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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements[1]

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How does a president's leadership style influence the nature of his advisory system? This paper examines how the president's work habits, the ways he likes to receive information, the people he prefers around him, and how he makes up his mind are all key to understanding the manner in which the White House is organized. A survey of the literature linking leadership style to advisory systems revealed five characteristics that seem important to shaping what kinds of advisers are selected and how they are constituted. Building on these five characteristics, we develop a typology indicating how presidents prefer to coordinate policy and the degree of control they need over the policy-making process. Recent presidents are classified and discussed using this typology.

KEY WORDS: U.S. Presidency; political leadership; foreign policy; decision making; leader-adviser relations; White House organization

As the world grows more complex, interdependent, and filled with uncertainties, presidents face an increasing dilemma in the making of foreign policy. More parts of the government have become involved in the foreign policy-making process and increasing numbers of agencies, organizations, and people have developed some interest in what happens in the international arena. Presidents inevitably are drawn into the "whirlpool of foreign affairs" (Fallows, 1981, p. 147). At issue is how presidents maintain control over foreign policy while still delegating authority to other actors in the government to deal with problems and take advantage of opportunities. Moreover, how do presidents shape the foreign policy agenda when situations are being defined and problems as well as opportunities are being perceived and structured by others in the political system?

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This dilemma has precipitated an increase in the size of the White House staff as presidents have worked to improve coordination among the various entities that can define and shape foreign policy (cf. Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988; Hess, 1988). As a result, the presidency has become an organization or advisory system (cf. Burke & Greenstein, 1989; Feldman, 1990). In effect, as in an organization, the president's staff extends his capabilities by increasing his "available attention, knowledge, and expertise" and by coordinating the behavior of the other units involved in making and implementing foreign policy (Feldman, 1990, p. 17). Because the president participates in the selection of members of this organization and sets into place the norms and rules determining organizational culture, what the president is like can influence what the advisers are like and the way the organization tackles foreign policy issues. In effect, what the president is like helps to shape the relationships among the advisers and his relationship with the advisers. As Greenstein (1988, p.352) has observed: "Leadership in the modern presidency is not carried out by the president alone, but rather by presidents with their associates. It depends therefore on both the president's strengths and weaknesses and on the quality of the aides' support"—that is, on the nature of the relationship between president and associates.

In this paper we are going to explore how a president's leadership style influences the kinds of advisers he will select and the relationships he will establish with his advisers. First, we will explore a number of proposals that others have made for classifying the ways presidents have structured their relations with their advisers. Second, we will abstract from these proposals what appear to be a set of common underlying characteristics that help to define a president's leadership style. Finally, we will show how these underlying characteristics can be integrated into a model for understanding how presidents will structure their advisory systems. The model uses personality characteristics as indicators of various aspects of leadership style.

WAYS OF CLASSIFYING ADVISORY SYSTEMS

Table I shows a number of classification schemes that have developed to indicate how presidents structure their relations with advisers as well as several sets of categories describing how political leaders more generally develop advisory systems. In each case we have identified a leadership style variable that researchers have linked to certain effects on how advisory systems are organized. If the president has that particular type of leadership style, his advisers are likely to be organized in a specific manner and exhibit certain characteristics. In effect, the president's leadership style helps to shape the kinds of advisers that are selected as well as how they are organized. We will explore several of these

Table I
Influence of Presidential Leadership Style on Advisory Systems

Source	*Leadership Style Variable*	*Effects on Advisers*
Campbell, 1986	Degree of partisan responsiveness	Degree of emphasis on loyalty, set of shared objectives, willingness to go around bureaucracy
	Degree does business personally or through institutionalized routines	Degree of centralization, openness to new ideas & options, delegation of authority
Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988	Degree of active involvement in foreign policy making, distrust of bureaucracy, experience in foreign affairs, focus on personal diplomacy, popularity with public and congress	Degree president will dominate foreign policy making, delegate authority, demand loyalty, seek advice
George, 1980	Cognitive style	Way president wants information network organized, openness to information and advice
	Sense of efficacy	Interests focus on foreign policy making, nature of agenda, involvement in foreign policy making
	Orientation toward political conflict	Degree of control and loyalty president needs
Hermann, 1987	General operating goal	Focus of agenda, priorities, and type of advisers need
	Commonly used strategies for coping with uncertainty	Degree work from principles, interested in consensus, willing to satisfice
	Willingness to tolerate conflict	Degree of control needed over process
	Preferred strategies for resolving conflict	Degree to which leader's preferences prevail, emphasis on unanimity versus majority rule
Johnson, 1974	Degree of tolerance for conflict	Degree of control over process
	Preference for "best" versus "doable" option	Degree of hierarchy and formality in advisory system
	Preference for evaluating rather than generating options	Openness of system to outside ideas, organization of information processing network
	Involvement in decision making	Degree of coordination of policy making, focus of attention on foreign policy making
	Degree willing to take responsibility for decisions	Degree focus on loyalty and advisers versus implementors

(*continued*)

Table I (*Continued*)

Source	*Leadership Style Variable*	*Effects on Advisers*
Kotter & Lawrence, 1974	How active leader is in decision making	Issues focus on, type of planning
	Goals trying to achieve	Who need as advisers, how build coalitions
	Ways accomplish tasks	Degree of emphasis on personalistic, entrepreneurial, or bureaucratic resources
Smith, 1988	Preference for strong chief of staff vs. free-wheeling inner circle	Degree of hierarchy, nature of organization for gathering information, pattern of delegation of authority
	Preference for proactive versus reactive policy making	Degree of consensus needed among advisers

classification schemes in more detail to provide the reader with the rationales behind the linkages.

