

# Problem-Generating Structures in Nigeria's Rural Development



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# Preface

This is the first volume to be produced by the Nigerian “branch” of the “Cross-National Project in Social and Political Change (CPSPC)”, involving countries as far apart as India, Nigeria, Japan and the US, and later extended to Yugoslavia, Austria and the Netherlands.\*

Sidney Verba, who was the initiator of the overall project, presented an Agenda, a blue-print for the study at a planning work-shop in Stanford in August 1964. Having invited independent and stubborn scholars like Hajime Ikeuchi, Japan, Rajni, Kothari, India, Albert Imohiosen, Nigeria, and myself (appointed to the Chair of Sociology at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria) to this work-shop he could not have been surprised to find himself under strong criticism for his own approach which was considered too “Western”, and somewhat irrelevant from the perspectives of developing countries. Gracefully he set aside his own paper; and the rest of us spent almost a week drawing up our blue-prints which were then compared. There were some differences. The Indian and Nigerian blue-prints were most similar in their insistence on a “problem-oriented” approach, starting from an attempt to identify some of the basic problems of underdevelopment, and regarding the development process as a problem-solving sequence, requiring not only the kind of “civic” participation investigated in Almond and Verba’s *Civic Culture* but also a prior awareness and articulation of problems in terms appropriate to the contradictions and conflicts inherent in the social structures of countries such as Nigeria and India.

Sidney Verba, our *primus inter pares*, continued to demonstrate his wisdom, openness and ability to induce our collaboration, by guiding us through a number of empirical pilot studies and two more research work-shops—one in Ibadan, Nigeria, in September 1965, and one in Uppsala, Sweden, in May

\* So far the following publications have appeared, reporting on some aspects of the CPSPC-data: Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim, *The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Analysis* (Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, no. 01-013, 1971); Sidney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anio Bhatt, *Caste, Race, and Politics: A Comparison of India and the United States* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971) and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America. Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1972). In addition there is one book in Japanese reporting on the Japanese data. It is significant that most of these publications have been produced under the auspices of US academic institutions. Results from less developed areas within this cross-national project are appearing at a slower rate. It is also significant that the present volume—although using the same kind of data as those found in the volumes mentioned above—makes a different use of them, focussing less on modes and structures of participation than on the problem-content which sets the stage for participation and development.

1966—before the final survey was launched in the summer of 1966. Part of his wisdom was manifested in his early realization that it would be futile, or at least too time-consuming, for us to reach agreement from the very beginning on one and the same theoretical framework. Instead we drew up a list of variables derived from our individual theoretical and political concerns, in order to test their realisation in pilot studies. These pilot studies also helped me to perceive what was simply irrelevant, say, to an old but sharp and witty farmer or shrewd market women in a Nigerian village or little town.

Then, in Ibadan, September 1965, the rudiments of a theoretical framework began to emerge. I have a photograph showing Rajni Kothari at the black-board impatiently drawing up the nucleus of what was to become our problem-awareness-problem-solving flowchart. We had then stuck fast for a few days in our own muddled verbiage. Rajni's contribution was crucial—at least to me. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova from Mexico (who later left the project for personal reasons) attached his notion of international colonialism to Rajni's diagram; there we recognized a problem-generating structure providing part of the input to Rajni's scheme.

The audience at this research work-shop included Martin Igbozurike, then a second-year student of sociology at the University of Ibadan, son of a peasant from Eastern Nigeria. He is now the author of the present volume—the first, I hope, of a series of at least three books using our Nigerian data.

I have a very vivid memory from my first year with Martin—it was eleven years ago. At the end of a warm day we stood in the soothing shadow under one of the almond trees outside the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, discussing social psychological concepts—but also some of the difficulties Martin faced in his first year at the University. He impressed me as a soft-spoken man with a clear and inquiring mind. No one could be less pompous than Martin, yet he was saying: "I know I have a potential. There is something inside me . . ." He talked in his usual unassuming manner; yet there was conviction in his voice.

Martin was later appointed a team-leader for the final fieldwork in Eastern Nigeria. Field-work was in progress in the other regions of Nigeria as well. These were troubled times. Even though Martin did not exactly conform to the stereotype of an assertive and virile leader, he must have possessed other qualities which made the team trust him so highly, and made him work so effectively.

Nearly ten years have passed since we collected our survey data. Martin spent the years of the Nigerian Civil War in Biafra, and later felt the same surprise as most "Biafrans" at the spirit of reconciliation shown by the Nigerian Federation after the war. I was extremely happy to meet him again in Ibadan in December 1970, and to be able to arrange for his participation in our doctoral program of sociology at the University of Uppsala in the following year.

Ten years before a research project yields its first product seems a long time.



Sponsors and Nigerian colleagues have also voiced complaints about the “lack of visibility” of this project in Nigeria. This delay can of course be explained. But no explanations help if the information is out of date. Fortunately for our project, but less so from nearly every other point of view, our object of research ten years ago—the problems of underdevelopment and development—were and are rather intractable. They persist, and so does the relevance of our data for a study of these problems.

But the author of this book has understood that data rarely speak for themselves even if analyzed by established statistical methods. They must be explored from an explicit awareness of a specific perspective. Of this perspective Martin Igbozurike will speak for himself.

Uppsala in January 1976  
*Ulf Himmelstrand*



# Acknowledgements

My gratitude goes to Ulf Himmelstrand who has been my teacher and my friend from my undergraduate days at the Nigerian University of Ibadan, for his painstaking and close supervision of this study; to the Ford Foundation of America for funding the CPSPC—Cross-national Project in Social and Political Change—one of the objectives of which was to train indigenous Nigerian students in sociological research; to the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Fund, to the Swedish Social Science Council, to SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority), and to the Swedish Institute for their grants during the period of data processing and analysis; and to Lola Billås for diligently typing the manuscript.

*To  
My elder brother, Alfred Agubuike Igbozurike, who led the way and my cousin, Lawrence  
Mbawelatonu Onuoha, my memory of whose unstinted support I can only immortalize thus.*

# The Problem

Nigeria's agricultural problems can be meaningfully studied only within the framework of a critical analysis of her overall economic development and underdevelopment. These problems derive basically from the colonial 'false start' (Dumont, 1966) in her economic growth and development, from the intended and unintended structural distortions inherent in her history and in the interaction with the contemporary world economic and political systems. The implications of these broad generalizations, which form the central theme of this study, will be clarified as the analysis unfolds.

The foregoing is a statement of my *point de départ*, in contradistinction to other theoretical positions which suggest that Nigeria's agricultural problems stem mostly from traditionalism, from resistance to change and innovation, and from the use of traditional techniques and tools where modern ones would have been more efficient. My thesis is that, while some or even all of these charges and claims may be partly true, they are based not on empirical findings about the Nigerian farmer but on Western-biased extrapolations from anthropological works which are themselves of questionable validity, or at least lack validity as a basis for extrapolation.



# I Objectives, Scope, Methods and Hypothesis

This study grew out of a much larger and more comprehensive cross-national research undertaking embracing five countries of which Nigeria is one.<sup>1</sup> Ulf Himmelstrand was the principal investigator responsible for the Nigerian study. An information bulletin (1965) of this Cross-national Project stated as its objective

... to study the way in which new modes of behaviour and new beliefs are adopted by groups and individuals in order to attain their goals and to satisfy the needs generated by changes in their social environment. We are interested in environmental changes as they appear to the *outside observer* using scientific methods as well as they appear subjectively to the citizens themselves.

In a follow-up release (1965) the objective was re-iterated and articulated thus:

We are primarily interested in the ways in which individuals and groups adopt new ways of life—new behaviours and new beliefs—as means of coping with felt needs and problems that arise from the structure of society, from the individual's position in society and from changes in that position . . . we are interested in goal-attainment activities that derive from felt needs and problems—how problems and needs are identified and converted into goals . . . we are interested in the ways in which individuals perceive the means available to solve these problems, the way in which they use existing social structures to aid in problem-solution, and the way in which they create new social structures to meet these needs . . .

I have tried to work within this original theoretical framework. Its usefulness is due not least to the fact that it is sufficiently broad to accommodate entirely different theoretical interpretations. For instance, the conceptual framework of problem-generating structures can be used for a Marxist or a liberal interpretation.

More important in this regard, however, than the simple question of *broadness* of the conceptual framework is the question of in whose support the interpretation is being made. Once the social analyst settles this problem of his affiliation, then the *double entendre* implied in broad conceptual framework is as good as settled. For this means that he exercises the caution which Peter Bauer (1972, p. 313) advised when he wrote,

... to be valuable abstract concepts must be used with consistency, for if they are used with shifting or inconsistent interpretations the concepts become useless either as instruments for systematic reasoning or as guides to policy. They can, however, become effective instruments for those who appreciate the possibilities of shifting their interpretation of the abstract notions in order to select the particular interpretation which in each instance promotes or justifies the policies they favour.

I have retained much of the spirit of the objective, particularly in the chapter on empirical analysis, *presenting the problems as they are subjectively reported by our farmer respondents*. This approach has a certain virtue: it enables the social analyst to keep close to structural processes which generate or generated these unobtrusively reported problems; more importantly, it gives the reader an appreciative insight into the specifics of the problems and needs of the rural population, and the way these are expressed. Intellectually, it undermines any possible argument that the problems examined in this regard are the figments of my own *sociological imagination*.<sup>2</sup> However, the approach does have its short-comings of which the social scientist ought to be constantly aware in the course of his data analysis and presentation: the presentation of the problems and needs of the farmer respondents in the way they were subjectively reported does not necessarily mean that the respondents have a clear understanding of their problems and their socio-economic predicaments. For instance, a look at the problem spectrum (cf ch. 4, figs. 4a, b, c) will show that Education is among the problems which have very low visibility. In other words, from the point of view of the farmer respondents, one can safely conclude that education is one of the issues which give least headaches to the Nigerian rural population. This conclusion could be contrasted with the readiness demonstrated by the average Nigerian parent in embracing education as the road to the good life. The farmer may tell you that his greatest problem is one of wages and jobs, as one can see from the very high visibility which these assume in the spectrum. He may also resent the price paid for his export crop and swear he will never take his produce to a particular market in the neighbourhood. Discussing the impact of the marketing boards on local markets, Peter Bauer (1954, p. 213) writes,

A comparatively small measure of competition can make its influence felt over a fairly wide area through a chain reaction. If the competition in a particular market results in payments above the statutory minima, these higher prices have to be paid in the next village, as otherwise producers take their crop to the other market. These higher prices have the same effect at the next stage and so on for perhaps half a dozen markets.

The farmer may little realise that his wage/job problem is structurally related, among other things, to the colonial, and elitist oriented, system of education, if not directly caused by it.<sup>3</sup> When questioned about the kind of agricultural policy pursued by the government, which may be directly responsible for the low return on his export cash crop, he may say that he knows nothing or that all is well. Peter Bauer (1954, p. 267) rightly contends that the operation of the marketing boards serves to

show . . . that a statutory export monopoly can prescribe producer prices more or less at any level (below the world level) it thinks desirable, and that it can fix prices at levels which would not be permitted by the government if attempted by private organizations. Whatever the merits of the West African Produce Control Board as an instrument of wartime control, its experience cannot be adduced in support of the establishment of permanent statutory export monopolies.



Therefore a unified and structurally organized view of socio-economic problems is an attribute of the social scientist by virtue of his training and discipline.<sup>4</sup> The structuring of problems in a cause and effect relationship, as opposed to a discrete presentation of them after the manner of the lay respondents, is, in part, a function of the scientist's value premise.

This brings me to a second point in this statement of objective: the CPSPC bulletin mentioned a record of environmental changes as they appear to the "outsider observer". Even though this expression may have referred to a 'foreign observer'—it is clear that even an indigenous observer can be 'outside' and consider this a scientific virtue. The reader will notice a considerable departure from this approach, for a number of reasons: I have written the thesis as a Nigerian, with a rural background, and with the Nigerian reader in mind. This implies a taking of sides, a value-orientation and standpoint on issues at stake in Nigeria's socio-economic and political evolution.

## The CPSPC sample. Its scope

The gathering and the use of random national samples in accordance with the requirements of statistical method is an extremely difficult, not to say impossible task in Nigeria—unless very large resources are available. Nevertheless an attempt was made by the CPSPC project administration to come as close as possible to these requirements. However the aim was not to attain a strictly representative sample, enabling us to estimate simple population parameters for the Nigerian population as a whole, or for any regional or demographic category of the population considered in isolation. From a sociological point of view two aims of sampling were believed to have particular importance:

- (a) a sufficiently large *range* with regard to the main variables of the given study—that is large enough to cover either the actual range in the population or the theoretically interesting range;
- (b) lack of bias significantly changing the *direction* of relationships between variables, or *direction* of differences between categories, or the rank order of such relationships and differences; biases with regard to the absolute magnitude of relationships and differences were considered less serious.

Since the research project lacked resources to take a random national sample of its own, it was decided to draw on two other sample surveys which had been carried out in Nigeria the year before our fieldwork was launched—*The Rural Economic Survey* carried out by the Federal Office of Statistics in Lagos and an urban survey made by the *Manpower Board* in Lagos. Both of these sample

surveys were designed by statistically trained experts, and the Rural Economic Survey also placed great emphasis on establishing good relationships with the rural communities involved. Local enumerators were thoroughly trained and properly introduced to the communities in which they worked intermittently for a full year.

The Rural Economic Survey was a two-stage sample. The primary sampling units (PSU-s)—207 rural units—were derived from aerial maps of Nigeria. Stratified random sampling was used in selecting these PSU's—the stratification variables being types of soil and types of crops. However, in view of the recent and prolonged uprisings in Tiv area on the Plateau, this relatively small area was deemed unsuitable at that time for an economic survey of this kind. It was thus excluded.

Within each PSU a total count of households was made and 20 picked at random. In these 20 households per rural unit—constituting the Rural Economic Survey master sample—a complete enumeration of individual household members was also made. The availability of these lists of individuals was a precondition for our own rural subsample. From these lists the Federal Office of Statistics randomly drew 20 individuals for every third rural unit.

Two levels of stratification were involved in the taking of this subsample. Firstly, the 207 PSUs of the Rural Economic Survey were stratified by us according to an index of district voter registration and voter turnout, calculated on the basis of the statistics available in Kenneth Post's (1963) study of the 1959 election in Nigeria. In view of the fact that social and political participation were crucial variables in our study such a stratification seemed justified. Every third village unit was then randomly picked from each participation stratum. The Federal Office of Statistics finally carried out the selection of individuals from these villages with a stratification by age group and sex. In addition to the 20 individuals thus sampled from each village, a number of substitutes were sampled in the same manner to replace unavailable respondents.

Our own fieldwork took place in August and September 1966. These were troubled times in many parts of Nigeria; many people left their domiciles to return to their regions of origin, and there were probably other types of migration too. For instance, we could not interview a single Ibo in Northern Nigeria. We had to rely rather heavily on our samples of substitutes—probably beyond what would seem acceptable to statistical experts aiming at estimating population parameters—even though substitutes were selected from the same sex and age brackets as the missing respondents.

Furthermore, because of delays in our work in Northern Nigeria, resulting from interference by the regional military government there, we were forced to scale down our Northern fieldwork in two respects. Instead of every third village we had to take every sixth to ensure that fieldwork could be finished in time before our student interviewers resumed classes. Secondly, women could not be used to interview Northern women since our female interviewers were students from a Teachers' Training College which resumed classes earlier than

universities; and with the delay already mentioned, our female interviewers in the North could never go out in the field. In the southern parts of Nigeria the fieldwork went well, however. And nowhere, either in the North or the South, did we encounter any refusals worth mentioning. Already in July 1966 the fieldworker allocated to a particular village had stayed for a few weeks there to collect so-called local unit data (see below) and to establish contacts with village heads. Once they had accepted the idea of the survey there was no resistance from villagers.

After the reduction of the Northern sample our rural survey came to include only 800 respondents. However, in the following pages, when we present data from our Nigerian survey they will be weighted to take account of differences in the probabilities of inclusion of different categories of Nigerians.

The effective urban sample became much larger—about 1,370 respondents. Even though our study is chiefly concerned with various aspects of rural development, we will at times make comparisons with data from this urban sample. Therefore a brief description is in order. In this case we subsampled a national urban sample survey conducted by the Federal Manpower Board. In addition to the internal weighting needed to make this sample roughly representative in view of the different fractions drawn from the different-sized urban communities involved, the rural sample had to be weighted to compensate the heavy overrepresentation of the urban population in our total national sample.

Overall the CPSPC survey data were supplemented with what were called “unit data on collectivities” (CPSPC, 1966) and “local elite data”. “Unit data” refer to data intended to provide background information on the sample units of villages covered by the formal questionnaire. The field interviewers (author included) were therefore sent in groups of two or three beforehand to each of the villages in the sample to collect unit data (and also get acquainted with the villagers and establish some rapport with them) for the purpose of tapping such information as might not be obtained through survey questionnaires: the kinds of voluntary organizations, occupational associations, mutual aid societies etc., which exist as channels for the solution of problems; the structure of the community, including the number and relative size of different linguistic and cultural groups, and the history of conflicts, if any; Communication, transport and road networks etc. and land tenure systems, special geographical features, religious institutions, and local industries, if any.

“Local elite data” refer to data collected through interviews with local celebrities, such as the village chief, town councillors and primary school headmasters.

Unit-data and local-elite data collection are mentioned here only to indicate the scope of the original project.<sup>1</sup> In our analysis we will confine ourselves to using the cross-sectional sample data for simple reasons of economy. It is hoped that others will use the unit and local-elite data together with the cross-sectional data for a multiple-level analysis.

## The guiding hypothesis

*I have tried to analyze the empirical data within the conceptual framework of problem-generation, problem-perception, problem-articulation and problem-solving-action among the Nigerian farmers. The central hypothesis running through the analysis of the rural data is formulated in terms of agricultural commercialization as a problem-generating as well as a problem-solving agent—for different categories of people: that is, the problems of many Nigerian farmers arise from, among other things, the process commercialization of agriculture and from the institutional structure and systemic linkages associated with commercialization.*

*In fact, the main guiding hypothesis can be stated thus: The more the farmer is involved in the moneyed or monetized market, the greater the problems he perceives, and the greater his problem-load. The class position of the farmer, measured in terms of his socio-economic status or his level of material possessions, is used as a specifying and control variable which conditions his problems and his problem-awareness. In practical terms his material resources determine the way he will go about solving these problems and meeting his wants and needs.*

By way of a summary, the study of problem-generating structures and the problems which they generate calls for a specification of the independent, control and dependent variables affecting our analysis and interpretation.

In very broad terms therefore, our main conceptual variables will draw heavily on the socio-economic and political structures inherent in the modes of production and distribution. These structures will be broken down into three distinct though mutually interacting categories: Economic, cultural and geo-political structures. These provide us with the independent variables for the study.

Our main independent variables centre on the individual farmer's position in the agricultural economy, his socio-economic status, or more correctly the quantity and quality of his material possessions. In a sense, insofar as this study focuses on the processes of commercialization, our independent variables could be expressed in terms of the degree of the farmer's dependence on the market. It is this structural dependence which conditions his problem perception, problem articulation and problem solving-action.

Our dependent variables centre on the problems which are generated by the economic, cultural and geo-political structures. We concentrate on the problems generated by the economic structures.

We will discuss the independent and dependent variables in greater detail later on. As the independent variables of this study must be seen in their wider historical context, we will now briefly examine Nigeria's history to provide the necessary background information on the structures which generate her problems.

## II Nigeria: The Historical Background

The geographical area named Nigeria owes its creation to British colonialism. The modern nation state of Nigeria was originally composed of over 200 tribes differing in their organization of political and economic life, in their cultural pursuits, and in their religious beliefs.

No other colonial territory grouped people so large and diverse. The Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri and other peoples of the savana country, whose religious traditions were Muslim and who possessed developed administrative structures, were linked with tropical forest peoples like the Yoruba and the Edo, who possessed sacred chiefs and a hierarchical system of government, and the Ibo, who were segmentary in their social organization and who were politically fragmented. (James O'Connell, 1967, p. 132)<sup>5</sup>

Despite this diversity in the composition of modern Nigeria, its traditional components do contain evidence of underlying similarity: the extended family system, the concept of the High God, the correspondence of creation legends and of the genesis of death—all these attest that there is a sense in which one can rightly speak of a Nigerian traditional culture.

These cultures (at once diverse and similar) had existed in pre-colonial times as autonomous political entities. Some of them had achieved the status of empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms or city-states, The Kanem-Bornu empire, the Hausa-Fulani emirates, the Oyo, Ile-Ife and Bini kingdoms each had the status of a sovereign state whose head had the power of life and death, conducted war and concluded peace, and engaged in international diplomacy with remarkable skill and ingenuity.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the final stroke of the British royal pen brought all these empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms, city-states and the surrounding societies under the name of "British Nigeria".<sup>6</sup> The preamble to this royal fiat is long and tortuous and we can only attempt to draw the picture in very broad outline.

### The early colonial period

The West African coast was famous not only for its gold, it was also called the Slave coast. Gold and slaves were the two major commodities which medieval

Africa offered to medieval Europe. The traffic in human beings continued into the nineteenth century when the conscience of the contemporary world started to react against it. Britain who was foremost in the trade was curiously in the forefront of the movement for its abolition.

By the nineteenth century, the more or less effective suppression of the slave trade led to the growth of legitimate trade in African produce.

For a time this new trade was conducted by Europeans and Africans on equal terms.

In 1854 Africans and Europeans in Bonny combined to deal with the problems of local trade by setting up a 'Court of Equity' on which both Bonny middlemen and European supercargoes were represented. Traders offending against the regulations of the court, which was presided over by a different white supercargo in monthly rotation, were subject to fines, which had to have the approval of the King of Bonny . . . This court was so successful that soon similar ones were instituted at New Calabar, Akassa, Benin River, Old Calabar, Brass and later Opobo. (Crowder, 1962, 1966, pp. 153—154).

The greed of the 'palm oil ruffians' was such as could hardly be satisfied with trading on equal terms. Thus, despite the British Parliamentary Committee's recommendation (1865) that the British Government should withdraw from the West African coast, British subjects on the spot thought it ever more pressing that the British Government exercise her imperial prerogatives.

The pressures on the home government eventually led to the establishment on the coast of the consulate system. With the installation of British consuls, the scales turned in favour of the White oil merchants, for "the European traders still used the power of their local Consul to force their own terms on African chiefs." (Crowder, 1966, p. 154).

While this new relationship did not mature overnight, nevertheless it marked a definitive step towards the consolidation of British control of West African trade. For, in spite of the success of the courts of Equity and of African resistance to the European encroachments into the interior, the courts were regularized by an Order in council in 1873. Following this formal act, a number of British commercial companies sprang into existence in Nigeria's key trading stations. Some of these companies still function in Nigeria today, operating more or less as commercial chains or multinational corporations with tentacles both in petty trade and at the heart of our economy.

The final blow to African threats to British monopoly had to await the arrival of George Dashwood Goldie Taubman to whom the European firms must remain eternally indebted for uniting them into the Royal Niger Company<sup>7</sup> (Crowder, 1962, 1966, pp. 184—188). The Royal Niger Company became the undisputed mistress of the West African trade and with the Charter issued her by the British Government she became the representative of the British Government in Nigeria until 1900 when the charter was revoked.

With the revocation, the Royal Niger Company confined herself to trade and the British colonial government tackled the real task of bringing British law and order to bear on *British Nigeria*. Gradually and increasingly, the interior came

under the umbrella of British colonial administration. By 1914, Lord Lugard had amalgamated the Northern and Southern provinces in what eventually became one of the biggest Federation experiments in British empire-building history. Thenceforth, from the twenties to the fifties, Nigeria went through a series of Constitution making and unmaking, centralization and decentralization, direct rule and indirect rule. Thenceforth, the missionary zeal for curbing the slave trade overflowed into the mixed motives of trade and salvation of the black man's soul. The Cross and the flag which had parted company in the Europe of the Enlightenment came together as strange bedfellows in 20th century Africa. The era of *mission civilisatrice* came into full flower. The British educational system was superimposed on the traditional schooling or more correctly, Nigeria quickly embraced the new system of education as the gateway to modernity. The Northerners, however, were an exception in a sense: the British colonial authorities had to come to terms with the Muslim Emirs as a condition for bringing the immense Northern territory under Pax Britannica; thus Christianity and Western education were very slow in reaching the people of the North.

The clash of cultures resulting from this encounter of British political institutions, Christianity, Western education, with African traditional political, educational, religious and legal institutions in one geo-political entity constitutes a series of structures which caused and are still causing problems for the Nigerian nation.

As noted above, a number of economic and commercial institutions followed upon the imperial venture. Infrastructures like the railways started to come into being. The Marketing boards which were among the institutions created by the colonial government are of special relevance to this study and therefore deserve some detailed discussion.

The history of the Nigerian marketing boards reaches as far back as the Second World War. They are the foster-child of the West African Produce Control Board (establ. 1942) under which were subsumed marketing boards established all over British West Africa to control the marketing of agricultural products.<sup>8</sup> As far back as 1954 Peter Bauer (p. 263) wrote,

The West African marketing boards are by far the largest statutory export monopolies in the British Colonial Empire and possibly in the Commonwealth; they are indeed among the most important in the world. Already their financial resources exceed those of the West African governments, and the disposal of their large reserves will be a major influence in the political and economic situation in these territories . . . Their decisions in fixing the prices paid to producers are a major factor in determining the level of incomes, the standard of living and the ability to save of the people, and through their influence on the flow of incomes these decisions largely affect the balance of payments of the colonies. By prescribing the producer prices they exercise a potent influence on the production of different crops.

Peter Bauer made this assessment and prediction before the independence era. The nationalization and, in the case of Nigeria, the regionalization of the boards and the concomitant administrative structure, which developed

around them, today constitute structures which generate problems of price and indirectly of incentives or disincentives towards productivity. Just as before independence the "policies of the boards and the use of their accumulated reserves raise difficult and delicate issues of relationship between the United Kingdom and the colonies", so the existence of the national marketing boards today generate thorny problems of relationships between the national or regional governments and the producers. For the marketing boards have now become an instrument for widening the gap between the rich and the poor farmers, for appropriating the products of the farmers by the upper class and for taxing farmers and therefore causing disincentive to productivity.

Insofar as this study is centred on the problems of contemporary African (Nigerian) farmers, and the structures which generate these problems, an attempt to place Nigerian agriculture in this historical context is more than justified.

Michael Crowder, in his brilliant and informative *Story of Nigeria* (1962, 1966, p. 29) refers to G. P. Murdock's hypothesis that there was "a spontaneous development of agriculture in the region of the Upper Niger between 5,000 B.C. and 4,000 B.C." As Michael Crowder contends, although Murdock's hypothesis awaits the confirmation of botanists, "there is no doubt that during the years from 5,000 B.C. to A.D. 1 African tribes in the Sahara regions and probably many of those inhabiting modern Nigeria, started to practise settled agriculture." (p. 29.) Walter Rodney (1972, p. 48) offers this view: "In the centuries before the contact with Europeans, the overwhelmingly dominant activity in Africa was agriculture. In all the settled agricultural communities, people observed the peculiarities of their own environment and tried to find techniques for dealing with it in a rational manner." Oliver and Fage, in *A Short History of Africa* (1965, p. 28) suggest that as early as the end of the second millennium B.C. neolithic agriculture has been identified "with the Nok figurine culture of northern Nigeria, ... a development" which continued into the Early Iron Age.

African agriculture was not something which flowered at one point in time only to degenerate or stagnate at other periods. This is true of the Niger Valley and the Sudan area, to mention the only two areas of immediate relevance to this study. Alexander Nzemeke (1975), in his *Imperialist Venture in the Niger Valley, 1851—1905*, ably documents historical evidence of how Africa's agricultural dynamism was largely responsible for what may be termed 'agrarian imperialism'. He tells the story of an eye-witness, "The whole country-side seemed to be under vigorous cultivation—acres of Indian corn, alternating with Guinea corn; rice-fields, planted along low-lying banks of streams, groundnuts, yams and sweet potatoes, white beans, pumpkins being cultivated as their principal foodstuffs." (pp. 541—542).

Therefore, as far as agriculture is concerned,



The rate of change over a few centuries was quite impressive. Millet and rice had been domesticated from wild grasses just as yams were made to evolve from selected wild roots. Most African societies raised the cultivation of their own particular staple to a fine art. Even the widespread resort to shifting cultivation with burning and light hoeing was not as childish as the first European colonialists supposed. That simple form of agriculture (I doubt if it was that simple) was based on a correct evaluation of the soil potential, which was not great as initially appears from the heavy vegetation; and when the colonialists started upsetting the thin top-soil the result was disastrous. (Walter Rodney, 1973, p. 48.)

Discussing this problem of agricultural change and its adaptive capacity, Michael Crowder (1966, p. 31) argues that the desiccation of the Sahara desert from about 2,000 B.C. onwards precipitated the downward movement of the Sahara pastoralists who were already knowledgeable in the cultivation of wheat and barley. These pastoralists came across Negro populations who did not practise settled farming but only vegeculture which was not enough to sustain both themselves and the new arrivals. This insufficiency of food resulted, Michael Crowder suggests, in "the development of settled farming of a whole new range of crops . . ." Michael Crowder traces the genesis and development of the Nok culture to this phenomenon. Drawing on the archeological findings on this culture, Michael Crowder (1966, p. 32) writes as follows,

These Nok terracottas are generally of a high technical standard . . . Apart from their artistic and technical accomplishments, these figurines tell us much about the people who made them. They were apparently agriculturalists, and some of the more recently discovered fragments suggest that they kept cattle. They were certainly interested in the animal world around them, for elephants, monkeys and other animals form the subject of a number of their studies . . . Other evidence suggests that they knew how to work iron . . .

Walter Rodney (1973, p. 48) notes that

Advanced methods were used in some areas, such as terracing, crop rotation, green manuring, mixed farming and regulated swamp farming. The single most important technological change underlying African agricultural development was the introduction of iron tools, notably the axe and the hoe, replacing wooden and stone tools. It was on the basis of the iron tools that new skills were elaborated in agriculture as well as in other spheres of economic activity.

We may now pause and ask: to what extent did precolonial Africa know poverty as a condition arising from the traditional subsistence state of her agriculture? To attempt a satisfactory answer, one must first refute some of the erroneous theories about underdevelopment of the third world countries. Used to the hardened convention of equating the material well-being of a people with their Gross National Product and rising per capita income, our analysis of their development problems more often than not derives from the conception of traditional subsistence agricultures as tradition-bound, unprogressive and therefore representative of poverty.

In that money is the quantifiable measure of the *wealth of nations*, commercialization of agriculture has come to dominate the strategies recommended for lifting the third world out of the grinding poverty, allegedly imposed on them for thousands of years by traditional subsistence farming.

