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Political values and extra-institutional political participation: The impact of economic redistributive and social libertarian preferences on protest behaviour

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Abstract

Left-wing and libertarian individuals are more likely to engage in extra-institutional political activism. Yet studies to date have not analysed the relative influence of economic redistributive and social libertarian values for the intensity of protest participation, due to the unavailability of data. By analysing data from a unique cross-national dataset on participants in mass demonstrations in seven countries, this article addresses this gap in the literature and provides evidence of the relative impact of economic redistributive and social libertarian values in explaining different degrees of protest participation. We show that there are divergent logics underpinning the effect of the two value sets on extra-institutional participation. While both economically redistributive and libertarian social values support extra-institutional participation, economically redistributive protesters are mobilized to political action mainly through organizations, whereas the extra-institutional participation of social libertarian protesters is underpinned by their dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy.

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Introduction

Progressive values can relate to both economic redistributive or social libertarian claims. This study analyses the relative extent to which protest activism is underpinned by either set of values. Previous literature has tended to argue that more progressive values underpin extra-institutional political participation (Welzel & Deutsch, 2012). The literature on political attitudes has identified two different dimensions in political value: an economic redistributive-free market dimension and a libertarian-authoritarian social values dimension (Tilley, 2005). The context of the recent economic crisis provides fertile ground for such an examination since many scholars have argued that the “cultural turn” in social movement activism has been redirected through a focus on inequality and redistributive concerns in the wake of the Great Recession. As Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 76) argue, events that affect large numbers of non-state fields such as large-scale economic crises can “undermine the power of incumbents and grant leverage to challengers... but even in more settled times, there are routine, low-level conflicts going on constantly in state and nonstate strategic action fields.”

As has been shown before, one of the primary challenges for social movement ‘organizational entrepreneurs’ is to redefine the ‘rules of the game’ and the terms of debate in wider society. The first step in this process involves the realisation that present conditions are subject to change and that concerted social and political action is amenable to reconfiguring these (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). The collective identity-formation of social movements plays a large role in this process (Polletta &

Jasper, 2001). At the individual level, ideology and value commitments recognising the potential for alternative social arrangements are key (McAdam, 1986).

While both economic redistributive and social liberal values tend to be associated with the progressive end of the spectrum of political beliefs, these two types of value commitments do not of necessity need to go hand in hand, nor do they imply similar underlying logics of belief. While a more redistributive economic policy implies a greater need for governmental action to control, plan, and manage the economy, against this, a more social liberal agenda implies the state withdrawing to a greater extent from the private sphere. As such, one would expect two different logics at play in the extent to which leftist and libertarian values promote protest politics. Supporters of economic redistribution could be seen to be more likely to use ‘protest as a political resource’ (Lipsky, 1968) as marginalised groups, struggling to making inroads by other means and thus ‘increase their bargaining ability’ by using protest actions as a reliable political tool to establish a group voice in the political arena (Gillion, 2013). Instead, for libertarians protest could be seen as an end in itself, the objective expression of anti-authoritarianism and their dissatisfaction with the political process, particularly in times of crisis. Rising government surveillance across the globe is another trend contributing to anti-government protest (Tarrow, 2015). Today, as governments increasingly come under fire from contenders from both the radical left and the populist right these trends have fed into wider perceptions of a legitimisation crisis in advanced Western democracies and the end of the post-war settlement. In particular, the expansion of surveillance “to those whose activities are merely related to an ongoing investigation, as opposed to raising probably cause of

actual involvement in illegal activity, have brought additional civil liberties under attack: freedom of association, privacy, the right to a fair trial, and access to government information” (Braman, 2006: 115).

Despite the ubiquity of protest in contemporary society only a handful of studies distinguish between levels of protest and it is still largely unknown whether the extent to which one holds certain types of values can explain differences in degrees of protest. Most quantitative studies of protest participation tend to focus on the distinction between protesters and non-protesters, making no distinction between individuals who are engaged in a great number of unconventional acts and those instead who only engage in a few. In this paper, we employ a novel and unique dataset collected in the context of a collaborative European project that allows us to distinguish between degrees of protest (Saunders, Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford, & Rootes, 2012) in turn allowing for a more nuanced investigation of the role of values. What is the relationship between political values and extra-institutional participation? And what dynamics underpin the relationship between extra-institutional participation and economic redistributive versus social libertarian values?