Johnson's (1974) classification scheme focusing on how the White House is managed remains the classic in this field. Johnson proposed that there are three ways of managing the White House that are found among modern-day presidents: the formalistic, collegial, and competitive styles. The leadership variables indicated in Table I are those Johnson used in differentiating among these three types. The formalistic style of organization is designed to reduce the effects of human error through a well-designed management system that is hierarchical, focused on issues rather than personalities, nonconfrontational, and oriented toward evaluating rather than generating options and making the "best" decision. Interest is on preserving the president's time for the "big" decisions. Across a variety of analyses of the presidents, scholars have considered the Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan administrations to have exhibited this style (cf. George, 1980; Johnson, 1974).

The collegial and competitive styles, on the other hand, emphasize a less hierarchical organization. The collegial style focuses on working as a team, sharing responsibility, and consensus-building with an interest in generating options, openness to information, and reaching a doable as well as the best decision. Presidents who organize their advisers around the collegial style want to be involved in policy making and are uncomfortable when they are not in the middle of things. Kennedy, Carter, and Bush appear to have had collegial styles (cf. Johnson, 1974). Whereas the collegial style is based on collaboration; the competitive style centers around confrontation. The president with a competitive style sets up his organization with overlapping areas of authority to maximize the availability of information and a variety of perspectives. Emphasis is on advocating positions and debate, with the president playing the role of the final arbiter.

The objective is a decision that is politically feasible and bureaucratically doable. Franklin Roosevelt is the president generally considered to have exhibited this style (see Johnson, 1974).

George (1980) built on Johnson's work, abstracting out three stylistic variables that seemed to shape what presidential advisers do. The first, cognitive style, refers to the way the president gathers and processes information from his environment. Does the president come with a well-formulated vision or agenda that helps to shape how he perceives, interprets, and acts on information or is he interested in sounding out the situation and political context before defining a problem and seeking options? The way this question is answered suggests the types of advisers the president will have around him and the kinds of information the president will want in making a decision. In the first instance, the president seeks advisers and information that are supportive of his predispositions; in the second instance, he is interested in experts or representatives of his various constituencies who will provide him with insights into the political context and problem at any point in time. At issue in this second instance is what fits with the context; what is doable at this particular moment.

The second stylistic variable centers around sense of efficacy or competence. Sense of efficacy for George relates to how the president's agenda is formed. The problems he feels most comfortable in tackling and the areas he is most interested in are likely to dominate his agenda. If, like George Bush, the president feels more at ease with foreign than domestic policy, his presidency will probably favor foreign over domestic policy. If, like Ronald Reagan, he has an arena of problems that are of particular importance such as building the military strength of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, these issues may dominate much of the time of his administration.

The third stylistic variable George calls orientation toward political conflict. How open is the president to face-to-face disagreements and confrontations among his advisers? The more open the president is to such debate and crossfire, the easier it is for him to forge an advisory system exhibiting the characteristics of Johnson's competitive model; the more uncomfortable such a milieu makes him, the more likely the president is to want an advisory system that either emphasizes teamwork (all of us work together) or formal rules (here are the gatekeepers who manage what gets to the president). George argues that this orientation tends to shape the president's dealings with his cabinet and the executive bureaucracy as well as the White House staff. It colors the way he wants his advisory system to run. Moreover, it helps to define the type of control the president will want over the policy-making process and how much loyalty he will demand from those around him. If conflict is to be minimized, the president will have to expend resources to keep it under control; one way to achieve such control is to choose advisers who are loyal to the president and have served him for some time. If conflict can be tolerated and, perhaps, even used, the president

may see high turnover among his staff as egos are bruised or tempers flare. But advisers are more likely to be policy advocates and know what they want the president to do.

Other scholars particularly interested in the presidency (Campbell, 1986; Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988; Smith, 1988) have added to what Johnson and George have described. These writers have been interested in leadership style variables that are relational in form; that is, they focus on what the president does vis-à-vis his advisers and the bureaucracy. One such variable is the degree to which the president does business personally or through institutionalized routines. Is the president a hands-on person like Lyndon Johnson, who wanted to talk to the commanders in Vietnam or the ambassador in the Dominican Republic about what was really going on, or is he more likely to want what comes up through the bureaucracy to be culled and organized before it gets to him for his reflection? Anyone can become an adviser to the first type of president; the gatekeepers at the end become the advisers for the second type of president.

