stop me or report it to anyone."⁶³

A little less than one year after Louima was brutalized, an unarmed West African immigrant named Amadou Diallo was killed by a hail of forty one bullets fired by four members of the NYPD's controversial street crimes unit.⁶⁴ Mayor Giuliani, in response, denied that the shooting was any indication of a pattern of excessive force by the department.⁶⁵ Those who dismissed the Louima and Diallo attacks as aberrational perhaps saw no connection to the Amnesty International report a year prior to the attack on Louima finding a pattern of brutality in the NYPD.⁶⁶ Or perhaps they concurred in the police commissioner's dismissal of that report as "anecdotal."⁶⁷ The Amnesty International report came only two years after the Mollen Commission's widely reported findings of widespread abuse and "willful blindness" to that abuse among the NYPD.⁶⁸

Willful blindness is a good term for it. In addition to all the anecdotal data, there is a convincing body of empirical evidence documenting the existence of systemic police brutality in police departments across the nation.⁶⁹ There are also many gaps in the data, and the reasons for those gaps are themselves an important part of the story of the resilience of police brutality. An effective, good faith effort

to be questioned).

63. Kane, *supra* note 62.

64. See Editorial, *The Mayor's Other Crime Rating*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at A26 (commenting on how the "aggressiveness and independence of the street crimes unit, with its macho slogan, 'We own the night,' warrant[s] the Mayor's attention").

65. See Elisabeth Bumiller with Ginger Thompson, *Thousands Gather Again to Protest Police Shooting*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A24 (reporting that Giuliani continued to deny that the Diallo shooting was any indication of a pattern of excessive force by the department); see generally Bob Herbert, *A Brewing Storm*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A33.

66. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 46.

67. David Marshall, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1997, at A22. Mr. Marshall is a lawyer whose research led to the Amnesty International Report. See *id.*

68. Krauss, *supra* note 17; see also Joseph B. Treaster, *Mollen Panel Says Buck Stops with Top Officers*, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1994, § 1, at 21. The Mollen Commission report itself covered much of the same ground as the 1972 Knapp Commission report.

69. See, e.g., sources cited in note 205.

to understand and change the patterns of police brutality would make use of both the anecdotal and the empirical evidence. It would welcome the anecdotal reports as a window onto the street and into the interrogation room—a way to learn about police-citizen encounters that usually elude supervision or review. It would be open to finding the patterns among the anecdotal reports, and it would supplement them with broader empirical studies.

Instead, there appears to be a desire to avoid knowledge, marked by a relentless anecdotalizing, a refusal to see patterns and connections, and a refusal even to gather or share the information that might buttress and explain the anecdotes.⁷⁰ Often the refusal is accompanied by a demand that those alleging brutality provide supporting evidence, though the type of evidence demanded is largely in the control of the police themselves.⁷¹ Instead of carefully collecting and analyzing data, officials offer the familiar, reassuring story of rotten apples scrupulously picked out of an otherwise pristine barrel. And they generalize from unrepresentative particulars: assumptions about police and citizen behavior based on the world familiar to the largely white, middle class officials themselves—a world that may bear little resemblance to the places in which police brutality flourishes.

The willful blindness afflicts every level and branch of government. The resilience of police brutality thrives on compartmentalization, failures to act, and deflection and denial of responsibility. Police brutality is the product of many institutional failures. Indeed, as many who have studied it believe, it could not thrive without the complicity

70. See Peter L. Davis, *Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of Police Brutality When the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute*, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 274 n.4 (1994) (noting that the Department of Justice for many years declined the authority to gather statistics on patterns of misconduct); *infra* note 214.

71. See, e.g., SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 46 (explaining that the NYPD denied Amnesty International requested statistics and case information and then criticized its resulting report for not presenting a complete picture); see also Editorial, *Laxity on Police Abuses*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A26 (taking Police Commissioner Safir to task for criticizing report on civilian complaint review board as incomplete and outdated and pointing out that the author of the report, Public Advocate Mark Green, had had to fight for the information relied upon in the report for two years, and had obtained it only by court order).

of the society police serve. And certainly it could not thrive without the complicity of the court system.

A. *The Story of Chicago's Area Two Violent Crimes Unit*

We don't keep separate count for electroshock, because there are so few—only three or four since the first of the year.⁷²

Consider the story of the Area Two Violent Crimes Unit, located in an overwhelmingly poor, black area of the South Side of Chicago. For years, stories trickled out of Area Two into the surrounding community that within that building, police officers were torturing people.⁷³ The problem was getting anyone outside the community to believe the stories. Beginning in the early 1970's, numerous complaints were filed with the applicable administrative agencies, the mayor, the state's attorney, and the United States Attorney, and there were allegations raised in numerous judicial proceedings.⁷⁴ These complaints and allegations came from numerous unconnected sources, described alarmingly similar acts of torture, and named the same men over and over.⁷⁵ But the scandal is not only that no action was taken for so long. It is also that men continued to be convicted, imprisoned and—in ten cases—sent to death row (where they remain today), based on confessions they alleged were elicited by torture.⁷⁶ The alleged torturers and those who supervised them continued to be commended and promoted through the ranks, never eliciting the slightest hint of official disapproval.⁷⁷

It eventually became known that over a period of at least thirteen years, starting in the early 1970's, more than sixty men, all of them black, had been systematically tortured by members of a group of approximately fifteen

72. Deborah Nelson, *Cop Torture and Shock Allegations Date to '70's*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at 4 (quoting a spokesman for the Office of Professional Standards).

73. See Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 14; Editorial, *Leads the Cops Don't Want to Follow*, CHI. TRIB. Feb. 13, 1992, at 20 [hereinafter *Leads*]

74. See *supra* text accompanying notes 111-39

75. See *supra* text accompanying notes 111-39.

76. See Margaret O'Brien, *Judge Won't Use Cop Torture Testimony*, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1999, § 2, at 4.

77. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 155-56.

Area Two officers, all of them white.⁷⁸ The Office of Professional Standards [OPS]⁷⁹ did not investigate the complaints until 1990, and the city suppressed its report finding systemic torture in Area Two until 1992.⁸⁰ The unit commander and ringleader, John Burge, was not fired until 1993.⁸¹ No criminal proceedings were ever instituted.⁸² Only two other officers (both of whom have been reinstated) were disciplined for any of the incidents, and many of them have been promoted, commended, and allowed to retire with full benefits.⁸³ No effort has been made to identify or address systemic problems in Area Two, or higher up the chain of command. The story is presented as closed, and even given a happy ending: the ringleader was ferreted out. As far as we know, there is no more police torture in Chicago.

A close examination of the Area Two story yields insight into the ways in which interlocking institutions, including state and federal courts, enable police brutality to thrive within the contours of existing law and social policy. The examination will also provide a concrete illustration of the assumptions that help government officials, including judges, accept and in many respects condone official brutality, and the way those assumptions work.⁸⁴

When suspects were tortured in Area Two, many of them sought to file complaints.⁸⁵ Some may have attempted to complain at Area Two itself. If so, there is no record of what occurred. The failure of police personnel to log complaints against their colleagues is a common problem, and one cause of the lack of data on police wrongdoing.⁸⁶

78. See, e.g., *United States ex rel Maxwell v. Gilmore*, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1999); *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*, *supra* note 9, at 153.

79. An internal agency of the police department which is made up of civilian departmental employees, and which reports to the Superintendent of Police. See *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*, *supra* note 9, at 165.

80. See Scott Fornek, *Police Review Brutality Cases Spanning 20 Years*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 25, 1993, at 10.

81. See Conroy, *Shocking Truth*, *supra* note 2, at 30.

82. See *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*, *supra* note 9, at 155-56.

83. See *id.*

84. See *infra* Part II.B.

85. See Fornek, *supra* note 80.

86. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 3 (discussing George Halliday's attempt to file a complaint in the Rodney King case); see also Yale, *supra* note 30, at 1854 (recommending the institution of a standardized national system of receiving and recording complaints against the police); *Nightline: The Blue Wall-Part II* (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 22, 1997) (containing an account by Abner Louima's brother and cousin of the refusal of the desk sergeant at the

But most suspects filed complaints with the OPS.⁸⁷ In this venue, the complaints were dismissed as "not sustained," a fate that befalls the vast majority of the complaints filed with OPS.⁸⁸ "Not sustained" usually means that the only witnesses to the incident were the police and the victims, and that OPS cannot figure out whom to believe. One journalist described "not sustained" as "a shrug that says 'who knows?'"⁸⁹ A finding of "not sustained" also reflects the presumption, automatically employed as a matter of OPS policy, that in an uncorroborated swearing contest, the officer's word must be believed.⁹⁰ When corroboration is available, it often comes from people whose credibility is questioned, such as other suspects, friends or family, people with criminal records, or gang members.⁹¹

Brutality and its culture create many of these conditions. Brutality is, by definition, concealed. The torturer usually attempts to leave no marks.⁹² Many of Commander Burge's techniques, including suffocating the suspect, placing a revolver in the suspect's mouth, squeezing the suspect's testicles, and playing Russian roulette, leave no physical trace. When there is visible injury, unless there is corroboration, it becomes the officer's word against the suspect's as to how and where it occurred.⁹³

70th precinct to allow them to file a complaint about Louima's assault by police).

87. See Yale, *supra* note 30, at 1854; see also John L. Stainthorp, with the assistance of Flint Taylor, *Litigating Police Torture in Chicago*, 13 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 3-2 (Salzman ed., 1998).

88. Eric Zorn, *Police Brutality Alleged: Bring on the Internal Review*, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1997, § 2, at 1. OPS claims that 90-92% of complaints are classified as "not sustained," and press figures put the percentage even higher. SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 166.

89. Eric Zorn, *Police Terminology Clouds Unresolved Brutality Cases*, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1997, § 2, at 1.

90. See Telephone Interview with Flint Taylor, People's Law Office attorney for several of those alleging police brutality, including Aaron Patterson and the Wilson brothers (Feb. 13, 1998); see also *Leads*, *supra* note 73. As one attorney put it: "If the officer denies it, you're out of luck." SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 168.

91. See, e.g., *People v. Hogley*, 637 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. 1994); *People v. Holmes*, 556 N.E.2d 539 (Ill App. Ct. 1989), *appeal denied*, 564 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1990).

92. See Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 22.

93. See, e.g., Brief of the State of Illinois in *People v. Cannon* at 37, 688 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (No. 94-4409), in which the state's attorney sarcastically said, *inter alia*:

The swearing contest is stacked by two other essential characteristics of brutality. One characteristic is that it is concealed not only by the officer inflicting it, but by the officer's colleagues and supervisors.⁹⁴ The nationwide code of silence is well documented, pervasive, and crucial to the continuation of official brutality.⁹⁵ In Area Two, no officer ever publicly stepped forward to corroborate the existence of torture, or even intervened at the stationhouse itself.⁹⁶

[S]omehow, defendant did not sustain severe muscle and tissue injuries and was able to make use of his shoulders and arms after being lifted by his handcuffs from behind and twice being 5 feet off the ground. Through divine intervention, defendant did not bite through his tongue or lip while being repeatedly electrocuted and suffering 'the most excruciating pain' of his life in various areas of the city. Detective Dignan who apparently possesses some magical ability to torture without leaving any evidence also grabbed defendant by his hair when he saw defendant's siblings in the police parking lot. Again, there was neither balding nor bruising to defendant's scalp.

(brief on file with author).

94. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., *Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts*, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 108-14 (1992).

95. See CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 51; SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 119; Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am": *Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports*, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 12 (1983) (calling police deception part of the culture, not aberrational); *infra* text accompanying notes 324-29. Ironically, the decision of several NYPD officers to step forward in the Louima case, though the decision was made after much delay and only in the face of impending personal consequences to the officers themselves, see *supra* note 62, was hailed by Mayor Giuliani and Police Commissioner Safir, not only as not aberrational, but as proof that the blue wall of silence is a myth. See Levitt, *supra* note 56; *supra* text accompanying note 56.

96. One individual with intimate knowledge of the torture wrote anonymous letters to civil rights attorneys providing names of victims. See Conroy, *Shocking Truth*, *supra* note 2, at 26; Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 23. This officer cited the case of Michael Lavery to explain his refusal to come forward. Lavery was an Area Two cop who blew the whistle on the longstanding Area Two practice of keeping a secret set of "street files" separate from official case files. The street files contained exculpatory evidence the officers did not wish to turn over to defense attorneys, and other evidence contradicting the official case. Lavery exposed the practice in order to prevent the trial of George Jones, a man whom he knew to be innocent, in a capital case in which his colleagues had suppressed evidence exculpating Jones and inculcating another man. See *Jones v. City of Chicago*, 856 F.2d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 1988). Although one panel of the Seventh Circuit thought Lavery should have been commended for his actions, see *id.* (citing *Palmer v. City of Chicago*, 755 F.2d 560, 564 n.3 (1985)), instead he was charged with a disciplinary infraction, "transferred out of the detective division, ostracized by his fellow officers, and assigned to a series of menial tasks culminating in the monitoring of police recruits giving urine samples. None of the defendants has been

The second characteristic is that brutality is practiced against members of marginalized groups living in marginal neighborhoods.⁹⁷ In Area Two, for example, all of the 65 known torture victims were black. One Philadelphia cop describing the widely known rules stated: "The first is, keep it in the ghetto. In the good areas, you don't go stopping people without cause."⁹⁸ One byproduct of this rule is that brutality will seem unbelievable or aberrant to decisionmakers who tend to hail from more privileged backgrounds⁹⁹—it will not correspond to their experience. Another is that those who can corroborate it are too easy to dismiss—they are more likely to have criminal records, to be associated with gangs, and to be less articulate, sophisticated, and educated. They are less likely to evoke the empathy of decisionmakers with whom they have little in common.¹⁰⁰

Whether a complaint is found sustained or unsustained, OPS makes no attempt to place it in any larger context. OPS files are not computerized.¹⁰¹ Due to police union complaints, in 1992 a five-year statute of limitations on administrative proceedings was established, with complaints over five years old held inadmissible in internal investigations.¹⁰² Thus police, attorneys, and the community were deprived of another avenue for tracking individual or precinct-wide patterns of brutality. In ruling on a complaint, OPS does not consider (or even ascertain) whether there were past complaints against the officer.¹⁰³ No effort is made to discern patterns of complaints

disciplined for misconduct in the arrest and prosecution of George Jones." *Id.* at 991-92. See also Fisher, *supra* note 95, at 2-4, 36-38, 40-45 (discussing Jones case), 42 n.207 (discussing treatment of Laverty); Orfield, *supra* note 94, at 101-02 (discussing Jones case).

97. See, e.g., *supra* note 35; SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 2, 39-46. The report noted that despite gains in many areas since the civil rights movement, one area that has been stubbornly resistant to change has been the treatment afforded racial minorities by the police.

98. Michael Kramer, *How Cops Go Bad*, TIME, Dec. 15, 1997, at 78.

99. See Douglas Colbert, *Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases*, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 561 n.322 (1993).

100. See Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 22; David Jackson, *Difficult Path to Justice in Police Brutality Cases*, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1992, at 1; see also *infra* text accompanying notes 312-16.

101. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 169.

102. See *id.* at 167; *infra* note 209.

103. See Eric Zorn, *supra* note 88.

regarding particular officers, particular precincts, or certain types of conduct (such as discharging a firearm or searching without a warrant).¹⁰⁴ This is particularly unfortunate since in Chicago, as nationwide, a vastly disproportionate amount of the brutality is committed by a small group of officers, each of whom may have many complaints in his file.¹⁰⁵ Even multiple sustained complaints have no negative effect at all on the officer's career—they are not even entered in his personnel file.¹⁰⁶

Even when the rules permit, OPS has not usually been a zealous investigative agency. Since 1985, three internal audits have accused the agency of losing investigative files and failing to interview key witnesses.¹⁰⁷ Even when a former Chief of Police asked the agency to look into allegations against Burge, it took an inordinate amount of time to do a slipshod and incomplete investigation.¹⁰⁸ OPS' performance is consistent with that of many internal police

104. The police union's contract with the city prevents disclosure of the names of officers under investigation in most circumstances. See *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*, *supra* note 9, at 154 n.9. *But see* *Wiggins v. Burge*, 173 F.R.D. 226 (N.D. Ill 1997) (striking the confidential designation of OPS files detailing a pattern of brutality in Area Two on the ground that the public interest in disclosure of the documents was not outweighed by the privacy interests of the officers). Often police organizations oppose disclosure of statistics about brutality even with names and other personal identifying information deleted. See *SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE*, *supra* note 9, at 46-49; Lynne Wilson, *The Public's Right to Access to Police Misconduct Files*, 4 *POLICE MISCONDUCT AND CIV. RTS L. REP.* (1994).

105. In 1989, for example, of Chicago's 11,000 member police force, 437 officers had more than one excessive force complaint. Of these, 278 had two complaints; 85 had three; 35 had four; and 39 had more than five. See David Jackson, *Police Brutality: How Widespread Is It?*, *CHI. TRIB.*, Mar. 24, 1991; see also Flint Taylor, *Proof on Police Failure to Discipline Cases: A Survey*, in 3 *POLICE MISCONDUCT CIV. RTS L. REP.* 37, 42-47 (1990) (discussing prevalence of repeat offenders nationwide); Patton, *supra* note 23, at 768-77; David Kocieniewski, *More Scrutiny for Shootings by Officers*, *N.Y. TIMES*, Jan. 1, 1998, at A18 (reporting that police officer who fatally shot an unarmed man on Christmas Day has been involved in more shootings than any other officer on the city's police force); Steve Mills & Todd Lighty, *Brutality Suit Not 1st Against Cop*, *CHI. TRIB.*, (Metro), Jan. 21, 1999, §1, at 6 (revealing that Chicago Police Officer Rex Hayes, who is currently being civilly sued for attacking and filing false charges against a South Chicago man and his daughter, had settled or lost at least eight other similar suits, in which the city had paid out a total of well over one million dollars in damages).

106. See Rebecca Anderson, *Policing Their Own*, *CHI. REP.*, Sept. 1999, at 1, *supra* note 103, at 8; Zorn, *supra* note 87.

107. See Jackson, *supra* note 100.

108. See Conroy, *House of Screams*, *supra* note 2, at 26.

divisions, stemming largely from the unwillingness of police officials to identify corruption in their ranks.¹⁰⁹ As Paul Chevigny observed in the similar context of New York's internal affairs division, "its policy was to make all the corruption investigations look like low-level, individual matters, so that they would not balloon into generalized scandals."¹¹⁰ For all these reasons, neither the large numbers of complaints against a small group of officers at Area Two, nor the fact that they alleged the same highly unusual and appalling story, was noticed until much later by the internal agency charged with policing the police.

In the meantime, many of the torture victims confessed, and were charged with crimes. Thus individual complaints of torture at Area Two were making their way to the Illinois courts in suppression motions during the 1980's and early 1990's. For example, in 1982, Andrew Wilson said that he was repeatedly punched, kicked, smothered with a typewriter cover, electrically shocked, and forced against a hot radiator.¹¹¹ In October 1983, Gregory Banks said he confessed to murder after Burge, John Byrne and other Area Two detectives beat him, suffocated him, and subjected him to Russian roulette.¹¹² In November 1983, Darryl Cannon said Byrne, Peter Dignan, and others subjected him to electroshock with a cattle prod and played Russian roulette with him, placing the gun in his mouth.¹¹³ In 1985, Lonza Holmes said that Burge and Detective Madigan severely beat him.¹¹⁴ In 1986, Aaron Patterson said that Area Two officers placed a typewriter cover over his face, beat him, choked him, and threatened him.¹¹⁵

In each case, the trial court denied a motion to suppress the confession.¹¹⁶ In many of the cases, the court denied the defendant access to police department brutality records on the officers involved.¹¹⁷ If the defendant had such evidence

109. See, e.g., CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 80.

110. *Id.* at 81-82.

111. See *Wilson v. City of Chicago*, 707 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Ill. 1989).

112. See *People v. Banks*, 549 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).

113. See *People v. Cannon*, 688 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).

114. See *People v. Holmes*, 556 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), *appeal denied*, 564 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. 1990).

115. See *People v. Patterson*, 610 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. 1992).

116. See *infra* appellate court decisions cited in notes 123-135.

117. See, e.g., *People v. Hopley*, 637 NE 2d 992 (Ill. 1994); Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 22.

in his possession, and sought to introduce evidence of similar acts of brutality by Area Two officers, or even by the same Area Two officers, the trial court barred such evidence—granting the state’s motion in limine on grounds that the evidence of prior beatings was irrelevant and immaterial.¹¹⁸ In all but the *Banks* and *Wilson* cases, the Illinois appellate courts initially affirmed the trial courts’ rulings. The courts ruled that there were no visible bruises,¹¹⁹ or that the bruises could have been inflicted earlier or by the defendant himself.¹²⁰ Contemporaneous written statements by one defendant chronicling his abuse were barred, and dismissed as self serving;¹²¹ the testimony by another defendant’s brother regarding bruises was found insufficiently credible.¹²² The trial courts’ decisions to suppress evidence of prior acts of brutality were upheld. The courts ruled, in case after case, that they would defer to the trial courts’ factual conclusions.¹²³

Patterson’s motion to introduce prior OPS files regarding brutality by Area Two detectives met the fate that has been, until quite recently, typical of such motions¹²⁴ OPS had found the prior allegations “not sustained” which the Illinois courts transformed to “unfounded.”¹²⁵ The Illinois Supreme Court declined to second guess the trial court’s decision to exclude the OPS evidence, stating: “A mere unfounded accusation that these officers beat someone

118. See, e.g., *Patterson*, 610 N.E.2d at 37.

119. See, e.g., *Patterson*, 610 N.E.2d 16; *Holmes*, 556 N.E.2d at 539.

120. See e.g. *Hobley*, 637 N.E.2d at 1002; *People v. Howard*, 588 N.E.2d 1044 (Ill. 1992).

121. See *Patterson*, 610 N.E.2d at 16.

122. See *Holmes*, 556 N.E.2d at 539.

123. See *id.*; *Hobley*, 637 N.E.2d at 992.

124. See, e.g., *People v. Maxwell*, 670 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. 1996), *modified*, *People v. Coleman*, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (Ill. 1998) (denying defendant post conviction relief despite studies establishing physical abuse and coercion at Area Two, because he failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated); *People v. Orange*, 659 N.E.2d. 935 (Ill. 1995) (rejecting claim of systematic torture at Area Two from 1982 to 1984 because defendant offered generalized allegations of coercive activity in Area Two, without other evidence); *People v. Murray*, 626 N.E.2d 1140 (Ill App. Ct. 1993) (holding that allegations of abuse of other suspects at Area Two were properly excluded as general in nature). *But see* *United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Gilmore*, 37 F. Supp. 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (granting writ of habeas corpus ordering an evidentiary hearing to consider claims of coercion in light of testimony of others who alleged torture by same Area Two detectives).

125. *Patterson*, 610 N.E.2d at 36.

who was arrested at Area Two one year previously, without more, does not tend to make it more probable that they coerced defendant's confession.¹²⁶

Given that holding, the Supreme Court had little trouble, only one year after rejecting Patterson's claim, in rebuffing Hobley's attempt to introduce testimony of several others who claimed to have been abused by Area Two detectives in similar fashion.¹²⁷ The court found that the three years between Hobley's interrogation and the alleged incidents made the prior allegations too remote to be relevant.¹²⁸

The court did not heed the words of Justice Rizzi of the Illinois Appellate Court, a member of the panel that reversed Gregory Banks' conviction. Banks had alleged that Dignan, Byrne, and Charles Grunhard had put a .45 caliber gun in his mouth and threatened to blow his head off, struck him with a flashlight on his chest, stomach, and the back of his legs while he was handcuffed, put a plastic bag over his head twice while kicking him in the stomach and the side, and said "we have something for niggers."¹²⁹ The trial court barred reference at trial to complaints of coercion by Byrne and Dignan thirteen months earlier, holding them irrelevant.¹³⁰ Justice Rizzi wrote in *Banks*:

When trial judges do not courageously and forthrightly exercise their responsibility to suppress confessions obtained by such means, they pervert our criminal justice system as much as the few misguided law enforcement officers who obtain confessions in utter disregard of the rights guaranteed to every citizen—including criminal suspects—by our constitution.¹³¹

Despite Justice Rizzi's warning, the *Hobley* court distinguished the thirteen month gap in *Banks* from the thirty six month gap between Hobley's beating and those he alleged. It found the latter gap long enough to render the

126. *Id.* at 38. See Editorial, *Fatal Consequences*, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at 45 (reporting on petition filed by the MacArthur Justice Center and 65 death penalty opponents seeking to halt Patterson's execution, and calling for courts to review petition carefully). I am one of those who signed the petition.

127. See *Hobley*, 637 N.E.2d at 992.

128. See *id.* at 1010.

129. *People v. Banks*, 549 N.E.2d 766, 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).

130. See *id.* at 770.

131. *Id.* at 771.

past conduct irrelevant.¹³² The fact that Hobley, Banks, Patterson, and numerous other unconnected individuals were alleging the same unspeakable course of conduct, by the same officers, over and over, escaped its notice.¹³³

The Illinois Supreme Court's peculiar notions of relevance may explain why the state's attorney was comfortable arguing, in the *Cannon* case, that the testimony of twenty-eight other arrestees who claimed to have been tortured at Area Two was irrelevant to Cannon's claim of torture.¹³⁴ The testimony of the prior arrestees included claims that Dignan, Byrne, Grunhard, and others had suffocated them with plastic bags, shocked them in the testicles, beaten them with a flashlight, held a gun in their mouths, and hanged them from handcuffs, among other allegations.¹³⁵ The State argued that the prior evidence was irrelevant because it differed from that at Cannon's trial. For example, whereas Cannon alleged that officers placed a shotgun in his mouth and pulled the trigger, these arrestees alleged that officers placed a *handgun* in their mouths.¹³⁶ And whereas Cannon alleged the use of a cattleprod, other arrestees alleged that they were beaten with a flashlight.¹³⁷ The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the argument, finding that the prior evidence was relevant to the intent, motive, and course of conduct of the officers, and also could be used to impeach their credibility.¹³⁸ It remanded the case to the trial court, directing the judge to permit evidence of the prior brutal acts.¹³⁹

132. See *Hobley*, 637 N.E.2d at 1009-110.

133. See *id.* at 1010; see also *People v. Hobley*, 696 N.E.2d 313, 335 (Ill. 1998) (reaffirming the ruling denying Hobley postconviction relief, despite Hobley's contention that the OPS report detailing a prior pattern of brutality constituted newly discovered evidence). The Illinois Appellate Court relied on *Hobley* in *People v. Hinton*, 706 N.E.2d 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), *appeal denied*, 712 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. 1999) (finding the evidence of a pattern of brutality irrelevant to claims that John Burge had tortured Hinton, since the only evidence that Hinton himself was tortured was his own testimony and a bloody jersey that he could not show had been bloodied in custody).

134. See *People v. Cannon*, 688 N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).

135. See *id.*

136. See *id.* at 697.

137. See *id.* at 696-98.

138. See *id.* at 697.

139. At the time of this writing, the evidentiary hearing is underway. See Steve Mills, *Torture Allegations Lead to Case Review from Man Convicted in '84 Based on Confessions*, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 1999, at N1. Aaron Patterson and others who allege torture by John Burge are scheduled to testify. Lawyers for

How did Darryl Cannon learn of twenty-eight prior incidents? Although he was first interrogated in 1983, and tried in 1984, his conviction was reversed on grounds unrelated to the conduct of his interrogation.¹⁴⁰ By the time he was retried in 1994, information was available that had been nonexistent or inaccessible ten years earlier. It began with the 1982 interrogation of Andrew Wilson and his brother Jackie, who had been arrested for killing two police officers.¹⁴¹ The investigation following the police killing included a house by house canvass of the area of the shooting, in which police kicked down doors, and, according to the Rev. Willie Barrow of Operation PUSH, stopped and questioned every young black male in sight. The Rev. Jesse Jackson compared the situation to "martial law," the holding hostage of the entire black community."¹⁴² The Wilson brothers were both convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison for the killings.¹⁴³ In 1982, Andrew Wilson filed a complaint with OPS about his interrogation, which was found not sustained.¹⁴⁴

In 1986 Wilson, represented by a small, highly committed group of veteran police misconduct litigators, filed a federal civil rights suit against the individual officers and the City of Chicago.¹⁴⁵ Wilson's testimony is described in excruciating detail in three articles by John Conroy, *House of Screams, Town Without Pity*, and *The Shocking Truth*.¹⁴⁶ For example, from Wilson's testimony:

Detective Yucaitis entered the room . . . carrying a brown paper bag from which he extracted a black box. Yucaitis allegedly pulled two wires out of the box, attached them with clamps to Wilson's

Cannon, Patterson, and others have requested a joint hearing before the Illinois Supreme Court to establish the pattern and practice of torture by Burge and other Area Two detectives. Perhaps in response, State's Attorney Richard Devine has asked the Illinois Supreme Court to halt proceedings in the Patterson case as well as two other torture cases (those of Derrick King and Ronald Kitchen) until the Cannon case is resolved. See Steve Mills, *Devine Asks Delay in Cases of 3 Who Claim Cop Torture*, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1999, at N1 [hereinafter Mills, *Devine*]

140. See Cannon, 688 N.E.2d 693.

141. See People v. Wilson, 626 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (1st Dist. 1993).

142. Conroy, *House of Screams*, *supra* note 2, at 8.

143. See *id.*

144. Stainthorp, *supra* note 87, at 3-4.

145. The ultimate decision in the case is in Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F. 3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).

146. See *supra* note 2.

right ear and nostril, and then turned a crank on the side of the box.

