

# Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades upon Posidonius' Περὶ παθῶν

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THE FRAGMENTS of Posidonius' ethical doctrines preserved by Galen contain a polemical attack on Chrysippus' doctrine of the passions.<sup>1</sup> Posidonius' motives for this attack are not well understood, and many critics argue that Posidonius simply did not understand Chrysippus or misread him.<sup>2</sup> Others interpret Posidonius' work on the passions primarily as a doctrinal reaction to Chrysippean monism:

<sup>1</sup> The principal commentaries are I. G. KIDD and L. EDELSTEIN, edd., *Posidonius*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge 1988: hereafter 'EK'); references to the fragments are by page and line numbers unless noted otherwise; W. THEILER, *Poseidonios: Die Fragmente* (Berlin 1982); P. DE LACY, *Galen: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (Berlin 1978–84: 'De Lacy'): all references to this treatise (PHP) are after De Lacy; and M. POHLENZ, "De Posidonii Libris Περὶ Παθῶν," *Fleck. J. Suppl.* 24 (1898) 537–653. See also L. EDELSTEIN, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," *AJP* 57 (1936) 286–325; J. FILLION-LAHILLE, *Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions* (Paris 1984: 'Fillion-Lahille') 128–99; M. LAFFRANQUE, *Poseidonios d'Apamée. Essai de mise au point* (Paris 1964) 404–514; K. REINHARDT, *Poseidonios* (Munich 1921) and "Poseidonios (3)," *RE* 22.1 (1953) 558–826; and A. GLIBERT-THIRRY, "La théorie stoïcienne de la passion chez Chrysippe et son évolution chez Posidonius," *RPhil* 75 (1977: 'Glibert-Thirry') 393–435.

<sup>2</sup> KIDD tries to explain Posidonius' motivation as a function of his interest in aetiology and scientific inquiry: "Philosophy and Science in Posidonius," *A&A* 24 (1978: hereafter 'Kidd [1978]') 7–15, esp. 13 (see n.7 *infra*); "Posidonius on Emotions," in A. A. LONG, ed., *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971) 200–15; *TT* 26, 58, 62, 85; *FF* 35, 176 with *II* 48–52, 72ff, 173–78, 646–51. Cf. Glibert-Thirry 395: "celui qui délibérément ou non lit mal Chrysippe." B. INWOOD (*Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* [Oxford 1985: hereafter 'Inwood']), whose treatment of Chrysippus I follow for the most part, resorts to the current views of the problem: Posidonius is interested in explaining psychological phenomena (129f); Galen is to blame (140, 143, 147); or Posidonius is just wrong (140 n.51, 149f, 154). I shall argue that Posidonius did not misunderstand, but understood all too well: a more controversial but also more interesting possibility.

For nearly a hundred years Posidonius has baffled students of Stoicism. While it is agreed on virtually all hands that his thought differs in many essentials from that of the Old Stoa, there has been little agreement on what these essentials are. While it is generally recognized that his psychological theories are to be contrasted with those of Chrysippus, and differ from those of his unorthodox teacher Panaetius, the extent of Posidonius' heresy even in this area is disputed. And about other branches of his thought the confusion is almost total.<sup>3</sup>

I hesitate to attribute serious misunderstandings of the orthodox position to Posidonius, Galen's source for much of the discussion. But Posidonius did disagree with the early Stoics about these fundamental issues.<sup>4</sup>

But ancient philosophy is not religion. Such prejudicial labels as 'orthodox/unorthodox' and 'heresy' discourage an independent assessment of Posidonius' achievements. Philosophical doctrines in the ancient world were only stable to the extent that they could withstand vigorous debate. To understand Posidonius' attack on Chrysippus, it is necessary to appreciate the Stoa's position in debates of the first century B.C. Carneades had earlier shown the dialectical vulnerability of certain of Chrysippus' monistic formulations. Posidonius' contemporary, Antiochus of Ascalon had blurred the distinctions between the Peripatos, the Old Academy, and the Stoa. The Stoa had to respond to these attacks if it was to survive and maintain its identity.

The fragments of Posidonius' ethical doctrines have never been placed properly into the dialectical context of these late Hellenistic debates. His arguments against Chrysippus in Galen's *De placitis* are known to be polemical. But it would be profitable to understand how doctrinal disputes in the interval between Chrysippus and Posidonius should shape our reaction to the arguments. To say that Posidonius attacked Chrysippus polemically reveals nothing about the merit of his arguments or the forces that might have persuaded him to adopt a polemical stance. An analysis of the arguments and their contexts will not only show what Posidonius did and did not understand about Chrysippus' doctrines, but will also clarify his motives. The fun-

<sup>3</sup> J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 201.

<sup>4</sup> Inwood 140 n.51 on Chrysippus' theory of the monistic soul, the passions, and their cure as in Galen *PHP* 4-5; Fillion-Lahille (153) also uses "orthodox"/"unorthodox."

damental question is whether Posidonius chose to attack Chrysippean monism for the reason he gives, namely that he thought it failed in a material way to explain the cause of the passions, or for another unspecified reason. An investigation of this kind is also warranted to explain Posidonius' rather Platonic psychology—a staggering compromise on a cornerstone of Stoicism.

Three preliminary considerations affect analysis of Posidonius' arguments in the *De placitis*: Galen's reliability, the attitude adopted towards Posidonius, and the possibility of evaluating the truth of Posidonius' claims about Chrysippean monism.

(1) Certain upper limits for Galen's reliability may certainly be set. Galen, attacking Chrysippus by name, treats his doctrines at length as the most conspicuously monistic, and wishes to prove that Plato's doctrines on the location, composition, and function of the soul are correct (*PHP* 4.234.12–21). He is also quite willing to assimilate Stoicism to Platonism.<sup>5</sup> Galen has reasons for misrepresenting or distorting Chrysippus' doctrines. At *PHP* 4 Galen reports, often out of context, all evidence he can find for the inconsistency of Chrysippus' monism. Conversely, although Galen may tend to over-assimilate Stoics to Platonism, he views himself as an ally of Posidonius. Despite uncertainty on the reproduction of actual quotations, Galen probably has been more trustworthy in his reporting of Posidonius than of Chrysippus.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> E.g. *PHP* 5.334.20–336.1: "For I did not promise, in this treatise, to go through whatever each of the philosophers held about the soul, but to examine what truth the doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates have. Accordingly, I made a refutation of Chrysippus to achieve this goal. As for Zeno, if he meant to advocate the same things as Chrysippus, he will be liable to the same charges. If, on the other hand, he meant to follow the principles of Plato, as Cleanthes and Posidonius did, then he would be a fellow in our school of philosophy. But if, as I am persuaded, he thought that the passions supervene on judgments, he would fall between the worst school of thought on these matters—that of Chrysippus, and the best, which Hippocrates and Plato were the very first to expound. Posidonius says, however, that Pythagoras also held this view, but since no writing from Pythagoras himself has survived to our day, he bases this on the writings of some of his students. As I said a little before, my account did not proclaim that it would teach the history of ancient doctrines, but only that it would examine what was said on the part of Hippocrates and Plato." On the significance of Posidonius' claims about Pythagoras for the transmission of Middle Platonic doctrine on the soul, see P. A. Vander Waerdt, "Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology," *GRBS* 26 (1985) 373–94, esp. 384ff.

<sup>6</sup> For Galen's use of Posidonius see EK TT 58–64. Kidd asks (EK II 51 *ad* TT 61–63) "Was Galen simply following Posidonius in this section [*De Placitis* 4–5, p.336.15], or using him for his own purposes? TT 61–63 all suggest the

(2) Posidonius claims an interest in the cause (αἰτία) of the passions, which, he argues, Chrysippean monism cannot adequately explain. This is undeniably a feature of his entire philosophical enterprise, as Kidd has shown.<sup>7</sup> It would be a mistake, however, to extend Posidonius' demand that both philosophers and scientists must begin from observable facts to the claim that they employ 'scientific objectivity' in the modern sense,<sup>8</sup> for if we assume that Posidonius proceeds 'scientifically', any 'dialectical' manipulation of the argument by him will seem out of character. But it is altogether unreasonable to suppose that any Hellenistic philosopher follows a modern conception of scientific procedure rather than ancient dialectic's complex modes of argument. An example of how dialectical strategy may overtake an apparently scientific principle may be seen in the following:

καὶ πυνθάνεται γε τῶν περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἐν τῇ Περὶ παθῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγματείᾳ, τίς ἢ τῆς πλεοναζούσης ὀρμῆς ἐστὶν αἰτία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό γε

latter, however extensive and basic the use." Galen undeniably reports Posidonius' fragments within the context of his own goal of demonstrating the truth of Plato's and Hippocrates' doctrines. It would be wrongly inferred from Kidd's assessment, however, that this agenda has tainted the so-called fragments of Posidonius. I take Kidd to mean only that the contexts into which Galen may have inserted otherwise genuine Posidonian fragments cannot be trusted. On Galen's treatment of Chrysippus and Posidonius see also Fillion-Lahille 124f, 153.

<sup>7</sup> For Posidonius' interest in aetiology see Strab. 2.3.8=EK τ 85, Sen *Ep.* 95.65=EK 176.4, Prisc. *Lyd. Solutiones ad Chosroem* p.72.2–12 Bywater=EK τ 26, and EK II 169f *ad* 34.12–20; for Posidonius' application of this argument in *Περὶ παθῶν* see EK 150b; 158; 161f; 164.100; 165.10; 166.2, 19; 168.1, 187.10, 61. Posidonius claims that his method is based on observable fact and that he uses "deductive proof from first principles" (ἀπόδειξις), for which see Galen *PHP* 4.258.19–22 (=EK τ 83); 5.292.25–94.3 (=τ 62), 356.25–58.3 (=156); Procl. *In Euc. Elementa* 216–18.11=EK 47.30–75; cf. *Simpl. in Phys.* 2.2 (193b23) p.292.21–31 Diels=EK 18; I. G. KIDD, "Orthos Logos as a Criterion of Truth in the Stoa," in P. M. Huby and G. C. Neal, ed., *The Criterion of Truth* (Liverpool 1981: hereafter 'Kidd, "Criterion"') 147; see especially Kidd (1978) 11ff, where he shows that Posidonius' conception of ἀπόδειξις is that of pure mathematics.

<sup>8</sup> Fillion-Lahille speaks (176) of his "rigueur scientifique." Kidd argues convincingly that Posidonius places aetiology above science and thus the philosopher above the scientist: the scientist observes the world and gives *an aitia* for it, but only the philosopher can give *the aitia*, although he too must begin with the facts. He summarizes Posidonius' attitude toward Chrysippus: "In ethics, Posidonius' quarrel with and criticism of Chrysippus' psychological theory was simply that it did not even square with the facts, and so could hardly give *an aitia* or explanation, far less *the explanation* for them" (1978: 13). Posidonius could argue *ad hominem*: EK II 170.

πλεονάζειν παρὰ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράγματά τε καὶ μέτρα. πρό-  
δηλον οὖν, ὡς ἕτερα τῆς ἀλογός ἐστι δύναμις αἰτία τοῦ  
πλεονάζεσθαι τὴν ὀρθὴν ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα τοῦ λόγου.<sup>9</sup>

Posidonius argues (according to Galen) that reason is perfect and therefore incapable of error or excess. If this is the case, he was willing to reduce Chrysippus' intricate model of monistic psychology to tautological absurdities. The Stoa was famous for its doctrine about the transformations of reason in human development from mere seeds in infants to a perfected state found only in the wise man (e.g. Cic. *Fin.* 3.16–26). In Chrysippus' theory, "the reason which is being disobeyed in a passion is Right Reason, the normative standard of all proper conduct which Chrysippus identified with Zeus" (Inwood 156 with n.126); that is, passion is called 'excessive' or 'irrational' only in relation to the perfect reason of nature or of the wise man, not with reference to a typical man's reason as Posidonius has interpreted the argument (for the sage, who alone possesses perfected reason, is immune to the passions).<sup>10</sup> Any false impression about the purity of Posidonius' procedure must be removed so that his dialectical

<sup>9</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.248.6–11=EK 34.12–18=157.4–10: "and he asks those in the circle of Chrysippus not a few times in his treatise, *On the Passions*, what is the cause of the excessive impulse. For reason would not be able to 'exceed' beyond its own acts and measures. It is perfectly clear then that some other irrational faculty causes the impulse to exceed the measures of reason...." For Posidonius' frequent charge of self-refutation, see EK II 74 *ad* τ 85 and *ad* τ 83, FF 34, 159, 164.87–93, 165.121; see also Kidd, "Criterion" 140.

<sup>10</sup> It may be that Posidonius actually wishes to maintain that human reason is perfect, because he posits irrational elements in man's soul to explain the cause of passion. He also says that *orthos logos*, i.e., the "perfected reason" possessed only by the wise man, is a criterion (D.L. 7.54=EK 42; see Kidd, "Criterion" 148f, and *infra* 316). Even Posidonius, however, allows that false suppositions may arise "in the theoretical sphere" (ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ) from weakness in the rational faculty (Galen *PHP* 5.320.24=EK 169.79–82). Posidonius' point may be a mathematical axiom that a thing cannot 'exceed' itself, or it may be an attempt to prove self-refutation: "why would reason want to command that an impulse be greater than it commanded?" The sense of οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο (*supra* n.9) is not entirely clear. Even if Posidonius regards man's reason as perfect rather than perfectable, and this seems unlikely, this passage demonstrates that he uses his own premises about reason to criticize Chrysippus' conclusions. This method of argument is designed to create the appearance of aetiology (as the definition of reason as that which "preserves measure" in its actions, is, he would claim, an 'evident fact'); but the subtlety of his argument's shifting premises shows that Posidonius employs as much dialectic as deductive proof in this instance. Kidd (EK II 170) sees the argument as part of an *ad hominem* attack on Chrysippus.

strategy, his arguments, and the place of his arguments in the late Hellenistic debates may be seen for what they are.

A related problem is how Posidonius may have treated earlier Stoics. According to Galen the assimilation of Cleanthes, and on occasion Zeno, to Platonism comes from Posidonius:

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ποσειδώνιος, ὡς ἂν οἶμαι τεθραμμένος ἐν γεωμετρίας καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων Στωϊκῶν ἀποδείξεσιν ἔπεσθαι συνειθισμένος, ἠδέσθη τὴν τε πρὸς τὰ σαφῶς φαινόμενα μάχην καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιολογίαν τοῦ Χρυσίππου καὶ πειράται μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Κιτιεῖα Ζήνωνα προσάγειν.<sup>11</sup>

Posidonius' adoption of a more Platonic psychology would suggest that there is no reason to doubt Galen's claim.<sup>12</sup> If a Stoic argues that Plato's model of the soul was essentially correct, it makes perfect sense that any evidence in the works of Zeno and Cleanthes would be manipulated to indicate their concurrence. It is likely, although it can never be certain, that Posidonius tried to make Zeno adopt a Platonic psychology. Moreover, any assumption that Posidonius differs from his predecessors in that his philosophical procedures are free from the taint of dialectical subtleties (as Galen asserts) needs reconsideration.<sup>13</sup>

(3) A clear understanding of Chrysippean doctrine on human action now disproves Posidonius' claim that Chrysippean monism cannot give an account of the *aitia* of passion.<sup>14</sup> It may be

<sup>11</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.258.19–23=EK ττ 93, 99: “Now Posidonius, a man reared in geometry, as I believe, and trained beyond the other Stoics to follow demonstrative proofs, was ashamed of Chrysippus' conflict with evident facts and of his self-contradictions; and Posidonius tries to bring not only himself but also Zeno of Citium into the company of the Platonists” (tr. De Lacy 259). See also EK τ 58f.

<sup>12</sup> See Kidd, “Criterion” 144. Posidonius, however, could disagree with Zeno e.g. on the definition of passion: Galen *PHP* 5.292.17–25=EK 152 (n.22 *infra*), 4.246.36–48.6=EK 34.1–12. On Posidonius' attempt to create conflict between Chrysippus and Zeno, “the Chrysippean theory of the passions is in all essentials the same as the theory of Zeno and the other early Stoics” (Inwood 143).

<sup>13</sup> *De sequela* 2.77.17–78.2=EK τ 58: ἐκεῖνοι μὲν (sc.οἱ ἄλλοι Στωϊκοὶ) γὰρ ἔπεισαν ἑαυτοὺς τὴν πατρίδα μᾶλλον ἢ δόγματα προδοῦναι, Ποσειδώνιος δὲ τὴν τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἀρεσιν μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀλήθειαν; cf. *PHP* 4.258.23ff=EK τ 59.

<sup>14</sup> Inwood shows (127–81) that Chrysippus' fragments present a coherent analysis of the cause of the passions. Inwood's account is preferable because he demonstrates the central rôle of “reservation” (nn.47–53 *infra*) in the monistic definition of passion as an “excessive impulse” (n.24 *infra*). Other scholars rarely discuss this concept, but Inwood shows (esp. 155–73) that this is precisely how a monist would explain the *aitia* of passion.

that Posidonius 'believed' what he 'argued', namely that Chrysippean monism was inadequate in this regard, but this is a naive assumption for a modern critic. Posidonius as a Stoic need not have been any more committed to the truth of his arguments against Chrysippus than other philosophers were to their arguments in refutation, although Stoics are not ordinarily suspected of subtle dialectical strategies. It is equally possible that he knew how Chrysippus might have responded to each of them. Nevertheless, Posidonius' claim that Chrysippean monism cannot explain the cause of passion need not be regarded as the truth about Chrysippean doctrine, nor even about what Posidonius believed. Rather, an independent modern analysis should, if possible, establish how fairly Posidonius treated Chrysippus, and where and for what purpose he manipulated the argument.

Some evidence suggests that Posidonius had the position of the Stoa in the Hellenistic debates very much in mind. Posidonius claims that his writings on the passions have a direct connection to Stoic doctrine of the *telos*, the "goal of life" and says more than once that the two topics are bound "as if by a single cord" (ὡςπερ ἐκ μιᾶς μηρίνου δεδέσθαι).<sup>15</sup> His discussion of the history of Stoic formulae for the *telos* reveals an interest in the vigorous Academic attack on the Stoa on this subject:

ἂ δὴ παρέντες ἐνιοὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν συστέλλουσιν εἰς τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ποιοῦντες τῷ σκοπὸν ἐκτίθεσθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ἀοχλησίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον. ἔστι δὲ μάχην ἐμφαίνον κατὰ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκφορὰν, καλὸν δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονικὸν οὐδέν. παρέπεται γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ τέλει, τέλος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτου διαληφθέντος ὀρθῶς ἔξεστι μὲν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ διακόπτειν τὰς ἀπορίας, ἃς οἱ σοφισταὶ προτείνουσι, μὴ μέντοι γε, τῷ κατὰ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν συμβαινόντων ζῆν ὅπερ ἰσοδυναμεῖ τῷ ὁμολογουμένως εἰπεῖν ζῆν, ἤνίκα μὴ τοῦτο μικροτρεπῶς συντείνει εἰς τὸ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τυγχάνειν.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.286.6f=EK 150a.9; cf. *PHP* 5.326.12-16=EK 30; Fillion-Lahille 154.

<sup>16</sup> Galen *PIIP* 5.328.8-18=EK 187.25-37: "But some people, disregarding these things, contract τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν [Zeno's formula for the *telos*] into 'doing everything in one's power for the sake of the primary things in accordance with nature' [roughly Antipater's formula] and make it similar to setting up pleasure or freedom from pain as the *skopos*. But in the expression itself, this creates the appearance of contradiction and contains nothing about virtue and happiness. For these things are necessarily a result of the end, but they are not the end. On the other hand, when this formula is understood in

Posidonius regards Zeno's formula as correct and misunderstood by Zeno's followers (see n.100 *infra*). His reference to sophists" (σοφισταί) is most revealing. Although his intended referent is left unnamed, Hirzel suggests that Posidonius may have had Carneades in mind.<sup>17</sup> Hirzel's conclusion, supported by the text, speaks of *aporiai* put forward by Stoic opponents—a mode of argument that the Academics favored. This passage also gives the *telos*-formula of Antipater and Chrysippus, Carneades' principal targets. Posidonius shows not only that he was interested in defending Zeno's definition of the *telos* against Academic attacks, but also, and most importantly, that he was concerned about the poor dialectical response of the Stoics to these attacks: neither Chrysippus' nor Antipater's formulae could dissolve the *aporiai*.<sup>18</sup>

This passage suggests that Posidonius intended his doctrines to respond to both Chrysippus' doctrines and the wider historical debate between Stoics and Academics. Posidonius' real target is not so much Chrysippus as the creators of the *aporiai* to which the Stoics did not adequately reply. But this fragment also

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the right way, it is possible to use it to cut through the *aporiai* which the sophists bring forward but 'to live according to the experience of what happens in the whole of nature' [Chrysippus' formula] cannot cut through them because that is equivalent to saying 'to live consistently when this does not lead unworthily to acquiring the indifferents'. I print Kidd's ἀδιαφόρων in the last line (proposed by Wyttenbach), rather than the manuscript reading διαφορῶν as De Lacy or διαφόρων proposed by Bake and Pohlenz.

<sup>17</sup> R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften* II (Leipzig 1882) 242. Posidonius never mentions Carneades by name, but in Hellenistic debates the intended opponent was customarily unnamed. See P. A. VANDER WAERDT, "Colotes and the Epicurean Refutation of Skepticism," *GRBS* 30 (1989: hereafter 'Vander Waerdt, "Colotes"') 231 n.18, and "Hermarchus and the Epicurean Genealogy of Morals," *TAPA* 118 (1988: 'Vander Waerdt, "Hermarchus"') 87–106, esp. 90, 94.

<sup>18</sup> If οἱ σοφισταί in fact alludes to Carneades, then Galen may have accurately reported direct quotations of Posidonius, because his own Academic purposes would justify omitting Posidonius' defense of the Stoa against Academic attacks. Galen may have deleted Posidonius' other references to Academic *aporiai*, if they were frequent, or omitted them through misunderstanding. But this is speculation. If Galen knowingly reported a characterization of Academics as οἱ σοφισταί, he was capable of impartiality even at the expense of his intellectual forbears. Kidd notes Galen's occasional criticism of Posidonius: "Euemptosia—Proneness to Disease," in W. W. Fortenbaugh, ed., *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus* (= *RutgStCIHum* 1 [New Brunswick 1983]) 110 *ad PHP* 5.296.18–36=EK 163.30–52.

reveals a more interesting problem: Posidonius' summary of Antipater's *telos*-formula seems to use Carneades' words.

Antipater's formula in Stobaeus: πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν.<sup>19</sup>

Carneades representation of Antipater's formula in Plutarch: τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἔνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν.<sup>20</sup>

Posidonius' allusion to Antipater's formula: πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ποιεῖν ἔνεκα τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν.

Admittedly, knowledge of Carneades, who wrote nothing, depends on Clitomachus' faithful preservation of what he argued (D.L. 4.65, 67). Although Plutarch's direct use of Clitomachus is uncertain (*supra* n.20), the assumption that Plutarch reproduces Carneades' words seems justified: the context is clearly the debate between Carneades and Antipater, and the arguments are entirely consistent with testimonia on Carneades' mode of argument, *i.e.*, he accepts the premises of his dialectical opponents for the sake of debate (Lactant. *Div. Inst.* 5.14.3ff). Most importantly, these arguments would not be effective if the words were different. The alteration of phrases in these three versions may seem subtle, but (as I shall show) Carneades' attack on the Stoic *telos* is based on his substitution of ἔνεκα for Antipater's πρὸς. Posidonius' ἔνεκα suggests the possibility that he criticized Antipater for the formula not as he proposed it, but as Carneades represented it.

<sup>19</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.76.13ff=SVF III Ant.57. Clement's single formula (*Strom.* 2.21, 179 Sylb.=V.2 497 Pott.=SVF III Ant.58) appears to conflate the two: Ἀντίπατρος ... τὸ τέλος κείσθαι ἐν τῷ διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπολαμβάνει.

<sup>20</sup> *Mor.* 1071A=SVF III 195. Von Arnim argues (*SVF* I xiv) that Clitomachus was Plutarch's source, but H. Cherniss (*Plutarch's Moralia* XIII.2 [Cambridge 1976] 397–406) is sceptical: Plutarch kept notebooks (ὑπομνήματα: *Mor.* 464F), in which he may have recorded quotations at various stages in his life and from a number of sources. Indeed the only reference to Carneades (1072F) in this portion of the *De comm. not.* (26f) is hardly decisive. After giving the entire argument in a manner to suggest an Academic source, Plutarch mentions Carneades as if reading another source (tr. Cherniss 765): "But there are those who think that his argument is directed against Antipater and not against the Stoic system, for, they say, it is he who under pressure from Carneades takes cover in these verbal ingenuities" (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσιν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον οἰόμενοι λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς τὴν αἴρεσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον εἰς αὐτάς καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὐρησιλογίας).

Posidonius employs this dialectical strategy throughout his attack on Chrysippus' doctrine of the passions: he not only attacks Antipater in this instance *as Carneades represented his position*, but also attacks Chrysippus' doctrines not as written, but as Carneades represented them. Such a sophisticated dialectical procedure, difficult to demonstrate at the very least, requires the following preliminaries: (1) an account of what Chrysippus actually said and meant (I–II below); (2) a reconstruction of Carneades' attacks against his ethical doctrines and of the subtle means by which he manipulated them to show their self-refutation (III); and (3) an analysis of Posidonius' arguments in which quotations of Chrysippus (through Posidonius as preserved by Galen) are separated from arguments loosely attributed to Chrysippus, though actually conceived by Carneades (IV–V).

The documentation of Posidonius' strategy requires a detailed discussion of Chrysippean ethics and an equally detailed examination of Carneades' responses. My first aim, demonstrating the importance of ἔνεκα in this passage, presupposes knowledge of how Stoic doctrines on the passions, selection, and the *telos* are interconnected. Then Carneades' attack on the *telos* and Posidonius' use of his words can be more easily understood and the significance of his use of ἔνεκα may be seen. This fragment represents the one piece of persuasive *prima facie* evidence that Posidonius actually put Carneades' words *contra* Antipater into Antipater's mouth. The implications of this evidence provide the proper context for Posidonius' arguments on the passions, in which Carneadean arguments are given to Chrysippus.

After demonstrating this striking and pervasive dialectical strategy, I shall offer a new account of Posidonius' motivations. He intends to do far more than refute Academic *aporiai*. Were that his only intention, he might have quoted Chrysippus and Carneades and exposed the dialectical manipulation of the former by the latter. Posidonius must have felt that monism was indefensible, but this does not mean that he endorsed the arguments against it, nor does it mean that he wished to abandon all the ethical doctrines that conform to it. As his strategy was to show that Chrysippus' doctrines *as Carneades represented them* are self-contradictory, it might be reasonably concluded that one of his primary objections to monism was its *verbal* vulnerability, *e.g.* to attacks from common sense. If it is easy to say that Posidonius' own Platonic model of the soul changes Stoic ethics radically, it is far more difficult to determine whether cer-

tain concepts of the earlier Stoa are yet retained within his model. I shall argue that Posidonius designed his own ethical doctrines to revive and preserve precisely those doctrines that Carneades attacked most vigorously. Although his model of the soul certainly leads to some new doctrines, its primary function, I suggest, is to render Stoic ethics invulnerable to Academic attack. He attempts to explain in the language of common sense what the earlier Stoa had explained by paradox. His strategy, in my view, demonstrates an even higher degree of dialectical sophistication than that for which Chrysippus was known.

Certain attractive features of this thesis compensate for its troubling implications. Although earlier critics thought that Posidonius did not understand Chrysippean monism and that he sacrificed important features of its rationalism in favor of certain features of Platonism, it can now be said that he makes such compromises to defend the Stoa against the Academy, and that he is first and foremost a dialectician. Indeed, Posidonius' own formula for the *telos*, when seen in the context of its dialectical function, preserves the Stoic doctrines on selection and on the good that suffered most at Carneades' hands. Whether this new portrait of Posidonius' philosophical contributions is more positive or persuasive than the existing one, I argue nevertheless that this portrait is of value because it relates his fragments to the most famous of the Hellenistic debates, and because it demonstrates how Posidonian ethics descend from those of Chrysippus and the early Stoa.

## I. Stoic Doctrine on the Passions

Galen reports that Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius each had a different definition of the nature of passion. The implications of each formulation should be clarified from the beginning in order to understand the context of Posidonius' arguments.<sup>21</sup>

Χρυσίππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύει  
πειρᾶται κρίσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων  
δὲ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγινόμενας αὐταῖς συσ-

<sup>21</sup> Inwood discusses the different definitions of Zeno and Chrysippus (129ff with nn.14–17) and correctly defends a monist interpretation of both figures; Glibert-Thirry (402ff) summarizes the debate over monist and dualist interpretations. Although both were monists, I want to suggest a subtle difference between the two positions based on Cleanthes' treatment of the passions at Cic. *Tusc.* (n.37 *infra*).