Another relational variable concerns how proactive versus reactive the president's policy making is. Is the president interested in shaping policy and enlisting the aid of others in selling the policy, or is the president more responsive to what comes to him from others rather than searching out activities? The proactive president is more likely to want a loyal staff with similar predispositions who are sold on the president's program and ready to enlist support for it. Consider the staff that supported Reagan in seeking the release of American hostages in Lebanon by selling arms to Iran. The reactive president becomes more dependent on how others define and represent problems and the pressure they place on him to act. The issues that the more reactive president focuses on are a function of whom he has on his staff.

A third relational variable centers around distrust of the bureaucracy. How much does the president trust the executive branch bureaucracy to carry out his decisions and program? Those presidents like Nixon with an inherent distrust of what the bureaucracy will do to their policies often centralize authority so that it rests with those they can trust, or they endrun the bureaucracy altogether by bringing policy making into the White House and under their control. With more trust of the bureaucracy comes more interest in recommendations from those further down in the hierarchy and more interest in interagency commissions and task forces.

Two scholars writing about political leadership in general (Hermann, 1987; Kotter & Lawrence, 1974) have stressed several further leadership styles that can influence how advisers are chosen. The first focuses on the leader's preferred strategies for resolving conflict. Which of the following strategies does the leader generally use to resolve conflict among advisers: leader preferences, unanimity/consensus, or majority rule? Each strategy suggests a difference in the advisory system. If the strategy focuses on insuring that the leader's preferences prevail,

the leader is going to play a more forceful role in the proceedings than if the strategy involves building a consensus or engaging a coalition to make a majority. Consensus-building demands more of a facilitative role from the leader, while engaging in coalition formation suggests an emphasis on negotiation and bargaining with trade-offs and side payments. Moreover, the advisers the leader selects may differ with these strategies. If the leader generally wants his preferences to prevail, he will probably seek out advisers who have a similar philosophy, are loyal, and predisposed to please him. If consensus is the name of the game, the leader will seek out advisers who are, like himself, interested in facilitating the process of bringing different views together and more conciliative than confrontational. Advisers to leaders whose preferred strategy is coalition building probably need skills at ascertaining where constituents stand and persuading others to join with them.

The last leadership style variable centers around the general operating goal of the leader—what is driving the leader to accept a leadership position. Why is a person interested in running for president? The type of goal indicates who the leader or president is likely to seek for advisers. Leaders interested in a particular cause seek advocates around them; those interested in support seek a cohesive group around them; those interested in power and influence seek implementors around them; those who want to accomplish some task or change some policy seek experts around them. Advisers are sought that complement the leaders' needs, that facilitate the leaders doing what they perceive needs to be done.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

An examination of the leadership styles listed in Table I suggests overlap among the categories. Although stated in different words, some of the categories focus on similar types of characteristics. The classification schemes in Table I appear to emphasize five types of leadership style variables. The five are involvement in the policy-making process, willingness to tolerate conflict, a president's motivation or reason for leading, preferred strategies for managing information, and preferred strategies for resolving conflict.

Involvement in the policy-making process focuses on both the president's interest and expertise in foreign policy making as well as his preference for personal versus institutional decision making. Involvement in the making of foreign policy is correlated with being interested in foreign policy, experience in foreign policy making, and a desire to do business personally rather than through institutionalized routines. As George (1980) has observed, the president's efficacy is enhanced when he is either interested or experienced in foreign policy making, and he finds this part of the job satisfying and easy. Involvement is also suggestive of a focus on personal engagement in the process and a desire to be a

part of what is happening, to be on top of problem solving in the White House (see Campbell, 1986; Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988).

Willingness to tolerate conflict is an orientation or set that the president brings to the White House. It is indicative of the degree of disagreement and disharmony he will allow among his advisers. In effect, this leadership style suggest the climate in which the president will feel comfortable operating. For some presidents (e.g., Franklin Roosevelt), conflict is permitted because it facilitates the generation of new alternatives and perspectives among advisers and leads to debate and dialogue over issues. For others (like Richard Nixon), conflict is something to be dealt with before it surfaces at the presidential level.

The president's motivation or reason for leading is another leadership style variable that suggests the president's orientation to his position and helps to structure the kind of climate and environment in which he is going to feel comfortable. Motivation here refers to degree of partisan responsiveness as well as the president's general operating goal and the goals he is trying to achieve. Does the president have a cause or problem he wants to solve? Is he motivated by power and status? Is he interested in approval, support, and popularity? Does he want to accomplish a particular task or change a policy? Does he have a desire to see the country become a more "moral" place in which to live? The goal tends to define the constituencies that are most important to the president and how he is likely to deal with them. Moreover, it indicates the type of advisers he is likely to seek—those who can best help achieve these goals.

The last two more "macro" leadership style variables are process variables: preferred strategies for managing information and resolving conflict. These two processes are fundamental to the way the presidency operates. Problems are defined, options raised and evaluated, and outcomes considered through the management of information. Coalitions are formed, consensus is built, people become part of decision-making units, and rules of the game are designed to resolve conflicts. Each of these processes can be organized in a variety of ways. In managing information, the president can want to be the hub of the communication wheel—the person who receives and disperses information. Or he can want to be at the end of a hierarchy that distills the information and presents him with a set of alternatives with their potential consequences. In dealing with conflict, the president can insist on his own preferences; he can also invite consensus-building, design a team that works together, or push for a working majority. These different processes lead to different types of advisory systems.

