


Dan Lindley

Promoting Peace with Information

Transparency as a Tool of
Security Regimes



Congress of Vienna



UNMEE Peacekeeper



Banner for MONUC's Radio Okapi

Full Manuscript, January 26, 2006

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¹ Cover graphics: MONUC's Radio Okapi banner at: <<http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/congo/okapi.html>>; UNMEE Kenyan Peacekeeper in ASSAB Team Site before going on a patrol, in May 2001. (UN Photo # 207019) at: <<www.un.org/av/photo/subjects/unmee.htm>>; Delegates meeting at the Congress of Vienna, found at: homepage for History 2: Introduction to Modern European History, 1789 to the Present, Winter 2003, Professor Jonathan Sperber, University of Missouri-Columbia, at: <<<http://www.missouri.edu/~histjs/hist2/>>>.

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This book began when my initial dissertation topic underwent creative implosion. The original idea, “The Formation, Effectiveness, and Demise of Collective Security Systems,” looked at the Concert of Europe, League of Nations, and United Nations and tried to explain the life-cycles of collective security systems. It was a huge topic, and it muddled the issue of most interest, that of effectiveness. There is a lot of great power politics in the formation and demise of collective security systems, and looking at their ebb and flow is a good way to take the pulse of great power politics. But what do these systems actually do to promote peace while they are around?

With an abiding interest in applying institutional theories to issues of war and peace, the clarifying revelation that came to me was to see if transparency might be a contribution of security regimes. Informational arguments occupy a large place in the institutionalist repertoire, but how well do they apply in the realm of security?

This book attempts to answer that question. I have run hypotheses about transparency up the flagpole, testing them by seeing if, and how well, two of the most prominent security regimes used transparency to manage problems and promote peace. Here, I report the results.

Whatever I have achieved, it would not have been possible without the help of a large number of people. I owe the greatest debt to Professors Stephen Van Evera and Barry Posen. Their many comments and marginalia over the years epitomized scholarly insight and the time they spent trying to make me make sense well exceeded their professional responsibilities. They have more than earned their pay, my respect, and my gratitude. Professor Kenneth Oye, my third reader, was always helpful, constructive, and to the point. The contribution of these three to my education goes well beyond thesis and paper comments and continues to this day. I am still trying to figure out what mental algorithms they bring to bear when they construct and parse apart arguments. Their ability to quickly get to the core of arguments is formidable.

My graduate student colleagues never failed to help when asked. I was lucky to go to school with Taylor Seybolt and Jane Kellett as well as Eric Heginbotham, Clifford Bob, Jonathan Ladinsky, and Daryl Press. David Nickles of the Harvard History Department commented several times on my pre-Concert and Concert chapters. In addition, I frequently availed myself of Professor George Rathjens and the New Directions in Security Studies Working Group to sharpen my ideas.

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I presented various aspects of my U.N. peacekeeping chapters at the Peace Studies Program of Cornell University in March 1999; at the CSIA of Harvard University in April 1999; at the MIT Security Studies Program in May 1999; and at the Seminar on Protracted Conflict at the Project on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School in May 1998. I presented my research on Cyprus at the Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus in March 1998; at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. in December 1997; at the University of Minnesota in October 1997; and at the Intercollege in Nicosia, Cyprus, in April 1997. Various portions were presented at the American Political Science Association conferences in 1994, 1995, 2000, and 2002; at the New England Political Science Association conferences in 1993 and 1995; and at the International Studies Association Conference in 1999. Research and parts of the book contributed to the following publications: "Avoiding Tragedy in Power Politics: The Concert of Europe, Transparency, and Crisis Management," *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Winter 2003/4), pp. 195-229; "Untapped Power? The Status of U.N. Information Operations," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 608-624; and "UNDOF: Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned," *Defense and Security Analysis*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 153-164. I thank all the discussants, reviewers, and other contributors to the above efforts.

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Dan Lindley, January 26, 2006

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Chapter 1: Promoting Peace with Information

After more than twenty years of civil war, foreign interference, and massacres by the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia finally seemed ready for peace. In 1991, a peace agreement was signed by the principle parties, and the United Nations sent peacekeepers to Cambodia to help maintain the cease-fire and rebuild the war-torn country. The U.N.'s prime objective was to hold an election to seal the peace with a new democratic government. Success depended on the U.N.'s ability to teach the country about elections, monitor the elections, and legitimize the results with a high turnout. However, a number of wild and false rumors and fears threatened to jeopardize the elections. Some potential voters suspected that the ballot-marking pencils contained radio beacons that broadcast to satellites, revealing who had voted for whom. Others feared spying by secret electronic eyes in the polling places. With radio and other educational efforts, the U.N. defused these rumors about what the Khmer Rouge and others were imagined to be doing to sabotage the elections, assured voters that the ballots would be secret, and taught the Cambodians about democracy. The turnout was a resounding ninety percent.

What happened here? The U.N. used accurate information to calm false rumors. This is but one example of a security regime increasing transparency – what adversaries know about each other's intentions, capabilities, and actions – to promote peace. There are many ways institutions can increase transparency and promote peace, ranging from providing a forum to broadcasting, inspecting, verifying, and monitoring.

Almost 200 years earlier, transparency also helped one of the first security regimes promote peace – though not in the way many think. At the end of 1814 and into 1815, the great powers of Europe met together in Vienna in what would become the first international crisis management forum in history: the Concert of Europe. Russia’s occupation of Poland and Prussian claims to Saxony caused a growing crisis. Supporting Prussia’s designs on Saxony with blustery belligerence, Tsar Alexander of Russia said in October 1814: “I have two hundred thousand men in the duchy of Warsaw. Let them drive me out if they can! I have given Saxony to Prussia....If the King of Saxony refuses to abdicate, he shall be led to Russia; where he will die....”¹ In December, Prince Hardenburg of Prussia said that Austrian, British, and French resistance to his plans was “tantamount to a declaration of war.” British Viscount Castlereagh termed this “a most alarming and unheard-of menace.”² Talk of war swept Vienna.

On January 3, 1815, Austria, Britain, and France signed a secret treaty to counter Russia and Prussia. Castlereagh revealed the treaty to Alexander the next day. Faced with hardened opposition, Russia forced Prussia to back down, and this quickly resolved the crisis. The great powers used the new forum to communicate threats and reach bargains far more rapidly than they could before. Information exchanged during forum diplomacy clarified the stakes at issue and the balance of power. Increased transparency did not calm fears, the most commonly imagined effect of transparency. Instead, it enhanced coercive diplomacy and bargaining.

International institutions in which states cooperate to prevent war are called security

¹ From a letter from the Prince de Talleyrand to King Louis XVII, Vienna, October 25, 1814, in Duc de Broglie, ed., *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand*, Raphael de Beaufort, trans., vol. II (New York, NY: Putnam’s Sons, 1891), p. 277.

² in C. K. Webster, ed., *British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe* (London, Great Britain: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1921), pp. 277-278.

regimes. One of the main tools at a security regime's disposal is increasing transparency.

Scholars and policy makers often assume that increased transparency reduces unwarranted fears, misperceptions, and miscalculation, but few have examined how transparency is provided or how it operates in practice.

This book answers two main questions about transparency: "How and when do security regimes increase transparency?" and "How and when do these efforts to increase transparency promote peace?"

I examine the role of transparency in crisis management by the Concert of Europe, and in several different U.N. peacekeeping operations. While there are many different security regimes, these cases allow examination of the provision and effects of transparency in a variety of contexts. The Concert brought diplomats together in a forum to manage crises, something they had never done before. In U.N. operations, peacekeepers more actively generate and exchange information. Findings based on these cases have global importance. Today, there are many forums from ASEAN to the African Union, and proposals for additional forums often cite the Concert as a model.³ In 2005, some sixteen U.N. and ten non-U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world monitor cease-fires and elections, verify disarmament and arms control agreements, patrol buffer zones and other areas of conflict.⁴

The mechanisms for providing transparency vary greatly, as do transparency's effects. As this book demonstrates, sometimes transparency succeeds in promoting peace, sometimes it fails,

³ See footnote 5, below, as well as footnote 82, p. 79.

⁴ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 166-67.

and sometimes it makes things worse. By helping figure out how and when security regimes can make transparency work, this book bolsters scholarship on security institutions, advances emerging debates about transparency, and helps policymakers more effectively use regimes to promote peace.

Why Study Transparency and Security Regimes?

There are three practical and scholarly reasons for studying security regimes and transparency. The first is policy relevance. States have turned to security regimes to help prevent war for the last 200 years. Recent years have seen renewed interest in the two types of security regimes examined here: peacekeeping and forums. Wherever one stands on debates about security regimes' ultimate influence in international relations, they consume considerable attention and resources from decision-makers. Second, security regimes in general are understudied by academics, and the large policy-oriented literature on peacekeeping remains a surprisingly theory-free zone. Few scholars have used the subject to develop and test international relations theories. Third, transparency is a reasonably manipulable product for security regimes, and transparency in the context of security regimes is understudied. Knowledge about transparency also helps us understand the role and practice of public diplomacy, because it also aims to influence the information environment. Thus, figuring out whether and how transparency contributes to security regimes' effectiveness will help policy makers use them better, and advance international relations scholarship on several fronts. I discuss these three points in turn, looking first at the topic of security regimes in policy and

scholarly debates, then explaining the specific focus on transparency.

Security Regimes and Policy

Security regimes are of perennial concern to policy makers. Every time a major war ends, the participants set up a security regime to help prevent a “next” war. The Napoleonic Wars were followed by the Concert of Europe; World War I by the League of Nations; and World War II by the United Nations. Similarly, the end of the Cold War rekindled enthusiasm for the U.N. and sparked a number of new peacekeeping operations. Over time, the number of security regimes has grown, ranging from the Open Skies agreement in Europe to the African Union.

Security regimes are of immediate interest to today’s leaders. The 1990s were marked by a surge of debate and new policies focused on the U.N. and other security regimes. To replace the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or supplement the U.N., a number of analysts proposed new security forums modeled after the Concert of Europe.⁵ Others proposed

⁵ Proponents of concerts include: Andrew Bennett and Joseph Leggold, “Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Summer 1993); Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, “Limited Collective Security,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 80 (Fall 1990); Douglas M. Gibler, “East or Further East?” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 6 (November 1999); James Goodby, “Commonwealth and Concert: Organizing Principles of Post-Containment Order in Europe,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 1991); James E. Goodby, “A New European Concert: Settling Disputes in CSCE,” *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (January/February 1991); Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993); Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991); Charles Lipson, “Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?,” pp. 109-110, 125 in George Downs, ed., *Collective Security beyond the Cold War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Charles Lipson, “Are Security Regimes Possible? Historical Cases and Modern Issues,” in Efraim Inbar, ed. *Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors* (Albany New York, State University of New York Press, 1995) (Lipson’s positive interpretation of the Concert is echoed by Robert J. Lieber’s contribution to this volume as well); John Mueller, “A New Concert of Europe,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 77 (Winter 1989-90); William Odom, “How to Create a True World Order: Establish a Concert of Great Powers,” *Orbis*, Vol. 13, #2 (Spring 1995); Richard Rosecrance, “A New Concert of Powers,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring 1992); W.R. Smyser, “Vienna, Versailles, and Now Paris: Third Time Lucky?” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 1991); and Philip Zelikow, “The New Concert of Europe,” *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992).

strengthening the United Nations and moving it closer toward being an ideal all-against-any-aggressor collective security system.⁶

These proposals for new forums and the initial post-Cold War enthusiasm for the U.N., followed by the U.N.'s troubles in Bosnia and Somalia, provoked a backlash. Critics charged that peacekeeping is useless or counterproductive: that it only makes peace between those who want peace; that it only works between small countries; or that it prevents adversaries from negotiating an end to their dispute by removing the strongest incentive to compromise, the pain of continuing war.⁷

As a result of these critiques and real-world failures, U.N. peacekeeping declined in the mid-1990s, but demand for these operations soon returned. The number of United Nations military personnel and civilian police jumped from 10,000 in 1987-1991 to 78,000 in mid-1993, falling back to around 10,000 in 1999 and rising again to almost 66,000 in May 2005.

Accordingly, costs for peacekeeping rose from the typical Cold War level of less than \$300 million per year to \$640 million in 1989 to \$3.6 billion in 1993, dropping to about \$1.0 billion in

⁶ Proponents of stronger, more ideal, forms of collective security include: Gene M. Lyons, "A New Collective Security: The United Nations in Theory and Practice," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1994); Edward Luck, "Making Peace," *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter 1992-93); Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: From Peace-Keeping to a Collective System?" in *Adelphi Paper* 265 (London, Great Britain: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1991/1992); and Robert Wright, "Bold Old Vision: The Case for Collective Security," *The New Republic* (January 25, 1993).

⁷ Critiques include: Richard Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?: Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992); Charles L. Glaser, "Future Security Arrangements for Europe: Why NATO Is Still Best," in Downs, ed., *Collective Security*; Dennis C. Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001); Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," Vol. 34, No. 1, *Survival*, (Spring 1992); Michael Lind, "Twilight of the U.N.," *The New Republic*, October 30, 1995, p. 25-33; and Michael Lind, "Peacefaking: The Case Against U.N. 'Peacemaking,'" *The New Republic*, November 8, 1993, pp. 14-17; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5 ed. revised (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 417-423; and Kenneth W. Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. xlvii, No. 3 (September, 1953). See also Richard Bernstein, "Sniping is Growing at U.N.'s Weakness as a Peacekeeper: The Optimism has Faded," *The New York Times*, June 21, 1993, p. A10.

1998, and rising to \$4.47 billion for the year July 2004 – June 2005.⁸

Despite this history and these policy debates, few scholars have stepped back to take a theoretically-informed look at security regimes. With peacekeeping in particular, much analysis is directed at policy-makers, but the subject is little used to test and develop international relations theories. Some scholarly debates about security institutions are heated, but do not contribute detailed analysis.⁹

Security Regimes and Scholarship

The study of security regimes is the study of how institutions affect security policies and the probability of war. This intersection of two core streams of international relations scholarship – liberal institutionalism and security studies – remains largely uncharted. Those who study institutions have contributed a lot to the political science subfield of international political economy, but relatively little to security studies. Few institutionalists have a background in security studies.

Regime theory originated in the subfield of international political economy (IPE), and theoretically-driven work on international institutions continues to be dominated by the IPE

⁸ See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, “Background Note: 1 March 2001” at <<<http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf>>>; “Composition of peacekeeping staff,” at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pdf/2.pdf>>>; “United Nations Peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000: Statistical Data and Charts” at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm>>>; “UN Peace Operations, Year in Review: 2002,” at: <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/yir/english/>>> and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Background Note, 31 May, 2005 at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>>>.

⁹ See John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security*, Vol. 19., No. 3 (Winter 1994/95) and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” (and other responses) in *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995).

subfield. Work here started with the question: do regimes matter? and moved on to the questions: how and under what conditions do regimes matter?¹⁰ Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons wrote that regimes could be shown to matter if case studies showed that decision makers:

“were actually concerned with reputation, reducing transactions costs, the need for transparency, and so forth, when facing decisions about regime creation and compliance....An even stronger claim [could be made if such analysis showed that regimes] can alter actor’s interests and preferences.....Surprisingly little work of this kind has been done.¹¹

That statement is still true, particularly in security studies. That work is the aim of this book.

Robert Keohane, a leading international political economist and proponent of international institutions, laments the lack of attention the field of international relations has paid to security regimes – a concern echoed more recently by David Lake.¹² The best work on security regimes is by Robert Jervis, Charles Lipson, and Charles and Clifford Kupchan who have used the Concert of Europe to discuss transparency and other peace-promoting effects of institutions such as promotion of rules and norms.¹³ I advance this research program by focusing

¹⁰ Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

¹¹ Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 514.

¹² See Robert Keohane “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., *neorealist and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), and David Lake in “Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), p. 129-130.

¹³ Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*; Jervis, “From Balance to Concert;” Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe;” Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” *World Politics*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984); Lipson, “Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?” See also Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” *International Journal*, Vol. XL, No. 4 (Autumn 1985).

on transparency and expanding the analysis to U.N. peacekeeping. Other scholars of security regimes examine how institutional momentum, persistence, or form affect states' policies. For example, John Duffield brings institutional analysis to bear on the contentious issue of weapons procurement within NATO.¹⁴

Some of the most insightful work on institutions and information comes from literatures on cooperation and bargaining, and security issues are especially prominent in the bargaining literature. Cooperation theorists have identified a number of barriers to cooperation among states and have studied how actors can overcome these hurdles. Barriers to cooperation include deadlock, inability or unwillingness to forecast or take into account the long term consequences of policies (theorists call this inability a short shadow of the future), large numbers of actors that cause collective action problems, uncertainty about the costs and benefits of cooperation, and insufficient capabilities to monitor compliance with agreements and punish defectors (which in turn increases the likelihood of cheating and defection). Regimes can promote cooperation by giving states forums for discussion and helping them bargain and horse trade across different issue areas (issue linkage). Regimes can increase the shadow of the future, reduce transaction

¹⁴ John S. Duffield, "NATO Force Levels and Regime Analysis," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Autumn 1992) and John S. Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). See also Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds., *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, special issue of *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn 2001) Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions During the Falklands Islands Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992); Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management," *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992); Benjamin Miller, "Explaining the emergence of great power concerts," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 1994); and Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1987).

costs, and increase the amount of information available to actors.¹⁵

Bargaining theorists have focused on why states fail to arrive at negotiated settlements to their conflicts, why this sometimes leads to war, and how war is itself a bargaining process. Even though the word transparency may not be frequently or explicitly used, the arguments in this burgeoning literature often hinge on the quality of information available to the actors. For example, war may result if two sides disagree about their relative power, or if both sides can not credibly commit to peace due to an inability to monitor the agreement. In the first case, increased transparency may help states calculate their relative power, better predict the outcome of a possible war, and negotiate to avoid that war. In the second case, increased transparency can help verify an accord, making commitments to that accord more credible and enforceable.¹⁶

¹⁵ Exemplars, emphasizing those relevant to security issues, include: Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984); Jonathon Bendor, "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), pp. 709-734; George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, *Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Matthew Evangelista, "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s," *World Politics*, Vol. XLII, No. 4 (July 1990); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1994); Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Krasner, *International Regimes*, pp. 159-167; Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); James D. Morrow, "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information," *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer 1994); Elinor Ostrom: *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Stein, "Detection and Defection," as well as many of the contributions in Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), in particular Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies;" Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert;" Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914;" George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation;" and Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions."