τολὰς καὶ (δια)χύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ ταπεινώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη. ὁ Ποσειδώνιος δὲ ἀμφοτέροις διενεχθεὶς ἐπαινεῖ τε ἅμα καὶ προσίεται τὸ Πλάτωνος δόγμα καὶ ἀντιλέγει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὔτε κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη δεικνύων οὔτε ἐπιγινόμενα κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ κινήσεις τινὰς ἐτέρων δυνάμεων ἀλόγων, ἃς ὁ Πλάτων ὠνόμασεν ἐπιθυμητικὴν τε καὶ θυμοειδῆ.<sup>22</sup>

Zeno and Chrysippus base their definitions upon a monistic model of the soul, which possesses reason alone,<sup>23</sup> whereas Posidonius' Platonic model has three powers. Zeno is credited with defining passion as ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, ἢ ὀρμὴ πλεονάζουσα,<sup>24</sup> and as a πτοία ψυχῆς.<sup>25</sup> He divides the passions into four categories: desire, fear, pain, and pleasure (D.L. 7.110=SVF I 211), and says that pain, for instance, is "a fresh opinion of evil being present" (Galen *PHP* 4.281.24=SVF I 212: δόξαν πρόσφατον τοῦ κακὸν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι). The significance of πρόσφατον, whether Zenonian or not, is clear in Cicero: it is an opinion containing the proposition "that it is fitting to submit to grief."<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Galen *PHP* 5.292.17–25=EK 152: "Now Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise *On the Passions*, tries to demonstrate that the passions are certain judgments of the reasoning faculty, but Zeno considered that the passions are not the judgments themselves, rather the contractions and expansions, risings and fallings of the soul which follow upon the judgments. Posidonius, diverging from them both, praises and associates himself with Plato's doctrine and opposes the circle of Chrysippus by demonstrating that the passions are not judgments nor do they follow upon judgments, but rather certain movements of other powers (of the soul) which Plato called 'desiderative' and 'spirited'." Cf. 4.246.36–248.6=EK 34.1–12. On their positions see J. Gosling, "The Stoics and ἀκρασία," *Apeiron* 20 (1987) 192–95. For general discussions of Stoic doctrine on the passions, see M. Frede, "The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul," in M. Schofield and G. Striker, edd., *The Norms of Nature* (Cambridge 1986) 93–110; M. Nussbaum, "The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions," *Apeiron* 20 (1987) 129–78.

<sup>23</sup> Cic. *Acad.* 1.38f=SVF I 207; Plut. *Mor.* 441c–d=SVF I 202. This is of course an oversimplification of early Stoic views on the soul. For a brief survey of the problems and scholarly debates, see Glibert-Thirry 402ff; Inwood 27–41.

<sup>24</sup> D.L. 7.110=SVF I 205: "an irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature or excessive impulse." Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.11; Philo *De spec. leg.* 4.79; Stob. *Ecl.* 2.39.4, 88.8ff; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.12, 54.5, 59.6; and see M. GIUSTA, *I dossografi di etica* (=PubbFacLettFil 15 [Torino 1967: hereafter 'Giusta']) 238, 268.

<sup>25</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.39.5 =SVF I 206, 88.11f: "a fluttering of the soul."

<sup>26</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 3.74=SVF I 212: *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat*. For Stoic definitions of passion see Giusta II 238–48. Cicero's definitions of individual passions use the formula *rectum esse videatur*: e.g. grief is *opinio recens mali*

From these definitions it is not easy to discern precisely what a passion is: is it a movement of the soul, an impulse, the result of a judgment, or an opinion? Inwood's explanation of Stoic action theory (129ff) accounts for how it could be all four. Man's impulses to things are not mere movements of the soul in monistic psychology; rather they are "commands to oneself which one obeys";<sup>27</sup> that is, impulse has one component, a rational act (an imperative), and another component, an action (motion). When a man sees something that might be appropriate for him, like a piece of cake (Inwood's example), he has the power to deliberate whether to allow his impulse to pursue the cake. In addition to his imperatival power of impulse, he also has the ability to exercise assent. An assent is a "judgment" (κρίσις), and erroneous judgments are "opinions" or "beliefs" (δόξαι); so δόξαι form a subset of κρίσεις (Inwood 130 n.11). Assents are made to propositions (λέκτα) that may be theoretical statements (e.g. "There is a piece of cake"), which will not rouse him to action, or "hormetic," i.e., "impulse causing" statements, that will rouse him to action (e.g. "It is appropriate for me to eat the

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*praesentis in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur* (*Tusc.* 4.14). A. BONHÖFFER (*Epictet und die Stoa* [Stuttgart 1890: hereafter 'Bonhöffer, *Epictet*'] 269f), followed by Inwood (146ff), shows that Zeno and Chrysippus intended πρόσφατος to mean what Cicero says here; cf. Giusta II 246–50. Arius says (2.89.2f) that "πρόσφατος is used in place of stimulative of an irrational contraction" (τὸ δὲ πρόσφατος ἀντὶ τοῦ κινητικοῦ συστολῆς ἀλόγου (ἢ) ἐπάρσεως) and that an "hormetic impression of something appropriate" must be present for all human impulses to occur (2.86.17f: τὸ δὲ κινεῖν τὴν ὀρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ' ἢ φαντασίαν ὀρμητικὴν τοῦ κατήκοντος αὐτόθεν). Proof that Zeno believed that an impression of "the appropriate" is necessary for impulse comes from Arcesilaus' response to the *apraxia*-argument (which uses Stoic premises) that two things are necessary for action: "an impression of something appropriate, and an impulse to it" (Plut. *Mor.* 1122c–d: ἡ γὰρ πράξις δυοῖν δέεται, φαντασίας τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὲν οἰκείου ὀρμῆς). See A. A. LONG and D. N. SEDLEY, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* I (Cambridge 1987: hereafter 'Long and Sedley') 456. Plausibly, Zeno held that an impulse to passion must result from an assent to the proposition that something appropriate is present; the "something" would be a passion itself—hence *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat*. At any rate, it certainly holds for Chrysippus—a most important point. In passion the content of the "fresh opinion" (δόξα πρόσφατος) must be that "it is appropriate to submit to passion."

<sup>27</sup> Inwood 62; see Plut. *Mor.* 1037f=SVF III 175 part; *contra*, Gosling (*supra* n.22) 183, 199ff.

cake”).<sup>28</sup> The impulse that follows a hormetic proposition would be a command (e.g. “Eat the cake!”). The imperative shares a common predicate with the statements (the cake), but each speech act has its own effect on the soul. A passion, therefore, may be defined as a motion (κίνησις), an impulse (ὁρμή), or an opinion (δόξα). If it is called a movement or an impulse gone to excess, it might also be said to “follow upon the judgment” (Zeno’s formulation); if it is called an erroneous decision, it might be said that the impulse is really caused by the opinion (Chrysippus’ formulation). Inwood argues (130f) that impulse and assent always occur together, and that it is rather pointless to debate which formulation is correct. But it is a question with which Chrysippus seems to have been concerned, so the distinction ought not to be dismissed just yet.

The important consideration in this monistic psychology is that passion is a movement of the rational soul in a manner contrary to reason. For the Stoics this process is of supreme gravity because it means that man is rejecting his own nature. Chrysippus’ etymology of λυπή (“pain” or “grief”) is “the dissolution of the whole human being” (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.61=SVF III 485). The goal of life is to live in accordance with reason. Passion destroys man’s only means to happiness (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.75.11=SVF I 179).

Posidonius, however, uses a tripartite model of the soul to explain the passions not as judgments but as movements of the soul’s other two parts, which are irrational. In his Platonic model,<sup>29</sup> reason ought to control the irrational powers;<sup>30</sup> when it

<sup>28</sup> Inwood 60; see also A. A. Long, “Language and Thought in Stoicism,” in Long, ed. (*supra* n.2), 75–113.

<sup>29</sup> Galen *PHP* 5.312.29–34 (=EK 142), 8.482.32–484.4 (=32). I say “Platonic” because Posidonius does not appear to accord θυμός its privileged position in Plato (*Ti.* 70A, *Phdr.* 253C–54B, *Resp.* 4.439E–41C). At *PHP* 5.350–54, where θυμός is claimed as the natural ally of reason, Galen is conspicuously silent about any agreement on this point by Posidonius. In Posidonius the two irrational faculties are distinct, although he couples them as τὸ παθητικόν (*PHP* 4.288.9=EK 165.139f), τὸ ἄλογον (*PHP* 4.290.7ff=EK 165.174–77), and τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον (*PHP* 5.324.8 [=EK 31.12], 5.330.18f [=EK 168.14f]). This implies that Posidonius understood tripartition as a Peripatetic dichotomy: see Vander Waerdt (*supra* n.5) 373–94; D. Rees, “Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy,” *JHS* 77 (1987) 112–18.

<sup>30</sup> Posidonius called his divisions “faculties” (δυνάμεις), not “parts” (μέρη); see Inwood 18–41; EK II 674. Diogenes of Babylon may have preceded Posidonius in revising Stoic doctrine on the soul: Paul Vander Waerdt has kindly brought to my attention Philodemus *De musica* 4 coll. 56\*, 57\*.40f, 69\*.3, 74\*, where Diogenes (unlike Posidonius) speaks of the soul’s μέρη. See D. Delattre, “Philodème, De la musique: livre IV, colonnes 40\* à 109\*,” *CronErcol* 19 (1989) 49–143.

does not, they move quite naturally towards an end that is contrary to reason (Galen *PHP* 5.326.20–27=EK 187.4–13=SVF III 460). Posidonius argues that it is absurd to claim that reason can reject itself or that it will command an impulse exceeding the measure it has set (*supra* n.9).

Zeno's definition of passion as a "fluttering of the soul" helps to explain how passion is conceived within a monistic framework. Plutarch records an interpretation of passion in monistic psychology as "a turning-about of reason in alternate directions so quickly that one does not notice."<sup>31</sup> Inwood describes (164) why the wise man is free from passions and why all others are subject to them:

When a man falls away from his own better judgement, through a failure to act with the necessary circumspection and reflection, it is because he has in his soul a set of inconsistent opinions. This would not be the case if the agent had fully assimilated his reason to Right Reason. A sage has done this, and this is why all of his actions are according to Right Reason. When a man has in his soul conflicting opinions, then the over-all condition of his soul is weak. His judgements on practical and ethical matters are liable to be reversed when external circumstances lead him to assent according to one of his incorrect opinions and so to issue to himself incorrect commands.

Stobaeus says that the Stoics call passion an "opinion" in the sense of a "weak supposition" (*Ecl.* 2.89.1f=SVF III 378: παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως). All unwise men have unstable dispositions—inconsistent or "unharmonious" sets of opinions—that make up their reason (*logos*). When a fool is confronted with a moral dilemma, he may form presentations for himself to which his reason assigns various *lekta* that conflict with one another. He may assent first to one proposition, then to another that conflicts with it. Such an alternation creates Plutarch's fluttering effect. When the fool assents in this way, weakly and without circumspection, he puts himself at the mercy of his own presentations. He is still a responsible actor, but he has become passive in a sense.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 446F–47A (=SVF III 459 part), 441C–D; Long and Sedley I 422.

<sup>32</sup> Inwood 162. This is an oversimplification of the actual processes as the Stoics understood them. They say that man does not assent to the proposition but to the presentation in which the proposition subsists—an important aspect of Stoic epistemology, at the center of which lies the *phantasia kataleptike*. Although Zeno held that assents are made to presentations, Arcesilaus charged

The Stoics also say, however, that a passion is a single opinion, a “fresh opinion of the presence of good or evil.” Zeno and Chrysippus may have had different understandings of this *doxa*: for Zeno passion results from the *doxa*, but for Chrysippus passion is the *doxa* itself. As it is not only the belief that these are present but the “fresh” belief that causes passion (δόξα πρόσφατος), Cic. *Tusc.* 3.74f (=SVF I 212) merits re-examination:

*Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat.*

*Additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens; hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paullo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur recens. Ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnassi fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu, eodemque etiam confecta contabuit.*

that they are really made to propositions (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.154), and Stobaeus confirms that later Stoics agreed (*Ecl.* 2.88.4ff=SVF III 171: καὶ συγκαταθέσεις μὲν ἀξιωμασί τισιν, ὁρμᾶς δὲ ἐπὶ κατηγορήματα, τὰ περιεχόμενά πως ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν, οἷς συγκαταθέσεις). Sextus says that a rational presentation is one “in which it is possible for what has been presented to be expressed in language (*Math.* 8.70=SVF II 187: καθ’ ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ παραστήσαι). The evidence conflicts with Zeno’s doctrine of the *phantasia kataleptike* and supports Arcesilaus. Zeno, however, nowhere states that what is “apprehensible” in the *phantasia kataleptike* is propositional; on the contrary, he uses an iconic metaphor of “stamping”—as of a coin (*Math.* 7.236=SVF I 58; Cic. *Acad.* 2.18, 77=SVF I 59)—and says only that this presentation has the power to reveal its object (Cic. *Acad.* 1.41=SVF I 60) and that it is such that it could not arise from what is not (*Math.* 7.247–56=SVF II 65). Part of the motivation for describing *phantasia* in non-propositional terms occurs in debates on the rôle of *phantasia* in passion. Presentations are said to cast a persuasive appearance that “drags” one to assent. Chrysippus describes *phantasia* as an antecedent cause of evil (nn.45, 154 *infra*). Carneades accepts for the sake of argument the “pull of the presentations” alone and without assent as a cause of passion (Plut. *Mor.* 1057<sub>A–B</sub>=SVF III 177). Because of the impact of presentations, “weakness of soul” (ἀσθένεια) is also a critical issue in the cause of passion (n.109 *infra*): see Frede (*supra* n.22) 103ff; Long and Sedley I 201f; F. H. Sandbach, “Phantasia Katalêptikê,” in Long (*supra* n.2) 12f; Long (*supra* n.28) 82ff, 91ff with nn.24f; and Inwood 56–59, 72ff, 86f with nn.212f, 92.

*Huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens, quae tum denique non appellatur recens, cum vetustate exaruit.*<sup>33</sup>

The structure of this passage suggests that Cicero cannot assign the phrase *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat* to Zeno,<sup>34</sup> who is credited only with adding the word “fresh,” not with its definition, and his followers’ definitions—“thriving” and “having a certain greenness”—are still a step removed from the proposition, “it is fitting to submit to grief.” It is difficult, nevertheless, to construct an argument showing that Chrysippus and Zeno essentially disagreed on the definition of passion.<sup>35</sup> An attempt to account for Galen’s different wordings (*supra* n.22) would have to rely, somewhat as follows, on the meager evidence available.

The evidence that Chrysippus spelled out the definition of *prospatos* comes from the Stoic treatments for those in a state of passion. Chrysippus disagreed with Cleanthes about the proper cure for passion (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.77=SVF I 577).<sup>36</sup> Cleanthes tried to convince those in pain or grief that they were mistaken in their belief that evil was present, because only virtue is good

<sup>33</sup> “I think that it has been said enough that grief is a belief that evil is present, the content of which includes that ‘it is fitting to submit to grief’.

To this definition, it was rightly added by Zeno that the belief that evil is present is ‘fresh’. They interpret this word such that they would have not only that which happened a little before be fresh, but however long a certain force inheres in the supposed evil so that it ‘thrives’ and has a certain ‘greenness’, they would have it be called fresh. The famous Artemisia, the wife of Mausolus, King of Caria, who commissioned that eminent sepulcher at Halicarnassus, lived in grief her entire life, and wasted away consumed with it. For her, the belief was fresh every day, since it is no longer called fresh only when it has withered to dust with age.”

<sup>34</sup> The Latin shows that Cicero’s source is, as might be expected, later than Zeno. He begins by saying that *recens* (πρόσφατος) is Zenonian, but his *interpretantur* indicates a later doxography. Perhaps whatever Zeno said about πρόσφατος required clarification and *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat* was proposed.

<sup>35</sup> Except for circumstantial evidence (*supra* n.26), convincing proof is lacking that Zeno understood the definition of πρόσφατος to contain the proposition *ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat*. In the present state of the evidence I do not accept Inwood’s view (147, 153) that Zeno and Chrysippus agreed on the nature of the passions. Cf. Bonhöffer 270. I shall argue for a subtle difference in their positions that Posidonius exploits.

<sup>36</sup> Inwood (146–54) does not emphasize Cicero’s evidence on Cleanthes in the doxography on πρόσφατος. In my view, Cleanthes’ position can reveal something about Zeno’s position and forms the background of Posidonius’ discussion of moral progressors that Inwood (154) dismisses.

and only vice evil. What they perceive as evil only appears to be so. Cleanthes learned this treatment from Zeno.<sup>37</sup> But Cleanthes could do nothing to relieve the passion of a moral progressor like Aeschines' Alcibiades, who was overcome with grief when Socrates demonstrated his lack of virtue (August. *De civ. D.* 14.8=Aeschin. fr. 5 Dittmar). Cicero (*Tusc.* 3.77) sums up the problem raised by this example (Alcibiades' correct belief that evil was present could not change over time):<sup>38</sup> "Cleanthes consoles the wise man who needs no consolation," *i.e.*, the man who can curb passion by considering what is good and what is evil.

Chrysippus seems to take up the moral progressor's case when he insists that the chief cause of passion is the belief that it is necessary. But it does not follow that passion is necessary or appropriate even from a conclusion that a man is without virtue and thus vicious. If Cicero's reports are taken together, Zeno seems to have understood the *doxa prosphatos* to mean an opinion that is "in full vigor" or "in the prime of youth" (*ut vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem*), and indeed this is the original use of *prospatos* in Greek: "not yet decomposed" human corpses or "fresh" perishable food items (LSJ *s.v.*).<sup>39</sup> The concept is not necessarily temporal, nor does it denote a specific proposition.

Zeno's interpreters also say that the force inheres "in the supposed evil" (*opinatio malo*).<sup>40</sup> This must mean "in the supposi-

<sup>37</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 2.60=SVF I 607—clearly an historical anecdote from a later doxography and thus of limited reliability (*cf.* SVF I 422–34), but consistent with Cicero's general picture: Zeno coined the phrase δόξα πρόσφατος; later interpreters had to spell out its meaning; Chrysippus disagreed with Cleanthes about how to cure the passions (and therefore what the root cause was); and Cleanthes learned his cure for the passions from Zeno.

<sup>38</sup> See Plut. *Mor.* 1063A–B=SVF III 539 part.; Alex. Aphr. *De fato* 199.14–22=SVF III 658; Cic. *Tusc.* 3.68.

<sup>39</sup> *Il.* 24.757; Hdt. 2.89; Zeno in Cic. *Tusc.* 3.75. This interpretation seems consistent with Zeno's definition of passion and inconsistent with Chrysippus' position in *Tusc.*

<sup>40</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 3.75; *cf.* Ps.-Andron. *On Passions* I 12.3=SVF III 391: προσδοκωμένου δεινού (Giusta II 249). φαινόμενον, modifying "goods" and "evils," appears in some textbook definitions of the passions: *e.g.* Stob. *Ecl.* 2.88.16ff=SVF III 378 (ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγείσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον κακόν); Aspasius in *Eth. Nic.* p.44.12 Heylb.=SVF III 386. On the connection between "apparent goods" and *phantasia* see nn.107, 109 *infra*. Bonhöffer (266ff; *cf.* Inwood 147 n.86) argues that there is essentially no difference between "fresh" to describe the evil and "fresh" for the opinion. Perhaps not, but Cleanthes' cure for the pas-

tion," rather than "in the thing," but the wording may suggest something between the two such as "in the thing as perceived." In passion one assents to a presentation with a subsisting *lekton* (*supra* n.32). Interpreters may have taken Zeno to mean, "So long as the *presentation* that the thing is evil remains, the judgment and the passion will persist," perhaps because the fool lacks the sufficient disposition to withhold his assent to it. Hence the opinion—the weak assent—will remain fresh until the presentation changes; and in the case of Artemisia, who contemplated her husband's death daily, the presentation remained forever the same. This explanation can give real meaning to the use of the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus in the *exemplum*: the *nobile sepulchrum* created an eternal reminder or *presentation* of her husband's death. If Cicero's *opinatio malo* is a meaningful rendering of what Zeno had in mind, it may be that Zeno associated the "fresh" element in passion with the presentation to which the assent is given.<sup>41</sup> This position would leave Zeno open to questions about the cause of passion. Presentations cannot 'cause' action in any strict sense—one may always withhold assent (Origen *De princ.* 3.1.3). Yet Zeno might have responded that the wise man always withholds his assent to all but the true presentation, the καταληπτική φαντασία, while the fool assents weakly and rashly to merely persuasive presentations.<sup>42</sup> As passion is found only in fools, it might well be said that the 'freshness' of the opinion that causes the impulse remains as long as the presentation remains persuasive.

Chrysippus, unlike Zeno, understands passion not as "following upon" an assent, but as an assent itself. He concludes that the cause of passion and the content of its 'freshness' is an assent to its "appropriateness" rather than the result of an incorrect decision about the presence of good or evil (Long and Sedley I 421). Chrysippus tried to treat the passions by removing from the

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sions (probably taken from Zeno [*supra* n.37]) suggests that there was, and only some difference can account for the disagreement between Zeno and Chrysippus on the definition of passion. Moreover, the intensely rationalist formulation of Chrysippus suggests his interest in finding the *aitia* of passion despite Posidonius' arguments to the contrary.

<sup>41</sup> Professor Kidd brings to my attention τῆς προσφάτου φαντασίας at [*Mag. Mor.*] 1203b4f. Inwood (248f) argues that the [*Mag. Mor.*] shows Stoic influence, which would make it not a precedent but perhaps still a corollary depending on the date of the [*Mag. Mor.*].

<sup>42</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.111.18–112.8 (=SVF III 548 part), 2.68.18–23 (=III 663).

agent's mind his belief that passion is "just" or "obligatory" (*iusto atque debito*: Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76=SVF III 486, 4.62=III 488). A passage in Galen purports to show Chrysippus' inability to explain why the passions cease with the passage of time, *i.e.*, how they cease to be 'fresh'. The passage, probably chosen to imply Chrysippus' confusion, suggests how presentation may have played a central rôle in the Zenonian doctrine of the passions that Chrysippus was possibly attempting to refine:

δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη δόξα διαμένειν, ὅτι κακὸν αὐτὸ ὃ δὴ πάρεστιν, ἐγγχρονιζομένης δ' ἀνίσθαι ἡ συστολὴ καὶ ὡς οἶμαι ἡ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὄρμη. τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ταύτης διαμενούσης οὐχ ὑπακούσεται τὰ ἐξῆς, διὰ ποιὰν ἄλλην ἐπιγινομένην διάθεσιν δυσσυλλόγιστον τούτων γινομένων. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ κλαίοντες παύονται καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι κλαίειν κλαίουσιν, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίας τὰς φαντασίας τὰ ὑποκείμενα ποιῆ καὶ ἐνιστῆται τι ἢ μηθέν. ὃν τρόπον γὰρ ἡ θρήνων παύσις γίνεται καὶ κλαυθμοί, τοιαῦτα εὐλόγον καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων συντυγχάνειν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μᾶλλον τῶν πραγμάτων κινούντων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν γέλωτα κινούντων γίνεσθαι ἔφην, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις.<sup>43</sup>

This passage, taken with Cleanthes' treatment of the passions (*Tusc.* 3.76f) and Zeno's definition of *prosphtatos* (*Tusc.* 3.75), suggests a debate. Zeno defines the passions as ἐπιγινόμενα κρίσεις, that is, as the "contractions" (συστολαί) themselves. The cause of the contraction is the impulse; the cause of the impulse is the assent. But the presentation cannot be said to be the cause of the assent, because assent is the locus of respon-

<sup>43</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.284.7–17=EK 165.59–70: "It seems to me that an opinion of this sort remains, that the very thing which is present is bad, but that as it (*sc.* the opinion) lingers the contraction relaxes and, as I think, the impulse to the contraction. Perhaps even if this (*sc.* the opinion) remains, the things which follow will not obey, as these things occur by some other supervening disposition which is hard to account for. For it is in this way that people cease weeping and weep even when they do not want to weep, whenever underlying circumstances produce dissimilar presentations and something or nothing interferes. For in the same way that the cessation of laments and weepings occurs, it is reasonable that such things should occur in those cases, since things are more stimulative at the beginnings, just as I said occurs in the case of things which stimulate laughter; and also things similar to these." Tr. Inwood 149 with nn.94f on the textual difficulties. Gosling argues (*supra* n.22: 192f) that Chrysippus also attempted to refine Zenonian doctrine on the passions at *PHP* 4.240.18–29.

sibility and free-will.<sup>44</sup> The above passage, purporting to show the confused state of Chrysippean doctrine, may in fact preserve the state of Stoic doctrine after Zeno. If a passion is an impulse rather than an opinion, the passions might appear to come and go merely by a change of presentation without a change of opinion, *i.e.*, assent. For example, one may try to forget about something painful by going to a show or even taking a long vacation, and the passion may subside (thanks to a change of presentation) without one's having ceased to believe that what had happened was bad. The seeds of Chrysippus' answer may be seen in Zeno's claim that all impulses are made to "something appropriate" (*supra* n.26): the impulse to passion must have been judged 'appropriate', and that judgment must be reversed for the impulse to subside, whether consciously or unconsciously.

The thorny point is that there are two parts to the *doxa prosphtatos*: the false belief that good or evil is present, and the false belief that "it is appropriate to submit to passion" (*ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat*: Cic. *Tusc.* 3.74; Long and Sedley I 421). The latter clause seems to have been associated especially with the word "fresh," so that when the 'appropriateness' faded, the *doxa* would cease to be *prosphtatos* and the passion would subside. But the fading of the 'appropriateness' is a complex matter: passion may also subside merely by a change of presentation. Cicero explains Chrysippus' position that there are also two causes of any human action, the assent and the presentation:

*Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri).<sup>45</sup>*

<sup>44</sup> Cic. *Fat.* 39–43=SVF II 974; Gell. *NA* 7.2.6–13=SVF II 1000; see Long and Sedley I 392ff; Inwood 44–50.

<sup>45</sup> *Fat.* 42=SVF II 974.16–24: "He thinks that he can easily explain the statement that acts of assent come about by prior causes. For although assent cannot occur unless it is prompted by an impression, nevertheless, since it has that impression as its proximate, not its primary cause, Chrysippus wants it to have the rationale which I mentioned just now. He does not want assent, at least, to be able to occur without the stimulus of some external force (for assent must be prompted by an impression)." Tr. Long and Sedley I 387f; *cf.* 393 for commentary.

The Chrysippean theory of causation discussed here shows that presentations are proximate causes of assents. In the case of the fool, Chrysippus argues that passion fades and the *doxa* ceases to be fresh only when the agent ceases to believe that his passion is 'appropriate' (rather than when he ceases to believe that good or evil is present, as Cleanthes argues: *supra* n.36). This may happen over time without the conscious knowledge of the agent, and it may result simply from a change in presentation: ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως τὰς φαντασίας τὰ ὑποκείμενα ποιῆ (*supra* n.43). Among fools whose assents are weak and easily influenced, a change in presentation, *i.e.*, in the proximate cause of action, may cause passions to begin and end, because the real cause of passion, the controlling cause, is the fool's inferior state of soul that will yield to any persuasive presentation.<sup>46</sup>

The evidence suggests that Chrysippus was particularly concerned to explain the cause of passion, the *aitia*, and its abatement. When he says that the false belief in the appropriateness of the passion must change for the passion to subside, he shows that the genuine cause of passion is the prior, the assent to the appropriateness of passion, not the proximate, the impression of the apparent good or evil (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76= *SVF* III 486). Moreover, he shows that of the two assents involved in the δόξα πρόσφατος, that the thing is good or evil, and that it is appropriate to submit to passion, the latter is more correctly called the 'cause'.

## II. Selection and the End

If passion is a movement of the soul contrary to reason, the goal of life is to have one's soul always move in accordance with reason. The passions make man live in conflict with nature and unhappily. The cause of passion and the cause of a happy life are both to be found in man's understanding of what is most important, that is, of what is *the* good. To see how Posidonius' arguments on the passions might apply to his view of the end, it is important to understand the Stoic doctrines of good, evil, and the "indifferents," on which the doctrines on the passions and on the *telos* depend.

The occasion of passion involves a certain belief about good and evil. The special case of Alcibiades (who really was in the presence of evil) notwithstanding, a man ordinarily decides that

<sup>46</sup> See Inwood 81; Long and Sedley I 420f.

“it is appropriate to submit to passion” when believing that something other than virtue or vice is good or evil. For the Stoics, all the things that come between are “indifferent” (ἀδιάφορα). The indifferents that accord with nature have “value” (ἄξια) and are “preferred” (προηγμένα); those contrary to nature have “disvalue” (ἀπαξία) and are to be “dispreferred” (ἀποπροηγμένα: Stob. *Ecl.* 2.84.18–85.11=SVF III 128), and some have neither value nor disvalue (D.L. 7.104=SVF III 119). As the practice of virtue requires interaction with the world, the rational selection of the indifferents is the practice of virtue. Hence Cicero calls them the “subject matter” of virtue. The wise man will decide whether to commit suicide or remain in life purely on the basis of the availability of this subject matter with which to practice virtue (Cic. *Fin.* 3.61=SVF III 763)).

The wise man who selects properly remains free from passion in the technical sense, but he experiences the rational counterparts of passion—the harmonious motions of the soul acting in accordance with reason, the εὐπάθειαι. He will experience χαρά (joy), a well-reasoned expansion of the soul based upon the correct belief that he is in the presence of good along with βούλησις, the motion based upon the correct belief that good is approaching, and εὐλάβεια (precaution), the motion based upon the correct belief that evil is approaching (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.14=SVF III 438). He never believes that he is in the presence of evil because the wise man will always avoid vice. All definitions of the εὐπάθειαι include “properly reasoned” (εὐλογος) motions of the soul, whereas passion, an irrational motion, arises from an improperly reasoned belief about good and evil.

The wise man exercises “reservation” in his decisions about the indifferents, a certain restraint by which he acknowledges that their acquisition is of no consequence to his happiness.<sup>47</sup> This mental reserve is the wise man’s way of preserving his fundamental belief that what is indifferent cannot be good or evil and, therefore, that its presence or absence should not lead him to passion. The technical term for reservation, ὑπεξάρεσις, is late (e.g. Stobaeus, Seneca, *et al.*),<sup>48</sup> but the concept may date to

<sup>47</sup> Inwood 155–73; cf. Bonhöffer 269f.

