

Perspectives on the Emerging ASEAN Political-Security Community:
Motivations, Barriers, and Strategies

Ta-Wei Chu

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Bùi Thị Hằng Phương	Kruakae Pothong	徐任賢
Bùi Thị Hồng	Ku Shu-Shiun (Family)	林育昇
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ABSTRACT

In 2003, ASEAN issued the Bali Concord II. In this declaration, ASEAN set the goal of creating the people-oriented ASEAN Community (AC) by 2015. The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) is a pillar of the AC. The APSC's blueprint addressed several security issues that are central to ASEAN's own objectives, which are prominent in the ASEAN Charter and which play no less an important role in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). However, although ASEAN has pledged to address these security issues, many Southeast Asians continue to suffer from significant security threats. This study will explore why ASEAN has not brought adequate security to the region's peoples despite ASEAN's decision to create the people-oriented APSC.

The research question guiding this study is simple, but no comprehensive answer is readily forthcoming because so diverse a population of actors and security issues has been involved in the creation of the APSC. Hence, rather than adopt a traditional state-centric approach, this study starts from the human-security concept to explore the creation of the APSC. I argue that traditional state-centric approaches have failed to rigorously explore security issues in Southeast Asia, owing to discrepancies between the state-centric approaches and Southeast Asian security culture. The human-security concept discursively embraces both the diversity of threats in the world and the wisdom of having diverse actors address these diverse threats. Because the human-security concept is not a theoretical approach, I endeavour in this study to transform the concept into a theory before embarking on an exploration of the ongoing effort to create the APSC.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
AC	ASEAN Community
ACJCC	ASEAN–China Joint Cooperation Committee
ACSC	ASEAN Civil Society Conference
ACWC	ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADMM	ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
ADMRS	ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System
ADRC	Asian Disaster Reduction Centre
ADVANCE	ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AECA	ASEAN–EC Cooperation Agreement
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
AHMM	ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting
AHRC	Australian Human Rights Commission
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AIPR	ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMME	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APA	ASEAN People’s Assembly
APF	ASEAN People’s Forum
APSC	ASEAN Political-Security Community
ARDEX	ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercises

ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARHP	Asia Regional HIV/AIDS Project
ARIF	Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASC	ASEAN Security Community
ASCC	ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN-Institute of Strategic and International Studies
ASEM	Asia–Europe Meeting
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
ASP	ASEAN–UNDP Sub-Regional Programmes
BIMP-EAGA	Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area
BLDP	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
BN	<i>Barisan Nasional</i>
BNDP	Brunei National Democratic Party
BNPP	Patani National Liberation Front
BSPP	Burma Socialist Programme Party
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action Authority
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CNRP	Cambodian National Rescue Party
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
CPM	Communist Party of Malay
CPP	Cambodian People’s Party
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CPV	Communist Party of Vietnam
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DiREx	Disaster Relief Exercise
DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

EAC	East Asian Community
EAEC	East Asia Economic Caucus
EC	European Community
ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FANK	<i>Forces Armées Nationales Khmères</i>
Fretilin	<i>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente</i>
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FULRO	<i>Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées</i>
FUNCINPEC	<i>Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif</i>
FUNK	<i>Front Uni National du Kampuchéa</i>
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMS	Greater Mekong Sub-Region
HD Centre	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
HDI	Human Development Index
HLTF	High-Level Task Force
HRRCA	Human Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMT	International Monitoring Team
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
IR	International Relations
ISA	Internal Security Act
JAIF	Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund
JI	<i>Jemaah Islamiyah</i>
KDA	Kachin Defence Army
KIO	Kachin Independence Organisation

KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KNU	Karen National Union
KPK	<i>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi</i>
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
LPDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNDAA	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i>
MPTC	Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre
MRC	Mekong River Commission
MTA	Mong Tai Army
NDAA	National Democratic Alliance Army
NDF	National Democratic Front
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIO	New International Order
NLD	National League for Democracy
NMSP	New Mon State Party
NPA	New People's Army
NSS	New Singapore Share
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OPM	Free Papua Movement
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAP	People's Action Party

PCP	Philippine Community Party
PD	Preventive Diplomacy
PDK	Khmer Rouge's Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i>
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RSO	Rohingya Solidarity Organisation
RtoP	Responsibility to Protect
SAF	Singaporean Armed Forces
SAPA	Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy
SARF	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SDF	Self-Defence Force
SEA	Single European Act
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
SPCPD	Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SPF	Singapore Police Force
SSA-S	Shan State Army South
SSNA	Shan State National Army
SSNPLO	Shan State Nationalities Peoples' Liberation Organisation
STUC	Singaporean Trade Union Congress
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i>
TRT	Thai Rak Thai Party
ULNLF	United Lao National Liberation Front
UMNO	Malays National Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNBRO	United Nations Border Relief Organisation

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNFDAC	United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor
USDA	Union Solidarity and Development Association
USTDA	U.S. Trade and Development Agency
UUCA	Universities and University Colleges Act
UWSA	United Wa State Army
UWSP	United Wa State Party
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WFP	World Food Programme
WP	Worker's Party
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Research Background

In October 2003, leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)¹ issued the Bali Concord II (ASEAN Concord II) at the 9th ASEAN Summit, held in Bali. This concord manifested ASEAN's decision to create the ASEAN Community (AC), founded on three pillars: the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).

Since issuing the Bali Concord II in 2003, ASEAN has been developing the AC in preparation for its actual establishment. At the 11th ASEAN Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, ASEAN decided to establish the ASEAN Charter, which would serve as the legal and institutional framework for the AC. At the 12th ASEAN Summit, held in the Philippines in January 2007, ASEAN leaders agreed to push forward the realisation of the AC from 2020 to 2015. In 2008, ASEAN declared at the 13th ASEAN Summit that the ASC would henceforth be the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), and in December of that year, ASEAN members ratified the ASEAN Charter and entered it into force. In the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN pledged to “promote a people-oriented ASEAN” (ASEAN, 2007: 18-24). From 2008 to 2009, the ASEAN Secretariat published the blueprints of the APSC, the AEC, and the ASCC. Tommy Koh, who is Ambassador-at-Large at Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, predicted the course of ASEAN development after ASEAN members' ratification of the ASEAN Charter:

Our ten economies [ASEAN members] are progressively being integrated into a single economy which will enable us to compete more effectively with China and India. At the same time, ASEAN is also evolving into a security community and a socio-cultural community. With the adoption of the Charter, ASEAN could reinvent itself into a more rational, coherent and dynamic organization. (Koh, 2008: 11)

The APSC is both an *important* and a *unique* pillar in the AC. The importance centres

¹ ASEAN was established in 1967 by its original members Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei and Vietnam joined the association in 1984 and 1995 respectively. Laos and Myanmar joined in 1997, and the latest member—Cambodia—joined in 1999.

on ASEAN’s plan for the APSC to address issues directly linked to people’s living standards, dignity, safety, and security (please see Table 1.1). Thus, the APSC is an essential pillar in terms of ASEAN’s stated goal of becoming a “people-oriented” association. The APSC’s uniqueness is rooted in the APSC’s intimate links to the ASCC and the ASEAN Charter. In the blueprint of the APSC, ASEAN pledged to address non-traditional security issues (ASEAN, 2009a: 12) and promoted human rights, but in practice, ASEAN embedded most of them in the ASCC (please see Table 1.1). In addition, the APSC states that it “shall promote political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN Charter” (ASEAN, 2009a: 1-2). Thus, whether or not ASEAN can successfully create the APSC hinges on the extent to which ASEAN addresses non-traditional security issues in the ASCC and adheres to the ASEAN Charter.

Table 1.1 The issues targeted for collaborative discussion and action by ASEAN

The AC’s Two Pillars	The Issues related to these two pillars
APSC	governance, human rights, corruption, democracy, South China Sea, maritime cooperation, conflict management and conflict resolution, post-conflict peace-building, humanitarian assistance, non-traditional security issues (e.g., drug and human trafficking, terrorism, illicit small arms and light weapons, and cyber crimes)
ASCC	education, human-resource development, decent work, information and communication technology (ICT), science & technology (S&T), entrepreneurial skills for vulnerable people, civil-service capabilities, poverty, food security and safety, healthcare and healthy lifestyles, communicable diseases, drug problems, natural-disaster management, rights and welfare of vulnerable people, environmental sustainability, ASEAN identity, ASEAN cultural heritage, and narrowing the development gap

Sources: the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC

Why is the APSC one of the pillars in the AC? Two motivations underlie ASEAN’s efforts to create the APSC. The first motivation concerns ASEAN’s goal of increasing its capacity to address security issues. Between ASEAN’s inception in 1967 and the early 1990s,

ASEAN members sought to manage regional security issues by adopting the principle of non-interference and the principle of non-use of force (Acharya, 2009b: 99-143), which ASEAN embedded in two important documents: 1976's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (abbreviated as TAC) and adopted ASEAN Way (i.e., ASEAN members' commitment to the non-binding character of member decisions and to the importance of informal consultation and diplomacy among members). ASEAN's mediation in the Cambodian conflict is an example of ASEAN's adherence to TAC and the ASEAN Way. Because Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia in late 1978 breached ASEAN's principle of non-interference, the association set out to defend the principle by calling for Vietnam's immediate withdrawal from Cambodia (ASEAN, June 28-30, 1979, ASEAN, June 25-26, 1980). In addition, ASEAN used the ASEAN Way to help resolve the Cambodian conflict. Notable, ASEAN sought to attract Vietnam back to the negotiating table through the creative use of informal meetings, sometimes referred to as "cocktail diplomacy" (Acharya, 2009b: 113). As argued by many scholars possessing authoritative knowledge of Southeast Asia's security issues, ASEAN's practical adoption of the principle of non-interference and non-use of force and the ASEAN Way has helped avert serious inter-state conflicts between ASEAN members (Busse, 1999: 53-5, Sharpe, 2003, Acharya, 1997: 328-33).

However, despite successes in the Cold War period, ASEAN's capacity to address security issues gradually declined from 1997. The association began contending with such threats as regional economic turmoil, transnational crime (particularly terrorism and human and drug trafficking), outbreaks of epidemiological diseases, and natural disasters. These threats have at best degraded people's living standards and have at worst claimed people's lives. From the perspective of many ASEAN governments, the most serious consequence of these insecurities have tended to be the possibility that a given government would suffer either diminished power or indeed a thorough fall from power. Interestingly, neither the principle of non-interference nor the ASEAN Way has addressed those insecurities (Bellamy and Drummond, 2011: 186). Instead, both the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN Way have compounded these insecurities (see sections 6.1.1.1.1, 6.1.1.1.2, and 6.1.1.2.1). The international community and academic circles have started questioning ASEAN's problem-solving capacity. In order to improve its capacity for addressing insecurities, ASEAN has decided since 2003 to transform itself into a more institutionalised association through the creation of the APSC.

The second motivation underlying ASEAN's efforts to create the APSC concerns ASEAN's desire to strengthen its regional influence (Collins, 2013: 63). In the late 1980s,

ASEAN enhanced its influence in East Asia, by means primarily of economic and political factors. Economically, ASEAN members experienced remarkable growth during this period. As can be seen from Table 1.2, from 1980 to 1993, the growth of the original ASEAN members' gross domestic product (GDP) except for the Philippines, ranged from 6.9% to 8.1%. From 1989 to 1993, the average growth of the GDP in ASEAN members exceeded over 8% (again except for the Philippines). ASEAN also prepared to achieve regional economic integration during this same period of time. In January 1992, ASEAN members proposed creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) at the 4th ASEAN Summit, held in Singapore. According to the proposal, ASEAN's members would shift to liberal market economies comprising over 500 million populations. Politically during the late 1980 and the late 1990s, ASEAN notched several triumphs, including participation in the successful mediation of the Cambodian conflict in 1989. In addition, in 1994, with the support of Australia, Japan, and China, ASEAN created the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),² which was the first regional platform in East Asia to discuss security issues. No less important is the fact that external countries regarded ASEAN as an important actor in Southeast Asia. Thus, external countries subsequently sought chances to strengthened economic and political relations with ASEAN.

Despite the aforementioned successes, a series of insecurities beginning in the 1990s revealed ASEAN's inability to address certain challenges and gave the Chinese government an opportunity to extend its influence in Southeast Asia. When ASEAN was beset by challenges that emerged in the late 1990s, China strengthened its economic and diplomatic weight. China has since become the "big boss" in Southeast Asia (Dosch, 2007). Economically, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have become recipients of significant Chinese assistance, and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have vigorously sought Chinese investment. Politically, ASEAN has become dependent on China as a 'catalyst' for strengthened regional security cooperation regarding such matters as non-traditional security issues (Arase, 2010) and disputes over the South China Sea (Dosch, 2007).

² In 1994, ASEAN created ARF, which has functioned as the first multilateral dialogue framework addressing political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. There have been, so far, twenty-eight participants. ARF has served to enhance regional stability and to ease mutual suspicion through regular meetings and political dialogue. Its norms and principles are based on TAC and the ASEAN Way, and all ASEAN members periodically occupy ARF's Chair. Within ARF, the instruments for achieving regional peace and stability involve various confidence-building measures (CBMs), the preventive diplomacy (PD), and elaborations of approaches to conflicts.

ASEAN's regional profile was declining influence from the late 1990s forward, while China was expanding its influence in Southeast Asia. In order to redress its own ebbing power, ASEAN in 2003 decided to strengthen its members' cooperation with one another through the further integration of their political and security systems.

Table 1.2 Original ASEAN members' GDP performance between 1980 and 1993 (%)

Year / Nations	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
1980	8.7	7.4	5.1	10.0	5.2
1981	8.1	6.9	3.4	10.7	5.9
1982	1.1	5.9	3.6	7.2	5.4
1983	8.4	6.3	1.9	8.5	5.6
1984	7.2	7.8	-7.3	8.8	5.8
1985	3.5	-1.1	-7.3	-0.7	4.6
1986	6.0	1.2	3.4	1.3	5.5
1987	5.3	5.4	4.3	10.8	9.5
1988	6.4	9.9	6.8	11.1	13.3
1989	9.1	9.1	6.2	10.2	12.2
1990	9.0	9.0	3.0	10.0	11.2
1991	8.9	9.5	-0.6	6.7	8.6
1992	7.2	8.9	0.3	7.1	8.1
1993	7.3	9.9	2.1	11.5	8.3
Average	6.9	6.9	1.8	7.8	8.1

Sources: <http://www.worldbank.org/>

In order to create the APSC, ASEAN has accepted assistance from external state actors, including, Australia, China, Japan, and the United States, and external multi-state actors, including the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). In addition, ASEAN has provided civil society organisations (CSOs) opportunities to present recommendations to the association. Under ASEAN's efforts and with outside assistance, ASEAN has achieved several targets (please see Table 1.3).

Table 1.3 ASEAN's achieved targets regarding diverse issues

Issues	The targets that ASEAN has achieved
Human rights and people's dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issued the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (January 2007) • Created the regional human-rights body known as ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) (October 2009) • Created the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) (April 2010) • Issued the Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women and Children (October 2010) • Issued the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Role and Participation of the Persons with Disabilities in ASEAN Community (November 2011) • Issued the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (November 2012)
Transnational crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issued the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children (November 2004) • Issued the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (January 2007) • Issued the Declaration on Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 (April 2012)
Natural-disaster management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) (July 2005) • Created the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) (November 2011)
Pandemic diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issued the ASEAN Declaration of Commitment: Getting to Zero New HIV Infections, Zero Discrimination, Zero

	AIDS-Related Deaths (November 2011)
Poverty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperating with external state-actors to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Conflict management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Created the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) (December 2013)
Infrastructure development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Created physical connections among ASEAN members in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (December 2010)

Source: Author's own compilation

1.2 Research Purpose

The research background suggests that the creation of the APSC will help improve Southeast Asians' living standards, Southeast Asians' dignity, and Southeast Asians' safety and security. Unfortunately, in the APSC-building process, ASEAN has strayed far from its possible incarnation as a people-oriented regional body. Myriad examples strongly suggest that ASEAN has much distance to cover before reaching its self-proclaimed people-oriented objectives: people in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have suffered from land-grabbing; ethnic minorities in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam have suffered from widespread persecution; the regional haze problem spawned by Indonesian bushfires has had measurably negative short-term and long-term consequences for vast swaths of people (mainly in Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore); the Rohingya minority in Myanmar's Rakhine state have endured discrimination, executions, and torture at the hands of the Myanmar government; people in riparian countries downstream of the Mekong have suffered from environmental degradation. Most of the aforementioned problems, despite having persisted since the 1950s, have become substantially more serious since 2003, when ASEAN began preparing for the establishment of the APSC. With these growing problems in mind, let us now consider the three central sets of research questions that have guided the current study and that, together, help clarify the main research purpose of this study:

(1) To grasp the first set of research questions, let us quickly review a handful of important points. In 2003, ASEAN decided to create the APSC, and during the APSC-building process, ASEAN has been addressing several security issues, such as transnational crime, human rights, poverty, disease, and natural disasters, and has achieved several related targets that ASEAN set in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC. Hence, the first set of research questions: Why have some security issues either worsened or at best failed to

improve? Given ASEAN's efforts, have Southeast Asian people perceived a tangible improvement in their living standards, in respect for their dignity, and in their safety and security? If the answer to the previous question is negative, then what are the barriers to success in this endeavour? Have the barriers resulted from ASEAN and its members? Or have the barriers resulted from Southeast Asians themselves?

(2) Individual states (most notably Australia, China, Japan, and the U.S.) and multilateral organisations (most notably the EU and the UN) have been involved in the creation of the APSC: they have expressed their support for and have provided assistance to the creation of the APSC. So why exactly have they wanted to be involved in the creation of the APSC? How have they been involved in the creation of the APSC? What assistance have they provided? Has their assistance benefited Southeast Asians?

(3) ASEAN has officially provided CSOs a space where they can participate in the APSC-building process. Two central questions follow from this fact: How have CSOs been involved in the creation of the APSC? And what have CSOs contributed to the creation of the APSC?

Comprehensive answers to these research questions are by no means forthcoming, in large part because of the questions' complexity. The first complexity is that the creation of the APSC has mainly addressed not traditional security issues like inter-state conflicts but issues directly related to Southeast Asians' safety and well-being. The second complexity is that not only state actors but also non-state actors and individuals have been involved in the creation of the APSC. Even, the mainstream international relations (IR) theories that usually help scholars explore security issues in Southeast Asia cannot serve as a proper foundation for analyses of this issue. In the present study's literature review, I will explore why mainstream IR theories are simply not up to the task of framing rigorous academic inquiries into the creation of the APSC.

In this study, I hypothesise that, if ASEAN creates the APSC (most likely by 2015), the APSC will stand a good chance of not functioning properly, even though democratic ASEAN members, external powers, and multi-state actors have supported the creation of the APSC. Standing in the way of the APSC's proper functioning are four barriers: Southeast Asian people's ignorance of the AC; non-democratic ASEAN members' reluctance to adhere to the provisions in the APSC and the ASCC; the embedding of ASEAN's *modus operandi* in the blueprint of the APSC; and ASEAN's obstruction of CSO input in the creation of the APSC.

1.3 Literature Review

Mainstream theories in IR have been an important research approach for scholars studying security issues in Southeast Asia. However, the capacity of mainstream IR theories to facilitate rigorous explorations of Southeast Asian security issues has diminished over time. I argue here that mainstream IR theories are not suitable for rigorous examinations of the APSC. In this section, I will explicate the foundations of mainstream IR theories and scholars' application of these theories to Southeast Asian security issues. Next, I will identify the factors constraining these IR theories' capacity to facilitate analyses of Southeast Asian security issues and explain why mainstream IR theories cannot satisfactorily aid serious research pertaining to the APSC's creation.

1.3.1 *Mainstream Theories in Southeast Asian IR Research: Realism and Constructivism*³

Realism and constructivism are two among several major mainstream IR theories underlying scholars' exploration of Southeast Asian security issues. Realism dominated the analytical framework for studies about Southeast Asian security issues from the early Cold War period to about the early post-Cold War period. Constructivism overtook realism as the predominant theoretical approach to studying Southeast Asian security issues between the closing years of the Cold War and the late 2000s. In this section, I will briefly introduce realism and constructivism, including their respective discursive foundations and arguments. The analysis will focus on Michael Leifer's and Amitav Acharya's writings, because these two individuals pioneered the use of realism and constructivism respectively.

³ This study excludes discussion of neo-liberal institutionalism. There are three reasons for this exclusion. First, neo-liberal institutionalism emerged in Southeast Asian IR research as a research approach during only a short window of time, from the early 1990s to before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997—a period much shorter than realism's forty-year involvement (from the 1950s to the 1990s) and constructivism's nearly twenty-years involvement (from the 1990s to the late 2000s). Second, when neo-liberal institutionalism emerged in Southeast Asian IR research, realism was still a dominant research approach; that is neo-liberal institutionalism did not replace or even threaten realism's mainstream academic position in the Southeast Asian IR research field. For example, many established scholars at the time relied exclusively on realism to explore the pressing issues surrounding the South China Sea (Buszynski, 2002). Third, neo-liberal institutionalism did not trigger academic debate, in stark contrast to the highly productive debates that took place between proponents of realism and proponents of constructivism. Against this backdrop, neo-liberal institutionalism—though it was a notable research approach in the Southeast Asian IR literature—never attained the status of a mainstream theory in the field. Thus, I have excluded it from my discussion of IR theories in the current study.

1.3.1.1 Discourses and Arguments of Mainstream Theories

1.3.1.1.1 The Realism Approach: Michael Leifer

Realism has been the most durable theory in the IR field. In realism discourse, states are the main actors in anarchic world (Waltz, 1979: 95), where invasion by other states is probable if unmitigated cooperation is unlikely, unless two or more states are galvanised around common challenges or concerns. Therefore, in order to avoid being invaded, a state's first aim is not the improvement of its people's well-being, but national survival (Grieco, 1988: 498). The most effective means of survival is for states to strengthen their internal material factors, such as military defense, to the maximum capacity possible—this is known as the doctrine of self-help (Waltz, 1979: 111). However, when states over-enhance their material capabilities, a security dilemma among nations is ineluctable (Jervis, 1976: 64) and security dilemma can be managed only through a balance of power (Morgenthau, 1949: 181-215). Realism, put simply, posits that the anarchical nature of international society requires states to strengthen their material factors and seek a balance of power if the states are to survive.

In Southeast Asian IR studies, the best known realist thinker is Michael Leifer. Discussions about IR theories, however, are rare in Leifer's research essays, nor do the essays exemplify a direct application of realism theory to Southeast Asian security phenomena (Haacke, 2005: 50). Ralf Emmers, who gained his PhD under Leifer's supervision, stated that "Leifer was less trying to make a contribution to the IR theory debate than he was to making a contribution to the study of the international relations of Southeast Asia."⁴ In fact, Leifer's research was dependent on participatory field studies within ASEAN-related circles and on informal interviews with officials and diplomats (Khong, 2005: 24). Even so, Amitav Acharya, whose theoretical stance stands in stark contrast to that of Leifer, has argued that Leifer's perspective was "never self-consciously theoretical" and called his analytical approach "classical" rather than "scientific". However, Emmers did agree that Leifer was predominantly a realist.⁵ The main reason underlying Emmers decision to categorise Leifer as a realist was Leifer's interest in power distribution. Emmers stated that "he [Michael Leifer] was not so interested in the great powers, he was much more interested in the smaller countries in Southeast Asia but he did assume that power and power distribution were very important variables in international relations."⁶ Except Emmers, Leifer is widely regarded as

⁴ Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei

⁵ Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei

⁶ Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei

a realist by scholars who have devoted their work to the debate between realism and constructivism in Southeast Asian IR (Batabyal, 2004, Busse, 1999, Eaton and Stubbs, 2006, Khong, 1997, Peou, 2002, Haacke, 2005). In short, Leifer has been classified as a realist, because his writings are underpinned largely by realist concepts, in particular the concept of the balance of power.

1.3.1.1.2 Unlikely Multilateral-Cooperation and the Balance of Power

Two realist concepts can be identified in Leifer's corpus. The first is that effective cooperation, especially multilateral cooperation, among Southeast Asian countries seems unlikely, owing to an absence of common strategic perspectives among these countries (Leifer, 1966, Leifer, 1973, Leifer, 1992, Leifer, 1999a: 31-2, Leifer, 2000a). Like other realists, Leifer acknowledged not only the threat of international anarchy (Leifer, 1996: 57), but also the salience of material factors (Leifer, 1983: 103). At the same time, however, Leifer did not regard the absence of a common inter-state government or the presence of a security dilemma as the sole cause of difficulty plaguing inter-state cooperation. His arguments seem to rest on the assumption that regional historical legacy, such as entrenched feuds and long-running competition over territory (Leifer, 1980: 11-3), had been and would remain the main factor in the divergence of views among member nations (Khong, 2005: 207, Leifer, 1975: 278, Leifer, 1980: 4-13, Peou, 2002: 129). Additionally, in Leifer's analysis, most leaders of Southeast Asian countries believed that cooperation might lead a neighbouring state to interfere in their own countries' domestic affairs, thereby compounding the difficulty of cooperation (Leifer, 1980). Therefore, leaders unsurprisingly eschewed the adoption of multilateral cooperation in order to maintain complete sovereignty and autonomy. It is interesting to note that Leifer disagreed with David Mitrany's concept of functionalism. Functionalism dictates that states can cooperate on less sensitive issues at first, in areas like the economy and culture, before moving toward more serious issues, such as politics and security. This cooperation process is known as a "spill-over." In the case of Southeast Asia, however, Leifer argued that regional states showed little willingness to cooperate on straightforward issues, let alone collaboration on more sensitive issues (Leifer, 1975: 278-83).

Leifer's other realist notion is the balance of power. His use of the idea to explain Southeast Asian security issues, however, has drawn out both discussion and criticism (Acharya, 2005, Eaton and Stubbs, 2006, Haacke, 2003, Khong, 1997, Peou, 2002: 125-30). According to Leifer's realist argument, given severe intra-regional differences, countries facing direct challenges or potential concerns are unlikely to embrace multilateral

cooperation. Nevertheless, in the past, many regional states were badly in need of national stability, since they worried that the aggressiveness of any given state was a threat to their own national survival. Insofar as multilateral-cooperation was unlikely, bilateral cooperation based on the principle of balance of power became the primary option for regional states. Balance of power requires that all sides have shared goals or that they can achieve individual national interests through proposed cooperation. In Leifer's series of Southeast Asian security texts, he used examples to prove that many countries in the region cooperated with neighbouring countries or external powers using the principle of balance of power. For example, in the 1960s, the governments in Singapore and Malaysia as embryonic independent states subscribed to the operative notion that British presence on their territory was beneficial to their own national security and stability, since deployment of British troops there could mitigate potential concerns (Leifer, 1966: 220-1). In 1977, Malaysia and Thailand engaged in military cooperation because they faced a common threat from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which was supported by the Chinese Communist regime (Leifer, 1992: 381). Indonesia's acceptance of the United States as an informal defence partner, and India as a formal ASEAN dialogue partner, exemplifies the Indonesian balance-of-power policy against the rising power of China (Leifer, 1999b: 102). By the same logic, Singapore's vulnerability in terms of natural resources and geographical proximity (Singapore being located between Malaysia and Indonesia) prompted the country's leadership to support the United States' influential presence in Southeast Asia (Leifer, 2000b: 100-8).

1.3.1.1.3 The Constructivism Approach: Amitav Acharya

Constructivism is the alternative to realism in IR theory. Like realism, constructivism treats the state as an important actor in world affairs. Alexander Wendt argued that one of the main principles of constructivism is that "states are the principal units of analysis for inter-national political theory" (Wendt, 1994: 385). In addition, Martha Finnemore's constructivism argument—"states are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interest by international organizations" (Finnemore, 1996: 5)—is based on the approach that treats states as the basic analytical unit (Finnemore, 1996). However, unlike realism's claim that the world is essentially in a state of anarchy, constructivism argues that anarchy is not immutable but "what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). Under this theory, states' interactions fall into the categories of enmity, rivalry, and friendship, or Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures (Wendt, 1999: 246-312). Against this backdrop, hostility and cooperation can be seen in the interactions between countries. Therefore, studying states' behaviour or national interests via

material factors is insufficient. Also of importance are ideational factors: norms and identities. Norms help states “to distinguish between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour” (Acharya, 2009b: 26, see also Kratochwill, 1989: 70), which can reduce uncertainty among states (Hopf, 1998: 178), and identities allow states to determine “who I am/ who we are” (Wendt, 1994: 385), which can help knit states together.

Constructivism is the other important approach in Southeast Asian IR. The study of Southeast Asian security issues focuses specifically on ideational factors: norms and identities. Scholars have used norms and identities to explore security and diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. For example, Nikolas Busse argues that ASEAN’s successful management of the Cambodian conflict stemmed in large measure from ASEAN’s decision to adopt TAC, which has become ASEAN’s norms for addressing regional security issues (Busse, 1999: 48-51). Likewise, Nguyễn Vũ Tùng explains that one of the key points promoting the Vietnamese government to join ASEAN was its norm known commonly as the principle of non-interference (Tùng, 2007). Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs’ essay argues that ASEAN is a powerful regional organisation because of its diffuse norms: namely, TAC and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Realism posits that power comes from strong material capabilities compelling other actors to do what they would otherwise be unwilling to do, and yet, ASEAN as a body has significantly smaller material forces at its disposal than does China, India, or certainly the United States. However, external powers accept and follow ASEAN’s norms. The ratification of TAC by China, India, Japan, and South Korea exemplifies the success of ASEAN in this regard (Eaton and Stubbs, 2006).

It is reasonable to argue that Amitav Acharya,⁷ the prolific writer on Southeast Asian

⁷ Some may argue that Acharya is an anti-state centrist scholar. Acharya and Richard have argued that, although the “state is a first point of reference,” it is not “the only or ultimately the most important actor” (Acharya and Stubbs, 2006: 132). In addition, Acharya also suggested that, in the realm of Southeast Asian IR, we should pay considerably more attention to the *woods* (i.e., a region) than to the *trees* (i.e., states) (Acharya, 2005: 106). Indeed, on the face of it, Acharya comes across as a researcher who has promoted a holistic approach to Southeast Asian security issues. What is more, none of his works pay particular attention to the policies and strategies of individual states. However, this observation is not to say that states are insignificant in his works. Instead and indeed, states are desiderata. The ASEAN Way exemplifies the critical role played by states in his works. As discussed previously, the ASEAN Way reflects a set of principles underlying ASEAN’s norms and identities—principles that arose from Indonesian villages and were accepted by ASEAN members as constituting the negotiation model optimal for addressing diverse security problems. This fact leads to the following question: if ASEAN members were to resist the ASEAN Way as the optimal model for negotiations, would the strength of ASEAN’s norms and identities come into question? The answer is impossible to answer

norms and identities, typifies the mainstream perspectives of constructivist researchers in the field of Southeast Asian IR (Acharya, 2009b, Acharya, 2005, Acharya, 2009a, Acharya, 2000, Acharya, 1997, Acharya, 1998b, Acharya, 1998a, Acharya, 2004b). In the context of Southeast Asian security research, Acharya's work is antithetical to Leifer's, although the positions of both authors are consistent with each other regarding the argument that intra-regional differences in both Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2009b: 54) and East Asia (Acharya, 1997: 322) have resulted in unlikely multilateral cooperation. Another point of agreement between the two authors' arguments is that other states' aggressive policies and behaviors constitute the most pressing national-security concern (Acharya, 1999). However, in contrast to Leifer's distinct pessimism, Acharya argues that the foundation of optimism characterising ASEAN can successfully counter seemingly insurmountable difficulties (Acharya, 1997: 320-4).

1.3.1.1.4 The Concept of Norms and Identities

According to Acharya, the principles of non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of an independent country constitute ASEAN's fundamental norms. These norms have been "a code of conduct for inter-state behaviours" (Acharya, 1997: 328), which can be found in the provisions of TAC (ASEAN, February 24, 1976b), initially ratified by the original five ASEAN members in 1976. The norms have guided ASEAN's handling of regional problems, in particular security and political issues. Again, according Acharya, the non-use of force is that ASEAN peacefully settle regional problems (Acharya, 2009b: 58-61) and the principle of non-interference requires that member-states (1) refrain "from criticising the actions of a member government towards its own people"; (2) criticise "the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference principle"; (3) deny "recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state"; and (4) provide "political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilising activities" (Acharya, 2009b: 72). Acharya regarded Vietnam's military intervention in Kampuchea in November 1978 "as a gross violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as well as the principle of non-use of force in interstate relations" (Acharya, 2009b: 116). Thus, ASEAN

because states are the most basic building blocks in support of norm-and-identity creation. Without states' unanimous acceptance of a model, the development of norms and identities within Southeast Asia would necessarily fail. Therefore, despite Acharya's emphasis on the *woods*, the *trees* remain the underpinning of his writings. Without *trees*, Acharya's academic discourse on constructivism would likely never have taken shape.

actively played mediator in the Cambodian conflict. For example, ASEAN members adopted “Cocktail Diplomacy,” which allowed the Vietnamese and Cambodian factions to sit around a table and discuss the situation (Acharya, 2009b: 112-3).

Also, Acharya regards ASEAN’s consensual and informal decision-making process as part of ASEAN’s identity. ASEAN’s decision-making process has followed the principles of informality and consultation (*musyawarah*) and consensus (*mufakat*) stemming from the informal, relaxed discussion process of Javanese village society (Acharya, 2009a: 82). The purpose of informality is to create a comfortable meeting environment where member states can cooperate with one another. It is hardly surprising, then, that ASEAN members avoid both publicly identifying who is a threat or a concern (Acharya, 1997: 336, Acharya, 1998b: 61, Acharya, 1999: 131) and discussing sensitive issues among fellow members (Acharya, 1997: 332). From these facts, it is reasonable to imagine that a military alliance in Southeast Asia would be unlikely (Acharya, 1997: 331). Under the model of consultation and consensus, moreover, every state’s interests are considered and each perspective expressed, because decision-making does not require unanimity (Acharya, 1998b: 62-3). An even more important facet of this issue is that, in the effort to achieve the lowest common denominator or agreement, ASEAN members usually negotiate with each other before engaging with external powers on sensitive security issues. This tactic can weaken intra-regional differences between Southeast Asian countries, which result in unlikely instances of multilateral cooperation (Acharya, 1998b: 63).

1.3.1.2 The Two Theories’ Gradually Reduced Capacity to Facilitate Analysis of Southeast Asian Security Issues

Realism and constructivism have become mainstream theories among scholars whose interests are Southeast Asian security issues, the two most prominent of which are regional security affairs (Simon, 1992, Emmers, 2005b, Buszynski, 1990, Busse, 1999) and security relations with external powers (particularly the relationships between ASEAN and China) (Ba, 2006, Dosch, 2007, Stubbs, 2008, Buszynski, 2002). In addition, adherents to realism and adherents to constructivism have had intense debates regarding Southeast Asian security issues (Acharya, 2005, Jones and Smith, 2002, Khong, 1997, Khong, 2005, Khoo, 2004). Although realism and constructivism have successfully helped explain Southeast Asian security issues, the capacity of these two theories to facilitate rigorous explorations of security issues has come into question. I argue that the main cause of the two theories’ declining popularity has to do with discrepancies between each of the two theories, taken

singly, and actual Southeast Asian security culture. In the next section, I will explore why these theories can help researchers rigorously analyse Southeast Asian security issues dating from the period between the 1950s and the late 1990s, but why these same theories are less than adequate for analysing the same types of issues as they have emerged in more recent years.

*1.3.1.2.1 Theoretical Discourse in Line with Security Culture in Southeast Asia*⁸

Realism and constructivism have successfully helped explain Southeast Asian security issues because each theory has been notably applicable to the region's security culture. From the Cold War period to the late 1990s, security culture in Southeast Asia was state-centric. During this time, regional states adopted a comprehensive security approach—particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. According to basic assumptions about comprehensive security, national insecurities stem not only from the military development and aggressive policies of other states, but also from economic and social instability on the domestic front (Emmers, 2009: 161). States concluded that in order to achieve national stability, they must ensure economic and social development domestically, an objective known as national resilience (*ketahanan nasional*). After states reached their national resilience, emergence of regional resilience could be expected (Emmers, 2009: 162).

At first glance, this concept seems people-oriented, because a region's nations would treat insecurities extending beyond the scope of military matters and into the realm of people's well-being and security (Nishikawa, 2010: 55). In fact, comprehensive security was still state-centric. There were two reasons for this characteristic. First, after ASEAN members adopted a comprehensive security approach in 1970, regimes' leaders remained concerned

⁸ So far, although few scholars of security studies have directly define the term "security culture," it has emerged in Jörn Dosch's and Jürgen Haacke's research. According to their research, security culture refers to states' ways of calculating the seriousness of diverse kinds of security and of responding particularly to the most pressing security issues. This phenomenon is not static but evolving (Dosch, 2003, Haacke, 2003). For example, according to Jörn Dosch, Southeast Asian security culture in the Cold War period rested on a general perception among regional countries—especially ASEAN members—that "traditional" security issues like the Cambodian conflict involved fundamental security threats capable of destabilising national security, and thus, ASEAN members used their methods of informal consultation and diplomacy to manage these security issues (Dosch, 2003: 486-8). However, since the end of the Cold War, this security culture has gradually changed: ASEAN members have come to regard non-traditional security issues as important in their own right (Dosch, 2003: 485). Given the fact that security culture had gradually changed in Southeast Asia, Jörn Dosch argued that ASEAN members had been adopting open and institutionalised ways of handling security issues (Dosch, 2003: 485).

mainly with national-security threats involving other states' aggressive policies and behaviours (Acharya, 2009b: 64). For example, original ASEAN members regarded China as a potential concern, because the Chinese government expressed sympathy for Southeast Asia's ethnic Chinese, many of whom had suffered unfair treatment at the hands of local governments (Leifer, 1980: 13). In addition, the Chinese government had staked a claim to the oil-rich Spratly Islands (Leifer, 1997: 157). These cases prompted ASEAN members to suspect the Chinese government of interfering in their domestic affairs and of challenging their national sovereignty (Acharya, 2009b: 66, 69). The second reason for comprehensive security's state-centrism had to do with states' role as the main actors addressing potential concerns. States' preferred methods for addressing these concerns reflected the principles guiding the "balance of power" theory and the "development of norms and identities" theory. For example, in order to counterbalance the unprecedented rise of China, on the one hand, ASEAN members established close military and political relationships with external powers, yet on the other hand, ASEAN encouraged the Chinese government to join ARF, whose *modus operandi* had been based on ASEAN's norms and identities. Thus, I argue that although ASEAN members adopted a comprehensive security approach, their main concern in the Cold War period remained other countries' aggressive behaviour, in resistance to which only states—not other types of actors—could successfully take action.

During this period in Southeast Asian security culture, researchers could conduct rigorous analyses of security issues on the basis of realism and constructivism because the two theories are identical to each other—that is, the two theories are state-centric. In Leifer's analysis, states are the source of threats (please see 1.3.1.1.2 section) and states are the only actor capable of adequately addressing threats (through skillful applications of balances of power and military might). In Acharya's analysis, the primary source of threats is from state and states are the only actor capable of adequately addressing threats (through the developments of norms and identities). The difference between Acharya and Leifer lies in their views on the methods that states adopt to address state-sourced threats. Because security culture in Southeast Asia from the Cold War period to the late 1990s was steeped in a state-centric discourse, and because the analytical frameworks of realism and constructivism have always been state-centric approaches, both realism and constructivism were—and remain—roundly applicable to research on related security issues dating from this period.

1.3.1.2.2 A Theoretical Discourse Out of Step with Security Culture in Recent Southeast Asia
State-centric security culture has gradually changed since 1997. Incidents including the 1997

financial meltdown, the deadly terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, subsequent terrorist attacks in Indonesia, the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 have served as catalysts for this change (Acharya, 2007: 22-6, Dosch, 2003: 489-93). These crises led to crippling fiscal problems, greater income disparities, and widespread unemployment. These calamities severely affected individuals and countries. In addition, many countries in Southeast Asia were being beset by transnational crimes, like drug trafficking, human trafficking, and serious environmental issues, which individually and cumulatively degraded people's quality of life. Therefore, with all of these myriad and untested stresses coming to bear, ASEAN members had to start paying attention to new security challenges that were qualitatively different from previous challenges insofar as the welfare of human beings was becoming a significant focus in the ASEAN agenda.

However, there was a discrepancy between each of the two dominant theories and the developing human-centric Southeast Asian security culture. Threats in the new security culture ran the gamut from unpredictable phenomena, such as pandemic outbreaks and natural disasters, to intractable non-state human threats, such as religious fundamentalists, drug traffickers, and warlords, whose networks are typically supra-national. The diverse origins of these new threats rocked the foundations of both realism and constructivism, which declare that threats arise only from states. In addition, in the new Southeast Asian security culture, states are not the only actor to address threats. Solving challenges beyond state borders necessitates cooperation with other actors, such as regional, international, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Katsumata, 2004: 240-1), because the negative effects of these new threats can spread across regions and indeed around the world. Therefore, individual states on their own cannot satisfactorily rise to these challenges. For example, after 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, individual states, regional and international organisations, and NGOs participated in the tasks of aid and reconstruction (Jayasuriya and McCawley, 2010).

The diverse origins of threats have rendered the two theories' methodological foundations essentially ineffective. In the realm of realism, material factors do not provide a feasible way of eradicating many related problems. An increase in countries' material strength is by no means a guarantee that they can avoid the negative effects of pressing threats such as epidemiological diseases and natural disasters. Moreover, countries need not pursue a balance of power to countervail unpredictable phenomena. Instead, countries should cooperate more extensively with counterparts, particularly regarding exchanges of information and cross-

border educational efforts.

In the realm of constructivism, the establishment of norms and identities cannot adequately resolve threats of diverse origins either. When crises spread, most countries find themselves in a difficult situation where they must respond immediately and appropriately. The chief motivation underlying countries' cooperation with one another is the need for immediate action in response to critical, direct threats. Two examples of such threats are SARS, which struck Asian regions in mid-November 2002, and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. As an aside, it is important to note that ideational factors may sometimes compound problems because of the required period of lengthy consultation (Elliott, 2003: 45). In cases involving crises, neither norms nor identities are necessary for cross-country cooperation, since the impetus for inter-state cooperation is a given problem's degree of urgency rather than ideational factors.

1.3.1.3 Discrepancies between the Mainstream IR Theories and the APSC

According to the above analysis, I have shown that the capacity of mainstream IR theories to facilitate rigorous explorations of Southeast Asian security issues has diminished because of discrepancies between each of the two theories and actual Southeast Asian security culture. However, it has yet to be explained in precise terms why the mainstream theories are limited in exploring specifically the creation of the APSC.

I argue that the main cause of the two theories' limitations in this regard is the APSC's status as a product of human-centric security culture in Southeast Asia. The APSC has several human-centric features. The first feature is that the target of the creation of the APSC is to improve people's living standards, enhance people's dignity, and protect people's safety and security. This target indicates that ASEAN has paid attention to Southeast Asian people. The second feature is that different actors have been involved in the creation of the APSC. Both ASEAN *qua* regional organisation and ASEAN's members are absolutely actors involved in the creation of the APSC. Also, Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the UN, and the United States have offered their support and assistances regarding the creation of the APSC. CSOs have been involved, as well, in the creation of the APSC. Thus, the actors participating the APSC's establishment have included—but not been limited to—states. The first and second features of the APSC indicate that the creation of the APSC has rested on the participation of three tiers of actors: individuals, state actors, and non-state actors. More precisely, individuals' security has been a target of the APSC, and state- and non-state actors have played roles in achieving the target. Diverse actors' involvement in security issues are in line with the

human-centric quality of the current Southeast Asian security culture. The third feature is that the insecurities that ASEAN listed in the blueprints of the APSC and ASCC derive not so much from states as from unpredictable phenomena and non-state human threats. Likewise, in Southeast Asia's new security culture, the types of threats are various.

The human-centric qualities of the APSC have pointed to important discrepancies between each of the mainstream IR theories and the creation of the APSC. The first discrepancy concerns the mainstream IR theories' nearly exclusive focus on the state. A preoccupation with the well-being of human beings, as such, has never been the central theme in discourses hailing from the mainstream IR theories: in realism, people's safety is necessarily dependent on their nation's security (Waltz, 1979); and as for constructivism, it emphasises above all else interactions among states and does so on the basis of norms and identities (Wendt, 1999). The second discrepancy between the theories and the APSC issue is the theories' assumption that states must be the main actor to address insecurities. Regarding this point, I agree that the mainstream IR theories can help explain why state actors have decided to be involved in the creation of the APSC. However, one point that we should not ignore is that the discourses of the mainstream IR theories have generally omitted non-state actors' role in efforts to address Southeast Asian insecurities.⁹ Thus, purist applications of mainstream IR theories cannot but overlook—or at best neglect—the roles of CSOs in the APSC issue. Third, the discourses of the mainstream IR theories identify the origins of threats as almost exclusively states. The mainstream IR theories have never prioritised non-state threats over state threats.

It should be noted here that my explanation of realism's and constructivism's weaknesses in analysing Southeast Asian security issues does not mean that I deny the

⁹ It is plainly the case that constructivists—in addressing security issues—have developed a discourse concerning non-state actors. For example, Alan Collins agreed with Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett's argument that a security community can best survive, mainly when its members adhere to member-created norms and that the more liberal the members are, the more likely the members will be to adhere to the norms (Collins, 2013: 19-24). Drawing on Adler and Barnett's argument, Alan Collins further argued that non-state actors' participation in a security community's decision-making process is the key factor for determining whether members within the security community are liberal or not (Collins, 2013: 25-6). Probably more importantly, non-state actors can help address “the plethora of threats that are classified as non-traditional” (Collins, 2013: 26). Although constructivism has treated non-state actors as an element essential to addressing security issues, the other mainstream IR theory in the Southeast Asian IR area, realism has refrained from treating non-state actors as an important discursive element. Neither constructivism nor realism has developed theoretical discourses treating individuals as a main actor in security issues.

relevance of these theories' contributions to the Southeast Asian IR area. What I am emphasising is that we have to keep our eye on whether or not theories can continue to facilitate rigorous analyses of security issues in a fast-changing world. Robert Keohane's argument on this subject can accurately represent my position on the inherent weaknesses of mainstream theories. He said,

Since both world politics and our values keep changing, there is no guarantee that even a well-tested theory will remain valid in the future. Each proposition of any theory of world politics should therefore be scrutinized carefully to ascertain the range of its applicability, its robustness under different conditions, and the likelihood of its being overtaken by events. (Keohane, 1986: 5)

1.4 Outline of the Study

In the above section, I have presented evidence suggesting quite strongly that the two mainstream theories of realism and constructivism are, by their very nature, limited in the analysis that they can shape regarding the emerging APSC. My next chapter (i.e. chapter two) will identify and explore the theory applied in the current study. I will argue that the concept of human security (which I will craft into a theory, as I explain below) is the most suitable basis for my research endeavours herein because the concept of human security itself has three critical qualities that can help rigorously address the uniqueness of current Southeast Asian security culture. The first quality is the concept's assessment of human security as a valid component of human-centred security thought. The second quality is the human-security concept's inclusion of not only state actors but also non-state actors in assessing efforts to address human insecurities (Henk, 2005: 97). The third quality is the human-security concept's stipulation that threats to human beings are various (UNDP, 1994: 25-33). Because of these qualities, I have adopted the human-security concept as the analytical framework in this study. However, one should not overlook the fact that the human-security concept is not a theory insofar as the concept lacks a consensual definition (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 9). Thus, before using the human-security concept to explore the emerging APSC, I will make a workable theory out of the human-security concept by systematising it in a five-step process. First, I will define human security's referent object. The second step is to explain broad and narrow definitions of human security. I argue that when we study human-security issues, these two definitions should co-exist. In the third step, I will describe the means to achieving human security. The fourth step is to identify and examine who ensure

human security. I argue that three types of actors play the most important roles in ensuring human security: individuals, state actors, and non-state actors. Also in this step, I will explore how and why actors are willing to be involved in human-security issues. In the fifth and final step, I will present and rebut the strongest criticism mounted against the human-security concept.

My analysis of the emerging APSC, which I present in chapters three through seven, rests on human-security concept. Chapter three explores Southeast Asian people's response to the APSC. Chapters four through six discuss state-actors' responses to the APSC: chapter four analyses ASEAN members, chapter five explores external powers, and chapter six examines multilateral organisations. Chapter seven focuses on CSOs' responses to the creation of the APSC. In exploring state and non-state actors' responses, I will emphasise the actors' strategies, motivations underlying strategies, and the strategies' effects on the creation of the APSC, focusing particularly on—whether the strategies in question have been benefiting or hindering efforts to create the APSC (the last section of chapter two presents my rationale for emphasising the three factors of strategies, motivations, and strategies' effects).

Before exploring each actor's response to the creation of the APSC, I will historically review each actor's involvement in human-security issues in Southeast Asia. Historical review is important because it can, in the context of the current study, clarify why these actors have been involved in the creation of the APSC, what these actors have done to strategically respond to the creation of the APSC, and what the actors have had as motivations underlying the strategies in question. For example, the U.S. government has supported the creation of the APSC. Through historical review, we know that the reason for—or the motivation underlying—the U.S. government's support strategies is tied up in the APSC's possible usefulness to the U.S. government's goal of re-enhancing U.S. influence in Southeast Asia (influence that declined between 1989 and 2003). Thus, without historical review, the current study would be hopelessly incomplete, lacking in the very concreteness that lends substance to studies such as this one.

Another noteworthy point here is time-frame. Because each ASEAN member has its unique historical background, I would be remiss to adopt a unified time-frame in my historical review of these members in chapter four. Thus, I will use a pair of approaches to shaping the time-frame for my historical review of each ASEAN member's involvement in human security issues. The first approach, which is based on leaders' shifts in direction, will facilitate my discussion of Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The other approach, which is based on occurrences of important domestic events,

will facilitate my discussion of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. In chapters five through seven, I will separate the time-frame for my historical review of each actor's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues into two periods: the first period will extend from the 1950s through 1989 and the second period will extend from 1990 through 2002. My reason for choosing 1989 as a boundary has to do with historical precedent: in this year, the Vietnamese government pulled its troops from Cambodia, where the UN started preparing peacekeeping operations in which Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the United States, and the UN were directly or indirectly involved.

In chapters four through seven, I adopt the same approach to time-frame: in the sections covering each actor's involvement in the creation of the APSC, I begin with the year 2003—the year that ASEAN decided to create the AC—and I extend my discussion up to the present.

CHAPTER 2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Realism and constructivism cannot independently serve as the framework for rigorous analyses of the APSC's creation. What theory, then, serves as the framework for the current study's analysis of this very topic? I argue that the human-security concept is congruous with the purpose of the current study's thesis. Since the late 1990s, discourse on human security has become increasingly common in academic and policy circles. However, the topic of human security has remained non-theoretical. This is to say that academic researchers and policy-makers have used the "concept" of human security rather than the "framework" of human security. One of my central aims in this chapter has two parts: first, I shall endeavour to forge a theory out of the human-security concept according to a five-step process, and then I shall explain how I use human security as an analytical framework in my overall study. My second central aim in this chapter is to explain the criteria guiding my selection of sources, field-study methods, and questionnaire methods.

2.1 The Five Steps for Developing the Human-Security Theory from the Human-Security Concept

In the field of human security, theorists and practitioners agree with one another that the concept entails as its main purpose the protection of human beings (Newman, 2010: 79, Henk, 2005: 96). However, many researchers who have analysed the human-security concept usually have not comprehensively discussed the roles that actors must play to ensure human security (Nishikawa, 2009: 215-6, Howe and Sims, 2011: 335-8, Acharya, 2001: 444-51, Paris, 2001: 89-92). Other research although it discuss the means by which state- and non-state actors can protect human beings (Peou, 2005: 100-3, Lam, 2006: 149-56, Suhrke, 1999: 273-5), does so without addressing the repercussions that follow from the adoption of certain means.¹⁰ In addition, advocates of human security have not persuasively responded to compelling criticism. Scholars' lack of a robust explanation pertaining to the concept of human security has forced this concept be just that: it has remained a concept rather than develop into a theory. In order to catalyse the transformation of the human-security concept into a theory, I will explain the human-security concept systematically following five steps.

¹⁰ Howe and Sims' essay is among the few to mention such repercussions (Howe and Sims, 2011: 337-8).

2.1.1 *Individuals as the Reference Object of the Concept of Human Security*

Advocates of the human-security concept and scholars who have studied human-security issues have agreed that the human-security concept stems from *The Human Development Report 1994* (Thomas, 2000: 7, Nishikawa, 2010: 13, Paris, 2001: 89, Newman, 2001: 243, Henk, 2005: 93). *The Report* emphasised that “the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly” and that security thinking, which has too often rested only on military force, should shift to a human-centric foundation (UNDP, 1994: 3, 22); that is, human beings’ safety and living standards should be prioritised. The role of states should be to protect their threats coming from any of seven areas: “the economy, food, health, the environment, personal issues, the community and politics” (UNDP, 1994: 25-33). In short, in the concept of human security, the referent object is human beings.

It should be noted that some researchers (Hong, 2005, Dosch, 2007: 214) have conflated the concept of non-traditional security with the concept of human security. Their viewpoint that the concept of non-traditional security falls in line with the concept of human security is partly right, because the concept of non-traditional security and the concept of human security mutually acknowledge threats’ diverse origins. However, in the concept of non-traditional security, the nation is the only actor able to cope with threats whereas in the concept of human security, actors coping with threats are various (Paris, 2001: 91, Henk, 2005: 97). Thus, in the spectrum of security thought, the concept of non-traditional security is closer to conventional-national concepts.

The best illustration of the non-traditional security concept’s greater proximity to the traditional security concept than to the human-security concept is *Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues*. In this memorandum, ASEAN and China extensively labelled security threats, including human and drug smuggling, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime, and cyber crime. This diverse list of concerns indicates that like the human-security concept, the concept of non-traditional security encompasses a recognition of threats’ diverse origins. However, the memorandum excluded the role of CSOs in addressing the aforementioned insecurities (ASEAN, January 10, 2004), and omission indicative of the belief that states are the only legal actors able to cope with threats. Thus, the concept of non-traditional security is a state-centric rather than a people-centred concept. Against this backdrop, it is better not to regard the non-traditional security concept and the human-security concept having essentially

the same content.

2.1.2 *Broad and Narrow Definitions of the Concept of Human Security*

Japan and Canada are two countries that, despite basing their diplomatic policies on the human-security concept, differ from each other regarding their definition of ‘human security’. The Japanese government has argued that “human security comprehensively covers all the measures that threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity—for example, environmental degradation, violations of human rights,¹¹ transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel land-mines and...infectious diseases such as AIDS—and strengthens efforts to confront these threats” (cited from Paris, 2001: 90). According to the Japanese government’s argument, insecurities, as broadly defined, arise from at least one of two types of origins. The first type of origin is the realm of unpredictability, which includes such relatively unpredictable threats as pandemic outbreaks and earthquakes. The second type of origin from which insecurities arise is the realm of human’s planned activities. For example, a government’s incompetence and ignorance may quite predictably result in poverty, malnourishment, crime, human-rights violations, and unemployment. These outcomes—if they do not directly lead to large-scale problems or imminent death—may at least bring about chronic hardship for human beings; thus, scholars have placed Japan’s definition of the ‘human-security concept’ in the “freedom from want” category (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 29).

The Canadian government has promoted a narrow definition of human security—human security is “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives” (cited from Paris, 2001: 90). In the narrow definition, insecurities include genocide and ethnic cleansing, civil disorder, and brutal political repression, any of which can inflict severe suffering on human beings, and is highly likely to result in imminent and large-scale deaths. Threat-producers can be ethnic groups, militant religious groups, political parties, or states.

¹¹ In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to distinguish the concepts of human security from the concept of human rights. The concept of human security has “an explanatory power” that the concept of human rights does not have, although the concept of human security has attracted criticism regarding its broader context of vulnerability; in contrast to human rights, human security emphasises diverse actors and covers a vast dimension of human insecurities including not only human-rights violations but also insecurities resulting from sources of threats unrelated to human rights (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 127-8). In short, the concept of human security is more analytical than the concept of human rights, and human rights constitute just one type of issue falling under the banner of human security.

More precisely, insecurities associated with the narrow definition may result only from threats originating chiefly from human activity, and in comparison with insecurities resulting from groups of humans in the broad definition, insecurities associated with the narrow definition tend to have graver consequences. Scholars have placed the Canadian definition of the human-security concept in the “freedom from fear” category (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 30-1).

Many scholars who have analysed the concept of human security have accepted this classification and proposed broad and narrow definitions of the concept as way to introduce discussions about human security (Newman, 2001: 240-2, McCormack, 2008: 116, Lam, 2006: 146-9, Nuruzzaman, 2006: 290-3, Acharya, 2001: 444-9, Paris, 2001: 89-92, Nishikawa, 2009: 215-6, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 39-57, James, 2006: 10-6, Ho, 2008: 104-6, Owen, 2004: 375-6). However, so far, scholars have reached no consensus as to which definition of the term ‘human security’ best serve their explorations of human-security issues. For example, Keith Krause emphasised that scholars should use the freedom-from-fear definition as the basis of an analytical framework to explore human-security issues. His argument in favour of prioritising the freedom-from-fear definition is that the definition of ‘freedom from want’, because it includes any form of insecurity, is “a useless shopping list” (Krause, 2004: 367). Jennifer Leanning advocated her preference for a definition of ‘freedom from want’ because, as she generally argues, human beings are entitled to have what they want within reason (Leanning, 2004: 354-5).

So which definition is better suited for scholars’ examination of human-security issues? I argue that these two definitions should co-exist, because insecurities in both freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear areas harm human beings. In addition, it is unlikely that state- and non-state actors address only insecurities in freedom-from-want areas, wilfully neglecting *en masse* insecurities in freedom-from-fear areas. For example, Japan typified a state advocate of government intervention in freedom-from-want problems, and yet the Japanese government has also been involved in freedom-from-fear issues since the 1990s (Lam, 2009). Thus, definitions of both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ are important clarifications in the effort to conceptualise human security.

2.1.3 *The Means for Achieving Human Security and Addressing Related Emergent Problems*

It is possible to achieve human security by development-oriented and intervention-oriented methods, which correlate with the broad and narrow definitions given above (Newman, 2010:

80). The first method refers to human-development programmes. From the 1930s to the 1960s, the term ‘human development’ signified state actors’ planning for investment, industrialisation, and the like—all with the aim of helping people address mainly economic problems (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 101). Beginning in the 1970s, when scholars and practitioners started focusing on human-security issues (particularly famine, poverty, and diseases in the third world), ‘human development’ came to signify state actors’ and non-state actors’ planning for various insecurities afflicting people—all with the aim of satisfying “the diversity of human needs” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 104). This focus is in line with the broad definition of human security. Thus, human-development programmes usually address threats that fall under the category of freedom from want and that include poverty, famine, human-rights violations, and disease. For example, the UN created the MDGs in 1999 to help improve people’s living standards around the world and since its inception in 1942, Oxfam has established numerous projects to help poor people rise out of poverty.

Japan typifies a country that has embraced a “development-oriented notion of human security” (Lam, 2006: 146). In 1992, the Japanese government adopted the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter. Under this charter, the Japanese government’s assistance would focus on environmental conservation, human development, democracy, and human rights (Kikkawa, 2007: 255). Most of the issues that the Japanese government mentioned in the ODA Charter fall under the freedom-from-want category. In 1998, Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared that the Japanese government’s human-security diplomatic policies had been designed to protect the security and safety of individuals and communities (Lam, 2013: 179). In May 2005, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) Yukio Takasu made a statement revealing the Japanese government’s commitment to advocating a freedom-from-want definition of human security:

The Japanese understanding of human security is very similar to the comprehensive and inclusive concept advocated by UNDP. I believe that Japan’s experience since the end of the Second World War in promoting prosperity and the well-being of its people through economic and social development makes it particularly well-prepared to advocate such a broad concept of human security. (cited from Ho, 2008: 103)

However, efforts to improve human development can have repercussions (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 98-100). First of all, when a country implements human-development programmes and similar programmes geared toward improving people’s well-being, certain

human insecurities may emerge or worse. For example, in order to ameliorate its people's living standards, the Laotian government resettled certain segments of the populations, but this policy inadvertently increased the possibility of people's exposure to diseases, human exploitation, and human trafficking (Howe and Sims, 2011: 350-3). Also, efforts to improve human development may lead to social instability if sufficient communication does not occur between the instigators of change and the targeted people beforehand. During the early Marcos period in the Philippines, the government sought to enhance economic development by providing attractive incentives to foreign companies. The Philippines' economy improved, but foreign companies confiscated the peasants' farms and lands without offering reasonable compensation. Many religious organisations sided with the victimised farmers and protested against government policy, resulting in tension between the regime and society (Youngblood, 1978: 509).

The latter type of method—the intervention-oriented method—is exemplified by the responsibility to protect principle (i.e., the RtoP principle), which serves to address mainly human insecurities related to freedom from fear. According to a 2005 World Summit Outcome document (A/RES/60/1), which attracted support from United Nations members, when states are unable to protect their own population or when states themselves become a source of threats, the international community has the RtoP; that is, they may protect individuals from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN, October 24, 2005). The purpose of using military force is to protect a troubled population rather than to initiate wars. The RtoP principle also calls for peace-maintenance and peace-building efforts. Sub-methods specific to these efforts include disarmament demobilisation and reintegration of factions involved in a conflict, rebuilding of infrastructures, promotion of human rights, and implementation of democratic systems, such as elections (ICISS, 2001: 39-43).

Canada typifies this method of humanitarian intervention. Since the 1960s, human security has been the central pillar of Canadian foreign policy, starting with the establishment of the Oslo-Ottawa axis with Norway on UN peacekeeping issues (Suhrke, 1999: 266). So far, Canada has been drawn into peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building and peace-maintenance operations in several countries, including the Congo, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. In addition, Canada has been the most proactive country in terms of supporting the establishment of the International Criminal Court and international campaigns against landmines (Suhrke, 1999: 266). In March 1999, the United Nations Trust

Fund for Human Security was established through Canadian financial support.¹² “In the Canadian view, human security is security of the people” (Acharya, 2001: 445).

However, regarding the implementation of the RtoP principle, two important questions among others arise: Who has the power to decide to carry out the RtoP principle? And when should the principle be invoked? These questions are intimately linked to grave concerns over national sovereignty (Alexandra, 2012: 56). Many states, especially small and non-Western states, are worried that a Western power may use the RtoP principle as a pretext for interfering in their domestic affairs (Alexandra, 2012: 56). From these states’ perspective, implementation of the RtoP principle means that their national sovereignty may be infringed upon. Thus, the non-interference principle is their shield against the RtoP principle. Even Indonesia, which is recognised as the ASEAN member that has made the greatest improvements in the area of human rights and democracy (Dosch, 2008, Boyd and Dosch, 2010), is apprehensive about the possibility of infringements upon its national sovereignty. The Indonesian representative to the UN stated in 2006 that “the concept of the responsibility to protect should be approached very carefully, taking into account the sovereignty and equality of all states” (cited from Alexandra, 2012: 58). Thus, in certain contexts, it would appear likely that implementation of intervention-oriented measures has historically encountered more barriers than implementation of development-oriented methods.

2.1.4 Who Ensures Human Security?

The question of who ensures human security is an important one in the field of human-security research, particularly where the human-security concept is influential. Three types of actors have been recognised by scholars (Peou, 2005: 109, Henk, 2005: 97). The first is the individual. Barry Buzan argued that individuals are the most basic element in the security research and that “the security of individuals is irreversibly connected to the state” (Buzan, 1991: 35, 39). The second type of actor is the state. Many human-security scholars have agreed that states have played an important role in addressing human insecurities (Henk, 2005: 97, Peou, 2005: 108-9). The third type of actor is the non-state actor, known collectively as CSOs. Research has found that CSOs play an essential role in addressing human insecurities (Paris, 2001: 91, Acharya, 2004a, Williams, 1998: 38-41). For example, See Seng Tan argued that CSOs have played the important role in conflict management

¹² Japan was the other contributor. It is estimated that Japan’s contribution has amounted to US\$227 million (Lam, 2006: 148).

because they have “technical expertise” and, what is more important, a “commitment to human rights and social justice” (Tan, 2005: 52).

Dan Henk nicely summarised the three types of actors’ involvement in human-security issues:

Achievement of human security is almost by definition a collaborative effort involving the individual citizen as an active player but also including key role for civil society groups and institutions; commercial, nongovernmental, and international organizations; and governments of nation-states. (Henk, 2005: 97)

Despite agreement on many matters, scholars in this field debate important points and raise intriguing questions. Buzan argued, for example, that the security of individuals is connected with states, because when individuals suffer from insecurities, it is highly likely that they first seek assistance from their governments (Buzan, 1991). I agree with this point; however, one should not overlook the fact that individuals may remove or mitigate insecurities by themselves through adoption of moderate or radical measures. This is individuals’ instinct to self-protect, a feature of human behaviour for which Buzan offers a distinctly incomplete explanation. Regarding state actors, many advocates of human security have agreed that states play the role of protecting their own people. However, few scholars have discussed why some states are more willing than others to protect their own people, and why some multi-state organisations ignore or neglect human insecurities. Regarding CSOs, few scholars have discussed the advantages and the obstacles that aid or undermine these organisations as they address human-security issues. In this section, I will comprehensively explore the roles of CSOs as well as of individuals and states in achieving human-security targets.

2.1.4.1 Individual Actors

Individuals are the most basic element required to achieve human security (Buzan, 1991: 35), although individuals are unlike state-actors insofar as the latter can implement robust development programmes usually requiring extensive funding and collaborative experts pooled from diverse areas of knowledge. However, when a threat erupts, a human’s instinct for survival manifests itself. I argue that humans’ responses to insecurities often reflect humans’ instinct for survival.

People strive to protect themselves in three general ways: people rely on personal initiative, people seek assistance from state-actors, and people seek assistance from non-state

actors. First, many people attempt to regain their security by themselves, whether through moderate or radical means. Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) exemplifies moderate methods, insofar as it has mildly but persistently advocated for human rights and political participation. By contrast, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), as adopted the radical approach of armed struggle, with the objective of creating a sovereign Bangsa-moro Republic. Both moderate and radical methods may produce other insecurities (Buzan, 1991: 52). Moderate methods may trigger repressive government policies, such as the Myanmar junta's repression of NLD members, whereas radical methods may endanger innocent people (Buzan, 1991: 46-7), as was the case with the deaths of non-combatants during the conflict between the Philippine government and radical insurgents on the island of Mindanao.

A second type of measure that people may employ when pursuing self-preservation centres on their request for assistance from a government (Buzan, 1991: 38), whether it is their own country's or another country's. A request for government assistance, however, does not automatically translate into a provision of government assistance, as many types of political regimes—but especially non-democratic ones—offer only perfunctory responses to requests for assistance and, not unusually, are the *source* of threat afflicting a population (Buzan, 1991: 43-50). Thus, the success with which people can obtain assistance from their own country's government, much less another country's government, is frequently unimpressive. The best chance of success in requests for government assistance is to be had in states enjoying a high degree of democratisation, because the governments of such states may attach great significance to their people's troubles, whether out of concern for electoral popularity or from a deep-seated sense of altruism, in which case a government may act spontaneously to resolve a problem threatening a segment of the population so that no request for assistance from the people is even needed.

The third measure by which people may attempt to attain assistance situates them in connection with regional and international organisations and CSOs. Sometimes, these organisations spontaneously help people bogged down in troubles. For example, these entities can provide assistance (e.g., educational preventive measures and post-crisis rescue operations), can mediate in conflicts, and can impose political and economic sanctions on states involved in atrocities. The extent to which these organisations can mitigate human insecurity depends on human understanding of plans and policies from state actors and CSOs. The better the understanding that people have of how state actors and CSOs can be beneficial, the greater the possibility that the organisations can successfully address human insecurity.

2.1.4.2 *State Actors*

I divide state actors into two types. The first comprises individual states. Individual states can plan and conduct programmes to help their own country's citizens or other countries' citizens and can, with the same aim in mind, request assistance and cooperation from regional and international organisations and CSOs. However, it is unlikely that states will arbitrarily undertake humanitarian interventions because unavoidably related issues are typically sensitive ones involving, first and foremost, national sovereignty. State action in many cases must be based on resolutions, which are passed by members in regional and international organisations. Generally, states that can help people in extra-territorial regions govern either developed or developing countries. The motivation for such states' adoption of strategies is, more often than not, based on the states' own national interests, which might include the acquisition of economic benefits or the promotion of status or influence (Suhrke, 1999). Suhrke argued that the reason for the Canadian and Norwegian governments' promotion of the human-security concept is their mutual desire to enhance their respective international reputations (Suhrke, 1999: 265-7).

It should be noted that the extent to which people under a given state enjoy human security depends on the state's type of political system. I argue that the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to have. Authoritarian or totalitarian countries, owing to their governments' lack of political legitimacy, usually face challenges from their people (Collins, 2003: 64). According to the Copenhagen School, authoritarian or totalitarian countries regard these challenges as not a political problem but a security problem that should be removed in various ways, such as declaration of martial law or adoption of repressive measures (Collins, 2003: 64-5). In order to prevent widespread challenges from emerging in the first place, the regimes in authoritarian or totalitarian countries usually tightly control their people and society and suppress dissidents and separatists—actions that ironically run the risk of triggering inter-state conflicts and civil upheaval. According to Barry Buzan, these states are a source of threats to the people residing in these non-democratic countries (Buzan, 1991: 43-50). In addition, lack of rule of law and rampant corruption are common in the countries. These problems hinder governments' efforts to mitigate human insecurity.¹³ Against this backdrop, under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes,

¹³ These problems have been common in Southeast Asian countries and have hindered governments' efforts to address human insecurities. For example, corruption in the Cambodian government has been rampant, thereby

people do not enjoy adequate human security.

In democratic and semi-democratic countries, governments are similarly concerned with acquiring, maintaining, or expanding political power. However, the governments' viability rests on their performance of generally good and righteous deeds, as perceived by a significant percentage of the voting population. In order to stay in power, the governments should be willing to address human-security issues and should properly respond to people's independent efforts to attain security, whether moderately or radically, because the extent to which the governments address human insecurities may help determine the extent to which the political parties controlling the governments can secure the confidence of a majority of the electorate and, quite possibly, win the next elections—or at least avoid no-confidence motions, landslide electoral defeats, and so on (Landman, 2006: 17). In other words, if they fail to address human insecurities, political parties that head governments in democratic and semi-democratic countries run the significant risk of falling from power.

There is an exception to this rule. Some states that are politically authoritarian but economically developed regiment their own citizens, particularly regarding basic human rights. Nevertheless, many of these citizens do not consider their government to be a threat. Many citizens do not worry about their government's tight control of society, because political regimes not only offer robust welfare systems that generate government loyalty among the people but also incentivise a form of complacency that dampens people's desire to pursue political expression or other rights. However, according to Alan Collins, it is likely that these states will gradually shift to democracy, because economic development may bring about the emergence of a middle class and entrepreneurs, which may in turn bring about their compelling demand for political participation (Collins, 2003: 71). In order to stay in power, authoritarian regimes may create channels through which people can release their disaffection, and one such channel involves a piecemeal loosening of stifling government strangleholds on political participation (Collins, 2003: 70-3). Alan Collins called this gradual shift to

exacerbating people's hardships there. Most poor Cambodians have depended on government-distributed food, much of which has come from foreign donors. However, according to a UN investigation, between January 2003 and February 2004, 44% of rice targeted for distribution to the poor was "stolen or diverted by government officials" (Beresford, 2005: 138). In addition, the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), which has been responsible for the clearing of landmines in Cambodia, has encountered severe problems rooted in corruption. Foreign donors have refused to provide funding to the CMAA, which led, at one point, to a 70% reduction in CMAA staff (Langran, 2001: 159). Shortages of manpower have, in turn, slowed down the progress of landmine removal.

democracy “self-renewal” (Collins, 2003: 65).

