



Robertson, S. L. (2016). Piketty, capital and education: a solution to, or problem in, rising social inequalities? *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 37(6), 823-835.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2016.1165086>

Peer reviewed version

Link to published version (if available):
[10.1080/01425692.2016.1165086](https://doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2016.1165086)

[Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research](#)
PDF-document

This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Elsevier at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01425692.2016.1165086>. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research

General rights

This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
<http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/>

**Piketty, Capital and Education: A Solution to, or Problem in,
Rising Social Inequalities?**

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Journal: | <i>British Journal of Sociology of Education</i> |
| Manuscript ID | CBSE-2015-0088.R1 |
| Manuscript Type: | Special Issue |
| Keywords: | Piketty, education policy, political economy, wealth, social justice, labour markets |
| | |

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Review Only

Introduction

When Thomas Piketty's book on *Capital in the 21st Century* was released in 2014, it became an overnight success, making the list of best sellers for months. Piketty's 685-page work was not at all light reading, and typically not the kind of book to be found prominently displayed in airport bookstores amongst the volumes of 'get rich quick' promise. Piketty himself was to become the darling of the modern day salons that make up the academic and popular circuits; his 'Frenchness' and youth a matter of comment. Yet it is his arguments, too, that struck a chord. For Piketty's work focused attention not only on the concentration of massive wealth in a tiny elite in countries such as the UK and the USA, but how the wealth of this elite had increased following the financial crisis of 2008. Piketty was not alone in drawing this kind of conclusion; he joined a body of work by leading scholars and commentators on rising income and wealth inequalities in the developed world (see Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Amin, 2013; Stiglitz, 2013; Dorling, 2014; Sayer, 2014; Streeck, 2014; amongst others). But this was an economist saying these things, and this distinction mattered.

Piketty's analysis has been hugely welcomed within the academy and beyond; as an economist he is not describing the social and political with terminology that economists like to use when the model does not quite match up to what is out there, such as 'the extra-economic' or 'spill-overs'. In *Capital*, Piketty points to the relationship between the long-run evolution of income and wealth in capitalist economies, and the importance of politics and policy in shaping governance frameworks, institutional arrangements (tax, labour laws) and of social norms in mediating outcomes. As a result, the value of Piketty for social scientists is that he highlights the flawed assumptions of neo-classical economists. This matters for sectors like education whose national and global policy agendas have come to be dominated by neo-classical economists and their ideas over the past three decades or more (Klees, 2009; Robertson et. al., 2012).

1
2
3 Yet despite his insights, Piketty's solution to the problem of inequality is to argue that "...the
4 best way to reduce inequalities with respect to labor...is to invest in education" (Piketty,
5 2014: 306-7). In this paper I argue there are major problems with this proposed solution. To
6 begin, Piketty views education as human capital, rather than seeing education as being a key
7 social institution involved in both the production and social reproduction of capitalist
8 societies. It is thus a key institution in producing social relations, including class, race and
9 gender, which in turn mediate ongoing income and wealth inequalities. Second, Piketty's
10 dependence on comparing national statistics results in a methodological nationalist lens.
11 Yet, as we have argued elsewhere, looking at the world through a methodological
12 nationalist lens is problematic (Robertson and Dale, 2008). Over the past three decades,
13 production and labour markets have become increasingly globalised, with important
14 outcomes for the relationship between skill and wages in developed economies like the USA
15 and UK (Brown et al., 2011).

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 Finally, Piketty underestimates the extent to which education itself in countries like the UK
27 and USA has produced greater inequalities as a result of transformations in how the sector
28 is governed, and the individual and social outcomes that have resulted (Robertson and Dale,
29 2013). The transformations can be linked to the income and wealth dynamics that Piketty is
30 documenting; declining tax receipts to the state has resulted in limiting its capacity to
31 redistribute and created a greater burden on households (Streeck, 2014); education itself is
32 a new frontier for commodification both for the state and entrepreneurs bringing it directly
33 into the sphere of production, profit making and wealth generation (Robertson, et al.,
34 2012); the corporate elite have used their wealth to fund foundations which in turn
35 promote education policies and fund programmes fostering social norms, such as
36 individualism, entrepreneurialism, and a "winner takes all" competition mentality, all the
37 while displacing state responsibility and accountability for education delivery (Sayer, 2014;
38 Dorling, 2014). This combination of lacunae for Piketty leads to an intellectual cul-de-sac,
39 and results in a missed opportunity to reveal the complex dynamics at work in producing
40 income inequality, particularly since the 1980s transforming society's education sectors and
41 wider social outcomes. This paper aims to fill in the missing social and political analyses –
42 with the hope of extending rather than dismissing Piketty's claims.

1
2
3 The paper proceeds in the following way. It begins by laying out the key claims of Piketty
4 and colleagues to frame my substantive engagement in the paper. I then elaborate three
5 lacunae in Piketty's 'investment in education->greater equality' argument: (i) dependence
6 on a technical rather than a social-relational understanding of education; (ii) methodological
7 nationalist assumptions regarding labour markets and production; and (iii) that the sector
8 has been untrammelled by the politics Piketty identifies as 'a conservative revolution' (2014:
9 355). I conclude by suggesting that by linking Piketty's work to a social and relational
10 understanding of the changing cultural and political economy of education in a globalising
11 world, we can identify the features of power and politics that inform how the endeavour of
12 education operates; those actors, ideas, institutions and governance instruments which are
13 instrumental in shaping education and social outcomes.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25 **Piketty and Colleagues: Main Claims**