The historical studies we have cited show, if nothing else, that the traditional subsistence agriculture was far from backward, and that Africans had for centuries enjoyed the material comfort which resulted from settled farming. Michael Crowder (1962, 1966, p. 37) writes, "Obviously in the lands of the Chad Basin the desert nomads, used to wandering from oasis to oasis, found what was by comparison a fertile paradise where the local inhabitants, though organized only in small village groups, lived a life of considerable agricultural prosperity."

Poverty may have existed (only Utopias do not know poverty, but Utopias do not exist in reality) but not to the extent we have experienced it since our incorporation into the capitalist system. As Walter Rodney (1973, p. 54) put it, "Certainly, no one starved while others stuffed themselves and threw away the excess" in traditional African societies. But with the incorporation into the capitalist system, poverty assumed dramatic, even tragic proportions, its vicious circle being the product of the "trend within capitalism to concentrate or polarise wealth and poverty at two opposite extremes" (Rodney, 1973, p. 149).

This polarization, of course, was started by factors internal to Africa, for, "once African societies began to expand by internal evolution, conquest or trade, the style of life of the ruling group became noticeably different. They consumed the most and the best that the society offered. Yet they were least directly involved in the production of wealth by farming, cattle herding, fishing . . ." (Walter Rodney, 1973, p. 54). By and large, the commercialization of agriculture within the capitalist structure created a new kind of poverty unknown to pre-colonial Africa.

This is not a plea for keeping developing countries out of the stream of commercialization. But in the bid to commercialize, we must be aware of new structural predicaments (probably the worst ill resulting from our new found strategy for certain classes or groups of individuals and social collectivities).

Thus in contemporary Africa, we find, as Michael Doo Kingué (1975, p. 27) has correctly identified, three types of poverty:

(1) intrinsic poverty—basic poverty characterized by the absence or insufficiency of significant possibilities of enrichment;

(2) induced poverty—poverty resulting from an iniquitous economic order, from the exploitation of ignorance or weakness, although the possibilities of enrichment and fair distribution exist; and

(3) emergency poverty—brought about by more or less temporary circumstances such as natural disasters, droughts or floods etc.

The three types of poverty are not found to the same extent in contemporary Africa. For a large number of African countries, intrinsic poverty is out of the question. The problem can be described in terms of emergency and induced poverty. This may be the case for the Sahelian areas. To establish the precise measures for assessing the effects of the one *vis à vis* the other may be a worth-while exercise.

Nigeria, however, today stands out as a resounding exception. The search for

explanations in terms of both intrinsic and emergency poverty does not arise, in the light of our not so recent oil boom which is more than enough to relieve emergency hunger of whatever magnitude.

To summarize, the poverty which we find in contemporary Africa in general and in contemporary Nigeria is not a product of the structure of our traditional agriculture. The conventional explanation of the gap between the rich West and the poor countries in terms of the *culture of poverty* is too naive to be taken seriously. Such an approach betrays a lack of a sense of history. There is no historical evidence of a society which takes poverty as its cultural underpinning. On the contrary, much of the poverty that we find in Africa today is there because the countries concerned are still made to develop willy nilly within the structures initiated by their incorporation into the capitalist system, structures which "move, live and have their being" by continuing the *development of underdevelopment*.<sup>9</sup>

### **Contemporary rural Nigeria: An introduction**

About 80 percent of Nigeria's population live in the rural areas. In other words, well over fifty million Nigerians live and work in rural surroundings, engaged in either farm or non-farm occupations with a rural base. It also means that, in spite of the rate and incidence of urbanization, much of the face of Nigeria still remains rural.

A bird's-eye view reveals Nigeria's variety of vegetation, ranging from the mangrove forests of the swampy south through the rain forests and Guinea savanna to the Sahara desert of the far north. Geological factors apart, this differential vegetation is in part a product of marked variations in rainfall, temperature, direction and duration of prevailing winds, and distribution of such factors as rivers, lakes and underground water, all of which combine and interact to determine soil fertility.

In terms of agriculture the result is that Nigeria is broken up into crop areas according to differing soil requirements of the various crops. These combined effects "exert a major influence on the types of indigenous plants grown, or on the exotic types which can be successfully introduced into the country" (Onyenuga, 1967, pp. 40—41). Thus we find that tubers, roots and tree crops prevail in the south, grains and cereals in the north, while a mixture of both is found in the central zone.

The main subsistence crops of the North are guinea corn, bulrush millet, peas, beans, and . . . cassava . . . Specialized crops include tomatoes, onions, maize, sweet potatoes, sugar cane, rice, wheat and tobacco. Groundnuts and cotton are the main crops grown for export. Goats are reared to provide the superb leather known to the outside world as Morocco leather, because before the British occupation the North exported most of its goods destined for the outside world by caravan across the Sahara to the countries of the Mediterranean littoral . . . The subsistence crops of this

area (i.e. Southern Nigeria) are yams, coco yams, cassava, maize, plantains, palm produce and rice, as well as . . . tomatoes, fruits and other vegetables. The West until recently was the richest of the four regions, producing for export cocoa, kola-nut, palm-oil, rubber and timber. The East produces timber, palm-oil, rubber . . . The Mid-West produces timber and rubber . . . (Michael Crowder, 1962, 1966, p. 24.)

Environmental factors also influence the nature and distribution of animal husbandry. "Climatic conditions generally, and the tsetse fly in particular, result in the majority of the cattle being in the dry savanna areas of the extreme north—in particular the Province of Sokoto, Kano and Bornu." (Stapleton, 1965, p. 20.) It is hoped that, developments in spraying techniques may eventually change the present north—south distribution of animal husbandry.

## On models of agro-economic development: A synoptic survey

The evolution of Nigeria's agricultural economy can be legitimately summarized in three coherent hisotrical models: (1) The Commercialization/Monetization model, (2) The Industrialization model, and (3) The Agro-industrial model.

*The Commercialization model* represents the process of growth and development which characterized the transition from a closed subsistence and self-sufficient agriculture to a fairly open monetized agriculture characterized by production not only for the domestic but also for the world market. Historically speaking, this model can be applied to the period of Africa's first contact with Europe (i.e. the period which saw the end of the slave trade and the growth in its place of the trade in tropical agricultural products) and to the era of colonialism which articulated our marginal integration into the industrial capitalist system. Marginal because the commercialization of African agriculture was motivated by a desire to keep Africa as a market for the products of European industries, and as a producer of the raw materials for those industries. For while African agriculture was manipulated to serve European needs as created by the Industrial Revolution a conscious and deliberate attempt was made to shield agriculture from the technological advantages of that Revolution. G. K. Helleiner (1966, p. 12) says "...beyond offering the peasant farmers a vent for their potential surplus production, the foreigner did next to nothing to alter the technological backwardness of the economy... (for) the relative switch from food to export cropping was not a switch from backward to modern agriculture." Mcphee (1971, pp. 39—40) takes a similar view, "The trade in palm oil and the trade in groundnuts enabled West Africa to bridge the gulf between the

old days of the Slave Trade and modern times, but they just sufficed . . . they effected no revolution in the society of West Africa." Professor Oluwasanmi (1966, p. 11) contends

In Nigeria as in other African territories the course of economic development was dictated by the logic of colonial expansion in tropical Africa. Before these territories could be transformed into effective markets for European industrial goods it was necessary first to modify the subsistence structure of their economies by creating new economic relationships based on money. In Nigeria, this task was achieved in part by persuasion, in part by taxation, in part by the creation of new wants and in part by a sedulous appeal to the instincts of acquisition latent in all men. Successive British administrators and agricultural experts devoted their time to persuading peasants to produce crops for the world markets. New crops such as cocoa and groundnuts were introduced into the agricultural system. The ancient oil-palm industry was given a new lease of life. By peddling the mass-produced goods of European industries in all corners of the country, European as well as African traders succeeded in creating new wants hitherto unknown in the indigenous economic system.

The pursuit of a policy of agrarian fundamentalism in a monetized framework overflowed to other spheres of the economy: forestry, appended to agriculture like its shadow, and mining, remained extractive enterprises employing African labour in such operations as neither required nor transmitted technical skills.

*The industrialization model* represents the effort made to transform Nigeria from an agricultural into an industrial economy typical of Europe and America. Historically, it represents the process of development which characterized the efforts of the first decade of our independence. It is a modernization model reflecting an ambitious but somewhat unsuccessful nationalist over-reaction to what was rightly considered a colonialist design to keep Nigeria as a source of primary products for European industries and as a market for finished consumer goods. Within the industrialization model, agriculture came to stand for underdevelopment and tradition, industries for development and modernity.

This nationalist over-reaction led to a spate of industrializing effort in Nigeria and other African countries. Economic development meant industrialization pure and simple. Plans were ill-conceived and poorly executed, with little or no feasibility studies. In many cases, narrow political motives guided the siting of projects and industrial plants, as was the case with the Nigerian Iron and Steel Industry, to mention one example. Politicians and politician/businessmen circled the globe begging for aid, most of which found its way into the private pockets of party stalwarts. Earnings from peasant agriculture, which was virtually left to take care of itself, were ploughed into questionable industrial ventures.

Little wonder that the Shomolu Tribunal of inquiry in the Western state showed that the farmers' schemes never existed; they were fictitious labels used by Western Nigerian politicians and their allies to siphon public funds into their pockets. I mention the Shomolu Tribunal because it was the only post-coup inquiry that made some progress. The political forces in the then

Northern and Eastern regions prevented such commissions from being set up at all.

Perhaps it is an overstatement to say that this attempt of industrialization has been unsuccessful, rather it has been an effort with limited success. One of the factors (probably the most crucial) which accounts for this limited success is the peripheral character of our development. As Samir Amin (1974, p. 9) lucidly argues, "The peripheral systems are dominated by production of luxury goods and exports and the consequent lack of internal mass markets. This leads to growing inequality, technological dependence . . . (and) . . . marginalization." A full treatment of the centre-periphery, dependence/independence, development/underdevelopment aspect of African economies belongs to the section on the international context of our problems. Here I only want to draw attention to a valid distinction between industrialization in the developing countries and industrialization in the advanced countries, a distinction which Samir Amin (1974) in his four sector model ably sums up in the "difference between a self-centred system and a peripheral one".

With particular reference to Nigeria, Professor Oluwasanmi (1966, p. 208) gives a picture of this industrial rat race which gave rise to

the building of industries that bear little or no relation to the existing economic advantages and growth capacities as determined by demand for industrial products and the existence of raw materials . . . Giant dam projects, iron and steel complexes, skyscrapers, and national airlines have become modern symbols of development. Investment in farm implements, pesticides, fertilizers, land resettlement, and in the extension service is often regarded, for the reason that it is agricultural, as a continuation of colonial forms of development even though the returns . . . may be higher than the returns on investment in dams, iron and steel, skyscrapers and airlines.

For a full appreciation of the operation of this model it is necessary to observe that the illuminating picture given by Oluwasanmi may have been a little oversimplified. I may also have exaggerated the situation by averring that peasant agriculture was virtually left to take care of itself: there were investments in agriculture, there were attempts to stimulate peasant productivity as well as to initiate agricultural modernization through the establishment of plantations and farm settlements. The main short-coming of these efforts lay in the fact that they were geared towards satisfying the increased need for foreign exchange in order to finance the giant industrial ventures. Thus the nationalist over-reaction to the colonialist agrarian fundamentalism, revealed in the pursuit of industrialism, unleashed a host of new problems which the half-thought out development plans never envisaged: the need for foreign exchange subjected the economy to the vicissitudes of the international market, the industrial enterprises failed to operate at the anticipated capacities that could create enough jobs for the army of school leavers; the farm settlements, designed after the pattern of the Israeli Moshavi, were more of economic disasters than absorbers of school leavers. The Israeli Moshavi were actually intended to settle the Jewish refugees, and we copied the pattern, little realizing that our colonial


system of education produces a refugee of a different order—a refugee from agriculture to the urban industrial centres.<sup>10</sup>

*The Agro-industrial model* came into operation owing to a loss of faith in the industrialization model. In our disillusionment with an industrialization race which far from advancing us towards the so-called take-off stage, continued to widen the gap between the rich and the poor nations, to multiply urban slums and threaten us with famine, we turned to search for a healthier and more balanced strategy of socio-economic development. Instead of treating agriculture and industry as mutually exclusive sectors in the process of economic growth, envisaging a stage at which agriculture will be phased out in developmental importance while giant industries dominate our economic scene, an awareness arose of the need for a harmonization of agricultural and industrial progress. The notion that somehow agriculture should grow in industry and industry should grow out of agriculture gradually began to dominate the thinking of our planners and policy makers. Hence agro-industrialization came to be the prevailing model of economic development. This model is partly a cause and partly an effect of the need for correcting the imbalance between the rural and the urban areas, of the need to stem the tide of rural-urban exodus, of the need for rural improvement. Today development experts talk of rural electrification plans, rural industrialization plans and rural welfare. How much is talk, and how much is plan-fulfilment still remains to be seen.

### **Socio-economic development: Towards a definition**

At this juncture it is pertinent to suggest a definition of socio-economic development. This is important for two distinct but related reasons. While some development experts explicitly state their notion of development, others proceed on the assumption that we all know what development is. The snag however is that both those who explain their definition and those who assume it, either by design or by default, fall prey to a number of disturbing biases. As a result, much of the evergrowing body of development literature is more than bewildering. For this reason, I will only address myself imm ediately to Samir Amin's four sector model of development which provided the theoretical well-spring of my own notion of socio-economic development.

Samir Amin (1974, p. 9) posits "a fundamental difference between . . . capital accumulation and . . . economic and social development characteristic of a self-centred system and that of a peripheral system". This difference is not only fundamental. It is absolutely crucial. With characteristic intellectual tidiness, Samir Amin (1974, p. 10) diagrammatically illuminates this difference between a self-centred system and a peripheral system:



According to Samir Amin, sectors 2 and 4 represent the essential features of the advanced economies, while sectors 1 and 3 represent those of the developing economies of the Third World. The former are self-centred while the latter are peripheral and dependent.

The point of immediate interest to this study is that the peripheral economy came into being as a result of demands imposed on it from outside—the supply of primary products. The consumption pattern which followed on this development of an export economy was essentially consumer-oriented and generated by the import-substitution industrialization. This meant, and still means, production for the rich few, the upper middle class. It left the majority of the population out of the stream of so-called development. Therefore, whatever may be the volume of the gross national product and however high per capita income may soar, this sort of development or more correctly, *growth without development* (Clower et al; 1966), leaves the masses without the means of subsistence.

The theoretical utility of Samir Amin’s model lies in the fact that it can incorporate “questions of social structure, and other important problems of the contemporary world, including the social (among others unemployment, underdevelopment and marginality), and the ideological and political (particularly the problems of social consciousness, class consciousness, planning, mobilisation of resources and men, education and its social role)”. (Samir Amin, 1974, pp. 9–10.)

In sum, underdevelopment is not the original state of third world countries, but rather the product of structural dependence incorporated into the capitalist system. Continued development within this structure has led and continues to lead to a proliferation of the problems of capitalist expansion. The net result is a polarization of wealth and poverty. The majority of the population are left out of the development stream. A meaningful development therefore (and this is the prime tenet of this thesis) is a process of socio-economic and political transformation of problem-generating structures in such a way that the masses are meaningful participants in, as well as sharers of, its costs and benefits.



## **Problem-generating structures—towards a definition**

In an earlier section, I sketchily specified the independent, control and dependent variables, with a view to a later discussion in greater detail. I will now formulate a definition of problem-generating structures and illuminate their developmental implications with special reference to Nigeria.

Problem-generating structures consist of those ecological, socio-cultural, economic and political elements from which derive strains and stresses potentially or actually felt by individuals and social groups. These strains and stresses may or may not be converted into needs and problems to serve as preconditions for problem-solving action. Within the discipline of sociology there are as many classes of problems as there are areas of study. Within one problem area, the definition of the problem differs among individual social scientists. Therefore the conception of problems can be quite problematic—it is determined by the ideological and intellectual background of the social scientist. The social scientist could also allow his definition to be determined by the ways in which ordinary people facing the predicaments of development and underdevelopment, rather than social scientists in contexts of concept formation and theoretical deduction, define their own personal needs and problems, the needs and problems of their community and of their nation.

Structures may facilitate development, but they may also impede development. Some structures may facilitate development in one respect, for some individuals, groups or social classes, and simultaneously impede it in others, for other individuals, groups or social classes. A structure which facilitates or impedes development at one point in time, may prove to impede or facilitate development on another occasion. To exemplify, the marketing boards, as a set of institutional structures, (in the form of the West African Produce Control Board) came into existence during the 2nd World War. Whatever the functional defects of the boards, they benefited the farmers in at least one respect, in that they helped to find markets for the farmers' products and thus avoid a war-induced slump. Today, the marketing boards have become a stumbling block for the farmers (while at the same time being functional to other groups or classes) in that they depress the prices of farm products. In short, the marketing boards have been turned into an instrument for taking the surplus from the producers, through an unhealthy taxation system.

The structures which generate problems for a pluralistic country like Nigeria can be broken down into three distinct but interacting types:

1. *Economic structures* generating such problems as the need for arable lands, credit, jobs and markets, and questions of economic concentration, domination, dependence and underdevelopment, even of exploitative development.
2. *Cultural structures: the clash of cultures*—those units of action or social identification which are objects of different cultural expectations and social definitions may generate problems when, where and if such different expectations and

demands come into conflict. Problems generated by cultural interaction may imply the erection of barriers to market exchange between different cultures or cultural spheres. Thus not only may cultural interactions derive from economic structures which have strengthened cultural conflicts through mechanisms of domination, but they may also affect economic structures in such a way as to generate further problems of an economic nature. Differences in education and technology and the differential values they impart fall under this heading. Nigeria's agriculture may have suffered more from the transfer of wrong technology, and the establishment of technical institutions may induce a continuity in the wrong direction as such institutions may fail to serve the urgent need for the assimilation and diffusion of skills to the majority of the population.

3. *Ethno-geo-political structures*: The location of political and ethnic units of different sizes and power within, between, or across geographical areas may generate problems related to mobility of labour, goods and services, or problems of political legitimacy and of ethnic imbalance in the distribution of the costs and benefits of economic and social development. The strains, options<sup>11</sup> and constraints inherent in such structures have far reaching socio-economic and political implications.

The discussion and analysis of problem generation, identification, awareness, articulation and problem-solving action will be set in the conceptual framework relating to such structures. Nigeria as the unit of analysis is to be considered as a socio-economic and political system operating within the larger system of world political economies which constitute the external factors of influences. In this study attention will be concentrated on the effects of economic structures, with a few glimpses at the effects of other structural factors. I will at this juncture therefore dwell on the meaning of the concepts of *dependence/development and underdevelopment*, as they are frequently used here in particular and in the general literature and somehow have been subject to confusion. An economy may be at once (1) dependent and underdeveloped (Namibia), (2) dependent and exploitatively developing (Nigeria), (3) dependent and developed (Canada), (4) independent and partly underdeveloped (China), (5) independent and developed (USA).

Of course, in this context I am considering development only in terms of the economy, for in terms of polity and civilization, China for instance is more developed than the USA. Within the African continent, there were cases of full-fledged civilizations and polities which but for colonialism would have continued into the modern world: The Ashanti, Benin, Dahomey, and Congo kingdoms, the Hausa-Fulani and Oyo Empires, and the city-states of the Niger Delta, all lost their former glory as a result of imperialist expansion in Africa. Dependence in this context is measured by the degree of control exercised on the economy by internal (as against external) forces in the service of internal needs of mass consumption and capital investments. Pertinent here is Samir

Amin's four-sector model of development and underdevelopment which has already been discussed.

As far as the economic structure goes, the breakdown of the rural population into categories is predicated on the analytical conception of market dependence—on both quantitatively and qualitatively different positions in the structure of the Nigerian agro-rural economy. It is built on the hypothesis that differential involvement in the cash nexus or the modern market economy has differing implications and consequences not only for the creation, identification, awareness and articulation of problems, but also for the capacity for problem-solving action. One hypothesis here is that the greater the dependence on the market—particularly the external market—the greater the loss of autonomy and self-sufficiency, implying also the loss of control over resources necessary for action in the context. Of course one could also put forward the alternative hypothesis that only the cash nexus, implying dependence on the risks and opportunities of the market, can bring about the growth which will provide the resources from which further growth is possible. In testing the first hypothesis, however, one will automatically also shed light on its alternative.

This study, therefore, has its central focus on highlighting the relationships between (a) market dependence and recorded social exchange balance in the context of extended family networks—where isolation from such exchange is considered an “objective” problem; (b) market dependence and subjective problem awareness, identification and articulation; (c) market dependence and quantitative problem load and problem-solving capacity.

# III The Genesis of the Problem

From the brief historical survey in chapter two we could see that pre-colonial Africa developed in its own way and dynamically responded to the challenges posed by its environment. The contact with Europe started with the trade in human cargo until a point was reached when it was in the interest of Europe to switch over to trade in raw agricultural commodities. The fact that raw materials successfully replaced slaves as trade goods can be explained neither by the activities of the abolitionists in Europe, nor by the missionary zeal of the crusaders who reached a rapprochement with the imperial flag on the African continent. The secret of the success lay in the Industrial Revolution. Acceptance of this theory "is not to belittle Wilberforce and humanitarians . . . The fact is Britain was really economically ready for this change-over from an economy of mercantilism, based largely on the Indian trade and slave-carrying between Africa and the West Indies, to that of the first industrial nation in Europe". (Crowder, 1962, 1966, p. 126). As a matter of historical fact, therefore, Africa's dependence and peripheral status started at this critical time which marked the transition from trade in slaves to trade in goods. The theory that this caused the underdevelopment of African indigenous technology and industry will provide the subject-matter of this chapter.

## Commercialization for what? For whom?

It is generally regarded as a well-established historical truth that the arrival of the European in Africa, particularly the advent of colonial rule, marked the beginning of a period of great changes in which African economies were for the first time to undergo the happy transition from subsistence to commercialized exchange. This truth is regarded as unchallengeable especially with respect to African agriculture. Allan Mcphee (1926, p. 9) has described this transformation as "an Agricultural Revolution . . . from the growth of subsistence crops and the collection of sylvan produce to the cultivation of exchange crops, with the necessary implication of a transistion from a 'Natural' economy to a 'Monetary' economy, and the innumerable important reactions from the latter phase".

Such an assumption contains a basic belief which has hardly been question-

ed. It takes for granted that commercialization is an immutable constant both in time and over geo-political space. Thus commercialized agriculture was taken to mean the same thing for Europeans as well as for Africans. It was in the mutual interest of Britain and Nigeria to conduct commercialized exchange based on British currency.

### **A further excursion into history**

A fundamental problem which is at the core of this study and which must therefore be discussed in more detail is that of distinguishing between commercialization initiated by the British and commercialization that antedated colonial rule.

Intense internal trade within, between and across regions was a remarkable feature of pre-colonial Africa. Walter Rodney (1973, pp. 51—52) argues that the growth of continental trade in Africa reaches as far back as the 10th century, and that the increasing use of forms of money exchange as against barter is a pointer to both the volume of trade and its qualitative development. Rodney cites salt, cloth, iron hoes and cowrie shells<sup>12</sup> as popular forms of money in addition to gold and copper. He writes, "In a few places, such as North Africa, Ethiopia and the Congo, the monetary systems were quite sophisticated, indicating that the economy was far removed from simple barter and subsistence." (p. 52). The fact that West Africa is known to commercial history as the Africa of the trade means that trade in this part of the world went far beyond barter. Allan Mcphee (1926, p. 44) notes that cotton grown and woven into cloth by West Africans had by the 16th century "achieved such a reputation that it was exported through the Barbary merchants in exchange for European and other commodities".

Marion Johnson (1974, p. 181) gives us a comprehensive insight into the spread of the indigenous cotton industry in particular and other industries like salt and leather. He argues that these industrial activities were carried on as extra-subsistence enterprises and that the cotton industry was one of the largest. Johnson also observes that the cotton cloth was not only a commodity but also a currency in many areas of what is today known as West Africa:

Much of the internal trade was concerned with the distribution of cloth from the great weaving centres such as Kano, the Mossi country, Nupe, Kong, the Segu area, Yorubaland, Borgu, Baoule, Mende country and many others. In some northern areas, the very currency was cotton cloth—in the Niger Bend and in the Upper Senegal/Upper Niger area, and also in Bargirmi east of lake Chad . . ."

Reuben Udoh, examining the relationship between "British Policy and the Development of Export Crops in Nigeria" (1967, p. 303), came upon similar historical evidence that "Indigenous varieties of cotton have been cultivated in

Nigeria for many centuries” and that “export was largely in the form of cotton gowns and cloth”.

Discussing the fusion of commerce and industry in the economy of pre-colonial Kano, Michael Crowder (1962, 1966, pp. 217—218) noted that “almost every family has its share” in these activities and, what is more, that “The chief articles of native industry, beside cloth, which have a wide market, are principally sandals . . . tanned hides (‘kulabu’) and red sheep skins, dyed with a juice extracted from the stalks of the holcus, are not unimportant, being sent in great quantities even as far as Tripoli”.

### **Indigenous industry**

Besides providing proof of a dynamic and changing agriculture and of the existence of indigenous currency system, at least in West Africa, the historical ground thus far covered in this study points to the existence of indigenous industry in pre-colonial Africa. This issue bears further examination, as it affects our understanding of the technological dependence or, more correctly, the technological arrest which is the lot of contemporary African countries and of the nature of the industrialization process in post-colonial Africa and most of the Third World.

In a footnote on this question of the indigenous cotton industry, Mcphee (1926, p. 44) observes that El Bekri, writing about the time of the Norman Conquest in England, reported that African cotton was the product of cottage industry, that ‘chigguiya’ was the name given to the cloth made of cotton, and that the ‘chigguiya’ were of such quality and attained such universal popularity that “they passed from hand to hand as currency, in the same way as native grain, salt and copper rings”.

Walter Rodney in his *How Europe underdeveloped Africa* (1973, p. 50) contends that “Africa had even better to offer in the form of cotton cloth, which was widely manufactured before the coming of the Europeans. Well into the present century, local cottons from the Guinea Coast were stronger than Manchester cottons”.

Marion Johnson (1974), who has already been cited, documents the rare quality of African manufactures. His examples go far beyond the indigenous cotton industry. He quotes the report of one of the administrative officers in the Niger area:

Native cloth is manufactured in great quantities and competes favourably with Manchester cottons; locally-won salt competes with British salt; locally grown kolas with imported kolas. The leather work and dyes of Kano and other large cities supply local wants to the exclusion of imported goods; while the natron from the north-east permeates the whole Protectorate, penetrating to Lagos itself, and fosters the native manufactures which are largely, though not entirely, bartered in exchange for it. (p. 183.)

Such was the finish of African cotton materials that, in the words of Walter Rodney (1973, p. 113), the "European cloth industry was able to copy fashionable Indian and African patterns, and eventually to replace them".

Allan Mcphee (1926, pp. 44—45) observes that the native cloths maintained their popularity on the West Coast, and that up to the 20th century they were being used both "as currency in commercial operations and in payment of taxes to the English government".

It is worth noting that eventually the Colonial government refused to accept taxes in local cloth currency and instituted a system of tolls in its place. Marion Johnson (1974, pp. 182—3) has this to say in the case of Nigeria,

Lugard instituted a system of caravan tolls, intended, he says 'as a just payment by those who used the roads', rather than as a means of achieving his economic policy. He is remarkably defensive about these tolls, especially those imposed on imported goods; his apologia makes interesting reading. Internal trade (in articles neither imported nor exported) was taxed only by these tolls, and the imposition of tolls thus operated in favour of duty-paid imports.

The key term in the above passage is *economic policy*. The economic policy of Lord Lugard is synonymous with the expansionist policy of British Imperialism. This point of view will be clarified as the analysis proceeds. A number of conclusions can now be drawn; pre-colonial Africa was not a static society. Like any other society it was undergoing change and transition in response to its environmental needs and problems. Industrial technology was not only spreading through West Africa, to say the least, technological culture (of which agriculture is a part) had flowered when, if not before King William of Normandy started to lord it over England. Pre-colonial Africans were astute men and women of business and trade. Contrary to the impressions usually given in most circles, pre-colonial Africa was not engaged only in subsistence farming; it produced for the world market and had in many respects come a long way from barter to monetized exchange. Monetization in this respect was a process generated in response to the internal needs of the African population masses.

### **Colonial commercialization of agriculture**

What then do we mean by the "commercialization" of African economies during the colonial period? Reduced to the Nigeria situation, what is meant by the colonial commercialization of Nigerian agriculture? What was the motivation behind the British drive to commercialize our agriculture?

The colonial drive to commercialize the Nigerian agriculture involved the forcible introduction of a system of exchange based on British currency in preference to the already existing currency indigenous to West Africa and to Nigeria in particular. The use of British currency would facilitate the despatch of primary palm-produce, cocoa, rubber, groundnut and cotton to Britain, and

of finished British industrial products to Nigeria. It meant gearing primary commodity production to serve Britain's needs. This definition enables us to place the establishment of the West African Currency Board and the West African Produce Control Board in their proper historical and functional context. It allows us to assign the development of some kinds of infrastructures and bureaucratic organs to their Nigerian colonial setting.

I therefore hesitate to share the view that colonialism ushered in an era of *Economic Revolution in West Africa*. The economic revolution did take place not so much in West Africa as in Britain and America. The Industrial Revolution in England generated a set of socio-economic problems to which effective solution was found in capitalist expansion overseas. Little wonder that Joseph Chamberlain said, "The Foreign Office and Colonial Office are chiefly engaged in finding new markets and in defending old ones" (Nicolson, 1969, p. 15).

*The solution that became a problem\**

The industrial Revolution created the need for raw materials to feed European industries, and for markets to absorb European finished products. This is the genesis of colonialism which perfected African integration into the capitalist system. This is the genesis of the concomitant process of commercialization in the sense just indicated.

The solution had far-ranging implications for indigenous African industry and technology. It also created the double necessity to crush existing industries to make room for European manufactures, and to keep African agriculture as a supplier of raw materials. For some products like oil which had not developed into an industry, the task was much easier. All that was required was as Helleiner (1966, p. 12) said, "to dangle sufficiently attractive prices before the producers' noses to persuade them to convert potential into actual surpluses by increasing their inputs".

Allan Mcphee (1926, pp. 30—32), discussing the importance of palm produce for the solution of some of the problems, noted that the tremendous increase in population consequent on the Revolution created the demand for oil which palm produce was able to meet. Culinary needs, the vogues of cleanliness and nocturnal illumination and the use of metal in place of wooden machinery created the demand for margarines and fats, soaps and detergents, stearic candles and lubricants. The demand for all these strained the old sources of animal and fish oils.