The second type of state actor comprises regional and international organisations composed mainly of individual states.¹⁴ Regional and international organisations have the same functions as do individual states: these organisations plan and conduct development programmes and provide humanitarian assistance. Also, regional and international organisations have abilities that individual states lack. First, regional and international organisations can retain the right to collect funds and manpower from individual states, rendering the organisations at times more robust, policy-wise, than the individual states could be on their own. Perhaps the most obvious example is the UN: UN members (which are, by necessity, individual states) must offer a portion of their own national wealth to the UN, which then uses the funds to finance UN activities, including the creation and deployment of development projects and peacekeeping operations (Baehr and Gordenker, 2005: 56-7). Second, regional and international organisations can impose sanctions on regimes or dispatch peacekeeping forces to troubled areas. Again with reference to the UN, one of the functions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is to impose sanctions on countries whose governments have routinely and substantially violated people’s human rights (Baehr and Gordenker, 2005: 24-5).

When addressing human-security problems, regional and international organisations are by no measure insusceptible to obstacles and other difficulties. First of all, regional and international organisations comprise individual states, each having its own distinct set of national interests. Thus, it is not easy to for organisations that are largely reliant on these individual states to achieve consensus among them. This dependence has had the effect of oftentimes delaying or even dampening the organisations’ responses to human insecurity. For example, Bellamy and Drummond noted that ASEAN member-states’ different perspectives

¹⁴ For the present study, I have categorised multilateral organisations as state actors. There are two reasons for this categorisation. First, multilateral organisations are composed of individual states. In fact, states’ membership in these organisations is necessary for these organisations’ very existence. Second, individual states play critical roles in operating multilateral organisations. For example, the UN’s member-states are the main sponsors regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks. Member-states provide the UN with funding, rescue equipment, and troops. Some scholars have regarded both multilateral organisations and CSOs as non-state actors (Collins, 2013: 4). I argue that this categorisation is inappropriate. Composed of individual states, multilateral organisations’ policies and actions are mainly the work of member-states and closely reflect member-states’ interests. Like-minded people create CSOs, whose purpose is not to satisfy states’ interests but to improve people’s well-being. In terms of behaviour, multilateral organisations are similar to individual states. Thus, multilateral organisations should be categorised as state actors.

regarding how to deal with Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar resulted in a significant two-week delay, during which time ASEAN debated humanitarian-assistance affairs. “Had disease broken out rapidly in the affected areas, the consequences might have been catastrophic” (Bellamy and Drummond, 2011: 193).

Two additional types of difficulty with which some regional organisations have had to contend arise from their own norms and from technical issues, both of which may become barriers to addressing human insecurities. The potential for norm-based problems is powerfully illustrated by the mass killings of Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s, when ASEAN members were reticent to intervene because they adhered to their previously championed norms summarised in the non-interference principle. To ASEAN members, running afoul of the principle was a more serious infraction than leaving Cambodians to fend for themselves. As for problems arising from technical issues, when regional and international organisations undertake rescue actions, their efficiency may be impeded by language barriers, different units of measurement, different technological formats, and the like (Berdal and Leifer, 1996: 41, 50, Smith, 2003: 62).

2.1.4.3 *Non-State Actors*

Non-state actors are commonly referred to as civil-society organisations (the acronym ‘CSOs’ is used throughout this study). CSOs are non-profit and voluntary and many CSOs have as their main function the two-fold task of improving people’s living standards and addressing human insecurities that people encounter (Kaldor, 2003: 16-7).

What are the advantages and barriers that characterise CSOs’ involvement in human-security issues? CSOs’ chief advantage is that unlike regional and international organisation, CSOs often—though not always—avoid direct involvement in matters of the state. This advantage is so powerful that some CSOs can implement their own programmes more efficiently than state actors can implement similar governmental programmes. The key to this success, however, comes at a price, as CSOs must generally keep a low-profile to avoid coming into conflict with the state. For example, after Cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar many national governments, whether acting collectively, ended up debating with one another whether they should abide by the RtoP principle there. Meanwhile, the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, a CSO established in 1996 by Dharma Master Chong Yen, had already obtained permission from Myanmar’s government to enter the devastated area (*China Post*, May 11, 2008).

The barriers preventing CSOs from effectively addressing human-security issues

generally stem from the organisations' scant resources, which manifest as minimal publicity, unimpressive advertising, underdeveloped technology, and weak responses to pressures from hostile governments. Kamarulzaman Askandar argued that although CSOs in 2003 tried to encourage the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Filipino government to resurrect their negotiations, the CSOs' lack of both resources and political influence gravely limited their efforts (Askandar, 2005: 47). In recent years, CSOs have been expanding their abilities as a result of improved communication technology, such as e-mail and community websites (Gilson, 2011: 135). Many CSOs can now publicise their causes readily, in turn facilitating fundraising events, recruitment of experts, and cross-CSO networking. In addition, many countries in the post-Cold War period have adopted democratic politics and liberal markets, the combination of which has promoted states to embrace the development of CSOs (Gerard, 2014: 54-63). Therefore, CSOs' influence has been growing ever more impressive.

2.1.5 Major Criticism of Human Security and Rebuttals to this Criticism

The concept of human security has been the target of compelling critiques. One critique centres on the concept's main referent object: people. Some researchers in the field place equal or often greater emphasis on the roles played by state and non-state actors protecting individuals (Lam, 2006: 106, Peou, 2005, Tan, 2005, Henk, 2005: 97). Indeed, in international politics, many cases have shown that not only states but also non-state actors have played a key role in achieving the goal of human security. However, if achieving the goal of human security is dependent on the protection from these actors, there is no difference between human security and national security, since "human security has been co-opted and thereby diluted by state practices" (Booth, 2007: 325). Therefore, critics of the human-security concept are "suspicious of human security as a state-sponsored movement" (Newman, 2010: 87).

A second critique centres on human security's broad spectrum of threat variables. In terms of narrow and broad definitions of human-security concepts, threats to human security range from physical violence, such as wars and massacres, to daily-life issues, such as hunger and disease; even traffic accidents have attracted attention in this regard (Howe and Sims, 2011: 354). Many researchers have disagreed about broader contexts of dangers. Roland Paris asked, "If human security is all these things, what is it not?" (Paris, 2001: 92); as noted earlier in this chapter, Keith Krause declared that inclusive definitions of threats amount "a useless shopping list" (Krause, 2004: 367); Andrew Mack declared, that "a concept [human security] that aspires to explain almost everything in reality explains nothing" (Mack, 2004: 367);

Edward Newman argued that a broader range of threats “would be of little use, as it would generate an unmanageable array of variables” (Newman, 2004: 358). These criticisms lead to the question of whether the human-security concept can be a useful analytical tool. In the spirit of these critiques of the human-security concept, I will provide my own contentions regarding the matter.

Although states can be actors in achieving human security, this does not mean that state practices necessarily dilute conceptualisations of human-centred security, since the objectives of state-provided security based on conventional national-security precepts are significantly different from the objectives of state-provided security based on the human-security concept. According to conventional national-security precepts, states can develop a material ability to achieve national security. Also, they can help other states enhance their own national security. The motive for this “generosity” could be religious, practical, or ideological. However, the purpose is always to ensure accepted states’ survival or accepted regimes’ continuity.

According to the concept of human security, the motive for states’ provision of assistance is likewise variable. However, the purpose is directly linked to people’s security. That is why regardless of whether people live in democratic or authoritarian states or developed or under-developed countries, when people suffer from threats, state and non-state actors are typically willing to provide assistance: the object that these actors are seeking to help is people, not states. For example, after Hurricane Katrina pummelled the Greater New Orleans area, many states provided humanitarian assistance to victims, and likewise, when Cyclone Nargis lashed Myanmar, foreign countries were willing to offer disaster relief. The fact that states are actors serving to realise the goal of human security does not, in itself, dilute the concept of human security.

Some scholars have recently tried to narrow the broad range of threat variables. Sorpong Peou combined the definition of ‘freedom from fear’ with the definition of ‘freedom from want’ to define ‘human security’ as “freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want” (Peou, 2005: 106). Likewise, Roland Paris categorised both the threats to human security and the actors who need protection: to this end, he divided sources of threats into military and non-military categories and the protected actors into two pairings: the pairing of states and societies and the pairing of groups and individuals (Paris, 2001: 98-101). Taylor Owen put forward the following position: that “A threshold-based conceptualisation, one that limits threats by their severity rather than their cause, allows all possible harms to be considered, but selectively limits those that at any time are prioritised with the security label” (Owen, 2004: 381). In fact, there is no need to narrow broad ranges of

threats, because inclusive threat variables are the basic foundation of the human-security concept.

My response to criticism targeting broad lists of human-security threats is ontological. I argue that inclusive threat variables are not a drawback to the concept of human security but a fundamental component of the human-security concept. After all, any daily-life object or activity could become a threat. For example, Chinese society's peculiar consumption of the masked palm civet seems to have been a critical factor in the transmission of the lethal SARS virus, which harmed economies and dramatically changed people's lives. Technology is usually unable to fully contain and eradicate such threats. Human beings are at the mercy of this threat-emergence pattern. When threats become adverse realities, people and their environments are at risk. For this reason, the human-security concept's main referent is individuals because of their need for protection against the aforementioned insecurities. In the absence of such threats, the assumption that individuals constitute security's main focus would be untenable.


2.2 Applying the Human-Security Framework to the Current Study

According to the above analysis and elaboration, the human-security concept, perhaps, can be transformed into a rudimentary human-security analytical framework; that is, into the theory that I have proposed to create for this study. The security-related referent in human security is human beings, and threats to human beings come from freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear factors, many of which can be offset by development-oriented and intervention-oriented measures usually implemented by state actors and non-state actors: implementation of these measures is beyond the ability of separately acting or loosely connected individual, although individuals can at least strive to protect themselves by adopting moderate and radical methods (please see figure 2.1).

The creation of the APSC can be regarded as a model similar to the rudimentary human-security analytical framework. The APSC target is to create people-oriented communities, and this fact alone indicates that, in theory, the security-related referent in the creation of the APSC is Southeast Asian people. The issues that ASEAN has planned to address in the blueprints of the APSC and ASCC fall under either the freedom-from-want category or the freedom-from-fear category. The issues in the freedom-from-want category include human rights, disease, transnational crimes, natural-disaster management, and poverty. The issues in the freedom-from-fear category include conflict management and post-conflict peace-building. So far, individuals, state actors, and non-state actors have been

involved in the creation of the APSC. Clearly, the creation of the APSC is congruous with the human-security analytical framework.

Figure 2.1 Human-security analytical framework



However, congruousness between the model and corresponding facts proves only that the human-security concept may be suitable for exploring the issue of APSC's creation but cannot help answer the questions that I posed in this study's research-purpose section. In order to come up with rigorous answers to these questions, we must consider each relevant actor's response to the creation of the APSC.

In this chapter's section on individual actors, I mentioned that when encountering insecurities, people can protect themselves by taking one or more of three measures: people can rely on themselves while enacting either moderate or radical solutions; people can seek help from their governments; people can seek help from regional and international organisations and CSOs. The creation of the APSC is congruous with the third measure—when encountering insecurities, people may seek help from regional and international organisations, and sometimes these organisations spontaneously come to the assistance of such people even in the absence of requests for help. The better the understanding that people have of how a multi-state actor can help them counter a human insecurity, the greater the

possibility that the multi-state actor can indeed successfully counter the human insecurity. I will use this argument to explore several questions regarding Southeast Asian people's responses to the APSC: What are Southeast Asian people's responses to the APSC? Do they know about the creation of the APSC? Have Southeast Asian people perceived improvements in their living standards their dignity, their safety, and their security?

In this chapter's section on state actors (2.1.4.1), I presented four concepts regarding state actors' and non-state actors' involvement in human-security issues. These concepts will serve as the analytical foundation for my effort to identify and to clarify the motivations, strategies, and barriers characterising state and non-states actors' participation in the creation of the APSC.

The first concept that I discussed earlier in this chapter is the necessary presence of motivations guiding states' involvement in human-security issues. In fact, this concept can shed considerable light on why multi-state organisations and CSOs are involved in human-security issues. For example, as mentioned in chapter one, the motivations underlying ASEAN's creation of the APSC generally concerned a desire on the part of the association (1) improve its ability to address insecurities and (2) to re-enhance its influence in East Asia. See Seng Tan argued that many CSOs have their own "commitment to human rights and social justice" (Tan, 2005: 52) and I argue this commitment can rightly be regarded as a reflection of CSOs' motivations. Two important advantages of analysing state- and non-states actors' motivations may be that we can understand (1) *why* these actors adopt certain strategies in response to human-security issues and (2) *how* these actors adopt the strategies. Before exploring this matter, I will discuss motivations state and non-state actors' adoption and use of related strategies.

The second and the third concepts regarding state actors' involvement in human-security issues can clarify the motivations underlying state and non-states actors' participation in the creation of the APSC. The second concept is the principle that the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to have; and the third concept is the perhaps obvious but critical principle that multi-state organisations may encounter difficulties when addressing human-security issues. These concepts can help us (1) identify barriers to the creation of the APSC, (2) determine whether or not democratic factors can become barriers to the creation of the APSC, when ASEAN members strategically address the creation of the APSC, and (3) gauge whether or not the norms of regional and international organisations can become barriers to the creation of the APSC when multi-state actors strategically address the creation of the APSC.

Table 2.1 The freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues addressed in the APSC blueprints, the ASCC blueprints, and the ASEAN Charter

	APSC	ASCC	ASEAN Charter
Freedom from Want	governance, human rights, corruption, democracy, non-traditional security issues (e.g., drug and human trafficking, terrorism, illicit small arms and light weapons, and cyber crimes)	entrepreneurial skills for vulnerable people, civil-service capabilities, poverty, food security and safety, healthcare and healthy lifestyles, communicable diseases, drug problems, natural-disaster management, rights and welfare of vulnerable people, environmental sustainability, and narrowing the development gap	human rights, democracy, narrowing the development gap, alleviating poverty
Freedom from Fear	conflict management and conflict resolution, post-conflict peace-building	—	peaceful settlement of disputes

Sources: the APSC blueprint, the ASCC blueprint, and the ASEAN Charter

The final concept regards non-state actors: namely the advantages and the barriers that can benefit and hinder CSOs' involvement in human-security issues. The advantages include CSOs' effectiveness in such undertakings, particularly given the fact that CSOs—unlike state governments—are not direct participants in national interests. Barriers to CSOs ability to get involved in human-security issues include CSOs' scant or underdeveloped resources and government hostility towards CSOs. This concept will guide my examination of CSOs' involvement in the APSC. I will seek to answer two questions in particular: Are the advantages from which CSOs benefit when involved in human-security conducive to the

creation of the APSC? Or do barriers to CSOs' involvement in human-security issues hinder the creation of the APSC?

Two points merit our attention here. First, as mentioned in chapter one, whether or not ASEAN can successfully create the APSC hinges on the extent to which ASEAN addresses non-traditional security issues in the ASCC and adheres to the ASEAN Charter. Thus, the current study takes into consideration each actor's response to the ASEAN Charter and the ASCC pillar.

Second, as mentioned previously in this chapter, both freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear elements are important in efforts to conceptualise human-security issues, and I also argue that freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues are important, when we study human-security topics (see section 2.1.2). Thus, when I historically review each actor's responses to Southeast Asian human-security situations and when I explore types of actors' responses—and individual actors' responses—to the creation of the APSC, my analysis will be based on discussions of freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear themes (Table 2.1 concerns the issues addressed in the APSC blueprints, the ASCC blueprints, and the ASEAN Charter, categorised according to freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear definitions).

2.3 Selection Criteria for this Study's Sources, Field Study, and Questionnaires

2.3.1 Selection Criteria for this Study's Sources

In the social sciences, researchers commonly use documentary analysis to interpret or explore a given topic. The materials in the present study come from one of three types of sources. The first type of source comprises academic essays and books. The second type of source is media (in order to gain perspectives local to each Southeast Asian country under review here, I have accessed mainly local Southeast Asian media, the *Brunei Times*, the *Borneo Post*, the *Inquirer.Net*, the *Jakarta Post*, the *Nation*, the *Philstar*, the *Star*, the *Strait Times*, and the *VietNamNet*). Official documents constitute the third type of source and include the highly relevant series of documents that ASEAN has issued in regard to the APSC.

2.3.2 Field Study

I conducted a field study for this research. The purpose of the field study was to place me in possession of such information as is generally absent from the three aforementioned types of sources. I arranged interviews with government officials, scholars, and CSO representatives (for a breakdown of these data, please see Table 2.2 and 2.3; and for transcripts, please see the appendix). The questions that I asked were based on interviewees' areas of specialisation.

Table 2.2 Field Study in Singapore (January 10, 2012 to January 20, 2012)

Institutions	Interviewees	Interview Date	Meeting Location
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies	Ian Storey (Senior Fellow)	January 20, 2012	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
European Union Centre	Lay Hwee Yeo (Director of the European Union Centre)	January 16, 2012	European Union Centre
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	Ralf Emmers (Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, Associate Professor)	January 18, 2012	S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Source: Author's own compilation

Table 2.3 Field Study in Indonesia (January 21, 2012 to February 4, 2012)

Institutions	Interviewees	Interview Date	Meeting Location
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Jose Javares (Directorate General of ASEAN Cooperation)	January 31, 2012	Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)	Lina Alexandra (Researcher in the CSIS)	January 25, 2012	CSIS
ASEAN Secretariat	Mely Caballero-Anthony (Director, External Relations ASEAN Political and Security Community)	January 25, 2012	ASEAN Secretariat
The AICHR	Rafendi Djamin (Representative of Indonesia to the AICHR)	January 27, 2012	Menteng Jakarta Pusat

Source: Author's own compilation

2.3.3 *Questionnaire-Survey*

The individual is an important actor in human-security issues: the individual is the referent object, and when encountering insecurities, individuals may seek assistance from state and non-state actors (see section 2.1.4). Thus, in the current study, I analyse Southeast Asians' response to the creation of the APSC. In order to gather Southeast Asian people's perspectives regarding the creation of the APSC, I conducted a survey, distributing questionnaires to 120 university students of Southeast Asian origins. The questionnaire method is appropriate within my study's parameters because use of questionnaires is an effective method by which researchers can tap into people's understanding or beliefs or sentiments regarding any of a host of issues, whether mainstream or obscure. Although the collection and the analysis of individuals' questionnaire-survey responses in IR research area has not been common, a few scholars in the Southeast Asian IR field have successfully adopted the method to explore diplomatic and security issues. For example, Guido Benny collaborated with Kamarulnizam Abdullah on a study concerning "Indonesian Perceptions and Attitudes toward the ASEAN Community" (Benny and Abdullah, 2011) and collaborated with Ravichandran Moorthy on a study, published more recently, concerning "Is a 'ASEAN Community' Achievable? A Public Perception Analysis in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore on the Perceived Obstacles to Regional Community" (Moorthy and Benny, 2012). It is important to note that these two essays address Southeast Asian people's perspectives about the creation of the APSC, a topic that is at the heart of the present study. This section discusses the countries and people I targeted, my approach to acquiring a sample of respondents, and the types of questions my questionnaire featured: open-ended questions or close-ended questions.

2.3.3.1 *Chosen ASEAN Members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam*

I chose the Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand countries (IMPST) and Vietnam for four reasons. First, the IMPST countries participated in the founding of ASEAN. Second, the IMPST countries have played an important role in the creation of the APSC. For example, the Indonesian government essentially broached the topic of creating the APSC. Third, the government of the IMPST countries have promoted national awareness of AC-related issues and have even held workshops with this goal in mind. The fourth reason is related to Vietnam. In contrast to Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, Vietnam has developed notably stable politics and a reasonably prosperous economy.

2.3.3.2 Chosen International University Students of Southeast Asian Origin

In configuring my questionnaire-survey, I concluded that international university students of origin would constitute a compelling sample population of respondents. Four factors were critical in guiding me to this conclusion. First, the questions in the questionnaires are academic, and thus, respondents should have attained an acceptable level of education if they were to answer the questions with reasonable acuity of mind. University students would be suitable respondents. Second, my limited research budget ruled out the possibility that I might travel to each chosen country for data-collection purposes. A quite reasonable alternative, however, was for me to distribute the questionnaire to students of Southeast Asian origin who were attending universities (mainly in the UK). In addition to being efficient and convenient, this approach guaranteed that the responses would come directly from natives of the six selected countries. Third, as I would have been unable to communicate with respondents in their native language had I travelled to the chosen countries, I would have needed to recruit a small army of translators and questionnaire-survey overseers, all of whom would have necessarily been proficient in both the spoken and the written language—or languages particular to each chosen country.

Table 2.4 Profile of respondents

Countries	Gender		Age			Degree that respondents are pursuing		
	Male	Female	18-25	26-33	34-41	Undergraduate	Master	PhD
Indonesia	11	9	3	11	6	1	7	12
Malaysia	10	10	16	4	0	15	4	1
Philippines	6	14	9	6	5	11	4	5
Singapore	7	13	9	10	1	6	12	2
Thailand	8	12	11	8	1	1	18	1
Vietnam	5	15	17	3	0	9	11	0
Total	47	73	65	42	13	43	56	21

Source: Author's own compilation

To have such a staff would have been ideal for an ideal questionnaire-survey, yet given just the financial limitations of my research project, no such staff would have been possible. A quite reasonable alternative was possible, however. In general, international university students of Southeast Asian origin (including, but by no means limited to, those students attending universities in English-speaking countries) have reasonably strong English abilities. They can intelligently complete questionnaires in English (Table 3.1 presents basic information about the respondents).

2.3.3.3 Sampling Method Used for Respondents

Of the various methods for recruiting study subjects, the snowball-design method was most suitable for the current study. When using questionnaires or surveys, researchers outfitted with the snowball-design method can identify “respondents to identify additional candidates to be interviewed” on the basis of recommendations from a small existing pool of respondents (Doyle, 2011). In the current study, I distributed my questionnaire to a selection of my Southeast Asian friends who were studying at international universities and requested that these respondents distribute my questionnaire to other international universities students of Southeast Asian origin who might be willing to respond to the questionnaire. I adopted two methods for distributing my questionnaire to potential respondents. The first method was electronic distribution, which was made possible primarily by use of email and Facebook. The second method was in-person distribution. The surveys were completed from December 2013 to July 2014.

2.3.3.4 The Reasons to Adopt Closed-Ended and Open-Ended Questions

Generally, questions in questionnaires can be divided into two types: open-ended and close-ended. The advantage of close-ended questions is that respondents can answer most of them easily, but the main disadvantage is that such questions shed little light on the possible complexity or nuance of respondents’ underlying thoughts about the matter under discussion: this is so because the answers are confined to “Yes” or “No” responses or to “Agree” or “Disagree” responses (Reja et al., 2003: 161). A huge advantage of open-ended question is that they enable respondents to express their perspectives about a given topic (Reja et al., 2003: 161). One intriguing disadvantage of open-ended questions is that they can be time-consuming for respondents, a factor that, among other outcomes, may decrease the willingness of respondents to participate in a questionnaire.

The current study adopted a combination of close-ended questions and open-ended

questions, because some of the questions as I formulated them were conducive to one-word or two-word responses whereas other questions were conducive to longer, content-rich responses that expressed respondents' perspectives at length and with useful nuance. Thus, a combination of close-ended and open-ended questions stood the best chance of eliciting from respondents the substance of their thoughts on a matter.

2.4 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter

In chapter one's literature review (see section 1.3), I argued that the state-centric approaches have failed to facilitate rigorous explorations of Southeast Asian security issues and that this failure is due mainly to discrepancies between state-centric theories and the Southeast Asian "new security culture." The first discrepancy is that in the Southeast Asian new security, origins of threats are various, but the state-centric theories focus only on state-sourced threats. The second discrepancy is that in the Southeast Asian new security, state and non-state actors play important roles in addressing insecurities. However, the state-centric theories pay either no attention or woefully little attention to non-state actors. The third discrepancy is that in the Southeast Asian new security culture, people usually are the victims of insecurities, but state-centric theories prioritise states rather than people. The APSC is, itself, a product of the Southeast Asian new security culture, with which the state-centric approaches are out of step: the targeted outcome of the APSC is a people-oriented ASEAN, a fact that points to ASEAN's growing concern about *people* in Southeast Asia. Moreover, issues that are enshrined in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC have been various. And Southeast Asians as individuals, state actors, and non-state actors have been involved in the APSC-building process. Bearing these signs of progress in mind, I argue that the human-security concept is congruous with the APSC because the human-security concept has recognised various origins of threats, the need for different actors to address threats, and the prioritisation of human beings over such traditional markers of progress as military might. However, human security is a concept rather than a theoretical approach and, thus, is in need of a makeover of sorts: to ultimately acquire the status of a theory, the human-security concept must evolve first into an analytical framework.

I followed five steps in transforming the human-security concept into a theory. In the first step, I explained the meaning of human security and distinguished between the human-security concept and non-traditional security concepts. In the second step, I clarified the definitions of freedom from want and freedom from fear. I argue that these two definitions should co-exist, when we study human-security issues, because insecurities in both freedom-

from-want and freedom-from-fear areas harm human beings. In the third step, I explained two central methods—the method of instituting human-development programmes and the method of enacting humanitarian intervention—to address threat to freedom from want and freedom from fear. In this same step, I also explored the repercussions arising from states’ and non-states’ implementation of methods for addressing human insecurities. In the fourth step, I explored how the basic types of actors respond to and address human insecurities. In the fifth and final step, I responded to critiques of human-security concept. By following the five steps, I confirmed the presence of three indispensable components of the human-security concept: (1) the *purpose of human security* is the protection of human beings; (2) the *types of actors* striving to achieve this purpose are individual people, state actors, and non-state actors; and (3) the two *basic means* by which the actors can achieve this purpose are human-development programmes and humanitarian interventions. My analysis in chapters three through seven rests on this human-security analytical framework.

CHAPTER 3 INDIVIDUAL ACTORS: SOUTHEAST ASIANS

Chapter three will examine Southeast Asian people's responses to the AC: Do they know about the creation of the APSC? Have Southeast Asian people perceived improvements in their living standards their dignity, their safety, or their security? To ascertain the kinds of responses that Southeast Asian people would have to such questions, I conducted—for the current study—closed-ended and open-ended questionnaire-survey involving 120 respondents from six ASEAN members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Chapter three comprises three sections. The first section presents a historical review. In it, I explore Southeast Asians' human-security situation from the 1950s to 2002. In the second section, I analyse the questionnaire-survey data. The final section presents my concluding remarks on the topics covered in this chapter.

3.1 Historical Review: Southeast Asians' Human Security

Before exploring the current study's questionnaire-survey data on Southeast Asians' perceptions of relevant issues, and as a prelude to the study's further review and analysis of other types of actors in this arena, I would like to present a historical review of Southeast Asians' human security. As I argued in chapter two, human beings' experience of insecurities can vary according to whether freedom-from-want or freedom-from-fear factors are in play, and the methods that human beings adopt in response to diverse insecurities may vary themselves. Bearing these premises in mind, let us consider the following questions: what were the threats to Southeast Asians between the 1950s and 2002? How did Southeast Asians manage these threats? Are there significant or telling differences between Southeast Asians' human-security situations from the 1950s to the early 1990s and Southeast Asians' human-security situations from the early 1990s to 2002? If such differences are discernible, what are their underlying factors?

3.1.1 *From the 1950s to the early 1990s*

From the 1950s to the early 1990s, the human insecurities that Southeast Asians encountered stemmed from often unpredictable phenomena and from rather predictable human activities. Affected people searched for solutions to their human insecurities, but solutions were more or less fleeting or even illusory. The main reason for the ineffectiveness of proposed solutions was the non-democratic essence of Southeast Asian states' political systems.

3.1.1.1 *Freedom from Want*

From the 1950s, to the early 1990s, threats to Southeast Asians' freedom from want came from unpredictable natural phenomena and human activities. Regarding the former category, many Southeast Asians were experienced droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, floods, landslides, waves, storm surges, and wind storms. After these natural disasters would strike, slightly more predictable problems might arise such as famine, impoverishment, outbreaks of epidemiological diseases, and malnutrition. According to the statistics from the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC), from 1961 to 1990, natural disasters caused homelessness for 6,184,224 and led to the serious injury of 50,597 people injured and the deaths of 72,301.¹⁵ To survive, such crises and to offset their destructiveness, many affected Southeast Asians sought solutions on their own. Examples of these kinds of activities abound. Just take climate change, which—regardless of its origins—has been a natural phenomenon associated with declines in catches of fish during the 1950: not a few Malaysian fishermen reacted to the crisis by resorting to piracy as an alternative livelihood (Jasparro and Taylor, 2008: 244).

Human activities were another source of insecurities to Southeast Asians' freedom from want during this period. To Southeast Asians, this threat took the form of their government. Some Southeast Asians sought solutions to regain their human security, but they encountered their governments' repression. In Cambodia, Muslim fishermen (near the City of Kampong Chhnang) protested against the government's adoption of a collectivisation programme, but the communists killed the demonstrators (Kiernan, 1996: 260-1). In Indonesia, in 1973, students protested against the government's incapacity to address several types of insecurities, including corruption, income gaps, and unemployment, but the Indonesian government dispersed the protesters rather than consider their grievances (Samson, 1974: 162-3). In Myanmar in September 1988, citizens demonstrated for the establishment of both their human rights and democracy, but the Myanmar government ruthlessly quashed the protestors. In the Philippines, in late 1975, Filipinos called for government to raise the minimum wage and to loosen controls governing the creation of labour unions, but the Marcos government arrested these people (Noble, 1977: 134-5). In Singapore in the mid-1970s, students demonstrated against the unemployment problem, and the Singaporean government responded promptly to the upheaval by arresting them (Gerard, 2014: 53). In Thailand in

¹⁵ http://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/DB2000_e.html

1973, Thai students protested their government's incompetence in addressing insecurities, including unemployment, lack of human rights, and corruption (Darling, 1974a: 13). The governments' response was predictably repressive, and certainly not progressive.

Why did government repression so uniformly greet Southeast Asian people's public expression of grievances related to freedom-from-want issues? The main reason lay in the political systems at the heart of Southeast Asian countries. From the 1950s to the early 1990s, political systems in many Southeast Asian countries were strictly non-democratic. As mentioned in chapter two, the non-democratic political system is remarkably efficient at erecting obstacles to people's human security, because non-democratic regimes' viability rests chiefly on placing almost an entire population in a kind of existential stranglehold rather than on winning democratic elections. The typical Southeast Asian government from this era was highly sensitive to criticism and was keen to stamp out demonstrations, campaigns, and social movements, and the like. Against this formidable opposition, Southeast Asians possessed few effective means for establishing widespread human security. Peter Kann pointed out, in the case of the Philippines, that Marcos declared martial law to consolidate his regime through the imposition of tight controls on the Filipino people rather than through the establishment of programmes targeting human-security threats themselves (Kann, 1974: 618-21). The Marcos reign ensured that most Filipinos would suffer from pronounced income inequalities, crime, and a denial of basic human rights (Kann, 1974: 624-28).

3.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

Southeast Asian people's adoption of radical measures to establish a reasonable degree of freedom from want met with repressive measures adopted by the governments in question, and a major consequence of all these countermeasures was a spike in freedom-from-fear problems. Freedom from fear was a comfort enjoyed by few people living in numerous areas throughout the region: the residents of Indonesia's Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya areas; Myanmar's Arakan, Kachin, Karen, Mon, Shan, and Wa states; Thailand's Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat areas; and the Philippines' Mindanao islands. In these areas, residents witnessed their governments' nearly continuous neglect of freedom-from-want problems, many of which were grave. For example, people in Irian Jaya suffered from the government's inequitable distribution of national resources (Lagerberg, 1979: 105); natural resources in Aceh and Mindanao were overwhelmingly exploited by their governments (Islam, 1998: 448, Huxley, 2002a: 35, 43); Acehnese cultural and religious traditions were marginalised by the Indonesian government (Sjamsuddin, 1985: 63-5); the Thai government chronically

overlooked the sufferings of Malay-Muslim populations in Thailand's three southern provinces (Thomas, 1975: 7-10); and governments became practiced at silencing the political demands (often for autonomy and independence) made by people living in the above mentioned places (Thomson, 1995: 271-4).

Some of these people, in the face of governmental neglect and hostility, devised radical solutions for the establishment of security. In December 1976, the Acehnese revolted against the Indonesian government by organising the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, GAM). People in Irian Jaya in 1964 created the Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, OPM) in 1964, which opposed through armed methods Indonesia's incorporation of Irian Jaya. Activists in East Timor established the *Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente* (Fretilin) in May 1974 in pursuit of independence. In Myanmar, each state had one or more insurgent organizations¹⁶ and their causes may have varied from fighting for autonomy, independence, and democracy to protecting interests like narcotics trading, but their measures were almost always militant. In Thailand's Muslim southern provinces, there were numerous armed groups, but the most influential one was the Patani National Liberation Front (*Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani*, BNPP). People in the Philippines' Mindanao islands created the MNLF,¹⁷ whose cause was to create a sovereign Bangsamoro Republic through armed struggle. These groups adopted radical means to fight for their freedom from want, and their governments responded with hard-line measures. Armed conflicts between these radical groups and their governments were rooted in numerous grievances and motivations surrounding freedom from want, and an irony of all civil wars is that they lead to people's freedom-from-fear insecurities.

Again, the principle of democracy has played an important role in Southeast Asian people's efforts to counter domestic governmental repression and to establish human security. From the 1950s to the early 1990, no Southeast Asian governments possessed a democratic system. The governments were suspicious of people's activities, which posed potential threats to the viability of domestic regimes in power. To these regimes, freedom-from-fear issues

¹⁶ Arakan State had the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO); Kachin State had the New Democratic Army and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA); Karen State had the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP); Mon State had the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Mong Tai Army (MTA); Shan State had the Shan State Army South (SSA-S), the Shan State National Army (SSNA), and the Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organization (SSNPLO) and Wa State had the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

¹⁷ In 1978, the MNLF was fragmented into the MILF.

were more sensitive than freedom-from-want issues, since the latter were related to autonomy and political independence. In order to maintain their own territorial integrity, non-democratic governments usually adopted hard-line measures in response to people's demands for participatory democracy, much less outright autonomy.

3.1.2 From the early 1990s to 2002

From the 1990s to 2002, many Southeast Asians encountered a decline in their governments' repressive policies, even when people publicly voiced demands for human security. This liberalising trend was confined largely to countries where a degree of democratic government had taken hold: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Human security remained significantly restricted for Southeast Asians residing in non-democratic countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV).

3.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

From the early 1990s to 2002, threats to Southeast Asians' freedom from want came from frequently unpredictable natural phenomena and from human activities, as had been the case in the preceding era. The negative effects of unpredictable natural phenomena on Southeast Asian people did not decline in severity. From 1991 to 2000, natural phenomena resulted in the homelessness of 182,787 people, significant injuries to 331,109 people, and the deaths of 32,029 people.¹⁸

Although Southeast Asian people remained beset by natural disasters, people in IMPST experienced less governmental repression than people in CLMV. In fact, widespread public pressure led to the collapse of certain Southeast Asian regimes. Such was the case in 1998, when Indonesian people protested against the Indonesian government's incompetence in addressing economic problems linked to the financial crisis: President Suharto, as a consequence, fell from power. However, people in CLMV still encountered repressive government measures. For example, CLMV governments still carried out systematic arrests of people who peacefully demonstrating for their freedom from want.

The differences between the IMPST situation and the CLMV situation had mostly to do with governments' attitudes towards democracy. Beginning in the early 1990s, governments in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand implemented democratic systems (although their democracies did not mature to the extent to which Western democracies had matured in

¹⁸ http://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/DB2000_e.html

preceding decades). Governments in Malaysia and Singapore also gradually accepted discussion of democracy in their national agenda. These governments' positive attitudes towards democracy were manifested in a survey which was conducted by Freedom House in 1999. By that year, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore had acquired the status of "partly free" countries, and the Philippines and Thailand were considered "free" countries.¹⁹ The survey suggested that people in these countries encountered varying degrees of reduced governmental repression related to people's pursuit of human security. For example, Damien Kingsbury argued that the Indonesian government's adoption of a democratic system was a key factor in the Indonesian people's relatively free expression of ideas (Kingsbury, 2005: 13-5).

By contrast, people in the CLMV countries still suffered from government repression, although the situation eased somewhat. Jörn Dosch argued that political transitions occurred in many Southeast Asian countries, including even in quite rigidly non-democratic countries like Cambodia (Dosch, 2008: 529-30). The growing influence and the growing number of CSOs in many Southeast Asian countries during this period exemplified these "structural alterations" (Dosch, 2008: 532). In large measure, however, political transitions in the CLMV countries were minor and the governments remained non-democratic. The Freedom House survey from 1998 and 1999 shows that the CLMV countries had earned a "not free" status (even in 2013, the CLMV countries held firmly onto their "not free" Freedom House status).²⁰ In addition, the CSOs expansion did not translate into significant political transitions in these countries. After all, CSO activities, despite their considerable diversity, differed during this era from people's pursuit of human security. CSOs existed in the CLMV countries precisely because the CSOs' activities generally created no direct challenge to governments' viability. Kelly Gerard argued that these non-democratic governments' tolerated certain CSOs' activities precisely because activities "fit with states' agenda" (Gerard, 2014: 60). However, when CLMV citizens protested their respective government's neglect of human rights, corrupt land-grabbing practices, or resistance to democracy, the protests were essentially directly questioning the government's legitimacy and openly challenging the government's viability. In order to consolidate their power, CLMV governments were unlikely to tolerate these anti-government activities. Thus, people who gained a measure of human security through public protest against their government still

¹⁹ <http://freedomhouse.org/>

²⁰ <http://freedomhouse.org/>

encountered repressive government measures in many other aspects of life.

3.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear

Governments' attitudes towards democracy can also help explain freedom-from-fear issues. When people in Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Mindanao used radical means to establish their human security, the Indonesian and the Filipino governments gradually adopted moderate responses to the demands, although sporadic armed conflicts between the governments and radical groups persisted. The main cause of this mellowing response between the early 1990s and the early 2000s centred on the Indonesian and the Filipino governments' gradual embrace of democracy. Some leaders recognised that regime consolidation through brutal repression of citizens could be far less effective than empathetic inducement of people's support. For example, Indonesian President SBY engaged in the Aceh peace process. He accepted EU and ASEAN members as mediators. SBY's efforts helped him garner 93% of the vote in Aceh during his run for a second presidential term. Thus, the Indonesian and the Filipino governments exhibited instances of tolerance for people who had been employing radical efforts to establish human security. For example, the Indonesian Megawati government in 2001 passed a special autonomy law in reference to Aceh and Irian Jaya. In addition, Philippine President Arroyo, during her first presidential term (2001-2004), rejected the all-out war policy of her predecessor, President Estrada, and adopted a moderate solution to the MILF.

However, the Myanmar government, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), remained reluctant to integrate democratic principles into its rule. Although from 1988 forward, SLORC negotiating a ceasefire with some armed insurgency groups, the government continued to impose repressive measures on other armed insurgency groups, such as the KNU and the United Wa State Party (UWSP), largely because these groups constituted long-term significant challenges to the government's legitimacy and policies. The KNU's State illustrates the kinds of challenges that the country's leadership would not tolerate (Smith, 2002: 17).

3.2 Individuals' Responses to the Creation of the AC

According to the above historical review of Southeast Asians' human security from the 1950s to 2002, people in pro-democratic countries enjoyed more human security than did people in non-democratic countries. Again, this is not to say that improvements in the human security of pro-democratic Southeast Asian countries were on par with improvements already attained

by many Western countries. Significant human insecurities continued to plague Southeast Asia's pro-democratic countries, and indeed still do. ASEAN's decision to create the APSC by 2015 is a huge opportunity for Southeast Asians, both in pro-democratic and non-democratic countries, to improve their human security (or, as the case may be, mitigate their human insecurity). The planned creation of the APSC has raised many concerns, of which a particularly important one is whether Southeast Asians will seize or squander the "huge opportunity." Having conducted a survey addressing this concern, I shall discuss in this section the survey itself, its results (which reflect the responses of 120 respondents), and two questions central to it: How familiar were respondents with the AC? And did respondents feel that their human security had been improving?

3.2.1 Empirical Analysis of Questionnaire Responses

In this section, I will analyse the two central issues addressed by the questionnaire: whether or not—and if so to what extent—respondents were familiar with the AC; and whether or not—and if so to what extent—respondents felt that their human security had improved. This section will not only present the results of the questionnaire but also illustrate the nuanced discourses at the base of respondents' answers.

The questionnaire featured three sets of questions (coupled with imperative requests for detailed information). The first set of questions consisted of three questions concerning basic knowledge about Southeast Asia and ASEAN: (1) How many countries are there in Southeast Asia? Please list the countries you know. (2) How many members does ASEAN have? Please list the members you know. (3) Is your country part of ASEAN? Please describe what you know about ASEAN.

The second set of questions consisted of one question concerning basic knowledge about the AC: Do you know that ASEAN plans to create the AC by 2015? If yes, please describe what you know about the AC.

The third set of questions consisted of three questions concerning people's human security: (1) When living in your country, do you enjoy adequate human rights? Please describe any human rights you are denied. (2) Do you think that your government provides you with enough security? Please describe any types of security your government is unable to provide. (3) Do you have confidence that, if your native country suffers a natural disaster like a tsunami or an earthquake, your government can provide rapid, adequate relief? Please give reasons for your answer.


3.2.1.1 Respondents' Familiarity with the AC

A total of 32 students (29.1%) knew that ASEAN was planning to establish the AC by 2015. Of the 120 respondents, the group of Thai respondents registered the highest number of respondents—15—who knew about the AC's creation was scheduled for 2015; the Indonesia and Singapore groups, each, registered 6 respondents in the know; the Philippines group registered 3 respondents; Vietnam, 2 respondents. None of the Malaysian respondents stated that they were aware of ASEAN's efforts to create the AC by 2015 (see Figure 3.1). An accurate description of the AC should, according to the Bali Concord, include at least the three pillars of the AC and the purpose of the creation of the AC. Even though 32 students claimed to know that ASEAN would be creating the AC, only 4 respondents could identify the two aforementioned qualities attributable to the AC (i.e., the three pillars and the purpose of the creation of the AC).

A few respondents' answers were too superficial to pass muster. Thailand Respondent No. 1 described the AC as an organisation

combining Asian countries together, similar to [the] European Union.

Figure 3.1 Respondents (by country) familiar with the AC



Source: Author's own compilation

Vietnam Respondent No. 8 wrote down that the AC is

a community like [the] EU.

Other respondents' answers focused excessively on the AEC. Indonesia Respondent No. 7 answered the question, "Do you know that ASEAN plans to create the AC by 2015? Please describe what you know about the AC" with the following description of the organisation:

To some extent, the association [ASEAN] is trying to build economic power as [is] [the] European Union through a free trade region. When the AC starts, there will be some policies to accelerate trade and business among the ASEAN member countries.

In response to the same questions, Thailand Respondent No. 15 offered an interesting attempt to describe the AC:

It's not [the] ASEAN Community, because it was established [a] long time ago. However, you may mean [the] AEC (ASEAN Economic Community) that will launch economic cooperation in the multi-lateral levels in extents [areas] of taxations, trade agreements, labour rights and foreign investments.

Thailand Respondent No. 19's answer to the question led to this description of the AC:

It aspires to be what the EU is in social, economic and political aspects. I think the main objective is economic.

Only 4 of the 32 respondents were able to accurately describe the AC. Indonesia Respondent No. 6 offered one such description:

[The] AC is the vision of ASEAN to form a community of people that has common regional identity, [is] democratic, [is] living in pace [peace], [has] economic integration, [has] prosperity, [is a] caring society, and share[s] cultural heritage. [The] AC comprises of [sic] three pillars: political-security, economic, [and] socio-cultural. [The] AC mission is not to make ASEAN [a] supranational body in the like [likeness] of [the] EU, but to make [a greater] connection among ASEAN people and [to promote]

greater understanding among [the] leaders in the ASEAN region about the importance and strategi[c] influence of [the] Southeast Asian region in world affairs.

Again in reference to the question “Do you know that ASEAN plans to create the AC by 2015. Please describe what you know about the AC,” Singapore Respondent No. 1 characterised the AC thus:

[AC] serves to further unify the ASEAN members by creating a more cohesive community/network (not that much unlike that of the EU). Founded on several pillars including economic and cultural. The economic pillar will look at managing tariffs between member states. The cultural pillar focuses on cultural exchanges between states.

Philippines Respondent No. 11 was the third respondent to describe the AC adequately:

The AC will be built on three pillars (political-security, economic, socio-cultural). The vision is to create the free movement of goods, people and services amongst the ten member states.

The fourth and final adequate answer to “what you know about the AC” was Philippines Respondent No. 15:


[The] ASEAN Community aims to highlight the objectives of the regional organization by creating three pillars...political-security community, economic community, and socio-cultural community. Each one has a blueprint of what needs to be done to ensure that we create these types of communities. All these aim to promote better cooperation and coordination across the different member states.

It should not be surprising that not many respondent shad a sufficient grasp of the AC’s general mission. In 2004, Caballero-Anthony argued that “While ASEAN is well into its thirty-sixth year, it remains an unknown entity for most of the people of Southeast Asia” (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 577). Thị Thu Hương Đặng also argued that “there is almost no sense of community among the people in Southeast Asia” (Đặng, 2008: 8). Several factors can explain why only 4 of the 120 respondents were able to describe the AC according to the

current study's standard. For starters, ASEAN has been a state-centred inter-governmental body and, for this reason, has failed to communicate its mission to Southeast Asian people. Perhaps an even more important factor in Southeast Asians' low awareness of the AC is their lack of interest in ASEAN and Southeast Asian affairs.

According to the data, only 14 respondents (12%) accurately identified all the countries in Southeast Asia and identified all the members in ASEAN (Indonesia Respondent No. 7; Philippines Respondents Nos. 11 and 15, Singapore Respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, and 15; and Vietnam Respondents Nos. 5, 9, 15, and 20) (please see Figure 3.2). Many respondents regarded Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and New Zealand as part of Southeast Asia and as members of ASEAN (Malaysia Respondent No. 10; Philippines Respondents Nos. 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 20; Singapore Respondent No. 6; and Vietnam Respondents Nos. 3 and 18).

Figure 3.2 Respondents (by country) who accurately identified the countries in Southeast Asia and members in ASEAN




Source: Author's own compilation

In addition, many respondents, including several of the Indonesians were unaware that East Timor is a Southeast Asian country. Each respondent knew that his or her own country was a member of ASEAN, but not many respondents could describe ASEAN.

Regarding the question—"Describe what you know about ASEAN", not many respondents could adequately describe ASEAN. An adequately accurate description of

ASEAN should mention its economic, political, and social functions. However, only 25 respondents (21%) provided descriptions of ASEAN encompassing the above three categories (please see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 Respondents (by country) who adequately described ASEAN



Source: Author's own compilation

Singapore Respondent No. 2 provided the following adequate description of ASEAN:

ASEAN is a bloc of 10 nation-states in Southeast Asia seeking to establish closer socio-political and economic ties. The bloc is working towards free trade, among other agreements as outlined in the ASEAN Blueprint 2015. In its history, ASEAN has been lauded and, at the same time, criticized for the 'ASEAN Way' as its defining approach in handling inter-state affairs. 'The ASEAN Way' is characterized by a soft approach in negotiations and resolving conflicts and policy of non-interference in one another's domestic affairs, among other traits. This has been met with criticism because of how long ASEAN nation-states take to reach consensus on any given issues, if at all reached.

Philippines Respondent No. 11 provided another of the adequate descriptions of ASEAN:

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations established between the first 5 member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines) as a security

arrangement to promote cultural and economic and national development. Initially non-communist in orientation, the bloc has come to represent pluralism in social, political and normative national traditions, hence giving primacy to sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the state.

A third adequate description of ASEAN came from Vietnam Respondent No. 6:

It is an association first established to counter Communism by 3 founding members (probably Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, I cannot remember exactly). Then it has opened to other countries in Southeast Asia and worked on the purpose of cooperating and helping each other to develop [the] economy, sharing culture[s], and political aspects. It is allowed that tourists from ... ASEAN members can get easy access to other countries of the Association without having to apply for visa[s]. [The] tariff rate for imports from one member into other members is lower. There are many advantages to encourage the mutual benefits of trading within ASEAN members.

3.2.1.2 Respondents' Perspectives on Their Living Standards, Dignity, and Safety

Since 2003 ASEAN has been preparing the creation of the APSC. However, not many respondents felt that their living standards had risen or that their safety was more secure since preparations to create the APSC had gotten underway. Regarding the question “When living in your country, do you enjoy adequate human rights?” 52 respondents wrote down that they lacked adequate human rights (43%). The majority of these respondents were Malaysians—15 out of the 52 (please see Figure 3.4). Also, 12 Singaporean respondents expressed their opinion that they lacked adequate human rights.

6 Malaysian respondents claimed that they had not enjoyed the freedoms of either religious belief or expression in their native country. For example, Malaysia Respondent No. 6 offered this commentary:

Islam [is] still [the] priority [as the] state religion but the society in our country is multi-cultural. It makes people feel like second [rate] citizen[s], if we are not from the state religion.

All twelve Singaporean respondents who felt that they had lacked human rights in their native country pointed out that the Singaporean governments has denied them, in particular, the


freedom of expression (speech). In discussing the matter, Singapore Respondent No. 2 wrote,

There are many ways to do it [practice free speech] on the Internet, but even that is being increasingly regulated with the new MDA [Media Development Authority] rule that forces influential bloggers to apply for a publishing license once they reach a certain level of followers online.

Singapore Respondent No. 17 offered these thoughts on the subject:

From my perspectives, our government has provided [a] robust welfare system. However, we have limited freedom of expression, in particular for political opponents. Our governments have used various methods to discourage political opponents. For example, our government has adopted defamation suits against its critics.

Figure 3.4 Respondents (by country) who expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their native country's current human-rights record



Source: Author's own compilation


A total of 77 respondents answered in the negative to the question “Do you think that your government provides you with enough security? Please describe any types of security that your government is unable to provide” (please see Figure 3.5) (64%). Of the 20 Singaporean respondents, 18 held that their government provided them with enough human

security. However, respondents from other countries complained that their native country's government had been failing to provide its people with sufficient human security.

In response to human-security question, poor medical care and environmental degradation were common themes responses among the 11 Indonesian respondents who held the belief that their native country's government was not providing them with adequate human security. Indonesia Respondent No. 1, provided an answer illustrating this pattern:

I lives [sic] in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. The government of Jakarta provides enough security and public services to its people. However, inequality is a major issue in Indonesia. Corruption that involves local officials, poverty, unavailability of basic health services and environmental degradation are some issues faced by the local government.

Figure 3.5 Respondents (by country) who held that their native country's government provided them with human security



Source: Author's own compilation

Some Malaysian respondents wrote that people in Malaysia have encountered such problems as endemic crime, poverty, corruption, or racism. Malaysia Respondent No. 17 wrote,

I do still think that our government is kind of funny as there is no one going to raise the problem of being discriminating among the races... Well, as a student, I do think that my

country[’s] education system wouldn’t bring us further as bias [is] still present among the system. I strongly believe that the racist issue... [is] present, but not among the citizen[s], but it [is] being manipulated by government as their tool to [exercise] control over us.

Corruption, crime, environmental degradation, job security, poor medical care, and poverty are problems cited by Thai students, including Thailand Respondent No. 9:

I think my government [is responsible for a] lack of good care in transportation and health care for poor or lower income people.

Filipino students identified insecurities they faced, singling out such problems as corruption, crime, environmental degradation, and poverty. Philippines Respondent No. 7 commented on all three themes:

There is hardly anything being done to protect the environment. New movements were only started due to the demand of the upper class and celebrities. I feel that the local police are there most of the time to catch criminals etc, but they do nothing to prevent them. Medical care is not free, and almost always very expensive. Hospitals have become a place of business, not a place of healing.

Another Filipino respondent (No. 14) echoed the same general sentiment while touching on additional themes:

Internet crimes, laws in doing business and education still have lots of holes and are not able to protect residents of the country. Issues related to poverty have not been solved as there are still a lot of people living in poverty and hunger. Industrial economic growth has brought a lot of environmental pollutions to the country.


Sixteen Vietnamese students stated that their government did not provide them with adequate human security. The types of problems tended to include corruption, environmental degradation, food security, unaffordable medical care, and poverty. Vietnamese Respondent No. 7 argued,

The medical care quality is not as good as in the more developed ASEAN countries (e.g: [sic] Singapore, Malaysia). The cost for good, effective medical treatments is still very high.

Regarding the question, “If your native country suffers a natural disaster like a tsunami or an earthquake, do you have confidence that your government can provide rapid, adequate relief?” Of the 120 respondents, 62 expressed a lack of confidence in their government’s preparedness (please see Figure 3.6) (52%). Singaporean respondents expressed the highest levels of confidence in their government’s ability to manage natural disasters. Singapore Respondent No. 1 wrote,

I am aware that our emergency services personnel have been trained for disaster relief (and they regularly do go to the aid of other countries).

Figure 3.6 Respondents (by country) who expressed confidence in their native country’s government regarding natural-disaster management



Source: Author’s own compilation

Singapore Respondent No. 5 had this to say:

Singapore has mission-ready response teams to provide aid and relief to victims of natural disaster both overseas and domestic[ally]. The Singapore Armed Forces and

Home Team agencies have the financial, technological and human resources to respond quickly to 'stranded' locations.

With the exception of Singaporean respondents, most respondents from each country expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of their native country's government to manage natural disasters. Indonesian Respondent No. 5 offered this balanced assessment:

If the small scale earthquake happens, with the small scale of damage, my government can handle it. But for large scale earthquake, like earthquake and tsunami in Aceh 2004, my government was not ready, especially if it happens in remote area.

Many respondents pointed out that the corruption was a significant barrier to their respective government's ability to address natural disasters. Malaysia Respondent No. 1 gave voice to this concern:

We are not given the real information about our financial status and because of the recent splurge of the government in useless stuff or buildings. Besides that, many will even embezzle money out of the country for personal gain.

Malaysian Respondent No. 16 singled out incompetence on the part of the Malaysian government:

Current government is not efficient enough and they may have not enough experience on handling natural disaster since Malaysia seldom have [sic] natural disaster. Paid government workers also [are] more lazy compared to private non-pay workers.

Likewise, Thailand Respondents No. 8 and No. 11 articulated their belief that the Thai government, because of corruption, is unable to cope satisfactorily with natural disasters. Thailand Respondent No. 8 argued from historical precedence:

Thailand ... experienced ... great disaster in the past 2 years and the government of Thailand ... proved that they cannot handle the situation. I think it is due to high corruption in Thailand[']s political sector.

Thailand Respondent No. 11 complained, as well, about corruption—this time in regard to the most recent tsunami that struck southern Thailand:

... the population depended on non-profit organizations such as Red Cross and others for relief. The funds from government was [sic] too much slower [sic] and was heavily corrupted by the time the aids and funds arrived.

Philippines Respondent No. 7 also drew a link between inept natural-disaster management and government corruption:

For example, look at what is happening now after Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. We received millions in international aid, but there is controversy happening about whether the money was spent on what the victims needed, and whether the money was used wisely. The government is so corrupt, and ... probably half of the money didn't go where it was supposed to.

Many Vietnamese respondents' answers point to the firmness of their belief that their government lacks adequate resources to address natural disasters effectively. Vietnam Respondent No. 1 stated,

There are barriers related to technology that restraint [sic] government's ability to recover the whole area affected. Government budget is insufficient but large support from people in different parts of the country may help a lot.

Vietnam Respondent No. 4 voiced a similar concern:

My country is a developing country. So the finance[s], technology or social fund[s] are not enough for government to deal with natural disasters.

Many respondents' complaints about a lack of human rights and a lack of human security in their homeland, and many respondents' strongly expressed lack of confidence in their own government, all suggest that ASEAN has done a sub-par job of creating the APSC and the ASCC. CSOs have already expressed their disappointment in the ASEAN Charter (Collins, 2008: 314) and many media have criticised ASEAN for failing to develop a people-

oriented AC, often accusing ASEAN of remaining an elitist organisation. Their disappointment and criticism point to their possible underlying assumption that if ASEAN cannot achieve people-oriented targets, ASEAN members must be the central culprits. Indeed, it is a generally accepted principle that state actors have a responsibility to improve people's human security, but I would like to focus here on Southeast Asians' own responsibility to protect and promote their own and one another's human security, as well. I mentioned in chapter two that the extent to which multi-state organisations can mitigate human insecurities depends on the wider population's understanding of multi-state organisations' plans and policies (see section 2.1.4.1). In short, to improve their human security, people should familiarise themselves with multi-state organisations. When the *Phnom Penh Post* interviewed ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, Surin's argument suggested that Southeast Asian people's awareness of the AC was of tremendous importance. He said,

The new charter now provides for people to participate and make a contribution. If people take that seriously, we'll have a chance to help drive and shape the region and the organization. If they don't, then you can't blame the leaders. They have made their commitment. They have opened up the space. Now it's for the people of ASEAN to seize the opportunity. (*Phnom Penh Post*, March 9, 2009)

Unfortunately, according to the current study's finding, few respondents knew about the efforts to create the AC. Respondents' lack of knowledge concerning ASEAN and indeed other multi-state organisations may prove detrimental to these respondents' human security, quite simply because their ignorance limits their range of choices in addressing human insecurities. For example, ASEAN created the AICHR in October 2009. The AICHR's purpose has been to improve and promote human rights among Southeast Asians. Although it is too early to conclude that the AICHR will directly combat Southeast Asians' human insecurity, the AICHR has regularly brought people's human-insecurity issues to the fore. Respondents, if they had adequately familiarised themselves with plans for the creation of the AC, could have communicated their pleasure or displeasure with the ongoing development of the AC by lodging praise or complaints with the AICHR.

3.3 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter

Chapter two's section on individual actors (2.1.4.1) mentioned that human beings instinctually seek to preserve their own human security by any of a host of means. We can

find recent historical instances in which Southeast Asian people have employed diverse methods to protect themselves from insecurities. However, whether their methods were effective or not often depended in large part on their respective governments' political system. People's adoption of self-protective measures may stand a better chance of eliciting a positive response from democratic governments than from non-democratic ones. And in this regard, I argued in chapter two's state-actors section (2.1.4.2) that the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to have.

In order to get a glimpse into Southeast Asian people's response to the APSC, I conducted the questionnaire-survey discussed above. I designed a closed-ended and open-ended questionnaire-survey and, by using the snowball-design method, distributed the questionnaires to students of Southeast Asian origin who were attending universities (mainly the UK). The questionnaire elicited from respondents their views on the creation of the APSC: specifically, the questionnaire helped clarify whether they extend to which respondents knew about the AC, whether respondents were satisfied with their current human-security situation, and whether respondents had confidence in their own government regarding its capacity to handle natural disasters.

One of the most compelling findings gleaned from this questionnaire-survey centres on an apparent mismatch between claim of knowledge and demonstrated knowledge: of the 120 respondents, 32 claimed to know that ASEAN would create the AC by 2015, yet only four of these 32 respondents could adequately describe the AC. In addition, the questionnaire-survey findings suggest that many of the respondents did not perceive themselves as benefactors of adequate human rights in their homeland, did not regard their own government as effective providers of human security, and did not have much confidence in their own government's ability to manage natural disasters. These and other themes in the respondents' responses to the questionnaire-survey items constitute tangible evidence pointing to the possibility that ASEAN has not done enough to inform the public of its intentions regarding creation of the AC. People should strive to gain familiarity with prominent, relevant multi-state organisations, because the less awareness people have of such organisations, the fewer the choices people have in addressing a variety of serious insecurities.

CHAPTER 4 STATE ACTORS I: ASEAN MEMBER-STATES

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand created ASEAN in 1967. Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined ASEAN in the 1980s and the 1990s. However, since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been a heterogeneous organisation. Politically, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand currently have relatively pro-democratic political systems. Malaysia and Singapore are soft-authoritarian polities. Brunei possesses an absolute monarchy. Laos and Vietnam are quasi-socialist. Myanmar is ruled by a military junta,²¹ and the government of Cambodia is authoritarian. Economically, development among members has its disparities. Brunei and Singapore are developed members, and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are developing countries. Economic development in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam lags far behind the economic development in the developed and developing member-countries. Because of political and economic differences among ASEAN members, it is not easy for the members to reach a consensus when trying to render decisions: after all, each member has its own unique set of interests to consider. Likewise, regarding the APSC, each member has adopted its own strategies and motivations underlying its strategies. Exploration of members' strategies and motivations underlying strategies is important. As I mentioned in chapter two, state and non-state actors involved in human-security issues have their own strategies and their own motivations underlying these strategies (see section 2.1.4.2). Rigorous exploration of strategies and motivations can help us identify the barriers to the creation of the APSC. In chapter four, I will analyse each member-state's strategies and underlying motivations. In the conclusion, I will explore significant barriers to the creation of the APSC.

4.1 Brunei Darussalam

Probably because Brunei is a small country in terms of size and population, it has not typically been in the academic or media spotlight. However, the Brunei government is among the few Southeast Asian countries to have steadily provided human security to its citizens, thanks to the country's abundant natural resources. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Brunei government has adopted support strategies. In this section of my study, I will first historically review how the Bruneian government has provided its people with human security, and will then explore the Bruneian government's strategies for creating the APSC

²¹ In late 2010, the Myanmar government implemented political reforms. They released political prisoners and hold the by-elections in April 2011.

and the motivations underlying these strategies.

4.1.1 *Historical Review: Since Independence in 1984 to 2002*

In this historical review, I will explore how the Bruneian government has provided its people with human security. Thanks to considerable crude oil and liquefied natural gas reserves, the Bruneian government has been able to provide its people with an impressive welfare system, but the Bruneian government has restricted people's political participation. Interestingly, the Bruneian government has not encountered significant challenges from the people.

4.1.1.1 *Freedom from Want*

The Bruneian government, reigned over by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah since independence, has provided its people with quite robust freedom from want. The main reason for this impressive provision of such freedom concerns Brunei's considerable crude oil and liquefied natural gas reserves. In 1986, oil production in Brunei reached about 181,000 barrels per day and natural gas production could reach as much as 293 billion cubic feet per year.²² The Bruneian government's revenues from hydrocarbon sectors have provided the fiscal basis for a citizen-oriented welfare system. The government imposes no income tax on the country's citizens. In addition, education and healthcare have been free and fuel prices have been subsidised. The Bruneian government has helped keep its citizens a good distance from famine, poverty, and malnutrition. In 2000, Brunei ranked 32 out of the 174 countries on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI).

However, Brunei's people did not have the freedom of political participation. The Brunei government restricted people's political participation. In May 1985, Malay businessmen and professionals established the Brunei National Democratic Party (*Partai Kebangsaan Demokratik Brunei*, BNDP). The BNDP's goal was to implement a democratic system, including referendums and the Sultan's resignation from the position of Prime Minister (Singh, 1988: 67-8). However, from the Sultan's perspective, "The party system led to chaos, it doesn't work out in Brunei" (cited from Hamzah, 1989: 92). Finally, the BNDP was banned and the leaders of the BNDP were arrested, including BNDP President Abdul Latif Hamid and BNDP Secretary-General Abdul Latif Chuchu. Because no opposition parties existed in Brunei, unsurprisingly, the Sultan and his relatives controlled Brunei's administration. Indeed, the important Ministers positions were held by either the Sultan

²² <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=BX>

himself or his relatives. For example, the Sultan acted as both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense; the Sultan's younger brothers Pengoram Muda Mohamed and Pengiran Muda Jefri acted as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance respectively (Singh, 1988: 66).

Interestingly, even though Brunei's people have lacked the right of political participation, the Bruneian government has not encountered significant challenges from the people. In chapter two's section on states, I mentioned that the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to have (see section 2.1.4.2). However, an exception to this rule consists of states that possess developed economies but authoritarian politics. In these states, people do not challenge their governments, because the government provides a robust welfare system to them. Brunei is an exemplary instance of this theme. According to Abu Bakar Hamzah and Hans Blomqvist, improvement of the Bruneians living standards has been advantageous for the government itself, because the robust welfare system could keep "social discontent at a low level" (Blomqvist, 1993: 174, Hamzah, 1989: 96-7). Given the government's welfare system, Bruneians could tolerate the lack of political participation.

After the Cold War, several threats to Bruneians emerged, but the Bruneian government took countermeasures. First, the crime rate increased. The Sultan was particularly concerned about the problem of illicit drugs. Regarding drug crimes, in 1992, 595 people were arrested by the Brunei government (Cleary and Francis, 1994: 61). In 2001, 547 people were arrested by the Brunei government (Sulaiman, 2003: 72). Although the figures slightly decreased, the problem of illicit drugs had not improved. Therefore, the government has imposed heavy punishments on people violating relevant laws. People found carrying over 50 grams of methyl amphetamines would receive the death penalty (Sulaiman, 2003: 73). Second, in order to ensure environmental sustainability, the Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources has regulated logging²³ and rehabilitated forests. In addition, the Brunei government has created a national park—Ulu Temburong National Park—in 1991, and the Brunei government encouraged ecotourism the country (Siddique, 1992: 97).²⁴

²³ After a few years, Brunei imported timber from outside countries rather than log its own forest resources (Duraman and Hashim, 1998: 59).

²⁴ Now, of all ASEAN's member states, Brunei has the highest percentage of rainforest coverage (78%) and the lowest deforestation rates (an annual change rate of less than 0.5%) (*Brunei Times*, December 8, 2011).

4.1.1.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Neither ethnic tensions nor civil wars have beset Brunei. Noteworthy is the fact that the Brunei government contributed to the mission of post-conflict peace-building in Cambodia. Regarding Cambodian post-conflict peace-building, the Bruneian government donated US\$1 million for rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes and sent twelve personnel from the Royal Brunei Police Force and three personnel from the Royal Brunei Armed Forces to participate in a peace-keeping mission (Mani, 1993: 101).

4.1.2 *Exploration of the Bruneian Government's Strategies for the APSC*

4.1.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Bruneian Government's Strategies*

According to the above historical review, we know that the Bruneian government has provided human security to its people. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that after ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the Bruneian government's strategy has been to support this target.

The Bruneian government's adoption of a strategy of support for the creation of the APSC has rested on two central motivations. The first motivation has been economic. Brunei is a country heavily dependent on the oil and gas sectors. However, the oil production in Brunei has been decreasing. Between 2006 and 2012, oil production declined from 220,000 barrels per day to 141,000 barrels per day.²⁵ Consequently, economic diversification has become an important issue in the Bruneian government. For the Bruneian government, development of the *halal* section has been important to diversifying the Bruneian economy, because there has been "large demand for *halal* products both from within the country and from the large global Muslim population," all of which may promote the development of small and medium enterprises in Brunei (Thambipillai, 2008: 96). Creation of the APSC gave the Bruneian government an opportunity to diversifying the economy, as the Bruneian government has come to consider Mindanao a "future hub for *halal* food production" (*Brunei Times*, December 3, 2010). If the Filipino government adheres in practice to the provisions in the APSC's blueprint and faithfully restores peace in Mindanao, the Bruneian government will likely expand its market of *halal* products and services to Mindanao. Since October 2004, hence, Brunei joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and enthusiastically helped the Filipino government restore peace in Mindanao.

The other motivation underlying the Bruneian government's support strategies has been

²⁵ <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=bx>

to ameliorate environmental problems. According to Azman Ahmad, since the 2000s, Bruneian people have suffered from environmental problems, including improperly treated waste and dangerous levels of water pollution (Ahmad, 2005: 102). In addition, Bruneian people have been affected by transboundary haze pollution. It needs assistance from regional organisations. In 2007, when Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah attended in the 13th ASEAN Summit, he called for ASEAN members to address environmental issues and strengthen cooperation in the ASCC.²⁶ The Bruneian government's adoption of strategic support for the APSC can help the government ameliorate the negative effects of environmental problems through multilateral cooperation.

4.1.2.2 *The Bruneian Government's Strategies*

4.1.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

Regarding the freedom-from-want issues, the Bruneian government has emphasised environmental issues found in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC: these issues include water-resource management and the haze-prevention problem (ASEAN, 2009b: 14-5, 19). At the 12th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME), held in September 2012 in order to enhance regional cooperation on environmental issues, the Bruneian Minister of Development signed the Bangkok Resolution on ASEAN Environmental Cooperation and emphasised the following point:

Brunei Darussalam's continuous support of the noble objective of achieving the vision of a resilient ASEAN Community and to have a sustainable environment. (*Brunei Times*, September 29, 2012)

In addition, when Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah attended the 2nd Asia-Pacific Water Summit, he urged participant countries, including ASEAN members, to pay more attention to water issues, which had already led to tension between countries, affected people's health, and produced natural disasters (*Borneo Bulletin*, May 21, 2013). Regarding the haze-prevention problem, ASEAN's adoption of the ASEAN Sub-Regional Haze Monitoring System was under Bruneian chairmanship. This system can identify the cause of forest fires through a sharing of satellite data.

²⁶ <http://www.aspirasi-ndp.com/en/archive/SultanCallsCharterNewBeginningForAsean.html>

4.1.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The Bruneian government has given substantive assistance to the Philippines. The Bruneian government's assistance in Mindanao lived up to the freedom-from-fear principle in the APSC: "lay the ground for reconciliation and all other necessary measures to secure peace and stability, thus preventing the affected areas from falling again to conflicts in the future" (ASEAN, 2009a: 11). Since October 2004, the Brunei government joined the IMT to monitor the ceasefire agreement, which had been signed by the Philippines government and the MILF in 2002. As mentioned in a previous section, the motivation of the Bruneian government to join the peace process in Mindanao was that the Bruneian government expected to diversify its economy by investing in the *halal* sector in Mindanao. Although the Bruneian government's motivation to be involved in the Mindanao peace process has had distinctly self-serving economic objectives, neighbouring countries have recognised the importance and indeed the effectiveness of the Bruneian government's. Handriyo Kusumo, the Indonesian Ambassador to Brunei, lauded the government, declaring,

Brunei has been playing an important role in the peacekeeping process in the southern Philippines, as part of the International Monitoring Team, thus reflecting Brunei as a peace-loving country. (*Brunei Times*, January 29, 2011)

4.1.3 *Summary*

The Bruneian government has established a good record of providing human security to the Bruneian people. Since Bruneian independence, the Bruneian government has provided its people with human security. Despite the population's lack of political participation, no significant popular challenges to the government have arisen. Internationally, the Bruneian government has provided freedom-from-fear assistance to people in other countries. At the same time, Bruneians have suffered from domestic environmental problems that sometimes have international origins. The Bruneian government has adopted measures to counter these challenges. The Bruneian government's support for the creation of the APSC relative to freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues can, it would seem, help the government address the aforementioned problems. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Bruneian government has been strategically supporting to the creation of the APSC.

4.2 **Cambodia**

Since Cambodian independence in 1953, none of the country's rulers—from Prince Norodom

Sihanouk to current Prime Minister Hun Sen—have been able to provide their people with a sufficient degree of human security. Indeed, these rulers have been sources of considerable threat to the welfare of the people. Their greed for power and wealth has exacerbated human insecurities. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Cambodian government's strategies have been beneficial not to the Cambodian people but to the current regime itself. In this section of my study, I will historically review how each Cambodian regime has deteriorated the Cambodian people's human security. Next, I will explore the strategies that the government has adopted in response to the APSC.

4.2.1 Historical Review: Since Independence in 1953 to 2002

This section of the historical review will address the shifting political positions of Cambodian leaders during these decades. The first part of this section discusses human security under the Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Pol Pot, and Heng Samrin regimes, and the second part discusses human security under the Hun Sen regime.