26
27
28 It is now a matter of history that in 2014 Thomas Piketty's book, *Capital in the Twenty-First*
29 *Century*, became an overnight sensation. Yet Piketty's contributions ought not to be
30 elevated above the work of a group of fellow economists who have been charting the long-
31 run evolution of income and wealth inequality in Europe and the United States. As Piketty
32 notes in his work *Capital* (2014: 16-17), his project has been to: (i) bring together sources of
33 data dealing with wealth, on the one hand, with data on income on the other, and (ii) draw
34 in colleagues, such as Antony Atkinson, Emmanuel Saez, Facundo Alvaredo, Fabien Dell,
35 Abhijit Banerjee and Nancy Qian, to enable them to extend Piketty's initial work on France
36 to include countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA),
37 Canada, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, India, Argentina, and China. These sources have
38 been assembled into a comparative data set called the World Top Incomes Database
39 (WTID).
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50 WTID is the largest historical data-base concerning the evolution of income inequality
51 (Piketty, 2014: 17-19). So what makes up income? Sources include income from *labour*
52 (wages, salaries, bonuses and so on) and income from capital (rent, dividends, interest,
53 profits and so on). Income tax returns enable the study of changes in income inequality,
54 whilst estate tax returns enable the study of wealth inequalities arising over time. These are
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 viewed as conservative figures in that tax and income returns are not likely to capture all
4 income; the very wealthy tend to hide their wealth in tax havens or in forms of creative
5 accounting. This means that inequalities are likely to be higher, rather than lower, than
6 Piketty and his colleagues report (Palan, 2002).
7
8
9

10 Using this income and wealth data, Piketty and colleagues are able to measure the stock of
11 national wealth (includes, land, industrial and finance capital) over a long period of time,
12 including the number of years it takes to amass this wealth. And though there are limits to
13 national wealth figures in that they are not sensitive to individual differences, it does help to
14 build a picture of the importance of capital as a whole to any particular society (Piketty,
15 2014: 19).
16
17
18
19
20

21 Yet as Piketty points out – it has only been possible in the past few years to assemble a long
22 run picture of the ongoing evolution between income and wealth over a range of societies.
23 The reasons are both technical and political. Technically, new digital technologies in make it
24 possible to work with very large amounts of data. Politically, the recent financial crisis was
25 able to reveal the effects of shocks within the system and what this means for income and
26 wealth distribution and equality.
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 So what are Piketty's core arguments and conclusions? It is useful to start with the main
34 conclusions to be drawn from charting and analysing these long run trends. He states:
35
36

37 ...we should be wary of any economic determinism in regard to inequalities in
38 wealth and income. The history of the distribution of wealth has always been
39 deeply political and it cannot be reduced to purely economic mechanisms. The
40 reduction that took place in most developed countries between 1910 and 1950
41 was above all a consequence of war and of policies adopted to cope with the
42 shocks of war. Similarly the resurgence of inequality after 1980 is due largely to
43 the political shifts of the past several decades especially in regard to taxation
44 and finance. The history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, social and
45 political actors view what is just and what is not, as well as the relative power
46 of those actors and the collective choices that result. *It is the product of all*
47 *relevant actors combined* [emphasis mine] (Piketty, 2014: 20).
48
49
50

51 This is an important conclusion, and one that I return to in the second half of this paper,
52 though not one that would surprise sociologists, including sociologists of education. Yet
53 there are critics in the wings; indignant economists and financial analysts who have doubted
54 the veracity of Piketty and colleagues data and assumptions, and influential left wing
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 intellectuals, such as Harvey (2014), Wade (2014), and Boyer (2014), who rightfully have
4 pointed out that, though Piketty has a lot to say about capital, he does not have anything to
5 say about capitalism, or 'predistribution' interventions - meaning decent jobs and a living
6 wage, or indeed poverty (Klees, 2015).
7
8
9

10
11 Nevertheless, Piketty's work does represent a welcome point of departure from mainstream
12 economic analyses. For the most part, the dominance of mainstream economists in policy
13 and political circles – nationally and globally – has tended to shore up, and reinforce, social
14 inequalities, because their assumptions are drawn from a potent combination of liberal
15 theory and neoclassical economics. Letting the market 'self-regulate' by reducing the role of
16 the state in managing the market, and promoting individualism and consumerism, has been
17 a powerful ideology advanced in the heartlands of developed world from the 1980s onward
18 (Leys, 2001; Harvey, 2005; Streeck, 2014b). One outcome of such policies was the decision
19 to lower taxes to corporations, beginning in the 1980s under Reagan in the US, and Thatcher
20 in the UK. These decisions were promoted by influential advisors, including Nobel Laureate,
21 Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank, and economic advisor to the US's
22 Clinton Administration in the 1990s. Stiglitz recently observed of inequalities in the USA in
23 2015:
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35 I trace the inequalities to a particular set of decisions that we took when we
36 lowered the tax rate from 91% down to very low levels at the top, where we
37 stripped away regulations. So the result of that was not a more dynamic
38 economy, but a more unequal society. We tried the experiment of trickle down.
39 A third of a century later, we can fairly definitively say it was a failure (Fisher,
40 2015: 1).
41

42
43 Whilst not all will agree that the experiment was a failure, particularly if one was a
44 beneficiary from such decisions, the point about political decisions is well made. Yet
45 decisions can be made that are committed to an opposite outcome to increased
46 inequalities; an increase in social equality. As Piketty also concludes, there are no inevitable
47 outcomes, and it is possible to see alternative politics at work that can, and do, lead to
48 different outcomes. In a report published in 2014 by the OECD, we can see decreasing
49 inequality in Greece and Turkey, and little or unchanged inequality in Belgium, France and
50 the Netherlands (OECD, 2014: 1). It should be noted that in this latter set of countries,
51 neoliberal policies aimed at restructuring their social policy and welfare sectors, have only
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 recently penetrated these societies – some thirty years after their launch in Chile, the UK,
4 USA and New Zealand.
5

6
7 If we turn to Piketty and colleagues' core findings, the following are key. First, they show
8 that it is a myth that inequality will 'naturally' decrease with industrialization and economic
9 growth. They refer to this as 'the myth of Kuznet's curve'.
10
11

12
13 Kuznet posited that income inequality first rises with economic development
14 when new, higher productivity, sectors emerge (e.g. manufacturing industry
15 during the industrial revolution) but then decreases as more and more workers
16 join the higher paying sectors of the economy. Our data shows that equality
17 declined in developed countries during the first half of the 20th
18 century....because of the fall of top capital incomes...there was no structural
19 decline in the inequality of labor income (Piketty and Saez 2014: 842).
20
21

22
23 However, and this is the punchline, the dip in inequality between 1914 and 1945 was the
24 result of political shocks—notably two World Wars— and not market mechanisms. In other
25 words, increasingly wealth equality was not shaped by the effects of economic development
26 and its maturing (Kuznet's curve), but by wars where wealth accumulation was simply wiped
27 out.
28
29
30