'I kept hollering when he kept cranking,' Wilson said, 'but he stopped because somebody come up to the door.'... Burge returned with the black box about an hour later. He said 'fun time.'... Burge put one clip on each of his suspect's ears and started cranking. . . . I was hollering and screaming. I was calling for help and stuff. My teeth was grinding, flickering in my head, pain and all that stuff. . . . That radiator. . . it wouldn't have mattered. That box . . . took over. That's what was happening. The heat radiator didn't even exist then. The box existed.¹⁴⁷

Photos taken the next day at the request of Wilson's lawyer showed burn marks where Wilson claimed to have been held against a radiator, and a pattern of scabs on his ears that "seemed inexplicable unless one believed that alligator clips had indeed been attached to Wilson's ears."¹⁴⁸ But on cross examination of Wilson, the policemen's attorney suggested that Wilson had found a roach clip between the time he left Area Two and the time he went to Cook County Jail, and that he had placed it on his ears and nose in order to support his story that he had been subjected to electrical shock.¹⁴⁹

The first trial ended in a hung jury.¹⁵⁰ Toward the end of the first trial, Wilson's lawyers fortuitously began learning of other victims of torture at Area Two.¹⁵¹ The information came, at the beginning, from the anonymous letter mentioning Melvin Jones, who led the lawyers to other victims.¹⁵² At Wilson's second trial, District Judge Brian

147. Conroy, *House of Screams*, *supra* note 2, at 20.

148. *Id.*

149. *See id.*

150. See G. Flint Taylor, *Two Significant Decisions in Chicago Torture Cases*, 5 POLICE MISCONDUCT & CIV. RTS L. REP., July-Aug. 1997, at 1.

151. In a deposition of Jon Burge, Wilson's lawyers repeatedly asked him for information on prior allegations of misconduct against him. Burge said he could not recall any, except one by someone named Michael Johnson. In denying a request for sanctions against Burge for failing to cooperate with discovery, Judge Duff found that "while Burge may have had a beneficially faulty memory, the court cannot say he lied." *Wilson v. City of Chicago*, No. 86-C-2360, 1989 WL 65189, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1989), *rev'd*. 6 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir. 1993).

152. The Jones letter arrived near the end of the first civil trial. When Wilson's lawyers moved for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence, Judge Duff denied their motion, finding that, among other shortcomings, they

Duff excluded the testimony of Jones, who claimed to have been subjected to electroshock by Burge and other officers nine days before the interrogation of Wilson, in an investigation of the same crime.¹⁵³ He also excluded the testimony of Donald White that he was arrested in the same investigation shortly before Wilson was, and was beaten for several hours by Burge and other Area Two officers.¹⁵⁴ Judge Duff held Jones' and White's testimony irrelevant. In Jones' case, he found his account diverged significantly from Wilson's: Jones claimed he was shocked using tweezers rather than alligator clips. Judge Duff was particularly skeptical of White, finding that his failure to complain to the State's Attorney or to file a complaint with OPS damaged his credibility.¹⁵⁵

The jury thus heard no evidence of Burge's prior conduct. The resulting highly confusing jury verdict was that Wilson's constitutional rights had been violated, that the City of Chicago had a de facto policy authorizing its police officers to physically abuse persons suspected of having killed or injured a police officer, but that this policy had not been a direct or proximate cause of the abuse to Wilson.¹⁵⁶

In 1987, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned Wilson's criminal conviction, finding that he had visible injuries, such as burns on his chest and thigh, a black eye, cuts requiring stitches, and bleeding on the eye surface.¹⁵⁷ It found he had been injured while in police custody, and remanded for a new trial because the state had not met its burden of explaining the injuries.¹⁵⁸

At the same time, public awareness of Wilson's allegations about Burge was beginning to grow. In 1989—one year after Burge was promoted from lieutenant to commander—a local watchdog group called Citizens Alert

had not exercised due diligence in their attempts to discover it. *See id.* at *4.

153. *See Wilson v. City of Chicago*, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing district court rulings); *see also Conroy, House of Screams*, *supra* note 2, at 30 (quoting Judge Duff's rulings as transcribed in the trial transcripts. The rulings were orally rendered on May 19, 1987, four weeks before the start of the second trial).

154. *See Conroy, House of Screams*, *supra* note 2, at 30.

155. *See id.*

156. *See id.*

157. *See People v. Wilson*, 506 N.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Ill. 1987).

158. He was again convicted on retrial. *See Wilson v. City of Chicago*, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir 1993) (giving background of state criminal case).

asked OPS to reopen Wilson's 1982 investigation as well as some other files in which Burge was mentioned.¹⁵⁹ Citizens Alert formed a special Task Force to Confront Police Violence, which created a coalition of more than fifty community organizations to lobby the police board.¹⁶⁰ The coalition began an intensive campaign of letter writing, speeches, articles, marches and rallies. They spoke at every police board meeting until the board agreed to have OPS reopen the case.¹⁶¹ Protests escalated as other men began stepping forward with similar allegations of torture.¹⁶² In 1990, Amnesty International issued a report finding that systematic torture had occurred in Area Two.¹⁶³ That same year, OPS began its new investigation.¹⁶⁴

OPS filed two reports in 1990.¹⁶⁵ The first found that John Burge had applied electroshock to Wilson and had burned his face, chest, and thigh by holding them against a radiator.¹⁶⁶ The second found that Burge and others had engaged in systematic abuse, including planned torture, for at least thirteen years, claiming at least fifty victims.¹⁶⁷ It concluded that command members were aware of the systematic abuse and had perpetuated it, either by participating or by failing to take any action.¹⁶⁸ The city immediately had the reports sealed, and they were not released until 1992, by the order of a federal judge in a related case.¹⁶⁹ Upon the report's release, Police Superintendent Leroy Martin called it "statistically flawed."¹⁷⁰ Martin reportedly claimed that "to believe the department has a brutality problem is to smear the

159. See Stainthorp, *supra* note 87, at 3-22.

160. See Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 25.

161. Telephone Interview with Mary Powers, Executive Director of Citizens Alert, Feb. 9, 1998.

162. See Ken Parish Perkins, *The Bane of Brutality: Commander's Firing a Starting Point for Look at How Cops Treat Minorities*, CHI. TRIB., (Tempo), July 4, 1994, at 3.

163. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 153 (discussing Amnesty International's Allegations of Police Torture).

164. See Stainthorp, *supra* note 87, at 3-22.

165. See Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 14.

166. See *id.* at 14 (discussing report of Francine Sanders).

167. See *id.* (discussing report of Michael Goldston).

168. See *id.*

169. See *Wiggins v. Burge*, 173 F.R.D. 226 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

170. Charles Nicodemus, *Brutality Rap Hits Merit Cop*, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at 3.

sacrifices of officers who have died in the line of duty."¹⁷¹ Mayor Daley said, "These are only allegations. . . allegations, rumors, stories, things like that. This is a report by an individual. It is not fully documented."¹⁷²

Although neither Daley nor Martin took action at the time, public pressure continued. Burge was eventually fired by the Police Board in 1993.¹⁷³ Two other men were disciplined for fifteen months each and then reinstated.¹⁷⁴ The president of the Police Board emphasized that the Board's findings were based on the Wilson case alone, stating "[w]e did not make findings on any other cases. This is not an indictment of the entire police department."¹⁷⁵

Burge's firing was upheld in state circuit court.¹⁷⁶ The judge commented: "[R]egrettably, I have to affirm the ruling of the police board."¹⁷⁷ No criminal charges were brought against Burge¹⁷⁸ or any of the other Area Two officers.¹⁷⁹ No federal investigation was undertaken.¹⁸⁰ The other Area Two officers, like Peter Dignan, continue to be decorated and promoted.¹⁸¹ In 1995, Dignan was promoted to the rank of lieutenant for meritorious service.¹⁸² Police

171. *Leads, supra* note 73.

172. *Id.*

173. See Sharman Stein, *Police Board Fires Burge for Brutality*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1993, § 1, at 18.

174. The Fraternal Order of Police was unsuccessful in its effort to enter a float in the 1993 Saint Patrick's Day Parade honoring Burge and the other disciplined officers. See *Wilson v. City of Chicago*, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1993).

175. Stein, *supra* note 173.

176. Andrew Fegelman, *Cop Firing in Torture Case Upheld*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1994 at 6.

177. *Id.*

178. Burge is currently living in Florida, where he works as a security guard and sails his forty foot cabin cruiser, *Vigilante*. See Charles Nicodemus, *Cop Links 10 Capital Cases*, CHI. SUN TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at 6.

179. It is extremely rare for the Cook County State's Attorney's Office to prosecute a police brutality case. *The Chicago Tribune* reports that between 1982 and 1992 only six officers have been criminally charged with abuse. Of those, five were acquitted. The sixth—who shot an unarmed man in the back of the head during a 1983 traffic stop—was convicted only of a misdemeanor civil rights violation. See Jackson, *supra* note 100.

180. See Paul Hoffman, *Feds, Lies and Videotape*, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455 (1993) for a discussion of the Justice Department's traditional hands-off attitude toward state level police brutality.

181. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 155.

182. He was named one of the nation's "top cops," leading to a visit to the White House in which he shook President Clinton's hand. Conroy, *Poison, supra*

Superintendent Matt Rodriguez was quoted as saying he was unaware of the allegations against Dignan when the selection was made.¹⁸³ The Mayor's spokesman said "the Police Department obviously had all sorts of information at its fingertips when it made these promotions, and is standing behind the promotion, and so are we."¹⁸⁴

As it turned out, the police department did have substantial information at its fingertips. In 1999, information ordered released over the strenuous objections of city attorneys shows for the first time that OPS had, in the early 1990's, reopened nine of the torture cases, reversing earlier rulings and determining that Burge and other Area Two detectives had indeed tortured six of the complainants.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, the released documents show that after determining systematic abuse had occurred, OPS failed to act on the information and simply allowed the files to languish.¹⁸⁶ These critically important findings were kept secret from the alleged brutality victims, some of whom are on death row and in the midst of the appellate process.¹⁸⁷ Late last year, the police department's general counsel, Thomas Needham, decided that the files should be closed because they were too old.¹⁸⁸ He stated that "the lengthy delay between the date of the initial complaint and the present makes it virtually impossible to conduct any kind of meaningful inquiry into the matters in issue."¹⁸⁹ He advised that the sustained findings be changed to "not sustained," clearing the officers.¹⁹⁰

note 2, at 26.

183. See Nicodemus, *supra* note 170.

184. *Id.*

185. Federal District Court Judge David Coar ordered the information released, on discovery in an unrelated case alleging a municipal policy of police brutality. See *Santiago v. Marquez*, No. 97C-2775, 1998 WL 160878, at *1 (N. D. Ill. 1998); see also Steve Mills, *Prober Found Cop Torture Was Likely*, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1999, § 2, at 1.

186. See Mills, *supra* note 185.

187. These include the cases of Darrell Cannon, Aaron Patterson and Ronald Jones. See Mills, *Devine*, *supra* note 139.

188. See Steve Mills, *Brutality Probe Haunts City; Cops Go Unpunished Despite OPS Findings Suspects Were Tortured*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1999, § 1, at 7.

189. *Id.*

190. *Id.* See Conroy, *Poison*, *supra* note 2, at 31. Federal Judge David Coar has since ordered Chicago Police Superintendent Terry Hillard to answer questions about the dismissed allegations. See Steve Mills, *Judge Keeps Heat on Alleged Cop Torture*, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1999, § 2, at 5. Community groups and

As to the Wilson brothers', in 1993, the Seventh Circuit ruled in their civil rights suit. In an opinion by Judge Posner, the court found that the federal district court's rulings on relevance had deprived the Wilsons of a fair trial.¹⁹¹ The Seventh Circuit held that the District Court had erred in allowing in "a massive amount of highly inflammatory evidence" meant to recreate the Wilsons' actions in killing two police officers, which had little or no relevance to the issues at trial.¹⁹² Conversely, the Seventh Circuit found that the District Court had wrongly excluded the testimony of Melvin Jones and Donald White. Judge Posner wrote:

[The District Court] kept out on grounds of relevance the plainly relevant testimony of Melvin Jones . . . If Burge had used an electroshock device on another suspect only a few days previously, this made it more likely (the operational meaning of 'relevant') that he had used it on Wilson. Another excluded plaintiff's witness, Donald White, would have testified that he was arrested as a suspect in the murder of the two police officers shortly before Wilson's arrest and was taken to a police station where he was beaten for several hours by Burge and other defendant officers. Although evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to prove a propensity to commit such acts, it is admissible for other purposes, including intent, opportunity, preparation, and plan.¹⁹³

The court remanded for a third trial on the individual allegations.¹⁹⁴

The court also considered the municipal liability holding. It found that Police Superintendent Brzeczek, who was the relevant policymaking official, had received many complaints about abuse in Area Two, that he had referred them to OPS which had done nothing "except lose a lot of the complaints,"¹⁹⁵ that he had written to the State's attorney, but when he received no answer, did nothing, that he had signed a commendation for Burge, and that a

attorneys for the brutality victims are urging that the cases be reopened. See Ashley Bach, *Police Urged to Reopen Alleged Torture Cases*, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 3, 1999 § 2, at 3.

191. See *Wilson v. City of Chicago*, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).

192. *Id.* at 1237. The court found that the underlying facts of the crimes were not relevant to Wilson's credibility, and therefore exceeded the scope of cross examination. See *id.*

193. *Id.* at 1238 (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).

194. The case settled for more than one million dollars before going to trial for a third time. See Conroy, *Shocking Truth*, *supra* note 2, at 1.

195. *Wilson*, 6 F.3d at 1240.

rational jury could have inferred that he knew Area Two officers were prone to beat up suspected cop killers.¹⁹⁶ But, said the court, “failing to eliminate a practice cannot be equated to approving it . . . Proof of dereliction of duty was not enough. But that was all there was.”¹⁹⁷

B. *The Pattern of No Pattern*

The system operates to immunize police from internal discipline and gives the appearance of formal justice, but actually helps to institutionalize subterfuge and injustice.¹⁹⁸

Perhaps our first instinct is to dismiss the story of Area Two as largely the work of one evil man, an isolated throwback to more primitive times, with no larger significance. A common reaction to unthinkable stories of this nature is to anecdotalize and compartmentalize them—to assume that they could not happen in our community, that they could only happen to others and never to *us* or those we value, and that they are not representative. It is also common to rationalize such incidents—to assume that the victims must have brought their punishment on themselves.¹⁹⁹ This, too, is a way of reassuring ourselves that we are exempt from such a fate.²⁰⁰

This reaction has elements of truth to it. First of all, police brutality is unlikely to be inflicted on non-minority members of the middle class.²⁰¹ One of the salient characteristics of police brutality is that it is largely practiced on poor and minority groups—in part as a way of devaluing them and demarcating *them* from *us*.²⁰² This

196. *See id.*

197. *Id.* at 1240.

198. David Fogel, former director of the Chicago OPS, in a 1987 internal memorandum to the mayor of Chicago, *quoted in Zorn, supra* note 88.

199. See, for example, the testimony apparently accepted by the jurors in the first trial of the officers accused of beating Rodney King—that he brought the beatings on by his resistance, CANNON, *supra* note 39, at 253-58.

200. See ERWIN STAUB, *THE ROOTS OF EVIL: THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER GROUP VIOLENCE* 79 (1989) (describing just world thinking).