¹⁶ James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 2, (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-314; Robert Powell, "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (2002), pp. 1-30; Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 27-43. James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Nov. 1989), pp. 941-972. In the first article above, Fearon notes interstate bargaining increasingly takes place in the context of regimes and argues that "regimes deserve greater attention as *forums for bargaining* rather than primarily as institutions that aid monitoring and enforcement," emphasis in original, p. 298.

By serving as forums, by monitoring, or by otherwise increasing information, regimes can increase transparency. Transparency in turn can reduce uncertainties about others' actions, intentions, and capabilities, and can help states calculate the consequences of their policies. Transparency can increase the ability to identify defectors and help states identify the payoffs from cooperation (or defection).¹⁷

This literature review, and the citations in the methods chapter, make clear that many different literatures talk about the effects of false information and transparency in similar ways despite their different angles and methods. The apparent differences between the political psychologists, rationalists, institutionalists, and qualitative causes of war scholars obscure these similarities, and cross-citations are rarer than they should be.

The Focus on Transparency

The first reason I focus on transparency as a tool of regimes is because of its relevance to issues of war and peace. Due to the effects described above, many believe that the promise of transparency can help seal a peace agreement or cease-fire. Transparency may also reduce arms races and security spirals, reduce misperceptions and miscalculations that can lead to war, and help adversaries bargain their way to agreements.

¹⁷ These are core arguments in the institutionalist literature, cited just above, and they are also discussed prominently in the field of development economics. See for example, Thomas Blanton, "The World's Right to Know," *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2002); Philip Bowring, "Through a Glass, Darkly," *Development Dialogue*, No. 1 (1998); Michel Camdessus, *From Crisis to a New Recovery: Excerpts from Selected Addresses* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1999), Scott B. MacDonald, "Transparency in Thailand's 1997 Economic Crisis: The Significance of Disclosure," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, No. 7 (July 1998), pp. 688-702, and Andreas Kluth, "In Praise of Rules: A Survey of Asian Business," *The Economist*, (April 7, 2001), and the work of Transparency International at: <<<http://www.transparency.org/>>>.

The second reason to focus on transparency is that it should be something relatively easy for security regimes to provide. Realist critics of institutions are correct that the U.N. is incapable of sending divisions of troops to quell a crisis. Security regimes are not that powerful. However, other benefits that regimes may offer should not be ignored.

Increasing transparency means exchanging or providing information. Compared to sending forces, increasing transparency is relatively easy for regimes to accomplish. This is true whether one is looking at cost, logistics, institutional or technical expertise, number of necessary personnel, or political sensitivity.¹⁸ Transparency is a fairly manipulable variable in the realm of security. Whatever good security regimes can do in a dangerous world should be studied and welcomed.

Finally, transparency is of growing interest to scholars and policy-makers. As mentioned, Jervis, Lipson, and Kupchan and Kupchan have led the study of transparency as applied to security regimes, while John Lewis Gaddis is the leading historian grappling with the subject. They have developed arguments about different peace-promoting effects of transparency ranging from calming arms races to reducing miscalculation.¹⁹ These arguments are the conventional wisdom for arms controllers and institutionalists.

However, a new wave of scholarship by Ann Florini, James Marquardt, Ronald Mitchell,

¹⁸ Similar efficiency and bang for the buck arguments are made about public diplomacy.

¹⁹ Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," pp. 73-76, Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," p. 136, and Lipson, "Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?," pp. 109-110, 125. Gaddis' work on transparency includes "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 25 and Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1987), chapter 7, "Learning to Live with Transparency: The Emergence of a Reconnaissance Satellite Regime." See also Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *World Politics*, (Vol 44, No. 4 (July 1992)); Robert Jervis "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Summer 1993).

Bernard Finel, and Kirsten Lord has begun to explore arguments about the potentially negative effects of transparency. They suggest that transparency may exacerbate tensions, make bargaining more difficult, and even lead to conflict.²⁰ Bargaining theorists are also developing arguments about the negative effects of transparency and the conditions when transparency helps or hurts cooperation. Some argue that noisy information and uncertainty can hurt cooperation even when the parties want cooperation, but help cooperation when the parties are hostile. Others argue that transparency can remove peace-promoting ambiguity and encourage deadlock or even preventive war.²¹ Within and across various literatures, the debate is engaged between transparency optimists and pessimists. This is one of the first attempts to lay out and test these conflicting contentions about transparency.

Cases and Methods

²⁰ Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, eds., *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*. (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2000); Ann Florini, "The End of Secrecy," *Foreign Policy*, 111, (Summer 1998), pp. 60-61; James Marquardt, *Why Transparency In International Relations Is Not What It Appears To Be*, Ph.D. Dissertation, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1998); Ronald Mitchell, "Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 109-130. See also John C. Baker, Kevin M. O'Donnell, and Ray A. Williamson, eds., *Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). There are increasingly vast literatures on the general subject of information and politics. See the website of the Institute of Communications Studies at the University of Leeds in Great Britain: <<<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/index.htm>>>. This site includes subsections on a number of areas, including: terrorism and propaganda at <<<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/terrorism.htm>>> as well as very up to date syllabi of courses on communications, the media, propaganda, and information warfare from Dr. Phillip Taylor, a leading scholar on these issues, at: <<<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ics/pt1.htm>>>.

²¹ Bendor, "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation;" Xavier Jarque, Clara Ponsati, and Jozsef Sakovics, "Mediation: Incomplete Information Bargaining with Filtered Information," *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, Vol. 39, Issue 7, (September 2003), p. 805; and Curtis S. Signorino, "Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty: The Effects of Symmetric and Asymmetric Noise," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 152-205.

To learn about the provision of transparency and its effects in a range of contexts, I study the Concert of Europe and several U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Concert was the first multilateral crisis management forum. I study the role of transparency as the forum handled its first five crises from 1814 into the middle 1830s. While the Concert is 200 years old, its lessons help us predict what will happen when forums convene to confront crises or when adversaries with few means of communication, such as North and South Korea, meet.

The four peacekeeping cases consist of two exemplars each of the two main types of U.N. operations: traditional and multifunctional.²² Traditional operations monitor buffer zones and verify areas of limited armaments, as in the cases I examine of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. Multifunctional (or complex) operations organize and monitor elections, and take on other tasks to administer a conflict area. I assess these in the cases of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

I study these cases for two reasons. First, these cases are historically significant and policy relevant. Second, the crises, incidents, and activities within the cases provide multiple observations of, and variations in, the variables I study: regime activity, transparency, and levels of tension between adversaries. To examine these variables, I first develop a number of hypotheses on the provision and various possible effects of transparency. I then test these

²² For typologies of peacekeeping operations, see: William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s," in William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press), pp. 3-10 and Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, "International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 33-55.

hypotheses by process tracing events within each case to see whether the regimes increased transparency, and to assess the effects of any transparency provided. I explain methods and case selection in detail in the next chapter.

Why should these cases have anything to do with transparency? Prior to the Concert, multilateral meetings between states happened at peace conferences, but crisis diplomacy was limited to bilateral exchanges. In contrast, multilateral meetings should increase transparency because they allow more states to exchange information more easily. To assess whether this is true, and to determine the effect of any transparency provided on crisis management, I not only examine five crises confronted by the Concert, but I also compare Concert diplomacy with diplomacy prior its formation. The ability to compare diplomacy before and after the Concert distills the effects of forum diplomacy and makes the Concert a valuable case for understanding how multilateral forums work.

United Nations peacekeepers may increase transparency by patrolling buffer zones, verifying arms control agreements, and monitoring elections. A central purpose of these activities is to generate, provide, or exchange information about adversaries' capabilities, intentions, and actions. From the very beginning, peacekeeping has been about transparency:

UN OBSERVERS. Their beat—no man's land. Their job—to get the facts straight. A frontier incident, an outbreak of fighting ... Which nation is responsible, whose story is true? The UN must know. So its peace patrols keep vigil to prevent flareups, supervise truces, investigate and report.
— UN Department of Public Information poster, c. 1960²³

Does this actually promote peace?

²³ Quoted in Walter Dorn, "Blue Sensors: Technology and Cooperative Monitoring in UN Peacekeeping," SAND 2004-1380 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, April 2004), p. 9.

Findings

Testing hypotheses about transparency across these cases generates a range of findings that indicate when transparency can most easily be increased, and what transparency's effects will be. These findings advance academic debates on the Concert, peacekeeping, international institutions, cooperation, and bargaining. They also provide the basis for a number of policy recommendations.

I find that the Concert often modestly increased transparency. This made coercive bargaining easier, while sometimes highlighting deadlock. Transparency helped bring peaceful endings to two crises, and led to peaceful standoffs in two other cases. For example, during the Poland-Saxony crisis, three states made a secret alliance, revealed it the next day, and successfully coerced two other states into backing down. I argue that such a quick exchange of information would have been impossible prior to the forum.

With transparency, the Concert made power politics work more quickly and peacefully. This argument occupies the middle ground between Concert optimists who find that the Concert transformed European politics and call it the “best example of a security regime”²⁴ and those of recent Concert pessimists who find nothing to support institutional arguments.²⁵ Because transparency helped coercion or clarified the existence of schisms, the cases reveal darker sides

²⁴ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics: 1763-1848* (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1994), and Jervis, “Security Regimes,” p. 178, respectively.

²⁵ Korina Kagan, “The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821-41,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98).

of transparency that contrast with the conventional wisdom of the arms control and liberal advocacy communities that transparency is a prescription for peace. Transparency did not overcome *realpolitik*, it just made it work better. At several points, transparency aggravated the crises and heightened the odds of war. While at first this might seem to support transparency pessimists, communication of positions and threats were also necessary to resolve the crisis.

Turning to the peacekeeping operations, I argue that traditional United Nations operations that monitor buffer zones face many previously unidentified barriers to their attempts to increase transparency. Scholars such as Michael Doyle may be too quick to assume that transparency works well in traditional operations.²⁶ For example, a close examination at United Nations Disengagement Observer Force's inspection system reveals a number of deficiencies. The personnel, procedures, and equipment look good on paper, but are not sufficient to adequately monitor the elaborate arms control agreement on the Golan Heights. These flaws suggest that the verification procedures in arms control agreements have to be carefully thought out down to a fine-grained level of detail. This case also shows that it is hard for a regime to increase transparency when the adversaries already know a lot about each other. When this is true, the regime cannot add much value to the flow of information.

The case of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus case reveals that efforts to increase transparency may not be able to overcome strong biases and enemy-imaging of adversaries.²⁷ For example, there is sometimes uncertainty about the nature of military

²⁶ Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 76, 98.

²⁷ For more on enemy-imaging, see Patrick G. Coy and Lynne M. Woehrle, eds., *Social Conflicts and Collective Identities* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) and Richard K. Herrmann, "Image Theory and

construction along the buffer zone: is a fortification being repaired (allowed) or upgraded (not allowed)? Each side often fears the worst about the other. In theory, transparency could reduce these fears when they are unwarranted and exacerbated by uncertainty. In reality, several incidents reveal that each side is so suspicious that UNFICYP may not assuage fears no matter what it says in its reports. On the other hand, UNFICYP often uses information to coerce aggressors and troublemakers into backing down, thus preventing incidents from escalating.

In contrast, multifunctional operations showed more promise. In Namibia and Cambodia where there were scanty media outlets and poorly informed and often illiterate citizens, information campaigns by UNTAG and UNTAC helped these operations succeed. In both cases, harmful rumors abounded, and the U.N. stopped these rumors with superior information firepower. As shown above, during the Cambodian elections of 1991, U.N. radio broadcasts reassured Cambodians that their votes would be kept secret. Other transparency-increasing mechanisms, including puppet shows, singers, and town meetings, taught voters about the U.N.'s mission and refuted rumors of violence that might have thwarted the elections. Transparency helped generate turnouts of 96 and 90 percent in these two operations' elections.

These peacekeeping missions suggest that efforts to increase transparency work best when:

- there are poor information environments where the regime can more easily add value to existing information;
- adversaries are not so plagued by biases that new information will not shift perceptions;
- adversaries are sufficiently weak relative to the U.N. so that they cannot thwart the U.N.'s efforts;

Strategic Interaction in International Relations,” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 9.

- the U.N. has sufficient resources and adequate procedures in place to accomplish its mandate.

These conditions for success are also likely apply to information operations and public diplomacy, including efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense and State Department.²⁸

Policy Implications

The study of forum diplomacy helps predict what will happen when states that do not regularly consult are brought together. Despite the internet and globalization, there are still areas like the Korean Peninsula and parts of Africa where adversaries scarcely communicate. Many analysts extol the virtues of concert-like forums and my findings help make clear what we should expect from their recommendations.²⁹ Forums beat the alternative of no forums, but only because forum diplomacy enhances tough bargaining.

The peacekeeping cases offer a number of lessons for both buffer zone-monitoring traditional and democracy-promoting multifunctional operations. While promoting democracy is a task now almost taken for granted at the U.N., the mandates of several recent U.N. and NATO missions include establishing and supervising buffer zones. These include operations in Kosovo-Serbia, Eritrea-Ethiopia, and inter-Congo.

²⁸ U.S. Army, Field Manual, FM 34-37, *Strategic, Departmental, and Operational IEW Operations* Preliminary Draft (1997), Chapter 3, Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) available at: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-37_97/3-chap.htm>>, U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Task Force Eagle Information Operations(IO)," CALL Newsletter 03-18 (2003) available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_03-18_toc.htm>> and U.S. Department of State, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at: <<<http://www.state.gov/r/>>>.

²⁹ See footnote 5.

The first lesson is that policy makers and U.N. officials should recognize the value of increasing transparency to the success of some of their peacekeeping operations. There is institutional resistance to wielding information in ways that may affect conflicts. These fears remain, even though many in the U.N. recognize the successes of UNTAC and UNTAG. These missions showed that active information operations and transparency can reduce tensions, defuse crises, and help peacekeepers fulfill their mandates.

As a result, U.N. information efforts remain deficient. For example, in the U.N. Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), the U.N. broadcasts about its mission for one hour a week on Eritrean radio, is denied access to Ethiopian radio, and has no independent radio facilities. This study suggests that conditions in UNMEE's area of operations might be ripe for increased information efforts and transparency: the local information environment is poor, and uncertainties appear to remain about the mission, the border, and perhaps the activities of the adversaries.

Second, peacekeepers can expand their transparency-increasing roles to new roles and missions. For example, peacekeepers could go beyond often passive border patrols and post-hoc incident reports and try to increase transparency proactively. By monitoring each sides' policies and statements, peacekeepers and truth squads could combat dangerous falsehoods, rumors, and myths with relevant facts. This would combat false fears and fear-mongering, and help get the adversaries operating with more common and accurate information.

Third, the U.N. should experiment with limited peacekeeping operations that seek only to increase transparency in cases where a full scale peacekeeping operation is not possible or desirable. A U.N. news radio located near a troubled area might do some good if it helped

reduce fears, correct misperceptions, and deflate myths held by each side.

In all cases, new doctrines, procedures, and equipment would have to be provided to bolster the small in-house information and media departments organic to most peacekeeping operations. Operations need enhanced expertise and information gathering capabilities to adequately separate myth from fact and provide tension-reducing information. Unfortunately, there is resistance within the U.N. to the development of these capabilities. Perhaps this book will bolster the forces of change.

Structure of the Book

Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the subject, the hypotheses, and the methodology. Chapter 3 begins by reviewing diplomacy and crisis management before the Concert of Europe. This provides a baseline, which I then use to assess how well the Concert used the new tool of forum diplomacy to manage its first five crises. Chapters 4 and 5 examine traditional buffer zone monitoring operations and the cases are the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 shift the peacekeeping focus to multifunctional operations that sponsor and monitor elections. I examine the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), respectively. Chapter 8 concludes the book, summarizing my findings and presenting their implications for scholars and policy-makers.

To help extend my findings and explore their limits, one appendix assesses the state of

information operations by the U.N. in several recent missions while a second appendix looks at the role of transparency in mini-cases ranging from the Open Skies regime and strategic arms control, to the non-proliferation regime.

Chapter 2: Theory, Methods, and Case Selection

Methods help us answer “What causes what?” questions about politics more systematically and with greater replicability. Methods establish standards for testing hypotheses, measuring variables, and making valid arguments about how the world works. Replicability and validity are tough to come by, but achieving them is a noble aim because they help scholars cumulate knowledge, and provide policy makers with more reliable insights.

Some variables like gross national product and geographic proximity are fairly easy to measure, while others such as ideas and norms are harder to visualize and evaluate. Transparency lies on the opaque side of this continuum. It is difficult to see transparency in action because it is about who said what to whom, and how information affects the outcomes of crises and incidents. The trick in studying transparency, then, is to define terms precisely, to clearly lay out hypotheses about the causes and effects of transparency, and to explain their observable implications. Those are the main goals of this chapter.

Definition of Transparency

Transparency describes the availability of information about potential adversaries’ actions, capabilities, and intentions. If information about potential adversaries is easy to obtain, and the amount and accuracy of information is high, then the world is said to be transparent. As transparency increases, completeness of information increases. If information about threats is

difficult to acquire, the world is less transparent or more opaque. As transparency decreases, opacity increases, and incomplete information and uncertainty also increase.

The hypotheses spell out the different ways that transparency can affect the probability of cooperation or deadlock, war or peace. Perhaps the effect of transparency that first comes to many people's minds is that it can calm arms races and reduce enemy-imaging between adversaries. A prevalent view in the liberal and arms control communities is that arms races are caused or exacerbated by incorrect worst-case analyses and that hostile relations are aggravated by exaggerated fears of the enemy.¹ When analyses and fears are indeed based on misperceptions, then transparency may reduce tensions and promote peace.² To those who think conflict is frequently based on misperception, transparency is viewed as an elixir of peace.

Stephen Van Evera argues that “anything that makes the world more transparent will reduce the

¹ For overviews of arms control arguments, see Arms Control Association, *Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1989), pp. 5-15; Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984, for the Stanford Arms Control Group), pp. 335-338; Randall Forsberg, “The Freeze and Beyond,” in Desmond Ball and Andrew Mack, eds., *The Future of Arms Control* (Sydney, Australia: Australian National University Press, 1987); George Rathjens, “The Dynamic of the Arms Race,” *Readings from Scientific American, Progress in Arms Control?* (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman, 1979); Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985; originally published in 1975), chapters 3 and 5, with a good discussion of verification in chapter 9; Blainey, *The Causes of War*, pp. 135-141; Bernard Brodie, “On the Objectives of Arms Control,” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force*, 3 ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 618-636; and Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), chapter 7.

