

Preventing competition because of “solidarity”: Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain

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**Preventing competition because of solidarity :
Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain**

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3 Preventing competition because of “solidarity”:
4 Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain
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21 **Abstract:**
22

23 From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market
24 mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be
25 based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast
26 if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based
27 on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy
28 provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy
29 makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in
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36 Data

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Preventing competition because of 'solidarity': Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain

Abstract:

From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in explaining such behavior. In fact, results from our analysis show that political motivations can eventually play a more relevant role than social welfare maximization.

Key words: Public Enterprise, Legal monopolies, Air Transportation, Models with Panel Data

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1. Introduction

Traditionally, airports have been seen as monopolistic infrastructures that hold tight control over flights with origins and destinations in their hinterlands. Consequently, neither economic analysis nor infrastructure policy used to consider competition as one of the relevant features of airports. Nowadays there exists a clear trend towards corporatization of airports. Like privatization, corporatization has been seen as a way to reform airports whose ownership and management have remained public. Within this context, competition has been seen as a powerful tool to stimulate efficiency.

Competition among airports at the international level is now a standard feature in all developed countries. Moreover, within each country airports compete to grow and win an increasing part of the business. Spain, alone among developed countries with more than one large airport, defies this pattern. Despite having a large population and several large airports, Spain air travel remains organized as a totally integrated network: airports are exclusively owned and managed by the central government. Thus, competition among airports does not exist. The market has no role in issues such as pricing or resource

1
2 allocation. The most relevant features of airport management are decided on bureaucratic
3 basis and approved within the Spanish Government budgetary process.
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7 Why is the Spanish system such an exception? No matter the political affiliation of the
8 ruling party, politicians in charge and bureaucrats have regularly claimed that inter-
9 territorial solidarity is the main rationale for their choice. Their story goes as follows: less
10 developed areas in Spain must have airports for regional development. However, such
11 areas cannot sustain airports costs. In this way, it is said that centralized management and
12 allocation of funds would allow the surplus from the largest and most profitable airports
13 to pay for the deficits incurred by the smallest and least profitable airports. In short, rich
14 airports would be paying for keeping poor airports working. Is this what is actually
15 happening?
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19 As far as social welfare maximization is concerned, there could be a potential
20 justification for constraining market mechanisms with the aim of progressive
21 redistribution.¹ This brings us to a traditional conundrum of public policy; the trade-off
22 between efficiency and equity. However, if we accept that the behavior of public agents is
23 aimed to their own interest, some policies designed to prevent competition might actually
24 be based on selfish motivations, while justified on the grounds of progressive
25 redistribution.
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29 Through our analysis we will empirically contrast two competing explanations for the
30 persistence of the unusual model in Spain. On the one hand, there does exist the public
31 interest explanation. From the point of view of the ‘general interest’, market mechanisms
32 would generate a less than socially desirable level of airport operating facilities, and public
33 intervention is needed to correct this ‘market failure’. This would be consistent with the
34 standard explanation by politicians and bureaucrats we have summarized above. However,
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¹ One could ask whether alternative systems of grants and subsidies could work better to make up the deficits of the non-profitable airports. In every other country, no matter its system of management and funding, these kinds of tools are used so that unprofitable airports can operate. We do not go with detail into this, since this departs from the central questions in our paper.

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2
3 our results show that choices of governments have been motivated by neither a
4
5 progressive redistribution criterion nor the claim of supporting smaller airports.
6

7 On the other hand, we explore a public choice approach. Within that framework, the
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9 agents of governments are rational utility maximizers: politicians trying to maximize
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11 success in elections, while officials seek to maximize their own budget. As long as each
12
13 group pursues its own-interests they will tend to resist institutional arrangements that
14
15 might constrain their behavior and enhance opportunities for efficient performance.
16
17 Within our specific framework, introducing market mechanisms in the provision of public
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19 services would limit increases in the discretionary budgets in the control of officials
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21 (Niskanen, 1971). Our results provide evidence that governments distribute investment in
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23 airports so that they can increase their electoral support.
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28 The idea of this work is related with the recent literature on regional allocation of
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30 public investments. Some recent works in this literature focus the attention on the
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32 traditional trade-off between equity and efficiency in public policies (Yamano and
33
34 Ohkawara, 2000; de la Fuente, 2005). Our paper is more closely related to the literature
35
36 that analyzes not just the efficiency-equity issue but also the role of political factors in
37
38 explaining the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure.² Kemmerling and
39
40 Stephan (2002) show that, along with the equity objective, political support from citizens
41
42 for the incumbent party in the central government is crucial in explaining the distribution
43
44 of investment grants across cities. Castells and Solé (2005) find that political considerations
45
46 promote differences in the attractiveness of regions to the central government in such a
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48 way that a deviation from the efficiency-equity rule can arise.
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53 Certainly, the efficiency-equity trade-off relationship in infrastructure policies is a basic
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55 and relevant story. But it is not the sole story to be found in the regional allocation of
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² Another similar strand of literature but less related to our work is that focused on the political motivations with regard to grant allocations between different government levels. Empirical applications of this issue can be found, for example, in Worthington and Dollery (1998), Case (2001), Costa et al. (2003) and Johansson (2003).

1
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3 public investments in infrastructure. This paper adds to the literature by analyzing a
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5 scenario where infrastructure policy may pursue neither efficiency nor equity.
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8 Indeed, airport management in Spain is embodied with specific features that allow us
9
10 to test a hypothesis about the behavior of government agents. Since one of the main
11
12 consequences of integrated airport management is that decisions about investment are
13
14 centralized in the national government, we want to disentangle the following questions: Is
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16 the allocation of investments in Spanish airports effectively based on redistributive
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18 purposes? Which factors explain actual allocations? Is airport policy in Spain consistent
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20 with publicly announced objectives?
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24 To advance our research we organize the paper as follows. First, we briefly review the
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26 main features of the Spanish system of airport management and finance and analyze it
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28 within the framework of international models. Then we proceed with our empirical
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30 analysis. Initially, we focus on economic factors, and subsequently, political factors.
31
32 Finally, we summarize our main results and draw out their main implications.
33
34

35 **2. Airport management in Spain: the exception to the rule**

36
37 High quality airport facilities foster intercity agglomeration economies and influence
38
39 the location decision of firms, especially those in knowledge intensive sectors (Button et
40
41 al., 1999; Brueckner, 2003). Hence, the link between the quality of airport facilities and
42
43 urban economic growth could provide a rationale for guaranteeing airport facilities in less
44
45 developed regions. In a similar way, scale economies could provide a motivation to
46
47 support small airports. Indeed, high fixed costs associated with airport operations may
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49 help explaining the existence of a positive relationship (although no necessarily a linear
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51 one) between air traffic and airport profitability –and so the amount of self-finance
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53 available for investments (European Commission, 2002). Thus, airports that generate a
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55 low volume of traffic may not be profitable
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Managing airports as an integrated national network arises as a, though by no means
the only, possible strategy of regional policy. In fact, as shown in table 1, European

1
2 airports that belong to large national airport networks are usually managed on an
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4 autonomous basis. This is the case for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom
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6 (and other large Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia).
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Autonomy is also the case for the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Austria. Indeed, in all these countries grants and subsidies to small airports and/or airports located in poor regions are often available from more than one government level.

Where a national network is run in a centralized way, it has just one large airport. Such a situation exists in Sweden, Portugal, Finland and most of the new accession countries. Spanish is unique, because it is the only European country with several large cities and airports in which all airports are managed by a single national agency.

Insert table 1 about here

Indeed, the Spanish Airports and Air Navigation Agency (AENA) owns and manages more than 40 commercial airports in Spain. AENA is a public entity belonging to the Ministry in charge of transportation issues, and it enjoys an autonomous legal and economic status. Investment decisions are centralized and are financed through the surplus of the entire airport system.³ In this way, there is a system of non-transparent, cross-subsidization across Spanish airports. Importantly, politicians have justified centralized management on the grounds that it supports territorial cohesion. The possibility of competition between airports or the benefits of a differentiated commercial policy is not recognized.

Where airports are managed on market criteria, the amount of investment in each airport should be strongly associated with the revenues obtained from local operations. Such revenues are fundamentally determined by the amount of traffic at the airport. On the contrary, when a territorial cohesion criterion is in place less developed regions should

3. Investment decisions are taken as follows: The Budget proposed by the Spanish Government to the Parliament displays in an annex the investments that AENA intends to implement during the fiscal year. The Spanish Parliament can either approve or reject this proposal, which cannot be modified. It is worth mentioning that there is no allocation of funds from the budget, since all AENA investment is financed with aeronautical fees and commercial revenues.