The native soap industry never developed because there was little or no demand for it. Even before the full flowering of colonialism the Lever Brothers had already seized the market. As Allan Mcphee (1926, p. 9) rightly observed, although Europeans had initial problems in persuading Africans to buy imported goods, it eventually became unfashionable among Africans to use commodi-

\* See Ulf Himmelstrand, "The problem that was a solution" (1976).



ties of native manufacture. For the bid to keep Africa as a European market provoked the spirited and self-appointed task of "mission civilisatrice" which took a variety of forms, ranging from the creation and manipulation of African tastes, wants and manners to the outright destruction of whatever indigenous industrial and technological culture had existed.

The contribution of cotton exports to the solution of the needs of industrial England is no less spectacular. The saga of imperial policy in achieving this end is very revealing, if only because the African cotton industry antedated the rise of the Lancashire textile industries.

We have seen from the literature, that the cotton which was indigenous to Africa was already being produced not only for internal use but for export. The central point to which attention is drawn at this juncture is that the export did not consist of raw cotton but of Africa's finished cotton cloth.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the export of African finished cotton cloth virtually came to an end. The reason did not lie in the quality of the African material. The literature cited so far contains abundant evidence that this material was superb and enjoyed popularity beyond the African continent. The reason is to be found in the character of the needs created by the Industrial Revolution in England and the related problem of sources of supply.

Allan Mcphee (1926, p. 45) expressed the reason succinctly thus, "The export of raw cotton to England from West Africa was begun in the fifties of last century at a time when the price of cotton in the world market was rising and the Lancashire cotton industry was feeling the pinch of short supplies". Yet the reason why England of the industrial Revolution came to feel the pinch of short supplies calls for elaboration; Nzemeke (1975, p. 93) explains, "the question of cotton supply in England was becoming rather disturbing on account of the political difficulties developing in the United States from where England drew her supplies mostly". From this point onwards, the pressure increased on all sides. The Cotton Growing Association was set up to find a solution to the problem. It recommended methods of production, and special strains to be produced for British industries. It was no easy task, but in the last analysis the imperial will held sway. Indeed in the case of Nigeria, imperial policy in the matter seemed to be reduced to the task of diverting "the supply of cotton from the Nigerian handlooms to the power-looms of Lancashire" (Allan Mcphee, 1926, p. 49). Marion Johnson brilliantly summarized the logic of imperialist expansion in his "*Cotton Imperialism in West Africa*" (1974). As he puts it, "Reduced to its crudest expression, the desire of the importing merchant would no doubt be to see native industries other than the production of raw material for export, crushed, in order that they may be superseded by imported manufactures..." (p. 183).

As I have already pointed out, imperial policy not only checked the advance of the already well-developed industry such as cotton; the swamping of the African market with European products prevented the development of other native industries which were still at the rudimentary stage. Where imperial

policy met with resistance, “mission civilisatrice” was supported either by police action, full-scale military expeditions, humble peace talk, subterfuge, intimidation or blackmail. Flora Nwapa (1966, pp. 4, 105) in one of her novels vividly and rather humorously recaptures one of the many aspects of this imperial policy in the case of the native manufacture of gin from the palm and rafia wine:

Efuru brought out a bottle of home-made gin—a very good one that had been in a kerosene tin for nearly six months. ‘I am sure you will like this gin. Nwabuzo had it buried in the ground last year when there was rumour that policemen were sent to search her house. When the policemen left, finding nothing, Nwabuzo was still afraid and left it in the ground. A week later, she fell ill and was rushed to the hospital where she remained for six months. She came back only a week ago. So the gin is a very good one’ . . . ‘Why the government does not allow us to drink our home-made gin, I do not know. The Government is strange. Doesn’t it know that it cannot stop us from cooking gin; that our people will continue to go to jail instead of giving it up completely. If they must stop us from cooking gin, then the white man’s gin and his schnapps should be sold cheap.’

To summarize, Africa’s technological dependence is rooted in the imperial history of capitalist expansion which followed in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. This is the origin of our socio-economic underdevelopment. In the case of Nigeria, this is the genesis of our agrarian underdevelopment. It is the origin of the rural-urban imbalance so noticeable in the process of growth and development of the Nigerian economy. This apparently intractable problem of rural-urban imbalance will form the subject of the next chapter.

Imperial and Industrializing Britain, in the attempt to solve her problems, created a number of structures which caused and continue to cause problems for Nigerian farmers. It is within the overall framework of these and subsequent structures that the farmer’s problems are subjectively perceived, defined, articulated and acted upon. We shall consider these problems in their specific and greater detail in chapter 5. Meanwhile, there is no better note on which to end this brief survey than that of Oginga Odinga (1967, p. 104):

Immediately after the war there was renewed pressure from the Colonial Office for the colonies to meet acute shortages in food and raw materials for the reconstruction of the metropolitan economy. The war had brought about a decisive change in the balance of power between Britain and the United States . . . Sterling was under fierce pressure from the dollar. Britain turned to her colonies to meet her economic deficit. Between 1945 and 1951 the sterling balances of her colonies doubled. Intensified production in the colonies helped restore Britain’s balance of payment position but it placed a severe strain on African resources.

## **The present as a legacy of the past**

By the eve of colonial rule, the prospect of independence brought new hopes and buoyant aspirations. When independence was eventually achieved, we learned by bitter experience that political emancipation was by no means

synonymous with economic freedom. Africa's economic dependence did not disappear on achievement of political independence. Economic dependence then took on a subtler and more pernicious form of cooperation, aid and advice. No sooner was the Union Jack lowered than neo-colonialism came into its own. As Rupert Emerson (1960, p. 20) remarked, "Only the most naive or doctrinaire anti-imperialist could believe that merely by transforming colonies or quasi-colonies into independent sovereign states would it be possible to cut off the complex entanglements of the imperialist system without bequeathing a host of old and new problems to succeeding generations".

Indeed, to be specific, not only is Africa's agrarian underdevelopment a legacy of her colonial past, but the structural context within which the African peasantry emerged is the product of colonialism. The adoption of this attitude does not mean that the presence of peasantlike dimensions in the rural life of pre-colonial Africa is forgotten. The crucial point is that the "incursion of imperialism and particularly of formal colonialism has gradually forced a large proportion of rural dwellers in Africa to take on the characteristics of a peasantry". (John Saul, 1974, p. 45). This is why the problems of the peasantry can be understood only within the framework of analysis of the problems arising from the capitalist system initiated in the colonial era. Therefore, "What we witness today in the underdeveloped world is a reproduction of the colonial situation, reflected with unmistakable clarity in the socio-economic position of the peasant population". (Jacoby, 1971, p. 123.)

Far from being a mere episode in the life of African nations, colonialism refers both to an era in history and to the contemporary socio-economic and political situation of these nations. It is against this background that I shall formulate a structural framework within which I shall classify and describe Nigerian farmers and peasant farmers.

### **The individual farmer and social structure: The amorphous peasantry<sup>13</sup>**

Most students of the African society have proceeded more often than not on the assumption that there are no classes in Africa or that classes are only beginning to emerge. Deliberately or inadvertently ignorant of the total context of African history, these scholars recreate the traditional African society on which they base their interpretations of contemporary events and developments. This rosy picture of the past, projected into the present, leads to a rather complacent analysis which omits *class* from its purview. The intellectual, ideological and political background of so-called 'African socialism' derives from this notion of classlessness. The fact that the traditional African societies were communitarian or based on extended family relationships (relationships which have come under considerable strain owing to the impact of Africa's contact with the capitalist West) is often used to argue that contemporary African societies have

a kind of built-in socialism—hence the African brand of socialism. To my mind this argument is a kind of sophistry, implying that all traditional African societies were egalitarian (and there is evidence to the contrary). Our possession of extended kinship relationships is not a sufficient condition for contemporary Africa to develop along socialist lines; for this to be true, we have to make a conscious effort, if socialism is the goal of all African societies! Today class analysis is as underdeveloped as Africa itself, because as the *Review of African Political Economy* (1975, No. 3) put it (pp. 1—2),

Governments and politicians, bureaucrats and academics have officially declared African societies to be classless. Class analysis has been deemed by them inappropriate . . . , it has been seen as divisive. African socialism promised to maintain or restore the supposed classless society of the pre-colonial past. Since there were neither exploiters nor exploited classes, nor any fundamental cleavages in society . . . , African regimes could thus legitimate themselves as representatives of the needs of all the people, and they could suppress those who questioned the united purposes of the 'nation'. Like African socialism, development under the direction of the state, was to be above class . . . the ideology of African socialism was used to put the study of Marxist method beyond bounds . . . , Economists denied the political implications of what they were doing. Political scientists identified conflicts and cleavages among parties, factions and individuals, but kept them separate from any analysis of the class relations. Sociologists emasculated the concept of class by assimilating it to the study of stratification.

If this is true of the analysis of the social relations of production in total African national economies, it is more so of most studies of the agro-rural sector. Here this simplistic analysis loses sight of the inequalities which arise from differences in the initial conditions of the individual farmers. The concept of the African extended family is quickly employed to gloss over the existence of glaring differences in income, landed property and in other material possessions which are the concomitants of differential access to social and political power. In short, we are told that the poor are not really poor, as they feed from the crumbs which fall from their 'affinal betters' table'.<sup>14</sup> We are presented with the picture of a peasantry among whom the metrics of socio-economic relations are characterized by a harmonious and scrupulous give and take. Little wonder, Brewster (1967, p. 77) contended that "The primacy of village loyalties takes the form of scrupulous observance of reciprocity in exchanges of mutual help among members of the village or of clan groups among several villages".

Admittedly, as our empirical data will show in the fifth chapter, a measure of exchange does still obtain within kinship and friendship networks, but certainly not in the sense of a *scrupulous observance* of reciprocity. Brewster's traditional village has, to a large extent, been stripped of its moralistic underpinning by what John Saul (1974, p. 45) aptly described as "its forced insertion, as a dependency, within the broader Europe-centred imperial system".

#### *Nigeria: agricultural occupational structure*

The agricultural population of Nigeria can be broken down into the following categories:

1. Subsistence farmers pure and simple i.e. PEASANTS proper. These are relics of the pre-European contact with Africa. They remain so willy nilly.

2. Subsistence-cum-cashcrop farmers i.e. PEASANT/CASHCROPPERS. These produce not only for their subsistence and that of their dependants but also for the world and domestic markets. Having one foot in the subsistence sector and the other in the cashcrop sector, they are in a position to balance subsistence with cash crop production, and to shift in favour of one or the other in response to prevailing market conditions. A variant of this class can be made by distinguishing between Peasant/Cashcroppers who produce for the domestic market and Peasant/Cashcroppers who produce for the world market—a more refined distinction but of little significance as some of the export crops have found their use also in the domestic market.

3. Subsistence farmers-cum-trade i.e. PEASANTS IN TRADE. These have one foot in subsistence farming and the other in economic activities outside agriculture. The rural shopkeeper, the rural barber, the rural tailor and the itinerant traders in either agricultural and non-agricultural, or both, products belong to this category.

4. Cashcrop farmers-cum-trade i.e. CASHCROPPERS IN TRADE. These have one foot in production for the domestic/world market and the other in economic activities outside agriculture. The common feature of both 3 and 4 is that their trade activities are secondary to agriculture. In my view, once trade becomes the primary source of income, the individual in either of these categories loses his position as farmer.

5. Cashcrop farmers pure and simple, i.e. individuals who engage in farming as a commercial enterprise. They are largely capitalist farmers. In this category we find owners of plantations and farm estates. A farmer in this respect may not necessarily be doing the actual job of farming; he is a farmer to the extent that he invests in the business of agriculture by way of extra-familial labour, land, capital and technical inputs for maximum profitability. Horizontally speaking, he may not necessarily have become a farmer after being a peasant, although a large number of African farmers do come from the peasant class.

This list could be regarded as a qualitative classification of farmers, but we would also like to claim an underlying ordinal quantitative dimension, the *degree of commercialization of farming*. The rationale behind this continuum is heuristic and exploratory—namely to discover the bearing of monetization and commercialization of farming, first on objective problems of exchange and support within kinship structures, and secondly on subjective perception, identification, articulation and solution of problems.

#### *Class structure and the agrarian sector*

The above classification can be further refined by distinguishing between

cashcrop farmers who produce for the world market and cashcrop farmers who produce food crops for the Nigerian domestic market. It must however be re-iterated that for most crops, like the groundnut and oil (even cocoa), the distinction is not very helpful, as they increasingly find both domestic and world markets. In theory, the distinction can help the analyst establish the difference between the problems faced by the domestic market cashcrop producer and by the world market cashcrop producer.

This classification is by no means an exercise in class analysis. It is only an attempt to place farmers in their horizontal structures with respect to the processes of commercialization. Within a particular category, it in no way helps us understand the differential or unequal access of individual farmers to socio-economic and political resources. It is this differential access to resources, situational and structural opportunities which places the individual farmer in a vertical position in the society. It is this vertical position which enables us to distinguish the less endowed farmer from his better endowed counterpart within, for instance, one and the same category of pure cashcrop farmers and/or peasants-in-trade.

When individuals are classified in accordance with the criterion of differential access to resources, they are said to be placed in their socio-economic status categories or socio-economic classes. A class runs through, or cuts across, the categories and without prejudice to these categories, restructures their individual members on a scale ranging from the very poor to the very wealthy farmers. Thus poor peasants in the five categories form a class of poor peasant farmers, and wealthy peasant farmers, found equally in all the five categories, form a class of rich peasant farmers. Objectively, the interests of the poor peasants are different from, and even opposed to, those of the wealthy peasant farmers. Even within the broad category of peasants proper, "the economic interests and behaviour patterns of the peasant landlords differ . . . from those of ordinary peasants". (Gunnar Myrdal, 1968, p. 1054.)

In the chapter on field data analysis and interpretation, I will use *socio-economic status* and its variant of *level of material possessions* as control variables. Among other control variables, it is the socio-economic status of the farmer which structures or conditions his awareness, articulation and solution of problems. *Ceteris paribus*, the individual farmer's socio-economic status conditions his problem-load and his capacity to use existing structures or create new ones to solve the problems. The Nigerian rural scene is therefore not one back-cloth<sup>15</sup> of a mass of equal peasants. It is a scene of contrasts. We have our share of rich and poor farmers, of small family farms and big estates, migrant sharecroppers and tenant-farmers. This point is well illustrated in Helleiner's *Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria* (1966). Drawing on a case study of Western Nigeria cocoa farmers, Helleiner (1966, p. 78) reports that "About 55 per cent of the cocoa farmers in a survey in the early 1950's held only 19 per cent of the cocoa land while at the other end of the distribution 1 1/2 per cent of the farmers held 12 per cent, and 10 per cent of them held 41 per cent of the

cocoa land". This pattern of unequal distribution of cocoa land reflects the pattern of distribution and ownership of other land. The survey's inclusion of family land in the computations did not alter the picture. As Helleiner noted "A little over 2 per cent of the families held 20<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> per cent of all the land, and 9 per cent held 38 per cent; at the lower end of the scale 37 per cent of the families held less than 10 per cent of the land, and 55 per cent held only 19<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> per cent".

Helleiner (1966, p. 78) corroborated the above evidence with similar results from a study by Galetti, Baldwin and Dina (1956, p. 149), who reported three main groups or classes of cocoa farmers in Western Nigeria: "the small farmers who are most numerous but hold little of the total land under cocoa and produce a small part of the cocoa exported; the middling farmers who have more than 1 1/4 but less than 6 acres and produce a fair proportion of the cocoa; and the larger farmers who hold more than 6 acres each and produce more than half the cocoa".

In her recent study of Northern Nigeria's *Rural Hausa* (1972, p. 57) Hill, with her characteristic scepticism of conventional economics, warns that "the evidence for economic inequality" among the small community of Batagarawa can be found neither in the demographic patterns nor in the "economic behavior of that dangerous statistical artefact, the average or representative farmer" but in "the complementary relationship between richer and poorer farmers, who have different roles and ambitions . . ."

Given the history and character of our incorporation into the world market, the structure of inequality is no surprise. That it continues to operate in such a menacing way as to polarize wealth and poverty not only between but within nation states is in keeping with the contradictory tendencies of capitalism towards development and underdevelopment.

Thus, as John Saul and Roger Woods (1971, pp. 106—107) argue, even though Sub-Saharan Africa is still predominantly rural, "the ubiquitous reach of colonialism has ensured that no significant numbers of the primitive agriculturalists (I take issue with the adjective *primitive* and suggest *pre-colonial* in its place) who previously comprised the vast majority of the population have remained outside the framework of a wider economic system".

Polly Hill's *Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa* (1970) is an eloquent testimony to the fall-out of the capitalist system not only on the rural sectors but on whole national economies. She ably demonstrated how the migrant cocoa farmers set up as agri-businessmen investing not only in agriculture but also in extra-agricultural enterprises. *Mutatis mutandis*, what Issa Shivji (1975, p. 12) has found for Tanzania does apply to other African countries: "petty trade, transport, shops and real estate, are the economic activities that the rich peasants-immediately enter into 'as soon as they have made some cash in the agricultural activity'".

This untrammelled play of the commercialization process has resulted in what John Saul and Roger Woods (1971, p. 113) have described as "a complex pattern of stratification, one marked by a number of strata of agriculturalists

stretching all the way from capitalist farmer to landless labourer.”

At this point it must be emphasized that the phenomenon of land fragmentation in contemporary Africa is as much a question of demographic pressures as a product of commercialization and the accompanying land monopoly. In pre-colonial Africa, land was communally-owned. Only the chief, king or elder was invested with the right to keep it in trust. With the commercialization which was initiated by colonial powers, land assumed a commercial value which eventually and increasingly led to its concentration in a few hands. Gunnar Myrdal, in his *Asian Drama* (1968, pp. 1039—1040) puts forward an argument which is of general application to the issue of land tenure in the developing world,

Once the land tenure system had been adapted to Western concepts of private property, land became a negotiable asset. It could now be used as security for loans, and in case of default, could be forfeited and transferred . . . The effects of these changes were . . . felt most acutely in those parts of the region . . . where individual peasants were recognized as full proprietors of the land in the Western sense.

Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1967), which is an historical inquiry into the relative roles of the nobility and the peasantry in the making of the modern world, documents the impact of commercialization on the European traditional tenurial system. Much the same could be said for African traditional land tenure. For, with the initial boom enjoyed by the peasant economies through the increase of labour time and land,

the . . . notion of judging economic actions according to their contribution to the health of the social organism began to collapse. Men ceased to see the agrarian problem as a question of finding the best method of supporting people on the land and began to perceive it as the best way of investing capital in the land. They began to treat land more and more as something that could be bought and sold, used and abused, in a word like modern capitalist private property. (B. Moore, 1967, p. 8.)

Writing as early as 1961, Chubb registered the impact of commercialization on the Ibo traditional land tenure system,

It is doubtful whether any localities remain where cash is not now paid as rent for a single farming season, though formerly it was in kind, more in the nature of a present than a recognized standard rent. In Onitsha Division, both in the eastern area stretching from Nkwelle to Igbariam and in the riverain stretch to the south, it is also customary for landlords to demarcate the land they are leasing . . . The apparently spreading custom of marking out a plot is an indication of the growing commercialisation of land since it tends to lead to a standard rent for a specified area of land. (pp. 43—44.)

Perhaps in no other African institution has Euro-African contact left the legacy of the subtle and confused interplay of crude individualism, western legalism and unfeeling cash payment than in the land tenure system. Buell (1928) noted that colonial commercialization, which underlay the production for export, not only set the pace and direction of agricultural development, but also caused such frenzy in land acquisition that African lawyers and businessmen capitalized on it to make fortunes:



African lawyers draw up titles and mortgages purporting to convey land which in many cases is later found to belong not to the individual connected with the transaction, but to the family of which he is a single member. When litigation over these cases arises, the courts usually hold that family land cannot be alienated or mortgaged without the consent of the family. But in many cases, the court is kept in ignorance of the real status of the land, and it grants a judgement which in effect converts what was formerly communal land into an individual holding, to the detriment of several members of a family. (Buell, 1928, p. 762.)

Allan Mcphee (1926, p. 162) cites the case of Lagos where, prior to the advent of the British Government, only urban sites for stores had acquired exchange value, and where King Docemo had given 'rough conveyances' of land to liberated slaves from Sierra Leone who later resold the holdings. The cession of Lagos as a British Crown colony was to intensify this drift towards private ownership of land. Even more important than the role of the British Colonial Government claim to land ownership in undermining the native land tenure system was what Allan Mcphee (1926, p. 163) rightly described as "the subtle penetration of English law and ideas, as a result of the setting up of English courts of justice and of the influx of educated native lawyers". These courts, without regard to the native conception of land, treated land as if it were in England. Communal lands were forcibly seized to execute debts to individuals. Within a generation "the native system of land tenure in the Lagos district was largely disorganised and the foreign rights of alienation, sale and mortgage were fully established". (Allan Mcphee, 1926, p. 163.)

The issue of land ownership is raised here merely to indicate the scope and impact of commercialization and the accompanying importation of western ideas on such traditional institutions as African land tenure. Land and landed property in contemporary Africa touch on such a complex of socio-economic, cultural, political and legal problems that any detailed discussion of them will lead to a lengthy digression. A full treatment of these problems will engage not only social scientists and anthropologists but also legal experts trained in both the European and African legal traditions.

Within the narrow range of the agricultural sector therefore, the central thesis which I posit is that just as the contemporary African peasantry is the direct creation of western industrial capitalism, so is the African landlord class a product of the commercialization which the West brought to bear on African traditional land tenure systems. With this commercialization, land speculation became a normal and accepted business activity. Thus we find in the rural sector two polar tendencies or what John Saul and Roger Woods (1971, p. 109) aptly describe as "the possible movements towards proletarianization of migrant labourers on the one hand and towards capitalist agriculture on the other", each tendency chipping away at the peasantry and pulling it in different directions. In this respect, it is more than remarkable that capitalism which created the peasantry in the first place, as a solution to the problems generated by the Industrial Revolution in Europe, is today creating socio-economic and political structures which may,—it is hoped—aid in phasing out the peasantry.

Among others, the political consequence of these two contradictory tendencies is something which African political leadership must take into serious consideration. Serious because the fate of the African peasantry—precisely because of the system that tries to phase it out—is inexorably tied to the destiny of African political economies. This is the uncomfortable truth which African political leaders must face, whatever their ideological leaning.

The European political economies were able to phase out their peasantries largely because the Industrial Revolution created job opportunities in the expanding factories and industries. The result was that the very few peasants left on the land were easily converted into farmers who provide food for the urban and industrial population. What is more, the African cultivators were converted into a peasantry to produce for the industries of Europe. This was achieved by destroying African native industries and gearing the economies to export production. Today African economies find themselves in a different, and difficult, position. Import substitution leads to a dead end. It generates little employment because production is not mass-oriented but meant to serve the needs of the upper middle class. Use of local resources is severely limited and capital equipment is imported. Native technology went with native industry. This is clear from the historical flashbacks which have already been made.

The problems of urbanization and urban industrialization which derive from African incorporation into the capitalist system and the resulting rural-urban migration will form the subject of the next chapter. I will therefore dilate further on the question of the emergence of the landlords, in particular, the emergence of what some writers will prefer to call “rural bourgeoisie” or *rural elites*, following the terminology of Jacoby (1971). The main purpose of this exercise is to broach, within broader framework of class analysis, the structures which are functional or dysfunctional to agro-rural development.

I will now take off from the thesis which I have already posited, namely, that there are two contradictory tendencies in contemporary African agricultural development: one towards proletarianization of the peasantry, the other towards capitalist agriculture. Michael Stål's *Ethiopia: Political Contradictions in Agricultural Development* (1974) is, *mutatis mutandis*, a clear and unequivocal evidence of this polar tendency in African agriculture. With particular reference to Nigeria, Allan McPhee (1926, p. 163) illustrates this tendency when he points out that the great population increase in and about Lagos caused an increased demand for food, and that in response to this demand the natives acquired available land for the purpose of acting as landowning farmers who could employ hired labour, thus reaping the profits of “farmer and landlord”.

The pattern of landlord emergence in other parts of the Federation was in many ways similar to that found in Lagos. Within the context of the rural hinterland, one might discern an initial difference in that as a result of the application of indirect rule traditional rulers were the first to achieve the status of landlord. This was a result of the combined advantage of their position as land holders in trust and as paid servants of the colonial administration. For,

with commercialization in train, the traditional tributes which were paid in kind and in communal labour became objects of commercial transaction.

It should also be recalled that the traditional rulers were the major instruments used by the colonial government for effecting the transition to export crop production. They enforced the tax on the natives. They were equally responsible for introducing the seed strains and methods of cultivation recommended by the colonial authorities.

In a bid to have cotton gins set up in Northern Nigeria, the English District Resident of Nupe, in order to convince the Cotton Agency in England that the mechanism was not beyond the comprehension of the illiterate natives, argued that the machines would not "be given over to the generality but to the Chiefs and headsmen alone." (Nzemeké, 1971, p. 543.)

The subjugation of Benin 1897 led to a happy revelation of interior forests teeming with rubber trees which were in short supply, and to a consequent decree to preserve native agriculture and forestry against foreign exploiters and speculators. (Nzemeké, 1971, pp. 524—525.) It was easy to get the happy cooperation of the Chiefs in keeping a watch over the rubber products with the proviso that a proportion of the fines imposed on defaulters was made over to them.

The traditional rulers were the first to emerge as landlords and beneficiaries of the colonial commercialization of agriculture. But it will be overly simple to think that they were the only group to be enriched by the whole process. "Monetization spread slowly and provided an instrument for the wealthy groups to accumulate land." (Michael Stål, 1974, p. 49.) In time, new classes of wealthy men and women began to enter the landlord class, and in particular the agro-rural scene, from other points than the traditional authority status. It is the impact of these entrants from extra-traditional status points which justifies the use of the concept of *The Rural Bourgeoisie*. It is the activities of these *nouveaux riches* or *parvenus* from other walks of life more than those of the traditional rulers, which are not only hastening the polar tendencies towards proletarianization and capitalist agriculture but also threatening African economies with a perpetuation of these tendencies. As Samir Amin (1964, p. 37) maintains, "Firestone in Liberia is an exception in West Africa where large modern European plantations do not exist. One does find immense forest regions covered with 'little' African plantations. It is in these regions . . . that a real rural bourgeoisie has formed." They are men who are of the village but not necessarily in it; they are men who, by virtue of their education, skill, and contact with the outside world, influence events and developments both in the urban centres and rural hinterland. They influence events and developments neither—necessarily—in response to rural needs and problems nor in response to the need for food among the urban masses but in response to the structural and situational possibilities which modern technology and the modern international market economy create. They also control a good deal of local business in the rural areas; they are the men who produce agricultural goods on a large

scale, and these they can afford to store for the seasons which bring better prices. A good number of them are the real farmers, running the business of agriculture on a strictly commercial basis. It is the rural bourgeoisie who have gained from whatever technological and other improvements have occurred in Nigerian agriculture. And this because the structural imbalance favours them, and where it does not, the modification of existing structures or the creation of new ones is done in their favour. As Gunnar Myrdal (1970, p. 398) argued,

Contrary to the motivation generally pretended, all other attempts at institutional reform, subsidized aid of various types handled through local self-government and various schemes of cooperation, have in the absence of land reform implied a bypassing of the equality issue. These other reforms have actually tended to favour the higher strata in the villages, thus increasing instead of decreasing inequality in agriculture.

With specific reference to cocoa farming in Western Nigeria, S. M. Essang (1971, pp. 188—189) observes that “the marketing board, the most strategic institutional arrangement serving the cocoa economy, is also an important factor behind the unequal distribution of income among the cocoa farmers themselves”.

We have now come to a point where we shall attempt to piece together in a summary fashion the main arguments and message of this chapter. The assumption that pre-colonial Africa had no currency is not grounded on historical evidence. There is therefore the need, in any intelligible discussion of the *commercialization* of African economies, to distinguish between *pre-colonial commercialization* which was internally generated in response to the needs of the masses of the African population, and *colonial commercialization* which was externally generated in response to the needs and problems arising from the Industrial Revolution in England, Europe and America. Colonial commercialization effected a change in both the direction and content of trade in African products. Trade became not merely externally oriented but oriented particularly towards those European countries which have spheres of influence in Africa. African economies were forced into the status of primary producers for European industries. Thus it was not only indigenous currencies which were nipped in the bud, indigenous industries were distorted, destroyed or rendered redundant and ineffective. African technological culture was arrested and made incapable of further growth and development.

Thus began the problems of Africa's economic underdevelopment, of economic and technological dependency. Therefore, today when one hears of attempts to transfer western industrial technology to Africa, and that failure in this venture is attributable to Africa's lack of traditional socio-economic and industrial infrastructure, one will be in a better position to assess such attempts and explanations.

## The contemporary international context of the problem: Trade and capital movements, continuity of technological dependency and disconnected industrialization

As we have repeatedly emphasized, it is short-sighted to study the Nigerian farmer's problems only within the structural context of the rural sector, or even of the total national economy, without relating these needs and problems to the international scene. As Basil Davidson (1975, p. 5) noted

... still less are the real problems of independent Africa a matter of 'little local difficulties': of the frictions which attend upon the exercise of political self-rule after a long period of direct foreign domination, of the momentary upsurge of this or that discontent and factional demand, or of the irresponsibility of this or that leader and leading group. They may be all these things; in any case they are also much more than these things, and different from them.

A balanced understanding of Nigeria's economic problems (and agricultural problems in particular) calls for a "theory and analysis adequate to encompass the structure and development of the capitalist system on an integrated world scale and to explain its contradictory development which generates at once economic development and underdevelopment on international, national, local and sectoral levels". (Andre G. Frank, 1969, Preface, p. XV.)

Since our independence, no season ever passed without a fanfare of international conferences on the price of this or that commodity. The honourable ministers and commissioners for trade and economic development never tire of trotting the globe on price-negotiating and demand-creating missions, all in a bid to enlist the goodwill of the advanced industrialized world for the solution of our problems of underdevelopment. A large number of these missions and conferences may well have helped worsen rather than solve our problems. A good number of commodity agreements have more often than not been broken no sooner than they were made. "While we all pay homage in all international forums, in various conferences and seminars, to the concept of international cooperation, the world—particularly the rich world today—simply does not believe in it". (Mahbub ul Haq, 1974, p. 7.)