4.2.1.1 Human Security under the Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Pol Pot, and Heng Samrin Regimes

Barry Buzan argued that “the individual citizen faces many threats which emanate either directly or indirectly from the state” (Buzan, 1991: 44). Indeed, from the Sihanouk to Heng Samrin Regimes, no Cambodian government provided human security to its people. If we read the *Asian Survey* journal's essays examining the Cambodian social and political situation as it evolved the 1970s to the late 1980s, we can readily observe that scholars emphasised the Cambodian government's incompetence in addressing social and economic problems (Jackson, 1978: 87-90, Kirk, 1971), the Cambodian government's regimentation on its people (Kirk, 1974: 92), the Cambodian government's complicity in atrocities carried out against its people (Quinn, 1977: 53, Chanda, 1987: 121), and Cambodians' abysmal living environments (Quinn, 1977: 53, Becker, 1984: 47). Under these regimes, Cambodian people lost their right of freedom from want and freedom from fear.

4.2.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

Prince Norodom Sihanouk was unable to minimise his people's pronounced hardships. During Sihanouk's period of rule, Cambodia had poor infrastructure, no light industry, and benighted economic conditions. These problems resulted in several human insecurities. Poor road conditions prevented delivery of food, which resulted in poverty and famine; lack of light industry meant that people's living standards were low; the ailing economy led to rises

in both food prices and unemployment (Kirk, 1971). The government's incompetence compelled many people to revolt. A few years before the *coup* against Sihanouk in 1970, Cambodians protested in several places including Kompong Cham and Battambang (Smith, 1968: 73-4), but the Sihanouk government harshly suppressed these demonstrations. Donald Kirk argued that the Sihanouk government's incompetence in addressing several problems in Cambodia was the main reason for his downfall (Kirk, 1971: 239-45).

After Sihanouk's downfall, the U.S.-backed Lon Nol came to power. However, Lon Nol failed to solve the problems that had existed during Sihanouk's reign. Famine and malnutrition were common among people. According to figures from the U.S. government, two million people in Cambodia suffered from famine and malnutrition (Poole, 1972: 153). Although the Lon Nol regime enjoyed U.S. financial assistance, it ended up being directly embezzled by officials (Poole, 1972: 154). All the while, public discontent with the government was growing. For example, in 1974, students and teachers demonstrated against Lon Nol's corruption and incompetence, triggering a serious conflict between police and demonstrators (Kirk, 1975: 57-8).

During the Khmer Rouge regime, Pol Pot callously disregarded human life. Culture, the education system, national currency, private property, and religious ceremonies were abolished by the Khmer Rouge regime (Kiljunen, 1984: 17-8). In addition, the government of Kampuchea moved people from urban to rural areas for the purposes of a mass collectivisation project, requiring the cultivation of rice and the creation of irrigation systems. The mass mobilisation of people resulted in many human insecurities, like famine, malnutrition, and disease. Moreover, when the Khmer Rouge relocated people, family members were forcibly separated (Quinn, 1977: 52). Thus, family structures were disrupted.

In November 1978, Vietnam initiated an invasion of Cambodia and created the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), led by Heng Samrin. Like previous Cambodian regimes, the PRK was nothing more than yet another threat to Cambodians' well-being. Most Cambodians, in particular children, suffered from disease, malnutrition, and poverty (Becker, 1984: 47). The Heng Samrin government compounded, rather than resolve, long-standing problems. For example, in 1980, bad weather decimated that year's rice harvest. Although the Red Cross and the UN provided rice to Cambodia, the most severely affected people could not benefit from the assistance, since, according to Leifer, "the Heng Samrin government was using rice as an instrument of political control, providing it to loyal supporters" (Leifer, 1981: 99).

4.2.1.1.2 *Freedom from Fear*

In the Sihanouk period, his regime's vacillating diplomatic policies negatively affected the people on a widespread basis. In 1955, Sihanouk declared that Cambodia was a neutral state. However, he established close friendships with China and North Vietnam and allowed them to create military facilities in eastern Cambodia and use a Cambodian port system. Meanwhile, he asked for assistance from the United States. When North Vietnamese forces increased in Cambodia, Sihanouk agreed that Washington could bombard North Vietnam's forces in Cambodia. Sihanouk was a culprit in the transformation of Cambodia into a battlefield. No accurate figures exist as to how many Cambodians died because of his vacillating policies. However, the repercussions are evident. One example is often cited: when North Vietnam and the United States waged war in Cambodia, they planted numerous anti-personnel mines, which have since claimed thousands of people's lives (Davies, 1994: 11).

When Lon Nol achieved power in 1975, his *Forces Armées Nationales Khmères* (FANK) waged war with the *Front Uni National du Kampuchéa* (FUNK), which had been established by Sihanouk and the Khmer communists. Meanwhile, the U.S. bombing raids in Cambodia remained in place. Between 1970 and 1974, the civil war resulted in around 600,000 to 800,000 deaths, the forced exile of 120,000 ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia to Vietnam, and 2,000,000 Cambodians refugees (Peou, 2005: 109-10).

Pol Pot's regime was the most brutal. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia became a killing field. Communist cadres adopted various approaches to carrying out its mass killing. Khmer Rouge cadres would employ such weapons as bayonets, machine-guns, mortars, and tanks, and would beat, drown and starve people to death (Kiernan, 1996: 251-309). Cases of fratricide were widely noted during this period (Kiernan, 1996: 263, 296). Violence-driven deaths during the Pol Pot regime numbered about 1.5 million, and refugees numbered about 600,000 (Ashworth, 1979: 6).

The PRK ended the brutal Khmer Rouge regime but did not end Cambodians' nightmare. Civil wars among the warring parties in Cambodia continued to rage. Armed conflict between the PRK and the anti-Vietnamese resistance forces led to a flood of refugees (Chanda, 1987: 121). In addition, the PRK employed "voluntary labour" to build border fortifications. Some of labours were injured or died during the work (Chanda, 1987: 118).

4.2.1.2 *Human Security under the Hun Sen's Government (1997-2002)*

Vietnamese troops' withdrawal from Cambodia in September 1989 offered hope for an end to

the civil wars afflicting generations of Cambodians. In February 1992, through Resolution 745, the UNSC created the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The aim of UNTAC was to deal with the ceasefire among the four factions: the Khmer Rouge's Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), the *Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif* (FUNCINPEC), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the State of Cambodia (SOC). Although the PDK refused to cooperate and join the negotiations, historical democratic elections in Cambodia, under the auspices of the United Nations, were held in 1993, where the FUNCINPEC secured 45% of the vote, followed by Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP)'s 38% and 3% won by Son Sann's Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) (Um, 1994: 75). Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen created the coalition government. Ranariddh assumed the position of first Prime Minister and Hun Sen assumed the position of second Prime Minister. In 1997, Hun Sen staged a coup d'état against Norodom Ranariddh. After the coup, Hun Sen exercised sole power in Cambodia. By the end of 1998, the remnants of the Khmer communists had surrendered to the Cambodian government. Widespread violent civil conflicts were over.

By 1997, scholars and Cambodian officials thought that Cambodia would achieve political stability and peace. Irene Langran argued that “the end of civil conflict in late 1998 helped to consolidate domestic stability” (Langran, 2000: 26). Prak Chantha, Secretary of State, Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training in Cambodia, echoed the sentiment: “this year is the first year when the hospitals are not full of dreadfully injured soldiers and civilians. This is a year of hope for a new and better future. Khmer are no longer fighting Khmer, our country is at peace” (cited from Langran, 2000: 25). I argue, however, that a cessation of civil wars in Cambodia did not free the country's people from all serious insecurities: the Hun Sen government has been a threat to Cambodians, eschewing a democratic political system, while regularly holding purely superficial elections. Martin Gainsborough regarded political culture in Cambodia as undemocratic and as rife with “elitism, paternalism, and money politics” (Gainsborough, 2012: 38-9). As I mentioned in chapter two's section on state actors (2.1.4.2), a central priority—if not *the* central priority—for non-democratic states is to consolidate regime power rather than concern itself with citizens' human security. In order to stay in power, non-democratic governments usually tightly control their people's human rights. As Ingrid Landau pointed out, local CSOs grew rapidly in the 1990s because international donor agencies provided financial and technical assistance to them (Landau, 2008: 247), and yet the Cambodian government devoted many of its resources to repressing CSOs' leaders (Landau, 2008: 247). Thus, even though violent civil conflicts have come to an end in Cambodia, the

Hun Sen government has not only neglected people's human security but managed to pose significant threats to Cambodia, as well.

4.2.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

The Hun Sen government was unable to enhance people's living standards. The Cambodian government failed to repair roads and bridges that had been destroyed in the civil wars. In turn, unrepaired roads and bridges blocked the delivery of much-needed food and medical assistance to rural areas. In addition, the Cambodian government was unable to ameliorate the country's abysmal health services. According to the UN Development Program, life expectancy at birth in 1998 was only 53.5 years (UNDP, 2000: 159). Furthermore, the progress of the government to clear unexploded landmines was slow. In Cambodia, there were more than 6 million landmines (Um, 1994: 78) and about 100 people would suffer horrendous injuries or death by landmines monthly (Langran, 2000: 30). Finally, during Hun Sen's period of rule, illegal logging in Cambodia has been a serious business. Deforestation, in turn, has greatly harmed people's livelihoods²⁷ (Peou, 1999: 23) and has triggered or compounded natural disasters.

Moreover, the Cambodian government has violently limited political participation. In 1998, Cambodia held national elections, but the opposition parties questioned election irregularities. They protested against the Hun Sen CPP government and attacked Hun Sen's residence. Hun Sen ordered the arrest of protestors and a crackdown on demonstrations (Peou, 1999: 22). In addition, the FUNCINPEC and the SPP promoted the commune election, which would serve to decentralise the authority's power. CPP leader Hun Sen refused their suggestion. The advocates of the commune election were arrested by order of Hun Sen's government (Un and Ledgerwood, 2002: 102) and are thought to have been murdered under circumstances pointing to the government (Human Rights Watch, January 19, 2002).

4.2.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear

Regarding the Cambodian people's freedom from fear, Hun Sen has been dithering over granting justice to the victims of the Pol Pot regime's human-rights violations. In 1997, Hun Sen called for the international community to help bring surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice for their horrendous acts (Langran, 2000: 27). In 2003, the UN and the

²⁷ For example, many rural Cambodians have been dependent on resin trees. These people collect resin and sell it to supplement their family income, particularly during poor rice harvests.

Cambodian government signed the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) Agreement and put it into force in 2005. As noted by Fen Osler Hampson, punishment of perpetrators through legal instruments, such as the International Criminal Court can “stop gross human rights violation such as genocide, political murder, and rape” (Hampson, 2002: 21-3).

Theoretically, Hun Sen’s demand was positive, because the Cambodian government tried to realise justice. However, Un and Ledgerwood argued that Hun Sen’s attitude towards the trial of former Khmer Rouge leaders “has swung back and forth between condemnation and support of a trial” (Un and Ledgerwood, 2002: 100). Indeed, before the ECCC tried for former Khmer Rouge leaders, Hun Sen’s behaviour hampered efforts to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. In 2000, Hun Sen stated that he opposed trying Ieng Sary, who had served as foreign minister and deputy prime minister under the Pol Pot regime (Marston, 2002: 99). In addition, former Khmer Rouge guerrilla commander Sam Bith became a general in the Cambodian army, which attracted criticism from the international community (Langran, 2001: 160). A “culture of impunity” (Un and Ledgerwood, 2002: 101) in Cambodia has taken shape.

4.2.2 Exploration of the Cambodian Government’s Strategies for the APSC

4.2.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Cambodian Government’s Strategies

The above historical review illustrates the threats that the Sihanouk to Heng Samrin regimes have posed for Cambodian people in general. After the UN-sponsored peace-keeping mission Cambodia in 1991, most Cambodians have known lives free of civil wars, but the Hun Sen government has not prioritised human-security issues. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the strategies adopted by the Cambodian government in response to the creation of the APSC have not prioritised human-security issues: on the one hand, these strategies have hindered CSOs’ participation in the APSC building process, and on the other hand, they have adhered to the principle of non-interference.

The motivation underlying the Cambodian government’s opposition to CSOs’ participation in the APSC building process has centred on the Hun Sen regime’s desire to consolidate its viability. According to Martin Gainsborough, since the 1990s, more and more Cambodian people have protested against the Cambodian government and people’s demonstrations have led to tensions between the Cambodian government and sizable swaths of the population (Gainsborough, 2012: 41-2). These people have challenged the Cambodian government’s policies and called for the establishment of democracy nationwide. Hun Sen has regarded these vocal activists as a potential threat to the government’s viability. However,

ASEAN has permitted CSOs' participation in the APSC building process (ASEAN, 2009a: 11, ASEAN, 2009b: 10, 14, 16), which indicates that CSOs had opportunity—limited though they may be—to join ASEAN's decision-making process. From the Cambodian government's perspective, CSOs' participation in ASEAN's decision-making process may facilitate people to challenge government, thus strengthening unwanted challenges to the Cambodian government's viability. Consequently, to consolidate its regime's viability, the Cambodian government has prevented CSOs from participating in the APSC-building process.

The motivations underlying the strategy of adherence to the principle of non-interference reflect the overriding objective of protecting national sovereignty. Ralf Emmers argued that since Cambodian participation in ASEAN got underway in 1999, “the TAC provides Cambodia with an instrument to manage its relations with both Thailand and Vietnam” because the principle of non-interference in the TAC could “keep the two powers from expanding into its territory” (Emmers, 2005a: 81-2). In addition, the principle of non-interference has been a powerful pretext for the Cambodian government's rebuttals to Western countries' criticism of the regime in power. For example, in 1999, the international community criticised Hun Sen's decision to reject the UN proposal that the international community participate in the trial of former Khmer Rouge leaders. However, Hun Sen argued that the international community's participation in the trial would infringe upon Cambodian sovereignty and destabilise the state (Langran, 2000: 27). It is reasonable to say that the principle of non-interference has been a shield serving to protect Cambodian national sovereignty from neighbouring countries' assertive behaviour and the international community's sometimes harsh criticism. Thus, it is not difficult to find that the Cambodian government's discourse of adherence to the non-interference principle is closely associated with the creation of the APSC. When the Cambodian government prepared to hold the 20th ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared that “we [Cambodia] will put all our efforts to chair the ASEAN with responsibilities in 2012 in order to push ASEAN towards One Community, One Destiny” and “ASEAN would stick to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member states” (*People Daily*, January 5, 2012).

4.2.2.2 *The Cambodian Government's Strategies*

4.2.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

In general, the Cambodian government has supported the freedom-from-want element in the APSC. In 2012, when Cambodia took over the 20th chairmanship of ASEAN, Prime Minister Hun Sen outlined a 7-point Phnom Penh Agenda: “A Strengthened mechanism for financial

stability, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative, multilateralisation, and a doubling of the resources of the mechanism from USD 12 billion to USD 240 billion; timely implementation of the Road Map for ASEAN Community Building; priority for the ASEAN Economic Community; promotion of the speed implementation of the Master Plan for Connectivity; protection for migrant workers; urgent priority for the effective functioning of regional disaster management mechanism; promotion of cooperation in the agriculture sectors to ensure regional food security” (ASEAN, April 4, 2012). Points three through seven concern freedom-from-want issues. For example, implementation of the Master Plan for Connectivity has as its central objective the development of roads and highways connecting certain ASEAN members geographically to one another, thereby enhancing economic prosperity and, in turn, reducing poverty.

Although the Hun Sen provided a 7-point Phnom Penh Agenda, the Cambodian government has spared no effort to hinder CSOs’ efforts to participate in the APSC-building process. Some entity banned Cambodian domestic CSO representatives from the 30-minute dialogue between CSOs and the government officials at the 14th and 15th ASEAN Summits.²⁸ The Cambodian government has come under suspicion of being the entity ordering the ban. In the 14th ASEAN Summit, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong alleged the following:

I would like to clarify that Cambodia’s delegation...did not prevent Pen Somony from entering the meeting. The Thai organisers did not allow these two representatives to join after the government complained [that] the groups did not have names on the civil society list. (*Phnom Penh Post*, March 2, 2009)

At the 15th ASEAN Summit, Hor Namhong stated, “The foreign ministers of ASEAN have agreed that the only civil society organisations that had the right to attend the meeting with leaders of ASEAN were civil society groups sent by their governments to participate [in the summit]” (*Phnom Penh Post*, October 26, 2009). Regardless of which country (Thailand or Cambodia or both) imposed the ban, the Cambodian government’s handling of CSOs’ absence at the APSC’s building process was indisputable.

In 2012, when Cambodia assumed ASEAN’s chairmanship, the Cambodian government

²⁸ Pen Somony and Khin Ohmarwere barred from joining the 14th ASEAN Summit, and Ney Vannda was barred from participating in the 15th ASEAN Summit.

continued to oppose CSO participation in the APSC-building process. Take the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) as an example. Organised by the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA) network, ACSC provides CSOs a channel through which they can voice their recommendations regarding the creation of the APSC. In 2012, ACSC planned to hold workshops in the Lucky Star Hotel in Cambodia's capital city of Phnom Penh to discuss human-rights issues and human insecurities, like land grabbing; however, the hotel threatened to cut power to conference rooms and to change padlocks on conference rooms if the workshops went ahead (Gerard, 2014: 121). CSOs in the ACSC suspected that the Cambodian government was the mastermind behind objections to the ACSC's activities (Gerard, 2014: 121) (for more detail on this particular incident, see chapter seven). Kelly Gerard noted that the Cambodian government's efforts to impede CSOs from participating in the APSC-building process have weakened ASEAN members' opportunities to gain information from experts regarding human insecurities, including drug and human trafficking, human rights, natural-disaster management, and environmental pollution (Gerard, 2014: 121).

The Cambodian government's opposition to CSOs' participation in the APSC-building process suggests that the government regarded CSOs as a potential challenge to its regime viability. Hun Sen publicly expressed his views on how his government should handle political dissidents and CSOs—"I govern not only to make the opposition party and group weak, but to make the opposition group die" (cited from Header, 2012: 111).

4.2.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear

The Cambodian government has expressed enthusiasm for the task of addressing and resolving freedom-from-fear issues. In March 2010, the Cambodian government created the Peacekeeping Training Centre, which was sponsored by the United States. U.S. forces trained Cambodian soldiers in the art of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. So far, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) has joined international peacekeeping operations in Central Africa, Chad, Lebanon, Nepal and Sudan. The Cambodian government's creation of the Peacekeeping Training Center has meant that the Cambodian government is preparing to create "a network among existing ASEAN Member States' peacekeeping centres to conduct joint planning, training and sharing of experience" (ASEAN, 2009a: 11).

However, the Cambodian government has supported and adhered to the principle of non-interference on the pretext of protecting the country's national sovereignty, but the non-interference principle is inconsistent with the peacekeeping operations. Rizal Sukma argued that a barrier to ASEAN's enshrinement of the RtoP principle is ASEAN members' adherence

to the principle of non-interference (Sukma, 2012: 143-4). It is important to bear in mind here that an important means to achieving the RtoP principle is reliance on peacekeeping operations. Thus, it is unlikely that these two concepts can co-exist without stirring up a great deal of tumult. The Cambodian government's participation in international peacekeeping operations should not be taken as evidence that the Cambodian government has lessened its support for the principle of non-interference, because this participation does not affect the standing of the principle of non-interference in ASEAN. It is likely that the Cambodian government would invoke the principle of non-interference rather than cite the RtoP or authorise peacekeeping operations if human rights violations were to take place in an ASEAN member's country. Thus, given the fact that the Cambodian government has been a stalwart supporter of the principle of non-interference, whether the Cambodian Peacekeeping Training Centre can contribute to the APSC's freedom-from-fear element remains to be seen.

4.2.3 Summary

Since Cambodian independence, every regime in Cambodia has failed to provide for people's human-security needs. During the Cambodian peace-keeping process, the international community rebuilt infrastructure in Cambodia and brought democracy and human rights to Cambodia. However, democracy in Cambodia did not take root, because Prime Minister Hun Sen regarded people's activities to gain their human security as a potential challenge to his regime's continuity and stability. Against this backdrop, he arrested opposition politicians and restricted people's human rights.

Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Cambodian government on the one hand has opposed CSOs' participation in the APSC building process and on the other hand has supported and adhered to the principle of non-interference. Clearly, the Cambodian government's strategy has been beneficial not to the country's people but the regime in power. The Cambodian government's opposition to CSOs' participation in the APSC has prevented ASEAN members from discussing human-security issues with CSO experts specialising in such topics as drug and human trafficking, natural-disaster management, and human rights. Moreover, the Cambodian government's support for the principle of non-interference may hamper the country's involvement in regional peacekeeping operations.

4.3 Indonesia

In terms of population, territory, and natural resources, Indonesia has asserted for itself a significant leadership role in Southeast Asia. However, like many Southeast Asian states, in

the Cold War period, the Indonesian government was authoritarian and failed to provide adequate human security to its people. When transitioning to democracy, the Indonesian government started expressing an observable concern about human-security issues. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Indonesian government became one of its active supporters. This section will include a historical review of how the Indonesian government has treated people's human security and what the Indonesian government's strategies have been relative to the creation of the APSC.

4.3.1 Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002

The section, which presents a historical review of Indonesia from the 1950s to 2002, is divided into two parts. The first part discusses human security under the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, and the second part discusses human security under the Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati governments.

4.3.1.1 Human Security under the Sukarno and Suharto Regimes

Like many Southeast Asian governments, in the Cold War period, the Sukarno and Suharto regimes failed to provide adequate human security to the Indonesian people. The Suharto government, although it helped lift many Indonesians out of poverty, it cultivated a culture of cronyism in Indonesia and committed appalling atrocities in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya.

4.3.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

In the Sukarno era, the Indonesian government did not provide people a substantial degree of freedom from want. There were two reasons for this failure. First of all, Sukarno paid considerably more attention to national security (Pauker, 1963: 73-5) than to either the economy or human development. Sukarno admitted that the reason for his government's neglect of the eight-year economic development plan, launched in January 1961, rested on the government's allocation of most of its budget to national security (Pauker, 1963: 73). Second, Sukarno never solved the problem of rampant corruption. Public servants' corruption prevented poor people from sharing in national resources and affected Indonesian tax revenue. Against this backdrop, most Indonesians have lived in poverty. According to the World Bank, in 1967, two years after Sukarno stepped down, Indonesians were among the poorest people in the world, a country where per capita GNP was only US\$50 (World Bank, 1990: 3). In addition, "infrastructure, rice-field irrigation systems, and manufacturing and transportation equipment" were all undeveloped (Pauker, 1981: 233).

Suharto's regime too failed to provide freedom from want to Indonesians. After Suharto's rise to power in the mid-1960s, he emphasised that economic progress would bring national and social stability. Indeed, economic development in Indonesia exhibited impressive performances. From 1980 and 1989, GDP in Indonesia grew by an average annual rate of 6.4%.²⁹ However, in 1980, Indonesia remained one of the poorest countries in the world and life expectancy was only 48 years (Pauker, 1981: 234). From 1985 to 1987, only 38% of the Indonesian population was able access safe water (UNDP, 1990: 102).

Unresolved rampant corruption remained one of the factors producing human insecurity. Greedy officials, including Suharto and his relatives (Kingsbury, 2005: 97-9), siphoned off national resources for their own use. The vulnerable was unable to get assistance. Although the Suharto government created a Commission for Corruption in 1970, this commission was useless in combating corruption (Samson, 1973: 138): corruption had strongly taken root in Indonesian society.

As the Indonesian economy developed, the government gave privileged positions to select members of the business community, especially Indonesians of Chinese ancestry (Bertrand, 2004: 66). Indonesian political dissident Slamet Bratanata said that "to most Indonesians, the word 'Chinese' is synonymous with corruption" (cited from Schwarz, 1994: 98). Government favouritism for certain businesses created a patron-client network that rather than counter poverty in Indonesia, widened the gap between rich and poor there. Income discrepancies caused widespread resentment among the indigenous Indonesians and Chinese Indonesians. Anti-Chinese sentiments and actions were not uncommon in Indonesia.

Regarding human rights, the Suharto regime restricted people's freedom of association. The Suharto government issued Regulation No. 8/1985 (*UU Ormas*), which declared that all mass organisations, including political parties and NGOs, had to adopt *Pancasila* (an official state philosophy) as their ideology (Hadiwinata, 2003: 95-6). The Indonesian government could dismiss or punish any organisation that did not obey the regulation. Hadiwinata argued that the Suharto government's efforts to discourage NGO development stemmed from the leadership's concern that "NGOs' greater access to the international community might increase international pressures on Suharto's authoritarian rule and boost demands for democratisation" (Hadiwinata, 2003: 99). Also, the Indonesian government restricted people's freedom of expression, forcing such media as *Expo*, *Topik*, and, *Fokus* to shut down, because the Indonesian government charged their publications with tarnishing the

²⁹ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

government's reputation (Weatherbee, 1985: 191).

4.3.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

The Sukarno and Suharto regimes' failure to establish, preserve, or enhance freedom from fear extended to Indonesians in particular areas, like Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya. The Indonesian government long ignored Acehese, East Timorese, and Papuan demands regarding such matter as living standards, political autonomy, and independence, triggering violent upheaval by people in these regions in pursuit of their human security (Sjamsuddin, 1985: 34-72, Lagerberg, 1979: 104-118, Budiardjo and Liong, 1984). The Sukarno and Suharto regimes responded with military repression.

Sukarno's regime was not a culprit in the armed conflicts involving local rebels in East Timor or in Irian Jaya and the Indonesian army: these conflicts occurred after Sukarno had stepped down from power. However, he was responsible for the Acehese people's egregiously compromised human security. Sukarno successfully persuaded Aceh to join Indonesia but he did not deliver on his promise to grant autonomy to Aceh. Sukarno's government ruthlessly repressed Acehese who organised a rebellion against the Indonesian government. During the conflict, the Indonesian army engaged in significant armed conflict with Acehese and slaughtered, raped, and robbed many Acehese non-combatants. Some Acehese were tortured to death (Sjamsuddin, 1985: 83-156).

During the Suharto period, the Acehese people's hardships remained unaddressed, and the East Timorese and the Papuans lost the freedom from fear. Like Sukarno, Suharto adopted brutal methods meted out against the Acehese. In October 1976, Teung Ku Hasan di Tiro declared Acehese independence and the creation of the GAM, and the Indonesian government immediately responded by ordering acts of military repression. Growing resistance to this repression forced Suharto to increase troops levels in Aceh from 6,000 to 12,000 personnel (Sulistiyanto, 2001: 441). The Indonesian military's torture and murder of Acehese occurred daily. One set of figures suggest that from 1989 to 1998, 1,958 people disappeared, 1,321 were killed, 3,430 were tortured, and 209 and 160 people suffered from sexual abuse and robbery (Sulistiyanto, 2001: 442).

After Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975, the Indonesian military and policy authority slaughtered residents, regardless of age or gender. In Lacluta, at least 400 people were killed by Indonesian soldiers; "200 villagers in Kraras were burned alive"; Indonesian soldiers killed 500 people in Bibileu; Malim Luro's villagers were run over by a bulldozer; Colonel Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, ordered soldiers to kill 20 people in Bere-Coli

(Taylor, 1991: 101-3). In addition, the Indonesian army and police arrested many East Timorese without legal justification. The Indonesian army tortured them by means of “beatings, burning with cigarettes, sexual abuse, electric-shock treatment, systematic cutting of the skin and crushing of limbs” (Taylor, 1991: 107).

After Suharto’s assumption of power, he approved of the government’s retaliations against Papuans. The Indonesian air forces bombarded many towns in Irian Jaya, and military forces killed people, looted their homes and burned their possessions, resulting in heavy casualties and refugees. The Indonesian military would incessantly attack refugee camps, under the pretext that the refugees were members of the OPM (Osborne, 1985: 44). In addition, the Indonesian military arrested and tortured many people. Indonesian soldiers provided little food and clean water to victims and tortured victims of this suffering.

4.3.1.2 Human Security under the Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati Governments

In 1997, the Asian financial crisis seriously affected the Indonesian economy. Suharto was unable to cope with the dramatic depreciation of currencies and massive inflation that triggered widespread public demonstrations. Ultimately, they forced Suharto to resign. After the demise of the Suharto regime, the Indonesian government gradually developed democratic characteristics. From Habibie to Megawati, the Indonesian government amended the constitution four times. Constitutional amendments confirmed the length of presidential terms, limited the president’s executive power, decentralised “authority from the central government to provincial and regional governments,” created “additional constitutional bodies such as the House of Regional Representatives and the Constitutional Court” (Ghoshal, 2004: 522), and ensured people’s right to directly elect the president and legislators.

In terms of human security, the most important aspect of the implementation of a democratic system was probably the government’s considerable willingness to provide human security to its people. As mentioned in chapter two on state actors (2.1.4.2), democratic government’s viability far more dependent on winning elections than on controlling the society and its people. In order to stay in power, the ruling parties in Indonesia exhibited a willingness to address human-security issues because to neglect the issues could have resulted in electoral defeat—and removal from power—for the reigning government. We can find that Wahid’s ouster and Megawati’s loss in 2004’s presidential election stemmed largely from their inability to address human insecurities (Kingsbury, 2005: 200-5)

4.3.1.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, Suharto's vice president B.J. Habibie became the Indonesian president. During B.J. Habibie's brief presidency, he enhanced human rights. Many labourers and activists created union organisations without suffering persecution under the law (Hadiz, 2002: 135-6) and the Habibie government launched a five-year human-rights action plan and ratified international human-rights conventions (Kingsbury, 2005: 276). In addition, he released political prisoners and removed government restrictions on media (Bird, 1998: 30). Damien Kingsbury argued that Habibie was a key figure in Indonesian's shift to democracy (Kingsbury, 2005: 275).

In 1999, the People's Consultative Assembly (*Makjelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR) elected Abdurrahman Wahid to the Indonesian presidency. Wahid failed to provide the nation's people with adequate human security. One area of many in which human security suffered was labour: for example, the Wahid government regulated that "a worker who went on strike for five days would be regarded as having resigned from his or her position" (Hadiz, 2002: 139). Meanwhile, the Wahid government found itself mired in corruption scandals and unable to cope with Indonesia's ravaged economy, the cumulative effects of which worsened existing social problems and created new ones (Malley, 2002: 124). Finally, the MPR removed Wahid, and Wahid's vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri assumed the presidency.

Megawati, during her presidency, failed to cope with several types of human insecurities. Although Megawati continued to enhance Indonesians' human rights by, for instance, helping create a national human-rights committee, she failed to enhance the country's ailing economy and, in particular, to appreciably lower the high unemployment rate. In addition, terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta and the SARS outbreak hurt the tourism industry in Indonesia (Kipp, 2004: 65) and, thus, compounded Indonesians' economic hardships. In 2004's presidential election, SBY defeated Megawati and assumed the mantle of the Indonesian presidency.

4.3.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Regarding freedom-from-fear issues, Suharto's successors were more tolerant of people's resistance to power structures. Although confrontation between dissident groups and the government still occurred, at least non-violent resolutions emerged as a means by which the government might address such issues as the secessionist movement.

After Habibie took over the presidency, he agreed to hold a referendum in East Timor, which was sponsored by the UN. Although the Indonesian army had murdered hundreds of

East Timorese and had destroyed infrastructure, attracting criticism from the international community, most East Timorese voters emerged to cast their ballot for independence in August 1999. The Habibie government accepted the international community as a mediator during the vote: the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) conducted a peacekeeping mission in East Timor and the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) assisted East Timor's nation-building affairs. Finally, East Timor proclaimed independence. The Indonesian army's atrocities targeting East Timorese came to an end.

Although the Wahid government failed to cope with several freedom-from-want issues, according to William Liddle, the Wahid government adopted political rather than violent measures to address secessionist problems in Aceh and Irian Jaya (Liddle, 2001: 213-4). Regarding the Aceh problem, in 2000, the Wahid government and GAM agreed to a three-month ceasefire, known more commonly as a "humanitarian pause" and regarding Irian Jaya, the Wahid government accepted the proposition that this region could "fly its own flag" (Liddle, 2001: 214). Although the Wahid government's political measures did not solve the long-running separatist movements in Aceh or Irian Jaya, Indonesian leaders started adopting more non-violent measures to handle these and other situations.

The Megawati government tried to solve the problem in Aceh. In 2001, the Indonesian Parliament passed a special autonomy law in reference to Aceh. According to the law, Aceh could receive 70% of revenues from oil and gas exploitation and could apply Sharia law. In December 2002, given the Indonesian government's acceptance of the US assistance, the Indonesian government ratified the Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (CoHA) with the GAM. According to the CoHA, the Indonesian army agreed to gradually withdraw from Aceh and the GAM agreed to be disarmed. Although activists in Aceh rejected the special autonomy law (Lanti, 2002: 120-1) and the peace agreement failed, which led to a serious confrontation between the GAM and the Indonesian government, the actions that Megawati adopted to address the confrontation between the government and the GAM are proof that the government is likely pursuing a peaceful resolution to the problems in Aceh.

The Megawati government made an effort to restore peace in Papua. Like Aceh, the government passed a special autonomy law pertaining to Papua, so that Papua could receive 70% of revenues from oil and gas exploitation. Although demands of independence in Papua remained audible (Lanti, 2002: 121), confrontation between radical Papuans and the government gradually eased.

4.3.2 *Exploration of the Indonesian Government's Strategies for the APSC*

4.3.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Indonesian Government's Strategies*

After the fall of the Suharto regime, the Indonesian government gradually accepted a democratic system that addressed human-security issues. The success with which elected government officials addressed human insecurities went far in determining whether or not these officials stayed in power. After 2004's presidential election, SBY became the Indonesian president. He continued to implement political reform. For example, SBY combated corruption. In particular, the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*, KPK), which Megawati had created in 2002, enjoyed great achievements during SBY's presidency. The KPK investigated and prosecuted legislators, ministers, and officials suspected of corrupt practices. Because of the KPK's efficiency, the Indonesian government salvaged US\$14.5 million bound for corrupt ends, and many Indonesians were satisfied with the KPK's work (Aspinall, 2010: 110). In addition, the SBY government kept engaging Aceh in the peace process. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami in Aceh, the SBY regime accepted EU and ASEAN members as mediators. The Indonesian government ratified the Helsinki Accords with the GAM in August 2005. The GAM agreed to disarm and renounce independence while opening itself to joint Indonesian democratic elections.³⁰ SBY's efforts in the direction of Acehese freedom from fear helped him garner 93% of the vote in Aceh during SBY's bid for a second presidential term (Aspinall, 2010: 113).

Clearly, from Wahid to SBY, the Indonesian government has gradually shifted into the democratic portion of the political spectrum. Jörn Dosch argued that this democratisation has influenced the Indonesian government's involvement in ASEAN's agenda. On the one hand, the Indonesian government "does not feel constrained anymore by the ASEAN Way of diplomacy," and on the other hand, the Indonesian government has "adopted an approach of pushing for agendas that reflect liberal values" (Dosch, 2008: 537). Indeed, since ASEAN's decision to create the APSC in 2003, the strategies of the Indonesian government as then consistent with active support for both in freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear objectives. What are the motivations underlying the Indonesian government's strategies?

The central motivation is the Indonesian government's desire to restore its leadership role in ASEAN (Collins, 2013: 62, Emmers, 2005b: 661). Ralf Emmers argued that from the 1960s to the early 1990s, Indonesia played a "benevolent" leadership role in ASEAN. Rather

³⁰ GAM evolved into Partai Aceh.

than practice regional coercion for the sake of amassing hegemonic power, Indonesia actively mediated regional affairs, like the Cambodian conflict and disputes surrounding the South China Sea (Emmers, 2005b: 649-52). However, in the late 1990s, two incidents downgraded Indonesia's leadership status. The first incident concerned East Timor's independence in 2001. Indonesia became a potential concern for its neighbouring countries because they feared that East Timor's separation from Indonesia would trigger declarations of independence from other Indonesian provinces, thus resulting in a regional refugee problem and promoting secessionist movements in Mindanao and Muslim-majority provinces in southern Thailand (Dupont, 2000: 164). Second, 1997's financial crisis and a series of domestic terrorist attacks led to social instability and political turbulence in Indonesia, harming its government's standing in Southeast Asia (Emmers, 2005b: 660).

Creation of the APSC gave the Indonesian government an opportunity to re-enhance its leadership in ASEAN (Emmers, 2005b: 661). It should come as no surprise that the Indonesian government's strategy for creating the APSC has been one of active support and has prompted the government to present several fresh ideas related to the project—two such ideas being the creation of a regional peacekeeping force and the creation of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. According to Anthony Smith, it was the 9th Summit (where ASEAN issued the Bali Concord II, which was drafted by the Indonesian government) that Indonesia re-assumed “the role of group leader, or at least demonstrated Jakarta's desire to begin to steer the direction of the grouping again” (Smith, 2004: 423).

4.3.2.2 The Indonesian Government's Strategies

4.3.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

The Indonesian government has actively supported the freedom-from-want element in the APSC, in particular human rights and democracy. The Indonesian government was among the few members to promote the function of the AICHR. Before the creation of the AICHR, Indonesia actively supported the establishment of a regional human-rights institution. After the creation of the AICHR, the Indonesian government appointed Rafendi Djamin to the position of Indonesian representative in the AICHR. He is the only AICHR representatives who hails from civil society (Anwar, 2010: 134).

In addition, the Indonesian government has sought to empower people by encouraging CSOs to join in the ASEAN decision-making process. During the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter, President SBY made the following statement:

The People and civil society should be deeply involved in the process of attaining the ASEAN Community and ASEAN Charter. (*Jakarta Post*, April 21, 2006)

President SBY kept his word. When Indonesia assumed the 18th ASEAN chairmanship in May 2011, CSOs were one of the participants in the subsequent ASEAN Summit. More importantly, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and Indonesian bloggers jointly created the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Community. The aim of this association has been to enhance Indonesians' awareness of the AC (*Jakarta Post*, May 14, 2011). This type of policy has not emerged in other members' domestic contexts. In recent years, the government in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos in fact arrested domestic bloggers who had allegedly posted anti-government articles.

In fact, when ASEAN drafted the ASEAN Charter, the Indonesian government voiced its support for efforts to improve human rights and democracy, which were long-standing taboos in the previous ASEAN agendas. The Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda declared,

Indonesia will try to include human rights and democratic values in the charter so that we have a stronger legal basis for the formation of a human rights mechanism, commission or even court. (*Jakarta Post*, January 9, 2007)

Indonesia's insistence on this step was opposed by non- and semi- democratic members, such as Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and even Singapore (Dosch, 2008: 536-7, *Jakarta Post*, June 15, 2007). However, the Indonesian government remained steadfast in laying down the human rights and democracy provisos in the Charter. Ikrar Nusa Bakti, from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, commented on the matter:

I think Indonesia now is the most democratic country in ASEAN. We should not let ourselves be bogged down by other ASEAN members. (*Jakarta Post*, June 15, 2007)

The Indonesian government's efforts to promote human-rights and democracy element in the APSC and embody human rights and democracy in the ASEAN Charter rest on the premise that "if we can do it with all of problems, you can do it too" (cited from Murphy, 2009: 72).

4.3.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Indonesia has been in the vanguard of efforts to enhance the element of freedom from fear in the APSC. First, the Indonesian government at the 9th ASEAN Summit held in October 2003 suggested creating a regional peacekeeping force: the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. The reason for this suggestion was that “most conflicts in the world today are not between states but within states, and internal strife has a way of spilling over from the embattled country to the rest of the region” (*Jakarta Post*, February 26, 2004). Though supported by the UN, the Indonesian suggestion was rejected by ASEAN members. However, the Indonesian government has been pushing the idea of creating a regional peacekeeping force.³¹

Interestingly, after the Indonesian government proposed this idea, ASEAN members accepted implementation of the regional-peacekeeping task’s cooperation. At the 5th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), held on May 19, 2011, ASEAN Defence Ministers adopted “The Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network.” According to this paper, ASEAN members agreed to “facilitate and utilize existing national peacekeeping centres to conduct planning, training, and exchange of experiences for peacekeeping operations with a view to developing a regional arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability in ASEAN member states” (ASEAN, May 19, 2011)

Second, the Indonesian government has advocated the creation of the AIPR, an issue that ASEAN had considered in the APSC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009a: 10). Under the Indonesian government’s auspices, ASEAN created the AIPR in December 2013. Lina Alexandra argued that the Indonesian government has had ambitions to re-enhance its influence in ASEAN through support of the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element:

Well, we [Indonesia] certainly accommodate non-traditional security issues. For example, we came up with the idea for the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center. But we want more from the ASEAN Political-Security Community. For example, we want to come up with an Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. We want to come up with a Network of Peacekeeping Center. We want to come up with a dispute-settlement mechanism, which should be more effective than the ASEAN High Council.³²

³¹ Interview in Jakarta, January 25, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei.

³² Interview in Jakarta, January 25, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei.

4.3.3 Summary

In the Sukarno and Suharto era, the Indonesian government failed to provide human security to Indonesians. Regarding freedom from want, the government did not enhance people's living standards and violated people's human rights. Regarding freedom from fear, the government's treatment of insurgency movements was egregious. After Suharto's downfall in May 1998, successors accepted democratisation. Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati were concerned about human-security issues. However, their ability to address human insecurities helped determine whether they stayed in power or not.

During the APSC's formulation, the Indonesian government played a supportive role. Regarding the freedom-from-want element, the government actively supported the creation of a regional human-rights mechanism and encouraged CSOs to join the ASEAN decision-making process. Regarding freedom from fear, the fact that the Indonesian government suggested creating a regional peacekeeping force led to ASEAN's cooperative engagement in peacekeeping efforts. The motivation underlying the Indonesian government's supportive strategies has been a desire to re-enhance its leadership position in ASEAN. Thailand's media stated that "Jakarta has set out with a very big ambition to transform ASEAN into a global game-changer—something no other ASEAN members have so far dared to think of" (*The Nation*, April 27, 2011).

4.4 Laos

In 1975, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) toppled the monarchy and established the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR). As soon as the Lao communists took power, their ability to address human insecurities proved itself to be incompetent. Even though the Lao government in 1986 adopted economic reforms that have enhanced its people's living standards, the government has restricted people's human rights and failed to address domestic human insecurities. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Lao government has not supported issues that might pose risks to the regime's continuity and stability. This section presents a historical review of the human-security situation under the LPRP's governance and then discusses the Lao regime's strategies for dealing with the creation of the APSC.

4.4.1 Historical Review: 1975 to 2002

This historical review section is divided into two parts. The first part discusses human-security conditions under the LPRPs' regime from 1975 up to the period directly preceding the economic reforms in 1986, and the second part discusses human security under the

LPRP's regime from 1986's reforms to 2002

4.4.1.1 Human Security before the Economic Reforms in 1986

When the LPRP came to power in 1975, the Lao government failed to provide its people adequate human security. In the freedom-from-want area, the Lao government restricted people's human right and did not improve people's living standards. In the freedom-from-fear area, the Lao government used repressive measures against ethnic minorities.

4.4.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

The LPRP took power in 1975, and pursued its adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology. Politically, the Lao government—rather than create a constitution protecting people's human rights—restricted people's human rights. The Lao government arrested people who expressed anti-government sentiment and people who were deemed too close to foreigners, sending these political and cultural prisoners to re-education camps (Thayer, 1984: 53). The conditions at these re-education camps were awful, and food shortages and disease were common afflictions (Brown and Zasloff, 1980: 109). In 1979, political prisoners numbered somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 (Brown and Zasloff, 1980: 109).

Economically, the Lao government adopted collectivisation of agricultural production. From 1978 to 1985, the government launched the Three-Year Development Plan (1978-1980) and the First Five-Year Development Plan 1981-1985. The Lao government claimed that these plans would boost agriculture production (John, 2006: 177). However, these plans did little to enhance people's living standards (Bedlington, 1982: 96-7). In fact, these plans resulted in poverty and famine, which created massive refugee flows (Bedlington, 1981: 110). Ronald Bruce St John argued that the government's purpose in adopting the development plans was to control people in rural areas (John, 2006: 177).

4.4.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

The Lao one-party government has not tolerated Hmong highlanders, some of whom have attacked the government and opposed government policies. Beginning in 1975, the government discouraged people from using traditional farming practices, including slash-and-burn rice cultivation. The government declared that this method devastated the environment (Ireson and Ireson, 1991: 929). Thus, the government resettled people who had been living in the uplands to the lowlands, where cultivation of paddy rice was common. In truth, according to Carol Ireson and Randall Ireson's research, government officials were worried not about

environmental devastation but about obstacles to the government's own exploitation of the environment: the fear was land burning would compromise forest resources, on the basis of which these officials—with an eye towards personal gain—hoped to export environmental products (Ireson and Ireson, 1991: 932). The Lao government brutally treated people who did not cooperate with its resettlement policies, in particular the Hmong minority. In order to carry out the forced relocation of the Hmong people, the government burned Hmong people's homes (Ireson and Ireson, 1991: 935). In addition, in order to repress Hmong rebels who attacked government outposts and who opposed the government's resettlement and agricultural policies, the Lao government called for help from Vietnam troops against Hmong people (Brown and Zasloff, 1979: 98). The Lao government obviously committed atrocities against its own people.

4.4.1.2 Human Security after the 1986 Economic Reforms

After the First Five-Year Development Plan, the Lao government adopted economic and political reforms. Economically, in 1986's Fourth Party Congress, the government launched a series of market-oriented economic reforms, known collectively as the Second Five-Year Plan from 1986 to 1990, where the aim was to improve the population's standard of living, including an increase in food production, an amelioration of poor infrastructure, and improvements in the education and health sectors (Meng, 1987: 183-4). Politically, the Lao government in 1991 created a new constitution, which embodied democracy and human rights. According to Kyaw Yin Hlaing's research, Lao people's living standards gradually improved in the 1990s (Hlaing, 2006). Indeed, according to 1992's HDI, Laos fell under the category of "low human development" countries (UNDP, 1994: 130), but in 2002's HDI, Laos found itself on the list of "medium human development" countries (UNDP, 2004: 148). However, the Lao government has failed to address human insecurities, many of which have emerged as a byproduct of domestic economic development, and has continued to restrict people's human rights and persecute ethnic minorities.

4.4.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

After the 1986 economic reforms, many countries, especially China and Thailand, invested in Laos' tourism, energy, and mining industries. For example, China and Thailand invested in dam building. In addition, foreign investors financed the construction of bridges between Laos and its neighbouring countries, such as the bridge connecting Thailand's Chiang Rai Province and Laos' Luang Namtha Province (Stuart-Fox, 1995: 63). The Lao government

profited fiscally from hydroelectric exports and transnational connections.

However, the Lao government's economic development created human insecurity. A case in point: the construction of hydropower stations displaced people and harmed the environment (Stuart-Fox, 1995: 183). Furthermore, after construction of a transnational road network, the rate of HIV/AIDS transmission increased, since brothels started dotting the thoroughfare, providing sex services to truck drivers (Stuart-Fox, 2007: 171). However, the Lao government persisted in launching economic development and had no solutions for these consequences, not all of which were unanticipated. For example, the International Rivers had warned the government that development of the Nam Theun 2 Dam would harm the environment, including places where local people were living,³³ but the plans for Nam Theun 2 Dam went forward, unchanged.

Regarding human rights, the government arrested many democratic activists. In the 1990s, the Lao government arrested such people who supported a multi-party political system as Thongsouk Saisangkhi, who was an assistant to the Minister for Science and Technology. In 1999, the Lao government arrested six students and a teacher who had both protested against the government's incompetence in addressing economic problems and distributed flyers calling for the government to release political prisoners and to practice democracy, including the establishment of elections and a multiparty political system (Thayer, 2000: 45). In October 2001, the government arrested five European activists who, in front of the presidential palace, had demonstrated against both the government's violation of human rights and the country's non-democratic political system (Bourdet, 2002: 114). It is reasonable to say that even though the Lao government created the new Constitution in 1991, the single-party regime did not launch a democratic political system and continued to violate people's human rights.

4.4.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Article 8 of the 1991 constitution declares that the document serves "to protect, preserve and promote the fine customs and cultures of [people's] own tribes" (Howe, 2013: 152). However, regarding anti-government rebels, the Lao government's policy was harshly repressive. In 1990, the Lao government entered into armed conflict with the United Lao National Liberation Front (ULNLF). The government killed forty ULNLF's members (Gunn, 1991: 89). In 2000, the Lao government asked Vietnamese troops to assist the government in

³³ <http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/nam-theun-2-dam>

suppressing a Hmong rebellion in Xiang Khouang Province (John, 2006: 185). And in 2003, the Lao government's military clashed with Hmong anti-government rebels again. Outside military options, the Lao government adopted a strategy of starvation against these rebels, which attracted perhaps most notably Amnesty International's firm criticism (Thayer, 2004: 103)

4.4.2 Exploration of the Lao Government's Strategies for the APSC

4.4.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Lao Government's Strategies

According to the above historical review, we know that the Lao government failed to address their human insecurities. In light of these facts, two questions pertaining to the current study's topic stand out: Has the Lao government supported the creation of the APSC? And what strategies has the Lao government adopted in response to the creation of the APSC?

The Lao government's adoption of strategies for responding to the creation of the APSC has rested on a central objective: to undermine certain provisions in the APSC, particularly those addressing human rights and freedom-from-fear issues. The motivation underlying this objective, in turn, has been the Lao government's desire to consolidate regime viability. As mentioned in the previous section, the Lao government in 1986 adopted economic reforms that gradually enhanced people's living standards. Yves argued that "Laotian leaders regard improvement of economic performance as the best way to ensure their legitimacy and the continuity of the one-party state" (Bourdet, 1996: 90). Likewise, Kyaw Yin Hlaing argued that economic development has been a method by which the Lao government has sought to consolidate its political legitimacy (Hlaing, 2006: 142). According to Kyaw's research, this method tended to be useful. In his research, Kyaw interviewed 25 Laotians, of whom 20 "did not think that their government should be replaced" and thought that "their country was very stable" (Hlaing, 2006: 143). In addition, anti-government activities, whether carried out by political dissidents or ethnic minorities, were very weak (Hlaing, 2006: 143-4). Kyaw's research suggests the possibility that the Lao government enjoyed a consolidated political legitimacy.

However, since the mid-2000s, the Lao government's legitimacy has encountered potent challenges. Political dissidents and CSOs have called for human rights and democracy in the country and have sometimes remorselessly criticised government incompetence (Gainsborough, 2012: 41-2). In addition, Western countries and international NGOs have criticised the Lao government's violation of human rights and lack of democracy. For example, in 2004, the U.S. House of Representative urged the Lao government to establish

democratic system and release political prisoners. In 2007, Amnesty International's report similarly criticised the Lao government's brutal repression of the minority population of Hmong highlanders (Amnesty International, March 2007). Demands from political dissidents and CSOs and criticism from the international community have placed pressure on the Lao government, which, in defending itself, has resorted to the principle of non-interference. For example, the Lao government objected to U.S. interference in Lao internal affairs (Pholsena, 2005: 181). These examples of back-and-forth disputes suggest that the political legitimacy of the Lao government has been not as consolidated as Kyaw's research would suggest.

Creation of the APSC has been a potential risk to the Lao government, because the objectives linked to the APSC have included promotion of human rights, pacific settlement of disputes, and reconciliation among states and peoples. The Lao government's support of these objectives could directly or indirectly encourage the development of domestic dissent among opposition groups and anti-government activities among ethnic minorities. Thus, the Lao government's strategic response to the creation of the APSC has, on the whole, been to undermine the APSC's element capable of undermining the regime's viability.

4.4.2.2 The Laotian Government's Strategies

4.4.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

After the Lao government agreed to create the APSC and ratified the ASEAN Charter, Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh signed an agreement allowing Lao citizens to create NGOs and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Jönsson, 2010: 241). The Lao government seemed to be implementing various rules, guidelines, and principles reflective of the APSC's general spirit.

In fact, the Lao government has undermined the human-rights element in the APSC. For example, when ASEAN decided to embed human-rights language in the ASEAN Charter and create the regional human-rights body, the Lao government claimed that "they were not ready for the immediate establishment of such a body [regional human-rights body] and ASEAN members might be allowed to join the body at a later date" (*The Star*, July 31, 2007).

In addition, in 2009, when the Thai government called for Myanmar's military regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi, the Lao government opposed the Thai government's request and insisted that ASEAN should adhere to the principle of non-interference (Jönsson, 2010: 245). Media and scholars have questioned how ASEAN created the APSC without addressing human-rights problems in Myanmar. Thus, human-rights violations in Myanmar have

constituted a barrier to ASEAN's creation of the APSC. The Lao government's opposition to the Thai government's demand that the Myanmar regime release Aung San Suu Kyi and the Lao government's support of the principle of non-interference suggest that the Lao government has not sincerely developed the APSC.

4.4.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The Lao government has been worried that its support for the APSC's freedom-from-fear element may encourage Laos' ethnic minorities to engage in anti-government activities. Thus, in order to consolidate the regime's viability, the Lao government has undermined this freedom-from-fear element. The Lao government on the domestic front has continued to brutalise its Hmong highlander minority. For example, in April 2006, Lao government troops attacked Hmong people foraging for food. The attack resulted in 26 dead, most of whom were children and women (Amnesty International, March 2007: 11). Although the Amnesty International issues the public statement to criticise the Lao government, the Lao authority's response was a denial of responsibility for the attack.³⁴ The Lao government's inhumane treatment of its Hmong population has led to displaced refugees escaping to Thailand. However, when the international community expressed concern about the Thai government's expulsion of Hmong people to Laos, the Lao government responded that the Hmong refugees were not Lao citizens and that they were rightfully Thailand's problem (*Jakarta Post*, December 27, 2009).

4.4.3 *Summary*

Since the LPRP's ascendancy to power in 1975, the Lao government has been unable to provide adequate human security to its people. From 1975 to just before the economic reforms in 1986, the Lao government was a source of tangible threat to the country's general population. Between 1986 and 2002, a time of economic reforms, the Lao government gradually enhanced people's living standards, yet restricted people's human rights and persecuted ethnic minorities. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the strategies adopted by the Lao government in response to the creation of the APSC have functioned to undermine certain provisions in the APSC, particularly those addressing human rights and freedom-from-fear issues. The motivation underlying the Lao government's manoeuvres in these regards has been to consolidate the regime's viability. The Lao government has

³⁴ <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA26/002/2006/en>

understood that what their authoritarian and undemocratic regime has needed is political legitimacy, and this strategy—in theory—should maximise the Lao government’s realisation of its goals.

4.5 Malaysia

Since 1963, when Malay integrated Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore (Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965), the Malaysian government has provided its population with good conditions for human security. However, like many ruling governments in Southeast Asian countries, the Malaysian government has failed to provide its people with adequate human rights. Interestingly, regarding the creation of the APSC where its spirit is people-oriented and its target is protection of human rights, the Malaysian government has been a voice of advocacy. In this section, I will first historically review human-security conditions under the Malaysian government and then explore both the strategies adopted by the Malaysian government in response to the creation of the APSC and the motivations underlying the Malaysian government’s strategies.

4.5.1 Historical Review: From 1957 to 2002

The following historical review will discuss human-security conditions as they existed during the period ranging from the Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Mahathir Mohamad governments. The discussion will focus particularly on how these leaders limited people’s human rights.

4.5.1.1 Human Security from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Mahathir bin Mohamad Governments

Since independence in 1963, Malaysian leaders have engaged in domestic economic development. The Malaysian government has promoted foreign investment in the country and exported electronic components, helping promote steady economic growth. From 1988 to 1996, GDP growth in Malaysia exceeded 8.5% each year, and average annual growth in the GDP was 9.5%.³⁵ This tremendous expansion of the economy enhanced people’s living standards. According to the HDI index in 1992 and 2002, Malaysia ranked 4th respectively in the category of medium human development (UNDP, 2004: 140, UNDP, 1994: 129). Politically, the government has adopted a democratic political system, although the National Front (*Barisan Nasional, BN*), which has comprised the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress

³⁵ <http://www.worldbank.org/>

(MIC), has dominated Malaysian politics since the National Front's formation in 1973. Thus, Malaysians have experienced regular elections and universal suffrage, and opposition parties have had a political space in which to operate. However, the Malaysian government has failed to provide its people with adequate human rights. In addition, from the 1960s to the early 1990s, armed conflicts between the Malaysian government and the MCP resulted in heavy casualties.

4.5.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

The first Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, designed two important laws that violated human rights. First, in 1960, Tunku Abdul Raham launched the Internal Security Act (ISA). Under the ISA, the police could arrest people without trial. For Tunku Abdul Raham, the ISA was a principal method for discouraging domestic communist factions, but his successors used the ISA to repress a wide swath of political dissidents. In addition, in 1966, Tunku Abdul Raham enacted the Societies Act. Under this Act, associations could not exist without formal permission from the government. Abdul Razak Hussein, Tunku Abdul Rahman's successor, also designed legislation to discourage dissidents. In 1971, Razak enacted the Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) to curb student's movement. In 1974, the Razak government amended this act. The amendment prohibited student—in the absence of university approval—from being members of parties or trade unions (Milne, 1976: 190).

Mahathir Mohamad also used the ISA to discourage political opponents. There are no exact figures as to how many people were arrested under the ISA during the Mahathir era. The most famous cases, however, are likely the arrests of both the Al Arqam movement's leader Ashaari Muhammad and the government minister Anwar Ibrahim. In 1994, under the ISA, the Mahathir government arrested the Al Arqam movement's leader Ashaari Muhammad and related people on the charge of engaging in deviationist teachings. The arrest sparked criticism from the international community. Many people believed that the main reason for the arrests was the Malaysian government's concern that the Arqam group might threaten the regime's stability and continuity (Hassan, 1995: 190). Kenneth Christie and Denny Roy argued that the Mahathir government's crackdown on the Arqam group "represented a fundamental violation of human rights and freedom, including freedom of expression, religion and the right to a livelihood" (Christie and Roy, 2001: 41). In 1998, the Mahathir government arrested Deputy and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim under the ISA. Anwar suffered inhuman treatment. For example, "Anwar appeared in court with a black eye and a

medical report showed that he had traces of arsenic in his blood” (Christie and Roy, 2001: 44). Governments from Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States criticised the Mahathir government’s violations of human rights (Felker, 1999: 52).³⁶

It should be noted here that during the period from the Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Mahathir Mohamad governments, Malaysia had pronounced ethnic problems between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese. The country’s affirmative-action policy for Malays may be an important reason for these ethnic problems (Rogers, 1972: 171-2). After racial riots erupted on May 13, 1969, Razak introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), whose purpose was to eradicate “poverty among all ethnic groups” and restructure “Malaysian society to eliminate the identification of communal groups with economic activity” (Rogers, 1972: 171). Under this policy, ethnic Malays enjoyed more privileges than non-ethnic Malays. For example, the state guaranteed that ethnic Malays could have 30% ownership of all commerce and industry for 20 years. The country’s affirmative-action policy, thus, seems to have helped trigger the aforementioned resentment and strife. In terms of human security, it appears likely that affirmative-action policies benefiting ethnic Malays have contributed to problems of social inequality and racism.

However, The Malaysian government has not satisfactorily resolved the cleavage between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese in the country. In fact, the Malaysian government has quite blatantly favoured the ethnic-Malay community. For example, when Najib became Prime Minister in 2009, he pledged to achieve ethnic harmony (O’Shannassy, 2011: 175). However, according to Najib, “To say all religions are equal before Allah is against the Islamic belief”—a position clearly favouring Muslims over non-Muslims (O’Shannassy, 2012: 168). Unsurprisingly, according to a questionnaire-survey that I conducted for this dissertation, 10 of the 20 Malayan respondents reported having encountered ethnic or racial discrimination.

4.5.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

Regarding freedom-from-fear issues, the Malaysian regimes—ranging from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Mahathir bin Mohamad—were beset by the anti-government of the MCP. Tunku

³⁶ Anwar’s arrest and imprisonment also resulted in diplomatic tension between Malaysia and neighbouring countries. For example, Mahathir butted heads with President Estrada of the Philippines and B. J. Habibie of Indonesia, who supported Anwar. After these squabbles, Mahathir cancelled security exercises between the Philippines and Malaysia. In addition, Mahathir questioned the legitimacy of Habibi’s regime, citing Habibi’s seizure of the presidency from Suharto (Narine, 2002: 187-8).

Abdul Rahman responded to the MCP by enacting the ISA and attacked the MCP base camps. Abdul Razak Hussein also adopted the preferred strategies of Tunku Abdul Rahman. In addition, Abdul Razak Hussein played the Chinese card. He visited China in 1974 and reached a consensus with the Chinese government: non-interference in each other's internal affairs (Milne, 1975: 166). The purpose of reaching the consensus was, for the Malaysian leadership, to stop the Chinese government's sponsorship of the MCP. By the time of Mahathir's rule, the MCP's influence on the Malaysian government had gradually declined. In December 1989, the MCP surrendered to the Mahathir regime. During the communist revolutionary struggle, the MCP killed about 10,000 Malaysians, including soldiers and civilians (Nathan, 1990: 210).

4.5.2 *Exploration of the Malaysian Government's Strategies for the APSC*

4.5.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Malaysian Government's Strategies*

In October 2003, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi became Malaysia's fifth prime minister. He ameliorated the country's human-rights conditions. For example, he adopted political reforms that resulted in "improved governance, stronger political institutions, and a softer approach to human rights" (Welsh, 2005: 153-4). Domestically, current Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Najib bin Abdul Razak enhanced the human-rights situation for the country's people, although his efforts have met limited success. One of the more notable successes took place in April 2012, when the Malaysian government replaced the ISA with the Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act. The new act gave detainees the right to meet with their relatives and to consult with their lawyers (Case, 2013: 136). In addition, the Malaysian government amended the UUCA. Today in Malaysia, students can join parties and trade unions (Case, 2013: 136).

Have the Badawi and Najib governments supported the creation of the APSC? The Malaysian government's strategies have been geared toward advocacy of the creation of the APSC, and the motivations underlying these strategies have involved the Malaysian government's ambitions in ASEAN. Engagement in ASEAN affairs has been a cornerstone in Malaysian diplomacy. The Malaysian government has used ASEAN as a platform to ensure national security. For example, according Acharya, the Malaysian government's goal in proposing the creation of the ZOPFAN in 1971 was to exclude Chinese government interference in ASEAN members' domestic affairs (Acharya, 2009b: 66). In the post-Cold War period, Malaysia has had a deep desire to be a principal leader in ASEAN. This ambition was quite obvious during the domestic political instability that gripped Indonesia in the 1990s.

For example, Mahathir's anti-Western statements led ASEAN members to oppose Western countries in spats over human-rights issues. In addition, in order to enhance ASEAN's international status, the Malaysian government encouraged ASEAN to open its doors to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Furthermore, the Malaysian government attempted to play the role of a pioneering leader in ASEAN's task of integrating regional economic. For example, the Malaysian government actively promoted the creation of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), which was the economic regional arrangement excluding Western countries' participation. In 1997, Mahathir delivered a speech at the annual seminar of the World Bank, declaring that the Malaysian government was willing to help poor countries (Mahathir and Irwan, 2007:103). Mirzan Mahathir and Fazil Irwan noted this effort, on the part of the Malaysian government, to manifest its leadership and progressiveness in relation to neighbouring countries (Mahathir and Irwan, 2007: 104)

However, Indonesia—not Malaysia—has been the best recognised leader in ASEAN. In recent years, moreover, Indonesia has experienced great improvements in its domestic human-rights and democracy records. Indonesia as a chief source of leadership in ASEAN has re-emerged as a potent possibility, if not a reality. In comparison with the Indonesian situation, Mahathir's anti-Western sentiments tarnished Malaysian national reputation. For example, after the UN-supervised ballot for self-determination on August 30, 1999 in East Timor, the Indonesian Army murdered hundreds of East Timorese and wreaked havoc on much-needed infrastructure in the region. Surprisingly, Mahathir—rather than criticise these atrocities—“blamed the West for manipulating Timorese separatism to weaken or even dismember Indonesia” (Felker, 2000: 59). Because of Mahathir's absurd statement, East Timor's leader objected to Malaysia's leadership role in East Timorese peace-keeping tasks in (Felker, 2000: 59).

Both the Badawi and the Najib governments have regarded the creation of the APSC as a chance to enhance Malaysian influence in ASEAN. During the APSC building process, Najib publicly said that “Malaysia has to lead in the process of getting ASEAN's act together in respect of the goal to become a modern regional block” (*Borneo Post*, April 9, 2014). Against this backdrop, the Badawi's government has been the vanguard in promoting human rights, revising the principle of non-interference, and promoting CSOs' participation in the ASEAN decision-making process. And to considerable effect, both the Badawi and the Najib governments have actively engaged in the Mindanao peace process.

4.5.2.2 *The Malaysian Government's Strategies*

4.5.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

With the exception of the Indonesian government, the Malaysian government has been the most prominent ASEAN member to promote human rights. During the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, the Malaysian government insisted that the language of human rights be enshrined in the charter itself. The Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar commented on this matter directly:

We must be seen not to be allergic, or not supportive of human rights ... if for any reason, the human rights provision is not in the charter, then people will think ASEAN is not pro-human rights and that is nonsense. We are for human rights, we are for civil liberties, we are for rule of law, we want to see good governments. (*The Star*, July 31, 2007)

The Malaysian government also suggested that the ASEAN Charter should have a provision for the creation of a regional human rights body (*The Star*, July 30, 2007). Finally, human rights took shape in both Article 1.7 and Article 2. 2. i of chapter 1 of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN, 2007: 1). Regarding the creation of a regional human-rights body, the blueprint of the APSC clearly regulates that ASEAN would create the regional human-rights body (ASEAN, 2009a: 5). The ASEAN human-rights body is the AICHR, created in October 2011.

In addition, during the APSC building process, Malaysia was the first member to propose reviewing the principle of non-interference as a way to address the emergence of more and more new insecurities. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said that “a cardinal principle of ASEAN, the non-interference policy, should be carefully refined and updated to tackle the new challenges facing the 10-member organisation” (cited from Mahathir and Irwan, 2007: 108).

The Malaysian government has been in the vanguard of encouraging CSOs to join the ASEAN decision-making process. At the 11th ASEAN Summit, Abdullah expressed his support for the creation of the ACSC and invited the ACSC to be held in parallel with the ASEAN Summit. Kelly Gerard argued that Abdullah’s friendly attitudes to CSOs “reflected not only his liberal outlook but also his desire to set himself apart from his predecessor, Mahathir” (Gerard, 2013: 418).

4.5.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The Malaysian government has played the leading role in enhancing freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. The Malaysian government has made substantial contributions to ending—or limiting the effects of—civil wars between the Filipino government and the MILF in Mindanao (Castro, 2012: 213). Since the mid-2000s, the Malaysian government has participated in peace process in Mindanao. As of early 2014, the Malaysian government has hosted, in total, 43 rounds of such talks in Kuala Lumpur (*The Star*, March 27, 2014) and has invited Japan to assist in these efforts, partly because the Malaysian government lacks relevant resources possessed in abundance by Japan (Lam, 2008: 54). Finally, in March 2014, the Filipino government and the MILF signed a peace treaty. The successful Malaysian mediation in Mindanao garnered domestic and international appreciation for the Filipino government. Filipino President Benigno Aquino himself noted his gratitude to Malaysia for the accomplishment:

I wish to thank Prime Minister Najib Razak for the significant support your government has demonstrated in facilitating and hosting the peace talks between my government and the MILF. I speak on behalf of our people when I say the Filipinos will never forget an act of kindness. (*The Star*, February 28, 2014)

Prime Minister Najib Razak expressed the opinion that the Malaysian government's continuous efforts in mediating civil wars involving ASEAN members stemmed in large measures from the desire to see the successful creation of the AC by 2015. Specifically, he stated,

Malaysia wants to do more to help resolve armed conflicts in the region ahead of the setting up of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015. When ASEAN becomes a community, we must help to end any conflicts in the region and spare no effort to seek a political settlement to the conflicts. (*The Star*, March 28, 2014)

4.5.3 *Summary*

After Malaysian independence, the Malaysian government provided its people with admirable living standards, but restricted people's human rights. Interestingly, the Badawi and the Najib governments have strategically advocated the creation of the APSC. The Malaysian government has played the leading role in promoting human rights, revising the

principle of non-interference, promoting CSOs' participation in ASEAN's decision-making process, and participating in the Mindanao peace process. It is reasonable to conclude that, aside from except Indonesia, Malaysia has stood out as a forceful supporter of the creation of the APSC.

4.6 Myanmar

Myanmar is a country rich in natural resources, diverse in its ethnic groups, and pluralistic in its religious tendencies. However, from 1962 to 2002, the Myanmar government was a source of threat to its people: Myanmar regimes brutally suppressed demonstrators and failed to address several prominent types of human insecurities, all while the Myanmar armed forces (*Tatmadaw*) kept up a nearly continuous assault against armed ethnic opposition groups. Given the country's historical context, it is hardly surprising that the Myanmar government adopted only rhetorical support for the creation of the APSC. However, during APSC building process, the Myanmar military regime adopted political reforms. This breakthrough has positively influenced the regime's strategic relationship to the APSC's creation. In this section, I will review how Myanmar's government has addressed human-security issues since the Ne Win period. The next section will explore specific aspects of the military regime strategy with respect to the creation of the APSC.

4.6.1 Historical Review: 1962–2002

The historical review section has two parts. The first part discusses the human-security situation under the leadership of Ne Win from 1962 to 1988, and the second part discusses the human-security situation after the Ne Win Era to 2002.

4.6.1.1 Human Security during the Ne Win Era (1962–1988)

In 1962, Ne Win ousted the democratic U Nu government. Almost immediately thereafter, Ne Win became a nearly ever-present threat to the country's people.

4.6.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

After coming to power in 1962, the Ne Win government inculcated itself in exacerbating people's human insecurities. Richard Butwell argued that the health sector was one of the Ne Win regime's few "bright spots" (Butwell, 1972: 910-1). According to his research, during the Ne Win era, the government doubled the budget for expanding in the number and quality of hospitals, hospital beds, doctors, and rural health centres (Butwell, 1972: 911). Indeed,

according to the World Development Report 1986, health statistics between 1965 and 1984 exhibited significant improvement: life expectancy increased from 46 to 57 years (male) and 49 to 60 years (female), and the infant mortality rate decreased from 125 to 67 per every 1,000 (World Bank, 1986: 232). However, the truth behind these statistics is that Burma ranked seventh among the world's worst countries regarding life expectancy and infant mortality, and Burma was the only Southeast Asian country among the top 10 worst countries (World Bank, 1986: 232), meaning that Ne Win's efforts did not translate into relatively substantial improvements across Burma.

In addition, Ne Win restricted people's human rights. During this period, people did not have freedom of association, because creation of political parties was banned. The only legal party in Burma was Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) (Butwell, 1972: 902). In addition, the Ne Win regime adopted repressive measures against people's freedom of expression and assembly. In March 1988, people, mainly students, demonstrated against incompetent governance, specially addressing economic hardship, but Ne Win's regime harshly suppressed the demonstrators. Burmese Riot Security Police (the Lon Htein) beat and stabbed students to death (Watcher, 1989: 175). In June 1988, when students protested the government again, brutal repression against protestors ensued. Although Ne Win resigned after the protest and appointed Sein Lwin as the new Burmese leader, Ne Win's harsh repression continued to reverberate among enraged students, whose demonstrations against the government persisted, resulting in the 1988 pro-democracy movement.

4.6.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

Since independence in 1948, the Burmese government has been plagued by the problem of multiethnic insurgencies. In 1952, in order to build "a strong Burmese nation," the Burmese government regulated that "all government business was to be conducted in the Burman language, Burmese history would be taught from the perspective of Burman nationalism, and the sole language used in education would be Burman" (Collins, 2003: 28-9). Alan Collins argued that this assimilation did not build "a strong Burmese nation" but resulted in armed insurgency groups whose function was to fight the central authorities (Collins, 2003: 28-9). During the Ne Win era, the government attempted to address these long-running ethnic conflicts. For example, Ne Win invited armed-insurgency groups to join peace talks and he guaranteed that Burmese and ethnic minorities would be equal economically and socially (Butwell, 1972: 907-8). However, Ne Win's regime remained poised to use brutal military tactics in its crackdown on armed ethnic opposition groups.