<sup>48</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.115.5=SVF III 564; Sen. *Ben.* 4.34=III 565 (*exceptio*); cf. Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 2.6.9f (=III 191), 3.24.23f, 85ff; *Enchiridion* 2f; M. Ant. 4.1, 5.20, 6.50, 11.37.

Zeno,<sup>49</sup> who is quoted that the ultimate source of all the passions is, in a way, intemperance,<sup>50</sup> defined as “the knowledge of what is to be chosen, what avoided, and what is neither” (ἐπιστήμη αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων), *i.e.*, what is “good,” what is “evil,” and what is neither.<sup>51</sup> Temperance is one of the four Stoic virtues, along with wisdom, justice, and courage. As virtue is perfected only in the wise man, it follows that only the wise man is perfectly temperate and thus free from passion. The definition of virtue also shows the central position in which the Stoics place the knowledge of good, evil, and the indifferents in the realm of action: φρόνησιν δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων, ἢ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων φύσει πολιτικοῦ (λογικοῦ) ζῶου.<sup>52</sup>

The chief function of temperance is to keep the soul free from excessive delights and distresses (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.37; 3.16ff=SVF III 570). It can accomplish this because it urges the wise man to mark the greatness of the universe and his own ephemeral existence and to keep watch lest anything strike him as “unexpected” or “unforeseen” (*nihil improvisum, nihil inopinatum, nihil omnino novum*; *Tusc.* 4.37). By Stobaeus’ definition of ὑπεξάρσις (*Ecl.* 2.115.5=SVF III 564) nothing will strike the wise man “unforeseen” (ἀπρόληπτον). Whether Zenonian or not, the “reser-

<sup>49</sup> Zeno’s “excessive impulse” implies some account of what Zeno saw as the meaning of “excessive.” Inwood (119–26, 165–73) concentrates on Chrysippus, but Zeno’s belief that intemperance is the cause of all passions could be connected to this material.

<sup>50</sup> Cic. *Acad.* 1.38f: *Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tolerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferrī laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem; cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes, aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem adsentiebatur, nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum matrem esse arbitratur immoderatam quandam intemperantium.* Cf. *Tusc.* 4.22=SVF III 379: *intemperantiam, quae est tota mente a recta ratione defectio.* In my view, Zeno conceived the important function of reservation under the heading *quaedam temperantia*. The term ὑπεξάρσις, however, is clearly later. Inwood (119) argues that the technical conception of “reservation” probably derives from Chrysippus’ intense interest in determinism: cf. Inwood 119. Chrysippus’ investigation of causation (*supra* n.45) revealed more clearly what is and is not in man’s power.

<sup>51</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.59.4 (=SVF III 262); Plut. *Mor.* 441A (=I 201).

<sup>52</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.59.4ff=SVF III 262: “Virtue is the knowledge of what must and must not be done and of neutral actions, or the knowledge of things that are good and evil and neutral by nature for a rational political being.”

vation" by which the wise man distinguishes the indifferents from good and evil is what keeps him free from the passions.

The wise man is to have an unrestrained impulse to the good and from evil (*Arr. Epict. Diss.* 3.24.23f, 85ff), but he must exercise restraint in the realm of the indifferent things. Chrysippus describes the rôle of selection in a life of virtue as follows:

διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος λέγει ὅτι μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ἦ τὰ ἐξῆς, αἰεὶ τῶν εὐφροστέρων ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτός γάρ μ' ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν τούτων ἐκλεκτικόν. εἰ δέ γε ἦδειν ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὤρων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὄρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι.<sup>53</sup>

Chrysippus makes the important point that nature intends man to obey fate—the reason that guides the universe—and to select the things in accordance with nature. Obedience to fate is man's primary duty. The pursuit of the indifferents is secondary. The wise man does all things with reservation in order to preserve this order commanded by nature. Reservation is indispensable to man's happiness inasmuch as he must select among the indifferents to live and to practice virtue.

The Stoics observe that the indifferents play a rôle in every phase of man's life.<sup>54</sup> Man's first impulses are to self-preservation and to things important for self-preservation (*Cic. Fin.* 3.16). When he attains the age of reason, he learns that what he formerly sought by instinct, he now seeks by reason. The selections of the indifferents by conscious choice are "appropriate actions" (καθήκοντα). In time the habit of performing appropriate acts leads to the observation that the choice of things in accordance with nature creates a harmony with nature that is choice-worthy in itself. This life of harmony with nature comprises a life of virtue that he comes to esteem more highly than the things he chooses. Harmony with nature includes harmony

<sup>53</sup> *Arr. Epict. Diss.* 2.6.9f=SVR III 564: "For this reason Chrysippus speaks properly when he says, "As long as what will happen is unclear to me, I hold fast to those things which are more suited to the attainment of the things in accordance with nature. For God himself made me inclined to select them. But if I knew that it is fated for me to be sick right now, I would direct my impulse to it. Even my foot, if it could reason, would direct its impulse to being muddled." See Inwood 119–26.

<sup>54</sup> See I. G. Kidd, "The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the *Summum Bonum*, with Reference to Change in the Stoa," *CQ* N.S. 5 (1955) 181–94; M. Reesor, "The Indifferents in the Old and Middle Stoa," *TAPA* 82 (1951) 102–10.

with Zeus' divine reason that directs the fate of the universe (D.L. 7.87ff=SVF I 162). Man therefore directs his efforts at perfecting his own reason and making it conform to the perfect reason of Zeus. When the wise man perfectly performs appropriate acts in accordance with Right Reason, they are virtuous acts (κατορθώματα: *Fin.* 3.21–24=SVF III 188.18, 497, 11, 186). First impulses lead to the “preferred indifferents” (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν or προηγμένα); they are both the “origin” (ἀρχή) and the “material” (ύλη) of appropriate actions (καθήκοντα); lastly, they are the ύλη of καθήκοντα, the *materia sapientiae*, the stuff with which virtue and virtuous acts deal, but they are not the origin of virtue, and their acquisition is not the goal of virtue (Plut. *Mor.* 1069E=SVF III 491). A happy life in accordance with reason and fate depends upon the wise man's belief that the indifferents are neither good nor the goal of virtue.

In passion one assents not only to the proposition that what is indifferent is good or evil but also to the proposition that passion is in accordance with nature. Part of the definition of the *doxa prosphtatos* is that one “ought” to have a passion (*ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat: supra* n.26). Chrysippus sees the “ought” as the cause of passion; one treats passion by convincing the subject that passion is not an *officium*, an “appropriate act”: *Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere illam opinionem maerenti, si se officio fungi putet iusto atque debito.*<sup>55</sup> Posidonius also understands Chrysippus to define passion as the belief that “it is appropriate and in accordance with the valuation” of things that are present to be moved to passion (Galen *PHP* 4.264.23=EK 164.18: καθήκον καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν). On this evidence Chrysippus seems to observe that the agent mistakenly decides passion is “to be preferred”: the *doxa prosphtatos* of passion is identified with the belief that passion is an “appropriate act”; that is, he focuses on what the agent judges about passion, an internal phenomenon, rather than what he may judge about external things or events.

The Stoic formulae for the *telos* recognize the interdependence of the doctrines on man's relationship to nature, on the selection of indifferents, and on the subordinate rôle of the indif-

<sup>55</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76=SVF III 486: “But Chrysippus judges that the main thing in consolation is to take away this opinion from the one who is grieving, if he should think that he is performing an appropriate act which is just and owed.”

ferents in the practice of virtue.<sup>56</sup> These formulae also tacitly recognize that passion is a threat to the happy life. Zeno defined the end (*telos*) as τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν (“to live harmoniously and consistently”).<sup>57</sup> Zeno’s successors revised the definition with the apparent intention of expressing the content of ὁμολογουμένως, *i.e.*, to give concrete definition to “living by rational consistency.” Stobaeus says (*Ecl.* 2.76.1–6) that Cleanthes added “with nature” (τῇ φύσει) to the formula because Zeno’s successors felt that the shorter formula was an incomplete predicate. Diogenes Laertius (7.87) attributes τῇ φύσει to Zeno. Attempts to redefine the predicate, to spell out what should qualify τὸ ζῆν, concentrate on man’s relationship to nature. Chrysippus is also said (*Stob. Ecl.* 2.76.6ff) to have given the *telos* as “to live in accordance with the experience of things which happen by nature” (ζῆν κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων). κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν suggests that man should live in accordance with what he can observe about the divine *logos*. Man’s goal is to make his *logos* conform perfectly with the divine *logos* and Chrysippus’ formula focuses on how he should do this. Man cannot observe the universe as it is, but only he can understand it (Inwood 203f). He should make himself a willing follower of fate, the ultimate teacher, and, like the dog tied behind the cart (*Hippol. Philos.* 21 [Diels *Dox. Graec.* p.571.11]= *SVF* II 975), he should make his own motions conform with what events demand (*D.L.* 7.87f=*SVF* III 4; I 552, 162).

Cicero appends Chrysippus’ formula without attribution: *vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere*.<sup>58</sup> The addition of selection and disselection may or may not belong to Chrysippus,<sup>59</sup> but, in any event, Cicero sees Chrysip-

<sup>56</sup> See A. A. Long, “Stoic Eudaimonism,” *ProcBostonColAncPhil* 4 (1988) 77–112; Inwood 203–08; T. H. IRWIN, “Stoic and Aristotelian Conceptions of Happiness,” in Schofield and Striker (*supra* n.22: hereafter ‘Irwin’) 234–42.

<sup>57</sup> *Stob. Ecl.* 2.75.11=*SVF* I 179. See J. M. Rist, “Zeno and Stoic Consistency,” *Phronesis* 22 (1977) 168–74; C. O. Brink, “Theophrastus and Zeno on Moral Theory,” *Phronesis* 1 (1955) 141–44.

<sup>58</sup> *Fin.* 3.31 (tr. Long and Sedley I 401): “a life applying knowledge of those things that happen by nature, selecting those in accordance with nature and rejecting those contrary to nature, that is—a life in agreement and consistent with nature.” Cf. 2.34.

<sup>59</sup> Long and Sedley I 407; A. A. Long, “Carneades and the Stoic *Telos*,” *Phronesis* 12 (1967) 59–90, esp. 69.

pus' formula in expanded form as an explanation of *convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere*, i.e., τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει ζῆν. Selection is logically added as the natural consequence of living κατ' ἐμπειρίαν. As seen earlier, man's relationship to nature is expressed in two ways: first, man must make his own *logos* conform to that of nature; and second, he must select among the indifferents in accordance with *logos* (cf. *supra* n.53). Cicero's formula suggests an interconnection of the two relationships.

The assimilation of one's own *logos* to divine *logos* is the final step of οἰκειώσις, the process by which man comes to realize the life that nature intended for him and by which he lives in accordance with nature. Chrysippus describes this process in his *Περὶ τελεῶν* (D.L. 7.85f=SVF III 178): man is constituted so as to be attracted by what will contribute to his own preservation; like the animals, man's impulse (ὄρμη) can only be stimulated by what is "appropriate" (οἰκεῖον); but because man has reason, he can use *logos* to govern his impulse. Reason performs this supervision as a craftsman (*logos*=τεχνίτης; D.L. 7.86) practices his craft. Stobaeus records that only "an hormetic presentation of something appropriate" (φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθήκοντος) can stimulate man's impulse; thus Diogenes' οἰκεῖον also has the sense of καθήκον.<sup>60</sup> In other contexts Stobaeus says that the preferred indifferents (the ὕλη and ἀρχή of καθήκοντα) are capable of stimulating impulse (*Ecl.* 2.82.5–10=SVF III 121; cf. *Ecl.* 2.75.1=III 131). Therefore Diogenes' *logos*, which supervises impulse, would include in its "craft" the selection of which indifferents will be allowed to stimulate man's impulse. Man's goal is to make his reason conform to divine reason; the function of his rational craft is to preside over his impulse. By this line of reasoning two kinds of craftsmen are discerned: those who supervise their impulse imperfectly because their reason does not conform to nature, and those who supervise it perfectly because their reason does conform to nature.

<sup>60</sup> *Ecl.* 2.86.17f; Inwood 84f with n.208; cf. *supra* n.26. οἰκεῖον as a concept predates the Stoics and occurs in Epicureanism: see Brink (*supra* n.57) 139ff; S. G. Pembroke, "Oikeiōsis," in Long, ed., (*supra* n.2) 114–49; J. Brunschwig, "The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism," in Schofield and Striker, edd. (*supra* n.22) 113–44; Vander Waerdt, "Hermarchus" 97 n.40. Its rôle in the *apraxia*-argument (*supra* n.26), however, suggests either that Zeno used the term or that later reporters like Diogenes accepted the more universal οἰκεῖον as an acceptable substitute for καθήκον.

Diogenes of Babylon defined the *telos* as “reasoning well in the selection and disselection of things in accordance with nature” (εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ).<sup>61</sup> Antipater, his student, is credited with two formulas that also use selection in the definition of the *telos*: (1) “to live continuously selecting things in accordance with nature and disselecting things contrary to nature (ζῆν ἐκλεγόμενους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγόμενους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν); (2) “to do everything in one’s power continuously and undeviatingly with a view to obtaining the predominating things which accord with nature” (πᾶν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν).<sup>62</sup>

Both Diogenes and Antipater attempt to incorporate man’s dual relationship (*supra* 253 with n.53) to nature into a single formula.<sup>63</sup> For Diogenes, εὐλογιστεῖν (“to reason properly”) expresses the first duty of making man’s reason conform to divine reason.<sup>64</sup> Antipater’s first formula requires selecting and rejecting what ought to be selected and rejected, *i.e.*, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν and τὰ παρὰ φύσιν. In the second formula man’s first duty consists in the effort intended by πᾶν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως, where the adverbs may allude to “consistency” and where “to do everything in one’s power” certainly includes the exercise of reason. But the adverbs may more properly allude to ‘rational impulse’. A generous reading of Antipater’s second formula might interpret it as the obligation to exercise the rational consistency advocated by Zeus in dealing with indifferents.

Diogenes and Antipater (in his first formula) expressly emphasize man’s second duty to select the indifferents. In Antipater’s second formula, however, man’s efforts towards “acquiring” (τυγχάνειν) the indifferents replace his duty of selection. Plu-

<sup>61</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.76.9f=SVF III Diog. 44ff (tr. Long and Sedley I 357); D.L. 7.88; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.21 p.179 Sylb. (I 497 Pott.). Diogenes and Clement omit καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ.

<sup>62</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.76.11–15=SVF III Ant.57; tr. Long and Sedley I 357. Clement’s single formula (*Strom.* 2.21 p.179 Sylb. [V.2 497 Pott.] = SVF III Ant.58) conflates the two: Ἀντίπατρος ... τὸ τέλος κείσθαι ἐν τῷ διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπολαμβάνει.

<sup>63</sup> For continuity between the formulae of Chrysippus and Diogenes see Long (*supra* n.59) 68–73; A. Bonhöffer, “Die Telosformel des Stoikers Diogenes,” *Philologus* 67 (1908) 582–605.

<sup>64</sup> Long and Sedley I 408; Sen. *Ep.* 92.11ff; cf. εὐλογος in definitions of εὐπάθεια: *supra* 251.

tarch provides the only clue for why he may have chosen to define rationally consistent selection as a rationally consistent attempt "to acquire" the indifferents: Antipater was forced to defend himself against the attacks of Carneades.<sup>65</sup>

### III. Carneades and the Stoic *Telos*

It is especially difficult to discuss the impact of Carneades upon Stoic doctrine because he cannot be held accountable for positions adopted for the sake of argument. As his attacks on the Stoa are *ad hoc* (e.g. Cic. *Orat.* 3.80; Lactant. *Div. Institut.* 5.14.3ff, *Epit.* 50.8), we not only have to sift out from divergent sources what Carneades may have said, but must also discover the original context. Scholars have attempted to reconstruct the fragments of his debate with Antipater from Plutarch and Cicero.<sup>66</sup> Plutarch complicates the task if, as generally assumed, Carneades began his criticism with the argument that Plutarch presents last.<sup>67</sup> Carneades, a student of Diogenes in dialectic (Cic. *Acad.* 2.98) and possibly thirty years his junior (Long [*supra* n.59] 75f), served with him in the Athenian embassy to Rome (155 B.C.). These considerations and Plutarch's clue (*supra* n.65) suggest that Carneades attacked the *telos*-formula of Diogenes via Antipater's first formula (essentially the same as Diogenes') and that Antipater attempted to answer the criticism of Carneades with his second formula.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1072<sub>F</sub> (=SVF III Ant.59 part), 1071<sub>A</sub> (=III 195 [*supra* n.20]); cf. III Ant.4-7.

<sup>66</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1070<sub>F</sub>-72<sub>F</sub>=SVF III 195, 26, Ant.59; Cic. *Fin.* 3.22, 5.16-20 and *Tusc.* 5.84=III 18, 497, 44. It is generally inferred from Plutarch's reference to Carneades at 1072<sub>F</sub> that Carneades is the indirect source for the whole passage: Long and Sedley I 407-10. For the debate between Antipater and Carneades see also B. Inwood, "Goal and Target in Stoicism," *JPhilos* 83 (1986) 547-56; Irwin (*supra* n.56) 228-34; Long (*supra* n.59); H. Reiner, "Die ethische Weisheit der Stoiker heute," *Gymnasium* 96 (1969) 330-57; O. Rieth, "Über das *Telos* der Stoiker," *Hermes* 69 (1934) 13-45; Rist (*supra* n.57) 161-67; M. Soreth, "Die zweite *Telos*formel des Antipater von Tarsos," *ArchGeschPhilos* 50 (1968) 48-72; G. STRIKER, "Antipater or the Art of Living," in Schofield and Striker (*supra* n.22: hereafter 'Striker') 185-204; and, most importantly, R. ALPERS-GÖLZ, *Der Begriff ΣΚΟΠΟΣ in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte* (=Spudasmata 8 [New York 1976: hereafter 'Alpers-Gözl']) 62-101, 131-35.

<sup>67</sup> Long and Sedley I 407f; Striker 189f; Long (*supra* n.59) 76.

<sup>68</sup> Striker 189; Long and Sedley I 409.

Against Antipater, Carneades argues that the objects of selection must be valuable only to the extent that they contribute to the end, which is reasoning well in their selection. This produces “the end is reasoning well in the selections of things having value with respect to reasoning well” (τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν ἀξίαν ἔχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν).<sup>69</sup> The Stoics, in response, argue that “selective value” is determined not by the contribution of the indifferents to the end, but solely on the basis of their accordance with nature.<sup>70</sup> Carneades then asks why, if they have value, their acquisition is not an end in itself. Plutarch’s account of the debate presents first the argument that it is “contrary to common conception” (παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν) that life should have two τέλη and σκοποί: παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐστὶ δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκειῖσθαι τοῦ βίου καὶ μὴ πάντων ὅσα πράττομεν ἐφ’ ἓν τι γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος ἐπ’ ἄλλο δὲ τῶν πραττομένων ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι.<sup>71</sup> The distinction of *telos* (“goal”) and *skopos* (“target”) derives from the Stoic position that living is an art (τέχνη). Antipater’s *telos*-formula seems to refer to this doctrine. As the Stoic understanding of this art involves many interrelated concepts, it may be useful to consider how this “art of living” differs from other arts before treating Plutarch’s technical distinction between *telos* and *skopos*.

The so-called *Carneadea divisio*, in which Carneades claims to represent all the possible goals of life (Cic. *Fin.* 5.16–20), begins with Carneades’ assertion that every art must be distinct from what it is supposed to accomplish: *est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti*.<sup>72</sup> The Stoics, on the other hand, suppose a kind of τέχνη (*ars*) whose purpose is merely its practice, a στοχαστικὴ τέχνη (“aiming art”).<sup>73</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1072E=SVF III Ant.58 part; cf. Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 2.164.7, 167.13–17.

<sup>70</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.80.7–13, 83.10–84.2=SVF III 124; D.L. 7.105=III 126.

<sup>71</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1070F–71A: “It is contrary to common conception that two goals and targets of life be set up and that there be not one single point of reference for everything we do, but it is even further contrary to common conception that one thing be the goal and that each of the things we do be referred to something else.”

<sup>72</sup> *Fin.* 5.16: “for it is evident that no craft is concerned just with itself, but the craft and its object are distinct” (tr. Long and Sedley I 403).

<sup>73</sup> Striker 194f; Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 2.159.34; Cic. *Fin.* 3.24.

Their understanding of the *στοχαστική τέχνη* is combined with their definition of the *telos*: “τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα· κακείνως οὐ χάριν τᾶλλα, αὐτὸ δ’ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα.” Καὶ πάλιν· “ἐφ’ ὃ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πραττόμενα καθηκόντως τὴν ἀναφορὰν λαμβάνει, αὐτὸ δ’ ἐπ’ οὐδέν.”<sup>74</sup> The key word in this definition is ἕνεκα (or χάριν: “for the sake of”). The *telos* is the expression of life’s purpose. A *telos*-formula must not contain “for the sake of” or an infinite regress occurs. The *telos* is the end of the line: as Stobaeus says, αὐτὸ δ’ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα. It follows that the art that describes it must *be* the purpose and not *have* another purpose of its own: the practice of the *στοχαστική τέχνη* of virtue is the *telos*—not an easy concept to grasp. This craft has no other purpose. Its purpose is its practice, because this “aiming art” is the practice of virtue that needs no further purpose. The substitution of ἕνεκα for πρὸς in Antipater’s formula serves Carneades’ purposes well. Posidonius’ use of that word, moreover, is unlikely to have been casual or a simple error, because the most basic of all principles of Hellenistic philosophy is that the *telos* must be the “end” of all activity of life (Long and Sedley I 398).

The Stoics answer the charge in the *divisio* that no craft may be concerned solely with itself, *i.e.*, contain its purpose within itself and depend upon nothing external for its fulfillment:

*Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. Et tamen est etiam alia cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt, non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem—illi appellant κατορθώματα, omnes numeros virtutis continent. Sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa.*<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.46.5–10=SVF III 2: “‘The *telos* is that for the sake of which all things are properly done but which is itself done for the sake of nothing,’ and in the same way as, ‘for the sake of which, everything else; itself for the sake of nothing.’ And again, ‘that to which everything done in life properly has its reference; itself referred to nothing.’”

<sup>75</sup> Cic. *Fin.* 3.24=SVF III 11: “For we do not consider that wisdom is similar to navigation or medicine, but rather to acting, as I just said, and dancing, so that the *telos*, *i.e.*, the practice of the craft, is contained within itself and is not sought outside of it. But there is yet another difference between wisdom and these other crafts, namely that in the case of other crafts, the products which have been made correctly do not contain all of the parts of the crafts from which they come; but those things which the Stoics call *katorthomata*, contain

Cicero undoubtedly attempts to answer the charge that in crafts such as medicine the nature of the *telos* is disputed. From the patient's viewpoint, the doctor's *telos* ought to be "to save the patient"; from the doctor's standpoint, it ought to be "to do everything he can." In Alexander of Aphrodisias' discussion of medicine (*Top.* 32.27–33.6), the "external result" (τὸ προκείμενον) of the craft of medicine is "to save the patient" (τὸ σῶσαι); the "function" of the doctor (ἔργον) is "to do everything in his power" (πάντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ποιῆσαι). These last words echo Antipater's second formula for the end (*supra* n.62), but Alexander's προκείμενον and ἔργον come from Aristotle (*Rh.* 1355b8–14, *Top.* 101b5–15).<sup>76</sup> Medicine was one of the stock examples of the "aiming art" because of the obvious rôle of factors beyond the practitioner's control, e.g., fortune. For Aristotelians the external *telos* should be the result. The Stoics rejected this view and placed the *telos* with the practitioner's function. Thus the Stoics had to sacrifice the position of common sense that the purpose of medicine is to heal for the paradoxical claim that the purpose of a stochastic craft is its practice. The difficulties attendant upon such a position led them to reject medicine as a fitting *exemplum*.

It seems to do some violence to the concept of medicine to say, as Cicero's last line demands, that the practice of medicine is concerned entirely with itself and that the patient is not an integral part of practicing that art: the patient is not only the subject matter upon which it is practiced but also a participant in the healing process.<sup>77</sup> The Stoics must surely have regarded medicine as a stochastic craft, but one insufficiently similar to that of virtue, perhaps because of the ability of τύχη to disrupt the craft of medicine but not the craft of virtue.

The central issues in the debate over this art of living, then, were how its products or results differ from those of other

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all the elements of virtue. For wisdom alone is concerned completely with itself."

<sup>76</sup> Irwin 229f; Long and Sedley I 409f. Alexander's τὸ πάντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ποιῆσαι curiously echoes Posidonius (*supra* n.16)—perhaps from a common source.

<sup>77</sup> Alpers-Gözl's instructive list (67f) of the Academic and Peripatetic uses of the craft of medicine in the doxography of the *stochastike technē* reveals the probable source of Carneades' inspiration for his approach to the Stoic conception of the *skopos*. It is unclear in what technical language the Stoics described medicine.

crafts, and in what sense it is rightly called an “aiming” art. An important question is at what does one aim while practicing virtue, if virtue is practiced for its own sake. In both Greek and English the image of an archer and target suggests that the target is the goal, and that we succeed or fail in our aim as we hit or miss the target. The concept is embedded deeply in Greek thought, as ἀμαρτία (“missing the mark”) shows. But the Stoics did not conceive of happiness or virtue in a common sense way, and their use of the image of archery was equally paradoxical: if virtue is practiced for its own sake, and if the practice of virtue is like the art of aiming, either it must not matter whether we hit the target or not, or the target as well as the art of aiming must be virtue in some sense.

Cleanthes and Chrysippus are credited with making the following distinction between *telos* and *skopos* (“what one looks at” or uses as a “sight”):

Τέλος δέ φασι εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ ἔνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν οὐδενὸς δὲ ἔνεκα· τοῦτο δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, ἔτι, ταῦτο ὄντος, ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν. Τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ Ζήνων ὠρίσατο τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· εὐδαιμονία δ’ ἐστὶν εὐροια βίου. Κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης τῷ ὄρω τούτῳ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρυσίππος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τούτων πάντες, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι λέγοντες οὐχ ἕτεραν τοῦ εὐδαιμόνου βίου, καίτοι γε λέγοντες τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπὸν ἐκκεῖσθαι, τέλος δ’ εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταῦτόν εἶναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν.<sup>78</sup>

Stoic logic dictates that the *telos* must stand in relation to the *skopos* as “predicate” (κατηγορημα) to “body” (σῶμα). The *skopos* is a body like εὐδαιμονία (“happiness”); the *telos* is a predicate like τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν (“to be happy”).<sup>79</sup> The *telos* is τὸ

<sup>78</sup> Stob. *Ecl.* 2.77.16–27=SVF III 16: “The Stoics say that the *telos* is to be happy, for the sake of which all things are done, but which itself is done for the sake of nothing. They say that happiness subsists in ‘living in accordance with virtue’, or in ‘living by rational consistency’, or yet again (it being the same thing) in ‘living in accordance with nature’. Zeno defined happiness in this way, ‘happiness is a good flow of life’. Cleanthes used this definition in his writings, as did Chrysippus and all those after them. They say that happiness is not different from the happy life, but they do make the distinction that happiness is set out as a *skopos*, while the *telos* is to ‘acquire’ happiness, which is the same thing as being happy.”

<sup>79</sup> *Supra* n.78. A predicate is a verbal idea expressed by the infinitive with no expressed subject: Stob. *Ecl.* 2.76.19ff=SVF III 3; Origen, *in Ps.*, Migne, *PG* II 1053. Stoic *telos*-formulae are all expressed as infinitives, and the idea is that

τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, where the sense of τὸ τυχεῖν seems to be less “to acquire” than “to make predicated of oneself.” To use τυγχάνω in this way is technical if not counter-intuitive. Its usual sense with a genitive object is “to happen upon” something, “to get” it, with the recognition that “fortune” (τύχη), has brought it. But the Stoics do not hold that one “happens upon” or “acquires” happiness by chance. Rather one “puts it into practice” by living according to virtue. I read this important logical fragment to suggest that τυγχάνω may have signified less “to acquire” than “to predicate” in this precise context. This is justified on the grounds that all Stoic ethics are devoted to the proposition that happiness is within the power of the wise man. He is immune to fortune and has the power to “bring about” (predicate of himself) his own happiness.

These concepts applied to the art of aiming would render virtue the art (*techne*) in one sense but also the target (*skopos*) in another sense, and the *telos* not “to get” virtue so much as “to practice” it. Stobaeus confirms that the Stoics did regard virtue as “an art concerned with the whole of life” (*Ecl.* 2.66.20–67.1: ἀρετήν, περὶ ὅλον οὔσαν τὸν βίον τέχνην). But, paradoxically, if one aims properly, he *is* practicing virtue and cannot miss the target of virtue. This paradox cannot be avoided by positing that the *skopos* is not virtue but something else like “happiness.” Virtue is not practiced to acquire happiness; happiness comes about only when virtue is practiced for its own sake.<sup>80</sup> A key concept in the Stoic position is ὑπάρχειν (“to belong to,” “subsist in”). For Stobaeus, “to be happy subsists in to live in accor-

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man should make himself such that he could be the subject: I live in accordance with nature. As man’s goal is to be happy, Chrysippus holds that happiness (ἡ εὐδαιμονία) is the *skopos* and its acquisition, *i.e.*, to have happiness (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) the *telos*. Because for Stoics the cause of a predicate is a body, the *skopos* is the cause of the *telos*: without happiness the thing, ‘to have happiness’ and ‘to be happy’, do not exist: Stob. *Ecl.* 1.138.14–139.4=SVF I 89, II 336; A. A. Long, “The Early Stoic Concept of Moral Choice,” in F. Bossier *et al.*, edd., *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought: Studia Gerardo Verbeke* (London 1976) 77–92. This Stoic distinction between body and predicate also separates the good from what possesses the good. As a body the good is “choiceworthy” (αἰρετόν), but what possesses the good, a benefit (ὠφέλημα), is “what has to be chosen” (αἰρετέον): Stob. *Ecl.* 2.72.19, 78.7=SVF III 88f. Examples of αἰρετέα are τὸ φρονεῖν, τὸ σωφρονεῖν, and other virtues conceived as verbs, whereas the αἰρετά include φρόνησις and other virtues conceived as nouns. Man does not choose the good, he chooses to have it. He does not choose virtue, he chooses to practice it: Long 89.