Witness a recent incident: France called a pre-summit meeting of both producers and consumers of oil. The meeting broke down mainly because oil producers wanted discussions to be broad-based, in the sense that they would want other primary commodities to be included in the discussions and not just oil which is of crucial interest to the industrialized countries. The deadlock is an indication of the nature of the goodwill and concern of the advanced countries over the problems besetting the developing countries whose economies are largely agrarian. The fact that these commodity conferences, missions and agreements worsen rather than solve our problems surprises only those who see them as a viable solution; it is a misguided exercise to appeal to the con-

science of those who held Africa in bondage for more than four centuries of slavery and colonial rule.

It is only just dawning on the third world countries that the issue of their underdevelopment, which is historically and structurally tied to the development of the rich West, cannot be settled by an appeal to *noblesse oblige*, but by an unrelenting use of every economic lever and vantage point in the scale of international and domestic politics. The use of such methods has been amply demonstrated in recent developments in the oil industry. As Frank Ellis (1974) noted, prior to the 1970s, the producer countries could at best voice the opinion that such prices (as predetermined by the seven) should be raised, and had made significant gains only in the taxation rates applicable to the profits of the companies. The formation and enlargement of OPEC (which increased the bargaining power of the oil producers), the emergence of rival oil prospecting companies which operate outside the cartel combined to break the power of the seven and create the situation in which possession of oil has become a big asset in international and domestic political economy. Little has been, and can be, achieved from dialogues and debates of the kind which has characterized dealings with the advanced countries in the sixties. Therefore "unless the realization comes to the developed countries that the Third World is important for them—economically, financially and politically—there will be no major change in the policies of the rich nations." (Mahbub ul Haq, 1974, p. 7.)

Leonard Barnes (1971, p. 205) argues that the first UNCTAD session of 1964 showed that the advanced world is not enthusiastic about real aid to the developing countries. Barnes irrefutably points out that although effective aid lies in the area of "drawing... the peasant population into efficient and profitable farming", yet neither public nor private enterprise in the advanced countrise are inclined to direct investment to this end. Overall, Barnes concludes, agriculture accounts for a very small share of international financial assistance, in spite of the fact that Mr. Robert McNamara, World Bank chairman, declared in October 1968, that the Bank would over the succeeding years quadruple its help to agriculture (without any special mention of peasant agriculture).

One of the reports of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee showed that in 1969 there was a regressive shift away from the minimum target of 1 per cent total net financial flow recommended by the UN, and from the 0.70 per cent official assistance urged by the Pearson Commission. Between 1960 and 1967, Africa's share of aid fell from 35 to 23 per cent. On the strength of these shifts, Onitiri (1971, p. 1343) rightly concluded that "Increasingly, the developed countries are concerned more about the trade and financial relationships among themselves than they are about their relationships with the developing countries".

*West Africa* (Sept. 24, 1971, p. 1105) reported that since the year 1965, gross disbursements of private loans and credits have increased from less than a

fourth of the total to almost a third, and grants have declined from a third to about a fifth. Official development assistance has dropped from 0.44 per cent of the gross national product of the donors in 1965 to 0.34 per cent in 1970.

Gamani Corea (1974, p. 8), UNCTAD's Secretary General, assessing the contemporary trade pattern, noted the "paradox that, although during the period 1963—1973 the member countries of the OECD experienced marked expansion and prosperity (with their per capita product increasing by 50 per cent in real terms), official development assistance actually declined, also in real terms, by some seven per cent".

During the era of direct colonialism, one could talk of agrarian fundamentalism, and therefore of international division of labour in terms of primary producers *vis à vis* the industrialized west. Today, the unwary observer may jump to the conclusion that the developing countries, or at least a few of them, are being industrialized. It is thus an historical paradox that the countries which used their imperial prerogatives to destroy indigenous industries during the colonial days are today encouraging the industrialization of, and transfer of technology to, the developing countries. This paradox dissolves when one closely examines developments in the industrial technology of the advanced countries.

Contemporary international division of labour is going through a phase of not only advanced technology but also of advanced peripheral development. In the words of Samir Amin (1974, p. 22),

At an advanced stage of peripheral development the reproduction of the system (capitalist system) can be guaranteed without directly controlled investment or direct political intervention (an intervention which was the pre-condition of colonial imperialism) merely through technological domination based on an increasing technological gap and combined with the existence of local social classes and strata, integrated through their consumption patterns . . . and through the ideology which accompanies it . . .

The traditional theory of international division<sup>16</sup> of labour no longer provides an adequate explanation of contemporary developments in the industrial and commercial spheres of the international system. The truth is that the Third World is no longer capable of holding its own even as a primary producer/exporter; the advanced world, through the application of superior technological know-how, has been able to develop new industrial inputs which are virtually substitutes for primary commodities. As the markets for these new inputs grow, so the markets for primary commodities shrink.

Discussing the international context of the problem with respect to Southeast Asia, Gunnar Myrdal (1968, pp. 595—603) gave a number of acceptable reasons for our agricultural ills: namely, world production has tended to increase more rapidly than world trade since the late 1920s, world trade as a whole has increased more than world trade in primary commodities, increase in international trade in primary commodities since the late 1920s for the world as a whole has exceeded that for the Third World. Gunnar Myrdal adduced the

following factors to explain these trends in world trade and economy: the demand for food tends to lag behind increases in income per head—this same is true of the demand for textiles. In addition the use of synthetic fibres and technological efficiency reduces the primary fibre content of finished products, and protectionist policies are designed by the West to support domestic textile industry. Technological advance has facilitated increasing economy in the use of raw materials. In contrast to the stagnant overall export trend, import needs and actual imports have risen sharply, consequent upon population growth and developmental efforts. And to cap it all, "... the trading patterns established in the colonial period linger on in the form of export dependence on the developed economies of the West". (G. Myrdal, 1968, p. 603.) While I agree that these factors are real bottlenecks, I do not subscribe to Myrdal's thesis that nationalist governments cannot control them (p. 595). Gunnar Myrdal's conclusion rests on a method of approach which derives from a questionable theory of circular causation of poverty. As Peter Bauer (1972, p. 452) points out, historical evidence refutes Gunnar Myrdal's thesis that it is impossible to emerge from this poverty without external aid: throughout the world many nations have risen from rags to riches; the now developed countries were once undeveloped, and some African and Asian and Latin American countries have made giant strides from poverty to affluence.

There is a discernible trend in the agricultural policies of the industrialized countries towards seeking to be as agriculturally self-sufficient as they can with their technological know-how. This applies not only to raw materials like foodgrains but in raw materials needed for industrial purposes. In political terms, the big nations seem to have noticed a trend in which the key to the future lies with the country which has more than it can even sell—a trend towards food power politics. This has just started as a drive towards self-sufficiency, but will eventually become an effort to maximize their international political power. After all, the tremendous bid for new sources of energy can overflow into agriculture. An article with a curious title which nevertheless speaks for itself, reported early this year (1975):

While government and media approaches to the world food crisis have focussed on the grand and dramatic—international reserves, green revolution, national days of fasting—a number of groups, in the United States and elsewhere, have been quietly developing a different level of response to the linked problems of increasing food production and getting food to the hungry. The approaches vary, but they have common features. All are appropriate to small-scale, low-cost application . . . in most cases appropriate to larger scale as well. Some are trying to increase yields per given space, concentrating on intensive farming and production techniques. Many seek to reduce external energy inputs into the food growing process. Most, although not all, of the groups involved in these efforts understand the political and social implications of their research. Others are simply involved in the technology itself. ('Fighting back' in *The Elements*, No. 4, January 1975, p. 2.)

The industrialized countries, with their need for Africa's agricultural commodities relegated to a secondary position partly because of competition from other regions of the tropics and partly as a result of developments in science and



technology, have increasingly shifted to new strategies in their dealings with the Third World. *Industrialization and transfer of Western technology* play a central role in this new strategy. The nature of aid, trade and investment is determined by this new-found solution to Africa's underdevelopment. In the case of investment, there is, as I have noted earlier, a deliberate tendency on the part of foreign investors to steer clear of agriculture, of peasant agriculture which is the prop of many an African economy. Little wonder that "... investment policy has given attention to the infrastructure, to building, and to light industry; Government funds furnishing most of the capital for the first, and private investment for the last two". (Leonard Barnes, 1971, p. 206.) This picture, although referring to developments in the French African territories, especially the Ivory Coast, is of general application to the Third World. Drawing heavily on Samir Amin's *Le Développement du Capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire 1967*, Barnes (1971, pp. 206—207) argues that although the use of capital from France during the first five years of Ivory Coast independence set in motion a marked economic boom, yet, owing to the absolute hold of external forces on the nation's economy, the accompanying expansion left the great mass of the local people virtually untouched. Nigeria's first development decade saw the heyday of the contractor finance form of investment. Ayida (1965, pp. 180—181) describes a variant of this investment as

the guaranteed riskless investment under which the government of a recipient country gives two guarantees:

firstly, to provide the necessary foreign exchange to enable the suppliers' credit to be made good when due and

secondly, to meet all obligations falling due if the investment is not viable. Such investment may be an industrial project sponsored by a company in which a foreign private investor provides about 5% to 10% of the equity capital and a public development agency or government in the recipient country provides the rest. The equipment required for the project is supplied by the foreign partner to the company under supplier credit arrangements. There are known cases where the foreign investor is the consultant who prepares the feasibility study for the project, the financial adviser and banker who finalised the credit arrangements, the manufacturer who supplied the equipment, the technical partner and managing agent who runs the factory under a managing agency agreement with fees or commissions. This economic 'Mikado' then gets a government guarantee that if the project fails, the government would from its budgetary resources service the loan for the equipment.

Thus "Foreign investment... far from being a means of developing underdeveloped countries, is a most efficient device for transferring wealth from the poorer to the richer countries while at the same time enabling the richer to expand their control over the economies of the poorer". (Baran and Sweezy quoted by Keith Buchanan, 1972, p. 45).

It is an over-simplification to assume that these developments are externally imposed in the sense that developments in the industrial technology of the West determine events and developments in the underdeveloped countries with the latter serving as unwilling partners. This brings us to the political side of the coin; for those countries which still want to develop along western capitalist

lines, and which still see development as a product of western capital and western technology, the West calls the tune in a manner which promotes its own interests and needs to the detriment of the underdeveloped countries.

The argument that Euro-America polices the Third World in the interest of European capital has spent its force in the sense indicated by the collapse of the American effort to bulldoze the Vietnamese into submission. In short, what is called economic development in the developing world and in Africa in particular, the kind of technology adopted and the kind of industries being established, reflects largely the class structure of the individual African countries and the power base of their governments. With particular reference to Nigeria, these broad generalizations will be illuminated in later sections when specific problems will be spelt out.

### **An african common market: Limits and possibilities**

The international context of Nigeria's agro-rural needs and problems requires two broad levels of analysis: the one deals with the relationship between the rich and the poor nations, the other with the relationship among the developing nations themselves. Having already treated the former, I shall examine the latter in terms of possibilities for the emergence of an African Common Market.

We are in the second decade of independence and economic development. On balance, the experience of the developing world points to an ever growing need for concerted action to tackle the crisis of development and underdevelopment. It is gradually dawning on the governments and policy-makers of the developing countries that cooperation in development must be sought more between themselves than between them and the rich advanced world. The developing countries have realized more and more that in a world dominated by the strength of the multinational corporations, their survival depends to a large extent on the collective counter-weight which the poor countries can muster against the developed world—the power base of these industrial giants. To be specific, with particular reference to Africa of which Nigeria is a part, the need for a working African Economic Community has never been greater and more urgent. Mahbub ul Haq (1974, p. 11) says,

If the Third World has to fashion its own development strategy in a framework of independence, its countries will have to move increasingly closer together. It is in a position today to arrange its own foreign assistance, since financial resources are moving to the oil-producing countries . . . It is also in a position to arrange its own trading patterns based on pots and pans and bicycle economies rather than on the traditional trading patterns between the developing and developed world.

The African continent has long been the scene of not only the federation of political systems but also the recasting of all or some of these political units into customs unions or common services. The main short-coming of these economic arrangements is that they were undertaken by the colonial masters as an effec-

tive method of exploiting African resources on a pan-continental scale. Today the regional economic organizations which were carried over from the colonial era diverge but little from their original structural roots. Even the new ones, formed after independence suffer, equally from the colonial mould in which Africa's overall socio-economic structure was initially cast. Be this as it may, recent developments in West Africa seem to hold out the promise of a possible emergence of an effective regional market which cuts across old colonial boundaries. The fact that former French and British West African countries eventually came together to launch an Economic Community may well mean the beginning of a new era of growth and development which seeks to involve the masses in a positive and tangible way. This hope can however only be justified on the grounds that the emergence of the ECOWAS<sup>17</sup> is a product of the developments which are taking place at both international and national levels.

At the international level, as has already been noted, commodity pacts and agreements tend to be worth no more than the paper on which they are written. The collapse of these agreements, the near futility of the UNCTAD and other international conferences on primary products, the manner in which they are usually deadlocked, the unwillingness of the rich countries to restructure the terms of trade in favour of the poor countries, the relentless use of aid and investment for transferring wealth from the developing to the developed world, the general impression that what really happens to the Third World is not the problem of the advanced countries; all these have combined to urge on the developing world the need for cooperation and collective bargaining power. It is only in this way that the Third World can bring pressure to bear on the rich countries and effect a change in the latter's major policies. (Mahbub ul Haq, 1974, p. 7.)

On the home front, frustration is spreading in ever widening circles. Peasant movements, having made a revolution here and held some governments to ransom there, loom menacingly on the socio-economic and political horizon. The smuggling of agricultural goods and commodities has become the order of the day, and the mounting of checkpoints on the borders offers no effective or lasting solution to the problem. Strangely and paradoxically enough, the smuggling involves most of the agricultural commodities on which we have been seeking (with doubtful success and most of the time with resounding failure) to enter international pacts and agreements. Nearly two decades of self-rule seem to have taught us that, in this age of integration, a jealous guarding of national sovereignties is not only an outmoded but also a self-defeating strategy in contemporary world political economy.

The pressures of both the external and domestic factors have led to a critical self-analysis. This has brought to light an appalling and humiliating fact, namely that between 1960 and 1965 intra-Africa trade was only 6.3 per cent of the total trade of African countries. Between 1965 and 1969, there was only a meagre increase of 0.50 per cent, bringing the figure to 6.8 per cent. (*Nigeria*

*Trade Journal*, vol. 20, No. 1, 1972, p. 5.)

We must however guard against over-optimism. For, although the West African Economic Community may be said to have been set on the road to materialization, and although other regional groupings have been in more or less operative existence, one must be less sanguine in regarding all of them as aimed at an African Common Market. African countries still encounter very thorny problems in the working out of practical details of cooperation.

These thorny problems are the product of accumulated neglect of socio-economic issues. This is true even within the short-term view of post-colonial developments. Even after independence when we were supposed to have stopped placing the blame on the colonial era, and to have started making serious plans to solve the accumulated problems, by encouraging what Dr. Polly Hill called "indigenous economics" (and therefore indigenous agricultural economics), the formation of effective home markets for our primary products, the encouragement of agro-allied industrial development, the assimilation of selective inputs relevant to technical and environmental needs and increasing productive efficiency through the establishment of progressive co-operatives and reform of tenurial systems in a manner which could make farming pay, a good number of the national governments showed no sense of urgency about the problems of the mass of African populations within their respective sovereign boundaries.

Thus although recent developments are indicative of an awareness of the magnitude of the problems, there appears to be no proper conception of the structures which *must* be changed to allow an effective solution. Thus although "the commodities which enter intra-West African trade are largely agricultural products which are derived from ecological complementarity . . ." (Ilori, 1973, p. 406), very little trade is generated between the states. The immediate reason for this paucity of trade can be found largely in both the fiscal and "autarchic planning" policies of African states. As Green and Seidman (1968, p. 77) observed,

National development plans have been a not insignificant factor in the virtual stagnation of recorded intra-African trade from 1956 to 1961. Seeking agricultural self-sufficiency and industrial development, national planners tend to propose increased agricultural output and the establishment of industries . . . which account for much of the present trade among African states.

It is true that most of these problems are caused by structures which were established during the colonial era, and which today interact with contemporary structures, but the difficulties will persist as long as most African states try to find a solution within these structures. As the Wey Commission Report (1971, p. 2) says, "the success or failure of a solution to any problem depends primarily on whether the cause of the trouble is tackled or just its effects".

The currency issue is one of the most rigid constraints on Africa's economic unity. The Kenya-Tanzania break of recent memory is a product of their separate links to the sterling and U.S. dollar respectively. It is curious

that their close commercial partnership, geo-physical contiguity and common membership of the East African Community were not strong enough to prevent the break. Elsewhere on the continent "there seems little chance at the present of any weakening in the barriers set up, particularly in West Africa, by the existence side by side, of currencies linked with sterling, the French franc and the U.S. dollar". (*West Africa*, Oct. 15, 1971, p. 1197.)

Admittedly, the influence of French post-colonial policy seems to be the most powerful factor blocking the emergence of an African common market. Through the association device and operational policy of its banks, France has been able to maintain a relentless commercial and financial hegemony over its former territories. As Green and Seidman (1968, p. 78, footnote) recalled that the effort to establish a free trade area between Ghana and Upper Volta was undermined by "the refusal of the French-dominated West African Central Bank which controls Upper Volta's foreign exchange, to accept proposed clearing and payments arrangements and by Upper Volta's conflicting EEC and Entente commitments". The continued association of the French-speaking African states with France, despite its short-term benefits, does have long-term effects which leave Africa with the unpalatable alternatives of socio-economic regression and subordination. The currency isolation of the French-speaking African states has contributed more than any other factor, to making them less enthusiastic about the need for economic integration in Africa. They have of course encouraged regional economic grouping but the rationale thereof can be found largely in the traditional encouragement by the French, and after independence, partly in the personal attitude of French-speaking African political leaders who have more or less looked to Europe and France for Africa's socio-economic salvation.

Of course it could be argued that in the formulation and implementation of inter-African policies, the short-term benefits tend to prevail mainly because of the state of relative underdevelopment and poverty of Africa, but African countries must face the undeniable truth that the emancipation of their economies cannot be realized without a major structural disengagement from the West. As the Guinean case vividly and unmistakably illustrates, this disengagement cannot be effected unless we are prepared to forego the short-term benefits intended to pull the wool over our eyes. It cannot be effected unless we are prepared to make the sacrifices which will be demanded by Western reaction to such attempts. This is where the real test of the spirit of cooperation lies. This is where the rich but underdeveloped countries like Nigeria will best serve the needs of African Unity.

While, "the African common market is not the panacea" (Helleiner, 1963, p. 298) for all of Nigeria's agricultural problems, it is nevertheless a solution to some of them. Even if "the overriding considerations underlying Nigeria's leading role in the push towards its formation are political..." (Helleiner, 1963, p. 298), attention may well be drawn to the history of the EEC which started as a political venture yet proved to be of financial benefit. Nigeria is in a

position to lend the weight of her wealth, manpower and large market to the quest for Africa's economic emancipation.

As Green and Seidman (1968, p. 224) give us to understand, a series of ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) industrial development studies reveals the complexities and possibilities of establishing "harmonious, mutually beneficial patterns of economic growth in Africa". This revelation, they argue, calls for the urgent need for "joint location agreements for a broad range of industries and agricultural projects" as the only way of ensuring that each country is endowed with at least one modern growth generating sector. Above all, contend Green and Seidman (1968, p. 224), there is a crying need for an "economic continentalism", even though the initial steps toward integration may involve four sub-continental units of East, West, Central and North Africa.

To summarize, the problems of Africa's economic integration may be formidable but they are not insuperable. The crucial factor, which cuts across all the technological, economic, socio-cultural and physical constraints, is, in the words of Barnes (1971, p. 341), "the diplomatic problem of finding a group of African states which share a political will to come together in initiating the enterprise".

## IV Rural-urban Relations as Problem-generating Structures

We have seen how the Industrial Revolution in England created the need for tropical, raw agricultural products, and how the attempt to meet this need resulted in the pursuit of agrarian fundamentalism. This in turn meant the destruction of Nigeria's indigenous industry and technology.

When, however, independence was achieved, nationalist leaders, in what was understandably and rightly a nationalist reaction to the colonial agrarian fundamentalism, set themselves the task of transforming their agrarian economy into a replica of industrial Europe. This approach to economic growth and development, which by no means entailed an effort to release native industry and technology from the constraints imposed by colonialism called for the loan of industrial technology from Europe. This choice to industrialize in the European fashion eventually complicated the rural-urban balance which had already been upset by the commercial and administrative activities of the colonial powers.

The process of rural-urban migration is one of the many consequences of a not very successful industrialization. Not very successful because the character of the industries or plants is such that they created few jobs for the mass of rural dwellers who streamed into the urban and industrial areas in search of gainful employment. And, as we shall see below, this drift from country to town gravely impaired agricultural productivity and left the rural economy in utter disarray.

The needs of imperial Britain required the establishment in Nigeria of certain kinds of infrastructures for transport and communications. In a reply to Joseph Chamberlain's question as to how best to realize its ideas on cotton production in West Africa, the British Empire Cotton Growing Association said among other things that "it would be useless to attempt cultivation at any distance from railway or river transport as a cheap and easy transport is essential to commercial success". (Nzemeke, 1971, p. 556.) Thus administrative, commercial and agricultural needs of England brought about the establishment of transport facilities in such a way that the Nigerian ports and cities were brought into a more effective and closer communication with metropolitan England than with our rural hinterland and agricultural communities: railways ran from the northern cities to Lagos and Port-Harcourt. Consequently, "the necessary corollary of the 'wealth' of the coast was the impoverishment of the hinterland". (Samir Amin, 1972, p. 117.) These developments in trade, transport and British administration account to a large extent for the character of Nigeria's urban growth and development. Our urban centres came to be cast

in the role of conveyor-belts for the transmission of primary products to the European industries on the one hand, and markets for the disposal of finished European products on the other. The fact that Nigerian urbanism has more varied sources of growth does not gainsay the great impact of British colonialism on the development of her cities. The net effect of all these infrastructures is that the agricultural sector took on the characteristics of a sub-dependency within an already dependent economy. Nigeria's efforts at economic development have therefore acquired a built-in urban bias. Indeed there is a sense in which this bias has the dogged strength of an ideology. Development experts tend to overlook the continued existence of the rural-urban imbalance, and in so far as they do notice it, they regard it as one of those problems which will eventually be resolved through the gradual process of diffusion of innovation from the urban centres to the rural periphery. They see the urban centres as poles of growth from which development will spread to the rural hinterland. My thesis is that the spread effect is far from being realized, and what is realized is of questionable value in rural development.

Our development ideology has a certain element of social welfare, an admirable thing in itself, but it must be admitted that it has been inequitable, favouring urban areas. While "a judicious balance between economic development and welfare is the ideal... Unfortunately... it is the welfare of the urban classes, that vocal minority, that is promoted. That of the rural people, the silent productive majority, invariably goes by default". (Adebayo Adedeji, 1973, pp. 14—15.)

Wolfgang Stolper (1966, p. 48) noted that, in so far as recurrent expenditure is subsidized, the Nigerian farmer is most frequently the payer "while the beneficiaries are a small number of urban dwellers".

Out of a total capital expenditure programme of f 676.5 million in the 1962—1968 development plan, f 91.9 million (or 13.5%) was allocated to primary production. Over the plan period the sector grew at an average rate of about 2% per annum, with the result that the share of agriculture in the gross domestic product declined from 61% to 55%. (Second National Development Plan 1970—74, p. 104.)

The marketing board, the most strategic institutional arrangement serving the cocoa economy is... a vehicle for transferring cash incomes from the cocoa farmers to the non-farm sector, thereby widening the rural-urban gap... (Essang, 1971, pp. 188—189.)

In 1971—72, the oil industry alone accounted for about 50 per cent of the entire growth rate and other sectors, manufacturing services, building and construction, agriculture... accounted for the remaining half. The agricultural sector was virtually stagnant... The amount of investment on agriculture was just about 8 per cent of the total during 1971—72, whereas, in the same period, investment in machinery, presumably oil equipment, etc. was about 60 per cent of the total.

But since the agricultural sector forms about 60 per cent of the total economy, which is a large sector, and since this sector was stagnant, the aggregative growth figures of the economy become very unrepresentative of the entire economy. The majority of Nigerians still depend on agricultural incomes, which are stagnant. Therefore the majority of Nigerians are becoming worse-off, and the rural-urban income gap has been increased enormously, especially with the recent urban wage increases.

Since the oil and manufacturing industries have the fastest growth rates and since these sectors are, naturally, capital intensive, they create relatively few jobs. The actual number of unemployed



Nigerians is currently about 4,5 m., and according to the plan's projects jobs could only be created for about 0.5 m. people. Therefore, although the aggregative growth rate of the economy has been high, incomes between sectors, persons and areas are becoming more un-equal. The economy is far from achieving full employment. (Kunle Adamson, 1972, p. 927.)

## A case of gap in knowledge

There is an intellectual background to the rural-urban bias which has until quite recently characterized the policy and practice of our economic development. To the extent that education is a process of socialization and acculturation, much of Nigeria's agro-rural problems owe their origin to the colonial education system. Designed, as Nyerere (1968, p. 46) said, to meet the needs of the colonial state, the education system was not co-ordinated with the indigenous economy which is largely agricultural. Primary schools, secondary schools and universities offered curricula overburdened with the history, geography, languages and literature of Metropolitan and "Mother Britain". The net result was a profound lack of knowledge about traditional agriculture. Its effect on our economic development is most unfortunate. A good many African student farmers, by reason of an education which disdainfully neglected indigenous agriculture, and by virtue of their training in Euro-American Agricultural Economics, display anything but a knowledge of traditional agriculture. It is true that "In many cases research results arrived at in advanced countries are relevant to the problems of an underdeveloped country, . . . Yet knowledge of tropical soils, of tropical agriculture and forestry is in its infancy". (Wolfgang Stolper, 1966, p. 8.) The students are at home with theories developed more for studying the advanced industrial societies than for understanding the socio-economic and political process at work in indigenous agro-rural economies.

On this issue, Polly Hill (1970, p. 5) writes as follows,

We are all far more ignorant than we are knowledgeable. From Dakar to Cameroon, there is very little systematized knowledge relating to the economic organization of internal trade in West African foodstuffs and raw materials . . . Present-day economists are far more ignorant of the rural economies of certain poor regions, including West Africa, than were their nineteenth-century counterparts of the rural economies of Europe.

This lack of understanding of traditional agriculture has been largely responsible for a corresponding lack of enthusiasm and serious concern among politicians, planners and policy-makers, about the need of rural improvement. Not until 1966 was a Federal Ministry of Agriculture established for a country with such an enormous agricultural base as Nigeria's, when the first national development plan was well under-way and the country was on the verge of a national crisis which eventually culminated in a civil war. Prior to 1966

Agriculture . . . was relegated to the position of being one of a number of rather unrelated divisions under the control of a Minister for Economic Development who had many other interests. Moreover the staff concerned with agriculture in his ministry was small and none of its officials would appear to have had suitable previous experience. (*West Africa*, 5th Feb. 1966, p. 147.)

The planners quite rightly stated that agriculture continues to be the mainstay of Nigerian nature but the sections of the Plan related to agriculture do not reflect an understanding of the nature of the science of agriculture and the need for integrated planning in all its ramifications. (Adegbola, 1971, p. 357.)

In fact, the 1962–68 development plan attracts no more than 13.6 per cent of its expenditure in this direction (Agriculture), primarily because sufficient information for investment decisions is not available. (Sokolski, 1965, p. 270.)

Thus today, *planning without facts* (Wolfgang Stolper, 1966) is among the major constraints on our economic development, and agro-rural development in particular. For, as Schätzl (1973, p. 18) suggests, even though “the agricultural sector continues to dominate (the Nigerian economic sector), its share in gross domestic product at 1962 factor costs declined from 66 per cent (1958/59) to 55 per cent (1966/67) . . .”

## Rural-urban migration: A problem-solving and problem-generating process

“Crime begins with poverty  
Poverty with want of food  
Want of food is the result of neglected cultivation.  
Without good cultivation man has no bond  
That connects him with his soil  
Without this bond he abandons only too readily his place of birth and his home . . .  
Neither walled cities nor mote nor severe loss  
Nor cruel punishment  
Can suppress this vagrant spirit

CH'AO Tso\*

Although migration antedates colonialism in Africa<sup>18</sup>, yet it was not until the colonial era that this process took new forms and assumed new dimensions.<sup>19</sup> With the establishment of colonial authority, the money economy<sup>20</sup> was able to gain a foothold in the isolation of the traditional subsistence farming village and rural hinterland. This sparked off the twin processes of modern migration and urbanization. I do not imply that urbanization is a colonial phenomenon; cities like Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Bornu and Sokoto in Northern Nigeria and Benin and Yoruba cities in the South attest to the fact that African urbanization dates back to pre-contact times. It is essential to note that these cities do not owe their genesis and initial population growth to rural-urban migration, at least of

\* Quoted in E. A. Gutkind, *Revolution and Environment*, 1946, p. 190

the type that characterizes the growth and development of cities during the colonial era. In other words, these pre-colonial cities were designed largely to serve commercial and politico-military interests, and consequently their location was such that they included or colonized<sup>21</sup> agricultural communities. The framework of the national economy was such that the rural areas were urban extensions. Michael Crowder (1962, 1966, p. 46) writes, "Agriculture was the main source of wealth for Kano, as it was for most of the Hausa states . . . Over the ordinary peasant farmers, some of the most diligent in the Sudan, was placed a hierarchy of village heads and fief-holders, who were responsible for collecting taxes (for the support of the central administration of the king)". John Fage (1965, p. 45) points out the commercial and politico-military background of these early cities:

Some of these towns developed as great commercial centres, especially in Hausaland and later in Yorubaland. But by and large the traders were natives, not immigrants, and in the whole area there is virtually no reflection of the twin-city pattern seen in the west. The pattern seems most obviously to be one of political and military settlement. It is known that this pattern was followed at Abeokuta and Ibadan, new foundations consequent upon the political and military upheavals in nineteenth-century Yorubaland.

The Yoruba cities have been variously described as rural cities or city-villages because their residential pattern is modelled on the traditional Yoruba kinship system wherein farmers lived in the city while the "belt immediately surrounding (the) town was used for cultivation of crops". (Oluwasamni, 1967, p. 29.)

There is copious literature on African migration studies but as Caldwell (1969, p. 6) observed "...very few are strictly studies of the rural-urban movement. There are great numbers of works dating back over half a century and further which are indexed in such bibliographies as 'movements of labour' but most are essentially concerned with the transfer of adult male workers". Until quite recently what passed for rural-urban migration studies dealt mostly with the urban end of the migratory process. Toward the close of the last decade, Caldwell (1969, p. 6) noted,

There is a . . . rapidly growing body of work on urban population and urbanization as studies from the town end of the process. These works are of great importance when examining rural-urban migration, but they do not cover all migrants who have ever set out from the villages for the towns. Nor do the retrospective reasons given by the migrants for leaving the farming areas necessarily coincide with their feelings about the matter at the actual time of their departure or the feelings of those now departing.