To analyse these theoretical questions we employ a new and rich dataset containing survey data on over 10,000 activists attending 72 demonstrations in seven Western European countries between 2009-2013. In what follows we first review theories that are linked to understanding the relationship between protest and values; we move on to discussing our data and methods; we discuss findings from multi-level models; finally, we discuss the implications of our results for our understanding of the relationship between protest and values in industrial societies.

Previous research

Since the student movements of the 1960-70s, protest activism and extra-institutional forms of political participation have become ubiquitous in post-industrial societies (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001). A number of studies from both political sociology and political science have argued that post-industrial citizens prefer these new modes of campaigning to more traditional types of institutional participation such as voting and party membership (Dalton, Van Sickle, & Weldon, 2010; della Porta, 2015; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Norris, 2002). This shift in modes of political engagement is often linked to changing political values. A number of authors have argued that societal modernization leads to the rise of progressive values conducive to extra-institutional political action (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2002). Research has shown a strong link between progressive values and protest across post-industrial democracies (Dalton et al., 2010). These values are particularly important predictors of activism in affluent advanced democracies (Dalton & Rohrschneider, 2002).

The role of ideological orientations for political engagement is acknowledged in the literature, with protest activism being seen as more common among those identifying with the Left (Dalton et al., 2010). There is also evidence from the United States that liberals are more likely to engage in protest activism (Dalton, 2008). It has been shown in the literature that individuals with more left-libertarian political values are more likely to engage in the new Green or New Left parties and social movements such as those focusing on the environment and women's and LGBT rights emerging since the late 1960s (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Kitschelt, 1988; Kriesi,

Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992, 1995). These values also have a role for differentiating participants in different types of movements.

Both political sociologists and political scientists include measures of liberal values in models to explain participation in social movement activities (Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). Studies in political sociology have importantly distinguished between two different value dimensions: economic redistributive-free market and social libertarian-authoritarian (Evans, Heath, & Laljee, 1996; Tilley, 2005). However, studies of political participation do not set a clear distinction between the economic redistributive-free market and social libertarian-authoritarian dimensions. As such, while there is disparate evidence that social libertarian and economic redistributive values all impact on protest activism, it remains unclear whether the same processes underpin the impact of different values on various types and intensities of protest participation.

We agree with scholars arguing that it is important to understand what explains different levels of protest activism (Klandermans, 1997; Passy & Giugni, 2001; Saunders et al., 2012; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2009). Considering the ubiquity of protest in advanced democracies, it has become particularly important to understand what distinguishes the occasional from the ‘stalwart’ protester and the extent to which different types of political and social values impact on one’s proclivity to become a habitual protester. Moreover, there is also evidence that ideological radicalism – of both left and right – is linked to protest activism with support for extremist parties positively linked to the level of protest once other national characteristics were taken into account (Dalton & van Sickle, 2005; Powell, 1982). As such, it is important to

examine the extent to which attachment to certain values impacts on both the frequency and the intensity of protest activism. By speaking to these critical new questions in the study of protest and political participation this paper breaks new ground while also speaking to classical debates in political science on the role of political values for political action which dates back at least to the seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963).

While the literature on political participation and social movements distinguishes between economic redistributive and libertarian social values and understands their role for spurring on protest in different ways, the literature to date has yet to elucidate the link between values and protest participation by specifically distinguishing between the redistributive-free market and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions. In an attempt to disentangle the different influences of economic and social values on the frequency and intensity of protest activism, we theorise that economically leftist values will be more likely to be linked to the support of state action in society, for example supporting redistribution. On the other hand, libertarian social values will be accompanied by a distrust of state action. As a result, we expect that the dynamics underpinning the effect of value sets on various degrees of participation will be different. We hypothesize that redistributive values mobilise to political action mainly through the link with organizations. On the other hand, with libertarian values, we expect that extra-institutional participation will be underpinned by dissatisfaction with democracy and distrust for organised politics. We theorise that more economically redistributive individuals are more likely to desire the political intervention of the state to redress distributional inequalities in the population, for

example through higher taxes or welfare measures. This means that individuals with greater preferences for economic redistribution are more likely to be institutionally embedded in organisational networks, both the more conventional – parties and trade unions – and the more unconventional – social movement organisations. On the other hand, more social libertarian individuals are more likely to distrust state intervention in and regulation in society and as such will be more likely to participate out of feelings of frustration with what they perceive as the unsatisfactory (un-)democratic standards in the nation, in an attempt to voice their concerns. Our hypotheses are detailed as follows:

H₁: *Economic redistributive values have a positive effect on frequency of extra-institutional participation.*

H₂: *Economic redistributive values have a positive effect on intensity of extra-institutional participation.*