In describing executive and presidential organizations, scholars (e.g., Campbell, 1986; Feldman, 1990; Wilensky, 1967) have emphasized several functions that such organizations serve. These functions revolve around mastery of the task, motivation and control, and coordination and coherence. There is a need within the president's advisory system to solve problems, to motivate, to have some semblance of control, and to arrive at policies that receive support. Wilensky (1967) has proposed that these functions lead to specialization, hier-

archy, and centralization. In the rest of this section of the paper, we would like to argue that the five leadership style variables we have just discussed may help to shape the way specialization, hierarchy, and centralization are defined in any particular president's administration.

We propose that presidential involvement in the foreign policy-making process is indicative of specialization in foreign policy. Such presidential involvement suggests a focus on foreign policy and presidential influence on the nature of the foreign policy agenda. Preferred strategies for managing information and resolving conflict are indicative of the amount of control the president will try to assert and the ways he will seek to motivate those under him—these strategies influence the manner in which authority is structured in the White House. And the president's willingness to tolerate conflict and motivation for leading suggest how he will go about coordinating policy making and where he will look for support for his policies—that is, the way in which policy making will be centralized in the White House. Table II indicates the linkages we see between the leadership style variables and these organizational functions. This table also indicates the categories that we will use to delineate the leadership style variables in the rest of this paper. Table III diagrams the interrelationships we perceive when we combine organizational functions with the leadership style variables. And Table IV describes the types of advisers and advisory systems presidents with these organizational preferences are likely to use.

Specialization

As noted in Table II, degree of involvement in the foreign policy-making process is used here to denote specialization. For purposes of this paper, we

Table II
Linkages Between Leadership Style Variables and Organizational Functions

Organizational Function	*Leadership Style Variable*
Specialization	Involvement in foreign policy-making process
Hierarchy (Control)	Preferred strategies for managing information: Formal chain of command Hub of information-gathering process Preferred strategies for resolving conflict: Leader's preferences prevail Decisions made through consensus or working majority
Focus of centralization (Coordination)	Willingness to tolerate conflict: Little willingness to tolerate conflict Willing to tolerate conflict Motivation or reason for leading: Motivated to seek approval and support (power/status) Motivated to promote cause (complete task, do what is right)

Table III
Relationships Between Organizational Functions and Leadership Styles

	Hierarchy (Control)	
	Formal	*Informal*
Build concurrence/community among advisers (focus on political process)	Little willingness to tolerate conflict Motivated to seek approval & support (power/status) Leader's preferences prevail Formal chain of command	Little willingness to tolerate conflict Motivated to seek approval & support (power/status) Decisions made through consensus or working majority Hub of information-gathering process
Focus of centralization (Coordination)		
Accomplish task (focus on substance of problem)	Willing to tolerate conflict Motivated to promote cause (complete task, do what is right) Leader's preferences prevail Formal chain of command	Willing to tolerate conflict Motivated to promote cause (complete task, do what is right) Decisions made through consensus or working majority Hub of information-gathering process

Note: Above relationships have more influence on foreign policy, the more involved the president is in the foreign policy-making process.

propose that the relationships displayed in Table III are more likely when the president is involved in the foreign policy-making process—when he is interested and experienced in the foreign policy arena. Under such circumstances, the president will want to organize the White House staff responsible for foreign policy, and his leadership style has a greater chance of shaping the nature of that staff. Moreover, such presidents are probably more likely to pay attention to foreign policy issues and be attuned to potential problems and opportunities in the international arena. Foreign policy issues will become a central part of the president's agenda. As a result, who the advisers are who deal with foreign policy and how they are configured can influence the nature of the policy.

Focus of Centralization (Coordination)

Presidents appear to differ in the way in which they coordinate their advisers. The focus of centralization in the White House seems to take one of two forms—either a focus on having concurrence among relevant advisers or a focus on accomplishing a task. The group dynamics literature suggests that these are two major functions that leaders play in groups—helping the group work through

Table IV
Influence of Leadership Style on Advisory Selection and Organization

	Hierarchy (Control)	
	Formal	*Informal*
Build concurrence/community among advisers (Process Focus)	Loyalty important; Advisers used as sounding board; Interested in focusing on important decisions; Interested in evaluating rather than generating options; Leader-dominated groupthink possible; Procedures well-defined & highly structured	Advisers seen as part of team; Sharing of accountability; Group cohesion is valued; Advisers provide psychological support; Options sought that minimize conflict & disagreement
Focus of centralization (Coordination)		
Accomplish task (Problem Focus)	Select advisers who share cause/concern/ideology; Advisers seen as implementors & advocates; Advisers tailor information to fit biases; One or two advisers play gatekeeper roles for information and access; Decisions shaped by shared vision; Disagreements center on means rather than ends	Want experts as advisers; Advisers seen as providing information & guidance; Open to using bureaucracy to get information; Time spent on generating options & considering consequences; Seek "doable" solution to problem; Disagreement is valued

a task or facilitating group interaction, participation, and satisfaction (e.g., Bass, 1984; McGrath, 1984; Stogdill, 1974). This theme also appears in the organization literature, where researchers talk about the twin goals of leadership as organizational survival and policy achievement (e.g., Hargrove, 1989; Meier, 1989; Miller, 1987). How comfortable presidents feel in an environment where there is conflict and disagreement and the presidents' motivation for leading are leadership style variables that are suggestive of which way a president is likely to want to coordinate policy.