Of course the literature is not totally devoid of information on the rural end. Rouch and Prothero, to mention only two, did much pioneer work in this respect, but here the focus was on rural-rural migration.<sup>22</sup> By and large, few studies have dealt to any remarkable degree with the rural origins of the migratory process; like agriculture itself and the rural community, the study of migration has until recently suffered from the intellectual scandal of a disdainful neglect of its rural underpinnings.

The dearth of information on rural-urban migration is a pointer to the extent to which the presiding genius of African studies and affairs (the colonial anthropologist) reigned supreme. As Jacoby (1971, p. 84) sadly commented, "we know little about the social and economic past of the peasantry in those underdeveloped countries whose history has been written by the colonizers with their disregard for peasant life and culture."

When the pressures of social change eventually forced him to take cognizance of the African's urban presence, the social anthropologist, unable to get over the "methodological inhibition" (Mills, 1959)<sup>23</sup> of his tribalistic framework, treated urban and rural phenomena like the geometrician would treat two parallel lines. Peter Gutkind (1967, p. 136) noted,

What urban research has been carried out in Africa thus far has been conducted primarily by social anthropologists, sociologists and geographers . . . I know of no research worker who, as a trained urban sociologist, has studied in, and published on, urban Africa. Thus the methodological traditions brought to this field are mostly those acquired by social anthropologists working in rural areas . . . this background . . . for long fostered the view that we were studying tribesmen in town and not townsmen in town.

The political implication of treating rural and urban developments as isolated themes is all too obvious: colonial authorities, being mainly interested in attracting African labour in the cheapest possible way, found it necessary to rationalize their utter neglect of, and indifference to, the African's urban welfare in terms of his so-called attachment to rural life<sup>24</sup>—a rationalization which buttressed complacency about the hard conditions in which the rural-urban migrants had to work to earn their living. Thus the initial African resistance to recruitment for urban wage labour was given an ideological explanation—it was treated as the conservative reaction of eco-culturally deracinated creatures to living in the Arcadia of rural peace and harmony.<sup>25</sup>

In a study of the problems of urban African workers in the Congo and central Africa, George Balandier (1967) emphasizes that this initial African resistance was essentially the product of a colonial structure and therefore of "the fundamental weakness of a labour market which is in itself precarious and subject to fluctuation because it is governed by purely external circumstances". Balandier refers to the case of Gabon where the labour policies and practices of the colonial authorities and their agents contributed not only to the disorganization of African family life in the villages but also to the emergence, in the cities and industrial areas, of "*villages de vagabonds* (shanty towns), the spread of which was contributing to the growth of a very unstable proletariat". He describes the "urban centres as reserves of manpower" and attributes "the failure of the workers to adapt themselves to town life and steady employment" to "the conditions of that employment" (Balandier, 1967, pp. 125—128).

## On theories of rural-urban migration

Even the most cursory reader on African migration will be struck by the lack of attention given to non-economic factors. By this I mean that the non-economic factors have been either neglected or treated as residual categories.<sup>26</sup> The economic determinism in the migration studies reached its culmination in the work of Todaro (1968, 1969, 1971) which E. M. Godfrey (1973) christened the "probabilistic permanent income approach" in his article on rural-urban migration. Todaro's hypothesis suggests that "the supply of rural labour migrating to urban areas in a given period is governed by the differential between the discounted streams of expected urban and rural permanent real income". (Godfrey, 1973, p. 66.) Godfrey questions this hypothesis with empirical data on Ghana which showed that in spite of the tough wages policy, because it closed the rural-urban gap, migration to the cities increased rather than decreased within the given period. This finding suggests that the reasons for increasing migration in historical times lie in other than purely economic factors. Godfrey then contends that, although the Todaro hypothesis could be used as a starting point for an inquiry into rural-urban migration, it could go no further. In this regard he suggests that it could be entirely dropped if only an alternative formulation—a sort a multiple-factor approach—can be found.

The need for an alternative hypothesis did not start with Godfrey's critique of Todaro: Unesco's *Social Implications of Industrialization and Industrialization in Africa South of the Sahara* (1956) and U.N.'s "Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara" (1957) are among the earliest studies which touched on more than the economic factor in rural-urban migration. The U.N. publication (1957, pp. 144—146) contains a summary of factors relevant to rural-urban migration:

While, in general, the causes of migration to cities are similar to those found elsewhere, certain factors can be considered to have special importance in various parts of Africa: the desire or necessity to obtain money income for such purposes as the payment of taxes, the purchase of certain highly valued consumers' goods or implements, or the payment of bride-price; pressure of population on the land, which is not generally found in Africa in the form of a shortage of land area per capita, but which, in many regions results rather from a recurring threat of famine or crop failure (owing largely to inadequate equipment and faulty method of utilization and cultivation of the land); the desire to break away from the monotony and strict controls of tribal life; the attraction of the town and its real or imagined opportunities for personal advancement and independence, as well as improved material welfare; the desire to join one or more members of the family already in the town; the social prestige associated in certain tribes with a period of residence in town, and finally, the pressure of labour-recruiting agents, administrators and chiefs, which has been in the past, and still sometimes remains, an important factor in movement to cities. There is also evidence that education affects the tendency towards migration . . .

The above summary of factors provides a file of variables which should be incorporated into any theoretical framework for the study of African migration. Until he works in the field the student of migration should keep an open mind as to which of these factors combine to induce migration.

Henri Collomb and Henry Ayats (1967, p. 338), in a theoretical part of their

study of migration in Senegal, divide the causes broadly into Geographical and Human. While geographical causes include such phenomena as flight from the advance of the desert, dependence on water and seasonal changes in water supply, human causes fall into the following categories:

1. At the psychological level, either individually or collectively, certain groups are characteristically restless (Peul), while others are sedentary. Attractions and repulsions can lead to migration.
2. At the economic level, demographic pressure is part of the price paid for better health and conditions of security, and conditions of perennially inadequate resources generate the need for an economy which complements other economies.
3. At the socio-cultural level, certain socio-cultural patterns make for more efficient migrants.

Polly Hill (1972, pp. 103—104) remarks that such is the ignorance about migration within Hausaland (more so within the Nigerian Federation and Africa), and about the socio-economic factors which influence it, that ideas or conclusions derived from the detailed study of a single village, even over a very short period, can be used in a wider context to question some of the prevailing beliefs found in economic studies of the process.

Stephen Imoagene's\* work (1967) on rural Jesse and urban Sapele represents a pioneering approach to the study of African migration. While acknowledging the importance and in some cases the primacy of economic factors, Imoagene specifies that his research on Jesse has "been profoundly affected by the forces of urbanization and culture contact" and that there "rural-urban migration tends to be more related to psycho-social factors of change in the migrant's need-dispositions and less to objective economic factors". (1967, p. 376.) Tapping the awareness of the Jesse people about the changing social situation which influences their tendency to migrate to cities, Stephen Imoagene found out that 34% of his respondents attributed the change to economic factors, 32% to political factors, 36% to socio-cultural factors, 32% to growing self-interest and crude individualism, 16% to the specific factors of education and religion, and 16% to such physical and infrastructural characteristics as population movements and communication networks.

Stephen Imoagene (1967, pp. 380—381, 1968, pp. 402—403) set his study in the framework of a rural detachment cum urban involvement hypothesis: in other words, those persons who are more rurally detached are also likely to be more city-oriented and therefore more prone to migrate. Likewise, at the urban end, those migrants who are more involved with city life and activities are likely to be less rurally attached. The rural attachment or rural identification hypoth-

\* Stephen Imoagene later changed name to Oshoma Imoagene. I will refer to him in his former name under which the articles were published.

esis states, as Imoagene (1967, p. 380) says, "that there is a positive correlation between rural identification and participation in traditional life, i.e. those who identify more with the socio-cultural life of the community also tend to participate more in it and *vice versa*". He also states the rural participation/migration hypothesis as follows, "there is a negative correlation between participation in traditional life and rural migration, i.e. those who are low on the scale of participation in traditional life tend to be more inclined to migrate and *vice versa*".

The general conclusion to be drawn from this brief survey is that the science of 'Economics alone can never fully explain the economic behaviour of man in his effort to improve his material welfare'. (Okurume, 1973, p. vi.) This observation applies with greater force to the processes of migration in West Africa where, in the light of the strength and resilience of the extended family system, to say the least, the decision-maker may not necessarily be an economist. We are not trying to convey the impression that there is an element of irrationality in the African decision-making processes; we merely acknowledge the effect of non-economic variables on economic decision-making, and the possibility, even the probability, that non-economic factors may assume an overriding importance in determining the economic ends to be achieved. This observation is not inapplicable to the so-called western economic man; in other words, so much has been made of the profit motive in economic behaviour, that economics more often than not fails to account for most of the behavioural phenomena subjected to its analysis and interpretation.

Interdisciplinary research has amply demonstrated that sometimes non-economic variables can be at least as important as, if not more so, the economic variables in the study of human decision-making and action. D. W. Norman in "Economic and Non-economic variables in village surveys" (1969, pp. 19-20) comments,

Lipton . . . argues convincingly that, in the developing countries, the link between economic and non-economic variables is often much stronger than in the developed countries. These considerations point to the use of a coordinated multidisciplinary approach in the investigation of problems of rural development . . . An example illustrating the interaction between economic and non-economic or social variables with the hope of . . . emphasizing the desirability of a multidisciplinary approach has been the frequent failure to recognize the fundamental goal of farmers in the Northern (Nigerian) states. Rational behaviour can be simply defined as behaviour that is consistent with the end or goal. Unfortunately the term end is often interpreted as being that which the investigator would like to see adopted. In economics the conventional wisdom concerning this end or goal has tended to be profit maximization. Consequently, because of this 'imposed end' research workers have sometimes termed farmers' behaviour in many countries as irrational, since it is inconsistent with the profit maximization goal. Similarly 'subsistence' farmers have been labelled as irrational compared with 'progressive' who are supposedly more profit-oriented and therefore closer to the conventional wisdom spectrum. It is suggested that the reason for such judgements on the part of economists is their failure to recognize the link between the economic and non-economic variables."

### *Migration: General implications for socio-economic development in Africa*

We have seen how many of the existing studies on rural-urban migration placed undue emphasis on economic factors, and how eventually dissatisfaction with these studies led to better theories which took account of the interplay between the economic and non-economic factors. We shall now examine, in short, the general implications of rural-urban migration for Africa's socio-economic development and at greater length, its significance for the development of the Nigerian economy.

With the impact of the Industrial Revolution and its colonial concomitants, urban growth became a major factor for the development of the African political economy. Of course the cities, especially in West Africa, prior to the Industrial Revolution and the full flowering of colonialism, had played no small role in Africa's overall development, perhaps a more balanced development than found in the cities which owe their growth to colonialism. It is a matter of historical record that colonialism initiated migrations of such magnitude as to upset the rural-urban balance which was so characteristic of traditional African city growth. Colonial authorities used direct and indirect coercion to force the process of migration on the African peasants. Today, the position is rather different; the very solution to the problems of the colonial economy has become a problem of alarming proportions to the developing African political economies.<sup>27</sup>

The multitudinous effects of rural-urban migration have long been a subject of interest to the Africanist. Such effects range from the economic, through the political, socio-cultural, environmental, and psychological categories. I do not intend to cover the whole range of such effects, nor do I intend to discuss any of them in detail. I only want to give an idea of the nature of the problems and the implications of such effects on economic development.

### *Migration: Implications for Nigeria's socio-economic development*

Rural-urban migration in Nigeria has reached a point at which it reduces the productive capacity of our agriculture and swamps the urban sector with more or less unskilled, even if somewhat educated labour force. In his plea for rural industrialization Aluko (1973, pp. 213—214) comments, "while increasing migration causes mass unemployment in the urban areas, there is a growing shortage of labour and diminishing productivity in the rural areas, particularly in the agricultural sector which is regarded as the main occupation of rural people". At this juncture, the relationship between urbanization and the industrial aspect of our development effort come in for particular attention.

When the African eventually accepted migration of the type on which the colonial authorities insisted there began a new trend in city growth whereby urbanization as a social process came to terms with industrialization. In a way, it could be said that *urbanization* and *industrialization* have been used synonymously by development planners and policy makers. Linking up with the



argument proposed in the industrialization model, one can observe that, although the colonial era ushered in lopsided rural-urban migration, the nationalist pursuit of the industrialization strategy and the operation of an urban-biased income structure turned migration into an avalanche.

As a matter of fact, urbanization is not synonymous with industrialization. Undoubtedly, it is related to industrialization, but the precise nature of this link has yet to be established. One thing is clear however, that urbanization eventually outpaces industrialization. For Nigeria, this is a truism, especially when we consider that many of our industrial ventures have been outright economic disasters. Peter Kilby (1969, p. 24) writes,

Major projects of this type, where public authorities have provided 90% or more of the capital, include a fruit cannery, four cement mills, two large sack factories, a paper mill, two breweries, an integrated textilmill, two soft drink bottling plants, a ceramics factory, a mint, a glass factory and four oil-seed crushing plants. Total investment in these projects is in excess of £ 35m . . . , none of these investments have proved profitable . . .

Perhaps the main problem with these industrial projects may not lie so much in their unprofitability as in their being consumer-oriented. In the main they are industries which produce consumer goods for the upper middle class—usually import substitutions for the well-to-do. Most of the plants were established without taking into consideration the fact that the raw material inputs (to the extent that these were local) were extracted by techniques which were not adapted to the needs of large scale production. Thus most of them could only operate at half capacity. The failure of some of these projects point to a large extent to the problem of technological gap. With the constraints on the growth and development of indigenous technology initiated in the colonial era, and the consequent superimposition of Western technology, Nigeria's industrial sector came to acquire the characteristics of a *disarticulated*<sup>28</sup> structure. Industries were established with sophisticated modern technology, largely owned and operated by foreign interests, while the traditional industries were still operating with limited indigenous skills. Even in agriculture which the colonial master wanted to be of the fundamental type as we mentioned in the discussion of the models, there were plantations operated with modern technology beside peasant farms. Peter Kilby (1969, p. 17), examining this issue, concludes that

Industrial production in Nigeria . . . exhibits wide diversity in terms of the degree of specialization and division of labour, technology, factor proportions, the quality of raw material input and product finish, the character of markets being served and enterpreneurial organization. This diversity is typically recognized in a polar form, as giving rise to a modern industrial sector and a semi-traditional industrial sector.

The modern industrial complexes are found in the urban areas. In many cases these operate side by side with small scale industries. Thus we can distinguish broadly between urban industries and rural cottage industries. While a large percentage of the rural cottage industries operate with more or less traditional

techniques, the small scale urban industries are run with both traditional and modern techniques.

The problem of technological dependence does not seem to be solved by the kind of modernization which the traditional sector of the economy is undergoing. As the traditional sector discards its ageold techniques for Western ones, this calls for an increase in resource inputs. This increase in resource inputs leads to a decrease in the use of local resources precisely because the technology is alien. (Onyemelukwe, 1974, pp. 49–50.)

Helleiner (1966, pp. 328–329) draws attention not only to reductions in

Import Dependence	Domestic Intermediate Inputs	Imported Intermediate Inputs	Value Added	Total
<i>Relatively Low</i>				
Sawmills .....	58.5	11.0	30.0	100.0
Leather tanning .....	50.2	1.7	48.1	100.0
Groundnut oil .....	75.8	3.7	20.4	100.0
Textiles—large .....	46.6	5.1	48.5	100.0
Shoes—rubber .....	49.5	13.1	37.2	100.0
Beer and soft drinks .....	34.8	1.6	64.8	100.0
Butter .....	96.9	0.1	2.9	100.0
Meat processing .....	67.8	25.3	6.9	100.0
Carbon dioxide .....	20.4	10.2	69.5	100.0
Soap—large .....	38.8	12.1	49.1	100.0
Boats .....	31.7	28.3	40.0	100.0
Tile and concrete .....	53.7	8.2	38.1	100.0
Cement and ceramics .....	35.1	7.8	53.7	100.0
Furniture—large .....	44.9	9.3	45.8	100.0
<i>Relatively High</i>				
Singlets .....	27.1	42.7	30.4	100.0
Footwear .....	18.2	56.9	24.8	100.0
Tobacco manufacturing .....	4.6	30.6	64.8	100.0
Bakeries .....	22.9	45.7	31.4	100.0
Industrial gases .....	12.4	56.5	31.1	100.0
Bitumen .....	21.9	70.7	12.0	100.0
Miscellaneous foods .....	34.7	48.8	16.9	100.0
Vehicle assembly .....	19.5	69.3	11.2	100.0
Metal manufactures—large .....	16.5	41.4	42.1	100.0
Bicycle assembly .....	5.9	88.2	5.9	100.0
Plastics and foam rubber .....	7.3	27.6	65.1	100.0
Tire retreading .....	26.1	29.2	44.8	100.0
Printing and publishing .....	15.4	26.2	58.4	100.0
Perfumes and cosmetics .....	16.9	50.4	32.7	100.0
Miscellaneous textiles and apparel .....	13.3	42.9	43.8	100.0
Umbrellas .....	10.8	62.3	27.0	100.0
Tarpaulins .....	8.8	62.4	28.8	100.0
Mattresses .....	29.2	31.7	39.0	100.0

import volumes which feature progressively in Nigeria's industrial sector, but also to the "import components of the new domestic manufacturing activities and the growth in potential demand for imports resulting from economic growth". Reworking the data from Nicholas G. Carter's "An Input—Output Analysis of the Nigerian Economy, 1959—1960", he arrived at the following assessment of Nigeria's industrial import dependence: (See table p. 74.)

This was the situation in the later fifties and early sixties. For the later sixties and early seventies, Schätzl (1973, pp. 33—34) reports that even though domestic manufacturing has contributed to a reduction in the share of consumer goods from 57 per cent to 30 per cent, there has been a recorded "increase in the share of raw materials and intermediate goods from 20 per cent to 28 per cent and of capital goods from 23 per cent to 42 per cent".

The employment capacity of these rural cottage and urban small scale industries is rather low: drawing on an industrial survey conducted by the Federal

Company	Product	Year of start-up	Fixed capital (£1000s)	UAC equity %
African Timber & Plywood	Timber and plywood	1948	3,000	100
Nigerian Breweries (3)	Beer and minerals	1949	3,500	33
Taylor Woodrow	Building contractors	1953	500	50
Nigerian Joinery (3)	Woodwork and furniture	1953	100	50
Prestress	Pre-stressed concrete	1954	40	20
Nipol	Plastic products	1957	105	35
Raleigh Industries (3)	Cycle assembly	1958	75	50
Vehicle Assembly Plant	Bedford lorries	1958	500	100
Minna Farm	Pigs	1959	35	80
Northern Construction Co.	Building contractors	1960	100	30
W. A. Thread	Sewing thread	1961	450	20
W. A. Portland Cement	Cement	1961	4,500	10
W. A. Cold Storage	Meat products	1961	250	100
Walls	Ice cream	1961	90	100
Vono Products	Beds, mattresses	1961	80	38
Cement Paints	Cement paint	1962	35	16
Guinness	Stout	1962	2,000	33
Fan Milk	Re-constituted milk	1963	100	45
The Nigerian Sugar Co.	Sugar and by-products	1963	3,800	7
Norspin	Cotton yarn	1963	1,100	53
Pye	Radio assembly	1963	40	50
Vitafoam	Foam rubber products	1963	100	50
A. J. Seward	Perfumery and cosmetics	1964	200	100
Bordpak	Fibre board cartons	1964	800	100
Kwara Tobacco Co.	Cigarettes	1964	500	80
Associated Battery Mfgs.	Vehicle batteries	1965	65	22
Crocodile Matchets	Matchets	1965	120	51
Textile Printers	Printed textiles	1965	3,250	68

Office of Statistics in 1963, Peter Kilby, (1969, p. 20) has this to say: "Of the 649 establishments returning information in that year (1963 survey), 59% employed 10 to 49 workers, 33% employed 50 to 229, and 8% employed 300 or more."

Kilby (1969, p. 20) further observes that more interesting than their size distribution is the pattern of ownership of these industries: 68% of the paid-up share capital of 321 limited liability companies was of foreign origin, while 22% was Nigerian public and the remaining 10 was Nigerian private. Perhaps most interesting is the spread of the industrial and economic activities of foreign-owned companies with all their technical, capital and organizational advantage over the indigenous industries, advantages initiated in the colonial era and perpetuated through integration into multinational chains. Peter Kilby (1969, p. 69) made a breakdown of the industrial investments of the United Africa Company Group, thus revealing the extent to which this multinational giant has thrust its tentacles into the fabric of the Nigerian society and economy:<sup>29</sup> (See table p. 75.)

Most of the foreign-owned firms pose as the biggest absorbers of Nigerian labour. This is evidently a sign of their indispensability to the Nigerian economy. O. O. Soleye's 'The Politico-economic Position of Multinational Corporations: A Nigerian Example' (1975) and Ikenne Nzimiro's 'The Political and Social Implications of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria' (1975) both lucidly portray the economic havoc which multinational enterprises are capable of perpetrating on an ideologically unwary and drifting nation. The cement industry is among the few successful enterprises in Nigeria; the establishment of more cement factories in Nigeria will not only help relieve unemployment but will also better meet the local demand for building materials, yet the WNDC was used by the foreign partners to oppose the establishment of more cement factories. (Soleye, 1975, p. 203.)

In sum, city-growth and development in contemporary Nigeria has culminated in rural exodus in what G. Breese (1966, pp. 5, 99) has aptly described as "subsistence urbanization". This development is in part a result of the dominant role of foreign industrialists and businessmen and in part a product of the carry-over of colonial urban bias in the nationalist planning for economic development.

## Rural-urban interaction and exchange: A theoretical overview

Early interpretations of African urbanization were based largely on the notion of a uni-directional process. They represent a carry-over of the bizarre theories of arm-chair anthropology which convey the image of the city as a crucible of

social change entailing disorganization, as the melting pot in which slowly but consistently all the rural components of the immigrant personality are dissolved.

Such views of the city have the ring of Western ethnocentrism which has a strong influence on contemporary theories of transition<sup>30</sup> in the developing countries. These views derive from the Hebrew literature in which the prophets "explained . . . corruption, personal disorganization and other evidences of social and personal pathology as products of the urban environment." (Hauser, 1965, p. 503.) Maine's *Ancient Society* (1861), Tönnie's *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887) and Durkheim's *Division du Travail* (1893) to mention a few, represent comparatively recent versions of the view, and what is more, present in an elaborate form the classical framework on which the theories of rural-urban dichotomy were based.

Thus students of the African scene found in the dichotomous model a ready-made technique for the study of migration and urban growth. The African urban immigrant came to be considered as a being without an identifiable personality. The African urban dweller is said to be detribalized:<sup>31</sup> this means that, by the mere fact of living in town, the urbanite has cut himself from the moral bonds of his rural home, his kinship networks, and the rural folk culture with which he is familiar. This culturally deracinated being, if he is unable to assimilate the urban culture (and a good number, we are told, never assimilate) becomes a *marginal*<sup>32</sup> man, an anomic *personality*, the victim of the breakdown in social control which "is largely responsible for increased personal disorganization as manifest in juvenile delinquency, crime, prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, mental disease, social unrest and political instability." (Hauser, 1965, pp. 20—21.) If, on the other hand, he is able to adjust to and assimilate the urban culture, he is depicted as a kind of ambulant calculating machine, reacting to every situation with his head and not with his heart.

This conception failed to explain the behaviour pattern of those urbanites who, far from sloughing off their rural and moral trappings, not only make regular visits home but also keep in touch with their rural village either through the medium of urban-based ethnic associations or through the post and oral messages. It failed to account for the behaviour of those immigrants who, far from losing their bearings, far from being embroiled in all the deviant and criminal acts associated with city life, still behave as normal personalities, as law-abiding and peace-loving citizens.<sup>33</sup>

As a result of the above inadequacies, the rural-urban dichotomy model fell into disrepute and the alternation model<sup>34</sup> was incorporated into the general theoretical framework of urbanization studies. The alternation model conceives of the African individual as behaving in conformity with an injunction which says "when you are in Rome, do like the Romans". Thus the urbanite or immigrant is said to take on city behaviour in accordance with the urban cultural norms while he is in the city, and while he is in his rural home he adopts rustic behaviour. The alternation model presents rural and urban

behaviour as two different packages which the African carries along and opens for use according to need in the rural or urban areas. Insofar as personality is considered at all, this amounts to assigning a dual personality to the individual. One is left to wonder if human behaviour is so mechanical, so liable to change as one changes one's shirt or coat. The model fails to explain human behaviour to the extent that it fails to take the learning and retention processes into account.

There was a time when the model of dual economies<sup>35</sup> gained preeminence in theories of the developing countries. The dual society model which is the intellectual heritage of the dual economy model is in part the background to the psychological theorizing implicit in the alternation-model of behaviour sketched above.

Whatever its short-comings, the alternation model prepared the ground for the emergence of the rural-urban continuum hypothesis. The rural-urban continuum hypothesis posits a partial though indirect recognition of the fact that, up to a point, the urban immigrant carries with him his rural background experiences which are instrumental for his adaptation to the urban milieu. With the development of theories based on this model, African urbanization came to be increasingly seen as a process of adjustive mechanism (Imoagene, 1968) for the urban immigrant. This enabled studies of urban Africa to place urban-based traditional and neo-traditional institutions in their functional context. Voluntary associations and kinship networks came to be seen as ethnic bridgeheads in the urban stream.<sup>36</sup>

The rural-urban interaction model also owes its conception to the attempts to perfect the continuum by making it reversible: urban-rural continuum. Thus the rural and urban systems came to be conceived as subsystems within a larger national system. Thus the influence of the urban areas on the rural areas and *vice versa* came to be incorporated into the analytical frameworks of urbanization studies. Urbanism was recognized to be as much a way of life for the African as it has been for the Western European. Yoruba cities, owing to a Western ethnocentrism which led to a deficient theoretical analysis of African urban social realities,<sup>37</sup> came to be known as city villages. With the growth and development of rural-urban interaction theories, the old notions and perceptions of urbanism gave way to the concept of urbanism as a way of behaving: "one can be very urban in his thinking and conduct although he may live in a village". (G. Beijer, 1963, p. 16.) By the same token a man can be very rural in his thinking and conduct while he lives in the city. In discussing rural-urban interaction in contemporary Nigeria therefore, we recognize that "Between town and country lies a richly variegated social gamma of rural and urban patterns, in which a city may sometimes be rural and a village highly urbanized." (G. Beijer, 1963, p. 16.)

## Rural-urban interaction and exchange: The case of Nigeria

We have seen how interpretations and theories of the behaviour of the African urban immigrant have progressed from the simplistic image of a creature who has been torn away from the cradle of his rural Arcadia and thrown into the incomprehensible "wonderland" of urban civilization, to the conception of a being capable of coping with the interactive behavioural system accommodating both city and village structures. We will turn to the particular case of Nigeria and see how processes of interaction and exchange work out between the Nigerian rural hinterland and urban areas.

We can say, without the risk of overstatement, that well over 80% of Nigeria's urban population have a rural origin and background. This accounts, to a large extent, for the flow of people, goods, ideas, values and services between the urban and rural areas of Nigeria. This flow of people and goods, ideas, values and services, is indicative of a critical point in the action system, both at micro and macro levels, which represents the dialectical processes of modernizing the traditional and traditionalizing the modern, in the urban as well as rural areas.<sup>38</sup>

This is the theoretical background to our concept of rural-urban interaction. It brings into focus not only economic but also what Imoagene (1967) rightly christened "psycho-social factors" in the study of rural-urban exchange and communication. Imoagene (1967) illustrates with his data on rural Jesse and Urban Sapele that, in time, cities (particularly the new West African cities) come to develop a culture of their own. By this, Imoagene meant that those (Nigerian) cities which owe their growth to the commercial and administrative activities of the colonial government, by virtue of their having acquired an urban culture, increasingly attracted rural-urban migrants. One of Imoagene's findings is that those rural Jesse villagers who are prone to migrate are rurally detached, in the sense of exhibiting a decreasing participation in the traditional and customary activities of the village, and therefore more likely to be involved in the urban activities once they migrate. Thus urban involvement and rural detachment (Imoagene, 1968) were found to be negatively correlated.

This finding raises a crucial question which had both theoretical and practical implications. Does rural detachment cum urban involvement mean simply less frequent face to face contact with one's kith and kin back home in the village? If this implies no more than separation in physical or geographical space, then there is little question about the validity of Imoagene's major findings and the kind of conclusions to which they lead. In Imoagene's terms, urbanization and urban involvement entail a progressive rural detachment.

This view of urbanization raises anew the question of whether modernization is to be equated with westernization; for Imoagene seems to take the position that unless a migrant loses touch with his rural home he cannot be regarded as urbanized. This position is at least implicit in his distinction between "forced migrants" and "genuine migrants" (Imoagene, 1967, p. 385);

... one essential difference between forced and genuine rural-urban migrants ... is the nature of contact with home people. By means of an unbroken channel of communication, the forced migrants keep themselves typically within their rural network of social relations. At the end of their career in town, the forced migrants quickly resume their tribal ways in the village as if they have never left ... They contrast with the second class of migrants. (Genuine migrants.)

The conclusion to which this distinction leads is that the genuine migrants, whose lines of communication with home are tenuous and bound disappear in time, constitute *budding townsmen* (Imoagene, 1967, p. 385), while the forced labour migrants who interact with their rural home constitute the hard core *part-time tribesmen* (Imoagene, 1967, p. 385). This again raises the question of the validity of rural-urban dichotomy model, with all the theoretical implications.

All told, however, the major breakthrough in Imoagene's work lies in the fact that it salvaged non-economic factors from the marginal status to which a good number of earlier studies banished them.

From the practical standpoint, it is true that migration entails detachment, in geo-physical space, from the area of origin; in time it entails a reduction, or even elimination, of face-to-face contact with one's kith and kin. How far this can be taken as an indicator of a lack of commitment to the needs and problems of the migrant's community of origin or of his rejection of, and indifference to, the obligations and concomitant rights of kinship relations is a question which needs a qualitatively different order of analysis and interpretation.