31
32 Piketty goes in to develop what he calls the 'first' and 'second' laws of capitalism. The first
33 law of capitalism concerns the relationship between the "capital/income ratio" (p. 164-98);
34 if the capital/income ratio is high, then the owners of capital will necessarily earn a larger
35 piece of the total pie than workers. But, how is the capital/income ratio determined? This is
36 where Piketty's second law of capitalism emerges. High savings and slow growth will result
37 in an enormous amount of capital, relative to income. This will automatically increase the
38 importance of capital in the overall distribution of wealth.
39
40
41
42
43
44

45
46 Piketty concludes that, if left to its own devices (weak institutional arrangements for
47 redistribution through progressive taxation; pressure for high wages, high taxes and high
48 skill arrangements), wealth distribution will tend toward the concentration in wealth
49 accumulation, in turn producing inequalities. In other words, inequality is produced by both
50 inequality from labour (wages differences) and inequality from capital (previously owned
51 wealth).
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Looking at the USA versus Europe, it can be shown that 'income inequality' was larger in
4 Europe than in the United States a century ago, but is now currently larger in the US than in
5 most of Europe, and this is true for every inequality measure – including the share of total
6 income going to the top 1%. In Europe, the top decile share is one-third smaller than it used
7 to be, whilst in the USA, the top decile share is close to 50%, up from 30-35% in the 1970s
8 and 80s meaning that inequalities have grown since the 1980s in the US (Piketty and Saez,
9 2014).

10
11
12
13
14
15
16 'Wealth inequality' (the accumulation of total net private wealth as a result of income and
17 inheritance) has also changed, so that in the US, wealth inequality is now larger than it is in
18 contemporary Europe, though it has not quite reached the levels that were witnessed in
19 pre-World War 1 Europe (Piketty and Saez, 2014). Why is income inequality higher in the US
20 today than in Europe? They argue inequality in the US is derived from the sharp rise in top
21 labour incomes than on the extremes of wealth that characterised the patrimonial societies
22 of Europe the past – where inherited wealth enabled concentrations of net private wealth
23 income.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31 If we look at the evolution of the 'aggregate value of wealth to income', we can see
32 variations between Europe and the United States. In Europe, and particularly France,
33 Germany and the UK, the aggregate wealth-income ratio has followed a U curve over the
34 past century; on the eve of WW1, net private wealth was equal to 6-7 years of national
35 income. This fell to 2-3 times national income in the 1950s and has risen again back to
36 around 5 -6 times from the 1980s onwards. In the USA, the pattern is flatter meaning that
37 though the US and Europe have U curves, the USA is "...a land of booming top labor
38 incomes; Europe is the land of booming wealth, albeit though with lower wealth
39 concentrations than in the United States" (Piketty and Saez, 2014: 840).

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47 Drawing on similar data, a recent OECD report also points out that the rising gap between
48 the rich and the poor is at its highest level in most OECD countries in 30 years, though as I
49 have noted earlier, some countries have remained relative stable and in others there have
50 been reductions in inequalities. However the US, UK, New Zealand, and Mexico, amongst
51 others, all show a marked climb in inequalities; these are also countries who have bought
52 into neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s. The effects have been devastating on
53 income and other social inequalities. As the OECD states, an "...increase in income
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 inequality is evident, not just in the widening gap between the top and the bottom income
4 deciles, but also in the Gini coefficient (which ranges from 0 – that is where all income goes
5 to every person equally - to 1 where all income goes to one person). In the 1980s the Gini
6 measure stood at 0.29 for OECD countries; by 2011/12 it had increased by 3 points to 0.32”
7 (OECD, 2014: 1).
8
9

10
11
12 The OECD has now come to argue that income inequality has a negative and statistically
13 significant impact on medium term growth. According to their report, if we took the average
14 increase in the Gini points that has characterised the OECD countries over the last two
15 decades, this would drag down economic growth by 0.35 percentage points per year and
16 represent a cumulated loss in GDP at the end of the period of 8.5% (OECD, 2014: 2).
17
18
19

20
21
22 In a useful exercise, the OECD models how much GDP growth there might have been had
23 inequality not changed between 1985 and 2005. They show that countries such as Mexico,
24 New Zealand, Finland, Norway and the United States, all experienced a loss of growth
25 (OECD, 2014: 2). The biggest factor in impacting on inequality and growth was the gap
26 between the lower income households and the rest of the population – especially the
27 lowest four deciles, or bottom 40%. They argue that the policy agenda has to address, not
28 just the issue of poverty, which might be the outcome of redistribution policies - such as tax
29 credits, but more importantly, the issue of lower incomes more generally. In relation to
30 lower incomes - the issue here is paying a living wage in exchange for labour.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

38
39 This is also linked to the earlier question of growing precarity and inequality for the bottom
40 40% who are at risk of failing to be able to access, as well as take advantage of,
41 opportunities for equal participation in societies, including learning. UK analysts, Harrap and
42 Reed (2015: 2), make a similar point. They argue that if policies stay the same in the UK,
43 then between 2015 and 2030 an extra 3.6 million will fall into poverty, including 1.2 million
44 children whilst the incomes of the high income households will rise 11 times faster than the
45 incomes of low income households. Any reforms that are really to tackle poverty will have
46 to be through the reform of labour markets (or pre-redistribution) rather than being
47 reserved, as Piketty does for taxation system.
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

58 **Education: A Solution to, or Problem in, Rising Social Inequalities?**
59
60

1
2
3 What role does education play in this? And equally important, what is to be done and how
4 might education be part of the solution? Despite Piketty and colleagues insights into the
5 significance of politics, power and policy in shaping the ongoing accumulation of capital,
6 they are curiously naïve in their view as to the role that education currently plays in social
7 inequalities. Rather than see contemporary education systems in countries, like the USA and
8 UK, as a part of the problem, they see education as part of the solution. In *Capital*, Piketty
9 argues that education, as a producer of knowledge and skills, is a force for convergence
10 rather than divergence (2014: 22-23), and where divergences do occur, this is because of a
11 failure to invest adequately in training in ways that tend to exclude whole social groups. His
12 solution? “The best way to reduce inequalities with respect to labour as well as to increase
13 the average productivity of the labor force and the overall growth of the economy is to
14 invest in education” (Piketty, 2014: 306-7). In the following section I show the ways in which
15 Piketty and colleagues fails to take more fully into account the ways in which education
16 systems have exacerbated divergence rather than being those forces that tend toward
17 convergence. My arguments are developed around three lacunae.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 *Lacuna 1: Education is a technical rather than a social and political process*