H₃: *Social libertarian values have a positive effect on frequency of extra-institutional participation.*

H₄: *Social libertarian values have a positive effect on intensity of extra-institutional participation.*

H₅: *Organisational membership will be the main variable underpinning the effect of economic redistributive values on both types of extra-institutional participation.*

H₆: *(Dis-)satisfaction with democracy will be the main variable underpinning the effect of social libertarian values on both types of extra-institutional action.*

Data and methods

This study analyses data from a unique original dataset produced in the context of the *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation* project. This is a collaborative effort, funded by national funding agencies in each participating country coordinated through the European Science Foundation (ESF), originally including seven countries: Belgium, Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, and aimed at studying who participates in demonstrations, why and how. To do so, national teams of researchers have conducted on-site surveys among participants in demonstrations between 2009-2013 following a rigorous standardized methodology (van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, & Verhulst, 2012). A survey questionnaire was handed out following a sampling method aimed at generating random samples of demonstrators. The questionnaire included questions concerning previous participation in different kinds of political activities and political values, and other indicators.

The project aimed to survey all the most visible large demonstrations (more than 3,000 estimated protesters) occurring in each participating country between 2009-2012. Moreover, face-to-face interviews (achieving an almost perfect response rate) were conducted with a sub-sample of respondents to allow for non-response bias checks on the mail-back surveys. The method is presented in detail in van Stekelenburg et al. (2012). This dataset has been used in a wide variety of publications in top international journals in political science, sociology and specialist fields: for e.g. *American Journal of Sociology* (Walgrave & Wouters, 2014) and *Mobilization* (Saunders et al., 2012).

Demographic snapshot of protesters
Gender: Men 52% Women 48%
Cohorts: Post-WWII 9% Baby-boomers 25% 80s Generation 22% 90s Generation 17% 00s Generation 27%
Education levels: Secondary school or lower 33% BA 23% MA or above 44%
Occupation: Salaried 56% Intermediate Professions 15% Working Class 8% Unemployed 6% Students 15%

We analyse the full dataset of 72 demonstrations in the seven original Western European countries – Belgium, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland – that conducted the surveys following the standardized methodology and containing over 10,000 respondents. While the countries have different political traditions, they are all Western European nations with broadly similar traditions making this a design of the “most similar systems” and studies have shown that economic and social values tend to be understood in similar ways across contexts (Dalton, 2008). The data are hierarchically structured, so as to lend themselves to multilevel analyses in which the individual-level data are nested into the demonstration level which in turn is nested into the country level.

The literature examining extra-institutional participation tends to be limited to a handful of indicators. Early studies, particularly those based on the Political Action Study and on the World or European Values study by Inglehart (1977, 1990) and colleagues tended to employ protest potential scales as dependent variables. These types of scales are problematic for investigating the relationship between political values and participation, since the dependent variable includes an attitudinal dimension in the ‘might do’ option. More left-liberal or post-material individuals will

be more likely to say they approve of different sorts of protest activism without actually engaging in these actions. More recent studies employ the only other indicator of extra-institutional participation available in population studies – a dichotomous variable coded as 1 for participation in an activity and 0 for non-participation. However, this variable does not specify the time frame of activism. Additionally, one respondent could have conducted the activity a great deal of times, whereas another might have only participated in it once. As such, this type of question also leaves us agnostic in terms of the relationship between political values and frequency of political activism. Given that only a small portion of the population engages in protest activities at all, asking about frequency of protest in large population studies is not generally feasible as it would lead to very small cell counts, making disaggregated analysis by groups arduous.

We employ two new types of indicators of extra-institutional participation: frequency of protest in the last 12 months and for intensity, a count measure of the number of extra-institutional activities – other than protest – that individuals have engaged in the last 12 months. (The activities included were petition; boycotted; bought products for political reasons; strike; direct action; violent forms of action. Principal component analysis showed that all six items loaded on one component with an eigenvalue of 1.7). This provides both a means for addressing different levels of protest participation and also for investigating the relative impact of values.

To reflect the hierarchical nature of the data, and the fact that respondents were sampled within demonstration and therefore the fact that their errors are likely to be correlated, we apply two-level random-intercept models, with the demonstration

as the higher level of analysis. Thus, the models in the analysis will be four sets of nested mixed effects Poisson models accounting for the influence of first political, then social values.