1
2
3 receive more resources for investment than their share of traffic would justify.
4
5 Furthermore, scale economies should justify an investment allocation outcome in which
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7 large (profitable) airports cross-subsidize small (unprofitable) airports.
8

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10 Some facts about the investment behavior of AENA cast doubts about political claims
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12 concerning the integrated airport network as a guarantee of the territorial cohesion
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14 criterion.
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16
17 The first year of activity of AENA was 1992 (in the previous period, the Ministry in
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19 charge of transportation issues was the unique responsible of airport management). Table
20
21 2 shows the relationship between investment and passenger traffic for the Spanish airport
22
23 network in period 1992-2004, and the corresponding relative position of each region in
24
25 terms of economic development. We present the results aggregated on a regional basis
26
27 because the regional level is the one for which most of the variables needed for further
28
29 analysis are available (individual information for each airport is available upon request).
30
31 Column (3) shows the relationship for every Spanish region between share of total
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33 investment and share of total passengers.
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37 **Insert table 2 about here**
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40 In the period 1992-2004, the richest Spanish region with the largest airport, Madrid,
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42 accumulated about 60 per cent of total investment but only 22 per cent of total traffic. The
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44 ratio (investment share)/(traffic share) is certainly high: 2.60. Overall, airports in the less
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46 developed Spanish regions (Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia, Murcia and Asturias)
47
48 received a share of investment lower than their share of air traffic generated. Thus, the
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50 allocation of airport investments in Spain does not seem to follow the territorial cohesion
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52 criterion regularly used by politicians to justify centralized management. Furthermore,
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54 several lightly populated regions with low levels of air traffic have an investment/traffic
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56 ratio smaller than one. In short, we must go look further to determine whether airport
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58 investments decisions have been effectively aimed to other objectives.
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3. Empirical analysis: Determinants of the regional allocation of airport investments

In order to obtain an equation that explains the allocation of airport investments across regions, we consider that policy makers of the central government maximize an objective function. Such objective function could be aimed to social purposes and/or political interests since both aspects could affect the utility of those agents.

To this regard, we follow the approach of Bernham and Craig (1987). The objective function of the central government is defined over infrastructure outcomes in region i ($i = 1, \dots, I$) from a given country at period t ($t = 1, \dots, T$) and can be expressed through the following form:

$$W_t = \sum_i O_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where O_{it} is a vector of infrastructure outcomes. This expression implies that the central government maximizes infrastructure outcomes. The first derivative with respect to O_{it} is assumed to be positive ($\partial W_t / \partial O_{it} > 0$).

The central government's maximization problem is subject to two constraints. First, there is a resource constraint. This implies that total investments can not be higher than the total resources available for that purpose:

$$\sum_i INV_{it} \leq R_t, \quad (2)$$

where R_t are total resources available at period t , which are assumed to be fixed and constant across regions, and INV_{it} are airport investments across regions.

The second constraint specifies that infrastructure outcomes across regions depend on investments made on them weighted by a vector of regional characteristics at period t , Z_{it} . Additionally, each element of the vector of regional characteristics is weighted by a parameter, a_z , such that unequal concern of the central government about different regions can arise:

$$O_{it} = C_{it}(a_z Z_{it})b(INV_{it}), \quad (3)$$

1
2
3 First order conditions of the central government's maximization problem yield

$$4 \quad b'(INV_{it}) C_{it}(a_Z Z_{it}) = m, \text{ for all } i \quad (4)$$

6 Here, m is the multiplier associated to the resource constraint, which necessarily binds.

7
8 This provides us with a general specification of the investment equation that is going to be
9 tested in our empirical analysis:

$$10 \quad INV_{it}/R_t = g[C_{it}(a_Z Z_{it})] \quad (5)$$

11
12 Our empirical model will consider g as a linear function, which could be justified as a
13 first order Taylor approximation:

$$14 \quad INV_{it}/R_t = \sum_i a_Z Z_{it}, \quad (6)$$

15
16 where $Z_{it} = GDP_{it}, PAX_{it}, NAC_{it}, INCUM_{it}, CORRE_{it}$ (See definitions below).

17
18 Given the value of R_t , $a_Z > 0$ implies that $\partial INV_{it} / \partial Z_{it} > 0$, while $a_Z < 0$ implies that
19 $\partial INV_{it} / \partial Z'_{it} < 0$. In this context, we must consider the elements of the vector of regional
20 characteristics.

21
22 Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) and air traffic (PAX) are included in this
23 vector. Indeed, where territorial cohesion criteria influence the airport investment
24 decisions of the central government, regions with low product per capita should receive
25 more investment than regions with high product per capita. Furthermore, where airport
26 investments are aimed to support small airports those investments in a region should
27 increase less than proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports of that region.

28
29 In addition to this, the central government could try to maximize the surpluses of
30 domestic rather than international passengers, since the latter are not incorporated in its
31 objective function. Thus, the proportion of national traffic with respect to the total traffic
32 (NAC) should be included in the vector of regional characteristics.

33
34 Finally, the political clout of each region, due to the popularity of the central
35 government's incumbent party in the corresponding region ($INCUM$) or due to the
36 correspondence between the incumbent party in the central and regional governments

(CORRE), may play a central role in the allocation choice of public resources of the central government as we will see below. Hence equation (6) can be expressed as follows:

$$INV_{it}/R_t = \mu + a_{GDP}GDP + a_{PAX}PAX + a_{NAC}NAC + a_{INCUM}INCUM + a_{CORRE}CORRE \quad (7)$$

From our analysis the following hypotheses can be established, which we test in further sections:

Hypothesis I: Consistently with claims of progressive redistribution, regions with low product per capita should receive more investment than regions with high product per capita. According to this hypothesis, a_{GDP} in equation (7) should take a value lower than 0.

Hypothesis II: If investments are aimed to support small airports, those investments in a region should increase less than proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports of that region. According to this hypothesis, a_{PAX} in equation (7) should take a value lower than 1.

Hypothesis III: Government looks after cross-subsidies from international passengers to national travelers. Consistently with this, investments should be higher in regions with higher ratios domestic traffic/total traffic. According to this hypothesis, a_{NAC} in equation (7) should take a value greater than 0.

Hypothesis IV: Investment allocations are used to enhance political support. Consistently with this, investments should be higher in regions where the ruling party has strong electoral support and/or the regional government is held by the same party holding national government. According to this hypothesis, a_{INCUM} and a_{CORRE} in equation (7) should take a value greater than 0.

Hypothesis I, II are consistent with an objective function of policymakers of the central government that fits a social welfare function, while hypothesis IV is consistent with a welfare function of policymakers that fits with a political rent-seeking behaviour. Hypothesis III is consistent with an objective function of policymakers that fits both with a social welfare function and a political rent-seeking behaviour.

3.1 Economic factors

It is of central interest in our empirical analysis to examine any type of cross-subsidization that can take place between the regional networks of the Spanish airport system. Hence equation (6) can be expressed for the empirical analysis in the following way:

$$\underline{INV}_{it} = \mu + \alpha_{GDP} GDP_{it} + \alpha_{PAX} \underline{PAX}_{it} + \alpha_{NAC} NAC_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (8)$$

where \underline{INV}_{it} refers to the percentage of investment made in airports from region i with respect to the total investment in the national airport network. GDP_{it} refers to Gross Domestic Product per capita, \underline{PAX}_{it} refers to the percentage of annual passengers carried in the airports from region i with respect to the total annual traffic in the national airport network and NAC_{it} refers to the percentage of national passengers carried in the airports from region i with respect to the total annual traffic in the regional airport network. The error term (ε_{it}) is assumed to be independent and identically distributed over regions and time, with mean 0 and variance σ_{ε}^2 . However, we test (and correct if pertinent) these assumptions in the empirical analysis.

In order to estimate this model, we have constructed a panel data for the period 1992-2004 for the 15 Spanish regions with airports. This period captures the first year of activity of the current airport management system and it is long enough to smooth out distortions from single projects in a particular period. To this regard, as figure 1 shows, the huge amount of investments made in the last six years in comparison to the previous years allows claiming that initial conditions should not play a relevant role.

Insert figure 1 about here

Data on the territorial allocation of investment have been obtained from the Ministry of Transport; data for Gross Domestic Product per capita have been obtained from the Spanish Statistics Institute. Finally, data of airport traffic have been obtained from AENA.

1
2
3 Table A-1 in Appendix shows the description and summary statistics of the variables used
4
5 for estimating our investment equation.⁴
6

7 Table 3 shows the results of our estimates of the investment equation, while table 4
8 indicates the elasticities than can be inferred from them. Column 1 presents the results of
9 the estimates when using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimator (FGLS). The
10 tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence of
11 heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. A problem of serial autocorrelation does
12 not seem to take place. Column 2 displays the results of the estimates when using the
13 FGLS estimator with the error term corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional
14 correlation. In this setting, Betz and Katz (1995) show that FGLS estimator involves an
15 underestimation of standard errors. In column 3, we present the results of the estimates
16 when using the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
17 (PCSE). This latter estimator corrects both for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional
18 correlation in the error-term and for underestimation of standard errors.
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34 As could be expected, the three estimators provide similar values of the estimated
35 coefficients but different standard errors. Correction for heteroskedasticity and cross-
36 sectional correlation using the FGLS estimator reduces the standard errors (see columns 1
37 and 2 of table 3). The estimation with the PCSE estimator is more efficient than that using
38 FGLS without correcting for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (see
39 columns 1 and 3 of table 3) but tends to increase the standard errors obtained with the
40 FGLS estimator with robust standard errors (see columns 2 and 3 of table 3). In any case,
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54 4. There is a possible simultaneity bias for the *GDP* variable as long as airport investment can be a
55 determinant of economic growth. However, our units of measurement are flows rather than stocks so that
56 annual investments in airports have a very low weight on the total stock of infrastructure, which must be one
57 of the main determinants of economic growth. In addition, it is worth taking into account that airport effects
58 on economic growth are particularly strong at a microeconomic level (greater market access, travel time
59 reductions, attraction of high-tech firms and so on). Additionally, we argue that the *PAX* variable should not
60 be endogenous either. Indeed, air traffic in a year can be dependent on airport capacity as a stock but not on
the contemporaneous annual investments in the airport, which influences only partially that stock for the
following years.

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3 statistical significance of all explanatory variables is not affected for the calculation of the
4
5 standard errors.