34
35 Piketty and colleagues view education as a technical rather than social and political process.
36 This can be seen in the claim made below where they argue that labour income inequality in
37 the long-run is determined by a race between skills and technology. That is,
38
39
40

41 ...the expansion of education leads to a rise in the supply of skills, while
42 technological change leads to a rise in the demand for skills. Depending on
43 which process occurs faster, income inequality will either fall or rise (Piketty and
44 Saez, 2014: 842).
45

46 Put another way, when education expands faster and there is a rise in the supply of skills –
47 this is not matched by demand, and thus income inequality falls. Conversely, when
48 technological changes occur rapidly, and education does not keep up with these processes
49 in terms of the production of skills, the limited supply of those with skills will result in a
50 higher price for such skilled labour, and thus greater income inequality. This argument
51 draws on work advanced by Goldin and Katz (2008) in their book *The Race between*
52 *Education and Technology*. According to Piketty, there has been an under-investment in
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 education in countries like the USA, so that there are not sufficient numbers of skilled
4 workers. The result is that skilled labour is able to command a much higher income relative
5 to those without skills ; this is an argument Goldin and Katz (2008) advance.
6
7

8
9 Yet Piketty and colleagues also sees something else at work, but they can't explain it. They
10 argue that whilst inequality has increased in recent decades as a result of a rise in the global
11 competition for skills driven by globalisation and skill-based technical change, this is not
12 sufficient to explain important variations between countries – for instance, the difference
13 between Europe, Japan and the United States, with Europe and Japan having lower income
14 inequality despite being caught in the technological race (Piketty and Saez, 2014: 842). The
15 problem Piketty and his colleagues face here is that they primarily conceive of education as
16 human capital, with productivity and wages simply functions of education and technology.
17 In essence they view education as a technical, and not a social and political process, and this
18 is despite their insight; that politics, institutions and social norms matter.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27
28 Theirs is a similar stance to the OECD, who draw upon human capital assumptions regarding
29 education. For instance, the OECD routinely promotes poster countries, like South Korea, for
30 their economic development over the past few decades. In a recent blog post that
31 accompanied the launch of the post-2015 education priorities for the next decade or more,
32 OECD Director for Education and Skills, Andreas Schleicher, argued that Korea showed 'what
33 is possible in education';
34
35
36
37

38
39 Korea provides an amazing example of how education can leverage social
40 progress and become the key agent of change. Two generations ago Korea had
41 the same level of economic development that Afghanistan has today, and one of
42 the least developed education systems. Today, Korea is one of the driving forces
43 of the OECD, and Korea's school system comes out on top of our global PISA
44 metrics for the quality of education...and better education outcomes can help
45 improve income and reduce poverty.
46
47

48
49 The key message here is simple: there is no shortcut to improved learning
50 outcomes in a post-2015 world where knowledge and skills have become the
51 global currency. And there is no central bank that prints this currency. We
52 cannot inherit this currency, and we cannot produce it through speculation; we
53 can only develop it through sustained effort and investment in people, both
54 young and old. And for those countries struggling to provide high-quality
55 education, the economic output that is lost because of poor education policies
56 and practices leaves many of them in a permanent state of economic recession
57 (Schleicher, 2015: 1).
58
59
60

1
2
3 In essence a worker – with a particular set of knowledge and skills – is regarded as a capital
4 good, and every worker a capitalist in that they own their own means of production. Yet
5 there are major problems with this view (Bowles and Gintis, 1975: 74) and these problems
6 are not simply ideological – but empirical (as Piketty and Saez themselves observe in the
7 ‘facts’, but lack the theoretical resources to open up a level of understanding about the
8 processes at work). In short, whilst clearly enhanced levels of education can enhance worker
9 productivity and economic growth, it is not *causal*. If this were the case, those countries
10 with highly educated workforces would have high growth economies. Instead we see high
11 skill-low growth economies – for example, Spain, Portugal, the UK and the USA - with many
12 of the unemployed having graduate credentials (OECD, 2014).

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 This is not to say that qualifications do not matter; they do. But qualifications serve a more
23 important purpose; they are a means for staying in the race, or if possible, of getting ahead,
24 rather than (necessarily) getting the job done. Indeed for the most part “...a college
25 education has failed to deliver any additional premium on investments in human capital
26 compared to those in the job market in the 1970s” (Brown et al. 2011: 117).

27
28
29
30
31 Human capital theory – like neo-classical liberal theory – invokes assumptions about perfect
32 information, and the role of the market in price-setting and wages, and that returns on
33 individual investments on education can be calculated. Yet markets are imperfect, there are
34 information asymmetries, monopolies which can limit productivity, unions and bosses can
35 negotiate wages, and particular social groups can demand higher salaries, whilst others are
36 not able to exercise power in this way (Streeck, 2014). In short, politics and power matter,
37 and in sectors like education – having the right credential from the right institution matters
38 more and more, as getting a secure, even modestly-paid job, has become highly competitive
39 (Sennett, 2006). Having the right CV can now mean working as an intern for no wages,
40 rather than even a pittance.