Facilitation of group satisfaction and organizational survival have as their focus building concurrence and a sense of belonging among members of a group and developing a climate of cooperation and support. Conflict and disagreement are dysfunctional to such an environment because interest is centered around promoting a sense of community. How does the leader help members feel a part of the group or organization and see their participation as valued and needed?

The way members feel about the group or organization becomes important to the leader. There is little tolerance for conflict and much attention paid to providing approval and support. Translated to the presidential advisory system, the desire of the president with such a focus would be to have advisers who feel empowered, who believe that their opinions and interests count, but who also function best in a climate of cooperation and trust. The advisory system becomes a community of interlocking parts with a shared interest in containing conflict and disagreement and in enhancing the sense of common interests and values.

When the focus of coordination in a group or organization becomes accomplishing a task or policy achievement, attention turns to getting something done. The major impetus for action is not how members feel about the group or organization but how present problems can be solved or how the current problem is defined. There is a change from seeing the group as a community to perceiving the group as a producer. The emphasis is on solving problems and taking advantage of opportunities toward some end. There often is a sense of mission and a bottom line. Leadership facilitates movement on the mission and achievement of the goal. Conflict and disagreement are generally valued with such a focus because they introduce different perspectives into discussion and enhance the chances for innovative solutions as members wrestle with their differences of opinion. Presidential advisory systems with this focus are interested in doing a good job, in addressing issues facing the administration in an effective manner with positive results. Members of the administration do not have to like one another but they need to acknowledge and admire each other's problem-solving competencies and skills. The advisory system is like a well-oiled machine with members both defining and carrying out their roles and functions with the quality of the product in mind.

In their discussion of the advisory systems of the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations, Burke and Greenstein (1991, p. 290) have differentiated between two aspects of political reality testing—"the political component of selling policies and mustering the support necessary to win approval and the substantive component of devising and analyzing policies and the means of implementing them." These two components parallel the two ways of coordinating policy we have proposed here. The political component is similar to the focus on concurrence and community; the substantive component is similar to the focus on accomplishing a task or policy achievement. In one the emphasis is on building support; in the other, the emphasis is on developing a good policy. Burke and Greenstein (1991) observe that Eisenhower and Johnson each felt more comfortable in dealing with one rather than both of these and, thus, tended to shape their advisory systems with that focus in mind. Eisenhower was predisposed toward tackling the problem, which meant a focus on substantive and policy analysis; Johnson was predisposed toward the process, which meant a focus on the political and building support.

Hierarchy (Control)

Presidents also appear to differ in the degree of control they need over the policy-making process. As Downs (1967) noted, complex organizations include people with different goals and interests—differences that cannot generally be resolved through voting but can through the establishment of a hierarchy and a pattern of organizational authority. How much control a president wants over the advisory system helps to shape the nature of the pattern of authority that develops. Presidential interest in control is evidenced in the strategies the president prefers for managing information and conflict/disagreement.

If the president wants to make the final decision—that is, have his preferences prevail—he is likely to seek to control what happens in the foreign policy arena. His is the ultimate authority and cannot be reversed. And he is likely to organize authority into a hierarchical system with himself at the apex of a formal chain of command. Information processing, problem definition, and option generation occur at lower levels and come up to the president. The advisory system is organized into a formal and rather inflexible hierarchy. In effect, there is a correct way to do things and authority patterns are well-defined.

But if the president is more comfortable when decisions are made through consensus or concurrence, he is less likely to use a formal hierarchical pattern of authority. Who will participate in decision making and how structured the process is will vary with the situation and problem. There will be a looseness and informality to the pattern of authority that facilitates the president's building a consensus. Often leaders in loose hierarchical systems become managers of the information in the system by putting themselves at the hub of the communications network. In this way they can have some control over who gets what information, and they have knowledge about what information others know. As a result, they have the basis on which to organize a decision-making unit that can reach consensus. In effect, the pattern of authority is more informal and is structured and restructured in relation to the particular problem at hand. The president is still on top, but he has chosen to involve others directly in decision making and to use informal channels of authority.

Once more Burke and Greenstein (1991) in their discussion of the Eisenhower and Johnson decisions on Vietnam provide evidence for the distinction we are making here. They describe the essentially formal system of authority that Eisenhower set up and nurtured, as contrasted with the generally informal system of authority that was Johnson's style. "No formal system in the modern presidency was more explicitly and extensively articulated than Eisenhower's. The formal component of Johnson's advising was minimal" (Burke & Greenstein, 1991, p. 276). Eisenhower had rules, routines, and procedures by which policy choices were defined, discussed, and selected. Those involved in the process understood and worked by these rules. The system was organized to

present Eisenhower with well-thought-out problems and options for his decision. For Johnson, there were no explicit operating rules and procedures. People had access because of whom they were and their position on the war.