201. Chevigny says it is rare and risky to subordinate those who are not subordinate, who are middle or upper class. CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 12; *see also supra* note 35.

202. See STAUB, *supra* note 200, at 58; Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, *Disrespect as Catalyst for Brutality*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A1 (describing racial component of incidents of brutality by the NYPD).

characteristic helps allow brutality to flourish, by making it easier for *us* to discount and marginalize the victims' credibility, value, even humanity. Second, a longstanding torture ring may be unusual even in the annals of brutality, at least in the United States. Paul Chevigny, in referring to the minimization of the third degree as one of the human rights success stories in the United States, refers to Area Two as one of the "pockets where the third degree has recently been used"²⁰³ and linking the types of torture that occurred there to tactics used in Brazil.²⁰⁴

Nevertheless, in most significant respects, what happened at Area Two is highly representative of business as usual both in Chicago and throughout the United States. As the foregoing account makes clear, the torture of more than sixty black men in Area Two over a period of more than thirteen years could not have occurred without the assistance of numerous individuals and institutions, including judicial officers and judicial institutions. And as the work of Chevigny, Jerome Skolnick, James Fyfe, and other scholars of police brutality well illustrates, if the methods of brutality were unusual, the rest of the story was all too familiar.

In Los Angeles, New York, Pittsburgh, New Orleans, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia—in every city for which anecdotal or statistical evidence exists, the pattern of no pattern, the relentless anecdotalizing, the refusal to learn, to know, to acknowledge, is the predominant reaction to police brutality.²⁰⁵ There are some city-based differences in police culture,²⁰⁶ but much more striking are the similarities—the siege mentality, the us/them attitude, the tendency to abuse poor minorities, the blue wall of silence, and the elevation of loyalty over integrity.²⁰⁷ The administrative structures set up to deal with brutality vary

203. CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 133.

204. *See id.*

205. *See, e.g.*, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9 (discussing fourteen cities); CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33 (discussing New York and Los Angeles.) *See also* the excellent five part series about police brutality in Washington D.C. entitled *Bias and the Badge*, appearing in the WASH. POST, Nov. 15-19, 1998, at A1.

206. *See, e.g.*, CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, chapters 1 and 2; Robert E. Worden, *The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force*, in POLICE VIOLENCE, *supra* note 35, at 23, 30-32.

207. *See* SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 25-122.

in some of their particulars—for example internal versus external—but few of the applicable administrative agencies are willing to see or act on patterns of brutality.²⁰⁸ Often, the agencies are bound by, or themselves promulgate, rules designed to impose secrecy, and to prevent knowledge of patterns and linkages.²⁰⁹ State courts vary in their independence and, even in a state like Illinois in which all state judges are elected, one or two courageous judges can make a real difference.²¹⁰ And indeed, the story of Area Two includes examples of judges, both state and federal, who challenged the conventional assumptions and attempted to use the courts to reform rather than condone police brutality.²¹¹ But most striking are the acquiescence, the passivity, the overwhelming *credulousness* of the state courts when faced with brutality claims and rote official denials.²¹² The federal government has largely been part of the problem—deferring to state law enforcement agencies, and rarely prosecuting either criminally or civilly.²¹³ The Justice Department, far from looking for patterns, historically opposed legislation that would have required local governments to report data to them, and then claimed that the problem was local since the federal government

208. See *id.* (discussing weak civilian review, ineffectual civil remedies, passivity on criminal prosecution, both state and federal, problematic internal affairs units, and other agency failures).

209. For example, the City of Chicago's agreement with the police union that all OPS complaints older than 5 years cannot be used in an internal investigation, discussed in Anderson, *supra* note 106, at 102. Another provision of the same contract prevents the disclosure of the names of officers under investigation unless there has been a criminal conviction or a decision has been rendered by the Police Board. SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 154 n.9. For a discussion of the Justice Department's unwillingness, until recently, to request or support legislation enabling it to track patterns of brutality, see *infra* note 214; Hoffman, *supra* note 180, at 1490.

210. See, for example, Judge Rizzi's courageous opinion in the *Banks* case, exhorting other judges to show similar skepticism toward rote denials of torture, *People v. Banks*, 549 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).

211. Thus in the story of police brutality told in *this* article, the actions of these judges are viewed as aberrational rather than part of a larger pattern. I believe this is the correct view, but want to draw attention to the fact that this story, like any other, seeks coherence, and chooses, according to the author's notions of significance, which events and actions are representative and which are anecdotal.

212. See discussion of the Illinois courts faced with Area Two brutality claims, *supra* text accompanying notes 111-44.

213. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 106; Hoffman, *supra* note 180, at 1455.

had no useful knowledge about it.²¹⁴ The federal courts have their own ways of disaggregating patterns of brutality, including an aversion to municipal liability suits.²¹⁵ Besides, the federal courts are only as effective as is the law that binds them. Much of the problem stems from Supreme Court decisions like *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*,²¹⁶ *Rizzo v. Goode*,²¹⁷ *Bryan County v. Brown*,²¹⁸ *Briscoe v. Lahue*,²¹⁹ *DeShaney v. Winnebago County*,²²⁰ and *United States*

214. See Hoffman, *supra* note 130, at 1490. The Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994) now authorizes the Justice Department to investigate and litigate pattern and practice allegations against local police departments. See Mark Curriden, *When Good Cops Go Bad*, 82 A.B.A.J. 62 (1996) (discussing the scope of the pattern and practice legislation). However, as of 1998 the Justice Department had yet to produce an annual report. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 108). Nevertheless, some progress is being made. For example, pursuant to a consent decree, the City of Pittsburgh will establish a computer database that tracks every officer, including detailed descriptions of all filed citizen civil or administrative claims, all documented uses of force, and the race of everyone arrested, searched without a warrant, or stopped for a traffic violation. An early warning program has been instituted to monitor this data to identify and address unusual patterns of behavior. The information will be kept for as long as each officer is on the force and for three years thereafter, and made available to the Office of Municipal Investigations before officials question an officer about a brutality allegation. See *United States v. City of Pittsburgh*, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997).

215. See Colbert, *supra* note 99; see also Hamilton, *supra* note 31.

216. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). *Lyons* denies standing for injunctive relief to litigants unable to demonstrate the likelihood that they will again be subject to the same conduct. See *id.* Since the courts are reluctant to assume that police misconduct will continue, and equally reluctant to recognize that the misconduct often targets particular (poor, minority) neighborhoods, they rarely find the threshold of likelihood of recurrence to be met.

217. 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (upholding dismissal of suit alleging patterns of police misconduct and brutality, based on lack of standing, federalism, and an unwillingness to hold government responsible for its failure to supervise). See also *O'Shea v. Littleton*, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), *vacated*, 414 U.S. 514 (1974) (denying standing to challenge a pattern of racial discrimination in administration of the city's criminal justice system).

218. 520 U.S. 1283 (1997), *reh'g denied*, 520 U.S. 1283 (1997) (holding that a Section 1983 municipal liability action for failure to train or supervise will not lie absent evidence that the policymaker knew, in making his decision, that it would deprive the particular victim of his civil rights).

219. 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (holding that police officers have absolute immunity for their testimony at trial, even if it is perjured).

220. 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that due process does not include any affirmative governmental duties to protect, even for governmental agencies like police or fire departments that are mandated and expected to afford protection to the citizenry).

v. Whren,²²¹ which represent the Court's own refusal to acknowledge or act on patterns of police abuse.

The "whole story," the coherent tale that courts tell about police brutality, is a story of dedicated police officers whose sole motivation is to serve the public good. The evidence of brutality is dismissed as anecdotal and irrelevant. The coherent tale remains coherent by rejecting or assimilating alternative stories. It either rejects stories of brutality as irrelevant and incredible or treats them as exceptions that prove the rule—isolated instances of "savage torture" that constitute "an exceedingly marked and unusual deviation"²²² from a squeaky clean norm.

Why do courts continue to adhere to the narrative of the rotten apples in the face of so many challenges to its coherence? Or, put differently, why do judges so often see their role as to perpetuate the status quo rather than to provide a check on lawless state behavior? What notions of relevance do courts use when they so often relegate each act of brutality to the realm of the irrelevant detail? When courts determine whether a suspect's injury was caused by a police officer, or whether several such police-inflicted acts were caused by the department's policies, what notions of causation do they employ, and what assumptions underlie these notions? When they need to fill in the blanks to render a story coherent, what pre-existing notions of human behavior do they use to create verisimilitude? What political and social assumptions guide, however invisibly, the construction of the narrative of police brutality?

II. THE FRAGMENTATION OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT

A. *The "Merely" Anecdotal*

The idea of anecdote, understood in broader contexts, can illuminate certain pervasive and crucial decisions courts must make: when determining patterns and links among individuals, when determining the scope of events,

221. 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding evidence that police actions were based on pretext irrelevant to a fourth amendment analysis, so long as police had actual authority to take the actions they did).

222. Conroy, *Shocking Truth*, *supra* note 2, at 34 (quoting corporation counsel characterizing the acts of John Burge after judgment was entered against him and the city sought to avoid having to indemnify him).

when determining what individuals and actions constitute a governmental entity, and when crafting an opinion describing the patterns it sees. Anecdote, as I will explain, can act as both a useful description of, and in some respects a corrective to, current understandings of the ways in which courts comprehend patterns. More specifically, for the purposes of this Article, it can help us think about why judges so often view police brutality as anecdotal, non-systemic, and a threat to the conventional narrative of a few rotten apples in an otherwise pristine barrel. What is the power of this story, and how should we understand the refusal to make the connections among these incidents that would open the way for change?

Questions of which details to include or highlight in a particular story, as well as which to minimize or exclude, are inescapable. A narrative can never be more than a representation, a selection of details.²²³ Shaping a narrative means determining what events and details are relevant, which requires a standard of relevance. It means determining how these events are connected to each other, and to the whole, which requires both a notion of causality and a standard for defining the whole. This standard is most often supplied by the conventionalized norms of the genre: the narrative structure "will not admit events or other kinds of phenomena that do not 'belong to it and preserve its laws'."²²⁴ Thus the storyteller will suppress any particulars that don't "fit the mold," that make the story appear "ill-formed."²²⁵ He may not recognize that the presence of the anecdotal can signal a need to re-evaluate the existing narrative. As the work unfolds, new linkages are revealed. The significance of the irrelevant detail may become fully apparent only as the total structure of the

223. Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey point out that until recently, social scientists rejected narrative analysis as "an ambiguous, particularistic, idiosyncratic, and imprecise way of representing the world." Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, *Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative*, 29 L. & SOC'Y REV. 197, 198 (1995). This description is of course often used about anecdotes as well.

224. SEYMOUR CHATMAN, *STORY AND DISCOURSE* 21 (1978). See also Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, *supra* note 223, at 213 (discussing the narrative's ability to colonize consciousness); Martin Price, *The Irrelevant Detail and the Emergence of Form*, in ASPECTS OF NARRATIVE 70-71 (J. Hillis Miller, ed. 1971); Hayden White, *The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality*, in ON NARRATIVE 15 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981).

225. CHATMAN, *supra* note 224, at 22.

story emerges.²²⁶

Anecdote is a literary term that comes weighted with both positive and negative connotations. It is defined as a "narrative of a detached incident, or of a single event, told as being in itself interesting or striking."²²⁷ The anecdote is a story with a point, or with "punch."²²⁸ The Romans regarded anecdotes as a miniature art form.²²⁹ The term calls to mind charming and memorable stories like those Boswell told about Samuel Johnson.²³⁰ As 18th century theorist Isaac D'Israeli wrote: "A well chosen anecdote frequently reveals a character, more happily than an elaborate delineation; as a glance of lightning will sometimes discover what has escaped us in full light."²³¹

An effective anecdote is simple—it is a small but polished story that emphasizes and even embellishes salient and evocative details and disregards those that might interfere with the moral or teaching point.²³² Telling an anecdote may have several salutary effects. It may bring alive an otherwise dry teaching point, through its evocativeness, and perhaps also through its appeal to empathy. It may focus on experiences with which we can connect on an emotional level. As David Simpson observed, "We understand human nature not by its grand appearances, but by the 'minute springs and little wheels' that anecdotes reveal."²³³

However, the dangers of anecdote are also evident. The anecdote may discard the *wrong* details. That is, instead of

226. See Price, *supra* note 224, at 70-71.

227. See THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 319 (1971).

228. Aristides, *Merely Anecdotal*, AMER. SCHOLAR, Spring 1992, 167, at 168 (citing Longford)

229. See ELIZABETH HAZELTON HAIGHT, THE ROMAN USE OF ANECDOTES IN CICERO, LIVY, & THE SATIRISTS 1 (1940).

230. See JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON (R.W. Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1970).

231. ISAAC D'ISRAELI, A DISSERTATION ON ANECDOTES 16 (Garland Publishing Inc. 1972) (1793).

232. See THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 90 (1991) (describing a good story as one whose message is emphasized and sharpened, whereas inessential details are de-emphasized or leveled). Such stories become "simpler and cleaner... not encumbered by minor inconsistencies or ambiguous details." They are informative and entertaining, and therefore worthwhile for both speaker and listener. *Id.* at 91.

233. DAVID SIMPSON, THE ACADEMIC POSTMODERN AND THE RULE OF LITERATURE 55 (1995).

discarding the irrelevant, it may oversimplify.²³⁴ It may present itself as representative when it is not. Even without an explicit claim of typicality, it may confuse listeners into believing it is representative because it is so evocative and memorable.²³⁵

The "Reagan anecdote"²³⁶ epitomizes the danger, and some of the ambiguity. The "Reagan anecdote" is a masterful means of humanizing and emotionalizing complex issues of policy.²³⁷ It does so by oversimplifying, by choosing unrepresentative stories and portraying them as representative, and, perhaps even by means of fabrication.²³⁸ Dinesh D'Souza called Reagan's anecdotes "morality tales" whose effective "illustration of a broader theme"²³⁹ was not invalidated simply because some of its details might be erroneous.²⁴⁰ Thus the term suggests both an evocative and effective tool for communicating, and a misleading and untrustworthy means to an end.²⁴¹

234. It has been described as "an all purpose put down device, which boxes complicated issues and individuals into a single caption." James Wolcott, *Hear Me Purr*, THE NEW YORKER, May 20, 1996, at 54, 58.

235. See generally Michael J. Saks, *Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?*, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1159-61 (1992); see also *infra* note 249; William Glaberson, *When the Verdict Is Just a Fantasy*, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, § 4, at A1 (discussing \$2.9 million cup of coffee and other legal horror stories).

236. See Chris Satullo, *Tiny Tales Can Bring Big Laws*, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 15, 1995 at 7 ("The Great Communicator's gift was to reduce the world to a simple, fervent vision, then sell it folksily. With that little toss of his head and a twinkle in the eye, he would pause as if to say 'Let's dispense with the oratory my speechwriters have foisted on me,' then launch into a pithy anecdote spelled out on an index card.") One of President Reagan's best known anecdotes was the story of the welfare queen who made \$150,000 a year. See Michael Lind, *The Southern Coup*, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 1995, at 20.