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7 **Insert table 3 about here**

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9 **Insert table 4 about here**

10
11 All variables are significant and the overall explanatory power of the equation estimated
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13 is reasonably high, regardless of the econometric technique used. Our results show clear
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15 evidence that progressive redistribution is not relevant to the airport investment choice of
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17 the central government. Indeed, the percentage of total investments in a region seems to
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19 increase when product per capita of that region also increases, which is not consistent with
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21 hypothesis I above.
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25 In addition to this, we do not find evidence that airport investments are motivated by a
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27 scale economies argument (in order to support regions with the smallest airports) because
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29 the percentage of total investments increases more than proportionally to the output
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31 generated for each regional airport network. Indeed, a 10 per cent increase in the share of
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33 the total traffic of the airport network implies about a 13 per cent increase in the share of
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35 the total investments made in the airport network. Holding the other factors constant, the
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37 percentage of total investments is higher in regional airport networks with a higher
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39 proportion of national traffic. These results are consistent with our hypothesis III above
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41 but not with our hypothesis II.
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46 Table A-2 in Appendix provides additional evidence of the results obtained in our
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48 estimates of the investment equation. In this way, table A-2 presents airport financial data
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50 for the last two years in which this information is available, 1997 and 1998.⁵ From the data,
51
52 it can be observed that cross-subsidization across Spanish airports does not take place
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54 from high-profitability to low-profitability regional networks, as expected if scale
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56 economies were controlled. Actually, the most profitable airport has the highest traffic-
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⁵ Since the late nineties AENA and the Spanish Government have been extremely reluctant to provide financial information on individual airports. Indeed, one of the consequences of an integrated management is that it makes possible for governments to be less transparent and, thus, less subject to democratic control.

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2 investment ratio, while many of the non-profitable airports have traffic-investment rates
3 lower than one. In fact, data from this table, along with the results of the investment
4 equation estimates, allows us to infer a type of redistribution not mentioned by Spanish
5 airport authorities. All profitable regional networks with low investment-traffic ratios
6 (Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Andalusia and C. Valenciana) have a common feature.
7 They all have, at least, one large airport focused on tourist traffic. This fact seems to
8 confirm that cross-subsidization from international to domestic passengers is taken place
9 in the Spanish airport system.
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20 21 **3.2. Political factors**

22 Since neither progressive redistribution nor scale economies seem to be the real
23 objective of the centralization of the Spanish airport network, further analysis is needed to
24 understand the objectives of Spanish airport authorities. Several studies (Cadot et al., 1999;
25 Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002; Castells and Solé, 2005) show that political motivations
26 based on the self-interest of the public decision-makers can play a crucial role in the
27 allocation of the stock of infrastructure across regions.
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36 Where election systems are based on proportional rules, as is the case in Spain,
37 politicians are motivated to maximize the number of votes their party obtains in highly
38 populated electoral districts.⁶ Following Grossman (1994), the incumbent party in the
39 central government may allocate public resources in order to buy the support of voters
40 and political agents across regions. Ceteris paribus, more resources will be invested in
41 those regions that have the most - and most valuable - political capital to offer. Such
42 political capital will be greater where the support for the incumbent party in the central
43 government is also greater, and it will be even more valuable where a correspondence
44 exists between the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in
45 the regional government.
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⁶ Where election systems are based on majority rule, as it happens in the USA and UK, for instance, politicians try to maximize the probability of winning seats in a unipersonal electoral district.

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3 Alternatively, some studies argue that the central government could invest more in the
4 regions where the closeness in elections between the two main parties is higher (Dahlberg
5 and Johansson, 2002; Johansson, 2003). Under this hypothesis, the incumbent party tries
6 to obtain higher rates of returns –in terms of votes- from its investments.
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11 In order to capture these political factors, we add to equation (8) the following political
12 variables:
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15 *INCUM*: Percentage of votes in the last general elections for the incumbent party in the
16 central government in the corresponding regions of the sample.
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20 *SWING*: The difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in the
21 general elections across regions.
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25 *CORRE*: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a correspondence between the
26 incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional
27 government.
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32 Data for the political variables have been obtained from the web site of the Ministry of
33 Domestic Affairs (Ministerio del Interior). It is expected a positive sign in the coefficient
34 of variables *INCUM* and *CORRE*, as specified in our hypothesis IV above, while it is
35 expected a negative sign in the coefficient of the variable *SWING*.
36
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40 The political variables are estimated separately in order to avoid multicollineality.
41
42 Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our estimates of equation (8) with the addition of the
43 political variables. In columns 1 and 2, we show the results when the political variables
44 added are *INCUM* and *SWING*, respectively. In column 3, we show results when the
45 political variable added is *CORRE*. Regarding the econometric techniques used, we follow
46 the same procedure to section 3.1. As in the previous estimation without political
47 variables, the tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence
48 of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation but not a problem of serial
49 autocorrelation. In order to clarify the exposition, we just present the results when using
50 the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). As in
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the previous estimation without political variables, the values of the coefficients and its statistical significance are similar to those obtained when using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Estimator (FGLS).

Insert table 5 about here

Insert table 6 about here

Results for the economic variables do not change substantially in relation to those obtained in the specification without political variables. The variable capturing the influence of partisan support, *INCUM*, is statistically and economically significant. Thus, we find some evidence that partisan support could play an important role in the investment allocation choices of the central government. Indeed, the incumbent party in the central government seems to compensate regions for partisan support in order to assure votes.

Results for the variable that captures the difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in the general elections across regions, *SWING*, show that such effect is, in our context, not relevant. We believe this is not surprising in our analysis, since swing voters are of paramount importance within the framework of one-seat elections systems, where one vote gives the majority. This is not the case in Spain, where jurisdictions are multi-seat and seats are assigned by means of a proportional system (with d'Hont correction). Because of this, maximization of absolute number of votes fits better than marginal changes due to swing voters.

The coefficient of the dummy variable capturing the correspondence between the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government, *CORRE*, is also economically and statistically significant. Thus, political affiliation seems to favor better coordination between decision-makers at different territorial levels of government.

Overall, our results suggest that politics matter in the allocation of airport investments across regions. Divergence between the policy announced and the policy effectively

1
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3 implemented could be explained, at least to some extent, by a desire to maximize the
4
5 contribution of that policy to the re-election chances of the incumbent party.
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8 **4. Concluding remarks**

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10 The Spanish model of airport management and finance is singular among comparable
11
12 developed countries. Spain is unique among countries with several large cities and
13
14 important airports in that its system is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar
15
16 institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and
17
18 bureaucrats in charge of the system rhetorically justify it on grounds of inter-territorial
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20 solidarity.
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24 Through our empirical analysis of the determinants of airport investments in Spain
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26 across regions, we find that the choices of the central government have been motivated by
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28 neither a progressive redistribution criterion nor the demands of supporting smaller
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30 airports. Indeed, *ceteris paribus* high-income regions receive relatively more public
31
32 resources than low-income regions. In addition to this, we find evidence that investment
33
34 increases more than proportionally to the output generated by the regional airport
35
36 networks, while our data shows that cross-subsidization from high-profitability airports to
37
38 low-profitability regional networks does not seem to take place. On the contrary, we find
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40 that cross-subsidization arises from international to domestic passengers.
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45 Given that economic factors do not explain the allocation of investments across
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47 regions, we pay attention to the influence of political motivations. We find some evidence
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49 that the incumbent party in the central government could try to maximize support from
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51 regional citizens. Indeed, more public resources seem to be invested in those regions
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53 where the support for the party in central government is greater. In addition to this, more
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55 public resources are invested in those regions where the incumbent party in the central
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57 government and the incumbent party in the regional government are the same.
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3 Rich and big airports do not pay to keep poor and small airports working. According
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5 to our results, solidarity seems to be merely a rhetorical excuse to prevent competition
6
7 among Spanish airports. In fact, competition would constrain discretionary power of
8
9 policy makers and bureaucrats over management and budgets. We are aware that the
10
11 public choice paradigm for explaining policymaking is too simple and naïve, and policy
12
13 processes are much more complex than can be explained by the self-interested policy
14
15 maker alone. Nevertheless, when analyzing why the system of airport management and
16
17 finance in Spain is different from any other comparable country, we do not find much
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19 more than rhetoric about solidarity to prevent competition in order to maximize power
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21 and budget.
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Appendix

Table A-1. Description of the variables and summary statistics (Number of observations: 195)

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum value	Maximum value
INV	Total investment in airports of the region (10 ³ euros)	54,181.31	184,457.3	10.22	1,552,165
<u>INV</u>	The share of investment of each region over total investment	0.07	0.130	0	0.707
GDP	Gross Domestic Product per capita in each region (euros)	13,368	4,054	6,408	23,889
PAX	Total output (number of annual passengers carried in airports of the region)	8,001,865	1.05e+07	15,547	3.81e+07
<u>PAX</u>	The share of output of each region over total traffic	0.07	0.08	0	0.26
NAC	Percentage of national passengers over total traffic in airports of each region	0.66	0.27	0.08	1
INCUM	Percentage of votes in the general elections for the incumbent party in each region	0.41	0.10	0.18	0.58
SWING	The difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in the general elections across regions	0.08	0.12	-0.21	0.32
CORRE	Correspondence between incumbent party in the central and regional government in each region	0.52	0.50	0	1

Table A-2. Spanish airports operating profits. Millions of euros

Region	Operating results (Yearly average 1997-98)	Share of the total surplus generated by regions with surplus	Share of the net surplus of the network	Ratio Investment- traffic
Madrid (1)	89.7	39.3%	45.7%	2.60
Canary Islands (8)	40.7	17.8%	20.8%	0.41
Catalonia (3)	40.2	17.6%	20.5%	0.99
Balears Islands (3)	41.8	18.3%	21.3%	0.35
Valencian C. (2)	10.8	4.7%	5.5%	0.35
Andalusia (6)	5.1	2.2%	2.6%	0.39
<i>Surplus in system</i>	228.3	100.0%		
Extremadura (1)	-0.6		-0.3%	0.54
Castile & Leon (3)	-1.8		-0.9%	1.82
Murcia (1)	-2.0		-1.0%	0.80
Navarra (1)	-2.1		-1.1%	0.69
Asturias (1)	-2.6		-1.3%	0.98
Cantabria (1)	-2.8		-1.4%	1.04
Aragon (1)	-2.9		-1.5%	1.82
Galicia (1)	-6.9		-3.5%	0.70
Basque C.(1)	-7.6		-3.9%	1.18
<i>Losses in system</i>	-32.2			
<i>Network surplus</i>	196.1		100.0%	

Note: 1998 is the last year for which financial data on operating results for individual airports has been made available by AENA. See footnote 11 above.

