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PREDICTING INSURGENT AND GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS: THE POWER BLOC MODEL

W. M. Jones

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PREFACE

The modeling of complex processes is a procedure commonly associated with the assessment of current states of affairs, the prediction of future states, and, often, with the control of processes themselves. Relatively well-understood processes, such as the refining of petroleum products, can be modeled with a precision that permits considerable automation of process control and prediction of the future. Less well-understood processes, such as the working of complex governmental decision systems, do not lend themselves to modeling of a sort that permits much confidence in situation assessment or prediction of the future, and certainly not to confident control of the process itself.

There are, however, some very good reasons for fabricating and using logical "models" of complex governmental (and quasi-governmental) decision processes. We are all influenced by domestic and foreign governmental decisions and actions. The desire to understand what is being decided, to predict future decisions, and to exert some measure of control over the processes involved has been obvious and well-documented throughout history, and will certainly persist in the future. An explicated, orderly framework or model for this kind of activity (of which this Memorandum is, hopefully, one example) is useful, first, in indicating the appropriate data to select from a plethora of data of dubious accuracy and timeliness, second, in giving guidance on the conditional weighting and using of the selected data, and third, in making assessments of current and probable future conditions. In addition, the obvious omissions (from the explicated model of potentially important elements) provide a constant reminder of limitations on the accuracy and completeness of the situation assessments and predictions being made.

Perhaps the most important benefit from explicating and operating a logical model of governmental decision processes is the assessments and predictions that are produced, however strange and illogical (by the standards of "common sense") they may seem. While many will prove, upon careful examination, to be the result of omissions of important

data in the model structure, cases will arise where "conventional wisdom" is proven to be inaccurate and a new insight is generated. Finally, explaining the elements and operations of his analytical model is a discipline needed by the analyst to "keep himself honest."

This analysis is a part of Rand's continuing work on Decision-making Processes in Military Organizations -- a study program intended to assist in explaining and predicting foreign military decisions and actions. As such, it will be of interest to those analysts whose duties involve making such estimates and predictions as a step in the development of appropriate U.S. military concepts and doctrine.

SUMMARY

Of what potential utility are logical models of complex governmental and quasi-governmental decision processes? They provide an orderly framework that can serve as a guide in the collecting, arranging and weighting of data, the description of existing conflict situations, and the assessment of current and future conditions.

The Power Bloc model of governmental and quasi-governmental decision processes, explained here, is one of a family of such models. It is designed to provide first approximations in assessing situations where either the available data are sparse and of dubious accuracy and timeliness or there is an embarrassing oversupply of such dubious data. The unit of analysis of the Power Bloc model is the *community* -- a term used to designate interagency groups of a relatively permanent nature that hold a common and generally consistent point of view concerning their functions. The "intelligence community" is an often used term that exemplifies this community approach. The communities considered appropriate for the kinds of analysis handled by the Power Bloc model are:

1. *The Political Control Element* with its function of final arbiter in national decision operations.
2. *The Military Structure* with its peacetime conservatism and wartime operational aggressiveness.
3. *The Foreign Affairs Community* with its function of dealing with its counterparts in other nations, a semiclosed diplomatic community.
4. *The Intelligence Community* with its tendency to collect data and conduct analyses that support the predilections of its major customers, and with its tendency to take direct action.
5. *The Technical and Industrial Managerial Group* with its continuous pressure for technological developments.

6. *The Domestic Administrative Bureaucracy* with its ever-present pressure for resource allocation to domestic problems.

These communities, which in their attempts to influence governmental decisions become political power blocs, have precursor or embryonic counterparts in the governing bodies of well-developed insurgent movements. In insurgent movements the "proto-communities," which in sum represent a sort of proto-government, evince a strong tendency to develop toward their stereotype within a conventional government. To paraphrase and expand on Stein, "An army is an army is an army and the combat elements of an insurgency will tend toward becoming an army." Similarly for the other communities.

The stages through which such proto-communities develop toward governmental communities are sufficiently well marked to permit the outside observer of an insurgency to judge where they are. Their decision concerning the problems known to be facing them is then postulated on the basis of the course of action most likely to help that community to develop toward conventionality. In those cases where the subject government can be shown to be fully developed, decisions that maintain a balance of community forces are the most likely.

A parallel way of predicting such decisions is to assume that the leaders of each of the communities or proto-communities are impelled by certain organizational *imperatives*. The operative imperatives for the kind of analysis appropriate to application of the Power Bloc model are:

1. At the top - *the Imperial Imperative*, with its strong tendency to take steps that preserve the leader(s) power positions.
2. At the higher levels - *the Managerial Imperatives*, primarily showing consistency and efficiency, which in turn reflect the impact of a manager's organization on his decision processes.
3. *The Functional Imperatives*, which impel a functional branch of a government or proto-government to press for overall decisions that fit functional needs.

4. *The Technological Imperative*, which is the recurrent tendency for organizations and agencies to advocate national decisions that will, when implemented, justify their acquisition of new and technically advanced equipments.

The use of the model to assess situations and give some basis for predicting the future is illustrated by two summary case studies using now obsolete data. First, the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong main military forces in the south are analyzed, and a contingent prediction of their future is made on the basis of their "fit" into the military element of the model. Next, the Arab commando units, upon study, are seen to better fit the overall proto-government of the model.

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GLOSSARY

- ARVN* - Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese Army)
- SVN* - South Vietnam
- NVA* - North Vietnamese Army
- VC Main Forces* - The major military forces of the Viet Cong (as differentiated from the local paramilitary guerilla companies and squads).
- COSVN* - Central Office of South Vietnam. The committee of senior communist officials that head the Viet Cong civil infrastructure, the North Vietnamese, and VC main military forces in the south and the pseudo-governmental National Liberation Front.
- Cadre* - VC-NVA term for military officer or civilian official equivalent.
- Fedayeen* - A general term covering the variety of organizations that collectively form the anti-Israeli, Palestinian Commando (and terrorist) Movement.
- PLO* - The Palestine Liberation Organization, a very loose grouping of Palestinian Commando and terrorist organizations the largest of which is Al Fatah.
- PLA* - The Palestine Liberation Army, a "courtesy title" covering the ill-coordinated fighting elements of the various Palestinian Commando organizations.

I. APPLICATIONS OF MODELS AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS

MODEL APPLICATION

Like most simplified models of human affairs, the model outlined in this Memorandum is applicable to a limited set of situations and can lead only to a limited group of insights or conditional predictions. The situations to which the model is most readily applicable are ones in which large scale, organized (or being organized) violence is a significant part, or perhaps the most significant part.

This emphasis on violent or threatening situations is partly the result of the severe problems such situations can present an analyst, and partly that the organizational imperatives of military structures are more sharply defined and better understood than the comparable organizational, technical, and functional imperatives of other national power blocs within a nation. In this sense, the analytical "tool" influences the selection of the task to which it might be put. The products of a model tend to be conditional predictions about how the major national "actors" will act and react to changing external conditions. No pretense is made that the approach gives any useful predictions concerning how the major human actors will *explain* their reasons for making specific predictions or that the "reasons" developed in the model, the "organizational imperatives" of various internal blocs, are more than a crude simplification of only one of the motivations that "drive" the individual decisionmaker. In short, the model, often by presumption, deals with power bloc positions in a crudely dynamic situation and leads to explanations and predictions that can best be termed "first approximations." As such, it is most readily applicable to situations where data are sparse and questionable or where the analyst is troubled by a plethora of reports and data of questionable accuracy and timeliness.

In those situations where the "observables" are well in hand, the data are relatively firm, and the personal preferences of the major human decisionmakers well known, the Power Bloc model is quite properly relegated to a position of being one of a number of approaches

to explanation and prediction. In such an application it serves as a continuous reminder to the analyst that significant human decision-makers are not completely free agents in their decision operations; they must, in some fashion, constantly allow for or adjust to the organizational imperatives of the major power blocs that affect and are affected by their decisions. In a sense, it can be said that the model provides both a "first approximation" when initially applied to a particular situation and also a guide to the search for and subsequent evaluation of observable information to use in an otherwise disorderly problem of analysis.¹

The first steps in model application are always data collection. The Power Bloc model is no different in this regard. One major feature of the model, however, does become evident early in the data collection phase. The recorded oral statements and writings of influential officials are not likely to be very useful unless the target audience is indicated. The interesting question is not simply, "What did he say?" but rather, "Why did he say it?" In short, the model leads the analyst to try to infer, from the domestically "targeted" statements of significant officials, which particular organizational imperatives are being dealt with and which power bloc might be in or moving toward an influential position. For "hard" data (in model terms) the analyst may often turn from the available statements of spokesmen of the government or proto-government and instead study the statements of officials of a hostile or unfriendly government or movement. In selecting and reporting data on the situation, an unfriendly official can be assumed to be free of the organizational imperatives of the subject government or movement. For example, Portuguese public statements concerning the state of guerrilla activity in Angola would not

¹An inherent feature of this and any other logical model of a complex social system is that the model has -- by design -- dynamics of its own. It follows that there are no safeguards built into the model itself to preclude its use with too few data and hard research. Because a model can "run" without much data, there is always the hazard of producing and acting on relatively baseless conclusions; however, the same hazard exists when analysis is not based on an explicit model.

have the biases in data selection and presentation that would be evident in the statements of Angolan insurgent leaders who must take into account both the morale and motivation of their guerrillas as well as potential foreign allies and the power positions of other, competitive insurgent leaders. Naturally, this "reading" of unfriendly officials' statements does not preclude possible biases. It just exposes *different* biases. For a hypothetical example, the Portuguese military commander in Angola, in making public statements about the insurgents must use care to insure that he neither damages the morale of his subordinates nor weakens his arguments to his home government for more troops and equipment.

UNITS OF ANALYSIS IN DECISIONMAKING MODELS

The Rational and Organizational Process Models

In the process of explicating the organizational process model, Graham Allison and A. W. Marshall have pointed out two procedures for explaining and predicting foreign governmental action: the rational model and the organizational process model.¹ The rational model uses the nation-state as its unit of analysis and deals with governmental decisions in terms of logical rationality and internal consistency as if the nation-state were similar to a rational human (or, at least, as a monolithic decisionmaker with no important internal conflicts and competitions). The unit of analysis in the organizational process model is the major subunit of the governmental bureaucratic elements such as the anti-aircraft artillery component of the Soviet defense establishment. In the organizational process model the governmental decision process is characterized by a persistent advocacy process in which each component of the governmental bureaucracy presses for those measures that promise continuing or increasing allocations of national

¹The Allison-Marshall work on the two models was done at Rand in 1969. For a thorough explanation of the Organizational Process Model see Graham T. Allison, Jr., Policy Process and Politics: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, Department of Government, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

resources to the advocating agency. This model can be used to "explain" the apparently illogical (in terms of abstract human logic) commitments of governmental resources, in amounts and periods beyond the apparent point of diminishing returns. The continuing expansion of Soviet air defenses at a time of diminishing bomber threat is an example.

The basic assumption of the organization process model is that functional advocacy is observable and predictable and that the growth or continuation of an organization's size and equipment (its share of the national resources) can be taken as evidence of its position of influence in the (assumed) governmental debate and therefore can be used as a basis for certain cautious predictions of future decisions.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model

Halperin uses a bureaucratic politics model in discussing the decision process leading to the ABM development decision.¹ In this model the major "units" are the involved senior governmental officials. Their individual actions and debating positions are treated as arising primarily from their own personal histories and developing ideas, with only secondary considerations being given to their roles as administrators and executives of major agencies. The decision process is portrayed as the interaction of such players and the observed decision as a product of this interaction.