237. This is not to suggest that President Reagan was either the first or last practitioner of the art. See e.g. Michael Kramer, *The Political Interest: Newt's Believe It or Not*, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 43 (describing Newt Gingrich as an accomplished practitioner of the Reagan anecdote).

238. See Joan Didion, *The Lion King*, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 18, 1997 at 13 (reviewing RONALD REAGAN: HOW AN ORDINARY MAN BECAME AN EXTRAORDINARY LEADER by DINESH D'SOUZA); see also Herblock, *Onstage With Two Bit Players and a Superstar*, WASH. POST, Dec 31, 1995 (reporting that Reagan "told anecdotes that had no basis in fact, but they were good lines and he kept using them").

239. Didion, *supra* note 238, at 13.

240. See *id.* at 16; see also GLOVICH, *supra* note 232, at 97 (arguing that an effective story may stretch the facts in service of a greater truth).

241. See PAUL D. ERICKSON, REAGAN SPEAKS 32 (1985); Editorial, *The Anecdote Trap*, WASH. POST, Mar 6, 1995, at A16.

The use of anecdotes inevitably raises the problem of representativeness.²⁴² Suzanna Sherry and Dan Farber argue that “even if a story is true, it may be atypical of real world experiences,”²⁴³ and that “to ignore the typicality concern would be to allow an unrepresentative individual to speak for a group, in effect silencing other members.”²⁴⁴ Farber and Sherry raise their concern with representativeness largely as a critique of critical race and other ‘outsider’ scholarship and its use of first person narratives.²⁴⁵ But this critique seriously underestimates the pervasiveness of the representativeness issue.

Sherry and Farber’s observation in fact describes an inherent and unavoidable problem with all use of anecdotes and indeed, most efforts at narrative coherence. Every narrative is itself—unavoidably—based on a choice of anecdotal events according to some standard of relevance, and on assumptions about the causal connections among these events. The tendency to make inferences about whether characteristics or events are representative is an integral part of our cognitive apparatus.²⁴⁶ What psychologists term the “representativeness heuristic”²⁴⁷ is one of a set of legitimate and absolutely essential cognitive tools, which permit people to think beyond the information given; to form inferences.²⁴⁸ In particular, the representativeness heuristic permits people to estimate the likelihood that an event or characteristic is part of a larger category or class.²⁴⁹ Like all inferences, it brings with it the danger of error, but nevertheless it is a critical means of

242. See KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 59-117 (1945); Kenji Yoshino, *Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays*, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1767 (1996).

243. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, *Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives*, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 838 (1993).

244. *Id.* at 839-40. See also David A. Hyman, *Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative*, 73 IND. L. J. 797, 801 (1998).

245. See Farber & Sherry, *supra* note 244, at 838-40; see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, *The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth*, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 652 (1994).

246. See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 38 (1980).

247. *Id.* at 18-28.

248. See *id.*

249. The other common judgmental strategy is the “availability heuristic,” which permits people to estimate the relative likelihood that particular events will recur. NISBETT & ROSS, *supra* note 246, at 18-28.

organizing our experience.²⁵⁰

In the legal context, there is a danger that anecdotes, divorced from any larger context and uninformed by empirical data, will unduly influence the development of legal policy. This is a danger which is decried, for example, in the field of tort reform.²⁵¹ As one commentator said, statutes written in response to anecdotal reports may yield highly complex codes that anticipate bizarre circumstances while ignoring the commonplace circumstances citizens are likely to encounter.²⁵² But there is a significant difference between identifying the dangers of anecdote and dismissing anecdote entirely, a difference some critics miss.

For example, one critic of the narrative turn in law stated that because of problems in assessing truthfulness and typicality, "scientists and medical researchers reject anecdotal evidence."²⁵³ But in ways that are crucial for our purposes, this statement is inaccurately broad. In the sciences and social sciences, anecdotal evidence signals an area ripe for further study, but by itself becomes *merely* anecdotal—unscholarly, unreliable and trivial. Unsupplemented by more systematic study, anecdotal evidence allows only the weakest of inferences, because its representativeness cannot be determined.²⁵⁴ But when accepted for what it is, anecdotal evidence is useful.²⁵⁵ Indeed, D'Israeli notes that neither the science of human nature *nor* the science of physics progressed very far until vague theory was supplemented by an anecdotal, experimental dimension which did not divorce knowledge from experience.²⁵⁶

In law—perhaps especially in law—the danger of the unrepresentative anecdote exists in continual tension with

250. See NISBETT & ROSS, *id* at 18-23. The authors note that it is almost impossible to imagine how mental life would be managed without such knowledge structures. See *id* at 38.

251. See, e.g., Michael Rustad, *In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data*, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15, 21 (1992); Saks, *supra* note 235, at 1159.

252. See Teresa A. Sullivan, *Methodological Realities: Social Science Methods and Business Reorganizations*, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1291, 1295 (1994).

253. Hyman, *supra* note 244, at 801.

254. See Saks, *supra* note 235, at 1159.

255. See GILOVICH, *supra* note 232, at 58 (distinguishing the cognitive processes involved in generating ideas from those involved in testing ideas).

256. See D'ISRAELI, *supra* note 231, at 27. See also SIMPSON, *supra* note 233, at 58.

a need for anecdotal evidence.²⁵⁷ Judge Posner observes that the use of anecdote is inevitable in fields, like law, where theory is weak.²⁵⁸ But could it be otherwise? The common law system proceeds largely by the use of anecdote, analogy and case studies.²⁵⁹ Unlike physics, for example, in which results can be laboratory tested, the results in law will ultimately be tested by more experiential—*anecdotal*—data.²⁶⁰ Anecdotal evidence is a way of learning about the world “out there”²⁶¹ – “the society the law serves.”²⁶² It is a way of testing theory to ensure it is grounded in reality, and that it serves the purposes for which it was conceived.

There is a tension in the notion of anecdote. Is it a story told because it is remarkable, or because it is a vivid and essential representation of something broader? To the extent it does seem remarkable, how can we be sure this is not in fact a function of its failure to conform to familiar stories, or accepted storytelling norms? How can we be sure it is not a function of the storyteller’s inability to see connections among “anecdotes” which would, if understood, convert the anecdotal to the systemic? For example, Joseph Epstein tells the following anecdote about the Soviet Union: its defenders were accustomed to dismissing the testimony of dissident writers such as Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn as “merely anecdotal,” and thus not to be taken seriously. The anecdotal was posed against the

257. See Albert W. Alschuler, *Explaining the Public Wariness of Juries*, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 414-17 (1998) (aggregating data and examining central tendencies is useful, but must exist in conjunction with examination of anecdotal evidence and atypical cases).

258. See Richard A. Posner, *The Jurisprudence of Skepticism*, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 845 (1988).

259. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, *Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy*, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Posner, *supra* note 258, at 844-45; Saks, *supra* note 235, at 1159. Indeed, the conventional notion of adjudication assigns great value to individualized, case by case decisionmaking. See Susan Bandes, *The Idea of a Case*, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 277-79 (1990).

260. I recognize that these questions are not considered closed in the “hard” sciences either. See generally SIMPSON, *supra* note 233, at 42 (citing RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 164-66); Laurence Tribe, *The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics*, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1989).

261. *Beal v. Doe*, 432 U.S. 438, 448 (1997) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Stephen Gillers, *Against the Wall*, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 405, 406-07 (1993); Sullivan, *supra* note 252, at 1293-94.

262. Gillers, *supra* note 261, at 407.

"documentary," which meant the statistics and accounts given out by the Soviet government.²⁶³ Similarly, one economist recently defined *anecdotal* as one of "the customary derisive tags for heterodox economic ideas."²⁶⁴ Anecdote, when well deployed, may be an effective tool in challenging the authority or universality of the conventional narrative. The greatest danger of the grand narrative is that it ossifies. Without the pull of the anecdotal, there is no way to assess the accepted story's continuing viability in the face of new understandings and new information. Its structural choices and assumptions become invisible, and its narrative viewpoint masquerades as omniscient.

The notion of anecdote may offer a partial corrective to such false claims of omniscience. The anecdote provides a temporary landing place, while reminding us that there is always more to come.²⁶⁵ But in law, the continual accumulation of detail, the temporary landing place, is not always possible or desirable. Closure is an essential element of storytelling,²⁶⁶ and certainly of legal storytelling. Judgment needs to be rendered. The difficulty is in distinguishing those events which ought to be part of the story from those which ought to be excluded.²⁶⁷

The challenge is to find a way to mediate between instance and theory, between the anecdote and the larger narrative structure.²⁶⁸ When ought a proposition be submitted for more systematic study,²⁶⁹ when ought it be perceived as a quirk or oddity, and when as sufficient notice

263. Aristides, *supra* note 228, at 168. See also STEPHEN GREENBLATT, MARVELOUS POSSESSIONS: THE WONDER OF THE NEW WORLD 2 (1991) (contrasting history told by anecdotes, or 'petite histoires' with history told through 'grand recit')

264. John Cassidy, *The Force of an Idea*, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 32.

265. See SIMPSON, *supra* note 233, at 53. "There can be no whole, totalized system, as long as we are dealing with real lives, and so the proper ambition is one of continual accumulation without closure." *Id.* at 62.

266. See, e.g., FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING 127 (1967); Hayden White, *The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality*, CRITICAL INQUIRY, Autumn 1980, at 5-27.

267. See Susan Bandes, *Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements*, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 382-90 (1996) (discussing normative aspects of choosing particular narratives).

268. See, e.g., JOEL FINEMAN, THE SUBJECTIVITY EFFECT IN WESTERN LITERARY TRADITION 73 (1991).

269. See Frederick Schauer, *The Questions of Authority*, 81 GEO. L.J. 95, 106 (1992).

of a more recurrent problem which needs to be explored? Conversely, when ought systematic, empirical evidence stand on its own without the need for individual, anecdotal stories of suffering or subjective intent?²⁷⁰

Narrative theory reminds us that these questions are inescapably normative. Jurists and others who shape the narratives of governmental misconduct are not faced with mechanical and inflexible rules for determining the narratives' construction, but with choices and contingencies that are influenced *but not dictated* by cultural, historical and political assumptions. There is no way to avoid evaluating those assumptions and assessing both whether they are the right assumptions, and whether they lead to the right results.²⁷¹

B. *Some Assumptions That Help Shape Stories of Police Brutality*

My central thesis is that a number of unstated assumptions interfere with the courts' ability or willingness to see patterns, sequences, causal links, and systemic coherence when they view allegations of governmental misconduct. These assumptions sometimes lead courts instead to a narrow view of connection, causality and plot, under which conduct that ought²⁷² to be viewed as part of a coherent whole is instead rendered irrelevant and fragmented. That which ought to be seen as part of a grand narrative of official misconduct is instead marginalized as

270. See, e.g., *Board of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (refusing to find municipality liable in absence of proof that sheriff hired deputy with subjective knowledge that he was likely to violate this particular plaintiff's civil rights); *EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), *aff'd*, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding a statistical pattern of discrimination insufficient in absence of stories of individual women); *Ewick & Silbey*, *supra* note 223, at 206.

271. We share pre-conscious assumptions about causality, coherence, relevance, motive, origin, and closure, and these unstated assumptions help define the narrative structures we find followable and meaningful. Narrative scholars disagree on many things, including the extent to which those assumptions belong to reader or author and the nature of the assumptions themselves (e.g., are they historical, moral, cultural, trans-cultural), but they do agree that notions like "event," "plot," "ending" and "causal sequence" cannot themselves explain how narrative coherence is achieved. See, e.g., CHATMAN, *supra* note 224, at 43; Price, *supra* note 224; White, *supra* note 224, at 14.

272. See Bandes, *supra* note 267, at 385 (discussing the unavoidable moral and political elements of decisions on which stories to tell).

anecdotal.

There is a deep and basic human need for narrative coherence, which may be threatened by what is perceived as irrelevant detail. We share, as William James said, an "indomitable desire to cast the world into a more rational shape in our minds than . . . the crude order of our experience."²⁷³ Narrative stabilizes, or appears to stabilize, a frighteningly complex world.²⁷⁴ In law, these tendencies are magnified. The law itself embodies a striving for coherence and order.²⁷⁵ Legal rules, presumptions, and thresholds can easily disguise patterns and dismiss details that threaten the continuity of the existing order. But they can also be used to illuminate such patterns and details. At times judges are open to challenges to existing governmental systems. At times they will refuse to condone—even help subvert—an order that appears unjust.²⁷⁶ But overwhelmingly, the judicial system acts to turn away systemic challenges to governmental wrongdoing.

When governmental misconduct is fragmented and anecdotalized, it is less threatening and easier to dismiss. When judges treat individuals who challenge the current system as isolated actors and dismiss or vulgarize their motives, or conversely, portray their actions as heroic and special, they act to perpetuate the current system. My goal in this section is to examine the background assumptions and perspectives that shape courts' tendency to anecdotalize government misconduct and thereby avoid systemic reform.

273. William James, *The Dilemma of Determinism*, UNITARIAN REVIEW (1897), reprinted in *THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY* 145, 147 (Dover Publication Inc. ed., 1956).

274. See GILOVICH, *supra* note 232, at 9 (discussing the predisposition to see order, pattern and meaning in the world).

275. The very notion of the social contingency of legal facts and norms may seem to threaten the legal order by calling into question the objectivity of legal judgments. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, *RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE* 178 (1981).

276. Notable examples include the federal judges, including John Minor Wisdom and Frank M. Johnson, Jr., whose decisions helped desegregate schools and other institutions in the South. See, e.g., Jack Bass, *John Minor Wisdom, Appeals Court Judge Who Helped to End Segregation, Dies at 93*, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, § 1, at 45; Robert D. McFadden, *Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Judge Whose Rulings Helped Desegregate the South, Dies at 80*, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1999, at A12.

What follows does not purport to be a comprehensive list of such assumptions. It is more in the nature of a provisional list of working hypotheses. I will explain each of them briefly. I will then examine them in detail in the context of police brutality.

1. *The Assumption that the Status Quo Is Essentially Coherent and Just.* This assumption stems from an inability to imagine that things could be very different from what they are—it sees the current governmental order not as based on political and social choices, but rather as neutral, natural, and nonpolitical. It reflects a (not necessarily conscious) desire to perpetuate the current structure on the part of those it has served well.²⁷⁷ But it is not only the power elite that have a stake in viewing the current order as coherent and just. Studies reveal a widely shared need among the citizenry to believe that the world is just—that those who are punished by the state (and even abused by the police) have brought their fates upon themselves.²⁷⁸ The longstanding phenomenon of police brutality could not have flourished without widespread acquiescence.

2. *Selective Empathy.* There is a human tendency to understand and empathize with those most like us.²⁷⁹ Judges are not exempt from this tendency, which often leads them to best understand and appreciate the motivations of those who share their defining attributes, such as class, gender, race, and prestige.²⁸⁰ Much of this occurs on a subconscious level. When judges need to *fill in the blanks*, for example, to make causal connections or assign motivations, they will do so in a way that seems natural and familiar to them. The danger for judges lies in forgetting that their perspectives are necessarily partial, and mistaking the dominant for the universal.²⁸¹ Judges'

277. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., *Brown v. Bd. of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma*, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); see also Reva Siegel, *Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status Enforcing State Action*, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (1997) (theorizing that the current regime is unlikely to redistribute power or goods in a way that significantly disadvantages non-subordinated groups).