Source: Own elaboration on AENA information (published in Bel, 2002 and RvyT, 1999).


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For Peer Review

Tables and figures

Figure 1. Total investments in the Spanish airport network, 1985-2004.
Mean annual values over the period (milions of euros 2004)



Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from Ministerio de Fomento. Data in the period 1985-1993 is available at the web page of IVIE-FBBVA, while data in the period 1994-2004 is available at the web page of Ministerio de Fomento.

Table 1. Major airports and air traffic of passengers in EU-25 countries.

Country	Number of Top 50 EU airports. 2002	Total passengers (10 ³). 2003	National passengers (10 ³).2003	International passengers (10 ³).2003	Airport management	Airport Ownership
United Kingdom	8	177,946	24,416	153,530	Decentralized	private, regional gov.
Germany	8	121,136	21,193	99,943	Decentralized	private, regional gov. and national gov.
Spain	9	120,248	31,324	88,925	Centralized	national government
France	6	96,296	26,712	69,584	Decentralized	national gov. (Paris), chambers of commerce (rest)
Italy	6	73,912	24,477	49,436	Decentralized	private, regional gov.
Netherlands	1	41,168	154	41,014	Decentralized	private, national gov.
Greece	1	28,237	5,030	23,207	Partially Decentralized	private (Athens), national gov. (rest)
Sweden	1	20,441	6,875	13,567	Centralized	national government
Ireland	1	20,010	812	19,197	Decentralized	national government
Denmark	1	19,575	1,606	17,969	Decentralized	private, national gov.
Portugal	2	17,739	2,853	14,886	Centralized	national government
Austria	1	15,799	548	15,251	Decentralized	private, national gov.
Belgium	1	15,087	2	15,085	Decentralized	private, regional gov.
Finland	1	10,516	2,701	7,816	Centralized	national government
Czech Republic	1	7,761	161	7,600	Centralized	national government
Poland	-	7,067	Na	Na	Centralized	national government
Cyprus	1	6,077	1	6,076	Centralized	national government
Hungary	1	5,010	0	5,010	Centralized	national government
Malta	-	2,648	44	2,604	Centralized	national government
Luxembourg	-	1,449	0	1,449	Centralized	national government
Slovenia	-	920	Na	Na	Decentralized	private, national gov.
Lithuania	-	722	1	721	Centralized	national government
Latvia	-	712	0	712	Centralized	national government
Estonia	-	710	15	695	Centralized	national government
Slovakia	-	626	32	594	Centralized	national government

Source: Eurostat

Table 2. Spanish airport and regional data, 1992-2004. Mean annual values over the period

Region*	(1) Share of total investment (Spain = 817,114 10 ³ constant euros)	(2) Share of total traffic (Spain = 120,291,150 passengers)	(3) Ratio Investment- traffic (1/2)	(4) Share of total population (Spain = 38,617,092 inhabitants)	(5) Share of total GDP (Spain = 557,063,815 10 ³ constant euros)	(6) Relative wealth index (5/4)
Madrid (1)	57.81%	22.36%	2.60	13.61%	17.72%	1.30
Catalonia (3)	14.60%	14.78%	0.99	16.31%	19.54%	1.20
Canary islands (8)	9.06%	22.31%	0.41	4.38%	4.12%	0.94
Balears islands (3)	6.62%	18.98%	0.35	2.14%	2.56%	1.20
Andalusia (6)	3.79%	9.81%	0.39	18.97%	14.10%	0.74
Basque C. (3)	2.44%	2.07%	1.18	5.46%	6.61%	1.21
Valencian C. (2)	2.15%	6.08%	0.35	10.69%	10.12%	0.95
Galicia (3)	1.33%	1.90%	0.70	7.13%	5.69%	0.80
Asturias (1)	0.54%	0.55%	0.98	2.82%	2.42%	0.86
Castille & Leon (3)	0.38%	0.21%	1.82	6.51%	6.05%	0.93
Aragon (1)	0.36%	0.20%	1.82	3.11%	3.34%	1.07
Cantabria (1)	0.20%	0.19%	1.04	1.39%	1.33%	0.95
Navarra (1)	0.15%	0.22%	0.69	1.41%	1.76%	1.25
Murcia (1)	0.15%	0.19%	0.80	2.51%	2.97%	0.85
Extremadura (1)	0.01%	0.03%	0.54	2.79%	1.84%	0.66

* In parenthesis, we indicate the number of airports of the region that provide commercial traffic.

Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from the web page of the Ministerio de Fomento (Spanish ministry of transports), the Spanish statistics Institut (INE) and the web page of IVIE-FBBVA.

Table 3. Investment equation estimates. N = 195

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	FGLS (1)	FGLS ¹ (2)	PCSE ² (3)
GDP	3.96e-06 (1.56e-06)**	3.93e-06 (4.03e-08)***	3.96e-06 (8.58e-07)***
PAX	1.349 (0.10)***	1.342 (0.01)***	1.349 (0.06)***
NAC	0.130 (0.03)***	0.128 (0.002)***	0.130 (0.01)***
Intercept	-0.163 (0.03)***	-0.161 (0.003)***	-0.163 (0.02)***
Wald1	257.77***	69,350.32***	1,373.81***
R²	-	-	0.57
BP	453.986***	-	-
Wald2	1.15e+05***	-	-
D_p	1.18	-	-

¹ Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.

² OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

³ Standard errors in parenthesis

⁴ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

⁵ Wald1 = Wald Test (χ^2) of joint significance; BP = Breusch-Pagan LM test of cross-sectional correlation; Wald2 = Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity; D_p = Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation (modified Durbin-Watson test)

Table 4. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means)

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	FGLS (1)	FGLS ¹ (2)	PCSE ² (3)
GDP	0.80 (0.32)**	0.79 (0.01)***	0.80 (0.19)**
PAX	1.35 (0.16)***	1.34 (0.02)***	1.35 (0.09)***
NAC	1.31 (0.33)***	1.29 (0.03)***	1.31 (0.20)***

¹ Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.

² OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

³ Standard errors in parenthesis

⁴ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

Table 5. Investment equation estimates. N = 195

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	PCSE ¹ (1)	PCSE ¹ (2)	PCSE ¹ (3)
GDP	3.65e-06 (9.44e-07)***	3.81e-06 (8.37e-07)***	3.66e-06 (7.54e-07)**
<u>PAX</u>	1.40 (0.08)***	1.36 (0.07)***	1.44 (0.08)***
NAC	0.14 (0.01)***	0.13 (0.02)***	0.15 (0.01)***
INCUM	0.13 (0.05)**	-	-
SWING	-	0.0002 (0.0004)	-
CORRE	-	-	0.06 (0.01)***
Intercept	-0.22 (0.04)***	-0.16 (0.02)***	-0.21 (0.03)***
Wald	1,231.96***	1,291.71***	1,373.81***
R²	0.58	0.57	0.62

¹ OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

² Standard errors in parenthesis

³ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

Table 6. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means)

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	PCSE ¹ (1)	PCSE ¹ (2)	PCSE ¹ (3)
GDP	0.74 (0.21)***	0.77 (0.18)***	0.74 (0.15)***
<u>PAX</u>	1.40 (0.13)***	1.36 (0.10)***	1.44 (0.12)***
NAC	1.44 (0.23)***	1.33 (0.20)***	1.51 (0.19)***
INCUM	0.82 (0.34)**	-	-
SWING	-	0.02 (0.05)	-
CORRE	-	-	0.46 (0.13)***

¹ OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

² Standard errors in parenthesis

³ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

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3 Preventing competition because of “solidarity”:
4 Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain
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21 **Abstract:**
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23 From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market
24 mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be
25 based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast
26 if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based
27 on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy
28 provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy
29 makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in
30 explaining such behavior. In fact, results from our analysis show that political motivations
31 can eventually play a more relevant role than social welfare maximization.
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33

34
35 **Key words:** Public Enterprise, Legal monopolies, Air Transportation, Models with Panel
36 Data

37 **Jel Codes:** L32, L43, L93, C23:
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Preventing competition because of ‘solidarity’: Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain

Abstract:

From a public interest perspective, there could be a justification for constraining market mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. However, some policies might be based on selfish motivations of government agents. In this paper, we empirically contrast if the infrastructure policy is based only on public interest motivations or if it is also based on the private motivations of policy makers. In this way, Spain infrastructure policy provides a useful policymaking field to test hypothesis about the behavior of policy makers. We find some evidence regarding the strength of political motivations in explaining such behavior. In fact, results from our analysis show that political motivations can eventually play a more relevant role than social welfare maximization.