The Power Bloc Model

The Power Bloc model takes as its major operating unit certain *communities* (in the sense of groups of people having mutually recognized common interests) found in every major government and quasi-governmental insurgent movement,² albeit in the latter some of the

¹Morton H. Halperin, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. in a paper entitled, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic Parties in the Pentagon and White House in the Johnson Administration," delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September 8-12, 1970.

²Hereafter entitled "proto-governments."

"power blocs" are embryonic. The reasons for using functional power blocs are: (1) They better fit and describe the cross-organizational groups that combine to perform essential national functions than do the functionally separated organizations. A nation's foreign ministry may be charged with recommending and administering foreign policy but there are elements of other governmental agencies that work in close coordination with foreign ministry personnel and that can upon occasion be dominant in certain foreign policy decisions. The expression, "power bloc" better describes this interorganizational grouping than any other convenient term. (2) The use of the term "power bloc" describes the close integration of foreign field office and domestic administration personnel which modern high speed, high volume, secure communications systems have made possible. Field office groups, domestic and foreign based, are today more deeply involved in the interagency political "game" than were the comparable groups of a decade ago. A unit of analysis that does not recognize this new phenomenon is likely to focus on functions within an organization and within a nation's capital that no longer exist. (3) Power blocs are informal groupings and, as such, usually have no formally designated government official leadership although a "lead" department or ministry can often be identified.

In a very real sense, the various phenomena attributed to bureaus (that is, bureaucracy) are more prevalent in power blocs than in bureaus themselves. Having identified official heads, nonbureaucratic decisions sometimes come out of bureaus. Because they have no official heads, decisions and actions from power blocs that are other than bureaucratic in character are most rare.

II. THE FORMATION OF POWER BLOCS

STAGES LEADING TO A CLIMAX ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

One can think of development of the large and extraordinarily complex administrative machinery of a large modern government in somewhat the way an ecologist thinks about a forest. Ecologists have coined the concept and the term "climax forest" to characterize a situation in which a large tract of woodland has reached a kind of stability so that, although different trees dominate at different times, the character of the forest remains unchanged over long periods of time. Another element of this concept is that following a catastrophic event such as a major forest fire, the tract will return to its climax condition by passing through a series of predictable stages. Following a major fire the land will first be covered with fire-resistant underbrush and weeds and with the sun-loving berries and brambles whose seeds are brought in by birds. Years later, fast growing trees of a soft wood variety will have overgrown, shaded, and killed the brush and weeds, converting the tract into a soft wood forest. Finally, the slower growing trees of the climax forest overshadow the soft woods and the forest returns to its climax condition. The climax, then, represents an ideal model for the so-called natural vegetation of a region.

The "climax" condition for a modern government's administrative machinery is one in which the major functional divisions of essential administrative operations are recognized by the existence of large departments or ministries such as a Foreign Ministry, Department or Ministries of Interior, Defense, Agriculture, and so on. Because, however, any major decision affecting the operations of the resource allocation to any one ministry seriously affects the operations of the others, a highly complex nexus of formal and informal interministry coordinating devices (procedures or, more often, panels and committees) exist to negotiate the necessary incremental changes in operations to fit any new requirements. There is a natural tendency for these coordinating negotiations, since they deal with proposed and contemplated operations, to gravitate toward decisionmaking by bargaining

and consensus. One expects -- and can observe -- responsible officials seriously debating a proposed action with all concerned deeply committed to the goal of the national interests. At the same time, the difficulties in being specific about the operational meaning of "national interests," and a debater's concern for his ministry's functional imperatives, tend to lead to recommendations that favor the agency making it. Since the decision results from an interagency debate, the result is usually a compromise decision. It is not in the nation's interest, as that term is likely to be defined by a functional ministry, to have its function eliminated or seriously degraded by an overall action or resource allocation made in the face of a current problem.

A second feature of this climax condition is that the formalized interagency coordinative bodies come eventually to have defacto, if not de jure, decisionmaking (executive) power. An inevitable pattern of events following the assignment of major functional areas of responsibility to specified ministries is the development of new problems or new technological capabilities that fall outside of but obviously between the areas of responsibility of two or more ministries. This inevitable happenstance naturally becomes the subject of debate in the interagency coordinating body and, equally naturally, the compromise decision is for the coordinating panel to take on the additional role of managing the new operation. The appearance of interagency boards, panels, and committees, each with a large operating staff of their own can be taken as evidence of a "climax" condition and the formation of power blocs.

Three additional features are evident in a governmental administrative system that is in climax condition. Typically, budget allocations are made to the statutory ministries and agencies, not to power blocs. Also, the new tasks usually resemble the functions of one agency more than the others. Therefore, for each power bloc, one can usually identify a particular ministry with major influence in the problem area. Foreign ministries, typically, keep the major position of power in the area of foreign affairs, with elements of other

agencies and ministries having very important roles. It is the importance or even dominance of these secondary roles *when combined* that has led me to deal analytically in power blocs rather than in statutory ministries. For example, U.S. foreign affairs operations cannot be studied comprehensively by an examination of the operations of the Department of State alone.

The second feature has to do with the career development motivations of the persons involved. The opportunity for upward movement of personnel in an organization has long been recognized as an important control element. In a climax administrative system this control can be observed to have been considerably weakened by the new opportunities for personnel to advance by lateral movement, ministry to ministry, while staying within a recognized power bloc. One might say, "it's a poor official within a complex bureaucracy who does not enjoy the freedoms of having more than one recognized boss, and it's an equally poor official who has only one channel for advancement open to him." The third feature common to a climax administrative system, and one where the analogy to a climax forest does not apply, is the deep involvement of foreign and domestic "field offices" in the day-to-day bargaining processes within and between the "home office" power blocs. The rapid, long-range transportation systems of today and the tremendously improved electronic communications and information handling systems ordinarily makes it possible for the "strings of influence" that formerly extended from agency to agency "across-town" to sometimes now be seen in operation via remote field offices. For example, one might speculate about the contents of confidential messages between the Soviet Defense Ministry and senior Soviet military officers in Egypt and comparable messages between the Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Ambassador in Egypt in a situation where the two Moscow based monoliths are in disagreement.¹ Foreign diplomatic-military problems

¹There is, of course, a level of acrimony and importance in such disagreements at which the top decisionmakers become involved and the debate is settled. The speculative example is for controversies below or before that ultimate level.

can no longer be solved without the deep and influential involvement of "home office" power blocs.

There is perhaps one more feature of governmental systems where the analogy to the ecologist's climax forest concept can be usefully applied. This is the notion that predictable stages tend, "all other things being equal," from the initial post-catastrophe underbrush and weedy growth to the ultimate climax condition.¹ The stages,² proceeding backward from a climax administrative system, are:³

Stage 4 is a clearly and authoritatively defined division of functional responsibilities into ministries and agencies. This is the system one normally thinks about when addressing the situation in one's own government or that of a major foreign nation. It is also an approximation of the situation created when an administrative system undergoes a major reorganization and realignment (clarification?) of functions. The notion that this state tends toward the

¹Another interesting possible analogy might be developed around the notion that just as the composition and characteristics of the climax forest of Southeast Asia are different from those of Latin America, the climax administration of one culture has some characteristics differing from those of a different culture. It seems however that like all analogies, this one should not be carried too far.

²The writer has adopted with reluctance the notions of "stages" or "steps" in a trend of development leading from incipient insurgency to a fully developed national administrative system. The reader is requested to consider the listing and describing of such "stages" as a kind of "shorthand" to describe the inherently confused and confusing conditions one can observe in successful insurgencies if one deliberately makes recurrent time lapsed observations.

In a sense, these "time slice" steps reveal the developing consequence of organizational growth to the ideologically based ideas of a charismatic leader or "core group." The developing commitment of the leader(s) to his (their) growing ranks of subordinates who are, insofar as their organizational positions permit them, trying to implement the leader's notions is not to be underestimated. The ends (the dreamed of "future" of the leader) almost always come to justify the means, that is, the large administrative organization capable only of administering a few grossly defined concepts.

³The stages are listed here in reverse order since embryonic communities are more easily identified working from a fully developed condition to the earlier stages of development.

climax agrees with the commonly observed pattern of events following large scale reorganization.¹ In the sense that stage 3 has its history in stage 2, one may often expect to find nationally recognized, functional leaders (perhaps identified with a kind of functional charisma) occupying the positions of heads of ministries. North Vietnam's Minister of Defense, Giap, the military leader of the period leading to Dien Bien Phu, and Israel's Moshe Dayan both come readily to mind as illustrations. At this stage there are a minimum of middle level interagency coordinating committees within the administrative system. However, one can and should assume that such committees are under development and growth but are too informal as yet to be observed.

Stage 3 is that period in the development of a government at which the administrative system tends to be relatively small and "handy." The "small group of dedicated men" is a usual phenomenon at this stage as is the charismatic leader. Apparently a Simon Bolivar, a George Washington, or a Ho Chi Minh is an essential element of any stage 2 proto-government. Even at this stage an embryonic separation of functions can sometimes be observed, usually with recognized personalities performing some function which, if the proto-government survives and grows into an actual government, will form the appropriate functional ministry. For example, Giap and his fighting associates now occupy the higher positions in the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense/Army Headquarters.

Stage 2 is that phase in which the pulling together of only partially cooperative elements leading to an insurgent movement is initiated. Not uncommon is the appearance of numerous resistance organizations of diverse ideological beliefs and views on the proper route to "freedom." The heterogeneous anti-Portuguese resistance groups in Mozambique and Angola are at about this stage or barely past it

¹This is not meant to denigrate the utilities of reorganization for the purposes of reallocating and clarifying functional responsibilities. It simply suggests the obvious. Recurrent reorganizations will be necessary.

with the formation of a committee to supervise and coordinate the activities of each quasi-independent group. The development of the charismatic leader begins (and often ends) in this stage. By and large, this is the stage of small group decisionmaking and coordinated action, with each small group having (or being) its own proto-military, proto-domestic bureaucracy, and so forth. The major activity in the proto-governmental sense of these small groups is their competition with each other for the manpower and resources needed for growth to some reasonably viable size and strength.

Stage 1 is of little interest to the analyst except as it precedes and is the historical phase of proto-governments of the stage 2. The salient feature of stage 1 for insurgent groups is their high mortality rate.

FORMATION OF POWER BLOCS THROUGH IMPERATIVES

Another way the formation of communities of interest (power blocs) can be discussed is in terms of *imperatives*. Within every operational social structure there are a number of such imperatives that tend to dominate the decision process, or at the very least to powerfully influence governments and proto-governments toward a certain conventionality. These must be taken into account by the analyst to enable him to make an accurate assessment of probable future actions of these organizations.

The four groups of imperatives that seem important to the operations of the Power Bloc model are: (1) *the imperial imperative*, (2) *the management imperatives*, (3) *the functional imperatives*, and (4) *the technological imperative*. These will be illustrated in the discussion that follows mainly by examples applying to the military structure. This selection of the military for illustrative purposes is appropriate for several reasons. First, the available documentation on typical military characteristics and attitudes is more complete and comprehensive than that on other important "communities." Second, the military is not only a profession but comprises several large, formal

organizations so there is a kind of articulation in the military structure that is not so pronounced in the other blocs. And third, the kinds of analyses appropriate to the application of the Power Bloc model are those in which military as para-military activities play an important part.