<sup>80</sup> Long and Sedley I 399; see SVF III 38–48 with 106.

dance with virtue” (cf. D.L. 7.89=SVF III 39). Happiness will automatically become predicated of the agent when virtue is practiced. As Chrysippus says, “only predicates that are actual attributes are said to belong; for instance, walking around belongs to me when I am walking around, but it does not belong when I am lying down or sitting” (Stob. *Ecl.* 1.106.5f=SVF II 509: ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει). A rough paraphrase might be that predicates such as the *telos* of being happy (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) only “belong or subsist” when we practice them; so in the case of being happy (as we cannot practice happiness directly), the *telos* “belongs to or consists in” practicing virtue.

It is a formidable muddle: (1) the *telos* is “to be happy,” which subsists in “to live in accordance with virtue”; (2) the *skopos* is “happiness,” but this must also subsist in the art (τέχνη) of virtue, because (3) the *telos* is also τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, which should mean “to hit the target” but comes to mean “to predicate the art of virtue” of oneself or “to practice” it. The reason for this manipulation of a familiar concept may be found in the Stoic dictum that “virtue is sufficient for happiness” (D.L. 7.127=SVF III 49: αὐτάρκη τ’ εἶναι αὐτήν (sc. ἀρετήν) πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν). Such preferred indifferents as health and wealth are not necessary for virtue. This is the opposite of the Aristotelian position, which is also the position of common sense. The Stoics use “target” paradoxically to communicate their thesis: “the aim is the thing, not the target.” As in Greek art, e.g. Myron’s *Diskobolos*, the practice of virtue is a tension. On this view, the virtue of the archer is the aim, not hitting the target. But then if virtue is a goal-oriented craft, the craftsman cannot miss his target when he practices it correctly: the practice of virtue always hits its target—virtue.

When Carneades accuses Antipater of positing two *tele* and two *skopoi*, he undoubtedly pits the common-sense image of aiming against the Stoic paradox of the “aim that never fails.” He gives some indication of why he accuses the Stoa of two *tele* and two *skopoi* when he discusses the relation of the preferred indifferents (what he calls τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν)<sup>81</sup> to the *telos*:

<sup>81</sup> Cicero frequently uses the phrase *prima naturae* as though interchangeable with the Stoic προηγμένα. Inwood (218–33) summarizes the problem of Carneades’ influence on these texts. See also Long (*supra* n.59) 70 n.32. Inwood (220 with nn.13f) follows Hirzel (*supra* n.17) III 304f and A. Bonhöf-

τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως ἐκεῖνα δ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ ὡσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὴν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα.<sup>82</sup> Carneades' use of ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται is instructive. Elsewhere Chrysippus uses ὑποκεῖμαι in participial form to modify *skopos*: τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπὸν (Plut. *Mor.* 1040F=SVF III 24: "the underlying *skopos*"). In the passage quoted above, Carneades distinguishes "to select and to take" (τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν) from "the things themselves and the acquisition of them" (αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν). When he calls the former the *telos* and says that the latter is "some sort of underlying matter," he intends for us to conclude that the latter must be *skopoi* for the Stoics. This is the best way to make sense of his claim that they have two *tele* and two *skopoi*.<sup>83</sup> The two *tele* are "to select" the preferred indifferents and "to take" them; the two *skopoi* are "the preferred indifferents" and "the acquisition of the preferred indifferents."<sup>84</sup>

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fer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart 1894) 175ff. Possibly Carneades' argument against the Stoic position on man's first impulses in conjunction with his attack on the *telos* (Cic. *Fin.* 5.16–20) is the source of this conflation. Inwood doubts that Chrysippus used the term "primary natural things" and the only evidence that Antipater used the term, aside from this passage, is Posidonius at Galen *PHP* 5.328.8–18=EK 187.25–37, which I shall argue is polemically derived by way of Carneades. προηγουμένων may be synonymous with προηγμένα, or it may be Antipater's translation of Carneades' πρώτα, or neither. In the textbook definition attributed to Zeno, προηγμένα are called indifferent things that we select κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.84.24–85.1=SVF III 128). Antipater may imply some difference between things themselves and the activity of the reason that selects them, but it is unclear what this difference is.

<sup>82</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1071B=SVF III 195: "They say that the *telos* is 'to select' and 'to take' these things [*sc.* τὰ πρώτα κατὰ φύσιν ] prudently, but the things themselves and 'to acquire' them are not the *telos*, but some sort of underlying matter with selective value."

<sup>83</sup> For λαβεῖν as a technical term related to selection see SVF I 191, III 118–22, 131f, 142. Cherniss claims (*supra* n.20: 748 n.d) *skopos* as a synonym for *telos*, thus meaning, if I understand him, that not four but two things are involved. I argue that Carneades allows the distinction, but manipulates the definition of *skopos*.

<sup>84</sup> Carneades' distinction between λαβεῖν and τυγχάνειν is that a verbal form of the noun λῆψις implies the use of reason and must be understood as the product of a rational selection. τυγχάνειν on the other hand implies only the getting without rational selection. In my view Carneades' two *tele* and *skopoi* form pairs: the *telos* of "selection" is practiced by applying reason to the subject matter (*skopos*) of "the indifferents," whereas the *telos* of "taking"

Carneades tries to establish that, by Antipater's own formula, the *skopos* in the aiming art of virtue must be the preferred indifferents. After all, Antipater had said that the *telos* was "to do everything in one's power continuously and undeviatingly with a view to obtaining the predominating things that accord with nature" (*supra* n.62). He takes Antipater to mean that the preferred indifferents are the *skopos*, and the *telos* is "to acquire" them. As the Stoics say that the *telos* is "to acquire" the *skopos*, clearly the preferred indifferents should be the *skopos*, at least for Carneades.

Antipater's *telos*-formula is difficult enough to grasp without the intervention of Carneades and without the problem of stitching together the fragmentary remains of so sophisticated an assault upon so subtle a doctrine. But the only evidence in which Antipater explains himself—a very difficult and misunderstood text with all the Greek concepts represented in Latin—complicates these problems:

*Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Etenim, si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam—sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut conliniet,—huic in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint facienda, ut conliniet; et tamen, ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur, sit hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.*<sup>85</sup>

is practiced by applying reason to the subject matter of "acquiring" the indifferents: man aims at the things to select them and aims at acquiring them in order to take them. He may, however, have arranged the terms chastically.

<sup>85</sup> Cic. *Fin.* 3.22=*SVF* III 18: "But from the outset any confusion arising from this must be removed so that no one will think that there are two *tele*. For if it were someone's *propositum* (*skopos* or *prokeimenon*?) to aim a spear or an arrow at something—just as we say that there is a *telos*, this would be for him to do everything in his power in order to aim—in an analogy of this kind he must do everything in order to aim; and nevertheless, this, namely that he should do everything by which to attain his *propositum* (*skopos* or *prokeimenon*?) would be his *telos* so to speak, the kind of thing we call the highest good in life, but that he should strike would be something 'to be selected' as it were, but not something 'to be chosen.'" The text with dashes supplied is of Alpers-Gözl 80, accepted by Long and Sedley II 397f. The translation with Greek inserted is mine. For the history of debate over the text see Alpers-Gözl 75–82; Long and Sedley II 398.

Besides the textual uncertainties of this passage, determining the Greek concepts behind these Latin terms, especially *propositum*, is very problematic. *Skopos* and *prokeimenon* are possible equivalents of *propositum* (“something that has been set up”), but each of these Greek words has more than one definition. The substance of the Carneades-Antipater debate turns upon a precise understanding of this passage.

Irwin claims (230) that in the Stoic view of stochastic crafts “they call the external result the ‘objective’ or ‘work proposed’ (*prokeimenon ergon*, Latin *propositum*; Alex. in *Top.* 33, 15), and the competent practice of the craft the end (*telos*, Alex. in *Top.* 33.17–22; *Quaest.* 61.12–23=SVF III 19).” He implies that *prokeimenon ergon* is a Stoic technical term translated into Latin as *propositum*, although *prokeimenon ergon* occurs only at Alex. in *Top.* 33.15, a discussion of non-stochastic crafts with Aristotelian terminology.<sup>86</sup> Stoic use of this phrase is (to my knowledge) otherwise unattested.

The possibility that the Stoics employed *prokeimenon* (either alone or as shorthand for *to prokeimenon telos*, *ton prokeimenon skopon*, or *to prokeimenon ergon*) depends entirely on Alexander, our only source, and it is unclear whether his usage is Stoic or a description of a Stoic position in Aristotelian language. Irwin certainly errs in associating the *prokeimenon* with *propositum* in the simile of the archer. Striker and Long and Sedley erroneously follow Irwin<sup>87</sup> because of the interpretation of a controversial passage from Alexander:

Εἰ τῶν στοχαστικῶν τεχνῶν τέλος εἶναί τις λέγοι τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ’ αὐτὰς ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προκειμένου τυγχάνειν, πῶς οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ αὐταὶ τοῦ οἰκείου τεύξονται τέλους ταῖς οὐ στοχαστικαῖς τῶν τεχνῶν; δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο μάλ-

<sup>86</sup> The reading of this line is uncertain. Bruns prints ἐν γὰρ ταύταις τέλοσ τὸ προκειμένον ἔργον τῷ ἔπεσθαι τὸ ἔργον τοῖς χάριν αὐτοῦ γινομένοις (“For in these crafts, the *telos* is ‘the proposed function’, because the function is accompanied by the results for the sake of which it is practiced”). τέλος, however, does not appear in all manuscripts. Without it the line would mean “and in these crafts, the external result is the function, because the function is accompanied by the results for the sake of which it is practiced.” That is to say, what the craft of shoemaking is intended to do does not differ from what the competent practitioner will accomplish by following the craft correctly. Unlike the doctor whose function is to “do everything he can” and whose external result is “to save the patient,” the shoemaker’s function, to make shoes, and his external result are the same. Either he has made shoes or he failed in his *telos*.

<sup>87</sup> Striker 195–98; Long and Sedley I 409f, II 398; Irwin 230f.

ιστα διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων αἰ στοχαστικά [καί] τῷ μὴ ὁμοίως τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνειν. καθ' οὓς μὲν τέλος ἐστὶν αὐταῖς τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ προκειμένου, διαφέροισιν ἂν ταύτη· καθ' οὓς δὲ τὸ προκειμένον ἐστὶν αὐταῖς τέλος, οὐ καὶ ταύτου τέλους μὴ ὁμοίως τυγχάνει, διαφέροισιν (ἂν) αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον αὐταῖς τὸ τέλος ἔχειν. ἐκείναι μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γινομένοις ἔπεσθαι τὸ οὐ χάριν γίνονται, καὶ τὴν ἀποτυχίαν αὐταῖς τοῦ προκειμένου κατὰ τὴν διαμαρτίαν τῶν γινομένων, οὐ τεχνικῶς γινομένων, ἔπεσθαι, τέλος ἔχουσι τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ προκειμένου· ἴσον γὰρ ἐν ἐκείναις τῷ πάντα τὰ παρ' αὐτὰς ποιῆσαι πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ προκειμένου τὸ καὶ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ· ταῦτα γὰρ ποιούντων τὰ παρ' αὐτὰς γίνεται. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν στοχαστικῶν τῷ μὴ πάντως τοῖς γινομένοις κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔπεσθαι τὸ οὐ χάριν, διὰ τὸ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν ἐκείνου πολλῶν, ἃ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ μόνῃ τῇ τέχνῃ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην γινόμενα μὴ ὠρίσθαι, μηδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ποιητικὰ τῷ μὴ πάντῃ ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν προσφέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ γέ τινα καὶ ἄλλως ἐν αὐταῖς οὐχ ὡς προσεδοκᾶτο ἔπεσθαι, οὐ τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ προκειμένου τέλος ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀποπληρῶσαι τὰ τῆς τέχνης. ἢ τέλος μὲν καὶ ταύταις τὸ τυχεῖν τούτου οὐ χάριν πάντα τὰ παρ' αὐτὰς ποιούσι, διὰ τοῦ πάντα τὰ παρ' αὐτὰς ποιῆσαι, ἔργον δὲ ἴδιον αὐτῶν τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ' αὐτὰς πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ προκειμένου ποιῆσαι τῷ μὴ μόνον τοῦτο ἀρκεῖν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προκειμένου τυχεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖν καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ἃ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῇ τέχνῃ.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>88</sup> *Quaest.* 2.16=SVF III 19: "If someone should say that the *telos* of the *stochastikai technai* (STs) is 'to do everything in one's power with a view to acquiring the *prokeimenon*', how will they achieve their proper *telos* differently from the *non-stochastikai technai* (NSTs)? STs seem to differ from other *technai* especially in this, namely that they acquire their *telos* differently. According to some (*sc.* the Stoics), to acquire the *prokeimenon* is the *telos* in STs, so they would differ in this way (*sc.* having different *prokeimena* or acquiring them differently). According to others (*sc.* the Peripatetics), the *prokeimenon* is the *telos* in STs, and STs do not acquire the same *telos* differently; rather they would differ from NSTs in having a different *telos*. For NSTs achieve that for the sake of which they are practiced by following the rules of the *techne*, and in NSTs the failure to achieve the *prokeimenon* is a result of failing to follow the rules of the craft, *i.e.*, the craft is not being practiced as it should be, and so these have as their *telos* the acquisition of the *prokeimenon*. For in NSTs that would be equivalent to doing everything in one's power with a view to the acquisition of the *prokeimenon* and the acquisition of it. That is because these results are in the power of the craftsmen. But STs achieve that for the sake of which they are practiced not entirely by following the rules of the *techne*, because it lacks many things with reference to the acquisition of the *prokeimenon* not contained in the *techne* itself; moreover the same results in accordance with the *techne* are not assured, nor are the things productive of the same results because they cannot be applied in

Von Arnim's inclusion of this text as a Stoic fragment is questionable. Although Alexander begins with a paraphrase of Antipater's second *telos*-formula, it does not necessarily follow that Alexander used exclusively technical Stoic language to treat a Stoic problem. In Aristotle *prokeimenon* means "the proposed" (*Top.* 101b12ff), where it should stand for *to prokeimenon telos* ("the intended goal"), *i.e.*, the "external result." When Alexander uses the term freely (*e.g.* in *Top.* 101b5), he is probably following Aristotle rather than Antipater, for whom we have no independent evidence at all. Alexander's return to the problem of stochastic crafts at *Quaest.* 2.16 possibly resumes where his commentary on the *Topica* left off, *i.e.*, he continues in Aristotelian language to discuss a Stoic objection to Aristotle. Antipater's use of *to prokeimenon* as "external result" cannot be disproved and Irwin may yet be correct, but one should begin with more reliable evidence if possible.

Use of κέῖμαι and its compounds in both the Carneades-Antipater debate and fragments on the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts is instructive. Alpers-Gözl's collection of fragments on *skopos* and *telos* readily shows that the Stoics never spoke of *to prokeimenon* as a separate technical idea for the "external result" of a stochastic craft; rather they used various forms of κέῖμαι together with *skopos* to describe it as something that is "set up or out" (like a target) or "corresponding to/associated with" the *telos*. She cites the following fragments with the exception of the fifth example, which I add:

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exactly the same way, rather all or at least some of the results in STs will turn out otherwise than was expected; so the *telos* is not the acquisition of the *prokeimenon*, but the fulfillment of the rules of the *techne*. Or the *telos*, also in STs is to acquire that for the sake of which one does everything in one's power with a view to the acquisition of the *prokeimenon*, although this alone (*sc.* doing everything in one's power or following the rules of the craft) is not sufficient for the attainment of the *prokeimenon*; rather other things not contained in the *techne* are needed." Cf. in *Top.* 33.17f. The text is that of I. Bruns, ed., *Supplementum Aristotelicum* II.2 (Berlin 1892) 61. Von Arnim's emendations and omissions (*e.g.* Bruns lines 23–28) do not really solve the manifest difficulties of sense. I offer this translation, despite some uncertainty about text and sense, because (to my knowledge) it has never been translated fully. I follow von Arnim in omitting οὐ before διαφέρειεν at p.7 line 5 (Bruns line 10). Von Arnim's apparatus does not show the omission, nor does Bruns' in adding it. But it is manifestly the right reading, and I emend Bruns accordingly. I further emend τὰ τοῦ (Bruns line 10; von Arnim p.7 line 5) to ταύτου, thus avoiding τυγχάνει with the accusative.

(1) καίτοι γε λέγοντες, τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπὸν ἐκκεῖσθαι, τέλος δ' εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταύτον εἶναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.77.25ff=*SVF* I 554, III 16: “They also say that happiness is ‘set out’ as a target, but that the *telos* is to acquire happiness, which is the same thing as being happy”).

(2) διαφέρειν δὲ τέλος καὶ σκοπὸν ἡγοῦνται· σκοπὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐκκεῖμενον σῆμα, οὐ τυχεῖν ἐφίεσθαι τοὺς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας στοχαζομένους (*Ecl.* 2.77.1ff:<sup>89</sup> “They hold that the *telos* and the *skopos* are different. The *skopos*, they say, is the target which has been ‘set out’, and those aiming at happiness strive to acquire it”).

(3) λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν τέλος, οἷον τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον ἀναφορικῶς λέγοντες ἐπὶ τὸ παρακείμενον κατηγορήμα (*Ecl.* 2.76.19ff=*SVF* III 3: “They also say that the *skopos* is the *telos*, in the same way that they speak of the harmonious life, referring to its ‘corresponding’ predicate”).

(4) δι' ὃ ρητέον, μήτε τῶν ἀρετῶν τινα δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴν εἶναι, μήτε τῶν κακιῶν φευκτὴν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ταῦτα δεῖν ἀναφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπὸν· (Plut. *Mor.* 1040F=*SVF* III 24: “For this reason, it must be said that neither are any of the virtues choiceworthy for their own sake, nor are any of the vices worthy of avoidance; rather one must refer all of them to the ‘underlying’ *skopos*”).

(5) Παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐστὶ δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκεῖσθαι τοῦ βίου καὶ μὴ πάντων ὅσα πράττομεν ἐφ' ἓν τι γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφορὰν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος ἐπ' ἄλλο δὲ τῶν πραττομένων ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι (Plut. *Mor.* 1070F–71A: “It is contrary to common conception that two *tele* and two *skopoi* of life be ‘set up’, and that the reference for everything we do be not one thing; but it is more contrary still that the *telos* be one thing and that each thing we do be referred to yet another”).

(6) Ὅμοιον γὰρ ἔλεγεν ὁ Παναίτιος τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὡς εἰ πολλοῖς τοξόταις εἷς σκοπὸς εἴη κείμενος, ἔχοι δ' οὗτος ἐν αὐτῷ γραμμὰς διαφόρους τοῖς χρώμασιν· εἴθ' ἕκαστος μὲν στοχάζοιτο τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἤδη δ' ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ πατάξαι εἰς τὴν λευκὴν εἰ τύχοι γραμμὴν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ εἰς τὴν μέλαιναν, ἄλλος (δὲ) διὰ τοῦ εἰς ἄλλο τι χρῶμα γραμμῆς (*Ecl.* 2.63.25–64.6=Panaetius fr. 109 part: “Panaetius said

<sup>89</sup> The text is fairly corrupt: the manuscripts read σῶμα not σῆμα and σκεπτομένους not Wytttenbach's στοχαζομένους; Wachsmuth proposes a lacuna before τοὺς. I give Alpers-Gözl's text (62). None of these problems affect the coincidence of σκοπὸν with τὸ ἐκκεῖμενον.

that what happens in the case of the virtues is similar to if a single target [*skopos*] is ‘set up’ for many archers, with different colored bands on it. Then each archer would aim at acquiring the target, but one would acquire his, if he should acquire it, by striking in the white band, another by striking in the black, and another by striking in another band”).

In the first three examples the Stoics speak of the *skopos* as something “set up or out”; Plutarch claims to quote Chrysippus verbatim in the fourth (*Mor.* 1040E: τὰς ἐκείνου λέξεις), where τὸν ὑποκείμενον σκοπὸν occurs; and Plutarch’s own polemic usage in the fifth confirms the concurrence of *skopos* and προκεῖμαι. Finally, Panaetius, who takes up the simile from Antipater, uses κεῖμαι in the same sense. All this suggests that *to prokeimenon* taken as “external result” was not Stoic at all, and if the Stoics used it, it meant *skopos*.<sup>90</sup> Thus Alexander’s *to prokeimenon* either derives from Arist. *Top.* 101b12ff (*to prokeimenon telos*) or he tries to represent the Stoic *ton prokeimenon skopon*. To prove the correctness of the first alternative, we must consider whether “external result” (Aristotelian *telos*) or *skopos* makes more sense at *Quaest.* 2.16.

The problem is how Alexander’s adaptation of Antipater’s second formula for the *telos* affects interpretation of *to prokeimenon* and *skopos*. First, Antipater’s definition of *skopos* is uncertain, if he used this word where Cicero records *propositum* in the archer simile. Rieth and Long argued from *Quaest.* 2.16 that Antipater used *skopos* to mean “external result.”<sup>91</sup> Alexander clearly substitutes τοῦ προκειμένου for Antipater’s τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν. This should mean that Alexander defines *to prokeimenon* in the formula as the “preferred indifferent” or the “external result” of a stochastic craft. Irwin, Striker, and Long and Sedley rightly argue (*supra* n.87) that Antipater cannot have intended *skopos* for τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν or “external result.” As Irwin puts it (228 n.25), “For virtue is not sufficient for its preferred external results; and if these constitute happiness, virtue will turn out to be insufficient for

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Stob. *Ecl.* 2.47.8ff, which occurs just before Arius’ eclectic discussion of Aristotelian doctrine on the passions using Stoic terminology: Καὶ ἔστι σκοπὸς μὲν τὸ προκεείμενον εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν, οἷον ἀσπίς τοξόταις· τέλος δ’ (ἢ) τοῦ προκειμένου τεύξις (“The *skopos* is what is set out for acquisition, like a shield to archers; but the *telos* is the acquisition of what is set out.”). On Arius’ eclecticism see n.196 *infra*.

<sup>91</sup> Rieth (*supra* n.66) 28f, 32ff; Long (*supra* n.59) 78f.

happiness, but sufficient for getting happiness. These odd results suggest that Rieth and Long misuse the Stoic doctrine.” To avoid the contradiction, it must be argued either that Antipater deviated from the Chrysippean definition of *skopos* (*supra* n.79), or that he did not understand it as “external result.” In the Chrysippean doctrine the *telos* is described as an art of living; the *skopos* would be this art conceived as a body and the *telos* the “acquisition” or “practice” of this art. Does Antipater observe this Chrysippean distinction?

From the problems inherent in Rieth and Long’s position, it is possible to see Alexander in the proper light: Stoics used phrases like σκοπὸν ἐκκεῖσθαι or προκεῖσθαι (as Alpers-Gözl’s survey shows); *skopos* should not mean “external result”; and *skopos* and *to prokeimenon* in Stoic usage should refer to the same thing, namely the *telos* conceived as a body like εὐδαιμονία. It is obvious from *Quaest.* 2.16 (quoted *supra* 267f) that Alexander’s *to prokeimenon* must mean “external result.” When Alexander says that the craft is not sufficient for the acquisition of the *prokeimenon*, he clearly means “external result.” All other evidence suggests that the Stoics used forms of κεῖμαι to modify *skopos* and that *to prokeimenon* ought to mean *skopos*. Either Alexander stands alone in his testimony on Stoic usage, or he uses Aristotelian terminology. In response to Irwin (230), if *to prokeimenon ergon* is a Stoic technical term, it is a *hapax legomenon*. Further, at *Quaest.* 2.16 Alexander uses Aristotelian language to describe the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts—and with good reason, for as Irwin shows (229f), the Stoics were answering Aristotle. Alexander merely frames their response in Aristotelian terminology. Thus the Stoics never used *prokeimenon* in the way that recent critics suggest: either they did not use it all or it stood for *skopos*.

It is now possible to translate Cicero’s *propositum*. At *Fin.* 5.16 (*supra* n.72) it serves as Carneades’ word for “the external object of a craft” in the *divisio* (*supra* 259). Carneades probably used the Aristotelian conception of crafts in his argument against the Stoa; so he may have called it, like Aristotle, a *telos*, or a *skopos* if he attempted to manipulate the Stoic position on *telos* and *skopos*. In Carneades’ response to Antipater’s simile of the archer, βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν (“to hit the target”) replaces τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν (Plut. *Mor.* 1071c). As Carneades usually takes Stoic premises and definitions, it is very likely that he chose to attack the Stoic concept of stochastic crafts by manipulating the common-sense definition of *skopos* as “tar-

get.” He could then appeal to the Stoa’s doctrine that the *telos* is τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ and argue that by Stoic premises the preferred indifferent ought to be the *skopos* and their acquisition, the *telos*.

Antipater also probably used *skopos* in the archer-simile (*Fin.* 3.22=SVF III 18): *propositum* first occurs in the context *si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam* (“if it were someone’s *propositum* to aim a spear or an arrow at something”). If *propositum* were translated as *prokeimenon* in Alexander’s sense as “external result,” the passage would read: “if it were someone’s external result to aim.” To make sense of this patent absurdity, most critics choose to interpret *conliniare* as “to succeed in aiming,” *i.e.*, “to aim at and acquire the external result”; Alpers-Gözl, on the other hand, chooses to take *propositum* not as a technical term but as a verbal form of *propono*.<sup>92</sup> Both alternatives are unpersuasive. The current understanding of the archer-simile is based upon an untenable definition of *conliniare*. The only remaining choices, *skopos* and *prokeimenon*=*skopos*, cause difficulties with the second occurrence of *propositum*: *ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur* (“that he should do everything by which to attain his *propositum*”), which seems close to a direct translation of Alexander’s πάντα τὰ παρ’ αὐτὰς ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ προκειμένου τυγχάνειν (*Quaest.* 2.16=SVF III 19: “to do everything in one’s power with a view to acquiring the *prokeimenon*). This apparent similarity has misled everyone into following Alexander for interpretation of the archer-simile in Cicero.

A more probable parallel for Cicero’s *ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur* occurs at Stob. *Ecl.* 2.77.1ff: σκοπὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐκκειμένον σῆμα οὗ τυχεῖν ἐφίεσθαι τοὺς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας στοχαζομένους (“the *skopos* is the target which has been set out, and those aiming at happiness strive to acquire it”). Despite the textual problems (*supra* n.89), the Stoics could speak of “striving to acquire the *skopos*.” Panaetius’ archer-simile confirms this: εἴθ’ ἕκαστος μὲν στοχάζοιτο τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.63.25–64.6=Panaetius fr. 109: “if each one should

<sup>92</sup> See *supra* nn.87, 91. Alpers-Gözl (132–35 with n.515) concludes that *conliniare* cannot mean “to hit.” Moreover τὸ στοχάζεσθαι, which will not admit of this significance, most likely lies behind it. Panaetius’ archer-simile (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.63.25–66.12) clearly distinguishes between “aiming” and “acquiring the target” or “striking it.” The latter two, τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ and τὸ πατάξαι respectively, are in no way confused with τὸ στοχάζεσθαι.

aim at acquiring the *skopos*”). I would translate Cicero’s *quo propositum assequatur* as ἔνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, where ἔνεκα would indicate the “purpose” of the archer’s effort. The meaning of the entire phrase from *ut omnia faciat* would be “that he should do everything to attain (=for the purpose of attaining) his target.” This reading can accommodate the Chrysippean doctrine in which “to attain” means “to make predicated of oneself” and “target” signifies “the craft of virtue” (or here of “aiming”). The whole then becomes “that he should do everything to make the craft of aiming predicated of himself.”

Indeed the structure of the passage in Cicero reinforces this reading: four *ut*-clauses, two purpose and two substantive, and one relative clause of purpose.<sup>93</sup> The two *ut*-purpose clauses explain the purpose of the archer’s activity. In both the archer’s purpose—a strange claim at first face—is “to aim” (*conliniet*). The archer’s *telos* should be “to do everything to acquire his *propositum*” (*ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur*). If *propositum* still means “to aim a spear or an arrow at something” (*conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam*), we must somehow make sense of “to acquire to aim.” Alpers-Gölz rejects (134) this possibility out of hand: “es wäre sinnlos, wenn der Schütze alles tun würde, um zu zielen; und er kann nicht ein *propositum* erreichen, das im Zielen besteht.” But the Chrysippean *skopos* and τυχεῖν explain why this paradoxical turn of phrase is what Antipater intended: *conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam* describes the *propositum* as the στοχαστικὴ τέχνη, a noun idea that it is the *telos* to “put into practice,” “to predicate of oneself.”