The traditional African kinship system has shown a strength and resilience to be reckoned with even in the urban environment: recent research has produced evidence that the traditional African kinship system, far from being destroyed by the urbanization process, has assumed new functions in the urban environment. Plotnicov (1970, pp. 66—81), in explaining this *resilience* of traditional institutions, argues that the development of modern communications which are attributed to the colonial authorities acted as a facilitating factor, promoting rural-urban exchange. This is not to gainsay the fact that the traditional African kinship system has come under increasing strain both in the urban and rural areas. Every social institution is designed to carry a certain optimum of problem load; if the load is not then relieved, the institution breaks down. Discussing this problem in the urban context, Peter Gutkind succinctly suggests that the present rate and direction of African Modernization may, if allowed to continue, break the traditional kinship system with an "energy of despair" (1967) which has already been generated among the jobless in the cities of Lagos and Nairobi. Analyzing the CPSPC urban samples, Ulf Himmelstrand (1975) found out that about 40 % of the sample from the Western Region and the Middle-belt area, about 50 % in the mid-Western and Eastern Regions and about 60 % in the far north are isolated individuals—who neither receive nor give support to their kinfolk. In the chapter that follows, we will find out how much of this predicament obtains in the rural areas of Nigeria.



## From tradition to modernity or tradition in modernity?

The general orientation of this study starts from a theory which questions the validity of the tradition-modernity dichotomy and the underlying notion of a progressive unilinear movement of societies and social orders from tradition to modernity.<sup>39</sup> The tradition-modernity polarity owes its origin to the Age of Enlightenment, in which human progress was measured by the extent of departure from accustomed ways of thought and action. So far so good. When, however, social anthropology and the social sciences came into their own and colonialism brought African societies under Western influence, the concepts of tradition and modernity underwent a metamorphosis which is yet to be understood even by those students who are most sceptical about their application. With the colonial conquest of Africa, the West quickly lost, or more correctly wished away, all semblance of traditionality and arrogated to itself all the gay accoutrements of modernity.<sup>40</sup> Technology, industrial advancement, individualism, nationalism and development came to stand for modernity. Absence of technology and industry (measured by Western standards), kinship, tribalism (or to avoid its pejorative overtone, ethnicism and communalism) and underdevelopment came to stand for traditionalism. Today, this dichotomy or polarity has become institutionalized in centres and institutes of *modernization of traditional societies series*. Their intellectual output is formidable: *The Dual Economy* (Boeke, 1953), *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Lerner, 1958), *The Passing of Tribal Man* (Gutkind, 1970) and *Stages of Economic Growth* (Rostow, 1967) to mention a few, attest to the fact that the literature is enormous.

A crucial question to which particular attention will be paid derives from the thesis which equated tribal and rural man with traditional man and urban man with modern man. Of course this question arises in the context of post-colonial Africa; for Europe, both rural and urban areas automatically assumed modernity as soon as Africa came on the scene. A careful reader cannot but be astonished by the degree to which tradition and tribe are usually confused or used interchangeably in both academic and journalistic literature.<sup>41</sup> This confusion is as much a result of the "tyranny of old concepts" as of a "conscious commitment to the *status quo*". (Mafeje, 1972, p. 30.)

Aidan Southall (1970, p. 28) defines tribe as "a whole society, with a high degree of self-sufficiency at a near subsistence level, based on a relatively simple technology without writing or literature, politically autonomous and with its own distinctive language, culture and sense of identity, tribal religion being also coterminous with tribal society". This definition can be fairly accepted as suitable to the tribe in pre-colonial Africa. For colonial and post-colonial Africa, it has to be modified considerably, but this need not bother us here.

The point that I wish to emphasize from this definition is that tradition is only one of the many characteristic features of the tribe. For example the organization of economic and social life on the basis of the extended family (kinship) relationship is an underlying feature of many an African tribe. The

kinship system which still finds a niche (albeit an uncomfortable one) in the so-called modern urban Africa, is an African tradition in so far as it has been practiced from one generation to another.

Now, with the advent of colonial administration and our contact with the West generally, it could be maintained, and rightly so, that tribal Africa has passed away (for the tribe *per se* has lost its economic self-sufficiency, and political autonomy; it could also be said to have partly lost its technology). It could also be argued with a measure of plausibility that *certain aspects* of the African tradition, to the extent that they are no longer capable of coping with most of the twentieth century problems, are lost to Africa. But this is far from saying that African tradition as such has passed away. The tribal man has in many respects passed away, but the traditional man is still a factor to be reckoned with in twentieth century Africa. One may take issue with this position by pointing to a certain contradiction: if something as a whole is said to have passed away, how can you say that an aspect of it still exists? A part is found within a whole, and when the whole ceases to exist, then common logic has it that its part has gone with it.

My simple answer to this question is that social facts cannot be fruitfully reduced to the simplistic logic of the whole and its part. Indeed if the problem is to be considered from this perspective, then I contend that there is a sense in which a sociological part can be greater than its sociological whole.<sup>42</sup> In any case, if (as some maintain) the traditional man has passed away, why do we still bother ourselves with attempts to modernize a non-existent entity? If traditional Africa has passed away, what are development experts modernizing?

The concepts of tradition and modernity, insofar as they refer to human behaviour, human attitudes and to the principles of socio-economic and political organization, are relative and not absolute. They can best be understood as interactive and not mutually exclusive. There is tradition in modernity and modernity in tradition. There is in no wise a linear progression from tradition to modernity. This is not to deny or minimize the tension between tradition and modernity. Neither is it intended to ignore the fact that in the struggle between tradition and modernity, the latter has the balance of technological and scientific power in its favour which more often than not eventually aids in its triumph over the former. As Rupert Emerson (1960, p. 15) rightly remarks, the modernization "process can be guided, delayed or speeded up, but there is little reason to think it can be halted".

### **Traditional exchange in a modern market economy**

In chapter three we considered the imbalance of rural-urban exchange mainly in a macro perspective. But macro-economic circumstances have repercussions

on the micro-level of family and kinship exchange; and these repercussions in their turn may affect macro-economic processes in some kind of feed-back loop. Since family and kinship groups are still to a considerable extent the main productive, economizing and risk-taking units in the Nigerian rural economy it is crucial to illuminate the forces which weaken these units, or maintain their strength. It would seem reasonable to assume that one of the factors which maintain their strength is the kinship system of redistribution and mutual aid. Therefore we will now take a closer look at the meaning of such "traditional" kinship exchange.

Admittedly, Africa's contact with Western Europe before, during and after the colonial era, did considerable violence to the traditional African social structure. A reconstruction of the exchange aspects of this social structure will enable us to assess the impact of the modern market economy on culturally inherited intra-kinship exchange patterns.

Traditional socio-economic exchange was predicated on the principle of reciprocal<sup>43</sup> give and take, involving a sort of complementarity of normative expectations. Everyone is involved in the exchange process, directly and indirectly.<sup>44</sup> I say socio-economic because the economic and social are not mutually exclusive spheres of activity in traditional African society. As Bohannan and Dalton (1962, Introduction, p. 4) rightly noted

... the social integument structures the material flows and accounts for the moral attributes, whether strong or weak, of any transaction including market transactions. To a Western observer, the moral attitudes toward redistributive and reciprocal movements seem to be stronger than those toward market transactions precisely because nonmarket moral attitudes are brought to bear on exchanges which, in our society, would be subject only to market, or economic, morality.

Failure to appreciate this has more often than not led to the conclusion that the African is unresponsive to market or profit incentives, and is therefore behaviourally different from the Western "Economic man". Belshaw (1965, p. 76) notes that "In Africa (the) markets ... coexist with traditional systems in which lineage and age-set interests govern principles of exchange". Bohannan and Dalton (1962) classify traditional societies into two broad categories—market societies and marketless societies. The distinction is determined by purely spatial terms, as the market principle operates as much in marketless as in market societies. In "societies in which market places exist and the market principle operates, but only peripherally" argue Bohannan and Dalton (1962, Introduction, p. 2)

the subsistence requirements of the members of the society are not acquired ... in the market place or through the operation of the market principle. As in marketless societies ... land and labour are not transacted by the market principle, and if the market ... were to disappear from such a society no major hardship would necessarily follow because the basic necessities of life are acquired otherwise than by transactions in the market.

These two categories are distinguished from a third—"those societies (or social situations such as modern cities) in which market places may be (and usually

are) present, but in which the primary source of subsistence goods for buyers and of income for sellers and producers is the market in the sense of transactional principle". (Bohannan and Dalton, 1962, Introduction, p. 2.) This third category represents the so-called modern society, the main characteristic of which lies in the centrality of the market principle, as opposed to the first two categories which are mainly characterized by the interpersonal and marginal or peripheral market principle.

Traditional exchange permeates all spheres of human endeavour and social life. It takes place in family life, at birth, in title-taking, ritual, in interpersonal visits, in marriage ceremonies, in burial and festive ceremonies, within and across kin groups and clans, among socio-economic equals and between low and high, king and subject, ruler and ruled.

"Kola exchange" among the Ibos, as R. N. Henderson notes (1972, p. 379) "remains symbolically and normatively rooted in kinship relations but is elaborated to express the prestige of title or age". Writing about the traditional market economy in Southern Dahomey, Claudine and Claude Tardits (1962, pp. 94—95) depict the gift exchange involved in training a Dahomean girl to be a trader. The father, mother or husband makes her a small gift of money for an initial capital outlay. Among the Bulu of Cameroon, Georg Horner (1962, p. 174) observed that "Exchanges through trade friends were established as a part of the avuso alliances between lineages". Horner (1962, p. 174) also identified another form of exchange called "nkukum", i.e. exchange between two rich men, the purpose being to "establish one's prestige over wider area, more than one lineage, through a gift exchange not unlike the 'potlatch' of the Kwakiutl Indians of the American Northwest coast".

The traditional Yoruba society provides an example of a market society in which principles of both market exchange and reciprocity, however marginal, are nevertheless pronounced. This is also true of traditional Hausa society. Writing about the Hausa, M.G. Smith (1962, p. 305) outlined the historical and environmental factors which converged to make their society such that not only were cities great centres of commerce but the rural areas were extensions of the cities. Thus rural-urban interaction provides the organizational "context within which Hausa communities live and practice various types of exchange... Traditionally, the center of a rural community was a walled town, at which the chief, imam, and market were found".

Among the Bororo Fulani of Niger, there is traditional exchange not only of goods and articles but also of human labour. In this way, the services of a child could temporarily be made available to persons other than just the biological parents. "This arrangement", Marguerite Dupire (1962, p. 343) argues, "allows households which are childless or are made up of only old or physically handicapped persons to be self-sufficient". And without asking for any compensation, a Bororo can lend a bull or milk to a friend in financial difficulties. When a boy reaches the age of five or six he is started on the road to property acquisition and ownership by the loan of livestock. After an agreed number of

servicings, he leads the animal back to the lender. Both within and without the kin group, "one exchanges, one inherits, one lends, and one participates in ceremonial obligations of a reciprocal nature". (Marguerite Dupire, 1962, p. 342.)

Daryll Forde (1962, p. 89) observed that

Complex and protracted mortuary ceremonies follow the deaths of senior men among the Yakö of Eastern Nigeria. They involve the provision of gifts, feasts and payments over a wide range of persons and groups . . . , the main social significance of such ceremonies, including the provision and transfers of goods and the changes of status associated with them, was to be found in a reaffirmation of the solidarity and a restoration of the structure of social groups that had suffered loss.

In the case of her heroine who lost her only child, Flora Nwapa (1966, p. 94) portrays with clarity the same exchange in life crisis among the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria:

Towards evening, Efurú was taken home by the members of her age-group who had brought kola-nuts, home-made gins and palm wine for the entertainment of sympathizers. Those who were unable to go to the market brought money. Efurú was well known in the town and so she had many sympathizers. She herself had given generously to her friends who were bereaved so these friends also gave to her generously.

The traditional African marriage is *per se* a system of protracted exchanges: ideally the man taking a wife matches every visit (formal and informal) to the fiancée with a present of wine or any other customarily approved item of exchange. The birth of a child brings in gifts from friends and kinsmen alike. Traditionally, the gifts are made in kind. A man who is taking a title counts on the generosity of kith and kin who will bring wine, kola, and alligator-pepper—indeed, title-taking is another elaborate mechanism of social exchange and distribution.

The foregoing is then a summary account of traditional exchange within the kinship framework of social relations. In what ways have exchanges of the modern market type permeated this traditional system? What are the consequences of this permeation for development? We will deal with these questions in the rest of this chapter. Although exchange takes place within the networks of traditional kinship relations, yet it is not necessarily of the traditional kind governed by scrupulous reciprocity. Admittedly, a process of reciprocal give and take may go on but much of it has been shorn of the scrupulosity characteristic of a purely traditional exchange. Much of the ritual quality of mutual obligations has been lost in the interplay of forces of traditional and modern market relations.

In a word, where secular values have entered into considerable areas of human relations, the principle of nothing for nothing is at work; people have learned to give in cash to get a return in kind or *vice versa*, or to gain some form of pay-off. The well-to-do businessman does not simply distribute his money to every Tom, Dick and Harry who happens to fall in his line of descent. Kinship

may provide the obvious rationale for helping a near or a distant relation. But his choice of the relative to support is not completely bereft of a certain economic *calculus* which determines what kind of immediate, short or long-term benefit he will derive from such assistance.

The modern market economy has not only widened the scope of exchange; it has also changed the very content of the process. Yet, "The process is cumulative: the new exists along with the old, sometimes in conflict. Money has now been added to the traditional indices of wealth, such as wives, slaves, cloth, livestock and grain". (Bohannon & Daltoneds., 1962, p. 57.) Although David W. Ames (1962, p. 57) wrote this of the "Rural Wolof of the Gambia", the statement is applicable to changes found in the form and content of exchange in other traditional African socio-economic structures.

Modern socio-economic exchange has brought a measure of efficiency to the transactions, viewed against the background of improvements in communications and transport. Thus money can be sent in place of perishable goods to a needy relative in a distant area. A woman delivered of a child receives more gifts in cash than in kind. Weddings, feasts, funerals, etc. are all occasions for either giving or receiving presents in cash or in kind or both. These can be sent in person or by mail to distant places, inside and outside the country. The use of money has made it much easier to return a good turn done on the spot or negotiate a favour in anticipation.

At this juncture, a word on bribery and corruption is pertinent. Given the character of traditional giving in Africa which we have sketched above, and viewing bribery and corruption against the background, one can understand the double standard in the African attitude to these phenomena. The African public manifests an outright moral indignation as well as covert approval. This is more than true of Nigeria. The public servant who has misappropriated public funds may be condemned in one respect and commended in another. So may the public servant who in that capacity is bribed to give contracts at government loss. This is understandable when one considers that the concept of the nation is rather vague, and ethnic sentiment more clearly defined than national commitment. Some Nigerian public servants still see the nation as a object of plunder, and the government as a legitimate instrument for conducting the plunder. No wonder a critical observer like Andreski (1968) has coined the term "cleptocracy", even though modernization writers suggest that the "accusation of bribery should be used most sparingly in contexts of development, at least until it has been demonstrated without doubt that the transactions were not part of an indigenous exchange network". (Belshaw, 1965, p. 46.)

Owing to the interplay of modern and traditional forces, African courts of law and legislative institutions seem on occasion to be caught up in a difficult predicament. One commission of inquiry after another has foundered in the effort to deal with the problem of bribery and corruption in Nigerian public life. "Even though the law-maker has decided that corruption is punishable, he has

never dared state exactly where the borderline goes between proper and inappropriate actions. This must be decided by custom". (Sune Carlson, 1964, p. 87.) I had occasion to attend the Ayoola Tribunal of Inquiry into the assets of local government officers of Western Nigeria. Hardly any case could be recognized in which a defendant did not explain away suspicious bank deposits as gifts of money made by friends, parents, brothers, sisters, and wives. Going through the gazettes on the proceedings of The Shomolu Tribunal of Inquiry into the assets and property of public officers of The First Republic, one finds much the same pattern of platitudinous explanation of gifts allegedly made in one form or the other. Thus the political factor interacting with such cultural factors served to reduce the tribunals to a ridiculous exercise. In a word, the Judiciary can easily be made to suffer from the cross-pressures inherent in the impact of "other cultures" (Beattie, 1964) which have made contemporary Nigeria at once doubly traditional and doubly modern. Thus it is hardly surprising that in most cases of the legal process there are no distinct rules, so it may not be quite clear how they have been broken. The growth of corruption from this cultural matrix has far-reaching implications for socio-economic development.

Commentators and observers of Nigerian socio-economic and political development hold contrary views on the issue: some believe that, given the traditional kinship structure, so-called corruption could be a lubricant to the engine of development since the extended family system acts as a kind of re-distributive mechanism. An outstanding Nigerian scholar and politician is known to have said before the Shomolu Tribunal that he had no qualms about the funds he had misappropriated during his political career, considering that they enabled him to assist his own people by establishing modern amenities. There is a further tendency to buttress this argument by asserting that on the other hand, all told, the volume of resources accounted for by corruption does not amount to very much in proportion to the overall national wealth, and that in any case whatever is appropriated by individuals is plowed back into the economy by a process of reinvestment. Others see corruption as an outrageous waste of the country's scarce (now, not so scarce, owing to the oil revenues) resources. The argument for the re-distributive character of the traditional kinship system is well taken to a considerable degree; if I may anticipate the chapter on empirical analysis, our data suggest that as many as 50% of the rural population of the country are involved in social exchange through kinship networks. A large percentage of our respondents show a fairly strong preference for support from kith and kin; the rural-urban flow of goods and services as well as intra-urban kinship exchange somehow justifies the argument. However, our later empirical analysis does indicate a rather disturbing tendency among the higher socio-economic strata to isolate themselves from kinship-based exchange.

No systematic studies have been conducted to estimate the volume of resources which is lost by corruption. The Ayoola and Shomolu Tribunals of Inquiry in the former Western Region came closest to providing fairly reliable material for

research in this direction, but unfortunately their reports to the Military Government never saw, and probably will never see, the light of day. Corruption belongs to the area of criminology, and criminal statistics are usually hard to come by. Be this as it may, Gunnar Myrdal's (1971, p. 2) comments on the disruptive effects of corruption on development are worthy of reflection: "I believe that it (Corruption) has a powerful effect in breaking development. But economists have permitted themselves to remain absolutely silent on that problem. A few of my American colleagues have even on frivolous grounds come to believe that corruption acts as the oil which makes the development process go smoother." (p. 2.) Leonard Barnes (1971, p. 75) traces the pervasiveness of corruption in Africa to the colonial capitalist economic system, and argues that when independence was imminent the colonial agents substituted the "Theft Economy" in place of the profit motive.

The reinvestment argument is a rationalization without empirical basis. Most Africans would seem to believe that our public servants deposit their money in Swiss and other foreign banks rather than in communal or clan projects. An observer once did speculate that "Nyerere may well be the only leader in the continent who has no numbered bank account in Switzerland."<sup>45</sup> What is more, the argument about reinvestment would seem to be invalidated by the fact that Nigerians, and indeed Africans generally, have a reputation for conspicuous consumption; the ethic of re-investment is predicated on asceticism. Development experts suggest that corruption in the form of ascetic acquisition does exist in India; but African public servants too frequently indulge in ostentatious acquisition (spending the ill-gotten wealth on consumer luxuries) to be able to contribute significantly to development through corruption.



# V Field Data: Analysis and Interpretation

The broad theoretical outlines thus far attempted have placed Nigeria's agricultural and rural underdevelopment in their historical context, as well as within the contemporary world economic order and class structures. An analysis of these structures yielded the main independent variables which will enable us to examine the problems generated for the Nigerian farmer and rural dweller. Our central hypothesis, related to the commercialization of agriculture, is predicated on the overlap between subsistence farming and market economy. As we have already shown in an earlier section, the CPSPC rural sample on this overlap breaks down into the following categories:

- S: Pure Subsistence farmers or *peasants*
- SC: Subsistence cum cashcrop farmers or *peasant/cashcrop farmers*
- ST: Subsistence farmers with secondary non-farm occupation or *peasants in trade*
- CT: Cashcrop farmers with secondary non-farm occupation or *cashcrop farmers in trade*
- C: *Pure Cashcrop farmers*

There is a small section of the CPSPC rural sample which was not amenable to unambiguous classification, largely because of lack of information either on the kinds of crops grown, or on the non-farm trade. This small group of respondents will therefore be omitted from the analysis.

We shall breakdown the sample in terms of the socio-economic status of the family, or of the level of material possessions. These control variables naturally influence problem-awareness, problem articulation and problem-solving action. They may also influence both the content and direction of socio-economic exchange within kinship networks.

The level of material possessions (the number of material things reported to have been acquired by the respondent and assessed by the interviewer from the respondent's living conditions) was found to be closely correlated with socio-economic status;  $r = 0.91$ . It also exhibits a smaller number of missing observations and thus allows of a more detailed multifarious breakdowns of the data.

The dependent and other relevant control variables will be introduced as they come into the analysis. In this regard therefore, we shall begin with the variable of kinship exchange balance. By exchange balance is meant the extent to which an individual is involved in, or isolated from, the exchange processes and activities within the networks of the traditional kinship social system. We shall study four known categories of participants/non-participants in this proc-

ess: 1, Donor-recipient (i.e. those farmers involved in mutual exchange or reciprocal give and take); 2, Pure Receivers (those who are only at the receiving end of the exchange); 3, Pure Donors (those farmers who are only involved in giving) and 4, Isolated individuals (those farmers who are cut off from the networks of exchange activities).

Within the isolated individuals we should distinguish between genuinely isolated and the isolationists. These consist of farmers who are rich, and who are therefore expected to be foremost in giving to the less fortunate but who in actual fact deliberately isolate themselves from the exchange networks or reduce their giving to its barest minimum. Isolationism therefore is a strategy which is increasingly employed by the very wealthy as potential recipients join the rank of dependants.

## The problem of exchange among farmers

Before we examine the data in the light of the commercialization hypothesis, we shall first present the percentage aggregates of farmers who are reported to be isolated, or involved in kinship-based exchange networks.

On the whole, an appreciable percentage of the rural population are involved in the so-called traditional forms of exchange within kinship networks. Across socio-economic categories, the percentages are as follow: among those of low socio-economic status, 24 % participate in the exchange process, while about 40 % of the wealthy farmers are involved in the exchange. Somewhat higher figures are obtained if we use a slightly different indicator, but the trend of the differences between the various socio-economic categories remains the same.

Isolated individuals in the lower socio-economic category form about 60%, while those of higher status are not less than 40%. Again somewhat different results are obtained with a slightly different indicator.

Even these percentages of the isolated group are fairly large and therefore call for explanation. In the case of most of the isolated individuals in the lower socio-economic category, it could be said that their isolation stems from their poverty, that they have nothing to offer as items of exchange. For others it could be argued that their isolation is more or less a result of their marginal self-sufficiency; the circumstances of their economic life are such that they have just enough to fend for themselves and are therefore in no position to act as donors. By the logic of the economic calculus underlying neo-traditional exchange, which reckons with the limits and possibilities of a pay-off, the chances are that they do not receive. The poverty of some of these farmers, and the marginal self-sufficiency which is the lot of the others, tend to limit the scope of their socio-economic activities of which kinship-based exchange is only one. This partly accounts for the so-called attitudinal elements of traditionalism, of

resistance to innovation and of lack of enterprise which most writers never cease to lament as the root cause of Africa's agricultural ills.

As shown in chapter four, empirical research has proved beyond doubt that, by and large, the decisions of African farmers are economic, if only they are examined against the structural background in which they are made. When such decisions are deliberately or inadvertently wrenched out of context and analyzed with the model of *economic man* as inherited from conventional economics, the resultant incomprehensibility is taken as evidence of traditionalism and unwillingness to take risks.

### **Isolated individuals and the commercialization of agriculture**

With respect to the relationship between the frequency of isolated groups and the degree of agricultural commercialization, we have the following findings: in the *lower socio-economic category*, the frequency of isolated individuals, used as an indicator of absence of kinship exchange, is positively correlated with commercialization. This finding contrasts sharply with our results, for isolated individuals in the *higher socio-economic category*, where commercialization correlates negatively with isolation from kinship exchange. In the diagram, isolation shows a fanning out or bifurcation towards the commercial end of the subsistence/cash continuum: Isolation increases with increasing involvement in cash production among the poor, while for the higher socio-economic category, isolation decreases as commercialization increases. (Fig. 1.)

Corresponding positive and negative correlations found for isolated individuals obtain for pure receivers, although on a lower scale than was found for such persons in both socio-economic status categories. The positions are here reversed in terms of socio-economic status: Pure receivers of higher socio-economic category increase in numbers with increasing commercialization of agriculture, and pure receivers of the lower socio-economic category become more rare as they get more involved in the cash nexus. The diagram demonstrates the same dispersion towards the cash end of subsistence/cash continuum. Pure receivers of the higher socio-economic category have an overall average of 16%, while those of the lower socio-economic category show only 9%. (Fig 2.)

Our figures on pure donors and donor/recipients of the higher socio-economic category do not exhibit any clearly positive or negative correlation between exchange and commercialization of agriculture. At the lower socio-economic level, the figures show some magnitude for pure donors and donor/recipients for the subsistence sector only and then fall steeply to zero toward the cash end of the subsistence — cash continuum. (Figs. 3a, b.)

We note the fact that in spite of the paucity or virtual absence of pure receivers especially in the low socio-economic status, donors manifest a significant percentage. How does such a substantial percentage of donors without a

# Figures

## LEGEND

- LOW SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
- HIGH SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
- S        PURE SUBSISTENCE FARMER
- SC        SUBSISTENCE CUM CASH CROP FARMER
- ST        SUBSISTENCE FARMER CUM TRADER (I.E. THE FARMER WHO COMBINES SUBSISTENCE FARMING WITH A SECONDARY NON-FARM OCCUPATION)
- CT        CASH CROP FARMER CUM TRADER (I.E. THE FARMER WHO COMBINES CASH CROPPING WITH A SECONDARY NON-FARM OCCUPATION)
- C        PURE CASH CROP FARMER

Fig. 1.  
Problem of isolation from kinship-based exchange




Fig. 2.  
Farmers at the receiving end of kinship-based exchange




Fig. 3a.  
Farmers at the giving end of  
kinship-based exchange





Fig. 3b.  
Farmers in reciprocal exchange  
based on kinship networks



corresponding percentage receivers arise? Before offering the most obvious answer, we should observe that our data do not provide information about pairs of individuals involved in exchange, they are therefore unsuitable for any far-reaching and precise conclusions about who gets what from whom. Only on the aggregate level, where sampling errors contribute to the variations, can we draw any conclusions at all. However, the differences between our percentages for pure receivers on the one hand and for others involved in kinship exchange on the other are so great that we find certain conclusions justified.

Our data suggest the obvious conclusion that support given in an exchange relationship usually does not go to pure receivers, who are fewer than pure donors, but that such support goes to others who are both givers and receivers in kinship exchange relations. In other words, giving and receiving are practiced between people who are not the least capable of participating in such exchange. More likely than not, therefore, exchange takes place mainly among the rural wealthy class on the one hand, and between the urban immigrants and their rural relations on the other, while those most in need of support, the rural poor, are by-passed. This situation is not unrelated to the dynamics of the interaction between traditional exchange and modern market relations. Nigeria's rural areas have to a degree become so involved in the modern market exchange (being part of the periphery of the world economy) that secular values have become an important part of social relations.

It may be necessary to remark that what we have called the genuinely

isolationist category are so only in relation to the poor. They participate in social exchange which favours them while using the strategy of isolationism to exclude the less fortunate. Discussing the isolation of the poor from the neo-traditional exchange, Gutkind (1967, pp. 399—400) points out the underlying factor of emerging class attitudes even in the rural areas:

The 'exchange activities' of the unemployed, and the rural-based underemployed, are clearly not being met. Unemployed men are unable to participate in either the traditional exchange activities or those brought about in the course of change and modernisation. As such a new rationale for the organisation of the social order can now be clearly shown to exist.

African society is now being organised progressively in terms of clearly differentiated strata which provided a foothold, and have a meaning, for, the individual. True, kinship, clanship and tribe still tend to cut across these strata. But the importance of socio-economic stratification for modernising African society is found in the fact that more and more Africans think and act in class terms. It is certainly remarkable that the concept of social and economic class, which has for long been a vital ingredient in the study of societal change, has had very little appeal to those engaged in the analysis of the "new societies of tropical Africa".

## Empirical findings: Problem awareness as related to commercialization of agriculture

We remind the reader that the question of needs and problems was asked on three levels: personal, community and national. In other words, our respondents were asked to mention their personal problems, community and national needs as they saw them. It was an open-ended question which allowed the respondents to report unobtrusively what they considered to be the needs and problems of themselves personally, of the community in which they live, and of the overall national unit of Nigeria. The coded responses to this three-level question which was asked in three different parts of the interview reveals a gamut of needs and problems of subsistence, production, growth, credit, markets, prices, wages, jobs, technical and environmental necessities (such as roads, transport, sewage, and piped water), education, and moral and ideological problems relating to social and political life, problems of conflict, of basic health, social welfare and interpersonal relations etc. (Figs. 4a, b, c.)

'No problem' responses were also considered in our analysis; standing as they do for 'no answer' and 'don't know', they serve as a more general indicator of problem awareness, or rather the lack of it. It is appropriate to point out the *double entendre* implied by this response; the replies may be indicative of a virtual absence of problems for the respondents (which is unlikely), or they may mean that there are problems of which the respondents are unaware. As Sjoberg and Nett (1968, pp. 32—33) rightly said "The idea of 'nothingness' seems to be central to much of social experience. Social scientists cannot ignore the existence of negative facts. Non-action is a negative fact (or nonevent) that may have considerable relevance for social inquiry".

Fig. 4a.  
Spectrum of reported subjective personal  
problems by socio-economic status in the  
farming population




Fig. 4b.  
Spectrum of reported community  
problems by socio-economic status







Fig. 4c.  
Spectrum of reported national  
problems by socio-economic status



A look at the diagram (figs. 4 a, b, c.) of coded responses reveals that the percentage of 'no problems' is rather high. In the case of national and community needs and problems it ranks higher than any of the more specific personal needs and problems in the spectra. This finding, besides being theoretically and methodologically interesting, has implications for social research particularly in Nigeria. Historically, it may be related to the political situation following the January Coup of 1966 when people hesitated to express views on matters of national concern.

# A comparative survey of problems

Our findings suggest that the rural population is more aware of those problems which impinge directly on its immediate socio-economic and political environment than of abstract questions even if these have an equal influence, on the humdrum decisions of daily life. Consequently our farmer categories register higher percentages (with sporadic fluctuations) on such personal and community needs and problems as refer to subsistence, growth, production, markets, technical and environmental facilities. Of course, this is hardly surprising. Social psychological research abounds with evidence that a person's occupational background and environment greatly influence his perception of socio-economic and political reality.