The Imperial Imperative

This imperative applies in the model to heads of state and to leaders of large insurgent movements. It can be simply stated. Kings do not voluntarily abdicate! When applied to the leader of a nation or proto-nation, it means that a decision that would obviously result in a general loss of his control, tantamount to abdication, is a decision that he will not make no matter how much it would seem to an outside observer to be in the nation's or movement's interest.

Management Imperatives

There are two major management imperatives. One is the need for the managers of a large organization (or for the managers of large organizations, working together) to be consistent, and therefore predictable to their subordinates in regard to the kinds of attitudes or positions they display toward recurrent issues. The other is the need for managers to be efficient in the allocation of their own time and efforts by focusing mostly on important and timely issues and allowing their subordinates to deal, in a "normal" manner, with issues that are less important or pressing.

The relationship of a manager and his staff is an extraordinarily complex subject that will not be explored to any great extent in this Memorandum. It seems sufficient to note that one important facet is the necessity for the manager to avoid frequent changes of directives, orders, and policies so that his subordinates can intelligently support him in the action decisions they make and in their coordination among themselves and with other agencies. Recurrent and frequent changes in policies and directives are sure ways of rendering an organization ineffective. This need for command consistency is evident in early

guerrilla operations and becomes increasingly essential as the organization grows and formalizes its control structure.

The second management imperative for managerial efficiency arises from the responsibility of a manager to allocate that scarce resource, his own time, toward the important organization problems. He must avoid, where possible, the routine organizational operations that are likely to proceed in a satisfactory manner whether or not he monitors them. To maintain an adequate degree of control over his organization, a manager must be prepared to listen to recommendations from his line and staff subordinates and accept and order the implementation of some part of them. Implicit or explicit recommendations from subordinates is an important means by which a manager keeps informed of new external conditions and also learns what is going on in his own organization. A reputation for never (or very seldom) accepting subordinate recommendations will "dry up" this information channel. Equally important is the fact that, by and large, the acceptance of a staff-generated recommendation for action will result in an operation that does not demand constant and exclusive management attention. In short, by letting the organization do what it wants in certain operational or policymaking areas, the manager lessens the demands on his time and attention and can therefore apply his attention to problems and operations where he has had to override his staff's recommendations. This need for managerial efficiency is evident in the smallest guerrilla band and in the largest governmental agencies (albeit much more noticeable in the latter).

Functional Imperatives

Another set of imperatives arise from the functions performed by various organizations and agencies. In the general function of an army, for example, there are large numbers of often pedestrian subtasks (weapons, maintenance, fire support, reconnaissance, security patrol, troop training, ad infinitum) that tend to be performed in a similar manner by all armies -- and for that matter, by all armed guerrilla bands. The basis of the operation of a small unit, for

example, is the same no matter what nation or social system is involved. One can expect to observe such familiar detailed operational styles in any conflict situation and, as the combat organization grows larger the appearance of conventional procedures spreads to the higher organizational levels. Much the same can be said for foreign affairs, intelligence operations, and domestic bureaucratic procedures. In part, this highly predictable trend toward conventional practices results from recurrent independent inventions. There is, by and large, one best way to organize an ambush, and intelligent guerrilla leaders are very likely to discover and develop it for themselves if they do not learn the procedure from study or by social diffusion. In part, this trend toward procedural conventionality does result from social diffusion. The writings of Guevara and Mao are widely available and no intelligent guerrilla leader (or aspiring leader) is likely to neglect studying them no matter what particular political ideology he advocates. Secondly, when a nation or an insurgent movement accepts materiel aid from a friendly power the likely interchange of technical instructions and training in its use is inevitably accompanied by the conventional procedural ideas of the advisors. The Soviet military advisors in Egypt will, in spite of themselves, convey to the Egyptian army their rather conventional ideas on military operations procedures while they are training and advising the Egyptians in the maintenance and use of Soviet equipment.

Technological Imperative

The more familiar image of the technological imperative is observable in the military-industrial complexes of fully developed nations. To the technician there is the association of proper service to his country associated with the maximum advance of the "state of the art." Similarly, the production managers and military services are powerfully motivated to press for weapons that incorporate the most advanced and presumably the highest performance technology. An equivalent urge exhibits itself in armed guerrilla bands with the fighters ever eager to obtain modern weaponry. The Soviet AK47 and 122mm rocket are

technically questionable as arms for guerrilla operations. Their use needs a sizable logistics support system and this, to some extent, would place the guerrilla movement under the control of the nation providing such technically advanced military equipment. Both of these developments should best be avoided by a guerrilla band that proposed to continue guerrilla operations. One must observe, however, an essentially universal tendency of insurgents to relinquish this element of freedom for the sake of technologically advanced military equipment.

The predictability of the imperative's pressures toward conventionality in proto-governmental and governmental agencies and their supporters in parallel agencies¹ is a basic operative assumption of the Power Bloc model. The second basic operative assumption is that the governmental (or proto-governmental) decision processes generate actions that reveal something of the state of balance among the power blocs. For example, an observed series of overall actions that follow the presumed recommendations of the military part of a government or proto-government leads to the assumption that the military bloc is occupying a position of power and that future decisions will probably reflect continued military decisions. There are, however, other "communities" in each government or proto-government that become power blocs when an overall action is being debated. The important ones and their characteristics are suggested below.

TYPES OF "COMMUNITIES" THAT CAN BECOME POWER BLOCS

The Political Control Element

The power bloc with its continuously changing elements, groups, and leaders represents the product and process of the power struggle that is found in every movement, organization, and nation. Therefore, the use of "power bloc" to cover the political control element in the model is an admitted stretching of the term. Nevertheless the term

¹That is, the power blocs that are the selected unit of analysis for this kind of study.

can be applied because a control element (and a power struggle) is associated with, and often observable in, every government or proto-government and certain characteristic patterns of action can always be assumed to be present. The function of the political control element is to control and direct the overall courses of action for the nation (or proto-nation) and its component institutions. It is the element that decides on the course of action to be followed by -- in model terms -- selecting, combining, or compromising the various overall courses recommended by the other blocs (a process discussed in Section III). These other blocs are considered by the political control element to be performers of technical service functions and not qualified to make final overall policy decisions. This role of "final arbiter" is the major function of the element's control.

Another technique of control that is employed to some degree by every political control element is the introduction or infiltration of political control sections into the blocs that it controls. This enables it to gain a more detailed degree of control than that provided solely by the role of "final arbiter." The Marxist-Leninist concept of a hierarchical structure of party cells and committees within every major subordinate bloc plus the role of final arbiter being reserved for the Party is an extreme example of control. A more usual case is one in which the political control element is the final arbiter and simultaneously maintains control of personnel at the upper hierarchical levels in each bloc.

The political control element is the primary exponent and jealous defender of the current national ideology. Characteristically, this element uses the ideology as an important control device by applying it to intranational communications and by placing itself in the position of judge of the ideological purity of the other institutions and their leaders. The objective of gaining or retaining overall control will, if necessary, override this urge toward ideological purity. By and large, the heads of the political control element are those men who have learned how best to manipulate the ideology to their own interests. They are, therefore, the least bound by the ideology

except that they must use it to legitimize their decisions. To the skilled manipulator of ideology, this is not likely to be an extreme limitation.¹

The Military Structure

Several of the attributes of the military structure² in the model are listed below in considerable detail since a basic assumption of the Power Bloc model is that the armed elements of an insurgency will move toward these.

(1) A hierarchical authority and command structure, a functionally separated combat, supply and personnel management suborganizations, and a system of reporting requirements whose volume and degree of detail is limited only by the capacity of the communications system.

(2) A career officers corps whose operational code is based on a firm set of professional standards, a tradition of service to society

¹Peter F. Drucker, Professor of Management at New York University, is quoted in *News Front Magazine*, February 1970, as saying, "If there is one dependable finding from a century's study of the political process, it is that action decisions are rarely made on the basis of ideology."

²Huntington, in describing the peacetime code of the (Western) Military Officers Corps, writes: "The military ethic emphasizes the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature. It stresses the supremacy of society over the individual and the importance of order, hierarchy, and division of function. It stresses the continuity and value of history. It accepts the nation state as the highest form of political organization and recognizes the continuing likelihood of wars among nation states. It emphasizes the importance of power in international relations and warns of the dangers to state security. It holds that the security of the state depends upon the creation and maintenance of strong military forces. It urges the limitation of state action to the direct interests of the state, the restriction of extensive commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose or adventurous policies. It holds that war is the instrument of politics, that the military are the servants of the statesman, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism. It exalts obedience as the highest virtue of military men. The military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative." Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959, p. 79.

(upon which it bases its claims for a share of the nation's resources), and an emphasis on national patriotism and heroism. The career officers corps displays the "normal" drive of a profession toward autonomy in managing its own internal matters, a well-developed, usually competitive method for allocating promotions and positions, and an equally well-developed mechanism for disciplining aberrant members.

(3) A characteristic tendency toward an apolitical attitude,¹ plus a downgrading of political and ideological issues insofar as these conflict with "the military necessities" raised by threats and combat situations.² This characteristic is particularly evident when political factors operate against the acquisition of modern sophisticated weaponry. This attribute, perhaps most important for model purposes, also displays itself in the military structure's characteristic and continuous peacetime pressure for the development and maintenance of a national heavy industry and armament production capability and a wartime pressure for accepting aid from foreign sources no matter what the cost in political compromise and violation of the national ideology.

(4) The tendency to prescribe spheres of influence in a rather precise geographical fashion and react in the national debate on that

¹Mao Tse-Tung in a resolution written in 1929 entitled, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in The Party," condemns "the purely military viewpoint" and characterizes this erroronous view as manifesting itself as follows: "To regard military work and political work as opposed to each other...; To regard the task of the Red Army as similar to that of the White Army - merely fighting...; and Organizationally, therefore, to subordinate the organs of the Red Army's political work to those of its military work.... If such an idea continues to develop, it may lead to estrangement from the masses, domination of the government by the Army and to a departure from proletarian leadership...." *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. I, International Publisher, New York, 1954, p. 106.

²Huntington observes in his writing on "The Military Mind" (albeit his focus is on the Western military attitude in peacetime), "The Politician must beware of overcommitting the nation beyond the strength of its military capabilities; grand political designs and sweeping political goals are to be avoided, not because they are undesirable but because they are impractical. Moral aims and ideological ends should not be pursued at the expense of security." *The Soldier and the State*, p. 68.

basis. In its role as national peacetime advisor in foreign affairs, the military structure will talk in terms of "direct action" and "military necessities" in addressing the problem of national interests. There is, characteristically, a strong territorial adjunct to the military view¹ both in regard to the "sacred" national boundaries and in regard to traditional spheres of influence. For example (in model terms) the U.S. military was unlikely to recommend positive U.S. military action in Czechoslovakia when the Russians were threatening to (and subsequently, did) invade. Conversely, the Soviet move to invade Czechoslovakia was exactly what the Soviet military would recommend. In both cases, the location of "the fence" dividing U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence was dominant.