This approach to the passage also resolves a more acute difficulty, namely that Antipater uses purpose clauses in his description of the archer’s *telos*. The *telos* is supposed to be the

<sup>93</sup> Alpers-Gölz (173 n.352a) takes *ut omnia faciat* as concessive: as *hoc* follows this *ut*-clause, it cannot stand in apposition to it. But this is a needless objection if Cicero uses chiasmus with the last two *ut*-clauses and *hoc-illud*. Long and Sedley (II 398) take this *ut*-clause as a substantival clause in apposition to *hoc*. The text should read: *Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Etenim, si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam—sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut conliniet* (Purpose)—*huic in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint facienda, ut conliniet* (Purpose); *et tamen, ut omnia faciat* (Substantival clause anticipating *hoc=ultimum*) *quo propositum assequatur* (Purpose), *sit hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat* (Substantival clause in apposition to *illud*=“acquisition of the indifferents”), *quasi seligendum, non expetendum*.

end of the line, as in the pithy dictum οὐ χάριν τᾶλλα, αὐτὸ δ' οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.46.5–10= *SVF* III 2). But Cicero expressly says that the archer's *ultimum* is *facere omnia quae possit ut conliniet* and *omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur*. In both cases the *telos* has a purpose clause embedded within it. If *quo propositum assequatur* should be translated as ἔνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, the Greek for *ut conliniet* would probably be ἔνεκα τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι. How would infinite regress be avoided in both instances? The answer must be that the *skopos* is the *telos* conceived as a noun, as Herophilus (*apud* Origen) suggests: τέλος δ' εἶναι λέγουσι κατηγορημα οὐ ἔνεκεν τὰ λοιπὰ πραττόμενα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἔνεκεν· τὸ δὲ συζυγοῦν τούτῳ, καθάπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, σκοπόν.<sup>94</sup> Origen neatly shows that οὐ ἔνεκεν τὰ λοιπὰ πραττόμενα may apply to the *skopos* as well as the *telos* and retain a distinction between the two: body and predicate e.g. "happiness" and "being happy." It is possible to give the *telos* as "to do everything for the sake of aiming," or "for the sake of making the *skopos* predicated of oneself." As the *skopos* is the *stochastike technē* conceived as a noun, that would mean "to do everything for the sake of practicing virtue" or here, "the art of aiming." In the language of Antipater's *telos*-formula, πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ is the same as πᾶν τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι, which is also the same as πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ τελοῦς.

The purpose of Cicero's simile is to distinguish κατορθώματα from καθήκοντα. His translation of Antipater gives the agent's *propositum* as "to aim a spear or an arrow at something" (*conliniare hastam aliquo aut sagittam*). This translation of *propositum* helps to reveal the true effect of the simile. The ordinary meaning of *skopos* is "target." Antipater begins with "For if it were someone's target to aim a spear or an arrow at something...." This sounds absurd because the "target" should be the "something." Antipater wants to distinguish between *propositum* and the "something" because he uses *aliquo* to stand for what the "target" ought to be. To answer Carneades, he must demonstrate the distinction between the purpose and the external result of a stochastic craft, identify the purpose of the craft with its practice, and reduce the external result to a reference

<sup>94</sup> Origen, *In Psalm.*, Migne, *PG* II 1053: "They say that the *telos* is a predicate for the sake of which everything else is done, but itself for the sake of nothing; and what is joined to this, just like 'happiness' to 'being happy', the *skopos*. For the *telos* is the end of the things to be chosen."

point inconsequential to the successful performance of the craftsman. He must take this paradoxical position in order to call the craft of virtue a “goal-oriented” craft and his simile is entirely paradoxical. Any other interpretation will do violence to his opening phrase, *si cui propositum sit conliniare*. Antipater’s fidelity to the Chrysippean position makes the archer’s target the activity itself and reduces what we think of as the target to the inconsequential *aliquo*. He reinforces this distinction throughout the simile with purpose-clauses that refer to aiming. Moreover, he concludes with the balanced *hoc-illud*, where *hoc*, representing the *telos*, refers to *ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur* and *illud*, what is “to be selected” (*seligendum*), denotes *ut feriat* (*sc. aliquid*: “to strike something”), *i.e.*, “to acquire the indifferents,” which is not the purpose of this activity but only the external result. If *assequor* translates as *τυγχάνειν* = “to predicate,” then all three uses of *propositum* in Cicero’s debate between Carneades and Antipater could be translations of *skopos*: Carneades employs it polemically in the *divisio* for external result and Antipater responds with the Chrysippean usage throughout the archer-simile.

To summarize, Antipater’s use of *πρός* in his second *telos*-formula differs sharply from *ἔνεκα* in Carneades’ formula. Antipater possibly used *ἔνεκα*, but only when its object was the *telos*, *i.e.*, the practice or ‘predication’ of the *skopos*; for saying “one does everything for the sake of the *telos*” was not controversial. Carneades gives *τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν* as the object of *ἔνεκα* in his attempt to argue: (1) that the external result of the rational selection of the indifferents is the acquisition of the indifferents; (2) that the external result of a craft should be its purpose; (3) that the purpose of the craft of virtue would then be the acquisition of the indifferents; (4) that the purpose of a craft is its end; and therefore the Stoics should call the acquisition of the indifferents the *telos*. Antipater tries to demonstrate that the Stoics do not accept the second premise, from which the equally unacceptable third premise and the conclusion follow. Carneades’ claim that the Stoics have two *tele* and two *skopoi* reveals his strategy: the claim only makes sense if *τὸ τυχεῖν* is translated as “to acquire,” so that “the things themselves” and “the acquisition of the things” become separate *skopoi* (though the Stoics would call neither the *skopos*). The two most counter-intuitive terms on the Stoic side are their uses of *τυγχάνω* and *skopos*. Antipater’s most difficult job was to show that the practice of the craft

of virtue is its purpose. The debate may be reconstructed as follows:

Carneades: When the archer aims, at what does he aim?

Antipater: At the preferred indifferents.

Carneades: And when he aims at these, is his purpose not to get them?

Antipater: No. His purpose is merely to aim, that is, to do everything in his power to aim.

Plutarch records a response of Carneades to an argument of this sort, in which mockery of *skopos*, *telos*, and a verb for effort (ἐφίημι) is suggested by the alliteration of the opening clause:

Σκόπει δὲ ὅτι ταῦτὸ πάσχουσι τοῖς τὴν σκιάν υπεράλλεσθαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐφιεμένοις· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολείπουσιν ἀλλὰ συμμεταφέρουσι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῷ λόγῳ, πορρωτάτῳ τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἀφισταμένην. ὥς γὰρ εἰ τοξεύοντα φαίη τις οὐχὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ παρὰ αὐτὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλὰ ἔνεκα τοῦ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρὰ αὐτόν, αἰνίγμασιν ὅμοια καὶ τεράστια δόξειεν ἂν περαίνειν.<sup>95</sup>

Carneades may not have introduced ἔνεκα into the debate. Antipater probably said something like “the archer does everything for the sake of the *telos*.” Then Carneades could revert to Antipater’s *telos*-formula and import the phrase about effort: “the archer does everything in his power for the sake of doing everything in his power.” Antipater argued that the practice, not the result, was the purpose, but he did not argue that the practice involved merely effort. Carneades’ substitutions within the formulae err by omitting the *skopos* from the formula: the archer makes effort for the sake of predicating aiming of himself, and the practitioner of virtue makes effort for the sake of predicating virtue of himself.

One consideration remains, namely how the indifferents actually did fit into Antipater’s conception of the *telos* and what he

<sup>95</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1071B-C: “Observe that the same thing happens to them as to those who strive to outleap their own shadow. Their reason does not leave behind, but drags along with it the absurdity furthest removed from the common conceptions. For if one were to say that an archer does everything in his power not for the sake of hitting the target, but for the sake of doing everything in his power, he would be thought to be telling tall tales and speaking in riddles.” On the use of ἐφίημι cf. Stob. *Ecl.* 2.77.1ff: σκοπὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐκκείμενον σῆμα, οὐ τυχεῖν ἐφίεσθαι τοὺς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας στοχαζομένους. Carneades also mocks τυγχάνω at *Mor.* 1072E (οὐ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶν αἰνίγμα) and τυγχάνω and ἔνεκα at 1071E (πάντα ποιούσης ἔνεκα τοῦ τυχεῖν οὐ τυχεῖν οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ μακάριον ἐστίν).

may have meant by *πρός*. At Plut. *Mor.* 1071A Carneades says that it is contrary to common conception that the end of our actions and the “reference” (*ἀναφορά*) should be different things. By this argument he seems to claim that “reference” must be connected with the purpose of an activity, just as he linked the external result with the purpose in his argument that the Stoics have two ends. Antipater would be willing to grant that we do everything in our power “with reference to” (*πρός*) acquiring the preferred indifferents (Striker 203). As this is his second formula for the *telos*, he means that this formula is the purpose of all one’s actions; there is no other purpose. He claims that purpose and reference can be separated. Indeed this seems the entire point of Antipater’s *telos*-formula. Cicero’s discussion of the difference between *κατορθώματα* and *καθήκοντα*, however, adds a complication. As *καθήκοντα* have the indifferents as their *ὑλη* and *ἀρχή*, they can be said “to take their reference from” the indifferents. On the other hand, *κατορθώματα* take their *ἀρχή* from virtue, and Cicero says that they are to be judged in relation to the virtuous or unvirtuous disposition of the one who performed them (*Fin.* 3.22 [=SVF III 18], 32 [=III 504]). They also take their *ὑλη* from, and “have reference to,” the indifferents. So *κατορθώματα* have reference to two things: the indifferents and virtue. The question remains how purpose and reference are related if we do everything in our power “with reference to” but not “for the sake of” acquiring the indifferents, and if *κατορθώματα* are done both “with reference to” and “for the sake of” virtue. The answer seems to be that *κατορθώματα*, as conceived in Antipater’s *telos*-formula, “refer” both to virtue (their *ἀρχή*) and to the indifferents (their *ὑλη*), but “that for the sake of which” they are done is only their *ἀρχή* not their *ὑλη*. This duality of relation properly expresses the status of *κατορθώματα*, but it is not necessarily contrary to common conception that the *telos* should be one thing and that each action should also have reference to something else. Carneades blurs the distinction between “take reference from” and “have reference to” by his use of the phrase “the reference is to.”<sup>96</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Cf. the Stoic position (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.46.8f=SVF III 2): (τέλος) ἐφ’ ὃ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πραττόμενα τὴν ἀναφορὰν λαμβάνει with Carneades’ καὶ μὴ πάντων ὅσα πράττομεν ἐφ’ ἓν τι γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφορὰν (Plut. *Mor.* 1071A). Inwood’s discussion (*supra* n.66: 547–57) of ἕξις and διάθεσις is an interesting parallel to the dual referentiality of the sage’s action. The objections of Mitsis appended to Inwood’s paper, however, are worth noting. Inwood wrongly follows Long (*supra* n.59) in identifying *skopos* with τὸ προκείμενον (551,

As suggested above, Carneades probably chose to attack Antipater through the Stoic definition of *skopos* because it allowed him to attack the *telos*. Chrysippus' doctrine that the *telos* is τὸ τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ and Antipater's τὸ τυγχάνειν in his *telos*-formula permits Carneades to undermine the *telos*. Striker (198) even argues that Carneades may have introduced the archer-simile first and that what survives is only Antipater's response. The considerable confusion created by Carneades and the unusual response of Antipater make this idea attractive. Possibly Carneades set up Antipater just to watch him try to defend the Stoic idea of predication: Antipater is forced to use τυγχάνω in his *telos*-formula for "to acquire," with the preferred indifferents as its object (cf. *supra* n.94). The most persuasive evidence that Carneades used ἔνεκα against Antipater is the infinite regress that it produces. From comparison with the circular argument against Antipater's first *telos*-argument (*supra* n.69), it is easy to see that Academic attack consistently exploited a common Stoic vulnerability of terminology.

Carneades certainly capitalized on the confusion that he created. He proposed two *telos*-formulae of his own for use solely against the Stoa, but committed himself to neither (Cic. *Fin.* 2.42, *Acad.* 2.131). The first formula is a logical consequence of his argument against the Stoic conception of stochastic crafts: as we do everything in our power "for the sake of" acquiring the primary natural things, the end should be to acquire them (*naturae primis bonis aut omnibus aut maximis frui*, "to enjoy the primary natural goods, either all or the greatest ones": Cic. *Tusc.* 5.84f, *Fin.* 5.20). By this formula Carneades even means to exclude virtue (Cic. *Fin.* 2.35; 5.20, 22). His argument is obviously designed to refute the one Stoic who addressed the acquisition of the preferred indifferents. His adaptation of Antipater's πρὸς to his own ἔνεκα makes it appear that Antipater

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555), for in *katorthomata* the sage's purpose resides with his virtue. Inwood also argues that the end, happiness, is not what we consciously aim at. True, but as the sage's purpose will be judged in relation to his virtue, he will consciously do things both with reference to and for the sake of his virtue, which, if not identical with his happiness, is what he knows will produce his happiness, for his happiness "subsists" in virtue (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.77.18=SVF III 16: τοῦτο δὲ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν). Cf. Rist (*supra* n.57: 163ff): "virtue is sufficient for happiness" (D.L. 7.127=SVF III 49: αὐτάρκη τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν [sc. ἀρετὴν] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν), the virtues "complete" happiness (D.L. 7.96=III 107: ἀποτελοῦσι) and "produce and compose" it (Stob. *Ecl.* 2.72.4ff=III 106: ἀπογεννώσι καὶ συμπληροῦσι).

cared nothing for virtue and that man's purpose in life should be to strive for "the integrity of body parts, health, properly functioning senses, freedom from pain, strength, and beauty," the *prima naturae* as Carneades defines them (Cic. *Fin.* 5.18). Carneades then suggests that the possession of them ought to be preferable to the mere effort to possess them. Cicero, referring to *desertus ille Carneades*, confirms that this argument would untenable in any other context except debate with Antipater (*Tusc.* 5.87; *Fin.* 2.38, 4.49). Striker shows, moreover, that the entire structure of the *divisio* in which both the craft argument and this formula for the *telos* occur is comprehensible only as an argument against the Stoics.<sup>97</sup>

We have only one other Carneadean argument for the *telos*: he once defended Callipho's view of the *telos* as virtue plus pleasure (Cic. *Acad.* 2.139). The context of this attribution also suggests that Chrysippus saw only three views of the *summum bonum* as defensible: virtue, pleasure, or both (Cic. *Acad.* 2.138, *Fin.* 2.44). Chrysippus apparently regarded freedom from pain and enjoyment of the primary natural things as euphemisms for pleasure. It might be deduced that Carneades, the probable source of this quotation,<sup>98</sup> accepted in another debate the Chrysippean premise that to enjoy the primary natural things is pleasure and that virtue plus these things, under whatever name, should be the *telos*. Indeed he argued in a debate on goods and evils that to be true to their ethical doctrines, the Stoics need to claim these things as necessary if not sufficient for happiness (*Fin.* 3.41).<sup>99</sup>

The full significance of Posidonius' passage on Stoic *formulae* for the *telos* can now be seen (quoted *supra* 235 with n.16).<sup>100</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Striker 200f with n.16. She suggests that inconsistencies in the *divisio* may result from the existence of more than one *divisio*. For an analysis of the sources and problem of the various *divisiones* see J. GLUCKER, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (= *Hypomnemata* 56 [Göttingen 1978: hereafter 'Glucker']) 52–63, 391–423.

<sup>98</sup> Glucker (54 n.143, 56 n.151, 60 n.164) argues that this passage describes a Chrysippean *divisio* to which Carneades may be acknowledging a debt before developing his own *divisio* for purposes of argument; see also Giusta II 244.

<sup>99</sup> Glucker 395; Giusta I 156–59.

<sup>100</sup> With Kidd (EK II 679–82), I take τούτου and αὐτῶ (30) to refer to τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, Zeno's formula. Rieth (*supra* n.66: 34–38), Long (*supra* n.59: 84f), and Long and Sedley (I 408ff) take them to refer to Antipater's formula. The subject of παρέπεται is also unclear: DeLacy's translation (329) supplies "those things," which suggests that the understood subject is pleasure and freedom from pain; Kidd (EK II 679) supplies "it" and seems to agree with Long,

Like Carneades (*supra* n.20), Posidonius translates Antipater's formula for the *telos* not by *πρός* but by *ἔνεκα*. Even though Carneades wrote nothing and Plutarch is the primary source for his views, the arguments are so devastating to Antipater's positions and so consistent in design that Plutarch must reproduce faithfully Carneades' language. Posidonius also translates Antipater's *τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν* as *τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν* like Carneades (*supra* nn.20, 81). When he goes on to say that this formula is "similar to setting up pleasure or freedom from pain as the *skopos*" and that it "contains nothing about virtue or happiness," his argument clearly presupposes Carneades' position that *τὰ πρώτα κατὰ φύσιν* do not include virtue (*supra* 279f). Finally, his claim that the expression appears to contradict itself (*ἔστι δὲ μάχην ἐμφαίνον κατὰ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκφορὰν*) reveals that his own method of argument is identical to the strategy of the Academics: he accepts a Stoic premise for the sake of argument and tries to demonstrate that the argument "refutes itself."

Posidonius' method might be summarized as follows. He clearly criticizes the *telos*-formulae of Antipater and Chrysippus and represents Antipater's formula in the words that Carneades used to attack it. His strategy signifies that Carneades effectively refuted Antipater and the debate was lost. He dismisses Antipater's formula by accepting Carneades' premises and conclusions. Moreover, the results of the debate must have been more important to Posidonius than whatever flaws existed in Antipater's position, because Posidonius undertakes neither an independent refutation nor a sympathetic defense of Antipater's actual words (or meaning).

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who supplies the miraculous "Attainment of or efforts to obtain *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* and assumes that the entire phrase beginning *πάν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον* is the understood subject. The problem is a quotation out of context. Clearly enough, Posidonius tries to explain the harmony between his Platonic model of the soul and Zeno's *telos*-formula in what precedes this passage and criticizes all *telos*-formulae against which Carneades could use his attacks on the Stoic definition of the *skopos*. Thus he seems to understand *skopos* as "external result" like Carneades, *i.e.*, the acquisition of the indifferents or here *τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν*. Consequently I understand "those things," *i.e.*, pleasure and freedom from pain, with De Lacy. The translation of *ἔστι δὲ μάχην ἐμφαίνον* as "this creates the appearance of contradiction" is difficult, but comparison with expressions like *τὴν τε πρὸς τὰ σαφῶς φαινόμενα μάχην* (EK τ 83) clearly suggests that Posidonius' frequent strategy of "self-refutation" lies behind the phrase. See Kidd *supra* n.9 and EK II 74 *ad τὰ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα*.

The preceding supports a thesis that Posidonius attacks his Stoic forbearers by a striking and deliberate dialectical strategy. He accepts Academic representations of Stoic doctrines and the conclusions that derive from them. His claim that Antipater's formula is liable to Academic *aporiai* is most revealing, as he employs only Carneades' representation of what Antipater said and meant. If he was aware of not quoting Antipater properly, as I think certain, his strategy was deliberate and circular: by accepting subtly altered Academic accounts of Stoic premises and the aporetic conclusions following from them, he meant to show that his Stoic forbearers could not cut through Academic *aporiai*.

#### IV. Posidonius' Attack on Chrysippus' Doctrine of the Passions

If this were the only example of such argumentation, it might be dismissed or attributed to Galen's editing, but Posidonius proceeds in this fashion throughout the ethical fragments. To demonstrate that Posidonius actually employs a consistent and subtle dialectical strategy, it will be necessary to consider his arguments against Chrysippus and three corresponding arguments of Carneades against the Stoics.

Posidonius seeks to show that Chrysippus cannot account for the cause (*aitia*) of passion. He attacks the doctrine that passion is simultaneously an "excessive impulse" (πλεονάζουσα ὀρμή), a "fresh opinion" (*doxa prosphatos*) of good and evil, and a "decision" (*krisis*). To prove that there must be irrational elements in man's soul, he treats the concept of excess at great length. First, how could reason command an impulse that would "exceed" (πλεονάζειν) its own measures (*supra* n.9)? Posidonius cites a Chrysippean *exemplum* on running: when walking it is possible to stop when desired or change speed, but when running this is not the case (Galen *PHP* 4.240.33–42.11). It is a difficult *exemplum* from which to understand passion, because Chrysippus' point seems to be that an excessive impulse is inevitable when running (the runner commands his legs to go quickly and *somehow* they get out of control). Chrysippus says that "For the proper measure of natural impulse is in accordance with reason, and only as much as reason deems appropriate (*PHP* 4.242.8f: συμμετρία γάρ ἐστὶ φυσικῆς ὀρμῆς ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἕως τοσούτου, [καὶ] ἕως αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ). The implication is that, in pas-

sion, reason must command the impulse in such a way (*sc.* with insufficiently specified limits) that the impulse *automatically* exceeds reason's capacity to regulate it. The "specified limit" should have been appended to the command in the form "but only as much as is proper" (ἕως τοσούτου). Posidonius, however, shows no interest in reading between the lines to find a rationalist explanation. On the contrary, he takes Chrysippus' *exemplum* as proof of irrational faculties: πρόδηλον οὖν ὡς ἕτερα τὶς ἄλογός ἐστι δύναμις αἰτία τοῦ πλεονάζεσθαι τὴν ὀρμὴν ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἄλογος ἢ αἰτία τὸ βάρος τοῦ σώματος.<sup>101</sup> By Posidonius' method of argumentation, if reason commanded the impulse and the impulse exceeded the measures set by reason, then something else must be the cause of the excess in "the excessive impulse," for reason cannot command anything immoderate, unmeasured, or excessive (*supra* n.9). This is not the monistic view of reason and how it operates, and it suits Posidonius' polemic well. But this is not the only flaw in his argument. Chrysippus' *exemplum* is an analogy in which reason is compared to the runner's impulse and impulse is compared to the runner's legs. The definitions of the larger system must be applied to the more limited system, as in the comparison of human behavior to animal behavior or in Plato's comparison of the operation of a city to the operation of the soul:

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τρεχόντων καθ' ὀρμὴν οὐκέτι τοιοῦτον γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πλεονάζει παρὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν ἢ τῶν σκελῶν κίνησις ὥστε ἐκφέρεσθαι καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εὐπειθῶς οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐναρξάμενων. αἷς οἶμαί τι παραπλήσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρμῶν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν κατὰ λόγον ὑπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν, ὥσθ' ὅταν ὀρμᾶ μὴ εὐπειθῶς ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δρόμου τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ λεγομένου παρὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὀρμῆς παρὰ τὸν λόγον.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.248.10–13=EK 34.16–20: "Therefore it is plain to see that the cause of the impulse's exceeding beyond the measures of reason is some other irrational power, just as the cause of the runner's exceeding beyond the measures of his choice is irrational: the weight of the body."

<sup>102</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.242.2–8=SVF III 462: "In the case of runners, this sort of thing (*sc.* the motion of the legs) is no longer in accordance with the impulse; rather the motion of the legs exceeds the impulse so that they are carried away and do not change speed obediently (thus initiating the change right away). I think that something similar to these (*sc.* movements) happens in the case of the impulses by their overstepping the symmetry in accordance with reason, so that whenever one uses impulse, one is not obedient to it (*sc.* reason); in the case of running, the excess is said to be beyond the impulse, but in the case of impulse, it is said to be beyond reason."

The last line shows the complication of the analogy: impulse occurs in both parts—as what *obeys* reason in the functioning of the soul, and as what *commands* the legs in the functioning of the whole person. Posidonius ignores Chrysippus' design in the analogy entirely and concludes that if the cause of the excess in running is irrational (*i.e.*, not caused by reason, occurring apart from reason=the weight of the body), the cause of the excess in the operation of the soul must also be irrational. Chrysippus' use of analogy (αἷς οἴμαί τι παραπλήσιον) from the whole person (=reason+the "irrational" body) to the soul (=reason alone), makes the verbatim application of results from one level to the other level improper and illogical. Posidonius is able to make his conclusion sound reasonable because Chrysippus' analogy is so complicated. These passages demonstrate Posidonius' dialectical strategy neatly: to take up the psychological problems most difficult for monism to explain; to treat monism with hostility, refusing to entertain sympathetic explanations; to deny subtlety to monistic definitions and to attack them with arguments cast in the guise of common sense; and to construct all arguments with a view to demonstrating the existence of irrational faculties. This last, a significant purpose of the polemic against Chrysippus, directs the structure of many of his arguments. As Posidonius considers each approach to the topic of the *aitia* of passion, he tries to demonstrate that rational processes cannot be the cause of irrational action. Rather, something else must be the 'mover', and reason must expressly not be the 'mover' but the 'moved'. To this end, Posidonius uses extensively the active and passive of κινεῖν (Plut. *Mor.* 449c=SVF III 384).

Posidonius asks whether the excess lies in the act of assent, and if so, what causes the element of "excess" (τὸ ἐπὶ πλεόν) in the *doxa* or *krisis*.<sup>103</sup> He offers a possible interpretation of the source of the excess when he discusses ἀρρωστήματα, the sickly dispositions of the soul that render it more prone to passion. Galen introduces this approach to the *aitia* by quoting Chrysippus:

“οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κρίνειν ἀγαθὰ ἕκαστα τούτων λέγεται ἀρρωστήματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλεόν ἐκπεπωκέναι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν.” ἴσως δ' ἂν τις “ἐν τῆδε τῇ ῥήσει” λέγοντος “οὐκ ἀπεστέρηκε μὲν τοῦ κρίσει εἶναι τὸ ἀρρώστημα, οὐ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ γε μόνη τῇ ψευδεῖ κρίσει τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ τίθεται, ἀλλὰ προσέρχεσθαι φησι τὸ ἐπὶ

<sup>103</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.248.25ff (=EK 34.33ff), 264.10 (=164.2).

πλέον,” ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερομένων ἢ γνώμη τοῦ Χρυσίππου καταφανήσεται “ὅθεν οὐκ ἀλόγως γυναικομανεῖς τινες λέγονται καὶ ὀρνιθομανεῖς.”<sup>104</sup>

Kidd (EK II 587) rightly recognizes κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλεόν ἐκπεπτωκέναι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν as the key phrase in the supposed quotation. This phrase interests Posidonius (whom Galen clearly follows: EK II 589), because it suggests an irrational longing for which reason alone cannot account—a longing that carries the excess with it. In his view, the “being drawn too much” should be the cause of the passion, because errors about good and evil alone do not constitute passions, as Chrysippus says. Galen reports an anonymous objection (τις) that attempts to explain how this “being drawn too much” may yet have a rationalist explanation:

Ἄλλὰ νῆ Δί' ἴσως ἂν τις φήσειε τὸ μανιῶδες οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀλογον γίνεσθαι δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλεόν ἢ προσῆκεν ἐξῆχθαι τὴν τε κρίσιν καὶ τὴν δόξαν, ὡς εἰ καὶ οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ἀρρωστήματα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ἀπλῶς τῷ ψευδῶς ὑπειληφέναι περί τινων ὡς ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μέγιστα νομίζειν αὐτά· μηδέπω γὰρ ἀρρώστημα τὴν περὶ τῶν χρημάτων εἶναι δόξαν ὡς ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτὰ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζει καὶ μηδὲ ζῆν ἄξιον ὑπολαμβάνη τῷ στερηθέντι χρημάτων· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ συνίστασθαι τὴν τε φιλοχρηματίαν καὶ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἀρρωστήματα οὔσας.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.262.34–264.6=*SVF* III 480: “For these are not called infirmities because one judges each of these things to be goods, but because of being drawn to them in excess of what is natural’. If someone should say, ‘in this passage Chrysippus has not deprived infirmity of its being a judgment, however he does not place the origin of the infirmity in the false judgment alone; rather he says that excess is present too,’ the opinion of Chrysippus will become plain from the words that follow, ‘whence certain people are not illogically referred to as woman-mad and bird-mad’.”

<sup>105</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.264.9–17=*EK* 164.1–10=*SVF* III 480: “But someone might well protest that madness does not arise through an irrational faculty, but because one’s judgment and opinion have been aroused beyond what was fitting, as if he said as follows, that ‘infirmities’ arise in the soul not simply by supposing falsely that various things are good or evil, but by supposing that the same things are the greatest [goods or evils]. The opinion that wealth is a good is not yet an ‘infirmity’, but whenever one considers that it is the greatest good and supposes that life has no value for one deprived of wealth, [the opinion is an ‘infirmity’]. For ‘love of money’ and ‘love of wealth’, which are infirmities, are comprised in this [supposition].” Kidd (EK II 589) comments that it would be dangerous to regard this as a “fragment” of Chrysippus, but offers no further comment on the implications of Posidonius’ dialectical procedure. De

Although Galen paraphrases this part of the argument without attribution to either Posidonius or Chrysippus, in what follows Posidonius shows that he regards the anonymous objection as consistent with Chrysippus' views:

ἀλλὰ τῷ ταῦτα φάσκοντι Ποσειδώνιος ἀντιλέγων ὧδέ πῶς φησι· τοιούτων δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου λεγομένων διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις πρῶτον μὲν, πῶς οἱ σοφοὶ μέγιστα καὶ ἀνυπέρβλητα νομίζοντες εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τὰ καλὰ πάντα οὐκ ἐμπαθῶς κινούνται ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντές τε ὧν ὀρέγονται καὶ περιχαρεῖς γινόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅταν τύχωσιν αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν κινεῖ τὸ νομίζειν καθήκον καὶ κατὰ ἀξίαν εἶναι παρόντων αὐτῶν ἢ παραγινόμενων (ἐμπαθῶς κινεῖσθαι) καὶ μηδένα λόγον προσίεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἄλλως δεῖν ὑπὸ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, τοὺς ἀνυπέρβλητα νομίζοντας εἶναι τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦς τοῦτο ἔδει πάσχειν, ὅπερ οὐχ ὀράται γινόμενον.<sup>106</sup>

The beginning of this passage is crucial: "if Chrysippus ... one would inquire...." The argument is plainly hypothetical (Posido-

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Lacy (1.263) does not translate ἐξήχθαι as a passive: "the judgement and the opinion have gone beyond what is fitting." It seems clearly an aorist passive from ἐξάγω, in which case it should not admit of middle significance. Moreover, as I shall show, it is entirely in keeping with Posidonius' strategy to argue that *doxa* and *krisis* are not the cause, so something must have *moved* them. The difficulty of translation has to do with the attribution of the passage. If the anonymous objector is Chrysippus (*sic v. Arnim ad loc.*: "ultima verba evincunt antecedentia Chrysippea esse"), one will want to make the verb's sense active to avoid the implication that something other than reason could cause a passion. But if Posidonius imparts a fictitious objection to Chrysippus, there is no difficulty with the passive: Posidonius' strategy makes Chrysippus seem to entertain causes external to reason. For a general sense of how Posidonius wishes to manipulate Chrysippus' occasional use of the passive to justify his own doctrine positing irrational faculties, *cf. PHP* 4. 276.34–278.9; *cf.* also the passive ἐκφέρεσθαι at 4.242.4, 244.25, 256.8, 27.