² Works exploring misperception and conflict include Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz, eds., *Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997); Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989) [reprint from *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 3, April 1968]; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, et al., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War, Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems” *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 1983); Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies II* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); and William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

risk of war.”³ As we shall see, transparency has more complex effects.

There are four types of transparency, each corresponding to one of the four general ways states obtain information about their potential adversaries: cooperative, ambient, coerced, and unilateral.⁴ I focus on *cooperative transparency*, which is the domain covered by most security regimes. Cooperative transparency is caused by states’ institutionalized and cooperative efforts to increase transparency. Various cooperative mechanisms can be used to increase transparency, including sharing of information, meetings, discussion forums, buffer zones, verification provisions in treaties, and shared intelligence. These institutional mechanisms vary according to their formality – the extent of the regime’s rules, bureaucracy, procedures, and functions. As a result, cooperative transparency has two main variants, *informal cooperative transparency* and *formal cooperative transparency*. For example, discussion forums like the Concert of Europe are less formal than U.N.-monitored buffer zones or on-site inspections.

The other three types include *ambient transparency*, which is caused by factors including the extent of global media coverage, relative ease of travel, and amount of trade and telecommunications, as well as information generated by non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and universities. Although these factors are hard for policy makers to manipulate, an

³ *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 34.

⁴ While I categorize transparency here by its sources, it can also be categorized by its effects or functions as well as by the subject of the information being revealed. For example, Ann Florini lists deterrent, reassurance, and revelatory effects in “A New Role for Transparency,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (August 1997), p. 59, while Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes list coordination, reassurance, and deterrence as functions in “Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles,” in Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Engagement in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), pp. 65-130, esp. pp. 81-84. By turning these effects, and others, into my hypotheses, I test whether, how, and under what conditions security regimes can achieve these results. The OTA classified transparency as macro or micro, depending on whether the information was about force structures and operational practices or about details like individual weapons designs in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Verification Technologies: Cooperative Aerial Surveillance in International Agreements*, OTA-ISC-480 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), p. 22. See also Mitchell, “Sources of Transparency.”

increase in any of them generally increases transparency. *Coerced transparency* occurs when states are forced to open up, as Iraq was forced to do after the Gulf War.

Unilateral transparency has three forms. The first is intelligence transparency which is a state's independent and directed efforts to collect information. These efforts include satellites, spies, and other such methods to gather and assess information. The second is confrontational transparency which is caused when states communicate in order to coerce or deter. When states coerce or deter, they may clarify their stakes in a given situation, clarify what actions they are willing to take to preserve their interest in those stakes, and clarify what capabilities (and allies) can be brought to bear to support those actions (and they may also be bluffing).⁵ The third is proffered transparency which is when states unilaterally reveal information in an effort to despiral conflicts and reassure others.⁶

There is sometimes overlap between the categories. For example, some security regimes such as UNSCOM generate coerced transparency.⁷ Bargaining during Concert crises was often confrontational. Even though states cooperatively joined in the forum's meetings, they often used the meetings to issue threats. It is also very important to note that just because the press or intelligence can be sources of transparency, they may also be prone to spreading misinformation, fostering and spreading biases, and so forth.

Moreover, the relationships between these types of transparency offer insight into how

⁵ On manipulation of risk, see Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

⁶ Kenneth W. Abbott, "'Trust but Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements,'" *Cornell Journal of International Law*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 4.

⁷ See Michael A Levi and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *The Future of Arms Control* (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.: 2005) for a set of innovative policy recommendations urging leaders to move beyond traditional views of view arms control and instead view arms control as an asset to coercive diplomacy and the use of force.

and when regime-provided transparency works best. A major finding of this book is that regimes can more easily provide transparency between adversaries when unilateral/intelligence and ambient transparency is low. This increases the ability of the regime to provide new and more accurate information.

Table 2-1 summarizes these types of transparency, underscoring that there are many sources of transparency and that this book focuses on cooperative transparency as provided by security regimes:

Table 2-1: Types of Transparency

Type	Definition	Examples
<i>Cooperative</i>	Agreed-upon sharing of information. Two variants:	Security regimes of various types
– Cooperative, informal	Exchanges of information where the nature of information offered or exchanges is not specified formally or in advance	Forums such as the Concert of Europe, military-military cooperation, G-8 meetings
– Cooperative, formal	Treaties and agreements specify the nature of information gathered and exchanged	On-site inspections, election monitoring, border and buffer zone patrols by peacekeepers, open skies agreements
<i>Ambient</i>	System and global level information sources	Mass media, trade, travel, NGOs
<i>Coerced</i>	Information that is coerced	UNSCOM in Iraq
<i>Unilateral</i>	Information gathered or offered by states	
– Intelligence	State-level intelligence gathering	Satellites, spies
– Confrontational	Information revealed to coerce or deter during a confrontation, standoffs, or competitions	Reciprocal missile and nuclear tests between India and Pakistan
– Proffered	Information offered to despiral or reassure	Publicized arms reductions, such as Gorbachev's withdrawal of offensive bridging equipment ⁸

⁸ Timothy A. Mueller, Lt. Col, USAF, "Developing National Security Policy In the "Gorbachev Era, National War College, March 31, 1989, p.3, available at <<<http://www.ndu.edu/library/n3/SSP-89-016.pdf>>>.

The Hypotheses

The questions this book answers are: Do security regimes increase transparency and does transparency promote peace? If so how and when? This means that the causal chain I am investigating is:

Security Regimes→Transparency→Peace

The first independent variable is security regimes. Transparency is a dependent and, then, an independent variable. The ultimate dependent variable is peace.⁹

To examine this causal chain systematically and explore the possible effects of transparency on conflict, I lay out and test hypotheses that explain the principal ways that transparency may reduce or increase tensions and affect the probability of war. Transparency may affect bargaining about regime formation, decisions for war, crisis bargaining, threat assessments, likelihood of cheating on agreements, behavior of rogues and spoilers, and the functioning and operations of the regime itself.

These hypotheses are largely derived from the literatures on arms control, the security dilemma, international regimes, cooperation, and bargaining. For example, much thinking about transparency in security studies is found in the scholarship on arms control.¹⁰ Advocates of arms

⁹ An independent variable causes things to happen and a dependent variable is the thing that is caused.

¹⁰ Examples include Ashton B. Carter, William Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 38-41; Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty*, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 6 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995), pp. 247-248; Ann Florini "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (September 1996); Florini, "A New Role for Transparency;" Marquardt, *Why Transparency In International Relations Is Not What It Appears To Be*; United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General, *Study on Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional*

control believe that regimes can increase transparency, and that the effects of transparency are to promote cooperation, reduce unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions, and reduce miscalculation. While these assumptions sum up the conventional and optimistic views of transparency, it is possible that their opposites are true. Perhaps regimes find it hard to increase transparency or end up spreading misinformation. Perhaps transparency confirms or increases fears instead of reducing them. As mentioned above on page 20, arguments about the negative and counter-intuitive effects of transparency are emerging in the arms control, bargaining, and other literatures.

Where these negative effects seem plausible, I match hypotheses about the positive conflict-reducing effects of transparency with primed or counter-hypotheses about the negative effects of transparency. However, this should not be construed as setting up a horse-race between positive and negative effects of transparency. As we shall see, whether transparency has positive or negative effects can not be determined on a blanket basis because transparency's effects are often highly dependent on prior conditions. Further, the Concert demonstrates that even when transparency seems to aggravate crises, the ability to make clear threats can also help resolve crises.

To test my hypotheses, I infer predictions (observable implications) about what behavior one should expect in the cases if the hypothesis were true. I then examine the cases to see if they contain evidence of the predicted behavior(s). Predictions tell us what to look for when

Arms (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 1992), esp. pp. 23-24; Edward L. Warner, III and David A. Ochmanek, *Next Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), pp. 124-126; Timothy E. Wirth, "Confidence and Security-Building Measures" in Robert D. Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press for the Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989).

examining the evidence and they answer the question “how do we know transparency and its effects when we see them?” Within a case study, determining how well the predictions fare is the best way to measure variables. My methods for testing the hypotheses are explained in more detail after I present the hypotheses.

REGIMES PROVIDE TRANSPARENCY (H1)

The first hypothesis is that security regimes provide transparency. Transparency is about information, specifically how much is known about a potential adversary’s political and military capabilities and intentions. Transparency does not just happen; an agent or mechanism is always required to generate information, provide information, or facilitate the flow of information between the states or parties involved. Examples of mechanisms include peacekeepers, forums, buffer zones, and others listed below. Without this hypothesis, I would be assuming, not examining, the first half of the causal chain that security regimes do in fact increase transparency:
Security Regimes → Transparency → Peace.

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS

Because security regimes must use mechanisms to generate, provide, or facilitate the exchange of information, I will look for their use in the cases. The use of information mechanisms is the main observable implication of H1. If no mechanism is used, the security regime can not be increasing transparency. Security regimes could use a variety of mechanisms,

alone or in combination, to provide transparency. They include:

- conferences
- summits
- liaisoning
- observation and monitoring missions
- inspection and verification missions
- demarcation lines
- buffer zones
- demilitarized zones
- restricted activity zones
- incident reports
- information and anti-propaganda campaigns
- radio, television, print, and other media
- organized sharing of intelligence
- organized sharing of information

Observable implications extend beyond identification of the mechanism. If the security regime provides new information or facilitates the exchange of information, then the actors to or between whom the information is distributed should also be identifiable. Further, the content of the information provided or exchanged should be identifiable and describable. For example, the information might be about the numbers and disposition of forces in buffer zones and limited force areas, might determine the exact location of a border, might help chains of command within countries to identify rogue actors, might outline the various different interpretations of an incident and show which versions are supported by the facts gathered during the post-incident investigation, and so forth. Finally, the information provided will show up in the statements and assessments of the actors involved.

If the content of the information is hard to identify, then post-hoc assessments by the actors involved and by historians and analysts assume greater importance. These assessments can be used to fill in the blanks and answer questions that would help indicate whether or not the

regime provided information. When a transparency mechanism is used, I want to determine what did the actors learned and how it affected their behavior? Actors should recount history using the information the regime provided and this history should describe the role of the information provided (for H1 and some combination of the other hypotheses to be confirmed).

This hypothesis would be discredited if the security regime tried to use a mechanism to increase transparency and it provided little or no information. Finding that transparency had little or no effect would also serve to discredit the other hypotheses. However, this is not a horse race to determine winning and losing hypotheses. It is an endeavor to tell the truth about transparency in order to advance scholarship and help policy makers.¹¹

Regimes Spread Misinformation (H1')

One should not assume that regimes only generate or transmit accurate information. Regimes may be used to spread misinformation, or they may themselves spread misinformation. If this happens in the cases, we should identify specific instances of misinformation in the transparency mechanisms. Support would be bolstered if the actor who spread the misinformation and his or her intent can be identified.¹²

ANTICIPATED TRANSPARENCY PROMOTES COOPERATION (H2)

¹¹ For more on my views about those who know the answers ahead of time, and do not tell the truth, see: "The Arrogance of the Dogmatic Left and Right" at <<<http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/arroganceofleftandright.html>>>.

¹² Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1970).

The second hypothesis is that the promise or anticipation of transparency promotes cooperation. States create regimes to take advantage of their benefits, and one benefit is increased transparency.¹³ The anticipation of increased transparency provided by a security regime promotes cooperation by increasing states' incentives to enter into agreements, and form a regime or accept a role for a security regime.

To illustrate how this works, fears of cheating diminish the willingness of states to enter into or stick with peace treaties, confidence-building measures, arms control, and other agreements. Transparency reduces fears of cheating and increases the incentives to cooperate by increasing the ability to detect cheating.¹⁴ While this is perhaps the primary way anticipated transparency would help the formation of a regime, a number of other possible benefits of transparency may spur regime formation, including reduced miscalculation, reduced fears and worst-casing, and better ability to detect and deter rogues and spoilers on either side. These regime-provided effects are covered by separate hypotheses below, and I defer discussion of their logics until then.

Although I focus on transparency, transparency and incomplete information are not, of course, the sole causes of war or impediments to bargaining. States may be bent on war and

¹³ The informational benefits of regimes have been a core theme in the literature on regime formation and design for a number of years. See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," *The Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-32; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Krasner, *International Regimes*; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, eds., *The Rational Design of International Institutions*; Mitchell, "Sources of Transparency;" and James D. Morrow, "The Forms of International Cooperation," *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer 1994), p. 400.

¹⁴ Abbott, "Trust but Verify," pp. 4, 28-29. See also the discussion of H5: Transparency Reduces Cheating, Rogue, and Spoiler Problems.

some problems are indivisible. Commitment problems and some conflictual aspects of power transitions may have little to do with information, though often both are related to uncertainty and incomplete information about the future. Likewise, there are a number of non-transparency related ways of solving commitment problems, promoting peace, and facilitating bargaining. These include security guarantees, economic or political incentives, and coercion, any of which may supplement or supercede transparency in sealing bargains or deterring war.¹⁵

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS

To assess hypothesis H2, I will look for evidence in the cases that states' willingness to sign an agreement increased after the promise of increased transparency by a security regime was extended. The reasons for this willingness will be found in the potential benefits the regime and increased transparency will bring. For example, states may be seeking cooperation but must not trust each other enough to come to an agreement – much like a prisoners' dilemma. When this is so, states will fear cheating, and will insist on adequate verification or monitoring before signing a peace, a cease-fire, agreeing to an election, or other tension reducing agreement. This insistence will be evinced in speeches, negotiations, policy statements, debates, and so forth. States may also seek increased transparency to control rogues or reduce security spirals.

¹⁵ Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War;" Robert Powell, "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 231-241; Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Anticipated Transparency Hinders Cooperation (H2')

The anticipation of increased transparency may hinder cooperation, and lessen the likelihood of regime formation. For example, militaries and politicians may fear that intrusive verification or monitoring by peacekeepers will hinder their operational flexibility or their ability to keep classified information private. The conventional wisdom of arms controllers is that insufficient monitoring makes bargaining harder because it increases fears of cheating. Similarly, many cooperation and bargaining theorists write that private or incomplete information makes it harder to locate bargains.¹⁶ These views suggest that transparency will generally promote cooperation, but this hypothesis explores counter arguments.

Transparency is about who knows how much about whom and thus transparency has potentially severe distributional consequences.¹⁷ This can hinder cooperation in a number of circumstances. Increases in transparency will be more likely to hurt cooperation if the parties are in the domain of relative gains,¹⁸ while they will be more likely to spur cooperation in the domain of absolute gains. Revisionist states and actors may have little to gain and much to lose from transparency, especially if their plans depend on secrecy and surprise.

Defenders also have large incentives to bluff and act determined to impose high costs in

¹⁶ Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," esp. pp. 285, 290; Walter, *Committing to Peace*; and see also footnote 1 on page 32.

¹⁷ Morrow, "The Forms of International Cooperation," p. 388.

¹⁸ Relative gains concerns are discussed in: Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 487-90; Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," pp. 9-14, esp 12-13; Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*; and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), chapter 6, esp. pp. 105-106, 118.

case of an attack. These bluffs may help deterrence, but they may also increase the odds of conflict because they raise tensions, and because their associated audience costs make it hard to back down.¹⁹ Weak states may depend more on bluffing than strong states, so strong states will tend to value transparency, while weak states are more threatened by transparency.²⁰ Military issues are acutely permeated by a sense of relative gains, boosting states' incentives to guard private information, misrepresent themselves to others, and fear transparency.²¹ These points are not necessarily consistent – there may be strong states who are revisionists and who want to bluff – but they do highlight a number of conditions under which states may fear transparency.

Two pieces of evidence must be found in the cases to support this contention. First, parties must hesitate or refuse to form a regime or use its services. Second, the basis for this refusal or hesitation will be because they fear that the effect of the regime to be will deepen information asymmetries, or that resulting transparency will disproportionately benefit others or hurt their ability to keep information private.

TRANSPARENCY PROMOTES COOPERATION AND PREVENTS CONFLICT (H3)

¹⁹ Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 30-31. However, engaging wider audiences and risking greater audience costs may reveal information, signal resolve, and lower the probability of war. See Kenneth A. Schulz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 829-844.

²⁰ Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No.4 (November 2003), pp. 621-632, esp. pp. 627, 630.

²¹ Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” In contrast to these arguments about why states have incentives to bluff, Anne E. Sartori argues in *Deterrence by Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) that states usually have powerful incentives not to bluff. A reputation for honesty builds credibility, which helps diplomacy and deterrence.

The third hypothesis is that increased transparency promotes peaceful outcomes from ongoing strategic interactions, including bargaining, coercion, and decisions for war. The qualitative causes of war and rationalist bargaining literatures contain a number of arguments in which uncertainty and miscalculations about threats, capabilities, actions, and resolve hinder negotiations and increase the likelihood of conflict and war. When incomplete information and miscalculation worsen strategic interaction, transparency can facilitate bargaining and promote peace.

For qualitative causes of war scholars such as Van Evera and Blainey, anything that makes calculations of coercive and deterrent power less accurate increases the probability of deterrence failure through offensive or defensive optimistic miscalculation.²² For rationalists such as Fearon and Powell, incomplete information and uncertainty hinders bargaining that would prevent costly war.²³ I discuss these two schools and their arguments in turn.

Optimistic miscalculation, the belief that one is stronger than one actually is, takes two forms. First, revisionist powers may believe their target for conquest is less powerful than it really is. This is *offensive* optimistic miscalculation and it may cause deterrence to fail because the revisionist does not know enough about its victim's capabilities or willpower to be deterred. For example, Germany's hope that Britain would not enter the coming war made it more belligerent than it otherwise would have been in the crisis leading up to World War I. Had Britain been clearer about its commitments, or had Germany possessed better information, the crisis might not have led to wide-scale war. Second, a status quo power may believe it enjoys

²² Blainey, *Causes of War*, and Van Evera, *Causes of War*.