In times of combat, the territoriality of the model characteristics of the military structure tends to be superseded by the everpresent dictum to "seize the initiative" that governs the (modeled) military structures in operation.² Although the military structure will

¹(Then) Captain Charles De Gaulle, a teacher at the French Military College of St. Cyr writes (in 1934) almost lyrically:

"As looking at a portrait suggests the impression of the subject's destiny to the observer, so the map of France tells our own fortune. The body of the country has in its centre a citadel, a forbidding mass of age-old mountains, flanked by the tablelands of Provence, Limousin, and Burgundy; and, all around, vast slopes, for the most part difficult of access to anyone attacking them from the outside and split by the gorges of the Saone, the Rhone and the Garonne, barred by the walls of the Jura Alps and the Pyrenees or else plunging in the distance into the English Channel, the Atlantic, or the Mediterranean; but in the Northeast, there is a terrible breach between the essential basins of the Seine and of the Loire and German territory. The Rhine, which nature meant the Gauls to have as their boundary and their protection, has hardly touched France before it leaves her and lays her open to attack. It is true that the Vosges set up a wide rampart, but it is one which can be turned by the gap at Belfort or by the salt marshes." General Charles De Gaulle, *The Army of the Future*, J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1941, p. 15.

²This "seize the initiative" dictum and ideas of "spheres of influence" can also work in peacetime. The Eastern Mediterranean and Cuba, "traditionally" within the U.S. sphere of influence, are now also "traditionally" within the Soviet sphere of influence as interpreted by the Soviet military structure. In that sense, both areas are more explosive than Europe with its well-marked line of demarcation between the two "spheres of influence."

recommend against "adventures" outside of the traditional sphere of influence, once the operation is underway, the commitment to the now-in-motion organization, and the exhilaration of being on the offensive will, almost inevitably, lead to a redefinition of the nation's "proper sphere" to include the target territory of the offense plan.

The military structure, controlled by a truly career or professional officers corps, has the low opinion of "fringe operations and operators" found in every profession. The low opinion the medical profession has of chiropractors is well-known. A similar view of guerrilla forces (and special, counterinsurgent forces, for that matter) and operations can be detected in the professional military structure. While the military structure may accept the assistance of such "fringe operators" if they must, it can be relied upon (in model usage) to strongly recommend against an exclusive reliance on such dubious operations to defend the national interests. This attitude extends even to the institutional distaste of the military structure with the job of fighting guerrillas. An army is meant to fight an army!

The Foreign Affairs Community

Foreign policy, the reason-for-being of a nation's foreign ministry (or the incipient foreign ministry of a proto-governmental movement) is a course of action undertaken in pursuit of national objectives in an arena outside of direct national control. The problems faced by the foreign affairs community call for its interactions with its foreign counterparts. Hann, in his study of the professional diplomat, observes:¹

Throughout the literature, there is a strong association of diplomacy and peace, the settlement of differences by peaceful means such as accommodation, mediation, conciliation, negotiation. Hans Morgenthau maintains that a

¹John Ensor Hann, *The Professional Diplomat*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, pp. 14 and 15. The quotation from Morgenthau is taken from Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1956, 2nd ed., p. 505.

"diplomacy that ends in war has failed in its primary objective: the promotion of the national interest by peaceful means."

For the purposes of the model, the foreign ministry's role is one of being the primary foreign affairs advisor to its government. The ministry's intimate knowledge of existing foreign conditions arising from continuous interactions with its counterparts places the foreign affairs community in an influential position in every important foreign affairs debate, that is, in debates where many international issues are interrelated. Sampson, in his work on the present British governmental system asserts,¹ "Diplomats have been inclined to be too busy mixing with the ruling circles, like Farouk or Batista, to notice potential new rulers, like Nasser or Castro."

The foreign ministry in a fully developed government is likely to be a highly structured bureaucracy, having many internal conflicts, showing resistance to external change and displaying a marked tendency to guard its own bureaucratic sphere of influence in the government. It operates in an international arena and is less conservative than the military structure in recommending foreign involvements. This is mainly because such involvements are "normal" to the practice of worldwide diplomacy, and are conditioned only by a caution to avoid new situations (for example, war) that would downgrade its international role and intranational position of influence.

The decisions recommended by the foreign affairs community, although supposedly reflecting a specific line of foreign policy, actually reflect a tendency to deal with foreign policy problems in a most empirical, case-by-case manner. Sampson, in his discussion of the British Foreign Service says,²

World events provide the constant stimulus of diplomacy. "The most important decisions," wrote one diplomat, Sir J. Headlam-Morley, "are often made, not as a part of a concerted and far-sighted policy, but under the urgent

¹Anthony Sampson, *The Anatomy of Britain Today*, Harper & Row, New York, 1965, p. 320.

²*Ibid.*, p. 328.

pressure of some immediate crisis." Decisions which from the outside look bold, from the inside look inevitable.

The Intelligence Community

Clearly, one of the more important power blocs in any government or proto-government is its intelligence community. It is also clear that few "observables" are exposed by this bloc, in either the foreign or domestic context. Because of this lack of useful observables, analysts often omit explicit treatment of the intelligence community in assessing the current activities or in predicting the future.

In both the model and in reality the intelligence community, with its characteristic operations, plays an important (if hidden) role in the timing and style of national decisionmaking. It plays this role and exerts its very real influence on military matters and foreign affairs primarily by its selections and assessments of pertinent data and by the actions it takes to obtain its information.

The intelligence community must and does place itself in a position of subordination to its major human and institutional "customers." Given that these customers are (for model purposes) the other power blocs that compose the government or proto-government being modeled, one can expect the different elements or agencies within the community to make different selections and evaluations of bits of data from the large information base and daily flow. This produces certain internal stresses within the intelligence community since it means the frequent production of two or more evaluations (for two or more customers) that may disagree with each other to some extent. Fundamentally, the community is no more adjusted to living with ambiguities and discrepancies than any large organization. Some evidences of coordinating bodies (committees) can occasionally be found but even here one finds signs that these bodies usually tend to identify and formalize differences rather than resolve them. The high degree of communications control, the cellular isolation internal to the intelligence community, and -- most important -- its community nature of nonformal organizations helps to alleviate this organizational problem of operating with ambiguities

and thus permits the community to function over long periods with unresolved conflicts in viewpoint.

As we know, large organizations are, for internal structural reasons, reluctant to change. In the intelligence communities there is a possibility that they might influence their external sources of data to provide information that generally confirms their biases against change. The need for unambiguity will eventually overcome this customer-induced bias toward multiple interpretations -- but "eventually" can sometimes be a long, long time, particularly in a "murky" situation. For example, the VC, on the basis of their intelligence, obviously expected a popular uprising to be triggered by their Tet 1968, "Great Offensive and Popular Uprising."¹ Urban Vietnam is sufficiently productive of widely variant indications to permit this kind of (presumed) VC intelligence evaluation to be supported by selected data, particularly since the VC ideology "says" a popular uprising is inevitable. No such uprising occurred. Similarly, raw intelligence data collected in the general Indochina theater are sufficiently rich in contradictions to permit optimistic situation reports while simultaneously providing backup data for assessments of "no significant change." The 1960 issue on the missile gap can be rationalized by this kind of model mechanism as can the Egyptian mistake leading to the 1967 Six-Day War.

The consequences of this customer influence to the model are as follows:

1. In cases where a major power bloc (customer) is using intelligence products as a resource the following will result:
 - (a) if the searched-for indicators are unambiguous when observed, a change in institutional direction will follow a period of successful search, or
 - (b) if the searched-for indicators are ambiguous when observed -- or contrary observables are simultaneously available -- no change will be forthcoming.

¹This was the VC title at the time and is another indication of what they were expecting.

2. In cases where the government or proto-government is being influenced mainly by the evaluation of the situation of only one element of the intelligence community and the evaluations or predictions of a competitive element continue to be more accurate, there will be a sudden, perhaps unheralded, change in governmental direction as the government changes "advisors." This point is certain to be long delayed however since most important international situations allow for multiple happenings before a need for change is officially perceived.

Another characteristic of the intelligence community is a tendency to take direct action against hostile or unfriendly persons or nations rather than simply collecting and assessing data for other agencies or communities to use. For example, this tendency is especially evident in an insurgent situation when a proto-intelligence community (such as a covert nonmilitary terrorist element) addresses its terrorist activity toward a hostile or even a neutral civilian population element. In a fully developed government this positive action is usually disguised as an accident or as a "spontaneous" mob action taken against hostile or unfriendly governmental personnel. One need not be a serious student of bureaucracy to predict the tendency of the intelligence community's power bloc to take an interest and perhaps action in the problem area.

The Technical and Industrial Management Community

The structural position of this group varies considerably from nation to nation depending upon the political system that exists. In communist countries this group is normally a part of the internal bureaucracy while in nonsocialist nations their position is relatively unstructured. Nevertheless, in both cases this is a highly influential group with distinct and predictable (in model terms) characteristics. The nature of its function makes it apolitical insofar as technical development and industrial production are concerned, and characteristically impatient of politically motivated decisions to restrict, delay, or deny the development and production of new technology. Halperin,

in discussing the bureaucratic politics of ABM decisions in the 1960s in the U.S. Government notes,¹

For Foster [the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense] the ABM issue was a relatively simple and straightforward one. What was at stake was the continued effectiveness of the weapons laboratory and scientific research teams within American industry. Having developed an ABM system that was technically well designed, that community would expect it to be deployed. Its morale would be adversely affected by a decision not to deploy a system which was viewed as technologically sweet.

This group will ally itself with any of the other governmental elements that support the development of new technology, the expansion of heavy industry, and the development or maintenance of a technical, industrial and military power position in relation to potential competitor nations.

Though usually small in number, this community is not without considerable influence. In underdeveloped nations and even in proto-governmental movements that aspire to govern, it represents the aspirations of the overall group as well as a connection to the recognized international fraternity of scientists, technologists, and industrial production experts. For example, Nasser felt it proper to note Egyptian support for this domestic element even during a period of high and intensifying military confrontation with Israel along the Suez Canal.²

As far as science and technology is concerned, we are endeavoring to catch up with what we missed in all types. We are developing and expanding our war industry.

By and large this community can be thought of as being apolitical in the sense that in fully developed industrial nations it exerts

¹"The Decision to Deploy the ABM...."

²President Nasser's speech at the opening of the record session of the Arab Socialist Union National Congress at Cairo University, March 27, 1969. Quoted in *The Israel-Arab Reader*, Walter Laquer (ed.), Bantam Books, New York, 1970, p. 410.

influence by virtue of its attractiveness as an alliance partner to the military structure, the domestic administrative bureaucracy, and -- upon rare occasions -- to the foreign ministry. The ABM case cited above is an example of a coalition of a technical and industrial management group with a military structure in a decisionmaking situation. The fact that the cultural revolution and Red Guard activities in the Chinese Peoples Republic in the 1960s was not allowed to interfere with conventional weapons productions or the development of nuclear warhead missiles suggests a similar coalition in Red China.

The Domestic Administrative Bureaucracy

This element is a less deliberate influence in foreign affairs decisionmaking than is usually believed. Characteristically, "the bureaucracy" is continuously divided between those components that are temporarily allied to one or more of the previously listed communities and those components whose exclusive thrusts are toward the internal development of the nation. This tends to have the bureaucracy canceling itself out of the usual international affairs debate.

The domestic administrative bureaucracy does play an important role in the model by its (often covert) persistent and strong advocacy of resource commitment to internal needs -- needs whose satisfying would call for an expansion of the internal bureaucracy. The attributed, self-serving motivation insures that there will ever be a strong and persistent opposition to any proposed foreign adventure that would take resources away from domestic needs. The "patience" displayed by this element in its continuous fight with the advocates of foreign commitment is, for model purpose, sufficient to insure that there is always a strong opposing trend to every foreign move.