Our key independent variables consist of economic values and social values. For economic values we combined the two Likert items (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) available in the survey. These ranged from 1 meaning Free market and 5 meaning Redistributive from two items: 'Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off' and 'Even the most important public services and industries are best left to private enterprise.' For social values we also combined the two Likert items (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) available in the survey. These ranged from 1 meaning Authoritarian and 5 meaning Libertarian from two items: 'Children should be taught to obey authority' and 'People from other countries should be allowed to come to my country and live in it permanently if they want to.' Both redistributive preference variables loaded onto one component with eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.26). The same was true of the libertarian pair of preference variables loaded onto one component with eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.29). The correlation between leftist and libertarian values is 0.329.

The models include a number of other variables to capture different mechanisms discussed in the literature which might be linking political values, on the one hand, and the frequency and intensity of extra-institutional participation, on the other. The most important ones measure different degrees of satisfaction with democracy and organisational membership. Democratic satisfaction is a continuous scale where 0 means very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the respondent's country

and 10 means very satisfied. Some scholars argue that democratic satisfaction means that people accept that others also are playing by the rules and that the system is not rigged and therefore that this is a spur to political engagement (Farah, 1979). Others have suggested that dissatisfaction may spur political activism (Norris, 2011, 1999). Most importantly for our present purpose, we believe that this variable sheds light on what explains the link between political values and extra-institutional participation. If the inclusion of this variable in the models reduces a large part of the effect of political values, this indicates that it plays a mediating role explaining why individuals with certain types of political values are more prone to political action. Organizational membership is a continuous variable measuring the number of organizations that the respondent has been involved with in the past 12 months. We prefer this more fine-grained indicator to another one, often used in research on the impact of organisational embeddedness on political participation, which simply distinguish between individuals who are members of at least one organisation and those who are not. Individuals who are members of more organisations are more likely to be mobilised to political action, either by other members asking them or by the spread of information about protests organised by their and other organizations (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Schussman & Soule, 2005). Again, a reduction in the effect for either economic or social values with the inclusion of this variable will suggest that the reason left-wing and/or libertarian individuals are more likely to engage in extra-institutional actions is that their values lead them to joining organisations which then mobilise them to participate politically. We also include a variable for institutional participation (voted; contacted a politician; worn a badge or

campaign sticker; donated money to a political campaign. Principal component analysis showed all four items loaded only on one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.5)). The inclusion of this variable allows to test, firstly, whether individuals who engage in extra-institutional participation shun institutional participation as several scholars suggest (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2002). Additionally, we include a number of controls which allow us to deal with previous accounts of extra-institutional participation. First, gender, since the literature has traditionally shown that men are more likely to engage in extra-institutional activism than women (Schussman & Soule, 2005). Second, we include a variable for cohorts or generations, since the literature argued that younger cohorts will be more likely than older generations to engage in extra-institutional activism gaining prominence and becoming more widespread since the 1960s. Third, the literature tends to argue that more educated people will be more likely to engage in political actions and extra-institutional activities in particular, given cognitive mobilisation. Fourth, we test the role of occupation and employment status since scholarship on political participation tends to argue that individuals in the middle classes, and also students, will be more likely to engage (Schussman & Soule, 2005). However, while the idea of resources is particularly prominent in the political science literature and the resource model of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995), grievance theories (Buechler, 2004) on the other hand tend to argue that it is those who are relatively deprived and resource poor that will engage in protest activities as these are one of the few resources they have left to make their demands heard.

Each variable is included in step-wise, nested models to see how much of the effect of political values is captured with the addition of each explanatory and/or control variable and try to account for the relationship between political values – whether economic or social – with both forms of protest participation. We include in the models predicting the number of extra-institutional activities engaged the variable for frequency of demonstrating, and in the models predicting frequency of demonstrating the number of extra-institutional activities engaged in, to see whether these two different measures are related. Similarly, in the models aiming to explain the relationship between protest activism and left economic values, we include social values, whereas in the models aiming to explain the relationship between protest activism and libertarian social values we include economic values at the end.

Findings

Moving to the findings, Table 1 and Figure 1 show the mean value on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means Free market and 5 means Redistributive for someone engaging in 0 out of 6 activities is 3.73, whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.50. Also, the mean value on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means Authoritarian and 5 means Libertarian for someone engaging in 0 out of 6 activities is 2.69 whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 3.67. Clearly, there is a strong positive relationship between being more economically redistributive and engaging in a greater number of activities in a given year. Similarly, there is a strong positive relationship between being more socially libertarian and engaging in a greater number of activities in a given year.