²³ Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," and Powell, "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict."

greater safety than it really does, and this is *defensive* optimistic miscalculation. Here, deterrence fails because the status quo power is defensively overconfident, underestimates its adversary, and does not take enough action to successfully deter or prepare for attack. An example is India's optimistic assessment of Chinese intentions and capabilities prior to the unexpected and devastating Chinese attack of October 1962.²⁴

Blainey sums up his miscalculation argument with this: "most wars were likely to end in the defeat of at least one nation which had expected victory." He later adds: "Any factor which increases the likelihood that nations will agree on their relative power is a potential cause of peace."²⁵ Transparency is one of those factors.

Rationalist bargaining scholars highlight a number of mechanisms by which incomplete information can increase conflict and lead to war. The main argument they make is that war is such a costly enterprise that if states had perfect information about each other's capabilities, resolve, and intentions then they could reach a deal before incurring the costs of war. The *ex post* costs of war create an *ex ante* bargaining space. The only reason a bargain is not realized is incomplete information and inability to calculate the costs of war, *ex ante*.²⁶ Sources of this incomplete information include deliberate misrepresentation to either hide or exaggerate

²⁴ Yaacov Vertzberger, "India's Strategic Posture and the Border War Defeat of 1962: A Case Study in Miscalculation," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1982).

²⁵ *Causes of War* pp. 144-145, 294.

²⁶ Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," pp. 383-384, as well as Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War;" James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Dec. 1996), pp. 715-735; Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve;" William Reed, "Information, Power, and War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 4 (November 2003), pp. 633-641; and Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec. 2004), pp. 783-813. Countering arguments that incomplete information is necessary for war is Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 123-133.

capabilities for political or military effect, secrecy, misperceptions, and opacity.²⁷ For these scholars, war is itself an extended bargaining session which reveals information. Over time, wars end when enough information is exchanged for one side to realize it must capitulate.²⁸ Despite different language, rationalist arguments about incomplete information leading to war have much in common with Blainey's conclusion that miscalculation results in at least one side ending up with an unexpected outcome that could have avoided with better information.²⁹

Rationalists also argue that incomplete information can make bargaining slower, inefficient, and less likely to be successful. Incomplete information and uncertainty hurt the ability of adversaries to signal their positions, actions, capabilities, intentions, and resolve during negotiations. When this is so, increased transparency should be able to improve signaling and facilitate bargaining.³⁰ Similarly, incomplete information can lead states to demand too much in

²⁷ Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," pp. 390-401; 383-384, as well as Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War;" Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve," pp. 943-945 and 954;" and Smith and Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War," pp. 784-787.

²⁸ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 4, (Oct. 2002), pp. 819-838; Mark Irving Lichbach, "Information, Trust, and Power: The Impact of Conflict Histories, Policy Regimes, and Political Institutions on Terrorism," University of Maryland, College Park, draft paper, October 15, 2004; R. Harrison Wagner, "War and the State: Rethinking the Theory of International Politics," University of Texas, Austin, draft paper as of October 2005; and Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War."

²⁹ See Dan Lindley and Ryan Schildkraut, "Is War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of War" (draft paper), for more discussion comparing and contrasting rationalist and miscalculation arguments about the causes of war.

³⁰ Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation;" Ariel Rubinstein, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," *Econometrica*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January 1982), pp. 97-109; Ariel Rubinstein, "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences," *Econometrica*, Vol. 53, No. 5 (September 1985), pp. 1151-1172; Signorino, "Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty."

Although it is beyond the capacity of this study to examine these claims, some scholars argue that regime type affects transparency and the abilities to signal effectively and make credible commitments. See: Peter F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 299-326; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-592; Charles

a negotiation, increasing the odds of deadlock and conflict.³¹

Ken Oye argues that deadlock may result more often from the absence of mutual interest than from unwarranted fears, security dilemmas, accidents, or miscalculations.³² However, even when cooperation seems impossible, this does not mean war is inevitable or that transparency is irrelevant. By helping sides understand that they have deadlocked and how they got to that point, transparency can help two ways. First, transparency can improve each side's assessment of the other's relative commitment and strength. This might help each side live with deadlock if they came to realize that escalation would be too costly, and both sides were deterred. Second, such an understanding can break the deadlock by helping one side successfully coerce short of the use of force. Coercion is a bargain of sorts.

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS

Cases will confirm H3 if negotiations succeed or if wars are prevented occur because of new information provided by the regime. This new information will reduce incomplete information and miscalculation, and increase the range of acceptable bargaining outcomes (“win-sets”) of the parties.³³ This should speed bargaining, and increase the likelihood of success.

Lipson, *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made A Separate Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 233-266.

³¹ Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” pp. 10-11.

³² *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, p. 7

³³ Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” reprinted in Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993)

Although it is hard to ascertain specific odds of success in negotiations, cases studies and process tracing can provide examples of regime-provided information causing turning points in negotiations.

Those who have offensively optimistically miscalculated will come to more fully recognize the costs of war, and these higher costs will be a factor in spurring negotiations and locating a bargain. Those who are on the verge of aggression due to optimistic miscalculation will change their plans and desist once they learn through the regime that those plans were based on faulty assumptions and information. The readiness of forces may be relaxed, forces pulled back, and alerts canceled.

States who have defensively optimistically miscalculated and who are more vulnerable than they thought will change their bargaining positions and plans accordingly once they learn from the regime that those plans were based on faulty assumptions and information. Such states may make concessions, appease, or bandwagon or they may balance. Concessions, appeasement, and bandwagoning are marked by conceding to the demands of the revisionist or joining it in carrying out its plans. Signs of balancing include building up forces, redeploying forces to better counter the newly recognized threat, and making new alliances. War may be prevented and conflict reduced through enhanced deterrence, or finding a bargain.

In all cases, H3 will hold true only if policy changes occur due to information provided by the regime. This information will be about the capabilities, resolve, and bargaining positions of adversaries, and it may have been deliberately obscured prior to the use or actions of the regime. Support will be strengthened if actors explain these changes with reference to this new information.

H3': Transparency Hinders Cooperation and Causes Conflict

Transparency may cause war or hinder cooperation by removing ambiguities that bolstered deterrence and sustained deadlock, smoothed negotiations, or helped parties maintain blissful (calming, anyway) ignorance. Transparency may also help a revisionist plan its attack. I discuss these points in turn.

Rationalists and others are increasingly exploring the extent to which noise, incomplete information, and uncertainty actually help cooperation and prevent conflict. For example, uncertainty can lead a state to overestimate its adversary, and this would help deterrence.³⁴ In such cases, transparency would hurt deterrence as it reduced positive overestimation and revealed a more easily conquered prize for a revisionist state. States may also underestimate their adversaries, and new information that revealed a more powerful adversary could increase incentives for preventive war.³⁵ Likewise, incomplete information may help maintain a deadlock or standoff. Non-optimal, but still short of war.

Morrow notes that incomplete information is a necessary precondition to have something to bargain about; it is a key cause of inefficiency and conflict.³⁶ However, incomplete information and shaded truth can also help adversaries reach a compromise. In part, this is

³⁴ Jack S. Levy, "Political Psychology and Foreign Policy," in Sears, Huddy, and Jervis, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, p. 261.

³⁵ Bendor, "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation;" Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve," p. 955; Signorino, "Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty;" and Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations."

³⁶ Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve," p. 944.

because parties are tempted, especially in the opening phases of negotiations, to start with overly ambitious opening gambits. This can lead to deadlock or spikes in tension. The essence of mediation can be to filter information as both sides learn more about each other and themselves.³⁷ As shown in the UNDOF case, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prevented deadlock by limiting information exchange as he mediated between the Syrians and Israelis after the 1973 War. Because each side initially took positions the other would find unacceptable, he feared that too much information would lead each side to walk away.

Negotiations are often marked by phases in which things seem to get worse before they get better. This is due to the multiple effects of transparency. It can first clarify how bad things are with respect to relative power, grievances, or resolve and/or it may reveal how unrealistic initial goals may have been. However, once these costs and clarifications are on the table, they may then increase the incentives to compromise – if the negotiations survive.³⁸

Transparency may remove a related form of peace-promoting ambiguity. Some ‘secrets,’ such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability are less irritating because of their ambiguous status. When norms and standards are not shared, familiarity can breed contempt, and transparency can make things worse.³⁹ It is also possible that transparency and too much information can create deadlock in negotiations, or overload leaders, making it hard to read their adversary’s signals and

³⁷ Jarque, Ponsati, and Sakovics, “Mediation: Incomplete Information, Bargaining with Filtered Information,” p. 805.

³⁸ Roger Fisher and William Ury, with Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In*, 2 ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 6.

³⁹ Florini, “End of Secrecy,” esp. p. 60 and Gaddis, *Long Peace*, p. 225.

making crisis management harder.⁴⁰

Looked at more generally, noise and uncertainty cause a regression towards the mean among actors caught in repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Among populations of players with non-nice strategies who would otherwise defect, incomplete information can lead to 'accidental' cooperation. On the other hand, among populations of players with otherwise nice strategies, uncertainty can lead to accidental defections. In both cases, noise dilutes strategies and average outcomes veer towards a mean of mixed strategies. Incomplete information can hurt cooperation even when the parties want cooperation, but potentially help cooperation when the parties are hostile.⁴¹

In other words, transparency helps nice players stay nice, but at the cost of keeping mean players mean. While this may not be an irrelevant contribution in a world fraught with noise (and assuming mean players are mean to the bone), this reflects the critiques of those who think peacekeeping and institutions more generally are symptoms rather than causes in international relations.⁴²

At its most brutal, Barry R. Posen argues that transparency may help a revisionist plan an attack by identifying enemy weaknesses or plans. He suggests that intrusive inspections could

⁴⁰ See Finel and Lord, "The Surprising Logic of Transparency," in Finel and Lord, *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency* (reprinted from *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 315-339). On overload, see also Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis Escalation War* (Montreal, CN: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972), chapter 3.

⁴¹ Bendor, "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation," p. 731.

⁴² Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War?"; Richard Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994); and Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions."

help attack planning by revealing the lay of the land, secret defensive positions, and so forth.⁴³

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS

To confirm H3', the cases should show that when the regime increased transparency, this weakened deterrence, pushed deadlock into conflict, and/or deadlocked negotiations. Evidence would be strengthened if it were also shown that incomplete information and uncertainty bolstered deterrence, sustained deadlock, or facilitated negotiations. If transparency does help plan aggression, then information provided by the regime should be shown to contribute to the offensive military planning of a state or adversary, leading it to an attack it previously thought unwise.

According to many deductively sound arguments, transparency (or incomplete information) can correlate with any outcome: peace, war, or somewhere in between. So if incomplete information can produce war, deadlock, or help negotiations, and if transparency can reverse these effects, how do we know what is causing what and whether H3 or H3' is being confirmed? This conundrum is more apparent than real because there is a continuum of conflict severity between successful bargaining, deadlock, and war. I am analyzing processes along this continuum where things are either getting better or worse because of transparency (or incomplete information and uncertainty). If process tracing shows that increases in transparency push towards successful bargaining and away from war, then H3 is confirmed. If transparency

⁴³ "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," *Daedalus*, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 228. Relatedly, one-sided information dominance is a cornerstone in U.S. plans to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

increases conflict, then H3' is confirmed.

Note on the Opposing and Conditional Effects of Transparency

It is clear by now that transparency and its inverses of opacity, incomplete information, and uncertainty can have a variety of different effects depending on whether opacity causes over or under estimation, and whether the actors are status quo (nice) or non-status quo (revisionist or mean). This is the logic behind the laying out of both positive and negative hypotheses about transparency. The following table shows some of the major ways over, under, and accurate calculation can affect the probability of war between status quo and non-status quo actors. I could make a similar table for most of the effects of transparency, but this one makes the point: transparency can help or hurt, depending on the circumstances.⁴⁴ Casting debates about transparency as being engaged between transparency optimists and pessimists is useful because it reflects the literature. However, this table serves as a reminder that such casting can oversimplify, and that the effects of transparency can be highly dependent on prior conditions.

⁴⁴ A complementary table is found in Signorino, "Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty" p. 193; see also Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1977), pp. 371-400, esp. pp. 389-393.

Table 2-2: Effects of Opacity and Transparency on Mis/calculation, Deterrence, and War

This Power Does This	Overestimates SQ Adversary's Power and/or Intentions (Opacity)	Underestimates SQ Adversary's Power and/or Intentions (Opacity)	Accurately Estimates SQ Adversary's Power and/or Intentions (Transparency)	Overestimates NSQ Adversary's Power and/or Intentions (Opacity)	Underestimates NSQ Adversary's Power and/or Intentions (Opacity)	Accurately Estimates NSQ Adversary's Power and/or Intentions (Transparency)
Resulting in						
SQ Power	1. Minor effects on chance of war; may spur unnecessary balancing, tension	2. Minor effects on chance of war; deterrence is weak	3. Minor effects on chance of war.	4. Reduces chance of war; spurs balancing and helps deterrence or spurs bandwagoning	5. Increases chance of war; reduces balancing; weakens deterrence	6. Reduces chance of war; spurs balancing and helps deterrence or spurs bandwagoning
NSQ Power	7. Reduces chance of war; deterrence strengthened; likely to spur arms build-up	8. Increases chance of war; opens optimistic window of opportunity	9. Indeterminate, depending on balance of power (and risk tolerance). Increases chance of war if NSQ power confirms that it is stronger; ⁴⁵ Reduces chance of war if NSQ power discovers it is weaker.	10. Reduces chance of war; deterrence strengthened; likely to spur arms build-up	11. Increases chance of war; opens optimistic window of opportunity	12. Indeterminate, depending on balance of power (and risk tolerance). Increases chance of war if NSQ power confirms that it is stronger; Reduces chance of war if NSQ power discovers it is weaker.

SQ = status quo; NSQ = non status quo (revisionist)

TRANSPARENCY REDUCES UNWARRANTED FEARS AND WORST-CASE ASSUMPTIONS (H4)

⁴⁵ If one assumes that transparency helps an aggressor plan, then one might also assume that it should help the status quo power to identify the revisionist. In other words, if both powers are awake, box 6 occurs at the same time as box 9. Unfortunately, the literature on surprise attacks suggests that vulnerability to surprise is a nearly perpetual condition due in part to opacity, but especially due to cognitive, organizational, and bureaucratic blinders. Many ‘surprise’ attacks are preceded by enough signals to prevent surprise, but these signals are ignored or misread. See Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 120-27; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 270-79, 291-96; Ephraim Kam, *Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective* (Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 128-9; Ernest R. May, "Conclusions: Capabilities and Proclivities," in Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 529, 537-42); Patrick Morgan, "The Opportunity for Strategic Surprise," in Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983); Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 386-96.

The fourth hypothesis is that increased transparency lessens unwarranted fears and reduces worst-case assumptions. Incomplete information and uncertainty allow for threat assessments that overestimate an adversary's hostility, and these are "one of the most common and important forms of misperception."⁴⁶ This misperception in turn worsens the security dilemma, escalates spirals and arms races, and increases tension and conflict. With increased transparency, states may replace worst-case assumptions with facts. Transparency can thereby reduce unwarranted fears, tensions, and security spirals, reducing the likelihood of war and increasing the likelihood of cooperation.

At the heart of this hypothesis is the spiral model. The spiral model depicts an action-reaction, tit for tat arms race (or other hostile escalation) in which each side escalates responding to real and anticipated actions on the other side. Arms races and escalations are both symptoms and causes of tension and conflict. The fundamental cause of spirals is anarchy because states must provide for their own security and can not escape the security dilemma. However, transparency becomes relevant when spirals are aggravated by uncertainty and incomplete information about present and future actions, capabilities, and intentions. In an uncertain and anarchic world, states seek insurance by making worst-case assumptions.⁴⁷ Spirals are also affected by psychological and perceptual dynamics, and by the indistinguishability of weapons that can be used for both offense and defense. In some cases, transparency can mitigate cognitive misperceptions and misperceptions of the offense-defense balance and the nature of some

⁴⁶ Jack Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 280.

⁴⁷ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, chapter 3.

weaponery.⁴⁸

George Rathjens writes that “Action-reaction phenomenon, stimulated in most cases by uncertainty about an adversary’s intentions and capabilities, characterizes the dynamics of the arms race.”⁴⁹ Similarly, George Downs, David Rocke, and Randolph Siverson argue that:

Imperfect intelligence can inspire an arms race that would not take place in the presence of perfect information, and can permit one to continue when it is ‘unjustified’.... Imperfect intelligence expands the range of games that can lead to arms races by raising the possibility that one side will think the other side has defected even though this may not have occurred.⁵⁰

Unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions are not just caused by rational responses to uncertainty and anarchy, but can also be affected by motivational orientations toward trust or fear or toward revisionism or peace, perceptual biases, and other psychological dynamics.⁵¹ Because transparency is about the quality of incoming information available to actors and not cognitive distortions of information after it has been received, transparency can better reduce fears when the source of those fears is external factors like opacity or bluffing than when they are due to an actor’s internal makeup. Nonetheless, the psychological literature does suggest that biases can sometimes be changed by new incoming information, especially when that

⁴⁸ On the ability of transparency to affect cognitive misperceptions, see footnote 52, p. 59.

⁴⁹ Rathjens, “Dynamic of the Arms Race,” p. 42; see also footnote 1 on page 32.

⁵⁰ Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” in Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, pp. 134-135.

⁵¹ Jonathon Bendor, Roderick M. Kramer, and Suzanne Stout, “When in Doubt... Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 691-719; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*; Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 675-700; Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” pp. 389-393; Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War, Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems” *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 1983), pp. 76-99; Signorino, “Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty,” pp. 155, 185.

information is vivid and forceful.⁵²

Prime examples of spirals made worse by incomplete information and uncertainty are the Cold War bomber and missile gaps, which occurred when the U.S. vastly overestimated Soviet bomber and missile capabilities, increasing tensions and worsening the nuclear arms race.

The Cold War also provides an exemplar of transparency calming fears. Gaddis contends that the reconnaissance revolution “may rival in importance the ‘nuclear revolution’ that preceded it” in explaining the long peace of the Cold War and that satellites helped prevent recurrence of the bomber gap and missile gap panics.⁵³ While the Cold War arms race may be the first thing that comes to mind when thinking about spirals, a number of scholars also apply the spiral model to ethnic conflict.⁵⁴

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS

The primary prediction of this hypothesis is that threat assessments become more benign after a regime increases transparency. With increased transparency, revised assessments should be based on new facts and information provided or facilitated by the security regime with the mechanisms listed above. Threat assessments characterized by worst-case assumptions and

⁵² Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception” and Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” in Sears, Huddy, and Jervis, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, p. 266.