Ne Win's counter-insurgency campaigns targeted armed ethnic groups in the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan States, leading to heavy casualties. For example, in 1980, the *Tatmadaw* attacked the KNU units on the Burma-Thai border. The *Tatmadaw* and the KNU's military arm-Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) fiercely resisted each other, leading to about 100 to 200 Burmese soldiers dead (Silverstein, 1981: 217). In addition, in the 1980s, the Burmese government negotiated with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and particularly with its leader, U Bran Seng, but the government did not grant the community autonomy or even political freedom (Silverstein, 1982: 184). The long-standing armed conflict between the Burmese government and the KIO persisted. Between 1961 and 1986, casualties of Kachins numbered over 30,000 and displaced Kachins and Kachin refugees numbered over 130,000 (Smith, 2002: 16)

4.6.1.2 *Human Security after the Ne Win Dictatorship (1989-2002)*

After political turmoil gripped Burma in 1988, General Saw Maung seized power and the *Tatmadaw* created the SLORC. In 1989, the SLORC changed country's name from Burma to Myanmar. In May 1990, the Saw Maung regime held elections and allowed the NLD, the main opposition party, to participate therein. The NLD won a landslide victory. They took 80% of the seats in the *Pyithu Hluttaw* (People's Assembly) and nearly 60% of the overall votes (Guyot, 1991: 210). Derek Tonkin argued that this election is proof of the Myanmar people's preference for a democratic system (Tonkin, 2007: 35). However, the SLORC refused to accept the results of the election. Many members and supporters of the NLD had to concede power, large numbers were arrested (Guyot, 1991: 221), and Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest. Thus, the SLORC continued to rule Myanmar. However, like the Ne Win regime, the SLORC restricted people's human rights and failed to address several important types of human insecurities. In the freedom-from-fear area, the SLORC continued its counter-insurgency campaigns against a handful of armed insurgency groups. In short, the SLORC remained a source of threats to its people.

4.6.1.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

In April 1991, General Than Shwe became Myanmar's new Prime Minister and the SLORC chairman. He released some political prisoners and allowed reporters and scholars to Myanmar (Steinberg, 1993: 176-7). On the surface, Than Shwe attempted to change the Myanmar government's abysmal human-rights record. In fact, the Than Shwe regime was nothing more than yet another source of threats to the people. The regime continued to

repress people's capacity for political participation. It still arrested members of the NLD (Seekins, 1999: 16). In addition, the Than Shwe regime created the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) in 1993. The task of this choreographed organisation was to vilify Aung San Suu Kyi and make mischief in the NLD. The military-ruled government's subterfuge led to serious conflict between the USDA and the NLD in May 2003. The conflict, which is referred to as the so-called Depayin Incident, resulted in 70 people dead and 100 injured (Hlaing, 2004: 88).

In addition, the military regime was one of the culprits in the increased infection rates of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar. In Myanmar, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS increased constantly between 1991 and 2004, with the figures jumping from below 50,000 to over 250,000 (UNAIDS, March 31, 2012: 9). Unsafe sex and intravenous drug use were the main causes for the spread of HIV/AIDS. Although the use of condoms and methadone treatment can effectively decrease HIV transmission rates, according to Cohen's research, the government declared that they would arrest any woman caught carrying a condom because the government regarded such women as prostitutes; moreover, the government regarded methadone as an illegal narcotic rather than as an effective drug-treatment option (Cohen, 2003: 1653-4).

The military regime's wrongdoings surfaced in the problem of trade in illicit drugs. In February 1974, Ne Win's government enacted laws to prohibit crops used for the production of narcotics, and accepted assistance from the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), all under the auspices of Phase I and Phase II of the UN/Burma Programme for Drug Abuse Control. Since 1989, the military regime has been a signatory to a ceasefire agreement with many armed ethnic groups. Even with some armed insurgency groups that were dependent on the narcotics trade, the military regime has signed ceasefire agreements; however, in exchange for the ceasefire, the military has granted these groups permission to engage in the drug trade (Steinberg, 1993: 182). In addition, some observers have suspected the military regime itself of involvement in the narcotics trade (Badgley, 1994: 154). Richard Gibson and John Haseman concluded that the Myanmar government has been "willing" to address the narcotics problem, but because of growing armed ethnic groups and rampant corruption in the police and military, the Myanmar government has been increasingly at the mercy of the narcotics problem (Gibson and Haseman, 2003).

4.6.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear

Since 1989, the military regime has signed ceasefire agreements with many armed ethnic

groups. However, the regime did not make tangible progress in pursuing national reconciliation. For example, the military continued to repress the KNU. In 1994, the military regime attacked the KNU its refugee camps in Thailand (Callahan, 1996: 163) and in 1998, the pro-SPDC Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) burned down KNU refugee camps in Thailand. Victims fled into the “malaria-infested jungle” (Seekins, 1999: 16).

In addition, the military government was a surreptitious actor in the racial tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State. In 2001, the Buddhist Rakhine and the Muslim Rohingya in Arakan State clashed with each other, and these conflicts led to heavy casualties and the destruction of mosques and Muslims’ homes. However, police and soldiers simply looked on with folded arms and did not intervene until the desperate Muslims themselves fought back (Human Rights Watch, July 18, 2002: 9-11). According to an interview that Human Rights Watch conducted with Muslim victims, the Myanmar government was surreptitiously involved in the racial conflict, because the monks who were clashing with Muslims were carrying hand-phones that were not available to people in Myanmar except for police and army personnel (Human Rights Watch, July 18, 2002: 8). These racial tensions have led to displaced Muslim refugees, who have relocated to refugee camps in Bangladesh. The military regime has been unwilling to accept them back into Myanmar (Amnesty International, June 21, 2007).

4.6.2 *Exploration of the Myanmar Government’s Strategies for the APSC*

4.6.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Myanmar Government’s Strategies*

According to the current study’s historical review, we know that the Myanmar government was a source of threats to its people. It is hardly surprising that the Myanmar government’s strategies for the APSC rested chiefly on expressions of rhetorical support. In fact, the Myanmar government did not adhere to the provisions in the APSC’s blueprint. The motivation underlying the Myanmar government’s use of the strategies was a desire on the part of the regime to consolidate its continuity and stability.

According to Jürgen Haacke, the Myanmar government did not publicly oppose the creation of the APSC but accepted it (Haacke, 2006: 43). Indeed, since participation in ASEAN in 1997, the Myanmar government has gained several advantages from ASEAN. For example, the Myanmar government strengthened its legitimacy, received economic benefits from ASEAN members, and gained ASEAN members’ political support in countering Western countries’ criticism of the Myanmar government’s human-rights record (Haacke, 2006: 42-6, Acharya, 2009b: 133). There should be little surprise that the Myanmar

government, rather than oppose the creation of the APSC, vocally supported it.

However, the Myanmar government's support was nothing more than rhetorical, because actual promotion of democracy and human rights as laid out in the APSC blueprint would lead to the military regime's instability, if the Myanmar government had adhered to this provision. The Myanmar government's cautious approach to the blueprint's human-rights and democratic elements can be observed in a meeting between the Myanmar government and ASEAN members. In 2005, when the Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid visited Myanmar to persuade the Myanmar government to release Aung San Suu Kyi and accept democracy, SLORC chairman Than Shwe expressed the Myanmar government's cautiousness—the Myanmar government was worried that development of democracy would trigger “Iraq-style unrest” in Myanmar (Haacke, 2006: 56). The Myanmar government, though rhetorically supportive of the creation of the APSC, did not adhere in practice to the provisions laid out in the APSC's blueprint.

Interestingly, the military regime's strategically rhetorical support softened somewhat at the end of 2010. The main cause of this turnaround was the Myanmar government's adoption of political reforms at about this time, and two factors facilitated the political reforms.

The first factor is closely associated with the desire on the part of the Myanmar government to strengthen its political and diplomatic autonomy. In the aftermath of the suppression of the 1988 protests, the international community pressured the military government to enhance its dismal human-rights record and to implement democracy. Much of this pressure rested on the community's adoption of economic and political sanctions and, more generally, public opprobrium. However, the military government remained intransigent, since they had gained the Chinese government's economic and political support. Economically, the Chinese government was the main material donor to Myanmar. They provided significant aid and loans, which amounted to US\$530 million from 1997 to 2006 (Haacke, 2010: 119). In addition, prosperous trade on the border between the two countries resulted in substantial Chinese investments in Myanmar and the Chinese government's assistance in constructing Myanmar's infrastructure, which helped develop that country's domestic economy. Politically, the Chinese always sided with the military regime. The Chinese government completely supported the military regime's sham democratic reforms, such as the seven-point “roadmap” (Haacke, 2010: 120). When the United States planned to integrate Myanmar's issues into the UNSC agenda in 2006, the Chinese government vetoed the American suggestion (Simon, 2007b: 69).

However, the military regime's overwhelming dependence on China transformed

Myanmar into a client of the Chinese government. What is more importantly, the Chinese government's political aid could not quash the ceaseless criticism from the international community. Ian Storey commented on this trend:

I don't think the generals in Myanmar have ever been very happy about this relationship with China. Basically, they had no choice in 1988-89, but to turn to China. It was more of a marriage of convenience than a love match. They've tried over years to reduce that dependence by joining ASEAN and then trying to pursue closer relationships with India and Russia and other countries, but every time they have been forced to rely even more on China. This is another attempt, I think, to reduce that dependence.³⁷

The second factor is that the Myanmar government wanted to preserve its membership in ASEAN. After acquiring ASEAN membership in 1997, the Myanmar government benefited from a consolidation of legitimacy, economic assistance, and political support (Haacke, 2006: 42-6, Acharya, 2009b: 133). However, since the mid-2000s, ASEAN members have exerted pressure on the Myanmar government regarding domestic democratic and human-rights issues, because of the military regime's recalcitrance in enhancing its internal politics and human-rights—a recalcitrance that has tarnished ASEAN's reputation. The most serious criticism probably came from Mahathir Mohamad. In 2003, he suggested expelling Myanmar from ASEAN (*Jakarta Post*, July 25, 2003). If other ASEAN members had adopted the suggestion which they did not, the political legitimacy of Myanmar's regime would have suffered a blow, itself putting at risk the regime's continuity and stability.

The impact of these factors on Myanmar's politics has grown stronger since ASEAN's decision to create the AC in 2003. The influence of the Chinese government has penetrated Myanmar's long-running civil conflicts (Haacke, 2010: 126-7). Owing to its important border trade in the area, the Chinese government established good relations with armed ethnic opposition groups, such as the UWSA, and Chinese state companies were suspected of selling weapons to the UWSA, effectively preventing the military regime from stamping out multiethnic insurgencies (Haacke, 2010: 126-7). In addition, during the creation of the ASEAN Charter, the Chairman of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) Tan Sri Musa Hitam, suggested that the ASEAN Charter should feature a provision for punishing members that do

³⁷ Interview in Singapore, January 20, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei.

not abide by the ASEAN Charter (*The Star*, September 12, 2007). Against this backdrop, the military regime has understood that acceptance of democracy and human rights is the ultimate strategy by which to temper Chinese influence on Myanmar's politics and diplomacy and to preserve Myanmar membership in ASEAN, even though promotion of human rights and democracy may stagger the Myanmar regime. Finally, at the end of 2010, the military regime adopted a series of political reforms, while changing its strategies for handling the creation of the APSC: the regime was now less a rhetorician and more an actual adherent.

4.6.2.2 *The Myanmar Government's Strategies*

4.6.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

As regards the APSC's freedom-from-want element, Myanmar's ruling government expressed their rhetorical support. In November 2007, Myanmar's Foreign Minister Nyan Win expressed his opinion that the military junta was willing to sign the ASEAN Charter and to respect democracy and human rights (*AsiaNews*, November 19, 2007). In 2008, the Myanmar government signed the ASEAN Charter and pledged to adhere to the charter. Foreign Minister Nyan Win said that the Myanmar government had a keen "desire to create a caring and sharing community" (*Brunei Times*, July 22, 2008). The Myanmar government's commitment constituted an apparently promising start to the task of improving domestic democracy and an abysmal domestic human-rights record.

However, when Cyclone Nargis struck the Irrawaddy Delta Division of Myanmar in May 2008, the military government completely ignored their prior commitment to the ASEAN Charter. The Nargis cyclone resulted in, according to statistics released by Myanmar's government, 84,537 deaths, 53,836 missing persons, and 19,359 injured persons (cited from Özerdem, 2005: 697). Victims lacked food, water, and shelters. They drank water in ditches and streams that had been made hazardous to human health owing to the presence of animal and human remains (Seekins, 2009: 167). Despite all this, the military regime refused to grant visas to foreign rescue teams and to accept assistance provided by foreign countries. Andrew Selth argued that the Myanmar government's central concern was "foreign interference in Myanmar's affairs" (Selth, 2008: 380, 389-94).

In addition, the Myanmar government opposed giving real power to a regional human-rights body. In July 2008, when Myanmar Prime Minister Nyan Win discussed with ASEAN members the creation of the proposed regional human-rights body, he opposed its potential capacity both to monitor human-rights situations in each member state and to investigate human-rights violations; moreover, he insisted that the regional human-rights body had to be

a merely consultative mechanism (Simon, 2009: 56).

Interestingly, the military government's rhetorical strategy started changing by the end of 2010. At that time, the military made an important decision: they released many political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi; they restored many human rights to the people; and they halted construction on the China-sponsored Myitsone Dam, which had contravened the Myanmar people's will (Turnell, 2012: 157).

The Myanmar government also changed its strategic response to the creation of the APSC. In November 2011, the military government pledged that it would "continue to work actively with ASEAN member states in community building and for the achievement of the common goals" (*Xinhua*, November 21, 2011). The first test of the military regime's commitment was 2012's by-elections. Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD received permission to participate in this election, which the Myanmar government allowed foreign observers and journalists to witness. The observers positively assessed the election, in which the NLD won 43 of the 45 available seats. The military government's successful election was consistent with the APSC's provision promoting democracy.

There has been no talk of expelling Myanmar from ASEAN. Instead, at the twentieth ASEAN Summit, held in Phnom Penh in April 2012, ASEAN members called for the international community ease its sanctions imposed on Myanmar (ASEAN, April 3-4, 2012). In addition, ASEAN agreed that Myanmar should take over the chairmanship of the ASEAN Summit in 2014. At the same time, the military government's adherent strategy remained in place throughout 2013. In June 2013, the Myanmar Foreign Ministry's deputy director general of ASEAN affairs, Aung Htoo, asserted that the military government, upon assuming the chairmanship in 2014, would specifically focus on the following issues: a "people-centered ASEAN, [a] convention on trafficking in persons and migrant workers" (*Jakarta Post*, June 17, 2013).

4.6.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

After the military regime agreed to create the APSC, the freedom-from-fear provisions seemingly demanded that the government promptly end its civil wars and reconstruct war-torn areas. However, the leadership did not adhere to the provisions for post-conflict peace-building in the APSC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009a: 11). The military regime neither reduced hostilities involving the KNU and UWSA nor renounced the use of force as a way of addressing long-running civil conflicts. In August 2009, *Tatmadaw* seized Laogai, which had been an area occupied by several armed ethnic groups, including the Myanmar National

Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the UWSA, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). The military government's seizure of Laogai resulted in 37,000 refugees (Seekins, 2010: 201-2).

After adoption of political reforms, the Myanmar government planned to sign a ceasefire agreement with armed ethnic groups, in adherence to the freedom-from-fear provision—pacific settlement of disputes—in the APSC blueprint. In 2013, the disputants reached a breakthrough in attempting to wind down these long-running ethnic conflicts. The military regime invited armed ethnic groups, including the most recalcitrant organisations, the KIO, the KNU, and the China-linked UWSA to enter into peace talks and sign a peace agreement. These organisations accepted the invitation. The Shan State Army leader, Yawd Serk, said, “The president’s announcement of reconciliation and invitation to the armed groups is why we came here. I trust him, that’s why I’m here and why we’ve stopped fighting” (*Forum*, January 30, 2013). The director of both the cease-fire negotiations and their implementation at the Myanmar Peace Center, Min Zaw Oo, echoed this sentiment: “Cease-fire agreements in the past do not include political settlement or not even a [sic] political discussions. But, this time the government already proclaimed that this discussion doesn’t stop short at cease-fire agreement and that will lead to a political dialogue, toward a political settlement” (*Vocie of America*, May 31, 2013). Declarations of good intention from both sides were a positive sign that the problem of Myanmar’s ethnic disturbances might finally be resolved. As of May 2014, the erstwhile opposing sides have held three peace talks, each in different location: Myitkyina (November 2013), Hpa-an (the capital of the Kayin State) (March 2014), and Rangoon (April 2014).

4.6.3 *Summary*

From 1962 to 2002, the Myanmar government posed a threat to the country’s people. The government failed to address human insecurities, restricted human rights, and attacked armed ethnic groups. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the military regime’s main strategy initially was rhetorical support for the APSC blueprint’s provisions, to which the regime did not adhere in practice. However, because the Myanmar government gradually experienced a decline in its political and diplomatic autonomy and was worried about being expelled from ASEAN, the Myanmar government adopted political reforms. Political reform has shifted the Myanmar government’s APSC strategies in the direction of an adherent stance. So far, the military regime has in no way assisted the creation of the APSC. However, the regime’s promotion of democracy and its ceasefire with armed ethnic groups have been consistent with

the APSC's overarching spirit.

4.7 The Philippines

In 1946, the Philippines gained independence from the United States. From the 1965 to 2002, the Philippines experienced the rulership of five presidents: Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (in her first presidential term). The critical difference among these leaders regarding each one's provision of human security lies in whether they genuinely practiced democracy. During the APSC building process, the Philippines have experienced two presidents: Arroyo (her second presidential term) and Benigno S. Aquino III. The key point of difference between their respective contributions to the APSC centred also on the topic of democracy. In this section, I will historically review how each Philippine government has addressed human-security issues since the Marcos period, and in the next section, I will explore the Arroyo and Aquino III strategies for handling the creation of the APSC.

4.7.1 Historical Review: From 1965 to 2002

The historical-review section comprises two parts. The first part discusses the human-security situation under the Marcos administration from 1965 to 1986. The second part discusses the human-security situation under the administrations of Corazon Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo (first presidential term).

4.7.1.1 Human Security during the Marcos Era

In December 1965, Filipinos elected Marcos to the presidency. During his first presidential term, he launched several social-development programmes and built schools, roads, and electricity in rural areas (Kann, 1974: 615). However, to extend his presidency, he declared martial law on September 22, 1972, significantly damaging the very democratic institutions that had helped him acquire political power. Marcos embraced martial law to establish a "New Society," which would boast low crime rate, adept governance and no communist interference (Adkins, 1973: 148). Early on, Marcos actively pursued his tri-fold target. According to Peter Kann, the Marcos government decreased crime rates, reduced corruption, and increased funds allocated for rural development (Kann, 1974: 619-620, 626-627). However, declaration of martial law was nothing more than a tool with which Marcos sought to continue his regime. Political dissent and separatist movements were among the significant challenges the setting his regime's continuity and territorial integrity, and in response, Marcos

adopted repressive measures. During these years, the Marcos regime failed to address several important types of domestic human insecurities.

4.7.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

Under martial law, Marcos restricted people's human rights. First, Marcos limited people's freedom of political participation. Opposition parties' leaders and political dissidents were detained or murdered. The most conspicuous example of this line of action is the assassination of the Liberal Party leader Benigno Aquino at the Manila International Airport on August 21, 1983. Many people believed that Marcos was the mastermind of the brutal assault, although he blamed the Aquino slaying on communists (Silliman, 1984: 154). In addition, Marcos controlled people's freedom of expression. The Marcos government banned the right of demonstration and prohibited the clergy in the Philippines from participating in trade-union activity (Noble, 1976: 185). Some clergy who continued to help vulnerable people and to criticise the government's wrongdoings were either deported or secretly killed (Youngblood, 1978). Senator Jose W. Diokno criticised Marcos' martial law:

Martial law was never intended and cannot by its very nature be used to try and solve social problems. Martial law cannot solve poverty and economic development, which are human centered. Martial law is authoritarian and authoritarianism assumes that the people do not know what is good for them. (cited from Nether, 1980: 157)

In addition, the Marcos government failed to address several human insecurities. Filipinos suffered inflation, rising food and production prices, high unemployment rates in urban and particularly in rural area (Adkins, 1972: 82), malnourishment (Nether, 1980: 164), and unsatisfactory responses to natural disasters. The Marcos' government failed to recover fully from the negative consequences of these human insecurities. For example, the Philippines has been prone to many types of natural disasters, such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruption, but the Marcos government provided few measures that might help the people minimise these natural disasters' devastating effects. Unsurprisingly, when natural disasters hit the Philippines, heavy casualties and damages occur repeatedly.

4.7.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

The non-democratic Marcos government adopted a hard-line approach to dealing with radical anti-government elements. Marcos suppressed radical insurgent Islamist groups. In February

1974, not long after the declaration of martial law, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) clashed with radical insurgent Islamist groups, including the MNLF. This conflict led to the death and disappearance of some 10,000 people (Carmen, 1975: 136). In September 1976, Marcos met with representatives of the MNLF and signed the Tripoli Agreement, under which Mindanao gained autonomy for 13 provinces and 9 cities, but the MNLF had to surrender its pursuit of political independence (Islam, 1998: 449). Although this agreement brought about a temporary lull in the fighting on Mindanao, clashes between the two sides broke out after Marcos announced plans in 1977 to hold a referendum in the southern Philippine provinces regarding their desire to join Mindanao: the MNLF believed that the referendum was a trick by Marcos to chip away at the MNLF's strength (Machado, 1978: 208). Armed conflicts between the government and the MNLF led to approximately 600 deaths (Machado, 1978: 208).

Marcos also adopted a hard-line approach to the indigenous communist insurgencies that under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army (NPA). These conflicts resulted in heavy casualties as well, but the Marcos government never negotiated with the CPP-NPA for a ceasefire agreement. This reluctance reflected the government's keen awareness that its anti-communist stance in the past had effectively discouraged his critics from weighing in too heavily on his harsh and corrupt policies. For example, the Marcos government declared that some clergy in the Philippines had consorted with the CPP-NPA against the government (Carmen, 1975: 138). Against this backdrop, the government arrested some clergy on this pretext, charging them with subversion and murder, while avoiding harsh penalties from anti-communist states around the world (Youngblood, 1983: 211).

4.7.1.2 Human Security after the Fall of President Marcos

Both the Marcos government's suspected involvement in assassinating the opposition leader Benigno Aquino and the Marcos government's incompetent handling of human insecurities led, in 1986, to the People Power movement. Although Marcos won the presidential election in February 1986, the election was rife with fraud. Many Filipinos protested this unfair, unclean election. Indeed, many Filipinos refused to accept the results of the election and called for Marcos' immediate resignation. Finally, through a U.S. offering of political asylum, Marcos escaped to Hawaii, and the previously vanquished presidential candidate Corazon Aquino became the new president of the Philippines. This section will discuss the human-security situation after the fall of President Marcos.

4.7.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

After fall of President Marcos, Corazon Aquino became the Filipino president. During the Corazon Aquino period, the Philippines still lacked advanced infrastructure, elites remained firmly in control of the political scene, and the distribution of social welfare was noticeably unfair (Brillantes, 1993: 225, Timberman, 1990: 173). Despite these evident failings, Brillantes argued that Aquino strengthened the country's human-rights record (Brillantes, 1993: 225). For example, she created a new constitution protecting such basic human rights as the freedoms of speech, press, and association (Yu, 2005: 224) and create the Commission on Human Rights in 1986. Because of her efforts, democracy returned to the Philippines, which then legally consolidated various human rights.

Corazon Aquino's successor, Ramos, initially supported the democratic system, but then attempted to extend his presidential term through an amendment to the Philippine constitution (Hernandez, 1997: 208). He eventually chose to preserve the country's fledgling democratic system. During the Ramos period from 1992 to 1998, Ramos attracted substantial foreign investments to the Philippines, bolstering economic growth there and indirectly but palpably enhancing people's living standards (Hernandez, 1997: 210). In addition, in order to protect overseas Filipino workers, the Ramos government signed the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in November 1993 and acceded to its implementation in July 1995.

Unlike Corazon Aquino and Ramos, Estrada disregarded democracy in the Philippines. For example, in order to extend his power, he attempted to amend the constitutional provisions governing presidential terms (Bolongaita, 2000: 69-70). In addition, his presidency was steeped in corruption and his "policy decisions were made during late night drinking and gambling sessions" (Labrador, 2001: 222). Thus, some policies that the Estrada government proposed for the amelioration of human insecurity were simply inept. For example, Gabriella Montinola noted that in order to enhance living standards in rural areas, Estrada approved the use of agricultural land for residential and commercial use, but he did not create any compensatory mechanism for the subsequently afflicted farmers (Montinola, 1999: 66). Estrada's corruption and his government's ineptitude led to the second People Power movement in early 2001, which quickly forced Estrada's resignation. His vice president—Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo—replaced him as the nation's president that same year.

During her replacement presidential term (2001-2004), Arroyo maintained a passable, if

not shining, democratic system in the Philippines.³⁸ Although the Arroyo government was unable to address high poverty rates, the Arroyo government combated criminal activities, as in 2003, when the Arroyo government passed the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act,” providing clear measures and programs for the prevention of human-trafficking and for the protection of its victims.

4.7.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

After the fall of President Marcos, Corazon Aquino restored democracy and human rights in the Philippines. Although conflicts between the government and these armed groups continued,³⁹ Corazon Aquino attempted to negotiate with the CPP-NPA and the MNLF regarding ceasefire agreements (Villegas, 1987: 196).

During Ramos’ presidency, conflicts between the government and the CPP-NPA were on-going, but the relationship between the government and the MNLF enjoyed a breakthrough. Under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Indonesia, the Philippine government signed the peace agreement with a MNLF. Following this agreement, both sides in 1996 established the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), whose chairmanship was occupied by Nur Misuari, founder and leader of the MNLF, and whose purpose was to “plan, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of administrative support to local government units and assist with election- and referendum-related activities” (Hernandez, 1997: 206).

Joseph Estrada’s government adopted a hard-line approach to insurgent groups. To the MILF, which was an offshoot of the MNLF forming in 1978, Estrada’s strategy was at times “all-out war” (Labrador, 2002: 141), although he negotiated with the MILF on occasion. Estrada also repressed the CPP-NPA. The swelling ranks of the CPP-NPA once prompted Estrada to declare, “You do not baby a rebellion, you crush it” (cited from Bolongaita, 2000: 76).

During Arroyo’s first presidential term, she rejected Estrada’s all-out war policy and adopted a moderate solution to the MILF. She accepted Malaysia as a mediator, and the

³⁸ For example, the general election in 2001 was rife with vote buying, murder, and fraud, and Arroyo herself was involved in a 2004 presidential scandal.

³⁹ The main reason for continuing conflicts was Corazon Aquino’s disagreement with the MNLF’s requirements: the autonomous regions had to include the provinces in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan (totaling 23 provinces), the MNLF’s leader had to be the person with the power to appoint officials in Mindanao, and autonomous regions had to have their own army (Hernandez, 1988: 36).

Philippine government signed a ceasefire agreement with the MILF in August 2001. Regarding the CPP-NPA, even though armed conflict between the government and the CPP-NPA continued (Montesano, 2004: 95-6), the Arroyo government attempted to peacefully address this communist insurgency movement. For example, the Arroyo government accepted Norway's mediating role in talks between the two sides, which engaged in negotiations from February to April 2004.

4.7.2 *Exploration of the Filipino Government's Strategies for the APSC*

4.7.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Filipino Government's Strategies*

We know that, according to the historical review, the Filipino government was willing to provide human security to its people when leaders accepted or abided by democracy. During the APSC-building process, the Philippines experience two presidents: Arroyo (second presidential term) and Benigno S. Aquino III. Have these two leaders supported or opposed the creation of the APSC? What strategies have the two leaders adopted in response to the creation of the APSC? And what motivations have underlain their strategies?

Both leaders have differed from each other regarding their strategic responses to the creation of the APSC, but the motivations behind their respective strategies have been similar to each other. Arroyo's strategic response to the APSC centred on rhetorical support. The motivation behind her strategies was to shift public scrutiny away from her electoral scandal and, thereby, to stabilise her vulnerable government. In Arroyo's first presidential term, she maintained democracy stateside, although the quality of democracy was unimpressive. In her second term, in order to extend her presidency, she disregarded democracy in the Philippines. For example, in June 2005, Arroyo admitted that she had phoned an official in the Commission on Elections, but she denied that she had committed electoral fraud. Her sullied reputation as a champion of democracy in the Philippines garnered criticism from public and political opponents, which significantly weakened her government (Hutchcroft, 2008: 144-6). Political opponents also seized on such legal approaches to destabilising her hold on power as impeachment proceedings. According to Hutchcroft, Arroyo distanced herself from the electoral scandal by declaring political reform—a shift from the then-current presidential system to a parliamentary system (Hutchcroft, 2008:146). Also, creation of the APSC provided Arroyo a good chance to divert unwanted attention from her electoral scandal. However, the Arroyo government's rhetorical support for creating the APSC had little practical effect on efforts to establish this body.

Aquino's APSC-oriented strategies have been, on the whole, supportive of the project.

The motivation underlying the strategies has been to consolidate his regime's stability. As noted in chapter two of the current work, many contemporary leaders in democracies have had to address human insecurities in order to win over a majority of the electorate for a subsequent term in office. In this regard, the Philippine constitution as it governs the presidency allows for only one term of six years. The reason for Aquino's supportive stance rested mainly on the country's contemporary political history, punctuated by the People Power Movement's overthrow of Marcos and Estrada. Philippine leaders have come to fear People Power: for example, when political opponents and NGOs sought to force Arroyo's resignation, she banned all unapproved protests, because she knew the strength of the People Power phenomenon (Hedman, 2006: 188). Thus, after assuming the presidency, Aquino vowed to address several human insecurities, such as rampant extrajudicial killings, poverty, and low living standards (Abinales, 2011: 168-71), and creation of the APSC offered him a reasonable opportunity to stand by his commitments, all while consolidating his regime's stability.

4.7.2.2 *The Filipino Government's Strategies*

4.7.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

During the APSC-building process, Arroyo used her image as an advocate of human rights and democracy in the ASEAN Charter to shift people's focus away from her electoral scandal. In 2007, the year that Arroyo faced the strongest criticism during her presidency, because of a presidential impeachment bribery scandal, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo issued a statement on Myanmar's dismal internal politics and human-rights violations. He stated, in particular, "The Charter is good; but if you sign it, then you must implement what is there" (*Inquirer.net*, November 18, 2007). Arroyo also commented on the matter:

Not only are we committed to seeing political reforms in Myanmar. Our Senate will not ratify the Charter, unless they see real political reforms take place in Myanmar. So we must work together to make the tough choices to make ASEAN real and Aung San Suu Kyi free. (*PhilStar*, January 27, 2008)

However, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago declared that she did not "see any strong opposition to the Charter in the Senate" and she is one of the senators who actively supported ratification of the ASEAN Charter (*Inquirer.net*, August 28, 2008). Miriam's declaration

suggests that the Arroyo government's various APSC-related statements were political tactical moves. In addition, in 2009, the Filipino government opposed the presence of Sister Crescencia L. Lucero, Executive Director of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines at a meeting between the ASEAN leaders and the ACSC. This human-right organisation had criticised Arroyo's detention of a rebel leader and had "questioned the sincerity of her attempts to build peace with communist rebel groups" (Gerard, 2014: 123). If Arroyo genuinely supported the creation of the APSC, she would not have blocked Crescencia L. Lucero from attending the meeting and would have actively addressed insurgent problems without resorting to the detention of a rebel leader. Moreover, in June 2008, typhoon Fengshen resulted in 1,200 deaths and damaged agriculture and infrastructure in parts of the Philippines (Hicken, 2009: 197). Prompted by these events, in October 2008, the UNDP suggested that the Philippines should establish its own specialised disaster-management agency (*PhilStar*, October 25, 2009)—a suggestion that directly revealed the Arroyo administration's few useful policies in response to natural disasters' negative effects, despite the emphasis on such policies in the ASCC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009b: 11).⁴⁰

The Aquino administration's strategic stance toward the APSC has been supportive. After assuming the Philippine Presidency, Aquino has vowed to address several types of human insecurities. Aquino's substantive support for the APSC has brought Aquino closer to materialising his commitment to handling human insecurities. Unlike Arroyo's substanceless contributions to natural-disaster remediation, the Aquino's government issued the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010. In line with this act, the government institutionalised diverse approaches to offsetting the negative effects of natural disasters, relying heavily on knowledge-building among the general public as well as among specialists, adoption of tried and true preparatory disaster-response methods like coordination among official agencies, and adoption of post-disaster recovery strategies like enhanced governmental cooperation with CSOs. In the aftermath of typhoon Yolanda, which lashed the Central Philippines on November 2013, Aquino suggested that ASEAN not only implement the AADMER but also strengthen the AHA Center (Rappler, May 11, 2014).

⁴⁰ It cannot be denied that during Arroyo's second presidency, she oversaw passage of the law known as the Magna Carta for Women (Republic Act 9710), which has served to protect females' human rights and to help females avoid domestic violence. In addition, in the twelfth ASEAN Summit, the Philippines was a notably active member supporting the ratification of the ASEAN Declaration on the Rights of Migrant Workers. However, the real impetus behind Arroyo's support for these two human-rights issues was the pressure that domestic human-rights activists and CSOs were placing on the Arroyo government in these regards.

Aquino improved Filipinos' human rights, too. For example, he protected overseas Filipino workers' human rights, in line with the ASCC provision C.2.28 (ASEAN, 2009b: 12-3). The Philippines government prohibited its citizens from working in fifteen countries where the labour environment did not meet standards laid out in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act (*Jakarta Post*, July 4, 2012). The standards regulate that the receiving country must have passed "labour and social laws protecting the rights of migrant workers," must be "a signatory to multilateral conventions," must have issued "declarations or resolutions relating to the protection of migrant workers," must have entered in to a "bilateral agreement or arrangement with the government protecting the rights of overseas Filipino workers," and must have in place "positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant workers."⁴¹

4.7.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Arroyo's strategy as it pertains to the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC rested on rhetorical support. In the beginning of her second presidential term, Arroyo continued to negotiate with the MILF, to which she planned on extending more autonomy, and accepted Malaysia to be a mediator. Under the new plan, the MILF would have their own law-enforcement, military, educational, and banking systems (Hicken, 2009: 194). However, Arroyo's plan was rhetorical rather than substantive, and the two sides continued to clash violently resulting in significant civilian collateral: 500,000 displaced (Hicken, 2009: 195). In addition, Arroyo shifted from her previously moderate handling of the CPP-NPA to a hard-line approach in Arroyo's second term (Hicken, 2009: 195).

Aquino substantively pursued the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. In 2011, the Philippine government entered into negotiations with MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim in Tokyo. The MILF refused the Philippine government's offer to "expand autonomy for the existing Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)⁴² along with an offer of major economic development, a lasting peace accord, and historical acknowledgement of the Muslim struggle" (Castro, 2012: 213). However, the Aquino government did not consequently launch a military campaign against the MILF. Instead, the Philippine government remained willing to continue peaceful negotiations (Castro, 2012: 213). In this

⁴¹ <http://poea.gov.ph/rules/ra8042.pdf>

⁴² The ARMM was created in August 1989. According to the ARMM, Basilan, Lanao De Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi acquired autonomy.

sense, the Aquino government abided by the provision for promoting “peace and stability in the region” (APSC A.1.9). In April 2012 in Kuala Lumpur, the Philippine government (referred to sometimes simply as the GPH) signed the GPH–MILF Decision Points on Principles. According to this document, the Philippines recognised the legal status of the MILF’s autonomy (Castro, 2013: 113). In 2013, the Department of Public Works and Highways in the Philippines government allocated around US\$77 million to Mindanao for infrastructure development in order to expedite the economic integration of Mindanao into the AC (*Manila Times*, August 16, 2013). Chairman of the Mindanao–Development Authority Luwalhati Antonino identified the benefits of this integration: “Growth corridors can spur economic activities in rural areas and urban centers, providing more opportunities for our industries and enabling them to participate in the ASEAN Community through our export gateways” (*Manila Times*, August 16, 2013). In March 2014, the Philippine government and the MILF signed a peace treaty. Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Legal, Political and Security Affairs Marshall Djoko Suyanto commented on the peace agreement:

The national security of each country will contribute hugely to the regional security. The regional security will also have a direct impact to [sic] the other pillars [of the integration] such as the economic pillar and the social cultural pillars that we are trying to build. I totally support and [am] totally grateful also that these [peace] opportunities are leading toward a better [ASEAN community]. (*Manila Times*, February 13, 2014)

The Aquino government also ameliorated tensions between itself and the National Democratic Front (NDF), which had been allied with the CPP-NPA. The Aquino government released some imprisoned communists, and the NDF expressed a willingness to negotiate with the Philippine government (Castro, 2012: 213)—a promising start for both sides’ pursuit of a peace agreement.

The Aquino government pursued the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC—the government addressed the conflicts with the MILF and ameliorated tensions with the communists. Aquino commented on his government’s efforts in this direction:

Included in our work to establish a strong, stable and peaceful ASEAN community is the task of building on the values and best practices of our institutions in addressing intra-, inter- and regional conflicts. (*Inquirer.net*, May 12, 2014)

4.7.3 *Summary*

The Marcos dictatorship, in order to extend its rule, declared martial law in the Philippines, damaging democratic institutions in the country. Armed with martial law, the government became a formidable threat to the people. Presidents Corazon Aquino and Ramos restored democracy and returned a measure of human security to the people, but Estrada's inept assumption of the presidency led to a flood of human insecurity afflicting Filipinos. Arroyo, during her first presidential term, placed the emphasis back on democracy and human security. It is reasonable to say that the Filipino governments' provision of human security to its people exemplifies the concept that I mentioned in chapter two's state actors section (2.1.4.2)—the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to have. Likewise in terms of ASEAN, the more democratic a state's government have been, the more supportive they have been toward the task of developing the APSC. Both Arroyo and Aquino III have regarded this development as a chance for them to consolidate their government, though from different angles. The creation of the APSC from Arroyo's perspective opened up a need for political tactics, and thus, Arroyo's corresponding support was frequently rhetorical. By contrast, Aquino III accepted democracy quite palpably and, thus, supported materially efforts to create the APSC.

4.8 **Singapore**

Since Singaporean independence, the Singaporean government has provided quite robust human security to its people. The new generation of Singaporean leaders, including Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong, have enhanced human rights in the country. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Singaporean government's strategies have been supportive. In this section of my study, I will historically review the human-security situation under Lee Kuan Yew's and Goh Chok Tong's governance. Next, I will explore the strategies that the Singaporean government has adopted in response to the APSC and the motivation underlying the strategies.

4.8.1 *Historical Review: Since Independence in 1965 to 2002*

This historical review will be divided into two parts: the first part discusses the human-security situation under the Lee Kuan Yew government and the second part discusses the human-security situation under the Goh Chok Tong government.

4.8.1.1 *Human Security during the Lee Kuan Yew Period*

After Singaporean independence in 1965 (marking Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia), Lee Kuan Yew ruled Singapore for 25 years. The Lee Kuan Yew government provided robust human security to its people, but like many undemocratic regimes in Southeast Asia during the Cold War period, the Lee Kuan Yew government did not provide adequate human rights to its people.

4.8.1.1.1 *Freedom from Want*

The Lee Kuan Yew government provided quite robust freedom from want to its people. After Singaporean independence in 1965, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew enacted a series of policies directly and indirectly enhancing people's living standards. First, he created a bilingualism policy. Although the original purpose of enacting this language policy was to minimise the Chinese image of chauvinism in Singaporean politics (Tilman and Tilman, 1977: 148), the Singaporeans could still legitimately speak both Chinese and English. Second, the Lee Kuan Yew government created many vocational training plans to enhance labour's productivity through skill enhancement (Rogers, 1972: 174). Third, Lee Kuan Yew believed what a country needed was rigid discipline. Thus, his government created strict laws, such as corporal punishment. These policies have shaped Singapore's reputation as "a safe haven for investment" (Quah, 1984: 184). Many foreign companies have invested in Singapore. Their investment and their establishment of business headquarters in Singapore have brought the country substantial national revenue, many job opportunities for Singaporeans, and rapid economic development (Rogers, 1972: 174).

Like its counterparts in Southeast Asia, post-independence Singapore—specifically under Lee Kuan Yew—limited people's human rights. The Lee Kuan Yew government limited people's freedom of expression. In one instance, executives for *Nanyang Siang Pau* (a major Chinese-language Singaporean newspaper) were detained by the government without trial for allegedly "glorifying China and fomenting Chinese chauvinism" (Rogers, 1972: 175). Lee Kuan Yew also limited people's freedom of political participation. For example, he used libel lawsuits to stifle political opponents whose articles and statements challenged and questioned the Singaporean government. These stiff fines would leave political opponents insolvent and force their departure from Parliamentary positions. In 1986, a key member of the Workers' Party (WP), Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, who had been elected to Parliament from the constituency of Anson, surrendered his seat after losing a libel suit and paying a stiff fine (To, 1987: 243).

4.8.1.1.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Even though Singapore is a multiethnic state comprised of 75% Chinese, 15% Malays, and 10% Indians, ethnic groups have, for the most part, gotten along with each other harmoniously. In addition, although the Singaporean government limited people's human rights, it did not commit any serious violations of human rights or engage in extrajudicial killings. Thus, armed conflicts and significant racial tensions in Singapore involving demographic segments of the population and the government were absent during the government of Lee Kuan Yew.

4.8.1.2 *Human Security under the Goh Chok Tong Period*

In 1990, Lee Kuan Yew relinquished the Prime Minister to Goh Chok Tong. At the time of this transition, Shee Poon Kim predicted that Goh Chok Tong's governance of Singapore would be similar to Lee Kuan Yew's: the country would be run "efficiently and effectively", even though the Goh government, more than its predecessor, would have to face such challenges as growing popular demand for democracy and human rights (Kim, 1991: 173-4). The Goh government encountered domestic popular demands for democracy and human rights, but expanded Singaporeans' human rights.

4.8.1.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

The Goh government continued to maintain high living standards for many Singaporeans. Singapore remained to be the one of the countries providing robust human security to their people—Singapore ranked 25 out of the 177 countries on the 2002 HDI (UNDP, 2004). In addition, the Goh government tried to help poor people in Singapore. For example, the government created the New Singapore Share (NSS) scheme. Under this scheme, the poorest 21% of adults would receive "government bonds providing dividends for a fixed number of year" (Huxley, 2002b: 158).

Although most Singaporeans had tolerated their government's soft-authoritarian governance, election results in the 1980s revealed that some Singaporeans expected the government to support the existence of opposition parties.⁴³ Thus, Prime Minister Goh loosened governmental controls on people's human rights to direct more popular support

⁴³ For example, the PAP government gained 75.5% of the vote in 1980's general election, but in the 1984 election, they garnered only 62.9% of the votes (Chee, 1986: 160).

toward the ruling party, the People's Action Party (PAP). To this end, the Goh government made Hong Lim Park the setting for an area known as the Speaker's Corner, where people could publicly express their opinions relatively freely. Even, demonstrations were accepted, so long as the demonstrators—or presenters for that matter—made sure to register with the Kreta Ayer Neighbourhood Police Post at some point during the thirty days prior to the scheduled event.

4.8.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear

During the Goh government, civil wars and ethnic tension remained absent in Singapore. However, the Goh government engaged in several peacebuilding tasks. Most important among the international activities in which the Singaporean government have been involved are those concerning East Timor. Singapore was the first country to participate in the INTERFET; after the UNTAET succeeded the INERFET, the Singaporean government provided the new effort with medical teams, staff officers, and forty Singaporean police officers; and during the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), the Singaporean government continued to help nation-building in East Timor. In total, the Singaporean government strengthened these efforts with 1,200 personnel, including Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) peacekeepers, Singapore Police Force (SPF) officers, medical logistics support personnel, and staff officers (Singh, 2004).

4.8.2 Exploration of the Singaporean Government's Strategies for the APSC

4.8.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Singaporean Government's Strategies

We know from the historical review that the Singaporean government provided robust human security to its people during the period extending from Lee Kuan Yew's rule to Goh Chok Tong's. Although the Lee Kuan Yew government limited people's human rights, the Goh government expanded Singaporeans' human rights. In August 2004, Lee Hsien Loong became Singapore's third prime minister. Under government, the Singaporeans have continued to enjoy high living standards. In addition, his government has continued to improve domestic human-rights conditions. Since June 2008, for example, his government has allowed people to deliver speeches in the Speakers' Corner without first requiring them to obtain police permits (Rodan, 2005: 141).

Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Lee Hsian Loong government's strategies have been supportive, and the motivation underlying the supportive strategies has been the Singaporean government's desire to reduce the potential negative effects of transnational

security threats. From its independence in 1965 to the early 1990s, Singapore's geographic location between the formidable regional powers of Indonesia and Malaysia constituted a critical inherent vulnerability, as did Singapore's lack of natural resources. Owing to these concerns, the Singaporean government's security perspective was state-centric: minimise the possibility of invasion by neighbouring countries and of regional instability in general. In meeting these challenges, according to Michael Leifer, the Singaporean government secured its foreign policies atop two central pillars. The first pillar has called for active participation in regional multi-lateral bodies, such as ASEAN, and has helped Singapore improve diplomatic relations with its neighbouring countries. The second pillar has called for the establishment of military relations with extra-regional powers, in particular the United States. This pillar has led to improvements in the Singaporean armed forces (Leifer, 2000b: 32-41, 100-8).

However, since the mid-1990s, Singapore has faced various types of threats. From its neighbouring countries, Singapore has had to contend with haze pollution and illegal migration, both of which have contributed to other types of human insecurities, like respiratory ailments and increasing crime rates. Hussin Mutalib argued that Singapore has been vulnerable amidst globalisation. For example, even though ethnic tensions have been notably minor in Singapore, Hussin Mutalib asserted that economic retrogression as posed by the global economic recession would lead to pronounced ethnic tensions, particularly "if the ethnic Malay minority, often occupying a relatively low socio-economic status vis-à-vis other ethnic communities, were to stagnate and be left behind" (Mutalib, 2002: 139). In response to such concerns, the Singaporean government has shifted its security approach from one steeped in the state-centric discourse to one based on "'Total Defence', which encompasses social, economic, psychological and military" element (Mutalib, 2002: 132).

The creation of the APSC has been in line with the Singaporean "Total Defence" concept, because the issues embedded in the APSC blueprint have been the precise issues with which Singapore has had to contend. Thus, the Singaporean government has adopted strategies supportive of the APSC. Lay Hwee Yeo noted how important the APSC is to the Singaporean government is:

As a very small country, the sense of being vulnerable has always been there. So, of course, if the regional environment is good, then that helps Singapore to feel a little bit more secure, but it will never be the case, because the policy-makers have always believed it is in a very challenging environment and it's going to get even more

challenging and volatile for the region. It has always positioned itself to try to make sure that it continues to be active, and to be able to influence developments within ASEAN is very important. That's why it has always tried to tell ASEAN that it must not become too nationalistic in some ways and to tone down some of the rhetoric.⁴⁴

See Seng Tan and Alvin Chew also argued that the Singaporean government needs regional cooperation to satisfactorily address various insecurities besetting Singapore, and the mechanisms facilitative of regional integration (i.e., creation of the AC, ratification of the ASEAN Charter, and creation of the ADMM) have become a catalyst for spurring regional cooperation over various threats—cooperation that would benefit the Singaporean government (Tan and Chew, 2008: 252-7).

4.8.2.2 *The Singaporean Government's Strategies*

4.8.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

The Singaporean government's strategic approach to handling the APSC's freedom-from-want elements has been supportive. The elements that the Singaporean government have supported include combating transnational crime (e.g., terrorism and drug and human trafficking), putting in place disaster-management systems, reducing haze pollution, and narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. Take as an example this last element: in 2013, the Singaporean government declared that it would create national health-care insurance for Singaporeans; and under this health-insurance scheme, people with middle and low income could receive medical subsidies (*Jakarta Post*, August 25, 2013).

Perhaps another element has attracted the most attention from the Singaporean government—reducing transboundary haze pollution. The ASCC blueprint proposed that one approach to ameliorating haze pollution issues would be a general reliance on the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ASEAN, 2009b: 14). However, Indonesia, the main producer of regional haze pollution, has been unwilling to ratify this agreement. The Singaporean government has, in this regard, been exerting nearly constant pressure on the Indonesian government to sign the agreement (*Straits Times*, July 9, 2013). In addition, the Singaporean government has “called for ASEAN to adopt a joint haze monitoring system” that can identify the cause of forest fires through a sharing of satellite data (*Straits Times*, October 8, 2013). Finally, in September 2013, the Indonesian government declared its

⁴⁴ Interview in Singapore, January 16, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei

willingness to sign the Haze Agreement, but insisted that their newfound willingness to was in no way a response to the pressures exerted by the Singaporean government (*Jakarta Post*, September 28, 2013).

4.8.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The Singaporean government has also supported the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. After ASEAN decided to create the APSC by 2015, the Singaporean government has participated in military exercises with other ASEAN states where the purposes were to increase participating countries ability to respond to disasters, whether of natural or human origins. In July 2011, the Singaporean government hosted the ASEAN Militaries' Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHX) with Indonesia. The purpose of launching this exercise was to "enhance ASEAN's capacity and capability to quickly and decisively respond to natural disasters" (MINDEF, July 14, 2011). Joint Operations Brigadier-General's Director Ngien Hoon Ping from the SAF expected that the exercise might contribute to peace and security in Southeast Asia (MINDEF, July 12, 2011). In addition, the Singaporean government successfully held the ASEAN Militaries' HADR Exercise with the Bruneian government in June 2013. During the exercise, the SAF constructed a modular structure that would "serve as a shelter and relief base for casualties and displaced personnel" (MINDEF, June 13, 2013).

4.8.3 *Summary*

As mentioned in chapter 2's section on state actors (2.1.4.2), some states that are politically authoritarian but economically developed have failed to provide adequate human rights to their people, but these same states run little risk that their people will rise up to challenge their respective governments, which—after all—are the sole provider of quite robust human security to the people. Not only Brunei (please see 4.1) but also Singapore fall into this category. Since Singaporean independence in 1965, the Singaporean government, as headed by Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong, and Lee Hsien Loong, has provided its people a high degree of human security. Although the Lee Kuan Yew period witnessed the Singaporean government limit people's human rights, the Goh Chok Tong and the Lee Hsien Loong governments have set Singapore on a path of self-renewal characterised by improvements in the country's human-rights situation. According to the survey in the current study (chapter 3), of the six chosen ASEAN members, Singaporean interviewees constituted the group most satisfied with their government's provision of human security and most confident in their

government's ability to address natural disasters (please see Figure 3.5 and 3.6). The Singaporean government has strategically supported efforts to create the APSC, and the motivation underlying this support has been an understandable desire to reduce the potential negative effects of transnational security threats. Regarding the freedom-from-want element, the Singaporean government has actively addressed haze pollution and regarding the freedom-from-fear element, the Singaporean government has participated in several training exercises related to natural-disaster management and peacekeeping.

4.9 Thailand

After Thai military and civilian officials overthrew the country's absolute monarchy in June 1932,⁴⁵ Thailand became a constitutional monarchy, but the country experienced long-running political turmoil that led to numerous coups d'état. For Thai leaders, their main concern tended to be their regime's stability and continuity rather than people's human security. However, since the May Uprising in 1992, the Thai government has gradually provided adequate human security to its people. As regards efforts to create the APSC, three leaders in Thailand stand out as important players: Thaksin Shinawatra, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and Yingluck Shinawatra. Thaksin's strategic approach to the APSC differed from Abhisit's and Yingluck's. In this section of my study, I will review how the Thai government, in recent decades, has provided human security to the Thai people. Next, I will explore the Thai government's strategic approaches to the APSC and the motivations underlying them.

4.9.1 Historical Review: From 1932 to 2002

The historical-review section comprises two parts. The first part discusses the human-security situation between the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932 and before 1991's Suchinda-led coup. The second part discusses the human-security situation from the uprising in May 1992 to 2002.

4.9.1.1 Historical Review: From 1932 coup to the 1991 Suchinda-Led Coup

During the period stretching from 1932 to 1991,⁴⁶ Thailand experienced significant domestic political turmoil, which triggered numerous coups d'état. When coups were successful, the

⁴⁵ In this coup, military officials replaced the king as the principal ruler of Thailand, but the newly empowered officials still recognised the king as the symbolic spiritual leader of Thailand.

⁴⁶ From 1932 to the early 1970s, Thailand was ruled almost exclusively by military juntas.

usual first action of the new regime was to abrogate the previous constitution and create a new one to strengthen the new leadership's hold on power. To Thai leaders, regime continuity and stability tended to be more important than the diminishment of the insecurities afflicting the wider population. Against this backdrop, the Thai government failed to provide adequate human security to its people.

4.9.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

From 1932 to 1991, Thai people were beset by several human insecurities: inflation coupled with deflationary pressures on the price of rice (Race, 1974: 194, Niksch, 1981: 229), diseases and natural disasters⁴⁷ (Punyaratabandhu-Bhakdi, 1984: 192, Christensen, 1990: 184), illegal logging were among the most prominent problems (Niksch, 1989: 181), high unemployment rate, and limited human rights (Darling, 1974a: 13). However, no Thai leaders provided effective measures to offset these human insecurities.

Thai people protested the Thai government's incompetence. The most serious of these protests were likely the student revolts taking place in 1973 and 1976. Triggers of the 1973 revolt included corruption among government officials, unemployment, the American military presence in Thailand⁴⁸ and government restrictions on human rights. The Thai government adopted hard-line measures to respond to the protesting students. The violent conflict between students and the government led to approximately 65 deaths and 1,000 injuries (Neher, 1975: 1103). King Phumiphon Adulyadet mediated in the conflict, eventually helping to end it.⁴⁹ In 1976, students protested the return to Thailand of ex-Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachornn, who had been forced into exile for his role in the crackdown on the 1973 revolt. The Thai government brutally repressed the protestors. Christie and Roy described the harrowing savagery of the crackdown—"students were burned to death, hanged from trees and shot at point blank range" (Christie and Roy, 2001: 168)

⁴⁷ According to statistics from the ADRC, from 1961 to 1990, natural disasters and related diseases caused the deaths of 2,325 in Thailand. http://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/DB2000_e.html

⁴⁸ Students worried that the American military presence in Thailand might infringe upon Thai sovereignty and, more generally, negatively influence Thai society.

⁴⁹ One consequence of the turmoil was the forced exile of Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachornn, Deputy Prime Minister Praphat Charusathien, and Thanom's son, Colonel Narong Kittikachorn. Sanya Thammasak, who was the rector of Thammasat University and an adviser to the King, created a new civilian government.

4.9.1.1.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The Thai government between 1932 and 1991 failed to provide a modicum of freedom from want to its people living in southern Thailand's Malay Muslim-majority provinces: Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. According to Astri Suhrke, the Thai government placed three general types of restrictions on Malay Muslims in these provinces. The first type of restriction was educational. The Thai government forcibly closed *pondoks* (rural Islamic religious schools), thereby compelling children to attend only Siamese primary schools and to accept a secular education (Suhrke, 1977: 238-9). The second type of restriction was economic. Although southern Thailand possessed abundant natural resources of tin and rubber, Thai Buddhists and Thai Chinese exercised notably disproportionate control over these economic advantages. Local Malay Muslims were unable to share in the benefits, resulting in distinct income inequalities (Suhrke, 1977: 241). The third type of restriction was administrative. Ideally, local officials in any given region should strive to resolve or at least minimise societal difficulties afflicting the local populations. However, most local government officials in the aforementioned southern provinces did not speak Malay, a situation that heightened the mistrust between local people and the government (Suhrke, 1977: 239).

People in these provinces used both radical and moderate methods to attain a degree of freedom from want. And both of these methods led to freedom-from-fear crises in the southern provinces. Radical Muslims closed down schools, kidnapped school teachers, and attacked police stations (Thomas, 1975: 18). Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir, the leader of the Islamic Religious Council in Thailand, adopted a moderate method. He submitted claims to the government describing the southern Malay Muslims' demands. However, his arrest in 1948 preceded his disappearance in 1954, and the Thai government was suspected of having masterminded a plot to remove the Muslim leader from the political scene (Liow, 2006: 29).

4.9.1.2 *Historical Review: From Black May in 1992 to 2002*

In May 1992, Thai people protested the Suchinda government's disregard of democracy, and the subsequent train of events led to the 1997 People's Constitution (Kuhonta, 2008: 377). Meanwhile, conflicts between the Thai government and Islamic separatists in southern Thailand enjoyed a lull.

4.9.1.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

The aforementioned protests that erupted in May 1992⁵⁰ stand in contrast to the 1973 student demonstrations, as most activists participating in the May crisis were middle class. General Suchinda's crackdown on the demonstrators resulted in 52 people dead and 200 people missing (Maisrikrod, 1993: 331-2). The King mediated between the government and the masses once again. Finally, the military regime ceded place to a civilian government in which the prime minister was Anand Panyarachun.

After the uprising, the Thai government prepared to create a new constitution. In 1997, the Thai government ratified the People's Constitution, which led to many political reforms, although critics argued that the document wrongly expanded Thaksin Shinawatra's political power (Kuhonta, 2008). For example, Thailand created independent watchdog agencies, like the Constitutional Court, the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Administrative Court, and the Election Commission. In the period extending from the end of the May bloodshed to 2001 (before Thaksin became Thai Prime Minister), the Thai political system closely approximated democracy, and coups d'état were dormant. Meanwhile, the Thai government paid more attention than in the past to people's human-security issues. In addressing various freedom-from-want issues, the government took several steps, three of which were legislative: the Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act (1996), the Measures in Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children Act (1997), and the Labour Protection Act (1998). In addition, none of the leaders, ranging from Anand Panyarachun, Chuan Leekpai, and Banharn Silpa-archa to Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (a retired general), imposed significant restrictions on people's human rights.

4.9.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

From the late 1980s to early 2002, the Thai government temporarily rescinded its heavy-

⁵⁰ In 1991, supreme commander General Sunthorn Kongsompong, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, Admiral Praphat Krisanachan, and Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rojananil staged a coup against Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. As usual, the constitution was abrogated after the coup. The military junta promised that it would return democracy to the people and hold an election in February 1992. General Suchinda also made the commitment that he would not intervene in politics and would not occupy the position of Prime Minister. After the pro-military coalition failed to nominate Narong Wongwan to the position of Thai Prime Minister (the failure was due chiefly to the nominee's involvement in drug trafficking), the pro-military coalition nominated General Suchinda Kraprayoon for the position of Prime Minister—a position that he secured. This situation enraged Thailand and people staged mass demonstrations in May 1992 against the government.

handed approach toward Islamic activists (Liow, 2006: 27). Thus, some local people enjoyed a brief improvement in their short-term freedom-from-fear situation. However, after Thaksin came into power in 2001, the Thai government reinstated its harsh repressive measures targeting Islamic activists.

4.9.2 Exploration of the Thai Government's Strategies for the APSC

4.9.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Thai Government's Strategies

According to the historical review in this chapter's section on Thailand, we know that the Thai government has gradually improved human security for the Thai people. Given this trend, it is reasonable to wonder, has the Thai government supported or opposed the APSC? And what strategies has the Thai government adopted in response to the creation of the APSC? During the APSC-building process, Thailand had experienced three leaders: Thaksin, Abhisit, and Yingluck.⁵¹ Thaksin's strategies in dealing with the creation of the APSC differed from Abhisit's and Yingluck's, but the motivations underlying these leaders' strategies were similar.

Thaksin's strategies were to ignore the provisions in the APSC blueprints, and the motivation underlying this approach was his desire to consolidate his regime's stability. In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra became Thai Prime Minister, and soon made use of several methods intended to effect regime consolidation. According to Ganesan, adoption of populism was the central method (Ganesan, 2004: 29-30). He generously provided subsidies to the poor in Thailand, such as "debt relief, low-cost health care and development funds" (Montesano, 2002: 94). Thaksin's populist policies helped his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party win the 2005 election and he secured a majority of the cast ballots in the northern and the northeast provinces (Albritton, 2006: 141). The other main method involved the manipulation of democratic institutions. Of particular note was his effort to place close family relations in "independent" watchdog agencies, such as the Constitutional Court and the National Counter Corruption Commission, which the Thai government had created according to the 1997 People's Constitution. Kuhonta argued that Thaksin's interference in independent agencies explains why Thaksin received an acquittal from the Constitutional Court regarding his hidden assets valued at 4.5 billion baht (Kuhonta, 2008: 386). Suppression of dissents was a third common method of which Thaksin availed himself while attempting to consolidate his

⁵¹ Before Abhisit, both Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat were prime ministers in Thailand, but the years they held the position were shorter than one year, in contrast to Abhisit and Yingluck, each of whom remained in power for over two years. This section, therefore, refrains from exploring Samak Sundaravej's and Somchai Wongsawat's strategic approaches to the creation of the APSC.

regime. Thaksin's populism and the harm his actions visited upon Thailand's democracy attracted criticism (Ganesan, 2004: 32). However, Thaksin used various ways to silence voices of opposition. For example, the Thaksin government used the Anti-Money Laundering Office to investigate *the Nation* editors Suthichai Yoon, Thephai Yong, and Sapon Onkgara (Mutebi, 2003: 105). However, the creation of the APSC was an obstacle to Thaksin's pursuit of regime consolidation. The main cause of this obstacle was the APSC's promotion of human rights and democracy, which was inconsistent with Thaksin's version of regime stability. In pursuing political power immune from political criticism, Thaksin failed to adhere to the provisions in the APSC.

Both Abhisit and Yingluck adopted generally supportive strategies in responding to the APSC. The motivations underlying their strategies tended to centre on consolidation of regime stability. Since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thai people have protested against the government when they have experienced a worsening of their human-security objectives, including those pursuant to human rights, democracy, and the economy. The Thai people's demonstrations have led to the downfall and resignation of notable leaders. The May 1992 uprising is a good example of this pattern. The Thaksin regime, owing partly to its effective silencing of challengers, enjoyed considerable immunity from popular expression of discontent. However, mass discontent seemed to have a stronger effect on the Abhisit and Yingluck governments, as suggested by these two leaders' encounters with domestic political turmoil, which took the form of confrontations between pro-Thaksin groups (the Red-Shirt) and anti-Thaksin groups (the Yellow-Shirt) (Dalpino, 2011, Ockey, 2013). Such confrontations led to a degree of regime instability, where a policy misstep might exacerbate ongoing political turmoil. Hoping to avoid an escalation of political turmoil and understandably keen to consolidate regime stability, Abhisit and Yingluck would have had few choices but to strategically support the creation of the APSC.

4.9.2.2 *The Thai Government's Strategies*

4.9.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

In order to consolidate his regime's stability, Thaksin did not adhere to the provisions in the APSC blueprint. For example, he limited people's freedom of expression. Before Thailand's participation in the 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference, the Thai government prohibited human-rights activists' arrival in Thailand and threatened them with arrest if they or their colleagues attempted to launch protests (Mutebi, 2004: 79).

It should be noted that in 2003, Thaksin launched "war on drugs." The spirit of this

campaign was in line with one of the targets in the APSC: a drug-free ASEAN by 2015 (ASEAN, 2009a: 12). However, Thaksin “authorised the police to use ‘extreme measures’” to combat illicit drugs, and as a consequence, many people were arrested without due process and killed in plain violation of basic civil rights (Mutebi, 2004: 80-1, Ganesan, 2004: 31-2). These facts suggest that Thaksin failed to consider the human-rights element in the APSC when launching this campaign.

Likewise, in order to consolidate regime stability, the Abhisit and Yingluck governments supported the creation of the APSC. Consider, for example, the events of 2009, when Abhisit was preparing for Thailand’s assumption of the 14th ASEAN Chairmanship: domestic political confrontation reached its apex in Thailand due to conflict between the Red shirt and the Yellow shirt. At one point, Pro-Thaksin demonstrators employed violence to unrail the ASEAN Summit, which was held in March 2009. According to Kitti Prasirtsuk, this incident “severely tarnished Thailand’s reputation” and placed pressure on the Abhisit government to solve the conflicts (Prasirtsuk, 2010: 204-5). There is a good reason to conclude, therefore, that the Abhisit government supported the creation of the APSC, in particular the human-rights element, because the supportive strategies might help his regime avert further domestic political turmoil capable of jeopardising Abhisit’s rule. For example, the Abhisit government supported the creation of the AICHR and moreover, the Abhisit government was among the few ASEAN members to be transparent in the process of selecting the AICHR’s representative (*The Nation*, December 14, 2009).

Yingluck Shinawatra came to power in August 2011. She also experienced political confrontation on the domestic front. For example, Yingluck prepared to reconcile domestic political turmoil by granting amnesty to political prisoners which would have benefited the ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra, in exile since 2006. Her reconciliation plan led to political confrontations between the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts straining the Yingluck regime’s stability (Ockey, 2013: 129-30). In order to avoid other political turmoil, the Yingluck government supported the creation of the APSC. During the APSC-building process, Yingluck empowered domestic women, a goal that has been a major target of the ASCC (Provision A.16) (ASEAN, 2009b: 5, 12). In order to “prepare Thai women for the ASEAN Community” (The Government Public Relations Department, December 6, 2012), the Yingluck government specifically created the National Development Fund for Women. According to this project, women can acquire low-interest or even zero-interest loans, while the fund itself “will be used to develop their [women’s] occupations, generate employment and income, promote their welfare, ease their problems, and enhance the potential of

women's networks" (The Government Public Relations Department, December 6, 2012).

4.9.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Thaksin did not adhere to the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. After Thaksin's rise to political power, confrontation between the Thai government and Muslim secessionists intensified. On April 28, 2004, Muslims, mostly youths, attacked police stations, checkpoints and military installations throughout Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala. This wave of violence led to many deaths (108 militants and 5 police and military officials) and to the creation of a refugee population in Malaysia (Liow, 2006: 36, Funston, 2010: 242). The most severe confrontation between the Thai government and Muslims was in the historic Krisek (Krue Se) Mosque in Pattani. After attacking police and military posts, a group of Muslims returned to the Krisek Mosque. The Thai government lay siege to the building, with the ensuing violence eventually claiming 32 militants lives (Liow, 2006: 37). Tensions between the government and the Muslim community continued unabated, and after a few months, another violent incident took place, this time in Tak Bai: police killed seven protestors in front of a police station and detained many other protesters and sent them to the Inkayit Military Camp in Pattani Province. Seventy-five people died of suffocation during the journey (Funston, 2010: 243).

At the 2004 ASEAN Summit, Malaysia and Indonesia attempted to discuss the unrest in southern Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin threatened to leave the summit if members treated the issue as an item on the ASEAN agenda (Weatherbee, 2005: 160). However, the 2004 ASEAN summit was important for the APSC, because ASEAN planned to issue the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action. Thaksin's attitude to domestic freedom-from-fear problem suggested that creation of the APSC was not among his leading priorities.

The Abhisit and Yingluck governments supported the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. Indeed, during the Abhisit and Yingluck periods, sporadic conflicts in southern Thailand broke out. However, neither of the leaders reacted with repressive measures. In addition, both Abhisit and Yingluck has been a participant in freedom-from-fear meetings. For example, the Abhisit government was represented at the 2nd ADMM, which adopted the Three-Year Work Program (2008-2010), whose target was to create the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network. The Yingluck government participated in the 5th ADMM which adopted the Concept Paper on the Establishment of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network (ASEAN, May 19, 2011). Both Abhisit and Yingluck supported further cooperation in regional peacekeeping affairs.

4.9.3 *Summary*

From 1932 to 1991, Thailand experienced repeated cycles of political struggle and coups d'état. During this period, the Thai government tended to be more concerned about regime viability than about people's human security. Thus, the Thai government failed to provide adequate human security to its people. After the popular uprising in May 1992, the government provided substantially improved freedom from want to its people, and conflicts in southern Thailand dipped into a lull. Regarding the creation of the APSC, Thailand experienced the Thaksin, Abhisit, and Yingluck governments. Thaksin's strategies for dealing with the creation of the APSC differed from Abhisit's and Yingluck's: Thaksin did not adhere to the provisions in the APSC; by contrast, Abhisit and Yingluck supported the creation of the APSC. However, the motivations underlying the diverse strategies of these three leaders were fairly uniform: consolidate regime stability. However, violent political upheaval in Thailand may not come to a resolution anytime soon, as Yingluck was ousted just recently, in late May 2014, by her political opponents. Thus, whether the Thai government will continue to support the APSC is a matter of speculation

4.10 **Vietnam**

After the Vietnamese reunification in 1976, the Vietnamese government failed to provide adequate human security to its people. In 1986, the Vietnamese government adopted a market economy, which has ameliorated people's hardships. In addition, the Vietnamese government has maintained political and social stability. Thus, Vietnam has been considered the most stable country among ASEAN's newcomers, in contrast to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. However, after adoption of liberal economy, the Vietnamese government has failed to provide adequate human security to its people and continued to limit people's human rights. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Vietnamese government has been lack of genuine support. In this section, I will historically review the human security under the Vietnamese government from 1976 to 2002. The next section will analyse the Vietnamese government's strategic approach to the creation of the APSC

4.10.1 *Historical Review: From 1976 to 2002*

The historical review of Vietnam is divided into two sections. The first section discusses human security under the Vietnamese government from 1976 (the reunification of Vietnam) to 1985 (the year before Vietnam's adoption of the Đổi Mới reforms). The second section

discusses human security under the Vietnamese government from 1986 (the year of Vietnam's adoption of the *Đổi Mới* reforms) to 2002.

*4.10.1.1 From 1976 to 1985 (Before the *Đổi Mới* Reforms)*

After the reunification of Vietnam in 1976, the Vietnamese government followed Marxist-Leninist doctrine, adopting a centrally planned economy. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese government initiated an invasion of Kampuchea which consumed the Vietnamese government's available financial resources. In these circumstances, the Vietnamese government failed—and indeed was probably unable—to make satisfactory inroads against human insecurities besetting the Vietnamese people.

4.10.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

During this period, the Vietnamese government's ineptitude imposed human insecurities on its people. Vietnam faced serious economic problems, including high unemployment rates, food shortages, spiraling inflation, and trade deficits (Niehaus, 1979: 86). These problems created or greatly exacerbated people's hardship. In Ho Chi Minh City, "some 300,000 families were living under extremely adverse conditions, with 120,000 houses lacking electricity, 195,000 having no water, and 120,000 with no toilet facilities; 70,000 people were living on one square mile of land in the Cholon district" (Esterline, 1987: 93-4). However, the Vietnamese government failed to address these problems, instead creating inept policies that served chiefly to compound people's hardships. For example, the Vietnamese government adopted a collectivisation programme, permitting the government to confiscate people's businesses and belongings. In addition, in 1977, the Vietnamese government created the New Economic Zone. According to this policy, the government would relocate people to uncultivated areas prone to outbreaks of famine and disease. Both of these inept policies did little or nothing to resolve people's hardships while forcing large numbers of people to become refugees (Niehaus, 1979: 86-7).

The Vietnamese government has also restricted people's human rights. Since reunification in 1976, the government has adopted a one-party political system, granting total control over Vietnam to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). In keeping with this authoritarian approach, the government has eliminated any potential threats to its viability, arresting and intimidating leaders of Islamic, Catholic, and Buddhist organisations (McWilliams, 1983: 67). In addition, the Vietnamese government forced people whose ideology was not in line with Marxism-Leninism to re-education camps. According to

Douglas Pike, from 1975 to 1977, about 2.5 million Vietnamese were forcibly re-educated (Pike, 1978: 72). People whom the government released from camps found themselves still without human rights. McWilliams noted that these people were under government surveillance and met with discrimination when seeking a job or an education (McWilliams, 1983: 67).