## The problem of subsistence

Subsistence needs and problems are among the most salient in our problem spectrum. Our data show much the same pattern of relationships between

Fig. 5a.  
Subjectively reported subsistence problem, considered at personal level






Fig. 5b.  
Subjectively reported subsistence problem, considered at community level



subsistence problems and commercialization as we have seen for isolation. The more monetized farmers tend to show a greater awareness, i.e. a deeper consciousness of the problem. In detail, however, and examined across socio-economic categories, the data show a positive relationship between the perceived subsistence needs and commercialization among *better* situated farmers, while such needs exhibit a stronger tendency to increase with increasing commercialization among less *well-to-do* farmers. This is true of the problem considered at personal and community levels. (Figs. 5a, b)

We again note a dispersion of the hunger curves for the lower and higher socio-economic status categories as we move from pure subsistence to more commercialized farming, a bifurcation of curves for poor and more well-to-do farmers nearly similar to that found earlier with regard to the incidence of isolation as we move towards a higher degree of commercialization of farming. Socio-economic status makes little difference among *subsistence* farmers; it is highly significant in terms of hunger at the *higher levels of commercialization*.

As shown in the diagrams, subsistence is not viewed as a national problem by the lower socio-economic status category, being regarded as a personal and community problem only. Farmers in the higher socio-economic status perceive subsistence as much a personal and community as a national problem. This would seem to suggest that a significant number of the more well-to-do break away from the image of a self-sufficient upper-class wholly unconcerned with the needs and problems of the less privileged, and instead consider the problems of the underprivileged to be national problem. (Fig. 5c.)



## The problems of prices, wages and jobs

Our diagram of the problem spectrum shows that the problems of prices, wages and jobs are the most important of all the problems reported in the sample. (Figs. 4 a, b, c.) This is particularly true of the problems considered at the personal and community levels. Socio-economic status again affects the level at which these problems are seen to emerge, for viewed as national needs, such problems assume greater significance among the higher socio-economic category.

It is no surprise that these kinds of problems are the most representative of the crucial needs and problems of the Nigerian farmer. In an earlier section of this study, we had occasion to discuss the various migrants who, rightly or wrongly, see no future in agricultural pursuits and who therefore leave the rural areas for the cities in search of jobs. The agricultural population contains a good number of migrant labourers and share-croppers; for these and for the sedentary farmers the price-wage-job problem is a source of distress. As sellers either of labour or of crops, they find themselves exposed to the uncertainties of the open market.

Let us look at the distribution of this problem in greater detail, in terms of our commercialization hypothesis. A scrutiny of socio-economic status, shows that, generally, an awareness of the price-wage-job problem tends to increase with increasing commercialization of agriculture.

Socio-economic status does affect the perception of the problem as shown in the diagrams in which reported problems are examined at the national, community and personal levels. The price-wage-job problem is perceived primarily as a personal issue; this is true of farmers of both high and low socio-economic status. Both categories, at this level, show a clearly positive upward trend of increasing awareness and increasing subjective problem-load with increasing involvement in the cash nexus of the agricultural economy. (Fig. 6 a.)

At the *community and national* levels, our results point to a more complex set of relationships than the simple alternatives of positive and negative. At the community level, position in the agricultural economy seems to have no straightforward effect on the awareness and load of the problem. The same level of problem perception and problem load obtains for both the subsistence farmers and the more or less commercialized farmers when we exclusively consider farmers in the *higher* socio-economic category. For the *lower* category, the relationship is rather irregular. Farmers in the subsistence dominated sector show more awareness and greater load of the price-wage-job problem; in the cash-dominated sector, awareness and load of the problem tend to decrease by slow degrees as one moves from mixed cash to pure cash crop agriculture. (Figs. 6 a, 6 b.)

At the *national* level, we also find irregular relationships for both high and low socio-economic categories: in diagrammatic form, we have a more or less U-shaped relationship for the high socio-economic category and a more or less

Fig. 6a.  
Subjectively reported price,  
job, and wage problem,  
considered at personal level




Fig. 6b.  
Price, wage and job problem  
at community level





Fig. 6c.  
Price, wage and job problem  
at national level



bell-shaped curve for the low socio-economic status category. (Fig. 6 c.)

The above finding is interesting, if only because it seems to have confounded our commercialization hypothesis as applied at the community and national levels. How therefore are the U-shaped and bell-shaped relationships reported for the wealthier and poorer farmers respectively to be explained?

In attempting an interpretation of these results, we must bear in mind that the subsistence farmer is operating in a monetized peasant economy, and is therefore a monetized subsistence farmer. He has taxes and school fees to pay, and a host of other needs which he cannot himself satisfy, and for which he has to find the money. Therefore it is not surprising that the subsistence farmer is as much aware of the price-wage-job problem as his cash-crop producing counterpart in the wealthy category. The other farmers, who normally find their place in between the pure subsistence and pure cash-crop farmers, being in a position to vary their activities between agriculture and other occupations, do not feel the pinch of these problems as much as the individual solely dependent on agricultural income.

For the poorer farmers, the most plausible interpretation to be placed on the bell-shaped relationship is that while the pure subsistence and pure cash-crop farmers are too set in their ways to consider these problems (they have them but may not be aware of them), the farmers engaged in both agriculture and trade are more sensitive to price differentials, wage and job situations. This awareness is compounded by the mobility inherent in the nature of their occupation. These interpretations are only tentative, subject to further research and investigation.

All told, the incidence of the price-wage-job problem is higher at the personal than at the community and national levels, and in all the three cases, farmers in the higher socio-economic category show greater awareness of the price-wage-job problem.

There is one methodological problem with this finding and that is the way in which price, wage and job questions were combined as one kind of problem. This may confuse our results. Admittedly, most of our farmers have much to do with prices, some with wages, but a few with jobs.

### **The problems of technical and environmental facilities**

The concept of technical and environmental facilities carries different meanings for different rural communities of the Federation. For one community it may be the need for piped water, for another it may be the need for feeder roads, for yet another it may be the need for transport or a combination of these and other facilities. Technical and environmental needs involve the general problems of technological change in the rural areas. The current national plan includes programs for rural electrification and rural industries. It is hoped that these

Fig. 7a.  
Reported problem of technical and environmental infrastructure at personal level




Fig. 7b.  
Infrastructural problem at community level





Fig. 7c.  
Infrastructural problems at the national level



programs will be translated into action and help redress the rural-urban imbalance.

As the diagrams indicate (figs. 7 a, 7 b and 7 c), awareness of these technical and infrastructural problems is not only related to the process of commercialization, it is influenced by the farmer's socio-economic status. The relationships, however, are much more complicated than is suggested and therefore call for a detailed examination.

Considered at the personal level during scrutiny of socio-economic status, we find that as commercialization spreads, awareness of these problems increases for the poor farmers as it decreases for the wealthy ones. (Fig. 7 a.)

At the national level, although both poor and wealthy farmers show increasing problem-awareness with increasing commercialization, the poor farmers show a greater awareness overall and carry a heavier subjective load. (Fig. 7 c.)

It is interesting to find that awareness of this problem is highest at the community level and that, curiously enough, at this level, the wealthy farmers are more perceptive of the problem and therefore more concerned. This finding is in the tradition of the pattern of community development initiated by the colonial government, and suggests the possibility that local elites may, within the constraints imposed by the international dependence of commercial agriculture, play a crucial role in the development of Nigeria's rural areas. (Fig. 7 b.)

## **The problem of conflict and violence**

The question of conflict and violence was naturally formulated at the community and national levels only. Empirical analysis shows that the problem has a higher profile at the national level. Examining this problem at both levels, we find a rather intriguing departure from the general tendency, which is more or less characteristic of the problems discussed above, namely, the greater the involvement in commercialization of farming the greater or less the awareness of the problems. The problem of conflict and violence follows a different and complex pattern in its bearing on position in the agricultural economy.

At the community level, conflict awareness tends to be higher at the subsistence than at the cash end of the commercialization continuum, and poor farmers on the whole tend to show a greater perception and carry a heavier load. (Fig. 8 a.)

At the national level, if we examine socio-economic status, we find that for the poor farmers conflict awareness has no clear relationship with commercialization.

Among the farmers with higher socio-economic status, we find a curvilinear relationship: those who combine cash-crop farming with non-farm trade tend to be somewhat more aware of conflict at the national level. (Fig. 8 b.)



Fig. 8a.  
Problem of conflict and violence at community level





Fig. 8b.  
Problem of conflict considered at the national level



That the farmer/trader is more aware of national conflict is not only due to his dependence on the market; it is compounded by his mobility. Farmers of this category, together with the urbanites with a rural background (and rural ties), and the rural-urban commuters constitute purveyors of modernization values. By virtue of their mobility, they are among the categories which are likely to be conflict-conscious.

Overall, the pattern which emerges from this analysis can be summarized as follows: for problems of subsistence, prices, wages and jobs, the poorer farmers show less awareness at the national level than the wealthier farmers, while for infrastructural (technical and environmental) needs, and for conflict and violence, they are in fact as much aware as or in some cases even more aware of problems than the wealthy farmers at both national and community levels.

This finding is interesting in that it belies the assumption that poor farmers are lacking in political consciousness. Gavin Williams (1974) has already documented evidence of "Political Consciousness Among the Ibadan Poor".

In a sense, the level of problem-awareness among the poor depends to some extent on the character and structure of the problems under examination. Prices, wages, jobs and subsistence possess a personal predicamental character and structure which are not easily perceived as part of the broad socio-economic and political framework. When a person is hungry, he does not wait for anyone to find him food, it is his immediate responsibility to help himself. This is even more true of the farmers who produce the food.

Infrastructural needs and problems of conflict and violence belong directly to the broad social structure, with the result that the poor are as conscious of them as the rich farmers.

With regard to the problem of conflict, this finding does not clearly bring out the nature of the conflict. The decision as to whether reference is made to class conflict, political or ethnic conflict is crucial for a country like Nigeria in which the conflict phenomenon has taken a variety of forms. Admittedly, an attempt to categorize a given case of conflict may create a false or misleading picture of its mixed character. This problem will be discussed in the next section.

## Problem articulation

In the foregoing section, we examined some of the structures which presumably generate our agricultural problems; we also examined in some detail the needs and problems generated by the given structures. The general result of this empirical analysis confirmed our hypothesis: the more commercialized the farming, the more beset with problems, objective and subjective, are the poorer farmers involved, whereas the wealthier individuals tend to benefit somewhat from commercialization. This is true of problems concerning isolation from kinship exchange, of subsistence or hunger, and not the least, of the kinds of problems and threats presented by markets in labour and commodities.

These findings prepare the ground for an examination of the data bearing on questions dealing with problem articulation and problem-solving action.

At this juncture, I would remind the reader that, with regard to problem articulation, our respondents were asked a number of questions intended to elicit information on the nature and direction of consciousness or unconsciousness of social conflict—they were asked what groups of people or individuals, if any, are opposed to one another in the local community, and whether they identify themselves with any of the parties to the conflict or are indifferent to it.

As with data on awareness of needs and problem, I shall start with *no-conflict responses* as indicators of lack of consciousness, using the question on the existence or non-existence of opposing groups within the local community as the only indicator. I will analyze these data first cross-regionally and then across the various farmer categories. The latter approach will shed light on the relationship, if any, between market dependence and problem articulation.

As shown in figure 9, the Western Region takes the lead in conflict awareness measured in terms of marginal percentages.

The Midwestern and the Eastern regions share second place while the Northern region comes last.

As usual with this kind of indicator, it is of little help to the reader who lacks even a nodding acquaintance with developments on the socio-political scene of

Fig. 9.  
Cross-regional comparison  
of conflict awareness by  
level of material possessions  
Percentage of  
conflict awareness




Fig. 10.  
Rank ordering of the  
regions on political  
conflict




Fig. 11.  
Rank ordering of the  
regions on economic  
conflict




Fig. 12.  
Rank ordering of the  
regions on ethnic and  
community conflict




Fig. 13.  
Rank ordering of the  
regions on tribal  
conflict





Fig. 14.  
Conflict considered as  
generational



contemporary Nigeria. Conflict awareness finds expression in a variety of circumstances. I will further analyze the data, specifying the type of conflict predominant in each region.

Thus Western region ranks first only when the conflict is considered as primarily political. In this respect, the Midwest comes second, the East third and the North last. (Fig. 10.)

When the conflict is considered as primarily economic, the East takes the lead, the North and the Midwest share second place, and the West comes last. (Fig. 11.)

When the conflict is conceived primarily in ethnic and communal terms, the Eastern region comes first, the Western region takes a second place, while the North and the Midwest come a joint third. (Fig. 12.)

When the conflict is conceived chiefly as caused by tribalists inflaming ethnic loyalties for their own benefit, the North comes first, while the West, the Midwest and the East together are an equal second. (Fig. 13.)

When the conflict is conceived as primarily generational (as a struggle between those who believe that only age and the wisdom that comes with it can cope with our problems, and those who probably imply that these qualities can go to Hell), the Western Region takes the first position, the East comes second and the North last. The notion of generational conflict is virtually absent in the Midwest. (Fig. 14.)

We have presented these five types of community conflict in a descending order of significance: political conflicts are mentioned most frequently, and

generational conflicts are least common. The conflict variable could be further analyzed by making a more broad-based North-South regional distinction, and in terms of two types of conflict: traditional and modern. Traditional conflict is conceived and expressed in ethnic, generational, lineage, caste, clan and racial differences; modern conflict in socio-economic and political terms. In this respect, our findings are as follows:

	South	North
Modern class conflict	71%	24%
Traditional conflict	29%	76%
Total	100%	100%

Contingency Coefficient 0.31

With a contingency coefficient of .31, we note that there is a fairly strong association between North/South differences, and both the level and the nature of conflict respectively. The figure above shows that Southern Nigeria with 71% of modern conflict as against 29% of traditional, is characterized more by class struggle. In other words, the stratificational order is more secular than sacred. Compare this with the North which registers only 24% of modern and 76% of traditional conflict.

	South	North
Conflict	35%	17%
No conflict	65%	83%
Total	100%	100%

Overall, the South is more conflict conscious than the North, at least one ignores the kind of conflict—traditional and modern being combined. This finding confirms our previous hypothesis that in, dialectical terms, in this context within the frame of interaction or contact between the North and the South (between the forces of modernity and those of tradition), the modern subsystem makes inroads in the traditional subsystem owing to the fact that the balance of technological power is in its favour.

If we control for the level of material possessions (socio-economic status), a cross-regional comparison shows the following differences:

Regions	Low material possession	High material possession
West	31%	48.4%
Midwest	16%	29.2%
North	11%	27.1%
East	22.4%	30%

Thus the level of material possessions does influence conflict articulation. In all four regions, there is a higher incidence of conflict articulation for the wealthy than for the poor farmers. This is most true of the farmers from the North, West, and Midwest. In the case of the Eastern Regions, the poor farmers are not very different from the wealthy in the degree of conflict articulation.

In the West and Midwest, community conflict has been identified as primarily political, in the East, it is primarily economic, in the North, it is primarily a tribalist phenomenon. How do we account for these regional differences in the conflict profiles?

The historical circumstances of this study suggest part of the answer. This is particularly true of the Western region which ranks first in political conflict consciousness. The Western Nigeria emergency in 1962 divided the Western community into rival units either by creating new political differences or heightening old and existing ones. With Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Groups, in detention even up to and during the first military regime, the Westerners felt the pinch of their deprivation as essentially political. Chief Samuel Akintola of the NNDP who had taken over the political leadership was very unpopular and widely regarded as a political turn-coat who had sold his brother and leader for a mess of pottage. Thus political differences in the West eclipsed every other issue during the first decade of Nigeria's independence. To quote Mao Tse-Tung, (1971, p. 116) "When the superstructure (politics, culture etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive".

The Agbekoya uprising, which took place two years after our survey, was an expression of the economic deprivation to which the Western farmers had been subjected, but the struggle took on a political form (Gavin Williams, 1974, pp. 109—134). Thus, whether a conflict is subjectively defined as political or economic depends on political circumstances while in fact it may be based on economic deprivation. The basic contradiction, which is economic, is found on several different levels, e.g. the conflict derived from the get-rich-quick exploitation by the usurping political leaders of the NNDP, but under prevailing conditions it expressed itself in political terms.

Somehow, circumstances in the Midwest take their cue from the West, which was part of it until the early nineteen sixties when it was given regional status. "The old Western Region lives on in spirit to the extent that the Mid-west and Western states still tend to keep in step . . ." (*West Africa*, February 20—26, 1971, p. 213.) The political dismantling of the West in 1962 affected the Mid-west. Moreover, with the establishment of the Midwest as a separate unit within the Federation (1963—64) (an essentially political action), it was only to be expected that remote and immediate socio-economic issues would be fought out in political terms. The problem of political leadership was as much a burning question for the Midwest as it was for its foster mother.

In the Eastern Region, community conflict was defined mainly in socio-economics terms. The East has been traditionally identified with a greater sense of

economic individualism than is the case with other parts of the country. In a society which is predominantly egalitarian in its values and beliefs, the stratification process consequent upon increasing commercialization and secularization facilitates the development of the class consciousness as a principal contradiction. An egalitarian value system which supposedly hinders the acceptance of economic differences as God-given or natural by this same token promotes tendencies towards economic individualism and class consciousness.

Another less psychological interpretation which may supplement rather than contradict the above derives from the fact that most of the Eastern Region was politically homogenous, the N.C.N.C. being the dominant party. In such a case it would be difficult to express economic differences in terms of political conflict. This interpretation can be tested by a breakdown of regional data to separate Iboland from the minority areas which were less dominated by the N.C.N.C. A breakdown of the Eastern rural sample in this respect showed the following results:

	Conflict		
	Economic	Political	Ethnic
Eastern Majority	16%	1%	3%
Eastern Minority	4%	8%	7%

In the minority areas, conflict tends to be perceived and articulated more in political than in economic or even ethnic terms.

For the farmers of the Northern Region, community conflict is articulated in anti-tribalist terms—the farmers see conflict as the handiwork of those who see socio-economic and political problems in terms of tribalism.

To appreciate this Northern result, it is necessary not only to clarify the ambiguity of the term tribalism, but also to recall the peculiar circumstances of time and situation in which these data were collected.

Conflict in this respect derives from two different but related sources. It is said to originate in Nigeria's ethnic diversity. In the CPSPC pilot study, people were found who said that the existing conflict was the making of tribalists, who play on the ethnic differences. A certain ambiguity therefore arises in the use of the term tribalists as it refers both to those who regard the existing conflict as a result of Nigeria's ethnic differences and those who incite tribal sentiment in order to achieve their ends.

In no other region was this ambiguity more evident than the North which was at the time of the CPSPC field work a veritable hotbed of propaganda which was then directed particularly against the Ibos in the North. This is the most probable reason for the high place of the North in the results on the tribalist dimension of conflict.

Thus far, we have singled out the major and most significant conflict in each region for a detailed analysis. In the West and the Midwest, conflict is articu-

lated primarily in terms of politics, in the East of economics, and in the North of tribalism. We have also established that the level of material possessions does influence the incidence of conflict articulation. We will further analyze the major conflict identified for each region by comparing results across socio-economic categories of farmers.

We have already touched on a clear correlation between commercialization on the one hand and kinship-based exchange and problem-awareness on the other. A scrutiny of socio-economic status or level of material position, showed that while most of the problems have the expected relationship with commercialization, others have both negative and positive links with it. The conflict variable was, however, found to behave differently, in the sense that it showed no clear tendency to increase or decrease with increase in the commercialization process. What was more, the poor farmers were shown to be as much, and in some cases more, aware of conflict than the wealthy.

In broad terms, what is true of conflict awareness could be said to be true of conflict articulation. As the diagrams (figs. 15 a, b, c, d) indicate, position in the agricultural economy (commercialization) does not appear to have a unidirectional trend effect on conflict articulation. This statement calls for some qualification.

This apparent lack of relationship may mask some rather contradictory relationships. These are revealed when the level of material possessions is controlled for. Thus we find that for the Western farmers with a low level of material possessions, increasing commercialization entails increasing conflict articulation, while for those with a high level of material possessions, conflict articulation stands in a bell-shaped relationship with commercialization.

A lenient interpretation of the diagram for the Eastern Region farmers who have a high level of material possessions will tend to suggest a similar bell-shaped relationship between commercialization and conflict articulation. On this basis, it can rightly be concluded that, for the wealthy farmers of both the Western and Eastern regions, conflict and problem articulation is stronger for those in both farming and trade than for those in either pure subsistence or cash-crop agriculture.

Is there any explanation of the similarity of results for the same class of farmers in both East and West? Beyond the speculation that both regions are dominated by what we previously called modern conflict (the West, *political*, the East, *economic*), our data can be of no further help. In other words, political and economic conflicts manifest a common origin in class structure and consciousness on which regional variation may have little or no influence.

For the Midwest the findings are not very illuminating. To begin with, values concerning poor farmers are totally lacking; comparison across socio-economic categories is impossible, and with respect to our commercialization hypothesis, the wealthy farmers do not show any clear association between position in agriculture and articulation of conflict.

For the Northern farmers, the process of commercialization does not seem to



Fig. 15a.  
Western Nigerian farmers.  
Conflict articulated in  
mainly political terms




Fig. 15b.  
Midwestern farmers.  
Conflict articulated in  
mainly political terms




Fig. 15c.  
Northern Nigerian farmers.  
Conflict articulated in  
mainly tribalist terms





Fig. 15d.  
Eastern Nigerian farmers.  
Conflict articulated in  
mainly economic terms



have any clear bearing on conflict articulation. Insofar as the conflict profile in this region is mainly tribalist, some analytical comment is in order.

When the level of material possessions is examined, the incidence of conflict articulation is greater among wealthy than among poor farmers. In other words, the perception of conflict in tribalist terms is common to farmers in both socio-economic categories which differ only in the levels.

We have identified the most significant and dominant conflict in each region: the West and the Midwest, mainly political; the East, mainly economic; and the North, mainly tribal. In other words, conflict perception and articulation among Northern Nigerian farmers are characterized mainly by traditional conflict, while modern conflict characterized the Southern farmers' perception and articulation.

Since the relationship between commercialization and the articulation of the dominant conflict is twofold and can only be discerned after examination of socio-economic status, the question to be analysed concerns the type of farmers which predominates in the perception and articulation of the main conflict. We will attempt to settle this question in the analysis which follows below.

### **A cross-regional analysis of conflict articulation by socio-economic status of farmers**

For Western Nigerian farmers with a low level of material possessions, conflict is articulated as primarily political (26%), then ethnic (3%) and only marginally tribal (2%). This is the position of cashcrop farmers. The wealthier class are also of the opinion that conflict is primarily political (36%), secondarily ethnic (8%) with a tribalist streak (3%) and only slightly generational (2%).

While the belief that conflict is primarily political is evenly distributed among all the categories of farmers with a high level of material possessions, its marginal attribute of tribalism is perceived only by the subsistence farmers with a high level of material possessions.

Among the Midwestern farmers with a low level of material possessions, only pure cash-crop farmers define conflict as wholly economic (3%). For the remaining categories, with the same low level of material possessions, conflict seems to be totally absent from their perception. The wealthier farmers think that the conflict is primarily political (22%), with the economic (3%) and tribalist (3%) dimensions interacting with equal strength. This mode of problem articulation prevails among the subsistence farmers.

In the Northern region, the poorer farmers articulate conflict primarily in tribalist terms (5%), and only secondarily in economic (3%) and ethnic (3%). On a somewhat higher scale, wealthy Northern farmers also regard the problem as primarily tribalist (16%), marginally economic (4%), with ethnic (3%), political (3%) and generational (2%) dimensions. Oddly enough, it is

mainly the subsistence farmers of both levels of material possessions who articulate the problem in this way.

It must be repeated here that the Northern results were influenced by the crisis which immediately preceded and even precipitated the civil war (1967—1970). Subject to research into this matter, it has been argued with reasonable conviction that the campaign of tribal hate made its far-reaching impact because it was conducted under the auspices of the dominant NPC.

The Eastern Nigerian farmers with a low level of material possessions think that the problem is primarily economic (9%), secondarily political (6%), at once marginally ethnic (3%) and tribalist (3%), with an undercurrent of generational conflict (2%). This is particularly the belief of subsistence-oriented farmers. Wealthier farmers also articulate the problem as primarily economic (12%), secondarily ethnic (8%) and political (7%), with a thin veil of tribalism (2%). Mainly subsistence farmers think this way. Pure cashcrop farmers think that the problem is a simple case of ethnic and generational conflict.

We will now attempt to set these findings on conflict articulation in a theoretical framework. A major theoretical model which immediately comes to mind is that of modernization. Implicit in theories of modernization is the notion that the more modern (the more educated, the more mobile and the more wealthy) the population, the less likely they are to emphasize ethnicism in their perception and articulation of conflict, and the more they tend to emphasize the political and economic aspects of conflict.

Class formation theories, on the other hand, posit the view that the poorer people tend to show greater perception and articulation of conflict in terms of economics and politics—they are thus more class conscious while the wealthier people to place greater emphasis on integrative problems and are therefore less conflict-conscious and where they are conflict conscious, they underline its tribalist element.

A North-South breakdown of the CPSPC data provides the most appropriate empirical evidence on which we can test these theories: the most salient conflict in the South is Economic/Political or modern, and in the North Ethnic/Tribal or traditional. (See p. 109.)

It hardly needs to be repeated that, socio-economic status apart, the commercialization variable cuts across this North-South breakdown. Thus it could be said that commercialization implies modernization.

As the diagram (fig. 15 a) suggests, while the poor farmers of the West tend to articulate conflict more clearly as commercialization increases, the articulation process among the wealthy farmers does not follow this simple trend. Rather, conflict articulation stands in a bell-shaped relationship with commercialization.

For the wealthy farmers of the Midwest, conflict articulation tends to spread evenly among the five categories (fig. 15 b).

Indeed, the finding on the wealthy farmers of both West and East shows, if

anything, that conflict articulation reaches its climax not at the cash end of the continuum but in the middle where farming and non-farm trade are combined. (Figs. 15 a, 15 d.)

We can compare the above result with an earlier finding which shows that, with regard to problems of prices, wages and jobs, problem-awareness for wealthy farmers reaches its climax, not in the central position of combined farming and trade but at both ends of the subsistence-cash continuum.

For the farmers of the North, commercialization has tended to proceed without reducing the wealthy farmers' consciousness of tribal and ethnic conflict compared with the poor farmers. Although the conflict here is said to be mainly of the traditional type, yet the data do show that the cash-crop farmers (the modernized farmers) are as hide-bound (if not more so) as their subsistence counterpart (fig. 15 c).

It is also remarkable that while the ethnic element is absent from the conflict articulation of the poor farmers of the South, it is present in that of the wealthy farmers.

Perhaps, Andrew Pearse's suggestion that "The crisis is not in the long life of the subsistence systems, but in the dysfunctional straddle between these and a reliable money-market system" (1971, p. 73) deserves more than the attention of a footnote, in theoretical and substantive terms.

A second issue derives from the first. Does subsistence agriculture necessarily stand for tradition or commercial agriculture for modernity? So far our findings suggest answers in the negative. As we have also argued in earlier chapters of this study, the African subsistence farmer is a product of an incorporation into a system which makes the same kind of demand on him as on his commercialized counterpart. The net effect of this incorporation is that commercialization has continued—and still does—without necessarily being accompanied by modernization, and to the extent that there has been any modernization at all, the subsistence farmer found himself as much exposed to its values (albeit questionable) as the cash-crop farmer.

In sum, the findings and the issues that follow from them once more emphasize the problem of modernity versus tradition which has already been treated at length in chapter four. By and large, the findings validate our theoretical position that there is a sense in which there is modernity in tradition and tradition in modernity.

## The action context

In the introductory chapter, we stated that we are not only interested in the ways in which structures create problems for individuals and groups but also in the ways in which these individuals and groups either use existing structures,

modify them or create new structures in the effort to solve their problems and satisfy their wants and needs.

In the section on rural-urban interaction, we argued that the ordinary peasant farmer has not witnessed enough breakthrough in agricultural innovation to be able to satisfy his wants and needs, and that at best it is only the moneyed few—described elsewhere as the *rural bourgeoisie*—who gain from whatever technological innovations there are or have been in Nigeria's agriculture. We conclude with the observation that the expected diffusion effect has not been sufficiently realized, and where realized, it has been of doubtful development value. We made these assertions mainly on theoretical grounds; it is hoped that the following empirical analysis will shed further light on the theoretical assertions.

Our farmer respondents were asked questions regarding both intentional and incidental visits to the agricultural plantations and settlements which constitute the central means of diffusion of technical and substantial innovations to the agricultural sector and population. The respondents were asked if they had ever seen governmental plantations and farm settlements. They were also asked if they had visited any demonstration centres.

A scrutiny of the overall marginal percentage distribution of the responses, we find that, about 11% of farmers with low material possessions and about 19% of farmers with high material possessions, report having seen or visited government plantations. The incidence of such reported visits is not unduly high for a country with an enormous agricultural base and with the paraphernalia of extension education staff. Olatunbosun (1969), writing on the impact of the governmental plantations and settlements, observed that these centres are regarded by the average farmer as out of bounds, that is as government land having the same status as the "European quarters" of colonial times. Although farmers recruited as labourers to work on such plantations and settlements may acquire useful agricultural experience, such farmers are more likely to be share-croppers, with little or no land or even financial resources to invest in agriculture.

The differences between level of material possessions, with regard to frequency of visits, though small, are not negligible: insofar as farmers in the higher level of material possessions also visit the plantations and farm settlements, they presumably have no intention of asking for work as labourers but are seeking insight into new developments in agricultural techniques and seed varieties. (Figs. 16 a, b.)

This point is reflected in the responses to the question on visits to agricultural demonstration centres, shows and fairs. As many as 27% of the farmers with a higher level of material possessions have visited or participated in such activities as compared with 12% of those farmers with low level of material possessions.

If we examine the data in terms of our commercialization hypothesis, we note the following: with regard to visits to agricultural plantations and settlements

Fig. 16a.  
Visiting plantations and farm settlements





Fig. 16b.  
Visiting agricultural shows, fairs and demonstration centres



there is a weak positive, even if not a monotonous linear, relationship between commercialization and visits to plantations and settlements. (Fig. 16 a.) The relationship does however show a clear upward trend for the poor farmers. The wealthy farmers report a greater frequency of visits.

It is noteworthy however that the same category (cash-crop/farmer traders) at the higher level of material possessions is the most active in visiting plantations and settlements. The point established by these results for farmers of this category (socio-economic status notwithstanding) is that, by virtue of their position in the market, these farmers are not only more mobile, but also more business-oriented. This businessorientation and the mobility inherent in the nature of their trade explains the high frequency of their contacts with plantations, settlements, demonstration extension centres, fairs and agricultural shows. If one compares the diagram of visits to plantations and farm settlements with that showing visits to agricultural shows and demonstration centres, one finds that the results point to similar conclusions. (Figs. 16 a and 16 b.)