III. THE OPERATION OF THE MODEL

PREDICTING NATIONAL DECISIONS

For analytical purposes, one can assume that every power bloc except the political control element in a government has a preferred national course of action at every national decision point. (A decision point is defined to be a time and a situation with important external elements and large potential consequences.) For example, the rapid liberalization of the Czechoslovakian Government in 1968 produced such a decision point for the Soviet Government.

The preferred national course of action for each power bloc can be assumed to be one that would best fit the set of attributes we input to it. The resulting national decision, usually observable, can take one of three forms. One form might be the decision to select a recommendation of a politically dominant bloc. For example, in model terms, the Soviet moves against Czechoslovakia conformed to almost all of the attributes imputed to the military bloc.¹ A second form might be a compromise decision between the assumed preferred national course of two or more important blocs. The U.S. decision to initiate the bombing of North Vietnam but initially to restrict it to only selected targets in the southern part of the country can be thought of as a compromise between no bombing at all and an all-out bombing campaign. A third form of national decision, in model terms, might be to simultaneously approve and pursue the two or more uncoordinated courses of action preferred by two politically powerful blocs. The apparent North Vietnamese decision to negotiate, or at least continue the Paris meetings while continuing the fighting in South Vietnam (and now Cambodia) can be thought of as uncoordinated dual courses of action recommended by their foreign affairs bloc and their military structure.

¹Positive reaction against unfavorable change within a traditional sphere of influence, a massive and sudden and overwhelming move of forces, and an apparent lack of planning for the new political situation created.

A number of such decision points can sometimes occur in fairly rapid succession, with the assumed compromise course between two or more major power blocs being followed repeatedly. This establishes a trend and, to a degree, makes predicting the immediate future a relatively high confidence operation. In effect, the observed trend can be taken to indicate the balance of power between the major power blocs in the government concerned. The tendency of the intelligence community to generate assessments that reinforce the decision sequence in such a trend adds confidence to our short-term predictions. Naturally, in any political system, domination of the governmental decision processes by any one bloc is likely to lead to an intense decision crisis if the dominant bloc loses its allied institutions one by one as an international situation changes. In this case it would be essential for the political control element to make a drastic change of policy so as to retain viability in its control position. The De Gaulle decision to liquidate the French military campaign¹ in Algeria can be thought of as exemplifying such a policy trend followed by a sudden policy reversal.

Predicting the national course of action likely to be preferred by the embryonic blocs of an insurgent movement (a proto-government) requires a somewhat different set of assumptions. In dealing with a fully developed government we base our predictions on the inherent conservatism of its mature blocs. Mature blocs can be thought of as reacting, albeit often clumsily and belatedly, to external issues in a manner designed to protect their domestic power positions. The embryonic blocs of an insurgent movement are much more adventuresome: they can be predicted to advocate a course of action that promises to improve their situation by offering an opportunity to develop toward formal bloc status. Thus, the acceptance of arms and ammunition proffered by a friendly foreign government would be strongly advocated by the insurgent's proto-military arm, the guerrilla forces. This action is predictable in spite of the fact that such an armament program

¹A campaign of some length that was terminated although it was near to French military victory.

places the insurgency to some degree under the control of the donor nation because the guerrilla tactic of obtaining ammunition supplies from its enemy is no longer applicable. A special case is where the military displaces and takes over the functions of the political control element in a coup d'état. In this case, the overall government can be predicted to take on and display for some time the conservative characteristics of the military. After a period, perhaps five years, the new government will have shed its uniquely conservative military attributes and thereafter react in a manner characteristic of a "normal" political control element.

TWO MAJOR MODEL LIMITATIONS

There are two important features of the model's operation that should be noted here. There is nothing in the model that allows confident prediction of a sudden change in policy. A basic assumption within the model is that observed national decisions can be interpreted to suggest which model element, that is, which internal bloc, is in a controlling or a near-dominant power position in the government being studied. A follow-on assumption is that the kinds of decisions preferred by that bloc will be made by that government at near future decision points.¹ Actually with the passage of time, a dominant or influential bloc, or model element, will tend to lose its allies and conditions will tend to change to the point where the political control element, in its role of final arbiter, can no longer safely follow the course of action prescribed by the (till then) dominant bloc. The De Gaulle decision to overrule the French Army's preferred course of action in Algeria is a case in point although this course had been followed for years with growing (military) success.

The second limitation of the model is that the reasons cited by the major human actors in a particular decision process for the

¹Note that this is slightly different from a prediction based on simple persistence. An assumed strong Soviet military preference to invade Czechoslovakia (based on the characteristic "sphere of influence" kind of thinking in the Soviet military) should not be interpreted to suggest a Soviet Union military recommendation to invade Norway.

positions they advocate are never the reasons developed in the model. It follows that the publicly stated reason for a national action is not a model output. To the extent that the model permits cautious predictions, these will be predictions of actions, not predictions of the reasons that will be cited by the actors. One might assume that the uncontrollable aspect of the Palestinian commando movement was of serious concern to the Soviets (particularly to the Soviet military structure which, by assumption, does not subscribe to this kind of "useless but dangerous para-military nonsense") and led them to pressure Nasser into the current cease-fire. Of all the reasons Nasser might have cited for his decision this is the least probable.

IV. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY AND VIET CONG
MAIN FORCES AND THE MODEL

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE DATA

A prefatory note to the remainder of this Memorandum seems appropriate here. This section on the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong, and Section V on the Fedayeen are intended as illustrations of the application of the Power Bloc model. They were prepared from available open sources mostly during the first half of 1970. The data are therefore somewhat incomplete, outdated, and perhaps incorrect but were, nevertheless, adequate to support certain contingent predictions. Since then, of course, the objective situations in both areas have experienced dramatic change. Because their purpose was for illustration, it seems unnecessary to bring them "up to date" although I admit to a strong temptation to reword the predictions to better fit the events. The temptation has been resisted.

THE NVA AND VC MAIN FORCES

There seem to be few areas in which the NVA-VC main forces fail to fit the model of a conventional army in both their internal procedures and their observable recent history. The main and local military forces of the Viet Cong comprise the formal army units directly under the control of the highest military headquarters in the south and the units controlled by the military affairs committees (military headquarters) of the Viet Cong military regions, subregions, provinces, and districts. The Viet Cong term for these forces is the Liberation Armed Forces. I have chosen instead to use the term NVA-VC main forces to indicate the unified command structure. This term excludes the guerrilla units controlled by the Party structure at village level and the part-time hamlet guerrillas.

To begin with, the NVA-VC main forces represent a sizable organization. There are over 100,000 NVA soldiers in NVA units in the south, some 25,000 in supporting units. The VC main forces have over 50,000 fighters (plus the 25,000 NVA mentioned above) and over 40,000 support

personnel. The political infrastructure is perhaps some 85,000 with operational control over some 75,000 guerrillas of which less than half are well equipped. The reader should not treat these estimates as indicative of anything except the fact that the numbers cited are sufficient for us to expect many of the characteristics of a large military organization.

The organizational imperatives, particularly the military functional and the technological can be expected to apply. It must be constantly kept in mind that the ubiquitous Party apparatus is an integral part of the NVA-VC main forces; an integral part with a number of personnel training and monitoring functions but with one overriding objective -- absolute, direct, and complete control. This apparatus, which in some form is found in all communist armies, causes their reactions to be somewhat different from those of more conventional, apolitical military forces. Occasionally the organization gives evidence of a schizophrenic oscillation between "party" and "military" motivations.

The conventional military service has a tradition of service to society, as the term implies. The NVA-VC is no exception to this. Although, in the classic communist society, the military forces are charged with "defending the revolution" (and this term is frequently used in VC propaganda), the NVA-VC in the South takes its cue from the NVA in this regard and views itself as defending the homeland -- Vietnam -- from American imperialism. The role of the NVA during its formative and formalizing years as described by Giap in 1959, clearly shows the mixture of conventional military and party viewpoints.¹

In the first of the ten points of his oath of honour, the fighter of the Vietnam Peoples' Army (NVA) swears, "To sacrifice himself unreservedly for the Fatherland, for the cause of national independence, democracy and socialism, under the leadership of the Vietnam Workers' Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic, to build a peaceful, reunited, independent, democratic and prosperous Vietnam and

¹General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 59.

contribute to the strengthening of peace in Southeast Asia and the world."

The NVA-VC is a multiple layered, hierarchical organization with numerous nonhierarchical (lateral) interconnections found throughout the structure. This situation is typical of any large, developed, functional organization and typically brings with it several types of communicative activities. These types are, normally, rather thoroughly intermixed.

In sheer volume the largest organizational communications activity is that which relates to the functional and subfunctional tasks. In this regard, the NVA-VC appears quite similar to any army.¹ The volume and variety of personnel orders, supply requisitions, receipts, orders, reports, commendations, and so forth, appear to be limited only by the capacity of the system, not an unusual situation. It is this voluminous functional activity within the structure that gives it a sort of stability. With everyone busily engaged in doing what they are supposed to do, communicating in familiar terms with those they are expected to communicate with about thoroughly familiar subjects, a resistance to serious change (a term that equates to disorganization) is to be expected.²

There are, obviously, other forms of activity that lead or can lead to change. There are the two patterns of top to bottom communication involved in the NVA-VC command and control process,³ the Party controlled movement of cadre personnel from assignment to assignment, and the normal "drift" in organizational ways of doing things that result from the thousands of daily adjustments to each other that the organization members will make. All of these change producers are apparent in the NVA-VC. The large MACV-CDEC file of captured documents

¹A well-developed postal system complete with an APO number equivalent handles this traffic.

²If one wishes to use a physical analogue, this functional communications activity can be viewed as the spin of the gyroscope, inducing a certain inertia into the overall structure.

³The quasi-annual, cadre, strategic reorientation sessions and the much higher frequency cycles of tactical reports and orders.

is convincing testimony to the high frequency of communications on (mostly military) functional matters.

The Giap pronouncements of 1967 concerning the situation in 1965 and the NLF Central Committees October 1966 resolution defined the American intervention with combat units as changing the NVA-VC from a strategy of special war to one of limited war.¹ The same evaluations are found in interviews with ex-VCs reflecting the top to bottom progression of the reorientation procedures. The interrogation reports from the Combined Military Interrogation Center and the Combined National Interrogation Center in Vietnam, as well as the Rand interviews attest to the activity of the tactical reporting and decision-making system. Perhaps most important of all has been the progressive rise in the hierarchy of the experienced, NVA trained southern VC cadres and the interleaving of senior NVA officers into the structure as it developed. This has induced a trend toward large unit activity (in response to the U.S. and GVN large unit operations) of a rather conventional military nature. Thus a rather common organizational phenomenon, the drift toward centralization and hierarchical development has appeared with the intraorganizational division of functions and the progression of cadres upward through a competitive promotion system.

Out of this pattern of intraorganizational activity arises the pattern of slow changes that characterize the NVA-VC, as they do any army in combat. The significant feature of this pattern of change is that it is not likely that any forces internal to the organization can lead to a reversal.

Two related features are present that modify the otherwise "normal" reactions of the NVA-VC. One is the Party control apparatus and the other is a high degree of intraorganizational secrecy. The party control apparatus and its procedures begin with the familiar self-criticism session, the three man cell, and the political officer

¹General Vo Nguyen Giap, *Big Victory, Great Task*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968, p. 11.

in the smallest tactical units, and end with the hard core, well-disciplined Party member/military commanders at COSVN Headquarters. (Actually, the assignment of senior NVA officers to the NVA-VC has extended this control link to the NVA/Lao Dong Politburo of North Vietnam.)