Table 1 & Figure 1

The results are very similar when we look at frequency of protest (Table 2). The mean value on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means Free market and 5 means Redistributive for someone attending only 1 demonstration is 3.93, whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.61. Also from Table 2, the mean value on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means Authoritarian and 5 means Libertarian for someone engaging in 0 out of 6 activities is 2.96 whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.06. Again, being more left-wing and also being more socially libertarian have strong positive effects on extra-institutional participation.

Table 2 & Figure 2

Now we turn to the mixed effects Poisson models. There is a strong positive effect of more economically leftist values on intensity of engagement in extra-institutional activities (Table 3), and the same holds true for more social libertarian values (Table 4) as with both social and economic values on frequency of protest (Tables 5 and 6). This evidence therefore confirms H1-H4. By and large, while most effects are similar for the two dependent measures of protest participation it is striking that gender is significant for across all models in Tables 3 and 4 when predicting intensity but when looking at the dependent variable for frequency in Tables 5 and 6, gender is no longer a significant effect. A similar pattern exists for cohort effects. These findings suggest that frequency is less likely to be patterned by socio-demographics than intensity and is rather more likely to be linked to other variables known to affect protest such as commitment and network effects.

For explaining the relationship between intensity of engagement in extra-institutional activities and more economically redistributive values (Table 3), the greatest reduction in the effect of values occurs with the inclusion of organizational membership in Model 7, confirming H5. Also frequency of demonstrating in Model 9, institutional participation in Model 8, and libertarian social values in Model 10 also appear to mediate this relationship. This suggests that more economically redistributive people engage in more extra-institutional activities because they tend to become members of organizations which mobilise them to action and also to be individuals which are generally very politically active – both in the extra- and institutional repertoires. In short, it appears having leftist values leads individuals to join organizations mobilising them to activism.

A different pattern can be observed when it comes to explaining the relationship between engagement in extra-institutional activities and more libertarian social values (Table 4). Here the greatest reduction in the effect of values occurs with the inclusion of democratic (dis-)satisfaction in Model 6, confirming H6. Also, frequency of demonstrating in Model 9, economic social values in Model 10 reduce the effect. To a lesser extent, institutional participation also appears to mediate this relationship. This suggests that, where organizational membership is particularly important for explaining why individuals with more economically leftist values engaged in a greater number of extra-institutional activities, it appears that what explains why more social libertarian people tend to engage in more protest actions is that they are dissatisfied with democracy, leading them to engage politically, and particularly through extra-institutional means.

In terms of explaining the relationship between greater frequency of protest and more economically redistributive values (Table 5), the greatest reduction in the effect of values occurs with the inclusion of organizational membership (Model 7), again confirming H5. Also extra-institutional activism (in Model 9), and there is also some effect of institutional participation (Model 8) and libertarian social values (Model 10). Interestingly, therefore, this shows a pattern for explaining the effect of economic values on extra-institutional activism since the results are very similar in this frequency measure to those of the count measure of activities (Table 3). The main story here appears to be that more economically redistributive individuals are more likely to engage with organisations and to be mobilised to engage politically, through both institutional and extra-institutional means.

Table 3 & Table 4 & Table 5

Just as with the count measure, explaining the relationship between greater frequency of protest and more libertarian social values (Table 6) (dis-)satisfaction with democracy stands as an important factor, supporting again H6. Also, organizational membership, institutional participation, extra-institutional participation and also having more redistributive economic values contribute to reducing the effect. Again, (dis-)satisfaction with democracy underlines explanation for why more libertarian people tend to be more likely to be involved in protest activities. For economic values, the key variable, as we have shown, instead is organisational membership. This suggests that while economic values' impact on protest activism is underpinned by organisational embeddedness, on the other hand, for libertarianism it is the desire to voice discontent with the present arrangements that is most central.

The relative reduction in the effect sizes when the mediators are included in the models are shown in Figure 3. Additionally, we ran some interaction tests on the full models (not shown here but available from the authors) to test for moderator effects and found significant effects for both organizational membership with respect to economic values (for both measures of protest) and for democratic dissatisfaction with respect to social values (for the intensity measure). We also found significant effects for the interaction between economically redistributive and socially libertarian values for both dependent variables. These results thus provide evidence also of moderator effects: economic and social values translate more easily into participation the broader the organizational membership networks and the more felt the feelings of democratic dissatisfaction. Moreover, we also found some evidence of moderator effects between the values showing that the more one is economically redistributive the greater the likelihood that social libertarian values will also be activated into participation and vice-versa. This fits into previous findings that left-libertarians are key constituencies of social movements (Kriesi, 1989).