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49 This is not a race between training and technology; rather, this is a race between competing
50 social groups with unequal resources. The outcomes are shaped by social and political
51 processes and relations (class/gender/race; a range of status marks of distinction that might
52 include private education, private tutoring, exclusive higher education institutions, and so
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 on) unless these are mediated by policies and programmes aimed at ameliorating these
4 inequalities.
5

6
7 Getting ahead via education in a highly competitive world is an expensive business, as it
8 means increasingly significant amounts of resources being assembled and invested in those
9 cultural, social and political capitals that will make a difference to your position in the status
10 hierarchy and competition for talent. But in a world that has come to link 'talent' to very
11 high salaries, and justify very high salaries as the reward for talent, winning that race is
12 worth the investment (Brown et al. 2011; Newfield, 2010). Like any race, however, there are
13 winners and losers, though the size of the pool of losers is widening as the 'winner takes all'.
14 Like all races too, the rules for engagement are always strategically selective of some over
15 others. This is power that matters, with bite! As Brown et al observe: "...if the capitalist
16 system has no loyalty to American workers, much the same can be said of American
17 corporate elites. They have not simply played a game of winner takes all; they have created
18 one" (2011: 115). This is the exact effect of inequality that Piketty and colleagues have
19 outlined; unfortunately, they have simultaneously failed to identify how the
20 technical/human capital view of education that they recommend as a panacea actually
21 reproduces the competitive foundation of inequality.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34 Viewing education in technical terms depoliticises education; as a result human capital
35 theory contributes to inequalities as it formally excludes the relevance of class and class
36 conflict in their account of labour markets and how they work. Yet as Bowles and Gintis
37 point out; "...the wage structure, the individual attributes valued on the labour market, and
38 the social relations of the educational process can only be accounted for through an explicit
39 class analysis" (1975: 75). Human capital theory, by making invisible the question of social
40 class and its role in mediating labour markets, income and wealth, also makes invisible class
41 interests, projects and outcomes.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49 This is not lost on the beneficiaries of class projects. Warren Buffett, the fourth wealthiest
50 person in the world, stated to the New York Times in 2006: "...sure there is a class war, and
51 it is my class, the rich, who are making it, and we are winning" (Stein, 2006: 1). In this case
52 Buffett is describing the ways in which a particular elite have managed to secure for
53 themselves salaries, and wealth generating opportunities (including lower or no tax) which
54 have, in turn, have made them part of the super-rich. The failure of the very wealthy to pay
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 their share of state taxes has resulted in major shortfalls in state revenues, that has in
4 exacerbated social class inequalities, in that the state has limited financial resources to
5 redistribute. I pick up these issues in the final section.
6
7
8
9

10
11 *Lacuna 2: A methodological nationalist lens in a globalising world*
12

13
14 A second lacunae for consideration when reviewing Piketty's skill-wages argument is that he
15 sees economies through the lens of the national statistics. This is hardly surprising in that he
16 is also looking at income tax data, which collected and reported nationally. Yet as Brown,
17 Lauder and Ashton (2011) show in their book, *The Global Auction*, national labour markets,
18 production and wages have been transformed by global processes. It follows that
19 understanding the dynamics at work contributing to what is increasingly in the US and the
20 UK, a high-skill/low-wage economy, and what this means for sectors like education, requires
21 an understanding also of these globalising processes.
22
23
24
25
26
27

28
29 A key dynamic at work here is the way in which relatively low-cost locations around the
30 world – India, China, Indonesia, Vietnam and so on – can reduce the market price of
31 technological know-how. They point to the availability of a well-educated (often in the
32 West) workforce available for outsourced and local operations who are willing to work for
33 lower wages, relative to the centre, but which are higher relative to the wages of the other
34 locals. What has made this possible has been innovations – like digital technologies – which
35 enable routine professional work (such as health, legal, educational) to be off-shored,
36 completed, and returned around the clock for a fraction of the price. Brown et al refer to
37 this process as 'digital Taylorism':
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 This involves translating the knowledge work of managers, professionals, and
46 technicians into working knowledge by capturing, codifying and digitizing their
47 work in software packages, templates and prescripts that can be transferred and
48 manipulated by others, regardless of location. ...Unlike mechanical Taylorism,
49 which required the concentration of labor in factories, digital Taylorism enables
50 work activities to be dispersed and recombined from anywhere in the world in
51 less than the time it takes to read a sentence (Brown et al, 2011: 72).
52
53

54 These global production work processes are, in turn, creating a middle class in countries like
55 India and China. And whilst these employees; "...with a college education working in
56 managerial and professional jobs for international companies may have to work long hours
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 and constantly feel the pressure of tough financial targets, they are among the winners in a
4 global auction” (Brown et al., 2011: 129).
5
6

7 One effect of digital Taylorism on education is that it challenges a key ideological
8 underpinning of the ‘national’ social contract. Because national economies now exert less
9 influence on the provision of jobs, they can no longer claim to provide a meritocracy and its
10 promise of a secure job and earnings in return for self-discipline, hard work and learning.
11 That link is broken, and with it a key mechanism of social control, on the one hand, and
12 legitimation for a system of social stratification suited to capitalist economies, on the other.
13 The globalising of the capital-labour relation thus has huge implications for national
14 education systems, including how best to ensure ongoing commitment to doing well, when
15 the returns are so visibly meagre for some, and a veritable cornucopia for tiny group of
16 highly privileged others.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26 *Lacuna 3: The transformation of education and the culture of the new capitalism*
27

28 In this final section I want to direct attention to how the public nature of education itself has
29 come under considerable pressure as a result of the social inequalities emerging as a result
30 of the concentration of wealth and income over the past three decades. I focus on three
31 issues in particular – as illustrations of the consequences of the transformation of capital in
32 the 21st Century that Piketty (2014) has charted.
33
34
35
36

37
38 *....declining tax receipts and education*
39

40 Public education is funded through the redistribution of finances collected via tax receipts.
41 Any decline in the value of tax receipts collected places pressure on governments to
42 variously limit their outlays and to find new ways in which to legitimate these limits; borrow
43 more money and find ways of creative ways of managing the debt; or to encourage
44 households to take on this debt, with ideological inducements to do so. Streeck (2014b)
45 describes this as a shift from a tax state to a debt state.
46
47
48
49

50
51 New challenges to the public purse are an outcome of a series of mechanisms that have
52 resulted in lower tax receipts in countries like the USA and UK: these mechanisms have
53 included ‘reforms’ that in essence lowered the top income and corporate rates – in turn
54 benefitted the very wealthy (Streeck, 2014a: 43; Fisher, 2015), and corporations using the
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 fast growing internationalisation of the economy to open up scope for corporations to shift
4 their tax obligations to less demanding countries (for example, Amazon paid only 0.1% of
5 tax on their UK earnings in 2012 – Garside, 2014; Streeck, 2014b: 67). In 2008, the USA and
6 UK governments also provided public funds to bail out the banks with the argument that
7 they were too big to fail, whilst public assets have been sold to speculators at fire-sale prices
8 benefitting.
9