The system of secrecy within the NVA-VC military is perhaps best viewed as a somewhat extreme and formal example of the informal "secret societies" that exist in all large hierarchical (military) organizations. Such a procedure of hierarchical secrecy is a natural complement to an intraorganizational control system and tends to prevent the natural growth of informal linkages. It would appear that this combination of Party apparatus¹ and intrastructural secrecy has succeeded in keeping effective formal and informal control of the NVA-VC in the hands of the higher ranking military officer and Party members. The significant change has been the tendency of the Party military apparatus to break away from the control of the Party civilian structure except at the very top -- COSVN. The "normal" trend toward military autonomy seems to be occurring in the NVA-VC inside the Party. It is in the area of military professionalism and officers corps pressure for autonomy that the NVA-VC evinces its strongest parallel and most significant difference with western military establishments. The hierarchical structure of political commissars is absent from Western armies. The elite core group represented by the party structure in the army is matched by apolitical professional core groups in Western officers corps.

A more meaningful way to examine this situation might be to focus on military-Party relationships. Under the previous listing of the

¹To the student of organizations, the Communist ideology is of interest only as a device for biasing "the masses" toward acceptance of their leader's directives. A similar function was performed by religion in the Crusades and the Islamic expansion and by patriotism in many of the wars of this century. In none of these cases did the ideology have much affect on the organizational control process. By and large, the members who progress to leadership positions are those who are skilled in manipulating the ideology (verbally) for their own bureaucratic self-interest.

"normal" characteristics of a military organization was a strong and continuous pressure for autonomy, an internal control of awards, punishments and positions, a well-developed mechanism for disciplining aberrant members and a distaste for fringe operations and operators. This description fits the NVA-VCMF Officers Corps perfectly if -- and only if -- one views the military branch of the Party as being the "in-group," that is, the controlling element. In the sense of the NVA officers corps being a profession, these features are rather clearly recognized by the members. For example, a captured Senior Lieutenant is quoted as saying:¹

I didn't like politics but I realized that being a Party member, I would have more guarantees and could advance to command position.

Any front man would grasp the opportunity to join the Party because Party membership meant prestige and leadership possibilities.

Notes possibly taken at a COSVN training conference (the author is believed to be an official of a major VC military region) make the point succinctly:²

In order to perform its role of collective leadership and insure the absolute power of the Party over the Armed Forces, the Party Committee must accomplish the following tasks:

1. Carry out the resolutions and directives of the next higher Party Committee and next higher organ chiefs, as well as those issued by the Party Congress of the same level. Discuss and establish plans of activity for specific periods in military, political and rear service fields.

2. Provide effective leadership in political and ideological matters. Strengthen solidarity and ensure uniformity of action.

3. Manage the cadre system effectively. Discuss recommendations for personnel transfers, provisions, improvements and punishments.

¹Rand interview AG 421.

²Captured in late 1967. See *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, Document No. 34, published by U.S. Mission in Vietnam, May 1968, p. 8 (emphasis added).

4. Take charge of Party development.
5. Direct the activities of the Youth Group.
6. Supervise and check on the execution of Party resolution by Party Committee members, unit heads and organ chiefs. Make sure that the system of filing reports and soliciting instructions is correctly carried out.

The writer goes on to point up the problem:¹

The Party Military Affairs Committee is responsible to the Party Committee, and to the next higher Party Military Affairs Committee. It carries out the orders and directives of higher military echelons.

Later, in discussing cadre affairs, the writer makes quite explicit the autonomous nature of the Party military branch in regards to control of cadres:²

Because of their professional character and mission, the military cadres of all consolidated forces (from the district company and above) are uniformly managed by the Party system in the armed forces. In the resolution issued by the Zone [SVN] Political Conference in August 1966 and ratified by the Standing Committee of the Central Office for South Vietnam, management of cadres is referred to as follows:

The cadres in the armed forces are professional ones. The local Party Committee does not directly handle the cadres in the consolidated troop units. They are uniformly managed by the military branch from upper to lower level. The local [civil] Party Committee only supervises, watches, gives suggestions and helps the military branch manage its cadres. The military branch manages the cadres according to their functions and tasks, as assigned by the Central Committee and Central Office for South Vietnam, and as specified by the Party Military Affairs Committee for South Vietnam. Management, assignment and recommendations in the present situation are determined as follows:

a. In case the cadres are assigned to serve in a given military agency or unit, they should be considered as belonging to the military branch and have specific ranks, so that they can improve themselves professionally. If there are some reasons for which their positions (for instance, the region political commissar, province unit political officer, and so

¹*Ibid.*, p. 16.

²*Ibid.*, p. 19.

on) cannot be determined, the military branch is also responsible for the management of these cadres, though this responsibility lies primarily with the Party Committee.

b. Military cadres who are assigned to other tasks in other branches, but are not fully transferred, are primarily under the management of the military branch. The branch to which they are assigned is also responsible for their management during the time they work in it.

c. If the local Party Committee thinks it necessary to transfer cadres from the military branch to another branch, or vice versa, it should discuss the matter with, and obtain the agreement of, the military echelons in charge of management. The transfer of military cadres is made by military echelons. The transfer of non-military cadres to [military] units is made by the local Party Committee. In short, the transfer and recommendation of cadres in the army are performed by the Party chain in the army, in accordance with the requirements of the local situation.

The most convincing evidence of this typically professional military pressure for autonomy can be found in the changes in the organizational control of the main combat units that appeared in the late 1960s. The "classic" (pre-1965) organizational structure had the military subordinate to the local Party Committee at villages, district, province, and regional levels. In short, the chain of command clearly ran from lower committee to higher committee with the military affairs committee (the local military control element) being subordinate to the local Party Committee. The only main force units under direct military control were the main force divisions under the military headquarters of COSVN.

In the late 1960s there appeared in the organization schemes an element entitled a "front" (not the NLF) that was marked as being in command of all main force units in its designated area with a chain of command running directly through military channels to the military headquarters of COSVN. These organizations were (are) headed by regular NVA officers assigned from COSVN, thus enabling them to coordinate the maneuvers of more forces than could be handled by the political structure. This change was an obvious reorganization to meet the needs of the NVA-VCMF to battle the large American units.

When one looks within the NVA-VC for evidence of an intense and apparent distaste for fringe operations and operators, one must first identify what comprises a "fringe operation." In terms of the normal military professional officer this is clearly guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare as used here means widespread, small unit, locally manned forces, armed by a system of pilferage and planned capture, operating in a manner that puts a premium on camouflage, covertness, and general use of cover. In this definition the emphasis on the use of ambush on both offense and defense is a characteristic of guerrilla tactics which can be (and are) employed by the NVA-VCMF, although their "fish in the sea" guerrilla strategy days are long past as is their reliance on the enemy for combat supplies. Somewhat surprisingly this theme evinces itself occasionally in the Rand interviews. Examples are, "I think that the only thing the Front can do is to abandon guerrilla warfare and resort to modern warfare in order to cope with the Americans."¹ And, "With the war becoming sophisticated and modernized, I think it is nonsensical trying to go back to guerrilla warfare. I think the Front could still be successful using a combination of large-sized units and sound politics."² The philosophical underpinnings for this attitude away from guerrilla warfare can be found in the writings of Giap. For example, writing in 1959 he stated:³

In training, training of officers is essential. The officers have been tested and tempered in actual fighting and have experience in building the army and leading the fighting. However because they have grown up in the circumstances of guerrilla war, our officers are weak in modern tactics.

In none of these examples does there appear any particular distaste for guerrilla warfare per se. In part this is because of a recognition that few alternatives to the relatively inexpensive guerrilla strategy existed and because the operation of guerrilla forces has become recognized as an integral part of the Party's

¹Rand interview DT 149 (1966).

²Rand interview AG 579.

³*People's War, People's Army*, p. 138.

doctrines concerning wars of liberation, especially their initial phases. Criticism of Party dogma is not the route to promotion. Nevertheless the rapidity with which North Vietnam went about converting its victorious guerrilla and main forces into a regular army is probably indicative of an attitude of distaste for guerrilla warfare.

Strategic conservatism in organizational terms means -- quite simply -- a resistance to large scale, rapid change in the major patterns of activity. Tactical flexibility is a ready adaptation or adoption of operating equipments and techniques that seem to offer some improvement in the performance of the organization's function without obviously requiring a great change in activity patterns. The NVA-VC is an excellent example of these organizational characteristics.

The NVA-VC has a tradition of tactical flexibility, of improvisation, of which they are quite proud. The "learning" procedures built into their tactical decisionmaking system is designed to exploit for all units the tactical lessons or tricks learned by one. Among its missions, the Headquarters Staff Training Section has the responsibility for recording and distributing typical combat "lessons" to lower echelons.

Looked at over the years of its existence, however, the NVA-VC has made few fundamental strategic changes aside from those specified in their credo for the stages of wars of liberation; stages that any student of military organizations would predict on purely Parkinsonian (non-ideological) grounds. This natural growth, discussed in Giap's (and Mao's) terms as the development of the three forces -- regular, local, and guerrilla -- was well along toward victory when the United States introduced military forces in 1965. Reportedly, there was a considerable debate in the Lao Dong central committee (probably echoing and paralleling a similar debate in COSVN) as to which course of action to follow. It is probably significant that the line of least resistance in organization terms was selected consistently until 1970. A recurring strategic offensive aimed at military victory was obviously the choice and the introduction of NVA units as well as NVA personnel into the VC was approved. Strategically, there have been few major changes

since that time. The 1968 Tet offensive against the cities and the repeated offensives since then have the apparent characteristic of being "more of the same," limited in frequency and intensity only by resource (manpower and armament supply) constraints. The normal military doctrine that emphasizes the essentiality of grasping and holding the initiative is obviously at play. It will not be organizationally easy to change this pattern, a fact that Hanoi and the COSVN are by now quite aware.

Closely coupled to this strategic conservatism is an NVA-VC orientation toward victory, especially that military victory is the only satisfactory outcome in SVN. Here again the NVA displays the traditional characteristics of a professional military force.

The toppling of the Sihanouk government of Cambodia by Lon Nol in early 1970 probably came as a surprise to the NVA-VC. Their reaction, however, strongly suggests a typical military decision. Attack! Seize the initiative, move west and restore the conditions needed to insure continued sanctuary in eastern Cambodia!! The subsequent movement of American and ARVN units into Cambodia was -- perhaps -- also a strategic surprise¹ and, again, the available evidence of their subsequent activity suggests conventional military thinking. The concentration on restoring the supply situation via Laos and the wide ranging attacks against Cambodian towns all suggest military control.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

As I said earlier, the data base for the discussion in this section was early 1970 material. Such being the case, any predictions of the future are highly questionable. Nevertheless, the Power Bloc model is only an interesting but essentially useless curiosity unless it

¹The efficient covert communications linkages between the VC and the ARVN would insure COSVN knowledge of our attack plans very soon after they were known in the ARVN. Conversely, the abandon with which ARVN units moved into and through the Cambodian countryside suggests that they knew that little resistance was to be expected.

can be used to "explain" the recent past and permit contingent predictions of the future.