Table 6 & Figure 3

Discussion and conclusion

Extra-institutional forms of political participation have become increasingly important and widespread and values are an important driver of political participation. In this paper, we investigated the impact of political values on the intensity and frequency of protest participation. Our study has a number of important features which allow us to develop on previous research and extend knowledge in the

field. Theoretically, the most important feature is embedded in our main goal: disentangling the relationship between political values and different degrees of engagement in extra-institutional activities. We accomplished this by looking at both high intensity and lower incidence activists. This is a feature of our study that only the kind of data from activist surveys that we are using allows. At the same time, it is important to stress that, given these data, our analysis and findings should be interpreted as applying only to actual protesters. Moreover, if panel data were available in the future we would be able to test for any feedback effects from participation to values in turn.

The key finding of our investigation is that, while both economically redistributive values and libertarian social values are important for engaging in a number of extra-institutional activities and for protesting frequently, we observe a different impact of economic and social value priorities and on extra-institutional activism. For both the count measure and the frequency measure, the results of the data analysis show that more economically redistributive individuals are more likely to join organizations that facilitate spread of information also from other similar organisation and agencies to mobilise them to both extra-institutional and institutional political action. More economically redistributive people are more likely to participate in a range of activities and this in turn might be since their political beliefs and their distaste for inequality are likely to provide strong motivations to engage politically to change the current institutions. Particularly in the context of the economic crisis, austerity, and wide-ranging budget cuts disproportionately affecting

the poorest, could push them to voice their dissent with principles they do not share in.

On the other hand, (dis-)satisfaction with democracy stands out as the main driving factor linking libertarian social values to protest activism (Farah, 1979). It seems thus that more socially libertarian people are particularly (dis-)satisfied with the gap between promise and reality in West European democracies, for example as symbolised in the convergence between major parties leaving no room for democratic choice or the curtailment of civil liberties and the great powers afforded to the police and other authorities in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent discourse around the need for social control and monitoring to avoid potential threats (Tarrow, 2015).

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Table 1. Intensity of Extra-Institutional Participation (Count Except for Demonstrating)

	Number of extra-institutional activities other than protest engaged in last 12 months				
	0	1	2	3	4+
Economic values scale mean (1 Free market – 5 Redistributive)	3.73***	3.89***	4.12***	4.35***	4.50***
Social values scale mean (1 Authoritarian – 5 Libertarian)	2.69***	2.91***	3.18***	3.38***	3.67***

Notes: Significance stars based on ANOVA and one-tailed comparison of means tests, based on total sample N: 10,012

Figure 1. Intensity of Extra-Institutional Participation (Count Except for Demonstrating)




Table 2. Frequency of Demonstrating (Number of Times in Last 12 Months)

	Number of times demonstrated in the last 12 months				
	1 time	2-5 times	6-10	11-20	21+
Economic values scale mean (1 Free market – 5 Redistributive)	3.93***	4.26***	4.63***	4.62***	4.61***
Social values scale mean (1 Authoritarian – 5 Libertarian)	2.96***	3.30***	3.79***	3.95***	4.06***

Notes: Significance stars based on ANOVA and one-tailed comparison of means tests, based on total sample N: 10,012

Figure 2. Frequency of Demonstrating (Number of Times in Last 12 Months)





Figure 3. Reduction in direct effects when mediators are included in the models



Appendix: List of demonstrations surveyed by each national team

Belgium

1. Antwerp, 1st of May March (2010)
2. Brussels, Climate Change (2009)
3. Brussels, March for Work (2010)
4. Brussels, No to Austerity (2010)
5. Brussels, No Government, Great Country (2011)
6. Brussels, Not in Our Name (2011)
7. Brussels, Non-Profit Demonstration (2011)
8. Brussels, We have alternatives (2011)
9. Brussels, Fukushima never again (2012)

Britain

10. London, National Climate March (2009)
11. London, May Day Labour March (2010)
12. London, Take Back Parliament (2010)
13. London, No to Hate Crime Vigil (2010)
14. London, Unite Against Fascism National Demo (2010)
15. London, Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (2010)
16. London, National Climate March 2010 (2010)
17. London, Second Student National Demo (2010)
18. London, Million Women Rise (2011)
19. London, 'TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (2011)
20. London, Occupy London (2011)
21. London, London Pride Parade (2012)

Italy

22. Assisi, Marcia Perugia-Assisi (2011)
23. Bologna, Gay Pride (2012)
24. Firenze, Semi di giustizia, fiori di corresponsabilità (2013)
25. Florence, May Day (2011)
26. Florence, General Strike (2011)
27. Florence, Florence 10+10/Joining forces for another Europe (2012)
28. Milan, Euromayday (2011)
29. Niscemi, No Mous (2013)
30. Rome, No Monti Day (2012)