<sup>106</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.264.17–27=EK 164.11–22: "But Posidonius answers this objection in the following manner: 'If Chrysippus should make such an argument, one would inquire first why wise men who consider that all honorable things are superlative and unsurpassable goods, are not moved to passion by them, desiring what they seek, and feeling excessive joy over these same things whenever they acquire them. For if the magnitude of things which appear as good and evil moves one to believe that it is appropriate and in accordance with the value of the things which are present or approaching to be moved to passion and to accept no reason to the contrary that one ought to be moved otherwise by them, then those who think that the goods before them are unsurpassed would have to suffer this passion, but one does not see this happen'."

nus uses τοιούτων and an optative governing verb), as is its attribution to Chrysippus (his name in a genitive absolute dependent on the optative verb). Posidonius' dialectical stance throughout the passage is that he is not making such an objection, nor is he claiming that Chrysippus actually made it. He says only that Chrysippus would make some such response to explain the origin of the "excess" in an agent's soul. The implications of Posidonius' response to this 'hypothetical' argument merit close scrutiny.

The key phrase, τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, is vague enough that four radically different interpretations might be entertained, depending upon how this argument fits with those around it.

(1) "The magnitude of apparent goods" construed not as real goods and evils but those imagined by the fool (φᾶν-λος). Posidonius would not suggest that the good has magnitude or 'incremental value', only that fools may think so in error. This argument would fit well with the preceding passage, in which passion seemed to result from excessive "suppositions" (ὑπολήψεις), *i.e.*, opinions that are by definition false.

(2) "The magnitude of apparent goods," construed as all goods, both true and false. This argument would fit well with Posidonius' *exemplum* of the wise man in what follows. For this *exemplum* to be appropriate, it must be that he discusses simultaneously what fools and the wise man respectively call good.

(3) "The magnitude of good things as they are presented," construed as a magnitude of good residing in the presentation. This argument would neatly complete Posidonius' larger strategy of searching for excess in each of the powers of the rational soul. Posidonius had earlier eliminated impulse, reason and assent as possible sources of excess (*PHP* 4.248.25ff=EK 34.33ff). Presentation remains the lone possibility, which Carneades had already exploited in his attack on Stoic determinism (*supra* nn.32, 45).

(4) "The magnitude of good things as they are presented," construed as a magnitude of good residing in the thing. This argument would, like (1), fit well with the preceding argument, by which passion results "from supposing that money is the greatest good" (τῷ μέγιστα νομίζειν αὐτά). This definition would nearly be "the magnitude of goods that are presented."

Definitions (2) and (4) contradict the doctrines of Chrysippus, Posidonius, or any Stoic. The good of the wise man cannot be compared to indifferents like money as in the anonymous objection, and the good does not have magnitude. It differs in kind from the indifferents and does not admit of increase or decrease (Cic. *Fin.* 3.46f). Definition (1), very close to (4), violates the Stoic doctrine of the good. There is a confusing nexus of issues at work here: the good, presentation, and supposition (or weak assent), which is passion. The hypothetical objection and response with no dogmatic implications for either Chrysippus or Posidonius does not help. Kidd (EK II 587–90) chooses definition (3), evident from his repeated references to the “magnitude of presentations,” but both he and De Lacy (265) translate by “the magnitude of apparent goods and evils,” without stating how these issues should be resolved. The striking ambiguity of this phrase, however, compels us to entertain all four of the definitions despite their obvious conflict with doctrines of the Old and Middle Stoa. It is not necessary to choose one definition over the others. The anonymous objection is intentionally hypothetical and undogmatic. It is important, nevertheless, to understand how all four are interrelated and why they might all be intended.

To be consistent with the objection imputed to Chrysippus (illnesses do not arise when money is falsely supposed a good but only as the greatest good), it may seem that τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν should involve an error in the estimation of its value. But this is not the case, as Kidd argues (EK II 589):

The objection stresses that emotion does not arise simply from error of judgement, but from some kind of excess in the process of judgement (κρίσις involves decision as well as judgement: Arist. *Pol.* 1275a23), and this is interpreted in terms of magnitude (μέγιστα) of the presentation comprising the δόξα. This cannot refer to *over-valuation*, for that would be mere error of judgement, but to the effect on one’s δόξα from the magnitude of the external presentation. πάθος (πάσχειν) is affection, being acted upon by an external force.

Kidd is quite right to preclude “*over-valuation*.” Galen had earlier praised Chrysippus for observing the distinction between error and passion (*PHP* 4.242.29–36: διορίζει τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τὰ πάθη). The objection makes it appear that passion does not occur when one considers something ‘good’, but it

does when a degree of perceived magnitude is attached to that good, “the greatest good.” Kidd is right: for this objection to make sense within the context of the entire argument by which reason cannot cause passion, this perceived magnitude must be due to an extra-rational source of excess.

A subtle shift in language from “excess” or “too much” (τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον) to “the greatest” (τὸ μέγιστον), an apparently insignificant shift from the comparative to the superlative degree, also changes from adverbial modification to adjectival modification. Chrysippus had said that the cause of passion is “being drawn to things too much” (EK II 587: κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεπτωκέναι). The anonymous objection uses μέγιστον to modify the external good or evil. This move is entirely unnecessary to account for passion within Chrysippean monism, because man may entertain any number of hormetic propositions about external things of such a form that assent to them (suppositions or opinions) results in an impulse excessive by the standard of right reason. But Posidonius’ refusal to acknowledge this conception of “excess” leads him to reify it as τὸ μέγιστον, to place it outside man’s rational processes (suppositions, opinions), and to attach it to the external thing. Attention no longer focuses on how or why the rational processes behave ‘excessively’ but on the magnitude of the subject matter of the supposition as it appears. The problem still remains whether Posidonius means to attribute this excess to the presentation or the thing. If the source of the excess is extra-rational, it seems necessary to place it with the thing. But Kidd correctly speaks of “external presentation” (“πάθος [πάσχειν] is affection, being acted upon by an external force”), at least to the extent that it is “external” to reason, because (as I shall show) Posidonius understood presentation differently from Chrysippus. The anonymous objection imputed to Chrysippus betrays many premises more consistent with the doctrines of Posidonius. This is but one. As often with anonymous objections, neither party could espouse this objection, which represents the doctrines of neither. Rather, Posidonius places in his opponent’s mouth an argument close to one of his positions that is easily refuted through certain subtle modifications to its premises (*supra* n.105). To see that presentation is indeed at the heart of the problem, it is necessary to consider Posidonius’ response to the objection.

He responds in three parts. In the first (quoted above) he accepts the premise that the magnitude of things as they appear could “move one to consider” (κινεῖ τὸ νομίζειν) that it is appro-

priate to suffer passion, in effect, that the cause of passion must be external to reason. Posidonius transfers the locus of causation from the supposition or opinion (*i.e.*, the agent's reason) to something else: μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν. The second part of his argument again states that the "cause" of passion must "move" the soul. Recognizing that sages and fools may react differently to the same thing's appearance, he considers whether "weakness of soul" (ἀσθένεια) might be the cause of passion:

εἴ τε πρὸς τῷ μεγέθει τῶν φαινομένων καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς αἰτίασονται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς τὸ παράπαν ἐροῦσιν ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν παθῶν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους, ὅταν ἀσθενεῖς ὡσι μὴ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ πλείον ἐρρηκυῖαν, (οὐ), οὐδὲ οὕτως λέλυται τὸ ζητούμενον. ὅτι γὰρ διὰ τὴν νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται, πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι· πῶς μέντοι γε κινήσεως καὶ πῶς κινούσης, ζητεῖται μὲν, οὐχ ὑποδείκνυται δέ.<sup>107</sup>

In the last sentence Posidonius clarifies the goal of his inquiry: what is "moving" the soul. Only this will meet his definition of the *aitia*.

Posidonius denies a correlation between the weakness of the agent's soul and the severity of the passions he suffers: all ignorant men suffer passions both great and small and in such men great passions may arise from small causes, and vice versa.<sup>108</sup> The last part of Posidonius' argument, however, displays clearly that the concept of presentation (φαντασία) underlies his participle φαινομένων:

δυσὸν τε τὴν αὐτὴν ἀσθένειαν ἐχόντων καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν λαμβανόντων φαντασίαν ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ ὁ μὲν ἐν πάθει γίνε-  
ται, ὁ δὲ οὐ, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἤττον, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐνίστε ὁ ἀσθεν-

<sup>107</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.266.30–268.7=EK 164.26–34: "And if they blame, in addition to the magnitude of the things as they appear, weakness of the soul also, and claim that for this reason wise men are entirely free from the passions, but that fools, whenever they are weak, not with an ordinary kind of weakness, but with one that has become excessive, [are not free from the passions], even so, the question is not resolved. For all agree that men fall into the passions through sickness of soul; but the question of how the soul has been moved and how it moves, this is not yet explained." See Kidd (*supra* n.18) 111; Origen *De princ.* 3.1.4=SVF II 988; Inwood 78f.

<sup>108</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.268.7–13=EK 164.34–41; 5.294.38–296.1=EK 163.8–12. Kidd (*supra* n.18: 109) suggests that in Posidonius' his own system he replaces causes great and small with his conception of *euemptosia*.

έστερος μείζον ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ προσπεπτωκὸς οὐ κινεῖται  
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅτε μὲν ἐν πάθει γίνεται, ἔστιν  
ὅτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ὅτε μὲν μάλλον, ὅτε δὲ ἥττον.<sup>109</sup>

Posidonius' third argument considers two hypothetical monistic alternatives to this own doctrine—*phantasia* and *astheneia*. It is now clear that τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν refers not only to "things seeming to be good or evil" but also to the technical concept of *phantasia*. From the context, moreover, Posidonius clearly does not conceive *phantasia* in the Chrysippean sense as inseparable from its interpretative *lekton* added by *logos* (*supra* n.32). The following passages illustrate the link between the two in Zeno's and Chrysippus' doctrines.

Ἔτι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι· λογικαὶ μὲν αἱ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων, ἄλογοι δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων.<sup>110</sup>

*primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus (quam ille φαντασίαν...)—sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus ad sensationem adiungit animorum quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam.*<sup>111</sup>

φασὶ δὲ [τὸ] λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>109</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.268.14–19=EK 164.42–48: "Assume that two people have the same weakness and that they perceive the same presentation of good and evil: one falls into passion, the other does not, and one is moved more, the other less; and sometimes the weaker man who supposes that what has befallen him is greater is not moved, and the same person sometimes falls into passion over these same presentations and sometimes he does not, and sometimes more, sometimes less."

<sup>110</sup> D.L. 7.51: "Some *phantasiai* are rational, and others non-rational. Those of rational beings are rational, while those of non-rational animals are non-rational."

<sup>111</sup> Cic. *Acad.* 1.40=SVF II 187: "[Zeno] first made new statements about sense-perceptions themselves, which he considered to be compounds of a certain blow, as it were, struck from without (which he called a *phantasia*) ... but to these things which are presented and, as it were, received by the senses, he adds an assent of the soul, which he would claim is placed within us and is voluntary."

<sup>112</sup> D.L. 7.63: "They [the Stoics] say that a *lekton* is that which subsists within a rational *phantasia*." Cf. Sext. *Emp. Math.* 8.70=SVF II 187.

προηγείται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἴθ' ἡ διάνοια ἐκπλαητική ὑπάρχουσα, ὃ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ.<sup>113</sup>

It would be a mistake to take the last passage as evidence that *phantasiai* can be separated from their subsisting *lekta*, as the first passage demonstrates that all presentations of rational beings are “rational” (*logikai*). Posidonius removes entirely the rational or propositional component from the presentation.<sup>114</sup> His argument throughout addresses “things as they appear,” using the participle φαινομένων, and when he finally substitutes the noun φαντασία, there seems little or no difference between “things as they appear” and “presentations.” In his usage, *phantasia* does not denote a “rational product” of the percipient; otherwise Posidonius would have to consider the content of the *lekton*, produced by the agent’s *logos*, as a cause of passion. His discussion of *astheneia* passes over this problem quickly without considering the propositional component of *phantasiai* as a cause. His conception of the term, more Aristotelian than Chrysippean, may be uniquely his own.<sup>115</sup> Posidonius clearly dissociates *phantasia* from *lekton* in the following:

οἶμαι γὰρ ὅτι πάλαι βλέπετε πῶς διὰ λόγου μὲν πεισθέντες κακὸν ἑαυτοῖς παρεῖναι ἢ ἐπιφέρεισθαι οὔτε φοβοῦνται οὔτε λυποῦνται φαντασίας δὲ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις λόγῳ κινήσειε τὸ ἄλογον, ἐὰν μὴ τινα ἀναζωγράφησιν προσβάληται αἰσθητῇ παραπλησίαν; οὕτως γοῦν ἐκ διηγήσεώς τινες εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκπίπτουσι καὶ ἐναργῶς ἐγκελευσαμένου φεύγειν τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον λέοντα οὐκ ἰδόντες φοβοῦνται.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>113</sup> D.L. 7.49=SVF II 52: “For *phantasia* comes first; then thought which has the power of expressing itself, renders in rational language that which it receives from the *phantasia*.”

<sup>114</sup> In the current debate over the status of *phantasia* and *lekton* (*supra* n.32), it is often asserted that a *phantasia* is more than its propositional content, and that it should in no way be thought as identical to its subsisting *lekton*. Without disputing these points and with allowance for the *distinguishability* of the two, I wish to maintain only their necessary concurrence in rational animals according to D.L. 7.51.

<sup>115</sup> See Arist. *De An.* 3.3; Inwood 11–17. Kidd’s remarks seem to confirm the difference between Posidonius’ definition and that of Chrysippus: EK II 590; cf. (*supra* n.18) 112.

<sup>116</sup> Galen *PHIP* 5.330.25–31=EK 162.4–11: “For I am sure that you have long observed how those who have been rationally persuaded that they are in the presence of evil or that it is approaching suffer neither fear nor grief, but [they do suffer these passions] when they receive *phantasiai* of these same things. For how would one move the irrational by means of reason, unless one places

Here Posidonius uses his own psychology of a tripartite soul with certain aspects of bipartition (*supra* n.29). In this model *phantasiai* do not partake of *logos*; on the contrary, they are associated with the irrational faculties: they contrast with “persuasion by reason” (διὰ λόγου μὲν πεισθέντες); and only they can stimulate the irrational (τὸ ἄλογον).

Against Chrysippus’ hypothetical objection, Posidonius attempts through his own conception of *phantasia* to pre-empt any demonstration that passion as a πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή could be caused by a ‘rational’ soul, and maintains the dictum that “reason would not be able to exceed its own acts and measures” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό γε πλεονάζειν παρὰ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράγματά τε καὶ μέτρα: *supra* n.9). His premise that something external to reason causes the soul to move to excess attacks the central truth of Chrysippean monism, that the soul of a man moves itself by assent to rational presentations (Origen *De princ.* 3.1.3=SVF II 988 part). If an imperfect *logos* produces the *lekta* assigned to these presentations, they will necessarily be imperfect and may conflict with one another (*supra* 243 with n.31). The soul may then produce an impulse excessive by the standard of Right Reason (*supra* n.10).

The scope of what Posidonius imputes to Chrysippus is striking. The grammatical structure of the objection attributed to Chrysippus occurs in a condition unlikely of fulfillment. With this minimal cover he entertains hypotheses that no Stoic could accept and creates a sophistic muddle of appearance and reality by forming his entire response around the “magnitude of things which appear as good or evil.” Under this rubric he compares real with apparent goods and rational with irrational agents, puts indifferents like money and the Stoic good of virtue side by side, and places the reactions of fools beside those of wise men. The translation of τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν should properly refer to the concept of *phantasia*, but it also conveys its customary significance of “apparent goods and evils.” Posidonius

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a representational image, as it were, before the percipient? So it is that some men fall into desire from a narrative and others become afraid, without their having seen, when someone has told them vividly to flee a charging lion.” At *PIIP* 5.320.18f (=EK 169.72f) Posidonius asks “why pleasure projects the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil” (διὰ ἣν ἡδονὴ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλγηδὼν δὲ ὡς κακὸν πιθανὴν προβάλλουσι φαντασίαν). As he associates pleasure and pain with the irrational faculties, they must clearly be the source of the *phantasia*: cf. n.154 *infra*.

can convey both senses under the same participle because he divorces *phantasiai* from *lekta*. Without reason a presentation is no more than the way something ‘appears’ in the mind, the ‘appearance’ an object gives of itself. Reality and truth are not considered. There are only appearances of external objects.

Posidonius tries to ascertain what causes the belief that it is “appropriate and in accordance with the value” of the things present (καθηκον και κατα αξιαν ) to suffer passion (*supra* 254 and n.106). Through his own conception of *phantasiai* he prohibits consideration of Chrysippus’ actual doctrines. Posidonius accepts the anonymous objection as signifying that “things as they appear” may have an amount—a magnitude—of good and evil in them: money is great, greater, or the greatest good. He attributes to Chrysippus (albeit in such a condition) the premise that both real and apparent goods and evils have “magnitude,” *i.e.*, that the value of indifferents and the value of the good can be compared. Without claiming this or saying that Chrysippus claimed it, he attacks this position as if Chrysippus would take it. The point at issue is not what Posidonius holds as dogma, nor what Chrysippus holds (for the argument is hypothetical), but how Posidonius proceeds dialectically against a member of his own school. We shall see below that Carneades is the ultimate source of Posidonius’ objection and response, but he also influences Posidonius’ other two arguments against Chrysippus.

Posidonius subsequently attacks the *doxa prospatos* as the vital element of Chrysippus’ doctrine of the passions. After attempting to show that an opinion (*doxa*) gone to excess must itself have another cause, he turns to the word *prospatos*.

εἶναι μὲν δὴ τὸ πρόσφατόν φησι τὸ ὑπόγουον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἀξιοῖ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτῷ ῥηθῆναι, διὰ ἣν ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ δόξα πρόσφατος μὲν οὖσα συστέλλει τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λύπην ἐργάζεται, χρονισθεῖσα δὲ ἢ οὐδὲ ὅλως ἢ οὐκ ἔθ’ ὁμοίως συστέλλει. καίτοι οὐδὲ τὸ πρόσφατον ἐχρῆν ἐγκείσθαι κατὰ τὸν ὄρον, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ τὰ Χρυσίππου. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἦν μεγάλου κακοῦ ἢ ἀνυπομονήτου ἢ ἀκαρτερήτου, καθάπερ αὐτὸς εἴωθεν ὀνομάζειν, τὴν λύπην εἰρησθαι δόξαν, οὐ προσφάτου.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>117</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.280.26–33=EK 165.9–17: “Now he [Posidonius] says that what is ‘fresh’ is ‘recent in time’ and he thinks he deserves to be told the reason why the belief of the evil being fresh contracts the soul and causes grief, but when it grows older it does not contract it entirely or no longer in the same way. And yet ‘fresh’ ought not to be in the definition if what Chrysippus said were true. For it would be more in accordance with his view to call grief

Galen does not indicate in what context Posidonius defined *prospthatos* as "recent in time." Whether he defined the word in that way himself or imputed the definition to Zeno or Chrysippus is of no importance to his own position, as he rejects the entire doctrine of the *doxa prospthatos* and the monistic psychology to which it pertains. As for his allegation that Chrysippus usually called the evil "great," "unendurable," or "intolerable," Cicero suggests (*Tusc.* 3.61) that Chrysippus might have used this turn of phrase: *opinio et iudicium magni praesentis atque urgentis mali*, where *urgentis* might be suitable Latin for ἀνυπομονήτου and ἀκατερήτου (cf. EK II 600). It is more interesting that in the last sentence Posidonius transfers the adjective *prospthatos* from the opinion to the thing about which the opinion is formed, a "fresh evil" (οὐ προσφάτου [sc. κακοῦ]).

Once again, Posidonius does not say that this was Chrysippus' view; rather the force of the contrary to fact condition (Smyth ¶2313) seems to carry over from the preceding sentence. Posidonius again criticizes what Chrysippus "might have said" to make his premises appear contradictory, whereas in reality his doctrines contradict themselves only in Posidonius' paraphrases. Like Posidonius' interchangeable use of "things presented" and "presentations," here "fresh" applies to both things and opinions. Posidonius most eagerly shifts the line between internal psychic and external material events in a constant effort to prove that the excess in passion cannot arise through rational processes (Chrysippus' actual position). There are only two other probable extra-rational causes: internal irrational processes (Posidonius' actual position) or an external material event. Posidonius does not consider Chrysippus' actual position; rather he presents Chrysippus' views as if he meant that passion has an extra-rational cause, then demonstrates that this hypothetical position is self-contradictory. It is never clear whether Posidonius accuses Chrysippus of considering external material events as the cause, but he need not accuse Chrysippus of anything more specific than considering some extra-rational cause.

Finally, if Zeno (as suggested earlier) had the concept of *phantasia* in mind when he used the phrase *opinatio malo* (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.61; cf. *supra* n.40), Posidonius had a precedent for his move. Zeno's followers interpreted his definition of *prospthatos* to

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an opinion of a great or unendurable or intolerable evil as he usually named it, not of a 'fresh' one."

mean that the passion will remain “so long as a certain force inheres in the supposed evil” (*quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit*). In this passage Zeno blurs the line both between the opinion and the thing and between the presentation and the thing, just as Posidonius tries to do. Nothing suggests that Zeno understood *phantasiai* as separable from *lekta*, i.e., as separable from the rational activity of the soul. But Posidonius, who did make such a separation, might rely on such passages to justify his argument that Chrysippus spoke of extra-rational causes like “presented things” and “fresh evils.”

Posidonius does not mention the subtle implications of Chrysippus’ *prosphtatos*. Rather, using his own definition of the word, he suggests that a familiar philosophical issue is at stake—the problem of “fresh” or “unfamiliar” events that surprise an agent (cf. [*Mag. Mor.*] 1203b4f: ἡ πρόσφατος φαντασία). Posidonius addresses the issue as follows:

κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἐρωτᾷ τὴν αἰτίαν, διὰ ἣν οὐκ ἡ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ παρουσίας δόξα τὴν λύπην, ἀλλὰ ἡ πρόσφατος ἐργάζεται μόνη· καὶ φησι· διότι πᾶν τὸ ἀμελέτητον καὶ ξένον ἄθρῶς προσπίπτον ἐκπλήττει τε καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἐξίστησι κρίσεων, ἀσκηθὲν δὲ καὶ συνεθισθὲν καὶ χρονίσαν ἢ οὐδὲ ὄλως ἐξίστησιν, ὡς κατὰ πάθος κινεῖν, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρὸν κομιδῇ. διὸ καὶ προενδημεῖν φησι τοῖς πράγμασι μήπω τε παροῦσιν οἷον παροῦσι χρῆσθαι.<sup>118</sup>

Just as Posidonius coherently attacked the Chrysippean doctrine of the passions, Carneades also interpreted the Stoic *doxa prosphtatos* as “an opinion formed about a recent event” and formulated defenses against an “unforeseen and strange” event (ἀμελέτητον καὶ ξένον). In brief, he had already devised a coherent series of arguments against the Stoa along the same lines as those later employed by Posidonius.

<sup>118</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.282.5–11=EK 165.22–29: “First he asks the reason why not the belief of the presence of evil but only the fresh belief causes grief; and he asks, ‘why everything which is unforeseen and strange falling upon us in a rush strikes us senseless and unseats us from from our former judgments and why things which are rehearsed and familiar and prolonged either do not unseat us entirely and cause passionate motion or do so to a very limited extent’. For this reason he says that we ought to make ourselves at home with future events and to treat things which are not yet present as though they were.”

### V. Carneades on the Good, the Passions, and the Criterion

We are unaccustomed to consider the passions as a subject on which Carneades attacked the Stoa. But a collection of his arguments on goods and evils and on the criterion (which treats *phantasia*) shows how the sum provides an argument against the passions. To see how Carneades' arguments underlie the discussion of the "magnitude of things that appear as goods and evils," two implications of Posidonius' hypothetical argument must be considered: (1) that apparent goods such as money may be compared to the real good, virtue; and (2) that the magnitude of presentations or 'appearances' may cause passion. For the first problem we must return to Carneades' attacks on the Stoic doctrine concerning good and evil (*supra* n.99).

Carneades never ceased to argue that the Stoic-Peripatetic debate over the definition of good(s) and evil(s) was a difference of words not facts: *non rerum controversia sed nominum* (Cic. *Fin.* 3.41); he acted as an arbiter, as if the dispute were only between Peripatetics and Stoics (*Tusc.* 5.120). The real dispute, however, involved Carneades and the Stoa, as Carneades used the Peripatetic conception of goods to reveal weaknesses in the Stoic doctrine. When Cicero's character Cato reports Carneades' vehemence in the matter (*Fin.* 3.41), he says that the principal point was whether everything that has value contributes to happiness. Carneades seems to have argued that as the wise man prefers wealth, we should say that he will be happier with it than without it. The value of wealth ought to be assessed by its contribution to the end of happiness, however little it may contribute. On this reading the Stoics and Peripatetics would agree that wealth has value. Carneades wants to dismiss the Stoic claim that value and happiness are not necessarily related. The argument that Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines on the good are essentially the same is closely allied to Carneades' argument against the selection-formulae of Diogenes and Antipater, in which he held that the value of the indifferents must be measured by their contribution to the *telos* (*supra* n.69).

Carneades' argument, however, has further ramifications: as Cato says, if wisdom and health are "to be chosen" (*expetendum*), both must be more "to be chosen" than wisdom alone (*Fin.* 3.44=SVF III 60). This conclusion is the foundation for the Peripatetic formula for the *telos*, which is to have virtue *and* the primary things of nature (*Fin.* 5.21). If Carneades maintains a

Peripatetic conception of the good against the Stoa, he might very easily use the Peripatetic *telos*. The only evidence that he did so lies in his vigorous defense of Callipho on the *telos* (*supra* n.98) and his habitual attacks on the Stoic doctrine that virtue is sufficient for happiness (*Tusc.* 5.83).

Despite uncertainties about Carneades' precise language and thought (*supra* 237), his arguments against the Stoa have some consistency,<sup>119</sup> which may derive not from his own dogmatic agenda but, on the contrary, from the consistency and interdependence of Stoic doctrine across various ethical topics. Carneades' argument against the selection-formulae concentrate on the Stoa's attempts to judge the value of the indifferents independently of the end of happiness (*supra* n.70). His argument against the Stoic conception of virtue as a stochastic craft attacks the Stoa's dissociation of the purpose of prudent activity from the achievement of the external result of the activity (*Fin.* 3.24=*SVF* III 11). Finally, in his argument against the Stoic conception of the good, he blurs the Stoa's distinction between the value of indifferents and the value of virtue (*Cic. Fin.* 3.41–44). These three arguments concern different aspects of the Stoa's unitary project of placing happiness with the wise man's reach.

If the wise man will always be happy, he must adopt a pose of indifference towards things that are not in his power and direct his purposeful activity to what will unerringly produce his happiness. The only activity that could produce happiness without fail does not depend on anything outside himself for its success. To the extent that activity produces happiness, it must be related only to the wise man's rôle in that activity, *i.e.*, the rational expenditure of effort towards the results outside this control. The results of his activity are not absolutely indifferent to him: indifferent for his happiness but not indifferent for their accordance with nature. Things that contribute to happiness, *i.e.*, a life of virtue and purposeful rational activity, have an absolute value. But things, which do not contribute to virtuous activity

<sup>119</sup> It is very difficult to trace the history of Carneades' argument because Cicero, the primary source, draws on multiple sources (Glucker 52 n.135): Carneades' defense of Callipho's *telos* comes from Clitomachus (54 n.143); evidence of the Carneadean *divisio* from Antiochus (*Fin.* 5.16ff) and another source (*Tusc.* 5.83ff; Glucker 55 n.150); and the argument that the difference between Stoic and Peripatetic ethics is *non rerum sed verborum discordia* is attributed to Carneades through both Antiochus (*Leg.* 1.38, 53ff) and another source (*Fin.* 3.41, *Tusc.* 5.120). Glucker concludes (394f) that both Carneades and Antiochus may have advanced these divergent arguments in different subjects of debate.

but are merely in accordance with nature, have a relative value. As the wise man's happiness derives from his rational activity, things with absolute value must affect him differently from those with relative value. When he is presented with things pertaining to virtue, he must be affected in a way that is morally significant, in that things with absolute value affect the possibility of his happiness, whereas things of relative value must not affect him in this way because they do not affect his happiness.<sup>120</sup>

Cato summarizes the significance of Carneades' argument (*Fin.* 3.44=*SVF* III 60): if Stoic and Peripatetic conceptions of the good were substantially the same, wisdom and health together would be more "to be chosen" than wisdom alone. The Stoics cannot accept this conclusion because it suggests that wisdom and health are comparable and should affect man in the same way when he is presented with them. Likewise Antipater says that acquiring the indifferents is "something to be selected" but not "something to be chosen" (*supra* n.85). The Stoics make this distinction between the value of virtue and that of the indifferents in several ways. The good, which cannot be added to, increased, or compared with other things, has its own proper quality (*Fin.* 3.34=*SVF* III 72): the good is compared to the sweetness of honey, which is uniquely sweet; the good differs by kind, not by amount, from other things of value; things with value in the latter sense can be increased in value, but virtue cannot. Some examples allude to a comparative evaluation of the two kinds of value (*Fin.* 3.45=*SVF* III 60): sunlight obscures and inundates lamplight; a drop of honey is lost in the *magnitudine* of the Aegean Sea; Croesus' riches obscure the addition of a penny. These comparisons blur the general distinction in favor of a direct comparison of magnitude. But at the end of his similes Cato reiterates that *opportunitas* (εὐκαιρία) is the standard by which virtue must be judged. His view may be paraphrased: if a shoe is evaluated by how well it fits the foot, many shoes would not be preferred to few, nor bigger to smaller ones. So virtuous action is not measured by number or greatness but how the action fits with nature (*Fin.* 3.46=*SVF* III 524).