TOWARD A NEW TYPOLOGY

The two types of authority patterns and the two ways of coordinating policy create a fourfold typology of advisory systems based on the president's leadership style. Table III presents this typology. Presidents can have a strict hierarchical or formal authority pattern with a focus on building concurrence; they can be more loose and informal in their authority pattern yet focus on building concurrence; they can organize a formal authority pattern but want to work on policy achievement; and they can maintain an informal approach while focusing on policy achievement. As we have noted, presidents with particular leadership styles will choose these various options in developing their advisory systems. What are the characteristics of the advisers and their organization that we might expect from these distinctive types of advisory systems? Table IV provides some answers to this question. As Table IV suggests, these different types of advisory systems contain advisers with different backgrounds and competencies and emphasize different kinds of processes and different missions. Let us examine each of these advisory systems in more detail.

Formal Control, Process Focus

Presidents whose leadership style leads to a rather formal pattern of authority and an interest in having concurrence among advisers as the way policy is coordinated look for advisers who are loyal to them and ready to be influenced by them. They want advisers who are predisposed to work *for* them and interested in pleasing them. Such presidents use their advisers as a sounding board on whom to try out their ideas and with whom to shape how proposals are phrased to encourage consensus outside the White House. The focus is on developing an orderly policy-making process that has well-defined procedures and reserves the more important decisions for the president. Problems are defined and options generated down in the chain of command and are refined as they move up the hierarchy. The president's task is to make the final decision among the options that have made it through his staffing process. The president's preferences prevail and, if known ahead of time, may influence the kind of information, problems, and potential options that reach him.

Materials on presidential leadership style suggest that this kind of advisory system was characteristic of Truman and Nixon among recent presidents (see,

e.g., George, 1980; Hess, 1988; Johnson, 1974; Light, 1982). These two presidents had a rather low tolerance for conflict, were more interested in power/status and approval/support than promoting a cause, wanted their preferences to prevail, and believed in a formal chain of command for the processing of information as well as in the definition of problems and the identification of options. As a result of these leadership styles, they appear to fall into the category leading to a preference for a more formal pattern of authority and a focus on process or on building concurrence among advisers. And the structure of their advisory system reflects many of the traits indicated in Table IV as characterizing such an advisory system. They were interested in loyalty among their advisers. Hess (1988) argues that loyalty was a unifying theme for the Truman and Nixon administrations. Johnson (1974) notes how Truman wanted to preserve his time for the "big" decisions and was interested in evaluating rather than generating options. George (1980) describes how orderly and well-defined the rules and procedures were in these administrations.

Informal Control, Process Focus

Presidents who work best when the pattern of authority is more informal and less well-defined and whose central concern is building concurrence or consensus among those involved in the policy process are more likely to seek out advisers who are trusted friends who have served with them, albeit in a variety of capacities across much of their political careers. These advisers are viewed as making up a team, the members of which share accountability for decisions and believe they are an important part of the policy-making process. A sense of the group is important to its members so that advisers as team players take pride in their job and in resulting policies. "We did this together; let's tackle this problem together" become mottoes for the advisory system. Advisers provide psychological and emotional support for the president since all are involved in what is going on and share his concerns and are alert to his needs. With the emphasis on group cohesion and team effort, problems are defined and options sought that minimize conflict and disagreement among members in the group.

The three modern presidents who appear to exhibit this pattern in their advisory system are Johnson, Ford, and Carter (see, e.g., Burke & Greenstein, 1991; Campbell, 1986; Crabb & Mulcahy, 1988; Hess, 1988; Johnson, 1974). These presidents wanted to be at the hub of the communication network—collecting and dispersing information; they were interested in policies that had received some form of consensual or unanimous support among advisers; and they were motivated by power and/or approval needs while feeling most comfortable exercising leadership in a cooperative and nonconfrontational environment.

Growing out of their leadership style preferences, these three presidents also

manifested the behaviors characteristic of the more informal advisory system with a concern for process noted in Table IV. Campbell (1986) and Hess (1988) have discussed Carter's dependence on his Georgian friends as advisers—people who had helped him move into politics, the governorship, and now into the White House. Burke and Greenstein (1991) describe the importance of Johnson's Tuesday Lunch group for discussions and decision making on Vietnam. Members of this group were advisers with whom he felt comfortable and on whom LBJ relied for advice and support. Burke and Greenstein (1991, p. 185) note the "consensus-prone qualities" of these meetings. They allowed the president to blow off steam. Hess (1988) discusses the importance to Ford of having consensus and a sense of group cohesion among his advisers. For each of these presidents, there was an emphasis on working within a team setting where options were sought that minimized conflict and disagreement and fostered a sharing of accountability and a feeling of inclusion in the process.