The Netherlands

31. Amsterdam, Student demo 1 (2010)
32. Amsterdam, Culture demo Amsterdam (2010)
33. Amsterdam, Stop racism and exclusion (2011)
34. Amsterdam, Anti Nuclear demo (2011)
35. Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Occupy Netherlands (2011)
36. Haarlem, Pink Saturday Parade Survey (2012)
37. Rotterdam, Retirement demonstration (2009)
38. The Hague, Together strong for public work (2011)
39. The Hague, Student demo 2 (2011)
40. The Hague, Military demo (2011)
41. The Hague, Stop budget cuts (care & welfare) (2011)
42. Utrecht, Climate demo (2009)
43. Utrecht, Culture demo Utrecht (2010)

Spain

44. Barcelona, Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (2010)
45. Barcelona, Self-determination is democracy (2010)
46. Barcelona, We are a nation, we decide (2010)
47. Barcelona, 1st May, Labour Day (2010)
49. Madrid, Against Labor Law (2010)
50. Madrid, Real Democracy Now! We are not good in the hands of politicians and bankers! (2011)
51. Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against language decree (2010)
52. Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against the new labour law (2010)
53. Vigo, Celebration May Day (2011)
54. Vigo, For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our Rights (2011)

Sweden

55. Copenhagen (mostly Danish & Swedish respondents), Climate March (2009)
56. Gothenburg, May Day (Left Party) (2012)
57. Gothenburg, May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (2012)
58. Gothenburg, Rainbow Parade (LGBTQ festival) (2012)
59. Malmö, May Day (Left Party) (2011)
60. Malmö, May Day (SAP/LO) (2011)
61. Stockholm, May 1 March, Left Party (2010)
62. Stockholm, Against racist politics (2010)
63. Stockholm, May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (2010)
64. Stockholm, Anti-nuclear demonstration (2011)

Switzerland

65. Bern, World March of Women (2010)
66. Beznau, Anti Nuclear Manifestation (2011)
67. Geneva, Gay Pride Geneva (2011)
68. Geneva, Women demonstration Geneva (2011)
69. Geneva, May 1ste demonstration 2011 (2011)
70. Mühleberg, Anti-nuclear (2012)
71. Zurich, May 1st Demonstration (2010)
72. Zurich, Pride demonstration (2012)

Tables 3-6 below should be included in the Online Appendix/ Supplementary Materials and linked in the article text please

Table 3. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Economic Values on Intensity of Extra-Institutional Participation (Count Except for Demonstrating)

<i>Groups: 72, N: 10,012</i>	<i>m1</i>	<i>m2</i>	<i>m3</i>	<i>m4</i>	<i>m5</i>	<i>m6</i>	<i>m7</i>	<i>m8</i>	<i>m9</i>	<i>m10</i>
<i>Fixed Effects</i>										
Economic Values (Redistributive)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Male		-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
Cohorts										
Post-WWII generation			-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)
<i>RC. 1960s/70s generation</i>										
1980s generation			0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
1990s/00s generation			0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Education										
<i>RC. Secondary school or lower</i>										
BA or equivalent				0.05** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
MA or higher degree				0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Occupation										
Salaried					0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Intermediate Professions					0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
<i>RC. Working Class</i>										
Unemployed					-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Students					0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Democratic satisfaction						-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Organizational membership							0.09*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Institutional participation								0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Frequency of demonstrating									0.12*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)
Social Values (Libertarian)										0.05*** (0.01)
Constant γ_{00}	0.31*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
<i>Random Effects</i>										
σ_u^2	0.036	0.034	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.028	0.026	0.023	0.020	0.017
- Log Likelihood	-16170.5	-16155.4	-16116.1	-16112	-16110.9	-16073.31	-15986.24	-15917.89	-15841.93	-15822.64
BIC	32368.61	32347.64	32296.69	32306.83	32341.58	32275.58	32110.65	31983.17	31840.45	31811.09
AIC	32346.97	32318.79	32246.21	32241.93	32247.83	32174.61	32002.48	31867.78	31717.86	31681.28

Table 4. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Social Values on Intensity of Extra-Institutional Participation (Count Except for Demonstrating)