Key words: Public Enterprise, Legal monopolies, Air Transportation, Models with Panel Data

Jel Codes: L32, L43, L93, C23:

1. Introduction

Traditionally, airports have been seen as monopolistic infrastructures that hold tight control over flights with origins and destinations in their hinterlands. Consequently, neither economic analysis nor infrastructure policy used to consider competition as one of the relevant features of airports. Nowadays there exists a clear trend towards corporatization of airports. Like privatization, corporatization has been seen as a way to reform airports whose ownership and management have remained public. Within this context, competition has been seen as a powerful tool to stimulate efficiency.

Competition among airports at the international level is now a standard feature in all developed countries. Moreover, within each country airports compete to grow and win an increasing part of the business. Spain, alone among developed countries with more than one large airport, defies this pattern. Despite having a large population and several large airports, Spain air travel remains organized as a totally integrated network: airports are exclusively owned and managed by a State Owned Enterprise, ‘AENA’. Thus, competition among airports does not exist. The market has no role in issues such as pricing or resource allocation. Some of the more relevant features of airport management, such as investment

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3 decisions or prices policy, are decided on bureaucratic basis and approved by the Spanish
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5 Parliament together with the National Budget.¹
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8 Why is the Spanish system such an exception? No matter the political affiliation of the
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10 ruling party, politicians in charge and bureaucrats have regularly claimed that inter-
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12 territorial solidarity is the main rationale for their choice. Their story goes as follows: less
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14 developed areas in Spain must have airports for regional development. However, such
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16 areas cannot sustain airports costs. In this way, it is said that centralized management and
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18 allocation of funds would allow the surplus from the largest and most profitable airports
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20 to pay for the deficits incurred by the smallest and least profitable airports. In short, rich
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22 airports would be paying for keeping poor airports working. Is this what is actually
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24 happening?
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28 As far as social welfare maximization is concerned, there could be a potential
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30 justification for constraining market mechanisms with the aim of progressive
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32 redistribution.² This brings us to a traditional conundrum of public policy; the trade-off
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34 between efficiency and equity. However, if we accept that the behavior of public agents is
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36 aimed to their own interest, some policies designed to prevent competition might actually
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38 be based on selfish motivations, while justified on the grounds of progressive
39
40 redistribution.
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44 Through our analysis we will empirically contrast two competing explanations for the
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46 persistence of the unusual model in Spain. On the one hand, there does exist the public
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48 interest explanation. From the point of view of the ‘general interest’, market mechanisms
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50 would generate a less than socially desirable level of airport operating facilities, and public
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52 intervention is needed to correct this ‘market failure’. This would be consistent with the
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57 ¹ Another relevant feature of airport management, slots’ assignment to airlines, is decided by a commission
58 made of ‘AENA’ top managers and direct representatives of the Ministry of Transport (Ministerio de
59 Fomento).

60 ² One could ask whether alternative systems of grants and subsidies could work better to make up the
deficits of the non-profitable airports. In every other country, no matter its system of management and
funding, these kinds of tools are used so that unprofitable airports can operate. We do not go with detail into
this, since this departs from the central questions in our paper.

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3 standard explanation by politicians and bureaucrats we have summarized above. However,
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5 our results show that choices of governments have been motivated by neither a
6
7 progressive redistribution criterion nor the claim of supporting smaller airports.
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10 On the other hand, we explore a public choice approach. Within that framework, the
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12 agents of governments are rational utility maximizers: politicians trying to maximize
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14 success in elections while bureaucrats, in this case 'AENA' top managers, seek to
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16 maximize their own budget. As long as each group pursues its own-interests they will tend
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18 to resist institutional arrangements that might constrain their behavior and enhance
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20 opportunities for efficient performance. Within our specific framework, introducing
21
22 market mechanisms in the provision of public services would limit increases in the
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24 discretionary budgets in the control of bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1971). Our results provide
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26 evidence that governments distribute investment in airports so that they can increase their
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28 electoral support.
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33 The idea of this work is related with the recent literature on regional allocation of
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35 public investments. Some recent works in this literature focus the attention on the
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37 traditional trade-off between equity and efficiency in public policies (Yamano and
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39 Ohkawara, 2000; de la Fuente, 2005). Our paper is more closely related to the literature
40
41 that analyzes not just the efficiency-equity issue but also the role of political factors in
42
43 explaining the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure.³ Kemmerling and
44
45 Stephan (2002) show that, along with the equity objective, political support from citizens
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47 for the incumbent party in the central government is crucial in explaining the distribution
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49 of investment grants across cities. Castells and Solé (2005) find that political considerations
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51 promote differences in the attractiveness of regions to the central government in such a
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53 way that a deviation from the efficiency-equity rule can arise.
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³ Another similar strand of literature but less related to our work is that focused on the political motivations with regard to grant allocations between different government levels. Empirical applications of this issue can be found, for example, in Worthington and Dollery (1998), Case (2001), Costa et al. (2003) and Johansson (2003).

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3 Certainly, the efficiency-equity trade-off relationship in infrastructure policies is a basic
4 and relevant story. But it is not the sole story to be found in the regional allocation of
5 public investments in infrastructure. This paper adds to the literature by analyzing a
6 scenario where infrastructure policy may pursue neither efficiency nor equity.
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12 Indeed, airport management in Spain is embodied with specific features that allow us
13 to test a hypothesis about the behavior of government agents. Since one of the main
14 consequences of integrated airport management is that decisions about investment are
15 centralized in the national government, we want to disentangle the following questions: Is
16 the allocation of investments in Spanish airports effectively based on redistributive
17 purposes? Which factors explain actual allocations? Is airport policy in Spain consistent
18 with publicly announced objectives?
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28 To advance our research we organize the paper as follows. First, we briefly review the
29 main features of the Spanish system of airport management and finance and analyze it
30 within the framework of international models. Then we proceed with our empirical
31 analysis. Initially, we focus on economic factors, and subsequently, political factors.
32 Finally, we summarize our main results and draw out their main implications.
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39 **2. Airport management in Spain: the exception to the rule**

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41 High quality airport facilities foster intercity agglomeration economies and influence
42 the location decision of firms, especially those in knowledge intensive sectors (Button et
43 al., 1999; Brueckner, 2003).⁴ Hence, the link between the quality of airport facilities and
44 urban economic growth could provide a rationale for guaranteeing airport facilities in less
45 developed regions. In a similar way, scale economies could provide a motivation to
46 support small airports. Indeed, high fixed costs associated with airport operations may
47 help explaining the existence of a positive relationship (although no necessarily a linear
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59 ⁴ In a more general context, a great number of studies have analyzed the impact of public capital stock on
60 private sector productivity [e.g. Aschauer's (1989), Duffy-Deno and Ebberts (1991), Garcia-Milà and
McGuire (1992), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Flores de Frutos et al. (1998), Miller and Tsoukis (2001), Milbourne et
al. (2003)]. In general terms, such impact is considered to be relevant although there is no agreement on the
precise elasticities estimated.

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2 one) between air traffic and airport profitability –and so the amount of self-finance
3 available for investments (European Commission, 2002). Thus, airports that generate a
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7 low volume of traffic may not be profitable
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10 Managing airports as an integrated national network arises as a, though by no means
11 the only, possible strategy of regional policy. In fact, as shown in table 1, European
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13 airports that belong to large national airport networks are usually managed on individual
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15 basis. This is the case for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom (and other large
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17 Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia). Autonomy is also the case
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19 for the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Austria. Indeed, in all these countries
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21 grants and subsidies to small airports and/or airports located in poor regions are often
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23 available from more than one government level.
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28 Where a national network is run in a centralized way, it has just one large airport. Such
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30 a situation exists in Sweden, Portugal, Finland and most of the new accession countries.
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32 Spanish is unique, because it is the only European country with several large cities and
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34 airports in which all airports are managed by a single national agency.
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38 **Insert table 1 about here**

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40 Indeed, the Spanish Airports and Air Navigation Agency (AENA) owns and manages
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42 more than 40 commercial airports in Spain. AENA is a public entity belonging to the
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44 Ministry in charge of transportation issues, and it enjoys an autonomous legal and
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46 economic status. Investment decisions are centralized and are financed through the
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48 surplus of the entire airport system.⁵ In this way, there is a system of non-transparent,
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50 cross-subsidization across Spanish airports. Importantly, politicians have justified
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52 centralized management on the grounds that it supports territorial cohesion. The
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⁵ Investment decisions are taken as follows: The Budget proposed by the Spanish Government to the
60 Parliament displays in an annex the investments that AENA intends to implement during the fiscal year. The Spanish Parliament can either approve or reject this proposal, which cannot be modified. It is worth mentioning that there is no allocation of funds from the budget, since all AENA investment is financed with aeronautical fees and commercial revenues.