4.10.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

The Vietnamese government adopted a hard-line approach to armed insurgency movements. After North Vietnam reunited with South Vietnam in 1976, the Vietnamese government restricted human rights within the expanded borders. The victims included Christian Montagnards, an ethnic minority living in the Central Highlands. The Vietnamese government restricted their freedom of religion, took their lands, relocated and arrested them, and did not grant them the autonomy that Hồ Chí Minh had promised them during the Vietnam War period (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 16-20). The United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (*Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées*, FULRO), which was established by Montagnards in 1964 in association with the U.S. government's war against North Vietnamese communists (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 9), fought to obtain human security. The Vietnamese government responded with brutal repression. According to Human Rights Watch's report, between 1975 and 1979, about 8,000 Montagnards were killed or arrested by the Vietnamese government (Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, 2012: 7).

4.10.1.2 From the Establishment of Đổi Mới in 1986 to 2002

In the late Cold War period, the Vietnamese government adopted a market economy which enhanced the Vietnamese economy and ameliorated people's low living standards. In 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN, an event that essentially ended that country's isolation in the international community. However, the Vietnamese government failed to address several pressing types of human insecurities and while continuing to limit Vietnamese people's human rights.

4.10.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

In 1986, the Party's sixth national congress initiated *Đổi Mới* the function of which was to attract foreign investments capable of boosting Vietnam's benighted economy. After the Vietnamese government adopted a market economy, GDP in Vietnam increased from average of 6.5% annually between 1986 and 1995 to an average of 7.33% annually between 1996 and

2005.⁵² Meanwhile, poverty rates in Vietnam dropped from 1992–1993’s 58% to 2002’s 29% (Luong, 2006: 151).

However, several human insecurities in the freedom-from-want area emerged alongside the economic development. The first was environmental devastation. According to the UNDP’s survey, 375,000 acres of forest in Vietnam were annually destroyed and exploited by foreign investors (Goodman, 1995: 96). Economic growth also led to a development gap. Living conditions in rural areas were characterised by unrepaired roads and a lack of infrastructure and access to clean water (Goodman, 1995: 96). Meanwhile, human and drug trafficking, exploitation of children and women, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and land-grabbing by the Vietnamese government were worsening (Sidel, 1998: 82-3, 87). However, the Vietnamese government failed to address these human insecurities, not least of all because some Vietnamese officials were heavily involved in some of the most egregious criminal activities, like drug trafficking (Sidel, 1998: 82) and land-grabbing.

In addition, the Vietnamese government limited people’s human rights. For example, In the 2000s, the Vietnamese government arrested Dr. Nguyễn Đan Quế and former military official Nguyễn Khắc Toàn. Both of them had passed domestic human-rights information to the United States (Hung, 2004: 303). Hung argued that for the Vietnamese government, “the campaign against political dissent was more successful than the fight against corruption” (Hung, 2004: 306).

4.10.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear

The Vietnamese government still adopted a hard-line approach to Montagnards. FULRO surrendered to UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992, but the Vietnamese government believed that remnants of FULRO were still agitating for independence from Vietnam. Thus, the Vietnamese government continuously repressed Montagnards. In the Central Highlands, the Vietnamese government destroyed churches, which had symbolised the Montagnards’ religious convictions (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 61), and arrested people who practiced their religious activities. In 2001, Montagnards protested against the creation of the economic-defence zones, which had led to land-grabbing problem, but the Vietnamese government deployed its military to quell the protests (Guan, 2002: 349).

The Vietnamese government adopted a moderate method for establishing peace with the Montagnards. Secretary-General Nông Đức Mạnh called for “local officials to work

⁵² <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=5>

closely with tribal leaders” and “he directed that ethnic minorities be given access to educational opportunities and that recruitment of ethnic minorities for government service be stepped up” (Thayer, 2002: 86). In addition, according to Ang Cheng Guan, the Vietnamese government legalised Montagnards use of their own language, provided subsidies to poor farmers, and pledged to develop the regions’ economy (Guan, 2002: 349). However, unrest re-emerged in 2004. Even though the Vietnamese government’s economic liberalisation improved people’s living standards, Margot Cohen argued that the Montagnards problem was striking evidence of the Vietnamese government’s failure to address the issues of “land rights, ethnic-minority status, religious freedom, and political autonomy” (Cohen, 2001: 25).

4.10.2 *Exploration of the Vietnam Government’s Strategies for the APSC*

4.10.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Vietnamese Government’s Strategies*

As discussed in the above historical review, the Vietnamese government domestically has improved people’s living standards by initiating economic liberalisation, but has failed to address human insecurities and has continued to impose on the Vietnamese people’s human rights. Regarding the APSC, which—once operational—is slated to address human-security issues and improve human rights, a question critical to this study arises: has the Vietnamese government supported or opposed it?

The Vietnamese government’s strategies for responding to the creation of the APSC have centred on rhetorical support for human rights, freedom-from-fear objectives, and the like; and the motivations underlying the strategies have centred on regime consolidation. Since Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN got underway in 1995, the country’s membership in the association has provided the government several tangible benefits. Jörn Dosch argued that the Vietnamese government gained three “golden opportunities” from its membership in ASEAN: ASEAN was a bridge permitting the Vietnamese government to play noteworthy roles in international affairs, including first and foremost participation in the international organisation of ASEAN itself; ASEAN could counterbalance China’s rising influence in Southeast Asia; and Vietnam could improve its relationships with other ASEAN members (Dosch, 2006: 241-6). Dosch also noted that this “golden opportunity” has become a “golden cage,” because the Vietnamese government has found that, with the exception of the non-interference principle, ASEAN’s *modus operandi*—the ASEAN way—has been unable to prevent unilateral Chinese actions in the South China Sea (Dosch, 2006: 247-50). However, I argued that ASEAN has remained a cornerstone in Vietnamese diplomacy, because the Vietnamese government has needed ASEAN members’ cooperation to ameliorate the

negative effects of natural disasters, environmental pollution, and transnational crimes. For example, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Cao Đức Phát declared, “The ASEAN Community must cooperate more profoundly at all levels to promote sustainable forest management and development. The use of forest land for hydro-power plants, roads and agricultural production had reduced the quality and quantity of natural forests...ASEAN members should raise their voices over trans-border forest protection” (*VietNamNet*, June 29, 2012). In addition, the Vietnamese government has been a stalwart supporter of the principle of non-interference (Dosch, 2006: 246), because the principle of non-interference has remained a shield with which the Vietnamese government has warded off criticism from the international community regarding human-right violations in Vietnam.

Not all is consonant in this arrangement, however, as a development gap has emerged between Vietnam and ASEAN: owing mainly to democratic members’ efforts, ASEAN has gradually expanded its focus on issues pertaining to human rights and democracy, whereas Vietnam has remained undemocratic and has been slow to improve its human-rights record. According to Freedom House, in 2002 Vietnam made the organisation’s list of “not free” countries, a list that Vietnam remained on in 2012.⁵³ As mentioned in chapter two, non-democratic regimes’ viability rests on their ability to control the domestic population and society. ASEAN’s creation of the APSC, by contrast, embodies an elevated respect for and promotion of human rights, something that is out line with the Vietnamese government’s approach to regime consolidation. Thus, if it were to extend genuine support to the APSC, the Vietnamese government would quite likely undermine its viability. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, ASEAN has been a cornerstone for the Vietnamese government’s interests. This curious aggregation of circumstances has resulted in a situation where the Vietnamese governments’ rhetorical support for human-rights and freedom-from-fear element in the APSC has tended to be the most suitable strategy through which the government can thus deal with the APSC: the Vietnamese government perhaps can avoid seriously damaging viability while nevertheless benefiting from membership in ASEAN. The irony of course is that, because its strategies have been rhetorical, the Vietnamese government has continued to limit human rights and repress ethnic minorities.

⁵³ <http://freedomhouse.org/>

4.10.2.2 *The Vietnamese Government's Strategies*

4.10.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

The Vietnamese government has displayed its rhetorical support for the APSC's freedom-from-want element, in particular in human-rights issues. During the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng stated that Vietnam was not ready to accept the ASEAN Charter's enshrinement of human-rights provisions (*The Star*, July 31, 2007). After a few months, at the 13th ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Dũng said that "Vietnam welcomes approval of ASEAN Charter" (VietNam-UN.Org, November 27, 2007). Finally, the Vietnamese government ratified the ASEAN Charter in March 2008. In addition, in 2009, the Vietnamese government expressed their support to creation of the regional human-rights body (VietNam-UN.Org, February 3, 2009). Moreover, Prime Minister Dũng "welcomed ASEAN's adoption of an ASEAN Statement on Human Rights—the first political document of the group that looks to enhance human rights cooperation in the region. It will adhere to goals and principles outlined in the ASEAN Charter, and contribute to materializing the people-centred ASEAN community" (*VietNamNet*, November 19, 2012).

Carlyle Thayer argued that in recent years, the growth of domestic dissidents despite state repression has put the Vietnamese government under pressure (Thayer, 2009: 17-22). General Secretary Lê Khả Phiêu expressed the Vietnamese government's position on the development of human rights and democracy in his country:

Vietnamese people had only one desire, the path to national independence and socialism [and] only under the leadership of the Community Party of Vietnam could that goal be reached. Our people won't allow any political power sharing with any other forces. Any idea to promote "absolute democracy," to put human rights above sovereignty, or support multiparty or political pluralism...are lies and cheating. (cited from Hung, 2000: 104)

Thus, the Vietnamese government, in order to ensure its regime's viability, has not genuinely developed human-rights elements in the APSC. Regarding the creation of the human-rights body, the Vietnamese government insisted that the body must rest on the principle of non-interference (VietNam-UN.Org, February 3, 2009), and this insistence points to Vietnamese government's preference of a human-rights body without teeth. In addition, the Vietnamese government, although it ratified the ASEAN Charter, has regularly violated human rights domestically, for example arresting Vietnamese people who openly or even

privately pursue human security. In June 2011, writer Trần Khải Thanh Thủy was arrested by the government because he supported implementation of a multi-party system (*Jakarta Post*, June 25, 2011).

4.10.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Regarding the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC, the Vietnamese government followed through with its rhetorical support for certain ideals. In 2010, the Vietnamese government welcomed UN independent experts to Vietnam, where they could witness the improving living standards of Montagnards (*VietNamNet*, March 2, 2011). The Vietnamese government's invitation seemed to be in line with the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. However, according to Ms. Gay McDougall, the UN independent expert invited by the Vietnamese government to visit Montagnards' areas of residence, everything she observed had been arranged calculatedly: people who met Ms. McDougall uniformly reiterated that the Vietnamese government did not repress them and Vietnamese officials followed her everywhere she set foot in Vietnam (Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, 2012: 7). The Vietnamese government, in truth, has continued to repress Montagnards. In 2010, the Vietnamese government arrested many Montagnards and accused them of "seeking to revive FULRO sympathies and illegal worship" (Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, 2012: 17).

4.10.3 *Summary*

From Vietnam's reunification in 1976 to the period directly preceding the Vietnamese government's adoption of *Đổi Mới*, the Vietnamese government failed to provide adequate human security to its people. After launching *Đổi Mới*, the Vietnamese government improved people's living standards but failed to address human insecurities and limited human rights. In order to ensure its regime's viability, the Vietnamese government has strategically adopted rhetorical support, which can help the Vietnamese government continue to gain advantages from ASEAN and to consolidate its regime.

4.11 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter

4.11.1 *What Are Barriers to the Creation of the APSC?*

Having explored not only each ASEAN member's strategies for handling the creation of the APSC but also the motivations underlying the strategies, we can roughly divide the members' strategies into two categories: support for the creation of the APSC and non-support of the creation of the APSC (please see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

The members supporting the creation of the APSC are ASEAN's founding states and Brunei (please see Table 4.1). The commonality among these members is that their governments support a measurable degree of substantive democracy. Although failing to provide adequate human security to their people, the post-reform governments in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (to a lesser extent during Thaksin's rule) have started addressing domestic human insecurities, including freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues. This situation reflects the concept I mentioned in chapter two's section on state actors (2.1.4.2): the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to have. Although Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore are soft authoritarian members, governments' self-renewal has ensured the extension of tangible human security to each nation's population. Both pro-democracy and soft authoritarian members have regarded the creation of the APSC as an opportunity to enhance their own influence in ASEAN (see Indonesia and Malaysia), to address human insecurities (see Brunei and Singapore), to promote regime consolidation (see the Philippines and Thailand), and to develop the domestic economy (see Brunei). These members have achieved several targets in the APSC blueprint: the language of human rights and democracy has been embodied in the aforementioned blueprint, the ASEAN Charter itself, the creation of the AICHR and the AIPR, and reconciliation between GAM and the Indonesian government and between the MILF and the Filipino government.

The group of non-supportive states tells its own story. This group comprises CLMV, all of which are countries that joined ASEAN in the 1990s. It is reasonable to say that these members, before joining ASEAN, were a source of threats to domestic populations. Famine, malnutrition, contagious diseases, refugees, massacre, and government crackdowns were common threats in these ASEAN members and each of these threats was attributable at least in part to government malfeasance. In the late 1980s, although the Myanmar government was still failing to provide human security to its people, Laos and Vietnam adopted economic liberalisation and subsequently improve their respective domestic populations' living standards. In neighbouring Cambodia, the UN conducted peacekeeping operations with the effect of restoring peace there. However, these relatively new ASEAN members have failed to address their domestic human insecurities and continue to limit their own people's human rights. Indeed, a prominent commonality among these members is that their governments have been reluctant to accept democracy. Thus, according to the concept that I mentioned in chapter two's state-actors section (2.1.4.2), a regime's viability is based on the regime's tight control of the domestic population and the country's society as a whole and on unvarnished

repression of secessionist movements. Unlike ASEAN's pro-democratic members, the CLMV quadrumvirate have regarded the creation of the APSC as a risk to their respective regimes' viability, because provisions of promoting human rights and democracy might encourage the growth of domestic political dissent, CSOs, and human-rights activism. Thus, we can see that CLMV's strategies have functioned to undermine the human-rights element, to rhetorically support the human-rights element (as well as freedom-from-fear goals), or a combination of the two.

Table 4.1 Strategies and motivations of ASEAN members supporting the creation of the APSC

Members	Strategies	Motivations
Brunei	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the creation of the APSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diversify domestic economy • Address transnational threats
Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the creation of the APSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-enhance its leadership in ASEAN
Malaysia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the creation of the APSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve its influence in ASEAN
Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the creation of the APSC (Arroyo's presidency excepted) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidate regime
Singapore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the creation of the APSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Address transnational threats
Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the creation of the APSC (Thaksin prime minister excepted) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidate regime

Source: Author's own compilation

CLMV's lack of genuine support for the creation of the APSC has become a barrier to ASEAN's creation of the APSC. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand supported the creation of the AICHR. Vietnam also expressed its support in this direction, but insisted that the AICHR be based on the principle of non-interference. Finally, ASEAN created the AICHR in 2009, yet the AICHR's terms of reference clearly state that "the AICHR shall be guided by the principle of the non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states" (ASEAN, October 2009: 4). Thus, the AICHR has been nothing more than a regional human-rights body that, limited to promoting people's human rights, is wholly incapable of protecting them.

Table 4.2 Strategies and motivations of ASEAN members not supporting the creation of the APSC

Members	Strategies	Motivations
Cambodia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hinder CSOs' participation in the APSC-building process • Support the principle of non-interference 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidate regime
Laos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undermine such provisions in the APSC as pertain to human rights and freedom from fear 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidate regime
Myanmar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rhetorically support the creation of the APSC (before Myanmar's adoption of political reform at the end of 2010) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidate regime
Vietnam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rhetorically support human-rights elements and freedom-from-fear initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidate regime

Source: Author's own compilation

Division among ASEAN's member-states has created the potential for a crisis. According to Barry Desker, ASEAN's slow drift toward people-oriented targets has led to the concern that "Indonesia might withdraw from ASEAN" (cited from Collins, 2013: 157). Some Indonesian scholars, such as Rizal Sukma, have similarly argued that "ASEAN is too small for Indonesia, because Indonesia is now a G20 member, it's a middle power and the largest Muslim country in the world.... ASEAN is such a frustrating experience, because it's moving slowly."⁵⁴ Indonesia's withdrawal from ASEAN is unlikely to occur (Collins, 2013: 157), at least in the immediate years ahead, but Indonesia's role in ASEAN should be to help cultivate ASEAN into a regional organisation that attends substantively to Southeast Asians' safety and living standards. Indonesian frustration suggests that the non-democratic group's resistance to sensitive issues has remained defiant, which does not bode well for a people-oriented APSC.

⁵⁴ Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu, Ta-Wei.

CHAPTER 5 STATE ACTORS II: EXTERNAL POWERS

Australia, China, Japan, and the United States have been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues since the 1950s. As mentioned in chapter two's state actors section (2.1.4.2), states that are involved in human-security issues have their motivations. The motivations underlying these countries' involvement in Southeast Asia have been various, including the desire to improve their own regional influence, to expand an ideology they support, and to protect their own people's human security. Different motivations have engendered different results. Some countries' involvement has improved Southeast Asian people's human security, but some countries' involvement has created human insecurities. Also regarding the creation of the APSC, external powers have had their own motivations. In chapter five, I will analyse the strategies of four external powers—Australia, China, Japan, and the United States—and their underlying motivations. In the conclusion, I will explore whether these countries' involvement in the creation of the APSC has helped tear down or erect barriers to the APSC.

5.1 Australia

Since the 1950s, the Australian government has been involved in human-security issues in Southeast Asia. The Australian government has helped Southeast Asian countries address several freedom-from-want issues and participated in and contributed to freedom-from-fear efforts. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Australian government has continued to play an important role helping ASEAN to create the APSC. In this section, I will review why and how the Australian government has responded historically to regional human-security issues and explore what the Australian government's strategic response has been to the creation of the APSC and how the Australian government has implemented this strategy

5.1.1 *Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002*

The historical review section here is divided into two parts. These two parts discuss how and why the Australian government was involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The time-frame in the first part extends from the 1950s to 1989 and in the second part from 1990 to 2002.

5.1.1.1 *From the 1950s to 1989*

During this period, the main motivation underlying Australian government's involvement in human-security issues in Southeast Asia was opposition to communist expansion. The

Australian government was worried that expansion of communism in Southeast Asia would affect the safety of Australian national security. The Australian government's approaches to preventing communist expansion generally divided along two lines: (1) engagement in multi-lateral cooperative development programmes providing economic and social assistance to Australia's neighbouring countries and (2) participation in wars between the capitalist and communist blocs. The second approach gradually lost favour as American military forces haphazardly began reducing their presence in South Vietnam in the early 1970s, as formalised in 1969 by the Nixon administration.

5.1.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

The Colombo Plan was a multi-lateral development programme that the Australian government engaged in providing economic and social assistance to Southeast Asia (Alves, 1993: 522). At a conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers, held in Colombo from January 9 to 15, 1950, Australian Minister for External Affairs Percy C. Spender, along with Ceylonese Finance Minister J.R. Jayawardence, proposed economic and technical assistance to under-developed states, including Ceylon, India, Pakistan, and such British colonies as Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei. This effort was the so-called Colombo Plan. Many scholars noted that the purpose of the Australian government's participation in the Colombo Plan was to prevent the spread of communism to Australia and its neighbours through an improvement in people's living standards (Ward, 1951: 199, Varma, 1974: 202-3, James, 1955: 41). Spender's proposal was supported by members of the Australian parliament (Varma, 1974: 202-5). Early on in the implementation of the Colombo Plan, Australian assistance extended only to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, but after the new participants joined the Colombo Plan, whether as aid donors like the United States (1951) and Japan (1954) or as aid recipients like Laos (1951), Burma (1952), Indonesia (1953), and the Philippines (1954), Australian donations expanded to all beneficiary countries (James, 1955: 29). The areas of assistance included agriculture (irrigation and power production), transport, communications, social services (housing, health, and education), and industry and mining. By the end of 1954, Australian donations amounted to A\$17.8 million, while the country had been devoting many experts and much equipment to the task of developing technology in the aforementioned areas and countries (Varma, 1974: 196). Although the Colombo Plan met with a degree of suspicion from recipient countries,⁵⁵ some Southeast Asians' living standards

⁵⁵ For example, some politicians in beneficiary areas, such as Malaya and Singapore, doubted the explicitly

improved. For example, some recipients enjoyed increased rice production and increased construction of roads, hospitals, houses, and schools (Blackton, 1951: 29, Symon, 1952: 193).

5.1.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

The Australian government's involvement in freedom-from-fear issues in Southeast Asia was driven by the same motivation: halt and turn back potential and real advance of communism. Against this backdrop, Australia's Liberal Country Party government sent troops to Vietnam, where between 1964 and 1972, over 50,000 Australian troops served (Cheeseman, 1994: 248). The Vietnam War resulted in heavy casualties throughout the divided region and produced massive refugee flows. However, after the American pullout from Vietnam in the 1970s, the Australian government adopted an anti-war policy. For example, the Australian government publicly condemned that American bombing of Hanoi after the U.S. government decided to pull out from Vietnam. The Minister for Overseas Trade and Secondary Industry Jim Cairns issued scathing remarks on the matter, characterising the bombing policy as "the act of one man [i.e., U.S. President Nixon] insensible to world opinion" and "the most brutal, indiscriminate slaughter of defenceless men, women and children in living memory" (Ingleson, 1980: 293).

After the American pullout from Vietnam in the 1970s, the Australian government helped ASEAN address Indochinese refugees' problems. Early on, the Australian government was unwilling to accept the resettlement of Indochinese refugees in Australia itself (Ravenhill, 1998: 277). After negotiating with ASEAN members (Ravenhill, 1998: 277), the Australian government accepted refugees and donated US\$3.4 million to the UN Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and the International Red Cross (Ingleson, 1980: 296).

5.1.1.2 From 1990 to 2002

After the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989, the Australian government remained involved in human-security issues in Southeast Asia, but the Australian government's main motivation shifted from fighting communism to promoting its human-security policy in the international community. Since the 1990s, leaders like Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991-1996) and Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) have gradually

declared motivations of donor states. From the perspective of these wary politicians, the real motivation was exploitation of recipients' raw materials (Varma, 1974: 205-6).

enshrined the human-security concept in the Australian government's overall foreign-policy platform (Camilleri, 2012). With these trends in mind, we can observe how the Australian government has engaged in Southeast Asian human-security issues, including the creation of human-development programmes and participation in peacekeeping tasks.

5.1.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

Since the end of the Cold War, the Australian government has actively provided assistance around the world to communities afflicted by human insecurities. Anthony Burke argued that the Australian government integrates its “homeland security, defence policy, and international security diplomacy into a working whole, anchors them in a core commitment to human security” and consider human security “a fundamental goal” in Australian security policy (Burke, 2012). In this context, the Australian government has provided assistance to several countries, including countries in Southeast Asia. For example, the Australian government has addressed specifically the problem of HIV-transmission rates in Southeast Asia. In July 2002, the Australian government created the Asia Regional HIV/AIDS Project (ARHP) to mitigate the transmission of HIV/AIDS. The participants in this project were Myanmar, Vietnam, and China (Yunnan and Guangxi Provinces). The Australian government provided financial assistance (A\$15.8 million), educational activities, and training to health officers in these targeted countries (December 2007: Australian Government). In addition, the Australian government has helped clear Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in Laos. The Australian government has provided A\$20 million and conducted UXO clearance, has assisted UXO victims through the provision of prosthetics and orthotics (Australian Government, 2010: 3). The Australian government's assistance was substantive, as attested to by Laos' Director of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO / Mine Action Sector Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune:

Australia is one of the key sponsors of the First Meeting of the State Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. We are extremely grateful to the Australian Government for this, as well as for its longstanding support to the UXO Sector in the Lao PDR. Australian aid to key actors of the UXO Sector has enabled the development of qualitative and innovative initiatives in terms of clearance, risk education, victim assistance and advocacy. We believe that these initiatives are essential to help the Lao PDR to implement its new obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. (Australian Government, 2010: 1)

5.1.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

From 1990 to 2002, the Australian government's human-security policy manifested itself in freedom-from-fear issues. Katsumi Ishizuka argued that the motivation underlying the Australian government's involvement in peacekeeping operations was to maintain the country's "status as a middle power" (Ishizuka, 2006: 152).

The Australian government has engaged in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues: peacekeeping tasks in Cambodia and East Timor. The Australian government's provision of manpower to peacekeeping missions in Cambodia merit special attention. Between 1991 and 1992, the Australian government provided 65 Army Communicators to the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), and after the creation of UNTAC, the Australian government provided 480 military personnel to UNTAC's Force Communications Unit (Londey, 2004: 169, 173).

In the case of East Timor, the Australian government provided significant assistance. After the UN-supervised independence referendum was held in East Timor in August 1999, where over 78% of the vote supported independence, thousands of East Timorese, in particular those supporting the independence of East Timor, were slaughtered by the TNI in Dili. The Howard government in Australia paid considerable attention to the problem of East Timor, even though the Indonesian government strongly rejected the Australian government's role as a leader in peacekeeping tasks (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005b: 132). Australia led the INTERFET, which involved participants from Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, their chief mission being to conduct peace-keeping operations in East Timor. Australia provided 5,500 personnel, a number that was far more than the sum of personnel, 2,464, from all other ASEAN participants (Dupont, 2000: 167). After the UNSC established UNTAET on October 25, 1999, the Australian government assigned 2,000 personnel to UNTAET (Ishizuka, 2006: 156).

5.1.2 *Exploration of the Australian Government's Strategies for the APSC*

5.1.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Australian Government's Strategies*

According to the above historical review, we know that the Australian government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues since the 1950s. Has the Australian government continued to be involved in the creation of the APSC whose spirit has been people-oriented? If yes, what strategies has the Australian government has adopted in response to the creation of the APSC? And what motivations have underlain these strategies?

Since ASEAN's decision to create the APSC, the Australian government has provided its assistance to ASEAN. I argue that the Australian government's strategies have supported the creation of the APSC and that the motivations underlying these strategies have centred on protecting people within Australia from various human insecurities. Since the early 2000s, Australians have been beset by various threats, such as terrorism (e.g., the 2002 Bali bombings), human and drug trafficking, the 2003 SARS crisis, refugee flows,⁵⁶ and the spread of HIV/AIDS. The Australian government has reiterated the importance of the human-security concept and has based national security policy on this concept. According to Joseph A. Camilleri's calculations, the number of official Australian statements involving the human-security concept increased from six in the Keating period to twenty-nine in the Howard period to thirty-eight in the Rudd period (Camilleri, 2012). With a clear eye toward protecting its people, the Australian government has also sought to strengthen cooperation with neighbouring countries (Burke, 2012), and Camilleri argued that "ASEAN has been the principal focus of Australian interest" in this direction (Camilleri, 2012).

Creation of the APSC, centred as it is on addressing several human insecurities, has given the Australian government an opportunity to further strengthen the country's cooperation with ASEAN. In August 2007, the Australian government with ASEAN signed the Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership (2008-2013). In this declaration, the Australian government expressed its intention to assist ASEAN regarding several of the APSC blueprint's freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues, such as combating transnational crime, and the Australian government pledged to provide financial and technical assistance for countering natural disasters (ASEAN, August 2007).

5.1.2.2 The Australian Government's Strategies

5.1.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

After ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the first related support from the Australian government was a programme for combating human trafficking. In 2006, the Australian government created the Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons (ARTIP) Project (which operated from August 2006 to August 2011), funded by AusAid (A\$20 million). Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd explained why the Australian government launched the ARTIP:

⁵⁶ When the TNU killed many East Timorese after the independence ballot in August 1999, refugees escaped to Australia. In recent years, people in Southeast Asia who have been afflicted by political persecution and racial discrimination in their own countries have been illegally entering Australia via human-trafficking rings based in Malaysia and Indonesia.

“We still find around the world today we have a real problem with slavery. We have a problem with bonded labour and we have a problem with trafficking, sex trafficking, in particular involving children. And...an important part of the business of politics is to give voice to the voiceless...That’s part of our job through what we do with the foreign aid program” (cited from Bazeley and Dottridge, 2011: 5). The range of assistance covered information exchanges, the training of specialists like judges and prosecutors, and the development to law enforcement (Bazeley and Dottridge, 2011). Initially, there were only four ASEAN-participants: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. Between 2008 and 2009, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines joined the project, in that order. Since 2013, the Australian government has been conducting the Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP) (2013-2018), to which the Australian government has promised funds amounting to A\$50 million.

The Australian government has supported to natural-disaster management. From the Australian government’s perspective, natural disasters “cannot be viewed or addressed solely through a national security lens,” and thus, it is necessary to cooperate with neighbouring countries (Burke, 2012). Holding this view, the Australian government has been one of the external powers to support the creation of the AHA Centre. In 2012, the Australian government approved a grant of A\$1million for the creation of the AHA Center and rhetorically aligned itself with efforts to implement AADMER (ASEAN, July 24, 2012a). In addition, the Australian government has been the main donor when natural disasters hit Southeast Asian countries. For example, the Australian government provided assistance to Aceh in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in 2004 and provided assistance to central Java in 2006 following the earthquake there (Snyder, 2006: 335).

It should be noted that the Australian government has not only provided assistance for the APSC’s freedom-from-want issues, which have been directly linked to Australian people’s security, but also provided support for other issues, such as human rights. For example, at the 2010 ASEAN-Australia Summit, the Australian government expressed its support for the AICHR’s creation (ASEAN, October 30, 2010) and at the 24th ASEAN-Australia Forum, the Australian government further suggested cooperation between the AICHR and the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) (ASEAN, September 6, 2011). The Australian government met its commitment. The AICHR and the AHRC jointly held the Workshop on Corporate Social Responsibility in November 2012.

5.1.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The Australian government has provided assistance for the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC because freedom-from-fear issues have been linked to Australian people's human security. Although according to Burke, the Australian government has not regarded asylum seekers as a threat (Burke, 2012), refugees could contribute to such human insecurities as human trafficking. Thus, the Australian government has helped ASEAN members improve their capacity for undertaking peacekeeping operations, in turn helping reduce the occurrence of conflicts that result in refugee flows.

For example, at 2008's 22nd AAF, the Australian government stated its willingness to support ASEAN's convening of the ADMM, where regional peacekeeping has been one of the widely discussed topics on the agenda, and to host the ADMM Plus, whose participants would include ASEAN members and ASEAN's dialogue partners (ASEAN, May 22, 2008). When the first ADMM Plus was held in 2010, the Australian government participated in ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups, which conduct practical cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medical responses, and peacekeeping operations (ASEAN).

In addition, the Australian government provided assistance to individual ASEAN members. In September 2012, the Australian and Indonesian government signed the Defence Cooperation Arrangement. According to this arrangement, peacekeeping operations constitute one of the areas in which both sides would cooperate. In May 2013, both sides successfully conducted a desktop peacekeeping exercise (*Garuda Kookaburra*). In April 2014, the Indonesian government created the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre, which is the biggest peacekeeping training centre in Southeast Asia and which has as a sponsor the Australian government (with additional financial support coming from the United States government, incidentally) (Australian Government Department of Defence, 2013: 59). The Australian government has cooperated with Malaysia and Thailand to strengthen their peacekeeping ability by bringing together experts from these Southeast Asian countries, NGOs, and the UN for the exploration and design of training programmes (Australian Government Department of Defence, May 25, 2011, 2013: 59-60)

5.1.3 *Summary*

Since the 1950s, the Australian government has been involved in human-security issues in Southeast Asia. Although the motivations underlying this involvement have varied across historical periods, it has been largely positive, except for Australia's participation in the wars

involving the United States and Vietnam in 1950s. The Australian government has provided assistance for the creation of the APSC. However, in 2013, a conservative Liberal Party-led coalition won national elections, and the new prime minister, Tony Abbott, declared that the Australian government would cut the foreign-aid budget while increasing the budget for domestic infrastructure (*Jakarta Post*, September 8, 2013). This policy left a haze of uncertainty as to whether the Australian government would substantively and financially assist the creation of the APSC.

5.2 China

Since the victory of communists forces in Mainland China in 1949, the Chinese Communist regime has inserted itself in human-security issues throughout Southeast Asia. Different motivations for this involvement have produced different results for human security. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Chinese government's strategy has been to shower assistance and support on the project. Again, because of its different motivations, the Chinese government has prioritised assistance and support for freedom-from-want goals while limiting its engagement in freedom-from-fear goals. In this section, I will review the period between 1949 and 2002, examining both the motivations for the Chinese government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues and the Chinese government's approaches to handling these issues. I will then explore in greater detail the Chinese government's strategic response to the creation of the APSC.

5.2.1 Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002

The historical review section on China has two parts, both of which discuss how the Chinese government was involved in and addressed Southeast Asian human-security issues. The time-frame in the first part spans from the 1950s to 1989 and in the second part covers the period between 1990 and 2002.

5.2.1.1 From the 1950s to 1989

Beginning in the 1950s and extending all the way up to 1989, the Chinese government was involved in human-security issues in Southeast Asia. Regarding the freedom-from-want area, the Chinese government provided assistance to Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese, many of whom suffered unfair treatment at the hands of their respective governments. The Chinese government's motivations for making this assistance available tended to emanate from the government's firmly held belief that it had a responsibility to protect overseas Chinese

(Skinner, 1959: 144). In the freedom-from-fear area, the Chinese government lavished several indigenous communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia with substantive assistance like armaments, military training, and moral support. The Chinese government's motivations for issuing this kind of support almost always derived from a desire to expand its communist influence in Southeast Asia. The Chinese government's underwriting of insurgencies protracted civil wars in Southeast Asian countries, claiming many people's lives and poisoning ideological discussion.

5.2.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

The Chinese government's involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues was associated with Southeast Asia's far-flung ethnic Chinese. For example, in Indonesia, the Chinese minority suffered from their government's policies, which resulted in the closure of Chinese language schools, the eradication of the Chinese press, the denial of Indonesian citizenship to Chinese people born outside Indonesia; and prohibitions on Chinese people's remittances to family in China (Fitzgerald, 1973: 40-1). The Chinese government protested against the Indonesian government's treatment of ethnic Chinese and encouraged local Chinese to resist (Sukma, 1999: 30). In December 1959, the Chinese government repatriated over 100,000 overseas Chinese who had been residing in Indonesia (Wong, 1984: 44). John Wong argued that the material and moral support provided by the Chinese government to these minority populations of ethnic Chinese was rooted in a powerful sense of responsibility of obligation felt by the Chinese leadership (Wong, 1984: 44).

In the late 1950s, the Chinese government's interventions in situations involving of overseas Chinese gradually declined. Skinner argued that this decline took place because the China's policy of protection had been (understandably) souring diplomatic relations between China and Southeast Asian countries—countries from which the Chinese government needed political recognition (Skinner, 1959: 145-6). However, a few examples from recent history suggest that the Chinese government did not jettison the policy in either the 1960s or the 1970s. When, from 1965 to 1966, Suharto staged a coup and took actions resulting in the deaths of several thousand communists (most of whom were ethnic Chinese), the Chinese government publicly excoriated the Suharto regime for its actions (Ramanathan, 1994: 121). In addition, the Chinese government provided assistance to ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, who, because of the political turmoil and violence, had become refugees. In the late 1970s, the Vietnamese government used force to evict ethnic Chinese from their residences in Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh. These refugees escaped to China and Hong Kong, as well as to

other Southeast Asian states, like Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines—often by sea or land routes. During their period of exile, these refugees faced the increased threat of infectious disease and malnutrition. The Chinese government provided humanitarian assistance to these refugees and directly oversaw the resettlement of 200,000 refugees, providing many Vietnamese refugees with living accommodations and jobs in the provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong, Fujian and Beihai (Alley, 1980: 4).

5.2.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

The Chinese government addressed freedom-from-fear issues by involving itself in civil wars between communist insurgencies and governments in Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese government's principal motivation was to expand China's communist-entrenched influence in Southeast Asia. Chinese officials Liu Shao-qi, Vice-Chairman of the World Federation of Trade Unions, said that "it is necessary to create strong people's armies of liberation, skilled in fighting against the enemy, under the leadership of the Communist Party, and also supporting bases for the operation of these armies...the armed struggle is the main form of struggle in the national liberation movement in many colonies and semi-colonies" (cited from Purcell, 1950: 195). Resting on convictions like this one, the Chinese government provided substantive assistance, such as weapons, moral support, and military training to Southeast Asian communist insurgencies. For example, the cadres of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) were trained in China; the Chinese government provided weapons and personnel to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB); the Chinese government supported the PKI, the MPC and the Philippine Communist Party (PCP) (Martin, 1977: 23-42). Southeast Asian governments felt that the Chinese government had expanded its influence through exports of communism that were neither requested or desired (Leifer, 1980: 13). Thus, many Southeast Asian countries regarded China as a great concern to their national security. In addition, the Chinese government's assistance protracted civil wars in Southeast Asian countries, claiming many people's lives. For example, the Chinese government's support of and assistance to the PKI fuelled its growing. Suharto disliked the PKI's increasing prominence and, thus, purged the principal members of the organisation, persecuting innocent ethnic Chinese in the process (Ramanathan, 1994: 118).

5.2.1.2 From 1990 to 2002

The Chinese government was involved in human-rights issues, economic crises, and peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia from 1990 to 2002. The motivations underlying

this involvement particularly as they regarded the human-rights issues and the peacekeeping operations, were generally aligned with the principle of non-interference. When the People's Liberation Army (PLA) killed peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Chinese government brought down on itself heated criticism from Western countries. Chinese people's demonstrations and Western countries' criticism were so intense that the Chinese government regarded its legitimacy and its stability under significant threat (Ba, 2003: 630, Yang, 2003: 313). In order to counter the criticism from the West, the Chinese government designed a human-rights discourse, referred to as the "New International Order" (NIO) (Jie, 1993: 235), which spiritedly invoked the principle of non-interference as it pertained to the human-rights issues of an independent country. The post-Tiananmen Chinese government emphasised that Western countries should not criticise the human-rights situations in Southeast Asian countries, as well as in China, and backed up several Southeast Asian regimes that had poor or even egregious human-rights records. In addition, because of the Chinese government's adherence—selective though it might be—to the principle of non-interference, China limited its Southeast Asian peacekeeping operations.

The Chinese government's motivations for getting involved in regional economic crises hinged on its desire to become a regional leader. In the late 1980s, the gradual lessening of US-Soviet antagonism prompted the Chinese government to lessen its own interventions in the affairs of overseas Chinese and in leftist social revolutions throughout Southeast Asia. In fact, the Chinese government gradually normalised diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries. However, the Chinese government's increase in national defense outlays led to concerns among some Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government presented China as a benign leader providing humanitarian assistance which manifested in the event of the 1997 financial crisis (Ba, 2003: 637).

5.2.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

Between 1990 and 2002, Chinese leaders regarded the Western concept of human rights as a threat to their government's legitimacy and stability, and thus sought to counter the concept by introducing in 1991 their own human-rights discourse, commonly referred to as the NIO, which embraced "non-interference with internal affairs" and "economic equality" (Jie, 1993: 235). In establishing NIO, the Chinese government solicited assistance from ASEAN member-states, all of which agreed to work with China on this matter (Jie, 1993: 235).

However, the Chinese government's NIO-based human-rights discourse indirectly

resulted in human insecurities. Take for example the human-rights violations attributable to the Myanmar government, whose restrictions on the domestic population's human rights led Western countries to castigate the regime and to impose economic sanctions on it. The Chinese government's attitude toward Myanmar, not so incidentally, was to abide by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Hence, the Chinese government has continued its relations with Myanmar economically, militarily, politically and socially. Economically, the Chinese government enhanced trade with Myanmar and purchased natural resources from it, which presented the junta there with a steady revenue stream (Haacke, 2010: 120); militarily, the Chinese government has been the biggest arms supplier to Myanmar, and has provided its regime with military training and infrastructural support (Seekins, 1997: 534); politically, the Chinese government opposed the international community's sanctions on the Myanmar government and supported its hypocritical proposal for democratic reform, like 2003's "Seven-Point Roadmap" (Haacke, 2010: 120, 124-5); socially, the Chinese government helped create bridges and roads in the border region between China and Myanmar (Seekins, 1997: 530-1). Partly because of the Chinese government's substantive and rhetorical support, economic sanctions did not shut down the Myanmar government, which continued to violate its people's human rights. Donald M. Seekins made the following observation in this regard:

China's military support makes it easy for SLORC hardliners to use their instrument of preference—brute force—to govern, but the militarization of Burmese society will only lead to more violence and instability as the generals turn away from non-violent alternatives that alone can bring the country social peace and development. (Seekins, 1997: 539)

During the 1997 financial crisis, the Chinese government generously provided economic assistance to nearly crippled Southeast Asian countries so that they could better address the economic hardships that had dramatically downgraded many Southeast Asians' living standards. Alice Ba argued that the 1997's financial meltdown provided the Chinese government an opportunity to play the role of a leader in Southeast Asia (Ba, 2003: 635). The Chinese government promised the affected Southeast Asian countries to refrain from devaluing its own currency and, in particular, provided considerable economic assistance to Thailand (Ba, 2003: 637).

5.2.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

As regards freedom from fear, the Chinese government was involved in peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and East Timor. The Chinese government's involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues was based on adherence to the non-interference principle, as was the government's involvement in the region's freedom-from-want issues. For example, in the Cambodian case, although Chinese authorities supported the creation of UNTAC, the Chinese Ambassador in the UN, Li Zhaoxiing, claimed that "outside forces should not interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia" (cited from Fravel, 1996: 1110). In the East Timor case, the Chinese government abided by the principle they emphasised, non-interference in the internal affairs of states. From the Chinese government's perspective, peacekeeping contributors' deployment of military units to countries would violate the principle of non-interference (Fravel, 1996: 1112). The Chinese government dispatched only "civilian police forces rather than military forces to East Timor" (Zhongying, 2005: 98).

Interestingly, the Chinese government contravened the principle of non-interference. During the Cambodian peace process, the Chinese government provided economic and arms assistance to the Khmer Rouge (Bert, 1993: 329), strengthening the PDK. The PDK continued its armed struggle, attacked UN peacekeepers, and refused to join the peace process (Brown, 1993: 85). Wayne Bert argued that the Chinese government's assistance indirectly protracted civil wars in Cambodia (Bert, 1993: 329), which prevented Cambodians from achieving even a paltry degree of freedom from fear.

5.2.2 *Exploration of the Chinese Government's Strategies for the APSC*

5.2.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the Chinese Government's Strategies*

According to the above historical review of China, the Chinese government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues had positive and negative results. On the one hand, the Chinese government helped both ethnic-Chinese refugees and economically compromised Southeast Asian countries; on the other hand, the Chinese government intervened in civil wars between Southeast Asian governments and indigenous communist parties, resulting in human insecurities. In the wake of these benefits and drawbacks to Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia, two questions arise: Has the Chinese government supported or opposed the creation of the APSC? And what the motivations has underlain the Chinese government's strategies?

I argue that the Chinese government, responding to the creation of the APSC, has adopted dual strategies: support the freedom-from-want element, but downplay the

importance of the freedom-from-fear element. The first motivation guiding the Chinese government's strategic response to the APSC's freedom-from-want elements has been a desire to maintain China's leadership role in Southeast Asia. Since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has steadily developed its economy, military, and political system, and meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries have voiced concerns about possible Chinese aggression in the region. Some ASEAN countries have expressed particular concern about China's extraordinary rising power relative to the Spratly Islands (Ba, 2003: 628). Thus, the Chinese government has tried to paint an image of itself as a benign, even a positive, presence in Southeast Asia. The best example is the Chinese government's outpouring of financial assistance to ASEAN-member countries afflicted by the regional economic turmoil in 1997 and 1998. According to several recent scholars, the Chinese government has successfully created soft power (Cho and Jeong, 2008). However, a few ASEAN members, like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have quite evidently voiced concern about China's rising regional profile, thus giving Japan, and the United States opportunities to develop their own lines of influence in the region. For example, Leszek Buszynski argued that Chinese unilateral actions concerning disputes about the South China Sea constituted the main reason for the sceptical eye with which the Filipino government still regards China and for the ongoing military relationship that the Filipino government has with the United States (Buszynski, 2002). These countries' growing engagement in Southeast Asian affairs is a challenge to the Chinese government's existing leadership position there. Take the example of cooperation between Japan and ASEAN regarding the creation of the East Asian Community (EAC): the Chinese government understood that "if Japan and ASEAN achieve closer ties under EAC and alienate China, this will undermine Beijing's quest for regional leadership" (Ji, 2006: 20). In particular, these countries have engaged in issues that the Chinese government has turned away from, issues concerning human rights (Cronin, 2009: 155-6, Chheang, 2010: 362-3). Thus, in order to consolidate its leadership in Southeast Asia, the Chinese government has actively supported the creation of the APSC: the Chinese government was among the earliest external countries to express support for the creation of the AC—a fact attested to by an official statement of the 8th ASEAN-China Summit (ASEAN, November 29, 2004b); the Chinese government has showered ASEAN members with considerable financial assistance; and, the Chinese government has created the ASEAN–China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC) whose function is to review the possibility of cooperation between China and ASEAN.

However, as mentioned in chapter 2 (see section 2.1.3), when state actors implement

human-development programmes, it is likely that the programmes will result in certain human insecurities. The Chinese government's involvement in human-development programmes in Southeast Asia during the APSC-building process has created several human insecurities, in response to which the Chinese government has yet to propose viable resolutions.

The second motivation for the Chinese government's dual strategy toward the APSC-building process has been a firm adherence to the principle of non-interference. Since seizing power in 1949, the Chinese government has acquired exceptionally poor human-rights records, exemplified by the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1970), and the Tiananmen Square massacre (1989). In particular, the 1989 Tiananmen Square event prompted an outpouring of criticism and even sanctions from Western countries, in this way posing challenges to the Chinese government's legitimacy and stability. In order to avoid a repeat of this situation, the Chinese government has created its own human-rights discourse which has emphasised the sanctity of the principle of non-interference. The Chinese government's methods have been successful, at least in Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, ASEAN members did not criticise the Chinese government despite the emergence of such human-rights problems as those surrounding the Chinese government's response to Falun Gong and the Tibetan independence movement. However, since the 2000s, some ASEAN members, like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have been gradually democratising. In addition, these members have watered down the principle of non-interference (Katsumata, 2004). During the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, the Malaysian governments attempted to review the principle (Mahathir and Irwan, 2007: 108), and CSOs in Indonesia in 2006 suggested that the Indonesian government should vocally admonish China for its baleful human-rights record (Alexandra, 2012: 66). These ASEAN members' attempt to review the principle of non-interference may create, in the near future, a situation where the Chinese government, if it seriously violates human rights, will come under withering criticism from these members—all in the context of a weakened principle of non-interference. Such criticism could indirectly chip away at the Chinese government's legitimacy and stability. Thus, while both China and ASEAN cooperate over the APSC's creation, the Chinese government has adhered to the principle of non-interference (ASEAN, October 2010) and has avoided talking about—or has simplified—the language of human rights and freedom-from-fear issues. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government's publicly displayed resolve to support creating the APSC and to shower assistance on ASEAN has been far more palpable than any such resolve the Chinese government has displayed in support of creating a people-oriented

ASEAN where human rights and freedom-from-fear elements can trump the principle of non-interference.

5.2.2.2 The Chinese Government's Strategies

5.2.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

The Chinese government has provided considerable assistance to various causes reflective of the APSC's freedom-from-want element. In October 2003, China and ASEAN issued the Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN and PRC on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In this declaration, China emphasised the importance of cooperation with ASEAN regarding non-traditional security issues, and in 2004, China and ASEAN institutionalised this type of cooperation: the two parties signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the PRC on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues. According to this memorandum, China would be responsible for creating workshops and training courses and would cover the participants' and trainers' expenses, including the cost of meals, travel, and accommodations (ASEAN, January 10, 2004). In 2009, the Chinese government initiated the first formal ASEAN Plus China Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC). In 2010, ASEAN and China issued the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2011–2015). And just recently (in 2013), the Chinese government dispatched troops for jointly held regional natural-disaster drills hosted by the Brunei government. In brief, the freedom-from-want causes in which the Chinese government has engaged itself have been various (please see Table 5.1)

David Arase argued that cooperation between China and ASEAN is beneficial for ASEAN, because China could be a leader possessing “power and resources, as well as the motivation and political ability to coordinate interests and broker deals with groups” (Arase, 2010: 820). Indeed, the cooperation between China and ASEAN mentioned above is evidence that the Chinese government has tended to play a leading role—not only initiating the cooperation-based plans but also covering expenditures associated with workshops and training courses. The Chinese government, on the whole, has expanded its influence by supporting the creation of the APSC.

Table 5.1 A summary of the information of the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2011–2015)

Issues	Details
Human rights ⁵⁷	cooperation in human-rights issues through “regional dialogues, the exchanges of best practices and other capacity building initiatives aimed at enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”; creation of the AICHR.
Non-traditional security issues	cooperation in combating drug and human trafficking, terrorism, and money laundering through the implementation and enhancement of existing mechanisms, like the ASEAN–China MOU on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues (2010–2014); exchanges of information and other forms of cooperation in academic areas
Poverty reduction	implementation of the ASEAN–China Rural Development Promotion Program; cooperation in sub-regional development programs, such as the GMS and the Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP–EAGA); a commitment to holding “the ASEAN–China Social Development and Poverty Reduction Forum” and related workshops and seminars
Transport cooperation	financial and technological support for the ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity; construction of infrastructure, such as roads and railways
Public health and infectious diseases	“cooperation on preventing and controlling cross-border animal and plant diseases by exchanging information, techniques and experiences on early warning, epidemic surveillance and development of vaccine to improve animal and plant disease prevention networks and disease notification system”; the ASEAN–China Health Ministers’ Meeting as a platform for facilitating “policy dialogue and exchanges”; cooperation “in preparedness and responses against pandemic influenza and

⁵⁷ Despite having promised to cooperate with ASEAN regarding improvements in human rights, the Chinese government did not help resolve Myanmar’s human-rights problems, which acted as a barrier to ASEAN’s creation of the APSC. The Chinese government obeyed the principle of non-interference. In 2009, when a Myanmar court sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi to 18 months of house arrest, an action that attracted significant criticism from the international community; however, the Chinese government declared that “the international society should fully respect Myanmar’s judicial sovereignty” (*Jakarta Post*, August 14, 2009).

	[provision of] ASEAN Members States with the supply of vaccines, antiviral drugs and Personal Protective Equipment.”
Environmental issues	sustainable development and management in the GMS; implementation of the China–ASEAN Strategy on Environmental Protection Cooperation 2009–2015; development of the ASEAN–China Environmental Cooperation Centre; establishment of the ASEAN–China Environmental Ministerial Meeting mechanism
Disaster management	exploration of creating the ASEAN–China Senior Officials’ Consultations mechanism on Disaster Management and the ASEAN–China Cooperation Agreement on Disaster Reduction and Relief

Sources: the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2011-2015)

The Chinese government ambitious can also be found in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), which has been the target in the ASCC’s blueprint to narrow the development gap among participants and reduce poverty through the development of infrastructure, the enhancement of trade, and increases in foreign investment (ASEAN, 2009b: 24). The Chinese government built several dams in the Upper Mekong (mainly in Yunnan province). Since September 2006, the Chinese government has supplied electricity to Vietnam and invested in an electricity-generation facilities in Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (Dosch, 2007: 230-1), the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar being one example. In November 2002, the Chinese government signed the Agreement on the Exchange of Hydrological Data, according to which, the Chinese government should “provide daily readings on water levels in the upper Lancang [Mekong is called Lancang in China] so that downstream countries would have advance warnings for floods” (Liebman, 2005: 292). According to Jörn Dosch, China has achieved hegemony in Southeast Asia through cooperation between China and ASEAN members (Dosch, 2007).

However, several issues surrounding human insecurities should be noted. The Chinese government has been engaging and investing in the GMS but more and more researchers have warned that extensive development in the Mekong River Basin would create an ecological disaster: decreased waterways, deforestation, floods, and species extinction ranging from animals and fish to plants (Cronin, 2009: 151-4, Chheang, 2010: 365-6, Dosch and Hensengerth, 2005: 278-9). Although the Chinese government has pledged to cooperate with the Mekong-region countries regarding a sustainable environment in the Mekong River

Basin (ASEAN, October 2010), the Chinese government's establishment of dams in Yunnan Province has produced several human insecurities: the flow of the Mekong in the downstream riparian states has been unpredictable; water quality and availability have been downgraded and reduced, already endangering several species and undercutting lower basin people who have subsisted on fisheries and water for irrigation (Liebman, 2005: 293-4). Regarding these human insecurities, a Cambodian official voiced helplessness: "What can we do? They [China] are upstream. They [China] are a richer country operating in their own sovereign territory. How can we stop them?" (cited from Liebman, 2005: 290). However, the Chinese government refused to join the Mekong River Commission (MRC) (Menniken, 2007: 109). Alex Liebman described the Chinese government's attitude toward efforts to manipulate the Mekong River system:

China is not behaving as a benevolent hegemon; rather, China is using its power to achieve its ends with little consideration for those downstream. (Liebman, 2005: 293)

In addition, creation of the Myistone Dam in Myanmar has displaced 12,000 people and damaged the local environment (International Rivers, September 28, 2011). In 2011, the Myanmar government halted construction on the dam (Turnell, 2012: 157).

5.2.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

In comparison with the APSC's freedom-from-want element, the Chinese government has not deeply engaged in the APSC's freedom-from-fear element. At the Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting of the ARF, PLA Admiral Sun Jianguo emphasised the Chinese government's international-peacekeeping achievements, noting that, as of "2013, China has taken part in 23 UN peacekeeping operations, and deployed more than 24,000 troops. China is willing to contribute more to world peace and security" (*Xinhua*, October 17, 2013).

In fact, the Chinese government's position on peacekeeping tasks has reflected a rather strict adherence to the principle of non-interference. With the exception of examples mentioned in the previous section (Cambodia and East Timor), international peacekeeping tasks demonstrate the China government's nearly unswerving adherence to the principle of non-interference, whether in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, or Haiti (Fravel, 1996: 1110-5). Thus, there should be little surprise that the Chinese government has exhibited limited support for the APSC's freedom-from-fear element. While ASEAN has been creating the APSC, Indonesia and the Philippines and their respective external mediators have

successfully resolved civil wars in Aceh and Mindanao. In neither of these efforts to broker peace did the Chinese government provide assistance or mediate; nor, yet again, did the Chinese government substantively contribute to the creation of peacekeeping training centres in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

5.2.3 *Summary*

Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the Chinese government helped ethnic Chinese residing in Southeast Asia in order to fulfil its obligation. And between the 1950s to the late 1960s, in order to expand its communist influence, the Chinese government provided assistance to communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia contributing to the protraction of civil wars between regional communist groups and national governments in Southeast Asia. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising, the Chinese government's desire to be a regional leader was the central motivation underlying the effort on the part of the government to reach out to other nations in such diverse ways as extending economic assistance. However, the Chinese government's NIO, based on adherence to the principle of non-interference, did little to improve the human-rights situation in Southeast Asia. Regarding specifically the creation of the APSC, the Chinese government has pursued to general goals: (1) to maintain and expand its leadership position in Southeast Asia and (2) to adhere to the principle of non-interference. Consequently, the Chinese government has showered assistance and support on freedom-from-want efforts in the region, but has been noticeably less engaged in freedom-from-fear efforts there.

5.3 **Japan**

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the Japanese government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues and the Japanese government's motivations have been various over the decades. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Japanese government has provided support and assistance in terms of both freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues. In this section, I will review why and how the Japanese government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. I will then explore what the Japanese government's motivation and strategic response have been in regards to the creation of the APSC.

5.3.1 *Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002*

The historical review of the Japanese government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-

security issues is divided into two parts here. The time-frame for the first part extends from the 1950s to 1989, and the time-frame for the second part extends from 1990 to 2002.

5.3.1.1 From the 1950s to 1989

During this period, the motivation of the Japanese government's involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues was to counter its infamous national reputation. Owing to the Japanese government's colonial policy—the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere—and its militarism in Southeast Asia during World War II, Southeast Asian countries feared a re-emergence of Japan's imperial ambitions and Southeast Asian people viewed Japan with antipathy (Hellmann, 1979: 1192). In order to offset its deeply wounded international reputation, the postwar Japanese government provided development assistance to Southeast Asian countries. However, Southeast Asian countries suspected that the assistance was a manoeuvre by the Japanese government to gain “control over an emerging Asian regional economy” and to integrate “the Asian economies under Japanese leadership” (Rix, 2001: 78). In addition, general populations in Indonesia and Thailand remained, for the most part, fiercely anti-Japanese. These people protested Japanese companies' culture of bribes and tax evasion in particular (Darling, 1974a: 11-2).

The legacy of Japanese colonialism and militarism managed to recede a bit farther into the past after 1977, when Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo issued the Fukuda Doctrine. According to this doctrine, “Japan will not become a military power; Japan will promote ‘heart-to-heart’ understanding with ASEAN nations in all fields; Japan will cooperate with ASEAN as an ‘equal partner’ while working for stable relations with the Indochinese nations; Japan will double aid in five years, while increasing imports from and investment in Southeast Asian nations” (cited from Hellmann, 1979: 1195-6). After the Fukuda Doctrine, the Japanese government strengthened its financial and technical assistance to Southeast Asia. The Japanese government's genuine engagement in freedom-from-want issues in Southeast Asia offset the nation's wartime legacy.

The chief motivation for the Japanese government's involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues—centred as they were on the Cambodian conflict—was related to economic and security concerns. Regarding economic concerns, the Japanese government was worried that the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia would lead to regional political instability capable of degrading the Japanese government's economic interests there (Singh, 2010: 395). Regarding security concerns, the Japanese government treated the Soviet Union, which had close links with Vietnam, as a potential threat (Kesavan,

1985: 1127). Thus, the Japanese government expressed an anti-war position and a willingness to pursue a peaceful resolution to the Cambodian conflict.

5.3.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

Between the 1950s and 1989, the Japanese government provided ODA, which included financial and technical assistance to Southeast Asian countries. The purpose of the ODA was to enhance people's living standards and reduce poverty. Between the 1950s and the 1960s, the Japanese government made available US\$1.2 billion for this very purpose (Hellmann, 1979: 1192). The assistance covered such investments as technology improvements, grant aid, and loans. Even the communist regime in Vietnam was a recipient of the Japanese government's assistance. From 1975 to 1978, the Japanese government provided ¥27.5 billion to Vietnam (Soeya, 1993: 99). Hellmann and Akira Onishi argued respectively that the overriding motivation for the Japanese government's provision of economic and social assistance to Southeast Asian countries was a desire to erase Japan's historical legacy of colonialism and militarism (Hellmann, 1979: 1192, Onishi, 1971: 413-9).

However, the Japanese government's development assistance did not remove the stain of Japan's imperial legacy. Some Southeast Asian countries' leaders suspected that the Japanese government's ODA was simply an attractive guise by which the country might extract economic interests from the region in a kind of free-market, postwar imperialism (Rix, 2001: 78). In addition, the Japanese sentiments emerged in Indonesia and Thailand (Haddad, 1980: 11-12). Not a few people in Southeast Asia viewed Japan as a "capitalistic exploiter solely interested in markets and profits" (Haddad, 1980: 12). In response to its countries persistently negative reputation, the Japanese government—rather than change its ODA policy—further strengthened it. Between 1980 and 1990, ASEAN members, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand entirely received US\$3.7 billion (Rix, 2001: 71). Bhubhinder Singh argued that the Japanese government's efforts eased ASEAN members' mistrust of Japan and strengthened members' acceptance of a notable role for the Japanese government in the process of Southeast Asian economic integration (Singh, 2002: 285-6).

5.3.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

During this period, the Japanese government was also involved in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues—surrounding the Cambodian conflicts, for the most part. Singh argued that the motivations underlying the Japanese government's involvement in the conflicts had to do

with economics and security. Regarding the former, the Japanese government tried to protect its economic interests in Southeast Asia. Regarding the latter, the Japanese government regarded the Soviet Union's disturbing establishment of a military base in Vietnam as a 'potential' threat to Japan (Kesavan, 1985: 1127) which would "challenge the regional balance of power unfavourably to Japan's interests" (Singh, 2010: 395). Accordingly, the Japanese government expressed an anti-war position and a willingness to mediate the Cambodian conflict (Kesavan, 1985: 1127).

During the period of the Cambodian civil wars, which extended from the 1970s to the early 1990s, the Japanese government adopted an anti-war position. When the Vietnamese army launched an invasion into Kampuchea in 1978, Japanese Ambassador to the UN Abe Isao stated that the Japanese government's position was anti-war (Kesavan, 1985: 1128). In addition, the Japanese government expressed an interest in helping broker and keep peace in Cambodia. At the 1984's AMM, the Japanese representative first expressed Japan's desire to play a peacemaking role in Cambodia and, specifically, to help cover the expenses of Cambodian peacekeeping operations and to provide economic and technical assistance in reconstructing the devastated Cambodia (Kesavan, 1985: 1131).

5.3.1.2 From 1990 to 2002

Between 1990 and 2002, an important motivation underlying the Japanese government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues was to maintain Japan's national reputation by means of human-security diplomacy. Between the 1950s and 1989, the Japanese government had watered down its wartime legacy by providing development assistance to Southeast Asian countries and by expressing a desire to participate in peacemaking efforts in Cambodia. Resting on the human-security concept, the Japanese government's human-security policies during the Cold War appear to have been successful, and thus, to maintain its national reputation after 1989, the Japanese government has continued to base its involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues on the human-security concept.

It should be noted that since the start of the post-Cold War period, the Japanese government has strengthened its human-security diplomacy. The Japanese government adopted the ODA Charter to bolster freedom from want (please see section 2.1.3). And as for freedom from fear, in September 1991, the Japanese government passed the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations. Article 9 of Japan's 1947 constitution states that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a

sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes” (日本国憲法, 2011: 24), and this principle frequently limited the Japanese government’s engagement in freedom-from-fear issues. However, according to this new law, Japan’s Self-Defence Force (SDF) could participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. In 2000, the Japanese government formally declared that human security would be one of the pillars of Japanese diplomacy (Kikkawa, 2007: 257).

5.3.1.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

In order to maintain its national reputation, the Japanese government continued to provide development assistance to Southeast Asian countries from 1990 to 2002. For example, in Laos, Japan was the biggest development-assistance donor (Bourdet, 1997: 76), providing financial assistance for road and bridges construction (Stuart-Fox, 1998: 77). Myanmar also received development assistance from the Japanese government: in 1995, the Japanese government constructed a nursing school in Myanmar; and in 2001, the Japanese government allocated US\$28.6 million for the reconstruction of turbines in a hydropower dam capable of meeting 20% of Myanmar’s entire electricity needs (Dalpino, 2007: 218, 224).⁵⁸ In addition, after the 1997 financial meltdown, the Japanese government was the larger donor to help Southeast Asian affected countries, which was US\$30 billion package (Lam, 2006: 150). Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s statement in 1998 suggests that the human-security concept was central to Japanese government’s strategic provision of assistance to Southeast Asian countries. He stated that Japan should prioritise human security, which, when considered within a theoretical framework,

is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to their socially vulnerable—the poor, women, and children, and the elderly— threatening their survival and dignity. We need urgently to implement measures for the socially vulnerable who are affected by the Asian economic crisis. (cited from Lam, 2013: 179)

Drawing on this view of the human-security concept, the Japanese government has

⁵⁸However, when the Myanmar government put Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest again in 2005, the Japanese government suspended its development assistance to the country (Dalpino, 2007: 224).

increased its national reputation by implementing human-security diplomacy. According to Soeya, this diplomacy has shaped Japan into the form of a “middle power” (Soeya, 2005). ASEAN members have been willing to cooperate with the Japanese government in political and security issues, as was evident when Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon argued that cooperation between ASEAN and Japan “must progress beyond economic issues to include matters of peace and security” (Singh, 2010: 399).

5.3.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The Japanese government’s engagement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues in this period was more active than in the period extending from the 1950s to the late 1980s, chiefly because under the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations, the Japanese government could send troops to join international peacekeeping tasks. Between 1990 and 2002, the Japanese government engaged in peacemaking in Cambodia and East Timor.

In the case of Cambodia, the Japanese government made considerable contributions. The Japanese government sent 1,200 troops of the SDF to Cambodia, where they engaged in peacekeeping tasks (Um, 1994: 73), constituting the first time that the SDF conducted peacekeeping operations in a foreign country. In addition, the Japanese government conducted peacebuilding in Cambodia, clearing land mines, collecting small arms and light weapons from insurgents, supporting efforts to bring to trial the brutal Khmer Rouge leaders, and reconstructing schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, ports, electrical systems, and water-treatment facilities (Lam, 2012: 117, Dobson, 2003: 122). The Japanese government’s contribution to Cambodian peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding tasks has improved Japan’s national reputation in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries welcomed the Japanese government’s efforts there, and Mahathir “hoped that the SDF would, in the future, be able to participate fully in peacekeeping operations without restrictions imposed by the Japanese Diet” (Singh, 2002: 292-3).

East Timor was the Japanese government’s other major peacemaking operation. The Japanese government regarded its participation in the East Timor peacekeeping operation as an opportunity to improve Japan’s national contributions to the world (Gorjão, 2002: 770). The situation in East Timor had been especially perilous. In the wake of the murder of hundreds of East Timorese by pro-Jakarta militias in 1999, the Japanese government deployed 2,300 SDF personnel to East Timor, undertaking what constituted Japan’s largest-scale participation in peacekeeping operations (Kikkawa, 2007: 258).

5.3.2 *Exploration of the Japanese Government's Strategies for the APSC*

5.3.2.1 *The Motivations underlying the Japanese Government's Strategies*

As discussed in the above historical review, we know that the Japanese government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues from the 1950s to 2002 rested mainly on the country's diplomatic policies replete with the human-security concept. The Japanese government's strategies in response to the creation of the APSC, whose target is a people-oriented ASEAN, have been supportive.

The motivation underlying the Japanese government's strategies has been to increase the country's influence in Southeast Asia. In the Cold War period, the Japanese government played a positive role in human-security issues in Southeast Asia, particularly in contrast to the Chinese government, which was an obstacle to peacefully resolving the Cambodian conflict (please see 5.2.1.2.2). However, in the post-Cold War period, the Chinese government showered significant assistance on Southeast Asian countries, despite paying little attention to Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues. The Chinese government's growing leadership role in Southeast Asia posed a challenge to the Japanese government's carefully cultivated positive position in this area (Singh, 2002: 288). For example, although, during the outbreak of the economic Asian crisis in 1997, the Japanese government provided the greatest financial assistance to Southeast Asian countries, and yet they still regarded China as a 'more responsible actor' than Japan (Singh, 2002: 288).

Nevertheless, the Japanese government remains focused on its objective: in order to consolidate its influence in this area, the Japanese government continues to strengthen its engagement in Southeast Asian human-security issues (Lam, 2006: 142). For example, during the outbreak of SARS, the Japanese government aided in the quarantine of the disease through medical assistance and financial support; as regards the tsunami disaster close on the heels of SARS, the Japanese government made financial donations of about US\$500 million in order to help the countless surviving victims and specifically deployed about a thousand troops to Aceh, the area that bore the brunt of the tsunami (Lam, 2006: 150-4). Interestingly, in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the Chinese government—despite its strong economic strength—provided relief efforts only US\$83 million (Hook et al., 2005: 226), a rather paltry sum compared to the Japanese government's US\$500 million. In 2002, the Japanese government adopted a more active policy to increase its influence in Southeast Asia. The Japanese government proposed the creation of the EAC. In December 2003, ASEAN agreed to the Japanese-sponsored EAC and signed the Tokyo Declaration with the

Japanese government. The function of the EAC has been to balance China's rising profile in Southeast Asia, in part by strengthening Japan's influence there (Ji, 2006: 20-1). You Ji argued that "closer cooperation with ASEAN is one convenient way to improve Tokyo's status in the region [Southeast Asia]" (Ji, 2006: 20).

ASEAN's decision to create the APSC gave the Japanese government an additional opportunity to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN. The Japanese government has, thus, provided substantive support for the creation of the APSC. In particular, the Japanese government established the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) in 2006 and in the same year, approved the provision of US\$64 million to the JAIF, which would use the funds in support of several human-security issues (MOFA, March 27, 2006). In 2007, when delivering a speech in Indonesia, current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that the Economic Partnership Agreement, cooperative efforts in the Mekong Region, and assistance in peace-building missions have been the Japanese government's three pillars for supporting the creation of the AC (MOFA, August 20, 2007). The second and the third items have been essential factors in efforts to realise the APSC. Abe's statement indicates that the Japanese government would focus on the APSC-related issues to which the Chinese government had been paying little attention—issues such as those concerning freedom from fear and human insecurities arising from Chinese assistance (e.g., cooperation in the Mekong Basin) (please see section 5.2.2.2.1).

5.3.2.2 The Japanese Government's Strategy

5.3.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

In order to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government has provided assistance to the APSC's freedom-from-want issues. Regarding natural-disaster management, the Japanese government has been an important supporter of the AHA Centre, providing it with new communications equipment. The Japanese government supported a project for the "Establishment of a Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN" capable of strengthening the AHA Centre's abilities (MOFA, March 2013: 41). In addition, the government sent natural-disasters experts to the AHA Centre to educate its staff on how to manage and operate the organisation and held workshops where AHA staff and ASEAN members could share with one another their knowledge of disaster-related risk reduction (MOFA, March 2013: 42). In 2013, in order to strengthen ASEAN members' ability to manage natural disasters, the Japanese government pledged ¥30 billion for the creation of infrastructure in ASEAN countries and for the training of 1,000 natural-disaster experts from

ASEAN countries (*Japan Times*, December 12, 2013).

The Japanese government was also actively involved in Mekong River projects. At the first Mekong–Japan Summit, the Japanese government launched cooperation in several areas. For example, the Japanese government initiated several projects pertaining to environmental and climate change issues, such as the Project for Establishment of Disastrous Weather Monitoring System in Laos, the Memorandum on Flood Control in Vietnam, and the Project on Capacity Development in Disaster Management in Thailand.⁵⁹ In addition, the Japanese government undertook development programmes to improve peoples’ living standards, helping clear unexploded ordinance in Laos and promoting expectant mothers’ and children’s health in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.⁶⁰

In the Mekong River area, the Japanese government has been involved in various projects (e.g., flood-control management) stemming from problems created by the Chinese government’s investment in dam building (please see section 5.2.2.2.1). During an August 2007 speech delivered by Prime Minister Abe in Indonesia, he pledged that the Japanese government would help solve some of these problems experienced by Mekong riparian countries (MOFA, August 20, 2007). Abe did not directly point out that the problems in question had resulted from the Chinese government’s investments there, but the above exploration of Japanese government’s recent efforts in the Mekong River area strongly suggests that these efforts are functioning to increase Japan’s influence, perhaps in competition with China. And it is likely that the efforts will continue. At the fifth Mekong–Japan Summit, the Japanese government reiterated that its engagement in the Mekong River area remained one of the pillars supporting the creation of the AC by 2015 (MOFA, December 14, 2013). Takashi Shiraishi, expert in the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, nicely described the Japanese governments’ strategies. “Abe is trying to deepen Japan’s relationship with ASEAN countries to counter China’s growing economic and military presence in the region” (*Japan Times*, December 14, 2013).