Using the model as an interpretative device leads one to "read" the situation (as of June 1970) as indicating a continuing separation in the NVA-VC chain of command and the VC civilian infrastructure in South Vietnam.¹ (One can also speculate about the differences in view between Hanoi and COSVN in this period of stress. Certainly their structure is not invulnerable to normal home office/field office strains in abnormal situations.) With the main NVA-VC military forces "tied up" outside III and IV CTZs, one can expect the VC infrastructure to go through a somewhat quiescent period of reorganization. It would be organizationally "in character" for the hardcore civilian infrastructure to take this opportunity to regain control over the remaining main force military elements in the south. If such a covert military-civilian struggle develops, one might expect (in the latter half of 1970) an increase in rallying by NVA personnel who had previously infiltrated into VC local forces but had been abandoned by their NVA comrades. The characteristic military drive for control over their own operations cannot be ignored. One might further expect some evidence of civilian VC cadres abandoning the organization when faced with the prospect of reversion to something resembling a pre-1964 situation.

Insofar as the military main forces are concerned (and by this I mean COSVN military headquarters) -- on the basis of the model -- one would predict a continuing concern with restoring and reinsuring their supply lines and system; a supply structure upon which they depend for replacement of men, materiel, and ammunition. Their presumed penchant for large unit operations would make a restored supply line essential. This is unlikely to be feasible via the Cambodian

¹The management technique that often works best in a situation where various, remotely located, subordinate offices are in operation is maximum permissiveness even at the expense of some miscoordination. By permissiveness in this context I mean letting the military do what they are organized to do while letting the civilian infrastructure do what it wants to do, even if these do not completely mesh.

seaport,¹ and Laos is the obvious alternative so one might predict a concentration of NVA main force units in northeast Cambodia and southern Laos.

The most important element, however, is the decisionmaking in Hanoi. If one assumes that there is something to the rumored peace-war controversy said to be taking place in Hanoi after Ho's death, one can speculate with some confidence about how the situation might look from there. To begin with, the notion of reverting to an indeterminate war of liberation in the south must look singularly unattractive to men who in 1964 thought that the then 10-year struggle was nearly over. On the other hand, a continuation of formal combat activity with its drain on North Vietnamese manpower should look equally unattractive. The power struggle in the Hanoi Politburo should be directly involved in debating such alternatives. The organizational "line of least resistance" and therefore a serious candidate for selection would have the NVA-VC concentrating their main forces in northeast Cambodia, the Laotian-South Vietnamese border areas and in the area just north of the DMZ with instructions to minimize large-scale conflict and, therefore, large-scale expenditures of men and materiel. Simultaneously, one can expect considerable efforts being made at keeping the insurgent operations going at a significant level all over the south.

One prediction which I can make from the model seems to me to be a high confidence calculation. Hanoi is most unlikely simultaneously to withdraw all its NVA forces in SVN, Cambodia, and southern Laos back into NVN. There are few nations in the world that can risk the return to its territory of a highly politicized, deeply frustrated army. A Hanoi decision to withdraw its army to NVN would be most frustrating to the senior professional officers corps (who after all consider themselves ranking Party men too) and therefore most dangerous to an already precarious power balance in the Politburo. A much safer

¹Note here that it doesn't matter whether or not the reader thinks a U.S.-SVN blockade of a "Red Cambodia" would be politically possible. The NVA commanders are almost certain to assume that we would blockade the coast in such an event and make their supply plans via Laos.

and more likely decision would be to keep them safely occupied in Laos and perhaps Cambodia while awaiting future developments.

V. THE FEDAYEEN AND THE MODEL

BACKGROUND OF THE FEDAYEEN

The Fedayeen, in one form or another, have been around for a long time. For our purposes we can start with the formation of a "Palestinian entity" at the Arab summit meeting in January of 1964. In May, 1964 a Palestine National Congress met in Jerusalem and founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and named Ahmed Shukairy president. The PLO subsequently decided to create the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), recruited from the Palestinians scattered throughout the various Arab countries. The PLO's budget was financed by contributions from the Arab countries and a tax levied on the Palestinians.

The PLO rapidly became a politically significant body and attracted the resistance of Jordan and Lebanon because of their concern that the PLA might trigger Israeli attacks against them if the PLA struck Israel from bases in their territories. In addition, neither country wanted any significant body of troops within their borders that was not directly responsible to them. In fact, most of the aggression launched by the PLO was verbal since the Arab areas adjacent to Israel from which the PLA could operate was limited to Syria. As a result of the growing impatience of the Palestinians with Shukairy's ineffectiveness, splinter groups began to spring up in competition with the PLO. One of these was Al Fatah, which early in January 1965 announced it had made a successful raid on Israel.

By 1966 a series of well-publicized (albeit generally ineffective) commando strikes was being launched against Israel and most if not all of the Arab states were unable, for political reasons, to control them. The Syrian frontier was freely available to the commandos and it was from Syria that they received the most cooperation. However, by 1967 none of the Arab nations could safely do anything except tacitly accept the activities of the commandos.

The commando organizations played no significant part on the Arab side of the 1967 Six-Day War, although their growing political strength

in the period leading up to that conflict almost surely limited the freedom of Nasser and the other Arab leaders to avoid belligerent actions and assertions. In any event, the miserable performance of the Arab armies and the shocked reaction of the Arab peoples to the debacle set the stage for an even faster growth of the political strength of the Fedayeen. Guerrilla warfare (which the commando operation is not) was successfully touted as the way to defeat Israel and restore Arab self respect. No person who espoused the Arab cause against Israel could fail to endorse the Fedayeen movement.

By mid-1968 Al Fatah had become the dominant organization among the Fedayeen groups and its spokesman-leader, Yasir Arafat, had assumed control of the PLO also. An issue of *Le Monde* quotes an unidentified Western Ambassador as saying, "Every passing day takes us further away from peace. Impatient public opinion turns more and more to Al Fatah. The moment will come when President Nasser will be the prisoner of Yasir Arafat."¹

As one can expect with "resistance" and "terrorist" organizations, the sizes and organizational structures of the various Fedayeen groups are kept secret. The total number of active commandos is approximately 18,000.² Al Fatah and the PLO are the main "resistance" organizations and are attracting members among the business and intellectual Palestinians.³ The continued existence and operation of this number of commandos attests to the presence of a functioning organization. The equipping, training, operating, and controlling of para-military units of this nature require resources, an adequately developed "ideology," and a functionally organized management structure.

Al Fatah/PLO has a proto-governmental structure of its own with offices in several countries, its own "State Department" and purchasing

¹Quoted in *Atlas*, May 1969, page 40.

²*The Wall Street Journal*, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 110 (circa 1968), put the number at 15,000 in Jordan, 2,000 in Syria, and 3,000 in Egypt and Gaza.

³E. Brunner, internal Rand paper, March, 1969.

commissions in several East European countries. The PLO is recognized by the Arab countries as something of a quasi-government.¹

It has an exceedingly active and effective "public relations" section. The Arab press is full of reports of its feats, descriptions of visits to its camps, interviews with leaders, discussing their ideas and citing their slogans. All are written in the most laudatory manner.² Al Fatah broadcasts daily over the UAR radio in Cairo, covering the entire Middle East with a propaganda program that is reportedly very popular. It is significant, perhaps, that the political "line" expounded on this Fatah program has, upon occasion, diverged sharply from the official Egyptian "position."

Sorting out the most probable from the improbable in the available (unclassified) literature is an admittedly "chancy" business, particularly in view of the volatility of the organizational competition in the area in the last three years. For example, the report that the Palestine Liberation Army of some 12,000 men (under the direction of the PLO) in three battalions, one with the Egyptian Army, one with the Syrian Army, and one with the Iraqi Army in Jordan,³ is probably a partially correct report of a planned but never completed development. There are, certainly, Palestinian Arab (refugee) recruits in most of the Arab armies. Nevertheless, the attractiveness of the commando movement should not be underestimated.⁴ The Fedayeen are publicly praised as an "elite corps" (a very old and very effective recruiting technique). The Arab commando recruit receives the equivalent of \$28 per month while in training and \$56 plus rations when he achieves

¹*New York Times*, December 3, 1968.

²Adelphi Paper #53, "Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy," December 1968.

³*New York Times*, December 3, 1968.

⁴The *New York Times*, December 27, 1968, asserts, "Most of the commandos are recruited, not from the unskilled sons of those who throng the [Palestinian refugee] camps but from the educated young men who have gone out from the camps to practice a trade or profession throughout the Arab world."

the status of full "guerrilla."¹ (This is more than the regular Arab (Jordanian) soldier receives, and this is in an area where the average annual income varies between \$170 in Egypt and \$450 in Lebanon.) To this base salary and subsistence can be added the camouflage uniform, the automatic shoulder weapon, and a carefully nurtured reputation for daring action against an enemy that has rendered completely ineffective the regular Army military units.²

An additional bit of information that suggests a certain quite logical and even necessary formalizing of functions is the recruiting of Arab doctors to staff Al Fatah field hospitals.

Most, if not all, of the Al Fatah training camps are located in Jordan and most of the commando unit operations until recently were launched from there. Since early 1969, Lebanon has been increasingly used as a launching base. There are no armed Fedayeen bands reported as being based and operating in the Israeli controlled West Bank area,³ a fact that Al Fatah continuously attempts to disprove (or mask) by its publicity campaign. The training activity in these camps is well publicized, resembling standard military recruit conditioning and basic combat training. This is not surprising given the background of the commando units in or associated with the various Arab armies, the use of Egyptian Army officers⁴ for training, and the commando's acquisition and use of Soviet (and Chinese?) automatic weapons, mortars, rockets, and so forth. Characteristically, the acquisition of such military armaments is accompanied by a corps of formal military instructors. Almost certainly these instructors (probably non-Palestinian Arabs, Algerians,⁵ and so on) bring with them the typical military nationalist

¹Wall Street Journal, *op. cit.*

²These figures are somewhat dated. The point here is that there is an economic advantage to membership in the commandos in addition to the ideological attraction.

³Adelphi Paper, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵For purposes of recruiting personnel, attracting Arab financial support, and maintaining the morale of their people, the Fedayeen

attitude along with other typically military views concerning the "proper" solution to the Israeli problem.

The conflicts between the Fedayeen and Lebanon in 1969 and the more recent struggle in Amman, illustrates the major problems within the commandos and between them and their host nations. The lack of military effectiveness of the commando units compared to the Jordanian Army (and even to the admittedly weak Lebanese Army) has been obvious. Militarily, the Lebanese Army was quite capable of containing the commandos in southern Lebanon and the Arab Legion was not used by Hussein to dislodge the commandos from Amman because of nonmilitary reasons. The chaotic conditions that would follow such a destructive battle to force the Palestinians from Amman are recognized by Hussein and apparently influence his repeated decision to make concessions to Fedayeen demands. Nevertheless, as the power balance is now he may be able to outface the commandos in a future showdown. In any future action the king would almost certainly get strong support from within the 55,000-man armed forces. They are largely made up of Bedouin stock who by tribal traditional are loyal to the royal family.

The political instability of the situation in both Lebanon and Jordan caused by the Fedayeen presence and programs is a most important factor. The impact of the Palestinian commando organization as a political polarizing force within the Arab nations is, to date, the most important consequence of their existence and activities. In planning its future domestic and foreign activities, no Middle East government can afford to leave the Fedayeen out of its considerations.