⁵³ Quote in “Long Peace,” p. 232; see also chapter 7, “Learning to Live with Transparency: The Emergence of a Reconnaissance Satellite Regime” and Jane Kellett Cramer, *National Security Panics: Overestimating Threats to National Security*, PhD dissertation (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2002).

⁵⁴ Fearon and Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation;” Stuart J. Kaufmann, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn 1996), pp. 108-138; and Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, Ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

unwarranted fears should suggest grave danger from an adversary, the inevitable threat of war, an implacably hostile enemy, and so forth. Hard facts and conservative estimates will be scanty or lacking. Instead, insider revelations or post-hoc analyses should indicate that the threat assessment was indeed based on assumptions, assertions, guesses, extrapolations, and so forth.

H4': Transparency Confirms Fears

In some cases, worst-case fears may be confirmed by new information. Not all dire threat assessments are wrong. If H4' is true then the regime's transparency mechanisms will confirm the gravity of the threat and the accuracy of the suspicions. This does not mean that transparency caused the underlying conflict, or will necessarily make it worse. Furthermore, it may well be the task of the regime to uncover violations or report information related to threat assessments, and its credibility may well depend on reporting the truth even if that risks exacerbating the situation. While it seems likely that reducing unwarranted fears will reduce tension, table 2-2 on page 56 makes clear that the effects of increased transparency and more accurate threat assessments may also be to increase the odds of conflict, depending on whether the parties are revisionist/s and what their prior assessments were.

TRANSPARENCY REDUCES CHEATING, ROGUE, AND SPOILER PROBLEMS (H5)

The fifth hypothesis is that transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems. This hypothesis is about the ability of transparency to help control provocative and hostile action,

while the prior two hypotheses focused on the ability of transparency to push outcomes from strategic interaction toward peace and to calm threat assessments, respectively.

Incomplete information encourages defection and provocation in several ways. First, it hinders the ability to detect defection and retaliate, increasing the incentives to defect in the first place. Second, it makes it harder for regimes to control rogues on their own side, and more difficult for the other side to decide if a provocative act is due to rogue behavior or deliberate policy. Third, uncertainty surrounding the nature and motives of potential spoilers makes them harder for peacekeepers to control. Fourth, incomplete information within conflict zones makes it easier for hate-mongers to perpetrate hostile myths. Transparency can reduce all these problems. Finally, international regimes also have a special informational tool that supplements transparency. They can use information to shed a public spotlight on hostile behavior, and this tool can shame and coerce actors into changing their behavior. I discuss these points in turn.

A key argument in the institutionalist, cooperation, and bargaining literatures is that institutions promote cooperation and deter cheating because they can monitor agreements and increase transparency. Transparency increases the odds that defection will be detected, and this then affords the opportunity for retaliation.⁵⁵ A key factor is that there is something to defect from in the first place. Without an agreement (to attend a multilateral forum during crises or abide by the agreement that installed a peacekeeping operation, in my cases), then defection is harder to define and identify. In this way, agreements help send signals and increase transparency, even when they are broken.

Jervis summarizes how transparency can identify and prevent defection:

⁵⁵ For citations on this, see Chapter One, footnotes 15, 16, and 17 on pp. 18, 18, and 19, respectively.

Cooperation is made more likely not only by changes in payoffs but also by increases in the states' ability to recognize what others are doing - called "transparency" in the literature on regimes. Coupled with the ability to act on this information, transparency can produce a situation in which, in effect, the choices of CD and DC [one cooperates, the other defects] are effectively ruled out. Short periods of defection may occur; but if they can be detected and countered, the only real alternatives are CC and DD [both cooperate or both defect].⁵⁶

Michael Doyle echoes this with his argument that traditional peacekeeping operations use transparency to promote cooperation and compliance by solving coordination games and by sufficiently altering the payoffs in prisoners' dilemma games to turn them into coordination games.⁵⁷ My research shows this is likely to be more true in multifunctional operations.

Fears of cheating are particularly high in the security arena. Compared to economic cooperation, there is a "special peril" of defection in security affairs.⁵⁸ In contrast to cheating in economic agreements, cheating on security agreements can lead to conquest by an aggressor, and 'game over' for the victim. This was the fear of those in the 1980s who thought the Soviets might rapidly break out of the ABM Treaty by upgrading their air defenses into ballistic missile defenses. Although the bar for reassurance is raised in security affairs, once states are assured that compliance can be adequately monitored, they are more likely to make agreements (as noted in H2).

Rogues engage in provocative behavior unsanctioned by their leaders or government.

Informational issues related to rogues are fourfold. First, governments may have a hard time

⁵⁶ Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," in Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, p. 73; his excellent discussion of transparency spans pp. 73-76. Lipson concurs that poor information hinders cooperation in "Are Security Regimes Possible," p. 5. See also the discussion of transparency and arms control on p. 9.

⁵⁷ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, p. 98, footnote 139.

⁵⁸ Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," p. 14 and Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in Krasner, *International Regimes*, p. 128.

identifying and thus controlling rogue behavior within their own ranks due to lack of internal transparency and accountability. This is seen in the Cyprus case. A second issue is that it may be hard for adversaries to differentiate rogue behavior from deliberate policy. As Fearon and Laitin point out, intergroup information is harder to come by than intragroup information. If someone from ethnic group A engages in provocative behavior, and all group B knows is that the provocateur is from group A, group B is more likely to want to punish group A as a whole. In contrast to limiting retaliation to the provocateur, group punishment increases the likelihood of violence spiraling upwards.⁵⁹ This dynamic helped start the Seven Years War in America, as I show in Chapter 3. A third factor exacerbates this problem. Even if the side with the provocateur promises punishment, the other side will not necessarily know if punishment has indeed been meted out, or how genuinely the provocateur's side is trying to suppress violence more generally.⁶⁰ Finally, negative noise, such as a false belief that an adversary broke an agreement or intentionally committed a hostile action, can spark conflict.⁶¹ A regime involving monitoring, verification, and inspections can ameliorate all these issues.

Spoilers are related to rogues, but their sole goal is undermine a peace agreement or peace process. Confronting spoilers is made more difficult because of uncertainties surrounding their goals, resolve, their leadership, and their unity. In the absence of this knowledge, it is harder for

⁵⁹ Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," p. 719.

⁶⁰ Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 266.

⁶¹ Bendor, "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation," and Signorino, "Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty" pp. 155, 193. Signorino terms actions by rogues and factions negative noise, which is false information that makes things seem worse than they are.

peacemakers to craft appropriate strategies.⁶² Thus, a major task for peacemakers is to generate more information about who is threatening the peace and why.

The final problem is that ethnonationalist leaders and hate-mongers bent on conflict can exploit uncertainty about the nature of threats to stir up their domestic constituencies and incite conflict. Media monopolies exacerbate this danger. Slobodan Milosevic's mobilization against his neighbors, and the Hutu's use of radio Milles Collines are frequently cited examples.⁶³ When these problems arise, one remedy is to try to break media monopolies and provide more accurate information to the targeted area.⁶⁴

International regimes can sometimes bring the international spotlight to bear to provocative behavior. This can promote peace by creating a shaming effect, and by increasing the likelihood of international censure and sanction. Examples of beneficent coercion through information disclosure and dissemination are found in the work of NGOs who promote good governance by publicizing pollution, corruption, human rights abuses, and other evils.⁶⁵

⁶² Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53, esp. pp. 7, 17, and 44-53.

⁶³ Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr. and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261-302, esp. pp. 277-280; V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130-166; and Kaufmann, "Spiraling to Ethnic War."

⁶⁴ Dan Lindley, "Collective Security Organizations and Internal Conflicts," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael Brown, ed., (M.I.T. Press, 1996), pp. 537-568 and Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 5-40.

⁶⁵ See Ann M. Florini, ed., *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace); Florini, "A New Role for Transparency;" Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, *Global Public Policy: Governing without Government?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); as well as the project: "National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance" at the Campbell Public Affairs Institute of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University <<<http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/opengov/>>>, the National Security Archive-based freedominfo.org at the

OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS

If H5 is supported, then there will be evidence in the cases that the regime identified and gathered information on cheaters, rogues, and spoilers, and that this regime-provided information was used to coerce, suppress, punish, or retaliate against these actors. The above discussion makes clear many of the specifics, that information can affect inter and intragovernmental and inter and intragroup relations, and so forth. However, showing that potential defectors were in fact deterred can be problematic. Not only is it hard to prove a negative, always difficult in the study of deterrence, but few potential defectors are likely to cry uncle, fess up to malignant intentions, and admit their inability to carry through.

There is no H5' as I can not readily see how transparency could help cheaters, rogues, and spoilers. If these actors did use the regime to spread myths and false information, that would not be about transparency helping them; instead H1': Regimes Spread Misinformation would kick in.

TRANSPARENCY ABOUT THE REGIME INCREASES ITS EFFECTIVENESS (H6)

The sixth hypothesis is that regimes can increase transparency about their own functions to reduce fears about the operation, clarify its purpose, and increase its effectiveness. States or parties involved with a peacekeeping operation may harbor fears about the operation, be uncertain about why it is there, or suspect the operation of working for or bias towards the other

George Washington University (funded by George Soros' Open Society Initiative) with many studies and reports, as well as links to similar organizations worldwide <<<http://www.freedominfo.org/>>>, and especially the anti-corruption work of Transparency International at <<<http://www.transparency.org/>>>.

side. These uncertainties may make the operation vulnerable to rumors and disinformation campaigns that will hamper its effectiveness. Parties may need to be educated about aspects of the operation's mission such as what democracies are, how to vote, and so forth. The operation may remedy these problems with an information campaign to increase transparency about itself and to teach people about its mission/s. I dub information operations about a peacekeeping operation's purposes 'self-transparency.'⁶⁶

This hypothesis is more applicable to formal regimes like peacekeeping that have agents on the ground trying to accomplish complex tasks. Informal regimes such as forums less likely to kindle fears or require explanation. Formal regimes are also more likely to be able to wage an information campaign.

To see if H6 is supported in the cases, I will look for evidence that the regime (e.g. peacekeepers) is aware that the operation is the subject of malicious rumors and misinformation or that its functions need explanation. The regime will embark on an information campaign using transparency mechanisms to correct this misinformation. The evidence will confirm that the information reached its target population, and affected their behavior in ways favoring the mission.

Table 2-3 summarizes my hypotheses:

⁶⁶ There is little theoretical work on 'self-transparency,' but for an excellent book devoted to information operations in U.N. peacekeeping operations, see Ingrid A. Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London, Great Britain: Frank Cass, 1999).

TABLE 2-3: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

	Applies to:	Main question used to examine hypothesis in the case studies:
Regimes provide transparency (H1) Regimes spread misinformation (H1')	Ability of regime to generate, provided, or transmit new and accurate information	Does the regime use a transparency mechanism to help exchange or generate information and is the information accurate?
Anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2) Anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2')	Effects of anticipated transparency on negotiations to establish the regime	Does the promise of regime provided-transparency promote cooperation?
Transparency promotes cooperation and prevents conflict (H3) Transparency hinders cooperation and causes conflict (H3')	Effects of new information from the regime on bargaining , coercion, and decisions for war	Does transparency promote peaceful outcomes within strategic interactions?
Transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4) Transparency confirms fears (H4')	Effects of new information from the regime on threat assessments , including arms levels, arms races, spirals, likelihood of future hostile actions, and overall level of tensions and suspicions	Does transparency reduce or confirm fears about the adversary's actions, capabilities, and intentions?
Transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems (H5)	Effects of new or anticipated information from the regime to detect, deter, reverse, or retaliate for defections , including cheating , or actions by rogues and spoilers	Is the regime detecting defection and does this lead to more lawful behavior or reciprocity? Is the threat of detection deterring defection?
Transparency about the regime (or self-transparency) increases its effectiveness (H6)	Effects of information activities by the regime to explain its purposes and operations	Is the regime or its purposes misunderstood or feared, and is it using information to correct this and help its mission?

Some may want to merge hypotheses where they see overlap, while others may want to break hypotheses into component parts where they see them capturing several discrete effects. For example, threat assessments affected by incomplete information hurt bargaining so one might be tempted to fold H4 into H3. One might want to break out cheating from rogues and spoilers, and thus change H5 from one hypothesis into two. I recognize these concerns, and have tried many permutations ranging from four (with no counter-hypotheses) to eight (with many counter-hypotheses) hypotheses. The end result reflects my goal of providing a comprehensive set of hypotheses on the provision and effects of transparency, with each hypothesis reflecting a major set of arguments in the relevant literatures. I have tried to steer between over simplifying and over complexifying.

To illustrate, much is made of uncertainty leading to worst-casing in the arms control and bargaining literatures. The ability of transparency to reduce this effect deserved being a separate hypothesis. Although worst-casing affects bargaining, folding worst-casing into the bargaining hypothesis would have obscured much more than it clarified and left many wondering what happened to this core theory about the way transparency is supposed to work. In contrast, I put cheating, rogues, and spoilers into one hypothesis because the underlying logic in the hypothesis is the same for all three: information can coerce better behavior. By creating a drizzle of hypotheses, separating these out would have obscured more than it clarified.

Methodology for Testing the Hypotheses

I test the hypotheses using the comparative case study method and process tracing. By asking the same questions of each case, I generate comparative case studies.⁶⁷ The comparative case study method strengthens findings by assessing evidence in the same way across cases.

The main questions I ask of each case are indicated in Table 2-3 on page 67. For example, to evaluate H1 consistently across cases, I ask: does the regime use a transparency mechanism to help exchange or generate information and is the information accurate? The specific evidence I look for is found under each hypothesis' observable implications. For a regime to provide transparency, as specified by H1, I must identify the mechanisms the regime uses to provide or generate information.

To increase replicability and clarity, I report my findings in tables at the end of each chapter.⁶⁸ These tables refer to the pages on which the evidence for each finding is found,

⁶⁷ See Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry, Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); David Collier and James Mahoney, "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," Research Note, *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (October 1996), pp. 56-91; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. VII (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975); Alexander L. George and Timothy McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), p. 35; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," in Paul Gorden Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); John Gerring, *Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Arend Lijphart, "II. The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (July 1975); James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 653-669; and Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

⁶⁸ King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 26-27.

guiding the reader to each piece of evidence which informs my conclusions. A summary table in the conclusion (page 262) aggregates the findings for each case and hypothesis, and highlights the variations in findings across the cases. These variations help tell us about when the provision and effects of transparency will best promote peace.

My goal in this study is to track new information provided or exchanged by the regime, and correlate that new information with changes in behavior by the actors involved. To do this, I process trace crises and incidents to evaluate the predictions and determine the influence of regimes and transparency. Process tracing means I look carefully at what caused the crisis and what made the crisis unfold as it did. In particular, I examine turning points in crises and see if the security regime and transparency played a role. Although I do not use extensive games or similar diagrams to tell my stories, turning points are the same as the inflection points represented in extensive games.⁶⁹

Crises are where we see regimes in action and where we see relations between adversaries shift from peace to tension and then back toward peace or on to war. Crises put the study variables into play, and this helps us understand whether the causal chain of security regimes →transparency→peace holds true.⁷⁰ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing point out that: “a crisis distills many of the elements that make up the essence of politics in the international system. It is a ‘moment of truth’ when the latent product of all these central elements [power configurations,

⁶⁹ Robert Bates, et al., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). See also Khong, *Analogies at War*, for the use of extensive game-type diagrams to make arguments about how analogies proved crucial in turning points.

⁷⁰ For more on process tracing, see the sources above in footnote 67.

interests, images, and alignments] become manifest in decision and action.”⁷¹

To address the question of “how much of the world can the theory help us explain?”⁷² I make a point with my hypotheses to examine the positive and negative effects of transparency. I am explicit and detailed with the observable implications for each hypothesis, increasing the likelihood that I will correctly identify the provision and effects of transparency and that others can replicate these findings. In the case studies to be honest about competing and complementary explanations. Whatever role transparency plays, I explain the major factors at work in a crisis or incident from power to norms. To help ensure that the regime really did increase transparency and that transparency really did have *x* or *y* effect, I often ask counterfactuals in my cases.⁷³ Symptoms that I have avoided ‘curve-fitting’ are the reports of “no evidence” in my cases, as are the variations in evidence within and between the cases where the successes, failures, and irrelevancies of transparency come to life.⁷⁴

Case Selection

⁷¹ *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 4.

⁷² King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, p. 101.

⁷³ This method is similar to that suggested by Goldstein and Keohane for assessing the impact of ideas in foreign policy in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), esp. p. 29. See also King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, p. 88 and Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) .

⁷⁴ Robert Bates, et al., *Analytic Narratives*, pp. 231-232.

To examine the provision of transparency by a forum, I study the first five crises confronted by the Concert of Europe: the dispute Poland and Saxony in 1814/15, the rebellions in Naples and Spain in the early 1820s, the revolt in Greece in the early 1820s, and Belgian crisis in the early 1830s. To examine transparency in U.N. peacekeeping, I study two traditional peacekeeping operations in which lightly armed U.N. forces patrol a buffer zone: the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. I also study two multifunctional operations in which U.N. forces and personnel rebuild war-torn countries by promoting democracy, monitoring elections, disarming factions, and other efforts. These cases are the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG).

I selected these cases because they let me assess the provision and effects of transparency in a range of settings, because they offer variation on all the variables and substantial within-case variance, because they are data-rich, and because they are important for scholars and policy makers. I explain these selection criteria in turn, and conclude by talking about other security regimes which I exclude or survey more briefly.

VARIANCE

This is the first extensive investigation of transparency provided by security regimes. For this reason, and to generate the most theoretical leverage and policy insight, it is important to look at an array of cases to see how various mechanisms for providing transparency function

under different conditions. The Concert of Europe and my U.N. cases evince variance at all the steps in my causal chain of security regimes –> transparency –> peace. The cases have variance in the presence or activities of the regime, the level of transparency provided by the regimes’ activities is variable and discernable, as is the influence of transparency on the level of tension between adversaries.

The Concert is a relatively informal regime, while the U.N. and its instrument of peacekeeping are more formal. Scholars of international institutions note that a primary way that regimes vary is according to how formally they are designed.⁷⁵ More formal regimes have more elaborate rules and procedures. In this analysis of transparency, the more formal the regime, the more actively the regime itself generates or exchanges information.