5.3.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

To increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government has addressed the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element, as well as its freedom-from-want element. The Japanese government has engaged in peace-building in Aceh and Mindanao. Before ASEAN decided

⁵⁹ Please see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/mekong/summit02/index.htm>

⁶⁰ Please see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/mekong/summit02/index.htm>

to create the APSC in 2003, the Japanese government had engaged in the civil war in Aceh. In December 2002, the Japanese government hosted the “Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh.” At this conference, the Japanese government pledged to provide financial support of US\$6.2 million to people affected by the war and to provide substantive assistance, such as training programs, to local officials; Japan, moreover, would “consider supporting programs for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Aceh” (Lam, 2009: 63). After the Indonesian government ratified the Helsinki Accords with the GAM in August 2005, the EU and ASEAN (Malaysia and Brunei) sent troops to Aceh, where they conducted peace-monitoring, but the Japanese government did not participate in this peace-monitoring team (Lam, 2013: 188), as the action was not under the auspices of the UN (Lam, 2009: 71). Nevertheless, the Japanese government re-constructed roads and sanitary and water systems and restored sewage-processing infrastructure in Aceh (Lam, 2009: 70), and these undertakings amount to peacebuilding tasks.

Regarding the case of Mindanao, the Japanese government stated that its policy of ending the area’s civil war was guided by the human-security concept (Lam, 2008: 53). Before ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the Japanese government had engaged in humanitarian-development programme. When Philippine President Arroyo declared that she would stop Estrada’s all-out-war policy in Mindanao, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro expressed his support for the change in policy (Lam, 2009: 51). The Japanese government hosted several meetings with the MILF leader Ebrahim Murad and provided humanitarian assistance to Mindanao (Lam, 2008: 50, 52). After ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the Japanese government joined the IMT in 2006 to monitor peace process in Mindanao.

Like the Japanese government’s support of the APSC’s freedom-from-want element, the Japanese government’s peace-building efforts in Aceh and Mindanao also stemmed from a desire to increase its influence Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia. Lam Peng Er argued that peace-building has become the “third path” along which the Japanese government has pursued international esteem (Lam, 2008: 46), and he further argued that the peacebuilding task, as a form of international intervention, has been a relied-upon method by which Japan has sought to counterbalance China’s rising regional profile in this region (Lam, 2008: 46-7). Alongside its peacebuilding in Aceh and Mindanao has been the Japanese government’s support of ASEAN members’ peacekeeping capacity. In 2010, the government provided US\$1 million, through the UNDP–Japan Partnership Fund, to the Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre (MPTC) (MOFA, October 27, 2011). Given the Japanese government’s financial assistance, the MPTC was able to hold several seminars, such as the Gender and

Peacekeeping Seminar in November 2011. By engaging in the APSC's freedom-from-fear element, the Japanese government has established its position that peace-building missions constitute one of the pillars upon which Japan shall facilitate ASEAN's creation of the APSC.

5.3.3 *Summary*

Since the start of the Cold War, the Japanese government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. In order to enhance its historically sullied national reputation and consolidate its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government has provided development assistance to regional countries. Between 1990 and 2002, the Japanese government continued to address Southeast Asian human-security issues in the form of human-security diplomacy. To increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government's has strategically supported the creation of the APSC. According to the IPSOS Hong Kong-conducted opinion poll regarding Southeast Asian people's perspectives on a set of given countries (America, Australia, China, France, Germany, India, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the UK), Japan was the most reliable country (33%), the most important partner (60%), and the most important future partner (60%) (MOFA, March 2014: 17, 33, 35). In addition, 89% of respondents agreed that the Japanese government's "Proactive Contribution to Peace" in the Asian region was valuable (MOFA, March 2014: 42). It is reasonable to say that the Japanese government has enhanced its reputation and influence in Southeast Asia.

5.4 **The United States**

Since the onset of the Cold War period, the U.S. government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. government's involvement created human insecurities in the region; and throughout the post-Cold War period, the U.S. government's involvement there has led to resentment on the part of ordinary Southeast Asians and their governments. Interestingly, however, the U.S. government's strategic responses to the creation of the APSC, so far, have not created any such negative responses. In this section, I will review how the U.S. government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues and what the U.S. government's motivations have been during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. I will, furthermore, explore in detail the U.S. government's strategic responses to the creation of the APSC and the motivations underlying the strategies.

5.4.1 *Historical Review: From the 1950 to 2002*

This study's historical review of the U.S. government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues is divided into two parts: the first part covers the period extending from the 1950s to 1989; and the second part, the period from 1990 to 2002.

5.4.1.1 *From the 1950s to 1989*

During the Cold War period, the motivations underlying the U.S. government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues centred on the prevention of communism's expansion in this region. Southeast Asia has had abundant natural resources, like tin and rubber, and busy waterways, like the Lombok Strait and the Malacca Strait, which have been important for the U.S. government and its non-communist allies (Darling, 1974b: 610-1). According to Frank Darling, U.S. foreign-policy thinking was that if Southeast Asia were to come under control partial or total communist control, the U.S. government and its ally's interests in this area would face serious challenges in accessing these important natural resources (Darling, 1974b: 610-1). Thus, the U.S. government was actively involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues: in the freedom-from-want area, to strengthen Southeast Asians' own resistance to communist ideology, the U.S. government provided economic assistance for enhancement of living standards; in freedom-from-fear area, the U.S. government used military power to prevent South Vietnam from falling to North Vietnam. However, the U.S.' government's Cold War-era involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues created human insecurities throughout the region.

5.4.1.1.1 *Freedom from Want*

In the freedom-from-want area, the U.S. government provided economic assistance to non-democratic Southeast Asian countries. Before the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the chief intention underlying the U.S. government's assistance was to increase Southeast Asian people's ability to resist communist ideology through an enhancement of these people's living standards. Beginning in 1950, the U.S. government showered economic assistance on such countries in mainland Southeast Asia as Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand (Darling, 1974b: 618).

However, the greater part of American economic assistance went to the recipient governments' militaries, although the U.S. attempted to separate military assistance from economic assistance (Darling, 1974b: 616-8). Whether the U.S. government's aid enhanced people's living standards or not remains unclear. However, the U.S. government's aid

indirectly produced human insecurities. In South Vietnam, the Ngô Đình Diệm family embezzled American aid (Kolko, 1969: 114), thus preventing it from reaching the poor and needy people for whom it had been nominally designated. In the Philippines, President Marcos used American aid to strengthen his military, which he then used to repress secessionists in Mindanao (Grossholtz, 1974: 106).

After the U.S. military's withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the ideological element in the U.S. government's assistance took on a far softer tone, and in its place emerged the increasingly prominent element of humanitarian-support. Two examples of this shift are noteworthy. Between 1977 and 1979, when Laos suffered from a nationwide famine, the U.S. government offered the country food assistance (John, 2006: 176). And the U.S. government offered financial assistance to improve the rural public-health situation in Myanmar (Silverstein, 1981: 214).

5.4.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

Prevention of communist expansion in Southeast Asia also drove the U.S. government to get involved in the freedom-from-fear issue in this region, most notably giving rise to the Vietnam War. The war led to 3.5 million wounded and killed on both the Vietnamese and the U.S. sides, and produced a mass exodus of refugees fleeing over land to Thailand and China or over seas to Malaysia, Indonesia and Hong Kong (Ashworth, 1979).

Perhaps, the most serious legacy of American military intervention in Vietnam was the global superpower's use of anti-personnel chemical weapons. Napalm bombs inflicted great suffering indiscriminately, severely burning people's skin by lighting it on fire, and these fires were difficult to put out because the ingredients of polystyrene and benzene would form a sticky blazing substance adhering with gross efficiency to human skin. The order that the U.S. government gave to American pilots was to "hit every hamlet within the area" (Neilands, 1970: 213). Between 1963 and 1966, American troops dropped over 76,000 tons of napalm bombs on the region (Neilands, 1970: 213).

5.4.1.2 From 1990 to 2002

From 1990 to 2002, ideological considerations were not at the heart of the U.S. government's motivations for getting involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The U.S. government's motivations changed to promote human rights. During the Clinton period, the U.S. government emphasised the diplomatic policy of "engagement and enlargement" whose importance was economic liberalisation, promotion of democratisation, and promotion of

human rights. In this context, the U.S. government addressed several instances of human-rights violations in Southeast Asia, criticising and imposing sanctions on Southeast Asian countries known to have egregious human-rights records. However, these involvements have led to disputes between the U.S. government and Southeast Asian national governments emphasising the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent countries.

5.4.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

After the demise of the Cold War, the U.S. government involved itself in human-rights violations occurring in Southeast Asia. As for the Myanmar government's abysmal human-rights record, the U.S. government fiercely criticised the leadership there and imposed economic and political sanctions on it—politically, the U.S. government banned the granting of U.S. entry visas to Myanmar's military rulers and, economically, the U.S. government banned Myanmar exports United States (Steinberg, 2010: 115). In addition, in 1998, the U.S. Vice President Al Gore decried Mahathir's arrest of Anwar Ibrahim on accusations of sodomy and corruption, which violated Anwar's human rights.

The U.S. government's imposition of sanctions and criticism on Southeast Asian states accused of human-rights abuses did not prompt the states to improve their human-rights record. For example, in 1997, ASEAN enlarged itself by including Myanmar as a member-state, regardless of U.S. criticism of Myanmar's woeful human-rights record. In general, the U.S. criticism of allegedly abusive Southeast Asian states led to diplomatic disputes, as occurred when, in 1999, Vice President Al Gores' criticism of Malaysia soured the relationship between the two countries (Simon, 2004a: 71). Why did the U.S. government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-rights issues fail to yield positive results? The answer is that most Southeast Asian governments adhered to the principle of non-interference. They regarded the U.S. government's human-rights concerns as undue interference in regional and domestic affairs (Brown, 1995: 402). In this context, the governments in Southeast Asia often opposed the U.S. government's hard-line approach to handling regional human-rights issues, and thus, diplomatic bitterness was, in hindsight, a predictable outcome.

5.4.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear

It promoting human rights, the U.S. government essentially left itself no choice but to get involved in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues. The U.S. government adopted a hard-line approach to handling the freedom-from-fear issues in the region. For example, Indonesian troops' slaughter of East Timorese in 1991 (known as the Dili Massacre)

promoted the U.S. government to stop military cooperation with and economic assistance to Indonesia. The violence continued however. Pro-Jakarta militias committed depredations against the population in East Timor in the wake of a UN-sponsored referendum on independence in August 1999. The U.S. government again responded firmly, criticising the Indonesian government's inability or unwillingness to keep the peace in East Timor (Simon, 1999: 35).

As with its response to freedom-from-want issues, the U.S. government's involvement in freedom-from-fear issues yielded few if any positive results. For example, after the 1991 Dili Massacre, the Indonesian troops continued to commit human-rights violations in East Timor. In addition, because the Indonesian government remained an adherent to the principle of non-interference, it accepted only ASEAN members' input into the implementation of peacekeeping operations in East Timor⁶¹ (see Haacke, 2003: 65-71). The U.S. government provided only some military equipment to INTERFET (Simon, 1999: 35).⁶²

5.4.2 *Exploration of the U.S. Government's Strategies for the APSC*

5.4.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the U.S. Government's Strategies*

According to the historical review above covering the period from the 1950s to 2002, we know that the U.S. government's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues was based on national interests—prevention of communism's expansion and promotion of human rights. What strategies did the U.S. government adopt in response to the creation of the APSC and what has motivations have underlain these strategies?

The answer to this two-fold question is rather straight-forward: the U.S. government's strategies have centred on supporting the creation of the APSC, and the motivations underlying these strategies have centred essentially on a desire to promote American influence in Southeast Asia. After the American military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the U.S. government's influence in Southeast Asia gradually declined. Most ASEAN members have disliked the U.S. government's tendency to express concerns about Southeast Asian human-rights issues. According to Memorandum of Confidence-Building Measures in Southeast Asia, which was issued by the ASEAN-Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) in 1993, the ASEAN-ISIS questioned the capacity of the U.S.

⁶¹The only non-Southeast Asian country to join the East Timorese peacekeeping operations was Australia (please see section 5.1.1.2.2).

⁶²The U.S. government was observably unwilling to join the East Timorese peacekeeping operation, because "U.S. forces were already deeply committed in Bosnia and Kosovo" (Simon, 1999: 35).

government to maintain its influence in Southeast Asia due to human-rights disputes between the U.S. and ASEAN members (see also Stuart and Tow, 1995: 60).

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the U.S. government adopted a global anti-terrorism campaign, which however failed to enhance U.S. influence in Southeast Asia (Mauzy and Job, 2007: 630). This outcome was disappointing, insofar as the U.S. government regarded Southeast Asia as the “second front” in its counter-terrorism efforts (Dalpino, 2002: 346). After all, the Southeast Asian militant Islamic organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) had connections with al-Qaeda. Regardless of its success or failure on this second front, the U.S. government carried on providing anti-terrorism assistance to Southeast Asian countries (Limaye, 2004: 83-6). For example, since 2001, the U.S. government has offered economic and military assistance to the government of the Philippines to combat the Abu Sayyaf guerrilla group in Mindanao; the U.S. government provided US\$468 million to the Indonesian government for curtailing the presence of radical Islamic thought in school curriculum (Simon, 2004a: 70). However, Southeast Asian people, particularly those of Muslim faith, disliked the U.S. government’s involvement in terrorism issues. First, these critics felt that the U.S. government’s anti-terrorism campaign was “a war against Islam” (Mauzy and Job, 2007: 638). Second, some Southeast Asians believed the U.S. government’s war on terrorism infringed upon their nations’ sovereignty. For example, the secretary general of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas Din Syansudd argued that the U.S. government’s efforts to expunge radical Islamic thought from the country’s education programme was “a form of interference” (Simon, 2004b: 70).

The Chinese government, meanwhile, has been profiting from Southeast Asians’ resentment of the U.S. government by increasing its own share of influence in Southeast Asia. To accomplish this feat, China has made generous offerings of assistance available to the region’s countries. Many scholars agree that this pattern has further marginalised the U.S. government’s influence in Southeast Asia (Mauzy and Job, 2007: 633-4, Sutter, 2009: 206). Since late in George W. Bush’s second presidential term, the U.S. government has gradually sought to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, which is clearly an important area to the U.S. government, anti-terrorism campaigns aside: economically, ASEAN has been the United States’ fifth largest trading partner,⁶³ and, politically, ASEAN—after creating the APSC by 2015—may increase its standing in the international community. So the U.S. government has

⁶³ Hence, the U.S. government continued to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, despite criticising human-rights abuses in Myanmar (Katsumata, 2009: 624).

regarded its involvement in the creation of the APSC as an opportunity to buoy U.S. influence in Southeast Asia. After ASEAN members adopted the ASEAN Charter at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, the U.S. government was the first ASEAN's dialogue partner to appoint its own ambassador to the regional organisation, Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Scott Marciel. In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the ASEAN Secretariat. This was the first time that a U.S. Secretary of State had expressly set out to meet an ASEAN Secretariat. Under the Obama administration, the U.S. government has shown an appreciation for Southeast Asia's vast importance as a region (Wilson, 2012: 113).

5.4.2.2 The U.S. Government's Strategy

5.4.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

In order to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government has provided countries there with assistance for tackling freedom-from-want problems, particular as spelled out in the APSC and the ASCC blueprints. The U.S. government has used the five-year ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration (ADVANCE) as a conduit for this effort. As noted, in 2007, the U.S. government and ASEAN created the ADVANCE, which comprised four projects: the ASEAN–U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility, the ASEAN Single Window Project, the ASEAN Value Chain Project and the Lao BTA Implementation/WTO Accession Project. The aim of the ASEAN–U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility was to promote the freedom-from-want elements as outlined in the AC by enhancing the capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat to address transnational crimes, disaster management, environmental degradation, climate change, and regional human rights (Wilson, 2012: 115-7).

Under this project, the U.S. government contributed to disaster-management preparedness. The U.S. trade and Development Agency (USTDA) sponsored the Workshop on ASEAN Disaster Management, Mitigation, and Response Technologies in Bangkok, whose purpose was to enhance ASEAN's "capabilities for emergency preparedness and disaster management and to promote a stronger U.S. private sector role in supporting these efforts," and made available various experts whose task was to cooperate with the AHA Centre to develop the ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System (ADMRS), which would "enable the AHA Centre to have better overall capability to analyse disasters and speed up decision making" (ASEAN, July 24, 2012b).

The U.S. government also provided support and assistance to various causes for the

furtherance of human rights. In October 2010, the U.S. government funded the Human Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN (HRRCA), whose tasks have been to “pursue research, training, teaching, capacity building, and raising awareness of human rights issues and the rule of law throughout the ASEAN region” (U.S. Department of State, October 18, 2010). The U.S. government also supported the work of the ACWC and invited members of the ACWC to visit the United States for exchanges of important information. In April 2012, members of the ACWC took up the invitation and discussed with U.S., NGOs and academic groups various human-rights issues.

Between the 1950s and 2002, the U.S. government’s strategies for handling the creation of the APSC and the U.S. government’s strategies for handling Southeast Asian human-security issues evolved, sometimes quite dramatically. First, the U.S. government focused its attention on an ever widening scope of Southeast Asian human-security issues. The APSC and the ASCC blueprints identify, for example, newer freedom-from-want issues in which the U.S. government has involved itself, and among these issues are natural-disaster management, suppression of transnational crime, and climate-change responses. A second change over the decades has been the broadening array of human-security issues that have attracted the U.S. government’s attention. Take the example of human-rights issues. Between 1990 and 2002 alone, the U.S. government began concertedly occupying itself with the human-rights situation in Southeast Asia, even though neither the criticism nor the sanctions that resulted substantively helped victims whose respective governments were dramatically infringing on human rights. Noting the less than stellar performance of U.S. policy in this regard, Ian Holliday argued that the U.S. government should adopt “a more nuanced carrot-and-stick approach” to address the Myanmar problem specifically (Holliday, 2005). Satu Limaye argued that difference between the human-rights perspectives held by the U.S. government and those held by national Southeast Asian governments are a significant barrier to improve relationships between the two regions (Limaye, 2007: 453-5). However, the U.S. government’s approach to human-rights issues shifted from one that was hard-line to one that was considerably softer. This change has been a promising new start for the U.S. government’s efforts to increase U.S. influence in Southeast Asia. In 2007, the leader of the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), Sam Rainsy praised the U.S. government’s decision to “lift the Congressional ban on direct U.S. funding for Cambodia” and said that “China does not pay any attention on human rights. We cannot leave our country to Chinese influence alone. The world must become more balanced” (cited from Simon, 2007a: 68)

5.4.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

In order to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government has provided assistance regarding the APSC's freedom-from-fear element. Since 2006, the U.S. government has spent US\$14.8 million trying to strengthen the Indonesian government's peacekeeping capacity through improvements in barracks and the purchase of important equipment (U.S. Department of State, November 18, 2011). In addition, the United States was the main sponsor of the Cambodian and Indonesian Peacekeeping Training Center. In 2009 and 2010, the U.S. government sponsored peacekeeping training exercises (known as Garuda Shield-09 and the Angkor Sentinel) in Indonesia and Cambodia.

The long-running separatist movements in Mindanao have been other matter attracting the substantive attention of the U.S. government in recent years. The U.S. government has not only trained the Filipino troops to combat Muslim extremists Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) but also implemented peacebuilding in Mindanao. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development allocated US\$2.5 million for the reconstruction of schools in Mindanao in June 2009 (Simon, 2008: 66).

Some ASEAN members have recognised the importance of the U.S. government's role in regional freedom-from-fear issues. In 2007, the Filipino President Arroyo commented on the U.S. government's involvement in anti-terrorism and peacebuilding in Mindanao: "Our strategic relationship with the United States has always been a leading point for Philippines and regional security—and becomes even more important as we push for strong collective security arrangements in ASEAN and in East Asia involving the U.S., China, and Japan (Simon, 2007a: 64).

5.4.3 *Summary*

From the 1950s to 1989, the motivations underlying the U.S. government's involvement in Southeast Asian human security centred on preventing the expansion of communism in the region. The U.S. government's involvement created human insecurities: the Marcos regime used the U.S. government's assistance to strengthen Filipino military power and used its strengthened military to suppress with greater efficiency the dissidents in Mindanao; the U.S. government's intervention in Vietnam created heavy casualties. From 1990 to 2002, the U.S. government's ideological motivations ceded place to a promotion of human rights. The U.S. government adopted hard-line approach in response to the Southeast Asian human-rights issues, which soured diplomatic relationships with Southeast Asian countries. Regarding the

anti-terrorism campaign, many Southeast Asians considered it an unjust campaign against Islam. People and governments in Southeast Asian countries resented the U.S. government's involvement in these issues. The U.S. government's influence in Southeast Asia declined and meanwhile, the Chinese government took advantage of the U.S. government's declining influence in Southeast Asia to increase its power in this region. The U.S. government seized upon the APSC's creation is a powerful opportunity to expand American influence throughout Southeast Asia: the U.S. government has recently provided assistance for freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear objectives.

5.5 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter

5.5.1 What Are Barriers to the Creation of the APSC?

In this chapter, we reviewed each selected external power's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues as it evolved from the 1950s to 2002, and we explored each external power's strategies in response to the APSC. As mentioned in chapter two's state actors section (2.1.4.2), states have their motivations when they are involved in human-security issues. As we can see from Table 5.2, each power in question had its own motivations for getting involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. Between the 1950s and 1989, ideological confrontation was the main factor directing most external powers' motivations toward either preventing or expanding communism. After the removal of this brand of ideological hostility, motivations changed. Australia and Japan have created human-security diplomacy and have actively promoted it, while China and the U.S. have promoted their own sets of modified values: in China's case, the government has come to support the principle of non-interference whereas, in the U.S. case, the government presents itself as a supporter of human rights.

These four external powers have been strategically involved in the creation of the APSC, and the strategies have been similar to one another: with the exception of the Chinese government, which has downplayed the APSC's freedom-from-fear element, these external powers have supported the creation of the APSC (please see Table 5.3). All the powers have regarded the creation of the APSC as an opportunity to achieve their national interests. The motivations underlying their strategies have also been similar to one another: China, Japan, the U.S. have sought to increase their influence in Southeast Asia, while Australia has been protecting its people from various human insecurities.

Table 5.2 Motivations for select external powers' involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues

States	The 1950s to 1989	1990 to 2002
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent communism's expansion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote human-security diplomatic policies
China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese • Expand communism's influence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the principle of non-interference • Be a regional leader
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve national reputation • Protect economic and security interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain national reputation by means of human-security diplomacy
U.S.A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent communism's expansion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote human-rights values

Source: Author's own compilation

Table 5.3 Strategies and motivations of external powers in response to the creation of the APSC

States	Strategies	Motivations
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the APSC including freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear elements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect its people from various human insecurities
China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the freedom-from-want element • Downplay the freedom-from-fear element 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain leadership in Southeast Asia • Support the principle of non-interference
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the APSC including freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear elements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase its influence in Southeast Asia
USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the APSC including freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear elements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase its influence in Southeast Asia

Source: Author's own compilation

Have external powers created a barrier to the creation of the APSC, despite their adoption of supportive strategies? If yes, what kinds of barriers? The answer probably has to do with the repercussions that human-development programmes can have—a concept discussed in chapter two (see section 2.1.3). For example, from the 1950s to 1989, the U.S. government provided assistance to the Filipino government, but President Marcos used the assistance to strengthen his military forces' repression of Mindanao's Muslim secessionists, which compounded incursions into freedom from fear there. Likewise, external powers' human-development programmes related to the creation of the APSC have had their own repercussions. A notable example is the Chinese government's participation in cooperative efforts involving the Mekong River—several types of human insecurity have resulted (please see section 5.2.2.2.1). This overall situation has become a barrier to ASEAN's goal of creating the APSC, particularly regarding environmental sustainability, poverty reduction, and natural-disaster management. The Chinese government, for its part, has provided no solutions to the problems under its purview. Moreover, a tendency has emerged in Southeast Asia for some Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia included, to foster closer ties to China. Closer ties between Cambodia and China, for example, have undermined ASEAN's unity. When Cambodia assumed the chair of the twenty-first ASEAN Summit in November 2012, the Cambodian Foreign Minister stated that “Southeast Asian leaders had decided that they will not internationalise the South China Sea from now on” (cited from Simon, 2013: 57). ASEAN leaders suspected that the Cambodian government's declaration was made at the behest of the Chinese government (Simon, 2013: 57). Of future concern is whether the Chinese government, in order to protect its national interests, will pressure its allies among ASEAN's member states to withdraw support for the proposal that ASEAN resolve human insecurities traceable directly to the Chinese government's actions.

CHAPTER 6 STATE ACTORS III: MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

Chapter six will discuss regional and international organisations as comprising a type of state actor. The main emphasis here will be on three state actors: ASEAN, the EU, and the UN, which since the 1970s, have been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The chapter will detail the three actors' strategies and underlying motivations in regard to the creation of the APSC. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter two's commentary on state actors (see section 2.1.4.2), regional and international organisations have advantages and disadvantages when addressing human-security issues. For this reason, chapter six will also explore the advantages and disadvantages that characterise the involvement of ASEAN, the EU, and the UN in Southeast Asian human-security issues, including in particular the creation of the APSC.

6.1 ASEAN

Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN as a regional organisation has been involved in several human-security issues in Southeast Asia, but its ability to address human insecurities has been limited. In order to enhance its ability, ASEAN decided to transform itself into a rules-based organisation, namely through the creation of the AC. However, ASEAN's ability in this regard has not improved. In this section, I will review ASEAN's past involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues and explore what factors have hampered ASEAN's ability to address regional human insecurities. Then, I will analyse how ASEAN has dealt with the regional human-security issues that were laid down in APSC-related documents and what factors have impeded ASEAN's ability to address various regional human-security issues.

6.1.1 Historical Review: Since Inception in 1967 to 2002

I have divided the following historical review of ASEAN into two parts. Both parts discuss how ASEAN addressed regional human-security issues. The first part covers the period extending from ASEAN's inception in 1967 to 1989, and the second part covers the years from 1990 to 2002.

6.1.1.1 From 1967 to 1989

Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has served as a platform where state members can

cooperate on human-security issues. However, ASEAN's norms and identities have been obstacles to ASEAN's management of human insecurities.

As mentioned in chapter 1 (see section 1.3.1.1.4), the term 'ASEAN norms' refers roundly to the principle of non-interference. The non-interference principle stemmed from ASEAN members' mutual-distrust (Katanyuu, 2006: 826-7), itself resulting from a regional historical legacy of entrenched feuds and long-running competition over territory (Leifer, 1980: 11-3). Given this sometimes poisonous atmosphere, member-states were worried that their counterparts would financially and militarily support acts of domestic subversion, such as Muslim secessionist activity and communist insurgency warfare. In this context, ASEAN's original members signed the TAC in 1976, which outlined ASEAN's norms: "non-interference in the internal affairs of one another" (ASEAN, February 24, 1976b). It cannot be reasonably denied that the motivation underlying ASEAN's decision to address the Cambodian conflict was protection of the principle of non-interference (Acharya, 2009b: 101-117). However, as mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.1.4.2), regional organisations' norms may become a barrier to the realisation of human-security targets. A significant barrier realising the principle non-interference is that ASEAN members, through their adherence to the principle, have successfully pursued certain national interests that contravene the concept of human security—protection of human beings.

ASEAN's identities refer to the ASEAN Way (for a review of the ASEAN Way, see section 1.3.1.1.4). According to constructivist discourse, the ASEAN Way has helped ASEAN avoid inter-state tension (Acharya, 2009b: 78-85). However, in terms of the human-security concept, these qualities have limited ASEAN's ability to address human insecurities, because under implementation of the ASEAN Way, ASEAN has lacked bureaucratic institutions capable of monitoring its own implementation of ASEAN's plans. Probably of more importance is the absence in ASEAN of binding regulations that could deter members' contravention of ASEAN decisions. Such regulations are a critical mechanism by which regional organisations address human-security issues (see section 2.1.4.2).

6.1.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

ASEAN did not specifically discuss human-security issues until the first ASEAN Summit held in Bali in 1976. At this summit, ASEAN issued the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and agreed to cooperate in freedom-from-want issues, including elimination of poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy, improvement of living standards, and a renewed campaign against transnational crime, including drug abuse and trafficking (ASEAN, February 24, 1976a). In

order to enhance ASEAN members' cooperation on the above issues, ASEAN created several Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, like 1980's ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (AHMM) and 1981's ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment (AMME). ASEAN also issued declarations and agreements, like the ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuses of Narcotics Drugs (1976) and the Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment (1984). However, these meetings and declarations were limited insofar as they could address human insecurities.

As an example of the ASEAN Way, take the issue of environmental sustainability. In 1981, ASEAN launched the AMME, which had a total of three meetings from 1981 to 1989. In each meeting, ASEAN members pledged to pursue environmental sustainability in various ways.⁶⁴ However, ASEAN failed to identify the cooperation oriented details of these pledges, such as which law-enforcement agencies would be responsible for policing the extent of members' cooperation. Ralf Emmers pointed out that an obstacle to ASEAN members' management of human insecurities has been ASEAN's reliance on "non-binding and unspecific measures without addressing the question of funding, setting target dates and establishing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress" (Emmers, 2003: 430). The lack of enforcement and the lack of specificity are quality of the ASEAN Way. Thus, although ASEAN held meetings and issued declarations, environmental sustainability in ASEAN members' respective states did not greatly improve. In fact, Indonesia and Malaysia were members that permitted large-scale deforestation in the 1980s (Dupont, 2001: 50-1).

The principle of non-interference has prevented ASEAN from improving the regional human-rights situation. Prior to 1991, ASEAN members never discussed human-rights issues in reference to the ASEAN agenda. They regarded development of human rights as a threat to their regimes' viability,⁶⁵ and "the non-interference principle enabled countries to concentrate on domestic matters, avoiding interference or criticism from other states" (Katsumata, 2004: 243). Thus, member-states eschewed efforts to integrate discussions about human-rights issues into the ASEAN agenda. For example, after the Regional Council of Human Rights in Asia in 1983 submitted the Declaration on the Basic Duties of ASEAN Peoples and Governments to ASEAN, discussions about this document never took place in the ASEAN agenda (Phan, 2008: 2).

⁶⁴ Please see <http://environment.asean.org/documentation/>

⁶⁵ Interview in Indonesia, January 27, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei

6.1.1.1.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The principle of non-interference has, as well, been a major obstacle to ASEAN members' handling of freedom-from-fear issues: Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and the mass killings in Cambodia in the late 1970s are brutal reminders of this pattern. In 1975, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor led to heavy casualties. However, ASEAN members—rather than criticise the Indonesian government's illegal annexation—actually supported it (Jones, 2012: 67-73). Two reasons explain ASEAN members' failure to criticise these actions. First, in the Cold War period, ASEAN members spared no efforts to suppress their own communist insurgencies, because communism was a threat to regime's viability and political stability. They were also worried that, in particular, an independent East Timor would lead to communism's expansion regionwide (Jones, 2012: 59-73). Moreover, many ASEAN members did not want to voice criticism that might sour their relationship with Indonesia, for such a turn of events might create tension in the region and, thus, weaken national security (Dupont, 2000: 164). It is safe to say that the principle of non-interference was the main factor leading ASEAN members to respond as they did to the Indonesian annexation of East Timor, and this principle had its roots in the widespread pursuit among member-states of two central national interests: the prevention of communist expansion and the promotion of national safety. Likewise it is this same principle of non-interference that explains ASEAN's failure to stand up for East Timorese as they fell victim to the Indonesian government's atrocities.

Regarding freedom from fear, the other example cited above has to do with the mass killings under the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s. The Democratic Kampuchea regime of Pol Pot was responsible for the brutal deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. ASEAN members chose to be officially silent on the mass deaths, because “Cambodia under Pol Pot was seen as a useful ‘buffer’ against any Vietnamese plans to foment revolution abroad” (Jones, 2012: 78). Likewise, in order to promote national interests (which, for many member-states, included preventing the expansion of Vietnamese influence), ASEAN is a collection of autonomous states chose to adhere to the principle of non-interference; that is, the organisation refrained from voicing concerns about the victims.

6.1.1.2 *From 1990 to 2002*

From 1989, when Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia to 2002, several human-security incidents emerged in Southeast Asia: the outbreak of the Asian economic crisis in 1997; pro-Indonesian militias' massacre of East Timorese in the wake of the UN-supervised

ballot of August 1999; deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia in 2002; and transboundary haze pollution. These events and themes, at best, diminished people's living standards and, at worst, claimed people's lives and severely damaged to people's living environments. A few scholars argued that in order to address new challenges, ASEAN has changed its norms. Hiro Katsumata argued that ASEAN has changed its principle of non-interference to "open and frank discussions" (Katsumata, 2004). Ruukun Katanyuu argued that ASEAN members, in particular founding members, have relaxed their adherence to the principle of non-interference (Katanyuu, 2006). Indeed, the principle of non-interference has come under fire from ASEAN members. In 1998, Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan suggested that ASEAN's non-interference principle should cede place to "flexible engagement". However, I argue that norms and identities remain extraordinarily potent guideposts in the ASEAN agenda. In other words, ASEAN's norms and identities remain a formidable obstacle to ASEAN's engagement with human insecurities.

6.1.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

Between 1990 and 2002, ASEAN encountered freedom-from-want problems. In response, ASEAN called for yet more meetings and issued yet more declarations. Throughout all of these activities, ASEAN's approach to addressing human-security issues has remained firmly rooted in obedience to norms and identities.

Take the example of haze pollution. Since the 4th AMME, ASEAN has emphasised that it is necessary for ASEAN members to cooperate with one another in addressing haze pollution. In 1995, ASEAN members adopted the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution. And two years later, in 1997, ASEAN created the Regional Action Plan in response specifically to haze pollution. Under this plan, ASEAN members are encouraged to create their own plans for prevention of haze pollution, to strengthen their own ability to monitor and anticipate haze pollution, and to improve their own "fire fighting capability" (Jones, 2004: 64-5). However, David Seth Jones argued that this plan was "no more than recommendations which were not binding on members states" (Jones, 2004: 65). More important is the fact that this plan gave rise to a way of operating that was remarkably similar to the one employed by ASEAN between 1967 and 1989: in both cases, there was a definite lack of detailed information regarding who "would be responsible for drawing up the list of resources, expertise, and procedures for preventing and fighting fires" (Jones, 2004: 65).

ASEAN members have adhered to the principle of non-interference, particularly for

ASEAN's newer members. As mentioned in chapter two's discussion of Cambodia (see section 4.2.2.1), we know that the Cambodian government has been a strong supporter of the non-interference principle. Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam have also been prominent advocates of the principle. These newer members opposed Surin's proposal for "constructive intervention" (Acharya, 2003: 383, Thayer, 1999: 41). Their insistence has prevented ASEAN from addressing human-rights issues. For example, since the early 2000s, ASEAN has changed its policies towards Myanmar's woeful human-rights record. ASEAN has pressured Myanmar to improve domestically human rights and to accept democracy as a form of national government. However, the Myanmar junta has, more often than not, used the principle of non-interference as pretext for rejecting improvements to the nation's human-rights situation (Haacke, 2006: 45).

6.1.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

ASEAN's involvement in East Timorese peacekeeping operations suggested that ASEAN members have remained to adhere to the principle of non-interference. After the UN-sponsored independent ballot in East Timor in August 1999, pro-Jakarta militias killed hundreds of East Timorese, which attracted international criticism. However, most ASEAN members were silent to this tragedy (Freistein, 2005: 184), because they adhered to the principle of non-interference. ASEAN members' adherence to this instance of the non-interference doctrine was rooted not so much in a concern over people's well-being as in a wish not to encourage their own domestic separatist movements and an equally notable wish not to irritate Indonesia, ASEAN's largest member-states (Dupont, 2000: 164). Again, ASEAN's response to the East Timorese massacre was related to member-states' national interests.

After the bloody campaign in East Timor, ASEAN members (Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) joined the INTERFET. Two motivations account for this decision by the four members: first of all, they expected that their participation in the INTERFET could enhance ASEAN's credibility, which had diminished significantly during the financial crisis owing to the organisation's incompetent response to it; and second of all, these members wanted to balance the Australian government's leading role in East Timor's peacekeeping task (Dupont, 2000: 166-7). An important point is worth making here: Although ASEAN members participated in the East Timorese peacekeeping task, the participation neither offset nor degraded in any substantial way either ASEAN's consensual style of decision-making or ASEAN's adherence to the principle of non-interference (Haacke, 2003: 70). ASEAN

members still had the right to invoke the “ASEAN Minus X”⁶⁶ calculation. In this regard, Myanmar and Vietnam expressed little interest in the East Timorese-peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission (Dupont, 2000: 168). Moreover, ASEAN members’ participation rested on both the explicit agreement of and an explicit invitation from the Indonesian government (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005a: 132). Had the Indonesian government’s consent not been forthcoming, one can reasonably speculate that the ASEAN members would have refrained from the mission as originally defined, despite its function of enhancing ASEAN’s international credibility.

6.1.2 *ASEAN’s Involvement in the Creation of the APSC*

In chapter one, I explored the motivations underlying ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC. In this section, I will explore ASEAN’s handling of human-security issues relative to the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC. I argue that the ability of ASEAN to address human-security issues has been limited, because the way in which ASEAN has addressed those issues has been inextricable from its *modus operandi*, namely the combination of the non-interference principle and the ASEAN Way.

6.1.2.1 *ASEAN’s Modus Operandi in the APSC*

6.1.2.1.1 *Freedom from Want*

The blueprint of the APSC involves ASEAN in several freedom-from-want issues. Five main issues will be discussed in this section: opposition to transnational crime, promotion of environmental sustainability, promotion of public health and control of communicable diseases, reduction of risk from natural disasters, and promotion and protection of human rights.

6.1.2.1.1.1 *Opposition to Transnational Crimes*

Combat transnational crimes have been one of the human-security issues in the APSC blueprints (ASEAN, 2009a: 12-3). So far, ASEAN has issued several declarations. In November 2004, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children. In this declaration, ASEAN pledged to combat the human-

⁶⁶ “ASEAN Minus X” means ASEAN members have had the option of participating in or refraining from joint ventures, an approach similar to the one outlined in the ASEAN Way—flexible participation and non-binding commitment.

trafficking problem through various measures including the creation of a regional network, the prevention of fraudulent use of travel documents, intensified cooperation among member-states' enforcement authorities, and the protection of victims of such crimes (ASEAN, November 29, 2004a). In 2007, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, which came into force in May 2011. The convention provided the framework in which ASEAN would combat terrorist activities. The cooperation included exchanges of information and intelligence, strengthening of border control, suppression of terrorists' tools (e.g., of terrorist financing), and development of members' anti-terrorism capacity through training and meetings (ASEAN, January 9-15, 2007).

However, ASEAN's ability to address transnational crimes has been limited, because the approach underlying this effort has rested squarely on the ASEAN Way. These documents elucidated the related areas in which ASEAN members would cooperate and the measures that ASEAN members would adopt. However, these documents lay out no concrete actions: Which agencies in member-states should conduct cooperative training and intelligence operations? Where will ASEAN acquire the resources for funding and equipment? And how will ASEAN overcome inter-member difficulties like unequal skill levels and infrastructure levels among member-states? These problems suggest that ASEAN has preferred to address problems in line with under the ASEAN Way. However, as mentioned previously (see section 6.1.1.1.1), the ASEAN Way has been a barrier to ASEAN's handling of address transnational crimes. As suggested by comments made by Ralf Emmers, ASEAN's approach to addressing transnational crimes has not improved ASEAN members' ability to combat the transnational crimes. He specifically stated,

I am doing some work on human trafficking. I remember interviewing people, and I was told that, in Laos, one very basic problem is the lack of computers. So, Thailand may have information on someone they have found who is working as a prostitute in Bangkok and has been the victim of human trafficking. Police will ask you to share the information on your country of origin. But, if you don't have appropriate data bases, it is very difficult to find out where this person is coming from. There are lots of anecdotes of this nature, but this is what we really mean by capacity.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei.

6.1.2.1.1.2 *Promotion of Environmental Sustainability*

ASEAN embedded provisions for both environmental protection and environmental sustainability in the ASCC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009b: 14-20) and, to a lesser extent, in the APSC blueprint (specifically, the provision addresses illegal fishing) (ASEAN, 2009a: 16). As with the effort to combat transnational crime, ASEAN has addressed environmental problems on the basis largely of the ASEAN Way. Let us again take the topic of haze pollution as an example. In the ASCC blueprint, ASEAN agreed to implement the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, signed by ASEAN members in June 2002, and to create the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control (ASEAN, 2009b: 14-5). However, the prevention of haze pollution in the ASCC blueprint has lacked detail: Which agency in each member should be responsible for regional cooperation? Which member should cover the expenses related to meetings and so on? And how should ASEAN handle non-compliant members. The absent of such details is a pattern similarly applicable to the ASEAN Way, in which non-binding commitment and flexible participation are preeminent. Lorraine Elliott argued that the ASEAN Way would prevent ASEAN from addressing environmental problems rigorously. She stated, in particular, that “ASEAN’s anti-institutionalism is now increasingly a barrier to dealing with the kinds of interdependencies and crisis situations associated with environmental degradation and resource decline” (Elliott, 2003: 45). Of course, we cannot reasonably deny that some members have actively addressed haze pollution (Nguitragool, 2011: 364). As a case in point, the Singaporean government has pressured the Indonesian government to reduce factors contributing to haze pollution. However, adoption of the ASEAN Way has meant that non-compliant members run no risk of bringing down upon themselves onerous sanctions. Thus, even though ASEAN created a measure to address haze pollution, people in Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia continue to suffer from completely avoidable haze spawned by Indonesian bushfires.

6.1.2.1.1.3 *Promotion of Public Health and Control of Communicable Diseases*

In the area of public health and communicable diseases, ASEAN has adopted several measures in the blueprint of the ASCC. The measures include cooperation through meetings and other exchanges of information involving experts, growth in people’s awareness of diseases through educational activities, adherence to the international norms like the International Health Regulations 2005, and implementation of regional disease-prevention programs like the ASEAN Work Programme on HIV and AIDS (ASEAN, 2009b: 8-10). Again, these measures have been non-binding commitments and have lacked detailed

information regarding such pivotal matters which agency in ASEAN members should oversee health problems singled out in the ASEAN agenda?

ASEAN's involvement in this area has lacked sufficient substance also because relevant agencies have lacked proficiency in their particular field. For example, Mely Caballero-Anthony pointed out that robust monitoring networks have been the chief mechanism for managing outbreaks of diseases and that public-health experts and equipment have been the critical elements in creating international as well as regional networks, but that less-developed ASEAN countries have lacked both public health experts and equipment (Caballero-Anthony, 2008: 518-9). Ironically, the ASCC blueprint makes no mention of any mechanism for resolving these deficiencies.

6.1.2.1.1.4 Reduction of Risk from Natural Disasters

ASEAN embedded guidelines for natural-disaster management in the APSC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009a: 14) and the ASCC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009b: 11). Perhaps, the most important task in these guidelines is to implement the AADMER, whose aims have been “substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of” ASEAN members (ASEAN, July 2005) through the creation of an effective mechanism for enhancing regional cooperation, and more importantly, creation of the AHA Centre, which would serve as the platform for ASEAN's cooperation with external actors, like the UN regarding natural-disaster issues (ASEAN, 2009b: 79-80). In order to improve members' ability to respond to natural disasters, ASEAN held a series of exercises, including the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercises (ARDEX). The ARF, ASEAN-derived institutions, also held the Disaster Relief Exercise Table Top Exercise (2008), the ASEAN Regional Forum Voluntary Demonstration of Response on Disaster Relief (2009), and the Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) (Collins, 2013: 136).

Although ASEAN has strengthened its ability to respond to natural disasters, implementation of the AADMER has been based on the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN Way. Regarding the principle of non-interference, the AADMER states that “each affected party shall have the primary responsibility to respond to disasters occurring within its territory” (ASEAN, July 2005). At first glance, this statement is similar, and content, to the RtoP concept—“the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare” (ICISS, 2001: 13). However, the AADMER also states that “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of the

parties shall be respected...external assistance or offers of assistance shall only be provided upon the request or with the consent of the affected party” (ASEAN, July 2005). This statement suggests that the implementation of the AADMER has rested on the principle of non-interference, which may delay external assistance to natural-disaster victims. Alan Collins argued that this provision “is actually an example of the [ASEAN] norms’ vitality” (Collins, 2013: 148).

Regarding ASEAN identities, ASEAN “is proud to claim the AADMER is the one and only legally-binding instrument in the world relating to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)” (Collins, 2013: 135). The HFA is an objective in the Yokohama Strategy, which serves “to strengthen regional response to natural disasters” (Collins, 2013: 133), and the HFA clearly regulates what state actors must do—and how they must do it—when responding to natural disasters (Collins, 2013: 135). However, the AADMER, like other ASEAN declaration, lacks of detailed information. For example, Alan Collins pointed out that the AADMER has failed to deliver sustainable development policies and guidelines of the involvement of non-state actors in natural-disaster management (Collins, 2013: 136).

6.1.2.1.1.5 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights

Since ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC, human rights have become a spotlight issue for member-states and for external powers concerned about Southeast Asia. The international community and media have been observing how ASEAN developed human-rights issues. As mentioned in sections 4.3.2.2.1 and 4.5.2.2.1, Indonesia and Malaysia were the two members that insisted upon the ASEAN Charter’s enshrinement of human-rights language. Indeed, during the APSC-building process, ASEAN has achieved several related targets (please see Table 1.3). Has ASEAN promoted human rights without having considered the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN Way?

I argue that the ability of ASEAN to address human-rights issues has been limited, because the human-rights mechanism that ASEAN created has rested on the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN Way. Since ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC, not only ASEAN representatives, mainly the EPG and the High-Level Task Force (HLTF), but also CSOs have held several meetings devoted to human-rights affairs, including human-rights language in the ASEAN Charter and creation of a regional human-rights body (Dosch, 2008: 532-6). As for the human-rights body, CSOs have suggested that for it to be strong, the body’s representatives must be independent from their respective governments, the body must reject consensus decision-making, and body must operate fairly and freely, without

submitting to constraints characteristic of the non-interference principle (Collins, 2013: 95-6).

In 2009, ASEAN created the regional human-rights body AICHR, whose Terms of Reference (ToR) included the ASEAN norms and identities. Article 2.1 a-c is informed by the principle of non-interference: “respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN members states; non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN members states; and respect for the right of every member state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion”; in its turn, Article 2.4 is informed by “pursuance of a constructive and non-confrontational approach” (ASEAN, October 2009: 4-5), which is one of the qualities of the ASEAN Way. Not all the ASEAN members funded the AICHR. As mentioned in chapter two’s commentary on the state actors (see section 2.1.4.2), an advantage of having multi-lateral organisation to address human-security issues is that regional and international organisations can retain the right to collect funds from individual states, rendering the organisations at times more robust, policy-wise, than the individual states could be on their own. However, according to Alan Collins, “the lack of resources is a serious hindrance to what AICHR can achieve” (Collins, 2013: 98). Thus, ASEAN members have not granted the AICHR the right to investigate human-rights violations alleged to have occurred in ASEAN member-states. It is reasonable to characterise the AICHR as a regional human-rights body without teeth.

6.1.2.1.2 Freedom from Fear

ASEAN’s involvement in the freedom-from-fear issue is on display in the APSC blueprint. As mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.1.3), the RtoP has been means by which ASEAN can address freedom-from-fear issues, such as massacres. But ASEAN adopted several different measures for achieving freedom from fear. The APSC blueprint mentions such conflict-avoidance and dispute-resolution measures as the implementation of CBMs, the clarification of ASEAN members’ defence policies, and the establishment of the AIPR (ASEAN, 2009a: 8-10). In addition, ASEAN members agreed that conflicts and disputes “should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures” (ASEAN, 2009a: 10), and when conflicts and disputes remain unresolved, they “shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit” (ASEAN, 2007: 24). However, these measures serve mainly to manage inter-members relationships rather than to protect Southeast Asians (Sukma, 2012: 141).

Probably what Southeast Asians need is the RtoP. Chapter three discusses a survey I conducted inquiring into respondents’ knowledge about the AC and respondents’ sense of their own human security. These respondents, in particular, answer the following questions: If

your living environment is devastated by a natural disaster or you are exposed to atrocious crimes, like genocide, imposed on you by your own government, would you expect governments or groups outside your country to conduct a rescue operation within your own country's borders? Of the 120 respondents, 71 replied that external assistance should be forthcoming.

Rizal Sukma expressed a glimmer of hope that the five-year amendment in the ASEAN Charter (2013) and the APSC (2015) might include the RtoP (Sukma, 2012: 149). I argue that Sukma's anticipated outcome is unlikely to become a reality, at least in the short term. The key point is that ASEAN enshrined the principle of non-interference in the ASEAN Charter (Article 2.2.d and 2.2.e) (ASEAN, 2007: 5). As mentioned in chapter two's Cambodian section (see section 4.2.1.2.2), this principle stands a remarkably poor chance of co-existing effectively with the RtoP, because these two concepts have radically different perspectives of national sovereignty: the non-interference principle treats national sovereignty as sacrosanct whereas the RtoP unabashedly downplays the inviolability of national sovereignty, rendering it secondary to the protection of human beings. Moreover, ASEAN's newcomer member-states have been stalwart defenders of the non-interference principle. The principle has become the central mechanism by which ASEAN newcomers have sought to consolidate their respective regimes' stability and protect national sovereignty. Thus, it is unlikely for them to give up supporting of the principle of non-interference. It is safe to say that the measures that ASEAN provided to address freedom-from-fear issues may not be directly beneficial for Southeast Asians and the RtoP may not be enshrined in the ASEAN Charter in the short term.

6.1.3 Summary

Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN as a regional organisation has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. However, by adopting a consensual decision-making style and by adhering to the principle of non-interference ASEAN has limited its ability to address these issues effectively.

The ASEAN Charter and the APSC blueprint represent ASEAN's effort to remedy this problematic circumstance. These documents feature language supportive of human rights and signal the creation of a regional human-rights body. In addition, ASEAN has planned to address several pressing human-security issues, including transnational crime, natural disasters, diseases, and environmental problems. Despite this shift in focus, ASEAN has addressed these issues on the basis of its norms and identities, and many scholars have agreed that ASEAN's norms and identities have been a barrier to ASEAN's successful handling of

human-security issues. Thus, one can reasonably postulate that ASEAN's overall approach to human-security issues has not significantly changed since the organisation's inception.

6.2 The EU⁶⁸

The EU's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues started in the 1970s. The EU has provided development assistance, helped resolve refugee crises, and expressed concern about human-rights violations. Although the EU's involvement has been positive, some Southeast Asian countries and individuals have expressed disapproval of the EU's involvement. After ASEAN decided to create the AC, the EU has been actively involved in furthering this project—assistance that ASEAN has welcomed. In this section, I will review both the EU's responses to Southeast Asian human-security issues and the motivations underlying the EU's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues over the course of different periods. Then, I will explore the EU's strategic response to the creation of the AC and the EU's implementation of this strategy.

6.2.1 *Historical Review: From the 1970s to 2002*

The historical review in this chapter discusses how and why the EU was involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The discussion has two parts. The time-frame in the

⁶⁸ The EU's integration has its roots in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was created by Belgium, France, German, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1951. In 1957, the ECSC members established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). In 1965, member-states adopted the Luxembourg Compromise. Under this agreement, important resolutions were based on unanimous decision-making. In the same year, the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom were integrated into the European Communities by the Merger Treaty. By the late 1980s, the European Communities had experienced three enlargements. The first and second enlargements involved the acceptance of Denmark (1973), England (1973), Ireland (1973), and Greece (1981) into the fold. In 1983, the European Communities accepted Spain and Portugal as members, and adopted the Single European Act (SEA), which integrated each Community under a single entity entitled the European Community (EC) and which created a single European market. In 1991, the EC's members signed the Maastricht Treaty, according to which the EC officially became known as the EU in 1993. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU. In 2000, the EU's members signed the Treaty of Nice, which institutionalised the EU's enlargement. In 2005, the EU approved the largest enlargement, as the organisation welcomed ten new members: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania became official participants in the EU. The EU accepted Croatia as the organisation's 28th member in 2013. In order to avoid unnecessary complexities in terminology, I will use the term 'EC' to designate the organisation in my section covering the period between the 1970s and the late 1980 and I will use the term 'EU' in the remaining sections.

first part extends from the 1970s to 1989, and the time-frame in the second part extends from 1990 to 2002.

6.2.1.1 From the 1970s to 1989

Between the 1970s and 1989, the EC was involved in several Southeast Asian human-security issues. The motivations driving the EC's involvement in this region were rooted in economic and human-rights considerations. Regarding the economic considerations, the EC tried to strengthen both its own economic interests and Southeast Asia's economic interests by extending development assistance to the latter. Regarding the human-rights considerations, beginning in the 1970s, the EC voiced concerns about human-rights situations in third world countries. In Southeast Asia, the EC's central concerns pivoted chiefly on the refugee crisis resulting from the Indochinese wars waged from the 1970s to the late 1980s.

6.2.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

The EC provided developmental assistance to Southeast Asia (mainly ASEAN's founding members) and, in this way, tried to cultivate the region's freedom from want. The motivations underlying the EC's developmental assistance usually reflected a desire to strengthen the economics of Southeast Asia and of Europe, with the former being important to the latter: European countries imported much-needed raw materials like rubber, tin, copra, and palm oil from Southeast Asia (Hull, 1984: 24). The thinking was that the more prosperous a Southeast Asian country was, the more useful the country would be to the EC members. In this context, ASEAN and the EC signed the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement (AECA). According to this agreement, the signatories cooperated in commerce, culture, development, and the economy (Pettersson, 2006: 572). In the area of development, the EC focused on advancing ASEAN's members' rural areas and food production (Hull, 1984: 19). Whether the AECA's development projects made substantial contributions to ASEAN members' general populations remains unclear, mainly because of a distinct lack of detailed statistical information. One point that is clear, however, is that the AECA was the only region-to-region conduit through which the EC could get involved effectively in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues.

6.2.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

The freedom-from-fear issue that most preoccupied the EC was the refugee crisis resulting from the Indochinese wars. In the 1970s, the EC began addressing the human-rights

situations in countries outside the EC. For example, EC members held frequent formal discussions about such human-rights issues as Palestinians' human rights and South African apartheid policies, all in line with the European Political Cooperation (EPC) agenda (Smith, 2008: 117). As for Southeast Asia, the EC occupied itself with refugee problems. In July 1979, the EC launched a meeting devoted specifically to Indochinese refugees. At the meeting, EC members pledged that they would help resolve the crisis (EUROPA, July 20, 1979). Between the 1970s and the late 1980s, the EC provided food, shelter, health, education and training assistance through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Border Relief Organization (UNBRO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the NGOs (EUROPA, January 23, 1990). President of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities Michael O'Kennedy expressed the EC's position regarding the Indochinese refugee crisis at that time:

We uphold the right of people to leave their own countries freely and to return freely to them; we believe that no one should be obliged to leave his own country through fear or compulsion... We believe that anyone who does nevertheless leave his country of origin for any such reason must not be forcibly returned against his will, nor denied asylum elsewhere. (EUROPA, July 20, 1979)

6.2.1.2 From 1990 to 2002

From 1990 to 2002, the EU (formerly the EC) continued to involve itself in human-security issues in Southeast Asia. Motivating the EU's involvement herein was a desire to promote and protect human rights. As mentioned, beginning in the 1970s, the EC—and subsequently the EU—have addressed human-rights situations in non-member countries. In the post-Cold War period, the EU strengthened its promotion of human-rights values. Since the late 1980s, the EU has declared that human rights are a basic and important value held by EU members, confirming this position in the SEA (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and the Nice Treaty (2000). Also, the EU has cited the value of human rights as an underpinning of the organisation's external relations and policies (Møller, 2007: 474). Promotion and protection of human rights tended to be EU norms. Ian Manners argued that “the value of human rights plays a constitutive role in shaping the EU as a hybrid polity, as well as EU-self-images and EU relations with the rest of the world” (cited from Smith, 2008: 122).

In this context, human-rights issues constituted an important element, when the EU was

involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. For example, in the report *Creating a New Dynamic in EU–ASEAN Relations*, published by the European Commission in 1996, the EU reiterated that human rights and democracy “must be important elements of the political dialogue between the European Union and ASEAN” (European Commission, July 1996: 11). Interestingly, the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights have been incompatible with ASEAN’s principle of non-interference. Moreover, the EU’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-rights issues has rested on often intractably hard-line measures, like the imposition of sanctions on offending states. Thus, the EU’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-rights issues has not helped resolve human-rights violations, but has created noteworthy diplomatic friction between the EU and ASEAN.

6.2.1.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

Between 1990 and 2002, the EU continued its involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues. For example, the AECA extended to ASEAN new members: Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The EU also pursued rural development in Southeast Asia. For example, in 1998, the EU provided funding to develop rural area, education, legal reform and health and human resources in Laos (Thayer, 1999: 41) and, in 2002, the EU launched the National Indicative Programme, one of whose objectives was to develop rural areas in Cambodia, with an emphasis on water supply and construction of roads.

The most conspicuous Southeast Asian issue in which the EU was involved was probably human rights. However, this involvement soured diplomatic relationships between the EU and ASEAN. Because the Myanmar government did not improve its human-rights records, the EU imposed economic and political sanctions on the country, including an embargo on exports of goods, a refusal to issue visas to Myanmar officials, and a freeze on Myanmar officials’ assets abroad (Petersson, 2006: 571-4). In addition, the EU blocked Myanmar’s participation in the AECA (Manea, 2008: 376).

The EU’s involvement specifically in Myanmar’s human-rights issues was a notable source of tension between the EU and ASEAN. The central contributing factor to this tension was the difference between the EU and ASEAN regarding socio-political values (Møller, 2007: 474-5). Since the end of the Cold War, promotion and protection of human rights have been EU norms, whereas ASEAN, since its inception in 1967, has adhered to the principle of non-interference, which would most often trump human-rights concerns. As mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.1.4.2), a regional organisation’s norms can be a barrier to organisation’s handling of human-security issues. In theory, the EU’s norms should benefit

human rights. However, EU norms promote the concept of universal values, which clashes with the concept that nations' borders and nation's sovereignty are inviolable, and as noted, it is the latter concept that is central to ASEAN's handling of state matters. When the two sides act on the basis of their respective norms, disputes are inevitable. Møller argued that a desire to avoid confrontation explains ASEAN's preference for economic discussions rather than political and human-rights discussions when engaging with the EU (Møller, 2007: 472).

In the case of Myanmar, ASEAN insisted to follow the principle of non-interference in responding to the country's domestic affairs. The EU, by contrast, castigated the Myanmar government's gross abuse of human rights and imposed political and economic sanctions upon the Myanmar government. These two markedly different norms pitted the two regional organisations—and members of their wider communities—against each other. ASEAN members and certain segments of Southeast Asia's population expressed sharp antipathy toward the EU's stance. For example, ASEAN accused the EU of practicing "political imperialism," and even democratic activists in Myanmar described the EU as guilty of engaging in "political hypocrisies" (Rocher, 2012: 169-70). It is reasonable to say that the EU's norms became a catalyst for disputes that did little to resolve Myanmar's human-rights problems.

6.2.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Between 1990 and 2002, the EU was not involved in freedom-from-fear issues. Exemplifying this trend were Cambodian peacekeeping efforts: the EU *en masse* did not participate in the UNTAC and contributed to the post-conflict reconstruction. Because the EU generally absented itself from Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues, the European Commission in 2001 published *Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership*, which suggested that the EU should engage in freedom-from-fear issues in this region (European Commission, April 2001: 21). This report paved the way for the EU's involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues after ASEAN decided to create the APSC.

6.2.2 *Exploration of the EU's Strategies for the APSC*

6.2.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the EU's Strategies*

My historical review of EU's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues shows that between the 1970s and 2002, the EU's involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues was driven by its norms—promotion and protection of human rights. However, because significant differences between the EU norms and ASEAN norms have resulted in

diplomatic friction between the two parties and between their respective member-states, EU norms failed to improve the human-rights situation in Myanmar. With this pattern of conflict in mind, two questions merit our attention regarding the creation of the APSC: What strategies has the EU adopted in response to it? And has the EU's involvement in it corresponded to a constant or variable motivation?

The EU's strategies have supported the creation of the APSC. Two motivations have underlain the EU's strategies. The first EU motivation has been to protect its European people from human insecurities. Since the early 2000s, people in Europe have suffered from a series of human insecurities: in March 2004, train bombings struck Madrid; in July 2005, a series of suicide bomb attacks occurred in London; and Europe has become the destination for substantial illegal Asian migration (UNODC, 2012: 72). In order to protect people in Europe, the EU has sought cooperation with non-European countries to combat related human insecurities. Southeast Asian countries, where local extreme Muslim groups such as JI have links to Al-Qaeda and where trafficked people make their way to the European continent, has been a region of great importance to the EU. Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN has been a key strategy for the EU in addressing these problems. Thus, the EU has been able to support the creation of the APSC, one of whose goals has been to address transnational crimes.

The EU's second motivation has been to improve relationships with ASEAN. Since the 1970s, the EU has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. Different norms between the EU and ASEAN soured both diplomatic relationships. However, Southeast Asia has been an important region for the EU. Economically, the EU was ASEAN's second-largest export market and third-largest trading partner after Japan and the United States (European Commission, July 1996: 5). Politically, ASEAN has come to play a central role in East Asian political integration, and this centrality has served to increase ASEAN's political influence in East Asia (Eaton and Stubbs, 2006). The EU has hoped to consolidate its economic interests and expand its influence in Southeast Asia. For example, according to Yepes, many EU members, such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Sweden, have expected to strengthen either their economic or their political relationships with Asian countries, including Southeast Asian ones, through participation in the ASEM (Yepes, 2005: 27-9). ASEAN's decision to create the APSC provided the EU an opportunity to improve its relationships with ASEAN. Thus, individual EU members and the EU *en masse* have similarly expected to strengthen their relationships specifically with ASEAN through cooperation on several issues. Interestingly, while helping ASEAN create the APSC,

particularly in the area of human-rights issues, the EU has been adjusting its norms.

6.2.2.2 *The EU's Strategies*

6.2.2.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, one of the motivations underlying the EU's involvement in the creation of the APSC has been to protect European people from human insecurities. Little academic research has discussed the EU's involvement in the APSC blueprint's treatment of transnational-crime issues. In general, this involvement by the EU reflects its desire to cooperate with external actors to ameliorate the negative effects of transnational crime. The EU and ASEAN created the Regional Indicative Programme (2005–2006) one of whose targets was the effective combating of terrorism through shared information (Severino, 2006: 333-4). In 2008, the EU contributed €6 million to ASEAN to create the EU–ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building (2009–2013). The purpose of this project was to strengthen the capacity of less-developed ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat regarding the creation of compatible official statistical data. This project could offset the problems associated with less-developed ASEAN members' poor capacity to share accurate information about transnational crime. In 2010, the two organisations created the EU–ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme. Two pillars supported this programme. One was to facilitate trade between Europe and Southeast Asia and the other was to enhance cooperation on the issues of illegal migration and human trafficking (EUROPA, May 27-28, 2009).

The EU publicly praised and supported ASEAN's efforts to craft the APSC's human-rights elements. During the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter, the EU supported the embodiment of human-rights language in the Charter (European Commission, May 2007: 11). The EU welcomed ASEAN's embedding of the rights of migrant workers and the welfare of women in the blueprint of the ASCC (ASEAN, April 26-27, 2012, EUROPA, May 27-28, 2009). The EU also expressed its support for the creation of the AICHR and the ACWC (EUROPA, May 27-28, 2009). The EU arranged for officials in ASEAN's human-rights institutions to visit the EU.⁶⁹ Probably more importantly, the EU has created bilateral human-rights negotiation platforms. So far, the EU has launched bilateral human-rights dialogues with Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.

⁶⁹ For example, in February 2013, representatives of the ACWC visited the EU to share experiences and information regarding the protection and promotion of children's and women's rights.

The above examples suggest that the EU has adopted a soft approach to the human-rights element in the APSC. Møller argued that economic cooperation, such as implementation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), may be an opportunity for the EU to improve its relationships with ASEAN (Møller, 2007: 477-9). However, the real obstacle to solidifying these relationships has been the chasm between EU norms and ASEAN norms—a chasm that is unlikely to be bridged by economic cooperation alone. The EU’s adjustments to its norms suggest that the organisation has diagnosed the dilemma as stemming from a difference in norms. For example, in *A New Partnership with Southeast Asia*, the EU declared that its involvement in human-rights issues in Southeast Asia would hinge on dialogue that might enhance ASEAN members’ confidence in improving human rights and that might help the EU “explore possibilities for cooperation” (European Commission, 2003: 15). This is not to say that the EU has diverted its “hard-line” attention to human-rights issues; after all, the EU still criticises human-rights violations in Southeast Asia, as is this case with the EU’s continued pressure on Laos and Vietnam to improve their religious freedom. However, one thing of which we can be sure is that the EU’s policies towards Southeast Asian human-rights issues have gradually evolved from a hard approach to a soft one.

6.2.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

Regarding the freedom-from-fear element, the EU has inserted itself in civil wars in Indonesia, where the organisation specifically acted as a mediator in the Aceh peace process. In 2002, the EU provided €2.3 million to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which comprises NGOs engaging in peacekeeping operations around the world, and this financial assistance went to implementing the peace process in Aceh (Herrberg, 2008: 33). After a massive earthquake struck the Indian Ocean in 2004, triggering a catastrophic tsunami that devastated Aceh Province, the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari—under the auspices of the Finnish NGO Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)—arranged negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government. In August 2005, the Indonesian government and GAM signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), under which GAM had to demobilise and decommission its troops, while the Indonesian government had to withdraw its police and military forces from Aceh and release political Acehnese prisoners. In addition, according to the MoU, EU and ASEAN members had to create the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), whose tasks were to monitor the peace process in Aceh.

The motivation directly the EU’s engagement in the Aceh civil war was chiefly a desire to improve Europe’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries. According to Gunaryadi,

several motivations explain the EU's role as a mediator in the Aceh civil war. For starters, rebuilding in Aceh would benefit for European contractors, as would Aceh's huge reserves of oil and gas; furthermore, the primary act of participating in the Aceh peace process could improve the EU's international status (Gunaryadi, 2006: 95-6). One specific motivation is to improve the EU's relationship with Indonesia—the *primus inter pares* in ASEAN. The EU has regarded Indonesia as a key player in the Asia-Pacific area, and a good relationship with the country could help member-states establish good relationships with other Asian countries, including countries in Southeast Asia (Gunaryadi, 2006: 96-7). Alongside the EU have been other ASEAN member-states and Japan, all participating in Aceh's peace process and all interacting with one another—an opportunity to forge stronger ties all around. So has the EU's involvement in the Aceh peace process improved the EU's relationships with ASEAN? Although sporadic conflicts have continued to arise in Aceh, the Indonesian government has expressed appreciation to the EU for its largely helpful efforts. The Office of the Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Amiruddin Usman responded to the EU's efforts with the following comments:

We sincerely thank the EU for their active involvement in reaching peace in Aceh. The peace process has not been easy to reach, but thanks to outside participation, particularly from the EU, peace has prevailed. (*Jakarta Post*, May 25, 2012)

6.2.3 Summary

Since the 1970s, the EU has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues, providing development aid, resolving refugee crises, and addressing human rights. However, owing to differences between their respective norms, the EU and ASEAN experienced friction in their diplomatic exchanges. Nevertheless, the EU has supported the creation of the APSC, with the two primary goals being to protect Europeans from human insecurities and to improve the EU relationship with ASEAN. It is too early to conclude whether the EU's strategies have positively influenced the creation of the APSC or not. What is clear is that diplomatic friction between the EU and ASEAN has declined. The key point to draw from these interactions is most likely that the EU has gradually shifted its method of addressing human-rights issues from a hard to a soft approach.

6.3 The UN

The UN as an international organisation dependent on members' contributions of funding,

manpower, and materials has concerned itself with the development, safety, and security of populations and regions since its creation in 1945. The UN has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues since the 1970s. Early on, the UN's involvement there was limited to human development (freedom-from-want), and did not prioritise the establishment of justice (freedom-from-fear) for Southeast Asian people; however, the UN has gradually broaden the scope of human-security issues in Southeast Asia. In this section, I will review how and why the UN has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues and will explore the UN's strategies for responding to the creation of the APSC and the motivations underlying these strategies.

6.3.1 Historical Review: From the 1970s to 2002

I have divided my historical review of the UN into two sections. Both sections discuss how and why the UN was involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The first section covers the period extending from the 1970s to 1989, and the second section, from 1990 to 2002.

6.3.1.1 From the 1970s to 1989

Since its creation in 1945, the UN has been a multi-functional organisation in the world. One function has been, according to the UN Charter, "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character" (UN, June 1945). The UN's motivation for making this public declaration has been to enhance people's living standards worldwide. The UN, to this end, have strategically created a host of human-development programmes. For example, in every decade since 1961, the UN has launched the UN Development Decade, and since 1980s, "the UN system has delivered a total of US\$67.73 billion to promote development and human progress" (Fomerand, 2004: 164). Insofar as Southeast Asian countries have become UN members since 1945,⁷⁰ the UN has provided social and economic assistance to these countries for the purpose of human development.

Another UN function, which is also the UN's motivation, has been to maintain international peace and security, and the Security Council has been responsible for this

⁷⁰ The Philippines was the first Southeast Asian country to join the UN (October 1945), followed by Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia in December 1946, April 1948, and September 1950. Cambodia and Laos joined the UN at the same time (December 1955). Malaysia and Singapore joined in September 1957 and September 1965. Vietnam and Brunei became members in September 1977 and September 1984.

function (UN, June 1945). In order to fulfil this function, the UN has employed both incentives and deterrents (Knight, 2005: 521). For example, the Security Council diplomatically mediated in the dispute between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, and imposed sanctions on Iraq, when it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Moreover, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council may employ coercive means both to diminish threats to peace and to restore peace. For example, from 1948 to 1989, the Security Council authorised 18 peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world (UN). However, during the Cold War period, the Security Council sometimes sacrificed people's safety and rights. These instances of *realpolitik* reflected the rivalry between the Communist and the U.S. bloc—a rivalry that spread to Security Council members, who sought to capitalise on security issues in ways that would strengthen their own bloc's influence (Russell, 1970: 324-5). In other words, for Security Council members, increasing their own bloc's influence was more important than genuinely addressing people's safety and security. The UN's involvement in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor exemplifies this murky area of compromise.

6.3.1.1.1 *Freedom from Want*

Since the 1970s, the UN has provided financial and technical assistance to Southeast Asian countries through a multilateral mechanism. In 1971, the UNDP became a dialogue partner of ASEAN, and from 1972 to 1991, the UNDP launched the fourth cycle of ASEAN–UNDP Sub-Regional Programmes (ASPs) (1972–1976, 1977–1981, 1982–1986, and 1987–1991). Although there is little documentation of how the UN's assistance may have affected Southeast Asian people's living standards, *Southeast Asian Perceptions of Foreign Assistance*, published by Chulalongkorn University in 1977, recorded where the UN's assistance was allocated. According to this book, the Philippines government received funding to develop internal infrastructure (Villavicencio, 1977: 26, 29). The Thai government received UN assistance (US\$295 million) in the areas of administration, agriculture, community and social development, communication, education, health, and industry (Chaowasilp, 1977: 74). Malaysia and Singapore received UN technical assistance in the areas of industrial development, technical education, primary production, and communication (Leng, 1977: 22, Soon, 1977: 68).