278. See STAUB, *supra* note 200, at 79 (describing just world thinking).

279. See Bandes, *supra* note 267, at 376.

280. See *id.* at 375-82.

281. See *id.*

lack of imaginative empathy may blind them to certain motivations and make them too credulous of others. When they mistake their own perspectives for universal truths, they may feel too comfortable in dismissing, distorting, or assimilating alternate perspectives.

3. *The Fear of Destabilization and Chaos.* The fear of chaos is often expressed in the language of societal costs.²⁸² The Supreme Court expresses concern that if it acknowledges the possibility that certain pervasive patterns exist, an entire system may need to be revamped. The cost is seen as simply too great, and becomes itself a value weighing against change. Justice Powell in *McCleskey v. Kemp*²⁸³ explicitly invokes the fear of destabilization as a reason not to act, when he rejects the plaintiff's argument that the administration of the death penalty is racially biased.²⁸⁴ He states: "[P]etitioner's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie the entire criminal justice system."²⁸⁵ *McCleskey* begins from the premise that protecting lives and preserving order is the highest value, and then concludes that therefore it would simply be too destructive of this value to recognize deep flaws in the criminal justice system. Like the state court judge who refused to infer that police are systematically evading the mandate of *Mapp v. Ohio*²⁸⁶ by fabricating their testimony, because that would be a "frontal attack on the integrity of our entire law enforcement system,"²⁸⁷ Justice Powell and four of his brethren in *McCleskey* virtually plead *not to be told*, because acting on such knowledge would be too destabilizing.²⁸⁸

Unrecognized selective empathy on the part of judges is closely connected to both their desire to perpetuate the

282. See, e.g., *United States v. Ross*, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

283. 481 U.S. 252, 277 (1987).

284. See *id.* at 282.

285. *Id.*

286. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

287. *People v. Berrios*, 270 N.E.2d 709, 713 (N.Y. 1971).

288. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 336-37 (1997). "Powell's *McCleskey* opinion was haunted by anxiety over the consequences of acknowledging candidly the large influence of racial sentiment in the administration of capital punishment in Georgia." *Id.* at 338.

status quo and their fear that disturbing the status quo will lead to chaos. The judge is far more likely to identify with the police officer and the law enforcement structure than with the victim of police brutality.²⁸⁹ But he may well overlook the fact that he is exercising selective empathy, and believe his perspective is universal. Thus he is able to believe that because the current system is working well for him and those like him, it must be working well in general, and that those who challenge it must be unrepresentative malcontents.²⁹⁰ He may also believe that to preserve such an effective system is essential, and that to make systemic changes to it would threaten not just the well-being of those like him, but of society as a whole.²⁹¹

The police officer's job is, at least in part, to preserve law and order. The police may see themselves as the thin blue line between order and the forces of crime, or as soldiers in the war on crime.²⁹² They may view themselves as synonymous with "the law" and with the preservation of order; and may view suspects as the enemy,²⁹³ or as out of order. Unless they have been carefully and progressively trained, they may perceive threats to their authority as

289. See Colbert, *supra* note 99, at 570 (noting that judges generally share few demographic characteristics with most civil rights claimants); Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 22 (noting that a judge may have an easier time identifying with an erect and courageous torturer than with an unpopular victim); see also Mills & Armstrong, *supra* note 7. The article quotes state court Judge John J. Mannion, who refused to suppress the confession of Stanley Howard despite allegations of police torture at Area Two, as saying, "Are you going to believe Stanley over three police officers?" *Id.* The article reports that Mannion is a former South Side police officer and Cook County assistant state's attorney. *Id.*

290. See Kim Lane Scheppele, *Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth*, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 162 (1992) (claiming that narrative "expectations are dependent on visions of normality and aberration, drawn from experience" and "widely available stock representations").

291. For example, as Tom Geraghty points out, judges (many of them former police officers and prosecutors) may be willing to countenance police perjury out of fear that the system would crumble if they could not rely on police testimony. See Letter from Tom Geraghty, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, to Susan Bandes, Sept. 16, 1999 (on file with author); see also *infra* note 328.

292. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 133.

293. See Worden, *supra* note 206, at 26. The author reviews psychological literature identifying several types of law enforcement personalities, and concludes that the "tough cop" who believes his role is primarily crime control, as opposed to problem solving, is most likely to use force improperly. *Id.*

threats to order itself²⁹⁴—and such perceived threats are a major trigger for police brutality.²⁹⁵ Charges of systemic police brutality are themselves often perceived by police supervisors, internal affairs investigators and even high level officials like the police chief or the mayor, as threats²⁹⁶ to the maintenance of order—since they may lead to scandals that could “rock the department” and interfere with its effectiveness at combating crime. As the Mollen Commission found, widespread police brutality and corruption was abetted by willfully blind supervisors who feared the consequences of a corruption scandal more than the corruption itself.²⁹⁷

To the extent judges see their role as enabling police to do their jobs, and as helping to maintain order, they may view accusations of systemic brutality as a threat to that role.²⁹⁸ Why judges might view their role in that light is a complex question, partly answered by the judicial fear of chaos and destabilization. To ward off chaos, it becomes crucial to preserve the grand narrative of a police force keeping order effectively, and yet without losing its integrity or abusing its discretion. To preserve this narrative, judges must dismiss stories that would threaten its coherence as irrelevant, incredible, or unrepresentative. Thus, rather than welcome the chance to learn more about and address problems of brutality, courts (like police and politicians) tend to fend off allegations of systemic brutality, perhaps viewing them as simply too dangerous.

Of course judges could buck the system if they chose,

294. CHEVINGY, *supra* note 33, at 140 (discussing tendency to view the person who defies the police as presenting as much danger as a criminal does).

295. See Sontag & Barry, *supra* note 202 (reporting findings that perceived challenges to police authority are often the predicate to police violence).

296. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 186.

297. See Krauss, *supra* note 17. The prosecution is also closely aligned with the police. They work together, and tend to see many of their interests as in alignment. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 199; see also Davis, *supra* note 70, at 289-91 (describing the symbiotic relationship between police and prosecutors); Mike Allen, *Charge of Murder Against an Officer Stirs Debate on Risk*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999 at A1 (reporting that local prosecutors who charge police with crimes often rely daily on those same police to make cases against other suspects.); Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, *The Flip Side of a Fair Trial*, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, § 1, at 1 (discussing how prosecutors sacrifice justice to win, and why winning becomes paramount).

298. See Colbert, *supra* note 99, at 561 (suggesting that most federal judges are white, wealthy, male, and conservative and unsympathetic to civil rights claims, particularly municipal liability claims).

but in police brutality cases they are unlikely to do so. First, it takes tremendous courage to buck the system in police brutality cases. For a state judge to “side with” the complainant and against the police is often political suicide.²⁹⁹ Police superintendent Leroy Martin was described as claiming that “to believe the department had a brutality problem was to smear the sacrifices of officers who have died in the line of duty.”³⁰⁰ Judges may agree with this sentiment, but even those who don’t are well aware of its power and prevalence.³⁰¹ Even a life tenured federal judge may have difficulty withstanding the wrath one incurs by speaking the truth. Recall the reaction to Judge Harold Baer’s observation that people in the Washington Heights section of New York City tend to fear and flee from the police, whom they regard as “corrupt, abusive and violent.”³⁰² Judge Baer had worked on the Mollen Commission, which had found rampant lawlessness, corruption, and brutality among police in that very neighborhood.³⁰³ Nevertheless, there were calls for his impeachment from, among others, the Senate Majority

299. See, for example, the case of Judge Lawrence Passarella of Chicago. When Judge Passarella acquitted a man of assault on a police officer, columnist Mike Royko and others called for his ouster, Mike Royko, *Cop’s Verdict on Judge Already In*, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1986, at 3. Passarella was then defeated in his retention election, a highly unusual fate. See Joseph R. Tybor, *Voters Mete Out Harsh Judgments; Ouster of 3 Judges Unprecedented*, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 1986, at 3. Several state court judges nominated by President Clinton for federal judgeships have met with substantial opposition based on their perceived softness on crime or insufficient opposition to the death penalty. For example, Philadelphia Judge Frederica Massiah-Jackson’s confirmation for a federal judgeship was derailed largely based on charges that she was “anti-police and anti-prosecutor.” Pete Leffler, *Political Maelstrom Grows Over Judgeship: Specter Insists Massiah-Jackson is ‘Mainstream’; Moranelli and Phila. District Attorney Say She’s Anti-Police*, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Jan. 11, 1998, at A1. More recently, Judge Ronnie White of the Missouri Supreme Court lost a confirmation vote, based on charges that he was soft on crime and anti-death penalty. See Benjamin Soskis, *White Out*, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 1999, at 14.

300. *Leads*, *supra* note 73.

301. Chevigny reports that in the early part of the century, lower court state judges were beholden to the machine and thus would deliberately accept perjured testimony from police, themselves cogs in the same machine. CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 120.

302. *United States v. Bayless*, 913 F.Supp. 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); *vacated*, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

303. See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, *supra* note 17; Treaster, *supra* note 68.

Leader.³⁰⁴ Judge Baer retracted his observation.³⁰⁵

On a less conscious level, judges are unlikely to buck the system because they see themselves as part of it. Judges, like police officers, may have a strong temperamental disposition toward the preservation of order. Robert Cover said:

[A] judge is educated to think in terms of the values underlying legality and ordered processes. His education, his collegueship with others of similar training, his day to day experience with those processes, lead him to be more alert than most to the potential dangers of the law. Moreover, because so much of his own life integrates those values, he is, himself, threatened by threats to them. He is quite likely to react when they are under attack or when he feels slippage.³⁰⁶

In addition, judges often have a strong identification with governmental actors, such as police officers.³⁰⁷ Their selective empathy is not hard to understand, in many cases. For example, Andrew Wilson was a convicted killer of two cops,³⁰⁸ whom he evidently attacked without provocation; Commander Burge was a decorated war hero, and a high ranking officer with several commendations for bravery.³⁰⁹ Empathy in such a situation would tend to flow toward the officer. In other cases, the selective empathy rests on grounds that are harder to admit.³¹⁰ For example, although most of Burge's victims were not accused of murder, all were easily marginalized—black, ghetto dwelling, sometimes gang members, and often unemployed. And indeed, one of the purposes of police brutality is to dehumanize its victims; to treat them as objects to whom no empathy is due.³¹¹

304. See Joan Biskupic, *Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism'; Conservatives Block Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits*, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at A8.

305. See *Bayless*, 921 F. Supp. at 211.

306. ROBERT COVER, *JUSTICE ACCUSED* 224 (1975).

307. See *supra* text accompanying notes 289-91.

308. *People v. Wilson*, 506 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Ill. 1987).

309. See Conroy, *House of Screams*, *supra* note 2, at 22.

310. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, *Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law*, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (discussing judicial difficulty with acknowledging racist beliefs); Charles R. Lawrence III, *The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism*, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987) (discussing difficulties with purposeful discrimination requirement).

311. See, e.g., Lester, *supra* note 35, at 183.

Commander John Burge told Melvin Jones, one of his torture victims: "No court and no State are going to take your word against a Lieutenant's word."³¹² Much police brutality takes place in secret—in interrogation rooms and back alleys.³¹³ Because of brutality's secret nature, the motivation and credibility of those involved becomes paramount in resolving the swearing contests that are an endemic feature of brutality claims.³¹⁴ The courts must, literally, fill in the blanks when they decide whether to believe the police officer or the complainant. Who has a motive to lie, and who is more likely to be telling the truth?³¹⁵ Courts will often fill in the blanks with what seems familiar and right to them.³¹⁶

The divide between the upstanding officer, often from the same class and race as the judge,³¹⁷ and the marginalized victim, is typical in police brutality cases, and in torture cases in general. It is a divide between those like us and those we may not see as completely human; it is also a divide between those we believe would preserve stability and those we believe would destroy it; between those fighting the war on crime, and, by clear implication, those who are enemies of the state. John Conroy writes:

[I]n societies where torture occurs, the tortured class is usually not

312. Stainthorp, *supra* note 87, at 3-15.

313. See, e.g., Bumiller & Thompson, *supra* note 65 (noting that the four officers involved in the shooting of Amadou Diallo were the only witnesses to the incident).

314. See, e.g., Anderson, *supra* note 106, at 6 (pointing out that in most complaints filed with OPS in 1998, allegations could not be proved or disproved, usually because the investigators had only the conflicting testimony of police officers and suspects). See also *supra* text accompanying notes 87-96.

315. Bill Nolan, president of the Chicago unit of the Fraternal Order of Police, summed it up this way: "These guys are all murderers. They were all guilty, and now they're looking for a way to get out of jail, so they're blaming John Burge." Martha Irvine, *Inmates: Police Coerced Confessions, 10 on Chicago Death Row Say They Were Beaten Under Burge*, PEORIA J. STAR, July 5, 1999, at B3.

316. The result (at least as of this writing) in the Louima federal civil rights case is instructive. One officer was convicted, and another pled guilty when conviction seemed certain. As to both defendants, police testimony corroborated the allegations of brutality. Officers indicted for another alleged incident of brutality against Louima, this one in a police car, were acquitted. In that case, no corroborating police testimony was offered. See *Justice in New York City*, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 12, 1999, at 16A.

317. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 239 (discussing white, male institution of police); *supra* notes 289-98.

held in much respect; the victims are rarely the pillars of the community, but rather its agitators, its poor, its heretics, and those viewed as a threat to the society at large. Torturers, on the other hand, often represent popular belief. It is not unusual for them to come from the rank of honored military men who have served their country in time of need. . . . A judge or jury choosing between an erect and courageous torturer and an unpopular victim often has an easier time identifying with the torturer.³¹⁸

What is problematic about judicial selective empathy in these cases is that it is invisible to the judges themselves, and often to those who read judicial opinions. Thus the alignment with the police and prosecution is portrayed and viewed as neutral decision making,³¹⁹ and deviations from it are viewed as ideological or political. The preservation of the status quo, which perpetuates police methods that almost exclusively harm the underclass,³²⁰ seems both important and just to those who are unharmed.

In the context of police brutality, the status quo may seem just if the bad actors get their just desserts, even if it isn't done "by the book." This is a recurring theme in the study of police brutality.³²¹ Officers report that the not very subliminal message, beginning at the academy and constantly reinforced thereafter, is to get the collars in any way possible. We are familiar with this ethic, which is so deeply embedded in popular culture that it is called the "Dirty Harry" syndrome.³²² Perjury and brutality are obviously acceptable, even necessary, ways of getting the job done, and those who engage in them are assured protection from the top down.³²³ Perjury is an essential handmaiden to police brutality. It takes the *passive* forms of refusal of officers, even supervising officers, to rat on their compatriots or discipline those under their supervision. But it also takes the *active* forms of covering up wrongdoing,³²⁴

318. Conroy, *Town Without Pity*, *supra* note 2, at 22.

319. See William J. Brennan, Jr., *Reason, Passion and "The Progress of the Law,"* 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 11 (1988) (discussing the judge's "visceral temptation to help prosecute the criminal"); see also Bandes, *supra* note 267, at 368-69.