A rational agent's deliberation, however, assesses something's value. Although it may appear from Cato's examples that mistakes about the difference between virtue and the indifferents could never occur, it is not difficult to imagine the circumstance

<sup>120</sup> Inwood 114f, 121, 205–15, 224–37.

of an improper evaluation. Inwood (166) uses this exemplum (based on Sen. *Tranq.* 13.2): a moral progressor runs for public office because he knows that public service, an appropriate activity, gives him an opportunity to practice the virtue that he has learned. He is defeated at the polls. If he regards his defeat as an indifferent, it will not affect his happiness; but if he regards the purpose of his action to be fulfilled only if he is elected, he will have failed and will be unhappy (Inwood 166; Sen. *Tranq.* 13.2). These two reactions show the difference between a sage's right actions and a non-sage's appropriate actions (κατορθώματα and καθήκοντα). The agent's disposition must evaluate events properly and in accordance with the distinction between the good and the indifferent in a thing. The good in his action consists in the virtuous disposition with which he conducts it, whereas the result, over which he has no control, is an indifferent. The problems inherent in 'evaluating' events connect the doctrine of the good to the problem of passion. When the moral progressor decides that his happiness depends on winning, he has in effect decided that an indifferent is a good. When he fails to obtain his desire (a false belief that something good approaches), he may decide that it is appropriate to feel pain (the false belief that something evil has happened or is present): these are passions.

For the Stoics the moral progressor errs in assigning not too much value to victory but the wrong kind of value. An indifferent has value if it accords with nature and disvalue if it does not (*supra* 251). An indifferent may even have a "magnitude" of value (e.g. prolonged health has more value than its brief enjoyment: Cic. *Fin.* 3.47). But virtue has what Cicero's Cato calls *opportunitas* (*Fin.* 3.46=SVF III 524), a unique, perfect, and timeless quality that cannot be increased by the addition of anything. When Carneades argues that Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines of the good agree in substance if not terminology, he demands not only (1) that virtue is not sufficient for happiness; (2) that the indifferents, although not sufficient for happiness, are nevertheless necessary; but also (3) that virtue and the indifferents must have a value that can be compared; and therefore (4) that virtue has a value that can be measured, in short, a magnitude.

Three bits of evidence suggest that Carneades applied his arguments on the evaluation of goods to an attack against the Stoic doctrine of the passions. Two of the three come from Clitomachus and Antiochus through Cicero's *Tusculans*, and the third derives from Plutarch's *De tranquillitate animi*. These arguments, in turn, involve Carneades' arguments on the criterion,

preserved by Sextus. The argument begins at *Tusc.* 3, where Cicero tries to discover the cause of passion and surveys the views of Cyrenaics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics.

Despite considerable controversy on the organization of the book, it is clear from 3.28–51 that Cicero is summarizing the position of the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans.<sup>121</sup> He argues that the Epicureans wrongly criticize the Cyrenaic position that unexpected evils cause passion, and that passion can be avoided by bearing in mind that evil may befall man at any time. The Cyrenaics employ three well-worn *exempla*: (1) Telemon, from Eur. *Andr.*; (2) Theseus (from a lost play), preparing himself for whatever sufferings and calamities might befall him in life; and (3) Anaxagoras, who, on learning of the death of his son, replied, “I knew that I had begotten a mortal” (*sciebam me genuisse mortalem*: *Tusc.* 3.29). All are designed to show that if life’s misfortunes do not come unanticipated, they will not cause passion. The structure thereafter seems as follows: Cicero, having dismissed the Epicureans, turns to a comparison of Stoic and Cyrenaic views at 3.52–61 and shows the limitations of the Cyrenaic view before launching a comparison of the Stoics and Peripatetics (*Giusta* II 320ff). A final reference to the Cyrenaics comes at 3.59. Two quotations from Carneades, embedded in this discussion, occur at 3.54, 60 in two very different contexts.

The reference at 3.54 comes from Clitomachus’ book on a Stoic topos, whether the wise man will feel grief at the loss of his fatherland. The wise man’s endurance even of this misfortune was a dogma, which Cicero (*Acad.* 2.135) calls *dura sed Zenoni necessarium*. Ioppolo argues that Carneades actually defends the proposition but undogmatically and on the basis of epistemological arguments.<sup>122</sup> Cicero offers some indication of how Carneades argued: *Sensim enim et pedetemptim progrediens extenuatur dolor, non quo ipsa res immutari soleat aut possit, sed id, quod ratio debuerat, usus docet minora esse ea, quae sint*

<sup>121</sup> See Hirzel (*supra* n.17) III 414–55; von Arnim, *SVF* I xix–xxvi; M. Pohlenz, “Das dritte und vierte Buch der Tusculanen,” *Hermes* 41 (1906) 321–55; Glucker 391–96; *Giusta* II 318–21. I follow A. M. IOPPOLO’s reconstruction of the evidence closely: “Carneade e il terzo libro delle *Tusculanae*,” *Elenchos* 1 (1980: hereafter ‘Ioppolo’) 76–91. See Plut. *Mor.* 101F–22A (*Cons. ad Apoll.*) for a portrait of how the Academics might respond to the *Tusculans*.

<sup>122</sup> Glucker 393f; Ioppolo 80f, 88, 91, who also suggests (82f with n.22) that the passage from Plutarch comes from the same treatise of Clitomachus as *Tusc.* 3.54. Her argument rests on the *exempla* of King Perseus and the fall of Macedon in both texts (*Tusc.* 3.53; Plut. *Mor.* 474F–75A).

*visa maiora*.<sup>123</sup> The wise man presumably avails himself of *ratio*, the fool of *usus*, with the result that the fool falls into passion. Two factors in this explanation derive from Carneades' argument on the criterion: (1) to arrive at the proper evaluation of something sufficient time is needed; and (2) when the object to be evaluated is great, an instant evaluation may be incorrect.<sup>124</sup> It is useful to consider Carneades' arguments in more detail before returning to the *Tusculans* and the problem of passions.

Debate on the criterion developed, broadly, as follows. Zeno proposed that presentations may be divided into three categories according to their reliability: knowledge, a presentation that can be "grasped" firmly like a clenched fist covered over by the hand; ignorance (the source of opinion), one that cannot be so grasped or comprehended (Cic. *Acad.* 2.145 [=SVF I 66], 1.41f [=I 60]); and καταληπτική φαντασία, one between knowledge and ignorance, the merely graspable presentation. The kataleptic presentation, clear and distinct, cannot be false, as it arises from what is and is stamped exactly in accordance with what is.<sup>125</sup> The Stoic concept of the kataleptic presentation asserts the existence of "cognition" (*katalepsis*), assent to a cognitive impression. Nature provides this criterion as a measuring stick of how things really are. From these cognitions man develops conceptions of things and from these are revealed not only the "beginnings" but the "roads" to the discovery of reason (*Acad.* 1.42=SVF I 60).

Arcesilaus argued against the Stoics, particularly Zeno (Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.150–58), that (1) whatever the wise man apprehends will be knowledge and whatever the fool apprehends will be ignorance; nothing lies between the two; (2) assent is made

<sup>123</sup> *Tusc.* 3.54: "For step by step grief diminishes as it progresses, not because the event itself usually is changed or could be changed, but rather because that which reason ought to have taught, experience then teaches, namely that things which had seemed very great are really very small." Cicero further states that if the book of Carneades' lectures collected by Clitomachus had been sent to the captive Corinthians some years after the fall of Corinth, the book would be healing only scars. Cicero's statement on the healing effect of time probably derives from this same book, so the argument belongs to Carneades: Ioppolo 79f.

<sup>124</sup> Ioppolo 79ff, who claims that *Tusc.* 3.52, a description of the reason unexpected events cause passions (*primum quod, quanta sint quae accidunt et qualia, cum repente accidunt, considerandi spatium non datur; deinde, cum videtur praecaveri potuisse, si provisum esset, quasi culpa contractum malum aegritudinem acriorem facit*) may be attributed to Carneades.

<sup>125</sup> Cic. *Acad.* 2.17, 77; D.L. 7.46; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.248; on the *phantasia kataleptike* see Sandbach (*supra* n.32) 9–21.

not to a presentation but to the proposition that accompanies the presentation (*supra* n.32); and (3) there is no presentation of such a kind that it could not be false. These arguments show that the *kataleptike phantasia* does not exist and therefore that the wise man cannot give assent. He must suspend his judgment and this suspension (ἐποχή) is the logical stance (but not a dogmatic *telos*) for the wise man (*Math.* 7.156ff). The Stoics responded that such a man would be completely inactive and therefore unwise.<sup>126</sup> To the charge of inactivity (*apraxia*), Arcesilaus replied by adopting the standard of the reasonable (τὸ εὔλογον), by which the wise man could withhold dogmatic assent yet *allow* himself to be moved to impulse by the appearance of things as it seems reasonable to him.

Carneades argued (1) that there is no criterion because reason, apprehension, and presentations can deceive (*Math.* 7.159) and (2) that if the criterion does exist, it cannot be separated from sensation that is "irrational": μηδεμιᾶς δὲ οὔσης φαντασίας κριτικῆς οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· ἀπὸ φαντασίας γὰρ οὗτος ἀνάγεται. καὶ εἰκότως· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτῷ τὸ κρινόμενον, φανῆναι δὲ οὐδὲν δύναται χωρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως. οὔτε οὖν ἡ ἄλογος αἴσθησις οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἦν κριτήριον.<sup>127</sup> Carneades also defended the proposition that a wise man, though lacking a criterion, might assent undogmatically to presentations and therefore "opine" (*Cic. Acad.* 2.67, 78).<sup>128</sup>

Sextus claims (*Math.* 7.166) that Carneades was *compelled* to propose his own criterion by the same argument from inactivity. Carneades' redefinition of the Arcesilean εὔλογον provides three criteria for the conduct of life that may be employed as circumstances demand. Carneades distinguishes truth from falsehood, on the one hand, in relation to what creates the impres-

<sup>126</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1035A=SVF III 177. Long and Sedley (I 455–60; cf. *supra* n.26) show that the Epicureans made the argument of inactivity (*Mor.* 1122A–F) but that Arcesilaus' response adapts Stoic terminology; see also Vander Waerdt, "Colotes" 244–47, 260f, who argues that Colotes took over the *apraxia* argument from the Stoics.

<sup>127</sup> *Math.* 7.165: "And if there is no presentation capable of serving as a criterion, neither would reason be a criterion; for it is derived from presentation. And obviously so; for that which is judged must first be presented, and nothing can be presented apart from our irrational sensation. Therefore neither irrational sensation nor reason would be a criterion."

<sup>128</sup> Although Arcesilaus seems to have argued that because the wise man never opines he must not assent—the reverse of Carneades' argument—both men only try to refute Stoic premises. As Long and Sedley show (I 456), it is only a difference of dialectical strategy; cf. *Cic. Acad.* 2.77f, 1.41f with 2.67.

sion, the external object (πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν), and, on the other, in relation to the percipient of the impression (πρὸς τὸ φαντασιούμενον: *Math.* 7.168). These correspond to the difference between the object as it really is and the object as it appears. A presentation πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν is either true or false in so far as it “is or is not in harmony with” the external object (σύμφωνος or διάφωνος: *Math.* 7.168); but as judgment requires the medium of irrational perception, a presentation πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν cannot be the criterion. A presentation πρὸς τὸ φαντασιούμενον, on the other hand, is “apparently true or not” (φαινομένη ἀληθῆς, οὐ φαινομένη ἀληθῆς: *Math.* 7.169). What is apparently true may be either intensely or dimly apparent, and the dimly apparent cannot be a criterion (*Math.* 7.171ff). Some things that seem intensely true may turn out to be true, others false, and some both true and false (*Math.* 7.174f). Therefore even this criterion can only be called generally reliable. This “probable” (πιθανόν) criterion leaves open the matter of truth and falsehood (Long and Sedley I 458). When time allows, the probable may be confirmed more securely by examining the particular qualities of the object as it appears. If none of them appears to conflict with the appearance that the presentation is true, the presentation can be called both probable and undiverted (πιθανή καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος: *Math.* 7.176–81). The third criterion is probable, undiverted, and tested (πιθανή καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ διεξωδευμένη): a presentation is tested like a judge’s examination of testimony. The judge must be competent, just as the senses must not be impaired. What is judged must be of a magnitude that can be judged and, finally, the medium through which the judgment is made must not hinder the decision. There must be no cause for suspicion or doubt created by darkness, excessive distance, too little time for evaluation, etc. (*Math.* 7.182f). Carneades concludes that in trivial matters the probable presentation is a sufficient criterion; in greater matters the undiverted; and in “matters pertaining to happiness” (τοῖς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνουσι) the tested is required (*Math.* 7.184). When time does not permit the latter, the probable must be employed (*Math.* 7.185f).

Plutarch shows the importance of this procedure for the avoidance of passion when Carneades says that “in matters of great importance, unexpectedness is the whole and entire cause of grief and dejection” (*Mor.* 474E–F: ἐπὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων ... πᾶν καὶ ὅλον ἐστὶν εἰς λύπην ἄγον καὶ ἀθυμίαν τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον). This is nearly the Cyrenaic thesis, but Cicero hints that

Carneades probably upheld this thesis against the Stoics for dialectical purposes in a specific debate.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>129</sup> My primary intention in this section, a demonstration that Posidonius used Carneades' arguments, requires reconstructing the context of Carneades' arguments on the passions. A *possible* reconstruction would be as follows. The two occurrences of Carneades' name at *Tusc.* 3.54, 60 come from different sources (Clitomachus and Antiochus) and report his attacks on Chrysippus in different debates: 3.54 on whether the wise man will suffer passion concerns the *aitia* of the passions; 3.60 on the utility of *consolatio* treats the cure of the passions (θεραπεία). But Cicero also discusses the Cyrenaics. *Plut. Mor.* 474E–F, where Carneades defends the Cyrenaic thesis on the cause of the passions, explains Carneades' rôle in this discussion. Epicurean evidence (*Tusc.* 3.28–51) accounts for Carneades at 3.60 on the "cure." In the Epicurean view, if a man thinks that he is in the presence of evil, he must necessarily feel grief (to the extent that *nature* demands it: *Ep. ad Men.* 127; *KD* 29; *Cic. Tusc.* 3.28). This grief will not diminish in time, nor will it be lightened (after the fact) by the Cyrenaic motto "let nothing happen unexpected" (*Tusc.* 3.32). If he dwells on this evil or considers that some misfortune may strike at any time, his evil will be perpetual. Only a "recall" to the contemplation of pleasures can cure his distress: *Tusc.* 3.32f; J. Annas, "Epicurean Emotions," *GRBS* 30 (1989) 145–64; M. Nussbaum, "Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle," in Schofield and Striker (*supra* n.22) 31–74; see also Galen *PHP* 4.282.1–284.17=EK 165.17–70 on the *doxa prosphatos*; *cf. supra* n.118.

After Posidonius asks why the fresh belief causes passion and why unexpected events cause it but familiar ones do not, he advocates the Cyrenaic position to "let nothing happen unexpected" by proposing that we "dwell in the future" (προενδημειν). Then he quotes, after the Cyrenaics, the same passages from Anaxagoras and Eur. *Andr.* (*Tusc.* 3.29f); a quotation follows in which Chrysippus ponders why the passions may cease in time although the opinion has not changed (*supra* n.43). This evidence may originally derive from a debate between the Epicureans and Cyrenaics on the cause of the passions, in which Chrysippus became involved (*Tusc.* 3.32; Giusta II 317; Fillion-Lahille 168), as we know that the Epicurean Colotes attacked the Cyrenaics for rejecting sense-impressions and living according to the *pathe* (*Plut. Mor.* 1120C–F; *cf. Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.190–200)—a debate that also involved Stoic arguments to some degree (Vander Waerdt, "Colotes" 230ff). Chrysippus, I presume, rejected outright the Epicurean position that passion is necessary: a Chrysippean *divisio* shows (*Cic. Fin.* 2.44; *supra* n.98) his concern to refute the Epicurean *telos*—a subject closely allied with the *pathe*. He would have accepted the Cyrenaic position as a correct observation from nature that unexpected events do affect us more (and he may even have conceded that the passages from Anaxagoras and Eur. *Andr.* are useful: *cf. Tusc.* 3.55, 58, 60; *supra* nn.122f), but he would have disputed the causal link between the unexpected and passion (*cf. supra* n.43). We might deduce that Carneades upheld the Cyrenaic thesis against Chrysippus on the cause of the passions, but reinforced it by his own arguments on the criterion about the necessary conditions (esp. time) for assent (*Tusc.* 3.54); he espoused the Epicurean thesis against Chrysippus' cure of the passions and strengthened it with an argument "on goods and evils" (*cf. Tusc.* 3.60: a connection between a "natural" evil and an "amount" of evil). Posidonius then, aware that Carneades had effectively

How would these arguments on the criterion be applied to the Stoic topos of a wise man's reaction to the fall of his city (*supra* n.122)? Carneades proposes that a wise man might use a scientific method to test his presentations. As I argue, Carneades' arguments describe a rational process, a *ratio*, which only a wise man could use because it is based on the presumption of undogmatic assent.<sup>130</sup> The wise man might either withhold his assent entirely or assent only to the proposition that his presentation is probable, until he could test it. A fool, with only the hard teacher of experience to rely on, cannot use this method and can hardly be expected to utilize the various kinds of undogmatic assent. An average man may, on occasion, instinctively reason things out in a calm and scientific manner, but Carneades claims only two ways of dealing with disaster: *ratio* and *usus*.

Carneades concludes that the problem is not whether the fall of the wise man's city is a great evil; rather, matters of importance demand time to evaluate the appearance. The 'magnitude' of the thing and its 'immediacy' artificially magnify its significance: what reason ought to have taught, experience teaches, namely that things that seem very great are really very small (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.54: *quod ratio debuerat, usus docet minora esse ea, quae sint visa maiora*; cf. *supra* n.123). For Carneades to say (as in Plutarch) that unexpectedness causes grief in great matters, he must be arguing that unexpectedness distorts the magnitude of appearances and causes the percipient to evaluate their importance too highly. The wise man (but not the fool), aware that sudden *phantasiai* appear greater than they are, corrects for the effects of distortion. More importantly, however, the force of unexpectedness must reside in temporal proximity, or the passage of time would not remove it in the fool.

Indeed, an objector (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.55) immediately asks "what need is there at all for reason or for that consolation we always use when we wish to alleviate the suffering of those in grief?" (*quid ergo opus est, dicet aliquis, ratione aut omnino consolatione illa, qua solemus uti, cum levare dolorem maerentium volumus?*). The Cyrenaic dictum "let nothing happen unexpected"

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used the Cyrenaic position to refute the doctrine of *doxa prospastos*, would have defended the Cyrenaic thesis against Chrysippus with Cyrenaic passages of which Chrysippus had approved.

<sup>130</sup> Even if Carneades suggests a *ratio* here, it need not commit him to any dogmatic stance. See Vander Waerdt, "Colotes" 265f for an account of how the sceptic might procede.

cannot, the objector continues, relieve suffering *after* one has submitted to passion, for “this kind of talk subtracts nothing from the actual amount of the evil” (*haec enim oratio de ipsa summa mali nihil detrahit*). Although Cicero upholds the Stoic view that “unexpectedness” cannot be the entire cause of evil, this dictum reminds him that misfortune is natural and not something that ought to cause grief. Cicero distinguishes *recens* in the Stoic sense of *prospatos* (“fresh”) from *repentina* (“sudden”) and argues that “things seem greater because they are fresh, not because they are sudden” (*Tusc.* 3.55: *maiora videntur quia recentia sunt, non quia repentina*). The Stoics define the freshness of an opinion by the ability of the opinion to cause an impulse of the soul (*supra* n.26). Freshness, measured psychologically rather than temporally, has no relationship to the passage of time.

The objection corresponds completely to Carneades’ other arguments: presentations (*visa*) have an amount—a perceived “magnitude” of good and evil; the point at issue, as Cicero’s response suggests, is whether the unexpectedness causes grief and reason is useless to remove it, *i.e.*, temporal newness, and time will heal the wound.<sup>131</sup> The citation of Carneades at *Tusc.* 3.60 confirms him as the anonymous objector at 3.55.<sup>132</sup> Antiochus reports how Carneades constantly chastised Chrysippus’ praise of a passage from Euripides’ *Hypsipyle* (*Tusc.* 3.60=*SVF* III 487; Eur. fr. 757 Dindorf), where man’s lot in life is described in grim terms: death and pain come to all according to the law of necessity. If Chrysippus liked the passage for its demonstration that misfortune is natural and therefore bearable for human beings, Carneades criticizes it because “to be victim to such a cruel necessity is itself something to be grieved” (*id enim ipsum dolendum esse dicebat quod in tam crudelem necessitatem incidissemus*). In his view these lines only add to the “amount” of grief with which the mourner must contend, as if to say “if things seem bad now, just wait; more misfortune is on the way.” The subject at 3.60, as at 3.55, is whether the dictum “let nothing

<sup>131</sup> Cf. *Tusc.* 3.54, a summary of Carneades’ argument: *tanta igitur calamitatis praesentis adhibetur a philosopho medicina, quanta in inveterata ne desideratur quidem* (“therefore so great a treatment for a present disaster applied by the philosopher would not even be desired in the case of one long past”). See Ioppolo 83 with n.23.

<sup>132</sup> Ioppolo 86: “Mi sembra che ci sia una perfetta concordanza tra l’obbiezione prospettata in forma anonima alla consolazione stoica al par. 55 e quella attribuita esplicitamente a Carneade al par. 60.”

happen unexpected” will do any good after the fact, *i.e.*, whether *consolatio* is beneficial. The anonymous objection, in all likelihood, derives from Carneades’ arguments against Chrysippus.

These various arguments reveal much. Carneades argued not only against the Stoic doctrine of the passions and their cure but against Chrysippus in particular. He probably attacked the *doxa prosphtatos* by defending the Cyrenaic thesis that the “unexpectedness of an event” causes passion; he would also have argued both that the temporal proximity of the event increases artificially the magnitude of presentations, and that *consolatio* cannot alleviate passion unless the actual ‘amount’ of evil present can be diminished.

Further, these arguments anticipate all the positions that Posidonius imputes to Chrysippus. In fact every description of Chrysippus’ doctrines repeats an argument that Carneades made against him. The curious τὸ μέγεθος τῶν φαινομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, imputed to Chrysippus (*supra* n.106), actually derives from Carneades’ view on the magnitude of *visa* (*supra* n.123). Carneades’ arguments on the criterion (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.159–86) explain very clearly Posidonius’ muddle of appearance and reality in discussing the “magnitude of things that appear good or evil.” There is no criterion in relation to the thing as it exists in reality (πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν); the only means of judging how to react to an external evil is by its appearance to the subject (πρὸς τὸ φαντασιούμενον). As Carneades considers only appearances, Posidonius imputes the argument to Chrysippus. Carneades’ own claim that *phantasiai* cannot exist apart from irrational sense-perception (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.165, *supra* n.127) finds an echo in Posidonius’ association of *phantasiai* with the irrational faculties (*supra* n.116). Posidonius’ definition of “fresh” (Galen *PHP* 4.280.26–33=EK 165.9–17: τὸ ὑπόγυον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον) and his claim that unexpected and strange events cause passion (*supra* n.118) are all earlier arguments of Carneades (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.54f, 60).

Despite the lack of evidence that Posidonius quoted Carneades’ arguments, it is sufficiently clear how and why Carneades used these arguments against Chrysippus (*cf. supra* n.129). All the very un-Stoic arguments attributed to Chrysippus appear to be consistent with Academic dialectical strategy in general and with arguments actually attributed to Carneades by Cicero. Even with due caution regarding *Tusc.* 3 as a source, the symmetry of argument inspires confidence in a relationship between Posidonius and Carneades.

## VI. The Impact of Posidonius' Dialectical Strategy upon his Ethics

This analysis of Posidonius' strategy against Chrysippus raises important questions about his motives. His deliberate attribution to Stoic forbears of Academic positions is in one case difficult to dispute (*supra* nn.16, 20) and credible in many others (*supra* sections IV–V). Further, his support of certain Aristotelian positions on the passions used by Carneades against the Stoa (*supra* nn.115f; [*Mag. Mor.*] 1203b4f) and his model of the soul (*supra* nn.29f) add to suspicions about his allegiance to the Stoa and his reputation as an "Aristotelizer."<sup>133</sup> His motive for misrepresenting other Stoics' views merits an explanation.

Posidonius' primary concern, as he suggests (*supra* n.16), is that Stoic formulations for the *telos* were vulnerable to apparent *aporiai*. Moreover, as doctrines on the *telos*, the *pathe*, and the good are "bound as if by a single cord" (*supra* n.15), all Stoic ethics were *dialectically* vulnerable. I argue that Posidonius' doctrines on the good and the *telos* attempt to recast the most important Stoic positions in simpler language. All his formulations appeal to common sense (τὰ ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα: *supra* nn.8, 100, 116).

The Stoa's most potent didactic tool both before and after Posidonius was paradox. Indeed its best-known doctrines, "that only virtue is good" (ὅτι μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν) and "that virtue is sufficient for happiness" (ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν) begin Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (6–19). These paradoxes defy common sense and experience, which would count health, wealth, and comfort necessary for happiness. Zeno says that the wise man, though afflicted by countless misfortunes and tortured on the rack, is "perfectly happy" (*beatus*: Cic. *Fin.* 5.84). His argument that some addition or the subtraction of any misfortune cannot increase man's happiness expose the Stoa's vulnerability to attacks from common sense. Posidonius' model of the soul, not strictly Platonic or Peripatetic, does not admit that these external things are 'goods'. Using roughly their model of the soul, nevertheless, he shows that these counter-intuitive Stoic doctrines need not be paradoxical. By replacing Stoic paradoxes with his own arguments from com-

<sup>133</sup> On τὸ ἀριστοτελίζον see EK T85 (=Strab. 2.3.8), 93a, T100 (=Simpl. in *Cael.* 4.3, 310b1), 18, T73 (=Simpl. in *Phys.* 2.2, 193b23) with Kidd, EK II *ad locc.*

mon sense, he demonstrates, as we shall see, a degree of dialectical sophistication surpassing even that used against Chrysippus.

Carneades attacks most successfully the positions that Posidonius addresses. Carneades' attempt to blur the line between the value of the indifferents and the value of the good (Cic. *Fin.* 3.41–44) allows him to attack (1) Chrysippus' doctrine that the passions arise by supposition that an indifferent is a good (*supra* nn.47–53; Cic. *Fin.* 3.24=SVF III 11) and (2) the doctrine that the *telos* of life should involve the practice of a *stochastike techne*, in which one aims at the acquisition of the preferred indifferents but achieves one's purpose in the virtuous effort of aiming (*supra* n.85). All Carneades' arguments relate to his attack on the good, the doctrine on which Posidonius is unquestionably Stoic. The doctrine of the good is in Kidd's words the "distinguishing stamp" of the Stoa and what makes a Stoic a Stoic.<sup>134</sup>

Posidonius regards his model of the soul as the starting point for his ethical doctrines and grounds his doctrines on the *telos* and the good (*i.e.*, virtue) in his psychology: συνῆφθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν διδασκαλίαν τούτοις φησὶ καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦ τέλους καὶ ὅλως πάντα τὰ δόγματα τῆς ἠθικῆς φιλοσοφίας ὡς περ ἐκ μιᾶς μηρίνου δεδέσθαι τῆς γνώσεως τῶν κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν δυνάμεων.<sup>135</sup> Posidonius' model of the soul portrays vividly the difference between man's attraction to virtue and his attraction to the indifferents. He clarifies how a proper understanding of the soul's chief good explains not only man's attraction to external things and the cause of the passions but also man's goal of becoming a sage.

The aspects of Stoic thought most difficult to explain in monistic psychology are selection (*supra* nn.54, 58–62), reservation (*supra* nn.47–53), and the status of the indifferents in κατορθώματα and καθήκοντα (*supra* 254, 278 with n.96). Doctrines on the *telos* teach how a correct understanding of these issues leads to happiness; those on the *pathe* explain how an incorrect understanding causes unhappiness. As monistic psychology can explain all these doctrines, Posidonius has no justification for adop-

<sup>134</sup> I. G. Kidd, "Posidonian Methodology and the Self-Sufficiency of Virtue," in H. Flashar and O. Gigon, edd., *Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique* (= *Entretiens Hardt* 23 [Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1986]) 8, and (*supra* n.54) 184.