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3 possibility of competition between airports or the benefits of a differentiated commercial
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5 policy is not recognized.
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8 Where airports are managed on market criteria, the amount of investment in each
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10 airport should be strongly associated with the revenues obtained from local operations.
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12 Such revenues are fundamentally determined by the amount of traffic at the airport. On
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14 the contrary, when a territorial cohesion criterion is in place less developed regions should
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16 receive more resources for investment than their share of traffic would justify.
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18 Furthermore, scale economies should justify an investment allocation outcome in which
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20 large (profitable) airports cross-subsidize small (unprofitable) airports.
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24 Some facts about the investment behavior of AENA cast doubts about political claims
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26 concerning the integrated airport network as a guarantee of the territorial cohesion
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28 criterion.
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31 The first year of activity of AENA was 1992 (in the previous period, the Ministry in
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33 charge of transportation issues was the unique responsible of airport management). Table
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35 2 shows the relationship between investment and passenger traffic for the Spanish airport
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37 network in period 1992-2004, and the corresponding relative position of each region in
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39 terms of economic development. We present the results aggregated on a regional basis
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41 because the regional level is the one for which most of the variables needed for further
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43 analysis are available (individual information for each airport is available upon request).
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45 Column (3) shows the relationship for every Spanish region between share of total
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47 investment and share of total passengers.
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52 **Insert table 2 about here**

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54 In the period 1992-2004, the richest Spanish region with the largest airport, Madrid,
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56 accumulated almost 60 per cent of total investment but only 22 per cent of total traffic.
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58 The ratio (investment share)/(traffic share) is certainly high: 2.60. Overall, airports in the
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60 less developed Spanish regions (Extremadura, Andalusia, Galicia, Murcia and Asturias)
received a share of investment lower than their share of air traffic generated. Thus, the

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3 allocation of airport investments in Spain does not seem to follow the territorial cohesion
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5 criterion regularly used by politicians to justify centralized management. Furthermore,
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7 several lightly populated regions with low levels of air traffic have an investment/traffic
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9 ratio smaller than one. In short, we must go look further to determine whether airport
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11 investments decisions have been effectively aimed to other objectives.
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14 15 **3. Empirical analysis: Determinants of the regional allocation of airport** 16 17 **investments**

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19 In order to obtain an equation that explains the allocation of airport investments
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21 across regions, we consider that policy makers of the central government maximize an
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23 objective function. Such objective function could be aimed to social purposes and/or
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25 political interests since both aspects could affect the utility of those agents.
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29 To this regard, we follow the approach of Bernham and Craig (1987). The objective
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31 function of the central government is defined over infrastructure outcomes in region i (i
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33 $= 1, \dots, I$) from a given country at period t ($t = 1, \dots, T$) and can be expressed through the
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35 following form:
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37

$$38 \quad W_t = \sum_i O_{it}, \quad (1)$$

39
40 where O_{it} is a vector of infrastructure outcomes.⁶ This expression implies that the
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42 central government maximizes infrastructure outcomes. The first derivative with respect to
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44 O_{it} is assumed to be positive ($\partial W_t / \partial O_{it} > 0$).
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48 The central government's maximization problem is subject to a resource constraint.
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50 This implies that total investments can not be higher than the total resources available for
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52 that purpose:
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$$55 \quad \sum_i INV_{it} \leq R_t, \quad (2)$$

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57 where R_t are total resources available at period t and INV_{it} are airport investments
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59 across regions.
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⁶ For simplicity, henceforth the vector of infrastructure outcomes is defined as a variable.

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Infrastructure outcomes across regions depend on investments made on them, as well as on specific factors such as the intensity of use. Additionally, infrastructure outcomes will also depend on the objectives of the central government since it is needed to consider not only the aggregate effect of infrastructure policies but also its impact on different regions, for example on regions with different income levels.

In this way, the allocation of investments in infrastructures across regions should depend on a vector of regional characteristics at period t , Z_{it} . Additionally, each element of the vector of regional characteristics may be weighted by a parameter, a_z , such that unequal concern of the central government about different variables (Z), which values may be different –or not– from one region to another, can arise.

Hence we can derive a general specification of the investment equation that is going to be tested in our empirical analysis:

$$INV_{it}/R_t = \sum_i a_z Z_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where $Z_{it} = GDP_{it}, PAX_{it}, NAC_{it}, INCUM_{it}, CORRE_{it}$ (See definitions below).

Given the value of R_t , $a_z > 0$ implies that $\partial INV_{it} / \partial Z_{it} > 0$, while $a_z < 0$ implies that $\partial INV_{it} / \partial Z'_{it} < 0$. In this context, we must consider the elements of the vector of regional characteristics.

Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) and air traffic (PAX), which in the empirical analysis refers to the percentage of passengers carried in the airports from a region with respect to the total traffic in the national network, are included in this vector. Indeed, where territorial cohesion criteria influence the airport investment decisions of the central government, regions with low product per capita should receive more investment than regions with high product per capita. Furthermore, where airport investments are aimed to support small airports those investments in a region should increase less than proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports of that region.

In addition to this, the central government could try to maximize the surpluses of domestic rather than international passengers, since the latter are not incorporated in its objective function. Thus, the proportion of national traffic with respect to the total traffic (NAC) should be included in the vector of regional characteristics.

Finally, the political clout of each region, due to the popularity of the central government's incumbent party in the corresponding region ($INCUM$) or due to the correspondence between the incumbent party in the central and regional governments ($CORRE$), may play a central role in the allocation choice of public resources of the central government as we will see below. It is worth noting that in the empirical analysis $INCUM$ refers to the percentage of votes in the last general elections for the incumbent party in the central government in the corresponding regions of the sample, while $CORRE$ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a correspondence between the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government.

Hence equation (3) can be expressed as follows:

$$INV_{it}/R_t = \mu + a_{GDP}GDP + a_{PAX}PAX + a_{NAC}NAC + a_{INCUM}INCUM + a_{CORRE}CORRE + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4)$$

where ε_{it} is a random error term. From our analysis the following hypotheses can be established, which we test in further sections:

Hypothesis I: Consistently with claims of progressive redistribution, regions with low product per capita should receive more investment than regions with high product per capita. According to this hypothesis, a_{GDP} in equation (4) should take a value lower than 0.

Hypothesis II: If investments are aimed to support small airports, those investments in a region should increase less than proportionally to the traffic generated for the airports of that region. According to this hypothesis, a_{PAX} in equation (4) should take a value lower than 1.

Hypothesis III: Government looks after cross-subsidies from international passengers to national travelers. Consistently with this, investments should be higher in regions with higher ratios domestic traffic/total traffic. According to this hypothesis, a_{NAC} in equation (4) should take a value greater than 0.

Hypothesis IV: Investment allocations are used to enhance political support. Consistently with this, investments should be higher in regions where the ruling party has strong electoral support and/or the regional government is held by the same party holding national government. According to this hypothesis, a_{INCUM} and a_{CORRE} in equation (4) should take a value greater than 0.

Hypothesis I, II are consistent with an objective function of policymakers of the central government that fits a social welfare function, while hypothesis IV is consistent with a welfare function of policymakers that fits with a political rent-seeking behaviour. Hypothesis III is consistent with an objective function of policymakers that fits both with a social welfare function and a political rent-seeking behaviour.

3.1 Economic factors

It is of central interest in our empirical analysis to examine any type of cross-subsidization that can take place between the regional networks of the Spanish airport system. Hence equation (3) can be expressed for the empirical analysis in the following way:

$$INV_{it}/R_t = \mu + \alpha_{GDP}GDP_{it} + \alpha_{PAX}PAX_{it} + \alpha_{NAC}NAC_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (5)$$

where INV_{it}/R_t refers to the percentage of investment made in airports from region i with respect to the total investment in the national airport network. The explanatory variables are defined as follows:

1. GDP_{it} : Gross Domestic Product per capita of region i .
2. PAX_{it} : Percentage of annual passengers carried in the airports from region i with respect to the total annual traffic in the national airport network.

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3 3. NAC_{it} : Percentage of national passengers carried in the airports from region i with
4
5 respect to the total annual traffic in the regional airport network.
6

7 The error term (ε_{it}) is assumed to be independent and identically distributed over
8
9 regions and time, with mean 0 and variance σ^2_{ε} . However, we test (and correct if pertinent)
10
11 these assumptions in the empirical analysis.
12
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14 In order to estimate this model, we have constructed a panel data for the period 1992-
15
16 2004 for the 15 Spanish regions with airports. This period captures the first year of activity
17
18 of the current airport management system and it is long enough to smooth out distortions
19
20 from single projects in a particular period. To this regard, as figure 1 shows, the huge
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22 amount of investments made in the last six years in comparison to the previous years
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24 allows claiming that initial conditions should not play a relevant role.⁷
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28 **Insert figure 1 about here**
29

30 Data on the territorial allocation of investment have been obtained from the Ministry
31
32 of Transport; data for Gross Domestic Product per capita have been obtained from the
33
34 Spanish Statistics Institute. Finally, data of airport traffic have been obtained from AENA.
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36 Table A-1 in Appendix shows the description and summary statistics of the variables used
37
38 for estimating our investment equation.⁸
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42 Table 3 shows the results of our estimates of the investment equation, while table 4
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44 indicates the elasticities than can be inferred from them. Column 1 presents the results of
45
46 the estimates when using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimator (FGLS). The
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52 ⁷ The allocation of investments across regions in period 1985-2004 is similar to that obtained in period 1992-
53 2004. Data for traffic is not available before 1992 so that the empirical analysis is restricted to period 1992-
54 2004.

55 ⁸ There is a possible simultaneity bias for the *GDP* variable as long as airport investment can be a
56 determinant of economic growth. However, our units of measurement are flows rather than stocks so that
57 annual investments in airports have a very low weight on the total stock of infrastructure, which must be one
58 of the main determinants of economic growth. In addition, it is worth taking into account that airport effects
59 on economic growth are particularly strong at a microeconomic level (greater market access, travel time
60 reductions, attraction of high-tech firms and so on). Additionally, we argue that the *PAX* variable should not
be endogenous either. Indeed, air traffic in a year can be dependent on airport capacity as a stock but not on
the contemporaneous annual investments in the airport, which influences only partially that stock for the
following years.