The currently accepted assumptions concerning the objectives of the Fedayeen are that they have no desire to take over the governmental responsibilities in any Arab land, preferring the freedom of operations that comes without governmental responsibilities. Presumably, they

explicitly connect the successful fight of the Algerian guerrillas against the French and the Fedayeen's fight against Israel. This in spite of the obvious dissimilarities. It is important to note that any explicit advice from Algeria would come from the (now formally trained and organized) Algerian Army, not the guerrillas.

recognize that their internal divisions may well break out into open warfare if one organization becomes the de jure government of Jordan or Lebanon. Eric Pace in the *New York Times* details this current judgment but also signals the difficulty that Al Fatah might experience in trying to avoid a progressively growing set of governmental responsibilities:¹

...The political pragmatists, notably the followers of Yasir Arafat, ...have no desire to oust the King just now. He is useful as a symbol of Jordanian-Palestinian unity. And they, too, fear the chaos that would follow another showdown, particularly if it led to King Hussein's ousting.

These relative moderates have the upper hand in the commando councils, as shown by the commandos' agreement to run joint patrols with the army to keep the peace in Amman.

ORGANIZATIONAL PRESSURES ON LEADERS

In the remainder of this section I propose to explore -- in terms of the model -- the pressures that organizational forces can be expected to bring upon their leaders, using the Fedayeen as an example. Obviously, leaders are not total captives to their organizations and, therefore, the following speculations should be treated as being at most contingent predictions.

The important point to note in the case of the Fedayeen is that the appropriate model is one of a nation with cooperative-competitive institutions. Naturally, many of the "institutions" are embryonic or even nonexistent. For example, with no territory of its own, little evidence of an equivalent of a Ministry of Interior is likely to be had although the weakening of the Hussein government may be followed by evidence of a growing Palestinian organization for "Interior" control.

The most significant activity at this time (in model terms) is the recurrent consultations, coordination and then disagreements, and

¹*New York Times*, December 27, 1968.

even hostilities, among elements within the Fedayeen. This primarily political relationship can be typified (but not described) by the activities of Al Fatah: the larger "moderate" element whose spokesman is Arafat, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine or "radical" element, controlled by George Habash. This recurrent debate should be thought of as representing the government of the Fedayeen, a government whose "executive council" is not (or perhaps I should say, not yet) dominated by a de facto "chairman." It follows that with this council being the apex of the political control structure (albeit a very loose structure) all issues and proposed actions must be viewed by each component of the council in the light of its own probable future.

In terms of the model, the Fedayeen proto-government has a number of external "enemies" among which can be listed the Egyptian governmental bureaucracy, the Egyptian Army, the Jordanian Arab Legion, the Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese armies and the various governmental bureaucracies. Although the Israeli is the nominal enemy, it is the only organization with which Al Fatah and the rest of the Fedayeen elements do not compete for resources. In this perverse sense, the Fedayeen and Israel are "allies."

The Egyptian governmental bureaucracy is notorious. Egypt's bureaucrats have probably done more damage to its economy than has Israel.

If Egyptians were more given to revolting they would abandon cause in Nasser's brand of socialism, which has put one of the world's largest, most inept bureaucracies in charge of the day-to-day functioning of Egypt's economy. Its mismanagement is to blame for epidemic shortages, non-existent planning and, ultimately, that Egypt's average income per person has gone up only from \$120 a year in 1952 to \$170 today. Much of even that modest improvement is swallowed up by increased taxes and inflation. ...Under Nasser's socialism, the fellah no longer has to make obeisance to the local pasha; instead, he is cheated by the corrupt administrator appointed by Cairo.¹

¹*Time*, May 16, 1969, pp. 32 and 37.

The Egyptian Army still suffers from its 1967 catastrophe. In mid-1970 Egypt was estimated to have (after the Soviet's post-Six-Day-War re-equipping program) some 400 combat aircraft and 800 tanks. However, years of retraining are likely to be necessary to make it into an effective fighting force. Since 1967 Nasser has been in personal control of the Egyptian military. His predicament is that he must take action against the Israeli to "defuse" the political threat of the commandos to his leadership in the Arab world and to retain the confidence of his disgruntled officers corps. The Egyptian Army is not yet either adequately equipped or trained to launch any kind of large or sustained attack across the Canal. Recurrent news media reports assert the restoration of Egyptian Army morale with the recent deployment of SA3 anti-aircraft missiles, MiG-21 air defense fighters and the Soviet personnel to maintain and operate these defensive systems. I find it difficult to imagine a boost in Egyptian military morale resulting from a Soviet military presence.

The Jordanian Army "lives" -- somewhat uncomfortably -- with the commandos. It is possible but not probable that the Jordanian Army could not (or perhaps, if put to the test, would not) defend the government of King Hussein from an attempted takeover by Al Fatah. The Army gives artillery support to the commandos on sorties across the Jordan River and frequently takes the blows of the Israeli artillery and air bombardment that come in retribution.

Syria is second on the list of Middle East countries receiving economic and military aid from the Soviet. Iraq is third. The volatility of Syrian and Iraqi politics together with ethnic and political factors and the play of personal ambitions make the exertion of Soviet influence a chancy operation. Syria trains commandos within its borders but sends them to Jordan or Lebanon to operate against Israel. Iraq uses its army to protect (control) the commando units within its borders. Neither army appears to be threatened by the commandos at this time. In fact, there are reports of Syrian soldiers being covertly introduced into Lebanon as guerrillas. The Lebanese cabinet, which resigned in the face of Fedayeen-triggered riots in April 1969, was replaced only with difficulty.

The omission of the Israeli from this list of Fedayeen enemies may come as a surprise to the reader. This "anamoly" results from dealing with situations in abstract model terms. The people who lead and speak for the commandos naturally think of Israel as their major enemy.

The Soviet advisory element in the Middle East is noncompetitive with the Fedayeen organizations insofar as resources are concerned. In the past, the USSR, perhaps in an attempt to gain some influence, has entertained Arafat in Moscow and approved the purchase of arms by Al Fatah in Communist Europe.

Nevertheless, the Soviets probably oppose the Fedayeen although the Soviet Military Advisory Staff is the most enigmatic element of all. Reportedly the Soviet generals have asked for and received a far greater say in Cairo military affairs than before the war.¹ This increased influence was re-enhanced by the introduction of Soviet anti-aircraft missile technicians and MiG-21 pilots in early 1970. The Israeli victory of 1967 was a serious blow to the Soviet military advisors and the current advisors are not likely to be over-optimistic in their estimates of Egyptian military capabilities vis à vis the Israeli. Again, in 1969 it was reported that the Soviet Union passed the word to its Arab client states that no more Soviet weapons earmarked for their armies are to be passed along to the commandos.² One can only conjecture concerning the Soviet military advisor's attitudes concerning the Egyptian Army practice of providing some officers to the PLO. Almost certainly, the Soviet advisors, being professional military men, would take a most realistic and probably pessimistic view of the ineffectuality of commando/guerrilla operations as a means of really threatening Israel. This presumed attitude coincides with the supposed USSR governmental concern with the possibility of the commandos triggering an undesired event in the Middle East. Therefore, one might conclude that the Soviet Union is probably quietly opposed

¹Walter Laquer, "Russia Enters the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1969.

²*Time*, May 2, 1969.

to the Fedayeen, a volatile element over which it has little control. This opposition is probably recognized by the Fedayeen themselves, but their need to keep good relations with some of their host countries would preclude their making a public issue of it.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

The background information cited and structured in this section has two major limitations that prevent any very confident predictions about the course of future events in the Middle East. One limitation is that the primary focus has been on only one of the many organizations whose activities and thrusts will influence the future. The other is the use of structure and patterns of operation as a context and, frequently, as a major determinant of the organization's decisionmaking. This usage, for example, emphasizes (and perhaps exaggerates) the use of ideological and political pronouncements as means to an organizational goal -- which goal was foreordained by the organization's structure and is competitive with the goals of other organizations in the immediate environment. With these reservations it is perhaps useful to speculate on the future.

Almost certainly, the competition between the various Arab governments and Al Fatah will increase in intensity (and noise). The national leaders and the leaders of the various Commando groups are competing for the same essential resources (money, men, and influence) and are most unlikely to be able to resolve their differences without severe damage or functional change¹ to one or more of these organizations. Although it may be patently inefficient and counterproductive to the Arab cause, the organizational "line of least resistance" will be to continue competing.²

In this competition and with the passage of time, especially if the organizations concerned follow typical patterns, one can expect

¹In organizational terms, these are the same thing.

²The actual and usual relationship is one of mixed competition and cooperation.

the commando organizations (at least Al Fatah) to continue to develop and reveal a functionally structured, government-like organization together with a shift in its pattern of para-military operations toward larger unit, more intricately planned, formal military moves.¹ Israeli military actions may retard or prevent this development but to do so will require the development and employment over a rather long period (one year or more) of an almost impenetrable defense system. Less than near total attrition of attacking Arab units and punishing retaliations will not reverse or prevent the postulated trend toward larger commando actions.²

The Arab governments and particularly the Egyptian government, are most likely to evince a growing concern for the developing "competitive position" of the commando organizations. For example, the Egyptian government, after a period of trying to capture political control of the commando movement, followed by an attempt to gain control by providing Egyptian military officers to Al Fatah, has now reached the stage of trying to "up-stage" the commandos by artillery barrages across the Canal and Egyptian Army commando strikes against Israeli military positions in Sinai.³ In passing it should be noted that the Egyptian response to the commando competition has been (and is most likely to continue to be) military responses against the Israeli military. This military/countermilitary focus in the Egyptian reaction is quite in keeping with the growing influence of the Soviet military advisors in Cairo. While the Palestinian Arab commandos strive for the spectacular, sometimes countercivilian targets, the Soviet military advisor in Egypt is relatively certain to be inclined

¹Note that this "prediction" implies that there is little likelihood that Al Fatah will, in the future, engage in a large scale terrorist campaign against Arabs in Israeli-held territory known to have cooperated with the Israeli. Terrorism used against civilians is not a tactic that fits the model's professional military component. Armies are meant to fight Armies.

²It should be noted that attempts to inflict near total attrition on raiders and insistence on punishing retaliation is organizationally "in character" for the Israeli Army.

³*New York Times*, June 23, 1969.

by his military background to focus on the Israeli military forces in Sinai.

The Arab commando organizations are the only entities in the area that have a stake in continued unrest. Only with continued inconclusive conflict can they expect to formalize and grow; a normal organizational objective. One can expect from them any action that is likely to continue or increase the existing Israeli-Arab military conflict, even actions that to the objective outsider appear likely to be counterproductive in the long run. When organizations are in conflict, self-inflicted long-range difficulties are readily accepted if the proposed action promises short-term gains, particularly in a situation where organizational survival is at risk. ("Organizational survival," in this context does not mean the physical survival of the human members. Rather, it means their survival and continued ability to interrelate their activities in a relatively familiar pattern.)

In their internecine conflicts one must expect the radical organizations and institutions to continuously influence and keep active the more moderate elements. If it should develop that the leaders of Al Fatah must choose between an attempt to overthrow and replace the government of Jordan or Lebanon or face the severe reduction of their influence in the commando councils (and, perhaps, within Al Fatah itself) it would not be surprising to see them opt for the former alternative. Such a "takeover" is obviously the alternative that would be recommended by the commando para-military units, units whose future growth and formalization will make them more and more dangerous to their hosts. This, in fact, is the speculation on the future in which one may have the highest confidence. The larger Arab commando organizations, having reached a stage where their functionally structured organizations are competitive with the Arab governmental organizations and where they provide an organized way of life to their higher "ranking" members, are at a stage wherein drastic change of operational patterns or goals are not to be expected. A decision to sacrifice one's self to the needs of the movement by failing to try to take over Jordan or Lebanon (if it seemed necessary) is a decision we cannot expect from the Fedayeen leaders.