<sup>135</sup> Galen *PHP* 4.286.4–7=EK 150a.6–10: "[Posidonius says] that education about the virtues and the end are fitted together with these things (*sc.* the dogmas on the passions and the faculties of the soul), and that in their entirety all the dogmas of ethical philosophy are bound as if by a single cord to the recognition of the faculties of the soul." Cf. 5.326.12–16=EK 30; *supra* n.15.

ting a new psychology on the grounds that monism *cannot* account for the *aitia* of passion. But Posidonius' psychology explains all these issues with a certain graphic clarity; and his doctrine on the soul's relationship to the good and the indifferents answers all Carneades' objections against Chrysippus. Despite the lack of a definitive statement that this was his goal, Posidonius' doctrines do answer Carneades. When Posidonius inserts Carneades' arguments into Chrysippus' mouth, this curious procedure demonstrates not so much flaws in Chrysippus' doctrines (for he rarely considers them in context and as they were written) as their vulnerability to Academic attack. So too in his ethics, Posidonius' sophisticated dialectical scheme has the defense of the Stoa against the Academy as its ultimate objective.

Seneca's lengthy discussion of Posidonius' view of the good<sup>136</sup> begins with Posidonius' view that riches can be an "antecedent cause" of evil (*causa praecedens*) because they puff up the spirit and tempt it to vice, although they are not evil because they lack an "efficient cause" of evil (*causa efficiens*). Nor does it follow that they are not "preferred indifferents" (*commoda*), because riches contain more benefit than harm. As indifferents that can be used well or badly, riches are not "goods" in Stoic terms.

Posidonius specifically designs his model of the soul to uphold the Stoic doctrine of the good within a Platonic, tripartite framework (cf. *supra* n.29). Each power of the soul has its own desires (ὄρεκτά: Galen *PHP* 5.330.5=EK 161.5)—a part of his model similar to Plato's (*Resp.* 4.441E–42A). The desiderative faculty (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) is drawn to pleasure (ἡ ἡδονή), the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές) to victory (ἡ νίκη), and the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν) to virtue (τὸ καλόν). These desires are οἰκείον ("natural and appropriate") to their respective faculties (Galen *PHP* 5.318.12–24=EK 160). Thus Posidonius connects his Platonic model to the fundamental Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις, the process by which man recognizes his bond with his own nature and with the nature and order governing the universe. By this process man learns to "habituate" himself to the world in which he lives and by which he is drawn to virtue.<sup>137</sup> Posidonius shows that his explanation of human motivation is to be understood by

<sup>136</sup> *Ep.* 87.31–40=EK 170. See Kidd, EK II 626–38, *supra* n.54, and esp. (*supra* n.134) 1–21. Kidd explains and refutes the evidence (EK 171 [=D.L. 7.103], 173 [=7.127f], 172 [=Epiph. *De fide* 9.46]; EK II 638–43), suggesting that Posidonius considered wealth and health "goods."

<sup>137</sup> D.L. 7.85f=SVF III 178; Cic. *Fin.* 3.16, 62–68; cf. SVF III 340ff. For the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις see Inwood 182–201; *supra* n.60.

the concept of οἰκεῖον, a term used by the Stoics and others (*supra* nn.26, 60).

Posidonius further qualifies his model: what is appropriate to the rational faculty is appropriate in a special way. What is οἰκεῖα to the rational faculty is “simply appropriate” (ἀπλῶς οἰκεῖα), whereas what is “appropriate” to the irrational faculties is not simply so (οὐκ ἀπλῶς οἰκεῖα: Kidd [1978] 207f; EK II 576f). This distinction corresponds to the relationship of the rational faculty with a divine nature (θεῖον) to the irrational faculties having that of an animal (ζωώδη: Galen *PHP* 5.330.2–6=EK 161.2–7). Posidonius compares the rational faculty to a charioteer and the irrational faculties to his team of horses.<sup>138</sup> The virtue of the rational faculty is to acquire knowledge of the nature of the universe (ἐπιστήμη τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως), whereas the virtues of the irrational faculties are to become accustomed to obeying the commands of reason (ἔπεσθαι τε καὶ πείθεσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ).<sup>139</sup> This model of the soul is intimately bound up with Posidonius’ doctrine of good and evil.

Virtue alone is ἀπλῶς οἰκεῖα; all other things desired by the irrational faculties are either evil or appropriate only with qualification. The irrational faculties are drawn to things that differ in kind, not in magnitude, from those to which reason is drawn. Posidonius’ ἀπλῶς indicates that the distinction is between the ‘qualified’ and the ‘unqualified’. To be led by the irrational faculty is to be drawn to something other than virtue and to mistake what is indifferent or evil for what is appropriate without qualification, *i.e.*, good.<sup>140</sup>

In Posidonius’ system man can fall into passion whenever he allows the irrational powers in his soul to have their way. All

<sup>138</sup> See Vander Waerdt (*supra* n.5: 386f) on the doxographical tradition of this image from Pl. *Phdr.* 253c–54b; Kidd (*supra* n.18) 111ff.

<sup>139</sup> Galen *PHP* 5.324.9–23=EK 31.14–30. The irrational faculties seem to accomplish this task by being neither too strong nor too weak, but by assuming the state of an Aristotelian mean: *Eth. Nic.* 2.5f, 1106a–07a. The virtue of the rational faculty does not seem to be a mean.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Galen *PHP* 5.326.20–24=EK 187.4–9: τὸ δὲ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἔπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικούντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζωώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι (“The cause of passion, that is, of discord and the unhappy life, is that people do not follow in everything the divinity in themselves which, in origin and in being, has the same nature as that which rules the universe, and sometimes, inclining towards the worse, animal-like faculty, they are carried away.”). Cf. D.L. 7.88 on the use of δαίμων.

three faculties are drawn to what is appropriate (οἰκεῖον).<sup>141</sup> These things contribute to the natural life; but it is not appropriate that every natural thing without qualification should be sought by a complete human being, whose soul moves him with three different generic desires (ὀρεκτά). The τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, appropriate to the several faculties of the soul, are appropriate for the entire man only when reason judges that their pursuit contributes to its own practice of virtue, always appropriate without qualification. This model identifies the entire man, in a limited sense, with his rational faculty because what is appropriate to it is appropriate to the entire man.<sup>142</sup> The irrational faculties must serve the rational faculty for the soul to be harmonious and free from passion.

Thus the irrational faculties may seek the preferred indifferents (προηγμένα) for their own sake, while the rational faculty pursues them only as a means to the *telos* of virtue. Posidonius' model could explain the appearance of two ends—virtue and attainment of the preferred indifferents—and refute Carneades' *aporia* (Plut. *Mor.* 1070 F). The preferred indifferents would be both the ὕλη and the ἀρχή of acts as the irrational faculties perform them, but only the ὕλη as the rational faculty performs them (*supra* 254, 278 with n.96). Posidonius does not mean that the irrational faculties perform καθήκοντα, for he says that being led by the irrational faculties constitutes passion (*supra* n.140). But so long as the rational faculty controls the irrational faculties, the whole soul pursues προηγμένα harmoniously to practice καθήκοντα (the acts appropriate for both the moral

<sup>141</sup> Kidd says (in Long [*supra* n.2] 207) that for Posidonius “*oikeion* is not necessarily related to the term good, however relative. Posidonius is not concerned here with ‘the preferred’ (*proegmena*), with what has relative worth (*axia*) in a moral context, but with native drives which upset the moral balance.” Although *oikeion* does not mean “good,” I do not entirely follow Kidd’s contention that Posidonius is not thinking of *proegmena* when he says *oikeion*. Posidonius explicitly associates pleasure (one of his τὰ οἰκεῖα) with τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν (Galen *PHIP* 5.328.11f=EK 187.27f), an Academic use for the Stoic τὰ κατὰ φύσιν (*supra* n.81). Moreover, Kidd says (*supra* n.134: 17; EK II 635f) that the irrational faculties are drawn to τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. The psychological importance of man’s “native drives” is that man is drawn to the unhappy life by ‘desiring’ what he should only ‘select’, which is a doctrine common to all Stoics.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. Glibert-Thierry 398, citing Sen. *Ep.* 121.14=SVF III 184: *Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo*. This general point, though acceptable to Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and others, is clearly one of the inspirations for the entire Stoic enterprise.

progressor and the sage) and, when this control is perfected, κατορθώματα (the virtuous acts of the sage).

This model explains not only the rôle of the indifferents in κατορθώματα and the appearance of two *tele*, but also the cause of passion, which the monist would call a “fresh belief” (*doxa prosphatos*) from the lack of “reservation” (*supra* nn.14, 47–53). When reason controls the soul, the proper attitude towards the good is preserved and with it man’s relationship to nature, divine reason, and fate. In Chrysippus’ model, the false belief that something indifferent is good or evil and, more importantly, the “fresh belief” that passion is “appropriate” (*oportet/καθήκον*: *supra* 254f) cause passion. Posidonius views the latter part of this doctrine as absurd and cites a comic fragment: ἔα μ’ ἀπολέσθαι· τοῦτό μοι νῦν συμφέρεi (CAF III 350=Galen PHP 4.270.1=EK 164.99). He replaces the paradoxical doctrine of Chrysippus with his own common-sense explanation that if one is led by reason, he practices reservation. If not, he is liable to the passions at any time.

But how is a man to know if he is led by the rational or the irrational faculties? The monistic model suggests two possibilities: one may assent to the proposition that passion is ‘appropriate’ either consciously or unconsciously. Posidonius mocks Chrysippus as if he held the former, although he certainly intended the latter (*cf. supra* n.43; Inwood 81–85, 161). Posidonius’ solution omits the problem of unconscious assent. He recommends that the rational faculty train the irrational to obey through an irrational education of “rhythms, harmonies, and practices” (Galen PHP 5.330.7f=EK 168.2f: ῥυθμοῖς ἅμα καὶ ἀρμονίαις καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασι). Apparently, just as Chrysippus held man accountable for his unconscious assents, Posidonius holds him accountable for training his irrational faculties. Interesting, however, is Posidonius’ treatment of reason’s responsibility in passion, *i.e.*, the problem of weak will, made famous in Euripides’ *Medea* (1019–80).<sup>143</sup> The tripartite model has its own paradoxes, which Posidonius fails to admit. He actually inverts the Socratic dictum “no one does wrong willingly” (μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν)<sup>144</sup> into a common-sense indictment of Chrysippus, as in the comic fragment cited above.

<sup>143</sup> On the problems of weak will for monists and dualists, see Inwood 132–39.

<sup>144</sup> Pl. *Grg.* 509E; *cf. Meno* 77D–E, *Prt.* 345E, 352A–57E, *Ap.* 25C–26A.

Posidonius' model of the soul and his doctrines on the passions and the good are the foundation for his *telos*-formula. His language, differing from earlier Stoic formulae (*supra* nn.57–64), requires elucidation. In its proper context his *telos*, like his other doctrines, resolves apparent *aporiai*: τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς.<sup>145</sup> The formula initially describes man's relationship to the order of the universe, *i.e.*, the divine *logos*: the first part of his *telos* is τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα (*cf. supra* n.140; Galen *PHP* 5.326.22f=EK 187.6ff). Kidd observes (EK II 672) that "it is difficult to find any passage in the earlier Stoa where θεωρία is given such a fundamental role"<sup>146</sup>—correctly if he means that θεωρία is not found in other *telos*-formulae. Comparison with Chrysippus' views of θεωρία may explain Posidonius' usage.

For Chrysippus, an understanding of justice must begin with Zeus and universal nature (Plut. *Mor.* 1035C–D: ἡ κοινή φύσις), as must an account (*logos*) of goods and evils: δεῖ γὰρ τούτοις συνάσαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνονος οὐδ' ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἔνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὔσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν.<sup>147</sup> This passage demonstrates the basic Stoic premise that man's *logos* is akin to the divine *logos* of nature, identical to the mind of Zeus (D.L. 7.87ff). As virtue is only possible when the wise man assimilates his reason to that of nature, the starting point of virtue becomes contemplation (θεωρία) of nature (man's own, universal nature, and the relationship of the two). Cicero clarifies this even more:

<sup>145</sup> Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.21.129.5=EK 186.13ff: "To live by rational contemplation of the truth and order of the universe, and by taking part in ordering it to the best of one's ability, while never being led by the irrational part of the soul."

<sup>146</sup> Kidd rightly observes that Diogenes (7.130) lists three lives: the "theoretical" (ὁ θεωρητικός), the "practical" (ὁ πρακτικός), and the "rational" (ὁ λογικός), but does not consider that the same information at Plut. *Mor.* 1035A shows that Chrysippus used θεωρία to describe the rational activity of which οἰκείωσις partially consists. *Cf. Arr. Epict. Diss.* 1.20.1f, 5, 14ff.

<sup>147</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 1035D: "For the doctrine on good and evil must be fitted together with these, since these [*sc.* good and evil] have no better beginning or reference, and physical speculation must not be undertaken for any other purpose than for the discernment of good and evil."

*Physicae quoque non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod qui convenienter naturae victurus sit ei profisciscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. Nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa.*<sup>148</sup>

To become a sage, one must contemplate the divine *logos* and accomodate himself to the world in order to complete his οἰκειώσις.

Kidd compares τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν with Posidonius' distinction between the philosopher's and the astronomer's observations on the universe (Simpl. in *Phys.* 2.2, 193b23 [pp.291.21–92.31 Diels]=EK 18). The philosopher looks to “the creative force” of the universe (εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν δύναμιν ἀποβλέπων), which Kidd takes as the *logos*: “the philosopher argues deductively from his fundamental universal principles or axioms; the scientist proceeds in his proofs from the observation and calculation of the properties of particular phenomena which form his field of study.”<sup>149</sup> Further, “τάξις not only covers the order of the οὐρανός, which is part of the proper study of ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρία (F18.8), but the order of everything imposed by λόγος, providence and Zeus” (EK II 672). Kidd's treatment (“Criterion” 148) of ἀλήθεια in Posidonius' doctrine that *orthos logos* should be the criterion (D.L. 7.54=EK 42) argues that in the period between Chrysippus and Posidonius attacks on the Stoa's criterion, the *phantasia kataleptike*, included a distinction between a criterion of action and a criterion of “underlying existence” (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.29f: περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως). Earlier Stoics like Chrysippus claimed that both wise men and fools may grasp τὸ ἀληθές through *katalepsis*, but only the wise man

<sup>148</sup> *Fin.* 3.73=SVF III 282: “To physics, and not without good reason, the same distinction is given, because whoever will live in accordance with nature must make the entire world and its governance his point of departure. Nor indeed can anyone judge truly about goods and evils without first recognizing the entire *logos* of nature and especially of the life of the gods, and whether or not the nature of man conforms with that of the universe.” Cf. *Nat. D.* 2.37, 39 =SVF II 1153, 641: *Ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum.... Est autem mundo nihil perfectius, nihil virtute melius: igitur mundi est propria virtus* (“But as for himself, man was born to contemplate and imitate the universe.... For nothing is more perfect than the universe, and nothing finer than virtue: therefore virtue is a characteristic of the universe”).

<sup>149</sup> EK II 131f; on the implications of this fragment see esp. Kidd (1978) 10–15.

may grasp ἡ ἀλήθεια, because only he possesses knowledge (Cic. *Acad.* 2.144f; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.42). In Kidd's view, Posidonius proposed his own criterion of action based on the natural attractions of the faculties of the soul, and *orthos logos* is intended as a criterion of "underlying existence" for the wise man: "As in the moral sphere 'appropriate action' (καθῆκον) becomes in the wise man κατόρθωμα ('perfect moral action') through his possession of *orthos logos*, so in the logic of truth, *katalepsis* becomes knowledge (*episteme*) through *orthos logos*" ("Criterion" 149). Posidonius' "the truth of everything that exists" probably means that part of the *telos* is to perceive, with the firm grasp of the sage's *episteme*, the universe as it is in reality. In other words, the specific implications of this phrase for Posidonius agree completely with Chrysippus' general principles: οἰκείωσις and progress towards virtue require man to observe and understand the divine *logos* and to make his own reason conform to it. Posidonius alludes not only to the process of οἰκείωσις, but also to its end in which man becomes a sage.

The first part of this formula refers exclusively to the rational faculty. Posidonius has good reason to spell out its particular activity, because elsewhere he describes its weakness as a cause of passion:

καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦθ' ὁ Ποσειδώνιος μέμφεται καὶ δεικνύναι πειράται πασῶν τῶν ψευδῶν ὑπολήψεων τὰς αἰτίας ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ (διὰ τῆς ἀμαθίας γινομένων, ἐν δὲ τῷ παθητικῷ) διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὀλκῆς, προηγέισθαι δὲ αὐτῆς τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀσθενήσαντος περὶ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· γεννᾶσθαι γὰρ τῷ ζῳῳ τὴν ὀρμὴν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσει, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ παθητικοῦ.<sup>150</sup>

<sup>150</sup> Galen *PHP* 5.320.23–28=EK 169.77–84: "Indeed Posidonius finds fault with him [*sc.* Chrysippus] on this matter too [*sc.* the source of error about good and evil], and attempts to show that the causes of all false suppositions arise in the faculty which contemplates <through ignorance, and in the faculty which acts> through the pull of the affections; but that false opinions are the antecedent causes of it [*sc.* the pull] when the rational faculty has become weak in judgment. For impulse is produced in a living being sometimes as a result of the rational faculty, but often as a result of the movement of the faculty subject to the passions." I give Kidd's text, defended at EK II 620–23. Fillion-Lahille (156f) uses this text to argue that Posidonius associates passions with "judgments" (δόξαι) and "suppositions" (ὑπολήψεις). This reading cannot be defended: *cf. supra* nn.9, 106, 140, and Posidonius' formula for the *telos* (EK 186), where it is quite clear that in Posidonius' view reason cannot cause passion, that he does not accept the Chrysippean doctrine of the *doxa prophantos*, and that passion consists in "being led by the irrational faculties." Given Posidonius' association of *phantasiai* with the irrational faculties, is this

One assumes that the activity of the rational faculty described in his *telos*-formula averts the weakness described here. False opinions may be avoided by constant contemplation of, and assimilation to, the divine *logos*.

The second part of the formula, καὶ συγκατασκευάζοντα αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, admonishes man to play a part in the ordering of the universe and to act in concert with what nature demands. Kidd notes (EK II 673) the parallel structure of θεωροῦντα ... συγκατασκευάζοντα, contemplation and action, and suggests that Plato's ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Tht.* 176B: "a likeness to the divine in so far as possible") anticipates the sense of κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. More importantly, he claims certain ethical implications for "to promote the truth and order of all things": "human beings have their part to play both in the macrocosm and in the microcosm of themselves,"<sup>151</sup> and concludes (EK II 674) that this *telos*-formula embraces all three branches of philosophy: physics, logic, and ethics.

In addition to Kidd's numerous insights on the formula and Posidonius' wider philosophy, the formula also reflects a specific concern to resolve Academic *aporiai*. κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, for instance, could allude to the στοχαστικὴ τέχνη, where the goal is effort, not success. Antipater's formula πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ποιεῖν (*supra* n.19) tries to account for the rôle of the indifferents in the craft of virtue by a highly specific use of πρὸς: man must do everything "with reference to but not for the sake of" the preferred indifferents. Posidonius' κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς preserves the suggestion of "effort" and resolves the ambiguity inherent in πρὸς: man is to participate in the ordering of all that exists "while never being led by the irrational part of the soul" (*cf.* Kidd *ad* μέρος: EK II 674).

Posidonius appeals to his model of the soul to explain that this effort must be rational. To be led by the irrational faculties would constitute passion. In Antipater's formula passion also plays a rôle, because "to do everything in one's power *for the*

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fragment not his answer to the Chrysippean doctrine about the persuasiveness of presentations (*supra* nn.32, 45, 116; nn.153f *infra*)?

<sup>151</sup> EK 85=Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.93; *cf.* Galen *De sequela* 819f=EK 35.22–27, in which Posidonius says that we need not shun the company of inferior men for fear that evil be increased in our souls, because the source of evil is not exterior but interior. In other words, man may be a more social being under Posidonius' account of the cause of evil (based on his model of the soul).

sake of acquiring the preferred indifferents” would be a tacit claim that they were ‘good’, and to pursue the indifferents as goods constitutes the excessive impulse of passion. Antipater’s use of πρὸς rather than ἔνεκα to govern τὰ κατὰ φύσιν is intended to represent reservation: man must make his efforts only “with reference to” the indifferents because the *arche* of his action must be virtue (*supra* 279). Posidonius’ model of the soul permits him to express the necessity for, and the meaning of, reservation in a much simpler fashion. To be led by reason is to preserve it, to be led by the irrational faculties is to abandon it.

Posidonius’ formula for the *telos*, is ideally suited to explain the problem of selection to which these other issues are directly related. It gives a rôle to the rational faculty *qua* rational in the first part: by observing the divine *logos* man not only progresses in virtue, but becomes aware of what is good and evil.<sup>152</sup> συγκατασκευάζοντα of the second part clearly suggests that man must not only contemplate the universe but interact productively with it. The means of this interaction is selection and rejection of the indifferents. As noted, the Stoa’s growing recognition of this fact led Diogenes and Antipater to include selection in their *telos*-formulae (*supra* nn.61–64). The second and third parts of Posidonius’ formula give the rational faculty positive and negative duties in selection: it must expend effort to interact with the world (possible only through selections of indifferents), but it also has a negative duty to rule the irrational faculties, which would, if allowed, pervert rational action into passion by pursuing the indifferents as goods. Posidonius completely interconnected his *telos*-formula, his doctrine of the good, and his model of the soul (*supra* n.15) and designed them to combat *aporiai* that Carneades raised.

A final way of reading this formula lies within the context of action. Posidonius’ formula based on tripartition accounts for the four primary functions of the monistic soul (φαντασία, λόγος, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμή). The first part of the formula clearly alludes to *logos* and, as Kidd shows (*supra* 318), ἀλήθεια tacitly refers to the criterion, *i.e.*, how one deals with *phantasiai*. Whether Posidonius explained the power of *logos* to create *lekta* and how his association of *phantasiai* with the irrational faculties (*supra* n.116) may be reconciled with his demand to observe the “truth” of the universe might be resolved through

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Cic. *Fin.* 3.33f=SVF III 72; Sen. *Ep.* 120.3ff, 8–11; Long and Sedley I 374f.

his argument that passion sometimes arises “when the rational faculty becomes weak in judgment” (*supra* n.150).

If continuous contemplation of the divine *logos* prevents weak judgments, it would also prevent the creation of false propositions (ἀξιώματα), about which a judgment might be made. But this is thorny ground: if Posidonius retains the theory of *lekta*, at some point it becomes difficult to distinguish his theory from Chrysippus’. Posidonius’ model, clearly intended to divide *phantasiai* from their corresponding *lekta*, has the *phantasiai* partake of the irrational. Perhaps he retains *lekta* and places them under the control of a different faculty, τὸ λογιστικόν, thus permitting his claim of two causes of passion: the weakness of the rational faculty in judgment and the disobedience of the irrational faculties (*supra* n.150). As Posidonius associated the effects of *phantasiai* on a weak rational faculty with the effects of disobedient irrational faculties, he probably claimed that *phantasiai*, like the irrational faculties, exert a “pull” (παθητική ὀλκή), which attempts to compel assent.<sup>153</sup> In discussing Chrysippus’ claim that “the persuasiveness of *phantasiai*” is one cause of evil, Posidonius associates attraction to impressions with the attraction of the irrational faculties to the indifferents:

καὶ γὰρ διὰ τί θεασάμενα καὶ ἀκούσαντα παράδειγμα κακίας οὐχὶ μισεῖ τοῦτο καὶ φεύγει τῷ μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτό, θαυμάζειν ἐπέρχεταιί μοι.... τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς παῖδας ὑπὸ μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς ὡς ἀγαθοῦ δελεάζεσθαι μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀποστρέφεσθαι δὲ καὶ φεύγειν τὸν πόνον, εἴπερ μὴ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠλλοτριῶνται φύσει; ... ἐρωτητέον αὐτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν, διὰ ἣν ἡδονὴ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλγηδῶν δὲ ὡς κακὸν πιθανὴν προβάλλουσι φαντασίαν.<sup>154</sup>

Posidonius’ response indicates that *phantasiai* derive their effect

<sup>153</sup> Cf. similar accounts in the later Stoics: Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 2.18.24f; Inwood 84.

<sup>154</sup> Galen *PIIP* 5.320.4ff, 7–10, 18f=EK 169.55ff, 59–63, 71ff: “It occurs to me to wonder why it is that when they have seen and heard an example of vice, they do not hate it and flee from it, since they feel no kinship with it... What necessity is there that children be enticed by pleasure as a good thing, when they feel no kinship with it, or that they avoid and flee from pain if they are not by nature also alienated from it? ... We must ask him why it is that pleasure projects the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil.” The Chrysippean phrase is ἡ πιθανότης τῶν φαντασιῶν at *PIIP* 5.320.17=EK 169.70f.

from man's "natural attraction" (οἰκείωσις) to the indifferents.<sup>155</sup> His *telos*-formula implies that all impressions about the indifferents must be submitted to the rational faculty, which tests them against the *episteme* acquired through contemplation (θεωρία) of the divine *logos*. His formula might mean: "all *phantasiai* must be tested by the criterion of truth." In this process certain propositions would have to be formed for assent to be given. As the word *lekton* does not occur in Posidonius' fragments, he may have suppressed the concept to avoid explaining how a weak rational faculty might produce conflicting *lekta* and thus becoming liable to his own arguments against Chrysippus.

Posidonius' formula also accounts for impulse and assent. The third part, κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, suggests that impulse (ὄρμη) must never result from the irrational faculty (cf. *supra* n.140). Possibly he would identify impulse with the irrational faculties, in which case he might say that "man must never live according to impulse." His positive account of impulse, embodied in συγκατασκευάζοντα, may involve a verbal pun: συγκατάθεσις, the technical term for assent, and σκευάζω, the proper activity of man's impulse, may combine as "making impulse conform to assent." Proper impulse would follow from proper assent, *i.e.*, the rational faculty's 'leadership' of the irrational faculties. Improper assent and impulse would be synonymous with the rational "being led by" the irrational.

If the preceding represents an over-interpretation of Posidonius' intentions, it nevertheless shows the sophistication of his response to Chrysippus. Posidonius' *telos*-formula embraces all branches of philosophy and preserves the central features of *telos*-formulae of Chrysippus, Antipater, and Diogenes; it accounts for rational action in terms of the soul's activities and can show how man should interact with the indifferents. His formula even preserves under κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν the central Stoic image of virtue as a tension, which Antipater rendered in the efforts of an archer, the *stochastike techne*. Moreover it accomplishes all these through language that is rich and layered yet simple.

<sup>155</sup> His model of the soul makes this clear (*supra* 311). Chrysippus too had said that man has a natural attraction to the indifferents in that "God himself made me inclined to select them" (*supra* n.53), but Posidonius might argue that it does not follow that this natural attraction can account for the corresponding *lekton* that such things are good, the assent to which would cause passion.

In sum, Posidonius did not undertake a refutation of Chrysippean monism through Chrysippus' expression of these doctrines, but attributes to Chrysippus subtly altered representations of Carneades' views. It was quite simple to show that these arguments refute themselves because Carneades designed them for that purpose. Although this complex dialectical strategy probably cannot be explained with complete satisfaction, I have tried to show that Posidonius' own doctrines display an even greater dialectical sophistication in that they can account for complex and even paradoxical early Stoic doctrines in the language of common sense.

Posidonius' motive may be summarized as follows: the most important aspects of Stoicism had to be explained through paradox; Carneades and others manipulated these doctrines slightly to make paradox synonymous with absurdity and argued *contra* through appeals to common sense; Posidonius portrayed the problem of Academic misrepresentations through his curious treatment of Chrysippus; and finally, he brought the Stoa into the camp of common sense by adopting tripartition. Posidonius' ability to explain the very phenomena that Carneades attacked so successfully suggests that his principal goal was to respond to Carneades and to render the Stoa invulnerable to future attacks. He respects Chrysippus far more than his fragments indicate because he preserves so many Chrysippean doctrines in his own model, and he omits entirely any mention of Carneades, whom he certainly read carefully (through Clitomachus and others). Posidonius' claim to conduct his inquiries from *aetiology* conceals, for the most part, his dialectical enterprise. Finally, his claim to begin his investigations from "what is plainly evident" (τὰ σαφῶς φαινόμενα: *supra* nn.8, 100, 116) more properly characterizes his 'end' to produce "plainly evident" arguments.

In the final analysis, Posidonius wrote in the age of Antiochus of Ascalon who, strongly influenced by Carneades, attempted to harmonize Stoicism with Platonism. It would be most interesting to compare their enterprises, as well as those of Eudorus and Arius Didymus.<sup>156</sup> The result might advance considerably our knowledge of the philosophical environment of the first century B.C.; others might wish to investigate Posidonius' rela-

<sup>156</sup> On the eclecticism of Eudorus and Arius see Stob. *Ecl.* 2.38f, 47f, 89f; Inwood 140-43, 189 n.34; A. A. Long, "Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics," in Fortenbaugh (*supra* n.18) 41-65.

tionship not only to the Stoa but to the arguments of Academics, Epicureans, and Cyrenaics, of which he was probably aware (*supra* n.129), and to the Peripatos that he clearly admired (*supra* n.133). The most intriguing, perhaps the most productive, area of investigation would be the extent to which Posidonius' doctrines actually reproduce the most important aspects of monism within a tripartite psychology, for this would provide insights into the works of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, where elements of monism and dualism exist side by side, seemingly without a loss to doctrine.<sup>157</sup>

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