320. See Lester, *supra* note 35, at 83 (citing studies that consistently find blacks most dissatisfied with the police).

321. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 7.

322. *Id.* at 7.

323. See *id.*; Chin & Wells, *supra* note 26, at 234-35; Kramer, *supra* note 98.

324. See, e.g., Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1232 (5th Cir.

and of lying under oath.³²⁵

And so judges are implicated. It has often been observed that judges routinely turn a blind eye to "even incredible"³²⁶ police perjury, implicitly condoning it.³²⁷ Judges may view police abuse as a necessary evil that allows them to put away bad actors rather than let them escape on technicalities.³²⁸ They may also see a certain amount of police misconduct as necessary for the maintenance of order. The perjury shields them from facing the point at which the force crosses the line and becomes brutality. Or perhaps, as Robert Cover describes in his brilliant study of antislavery judges enforcing the fugitive slave laws, they have convinced themselves that the law allows them no choice.³²⁹

Even if judges convince themselves that brutality is a necessary cost of obtaining convictions, it is not clear what thought processes they use in a case like Andrew Wilson's. Wilson's civil suit had no bearing on his incarceration, but sought damages for police torture.³³⁰ The civil suit raises the even more unpalatable explanation that "just desserts" may include extra-legal punishment, like police beatings. There is ample evidence that police administer brutality as summary punishment, of a particularly dehumanizing and racialized sort.³³¹ But there is no acceptable answer to the question of why a judge would condone such behavior, particularly on an ongoing basis.

1982) (discussing using throw down guns to disguise wrongful use of deadly force); David Rudovsky, *Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?*, 27 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 487 (1992).

325. See Rudovsky, *supra* note 324, at 486; see also David Kocieniewski, *Police Prosecutor Claims Cover-Up in Beating Case*, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1998, at A25 (reporting that New York City Police sergeant assigned to prosecute officers accused of brutality filed federal suit charging that commanders ordered him to cover up evidence of wrongdoing, and punished him when he refused to do so).

326. Rudovsky, *supra* note 324, at 488. See also *supra* note 291.

327. See, e.g., Chin & Wells, *supra* note 26, at 264-65; Cloud, *supra* note 26, at 1345, 1356.

328. See Rudovsky, *supra* note 324, at 467.

329. See COVER, *supra* note 306, at 213-16 (discussing the 'judicial rhetoric of inevitability').

330. Even when Wilson prevailed, he would never see a dime, since his award would go straight to the families of his victims. See Conroy, *Shocking Truth*, *supra* note 2, at 1.

331. See CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 11.

4. *The Need for Individual Stories of Motive, Fault, and Blame.* Robert Cover said: "Every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral."³³² The demand for a clear moral point often carries with it the demand for uncomplicated villains, who have deliberately done bad things to good people. That is, when harm occurs, but is not set in motion by malevolence, the reader may find the story lacks verisimilitude; she might find the harm was unlikely to have been *caused* in the way described.

These storytelling conventions are highly problematic when governmental misconduct is alleged. For several reasons, the insistence on motive—on deliberate, bad faith wrongdoing—can only serve to disaggregate governmental misconduct. First, complex governmental entities like police departments, unlike people, don't have motives—they act with an impersonal face. Second, even the individuals who constitute government operate from a variety of motivations, not often directed at particular individuals.³³³ Finally, much governmental misconduct is inaction, or a web of interlocking actions and inactions, which do not fit comfortably within the standard morality tale's paradigm of malevolent individuals causing harm by singling out innocent victims.³³⁴

Police brutality can flourish because so many individuals and institutions are willing to delegate, look the other way, fail to act, and make sure they *do not know* what has occurred before, or in some other department.³³⁵ Street

332. Robert Cover, *The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative*, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (1983).

333. See, e.g., *Owen v. City of Independence*, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980) (discussing "systemic injuries that result not so much from the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive behavior of several governmental officials, each of whom may be acting in good faith"). See also Susan Bandes, *Monell, Parratt, Daniels and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act*, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101, 126-27 (1986); [hereinafter Bandes, *Distinguishing a Custom*]; Susan Bandes, *The Negative Constitution: A Critique*, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2317-23 (1990) [hereinafter Bandes, *Negative Constitution*].

334. The innocent victim part of the tale is also important. The fact that so many victims of police brutality are not only part of marginalized groups, but also in many cases charged with serious crimes, members of gangs, persons with prior criminal records, makes them a poor fit for the standard conception of the innocent victim.

335. In *The Shocking Truth*, for example, Conroy writes about Assistant Corporation Counsel Forti, who is now arguing that the actions of the defendants in the Wilson case were outrageous, shocking, and unique:

level cops make large numbers of small, disconnected decisions, rarely documented, and subject to minimal review.³³⁶ In some cases these decisions are guided, at least in theory, by written policies or legal constraints.³³⁷ More often, they are guided by priorities communicated less overtly. Indeed, the failure to promulgate specific policies protects policymaking officials and keeps responsibility and blame at low levels.³³⁸ It perpetuates the appearance that street level officers are making autonomous, disconnected decisions. But in fact, administrative norms are clearly communicated through less traceable channels. Police learn what it means to be a good cop through the behavior of their colleagues and supervisors, through observing how things are done, what is rewarded, what is punished, and what is ignored.³³⁹ An occasional expression of official shock at "isolated instances" of brutality can only be viewed cynically when cops known for their brutality receive sterling personnel reports which fail to even mention their infractions,³⁴⁰ and in fact are promoted, commended, and by all objective indicia, highly valued in the departmental culture.³⁴¹

Forti says he doesn't know the facts of the other Area Two cases. He wants to confine all discussion to what the corporation counsel's office is charged with doing in the Wilson case, and in his mind his arguments are logical, consistent with the law, and the best course for city taxpayers. The fact that the corporation counsel's outrage is expressed in this, the single case of electric shock that threatens the city's wallet, is merely indicative that the office is doing its job in this single case—he is familiar with no others.

Conroy, *Shocking Truth*, *supra* note 2, at 33.

336. See generally PETER SCHUCK, *SUING GOVERNMENT* (1983).

337. For example, the decrease in the use of deadly force against non-dangerous suspects came about largely through cooperation from police chiefs. See CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 7.

338. See, e.g., *City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik*, 485 U.S. 112, 171-74 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); SCHUCK, *supra* note 336, at 104 (describing skewed incentives toward inaction); SKOLNIK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 203-04 (describing decision by some police departments not to adopt specific policies in order to avoid liability); Bandes, *Distinguishing a Custom*, *supra* note 333, at 120-27.

339. See Kramer, *How Cops Go Bad*, *supra* note 98, at 77 (describing the messages transmitted at the police academy and on the street).

340. This is so even when the city repeatedly pays out substantial judgments in civil cases to settle claims against officers accused of brutality. See SKOLNIK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 205; *infra* text accompanying notes 380-85.

341. See Bob Herbert, *A Cop's View*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, § 4 at 17 (reporting that instead of cracking down on . . . volatile, dangerous young cops,

Section 1983's³⁴² legislative history reflects that it was meant to address the justice system's willful blindness to crimes against the powerless.³⁴³ Yet municipal liability law, which theoretically permits systemic challenges to unwritten policies which cause constitutional harm, has become increasingly inhospitable to claims of systemic inaction. Although in *City of Canton v. Harris*,³⁴⁴ the Supreme Court held that policies of failure to train or supervise could be actionable, it demanded a showing that the failures were attributable to the deliberate indifference of policymakers. The recent case of *Bryan County v. Brown*³⁴⁵ further heightened the requirement, demanding a showing that the policymaker was deliberately indifferent to the risk that "this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by plaintiff."³⁴⁶ Failure to act, in itself, is simply not seen as a possible cause of harm. Yet government can cause widespread misery, and has, by its failures to screen police officers properly, its failures to train them correctly, and its failures to discipline them for their wrongdoing.

The conventional story of blame and purposeful misconduct dangerously misdescribes the way governmental misconduct works, by disaggregating it into a series of individual, anecdotal acts. Government causes harm not through the misdeeds of a single malevolent person who wants to harm a specific individual, but through the collective decisionmaking of numerous people, many of whom may be acting in good faith.³⁴⁷ Few have to affirmatively act in bad faith, because all the incentives are skewed in favor of simply not acting at all.³⁴⁸ In the Burge

the department frequently goes out of its way to reward them).

342. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

343. See, e.g., *Monroe v. Pape*, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Colbert, *supra* note 99, at 504.

344. 487 U.S. 378 (1989).

345. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).

346. *Id.* at 412. This demand parallels that in *McCleskey*, in which a statistical pattern of racially discriminatory decisions in capital cases was dismissed because plaintiffs could not show that *this* particular state system intended to put *this* capital defendant to death because of his race. See *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 306 (1987).

347. See Bades, *Negative Constitution*, *supra* note 333, at 2323; David A. Sklansky, *Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment*, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 308.

348. See SCHUCK, *supra* note 336, at 104.

case, the list of people and entities who “simply” failed to act is staggering, including the other officers and supervisors at Area Two, certain doctors and other personnel at the County Hospital, certain employees at the County Jail, members of the Office of Professional Standards, the State’s Attorney’s Office, several Chiefs of Police, the mayor of Chicago, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, among others. The courts were particularly complicit in ensuring that all these actors, themselves included, could avoid knowing of the systematic nature of the brutality.³⁴⁹ The fact that none of these persons or institutions had singled out any one of the more than sixty torture victims in order to inflict punishment on him in particular does little to assuage their responsibility for allowing the punishment to continue.

The Supreme Court has made motive crucial in certain contexts, such as municipal liability³⁵⁰ and equal protection.³⁵¹ In these contexts, plaintiffs are caught in a bind when courts demand proof of certain motivations, like racial animus, only to either erect impossible roadblocks to obtaining the information or to recoil from the proof when offered.³⁵² Conversely, when victims of police misconduct have sought to prove improper motives on the part of law enforcement agents, as in the case of pretextual arrests, the Court has claimed an unwillingness to inquire into motivation.³⁵³ This is a particularly unfortunate development in the effort to contain police brutality. A significant amount of the brutality on the streets begins with pretextual arrests, and most such activity targets minority citizens.³⁵⁴ The effect of the Court’s *Whren* ruling was to

349. For example, through protection of police personnel and disciplinary records from discovery, and through the practice of granting motions in limine and protective orders to prevent dissemination of such records, even once discovered. Conversation with Flint Taylor, People’s Law Office attorney for several of those alleging police brutality, Feb. 13, 1998. See also Patton, *supra* note 23.

350. See, e.g., Board of Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).

351. See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

352. See Lawrence, *supra* note 310, at 321.

353. See *Whren v. United States*, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

354. See Jennifer A. Larrabee, *DWB (Driving While Black) and Equal Protection—the Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice*, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 291, 296-99 & nn.27-39 (1997) (citing statistics).

establish a basically irrebuttable presumption that an officer with probable cause to arrest—even if he arrests for an illegal left turn with the intent to search for drugs—is acting in good faith.

In several other ways, courts and administrative agencies have adopted presumptions that cast police officers as public servants acting only from pure motives,³⁵⁵ while casting brutality complainants as untrustworthy, self serving, and acting from vulgar motives.³⁵⁶ The paradigmatic statement of the courts' view is Justice (then Judge) Burger's statement in *Bush v. United States*,³⁵⁷ that "it would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its security are called to testify in court under oath, their testimony must be viewed with suspicion."³⁵⁸

In this view, the police are not individual actors, some of whom may sometimes perjure themselves, nor are they members of a police force that has a particular agenda and a particular job to do,³⁵⁹ but rather they are representative of society as a whole. Admitting that police may act with partiality or with a particular agenda would render them ideological and unrepresentative. Moreover, in this view it would reflect poorly on us all. The message is clear. Police officers act as nonideological civil servants. If one doesn't, he must be a rogue cop, unrepresentative and irrelevant. Occasionally, someone points out that this may not be the case. Justice Rizzi, in overturning the conviction of Gregory Banks, observed:

355. For example, OPS and other agencies that investigate misconduct complaints habitually "give great deference to police officers and are extremely cynical about complainants." CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 92.

356. One prospective juror reported that she and others were excused for cause because they expressed skepticism about police conduct. See Dorothy M. Zellner, Letter to the Editor, *Skeptics Kept off Juries*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1997, at A18. Yet at least one federal circuit rejects a per se rule that attorneys must be permitted to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of the testimony of law enforcement officers when the government's case depends wholly on the testimony of law enforcement agents. See *United States v. Lancaster*, 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996).

357. 375 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

358. *Id.* at 604. As Albert Alschuler observed, the problem is not the courts' failure to adopt a blanket presumption that police testimony should be viewed with suspicion, but their adoption of a blanket presumption that such testimony is trustworthy. See Letter from Albert Alschuler, Professor of the University of Chicago Law School, to Susan Bandes, Mar. 11, 1999 (on file with author).

359. See SKOLNIK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 198 (observing how courts treat police as professionals with their own standards and rules).

[We] bear in mind that in a criminal case the police are considered part of the prosecution team. Thus, when there is a motion to suppress because of alleged police coercion or racial intimidation, the trial judge must maintain a conscious awareness that the testimony of police is not to be viewed in isolation as if they have no interest in the outcome of the case. Rather, the testimony must be examined by the trial judge with the same scrupulous eye that one would expect the trial judge to use to assay the testimony of a party to the lawsuit.³⁶⁰

While police officers are viewed as acting without bias, complainants are seen as having an axe to grind. If the police are seen as speaking for all of "us," then complainants can be easily distanced and seen as speaking only from their own narrow self interest. In the words of two of the members of the Area Two torture ring:

Defendants fabricate exotic allegations in a desperate attempt to undo their confessions. The prospect of a life sentence or the death penalty can make a defendant particularly creative. . . . It's a lot of fun to make stuff up. . . . If you look at all the allegations coming down the trail, you find³⁶¹ everyone who gives a statement says we did something to them.

Complainants are suspect because they have been charged with a crime³⁶² and are trying to suppress a confession, or because they have a criminal record, or are affiliated with a gang, or because, for racial, social, and economic reasons, judges find it difficult to empathize with their plights. Sometimes they are suspect simply because they have complained. The very act of challenging the police seems to suggest an unhealthy lack of respect for authority

360. *People v. Banks*, 549 N.E.2d at 766, 770 (Ill. 1989).

361. Nelson, *supra* note 72.

362. This raises the problem that often police charge brutality suspects with a crime in order to discourage the bringing of charges, in order to have something to trade for the dropping of charges, or just simply in order to retaliate. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, *Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Brutality?* in *POLICE VIOLENCE*, *supra* note 35, at 247. Professor Cheh notes that police and prosecutors often follow the time honored practice of discharging misdemeanants on condition of a release of civil liability (a practice upheld by the Supreme Court in *Town of Newton v. Rumery*, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)) and that often the charges—such as assault or resisting arrest—were brought by police during the brutality incident. See *id.* at 267. See also CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 50 (discussing practice of charging brutality complainants).

and order.³⁶³ Thus, just as challenging the police acts as a trigger for brutality, it also acts as a barrier to the credibility of those who complain about that brutality.