Formal Control, Problem Focus

Presidents adopting this type of pattern for their advisory system are interested in institutionalizing a formal set of rules and procedures in the organization of the White House in the service of accomplishing a specific task. Such presidents can tolerate some conflict in their decision-making environment; they are motivated to accomplish something—be it solving a problem, achieving a goal, or moving the country ahead on some cause; but they want their preferences to prevail and information to flow upward through a formal chain of command. Table IV suggests that as a result of their predispositions, these presidents are likely to select advisers who share their concern, cause, or ideology. The advisers become facilitators for the achievement of a particular end. They are advocates and implementors who are committed to working toward a certain goal. Key advisers serve the function of gatekeepers for information and individual access to the president to ensure that problems relevant to what he wants done reach him. Moreover, decisions are generally shaped by the shared vision that the advisers and president have with disagreements focusing on how things should be done rather than on what should be done. Timing also becomes a focus of attention as advisers and president consider when to do something to achieve what they want.

Reagan is the one modern president whose leadership style fits this category. As Light (1982) has observed, Reagan focused the nation's priorities around his own ideology and pushed to see that the goals he set for his administration were achieved. But he did so within a fairly formal hierarchical system with gatekeepers during his first term and a dominant chief of staff during the second (see Hess, 1988). He was interested in aides whose opinions were like his and

whom he trusted to evaluate specific policies for him (see Campbell, 1986; Hess, 1988).

Informal Control, Problem Focus

Presidents with this type of advisory system are interested in working in an environment that is rather informal while focused on getting the task done. They are interested in being the center of the information network and in achieving a consensus on policies that will work; they can tolerate conflict among those around them as long as it is in the service of accomplishing things. As Table IV suggests, these leadership style characteristics have implications for the advisory system. Since information is important to these presidents, they want experts as advisers and use their advisers to gather and organize information regarding problems and opportunities. With their focus on wanting to know, such presidents often seek particulars either from people on the scene or from anywhere in the bureaucracy. Everyone has some piece of information that may prove useful. Time is spent generating options and considering what is feasible in the particular situation. Conflict is to be promoted if it provides a different perspective or way of thinking about a problem. Emphasis is placed on finding an alternative that will successfully accomplish an objective.

Franklin Roosevelt is often used to exemplify this style (see George, 1980; Hess, 1988; Johnson, 1974). As Hess (1988) observes, FDR had an insatiable appetite for information. He wanted to have an open, free-wheeling discussion of problems with diverse opinions and options put on the table (see George, 1980). As a result, he sought multiple channels of communication, placing himself at the center of the information network so that he knew more than anyone else. Often he promoted overlapping jurisdictions of authority in order to hear how persons with differing perspectives would tackle a problem or perceive an opportunity (George, 1980). In FDR's view, disagreement ensured that problems with options would be aired and considered before a decision was made and an action taken. Thus, the chances for success were enhanced.

Mixed Types

We have discussed these four advisory patterns as if they were mutually exclusive and pure types. An argument can be made that some presidents tend to emphasize one or the other of the two dimensions that make up this typology—control or coordination—and move across the other dimension depending on situational and contextual variables. It can also be argued that presidents change the nature of the decision units they use as the nature of the problem or topic changes. In each case our position would be that aspects of the president's

leadership style have become linked with characteristics of the context. When a particular contextual variable is present, it changes the nature of certain aspects of the president's style. Some examples are in order.

Burke and Greenstein (1991), as we have noted earlier, describe Eisenhower as mixing both formal and informal procedures in his advisory system. In the language of the typology, certain aspects of his advisory system could be characterized as formal and other aspects as informal. In both cases Eisenhower was interested in devising and analyzing policies—in focusing on problems or the substance of issues. Inferring from Burke and Greenstein's analysis (1991), we advance the proposition that Eisenhower involved advisers in an informal way when he was "engaging in distilling available information, stating options, and preparing recommendations" (p. 288). In other words, the informal advisory system was useful in the problem-definition or representation stage of decision making—while Eisenhower was searching for information on which to make a decision. He used the NSC Planning Board, as its name suggests, for developing plans and considering hard problems (see Burke & Greenstein, 1991, p. 277). As one of Eisenhower's aides indicated, this group debated and argued a range of views on major issues in preparation for crises that might arise. A more formal system, however, was used in the decision-making and implementation phases of dealing with a problem. Eisenhower made decisions on his own and expected his aides to implement them through their various positions in the hierarchy (Burke & Greenstein, 1991, pp. 287–288).

In effect, Eisenhower's focus was on the coordination of policy and he used formal and informal systems to deal with various phases of decision making. He emphasized one of the two variables in the typology while varying the other depending on where in the decision-making process he found himself. Problem representation and definition, including the specification of options and potential consequences, was the prerogative of a more informal planning and search network. The choice and implementation stages were much more formalized and within a chain of command. Stage in the decision-making process becomes the contextual factor that is linked to leadership style. Eisenhower was more comfortable being the hub of the information network and seeing if consensus was possible in setting forth and analyzing the problem than in actually deciding what to do. In the choice-making stage, he wanted to be in command and have his preferences prevail.