As indicated above in Table 2-1: Types of Transparency, *informal* regimes such as forums like the Concert of Europe have no buildings, no secretariat or other employees, and few formal rules governing behavior. They are decentralized, highly flexible, and confront an range of problems on an ad hoc basis. Forums are informal because states simply meet to discuss the problems they face. Compared to pre-forum diplomacy where diplomats met separately, forums facilitate communication, and transparency may be increased as the actors exchange information while bargaining.

The Concert offers a wonderful opportunity for measuring the presence of the security regime and its influence on diplomacy. The Concert was the first peacetime multilateral crisis management forum in history. This allows me to more easily compare pre-Concert, non-forum

⁷⁵ See Abbott and Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” and Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, eds., *Rational Design of International Institutions*.

diplomacy with forum diplomacy. Per Mill's "method of difference" in which cases for comparison are chosen to be similar in all ways but the study variable, I examine the first partition of Poland in 1772 because it is the closest crisis to the Concert (1814) in terms of date, stakes, and actors.⁷⁶ A chief difference is the existence of the forum. This comparison offers analytical leverage and variance that few other Concert scholars have exploited. I also examine whether the promise of transparency motivated diplomats to form the Concert.

In looking at five crises within the Concert, I assess how much communications were facilitated by the forum by process tracing, and I ask the counterfactual: what would have happened in the absence of the forum? Analysis of the first partition of Poland makes this counterfactual question easier to answer. Between and within the five crises, there is variance in the level of activity of the regime in that some crises were resolved almost exclusively within the forum (Poland-Saxony), while the outcomes for other crises also depended on diplomatic dispatches (Greek) and meetings outside of the forum (Belgium).

Finally, the five crises I assess offer variance in the levels of tension – the ultimate dependent variable in my causal chain. The crises include revolutions in neighboring states and territorial disputes. Their gravity ranged from major war scares to fits of pique - often at different times within the same crisis. The analytical task is determining whether the regime helped defuse these incidents and whether transparency had anything to do with it.

More *formal* regimes such as U.N. and its peacekeeping operations have buildings, bureaucracies, budgets, hierarchies, standard operating procedures, and formal rules. Here the

⁷⁶ John Stuart Mill, *The Logic of the Moral Sciences* (London, Great Britain: Duckworth & Co., 1987), pp. 68-69; Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 68-69.

mechanisms to generate or exchange information include the activities of traditional peacekeeping missions such as patrols, monitoring of buffer zones, verification of arms control agreements and disarmament. Multifunctional operations also may conduct patrols and verify disarmament, but their functions extend to the monitoring of elections and the pro-active shaping of the information environment with educational and media campaigns. Thus, the U.N. cases differ from the Concert in terms of formality, and from each other in terms of functions and the mechanisms they use to provide transparency.

For the U.N. cases, the first step in assessing variation in the presence or activities of the regime is to examine whether the promise of transparency provided by the regime was a factor in signing the peace or counterfactual deal that led to the mission. I then review the U.N. mandates for each mission and examine the extent to which each of the activities in the mandate relies on transparency for its success. As mentioned, activities range from patrolling buffer zones, arms control inspections, disarmament, and election monitoring. Crises and incidents range from inter-group violence and threats of violence to malicious rumors and harassment along buffer zones. Again, the analytical task is to see if transparency plays a role in the regime's activities at each juncture, and whether transparency affected the outcomes.

Each of my cases, five crises during the Concert of Europe and four U.N. peacekeeping operations, contain many subcases in the form of incidents, crises, and subcrises. For example, in the crisis surrounding Belgian independence starting in 1830, France had to be convinced to leave Belgium, then persuaded not to intervene again. Finally, France and Britain coordinated a joint intervention into Belgium. U.N. peacekeeping missions have a number of mandated tasks, and each operation usually confronts many incidents related to each of those tasks. In short,

there is substantial within case variance. This increases the number of observations and the robustness of my conclusions.⁷⁷

The proof about variance is in the pudding. The cases provide evidence of transparency playing strong, moderate, weak, and non-existent roles in ways that increased, decreased, and did not affect tensions in a wide range of circumstances. There are positive cases and negative cases in this analysis.⁷⁸

I have not picked hard cases, easy cases, extreme cases, or crucial cases. I picked cases which were important on scholarly and policy dimensions, which I thought would contain variation in all my variables, and about which there was enough information to process trace about transparency. Perhaps these are easy cases for transparency because there was no great power war during the Concert period, only moderate conflict on Cyprus – and almost none since 1974, no war on the Golan Heights, and the elections in Cambodia and Namibia were successful. On the other hand, these may all be hard cases because they are all instances of regimes operating in the realm of security. Institutions have a much more difficult time being effective in this realm than in economics and other issue areas.⁷⁹ Another reason that it is hard to judge whether these are hard or easy cases is that it is difficult to tell *a priori* whether it is easy or hard for a regime to increase transparency, how much of a role transparency played in the cases compared to other influences on crisis and incident outcomes, or even to predict the effects of transparency. As the

⁷⁷ Gerring, *Social Science Methodology*, pp. 190-91; King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 217-230; and Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, pp. 47, 61-63.

⁷⁸ James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 653-669.

⁷⁹ Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.”

hypotheses suggest, increases in transparency can reduce or increase tension depending on the information revealed, the aims of the actors, and other circumstances. In the end, I think there are instances in the cases which lend themselves to the provision and peaceful effects of transparency, and other times when the regimes and transparency are less successful or fail outright. This variation helps us learn about the provision and effects of transparency.

DATA RICHNESS

Another criteria for case selection was data richness. As the observable implications for the hypotheses suggest, evaluating hypotheses on transparency requires figuring out how the regime influenced what information was exchanged or generated, and what effect that information had. Learning who said what to whom and with what effect involves a fine-grained level of process - tracing.

For the Concert, because I have failed to raise Castlereagh, Metternich, and Alexander at seances, the chapter is based on primary materials such as letters and memoirs as well as the large historical and political science literature on the subject. There is a wealth of data and debate on the Concert.

On the U.N., my data is best for UNFICYP and UNDOF, where I conducted extensive field research on both sides of both buffer zones including interviews, access to peacekeeping sites, and to diplomatic and operational documents. A solid literature has developed for UNTAC, and includes several books devoted solely to its information operations. The literature is less developed for UNTAG. The UNTAG and UNTAC chapters are bolstered with primary

sources including operational records and interviews with a number of U.N. officials involved with both missions at the U.N. headquarters in New York.

Unfortunately, scholarship is more scanty on newer missions and it is often not detailed enough to offer transparency-related insights. It is often hard to find operational details about newer missions, much less details (or even summary assessments) regarding information operations. For example, to write two and half pages on UNMEE, I collected hundreds of news items and U.N. reports in about eight inches of folders, and conducted a number of phone interviews. In the absence of field research, operational details are hard to come by on the newer missions.

SCHOLARLY AND POLICY IMPORTANCE OF THE CASES

Cases were also chosen for their scholarly and policy relevance as students, scholars, and policy - makers are the main audiences for this book. Although it began almost 200 years ago, the Concert lives on as it continues to inspire the development and understanding of international organizations. The Concert of Europe was formed in 1814-1815 to help preserve Europe's hard-won peace. It was the first peacetime multilateral crisis management forum as well as the institutional precursor of the League of Nations and the United Nations.⁸⁰ As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War sparked over a dozen calls for Concert-based or Concert-like structures

⁸⁰ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

to replace or supplement NATO and the U.N.⁸¹ The Concert has influenced the thinking of scholars and policy-makers on other regimes as diverse as the Group of Seven/Eight (G7/G8), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).⁸² While recommendations for forums are plentiful, scholarly analyses of the effects of forums on diplomacy are not. Fearon notes that interstate bargaining increasingly takes place in the context of regimes and argues that "regimes deserve greater attention as *forums for bargaining* rather than primarily as institutions that aid monitoring and enforcement."⁸³ This book addresses this gap.

Finally, international relations theorists often rely on the Concert to develop theories about security institutions. Robert Jervis called the Concert the "best example of a security

⁸¹ See Chapter 1, footnote 4.

⁸² In addition to many of the cites in Chapter 1, footnote 5, page 13, see also: Amitav Acharya, "A Concert of Asia?" *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 1999); Armstrong Matiu Adejo, "From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old Bottle?" paper prepared for CODESRIA's 10TH General Assembly on "Africa in the New Millennium", Kampala, Uganda, December 8-12 2002; Aspen Institute, *Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War World: The Role of Intervention, Report of the Aspen Institute Conference*, August 2-6, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, 1996); Nicholas Khoo and Michael L.R. Smith, "A 'Concert of Asia'?" *Policy Review*, No. 108 (August & September 2001); Winrich Kühne, in cooperation with Jochen Prantl, "The Security Council and the G8 in the New Millennium: Who is in Charge of International Peace and Security?" Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP), Research Institute for International Affairs, 5th International Workshop, (June 30 - July 1, 2000), Berlin, Germany; Gani Joses Yoroms and Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, "West African Regional Security in the Post Liberian Conflict Area: Issues and Perspectives," CDR Working Paper 97.7 (November 1997), Institute for International Studies Department for Development Research (Former Centre for Development Research), Copenhagen, Denmark; Mark W. Zacher, "The Conundrums of Power Sharing: The Politics of Security Council Reform," prepared for the conference on the United Nations and Global Security, Centre of International Relations, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia (January 18-19 2003), Vancouver, B.C., Canada.

⁸³ Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," emphasis in original, p. 298.

regime."⁸⁴ John Gerring calls certain cases “paradigm” cases which have high “analytic utility.”⁸⁵ Nazi Germany is a paradigm case for studies of fascism, for example, and a study lacking that case would be suspect. The Concert is a paradigm case in the literature on security regimes.

The U.N. is the most prominent present-day security regime and its most visible function is peacekeeping. Again, this is a paradigm case with high policy relevance. To learn the most from my U.N. cases, I picked operations that seemed most typical for their genre: UNFICYP and UNDOF for traditional missions, and UNTAG and UNTAC for multifunctional missions. Although there are wide variations among U.N. and other peacekeeping operations, these missions are likely to share many characteristics with what would be deployed in either the traditional or multifunctional context.⁸⁶ Moreover, the lessons from these two types of operations should offer much to various peacekeeping, border monitoring, and democracy promotion operations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the AU, the European Union (EU), ECOWAS, and other regional security organizations and coalitions.

MINI-CASES AND EXCLUDED CASES

⁸⁴ Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 178.

⁸⁵ Gerring, *Social Science Methodology*, pp. 192-193; 219. He also call paradigm cases “crucial cases” but this does not correspond with the way other scholars use the term crucial case to mean most and least-likely cases. Gerring discusses this meaning of crucial case on p. 220.

⁸⁶ For example, Ingrid Lehmann argues that UNTAG was a model for many of the multifunctional missions that followed, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, p. 28, as did Michael Doyle, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy in an interview, April 19, 1996. Mark Thompson and Monroe Price write that UNTAC’s information practices set a precedent for a number of operations in “Introduction,” in Monroe E. Price and Mark Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 1. For typologies of peacekeeping operations, see footnote 22, p. 22.

Some regimes and newer peacekeeping operations I cover with mini-case studies in the appendices. Their purpose is to explore the wider applicability and limits of my findings, and to probe what other cases might contribute to the study of transparency. In the appendices, I first review three recently launched peacekeeping operations: the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). I then examine the Open Skies Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and SALT II) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the associated International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). My main cases let me make arguments about forums, peacekeeping, and public diplomacy/information operations, but the mini-cases of other regimes help assess the tradeoffs in my case selection.

Time and space meant that some regimes were left aside. These include the peacekeeping, democracy promotion, and other security related activities of various regional organizations and coalitions including the EU, the AU, ECOWAS, ASEAN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and historical cases such as the League of Nations and Organization of African Unity (OAU). Absent field research, the study of regional organizations is hard because they lack the wealth of primary and secondary data sources available for the Concert and U.N. Their activities are generally not as salient as those of the U.N. However, the number of non-U.N. peace operations is growing, and the lessons from this study should assist these activities.⁸⁷

A host of additional arms control and confidence-building agreements such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the Missile Technology Control Regime

⁸⁷ Bellamy and Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace?" pp. 157-195.

(MCTR) are not covered.⁸⁸ The Federation of American Scientists' website lists some 67 arms control treaties and agreements, underscoring the Nathan Hale aspect of this book: "I regret that I have but one life to give for this phase of my research program."⁸⁹

While most of the excluded regimes and all the mini-cases are worthy of more study, many of these do not meet my case selection criteria as well as the Concert and U.N. For example, the League of Nations is not as historically significant or as policy relevant as the U.N., and scholars of security regimes pay much more attention to the Concert than the League.

Arms control agreements have a number of benefits, and many of these benefits are tied to verification and transparency,⁹⁰ but most arms control regimes do not deal with crises and incidents, and it is harder to detect how they affect levels of tension between adversaries. Hence, variance on my independent and dependent variables is more difficult to obtain or observe. Nonetheless, I examine the Open Skies regime, SALT I/ II and the ABMT, and the NPT/IAEA to see what roles transparency played in their formation, and in how well they accomplished their objectives. Of these, transparency is most salient in NPT/IAEA cases of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. This is because transparency is impossible to provide at a sufficiently high level to calm suspicions, and suspicions are high mostly due to the fact that those countries deserve/d to be suspected as proliferators in the first place.

⁸⁸ See lists of arms control agreements at the Federation of American Scientists' and Arms Control Association websites: <<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/>>> and <<<http://www.armscontrol.org/treaties/>>>, respectively.

⁸⁹ Nathan Hale really said "I regret that I have but one life to lose for my country" before he was hanged by the British as a spy during the Revolutionary War. From information on the CIA's Nathan Hale statue: at <<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/tour/hale.html>>>.

⁹⁰ For lists of arms control agreements see the Arms Control Association website at <<<http://www.armscontrol.org/treaties/>>> and the Federation of American Scientists website at <<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/>>>.

Limits and Opportunities

My goal is not to provide a comprehensive history of the Concert, nor a general theory of peacekeeping, and I do not claim that a focus on transparency will yield either of these. As with all theories, transparency is a lens that brings some elements of a story into sharper view, at the risk of obscuring other elements. Because I am aware of the tradeoffs of this focus, I have tried to be fair in my cases by acknowledging the multiple purposes of the Concert, and the various peacekeeping techniques and activities in each of my peacekeeping cases.

It turns out that focusing on transparency and telling who told what to whom stories inevitably reveal a lot about the Concert's politics and purposes, and about the range of techniques involved in peacekeeping. What follows are stories about the ideologies and alliances of Concert states, and about peacekeepers interposing themselves between combatants, confronting shootings in buffer zones, and using puppets to educate people about elections. Focusing on transparency helps us understand these stories. Being honest about the successes, failures, and irrelevancies of transparency in the context of each regime's activities provides helps us see how well institutionalist arguments apply to the realm of security, and contributes to theory-building, cumulation of knowledge, and wise policy making.

Chapter 3: The Concert of Europe: Forum Diplomacy and Crisis Management

Introduction

The Concert of Europe was the first peacetime multilateral crisis management forum. States before the Concert were limited to bilateral diplomacy, and never met together to manage crises. Compared to prior pre-forum diplomatic practice, the chief benefit of meeting together should be the quicker exchange of information. A greater flow of information should mean increased transparency – what states know about each other’s intentions and capabilities.

The reason is that in situations involving three or more states, bilateral diplomacy slows communications and poses coordination problems. For example, if five states are limited to bilateral diplomacy, there have to be ten separate meetings for each to meet each other only once. Imagine trying to exchange views as one might in a Parent-Teachers Association or a faculty meeting, without actually convening. In contrast, multilateral forum diplomacy speed communications and lowers the transactions costs for exchanging information, and thus increases transparency. Meeting in the same place should also facilitate backroom deals between subsets of the participants. As Austrian foreign minister Count Wenzel Lothar Metternich said in anticipation of an 1821 meeting with British secretary of state Viscount Robert Stewart

Castlereagh: “I shall achieve more in a few days...than in six months of writing.”¹ In theory then, multilateral forum diplomacy should speed communications. Meeting in the same place should also facilitate backroom deals between subsets of the participants.

The questions this chapter raises are: Did the Concert facilitate the exchange of information and increase transparency? If so, what effects did transparency have on crisis management?

To answer these questions, I first investigate diplomacy and crisis management in the 18th century. Examining how well crises were managed under pre-Concert conditions helps reveal what effect the Concert of Europe had on causing peace. I set this 18th century performance benchmark in three parts.

The first examines the general conditions under which diplomacy was conducted during the 18th century. Transparency-increasing mechanisms we now take for granted were minimal in the 18th century: states employed small diplomatic corps and bureaucracies, travel was slow, and there were no peacetime forums for conducting diplomacy. The second is a short case study of the outbreak of the Seven Years War in America. This case illustrates how lack of transparency can help cause war. Rogue actors used faulty and unverifiable stories to foment war; they exploited opacity to peddle bad information. Uncertain borders led to disputes. Plausible counterfactuals suggest that greater transparency or a Concert-like forum might have prevented the war.

The third part is a brief case study of the crisis surrounding the first partition of Poland in

¹ Roy Bridge, “Allied Diplomacy in Peacetime: The Failure of Congress ‘System,’ 1815-1823,” in Alan Sked, ed., *Europe’s Balance of Power: 1815-1848* (London, Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 47.

1772. Even more than the Seven Years' War, this case serves as a control case for analysis of the Concert's crises. This is because the first partition of Poland is as close as possible to a Concert episode in time, geography, participating actors, stakes, and severity. During the first partition of Poland, as in many Concert episodes, a crisis arose on the periphery of Europe and the resulting tensions among the great powers threatened general war. Despite lacking a Concert-like forum, the great powers worked through some complicated diplomacy and prevented a general war. This success for bilateral, Concert-less diplomacy and its similarity to the Concert's crises casts doubt on whether the Concert transformed crisis management or European politics more generally.²

I spend the rest of the chapter examining how the Concert handled the first five crises it confronted: the dispute over who would control Poland and Saxony during the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15, the liberal rebellions in Naples and Spain in the early 1820s, the nationalist revolt in Greece against Turkey also in the early 1820s, and the establishment of Belgian independence and neutrality in the early 1830s.