6.3.1.1.2 *Freedom from Fear*

During this period, the UN's involvement in Southeast Asia centred on East Timor's integration into Indonesia. In 1974, the Indonesian government invaded East Timor,

bombarding Suai, Betano, and Tiomar and using napalm and biological weapons, leading to the deaths of hundreds of East Timorese (Lawless, 1976: 956). The Indonesian government's conduct clearly breached the UN Charter, but the Security Council called only twice for a withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the disputed region (Security Council Resolution 384 in 1975 and Resolution 389 in 1976), and from these calls came nothing. The main cause of these tepid, ineffective steps was the Security Council's most dominant power, the United States, which sought Indonesia's support in the context of the Soviet–American rivalry (Howard, 2008: 269). Even, the United States Ambassador to Indonesia, David Newsome, stated that Indonesia's annexation of East Timor should be effective and quick (Carey, 2008: 349). Thus, despite passing the aforementioned resolutions, the Security Council failed to take substantial action that could have ended the Indonesia invasion. In the process, the UN effectively sacrificed East Timorese people's lives and rights.

6.3.1.2 From 1990 to 2002

The end of the Cold War meant that inter-state conflicts were diminishing as an immediate threat to people's safety and security. Intra-state disputes, transnational crimes (e.g., human and drug trafficking and terrorism), natural disasters, and financial crises became the UN's focus regarding emerging threats to people. In *Human Development Report 1994*, the UN characterised the threats to people as distinctly various (UNDP, 1994: 2). Thus, in Southeast Asia, the UN addressed not only human-development issues but transnational crimes and economic instability, as well. In addition, with a decline in the barrier of ideological confrontation, the UN could strengthen its impartiality when handling freedom-from-fear issues.

6.3.1.2.1 Freedom from Want

The scope of the freedom-from-want issues that the UN addressed in Southeast Asia between 1990 and 2002 was broad. In 1994, the UNDP published the Human Development Report. The report emphasised the importance of the human-security concept and identified seven areas in which insecurities common to human beings often arise: economics, food, health, the environment, the personal, community, and politics (UNDP, 1994: 25-33). S. Neil MacFarland and Yuen Foong Khong argued that the 1994 Human Development Report has far-reaching influence: it shifted the central reference for security from states to individuals and it broadened the scope of security issues (Facfarlane and Khong, 2006: 145-50).

In this context, we can find that the UN as an international organisation continued to

provide development aid to Southeast Asian countries, but the issues that the development plans covered were various, including combating transnational crime and coping with economic crisis in 1997. From 1990 to 2002, the UN continued to launch ASPs. In the fifth ASPs (1992–1996), the UN provided nearly US\$1 million to the human-development program (ASEAN). The programme’s purpose was to promote people’s living standards and to reduce drug trafficking. The sixth ASP addressed mainly the problems resulting from 1997’s financial crisis, which had dramatically degraded many Southeast Asian people’s living standards. The UNDP devoted US\$1.7 million to facilitating the economic recovery in affected ASEAN countries and conducted a series of reforms in the financial sectors of such less-developed ASEAN members—as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (ASEAN).

6.3.1.2.2 *Freedom from fear*

The dissolution of the Soviet Union that quickly followed the thawing rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet bloc ended the possibility that Cold War antagonism would sabotage the UN’s handling of freedom-from-fear issues. As mentioned in chapter two’s comments on state actors (section 2.1.4.2), an advantage of regional and international organisations is their ability to collect funds and to harness manpower from individual states. Benefiting from this advantage, the UN from 1990 to 2002 was involved in Cambodian and East Timorese peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks. In Cambodia, after the pull-out of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989, the UN held the Paris International Conference on Cambodia and adopted the Paris Agreement, which authorised UNTAC to conduct peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The UN established a budget of US\$2 billion and dispatched 16,000 troops, 3,000 police officers, and 3,000 civilian officials to the area (Jeldres, 1993: 106). In East Timor, according to Resolution 1264, the Security Council authorised the creation of INTERFET. Nearly 8,000 personnel, including military, medical, and engineering experts from five countries (Australia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) joined the mission. Scholars agreed that the UN positively contributed to the peace process in Cambodia and East Timor, although violence continued to occur, including sporadic conflicts between peacekeeping forces and local insurgents (in Cambodia) and destruction of infrastructure by pro-Indonesian militia (East Timor). On the whole, large-scale conflicts have dramatically wound down in Cambodia (Howard, 2008: 173), and peacekeeping operations in East Timor paved the way for the UN’s assumption of peacebuilding operations (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005b: 132).

However, chapter two (section 2.1.4.2) mentioned that the UN must remain alert to the

possibility of significant technical problems in its rescue operations. In the Cambodian case, according to Berdal and Leifer, peacekeeping troops from various countries lacked compatible communication equipment, “standardized communications procedures and joint level planning before deployment” were conspicuously insufficient, and failure to use a common language plagued the flow of critical information among segments of the international contingent (Berdal and Leifer, 1996: 41, 50). In the East Timorese case, the international forces had difficulty contacting and communicating with one another, largely because of underdeveloped or damaged infrastructure (Smith, 2003: 62). And while conducting reconstruction tasks UN personnel found it difficult to communicate with local people, as most of them spoke Tetun rather than English (Ishizuka, 2003: 54).

6.3.2 *Exploration of the UN’s Strategies for the APSC*

6.3.2.1 *The Motivations Underlying the UN’s Strategy*

The strategies employed by the UN in response to the creation of the APSC have centred chiefly on support the creation of the APSC and the motivations underlying the UN’s strategies have centred chiefly on strengthening the UN’s ties with ASEAN. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that participants in regional arrangements and agencies “shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes” before the Security Council involves itself in the matter, and “the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority” (UN, June 1945). This statement indicates that the UN should strengthen cooperation with regional organisations. Indeed, from 2002 to 2006, the UN General Assembly passed three resolutions (A/RES/57/35 of 2002,⁷¹ A/RES/59/4 of 2004,⁷² and A/RES/61/46 of 2006⁷³) whose content was to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN. However, the UN has received little cooperation from ASEAN regarding human-security issues, with the exception of ASPs and peacekeeping in Cambodia and East Timor. A report from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) argued that “cooperation between the two bodies lags far behind cooperation between the UN” and the African Union and the EU (HD Centre 2009: 5).

The creation of the APSC gave the UN an opportunity to strengthen relations with ASEAN, because in the APSC’s blueprints, ASEAN pledges to address several categories of

⁷¹ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/57/35&Lang=E

⁷² http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/59/4&Lang=E

⁷³ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/61/46&Lang=E

human insecurity and emphasised cooperation with the UN, particularly regarding security and peace issues (ASEAN, 2009a: 8, 11). The UN has established its resolve to support the creation of the APSC and has made related allocations of assistance and support available. At the second ASEAN–UN Summit, held in New York in September 2005, the UN agreed to cooperate with ASEAN on the matter of the following AC elements: the MDGs, poverty alleviation, prevention and control of infectious diseases, disaster management, transnational crimes, development and peace and security (ASEAN, September 2005). At the fourth ASEAN–UN Summit, held in Bali in November 2011, the two sides issued the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations. According to this declaration, the UN’s assistance and cooperation regarding human-security elements in the AC would fall into four categories: political security (peace and security, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding), economics (the MDGs, narrowing the development gap among members), socio-cultural issues (rural development, poverty reduction and improvement of people’s living standards, prevention of HIV/AIDS), and cooperation between the ASEAN Secretariat and the UN Secretariat (ASEAN, November 2011b).

6.3.2.2 The UN’s Strategies

6.3.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

The UN has provided assistance to several freedom-from-want issues in the APSC and ASCC blueprints. Regarding the human-rights element in the APSC, the UN welcomed ASEAN’s contribution to regional human rights issues (Katsumata, 2009: 632), as Asia had not had a regional human-rights body before the creation of the AICHR in October 2009 (HD Centre, 2009: 14). Thus, the UN has been involved in the process of ASEAN’s promotion of human rights. For example, UN Women and UNICEF joined the ACWC in an effort to reduce violence against women and children. The purpose of this conference was to strengthen the ACWC’s engagement in the UN’s human-rights mechanism.

The UN has been involved in the APSC’s efforts to alleviate poverty and promote people’s living standards. In order to help ASEAN create the APSC, the UNDP allocated US\$1.45 million to the creation of the ASEAN–UNDP Partnership Facility (AUPF) in 2004. The purpose of this programme was to reduce poverty and narrow development gap between ASEAN developed members and ASEAN developing members through facilitating regional economic integration (ASEAN).

In the area of natural disaster management, the UN and ASEAN in the third ASEAN–

UN Summit agreed to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the AHA Centre, and they issued the Joint Declaration on ASEAN–UN Collaboration in Disaster Management, whose main purpose was to create the ASEAN–UN Strategic Plan of Action on Disaster Management 2011–2015 which would be the guideline for the two sides’ cooperative handling of natural disasters (UN, November 1, 2010).

It should be noted here that the UN has implemented its strategies. As exemplified by the aforementioned cooperation, the UN has adopted a soft approach: focusing on providing experts and funding. The reason for the UN’s adoption of the soft approach concerned ASEAN’s unshakable adherence to the non-interference principle. The condition that UN assistance be tethered to human-rights improvements might have been objectionable to ASEAN members, hindering the UN’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with ASEAN. The HD Centre report stated that regarding the UN’s support of the human-rights element, “few ASEAN governments would welcome an intrusive human rights mechanism” (HD Centre 2009: 14). Thus, we can see the “soft” nature of the UN approach. The soft approach has, to an extent, promoted ASEAN’s willingness to cooperate with the UN. Vietnamese UN Ambassador Le Luong Ming declared that “[ASEAN] cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organisations is crucial and beneficial, not only to the safeguarding of peace and security but also to development” (*Xinhua*, January 14, 2010).

6.3.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

The UN initially responded actively—some might say even intrusively—to the freedom-from-fear issues. In point of fact, the UN was the first of ASEAN’s dialogue partners to express support for the creation of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. The UN Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Türk “expressed the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA)’s readiness to solicit assistance from the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) if ASEAN decides to establish it” (ASEAN, February 19, 2003). In the ninth ASEAN Summit, held in October 2003, the Indonesian government suggested creating the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, a proposal supported by the UN. The Indonesian suggestion was rejected by ASEAN members. Vietnam argued that “it is too early to think of having regional peacekeepers,” and Singapore argued that “ASEAN is the wrong forum for peacekeeping, because it isn’t a defence or security organization” (Wain, 2004: 19). Among the many obstacles to creating the force was financial expense (Wain, 2004: 19). However, ASEAN’s insistence on the principle of non-interference has probably been the

main barrier (Askandar, 2005: 44). The ASEAN members worried that the regional peacekeeping force might undermine the principle of non-interference. Since the second ASEAN–UN Summit (ASEAN, September 2005, UN, November 1, 2010, ASEAN, November 2011a), the UN has changed its way of supporting the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC: UN seminars, workshops, and other training measures serving to strengthen ASEAN’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacity are just some examples of the UN’s more recently acquired soft approach.

6.3.3 *Summary*

Since the 1970s, the UN has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The UN’s central motivation has been to enhance people’s living standards, safety, and security. However, in the freedom-from-fear area, a rivalry between the United States and the Soviet bloc prevented the UN from bringing justice to afflicted peoples in parts of Southeast Asia. In the post-Cold War era, the UN has emphasised human-security and has broadened the scope of UN involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues. Also, the end of the US-Soviet ideological confrontation permitted the UN to play a more impartial role in freedom-from-fear issues than had generally been possible. In order to strengthen ASEAN’s capacity to protect people’s human security, the UN backed the regional organisation’s mission to create the APSC. The UN has provided assistance to projects supportive of human rights, natural-disaster management, living standards, and ASEAN members’ peacekeeping capacity. It is too early to conclude that the UN has substantially strengthened its relations with ASEAN, but ASEAN has been willing to cooperate with the UN on several noteworthy human-security issues.

6.4 **Concluding Remarks to this Chapter**

6.4.1 *What Are Barriers to the Creation of the APSC?*

In chapter six, we reviewed ASEAN’s, the EU’s, and the UN’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues. Earlier, in chapter two (section 2.1.4.2), we had observed that, along with advantages, certain disadvantages characterise regional and international organisations’ handling of human insecurities: ASEAN’s norms and identities have greatly impeded its ability to address human-security issues, including environmental sustainability, human rights, massacres, and haze pollution; the EU’s norms essentially ruled out improved relations with ASEAN; and the UN encountered technical problems when conducting peacekeeping operations in far-flung, technologically and infrastructurally challenging places

like Cambodia and East Timor.

These three actors' strategies for responding to the proposed creation of the APSC have been formally indistinguishable from one another: provide material or verbal support for the APSC's creation. Nevertheless, the motivations underlying these strategies have varied somewhat from one actor to the next: ASEAN has expected to improve its handling of security issues and to enhance its regional influence; the EU has expected to diminish the effects of transnational crime on Europeans while improving relations with ASEAN; and the UN has expected simply to improve its relations with ASEAN.

As mentioned in chapter two, norms have constituted a major obstacle to the realisation of these various expectations (section 2.1.4.2). Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has adopted its norms—the non-interference principle and the ASEAN Way—to address regional security issues. Despite planning to enhance its problem-solving capacity through the creation of the APSC, ASEAN has rested on its norms to address the issues that it enshrined in the APSC and ASCC blueprints. However, ASEAN's *modus operandi* has not helped the regional organisation address human insecurities. This study has found that ASEAN's capacity to address human-rights violations and natural disasters have been constrained by principle of the non-interference, enshrined as it is in the AICHR's Terms of Reference and the declaration of the AADMER. In addition, this study has found that ASEAN has been anything but forthcoming regarding how it will address transnational crime, public-health threats, and unsustainable use and abuse of the environment.

As mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, since the 1990s, the EU has established and talked up its mission to promote and protect human rights. However, EU norms are different from ASEAN norms which treat national sovereignty as sacrosanct. The difference has led to diplomatic spats between the two regional entities regarding Myanmar's woeful human-rights record. In order to protect European people from transnational crimes and strengthen its relations with ASEAN, the EU has supported the creation of the APSC. Interestingly, the EU has played down its norms and adopted a soft approach to getting and staying involved the creation of the APSC.

In avoiding a confrontation with the non-interference principle, the UN too has adopted a "diplomatic" approach to ASEAN. Early on, the UN actively provided assistance to the task of integrating into the APSC such human-security issues as the promotion and protection of human rights and the creation of regional peacekeeping forces. However, early on, ASEAN did not accept the UN's efforts, mainly because the UN's efforts challenged ASEAN's non-interference principle. Like the EU, the UN has played down its norms and

has adopted a soft approach toward the APSC. Whether the EU's and the UN's approaches have been successful means to the desired end remains to be seen. One point is clear: ASEAN has accepted the EU's and the UN's assistance.

CHAPTER 7 NON-STATE ACTORS: CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

As mentioned in chapter two's commentary on non-state actors (section 2.1.4.3), a central motivation underlying the relevant non-state actors' attitude to the human-security issues has been to improve people's living standards and to help people overcome significant community-wide difficulties. However, between the 1970s and 1989, CSOs addressing Southeast Asian human-security issues were themselves the target of regional national governments' repressive policies. Between 1990 and 2002, Southeast Asian governments tolerated CSOs, which could—in the absence of erstwhile governmental restrictions—participate relatively freely in human-security issues. In particular, CSOs have proposed recommendations for the creation of the APSC but have had only a marginal influence. In this chapter, I will first review CSOs involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues from the 1970s to 2002 and the related problems besetting CSOs. In the very next section, I will analyse CSOs' involvement in the creation of the APSC, focusing on their contributions to the project and their experience of various related obstacles.

7.1 Historical Review: From the 1970s to 2002

I have divided my historical review of relevant CSOs into two sections. Each one addresses how these diverse CSOs responded to Southeast Asian human-security issues in recent decades. The first section begins its review in the 1970s and continues through 1989; the second section picks up the review in 1990 and takes us through 2002.

7.1.1 From the 1970s to 1989

Between the 1970s and 1989, CSOs' involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues brought the organisations into direct conflict with Southeast Asian governments' repressive policies.

7.1.1.1 Freedom from Want

During this period, CSOs' involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues led to conflicts between many of the organisations and repressive governments in the region. The reasons for the conflicts are not mysterious. For starters, the government of ASEAN's original members feared communist expansion and were acutely aware that many CSOs represented workers, peasants, and nationalists whose thinking was leftist (Gerard, 2014: 52-

3). Thus, in order to ensure regime stability and viability, member-states' governments often unhesitatingly repressed CSOs' activities. For example, in the Philippines, under Marcos, CSOs directly criticised and challenged Marcos' policies, like martial law and land-grabbing, which had resulted unjust evictions of the ill-compensated powerless masses (Youngblood, 1978: 508-10); in response, the Marcos government arrested and murdered a host of CSO workers, whom Marcos and his ilk regarded "as subversives and tools of the communists" (Youngblood, 1978: 508). Governments in Indochinese states feared the potential rise of a viable political opposition. CSOs tended to comprise a good number of anti-government dissidents and, thus, came under repressive state scrutiny (Gerard, 2014: 53-4). Taking the example of Cambodia, Kelly Gerard asserted that "space for civil society was limited"—a result of the government's repressive policies (Gerard, 2014: 54).

7.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear

Few studies have examined CSOs' involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues. One rare and noteworthy study by Barter in 2012, however, discusses how Oxfam Australia helped victims in Cambodia. Oxfam Australia donated food and rice seed to victims of the country's upheaval, created infrastructure for the delivery of potable water, made health clinics available to many impoverished Cambodians, and provided many others with vocational training (Barter, May 2012). The historical evidence suggests that Oxfam Australia never made a priority of challenging a government's policies and political system. In other words, Oxfam Australia kept a low-"political" profile (see section 2.1.4.3). The first task of Oxfam Australia was to "save lives before, during and after humanitarian crises."⁷⁴ Their activities would not pose a threat to any government's viability, and thus, Oxfam Australia successfully circumvented obstacles to its goal of addressing freedom-from-fear issues.

7.1.2 From 1990 to 2002

From 1990 to 2002, the number of CSOs in Southeast Asia rapidly increased: the number of CSOs in Southeast Asia spiralled up from 6,558 to 11,270, of which Malaysia and Indonesia hosted a relative majority (Chandra, 2004: 159). Two factors can help explain the rapid growth of CSOs. First, ASEAN founding members have implemented democratic systems of government (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) or at least voiced support for democracy (Malaysia and Singapore), indicating that the leadership in these countries was

⁷⁴ Please see the official website of Oxfam Australia, <https://www.oxfam.org.au/>

growing tolerant of divergent voices from diverse quarters in society. Lars Jørgensen noted that “the more legitimate and effective the state is, the more it can allow a strong civil society to develop” (Jørgensen, 1996: 37). Second, the governments of Indochinese states, although not going so far as to adopt political reforms, launched economic reforms based on liberal models. In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s government sought to attract foreign investment in the country’s beleaguered economy; the government of Laos transformed its collective economy into a liberal one in 1986; Myanmar’s military junta implemented a market economy nationwide, despite being the target of Western countries’ sanctions; and Vietnam adopted the market-oriented economic-reform policy known as *Đổi Mới*. When these governments implemented liberal economies, foreign CSOs were able to benefit from this liberalisation insofar as they could now gain entrance to these countries and directly address as-yet unresolved human-security problems (Gerard, 2014: 60). Of perhaps even greater importance was the assistance that these foreign CSOs provided to local CSOs (Landau, 2008: 247), which quite directly led to the development of several new CSOs.

Many CSOs were involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. First, despite being extraordinarily diverse in their structure and mission, these CSOs usually operated according to *modus operandi* that directly challenged government policies, prioritising issues that were at the forefront of people’s concerns—not leaders’ concerns. As noted, Southeast Asian national governments have grown rather tolerant of CSOs’ activities and existence because political and economic liberalisation has been taking root in the countries. Of perhaps less but significant importance has been CSOs’ collective involvement in human-security issues. This second factor merits further attention here. As mentioned in chapter two’s discussion of non-state actors (see section 2.1.4.3), it was not unusual for CSOs to face such difficulties as a lack of resources and a shortage of personnel necessary for a proper handling of human-security issues. From the early 1990s to 2002, CSO networks became ever more popular, as they permitted like-minded CSOs to address human-security issues under often powerful alliances.⁷⁵ The key objective behind this trend was to improve CSOs’ communication technology. For example, the Internet simplified CSOs’ communications with one another, facilitating the development of CSO networks. Julie Gilson argued that the use of the Internet would quicken “the pace of social learning and development among” CSOs

⁷⁵ For example, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia) comprises nearly fifty Asian CSOs, many of which have their own official websites (Gilson, 2011: 136). Under the framework of Forum-Asia, CSOs have provided human-rights training and education to people in East Asia.

(Gilson, 2011: 135). By providing their constituent members with mutual financial and material assistance, CSO networks are likely to resolve or minimise many of the difficulties that individual CSOs face regarding shortages of resources and personnel.

7.1.2.1 *Freedom from Want*

CSOs' direct and unified *modus operandi* are evident in the CSOs' handling of freedom-from-want issues during this period. In the 1990s, Indonesian forest fires jeopardised people's health in neighbouring countries. Although ASEAN held meetings to discuss the problem and oversaw a series of agreements, like the Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Environment and Development in 1990 and the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution in 1995, transboundary haze pollution remained unresolved (Jones, 2004: 64-65). When the haze problem became more serious in 1997, CSOs created a cooperating network. They raised their concerns about ASEAN's incompetence handling of the regional haze crisis and directly exerted pressure on ASEAN to put more effort into transboundary haze pollution (Aviel, 2000: 21). CSOs' involvement in the issue of haze pollution reveals that their *modus operandi* has been direct and unified. Joann Fagot Aviel argued that although CSOs' involvement in addressing haze pollution did not immediately resolve the problem, their efforts "may help prevent a total neglect of environmental issues" (Aviel, 2000: 21).

CSOs' direct and unified *modus operandi* also presented themselves in human-rights issues. After ASEAN accepted Myanmar as a member, 46 CSOs from 20 countries issued the Alternative ASEAN Declaration on Burma. In this declaration, CSOs listed the Myanmar's government many human-rights violations and openly opposed ASEAN's enlargement through an extension of membership to Myanmar.⁷⁶ In 1999, CSOs attending the ASEAN People's Summit continued to express concerns about the human-rights situation in Myanmar. They asked ASEAN to review Myanmar's membership and to provide assistance to displaced people in Myanmar (Aviel, 2000: 25). Again, CSOs' involvement in the accession of Myanmar to ASEAN exemplifies their embrace of a direct and unified set of *modus operandi*.

7.1.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

CSOs' involvement in freedom-from-fear issues reflected these CSOs' direct and unified *modus operandi*. Six CSOs in Forum-Asia addressed the massacre carried out by Indonesian government forces in East Timor. The CSOs attempted to hold an Asia Pacific Conference on

⁷⁶ <http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1996vol06no04/216/?print=yes>

East Timor to discuss the problem, but met with government harassment (Aviel, 2000: 25). When the conference was first held in Manila, the Indonesian government threatened to sever its diplomatic relationships with the Philippines. When the conference was held again, this time in Kuala Lumpur in 1996, the Malaysian government arrested participants. Despite government obstacle, CSOs jointly condemned the Indonesian atrocities and emphasised the East Timorese people's right to self-determination. In the case of the atrocities in East Timor, CSOs reasserted their use of direct and unified *modus operandi*.

7.2 Exploration of CSOs' Strategies for the APSC

7.2.1 CSOs' Approaches to Strategy Implementation

From the preceding, we know that Southeast Asian governments have been a key factor in CSOs' involvement in human-security there. It is reasonable to say that the more democratic a Southeast Asian government is, the more space CSOs have to address human-security issues in the country. AC-related documents show that ASEAN condoned CSOs' participation in the community-building process: in the ASCC Plan of Action (PoA), ASEAN formally agreed that CSOs should play a role in the AC's development (ASEAN, 2004); and the ASEAN Charter approves of CSOs' role in ASEAN integration and community building (ASEAN, 2007: 4). Indeed, ASEAN's openness to certain CSOs has been instrumental in their involvement specifically in the APSC-building process. Some important questions, of course, arise as regards this process of participation: What strategies have CSOs adopted for dealing with the building process? What motivations underlain these strategies? And what barriers have CSOs encountered in the building process?

In this building process, CSOs' strategies—through diverse in form—have functioned to support the creation of the APSC. The motivations underlying these strategies have centred on improving Southeast Asians' human security. Theoretically, according to Mary Kaldor, an important sub-set of this motivation has been a desire to resolve significant community-wide problems and to improve people's living standards (Kaldor, 2003: 16-7). It should not be surprising that CSOs' motivations have been to improve people's human security. Perhaps, what is less clear—and what is worth exploring in some detail here—is how CSOs have implemented their strategy.

The implementation of CSO strategies has been based on dual channels: use of ASEAN-recognised channel and use of CSO-led channels.⁷⁷ The ASEAN People's Assembly

⁷⁷ My assertions regarding CSOs' use of certain channels to get involved in the APSC's human-security issues

(APA) is an ASEAN-recognised channel (ASEAN, November 2004: 30). The original concept of the APA is attributable to Thai Foreign Minister Kasem Kasemsri, who suggested that ASEAN create a “congress of ASEAN peoples” and who assigned to the ASEAN-ISIS the task of implementing his concept (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 577). ASEAN-ISIS launched the first APA in 2000 and launched the last APA in 2009. Beginning with the third APA, CSOs used the APA as a forum for proposing recommendations regarding human-security issues in the APSC’s and the ASCC’s blueprints. ASEAN-ISIS selected the APA participants, which included CSOs, think-tanks, business officials and high-level government officials.

The ACSC is a CSO-led channel. The ACSC was organised by the SAPA network, which comprised precisely 100 CSOs, and had the support of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. Since the launch of the first ACSC in 2005, CSOs have used this channel to voice their recommendations regarding the human-security issues in the APSC’s and ASCC’s in the blueprints. In addition, CSOs have tried to organise the ACSC so that it would take place in parallel with the annual ASEAN Summit. The ACSC has been an open conference, as any type of CSO may participate in it (Gerard, 2013: 421).

However, CSOs’ strategies, which have been based on ASEAN-recognised and CSO-led channels, have encountered several noteworthy problems. First, these two channels have permitted CSOs to wield only a marginal influence on the creation of the APSC, because ASEAN has excluded CSOs from community-building processes. CSOs’ *modus operandi* constitutes the key determinant in whether or not ASEAN has tamped down on the CSOs’ roles in community-building processes. In general, CSOs have selected *modus operandi* that most accurately give voice to people’s aspirations and concerns and that most effectively address pressing difficulties in people’s lives. CSOs have challenged and criticised ASEAN’s policies. Non-democratic ASEAN members, like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent democratic ASEAN members, like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

originated from Kelly Gerard’s book *ASEAN’s Engagement of Civil Society*. In it, she dually categorized the contexts in which CSOs would join ASEAN decision-making processes: “participation in spaces established by ASEAN” and “participation in spaces recognised by ASEAN.” CSOs have been involved in the APSC’s human-security issues mainly by way of the APA and the ACSC, which Kelly Gerard categorized as “participation in spaces recognised by ASEAN.” I agree with the assertion that ASEAN has recognised APA activities. Although not a sincere supporter of the APA, ASEAN has refrained from repressing APA activities. However, I disagree with the assertion that ASEAN has recognised ACSC: ASEAN members have adopted various means of discouraging ACSC activities. Not in contention, however, is the assertion that a CSO network has organised and led ACSC. Thus, in this section, I categorise the ACSC as a CSO-led channel.

Philippines, have contested CSOs' *modus operandi*. ASEAN members have thwarted the activities of a long list of CSOs vis-à-vis the ACSC. Thus, although CSOs involved in various human-security issues have had a channel for proposing recommendations, ASEAN members have rejected with swaths of them.

The second noteworthy problem besetting CSOs in this regard is their distrust or dislike of one another—mutual suspicions can be counter-productive and are particularly tangible in the APA. As mentioned in the previous section, the creation of a CSO network helped the CSOs overcome problems like insufficient resource—problems that would be insurmountable for CSOs acting individually. The CSO network, however, has given rise to problems. For example, CSOs differ from one another regarding their perspectives on how best to address issues, how best to manage agendas, and which issues merit discussion. In fact, it has not been unusual for CSOs' personnel to distrust each other, even though they may belong to a common network. When a CSO network comprises only a few organisations (as is the case with the previous section's cited examples), strengthened communications can diminish these problems of contentious distrust. However, the APA differed from small CSO network. There are over 200 CSOs in the APA and this sheer number makes the resolution of intra-organisational strife highly problematic. In the APA, discrepancies regarding organising the APA agenda among members' positions led to the termination of the APA (Gerard, 2013: 415-6).

7.2.2 CSOs' Strategies

7.2.2.1 Freedom from Want

CSOs have proposed their recommendations for the APSC's freedom-from-want issues by using the platforms of the APA and the ACSC, but neither platform could serve as an effective conduit for these recommendations.

In the APA, CSOs failed to exercise substantive influence on the freedom-from-want issues. Two central objectives underlay CSOs' creation of the APA: promotion of "greater awareness of an ASEAN Community" and assistance "in the building of an ASEAN Community of caring societies as sought by ASEAN Vision 2020" (cited from Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 577-8). At the third through sixth APA gatherings, the most ardently discussed theme concerned ASEAN's creation of the AC.⁷⁸ The freedom-from-want issues

⁷⁸ The titles of these gatherings were "Towards an ASEAN Community of Caring Societies," "Towards a People-Centred Development in the ASEAN Community," "The Role of the People in Building an ASEAN

that the CSOs discussed at the APA gatherings included empowerment of people (e.g. “the role of the people in setting ASEAN’s agenda,” “the power of women and their empowerment,” “the role of civil society”), and human rights (e.g., “the possibility of a regional human rights mechanism”), and environmental and poverty issues (e.g., “efforts to address poverty” and “the limits and opportunities of environmental management”) (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 579).

However, the APA was able to secure only marginal influence on the APSC’s freedom-from-want issues, and two factors go far in explaining this general failure. First, ASEAN members were reluctant to support the APA. Although the APA counted among its members some high-level ASEAN officials, such as ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino and ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Wilfredo V. Viullacorta, most ASEAN officials had no interest in joining the APA. Beginning with the fourth APA gathering, ASEAN required some of its low-ranking officials to join the APA and ASEAN opposed the APA’s efforts to establish “an interface meeting that would create the opportunity for dialogue between officials and APA participants” (Gerard, 2014: 112). Insufficient channels for communication between ASEAN members and CSOs could result in a situation where ASEAN would, unknowingly and to its own detriment, neglect CSOs’ worthy recommendations. Thus, the APA operated in a context where CSOs issued recommendations that ASEAN members could consider and either accept or reject as they saw it.

The second reason is that CSOs in the APA did not trust each other. The creator of the APA, ASEAN–ISIS, has had close ties to ASEAN member-states (Dosch, 2008: 533, Gerard, 2013: 416). In addition, ASEAN–ISIS was able to select CSOs that would join in the APA. “ASEAN–ISIS’ regulation of CSO participation” (Gerard, 2013: 416) in the APA transformed ASEAN–ISIS into a “gatekeeper” (Collins, 2008: 322). From CSOs’ perspectives, ASEAN–ISIS was representative of ASEAN rather than of Southeast Asians. Thus, CSOs in the APA were suspicious of ASEAN–ISIS.

The other channel through which CSOs can communicate with ASEAN is the ACSC. Since 2005, when CSOs created the ACSC, it has been involved in the APSC’s freedom-from-want issues. Before ASEAN ratified the ASEAN Charter, the ACSC’s main organiser, SAPA, submitted proposals to the EPG regarding each pillar of the AC (The EPG was responsible for drafting the ASEAN Charter). SAPA pointed out that the blueprint of the

Community of Caring and Sharing Societies,” and “ASEAN at 40: Realising the People’s Expectations” (Gerard, 2004: 110-1).

APSC had contradicted itself. The gist of the contradiction was this: ASEAN had stated that the APSC process “shall be guided by well-established principles of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty,” but ASEAN had also stated that “ASEAN shall not condone undemocratic regimes” (Đặng, 2008: 21).⁷⁹ Regarding the AEC, SAPA suggested that ASEAN should achieve “redistributive justice, poverty eradication, and growth equity and non-discrimination” when ASEAN members strives to strengthen the economy (Đặng, 2008: 21). Regarding the ACSC, “SAPA urged for a people-centred and people-empowered ASEAN community with the recognition of local culture, language, and heritage” (Đặng, 2008: 21). Regarding human rights, SAPA suggested that ASEAN should create a regional human-rights body responsible for monitoring, investigating, and reporting the human-rights situation in Southeast Asia (Đặng, 2008: 22). Regarding environmental issues, SAPA suggested that ASEAN create the fourth pillar—the ASEAN Environmental Community. Regarding people’s empowerment, people should have the right to vote on the ASEAN Charter.

Clearly, ASEAN adopted none of SAPA’s suggestions: the principle of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty are enshrined in the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN, 2007: 5); the ASEAN Charter and the APSC blueprints have had no provision for punishing non-compliant members; some ASEAN members like Laos and Vietnam have failed to respect the culture of their minorities; ASEAN created a human-rights body, but it has lacked teeth; ASEAN has not considered the ASEAN Environmental Community to be the fourth pillar of the AC; and Southeast Asian people have not had a right to vote on the ASEAN Charter.

Clearly, the ACSCs’ recommendation had limited influence on the APSC’s handling of freedom-from-want issues. In fact, CSOs in the ACSC had higher expectations for the ACSC’s inputs than for the APA’s inputs, because the main organiser of the ACSC was not a group of ASEAN-supported non-governmental entities but SAPA, which constitutes a CSO network. Thus, the ACSC could avoid the problem of CSOs’ mutual distrust within a CSO network. However, the ACSC encountered the same problems as those encountered by like the APA, having to do chiefly with ASEAN government’s obstructionism.

When we consider how ASEAN members prevented the ACSC’s activities, we can hardly be surprised that ASEAN rejected CSOs recommendations regarding the APSC’s freedom-from-want element. At the second and third ACSC gatherings held in the Philippines

⁷⁹ The statement from the Malaysian representative at the EPG Tan Sri Musa Hitam accepted SAPA’s point. Musa stated that “I would think yes it [the principle of non-interference] would be revised. If you look at the current situation, there are contradictions as on one hand you respect sovereignty and non-interference while on the other hand you say you must behave yourself” (*The Star*, September 12, 2007).

and Singapore in December 2006 and November 2007, the Filipino and Singaporean governments refused to endorse the ACSC and refused to join the interface meeting between ASEAN and CSOs (Gerard, 2014: 118). At the fifth ACSC gathering, held in Thailand in October 2009, the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Singapore “rejected their civil society representatives that had been elected to participate through ACSC processes” (Gerard, 2014: 119). The CSOs representing Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand walked out of the conference in protest against those governments’ non-democratic policies. At the eighth ACSC gathering held in Cambodia in March 2012, the Cambodian government created the ASEAN People’s Forum (APF), whose function was to encourage the ACSC’s CSOs to participate in the APF, thereby further weakening the ACSC’s influence. In addition, the Lucky Star Hotel in Cambodia Phnom Penh, where the ACSC planned to hold its workshops, threatened to cut power to conference rooms and to change padlocks on conference rooms if the ACSC held workshops at the establishment (Gerard, 2014: 121). CSOs in the ACSC suspected that the Cambodian government was the mastermind behind objections to the ACSC’s activities (Gerard, 2014: 121). Interestingly, the workshop topics that the ACSC planned to discuss were sensitive issues, including the human-rights situation in Myanmar and land grabbing throughout Southeast Asia.

A previous section in this chapter mentioned that since the early 1990s, CSOs have had more chances than in the period between the 1970s and 1989 to express concerns about human-security issues because ASEAN members have grown increasingly tolerant of CSO activities. Moreover, ASEAN recognised the effective role of CSOs in the process of community-building. So why did ASEAN member reject CSOs’ recommendations regarding the APSC’s freedom-from-want element and adopt various means to discourage CSO activities? The main reason for this rejection was that most of the ACSC’s freedom-from-want recommendations were so contentious that they challenged not only ASEAN’s *modus operandi* but also ASEAN members’ policies. The principle of non-interference has shielded ASEAN members, in particular ASEAN new comers, from Western governments’ criticism of the members’ sometimes woeful human-rights records. In addition, no ASEAN members have been willing to change ASEANs’ consultative process from a top-down to a bottom-up one, because this change would essentially invite more and more CSOs into the ASEAN decision-making process, where they would undoubtedly challenge ASEAN policies. Thus, removal of the principle of non-interference, people’s vote for the ASEAN Charter, and creation of a powerful human-rights body have been contentious issues for ASEAN members. Both non-democratic and post-authoritarian ASEAN members have roundly rejected CSOs’

recommendations in these regards.

7.2.2.2 *Freedom from Fear*

CSOs' influence on the APSC's handling of freedom-from-fear issues has also been marginal. The first reason for this lack of influence has been rooted in how CSOs' networks raise concerns about these issues. In the APA, CSOs have never discussed freedom-from-fear issues, such as peacekeeping operations and the RtoP. In the ACSC, freedom-from-fear issues—although discussed—have remained unimportant topics relative to such other topics as human rights. So far, no studies have discussed why CSOs have neglected the APSC's freedom-from-fear element. One possibility is that—both the APA and the ACSC have gathered together a huge number of CSOs, so consensus among them may be highly difficult to reach regarding the prioritisation of issues.

The second reason for the aforementioned lack of influence has been the series of hurdles that ASEAN members have erected to destabilise CSOs. In 2009, ASEAN created a chance for CSOs to discuss the AC's freedom-from-fear issues, but not through the ACSC mechanism. In February 2009, the ADMM adopted the Concept Paper of ASEAN Defence Establishment and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security.⁸⁰ The paper described CSOs as indispensable actors in the effort to achieve freedom from fear:

CSOs have played a major role in contributing assistance and worked closely with the people at all levels on non-traditional security issues. Generally, they often have strong links with community groups in developing countries, and they often work in areas where government-to-government aid is not possible ... Appropriate CSOs participation and involvement, in a value added manner, have also contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector's work and the betterment of people and society. In the future, this trend of CSOs involvement will continue to rise (ASEAN).

The ASEAN paper points to a strong likelihood that CSOs in the future would make greater and greater contributions to ASEAN's handling of freedom-from-fear issues. However, in

⁸⁰ In this concept paper, freedom-from-fear issues like post-conflict peacebuilding fall under the category of non-traditional issues.

practice, CSOs' influence has remained distinctly limited. For example, ASEAN stated in the concept paper that "the CSOs should be legalised and recognised by local or state government" (ASEAN), and this seemingly minor point is crucial, as it indicates that without ASEAN member-states' consent, CSOs shall be barred from the freedom-from-fear discussion.

All in all, CSOs' marginal influence in this sphere of discussion has come down to the sheer contentiousness of freedom-from-fear. From ASEAN members' perspective, the successful implementation of the APSC's freedom-from-fear element can take place only if ASEAN members first water down its principle of non-interference. In defense of their sovereignty, ASEAN members have rejected—and will continue to reject any element that undercuts the importance of the principle of non-interference. The ASEAN members' resolve to defend the principle of non-interference was manifested in the workshop on ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on Non-Traditional Security. In this workshop, held in June 2009, ASEAN selected both the CSO participants and the discussion topics. Such strategies reveal, in short, that ASEAN has been controlling CSOs' role in shaping the APSC's treatment of freedom-from-fear issues. ASEAN quite predictably picked complaisant CSOs and benign discussion topics for the workshop in question (topics like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief won out over topics like peacekeeping operations or the RtoP). ASEAN members have exercised nearly total control over the handling of the APSC's freedom-from-fear issues, and as a consequence of this oversight, CSOs' recommendations on these issues have been marginal.

7.3 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter

As mentioned in chapter two's discussion of non-state actors (see section 2.1.4.3), CSOs have advantages and disadvantages when addressing human-security issues. One advantage is that many CSOs are less inclined to follow national interests than are state actors. Thus, sometimes CSOs can implement their programmes more efficiently than state actors can. Exemplifying this trend is the case of Oxfam Australia's engagement in Cambodia during the reign of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime. A leading disadvantage is that CSOs usually lack resources. However, the effect of this disadvantage on CSOs' activities worldwide has declined owing to technological advances we can see that since the post-Cold War, CSOs involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues have linked up and have collectively voiced their concerns and goals, oftentimes by virtue of new technology. At the same time, Southeast Asian governments that once strictly imposed repressive policies on CSOs have, in

the post-Cold War era, followed paths toward political and economic liberalisation. These same governments have taken a correspondingly liberal view of more and more CSOs. Benefiting from governmental tolerance of their activities, CSOs have rapidly grown in number throughout much of the region.

Dealing, as they have been, with the creation of the APSC, ASEAN member-states' governments have largely agreed to the premise that some CSOs should play a role in the community-building process. And CSOs have been actively involved in freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues in the APSC's blueprint. Nevertheless, CSOs' involvement in the APSC has encountered two barriers: mutual-distrust among CSOs and ASEAN's non-interference principle. Mutual distrust among CSOs worsened as a direct result of their interactions with one another in the APA, and once divided, CSOs were less effective at giving voice to their human-security concerns. In addition, ASEAN has rejected ACSC's human-security recommendations while ASEAN members have individually discouraged related CSO activities, because the issues raised by ACSC have been sensitive and at times so contentious as to threaten adherence to the non-interference principle. In this context, although ASEAN has recognised CSOs' role of integrating recommendations into the APSC building process, the influence of these recommendations within the actual process have been marginal at best.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

In 1967, ASEAN was created by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. This inter-governmental organisation has dealt with regional political issues and has followed, as its *modus operandi*: the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN Way. In this way, ASEAN has generally avoided inter-state conflict in Southeast Asia while nonetheless failing to address several significant types of human insecurity. Recent economic downturns, health crises, and natural disasters have prompted ASEAN to improve its handling of such threats to human well-being. ASEAN's fundamental push in this direction has been the decision to create the APSC. However, by using a human-security analytical framework, this study has identified several barriers to ASEAN's creation of the APSC. In this chapter, which concludes the study, I will present its research contribution, review its research findings, explore its research limitations, and suggest directions for future research.

8.1 Research Contributions of this Study

The first contribution made by this study is its identification and clarification of discrepancies between mainstream IR theories and Southeast Asian security culture. From the 1950s to the late 1990s, explanations of security issues were dominated by state-centric IR theories, through which one would strive to understand states' behaviour: why states launch wars, why states develop their military, and why states cooperate with each other despite the chaos sometimes inherent in a given international set up. These state-centric IR theories, including realism and constructivism, also became popular among scholars exploring Southeast Asian security issues.

Realism and constructivism indeed underlay successful explorations of Southeast Asian security issues from the Cold War period to the late 1990s, because both realism and constructivism generated theoretical discourses in line with Southeast Asia's security cultures during those decades. From the Cold War period to the late 1990s, Southeast Asian countries were concerned mainly with national-security threats involving other states' aggressive policies and behaviours. And Southeast Asian countries addressed state-sourced threats by pursuing balances of power and by developing norms and identities. According to realism and constructivism, the primary source of threats is the state, the state is the actor best capable of addressing threats, and the typical state combats threats by establishing a balance of power and developing norms and identities.

However, security culture in Southeast Asia is not static as I mentioned in chapter one

(1.3.1.2.2). This study argued on evidence that Southeast Asian security culture has gradually shifted from state-centric to people-centred ways of thinking. Under the new Southeast Asian security culture, threats come from unpredictable phenomena, such as pandemic diseases, natural disasters, and economic crises, and from sometimes slightly less unpredictable non-state actors, such as religious secessionists. In addition, the actors addressing threats comprise both state and non-state actors. The new Southeast Asian security culture rocked the foundations of both realism and constructivism, which declare that threats arise only from states and that states are the only actors capable of addressing threats successfully.

The APSC is the product of the new Southeast Asian security culture. There are three discrepancies between previously cited the mainstream theories and the APSC. The first discrepancy is that the target of the APSC is the realisation of a people-oriented ASEAN, whereas realism and constructivism focus only on the state rather than people. The second discrepancy is that state and non-state actors have been involved in the APSC-building process, whereas realism and constructivism recognise only state as the type of actor equipped to address threats. The third discrepancy is that the threats that ASEAN has planned to address in the APSC are mainly non-state threats, whereas neither realism nor constructivism has ever prioritised non-state threats over state threats.

What we need is an in line with this new Southeast Asian security culture, and perhaps—as I contend—the human-security concept can lead us to just such an approach. Three qualities of the human-security concept fit with the new Southeast Asian security culture. First, in the human-security concept, the security referent is human beings. Second, the human-security concept recognises that origins of threats are various. Third, in the human-security concept, the types of actors addressing threats should encompass state actors and non-state actors. The human-security concept, in sum, is a highly useful—and perhaps even the most suitable—approach to exploring the security issues under the new Southeast Asian security culture including the APSC, which is people-oriented, characterises origins of threats as various, and regards non-state actors as well as state actors as critical factors in addressing insecurities.

The second contribution of this study is to transform the human-security concept into a human-security theory. Although the concept of human security has attracted criticism, Lam Peng Er argued that “we do not necessarily ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’ just because certain concepts are deemed to be less than clear or useful to everyone” (Lam, 2006: 145). I agree with his statement. Indeed, the concept of human security has changed our perception of exploring security issues: the security referent is human beings and the role of

the state is to protect people within the state's borders or to assist people outside the borders. However, the human-security concept, since its emergence in the mid-1990s, has been uniquely a 'concept' and never an applicable 'theoretical approach', and this fact goes far in explaining why many scholars who have analysed human security (i.e., the safety and well-being of people) have done so on the basis of the human-security concept rather than a human-security theory: *quite simply no one has ever drawn up a human-security theory*. For the present study, I have theorised the human-security concept by way of a five-step process and, finally, created a human-security theoretical approach: the security referent is human beings, the threats to human beings come from freedom from want and freedom from fear, human development programmes and humanitarian intervention are the means to address insecurities arising from freedom from want and freedom from fear, and individuals, states actors, and non-state actors are the essential elements functioning to ensure human security.

8.2 Research Findings of this Study

By using this new theoretical human-security approach, the current study made six significant findings regarding Southeast Asia's new security culture as it is manifested in the APSC. The first finding concerns individual actors: Southeast Asians. I conducted a questionnaire-survey, the results of which show that not many respondents were familiar with the creation of the AC. Of the 120 respondents, only 32 (27%) knew that ASEAN will create the AC by 2015 and only 4 could identify the basic characteristics of the AC. These numbers indicate that ASEAN has failed to communicate to Southeast Asians the nature of the APSC.

Three sets of results show that many respondents were not satisfied with their human-security condition. First, 77 respondents (64%) felt that their governments did not provide enough human security. These respondents complained that their governments failed to address the problems of medical care, environmental degradation, and poverty. Second, 52 respondents (43%) pointed to a personal lack of adequate human rights, citing the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression as the two most troubling types of personally experienced human-rights violations. The final result shows that 62 respondents (52%) did not have confidence in their government's ability to manage natural disasters. They pointed out that the barriers preventing their governments from effectively addressing natural disasters were corruption, inexperience, and material deficiencies in government. According to these results, we can reasonably conclude that ASEAN has done a poor job of countering human insecurities experienced at least by the respondents. We can also see that CSOs and media outlets have criticised ASEAN for failing to develop a people-oriented AC. However, I

argue that individuals should bear a personal responsibility to protect and promote their one human security. Please recall an important observation I mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.1.4.1): the better the understanding that people have of how state actors and CSOs can be beneficial, the greater the possibility that the organisations can successfully address human insecurity.

A second significant finding is that regarding the creation of the APSC, ASEAN member-states fall into one of two groups: the democratic group (ASEAN's founding members) and the non-democratic group (ASEAN's new-comers), which has prevented ASEAN from achieving people-oriented target. Members in the democratic group have actively supported and provided assistance to the task of creating the APSC, but the members of the non-democratic group have effectively prevented ASEAN from addressing sensitive issues that, if openly explored, would likely undermine the stability and viability of various state regimes. Divisions among ASEAN's member-states have stunted ASEAN's proposed adoption of a more people-oriented set of targets. The creation of the AICHR best exemplifies this trend: members in the non-democratic group opposed the AICHR's exercise of real power; thus, the AICHR has been nothing more than a regional human-rights body that, limited to promoting people's human rights, is wholly incapable of protecting them.

A third significant finding in the current study is that external powers have supported the creation of the APSC in order to achieve their own national interests, but the Chinese government's involvement in the APSC has resulted in several human insecurities. In chapter five, we learned that the motivations of Australia, China, Japan, and the U.S. in response to the creation of the APSC have centred either on expanding the countries' respective spheres of influence in Southeast Asia (China, Japan, and the U.S.) or on protecting the given country's citizens from transnational crimes (Australia). In this context, each external power has supported and provided assistance to the creation of the APSC. However, as mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.1.3), when state actors launch human-development programmes, it is likely that the programmes may result in other human insecurities. We find that in Yunnan Province and the downstream Mekong riparian states, some of the Chinese government's human-development programmes, such as the creation of dams, have produced several daunting sources of human insecurity.

A fourth significant finding here is that even though ASEAN has pledged to address several human-security issues in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC, ASEAN's ability to address these issues has been limited. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has adopted its norms and identities—the non-interference principle and the ASEAN Way—to address

regional security issues. Regarding the creation of the APSC, ASEAN's *modus operandi* has remained based on its norms and identities. However, ASEAN's *modus operandi* has prevented it from addressing several human-security issues: (1) The non-interference principle being embedded in the AICHR's Terms of Reference, the AICHR has lacked the power to investigate human-rights violations satisfactorily. (2) ASEAN is at risk of lagging in its response to natural disasters because, in line with the spirit of the non-interference principle, "external assistance or offers of assistance shall only be provided upon the request or with the consent of the affected party" (ASEAN, July 2005). And (3) ASEAN's reliance on the slow, non-binding consultative process of the ASEAN Way when addressing human-security threats has prevented ASEAN from detailing which agencies in member-states should conduct cooperative training and intelligence operations, where ASEAN will acquire resources for funding and equipment, how ASEAN can overcome inter-member wealth and human-capital inequities, and how ASEAN will punish members who do not adhere to its binding decisions, which are few in number as noted.

A fifth significant finding is that the EU and the UN have adopted a soft approach to being involved in the creation of the APSC. As mentioned in chapter six (see sections 6.2 and 6.3), the EU's and the UN's norms emphasise the promotion and protection of human security including human rights. These norms soured the two organisations' diplomatic relationships with ASEAN, most notably in the case of the EU. In order to improve relationships with ASEAN, the EU and the UN played down their norms and adopted a soft approach to handling the creation of the APSC.

A sixth significant finding from the current study is that only marginal spaces exist in which non-state actors can be involved in the creation of the APSC. This finding is somewhat curious for two reasons: first, in the ASEAN Charter and the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC, ASEAN has officially recognised CSOs' role in the APSC-building process; and second, technological advances have ensured that most CSOs are not lacking for resources with regard to involvement in the creation of the APSC. However, for ASEAN members, issues raised by CSOs have been sensitive and challenged ASEAN's non-interference principle. In order to defend its non-interference principle, some ASEAN members have hindered CSOs' participation in the APSC-building process—hence, the marginality of CSOs' role in this process.

8.3 Research Limitations of this Study

As with any study, the one here has its fair share of limitations. By considering them, we can

better gauge the many strengths of this study and we can identify directions in which future research should contribute to the literature, perhaps in part on the shoulders of this project. A limitation of the current study is the rudimentary status of my proposed human-security theory. I have used this new human-security theory to good effect in exploring the creation of the APSC, but the theory does not address several important questions related to human-security issues. For example, which human-security issues are the most critical ones to human beings? Why are democratic and semi-democratic states likely to fail in their efforts to address some human insecurity? Thus, although highly useful in analysing different actors' responses to the creation of the APSC, the new theory did not permit this study to identify which human-security issues are the most critical ones besetting Southeast Asians and could not explain why even the Indonesia and Malaysian governments, which have actively supported the creation of the APSC, have resoundingly failed to address several pressing domestic human insecurities, such as land-grabbing (Indonesia) and sharp incursions into religious freedom (Malaysia).

Another limitation is that my proposed human-security theory does not clearly explain the relations between the freedom-from-want issues and the freedom-from-fear issues. In fact, I contend that the issues of freedom from want and the issues of freedom from fears are causally related to each other. People's lack of freedom from want may lead to their adoption of radical means to gain freedom from want, resulting in freedom-from-fear problems, such as civil wars. The areas or states that have freedom-from-fear problems usually have freedom-from-want problems, such as famine, low living standards, and human trafficking. In order to create an applicable human-security theory, I artificially separated freedom-from-want issues and freedom-from-fear issues from each other. This separation has helped me clarify how each analysed type of actor had been responding and might respond to different human-security issues and why each actor has had unique response to freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues. However, because the proposed human-security theory does not address the relationship between freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues, both my freedom-from-want section and my freedom-from-fear section in each of five consecutive chapters (chapters three through seven) lack any reference to the aforementioned causal links.

The final theoretical limitation I would like to mention here is that my proposed human-security theory does not identify the extent to which state actors play important roles in human-security issues. As the foundation of my theory, the human-security concept has prompted many scholars to recognise that state actor can help achieve human security. In chapter two (see section 2.1.4.2), I even explored differences between democratic and non-

democratic states regarding their provision of human security to their people and differences between individual states and multilateral state actors regarding their involvement in human-security issues. However, my proposed human-security theory offers researchers no measure by which to assess state actors' effects on human-security issues. Because of this limitation, my proposed human-security theory specifically lacks a mechanism for helping to determine which state actors merit the most attention in scholarly research. As for my own study, I eventually chose to discuss Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the UN, and the U.S. because these state actors have close historical, political, economic, and security relations with ASEAN. As stricter, more refined mechanism for making these choices and for assigning varying degrees of attention to state actors would have strengthened the current study.

Limited funding, which is entirely non-theoretical, has been a significant limitation on this study. My constrained budget prevented me, first and foremost, from going to Southeast Asian countries where I would have distributed my questionnaires to local university students. The current study features a questionnaire whose respondents were all university students of Southeast Asian origins (residing and studying mainly in the UK). Thus, the sample size of my respondent population was small, relegated to six ASEAN members, and hence not nearly as generalisable as would have been desired. In other words, the data stemming from the respondents might not reflect wider patterns concerning Southeast Asians' understanding of the APSC.

Owing to limited funding, this study relied on a smaller than desirable field study. I conducted the field study in Indonesia and Singapore in January 2012, but budget constraints prevented me from extending the field study into other ASEAN countries, where I would have interviewed additional experts and officials. Consequently, this study's exploration of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand rested exclusively on secondary academic sources and media sources, not on author-conducted interviews. Although these sources presented substantive direct and indirect evidence about each ASEAN member's responses to the creation of the APSC, and were thus extremely helpful in identifying each member's strategies and each member's motivations underlying the strategies, the human-security issues that these sources covered were rather homogeneous in their focus, prioritising such reliably popular topics as human rights and democracy. Thus, while exploring the ASEAN members' response to the creation of the APSC, I found that these gaps in the literature prevented me from discussing ASEAN members' response to such critical but less popular human-security issues as disease, poverty, and public health.

Also, my limited budget prevented me from travelling to Australia, China, Japan, and

the United States, where I would have interviewed officials and experts. So yet again my exploration—this time, of both these external powers' strategies and their underlying motivations—rested mainly on the academic literature and media sources. And of course these sources usually rested on the perspective of realism. Thus, with the exception of external powers' motivation to bolster their influence in Southeast Asia, I found no evidence that other motivations underlie external powers' involvement in the creation of the APSC. This absence of evidence may reflect the incompleteness of the existing literature's theoretical foundations rather than an actual absence of diverse factors in reality.

8.4 Suggestions for Future Research

I would like to offer three suggestions for future research. My first suggestion is that scholars in the field clarify why my proposed human-security theory encompasses state-centric elements. The human-security theory integrates some features of two mainstream IR theories: realism and constructivism. This overlap may confuse readers and researchers. In chapter one, I argued that mainstream IR theories have not permitted rigorous analyses of Southeast Asian security issues, owing to the discrepancies between the IR theories and today's evolving Southeast Asian security culture. However, my proposed human-security theory still includes the concept of balance of power and ideational factors, like norms and identities. If the human-security theory is to help researchers explore human-security issues rigorously, researchers should first explain why it encompasses state-centric elements. The main issue currently is that balance of power and ideational factors can serve to explain only state actors' behaviours, not individual actors' and non-state actors' behaviours regarding involvement in human-security issues.

I would also like to suggest that researchers address several important human-security problems that I mentioned when discussing my study's research limitations. Researchers might consider exploring how to grade human-security issues in their order of important to human beings. If this task is not challenging enough, researchers might try to cast light on why democratic and semi-democratic state have, on notable occasion, failed to address their own domestic human securities. An issue of both theoretical and practical concern to future researchers is how they might embed causal links between the freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues when discussing the two sets of issues separately. Future researchers might ask, how can we identify the extent to which state actors play important roles in human-security issues? From my perspective, serious inquiries into these issues might rock the structure of human-security theory. For example, a failure to explain which

human-security issues are the most important ones to human beings may call into question—why this study mainly discuss human rights and transnational crimes issues rather than poverty and public health issues. Moreover, the current study cannot properly assess state actors' important to human-security issues, hence calling into question this study's decision to discuss Australia, China, the EU, Japan, and the U.S. rather than, say, Canada, India, Russia, and South Korea.

The third suggestion is that adoption of this proposed human-security theory to explore human-security issues should also conduct field study. This new human-security theory is a macro-theory because (1) it emphasises that each type of actor—individual actors, state actors, and non-state actor—is essential; (2) it covers each type of actor's responses to human-security issues, and (3) it does not exclude any insecurity variable that may threaten human beings. Thus, when researchers apply this approach to a given topic, research sources should include not only academic essays and media information but also field studies, such as interviews and questionnaire-survey. For example, interviews may help researchers find out information regarding actors' responses to human-security issues such as public health and poverty—issues that much of the literature either overlooks or relegates to a secondary status. And as for questionnaire-surveys, they can help researchers specify individual actors' responses to human-security issues in quantifiably useful ways.

For the present study, I have explored analytical approaches to determine which is most congruous with Southeast Asian's new security culture and I have found that the concept of human security appears to be the most suitable candidate. In addition, I have tried to transform the concept into a workable approach and subsequently applied it to the study of a current affair: the creation of the APSC. By exploring individuals', state actors', and non-state actors' responses, strategies, and motivations underlying these strategies, this study has found several research findings. Most of findings are the barrier for ASEAN to create the APSC. In this context, ASEAN may create the APSC by the 2015 target date, but the likelihood that the APSC would then function properly seems narrow indeed.

APPENDIX: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

Interviewee: Ian Storey

Meeting Location: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Question:

What is your perspective on the creation of the APSC regarding the issue of the South China Sea?

Answer:

I don't really see much connection. I don't think it will have any impact on the dispute. It will be ten years, this year, since the DOC (the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea) was signed in November. It was only last year that they agreed on implementation guidelines. It was quite disappointing, because they are not really specific, there are no details and it basically reiterates what was in the original agreement of 2002. But, now ASEAN and China have started to discuss confidence building measures. There was meeting in Cambodia last week. The kind of things that they are looking at is search and rescue, maritime, disaster relief and environmental concerns. Even if those projects go ahead, I don't think they'll have any impact on tensions in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is driven by rivalry over maritime resources: oil, gas, fish. It's driven by nationalism. The military balance of power is changing in the South China Sea, because of the growth of the Chinese navy. The US has shown a much greater interest in the South China Sea dispute. So, the DOC has no impact any of the central drivers of the dispute, in my opinion.

The two sides have also agreed to start discussing a code of conduct, but I think that will be very difficult to agree on. What is the geographical scope of the agreement? Is there going to be joint development? How do you do that? How do you enforce an agreement like that? What kind of sanctions are available? I am not very optimistic that either the DOC or the code of conduct will have much of an impact on tensions in the South China Sea. I predict that we will see the kind of incidents that we saw last year that you just mentioned again this year. Or involving fishery vessels or fishing trawlers.

I think the status quo will remain in place for the time being. Tensions in the South China Sea go up and they go down. And that's what we've seen over the last few years. I'd say they have been on the up since about 2007—2008. I don't see them going down in the future, because I don't think the DOC and code of conduct can really have much of an impact on reducing tensions. I don't envisage a major conflict in the South China Sea or war, but

because of the increasing number of incidents at sea, like we saw last year, then the risk of an accidental clash at sea which could escalate into a more serious diplomatic or military crisis, that risk increases.

Question:

Do you think ASEAN's norms and identities matter in the South China Sea issues?

Answer:

Not really. Tensions in the South China Sea went down in the late 1990s and early 2000 partly because China saw it in its own interests to try to reduce the tensions. It was all part of its charm offensive, one of the central messages of which was that rising power of China does not pose a strategic threat to any country and that China's armed forces are for defensive purposes only. It was highly symbolic for China to sign the TAC, but they gained a lot of goodwill but gave away nothing. It didn't cost them anything, because it was symbolic. This is true of every country that signed the TAC. It doesn't constrain their ability to employ military force in Southeast Asia. So, I don't think it has had any impact. Some countries have written an additional protocol where they basically say yes we've signed the TAC, but it won't affect our ability to use force. So what does it all mean then? So, norms and identity...they both talk about the importance of stability, peace, the need for cooperation and confidence-building measures, but they say one thing and they tend to do something else. I would say that particularly China's actions have been very destabilizing. It's not just China, but also Vietnam and, to some extent, the Philippines. I am not really convinced that norms and identities somehow constrain China.

Question:

What is your perspective about the cooperation between China and ASEAN members regarding the non-traditional security issues?

Answer:

I think the primary issue will continue to be the South China Sea, because I don't see any breakthrough in that dispute. I don't think the tension will be lowered in the foreseeable future, so the South China Sea is *the* security issue between China and ASEAN. In fact, there aren't many other issues between them, it's the South China Sea. [With regard to non-traditional security threats] they have signed a number of agreements, but I haven't seen much real practical cooperation...possibly, in the area of anti-narcotics among the mainland Southeast Asian countries and China. [On the issue of] piracy, China has offered to support to

the Southeast Asian countries but there has been no follow through, they haven't delivered anything. I suppose they did cooperate over SARS, the spread of infectious diseases and human trafficking, mainly the mainland Southeast Asian states and China. Is that really a security issue? That's a police issue, I think. That's a matter for law enforcement agencies. Is it really security issue? I am not convinced about that. I am not a big fan of this non-traditional security thing, to be honest. When it comes to terrorism, has there been much cooperation or exchanging intelligence between ASEAN countries and China? I haven't heard of very much. It's possible that it goes on, but I have no evidence of that.

I have looked at piracy in Southeast Asia very closely and China's contribution to that area has been minimal, certainly compared to the United States and Japan. The United States has provided Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines with a lot of money for radar installation and patrol boats, which was hundred million dollars. The only thing I can find that China has provided is some computer equipment for Indonesia, which is ten thousand dollars. Japan has been doing this since the 1960s, providing technology and financial assistance. Again, this is not really a security issue. That is a safety of navigation issue. Japan wants its ships to come through the Straits of Malacca and up to the South China Sea safely. A bit of anti-piracy cooperation, the Japanese coastguard has been active in that respect. Japan and the United States have done much more than China in that area.

Another issue would be the Mekong River. If you want to class that as a security issue or environmental issue, again, there is not much cooperation. China is not a member of the Mekong River Commission. Last year, because many of the Thais started to complain about the low water level in the Mekong, China said they would provide more information on the dams and that kind of thing. My understanding is the lower riparian countries have been a bit disappointed with cooperation from China in that area.

Question:

Last year, Myanmar released Aung San Suu Kyi and allowed her to meet foreign diplomats. Do you think that Myanmar's change regarding the issue of human right is due to ASEAN's pressure? Or has Myanmar itself accepted ASEAN's norms? Or are there other political implication?

Answer:

No, I don't think that is due to ASEAN pressure. It is all about the internal domestic politics. In fact, we are going to publish an article in the next issue of Contemporary Southeast Asia on this issue of how effective ASEAN has been in putting pressure on Burma over human

rights, and the answer is not very effective. I think this is all internal. I think it's the new government's desire to break out of its isolation and to reduce its dependence on China. And, in order to have sanctions lifted, and have better relations with the west, particularly the United States, they are going to have made the progress on this issue, which they have. I think the reform process looks quite genuine. Some people suggested the reforms were cosmetic, when they were first introduced. I don't think you can make argument now. Something positive is happening in Burma. Whether it will continue, we don't know, but certainly, things are changing in the right direction in Burma. I don't think it has much to do with ASEAN. It is purely internal politics in Myanmar and their desire to broaden their foreign policy and to improve the image. Actually, you might argue Chinese pressure has been more effective than ASEAN pressure.

Question:

As you mentioned, why is Myanmar trying to reduce its dependence on China?

Answer:

They don't like to be dependent on China. I don't think they like the Chinese very much. No one likes to be dependent on another country. I don't think the generals in Myanmar have ever been very happy about this relationship with China. Basically, they had no choice in 1988-89, but to turn to China. It was more of a marriage of convenience than a love match. They've tried over years to reduce that dependence by joining ASEAN and then trying to pursue closer relationships with India and Russia and other countries, but every time they have been forced to rely even more on China. This is another attempt, I think, to reduce that dependence. There's a lot of unhappiness within Burma about their close relationship with China. Obviously, it negatively affects their relationship with the United States. And there have been people within ASEAN that are uncomfortable with Burma's close relationship with China. It is not to say that China won't be an important country in Burma's future. Of course, it will. It is their neighbour and their biggest trading partner and China has a lot of interests in Burma which it will want to protect. But, perhaps, the role of China will lessen in the future. It won't be [Burma's] primary patron in their foreign policy.

Question:

Will the problem of human rights and democracy within Myanmar continue to be a barrier in the relationship with ASEAN and Western countries, in particular the United States and the EU?

Answer:

That depends on how far and how fast the process continues. They have made a lot of progress in the last six months, but will it continue? We don't know. It looks to me like it will, because it's hard to reverse these things once you start. So, definitely, if the reforms continue, then human rights will become less of an issue with the EU and the United States and with ASEAN. But, it will still be an issue. Until, maybe one day Burma is a fully fledged liberal democracy and there are no political prisoners, the ethnic minorities aren't mistreated. Then, it stops being a problem.

But the United States has human rights issues with every country in Southeast Asia, even Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. These issues don't disappear, but they are not central issues. You can say right now this is *the* big issue in Burma-US relations. Clearly, human rights is not *the* big issue in Singapore-US relations. It's an issue, a small one, but nothing like it is with the United States and Burma. So, over time, if these positive trends continue, it will become less of an issue.

Question:

Do you think that, after the creation of the APSC, the relationship between the US and ASEAN will be influenced, still, by the issue of terrorism?

Answer:

Not so much. The terrorism issue around the world, in particular in US foreign policy, is far less significant than it was five years ago or ten years ago after 9/11. When senior US officials visit Southeast Asia, they seldom talk about terrorism now. The United States has lots of interests in Southeast Asia, trade and investment, education and promoting democracy. Increasingly, the US focuses on Southeast Asia's geopolitics, and that is its increasingly competitive relationship with China. Terrorism will always be on the agenda between the United States and ASEAN countries, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia, but I don't think it is such big issue between ASEAN and China in the future. ASEAN countries have been quite successful in dealing with that issue with support from other countries like Australia and the US.

Question:

Will the United States continue its military presence in Southeast Asia?

Answer:

As long as they can afford it, yes. They have already increased their military presence in

Southeast Asia through more ship visits, more training and more exercises. In the future, they will forward deploy littoral combat ships to Singapore and, possibly, to the Philippines as well. More training, more exercises and more ship visits, that's all good. Most Southeast Asian countries support that and facilitate it. But the question on the minds of Southeast Asians is, given America's severe financial difficulties, can it sustain this military presence?

Also, you have to consider two things. If Obama is elected in November, Hillary Clinton probably will not be the Secretary of State. Probably, Kurt Campbell will leave as well. So, you may have a Secretary of State who doesn't focus as much on Asia and Southeast Asia in the future.

The second thing is if Obama loses and the Republicans come into power, they also may not focus on Asia. I think what will happen is, many of the people, if the Republicans win, who go into office, they are people who will want to justify decisions made by the Republicans about Iraq, the Middle East and Afghanistan, so those issues might be more prominent in their minds. So, it's really a question of money, political will and political interests, whether this focus on Southeast Asia is maintained. And it's not a given.

Interviewee: Jose Javares

Meeting Location: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

Question:

How will the relationships between the EU and ASEAN develop in the future, after the creation of the APSC?

Answer:

I think the EU is very important as ASEAN's dialogue partner. The EU also has the commitment to continue its support for ASEAN so I believe that, by the establishment of the APSC, the relationships between ASEAN and the EU continue to become closer, because there are some activities and projects by the EU which support the establishment of the APSC. Specifically, the support provided is like last year in October, we had the related workshops so I think they are going to start focusing on this kind of area. I believe there is also a fund of 17 million Euros. The European Union is supporting various projects, including human rights, transnational crimes, capacity building and also initiatives of ASEAN integration, if I'm not mistaken. There is quite a lot of money, several million Euros for several years.

One of the obstacles you see, even though the EU has already been established a long time ago, it still has the problems and continues to develop as a community, as a union. So, I believe that ASEAN too is in the earlier stage in comparison with the EU. We are developing

towards 2015 and this is not the end of it. It will continue and nobody will say when the community will reach a point when it is takes enough. No! I believe that the community will continue evolving. Before, I heard that if you want to study the European Community, it's like shooting a moving target while riding a horse. So, both are moving. It is very difficult, very fluid. The same thing applied to ASEAN too.

These two regional organizations have emerged. They are moving in their way so they have to do some fine-tuning when they are cooperating. They have their own internal evolution, their own process to do. I think this is the problem. Of course, another aspect, as you have already mentioned, is they have an impact on human right values and democracy.

But now, ASEAN since 2008 has had the ASEAN Charter and Indonesia too few years ago. We were a totalitarian regime now we are moving. We are already at the higher stage. We are better in terms of democracy. Likewise, other ASEAN members countries too. So, as you see, Myanmar has been developing very fast over the past year, in terms of the political transformation, they released of Aung San Suu Kyi and the release of political prisoners. And now, she is engaging in a by-election in Myanmar. So, everything is moving. I believe now this is new momentum for cooperation between the EU and ASEAN.

The EU has also experienced a financial crisis in several countries. Because of the single currency in the EU, you cannot tackle this issue at the national level. You must tackle it, of course. You cannot have a national policy, then, suddenly, be impacted at the national level. That is one thing. Of course, there is an impact of the issue of the single currency, where we should be a kind of the policy that have an impact on all of the European Union. Why in ASEAN we don't have the single currency yet. So, every national policy has an immediate effect on its own, even though they have regional effects, obviously. I believe that it's about time that the relations between ASEAN and the EU will improve very fast. I believe in the next few months. I hear that the EU will be discussing Myanmar perhaps in April. And after that, there will be significant progress in the cooperation between the EU and ASEAN.

Question:

After the creation of the AC, will ASEAN become the more institutionalized organization, for example, through the implementation of more stringent mechanisms like the EU?

Answer:

You are right. The institutionalisation has become more integrated, through the single currency. They have their own shortcomings and weaknesses because I believe that there are strong European countries like Germany, Spain and France, obviously the United Kingdom

doesn't want to be there, opting out from the single currency. Now, we are ASEAN. We are not like the EU that is more like a supra-national body. ASEAN is like a lot of sovereignties that belong to the European Union. They have more regulations on every aspect like agriculture. They still have their own sovereignty maintained in various aspects of national affairs. In terms of ASEAN, we are not moving to that yet. I don't know whether we are going to move in the same direction. At this point, we are more an inter-governmental organization. Sovereignty still belongs to every country and we are doing our own different parts of community. It doesn't have to be the same as the European Union. There, you are surrendering a certain level of your sovereignty to the EU. In ASEAN, this is not the case. It is more like an intra-governmental organization. In handling issues like finance, of course, we have Chi-Maing initiatives. This is something different. The EU does not have this. If problems of liquidity emerges, they use this pocket money to help in assisting. The arrangement now is becoming more multi-lateralised in ASEAN. So, the kind of different parts we are taking, not necessarily like the EU. I don't think the EU models are quite suitable for us, because we are not at the same level yet. I don't know if, when we reach a point, that a certain level of sovereignty will be given to ASEAN, in terms of economy, yes, there is already harmonization in the regulations on trade, for example. Actually, we are talking about a certain small level of sovereignty, but not in the political aspects.