Bush is another interesting president to consider in any discussion of mixed types. For many issues in his administration, his advisory system could be classified as involving informal control and a process focus. His was a team approach to decision making with consensus building and information sharing the mechanisms for control and with a low tolerance for conflict and a need for approval and support defining what was a comfortable climate in which to operate (see Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, & Walker, 1991). Group cohesion and

minimization of open disagreements were the order of the day among advisers. Of interest is what happened to that advisory system when Bush felt himself backed into a corner—for example, prior to the Panamanian invasion, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on his China policy. Bush appeared to shift his advisory needs to the type of system characterized by formal control and a problem focus. He became a man with a mission, wanting advisers who would act as advocates and implementors of his policy decisions. Only advisers who shared in Bush's vision became part of the inner circle. Disagreements, when they appeared, were tolerated on means but not ends. Motivation changed from the need for approval and support to promoting a cause, and, in turn, coordination switched from concurrence among relevant advisers to accomplishing a task. When he perceived a threat not only to the policies of his administration but also to policies important to his political well-being and place in history (see Hermann, 1979), Bush became more task-focused and more driven to see something happen that would deal with the situation and save him face. He seemed more certain that he knew what to do and what was right. Problems were defined more in moral terms and driven less by the polls and what the people wanted than by the challenge to his integrity and expertise. A certain type of situation—a perceived threat to his sense of self-worth and political reputation—is the contextual variable that changed how Bush viewed the leadership setting and what he needed from advisers.

What we are proposing is that presidents probably have a dominant style that fits within the typology we have outlined above. But there may be situations or contextual factors that lead presidents to be more comfortable with another leadership style. Barber (1977) has argued that the presidents' first political success helps to shape the leadership style they will depend on in future political settings. If this style continues to be rewarded with success in the future, it becomes even more a part of the president's repertoire. Presidents begin to rely on this style, and it defines the way they will approach decision making and their interpersonal interactions. There may, however, be certain situations in which presidents have not found their usual leadership style helpful and have learned to adapt it in order to cope with such events. Knowing something about presidents' personalities can help shed some light on when such changes are likely.

In another place, one of the authors (Hermann, 1993; Hermann & Hermann, 1989) has shown how leaders' sensitivity to the political context can influence when contextual factors are likely to shape how they engage in decision making. Leaders who show less sensitivity to contextual cues from their environments tend to be top-down information processors or cognitive misers; they are more ideological, more reliant on heuristics to guide how they perceive any problem, less willing to deal with discrepant information, and more interested in advocating a specific option than in learning about alternative possibilities. Such leaders are more likely to find a leadership style that is successful in getting them what

they want and to rely on it in most situations. These leaders will probably build an advisory system that is fairly stable across time and situation.

Leaders, on the other hand, who are more sensitive to contextual information appear to be bottom-up information processors or hypothesis testers; they use contextual information to guide what they do, being more pragmatic and opportunistic, interested in the cues discrepant information provides about what they want to do, and concerned about option generation. If they have a position, such leaders use contextual information to gain information about timing and constituent opinion. If they do not have a position, they use the information to help them decide where to look for a position. These leaders are likely to use different types of advisory systems for different types of problems and are likely to use information from the environment to guide whom they select to become part of the decision unit on any occasion. Cues about the nature of the advisory system can be gleaned from knowledge about the topics or constituents of importance in any particular situation. How the leader reacts to those topics or constituents will help to determine the way leadership style will have an impact on shaping the advisory system. Our earlier discussion of the Bush presidency illustrates this point. When the topic was perceived as threatening to him or his policies, Bush organized his advisory system differently than when the topic was not threatening.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have focused on how the president's leadership style influences the nature of his advisory system. As Hess (1988, p. 188) has observed, the president's style, his work habits, how he likes to receive information, the people he prefers around him, and the way he makes up his mind are all key to how the White House is organized. A survey of what has been written linking the president's leadership style to the nature of the advisory system revealed five leadership style variables that seem important to shaping what kinds of advisers are selected and how they are organized. These five variables suggest how the president is likely to shape his advisory system to satisfy the organizational functions revolving around mastery of the task, motivation and control, and coordination and coherence. We propose that the leadership style variables form a typology indicating how presidents prefer to coordinate their advisers and the degree of control they need over the policy-making process. Each type relates a particular leadership style to a different kind of advisory system containing advisers with different backgrounds and competencies and emphasizing different processes and missions. We have been able to fit most recent presidents into one of the types. Where such was not feasible we have

raised the possibility of mixed types and indicated how one might determine from the context when the types would change.

The typology proposed in this paper builds on previous presidential literature on leadership style and executive arrangements. It is an initial attempt to synthesize this literature and develop a more coherent way of considering what aspects of leadership style influence how advisers are selected and constituted. Much work remains in examining the proposed relationships. We need to study the proposed linkages across a set of instances of foreign policy decision making and a set of presidents. A start at this kind of research is found in Preston and Young (1992). They examine the linkage between President Bush's leadership style and decision making leading up to and during the Gulf war.

Of interest, also, is whether the typology will generalize to other kinds of political leaders than presidents—such as, prime ministers, mayors, governors, party heads. Our plan was to consider variables that were sufficiently broad to be applicable to the variety of political leaders who must set up advisory systems to guide their administrations. We urge those doing research on other kinds of political leaders to examine the applicability of the typology.

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