1
2 tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence of
3 heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. A problem of serial autocorrelation does
4 not seem to take place. Column 2 displays the results of the estimates when using the
5 FGLS estimator with the error term corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional
6 correlation. In this setting, Betz and Katz (1995) show that FGLS estimator involves an
7 underestimation of standard errors. In column 3, we present the results of the estimates
8 when using the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
9 (PCSE). This latter estimator corrects both for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional
10 correlation in the error-term and for underestimation of standard errors.
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23 As could be expected, the three estimators provide similar values of the estimated
24 coefficients but different standard errors. Correction for heteroskedasticity and cross-
25 sectional correlation using the FGLS estimator reduces the standard errors (see columns 1
26 and 2 of table 3). The estimation with the PCSE estimator is more efficient than that using
27 FGLS without correcting for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (see
28 columns 1 and 3 of table 3) but tends to increase the standard errors obtained with the
29 FGLS estimator with robust standard errors (see columns 2 and 3 of table 3). In any case,
30 statistical significance of all explanatory variables is not affected for the calculation of the
31 standard errors.
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44 **Insert table 3 about here**

45 **Insert table 4 about here**

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48 All variables are significant and the overall explanatory power of the equation estimated
49 is reasonably high, regardless of the econometric technique used. Our results show clear
50 evidence that progressive redistribution is not relevant to the airport investment choice of
51 the central government. Indeed, the percentage of total investments in a region seems to
52 increase when product per capita of that region also increases, which is not consistent with
53 hypothesis I above.
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3 In addition to this, we do not find evidence that airport investments are motivated by a
4 scale economies argument (in order to support regions with the smallest airports) because
5 the percentage of total investments increases more than proportionally to the output
6 generated for each regional airport network. Indeed, 10 percentage points increase in the
7 share of the total traffic of the airport network implies about 13 percentage points increase
8 in the share of the total investments made in the airport network. Holding the other
9 factors constant, the percentage of total investments is higher in regional airport networks
10 with a higher proportion of national traffic. These results are consistent with our
11 hypothesis III above but not with our hypothesis II.
12
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16 Table A-2 in Appendix provides additional evidence of the results obtained in our
17 estimates of the investment equation. In this way, table A-2 presents airport financial data
18 for the last two years in which this information is available, 1997 and 1998.⁹ From the data,
19 it can be observed that cross-subsidization across Spanish airports does not take place
20 from high-profitability to low-profitability regional networks, as expected if scale
21 economies were controlled. Actually, the most profitable airport has the highest traffic-
22 investment ratio, while many of the non-profitable airports have traffic-investment rates
23 lower than one. In fact, data from this table, along with the results of the investment
24 equation estimates, allows us to infer a type of redistribution not mentioned by Spanish
25 airport authorities. All profitable regional networks with low investment-traffic ratios
26 (Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Andalusia and C. Valenciana) have a common feature.
27 They all have, at least, one large airport focused on tourist traffic. This fact seems to
28 confirm that cross-subsidization from international to domestic passengers is taken place
29 in the Spanish airport system.
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⁹ Since the late nineties AENA and the Spanish Government have been extremely reluctant to provide financial information on individual airports. Indeed, one of the consequences of an integrated management is that it makes possible for governments to be less transparent and, thus, less subject to democratic control.

3.2. Political factors

Since neither progressive redistribution nor scale economies seem to be the real objective of the centralization of the Spanish airport network, further analysis is needed to understand the objectives of Spanish airport authorities. Several studies (Cadot et al., 1999; Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002; Castells and Solé, 2005) show that political motivations based on the self-interest of the public decision-makers can play a crucial role in the allocation of the stock of infrastructure across regions.

Where election systems are based on proportional rules, as is the case in Spain, politicians are motivated to maximize the number of votes their party obtains in highly populated electoral districts.¹⁰ Following Grossman (1994), the incumbent party in the central government may allocate public resources in order to buy the support of voters and political agents across regions. *Ceteris paribus*, more resources will be invested in those regions that have the most - and most valuable - political capital to offer. Such political capital will be greater where the support for the incumbent party in the central government is also greater, and it will be even more valuable where a correspondence exists between the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government.

Alternatively, some studies argue that the central government could invest more in the regions where the closeness in elections between the two main parties is higher (Dalhberg and Johansson, 2002; Johansson, 2003). Under this hypothesis, the incumbent party tries to obtain higher rates of returns –in terms of votes- from its investments.

In order to capture these political factors, we add to equation (5) the following political variables:

1. *INCUM*: Percentage of votes in the last general elections for the incumbent party in the central government in the corresponding regions of the sample.

¹⁰ Where election systems are based on majority rule, as it happens in the USA and UK, for instance, politicians try to maximize the probability of winning seats in a unipersonal electoral district.

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3 2. *SWING*: The difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in
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5 the general elections across regions.

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7 3. *CORRE*: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a correspondence between
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9 the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional
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11 government.

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14 Data for the political variables have been obtained from the web site of the Ministry of
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16 Domestic Affairs (Ministerio del Interior). It is expected a positive sign in the coefficient
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18 of variables *INCUM* and *CORRE*, as specified in our hypothesis IV above, while it is
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20 expected a negative sign in the coefficient of the variable *SWING*.

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23 The political variables are estimated separately in order to avoid multicollineality.
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25 Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our estimates of equation (5) with the addition of the
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27 political variables. In columns 1 and 2, we show the results when the political variables
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29 added are *INCUM* and *SWING*, respectively. In column 3, we show results when the
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31 political variable added is *CORRE*. Regarding the econometric techniques used, we follow
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33 the same procedure to section 3.1. As in the previous estimation without political
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35 variables, the tests about the validity of the error term assumptions indicate the existence
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37 of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation but not a problem of serial
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39 autocorrelation. In order to clarify the exposition, we just present the results when using
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41 the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). As in
42
43 the previous estimation without political variables, the values of the coefficients and its
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45 statistical significance are similar to those obtained when using the Feasible Generalized
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47 Least Squares Estimator (FGLS).
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53 **Insert table 5 about here**

54 **Insert table 6 about here**

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57 Results for the economic variables do not change substantially in relation to those
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59 obtained in the specification without political variables. The variable capturing the
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influence of partisan support, *INCUM*, is statistically and economically significant. Indeed,

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3 10 percentage points increase in the percentage of votes of the incumbent party in a region
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5 implies about 8 percentage points increase in the share of the total investments made in
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7 the airport network. Thus, we find some evidence that partisan support could play an
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9 important role in the investment allocation choices of the central government. Indeed, the
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11 incumbent party in the central government seems to compensate regions for partisan
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13 support in order to assure votes.
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16 Results for the variable that captures the difference in the percentage of votes between
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18 the two main parties in the general elections across regions, *SWING*, show that such effect
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20 is, in our context, not relevant. We believe this is not surprising in our analysis, since swing
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22 voters are of paramount importance within the framework of one-seat elections systems,
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24 where one vote gives the majority. This is not the case in Spain, where jurisdictions are
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26 multi-seat and seats are assigned by means of a proportional system (with d'Hont
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28 correction). Because of this, maximization of absolute number of votes fits better than
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30 marginal changes due to swing voters.
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35 The coefficient of the dummy variable capturing the correspondence between the
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37 incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional
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39 government, *CORRE*, is also economically and statistically significant. Indeed, such
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41 correspondence implies almost 4 percentage points increase in the share of the total
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43 investments made in the airport network. Thus, political affiliation seems to favor better
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45 coordination between decision-makers at different territorial levels of government.
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49 Overall, our results suggest that politics matter in the allocation of airport investments
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51 across regions. Divergence between the policy announced and the policy effectively
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53 implemented could be explained, at least to some extent, by a desire to maximize the
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55 contribution of that policy to the re-election chances of the incumbent party.
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4. Concluding remarks

The Spanish model of airport management and finance is singular among comparable developed countries. Spain is unique among countries with several large cities and important airports in that its system is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and bureaucrats in charge of the system rhetorically justify it on grounds of inter-territorial solidarity.

Through our empirical analysis of the determinants of airport investments in Spain across regions, we find that the choices of the central government have been motivated by neither a progressive redistribution criterion nor the demands of supporting smaller airports. Indeed, *ceteris paribus* high-income regions receive relatively more public resources than low-income regions. In addition to this, we find evidence that investment increases more than proportionally to the output generated by the regional airport networks, while our data shows that cross-subsidization from high-profitability airports to low-profitability regional networks does not seem to take place. On the contrary, we find that cross-subsidization arises from international to domestic passengers.

Given that economic factors do not explain the allocation of investments across regions, we pay attention to the influence of political motivations. We find some evidence that the incumbent party in the central government could try to maximize support from regional citizens. Indeed, more public resources seem to be invested in those regions where the support for the party in central government is greater. In addition to this, more public resources are invested in those regions where the incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government are the same.

Rich and big airports do not pay to keep poor and small airports working. According to our results, solidarity seems to be merely a rhetorical excuse to prevent competition among Spanish airports. In fact, competition would constrain discretionary power of

1
2 policy makers and bureaucrats over management and budgets. We are aware that the
3
4 public choice paradigm for explaining policymaking is too simple and naïve, and policy
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6 processes are much more complex than can be explained by the self-interested policy
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8 maker alone. Nevertheless, when analyzing why the system of airport management and
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10 finance in Spain is different from any other comparable country, we do not find much
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12 more than rhetoric about solidarity to prevent competition in order to maximize power
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14 and budget.
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APPENDIX

(Insert Table A-1)

(Insert Table A-2)

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
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Tables and figures

Figure 1. Total investments in the Spanish airport network, 1985-2004.
Mean annual values over the period (millions of euros 2004)



Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from Ministerio de Fomento. Data in the period 1985-1993 is available at the web page of IVIE-FBBVA, while data in the period 1994-2004 is available at the web page of Ministerio de Fomento.

Table 1. Major airports and air traffic of passengers in EU-25 countries.