In the Poland-Saxony and Belgian cases, the Concert added-value to diplomacy by increasing transparency, as predicted by H1. The effect of the increased transparency was to clarify power balances and deadlocks. This prevented miscalculation and helped states make coercive threats that ended these crises, as contended by H3. Thus, the most visible contribution of forum diplomacy and transparency was to facilitate *realpolitik*. *Realpolitik* or power politics is self-interested diplomacy, frequently supported by the threat or use of force. It contrasts with behavior constrained or informed by norms or rules that promote enlightened self-interest

² This transformation is the core argument of Schroeder in *Transformation of European Politics*.

(helping oneself by helping others) and which discourage threats or use of force.³

The Concert clarified the existence of deadlock in a minor way in the Naples and Spain cases, causing a schism between Britain and the other Concert powers. Here, transparency mildly increased conflict, as predicted by H3' which contends that transparency can increase tensions during bargaining. Forum diplomacy was little used in the Greek case.

Diplomacy in the 18th Century

Diplomacy is a basic way of increasing transparency. It is one of the first mechanisms states turned to to learn more about their adversaries. The foundations for modern, bureaucratized diplomacy took years to develop, with much progress made in the 18th century. States in the 1600s began to handle “outside threats [with an] emphasis on acquiring information. Permanent embassies were established; secret agents and spies were hired; knowledgeable merchants and travelers were questioned.”⁴ Diplomats were not systematically recruited and paid to serve their state prior to the 18th century. Strange as it may now seem, the few diplomats who were posted abroad were often paid by the host government,. France had five officials in its foreign ministry in 1661, but the ministry grew during the 1700s to include cartographic,

³ According to the Oxford English Dictionary, *realpolitik* is “Practical politics; policy determined by practical, rather than moral or ideological, considerations” at: <<<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00198460>>>.

⁴ Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 96. He goes on to discuss the shortcomings of these early efforts, some of which are discussed below and many of which were not very well addressed until the 18th century.

financial, cryptographic, correspondence, legal, and archival departments.⁵ In 1695, Russia had no permanent representatives abroad. By 1721, it had 21 missions abroad, although by 1800 this number had declined to 14. In 1702, there were four representatives from abroad in Russia, and eleven by 1719.⁶

In the mid-18th century, dispatches traveled at a maximum of 100 kilometers per day. It took about three weeks for news to travel from London to Venice.⁷ The European road network grew swiftly during the 18th century and when the stagecoach system was developed, it hastened communications and enabled meaningful diplomatic discussion by dispatch. With permanent diplomats and sufficiently speedy communications, continuous diplomacy became possible. In the hands of a capable diplomatic corps, an organized and continuous flow of information about other states could be relayed back to the home state. The state could respond with instructions that were less likely to have been overtaken by events.

Precursors to Concert practices fell into place during the 18th century. There were peace conferences following several of the many wars of the time.⁸ The practice of mediation also became widespread. Kalevi Holsti lists six instances of mediation from the Peace of Nystadt in 1721 to the ending the war of Bavarian Succession in 1779. However, he argues that mediation

⁵ Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), pp. 73-74.

⁶ M.S. Anderson, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: 1713-1783*, 2 ed. (London, Great Britain: Longman Group, 1976), pp. 198-99.

⁷ Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century: The Structures of Everyday Life, The Limits of The Possible*, Vol. I (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 424-427.

⁸ For example, the Congresses of Soissons (1728-1729), Aix-la-Chapelle (1745), and the Congress of Breda (1746). See Richard Langhorne, "The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830," *Studies in History and Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1981/1982), pp. 73-75.

was most often a device for states to save face after “issues had already been resolved on the battlefield” and that “there are no cases on record where formal mediation actually prevented a war.”⁹ Between 1713 and 1814 there were no crisis management conferences but states were developing the institutional capacity and physical infrastructure to conduct concert diplomacy.¹⁰

Seven Years War in America

The lead up to the Seven Years War between Britain and France in America during the 1750s highlights the dangers of opacity. Concert diplomacy and other means of increasing transparency would have lowered the probability of war.

In the mid-1700s, the expansion of the British colonies in Eastern North America made tension inevitable with its less populated French neighbor to the West. Britain and France sought to control the Ohio River Valley, a vital transit link for the French, and the next open territory to the West of the British colonies. Each side engaged in arms races to build forts faster than the other and thus control territory. Attacks followed to oust each other’s forts and forces. On one

⁹ Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 111-112.

¹⁰ Other sources consulted for this section include: M.S. Anderson, “Eighteenth-Century Theories of the Balance of Power,” in Ragnild Hatton and M.S. Anderson, eds., *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London, Great Britain: Longman Group, 1970); Anderson, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 174-215; Sir Herbert Butterfield, “Diplomacy,” in Hatton and Anderson, *Studies in Diplomatic History*; Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, pp. 21-27; Gordon A. Craig and Alexander A. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 2 ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 22-24; Leo Gershoy, *From Despotism to Revolution: 1763-1789* (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1944), chapter 7; Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 153-196; Holsti, *Peace and War*, chapters 3-5; Richard Langhorne, “The regulation of diplomatic practice: the beginnings to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Practice, 1961,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 4-5; Langhorne, “Development of International Conferences,” pp. 65-77; Paul Gorden Lauren, *Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), chapter one; and Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 3-11.

level, this is a straight contest over resources – a contest taking place while both sides were on the verge of world war.

However, opacity exacerbated misperceptions, caused miscalculations, and made specific catalysts of the war including territorial contests and rogue activity harder to rectify. Britain and France frequently misinterpreted each other's actions as aggressive and their own as defensive. Both had different maps of the same areas, were hampered by slow communications, and the central governments could not monitor their own hawkish, expansionist underlings. These opacity-related problems contributed to the start of the war.

While tension was inevitable, perhaps war was not. Britain and France attempted to dampen their incipient conflicts throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably by establishing a joint Delimitation Commission in 1750 to settle land claims where their colonies bumped up against one another. As looking at old maps reminds us, there was great uncertainty about the state of the world in this period – especially about relatively undeveloped land. The goal of the commission was to promote peace by establishing a base truth or common version about where rivers and boundaries actually were. Thus, the goal of the Commission was to increase transparency, but it had limited powers and could not resolve what should have been objective differences between British and French maps.

The map problem became dangerous in 1753 when France began to fortify the Ohio territory, land that was claimed by both powers. The British responded in February 1754 with an eviction notice and began to build a counter-fortification at the fork of the Ohio River (now Pittsburgh). The French forcibly ousted the British in April 1754 while they were still building the fort. Tensions rose, but at this point, neither side wanted war.

Opacity helped cause the crisis escalate into a war. First, each side thought itself to be supporting the status quo, so each side perceived its own actions to be aimed at deterrence while viewing the other's moves as compellent. Neither understood the other's intentions and ultimate goals. To the French, their successful attack on a new British fort, Fort Necessity, in July 1754 repelled intruders into their Ohio area. Many British saw it as an indication that Louis the XV was pursuing maximum objectives around the world, even at the risk of major war.

Second, rogue hawks influenced policy at several key junctures. Governor Shirley of Massachusetts contributed to Britain's overly pessimistic assessment of French motives by falsely reporting to London in 1754 that the French had begun to settle in Massachusetts.¹¹ Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia and Governor Duquesne of New France had commercial interests in Ohio. In communications to their home governments, both over-emphasized Ohio's importance while exaggerating threats to the area. Their claims were hard to verify and their influence went unchecked by their central governments in part because few channels of communications existed and because communications were so slow (news from Ft. Necessity took two months to reach London).

Greater inter- and intra-governmental transparency would have reduced the influence of the hawks in precipitating the war. A forum, in particular, would have sped up diplomacy, and allowed Britain and France to clarify their misperceptions. Instead, after a series of skirmishes

¹¹ Had the joint Delimitation Commission stuck around long enough to tell London that the French were not in fact colonizing Massachusetts, this would information would have contradicted Shirley's falsehoods. This would have been an early example of a regime disclosing information to coerce rogues into backing down, the contention of H5, and might have helped delay or prevent the Seven Years War.

and a small naval engagement, Britain declared war on France in May 1756.¹² As many of the causes of the war lie in a series of misperceptions and miscalculation, a reasonable counterfactual suggests that greater transparency might have prevented war by helping bargaining, reducing fears, and controlling rogues. This case therefore offers some support to H3: Transparency Promotes Cooperation

The First Partition of Poland

On October 6, 1768, war erupted between Russia and Turkey when Russian troops pursued Polish rebels across the Polish border and into the then Turkish-held town of Balta. At the time, Poland, though technically sovereign and neutral, was Russia's puppet, while the Ottoman Empire extended north through what is now Romania up to Poland.

In spring and summer 1769, Russia won a series of military victories. Russia occupied Bessarabia and the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia on the Austrian frontier. By mid-1770, Russia had begun to conquer the Crimea, stirred up a revolt in southern Greece (Morea), and, after sailing from the Baltic, had sunk the Turkish fleet (with British help) at Chesme in the Mediterranean.

Austria feared being dragged into this war along its Eastern borders, and Prussia in turn feared what might become a larger European war. Starting in August 1769, Austria and Prussia began discussions over a number of issues, including exchanging articles of neutrality, possible

¹² This account is drawn from Richard Smoke, *Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), Chapter 8.

mediation of the Russo-Turkish war, and initial ideas for a partition of Poland. In the partition, Russia would be given some of Poland as compensation for backing off from Turkey and withdrawing from the Danubian principalities it now occupied. Austria and Prussia would gain Polish territory as well.

Although Russia continued South and conquered Crimea on July 1, 1771, domestic politics, an epidemic, fear of peasant revolt, and continued unrest in Poland led Russia to become more conciliatory; it began to see partition as a viable choice to end the stresses of war.

A further prod to Russia came on July 6, when Turkey took up Austria's offer of alliance. Although Frederick believed that Austria actually would not be willing to fight for its new ally, he renewed his push for partition of Poland with Russia. Russia viewed the Austro-Turkish treaty with greater alarm.¹³ Its fears were exacerbated when it learned that Turkey sent silver to Austria, as payments in accord with their not so secret treaty. Russia learned this from Frederick (who knew it would alarm Russia), who learned it from the French, whose government in Paris had been informed of the shipment by the British Ambassador in Constantinople.¹⁴ This was the final straw for Russia which finally accepted a Prussian plan for partition in January of 1772. Austria resisted the plan for several months, but eventually gave in as Russia and Prussia offered ever-larger shares of Poland.

The turning points in the three years' long crisis were three shifts in power: on the ground

¹³ Leo Gershoy, *From Despotism to Revolution: 1763-1789* (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 174-181; Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany: 1648-1840* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 253; Schroeder, *Transformation*, pp. 15-16; Albert Sorel, *The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century: The Partition of Poland and the Treaty of Kainardji* (New York, NY: Howard Fertig, 1969), pp. 161-162.

¹⁴ Sorel, *Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 173. I cannot tell how long it took this information to flow from the British ambassador in Turkey (who learned of the shipment on July 25) to Paris to Austria and on to Russia.

(Russia's victories), domestically (Russia's turmoil), and in alliances (Turkey with Austria). None required a security regime to make its effects known. In the end, Poland lost one-third of its territory and one-half of its population. Prussia achieved its goal of partitioning Poland and avoiding being dragged into war. Austria received the largest share of Poland, and the Russians withdrew their threatening forces from the Danubian Principalities and returned the territory to Turkey (but gave itself the role of protector of those lands).¹⁵

The deal to partition Poland was a complicated and multilateral outcome - even though it resulted from a series of bilateral negotiations and maneuvers. A multilateral forum was not necessary to conduct the complicated diplomatic dance that preceded the partition, or to achieve the tripartite partition itself. States did not need a forum or any added transparency it might provide to machinate, to be aware of each others' machinations, or to make a multilateral peace agreement.

Could a multilateral forum, like the later Concert of Europe, have changed the outcome? A plausible counterfactual argument can be made that multilateral diplomacy would have reduced tensions between Russia and Austria and hastened - but not changed - the eventual outcome. Austria and Prussia (and Russia to a lesser extent) had shared and overlapping interests. Multilateral diplomacy could well have revealed those common interests sooner and reduced the need for what seems to have been an inefficient and time-consuming level of manipulation. That said, Russia's victories and then domestic weakness arguably explain most of the changes in

¹⁵ Additional sources used for this section include: M.S. Anderson, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: 1713-1783*, 2 ed. (London, Great Britain: Longman Group, 1976), pp. 186-192; Arthur Hassall, *The Balance of Power, 1715-1789. Period VI* (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1898); R. B. Mowat, *Europe, 1715-1815*, (New York, NY: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1929), pp. 113-115.

Austrian, Prussian, and Turkish policies during this episode. Multilateral diplomacy would have had little effect on these factors. In the end, all one can conclusively say is that sequential diplomacy was *sufficient* to produce a multilateral outcome and that multilateral diplomacy was not *necessary* to do so.

To what extent do these results offer a baseline for measuring increases in transparency provided by the Concert, and thus help assess the hypothesis that regimes can increase transparency (H1)?¹⁶ The first partition of Poland suggests that there was already some transparency and diplomatic nimbleness without forum diplomacy. On the other hand, the first partition of Poland took a long time to negotiate. In contrast, several disputes during the Concert were resolved with relative alacrity. They probably would not have been resolved so fast without the use of multilateral forum diplomacy.

The Concert of Europe: Five Crises

This section investigates how much the early nineteenth century's new practice of multilateral crisis-management - called the Concert of Europe - helped states manage crises. I examine the five most significant crises the Concert confronted in its early years: the crisis over Poland and Saxony in 1814/15, the rebellions in Naples and Spain in the early 1820s, the revolt

¹⁶ Usage note: in order to clearly match evidence to hypotheses in my case studies, and to help the reader understand and replicate the findings reported in the summary tables at the end of each case (which themselves flow into the master summary table at the conclusion of the book), I frequently make explicit reference to the relevant hypotheses. Sometimes, I make a full notation along the lines of "...and this supports hypothesis H4 which contends that transparency reduces unwarranted fears." Because such lengthy explanations would get tedious, and because the hypothesis and its effects are often clear from the context, at other times I refer more elliptically to the hypotheses and simply write, for example, "(H4)."

in Greece also in the early 1820s, and the establishment of Belgian independence and neutrality in the early 1830s. According to most scholars of the Concert, it was most effective and coherent during its earliest years: 1814-15 through the early 1820s.¹⁷

I begin by sketching the origins and legal framework of the Concert. This will help determine the extent to which the promise of transparency to be provided by the Concert helped motivate the Concert's founders. To the extent this is true, it supports H2 which contends that the promise of transparency promotes cooperation. Then I examine the five crises to see if the Concert actually provided transparency (H1) and what effect this transparency had on crisis management. Whether transparency is found to help bargaining or calm fears bears on H3 and H4. Because the Concert is an informal regime with relatively few rules and procedures, cheating and self-transparency (H5 and H6) are not likely to be as important.

The Formation of the Concert

¹⁷ Although the practice of multilateral peacetime diplomacy started by the Concert lived on, I side with scholars who argue that the Concert ended or was in decay by the early 1820s, including Inis Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 4th ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1984), pp. 25, 31; F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 198-199; Jervis, "Security Regimes, p. 178; Richard Langhorne, "The regulation of diplomatic practice: the beginnings to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Practice, 1961," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January 1992), p. 318; Harold Nicholson, *The Congress of Vienna, A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946), pp. 272-273; Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective* (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1963); H. G. Schenk, *The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars: The Concert of Europe - an Experiment* (New York, NY: Howard Fertig, 1967), p. 213. Some argue that the Concert's effectiveness ended with the Crimean War including Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972) and Elrod, "Concert of Europe," p. 159. Others contend that World War I marked the end of the Concert, including K. J. Holsti, "Governance with government: polyarchy in nineteenth-century European International Politics" in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 50-51 and Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth Century Diplomacy," p. 36.

The Concert of Europe took form through a series of military, political, and ideological treaties. Tracing these treaties shows that the Concert had its roots in the wartime alliance against Napoleon. It owes much of its existence to the momentum of that alliance, to continued fear of a resurgent and possibly revolutionary France, and to the fear of liberal revolution more generally. These fears bound the Concert and thus Walt's balance of threat theory explains most of the Concert's origins.¹⁸

However, hopes for increased transparency played a supporting role in spurring the Concert into existence. Because of this, H2, which contends that the anticipation of regime-provided transparency can promote cooperation, receives modest support. Britain's Foreign Minister Viscount Castlereagh, the prime architect of the Concert, expressed hope in his first trip to the continent in 1814 that the Concert-to-be would increase transparency:

many pretensions might be modified, asperities removed, and causes of irritation anticipated and met, by bringing the respective parties in unrestricted communications common to them all, and embracing in confidential and united discussion all the great points in which they were severally interested.¹⁹

This statement confirms H2 because Castlereagh expressed a general belief that a regime could promote peace with transparency. More specifically, Castlereagh's statement also indicates an understanding that transparency would enhance bargaining as predicted by H3, and reduce fears, as predicted by H4. Confirmation would be even stronger if I had found evidence that Castlereagh used these arguments to persuade others to sign on.

¹⁸ Balance of threat theory posits that states ally with each other to secure themselves from threats. For more, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987).

¹⁹ Sir Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the European Alliance* (London, Great Britain: G. Bell and Sons, 1947. First published in 1925), p. 56.

The first concrete step towards the Concert of Europe was the Treaty of Chaumont, signed by Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia just prior to Napoleon's first defeat and abdication in March 1814. The allies agreed to continue the war against France, each maintaining 150,000 troops in the field for service against France, and "most important, [it] united them for twenty years in jointly maintaining peace."²⁰

In September 1814, the Congress of Vienna met to chart Europe's future and this meeting is widely recognized as the birthplace of the Concert of Europe. The Congress' Final Act of June 1815 - a lengthy, formal, and detailed document - covered over one hundred territorial, governance, legal, and other issues.

The defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo marked the next evolutionary step, when the Allies signed the Second Treaty of Paris, on November 20, 1815. While singling out the dangers of Bonapartism, the allies also expressed more general fears about liberal revolution:

And as the same revolutionary principles which upheld the last criminal usurpation, might again, under other forms, convulse France, and thereby endanger the repose of other States; under these circumstances the High Contracting Parties...engage...to concert themselves...for the safety of their respective states, and for the general tranquillity of Europe.²¹

Further, the Allies pledged to "renew their Meetings at fixed periods...for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests" to promote prosperity and maintain the "Peace of

²⁰ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 501. The Treaty was signed on March 9, 1814 and backdated to March 1. See also Frederick H. Hartmann, ed., *Basic Documents of International Relations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1951), pp. 1-4.