10
11
12
13
14 Taken together, these developments have created a fiscal crisis of the contemporary state –
15 and this is reflected in an escalation in public debt since the 1970s. Streeck argues that by
16 replacing tax revenue with debt,
17
18

19
20
21 ...governments contributed further to inequality, in that they offered secure
22 investment opportunities to those whose money they would or could no longer
23 confiscate and had to borrow instead. Unlike taxpayers, buyers of government
24 bonds continue to own what they pay to the state, and in fact collect interest on
25 it, typically paid out of ever less progressive taxation; they can also pass it on to
26 their children. Moreover, rising public debt can be and is being utilized politically
27 to argue for cutbacks in state spending and for privatisation of public services,
28 further constraining redistributive democratic intervention in the capitalist
29 economy (Streeck, 2014a: 43).
30

31
32 The rise of public debt is closely bound to the victory of neoliberals and their class war,
33 though typically it is represented as bloated or high spending government. Along with
34 the skewing of income inequality, the rise in public debt is occurring not just in
35 countries with historically higher degrees of inequality – such Italy, the US and the UK
36 - but also in comparatively egalitarian countries, such as Sweden and Germany
37 (Streeck, 2014b: 52). And as Streeck is quick to point out:
38
39
40
41

42
43
44 Not high spending but low receipts are the cause of the government debt, to be
45 explained by economy and society, organised around the principle of possessive
46 individualism, setting limits to their taxation, while at the same time making
47 more and more demands on the state (2014b: 66).
48

49
50 As a public service, education has been a casualty of the debt state, with teachers' wages,
51 investment in infrastructures, and redistribution to close inequality gaps, all under pressure.
52 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) has been rolled in as a new mechanisms for raising funds;
53 creative accounting techniques – such as off-balance sheet accounting have been used to
54 hide long term mounting public debt; venture capitalists and education entrepreneurs have
55 been welcomed into bidding for a share of the education pie, and households have been
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 courted with ideas such as the 'graduate premium' in order to recalibrate ongoing
4 challenges to the public purse. Yet the irony here is that many of these initiatives – such as
5 PPPs – have created new opportunities for corporations to use public funds to cream off
6 profits, and deliver in many instances inferior education outcomes (see Robertson et al.,
7 2012; Macpherson, et al 2014).

8
9
10
11
12 Paralleling the rise of public debt is the rise in private debt, and this matters again for
13 education equality, as more and more, households are asked to shoulder the cost of running
14 the highly competitive education race. The ready availability of credit, coupled with
15 downward pressure on wages, has led to what Colin Crouch calls 'privatised Keynesianism';
16 the replacement of government debt with private debt as a mechanism for expanding the
17 resource inventory in the national economy (Crouch, 2011: 97-124).

18
19
20 Taken together, the rise of public and the rise in private debt, reflects a fundamental shift in
21 democratic capitalist systems. As Crouch observes:
22
23

24
25
26
27
28 The bases of prosperity shifted from the social democratic formula of working
29 classes supported by government intervention to the neoliberal conservative
30 one of banks, stock exchanges and financial markets. Ordinary people played
31 their part, not as workers seeking to improve their situation through trade
32 unions, legislation protecting employment rights and publicly funded insurance
33 schemes, but as debt holders, participants in credit markets. ...It has imparted a
34 fundamental rightward shift to the whole political spectrum, as the collective
35 and individual interests of everyone are tied to the financial markets, which in
36 their own operations act highly unequally, producing extreme concentrations of
37 wealth (Crouch, 2011: 116).
38
39
40

41 No-where is this more evident than in the higher education sector in the USA and the UK.
42 Recent figures for the USA (2015) show that more than \$1.2 trillion is owed in student loan
43 debt, involving 40 million borrowers, with an average balance of \$29,000 (Holland, 2015: 1).
44 Year-on-year, tuition fees are hiking, with the result that not only are governments stepping
45 up their lending, but so, too, are private lenders, offering new kinds of financial products,
46 such as asset backed securities backed by student loans, or human capital contracts.
47
48
49
50

51
52
53 *...education - a new frontier for commodification*
54

55 Education itself is a new frontier for commodification both for the state and for
56 entrepreneurs bringing it directly into the sphere of production, profit making and wealth
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 generation (Robertson, et al., 2012). As a frontier, education is regarded as an important
4 area of international trade and is represented in national GDP statistics.
5

6
7 Education is also being opened up to private sector investors and investment (Robertson
8 and Komljenovic, 2016). In March 2014, investment advisors working for Merrill Lynch Bank
9 of America on the estimated value of education – \$4.3 trillion (Hartnett, Leung and Marcus,
10 2014: 6). This was not idle speculation – much as we might imagine ourselves as landing the
11 lottery. Three large global publishing companies are identified as the beneficiaries of
12 opening education up to whole-sale, and huge scale, corporate investors; Pearson
13 Education, Elsevier, and Informa.
14
15

16
17 Pearson Education are a huge education corporation who operate globally: they own the
18 Financial Times; examinations companies like EdExcel servicing English schools; more
19 recently a for-profit university in London; and financed a chain of schools in Ghana and
20 other countries. Similarly, Elsevier – a large publishing company – is linking testing with text
21 production, and has expanded its academic publishing activities to situate itself as a
22 knowledge services firm. These firms are not imagining themselves as operating on the
23 margins, but increasingly moving into core business of education through providing
24 infrastructures, on-line learning, and so on.
25
26

27
28 Like many of the new for-profit edu-businesses, their CEOs are also handsomely rewarded.
29 According to the *Chronicle of Higher Education* (2010) who track the for-profit higher
30 education industry, in 2010 the President and CEO of Bridgepoint Education, earned a \$20
31 million a year in total compensation, including stock awards, bonuses, option awards and
32 non-equity incentives (Baker, 2010). High salaries have also been paid out to Presidents of
33 US public universities and to Vice Chancellors in the UK. One of the highest paid in the US,
34 Pennsylvania State University's President, earned \$1.5 million in 2014 whilst Penn States
35 now retired predecessor earned nearly \$2.3 million in the same period.
36
37