<i>Groups: 72, N: 10,012</i>	<i>m1</i>	<i>m2</i>	<i>m3</i>	<i>m4</i>	<i>m5</i>	<i>m6</i>	<i>m7</i>	<i>m8</i>	<i>m9</i>	<i>m10</i>
<i>Fixed Effects</i>										
Social Values (Libertarian)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Male		-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
Cohorts										
Post-WWII generation			-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)
<i>RC. 1960s/70s generation</i>										
1980s generation			0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
1990s/00s generation			0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Education										
<i>RC. Secondary school or lower</i>										
BA or equivalent				0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
MA or higher degree				0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Occupation										
Salarial					0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Intermediate Professions					0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
<i>RC. Working Class</i>										
Unemployed					-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Students					-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Democratic satisfaction						-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Organizational membership							0.09*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Institutional participation								0.09*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Frequency of demonstrating									0.12*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)
Economic Values (Redistributive)										0.08*** (0.01)
Constant γ_{00}	0.51*** (0.04)	0.54*** (0.04)	0.52*** (0.04)	0.50*** (0.04)	0.50*** (0.04)	0.64*** (0.05)	0.45*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)
<i>Random Effects</i>										
σ^2_u	0.032	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.032	0.027	0.025	0.022	0.019	0.017
- Log Likelihood	-16167.83	-16158.5	-16132.11	-16127.98	-16126.99	-16093.21	-16001.49	-15923.8	-15852.9	-15822.64
BIC	32363.29	32353.85	32328.71	32338.86	32373.73	32315.38	32141.16	31994.98	31862.4	31811.09
AIC	32341.65	32325	32278.22	32273.96	32279.98	32214.42	32032.99	31879.59	31739.8	31681.28

Table 5. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Economic Values on Frequency of Demonstrating (Number of Times in Last 12 Months)

Groups: 72, N: 10,012	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10
<i>Fixed Effects</i>										
Economic Values (Redistributive)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Male		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Cohorts										
Post-WWII generation			0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
<i>RC. 1960s/70s generation</i>										
1980s generation			-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
1990s/00s generation			-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Education										
<i>RC. Secondary school or lower</i>										
BA or equivalent				-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
MA or higher degree				-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Occupation										
Salariat					-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Intermediate Professions					-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
<i>RC. Working Class</i>										
Unemployed					-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Students					-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Democratic satisfaction						-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Organizational membership							0.09*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Institutional participation								0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Extra-institutional activism									0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Social Values (Libertarian)										0.05*** (0.01)
Constant γ_{00}	0.27*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
<i>Random Effects</i>										
σ_u^2	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.017	0.017	0.014	0.011	0.010
- Log Likelihood	-13599.53	-13598.58	-13597.89	-13596.26	-13594.87	-13575.22	-13509.74	-13483.53	-13441.8	-13428.3
BIC	27226.7	27234	27260.26	27275.42	27309.5	27279.4	27157.66	27114.44	27040.2	27022.42
AIC	27205.06	27205.16	27209.78	27210.51	27215.75	27178.44	27049.48	26999.06	26917.6	26892.61

Table 6. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Social Values on Frequency of Demonstrating (Number of Times in Last 12 Months)

Groups: 72, N: 10,012	<i>m1</i>	<i>m2</i>	<i>m3</i>	<i>m4</i>	<i>m5</i>	<i>m6</i>	<i>m7</i>	<i>m8</i>	<i>m9</i>	<i>m10</i>
<i>Fixed Effects</i>										
Social Values (Libertarian)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Male		0.03* (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
<i>Cohorts</i>										
Post-WWII generation			0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
<i> RC. 1960s/70s generation</i>										
1980s generation			-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
1990s/00s generation			-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
<i>Education</i>										
<i> RC. Secondary school or lower</i>										
BA or equivalent				-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
MA or higher degree				-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
<i>Occupation</i>										
Salariat					-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Intermediate Professions					-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
<i> RC. Working Class</i>										
Unemployed					-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Students					-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Democratic satisfaction						-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Organizational membership							0.09*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Institutional participation								0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Extra-institutional activism									0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
<i>Economic Values (Redistributive)</i>										
Constant γ_{00}	0.36*** (0.04)	0.34*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.04)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.05)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)
<i>Random Effects</i>										
σ_u^2	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.020	0.020	0.016	0.013	0.012	0.010	0.010
- Log Likelihood	-13587.7	-13585.5	-13583.6	-13581.5	-13580.4	-13564.21	-13498.19	-13470.75	-13432	-13428.3
BIC	27203.1	27207.8	27231.6	27245.84	27280.56	27257.39	27134.55	27088.89	27020.59	27022.42
AIC	27181.47	27178.95	27181.11	27180.93	27186.81	27156.43	27026.38	26973.5	26897.99	26892.61