Country	Number of Top 50 EU airports. 2002	Total passengers (10 ³). 2003	National passengers (10 ³).2003	International passengers (10 ³).2003	Airport management	Airport Ownership
United Kingdom	8	177,946	24,416	153,530	Individual	private, regional gov.
Germany	8	121,136	21,193	99,943	Individual	private, regional gov. and national gov.
Spain	9	120,248	31,324	88,925	Centralized	national government
France	6	96,296	26,712	69,584	Individual	national gov. (Paris), chambers of commerce (rest)
Italy	6	73,912	24,477	49,436	Individual	private, regional gov.
Netherlands	1	41,168	154	41,014	Individual	private, national government
Greece	1	28,237	5,030	23,207	Individual	private (Athens), national go. (others)
Sweden	1	20,441	6,875	13,567	Centralized	national government
Ireland	1	20,010	812	19,197	Individual	national government
Denmark	1	19,575	1,606	17,969	Individual	private, national government
Portugal	2	17,739	2,853	14,886	Centralized	national government
Austria	1	15,799	548	15,251	Individual	private, national gov.
Belgium	1	15,087	2	15,085	Individual	private, regional gov.
Finland	1	10,516	2,701	7,816	Centralized	national government
Czech Republic	1	7,761	161	7,600	Individual	national gov. (Prague) / regional gov. (others)
Poland	-	7,067	Na	Na	Centralized	national government
Cyprus	1	6,077	1	6,076	Centralized	national government
Hungary	1	5,010	0	5,010	Individual	private
Malta	-	2,648	44	2,604	Individual	private
Luxembourg	-	1,449	0	1,449	Centralized	national government
Slovenia	-	920	Na	Na	Individual	private, national gov.
Lithuania	-	722	1	721	Centralized	national government
Latvia	-	712	0	712	Centralized	national government
Estonia	-	710	15	695	Centralized	national government
Slovakia	-	626	32	594	Centralized	national government

Source: Eurostat, European Commission (2002, 2006) and airports web pages.

Table 2. Spanish airport and regional data, 1992-2004. Mean annual values over the period

Region*	(1) Share of total investment (Spain = 817,114 10 ³ constant euros)	(2) Share of total traffic (Spain = 120,291,150 passengers)	(3) Ratio Investment- traffic (1/2)	(4) Share of total population (Spain = 38,617,092 inhabitants)	(5) Share of total GDP (Spain = 557,063,815 10 ³ constant euros)	(6) Relative wealth index (5/4)
Madrid (1)	57.81%	22.36%	2.60	13.61%	17.72%	1.30
Catalonia (3)	14.60%	14.78%	0.99	16.31%	19.54%	1.20
Canary islands (8)	9.06%	22.31%	0.41	4.38%	4.12%	0.94
Balears islands (3)	6.62%	18.98%	0.35	2.14%	2.56%	1.20
Andalusia (6)	3.79%	9.81%	0.39	18.97%	14.10%	0.74
Basque C. (3)	2.44%	2.07%	1.18	5.46%	6.61%	1.21
Valencian C. (2)	2.15%	6.08%	0.35	10.69%	10.12%	0.95
Galicia (3)	1.33%	1.90%	0.70	7.13%	5.69%	0.80
Asturias (1)	0.54%	0.55%	0.98	2.82%	2.42%	0.86
Castille & Leon (3)	0.38%	0.21%	1.82	6.51%	6.05%	0.93
Aragon (1)	0.36%	0.20%	1.82	3.11%	3.34%	1.07
Cantabria (1)	0.20%	0.19%	1.04	1.39%	1.33%	0.95
Navarra (1)	0.15%	0.22%	0.69	1.41%	1.76%	1.25
Murcia (1)	0.15%	0.19%	0.80	2.51%	2.97%	0.85
Extremadura (1)	0.01%	0.03%	0.54	2.79%	1.84%	0.66

* In parenthesis, we indicate the number of airports of the region that provide commercial traffic.

Source: Own elaboration on information obtained from the web page of the Ministerio de Fomento (Spanish ministry of transports), the Spanish statistics Institut (INE) and the web page of IVIE-FBBVA.

Table 3. Investment equation estimates. N = 195

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	FGLS (1)	FGLS ¹ (2)	PCSE ² (3)
GDP	3.96e-06 (1.56e-06)**	3.93e-06 (4.03e-08)***	3.96e-06 (8.58e-07)***
PAX	1.349 (0.10)***	1.342 (0.01)***	1.349 (0.06)***
NAC	0.130 (0.03)***	0.128 (0.002)***	0.130 (0.01)***
Intercept	-0.163 (0.03)***	-0.161 (0.003)***	-0.163 (0.02)***
Wald1	257.77***	69,350.32***	1,373.81***
R²	-	-	0.57
BP	453.986***	-	-
Wald2	1.15e+05***	-	-
D_p	1.18	-	-

¹ Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.

² OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

³ Standard errors in parenthesis

⁴ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

⁵ Wald1 = Wald Test (χ^2) of joint significance; BP = Breusch-Pagan LM test of cross-sectional correlation; Wald2 = Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity; D_p = Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation (modified Durbin-Watson test)

Table 4. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means)

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	FGLS (1)	FGLS ¹ (2)	PCSE ² (3)
GDP	0.80 (0.32)**	0.79 (0.01)***	0.80 (0.19)**
PAX	1.35 (0.16)***	1.34 (0.02)***	1.35 (0.09)***
NAC	1.31 (0.33)***	1.29 (0.03)***	1.31 (0.20)***

¹ Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.

² OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

³ Standard errors in parenthesis

⁴ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

Table 5. Investment equation estimates. N = 195

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	PCSE ¹ (1)	PCSE ¹ (2)	PCSE ¹ (3)
GDP	3.65e-06 (9.44e-07)***	3.81e-06 (8.37e-07)***	3.66e-06 (7.54e-07)**
<u>PAX</u>	1.40 (0.08)***	1.36 (0.07)***	1.44 (0.08)***
NAC	0.14 (0.01)***	0.13 (0.02)***	0.15 (0.01)***
INCUM	0.13 (0.05)**	-	-
SWING	-	0.0002 (0.0004)	-
CORRE	-	-	0.06 (0.01)***
Intercept	-0.22 (0.04)***	-0.16 (0.02)***	-0.21 (0.03)***
Wald	1,231.96***	1,291.71***	1,373.81***
R²	0.58	0.57	0.62

¹ OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

² Standard errors in parenthesis

³ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

Table 6. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means)

Dependent variable: <u>INV</u>			
	PCSE ¹ (1)	PCSE ¹ (2)	PCSE ¹ (3)
GDP	0.74 (0.21)***	0.77 (0.18)***	0.74 (0.15)***
<u>PAX</u>	1.40 (0.13)***	1.36 (0.10)***	1.44 (0.12)***
NAC	1.44 (0.23)***	1.33 (0.20)***	1.51 (0.19)***
INCUM	0.82 (0.34)**	-	-
SWING	-	0.02 (0.05)	-
CORRE	-	-	0.46 (0.13)***

¹ OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Standard errors robust to heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlation).

² Standard errors in parenthesis

³ Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*)

Table A-1. Description of the variables and summary statistics (Number of observations: 195)

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum value	Maximum value
INV	Total investment in airports of the region (10 ³ euros)	54,181.31	184,457.3	10.22	1,552,165
INV	The share of investment of each region over total investment	0.07	0.130	0	0.707
GDP	Gross Domestic Product per capita in each region (euros)	13,368	4,054	6,408	23,889
PAX	Total output (number of annual passengers carried in airports of the region)	8,001,865	1.05e+07	15,547	3.81e+07
PAX	The share of output of each region over total traffic	0.07	0.08	0	0.26
NAC	Percentage of national passengers over total traffic in airports of each region	0.66	0.27	0.08	1
INCUM	Percentage of votes in the general elections for the incumbent party in each region	0.41	0.10	0.18	0.58
SWING	The difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in the general elections across regions	0.08	0.12	-0.21	0.32
CORRE	Correspondence between incumbent party in the central and regional government in each region	0.52	0.50	0	1

Table A-2. Spanish airports operating profits. Millions of euros

Region	Operating results (Yearly average 1997-98)	Share of the total surplus generated by regions with surplus	Share of the net surplus of the network	Ratio Investment-traffic
Madrid (1)	89.7	39.3%	45.7%	2.60
Canary Islands (8)	40.7	17.8%	20.8%	0.41
Catalonia (3)	40.2	17.6%	20.5%	0.99
Balears Islands (3)	41.8	18.3%	21.3%	0.35
Valencian C. (2)	10.8	4.7%	5.5%	0.35
Andalusia (6)	5.1	2.2%	2.6%	0.39
<i>Surplus in system</i>	228.3	100.0%		
Extremadura (1)	-0.6		-0.3%	0.54
Castile & Leon (3)	-1.8		-0.9%	1.82
Murcia (1)	-2.0		-1.0%	0.80
Navarra (1)	-2.1		-1.1%	0.69
Asturias (1)	-2.6		-1.3%	0.98
Cantabria (1)	-2.8		-1.4%	1.04
Aragon (1)	-2.9		-1.5%	1.82
Galicia (3)	-6.9		-3.5%	0.70
Basque C.(3)	-7.6		-3.9%	1.18
<i>Losses in system</i>	-32.2			
<i>Network surplus</i>	196.1		100.0%	

Note 1: 1998 is the last year for which financial data on operating results for individual airports has been made available by AENA. See footnote 11 above.

Note 2: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of commercial airports in each region.

Source: Own elaboration on AENA information (published in Bel, 2002 and RvyT, 1999).