38
39 It is clear that as education systems – from schools to universities - are confronted with
40 funding shortfalls and/or governments willing to change the regulatory protections around
41 education as a public good – they are also exposed to a predatory form of financial capital –
42 including private equity firms, which in turn makes education vulnerable to the logics of
43 profit, differentiation and social inequalities.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 ...new social norms – individualism and entrepreneurship
4
5

6 Corporate philanthropists are also increasingly targeting their contributions to education in
7 areas of policymaking and programme intervention in ways that hugely shape the direction
8 of the sector, on the one hand, and the social norms that they believe are more desirable
9 for competitive economies, on the other (Scott, 2009).
10

11
12
13 Researchers argue that though philanthropic organisations are not new to funding
14 education, in the past they tended to be more altruistic and liberal in their approach to
15 education (Saltman, 2010). More recently, however, Foundations are interested in
16 promoting particular governance models in education, such as charter schools, school
17 vouchers, standards and testing – and are promoting a strong vision for education and for
18 learners (as passionate entrepreneurs). In the schooling and the university sector, active
19 Foundations include the Walmart Foundation, Lumina Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates
20 Foundation, the Robertson Foundation, the Broad Foundation, the William and Flora
21 Hewlett Foundation, the list goes on. Their significant investments in education give
22 corporations, via their Foundations, significant influence over the governance of education
23 systems, and the social norms and outcomes that follow.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 This kind of influence, shaping the hearts and minds of the next generation through their
34 influence on education, has its alter-ego in the culture of the new capitalism that Sennett
35 describes so well; a small slice of the economy that has a cultural influence far beyond its
36 numbers (Sennett, 2006: 12). Work, talent and consumption are now the attributes for
37 operating in the new 'skills' society. Yet as I have argued above, this excess of individualism
38 and winner takes all approach has fed the greed machine that has normalised super-salaries
39 and concentrations of wealth at the same time that we have seen the growth of poverty in a
40 new working poor (Harrap and Reed, 2015).
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50 **Conclusions**
51

52
53 It is clear that whilst Piketty is able to name the problem of the age; the concentration of
54 capital amongst a small elite, and challenge the assumptions of the neo-classical economists
55 with evidence. However, his observations require more in-depth social and political analyses
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 to broaden our understanding of the issue of rising inequality. I have also argued that
4 Piketty and colleagues analysis of education – as part of the solution and not part of the
5 problem - fails to engage with the role that education currently plays in furthering, rather
6 than ameliorating, these inequalities.
7
8
9

10
11 What alternatives might we consider here for the reform of education that would
12 ameliorate, rather than continue to exaggerate, the trends that Piketty has been able to
13 delineate. The first is that we look at strategies and other interventions where a tax rather
14 than debt state ‘manages’ the race between competing social groups for education as a
15 positional good through forms of redistribution. This in turn means challenging human
16 capital accounts of education, and those powerful interests who propagate these views; the
17 unprecedented power that neo-classical economists of education have in shaping education
18 policy, along with the growing power of key international organisations in advancing human
19 capital arguments and projects. It also means challenging the ideological project that has
20 normalised ideas like ‘choice’, ‘talent’, and ‘resilience’. These tropes have obscured the
21 class-based nature of capital’s project. As Streeck (2014: 18, 19) so potently points out,
22 “capital is treated as a factor in production, and not as a class...capital is a player and not a
23 plaything”.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34
35 A second is that we develop new kinds of research tools that enable us to see beyond the
36 limits of national data-sets to bring into view the ways in which global labour markets are
37 developing and what this means for the organisation of national-located labour. To be sure
38 this will demand the collection of data on flows of capital, the locatedness of workers, and
39 the ways in which global space is used by capital to gain a competitive advantage. But this
40 work is not impossible. Rather, it has tended to be improbable as there are interests at work
41 ensuring that as much as possible is obscured by using the global strategically and to the
42 advantage of the capitalist class. Such data would be put to use to encourage a conversation
43 about social inequalities, working conditions, labour rights, a living wage, new forms of
44 exploitation, and so on. It would mean that the interests of labour in one country are not
45 pitted against labour in another.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 Finally, education must be extracted from the vortex that is rapidly sucking it up into the
56 new culture of capitalism. For education to be recovered as human right, and the basis of
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 what a new social contract, it must be viewed as a societal good funded by the state. This
4 means the reform of societies and their regulatory mechanisms, including progressive forms
5 of taxation, that in turn contribute to the collective wealth and health of any society. This
6 is, in itself, a job of education, writ in its widest of senses – so that societal arrangements
7 are built and judged fit for purpose, not because they benefit a tiny greedy elite, but
8 because they take in, and care for, those who are most vulnerable.
9

10
11
12
13
14 Education is at its best when it creates those spaces, opportunities, and encounters where a
15 next generation are helped to ask the kinds of questions and engage in the kinds of politics
16 that will make a positive difference to their lives and the lives around them. An education
17 system committed to social justice and not market justice would have a radical effect on
18 politics. Only then might education become part of the solution and not the problem.
19
20
21
22
23

24 25 26 27 **References**

28
29 Amin, A., (2013) *The Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism*, New York: Monthly Review
30 Press.
31

32
33 Baker, S., (2010) *Pay for CEOs of For-Profit Colleges Top of the Class*, CNBC, 21st December,
34 [<http://www.cnbc.com/id/40680879> – last accessed 18th June, 2015].
35

36
37 Boyer, R. (2014) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century: A régulationist view*
38 [<http://regulation.revues.org/10618> – last accessed 18th June, 2015]
39

40
41 Bowles, H., and Gintis, S., (1975) The problem with Human Capital Theory: A Marxian
42 critique, *The American Economic Review*, 65 (2), pp. 74-82.
43

44
45 Brown, P. Lauder, H., and Ashton, P. (2011) *The Global Auction*, Oxford: Oxford University
46 Press.
47

48
49 Crouch, C., (2011) *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, Cambridge: Polity.
50