We will see whether it is suitable to learn from certain aspects of the EU and adopt them here. For example, the EU has the same visa. Now, in ASEAN, we have already an agreement between the ASEAN member-states that there is no longer a need for diplomats to have a visa. When you have an agreement with ASEAN, some countries give a one-month visa and some countries two-weeks visa. It depends on the bilateral agreement. But for diplomats and officials, there is no longer a visa. Also, common people, ordinary people, no longer need a visa. But not all of the countries in ASEAN have yet applied this, because Myanmar needs to have bilateral agreements with other ASEAN countries. All of the ASEAN countries have already implemented it, except one, which is Myanmar. I believe that, in the near future, Myanmar will do so also. We are going to have some kind of similar arrangement, if someone from outside comes to ASEAN and visits Indonesia, they can go everywhere and vice versa. So, this is a kind of certain level of regulation of sovereignty of our countries which is given, not as vast as the EU but it has already been accepted.

Question:

What is your perspective about the relationship between ASEAN and Japan and ASEAN and

the United States, in terms of non-traditional security issues?

Answer:

The maritime cooperation is very important for ASEAN and Japan, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, freedom of navigation, fisheries, pollution of the environment and cooperation on disaster issues, as we have a problem with that. Obviously, this is one of the issues that are really of interest to ASEAN countries, Japan and others too, because it will always be a problem for trade in this area. I believe that, if countries can increase their cooperation in this area, they can tackle the issue. Somalian piracy also reached the Indian Ocean. It's very dangerous and can hamper the trade of the countries in the region.

The cooperation between ASEAN and the U.S. has already reached a summit. Now, we have plan of action for 2011-2015. There is a pattern of cooperation between ASEAN and its dialogue partners, which is political cooperation, such as the promotion of human rights, capacity building, combating transnational crime, and terrorism, and so on. The cooperation also includes economic and educational aspects. There is an enhancement of trade, culture and also education. A lot of ASEAN students study in the U.S. Now, we are thinking that the U.S. too has to understand us, so they send their students to us to study at our universities. Things are moving. The direction now is in the process of discussing strategic partnership. They want to enhance the partnership to a higher level. But this issue has now been studied by the eminent persons just established in November last year. So, the eminent persons from ASEAN and the U.S. will sit together and discuss on what has been done already, what needs to be improved and what new should be done.

Question:

What is your perspective about the improving democratic situation in Indonesia and its effect on ASEAN?

Answer:

Since the Soeharto era, Indonesia has been moving towards democracy. Sometimes, we think that democracy is too much. For example, if someone criticizes the president, for example, and even doesn't have any strong substantive reason to say such things. You don't find this in very democratic countries like Europe and the U.S. You don't see such things. Sometimes, it is too much. People are using opportunity of democracy to do more than what other democratic countries have already done. Then, I hear that the president went to the police and reported someone, because these people are saying something serious about him. You don't see this situation in the U.S., because if you want to accuse a president, you must have really

strong evidence to do that. Here it happens! So, sometimes, there is too much democracy. Some people say no. The academics say that you a pendulum that is moving too much when it should be in the middle. Right in the middle. You should have democracy that is responsible. Everybody knows how to play with democracy.

And what we have here is that we are trying to tell people that this system democracy and respect for human rights better for us rather than authoritarianism, when you can go and hit everybody. We are telling our ASEAN colleagues that this is the best thing to do. By doing that, you see what is institutionalized in ASEAN is the ASEAN Charter. It is very clear on democracy and human rights. Whether you like it or not, you have to follow what is written and signed by the ASEAN leaders. So, every country is gradually moving towards what has been set by the ASEAN Charter in 2007, coming into force in 2008.

Interviewee: Lay Hwee Yeo

Meeting Location: European Union Centre

Question:

When members of the EU such as Greece and Spain were engulfed in last year's financial crisis, the EU, which is the most institutionalized regional organization in the world, showed that, like ASEAN, it was unable to solve problems effectively. Do you think the fact that, for example, the EU failed to resolve the Greek default will encourage ASEAN to insist on its informal conflict-avoidance mechanisms?

Answer:

During the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN, of course, was criticized for being unable to respond effectively. So, there was lot of soul-searching. Coming from that, you can see that, of course, there was a lot of ...sort of... trying to look at the EU's example, policy-learning, trying to understand how other regional institutions work. But, I think all along ASEAN has been quite balanced, in that they knew that they had to think of new ways of handling their own regional affairs. But, they are not naïve enough to believe that what is done in the EU can be entirely copied for the ASEAN context. So, they are willing to open their minds to look at what does deepening mean? What does to be more institutionalized mean for ASEAN? So, they are willing to explore. That is why they came up the idea of the ASEAN Community, trying to create a single production network, for very practical reasons, in order to continue to be competitive. But, at the same time, they are also quite clear that they cannot adopt all things, the EU institutional methods. So in many ways, I think that it's balanced.

So now, I think the situation in the EU will just confirm those perspectives. Each region has

to find its own way of handling... There are advantages of being very institutionalised, but there are also advantages of being very flexible. Soft institutionalisation, like ASEAN, which can, in some way, use favourable geometry that maybe the EU has to learn to be much more relaxed about this, moving in the two-speed Europe that is taking place. Or a few countries saying they are willing, like France is now threatening to say, we are going to impose a financial transaction tax anyway and go ahead. Even the others like London are not willing to come along. I think that just confirmed to the ASEAN policy makers that that each regional institution needs to find its own way of managing its own regional affairs.

Of course, there are those who are starting to criticize the EU methods and theories as just too inflexible. Of course, there are lots of people that when things are bad they will bring all this criticism. In general, both the Asian financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that is unfolding in the EU just confirm to many of these more rational policymakers and more prominent policymakers in ASEAN that each needs to find its own way of building its own region.

ASEAN has been becoming more institutionalized over the last decade. Already, they have taken steps. But how far would they go? I think the EU case tells them that this is not necessarily the way to go. It doesn't mean that regional integration must be a linear process. It is not necessary to keep on being more and more institutionalised.

Question:

Do you think that ASEAN will review the ASEAN Way?

Answer:

When we talk about the ASEAN Way, in reality, it has always been interpreted very widely. People always say ASEAN always talks about non-interference. The UN Charter also talks about non-interference, because this principle of sovereignty equality is very important in the context of international relations, especially for the weaker powers. You need to have that kind of sense of security. The ASEAN Way is not just about non-interference, but also about trying to seek solutions through consensual methods and consultation. You can see over the history of ASEAN, sometimes, this so-called principle of non-interference, is not strictly adhered to. But, the way they do it is different from this megaphone diplomacy that the West uses, like openly-criticizing. But, there is a lot of quiet diplomacy ASEAN uses. If you look at how, in this Thai-Cambodian conflict, the ASEAN Chair, Indonesia, tried in some ways to be involved.

So I think the principle has to stay, because, if you look at the history of ASEAN, ASEAN

was launched because of the fear of confrontation and interference into each other's affairs, because we have our own domestic problems, all these ethnic tensions. So officially, the principle has to be strongly adhered to, but the operationalizing of it changes with the context. I think, again, it shows ASEAN members are quite pragmatic. When the opportunity arises, they can do something. Especially, when it comes to what we call the issues that certainly affect the region as a whole. Of course, it is not internal issues where it doesn't have regional repercussions, like in a case where someone is going to be given the death penalty for drug-trafficking. But in the case of Myanmar, you can see that they feel that what happens in Myanmar has regional repercussions. It had started to undermine ASEAN. They will see that the other ASEAN members will get together and say "how shall we resolve this" and they will put pressure on Myanmar in a quiet way, not openly. Already, some have openly criticized Myanmar, but they try not to, they send some people to the Myanmar government.

Question:

Do you think that the relations between ASEAN and the EU will be enhanced after the creation of the APSC? What kinds of barriers will emerge between them in the future?

Answer:

What I am concerned about is that the sovereign debt crisis will consume lots of time and energy of the European Union and they will not be able to meet this opportunity at the point when there is a lot of movement and Myanmar is opening up. I am afraid that they will not be able to turn this into a good opportunity where they can really step up relations with ASEAN. If you look at how fast the US has responded, it has now restored diplomatic relations in such a short time, how much quicker it has responded compared to the EU now. Of course, you have just had the French Foreign Minister visiting, Alain Juppe, which is good news. But, to get this to translate into a common policy of the EU, again, because of very nature of the need for this coordination, getting 27 member-states to change the policy, like, ok now we will decide to lift the sanctions. That will take time. This is a very good opportunity for the EU to use this occasion to step up relations with ASEAN. But whether it can do so effectively, I am not sure, because, like I say, the fact they are still so embroiled with the sovereign debt crisis that they might let this opportunity slip and they cannot come up with a coherent response and a good coherent, cohesive policy at this moment.

Questions:

What is the perspective from the EU in terms of the human rights and democracy of ASEAN?

Answers:

Officially, the EU welcomes this move by ASEAN to set up the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Officially, the stance is very clear, that what ASEAN is doing with the ASEAN Political-Security Community pillar, in terms of focusing on education on human rights are all moves in the right direction. I think that will be the typical response from the EU. But, again, they are probably still waiting for more concrete policies. Myanmar seems to be responding to this and all these exciting changes that are taking place, but it comes back to what I was saying just now about whether they are able to respond quickly, because ASEAN has already called on the US and EU to lift the sanctions. And how fast the EU can respond to this, I am not sure, whereas I think that, with the US making all this effort to establish full diplomatic ties, they will probably be much faster in lifting certain sanctions towards Myanmar.

Questions:

What kind of barriers will emerge between the EU and ASEAN in the future?

Answers:

I think the concern now will be more about protectionism because of the problems faced by the EU because of its growth prospects and all these austerity measures and social political tensions arising in the EU itself, which I think is the challenge. If you think of more far-right parties, for instance, coming into power or having a bigger share of the popular vote and sharing power than you can expect the EU policies may become more protectionist, maybe become more anti-immigrant, that dents the image of the EU that wants to show itself to be a normative power. These are the obstacles which might arise because the domestic situation in the EU itself with the anger from young people over the austerity in all of the countries and the prospects for low growth for a long time, so sentiment within Europe itself may turn sour. Then politicians who have to pander to the domestic constituencies will start to take a much more strident, anti-Asian, because it's seen as competition, as you can see with China, they see this more as a threat, you know "We have to protect our industry. We have to make sure there's no outsourcing to China". These kinds of sentiments already exist. But what I am concerned with is that if the crisis continues to drag on making things even more problematic. One can say that it is quite lucky that there are no wholesale protectionist measures in the wake of the crisis. But as I say, if the crisis is prolonged, the main threat is really this kind of protectionism and then you will have global trade impeded. You know the EU has long been the bigger trading power, but if it closes its market, I mean not entirely, but starts to put up all

these protective barriers, then you will have more trade friction and tensions between Asia and Europe.

Question:

As a relatively weak and fragile state, what are the security strategies of Singapore, after the creation of the APSC?

Answer:

I think the Singaporean government has always understood this vulnerability. As a very small country, the sense of being vulnerable has always been there. So, of course, if the regional environment is good, then that helps Singapore to feel a little bit more secure, but it will never be the case, because the policy-makers have always believed it is in a very challenging environment and it's going to get even more challenging and volatile for the region. It has always positioned itself to try to make sure that it continues to be active, and to be able to influence developments within ASEAN is very important. That's why it has always tried to tell ASEAN that it must not become too nationalistic in some ways and to tone down some of the rhetoric. I think it will continue to play an important role in ASEAN.

In some ways, Singapore must find a way to work more closely with Indonesia. We are realizing that Indonesia is becoming the key power and will want to exert their power in ASEAN. For a long time, Indonesia was quite willing to 'lead from behind' but now it's no longer doing that. Now they want to lead from the front. Of course, you can say that the other small ASEAN powers' countries maybe concerned. So, Singapore, in that sense, as a very small country, with little power, can manage this good relationship and work with Indonesia closely. Then, a lot of things within ASEAN can be pushed because they can be seen in some ways as a sort of...if any ideas come, it will both take care of the interests of big powers and small powers within the regional institutions. Working closely with Indonesia has become a very important strategy. I think our government has to adopt... has to be very concerned about... how to manage the good relationship with Indonesia within ASEAN to move the agenda of ASEAN forward as a joint effort, so the smaller countries in ASEAN will also look at this initiative as something that is not being pushed only by the big powers. So, I think that is the important strategy that Singapore really has to be cognisant of. Now that Indonesia has emerged as a big power, playing a role in the G20, of course, its global image has improved considerably, as a good example of a Muslim country that has achieved democratization also. Of course, Singapore will see itself as a global city. It always pursues different parallel strategies at the same time. It doesn't only say we are focusing on regional dimensions but

also the global connection. So, it will continue to develop this cross-regional means. You can see that it is very active with trying to link up with Brazil, in Latin America, and South Africa, in the African continent. They will continue this global strategy, whilst Indonesia will be the regional power.

Question:

How does Singapore face the implementation of the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Security Community in terms of the issue of human rights and democracy?

Answer:

The understanding within ASEAN is quite clear. We put in our charter this respect for democracy and human rights, but they also believe that each country should take its own pace. A lot of this change has to come from within, which means they believe, for instance, in internal measures taken by Myanmar and to support it in ways that are helpful not just criticise, because each country, because of its own historical, cultural, background and context, will take a different pace of liberalisation and democratisation. If you take the long view, as long as there is improvement... So, we have a lot of states in ASEAN now that are not completely free or democratic. You have Brunei which is a monarchy, which doesn't have regular elections, because they have only a parliament which is appointed. You accept that there are different political systems, with different levels, different degrees of openness and democracy. The issue is that the Charter says ASEAN members are committed to improve their human rights. As long as there are signs that each country in some ways is taking steps to do that, then, there should not be an issue at all. But, we are not the one to determine that by 2015, everyone has to be completely democratic and have the same system. I think ASEAN has never dictated in any way in the Charter everyone should become similar. We are all different, as long as there is a commitment to improve on what we have politically aspired to achieve and as long as that benchmark is there and there are certain moves taken to improve the situation then I think there is no issue at all. Similarly, how can you compare Singapore's democracy? What about the issue of rule of law? Singapore has a very high score in rule of law. What does democracy mean, again? We don't look at democracy as only one model. The key to me in ASEAN is that the pressure for change should come from within, which means the domestic constituency. Singapore is becoming more open. This is not because of the pressure from Indonesia or the Philippines, but because of its own people, like in the election last year when they made it clear to the government that they don't want this government to keep on being elitist in its approach. Similarly, you see what happened in

Myanmar when they had their own vote for democracy, which they say they are going to implement, so they say 'we are going to carry out elections in November 2011'. I think ASEAN is flexible enough to accommodate these differences.

Interviewee: Lina Alexandra

Meeting Location: Centre for Strategic and International Studies – Jakarta

Question:

The Indonesian government adopted a comprehensive approach to deal with terrorism and separatism, encompassing national security, society, educational policy and ideology. Do you think this approach has been successful?

Answer:

I think, on the one hand, this is two different issues. On the other hand, there is some overlapping of the two issues. Before, actually, the concern was mainly on the issue of separatism, like Aceh and Papua. Some of the separatist groups, such as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) last time, used some terrorist ways to intimidate people or force the government to do something, regarding their voice and demands. But, if you think about that there is a certain connection with international terrorism that is definitely a different case with the separatism issue, like some arms of Jemaah Islamiyah, for example, here in this country. So I would rather argue that they are two different things.

The way the government deals with these issues are also different in their mindset. But, on the surface you can see that the government is focusing much on using the military instrument to deal with this. And that would certainly bring a lot of consequences. If you ask whether it is effective or not, when they are using military instruments, using arms for example, that would be certainly be the domain of those police and military authorities. But, I would rather argue this is mainly a police issue, on the one hand. On the other hand, that would certainly not touch on the root causes of the issues. For example, the case in Aceh, the idea of separatism was there but it has been nurtured by the cases where people with lots of abundant natural resources, but they have never tasted any benefits, even a trickle of benefits from those natural resources. It is all absorbed by the central government. So, it is still an economic issue.

In the terrorism issue, because some people, out of poverty, were inspired to join this group and then committed suicide bombing, or just joined the terrorist activities, because they are disappointed with the central government. The government cannot actually increase their prosperity. So, the effort so far has not really touched upon those root causes. Like in Papua,

this is a burning issue, but the government both local and central, have no idea how to deal with the Papua issue. They just put military instruments there, like soldiers, whatever, armies. They barely have any idea.

Because of the decentralization issue, the government has tried to engage more through the local government, but for example if there is certain movement from the Papua separatist group for example just to raise the flag, they would send a lot of soldiers there just to show some strong action to that idea. I don't think that is necessary. The instrument is not proportionate. It's like when the president cancelled his trip to the Netherlands because there is a [Maluku?] in exile there, and we cancelled the government for cancelling his trip there, because that group is not significant. But he showed they are significant enough to cancel his trip to the Netherlands. The way the government responds to those issues is militaristic and disproportionate.

Question:

ASEAN leaders have decided to establish the APSC before 2015. How does the creation of the APSC impact on Indonesia's policies towards non-traditional and traditional security issues?

Answer:

I think ASEAN Political-Security Community has been focused more on the high political issues rather than non-traditional security issues. Non-traditional security issues are still there in the APSC but are also being addressed in other forms like the East Asian Summit. From a political view, the non-traditional security issues have been considered as something not sensitive. Usually, the non-traditional security issues have been elevated and used to make major countries in the Asia-Pacific or Asia talk with each other because those issues are not sensitive issues. If you check the last summit, they mainly talked about climate change, for example.

Indonesia is trying to put more attention on non-traditional security issues. Well, we certainly accommodate the non-traditional security issues. For example, we came up the idea of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center. But we want more from the ASEAN Political-Security Community. For example, we want to come up with an Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. We want to come up with a Network of Peacekeeping Center. We want to come up with a dispute settlement mechanism, which should be more effective than the ASEAN High Council.

Question:

What is your perspective regarding the Indonesian leadership in ASEAN?

Answer:

The Indonesian economy is relatively stable, although it is not actually persistent if there is any huge economic crisis. Militarily, we still lag behind, especially compared to Singapore, although our country is more than ten times bigger than Singapore. I think the Indonesian government, especially in terms of foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has worked very hard to put Indonesia in a more prestigious position, at least in Southeast Asia. They invested a lot during their chairmanship of ASEAN last year. They came out with lots of initiatives like the Institute for Peace and Reconciliation and other initiatives. For example, trying to mediate the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, trying to boost certain developments of ASEAN bodies and trying to mediate the problems in the South China Sea. They invented lots of ideas and initiatives. So I would argue that the leadership or power has been in terms of those initiatives.

However, we still have to wait and see whether Indonesia's leading role can be turned into reality and whether it can be sustained in future or not. To say that Indonesia is a benevolent power, a middle power, the leader of ASEAN, we still have to wait and see, because if it is still at the level of initiatives and we cannot sustain them during others' chairmanship after Indonesia. Then, I don't think anyone would see that this is because of Indonesia's leadership role in the region because this leadership has to be nurtured and has to be maintained somehow for at least the next five to ten years. It is easy to come up with initiatives, but the most important thing is to transform those initiatives into real action.

Question:

What is your perspective about the idea of establishing a peacekeeping force which was provided by Indonesia?

Answer:

At least, in the past few years, and hopefully in the future, Indonesia has been confident about its domestic problems, that they can actually manage the issues. In the future, I think that Indonesia will push for this idea again, to create this regional peacekeeping force. We, as academicians, also put our recommendation to the government to actually create the parts towards that at the end the final creation of the ASEAN Regional Peacekeeping Force. This mechanism will support the United Nations peacekeeping force.

But, the thing is that we are certainly aware or acknowledge the problems within ASEAN,

especially the countries who have just joined ASEAN, as well as some old members who are still very much concerned with the strict implementation of sovereignty and non-interference, so they wouldn't be happy at all with this idea. So we are aware of these issues and we cannot certainly push too hard or fasten the process, because everything, not only regional peacekeeping issues, but also other issues like human rights, in ASEAN, that should be a gradual approach. Sometimes, it is really slow; sometimes you see that it's actually not moving anywhere. That's how ASEAN works, actually. So, you have to start with the peacekeeping network, for example. Just creating a network among the peacekeeping centres. Last time, we put our recommendations to say where it is heading to. In creating a network of peacekeeping centres, what are you aiming for? Whether you want to build the regional capability, for example, to supply the UN peace-keeping. So, it is no longer national contribution but it will be regional contribution. We ask the government to actually scrutinize this idea. The network should evolve into something. It should not stop in creating or building this network only. Because actually the network has been existing for so many years already in the peacekeeping centres. That's first. Second, whether this network of the peacekeeping centres will influence the other countries that have not yet developed or established peace-keeping centres. So whether we want to aim for those countries to have peacekeeping centres because so far we have only four or five if I'm not mistaken, but the others are still not yet thinking about developing peacekeeping centres. So, we want more. We want to continue further with this issue. The latest issue, actually, is to build the civilian capacity for peacekeeping but so far the idea is still somehow nationally developed. So in Indonesia, for example, in order to support operations conducted by the UN, we want to contribute more for security capacities rather than soldiers. I think we will still push this idea because we need regional peacekeeping capacities in the region and don't want the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia to destabilize the region.

Question:

When the idea of a peace-keeping force is being pushed, how does the Indonesian government overcome the principle of the non-interference?

Answer:

Indonesia is the single fighter so far in somehow moderating the mindset of the non-interference principle, because this is not only a regional peacekeeping issue but also a human rights issue. Last time, our former foreign minister has already addressed the issue that we cannot ignore, if there are certain serious human rights violations happening in our

neighboring countries. That was in the context of Myanmar at that time.

Because of the Asian financial crisis, regional countries realized that we cannot strictly adhere to the non-interference principle. When we did that, we don't want to interfere with each other, that is exactly how the Asian financial crisis took place in the region. Because we just didn't care about each other. So, there should be some modification on how non-interference principle should be interpreted and implemented in the interactions of countries in ASEAN. And then that's how the idea of an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-cultural Community developed. Because, with the term "community", we want something more, we should be able to somehow influence other countries in this community, because you can say that in the Community, I am doing my own business and you are doing your own business, but my business would certainly influence your business. And that's the logic. Although, certainly it is not easy, that's how I think the issue of regional peacekeeping is still being debated very much in the region. Whether this regional peacekeeping would deal only with inter-state conflicts which then lead into the category traditional peacekeeping or into more robust peace-keeping efforts, for example peace-making or peace building, as well as intra-state conflicts, which are more relevant conflicts in the region, because currently we seldom deal with interstate conflicts in the region, we have more intra-state or separatist conflicts. That is why, so far, we are still lingering upon the issues of a network of peacekeeping centers just to have communication, joint training and seminars.

I think through many challenges, Indonesian government is trying to again and again put forward this idea that non-interference should be modified in order to deal with so many challenges in the region, like human rights and democracy. We don't say that then there are no borders, I would argue that is not the case. The idea is that, if you face common challenges, you have to deal with them and re-think the non-interference principle.

In practice now, it still very much needs the consent of the countries involved. For example, with the development of Myanmar, previously our government tried to engage with Myanmar. It's not too pushy. For example last time with the Cyclone Nargis, the junta closed access for all international or foreign aid. So what happened is the Indonesian foreign minister told the junta government, "Well, you can choose, first you open up for international humanitarian aid or second let ASEAN coordinate or lead the humanitarian assistance, or third you let the international community come in on the responsibility to protect principle." That means they are eligible to use Chapter 6 until Chapter 8 instruments, which includes Chapter 7. They talked for a while and eventually they decided to let our government in. This is how we are

able to use this idea of modification of non-interference. You don't want the international [community] to intervene or interfere in your domestic affairs, but you can let ASEAN deal with you. That's quiet diplomacy, but, to some extent, that shows you how intervention can be conducted depending on the issues. And now, with the current development of Myanmar, our government has already offered assistance, for example on how to build the election commission, how to create the think tanks and civil society, and sent our election commission there to monitor the free and fair elections to help them set up all the democratic instruments in the country, that's still interference to some extent, but they happily accept it. So it's not all about military intervention and sometimes, interference can be beneficial to other countries.

Question:

How will the relationship between the US and Indonesia develop after the creation of the APSC?

Answer:

Generally, you can say that the U.S. certainly supports the establishment of the APSC, because it is expecting, by the creation of the ASEAN Community in the future, that will create regional stability which will benefit the U.S., as well as countries in the region having significant power to deal with the challenge coming from the rise of China. I would argue that the United States definitely supports this. In terms of the impact towards the relationship between Indonesia and the U.S., not much has changed because, not only Indonesia but other countries in the region, have become very much the interest of the United States now, because of the policies of the current government to look to Asia not focusing too much on the Middle East or to Europe.

Interviewee: Mely Caballero-Anthony

Meeting Location: ASEAN Secretariat

Question:

After the creation of the APSC, will ASEAN create an effective mechanism to deal with its problems, or remain dependent on its traditional approaches, such as the ASEAN Way and non-interference?

Answer:

ASEAN has created new mechanisms. If you go to the website and look at the writings under the APSC, the ASEAN Charter will tell you that the institutions are created. For example, you have the Charter that, then, stipulates certain norms and principles that ASEAN countries

must adhere to. And one is the principle of democracy. Then, you have elements of economics and dispute settlement. And then you have mechanisms which look at, for example, enhancing cooperation, in issues like maritime security, cooperation in infection diseases. That's to say the work plan. You have the Charter and then you have the blueprint of the APSC. All these mechanisms that enhance cooperation in areas like terrorism, maritime security, infection diseases, disaster management and food security; these are gearing us towards the possibility where the practice of non-interference will have to be recalibrated. How is that so, you may ask? For example, if you want to ask for certain information on counter-terrorism or certain information on preparation for disaster relief, all that, actually, opens up your country and allows them to look into your policies. In the field of economics when you have a surveillance mechanism that looks at your fiscal policies. For all intents and purposes, you're opening yourself to international or regional scrutiny. These are some of the things which you can no longer hide behind the shield of sovereignty or non-interference. Are there any specific examples, if you want to push for examples, are there specific things where the non-interference principle, since the adoption of the APSC, has been openly challenged? Yes, when you look at, for example, the efforts by the ASEAN Chair, which is now empowered to look at managing tensions in the region whether it's a regional one or bilateral one that causes a regional impact. Yes, last year, for example, the Indonesian chair tried to mediate between Thailand and Cambodia.

The ASEAN Way is still there. It has not been scrapped but it has been recalibrated, because you can argue this is not your business. But they come in, because it has an impact on the region. So that can be an example where you don't necessarily discard the principle of non-interference but you challenge it and you open spaces where you can sort of help, mediate, and that can be regarded as already challenging principle of non-interference. Whether it is in the area of traditional in terms of bilateral or in the area of non-traditional, then, the ASEAN Way has already moved to a more flexible, a more open kind of engagement between and among member-states.

The ASEAN Way has changed. I have often argued and you have read this from me that the depiction of ASEAN as very strictly following the non-interference, I think, is no longer correct because there are events even from 1997 to the present, when you need more enhanced, deeper regional cooperation. To be able to do that, you have to be able give way on some elements. You ask for records, you give me your policy, in the field of economics, for example. Show me your trade statistics. Show me this, show me that. You can choose to say no, this is not your business, but in order to have a more coherent fiscal policy in the region,

you have to open up. If you tell me about reporting the rate of infectious diseases, whether it's H5N1, et cetera, you have opened up your medical record. Issues of national health are issues of national security but then you are compelled to open up because for the sake of regional cooperation. In natural disaster, if your task force that deals with it are hampered by their own constraints, they don't have enough capabilities, and then you ask for help from the outside, that's already seen as opening up.

You can look at what the whole concept of non-interference actually means. There's no such thing as pure if you look at the works by Krasner on sovereignty, contested sovereignty or whatever, there's no such thing, so what do you want to do? If you want to argue that the ASEAN Way has changed, it is to look at the framework of what it means. How has it evolved over the years? And then you apply in the context of ASEAN. This jealous effort to protect sovereignty, is it actually true? I mean is it as sacred as some commentators put it to be? I think, historically, there are elements of that, there are points of reference, whether it's in the west or here. They have actually opened up sovereignty.

Question:

ASEAN ratified the ASEAN Charter. However, some people are disappointed about the Charter, because they think the Charter ignores civil society. What is your perspective?

Answer:

The criticism about the role of the civil society, well, what is a Charter? A charter is the thing meant to put legal stature to ASEAN. Civil society is not a part of it. But, if you look at the blueprint, you have to be really careful. This is the goal of ASEAN. You have the goal which is the ASEAN Community by 2015 or now they move it to 2020. How do they do that goal? There are several mechanisms. One is the ASEAN Charter. What else? The blueprint for the ASEAN Community, which has three legs: the APSC, the ASCC and the AEC. All of these, and they are available on the website, they have blueprints on how implement the APSC, the ASCC and the AEC. It is here where you can look at the participation of the civil society. And they have that. So, to say that the ASEAN Charter has not or has failed to promote civil society participation is not necessarily correct. You can ask Lina about it, because she deals with regional associations associated with ASEAN. That is also something that provides that. So, be very clear about what the criticism is and that you also know whether in fact it is or it isn't. Perhaps, if you are a scholar what you want is to know the extent to which that is actually being realized. You go beyond the Charter but you look at the APSC blueprint, where you perhaps get more information or what could have been improved. This is where you

target a certain part in the ASEAN Secretariat.

Question:

Do norms and identities matter in Southeast Asia in terms of security issues?

Answer:

Yes, the answer to that is yes. What are the norms that are promoted in Southeast Asia? The norms that are there in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, are peaceful resolution of disputes, non-use of force and also non-interference. It's all there. These are norms that have been promoted ever since ASEAN was created in 1967 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was adopted in 1976. You could say that from 1976 when that was actually codified there and that was also codified in the Charter that means you find the legal voice in the ASEAN Charter. Every effort by ASEAN member-states individually or ASEAN as a corporate body and now the new ASEAN, which is all this mechanism, whether it's the ASEAN Chair, the Secretary General, one could say, I think, with true conviction, that much of these norms are being promoted because these norms matter. They matter for managing inter-state tension. And, again, if you look at how you demonstrate that these norms in fact matter, you look at certain events in the most recent past. If you look at bilateral disputes, although there were real clashes between Thailand and Cambodia, efforts were being made to defuse that as soon as possible. Norms were broken but norms were made or were put back on the table when they agreed to sort of resist or desist from going into armed conflict. What about extra-regional norms? ASEAN promoted this. What is ASEAN Regional Forum? They called it the 'talk shop'. But the ASEAN Regional Forum, some constructivists argued, was basically a brewery of norms. It has advanced. It has carried on and its activities are all informed, premised on the promotion of these norms. Norms that are not necessarily unique to ASEAN, but norms that ASEAN had promoted and are integral to its identity. This is what it is: they are a community, and to be able to achieve the ASEAN Political-Security Community, you must abide by these norms. Even the norms that promote the respect of human rights, it is there. That is why in the Charter, for the longest time, the promotion of human rights seen in the adoption of regional human rights body since 1993, it took long time, but these norms were very important. And with ASEAN becoming a more mature community, they had to, against all reservation and scepticism, a body was finally formed. These norms do matter.

But, are they being challenged? Yes, they are being challenged. Otherwise, all the activities, such as human rights, human welfare, peaceful settlement, all of the activities of ASEAN are

not contrary to these norms. These activities are all geared towards the promotion of these norms. This is what it's all about.

Question:

Don't you think ASEAN just sweep the problems under the carpet?

Answer:

Well, they did that. And that's part of an approach to minimize tension. Some would argue it is good to meet the problems head on, but if that is not a wise thing to do, why do you have to push it. One used to think that sweeping under the carpet is really a way not to solve it. But not solving it, but sweeping it is also a response, a mechanism, an approach to resolve something which is really intractable. For example, how can you resolve the bilateral disputes? It will take ages to do that. So all they do is sweep it under the carpet. Don't bring it up and work around it. Whether it is between ASEAN member-states? You have bilateral disputes, for example, the Philippines and Malaysia. They have swept that under the carpet. Thailand and Cambodia, it was swept for long time because of domestic pressures it came up. So they cannot sweep it, they have to manage it. They cannot resolve it. It takes years to manage and resolve this dispute. Outside ASEAN, you have the South China Sea again, it has been swept under the carpet. Well, yes, it was. But sweeping under the carpet also means don't bring it up until a more reasonable way to solve it can be thought about and discussed. Slowly, they have, from the time they adopted the 2003 Declaration of Code of Conduct of South China Sea and took that from 2003 until last year, the guidelines were adopted. Is that sweeping under the carpet? Ya, it was swept. And, until pressure on them and they are ready address it. And, even that, it was very slow, extremely slow. And, is this because of failure of ASEAN as an organization? It's not just ASEAN, it's the readiness of other countries, in this case the readiness of China, to actually address issue.

Question:

Regarding non-traditional security issues, how can ASEAN member-states deal with their fundamental differences of strategic perspective?

Answer:

If addressing this issue, which is transnational, requires, first and foremost, the ability of the countries concerned to address it, from their own domain and that is not possible, because, as I've argued in the past, they lack, perhaps, capability to do so, or there is a question of governance, then if Country A, who is a member of an association is not able to do it, because

of either an inherent problem or lack of capacity to do it or perhaps just a problem of governance, ASEAN can help to manage this or address this, again, by choosing a number of approaches. Number one is, if it is a question of capability, then, you help. It has been done bilaterally. If you look at my essays on health, you would have seen that there are cases where countries who have got the technical expertise have come in and helped. Whether it's in the speed of detection of virus or even in the context of providing money be able to purchase vaccines that is being done on a bilateral basis.

Regionally, they have put that as an agenda for the region to tackle. What is the advantage of putting it at the regional agenda? The advantage is to urge other member-states to provide the necessary support, help in capacity-building and put formal pressure, because when you come together and you say "my dear neighbour you have to do more". That is peer-pressure.

So that's that. Has that happened in the past? If you don't look at it at your end, then, it comes to me as your neighbour. If you don't address the issues... if you think they are in fact, in the case of infectious diseases there are outbreaks you cannot do anything about. You don't know, and people are actually travelling to that part of the world. If you don't want the people to be stuck at the borders you'd better do something about it. And if you can't do something about it because of inherent problems—you don't have testing kits—tell us, we can help you. There have been many cases. There is actually a lot of material that has already been published on this. You just even Google ASEAN+3 cooperation infectious diseases. You see the modalities in addressing this. And you would understand why this has become a regional agenda. You bring it to the region because you know unilateral and bilateral efforts are insufficient. And you need to multilateralize the problems, because it is through multilateralism that you are able to maximize efforts to address this. And this is where ASEAN matters, because you have small states, who are obviously hampered. You have states who are advanced but whose security is tied to somebody else's. So there's no other way but to work together and it is a multilateral setting that allows you to do this.

What is a country's national interest? A country's national interest is to make sure that the country is safe and economically progressive, that its political system is not challenged. That's the international interest. You can frame it in the other way. How does that affect or how does that become an obstacle in addressing non-traditional security issues? You have to use an example. Then, you can say, yes these are the fundamental problems that inhibit deeper cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues. A general argument for that is no because it is in the interest of the country to address national non-traditional security issues, because if you address that, then, it actually serves your national interests. That is one

way of doing it. But unless you can cite an example to say, I refuse to for example open up my economic books, my policies, because if I open up, then it is no longer to my interests. They know what my economic policies are they know my investment policies are, so fundamentally I think it affects my interests so I will not give you 100% cooperation, only give you 20%, 50%. If you argue that way, yes, of course, national interests matter. But interests change. If you follow the constructivist argument, identities interests are all shared but they are not constant it depends on what are the demands or the challenges of the day.

Question:

Will ASEAN keep pushing the idea of a peace-keeping force in ASEAN?

Answer:

The peace keeping force, when it was initiated, was geared to peace keeping. I mean that is what it is. How do you relate that to humanitarian assistance? Those who argue that if you have a peace keeping force or if you have already acted as one of those country contributors, then it allows you to have already a base, a mechanism, a platform to deploy your troops for humanitarian purposes. So, the argument from those who say that it is good to encourage countries to seriously look at eventually having a regional peacekeeping force or, to start with, to have a national contingent dedicated to peacekeeping, they make it easy for deployment of troops for humanitarian purposes. There are two different purposes. One can be used in lieu of something that is actually more ambitious. Then, you can use it for that. And, is that actually being done, well there are already talks to that. Under the ASEAN plan for the ASEAN Humanitarian Centre and, whether it's under the auspices of the ARF, or the ASEAN+3 there are efforts to coordinate among the military, volunteers for coming and providing disaster relief and assistance.

So, it is good. But, the original objective, which is that we should already have reached a level—this was in 2003—reached a level of comfort, then, to be able to call in our regional troops to come in, should a humanitarian crisis arise. Many people are uncomfortable about this for several reasons. One is that they didn't think this was going to happen in the region. The kind of humanitarian crisis you would find in Africa, or in Europe, Bosnia Herzegovina or Rwanda. Some countries in Asia would argue that it was not going to happen here. So, why do you need this? So, while you socialize the idea having to have this force, so that you can be ready, should a need arise. One way to look at it is to still have this for the purpose of international deployment. So, if, in lieu of a force, you have peace-keeping training centres, you can have activities to train your own troops and address the major problems of

interoperability when it comes to global deployment. You can also build camaraderie, which is also part of confidence-building. So, the long and short of my answer is it is not anywhere close to achieving what Indonesia had wanted to do, as it had proposed, but the idea is being socializing and in lieu of the main regional peace-keeping force, they adopted the second best option, and that is the promotion of regional peace-keeping training centres. And that is already happening, you have one in Malaysia. One has been established in Thailand. And one I think will be established in Indonesia and eventually also Cambodia.

Interviewee: Rafendi Djamin

Meeting Location: Menteng Jakarta Pusat

Question:

ASEAN is applying the conservative understanding of the non-interference principle, particularly in relation to human rights. So how is the development on that?

Answer:

Any other governments are part of an inter-governmental organization. They know that the non-interference principle is an evolving concept, evolving principle which really goes in line with the development of relations between states and challenges among states in relation to security, in relation to human rights that will then have impact on regional stability. This kind of thing has something that is already in the back of the minds of the ten member countries, because there are all members of the union. They will all be subjected to the so-called universal political review. And universal political review is an instrument that really strikes the conservative understanding of non-interference. And all the member-countries accept the universal political review. When it comes to ASEAN, that is a different context. Why is it a different context? They don't mind to be questioned, to be intervened. If you use the word 'intervene' on the internal matter of human rights, they consider that those internal matters in the UN Human Rights Council. They follow that. They make a report. But when it comes to ASEAN, they don't want it. This will be something that shows ASEAN, as the inter-governmental organization in this region of ten member-countries, would like to build something different than what is happening in the global level. What they are trying to build is that...when it comes to the world of the ASEAN Way, the world of a very strong notion, a very conservative notion of non-interference, when you talk about a national situation without the consent of the respective country, that would already be an exercise of intervention. That will not be accepted in ASEAN.

So these are the things which replicate, in the context of ASEAN, when it goes back to its

initiation in 1967. In its initiation in 1967, the TAC is one of the basic instruments which is introduced by ASEAN. They would like that ASEAN will grow with its own interpretation of the non-interference principle. So, the members are applying double-standard in understanding and applying the non-interference principle. That is what happening as far as I concerned.

When ASEAN was initiated, human rights were not an issue. It is something that should not be discussed in the ASEAN context. For us, it is enough that human rights is discussed in the UN, not in ASEAN. Our purpose for ASEAN is not human rights but on the stability of the region to prevent wars between the nations. That is the main concern at the time.

And the second later on after ten years, because ASEAN was developed by all dictator governments. So, the main purpose is to establish a region that is stable and can try to develop itself by guaranteeing the stability of the region. At the global level at that time was still in the context of Cold War situation. So, ASEAN was really part of this Cold War situation, where stability with an authoritarian government in the Cold War situation is a safe, one way solution to have development in this region. So that is what they believed. That means anywhere that will actually go through the principle of non-interference like human rights, which is very intrusive, is rejected since the beginning. There is no language of human rights from 1967 until 1993. All the members refused to discuss human rights in the ASEAN context. In 1993, when the world was redefining itself, understanding about the post-Cold War situation, then you have this world conference of human right. Then ASEAN member-states will have to follow rhetorically to this process. That is why they made up the communiqué, political communiqué, the first political communiqué 1993. That they would also like to implement, the so-called Vienna Regulations on Human Rights, one pillar of the Vienna Regulations on Human Rights is to create regional human rights mechanisms. Then, the word of human rights is there in the ASEAN context for the first time as a political document.

That means the readiness, the feeling of comfortable in the ASEAN context to discuss human right was only initiated in 1993. That's a very short history for the inter-relations of the states to re-develop human rights in this region. If you look at the process since 1993, it took almost 16, 17 years, before ASEAN established or adopted the Charter of ASEAN in 2008. So 1993 to 2008, how many years is that? It has been sixteen years. What's happening along those times? Is there anything happening about human right? Yes, something in terms of discourses is happening, because ASEAN government rulers, ministers and their senior administrators created, appointed, giving the task to a group or the so-called track I or track II, track 1½,

formal government officials, to discuss and to think how ASEAN in the future should establish human rights mechanisms. The group called the working group on ASEAN human rights mechanisms made the report of their study, their activities every year to the ASEAN Senior Officer Meeting (SOM). It's a standing agenda but it remains a standing agenda that stays without any significant progress in the last 15 years. Only when ASEAN decided to discuss and to have the ASEAN Charter, then the notion of human rights is getting stronger. This (getting stronger) is also influenced by the political changes happening in some of member-states, particularly in Indonesia.

Indonesia changed in 1998. Suharto fall down. The authoritarian military regime fall down. All of a sudden, you have open democratic Indonesia in transition. This also gave some influence in the dynamics of relations in the ten nation states. That is the first time that the political security was also introduced as the political security pillar, next to the economic pillar. Basically it was first stability. You can call it hard security.

As I say, because of the development between 1998 and 2008, that is a very important process, an expedient process. A more expedient process of introducing and making human rights more comfortable to be discussed among ASEAN officials, particularly the Senior Officer Meetings, which is a political body before the ASEAN Minister Meeting. SOM is the one actually discussing and then trying to recommend and make a connection.

When all member-states of ASEAN finally agreed to adopt the ASEAN Charter, which is making a very strong reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration of Human Rights and then to International Humanitarian Law in the Charter. And the principle of the good governance, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, respect to fundamental rights. This is something which is very fundamental as a basis for ASEAN to reinterpret the understanding of non-interference in the context of ASEAN. So, it is something that grows in applying the non-interference principle in the context of ASEAN. After the Charter the terms of reference were discussed. One year of negotiations on the terms of reference of the ASEAN Human Rights Commission. Indonesia wanted to call it the ASEAN Human Rights Commission, but then some member-states disagreed with that. They wanted to a make strong emphasis that this is a governmental organization. So they put ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights. ASEAN itself, however, is already an inter-government. Why do they want to put into inter-governmental again? They just wanted to underline this is governments. That reflects the position to be very cautious about understanding the new reinterpretation of human rights and non-interference principles. In the formulation of the terms of reference, the Commission on Human Rights is

intentionally not going to be created with a mandate to discuss countries' regulations. Of course, Indonesia disagreed with that during the negotiations, supported by some member-states. If you want to have a commission, at least you should be able to investigate any human rights violations, you should be able to make a report on the current situation. No, it was an agenda, it was one against nine. Indonesia and the whole nine at the end of negotiation 2009 in Thailand among the ministers.

So, the compromise had to be taken. Otherwise, the Commission would not be there anymore. So the compromise is taken. Indonesia withdrew, with the strong position to have strong mandate of protection, country situation and so forth. We go along with this. But, of course, with the promise that in the review after four years of implementation. That should be opportunity to review the terms of reference and to redefine it again. Now, we are in the middle of this five years. We are in the second year, so the practice with the AICHR (ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights), that human rights is discussed systematically in the approach of human rights not welfare not anything but really human rights is only within AICHR. But, AICHR is also representing governments. So, that is good. That means it's engaging governments and governments keep on engaged and really try to understand and to learn each other and to share each other about how human rights actually should be implemented. When you have to answer the question how human rights should be implemented, you cannot go out or you cannot run away from creating in the future mechanisms of protection. So, this is something that develops in the course of the year. This is something that will develop the reinterpretation of the practice of non-interference and human rights in the ASEAN context. If you are looking at this perspective after 2006, I think ASEAN is making a lot of progress in terms of redefining human rights from nothing in 1993, communiqué, rhetoric, statement, political will. It goes to a very long process and gained momentum again in 1999. And then the second momentum is in 2006, when the Charter is made. It goes with the reinterpretation of non-interference. I think that is my answer.

Question:

Do you think the establishment of the APSC will directly benefit Southeast Asian people?

Answer:

Of course, it does benefit the local people. Why does it benefit people? Because it starts the most fundamental principles of the way of life of the people. The principle of good governance, the principle of the independence of the judiciary, the principle of the respect of fundamental rights will benefit people definitely. But, the question is how fast and how far if

you achieve that if you already put that in the action line of the blueprint? But to answer your question, of course it will benefit, if implemented, because on paper it means nothing. But the blueprint, we should not also forget is the outcome of political negotiation. A political negotiation which was then adopted by heads of states. It was only in 2009. 2009 is the political blueprint to achieve the ASEAN Community in 2015. There are now in the 2011. It is just another two years. With a very big agenda on those things that we mentioned: good governance, independence of the judiciary, rule of law. These are the things that we have to look at. Whether ASEAN is making progress, whether ASEAN is making progress by implementing its own commitments in the political blueprint and to be fair with the measure and the benchmark what you can achieve for ten member-states to implement that kind of programme. Then, you are making sense. If you look at the APSC blueprint, it accepts in the making of its implementation. It is good if you can look at what are the assessments of this political security blueprint. You should check it out with the ASEAN Secretariat, talk with the guys responsible the DSG (Deputy Secretary General) of Political Security. And then you can have a discussion about what is the assessment about the implementation of the Political-Security blueprint. You can also have your own judgement, of course. I think if you only achieve this much, with the capacity you have this much then you can firmly say you are achieving very low. So that bit remains for the academics, public, media whether the implementation is highly achievement implementation or not. But that's very interesting to look at though. I can mention something. For example, in the political blueprint in 2009, it's creation of this commission. On the declaration of the commission, then there is another thing on the Commission on women and children. It is implemented, it is then established. It's is not easy to establish that kind of thing because you have to go through a series of negotiations. On other things, for example on the good governance, has anything been implemented on good governance? So far, after three years, there is only one programme on good governance, which is implemented. What is that? The creation of the ASEAN Supreme Audit Association. That's a good start because ASEAN then talks about good governance, at least, from the auditing, they talk, they share together. They can make a recommendation or any guideline for the policy on a regional level on the good governance. On conflict prevention? In the last two years, what has been done in the conflict prevention? One which is very significant is, in 2011, introduced by Indonesia is the creation of one institute, ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. It was already adopted by heads of state in the process of making and shaping that institution, because that institution will then discuss on the issue of how to prevent conflict how to build the programme of peace-building and

negotiation in the situation of post-combat situation. So these are some of the benchmarks that you can see whether ASEAN is making progress or not in this form of implementation of the blueprint.

When you look at other instrument of some affairs, DOC, COC, there is progress. In 2011, you cannot deny there is progress. The function of the ARF, ASEAN's role in the North Korean Peninsula conflict to stimulate the six parties starting to talk in the context in the ARF in the informal meeting. Those are the things that are happening. Implementing this political blueprint and on the matter of peace keeping operations there's been a lot that's been done and achieved in the context of the last two years. In the context of disaster management a lot has been achieved. In the context of non-traditional security like trafficking in persons, so many have been done, even in terms of institutions, even in the terms of standard setting, even organising the states in the creation of a convention. A convention is something that will be politically and legally binding and on the war against terrorism, there is a convention which is already working into force, just waiting for the ratification of the ten member countries. So, these other things are looking at the progress related as well as human rights, how it's implemented in the political-security building and how this then benefits the people. The ASEAN Maritime Forum is already started. It's in the second year since it started. It's even going to be advanced. ASEAN Maritime Forum will also discuss about this non-traditional security threat on the illegal fishing, illegal logging that will also affect human rights of the people. And the AICHR is looking at this programme and trying now to play a role. Not only monitor the progress, contribute to the process. When you are discussing about preventing illegal fishing you have to look at the fishermen, the innocent fishermen who are trapped in the situation. When you arrest them, without looking at the context and without respecting their rights, you are violating human right that needs to be protected by AICHR. AICHR has the mandate to look at this and provides the contribution to the process, in the issues of trafficking in persons. The approach is not only on the security to combat and eliminate smugglers. But, the victims, the rights of the victims have to be respected. How are you going to respect the human rights of the victims? How are you going to treat them? That is supposed to be the role of AICHR. The question is how human rights internalizes itself in the political-security blueprint. It is not only political-security blueprint. AICHR has an overarching role cross-cutting the three pillars of ASEAN. Human Rights is not only in the Political-Security Pillar. That is the basic understanding that everybody should internalize among ASEAN, particularly, the ASEAN Secretariat as well as the member states. Of course, it takes time to understand that. Even the ASEAN Secretariat is not ready yet. With this

ASEAN Commission of Human Rights, what is the role of the ASEAN Commission in my programme of action and programme of implementation of anything? On economic programme, on the trade negotiations it has nothing to do with us. But, now it has something to do with us. So this kind of thing needs time to really become something mainstreamed in ASEAN. Now, we are already touching on other pillars not only the political-security pillar, because for human rights, it is much easier to intervene with the political-security pillar. Because in the beginning, the creation of human rights cooperation is coming from the political-security blueprint. That is one aspect of the brief that AICHR has. It is a part of the so-called ASEAN Security Community blueprint. For AICHR now, it is much easier to create a programme to intertwine with other sectoral bodies within the political security coordination.

Question:

Do you think that Myanmar's change regarding the issue of human rights is due to ASEAN's pressure? Or has Myanmar itself accepted ASEAN's norms? Or are there other political implications?

Answer:

That is very interesting to look at Myanmar. I think maybe ASEAN will have to thank Myanmar later on in the future, as part of the history. It plays a very significant role in the institutional building of ASEAN as a regional group, in terms of discussing human rights of a member state. Since the beginning, as I already said in my earlier explanation, it is not very keen. It is something taboo to discuss internal matters of human rights. But, with Myanmar, it isn't internal matters which is discussed by ASEAN. It is not by AICHR because AICHR was not there yet. In 2005, when Myanmar was forced make to them understand not to have a chair, to take up the chair of presidency, because of the pressure from ASEAN, look for the sake of ASEAN, we request you, your willingness, your big heart, not to take up the chair of presidency. So, they did not. But, of course, after that Myanmar is becoming a standing agenda of the political negotiation of the leaders. The leaders and the AMM. This is very interesting. When one argues ASEAN doesn't care about human rights matters in one member-state but Myanmar is still a strong case. It is a very internal domestic situation which is discussed by other member states. So, this is my proposition, without the role of ASEAN, since the beginning of 2005, in engaging Myanmar as part of the ten member-states and discuss annually even in every summit and every AMM on the agenda of Myanmar. Actually, look at the so-called roadmap to democracy, the so-called changing of Myanmar to a modern

democracy. Without the role of ASEAN, Myanmar wouldn't change.

Without the pressure of the groups of states outside of ASEAN, there is no pressure for ASEAN to ask Myanmar to step down from the chair of presidency. Without the role of the EU, US and others, to look at ASEAN and "we cannot deal with you if you are having the chair of Myanmar" the situation like this. That also helps, because then ASEAN will have to ask Myanmar, please stay down for a while. Without the pressure, Myanmar would be the chair. So, it is a kind of combination: the engagement and the pressure from outside. The pressure from outside makes ASEAN leaders have to convince Myanmar and then, with some programmes of action, the roadmap of democracy, that goes along since 2005 until 2011. Six years of this course, every year we're criticised, we're not making progress you are making progress but you are arresting people. There is a war there, human rights, you know. Those things are happening every year under the scrutiny of ASEAN but in the spirit of engaging.

What do you think Indonesia? Indonesia is changing also because of international pressure. When there is no international pressure on Timor-Leste, then there is no agenda of human rights in the UN in Indonesia. I am the activist since 1990, active in the council during the Timor-Leste occupation. I have taken the benefits of the fact that Indonesia is on the agenda of the UN because Indonesia then in the agenda, so I can also raise issues and concerns of human rights situation of the Suharto Period. So Realism works.

Interviewee: Ralf Emmers

Meeting Location: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Question:

There is the debate over whether Michael Leifer is a realist or not. As Leifer's student, what is your personal standpoint about his research approach and contribution to the realm of Southeast Asian international relations?

Answer:

I remember Michael Leifer once told me that he had been called a realist at a conference, and his response [was that he] had been called worse things than a realist. Ultimately, I think Leifer was less interested in the IR classifications than he was interested in understanding the region. He was, therefore, perhaps less trying to make a contribution to the IR theory debate than he was to making a contribution to the study of the international relations of Southeast Asia. That's why he has often been called the doyen of Southeast Asian Studies. He was more interested in that than anything else. Leifer was also a rare academic, especially in the contemporary context, because he was both looking at domestic politics and international

relations. So, he was both a comparative politics person, as well as an international relations scholar. He happened to be in an international relations department, but quite a big chunk of his publications could have been considered to be comparative politics. You did mention, however, that he does have this reliance on the balance of power concept. Because of that, I would agree, from the IR point of view, that Leifer was predominantly a realist. His starting point was the distribution of power and denial of [hegemony]. He was mostly interested in how small or medium sizes countries ensure their survival and their autonomy. So, if you look at his very extensive bibliography, he started working on Cambodia's foreign policy. Then, later on, he worked on Indonesian and Singaporean foreign policies, ASEAN and maritime security. I think his starting point was how small or medium sizes countries can ensure their security and survival in international politics. He was not a classical realist in that sense and he was not so interested in the great powers. He was much more interested in the smaller countries in Southeast Asia but he did assume that power and power distribution were very important variables in international relations. At the same time, he also paid great attention to factors, like regime legitimacy, socio-economic security and nationalism. In fact, his PhD was on nationalism in the Middle East. He only came to Southeast Asia much later on. So, he is very difficult to box into one political category but if you have to choose one, I would choose realist.

Regarding his contribution, I think, to a large extent, he is the one who started this International Relations of Southeast Asia discipline. With others, he was not the only one, but he's part of the generation that really started looking at the international relations of Southeast Asia. And, up until that point, you have a lot of very good work being done in comparative politics, you have Indonesianists, people who are focussing on the Philippines, people focussing on Thailand, people focussing on the Vietnam War, but he was a man who was really interested in the international relations of this region or this sub-region. I think this will probably remain his main contribution.

Question:

Although Acharya argues that '*realism remains the dominant approach to the study of regional order in Southeast Asia*', it is true that constructivism has become the mainstream research approach in the realm of Southeast Asian international relations. By contrast, the approach of realism is less popular than constructivism. In particular, except for Michael Leifer, it seems difficult to find researchers whose tests focus on the realism approach. Regarding this unbalanced situation in the methodology of Southeast Asian international

relations, what is your perspective?

Answer:

I agree with you completely. I know Amitav very well and he used to work here. And he would make this point. And I would say no. And I think it's mostly thanks to his own influence. But, most of the work that I now see focusing on Southeast Asia, especially work on ASEAN, seems to be driven by constructivism. With great attention being given to identity, to regionalism, to community-building and I would have a hard time, as you suggested, naming one IR theorist from a realist inclination looking at Southeast Asia. If I had to personally classify myself, I would probably put myself into the soft-realist camp. Then, I have moved on, I've done all kinds of things, I've even looked at securitization theory, which is very much a constructivist theory. So, you have some out there, you have seen those guys moving increasingly towards the South China Sea situation, because here is an immediate interstate conflict situation that could [progress]. So, it is not surprising that people, like Ian Storey and myself and others have paid so much attention to South China Sea because this is where the concept of balance of power and arms procurement and all of those things can have an immediate relevance. If you're looking at ASEAN studies, I would agree with you that I think there is a very strong imbalance. You know that Jürgen Haacke, Alice Ba, Amitav Acharya and Tan Seen Teng tend to come from more of a constructivism position. It is good for them but the realists have to wake up and publish a bit more. But, what is true also is that realists are ultimately more interested in great power politics. I think they've moved either to focusing on Sino-Southeast Asia relations or they've started looking at East Asian order questions where the realist toolbox is more applicable. Within Southeast Asia, I would actually go a step further. I think it's not only constructivism but I think there is also now a very strong focus on non-traditional security, human security. It is true that security in Southeast Asia is increasingly interpreted through the comprehensive security lens or the non-traditional security lens. The state is still pivotal but the threats to security are considered increasingly to be transnational and coming from non-state actors. I think we'll probably see a swing back. We've seen it a bit over the last two years with China becoming more assertive. This will give more room for the realists to have something to say.

Question:

From your personal standpoint, why is the influence of realism within Southeast Asian IR gradually declining?

Answer:

I think there are multiple factors. On the one hand, perhaps, this is not a region of the world where classical realism or offensive realism is easily applicable, because you don't have a hegemon in Southeast Asia, you don't have immediate conflict situation with the exception of the South China Sea. So, most of the problems seem to be more coming from socioeconomic point of view, domestic issues that can transcend national borders. That is one factor. When the realists are focusing on Southeast Asia, I think it's increasingly in terms of how Southeast Asia has to coexist with two rising powers: China and India. So, they fit Southeast Asia in the wider region. Then, there is also a much more personal dimension which is that you need personalities. I don't think there is a lack of materials to the realists to apply theory in Southeast Asia, but perhaps at this moment we don't have strong personalities applying it.

Question:

What kind of limitations will constructivism have, when constructivism is used to explain the security environment after the establishment of the APSC?

Answer:

I think the major limitation of constructivism is that they don't have much to say about great power relations and great power competition. It is not [inaudible] based on the development last two or three years, which has led to a very strong the US engagement region, military re-engagement, a perception that Sino-US relations will become more complicated, a perception also that there is a power transition in Asia, perhaps from Japan to China and to some extent from the US to China. All of this will have implication for Southeast Asia and I don't think constructivists would have very much to say about what those consequences could be, because they are very much in the realist camp. Again, if you are looking at Southeast Asia and how Southeast Asia tries to address this changing of distribution of power, constructivists would say it's all about socialization of China and India, building up common norms, localization of norms and Amitav has written a lot of them. When I read Amitav nowadays, I am starting to feel that he is becoming increasingly realist himself. Even some of his latest books on the localisation of norms, I would argue there is a bit of a realist undercurrent there and also his shorter pieces the ones that he published for Pacific Forum and others. Amitav is well aware power matters and we are in the midst of a power transition. Again, this will influence Southeast Asia, the way Southeast Asia has, kind of, welcomed back the US, for instance. I think on most issues a sophisticated realist and a sophisticated constructivist would agree on the importance that they would give to some variables.

No sophisticated constructivist would deny material powers, but they put it in the wider

context of 'its not the only explanation', so you need to pay attention to normative development to understand how this power is utilized and how it is transformed into influence, leadership. I think on most issues a sophisticated realist and a sophisticated constructivist would agree, they just disagree on the importance that they would give to some variables. I mean, obviously a constructivist would pay much more attention to identity and to the notion of the socialization of norms, while a realist would obviously have power as a starting point.

Question:

Do you think, after the creation of the APSC, the security environment in Southeast Asia will change?

Answer:

The security community endeavour is interesting but of what I can see not very much has been achieved. What is ultimate objective? Is the ultimate objective to make sure we live in a region where interstate conflict is unlikely? Well, that is kind of already the case, with the exception of some of the newer members. We've had, of course, the border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand, but generally, the region is unlikely to see interstate conflict. I think the question is, is that the result of ASEAN or is that the result something else? But that seems to be the question constructivists never want to answer. What about the alternative explanations? And some alternative explanations are the role of external powers, the United States and China and others. Others is perhaps, and this is an argument that Michael Leifer often made, within Southeast Asia, you don't have an obvious casus bellum, you don't have an immediate reason for two countries to go to war, as you would have, for instance, in Northeast Asia over Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula or as you have now in South Asia over Kashmir. Southeast Asia is fortunate not to have this. You have lots of territorial dispute, but they've been managed, generally, at the bilateral level. That is one objective and if that's an objective then we could always read that ASEAN is already a security community. The likelihood of conflicts is quite remote. What I am more interested in is whether ASEAN is able to set up a conflict management and resolution mechanism. On that front – and I do keep an eye on what is coming out of ASEAN, as in documents and everything else – I don't see much progress. I see calls for a high council that have never been implemented. I hear calls for a Troika to be set up and so on and so forth, but to me, that is all a rhetorical response. I am quite interested that, when we have the Thai and Cambodia border clashes, both parties prefer to work with the United Nations than with ASEAN. So, I think that says a great deal

about conflict management and conflict resolution within ASEAN. ASEAN yet doesn't have structures in place and also the level of trust is not there. For all of those reasons, I think we need to take this community idea with a pinch of salt.

Question:

In the essay – *Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Approach to Terrorism* – you pointed out that the way to deal with terrorism is exploiting differences between the group of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore and the group of Thailand and Malaysia, which indicates that the ASEAN members have divergent strategic perspectives on the issue of terrorism. Indeed, fundamental differences in the strategic perspectives within ASEAN appear on every ASEAN member's agenda. How can the member-states overcome this given problem?

Answer:

I think to the large extent that non-traditional security issues are not new to Southeast Asia. If you look at security in Southeast Asia post-independence, in Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries, it's mostly been dominated by socio-economic problems translating into insurgency movements, or criminal organizations and piracy. Piracy is the oldest form of insecurity in Southeast Asia – the British were trying to solve it for hundreds of years. My friend, Tim Huxley always says that non-traditional security problems are actually traditional security problems, because they have been problems forever in Southeast Asia. What is new, to some extent, would be environmental concerns, the repercussion for climate change and food security issues. Those problems, by the way, fall under the concept of governance. Problems that have are transnational nature, and therefore they need to be addressed in an integrated fashion. The ASEAN countries are trying to do so by finding the middle ground. They don't want to go as far as the Europeans, where sovereignty is being pooled together into supra-national institutions. I don't think that is likely to happen in the years to come. At the same time, they are still trying to coordinate their response and then it very much depends on domestic interests. In some areas, this has indeed worked out, look at the piracy of the Straits of Malacca, you have multiple arrangements outside of the ASEAN umbrella, at the trilateral level, because Thailand has joined in, as well.

But then, there are other problems where you haven't seen the convergence of interests across member countries, I am particularly thinking about the haze problem, which you do have an ASEAN initiative to enhance environmental security address the haze problem and all the countries have ratified it, except Indonesia, which is where the haze originates. I think that

Indonesia makes a very fair point which is that most of the activities that lead to the haze are actually undertaken by Malaysia and Singaporean companies, except that it's on Indonesian soil. So, they would say why is Indonesia the only country to blame and the only country that really has to respond to this problem? Malaysia and Singapore should look into the finance behind the logging. So, here I think we are in very good old traditional liberalism territory, which is when you do see the convergent of interest. When you do see the convergence of interests and when you see the institutionalization of relations to address this, then yes, indeed, it happens. But, quite often, unfortunately, you don't see a convergence, you see a divergence of interests, a lack of trust, a lack of confidence, you see the problems of free-riding and all those sorts of issues. And that ultimately undermines the setting up of regimes, because that's what we are looking at. We are looking at the setting up of international regimes to address particular problems. And I think that is what ASEAN is doing now. I would argue that ASEAN has probably over-committed itself, in the sense that, at the moment, if you look at the non-traditional security agenda, it has really tried to address many different issues...food security...I mean you name an issue and ASEAN has set up an initiative. All of this has been done over the last ten years or so. Up until the late 1990s, ASEAN was pre-dominantly a diplomatic club, trying to address the climate of relations...trust, confidence. But, post-911 and post-Bali Bombing, the non-traditional security agendas are becoming very prominent. It looks like now the ASEAN countries are really trying to address many of those issues. They have come up with lots of declarations. The problem of course, is that it has, to some extent, I think, undermined its creditability, because it has probably overstretched itself. It has promised way too many things. And, now people are starting to look at the where are the deliverables, and very often the deliverables are not there. Then, that begs the question, are you only taking a rhetorical stand or are you truly committed to address the issues?

For example Southeast Asia is supposed to be a drug-free area by 2015...it's impossible. And drugs will always be with us, it's a question of managing the problem. And you see more and more such declarations and I think ultimately it weakens the credibility of ASEAN.

Question:

With the exception of divergent strategic perspectives, are there other obstacles, when ASEAN deals with non-traditional security issues?

Answer:

One significant obstacle would be capacity. After all, many of those problems have socio-

economic roots... also, problems of corruption. I will give you one example. I am doing some work on human trafficking. I remember interviewing people, and I was told that, in Laos, one very basic problem is the lack of computers. So, Thailand may have information on someone they have found who is working as a prostitute in Bangkok and has been the victim of human trafficking. Police will ask you to share the information on your country of origin. But, if you don't have appropriate data bases, it is very difficult to find out where this person is coming from. There are lots of anecdotes of this nature, but this is what we really mean by capacity. So that's physical capacity, but also, there is lack of knowledge. If you have very small teams working on some of those problems, that is not going to be easy to get on top of it. So, if you put all of this together, it brings us to a very big problem within ASEAN, which is economic disparity. Flying from Singapore to Vientiane, you will see the economic disparity. Of course, this makes it much harder to respond to the problems. I give you another example. Many people are saying that ASEAN should take a common stand on climate change negotiations, but, when you think about it, that actually makes very little sense, because there are such diverse economies and such different levels of economic development that it's hard to imagine that you could come up with a position on the climate change negotiation that would fit both the interests of Singapore, a highly industrialized nation, and the countries like Laos and Myanmar. Again, we need to bring socio-economic disparity into bear, if you want to really understand why ASEAN has a problem moving beyond the low common denominator. Again, those are transnational problems. But, if you have such differences in capacity and everything else, it is hard to have a coordinated policy.

From a rhetorical point of view [the APSC] is a very ambitious project. There are lots of plans of actions, scheduling and everything else. It's all there and I think what people now want to see is implementation. And of course this is not unique to ASEAN. International organisations usually don't fare very well as far as implementation is concerned. That is often the weakest link.

Question:

As you mentioned in *Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia*, because of the impact of the Asian economic crisis and domestic insurgencies, Indonesia failed to use benevolent power in ASEAN. Do you think that Indonesia will continue to use benevolent power to increase its influence due to its leadership role within ASEAN, after the creation of the ASC? Is it useful that a benevolent power emerges in Southeast Asia, when the member-states address non-traditional security issues?

Answer:

In 2004 and 2005, it was fair to say that the Indonesian economy was so weak that it did not have the capacity to transform its natural position as first among equals into strong leadership. And that was also partly because of Indonesia not wanting to play that role, always being wary of causing alarm among other Southeast Asian countries. Although he was a dictator, Suharto, in particular, understood international relations and foreign policy-making well. I think he understood that it was more effective for Indonesia to take this benign position within ASEAN, to kind of lead from behind. And this policy worked very well for many years and then, of course, with the financial crisis, Indonesia had no foreign policy to speak off and Indonesia became very inward-looking, and didn't really have an ASEAN policy. Now that the economy is back on its feet, and doing quite well—it was less affected by the global crisis, for instance—it is clear that Indonesia wants to play that ball again. What has changed since the Suharto years is that Indonesia has become a democracy. They are very proud of becoming a democracy. They would like to see the promotion of good governance, democratization in other Southeast Asian countries. I think Indonesia would like to steer ASEAN in that direction, leading the association, and at the same time, starting to pay more and more attention to those factors, democracy and good governance.

But, Indonesia had a very good year as chair last year. It was a strong leadership and it managed to navigate issues carefully on the South China Sea, the East Asia Summit. It did a good job. But, at the same time, Indonesia is starting to face resistance. There are other countries that feel like 'well wait a minute, you're not the only leader'. Countries like Vietnam and the new members don't want to hear about democratization and human rights. They say 'this is not the association we joined'. That is very interesting area of contention, because on the one hand, you have the ASEAN Human Rights commission but without any teeth and I think that is the Charter that mentions good governance, but the next paragraph says non-interference. I think that's the balancing act that you have going between Indonesia and the Philippines, in particular, and the newer members, on the other hand. I think, generally, Indonesia is still regarded as the benign leader of Southeast Asia, but it's not an uncontested position. I think it's uncontested in areas of regional security and political cooperation. But in economics, for instance, the leadership doesn't come from Indonesia. The leadership tends to come from Singapore and, to some extent, Malaysia and Thailand. The leadership in socio-cultural issues tends to come from the Philippines. I call it sectorial leadership. You have leadership in different sectors of cooperation. Indonesia, probably, predominantly leading in security and political cooperation, economics somewhere else, socio-

cultural somewhere else. That is one big debate. The debate we had one or two years ago, is that some people are starting to say—people like Rizal Sukma—that ASEAN is too small for Indonesia, because Indonesia is now a G20 member, it's a middle power and the largest Muslim country in the world. What Rizal and others were saying is that ASEAN is such frustrating experience, because it's moving slowly. Indonesia needs to have a better sense of its national interests and let those interests drive its foreign policy. I often go to Indonesia and I often meet young Indonesian researchers. What always surprises me is how critical they are of ASEAN. I always wonder, if that's the generation that will lead Indonesia's foreign policy in say ten or twenty years, then ASEAN has a problem. But if you go to the Indonesian ministry foreign affairs, they all love ASEAN. And I think that's partly because, at some point, they were all on the ASEAN desk of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. To have a good career in the Indonesia foreign ministry, you have spent time on the ASEAN desk.

I would actually go beyond the benevolent power. I would now really go and use the concept of leadership. I think what ASEAN needs more than anything else is leadership. Indonesia is the obvious example but I think that people are still waiting for more leadership coming from Indonesia...Indonesia taking a clearer stand. Last year was very good but, unfortunately, with this rotation system, we are now stuck with Cambodia for a year...and then Laos, and then Brunei: it's going to be a series of potentially very weak leaderships. So, it would be interesting to see how Indonesia will be able to continue playing its role of the natural leader of ASEAN, even if it is not in charge, even if it is not holding the chair.

Question:

Last year, Myanmar released Aung San Suu Kyi and allowed her to meet foreign diplomats. Do you think that Myanmar's change regarding the issue of human right is due to ASEAN's pressure?

Answer:

I would personally argue that is mostly due to the domestic transformations within Myanmar. I think, perhaps, it's a generational shift in Myanmar, but also realization in Myanmar could not continue be a pariah state. That is the primary reason, like a transformation from within and the realization that the region is changing. They don't want to be overly reliant on China. But, I would still give some credit to Indonesia. Especially, president SBY committed himself, because you have multiple parliamentary delegations travelling to Myanmar and of course, Myanmar could listen to Indonesia, because they have a very similar history, they had to fight for their independence. And, Indonesia is a success story. Indonesia is a country that managed

to go from being led by a soft-authoritarian and it has actually managed to go through a process of democratization and managed to keep the countries together, despite separatist movements. I don't know much about Myanmar but I hope they are looking at the Indonesian case closely, because, possibly, it could happen to them. Of course, Myanmar seems to be an even more complicated country to manage because of separatist movements, but they have the resources. So, if they were to be plugged in into the international economy, they could perhaps benefit from that.

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