These findings also suggest the possibility of reversed causality, even of reciprocal causality. In other words the farmer-trader may not necessarily frequent the plantations, settlements and demonstrations centres because he is a commercialized farmer. He may have commercialized his farming because he made the visits. A point may be reached where the two acts or processes of visiting and commercializing change places as cause and effect.

Concerning the number of problem-solving organizations in which our respondents reported active participation, our data again point to division such

Fig. 17a.  
Participation in one  
problem-solving organization





Fig. 17b.  
Participation in more than  
one problem-solving  
organization




as we found earlier in our analysis of hunger and isolation among well-to-do and less fortunate farmers. The tendency is not quite linear but we can still make the following statement on the basis of figures 17 a and 17 b firstly, that the more well-to-do farmer show a higher incidence of membership in effective problem-solving organizations along the whole spectrum of our commercialization variable from subsistence to pure cash crop farming than do the less privileged farmers, and secondly, that this difference between better situated farmers and poorer farmers with regard to the incidence of their organizational participation grows larger with greater commercialization of farming. Thus among subsistence farmers there is only about 15% difference in organizational membership whereas we find as much as 46% difference among pure cash farmers at the other end of the commercialization scale. (Fig. 18.)

The indicator used to check the variable of organizational participation in this case is a dichotomization of a variable combining the number of "effective problem-solving organizations" of which the respondents were active members. By "effective problem-solving organizations" we mean organizations which, according to respondents, help to solve the personal and community needs and problems mentioned earlier in the interviews by the respondents.

We are particularly interested in relating the incidence of memberships in what we have called "effective problem-solving organizations" to the incidence of having participated in forming *new* organizations. Does dissatisfaction with the *problem-solving capacity* of present organizational memberships encourage or discourage people from forming new organizations? In answering this question,


Fig. 18.  
Forming problem-solving  
organizations



we broke down the organizations into economic, civic (political cultural), ethnic, and others which are more difficult to classify.

In case of economic associations, our findings suggest that those members who feel that they fail to deal with their needs and problems are also less likely to become involved in forming new organizations. Those who participate in forming new organizations are predominantly those who are already satisfied that economic associations do a reasonably good job. Note that this relationship holds with a gamma around 0.31—0.36 when we check on the influence of material status. This enables us to dismiss any overall explanation of low participation in forming new associations as evidence of a needy and underprivileged group lacking in requisite resources. A low participation in forming new organizations among those dissatisfied with existing organizations is found not only among the needy, but also among the well-to-do. In other words, the material resources exist, organizational mobilization is lacking.

The alternative causal interpretations which we have here juxtaposed can be summarised in the following diagrams:





With respect to the commercialization hypothesis, the use of economic organizations in solving problems tends to increase as commercialization increases. This is true of the wealthy farmers only. For the poor farmers, information on the cash sector of the continuum is missing and so we have no basis for drawing any reasonable conclusions. (Fig. 19.)

With regard to ethnic associations, we have similar differences between those farmers who are better off and those who are less well-to-do. If, for the poorer farmers, we disregard the distinction between the subsistence/trade and cash-crop/trade categories (the latter in particular is much too small to yield a significant statistical meaning) and combine them with the pure cashcrop category, the sum reveals a downward sloping trend with commercialization. The wealthier farmers, show a rising trend: the more commercialized the agriculture, the more satisfied they are with the use of ethnic organizations in practical problem-solving action. (Fig. 20.)

In the case of civic organizations, we also find a downward sloping trend for poorer peasants and farmers. If the frequencies for the last three farmer categories are combined and considered as a percentage of this base, we see the same downward trend for the poor. Now if we look at those who are better off, and see how they assess the efficiency of civic associations, there is little tendency there: commercialization of agriculture does not seem to have much effect on the evaluation of civic organizations.

One point should be made here; compared with figures on economic organizations, the highly commercialized farmers are no more satisfied with civic organizations than with economic organizations; the real difference among subsistence farmers which are lower in economic and higher in civic associations implies that civic organizations serve the purposes of all categories of farmers better than do economic associations.

In examining the variable which deals with the typology of different ways of seeking jobs, the point to be considered is the row totals for the lower and higher category in terms of material possessions. The data suggest that further training is about three times more frequent among the better situated than among the less well — off farmers: 2.3% as against 0.7%. Personal contacts and other similar means show a slightly larger number: 12.6 as against 9.3%.

With regard to the association of education and jobseeking, checking on rural and urban background, a positive correlation is found in both rural and urban areas, between education and jobseeking. The better educated the individual, the more likely it is he will look for a new job. But the association is somewhat stronger in the rural areas, probably because education there is far less common than in the urban areas.

Here we consider ways of seeking a job as related to education: When checking on urban versus rural background, further training as a means of jobseeking is far more common in the urban than in the rural areas. But otherwise, personal contacts and passive fatalism are equally common means in both places. All that can be said about the influence of education here is that it

Fig. 19.  
The use of economic organizations  
in problem-solving action




Fig. 20.  
The use of ethnic organizations  
in problem-solving action





Fig. 21.  
The use of civic organizations  
in problem-solving action



goes in the same direction, namely, the better educated individuals are more likely to go seek further training and impersonal means, and the less educated to resort to personal contacts and passive fatalism. This relationship is much stronger for the rural areas. Gamma is .43 for rural and .29 for the urban areas. One can say that education has an impact on the attitude to finding jobs. This influence of education itself does not differ between the urban and rural areas, but the association is stronger for the latter, from where a majority of School leavers throng the labour offices and streets of our cities in search of jobs for which they are either unqualified or ill-qualified, or which are non-existent.

In conclusion, statistically speaking, the results of this empirical enquiry are clear: the more commercialized the farming, the greater the load of both objective and subjective problems, the more beset by these problems are the poorer farmers involved, whereas the somewhat better situated farmers tend to benefit from commercialization. This holds for such problems as isolation from kinship-based exchange, subsistence, and the threats generated by markets of labour and commodities.

The socio-economic status of farmers, measured in terms of the number of material items of various kinds which have been acquired by the respondents, has a large influence on the effects of agricultural commercialization by increasing the gap between the haves and the have-nots. How in the first place these differences were created is an historical question which has already been examined at length in earlier sections of this study.

# VI Summary and Conclusions

The first chapter of this study began with a statement of its objectives and the scope of the data. We registered that, considerable departures notwithstanding the CPSPC research framework provided the over-riding theoretical structure. Hence problems examined were cast in the analytically distinct stages of problem-perception, problem-articulation and problem-solving action. The theme of this three-stage process was designated the commercialization hypothesis.

In Chapter Two we delved into the history of Nigeria, with a view to providing the background to a fuller understanding of the structures which generate problems for the Nigeria agricultural economy. We followed this up by developing historical models to comprehend the various stages through which Nigerian agriculture has passed from colonial times to the present day.

Chapter Three is more or less an extension of Chapter Two: in it we made further excursions into history to relate the process of commercialization to its proper perspective. The commercialization hypothesis was given an operational definition in that the farming and rural population was divided into five farmer categories ranging from pure subsistence through mixtures in between to pure cash crop production. Here also the problem was given a national as well as international setting.

In Chapter Four, we examined the role of rural-urban relations in the making of the problem. We saw how migration has the doubly negative effect of denuding the rural areas and swamping the urban centres with unemployed and unemployable labour, and how the dead-end of import-substitution industrialization created the regrettable trend towards proletarianization and subsistence urbanization.

In Chapter Five, we reported the analyses and interpretations of our field data. The commercialization hypothesis was here tested. Although it did not hold in relation to such variables as conflict articulation, we found both positive and negative correlations between commercialization and most problem loads. For example, problems of isolation from kinship-based exchange and of subsistence, analysed across socio-economic status categories, tend at once to intensify for the poor and lessen for the well-to-do farmers as commercialization

increases. Diagrammatically speaking, these two problems show a unique divergence with increasing involvement of the farmers in the cash nexus of the agricultural sector.

The findings of this study have a number of policy implications which should be defined in this concluding chapter.

Firstly, if differences in terms of problem load between wealthy and poorer farmers increase with increasing commercialization of farming, and if these differences are comparatively slight among farmers who have a fairly secure subsistence base, we may ask whether this means that we should avoid commercialization of farming and rather stick to subsistence farming, supplemented perhaps with some little trade or cash crop? Of course not. Our diagrams suggest other more progressive options even in sociological terms. If it is true, as we have proved, that only farmers who are somewhat better off benefit from the commercialization of farming, it would seem justified to advocate a redistributive policy aiming at higher standards of living for *all* farmers, thereby removing the disincentives which seem to threaten poorer farmers with increasing commercialization of farming. In terms of our diagrams this simply means that we remove the line indicating a positive correlation between problem load and commercialization of farming, while leaving the dotted line indicating the fate of wealthy farmers.

Whatever the practical implications of any redistributive policy, the rural development planners and the rural extensionists must review their strategy if extension is to make a greater impact on the generality of the farming population. The conventional approach in the rural extension services has been to begin by concentrating attention on the so-called progressive farmer, in the firm belief that he will eventually impart his innovative skill and technical knowledge to his less fortunate and less successful neighbours and kinsmen. The net result, insofar as it has any result at all, has been to mask and perpetuate socio-economic inequalities between farmers.

The Nigerian rural extensionist must reverse his scale of priorities by giving greater attention (or equal attention, to say the least) to the farmers in the subsistence sector of the agricultural economy. As our findings indicate, the subsistence farmers are less aware, and report less of a subjective load of personal problems, because they are not as involved in the vicissitudes of the world market, yet, operating as they do within the structures of the contemporary capitalist system, they suffer most from rural-urban imbalance with respect to prices, incomes and overall standard of living. Even from the standpoint of macro-socio-economic analysis, the disdainful neglect of the subsistence sector has had, and still does have, untold negative effects on the national economy. This is one of the major reasons for the menacing presence of hunger in an oil rich Nigeria.

A second but related issue derives from a consideration of the content of farming as well its degree of commercialization. As indicated in Chapter Three of this work, a greater part of Nigeria's agricultural production system is

designed to serve the demands of overseas metropolises rather than the population's need of food. The fact that those least involved in the international commercial network—the subsistence farmers—seem to have a lesser load of problems should not serve as an excuse for leaving this larger sector to take care of itself. Yet this has happened in our development planning. As we have shown in the historical sections of this work, the colonial government enforced an externally-oriented kind of commercial agriculture adapted to the needs of Britain and not necessarily those of Nigeria. The fault of the post-colonial policy was to continue the same kind of commercial farming to the detriment of the subsistence sector.

The Nigerian planners and policy-makers should therefore work consciously to change the content of our agriculture in such a way as to take care of the subsistence needs of the people. The use of more progressive techniques of production and marketing could be made available as much to the subsistence sector as to the cash crop sector, and greater emphasis should be placed on production for the domestic market rather than the international market.

Thirdly, the question of finding markets for our agricultural products is not as serious as was often thought. It is true that foreign exchange needs and the balance of payments have imposed constraints on the viability of the domestic market. But now that our oil industry has begun to make immense contributions in these respects, changes in the content of our agriculture will promote a more balanced growth and development.

It will also be realized that as we gradually shift towards agro-industrialization, the volume of demand for local products will begin to expand, thus rendering export production ill-advised. The soap and rubber industries, to mention only two, can buy up all the palm oil and rubber produced in the country.

A long backward look reveals that Nigeria has come a long way from the agrarian fundamentalism of colonial days to the agro-rural industrialization effort which characterizes the contemporary shift in development: today we have the garri-processing industry, meat-canning, tanning, cotton and textiles, to mention a few. The fact that Nigeria constitutes a large market in itself, coupled with the oil wealth, places her in a position to revive the tradition of extra-subsistence production which was the dominant feature of agricultural production before the advent of colonial rule.

It is in this regard that we must review our attitude not only to the subsistence farmer but also to those farmers who combine subsistence with cashcrop production, or combine agriculture with nonfarm (trade) occupations. It is the neglect of these categories of farmers which is largely responsible for low productivity in agriculture. Given our limited capacity for genuine industrialization, we cannot afford to regard these categories of farmers as in transition to pure cashcrop production or to trade and industrial employment. As late-comers in development, such farmers will provide the backbone of our peasant economy for the foreseeable future, when a large percentage of our population

must have one foot in subsistence and the other in cashcrop production or trade. It may be in our economic interest to transform the pure subsistence farmer into any of the four categories partially or wholly involved in with cash-crops. Any attempt to make our farmers into what we know to be a farmer in the industrialized West is to court socio-economic and political disaster, which the Third World and Africa in particular cannot afford.

The need for an African Common Market has already been emphasized and need not detain us here. Suffice it to re-iterate that, while an African Common Market is no panacea, it will increase the size of the market for Nigerian products.

Fourthly, our data on social exchange within networks of kinship relations indicate that as development and social change or modernization proceed, individuals and groups who are already deprived will find themselves more and more caught up in a number of predicaments involving increasing isolation and helplessness with increasing commercialization. Insofar as the welfare system is as underdeveloped as the overall economy, we have no alternative solution to this increasing isolation than to design agricultural production in a way which can preserve the best of the communal spirit and mutual aid patterns which belong to our cultural heritage. The capacity of the kinship system to adjust to the urban environment is a tribute to the resilience of this time-honoured institution. We cannot appreciate its socio-economic role unless we realize that, for instance, it has been able to solve for us the problem of care for the aged, a problem with which the advanced West is now faced.

The point I wish to make is that collective farming based on natural kinship units ought to form the starting point for agricultural cooperative effort. Admittedly, the kinship system does have its organizational limitations but certainly it is better than the settlements of artificially-created camps of school leavers.

Perhaps the nuclear farm system currently being applied in the East Central and probably in other states is banking on the viability of the extended family system for success.

Cooperatives formed on the initial basis of the kinship institution will create the necessary atmosphere of trust which is a pre-condition for successful organization. In this way, governments and agricultural credit banks can advance loans, for when they insist on security (as the federal agricultural bank rightly and understandably does) which individual farmers cannot offer, multi-purpose cooperatives can still get loans and other supplies such as transport and equipment. Probably, cooperatives based on extended family system will help check the parcelling of land or turn it to good account.

Fifthly, and finally, perhaps the most important aspect of our study is the *emancipatory* effects of the findings. For a long time the dominant belief among rural development planners in Africa and Latin America as well as in Asia has been the assumption that development requires a more rapid commercialization of agriculture. As a result, a good number of surveys were undertaken to study the conditions which inhibit or promote the adoption of innovations in

agriculture in order to speed up commercialization and modernization. The *dependent* variables in such studies have been the adoption of technological innovations and the acceptance of commercialization—i.e. what usually is subsumed under the label of modernization. Through a process of conceptual reification which stems from a firm belief in Western models and patterns, it has more often than not been taken for granted that “modernization” in the sense just indicated has a good and desirable effect. Consequently, few, if any, researchers have contemplated the possibility of this “good effect” being itself a cause of less desirable outcomes. What this study has done is to take one of the most common dependent variable of conventional surveys as an independent variable and then look for its effects on basic distributive aspects of human welfare.



# Notes

1. Initially there were five countries involved: U.S.A., Nigeria, India, Japan and Mexico. Mexico later backed out of the project.
2. The possession of the sociological imagination in C.W. Mills' (1959) sense is a virtue. It is echoed in this context in a perjorative sense.
3. The farmer's child, while still in school, is agriculturally unproductive even if he is willing to help with farm work. On finishing school he leaves home to look for a job which may not be there. Before this, all his schooling may have been supported from the meagre earnings on agricultural crops. And before the advent of the oil boom, the peasant farmer has borne the brunt of taxation for the development projects undertaken by the governments. These projects were allegedly meant to give jobs to the graduates of our schools.
4. The layman does also make law-like and causal statements on issues that interest him, but, to the extent that he does not worry about checking these statement against empirical observation, they become more of dogmas than of theories.
5. O'Connell may be right in describing the Ibo as segmentary in social organization, but to say that they are *politically fragmented* suggests a lack of social and political order and cohesion. I am sure O'Connell did not mean to give this impression.
6. On the creation of British Nigeria, Mockler-Ferryman (1902, p. 160) wrote not only with the vivid precision of an eye-witness but also with the proud enthusiasm of a military Lieutenant in active imperial service,  
"on the first January, 1900, . . . the final stroke of the pen brought under direct imperial administration a tract of country in West Africa covering an area of something like 400,000 square miles . . . this was what happened on the revocation of the charter of the Royal Niger Company, and the birth of the British Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria . . . I feel that my enthusiasm for this far-off land will hardly be shared by those who have never visited it. I am, however, quite confident that the nation will not for a moment have cause to regret the step taken by the Government . . . when it established the two protectorates and added to the Empire the slice of West Africa to be known to future generations as British Nigeria".
7. In 1672, Charles II gave a charter to the Royal African Company and with it a monopoly of trade between Morocco and Cape Colony. This company is not to be confused with the Royal Niger Company whose history started with the arrival of George Goldie Taubman on the West African scene. In 1877, Captain Goldie Taubman was granted a charter for his small National African Company which he merged with other small competing British companies into the Royal Niger Company.
8. The marketing of agricultural produce through statutory boards reaches back to the period of the Second World War:  
1940 — The West African Cocoa Control Board was established.  
1942 — The West African Produce Control Board was established.  
1947 — The Nigerian Produce Marketing Company, Ltd. was formed and incorporated in the United Kingdom under the Companies Act of 1930.
9. Basil Davidson (1970, p. 493) in what can justly be described as a fine blend of St. Paul of the Holy Bible and Gunder Frank, summarizes the causes of Africa's underdevelopment as follows,  
"The existing structure is not . . . by any means autonomous. Even if it were capable of

- carrying through a productive revolution, it would still live and have its being as part of a much wider structure which, in turn, imposes conditions that ensure the continuation of 'underdevelopment', whether by the persistent transfer of wealth through dividends . . . , by the tendency to buttress socio-cultural structures which belong to the colonial epoch or still more, by insisting on terms of trade which are cumulatively adverse to primary producers."
10. "Encouraged by the potential production of the Moshav form of organization, Chief Akir Deko, then Minister of Agriculture in Western Nigeria, on his return from Israel, proposed the implementation of a modified Moshav scheme in Western Nigeria." (Olatunbosun, 1971, p. 418.)
  11. Himmelstrand, U., "Tribalism, Regionalism, Nationalism and Secession in Nigeria", Eisenstadt and Rokkan *Building States and Nations*, 1973, and Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, 1970.
  12. Marion Johnson, in his article "The Cowrie currencies of West Africa", *Journal of African History*, xi, 1(1970), p. 17, quotes an anonymous Dutch writer as follows,
 

What we call money being arbitrary, and its nature and value depending on a tacit convention betwixt men, these (cowrie) shells, in several parts of Asia and Africa, are accounted current money, with a value assigned to them. This is established by a reciprocal consent, and those who are pleased to show a contempt of them don't reflect that the shells are as fit for a common standard of pecuniary value as either gold or silver.
  13. Polly Hill, "The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry", 1969.
  14. "Yea, Lord; for the whelps also eat of the crumbs that fall from the table of their masters." Matthew, 15<sup>27</sup>.
  15. Schwarz (1968, p. 21) contends: "For all its drama and gusto, Nigerian political life is played out against the backcloth of mud huts, with impoverished peasants as the uncomprehending audience. Almost 80 percent of Nigerians are farmers." The figure 80% may admittedly be correct, but I have my doubts whether all these peasant farmers are "uncomprehending".
  16. Annerstedt and Gustavsson (1975, pp. 17—19) contend that "In spite of the fact the old pattern is still dominant, in different places we can begin to see the emergence of a new pattern for the international economic division labour". This is consequent upon the shift in the developing world from extractive enterprises to import substitution style of industrialization. In a sense, this new division of labour reflects the growing new class structure in the developing countries whose elites take their life style, tastes and preferences from the industrialized world.
  17. ECOWAS, (Economic Community for West African States) has just started to take measures towards standardizing trade and tariff procedures. West African citizens are free to move within the region without visas.
  18. As Prothero (1958, Introduction) contends,
 

Evidence, of fact and in myth and legend, indicates the occurrence of large scale migrations in the past. The majority of tribes in the Western Sudan trace their origins from the lands away to the North and North-east beyond the desert. The dispersion of the Fulani speaking people throughout the northern parts of West Africa is well known. In addition to such movements, there are the age-old seasonal wanderings of herders seeking water and pasture for their stock.
  19. Helleiner (1963, p. 17) contends that with the British conquest of Nigeria and the consequent development of communications and other services there cropped up new urban centres into which "Nigerians flowed freely . . . without recruitment, compulsion or assistance".
 

Prothero (1958, Introduction) notes that "During the present century the migration of labour to centres of mineral and industrial production has become one of the most important demographic features of East, Central and South Africa, bringing in its train social and economic problems which have been studied but whose implications are not yet fully understood."
- Overall, therefore, the commercial, administrative, and extractive activities of the colonial governments and their agents gave a fillip to the existing pre-industrial (pre-colonial) cities and initiated the emergence of new ones.
20. The money economy did not come with colonialism as such, but colonials gave it a new lease of life through the expansion of the scale of export production.

21. Bergel (1955, p. 242) distinguishes between colonizers and colonials, arguing that the former move in peacefully with the intention of farming while the latter move in with the "intention of maintaining their political and cultural ties with their mother country".
22. The typology or classification of migration can be done in a variety of ways. Wallerstein (in *Urbanization and Migration in West Africa*, ed. Hilda Kuper, 1965, pp. 148—159) classifies African migration into three broad historical types: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial migrations. From another point of view migration can be classified into two: international migration which refers to movement across national frontiers (the Mossi of Upper Volta migrating to Ghana) and intra-national migration referring to movement within national boundaries. The former can be called external migration while the latter can be called internal migration. Internal migration can be broken down into: rural-urban, urban-rural, rural-rural, and urban-urban migrations. The typology can be pushed a step further by distinguishing between permanent and seasonal migration. All or any of the above types could be labelled labour or psycho-social migration. (I am indebted to Imoagene (1967), for the application of the term *psycho-social* to the study of the migration process in West Africa.)
23. "Those in the grip of the methodological inhibition often refuse to say anything about modern society . . ." (C. W. Mills, 1959, p. 71.) And to the extent that they say anything at all, their "interpretations of the events and developments in the developing world centre around the notion of cultural lag". (Himmelstrand, 1974.)
24. "It was not until about the 1940s in South, Central and East Africa, that the notion of a legitimate and permanent African presence in the urban areas came to be taken seriously" (*African Affairs*, Vol. 68, 1969, No. 270, p. 95).
25. The *Arcadia* is in Ancient Greek Literature a region or scene used as background to pastoral poetry. Thus it is a place of simple pleasure and quiet. Sir Philip Sidney wrote the *Arcadia* in 1590, an Elizabethan work depicting a perfect, rustic paradise characteristic of the Renaissance imagination and impulse. This was in honour of his sister the Countess of Pembroke.
26. The economic definition is evident in the pre-occupation of studies with labour migration or migrant labour. In the process, non-economic factors have either been ignored or played down even where they may have been of primary significance in inducing, promoting or impeding migration. Take the case of Batagarawa, an Hausa village in Northern Nigeria. Here Polly Hill observed that in principle heads of households do not migrate but can do so under specially defined conditions of economic pressure; as a matter of fact Dr. Hill records that three out of her 11 cases, the primary reason for the migration of the heads of farming units was indebtedness. *Rural Hausa*, (1972, p. 150).

Hance in his *Population, Migration and Urbanization* (1971) takes the view that "African migration is generally due to crude economic considerations, rather than to others such as a desire to escape chiefly authority or to taste the 'bright lights' of Lagos or Abidjan". *West Africa* (17th September, 1971). And, following examples cited by Dr. Imoagene, the under-named studies provide further evidence of undue emphasis on the economic factors of migration: Prothero, R. M. in "Migratory labour from North Western Nigeria", *Africa* (1957) contends that the economic motive accounts for over 92% of the causes of migration.

Gulliver, P. in his "Labour migration in a Rural Economy" (1955) cited 90% of the causes as economic.

Richards, A. I, in "The Travel Route and Travellers" (1954) records that about 80% of his survey sample moved into Buganda for economic reasons.

27. See Ulf Himmelstrand, "The Problem that was a Solution". (1976.)

24. Reference has already been made to Samir Amin's four sector model of development. C. C. Onyemelukwe (1974, p. 50) was describing a similar problem in the context of Nigerian experience when he wrote that

A technology imposed from outside . . . usually starts with raw material inputs which do not necessarily correspond with local endowments. It starts with raw materials which are used in the foreign country in which the technology developed. Having established itself in an underdeveloped economy, this technology finds it more difficult—to extend backwards in order to make fuller and better use of local resources.

29. With the indigenization decree issued under the Gowon regime, Nigeria went a long way on the road to a tighter hold on its economy. This however does not necessarily negate the inequality issue which is the product of class developments in a rapidly changing society. Exploitation and still exploitation, whether by foreign nationals or by a domestic bourgeoisie. Quite apart from the domestic power base of the governments on which the impact of nationalization/indigenization is predicated,

“There are” as Annerstedt and Gustavsson (1975, pp. 39—40) point out “many examples of nationalization which are of questionable value to the new owners . . . (Most) nationalizations . . . point . . . to the fact that state take-overs lead to new forms of dependency, which are certainly less transparent than direct ownership, but are just as significant for the local economy. The lack of technical and administrative personnel forces the nationalized firm into, among other things, ‘management contracts’ and therewith dependency”.

30. C.S. Whitaker, Jr. (1970, p. 3) argues that in purely conceptual terms, the principal objection to the prevailing notion of transition is that it unsoundly rests on a strictly a priori assumption that for all societies there is only one direction of significant change culminating in the essentials of modern (Western) society.

This conceptual attachment to a uni-linear model of change has on reflection seemed to critics to be partly rooted in a naive faith in general social evolution or the inevitability of ‘progress’ and partly in an implicit cultural and ideological bias which arbitrarily (even unconsciously) places the societies that one is most familiar with or admiring at the top of the descending scale of human virtues. And closely related is that the concept entails a dichotomization of significant social qualities which are not necessarily mutually exclusive and thence the attribution of each of the two sets of qualities thus derived to imaginary classes of societies, called *modern* and *traditional*, respectively.

31. A. L. Epstein in his article “Urban Communities in Africa” (1964) writes thus  
“The process of urbanization has sometimes been regarded as a movement from the ordered ways of tribal life to the anarchy of the urban jungle. Here the use of such terms as disorganisation or malaise applied to the urban situation suggest a profound methodological error, for they imply the assessment of the urban conditions against a model of the traditional tribal system: such concepts help little in understanding the events and developments in urban Africa.”

Abner Cohen’s *Bustom and Politics in Urban Africa* (1969) is a study of the twin processes of what he called “detrribalization” and “retribalization”.

32. Robert Park (1928, pp. 892—893) defined marginal man as “a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused”. Park’s marginal man is the carrier of culture and civilization, hence his conclusion: “It is in the mind of the marginal man—where changes and fusions of culture are going on—that we can best study the processes of civilization and progress.” Evidently this is not the kind of marginal man which most students found in urban Africa.
33. Myron Weiner, in “Urbanization and Political Protest” (1967, p. 50) notes “Our analysis of Calcutta supports the proposition that cities in developing areas with a high urbanization rate are characterized by violence and extremist political movements, but refutes the notion that these characteristics are prevalent among migrants”.
34. I have raised to the status of “model” this on time popular way of looking at rural and urban worlds as exclusively encapsulated entities. Imoagene (1968, pp. 398—399) makes strictures on the way in which Gluckman and Mayer applied the model.
35. The dual model of societies and economies is applied with a bow to J. H. Boeke who authored *Economics and economic policy of dual societies; as exemplified by Indonesia*. (1953.)
36. Kenneth Little (1965) made a study of West African urban voluntary associations which “build for a migrant a cultural bridge and in so doing . . . convey him from one kind of social universe to another”. (P. 87.)
37. L. Wirth (1938) pioneered a study in which urbanism was found to be part of the African tradition.

As Gutkind (1967, p. 140) rightly observed, until quite recently,

"In West Africa . . . where large urban centres have for long been part of the social and cultural life of some important tribal groups, social anthropologists virtually ignored the existence of towns such as Lagos, Ibadan, Freetown and Kano despite the fact that most of them were predominantly African and had large populations, . . . It is extraordinary that social anthropologists considered it possible to write, . . . about the Yoruba of Western Nigeria although they paid very little attention to Ibadan, Ife or Oyo. Studies about these towns did not appear until after the second world war . . ."

38. Tension and conflict within and between individuals, within and between structures and institutions of society underlies the interplay between tradition and modernity. This interplay is conceptualized without prejudice to what may be the eventual outcome, although it is less romantic to think that modernity is "the soonest winner" (Shakespeare, Henry V) because it has the balance of technological and scientific power on its side.
39. Whitaker's study (1970) of Northern Nigeria and Melson and Wolpe's work (1971) on Nigeria provide the best examples of how tradition is built into modernity and modernity into tradition, and of continuities and discontinuities in the socio-economic and political life of rapidly changing societies.
40. "It could not be disputed that elements of pre-station continue to operate with strong force in our society wherever family ceremony is involved. One has only to think of birthdays, anniversaries, gift-giving at the time of a child's birth, and above all marriage and Christmas, to notice that there is an a priori case for the significance of gift ceremony." (Belshaw, 1965, p. 49.)
41. Gutkind's *The Passing of tribal man in Africa* (1970) typifies the tendency or temptation of slipping from the concept of tribe to the concept of tradition.
42. Adebayo Adedeji summarized this argument when he said of Nigeria that "The regional tail has successfully wagged the (Federal) national dog." *Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria*, (1971, p. 107.)  
Also Kirk-Greene (1975, p. 12) contends, "The much-vaunted stability of Nigeria was no more than an illusion based on the strength of integral parts. Federal Nigeria was the antithesis of the saying that the whole is as strong as the sum of its component parts. She was as weak as the strength of those parts could ensure."
43. Bohannan and Dalton (1962, p. 3) distinguish between the principle of reciprocity and the principle of market exchange. The former refers to exchange based on socially obligatory gift-making and receiving, while the latter refers to a mode of transaction based on buying and selling or barter.
44. "It is accepted, perhaps even enjoined, that the gift continues in circulation. The person who receives it must himself share it with others, by distributing it or passing it on in some manner, retaining only a small portion or perhaps even nothing for himself. The man who did not do this would be greedy, selfish, or, if a man of status, not fulfilling his social obligations. Traditional societies could not in fact work the way they do unless the gifts circulated." (Belshaw, 1965, p. 47.)
45. *To the Point International*, Vol. 2, No. 19, September 20, 1975. pp. 26-27.

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
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
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Problem-Generating  
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Rural Development

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