51
52 Dorling, D., (2014) *Inequality and the 1%*, London and New York: Verso.
53

54
55 Fisher, J., (2015) Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz: There is no magic bullet to fix income
56 inequality, *Business Insider UK*. May 6th [[http://uk.businessinsider.com/nobel-laureate-](http://uk.businessinsider.com/nobel-laureate-joseph-stiglitz-2015-4)
57 [joseph-stiglitz-2015-4](http://uk.businessinsider.com/nobel-laureate-joseph-stiglitz-2015-4) – last accessed 18th June].
58

59
60 Garside, J. (2014) Amazon UK boycott urged after retailer pays just £4.2m in tax, *Guardian*,
9th May, 2014, [[http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/09/margaret-hodge-](http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/09/margaret-hodge-urges-boycott-amazon-uk-tax-starbucks)
[urges-boycott-amazon-uk-tax-starbucks](http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/09/margaret-hodge-urges-boycott-amazon-uk-tax-starbucks) – last accessed 18th June, 2015].

1
2
3 Goldin, C., and Katz, L. (2008) *The Race Between Education and Technology*, Cambridge:
4 Harvard University Press.

5
6 Harrop, A., and Reed, H., (2015) *Inequality in 2030 – Fabian Policy Report*, London: Fabian
7 Society.

8
9
10 Hartnett, M. Leung, B., and Marcus, J., (2014) *Transforming World, Thundering Word*,
11 Merrill Lynch Bank of America
12 [<https://mlaem.fs.ml.com/content/dam/ML/Articles/pdf/ATW-The-Thundering-Word.pdf> –
13 last accessed 18th June, 2015].
14

15
16 Harvey, D., (2014) *Afterthoughts on Piketty*,
17 [<http://davidharvey.org/2014/05/afterthoughts-pikettrys-capital/> - last accessed on 18th
18 June, 2015].
19

20
21 Holland, K., (2015) The high economic and social costs of student loan debt, *CNBC News*, 15
22 June [<http://www.cnbc.com/id/102742696> – last accessed 18th June, 2015]
23

24
25 Klees, S., (2015) *The Political Economy of Inequality and Education: Reflections on Piketty*, a
26 paper presented to the AERA Conference, April 15-20, Chicago.

27
28 Klees, Steven. 2008a. A Quarter Century of Neoliberal Thinking in Education: Misleading
29 Analyses and Failed Policies, *Globalization, Societies, and Education*, 6 (4), pp. 311-48.

30
31 Leys, C. (2001) *Market-Driven Politics*, London and New York: Verso.

32
33 Macpherson, I., Robertson, S. Walford, G. (2014) *Education, Privatisation and Social Justice*,
34 Oxford: Symposium Books.

35
36 Newfield, C., (2010) The structure and the silence of the cognitariat, *Globalisation, Societies*
37 *and Education*, 8 (2), pp. 175-89.
38

39
40 OECD (2014) *Does Income Inequality Hurt Economic Growth?* Paris: OECD

41
42 Palan, R., (2002) Tax havens and the commercialization of state sovereignty, *International*
43 *Organization*, 56 (1), pp. 151-76.

44
45 Piketty, T., (2014) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

46
47 Piketty, T., and Saez, E., (2014) Inequality in the long run, *Science*, 23 May, 2014, Vol 344,
48 Issue 61686, pp. 838-842.

49
50 Robertson, S. Mundy, K. Verger, A., and Menashey, F. (2012) *Global Governance, Private*
51 *Sector Partnerships and Education for Development*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

52
53 Robertson, S. and Dale, R. (2008) Researching the globalisation of education: beyond
54 modernity, methodological nationalism and spatial fetishism, in J. Resnik (ed) *The*
55 *Production of Educational Knowledge in the Global Era*, Netherlands: Sense Publications
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Robertson, S., and Dale, R., (2013) The social justice implications of privatisation in
4 education governance frameworks: a relational account, *Oxford Review of Education*, 39 (4),
5 pp. pp. 426-445
6

7
8 Robertson, S. and Komljenovic, J., (2016) Unbundling the University and Making Higher
9 Education Markets', In T. Verger, G. Khamsi Steiner, and C. Lubienski (eds.) *The Global*
10 *Education Industry*. vol. 2016, World Yearbook of Education, London and New York:
11 Routledge.
12

13
14 Saltman, K. (2010) *The Gift of Education: Public Education and Venture Philanthropy*, London
15 and New York: Palgrave.
16

17 Sayer, A., (2014) *Why We Can't Afford the Rich*, Bristol: Policy Press.
18

19
20 Schleicher, A., (2015) *Want proof of what's possible in education? You'll find it in Korea*, 26
21 May, 2015.[[https://efareport.wordpress.com/2015/05/26/want-proof-of-whats-possible-in-](https://efareport.wordpress.com/2015/05/26/want-proof-of-whats-possible-in-education-youll-find-it-in-korea/)
22 [education-youll-find-it-in-korea/](https://efareport.wordpress.com/2015/05/26/want-proof-of-whats-possible-in-education-youll-find-it-in-korea/) - last accessed 18th June, 2015].
23

24 Scott, J., (2009) The politics of venture philanthropy, *Educational Policy*, 23 (1), pp. 106-136.
25

26 Sennett, R., (2006) *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, New Haven and London: Yale
27 University Press.
28

29 Stein, B. (2006) Class Warfare, Guess Which Class Is Winning, *New York Times*, November 26
30 [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/business/yourmoney/26every.html?_r=0 -
31 last accessed 18th June, 2015].
32

33 Stiglitz, J., (2013) *The Price of Inequality*, New York: Penguin.
34

35 Streeck, W., (2014a) How will capitalism end? *New Left Review*, 87, May/June, pp. 35-64.
36

37 Streeck, W., (2014b) *Buying Time: the Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism*, London and
38 New York: Verso.
39

40 Wade, R. 2014. The Piketty phenomenon and the future of inequality. In E. Fullbrook and J.
41 Morgan (eds.) *Piketty's capital in the twenty-first century*, UK: College Publications.
42

43 Wilkinson, R., and Pickett, K., (2009) *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Always Do*
44 *Better*, London: Allen Lane.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60