Finally, issues of motivation are important in determining who has standing to challenge policies that encourage brutality—in other words, who gets to tell the story, and on behalf of which group? We have seen that often the courts will disaggregate police conduct, portraying each brutal cop as an isolated rotten apple. Conversely, the courts may aggregate police as a class (or even as societal representatives), raising the stakes for those who would challenge police credibility or motives. When individuals seek to challenge police conduct, they may be grouped in pernicious or stereotypic ways—as suspects, gang members, or members of other easily marginalized groups.³⁶⁴ Again conversely, they will be disaggregated when they seek to represent groups larger than themselves.

In *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*,³⁶⁵ for example, the Court was unable to accept that Adolph Lyons, a black male living in Los Angeles who had been subjected to a police chokehold, had a claim of future injury. Despite ample evidence that the chokehold was used primarily on black men in the South Central area of Los Angeles,³⁶⁶ the Court would not recognize either that Lyons himself had a tangible fear of being choked again, or that he had sufficient connection with other members of the black community in Los Angeles to permit him to litigate an issue that was certain to continue to affect members of that community.³⁶⁷ In this way, the Court rejects or vulgarizes

363. See Sontag & Barry, *supra* note 202. See also CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 43, 74 (documenting brutality against those who defy or criticize the police).

364. See *supra* text accompanying notes 119-22 (illustrating this tendency in the Area Two cases).

365. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

366. See CHEVIGNY, *supra* note 33, at 45.

367. For a most effective illustration of the extent to which police brutality affects black and other minority communities, see Felicia R. Lee, *From Some Parents, Warnings About Police*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at A18. Lee reports that “much as all parents broach sensitive topics like AIDS and sexuality or drug use, black and Hispanic parents say they talk to their children about dealing with the police. It is just a matter of time, they tell them, before they encounter a police officer who sees dark skin as synonymous with crime. They coach them on how to behave . . . most said they began the lessons when their children were 9 or 10. . .” *Id.*

motivations based on linked fate,³⁶⁸ or membership in a community, or transforms them into individualized interests in the plaintiff's own welfare or aggrandizement.

5. *The Assumption that the Common Law Attributes Provide the Paradigm for Public Law Cases.* The common law paradigm, as I have discussed elsewhere in detail,³⁶⁹ assumes the attributes possessed by private law cases in the early stages of the common law. The notion of atomistic, equally placed individuals, engaged in a bipolar contest for pecuniary stakes, with linear causation, impelled by traditional motives, and completely redressible by damages, is a notion that has done immeasurable harm when used to describe the harms inflicted by government.³⁷⁰

The common law model misportrays government, thereby thwarting governmental reform. For example it demands simple and direct causal chains which rarely exist in the complex administrative state,³⁷¹ it assumes that the individual plaintiff is on equal footing with the governmental defendant³⁷² and it calls for stories of motive and fault which fit poorly with the usual governmental choices "more often made by the interaction of several people acting in good faith than by a single malevolent person."³⁷³

The bipolar model portrays a contest between two adversaries, in which causal links are linear and easy to trace. (A put his fence on B's property, causing B to lose the use of that property). Common law causality bears little resemblance to the complex ways in which governmental entities cause harm. Governmentally caused harm hews more closely to a probabalistic model, in which a complex ongoing entity causes a predictable amount of ongoing

368. See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 76-81 (1994) (discussing the use of a "linked fate" construct to measure the degree to which African-Americans believe that their own self interests are linked to the interests of the race).

369. See Bandes, *Negative Constitution*, *supra* note 333, at 2317-23.

370. See *id.* at 2320-23.

371. See, e.g., *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).

372. See, for example, *United States v. Armstrong*, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), in which the Court elides the question of how plaintiffs are to obtain records of prosecutorial decisionmaking.

373. Bandes, *Negative Constitution*, *supra* note 333, at 2323.

harm, but the particular recipients of that harm are not predictable.³⁷⁴ As long as the Los Angeles Police Department continued to authorize the application of chokeholds as a means of ensuring compliance, it was virtually certain that some percentage of its recipients would die.³⁷⁵ It was impossible, however, to predict with certainty which individuals would be choked and die, just as it was impossible to predict with certainty which police officers would inflict the deadly chokeholds.

Nor are plaintiff and defendant on equal footing when one of the litigants is the government. For example, government has monopoly control over vast stores of information—including police reports, personnel, and disciplinary files, court records,³⁷⁶ and the ability to withhold or seriously delay litigants' access to that information. In the police brutality context, police departments use that ability as an essential tool for fighting off oversight and intervention.³⁷⁷ Moreover, government possesses virtually unlimited resources. This means, for example, that it can litigate strenuously and at great length. In Andrew Wilson's civil suits, the plaintiff's attorneys, members of a small civil rights firm, "labored for nine years without a paycheck while the city steadily paid more than \$850,000 to . . . private attorneys who defended the police, and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars more on its own defense."³⁷⁸ It is not surprising, especially given the high odds against recovery, that few lawyers are available to bring civil suits in police brutality cases.³⁷⁹

374. One scientist explained the problem by analogizing to the reasons why the average gambler always loses out to the average casino owner. He said that the gambler attempts to predict the individual and unpredictable spins of the roulette wheel, while the owner concerns himself with the quite predictable average outcome. Sarah Boxer, *Science Confronts the Unknowable*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, at A15 (quoting Ralph E. Gomory in SCI. AM., 1995).

375. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, *supra* note 1, at 42; see also Hoffman, *supra* note 180, at 1513 (stating that the Christopher Commission report "documented patterns of abuse that would support a reasonable fear by all young African American and Latino males in LA of abuse at the hands of the LAPD or Los Angeles Sheriff's Department in a wide variety of settings").

376. See, e.g., Patton, *supra* note 23, at 761 (describing the legal barriers to discovery of police discipline and personnel files, and suggesting that state judges tend to deny discovery motions for fear of offending police departments).

377. See SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, *supra* note 9, at 46-49.

378. Conroy, *The Shocking Truth*, *supra* note 2, at 31.

379. See Rudovsky, *supra* note 324, at 490.

Alternatively, if government does not wish to litigate at great length, it can use its unlimited resources to settle case after case. The statistics on settlements in various cities tell similar stories.³⁸⁰ In New York City, for example, the city paid almost \$20 million annually in settlements in 1995 and 1996, and more than \$27 million in 1997.³⁸¹ In 1997, the city settled 503 police misconduct cases, and tried only 24.³⁸² In 1998, the city paid out over \$31.2 million.³⁸³ The city routinely pays tens of thousands of dollars to abuse complainants, but rarely investigates their allegations, and "the officers named in their lawsuits almost always continue working without scrutiny or punishment."³⁸⁴ In other words, the government can operate on a "pay as it goes" basis, making no effort to learn from the settlements, much less to address the systemic flaws that make them necessary.³⁸⁵

The focus on money damages is yet another attribute of the common law system. The Supreme Court's unfavorable rulings in suits like Adolph Lyons' injunctive action against the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) chokehold policy, or *Rizzo v. Goode*,³⁸⁶ in which plaintiffs were denied standing to seek structural reforms of the Philadelphia Police Department,³⁸⁷ have forced police brutality plaintiffs

380. See Andrew Martin, *Daley Backs Officers in Death of Honduran*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 1998, § 2, p. 1 (reporting that since 1992, the City of Chicago has paid more than \$29 million to settle 1,657 lawsuits alleging police misconduct and brutality. The average cost of the settlements was about \$17,500). See also *\$24 Million is Paid in Suit on 36 Arrests in Los Angeles*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at A21 (noting that an award was paid by Los Angeles County to Samoan-American partygoers who were wrongfully arrested and in some cases beaten, but the Sheriff's Department had not yet disciplined the deputies involved in the melee).

381. See Sontag & Barry, *supra* note 202.

382. See *id.*

383. See Editorial, *Broken Kneecaps Policing*, THE NATION, Oct. 11, 1999, at 3 [hereinafter *Broken Kneecaps*].

384. Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, *Police Complaints Settled, Rarely Resolved*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A1 (reporting also that the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department now uses information from civil claims to help identify troublesome police officers and patterns and misconduct, and the number of lawsuits against the department has dropped substantially).

385. An editorial in THE NATION points out that the money for these settlements, in most cities, comes not from the police budgets but from the general coffers. When San Francisco began taking the funds from police budgets, payouts dropped dramatically. See *Broken Kneecaps*, *supra* note 383.

386. 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976).

387. See *id.*

to file damage claims instead of seeking the appropriate system-wide declaratory and injunctive relief. When harm is tangible and easily monetized, when plaintiffs are motivated solely by the desire to be made whole financially, and when defendants are individual wrongdoers, damages are a perfectly satisfactory remedy. Yet when systemic governmental harm exists, damages are generally a highly unsatisfactory way to address it. The settlement pattern illustrates why: it is often far easier to ask the taxpayers to pay and pay than to take the politically risky position that the police department has to change its wrongful practices.³⁸⁸

At bottom, the common law paradigm is based on the notion of each litigant as an autonomous actor, impelled by rugged, even heartless, individualism.³⁸⁹ The paradigm dictates that a plaintiff charging police brutality will be seen as motivated solely by greed or fear for his own well-being, that he can be easily bought off by money, that he has no long term concerns for good government or community,³⁹⁰ and that his adversary is an individual like him, of equal power and similar motivations. According to this paradigm, police brutality litigation can be nothing more than a contest between two individuals, with money as the prize—a story that begins and ends with each isolated incident.

6. *The Preference for Judicial Insulation.* This terrain has been brilliantly explored by Robert Cover in *Justice Accused*.³⁹¹ Judges utilize many devices to assure themselves and others that they have no choice but to affirm the status quo, including, in Cover's words, "elevation of the formal stakes," "retreat to a mechanistic formalism," and "ascription of responsibility elsewhere."³⁹²

388. See Hoffman, *supra* note 180, at 1509.

389. See Bandes, *Negative Constitution*, *supra* note 333, at 2316-23.

390. See Mary I. Coombs, *Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships*, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1635 (1987) ("[A] view of the world that recognizes the essential interconnectedness of people and the importance of intimacy and sharing is foreign to the atomistic social theory underlying the Court's present doctrine").

391. See COVER, *supra* note 306 (exploring the means by which antislavery judges dealt with the conflict between their moral values and their perceived duty to uphold fugitive slave laws).

392. *Id.* at 229-38.

Cover speaks of the helplessness to which judges lay claim when they wish to deflect responsibility for a difficult choice.³⁹³ Though he does not describe these devices as wholly conscious, he certainly suggests that judges have other choices open to them. When a judge refuses to disturb the status quo, he may experience himself as not having acted at all, which seems a good deal safer than affirmatively acting to change the system.³⁹⁴

The failure of judges to take a stand against police brutality is, in some ways, the most intractable piece of the puzzle. As Robert Cover said, the "statist, apologist" orientation is not preordained. Judges can, and sometimes do, act in resistance to an unjust social order.³⁹⁵ In the police brutality context, moreover, there is no federal Fugitive Slave Act to hinder moral action. Instead, moral action is evaded through a good deal of judicial creativity, willful blindness and refusal to accept responsibility.

The Supreme Court has set the tone particularly in *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*.³⁹⁶ In that opinion, the Court made ample use of two of Cover's responsibility mitigating mechanisms: the retreat to a mechanistic formalism and the ascription of responsibility elsewhere.³⁹⁷ These mechanisms permitted the Court both to disaggregate systemic conduct and to avoid dealing with its ugly consequences. The Court disaggregated systemic conduct in several ways. As Justice Marshall complained in dissent, it did so by "fragmenting the standing inquiry and imposing a separate standing hurdle with respect to each form of relief sought,"³⁹⁸ so that the injury sufficient to permit standing for damages was insufficient to permit standing for an injunction. It also did so in its characterization of the injury itself: fragmenting Lyons' own interests into individualized rather than communitarian concerns. Although the imposition of separate standing hurdles for equitable and damage relief was entirely unprecedented,³⁹⁹ the Court

393. See *id.* at 236.

394. See Lenore M. Lapidus, *Maintaining the Status Quo: Institutional Obstacles in a Child Custody Dispute*, in *LAW STORIES* (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); Bades, *Negative Constitution*, *supra* note 333, at 2283-85.

395. See COVER, *supra* note 306, at 224.

396. *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

397. See COVER, *supra* note 306, at 199.

398. *Lyons*, 461 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

399. See Richard A. Fallon, Jr., *Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law*

portrayed itself as choiceless.⁴⁰⁰ Robert Cover might describe this kind of judicial decision-making as "bowing out of duty to law to crystal clear demands," "on the basis of unclear and sometimes contradictory authority."⁴⁰¹

The retreat to mechanistic formalism is itself a means of denying responsibility, but it was not the only one employed by the *Lyons* court. The Court went on to invoke federalism, shifting the responsibility to the state courts to fix the problem.⁴⁰² But of course the state courts have their own notions of mechanistic formalism, such as legal reasoning of the sort that finds a legally significant difference between placing a shotgun or a revolver in the mouth of a suspect in a game of Russian Roulette. And they have their own ways of shifting responsibility, including waiver, harmless error, and deference to the trial court's findings.

III. CONCLUSION

The courts, like all the other institutions that have allowed police brutality to flourish, seem to believe that inaction is not only an option, but an ethically neutral one—a choice to opt out of the whole unpleasant situation. Or perhaps, on some levels, these institutions have made a choice, and are comfortable with it. The decision to maintain the status quo is unlikely to be made by police, or even judges, in a vacuum. Much of the police brutality literature suggests that many societal forces converge to encourage the existing order. To the extent that low level police officers, unhindered or condoned by supervisors, the chief, the local political structure, and the courts, are brutalizing minority residents of poor neighborhoods, it may be that these actions are part of an implicit bargain with society—at least that part of society that has political and economic power. Such brutality is often implicitly

Litigation: Notes on The Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984).

400. See *Lyons*, 461 U.S. at 112 (describing its holding as dictated by requisites for equitable relief).

401. COVER, *supra* note 306, at 230-32. See *Lyons*, 461 U.S. at 112.

402. See *Lyons*, 461 U.S. at 113. The court noted that "[t]he individual states may permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis" but that this was not a role for the courts. *Id.* at 112.

approved by majority residents of stratified, segregated societies who value law and order, who want the boundaries between black and white neighborhoods policed, and who will put up with the infliction of a substantial amount of brutality on others as long as it is not made impossible to ignore.⁴⁰³ The treatment of police brutality as aberrational and anecdotal is an essential though largely invisible part of the bargain.

403. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, *Behind Police Brutality: Public Assent*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, § 4, at 1 (reporting that though most Americans decry flagrant episodes, many have tacitly blessed a more vigorous, belligerent brand of policing, which is often difficult to distinguish from the unduly brutal or abusive).