²¹ Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, p. 54.

Europe.”²² The Concert of Europe thereby received formal recognition and its role as a discussion forum was codified.²³ The Quadruple Alliance was expanded to include France by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1818. [[expand? any other purposes?]]

Next, the Treaty of the Holy Alliance was signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia on September 26, 1815. The most ideologically motivated of the various treaties of the period, it marked the beginning of the European Eastern-Conservative vs. Western-more-liberal schism. The Treaty stated that the “Three Contracting Monarchs” agreed to “take no other rule for their guidance” than the precepts of Christianity - “Justice, Charity, and Peace” and to give each other aid and assistance “on all occasions and in all places.”²⁴ Even though they did not take it seriously, all other European governments subsequently adhered to this treaty, except Turkey, the Papal States, and Great Britain.²⁵

Two liberal revolutions in 1820 (Spain, January; Naples, July) prompted Russia’s Tsar Alexander I to call a conference of the great powers in Troppau in October, 1820. The resulting Troppau Protocol endorsed the use of force against revolutionary states, and was signed only by

²² Hartmann, *Basic Documents*, p. 5.

²³ René Albrecht-Carrié, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since The Congress Of Vienna*, revised edition (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 24, and Sir Charles Webster, *The Congress of Vienna: 1814-1815* (New York, NY: Barnes and Noble, 1969. Originally published by the British Foreign Office in 1919), p. 163.

²⁴ Hartmann, *Basic Documents*, pp. 6-8.

²⁵ Albrecht-Carrié, *Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 19; Kissinger, *A World Restored*, pp. 189-90; Nicholson, *The Congress of Vienna*, p. 250; and Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, p. 59.

Austria, Russia, and Prussia.²⁶ The rejection of the Protocol by the British Government²⁷ created “an open and public breach with the Alliance.”²⁸

By formalizing commitments and making states more explicitly express their views by voting on them, the Concert reduced ambiguity and heightened tensions with England. However, this incident only mildly supports hypotheses about regimes increasing transparency (H1), and transparency increasing conflict during bargaining (H3') because Britain would probably have distanced itself from any conservative intervention, regardless of procedures. Despite these initial schisms, Castlereagh said in 1816 that the practice of meeting together reduced what otherwise would have been a “cloud of prejudice and uncertainty.” Although it is not clear what uncertainties (H3) or unwarranted fears (H4) were reduced, his assertion offers modest support for H4 due to the specificity of the word “prejudice” and the presumed effects of removing its cloud.²⁹

First Crisis: Poland and Saxony, late 1814 - early 1815

In this crisis, forum diplomacy helped Austria, France, and Great Britain quickly make an

²⁶ This idea was first floated at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle by Tsar Alexander. Castlereagh vigorously objected to this notion of a conservative collective security system designed to interfere in the domestic politics of its members and it never got off the ground at Aix. Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, pp. 307-8.

²⁷ Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, The Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World* (London, Great Britain: G. Bell and Sons, 1925), p. 73, and Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, pp. 298-307, esp. p. 304.

²⁸ Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, p. 306.

²⁹ Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, pp. 56-57.

alliance and coerce Russia into ending the conflict. Clear diplomacy prevented Russia from miscalculating and led it to back down. This offers support for H3, which contends that transparency can reduce miscalculation and help bargaining achieve peaceful outcomes. Forum diplomacy increased transparency, and the effect of this increased flow of information was to facilitate power-political bargaining.

The most difficult and dangerous problem that arose during the Congress of Vienna involved the ultimate governance of the Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) and the Kingdom of Saxony. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had already signed treaties (Teplitz, Kalisch, and Reichenbach) to peacefully partition Saxony, Poland, and other territories when the war was over. Russia, the dominant power in the region, wanted Poland and had 200,000 troops stationed there at war's end. But some of Poland had been part of Prussia, so to placate Prussia, Russia backed giving it long-coveted Saxony in exchange.

Russia's plan amounted to a *fait accompli* and raised fears in England and Austria.³⁰ If Russia obtained Poland, Russian power would be projected deep into central Europe. Central Europe would then no longer be strong enough to serve as a counterweight either to French or Russian expansion. Austria was concerned that Prussian expansion into Saxony would boost its influence throughout greater Germany and give Prussia a much longer border with Austria.

As resistance mounted from England, Austria, and France, Alexander became increasingly adamant. During an October 22, 1814 meeting between Alexander and France's representative Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord: Alexander said, "I have two hundred thousand men in the duchy of Warsaw. Let them drive me out if they can! I have given

³⁰ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 524.

Saxony to Prussia; and Austria consents.” Talleyrand replied, “I do not know that. I should find it difficult to believe, it is so decidedly against her own interests. But can the consent of Austria give to Prussia what belongs to the King of Saxony?” Talleyrand had, “reminded [Alexander] of the treaty by which the allies had agreed that the duchy of Warsaw should be shared by the three courts,” and Alexander retorted that, “If the King of Saxony refuses to abdicate, he shall be led to Russia; where he will die.... You are always speaking to me of principles. Your public law is nothing to me: I don’t understand all that. What do you think are all your parchments and treaties to me?”³¹

Thus Talleyrand and Alexander clarified their differences, made claims about relative power on the ground, and indicated how each viewed the stakes in the crisis. At this point, transparency was increasing tensions, as suggested by H3’.

Talk of impending war swept the Congress from October on into December. Despite quickly rising tensions, it became clear that Russia would not budge and would eventually receive the lion’s share of Poland. The prospect of Russia’s inevitable success in Poland frightened Prussia’s Prince Carl Vincent von Hardenberg, as the agreed-upon support from Austria and Britain for his claims to Saxony were conditional on a less lopsided outcome in Poland.

Having lost on Poland, Austria dug in its heels on Saxony and tensions rose between Austria and Prussia. Castlereagh proposed to Prussia that it accept a limited part of Saxony and receive compensation elsewhere. This outcome was unacceptable to Prussia, and on December

³¹ From a letter from the Prince de Talleyrand to King Louis XVII, Vienna, October 25, 1814, in Duc de Broglie, ed., *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand*, Raphael de Beaufort, trans., vol. II (New York, NY: Putnam’s Sons, 1891), p. 277.

30, Hardenberg stated that refusal of others to recognize its annexation of the whole of Saxony was “tantamount to a declaration of war.” Castlereagh termed this “a most alarming and unheard-of menace.”³² Here is another instance of clarification of positions increasing conflict, supporting the predictions of H3'.

Meanwhile, Talleyrand had offered an alliance with Austria and Britain on December 23. These rising tensions made Austria and Britain accept. On January 3, 1815 the three powers signed a secret treaty in which each promised to supply 150,000 troops in case of attack. The treaty strengthened the resolve of Metternich and Castlereagh in their continued discussions with Hardenberg, and Hardenberg began to yield.

Castlereagh met with Alexander on January 4, just one day after the treaty was signed. At this meeting, Alexander asked him if the rumors of the treaty were true and Castlereagh answered in a way that “could have left him little doubt...and henceforward the Russian plenipotentiaries worked their hardest for a settlement.” Alexander withdrew Russian support of Prussia’s all-or-nothing position and urged a compromise partition of Saxony.³³ Prussia, the weakest of the great powers, lost its ally and was forced to accept a compromise in which it received two-fifths of Saxony and portions of the Rhineland. The quick formation and even quicker leak of the secret alliance was the turning point.

Coercion was successful. Plans were changed based on new information whose provision was facilitated by the regime, reducing miscalculation that might otherwise have caused Russia

³² in C. K. Webster, ed., *British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe* (London, Great Britain: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1921), pp. 277-278.

³³ Webster, *Congress of Vienna*, p. 135.

and Prussia to persist with their demands in the face of ever more determined opposition.³⁴

Russia's bargaining position became more pliable, once the costs of its hard line were raised and made evident – all effects of transparency that support H3.

Assessment

To assess the role of transparency in this crisis, one must look at how the two problems that created the crisis were resolved: Russia's annexation of Poland and Prussia's claims to compensation. Russia succeeded while Prussia's claims were clipped back. In both cases, albeit with some risk, power relationships were made clear and then were no longer contested.

At first, the forum increased transparency, as hypothesized by H1, because it helped states clarify their positions. This increased tensions, as predicted by H3', and led to balancing. The most crucial turning points were the events leading up to Prussia's diplomatic retreat. Concert diplomacy facilitated the making of the secret alliance and Concert diplomacy also let news of the alliance reach Alexander efficiently. As this would have been very difficult to achieve with such speed prior to forum diplomacy, this is clear evidence that the Concert increased transparency, supporting H1. Russia was successfully coerced and when Prussia then backed down, its aggressive optimism was revealed to be something of a miscalculation; thus transparency reduced miscalculation and helped bargaining as predicted by H3. The complex

³⁴ General references for this section include Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classic Balance of Power* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1955), pp. 189-243; Kissinger, *A World Restored*, pp. 152-174; Nicholson, *Congress of Vienna*, pp. 148-181; Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 523-538; Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Revolution Francaise*, 7th ed., vol. 8 (Paris, France: Plon, 1908), pp. 393-401; Webster, *Congress of Vienna*, pp. 117-141; Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, vol. 1, pp. 122, 327-387.

dance between rising tensions, balancing, and successful coercion is simply realpolitik, aided by transparency.

Were norms or other institutional effects at work helping to resolve the crisis? Schroeder rejects the realpolitik argument altogether, arguing that “balance of power tactics were tried and failed.” Yet he also says that Russia prevailed “hands down” with its *fait accompli* due to its “big battalions,” and that power helped “force” concessions from Prussia.³⁵ If that is not realpolitik, what is? Schroeder writes that Russia forced concessions to save the alliance,³⁶ but that boils down to saving the alliance from Russia’s own belligerent policy. Russia reduced the costs of its *fait accompli* by transferring those costs onto Prussia (by making Prussia accept less than it sought and less than it had been promised). Kissinger and Schroeder agree that no state truly wanted war, so some credit for the peaceful outcome of this episode is due to the shared moderation of the Concert states. However, perhaps more remarkable is all the talk of war from states who had just endured and fought together during the Napoleonic Wars.

Second and Third Crises: The Rebellions in Naples and Spain

The liberal rebellions in Naples and Spain highlight the ideological jockeying over the purposes of the Concert. The crises made Britain’s opposition to joint intervention against liberal revolution even more explicit. This created a schism in the Concert. As a result, these

³⁵ *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 537-38.

³⁶ *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 558.

cases offer modest support for the predictions of H3', that transparency may increase conflict.

When a military-led revolution broke out in Spain in January of 1820, the only great power concerned at first was Russia. Having for years advanced the idea, particularly at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, that the alliance should evolve into an anti-revolutionary league, Russia soon called for a great power congress to confront the Spanish revolt. Russia's call languished until another revolt broke out in Naples in July. Naples adopted the same liberal constitution as that taken up by the Spanish revolutionaries. Austria wanted to intervene in Naples to restore conservative order in its Italian satellite. For France, this plan heightened the Franco-Austrian competition for influence in Italy, so it began to seek a congress in order to restrain Austria. As at Aix, Britain opposed any allied steps towards a general policy of suppressing revolutions and it opposed a congress

Despite British opposition, a congress was held at Troppau in late 1820, with Russia, Austria, and Prussia represented by plenipotentiaries and France and Britain by observers. The three Eastern powers issued the Troppau Protocol on November 19 which stated in part:

Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become a menace to other states, will automatically cease to form a part of the Alliance.... The Allied Powers ... will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed.³⁷

Lord Charles Stewart, the British representative, returned from a visit to Vienna to find himself presented with the Protocol already signed by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. He protested

³⁷ W. P. Cresson, *The Holy Alliance: The European Background of the Monroe Doctrine* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 99. "European Alliance" refers to the Holy Alliance. Do the roots of the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine go back almost 150 years?

this *fait accompli*. Britain and France refused to sign. This shows how a document which was intended to express and consolidate norms instead ended up highlighting rifts in the Concert, as predicted by H3'.

Nonetheless, Austria's plans were blessed by the Troppau Protocol and Austria sent troops to crush the Naples revolt in early 1821. In theory, this joint blessing may have reduced miscalculation, promoted cooperation, and supported H3. In reality, there was little threat of war due to the intervention, blessing or not, hence little potential for miscalculation.

With regard to the revolt in Spain, Russia offered to lead an international army to quash the Spanish rebellion by sending its troops across Europe and into Spain. This was a threatening prospect for the other powers, especially Austria, and preventing Russian intervention was one reason that Metternich so quickly supported action by France. France at first wanted to keep the matter out of alliance hands, but ended up supporting a Congress at Verona which convened starting in October 1822.

Britain again objected to intervention. However, France won the backing of the three Eastern powers, invaded Spain, and restored Ferdinand VII in April 1823. Canning, Castlereagh's successor, obtained French assurances that the invasion would be temporary and that Portugal's independence would be respected.

The joint blessing to France made action in Spain more predictable, and helped keep Russia from marching across Europe. Thus, it is possible that forum diplomacy mildly reduced fears of Russian or French actions, and reduced any resulting miscalculation. This would support the predictions of H4 and H3. But the clearest result of the diplomacy surrounding these revolutions was to highlight schisms in the Concert caused by Britain's objections to the

interventions, and this supports H3' which contends that transparency can increase tensions when it reduces uncertainty and clarifies positions.

The revolutions showed that “common action was no longer possible ... because the insular and the Continental conceptions of danger had become incompatible.”³⁸ When Britain rejected the Troppau Protocol, it started a “doctrinal controversy and propaganda war [that] would last for decades [and produced] the first open break between Britain and the Holy Alliance.”³⁹ Canning wrote of Verona: “The issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy...and so things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all.”⁴⁰ According to Temperley, Metternich thought the breach with England might end the Congress system.⁴¹

Assessment

Concert diplomacy helped clarify the great powers' intentions and it is possible, although

³⁸ Kissinger, *World Restored*, p. 275.

³⁹ Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 611.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Norman Rich, *Great Power Diplomacy: 1814-1914* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1992), p. 40.

⁴¹ Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827*, p. 73. Other sources for this section include Bridge, “Allied Diplomacy;” Roger Bullen, “The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815-1848,” in Sked, ed., *Europe's Balance of Power*; Kissinger, *A World Restored*, pp. 247-285; Irby C. Nichols, Jr. *The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona, 1822* (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); Walter Alison Philips, *The Confederation of Europe: a Study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823, as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace*, 2 ed. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1920), pp. 164-66; Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 606-614, 621-628; Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning*, chapters 1, 3, 4; and Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, pp. 228-347.

unlikely, that the chance of war was diminished in the Spanish case. However improbable, Russia's scheme to march a Russian army through Europe to Spain raised tensions and the risks of accident and miscalculation. Concerted diplomacy helped dissuade Tsar Alexander from following through with his plan. By clarifying actions, the potential for miscalculation and unwarranted fears was possibly reduced, extending mild support to H3 and H4, respectively. With regard to the possible conflict between France and Austria over Italy, discussions, the Troppau declaration, and Russia's backing of Austria all made the small possibility of Franco-Austro conflict even more remote.

However, it is not clear that Concert diplomacy added much to what regular diplomacy could have achieved. Other than when Britain was presented with a pre-signed declaration, I cannot identify moments where crisis resolution was greatly accelerated or where specific information really altered the course of events. In the end, the most threatened powers (Austria and France) intervened against the threats and the least threatened power (Britain) stayed on the sidelines. No serious problems were averted or were even at stake. Britain's liberal position was known before hand, and despite some grave language, Britain came back to the Concert in later episodes. Thus, it is not clear that the Concert did much to increase transparency (H1). And if H1 is not really confirmed, this weakens support for the other hypotheses.

Fourth Crisis: The Revolt in Greece

The case of the early 1820s revolt of the Greeks against the Turks offers hints that the Concert facilitated a deception campaign. Britain and Austria used misinformation to persuade

Russia not to intervene on behalf of the Greeks. However, support for the contention that regimes can spread misinformation (H1') is diminished by the fact that the Britains and Austrians mostly used bilateral means and not the forum for transmitting false reports.

In early 1821, Christians in Greece and in the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia rebelled against their Muslim Turkish rulers. By March 1821, over one-third of the forty thousand Turks in Morea (Southern Greece) had been killed. This quickly led to Turkish counter-atrocities, including the killing of the Orthodox Greek Patriarch of Constantinople at the door of his cathedral on Easter Sunday in April 1821.

Had this been another liberal revolution similar to those in Naples and Spain, the Concert powers might have been content to see the Sultan suppress the revolution. But Russia had traditionally viewed itself as the protector of the Orthodox faith and was motivated to intervene to protect its fellow faithful. Moreover, Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been competing for influence throughout the Balkans, the Caucasus, and around the Black Sea for years. Instead of wanting to crush the Greek rebellion, Russia wanted to intervene for solidarity and gain.

Austria feared Balkan turmoil on its doorstep, and wanted to keep Russia at arms-length. Britain preferred a weak Ottoman Empire to a strengthened Russia moving South into the Mediterranean. France favored restraining Russia as well.

In July 1821 Russia issued an ultimatum to the Turks insisting that they protect the rights of Christians, and breaking relations with the Turks. War seemed imminent. Austria's Metternich set out to convince the Tsar not to intervene. As British interests were now threatened, Castlereagh put the schisms over Naples and Spain aside and added his voice to Metternich's.

With Metternich in the lead, they appealed to the Tsar's pro-Concert and anti-revolutionary feelings. They reminded him of his pledges not to act unilaterally. They gave the Tsar credit for creating the European Alliance and urged him not to wreck it. At the same time, they also tried to convince Alexander that the rebels were not Christian victims in need of being saved by the Muslim Turks. Instead, they painted the rebels as ordinary but dangerous liberal revolutionaries, whom Turkey was justified in crushing. Metternich arranged to send numerous slanted and exaggerated (if not false) diplomatic and police reports from around Europe to Alexander attesting to the spread of revolutionary sentiment and the dangers of revolution.⁴² Patricia Kennedy Grimsted wrote that Metternich used "gross exaggeration and underhanded tactics" as part of his campaign. For example, he ordered the interception of diplomatic dispatches looking for evidence to undermine the Tsar's most influential advisor, the pro-Greek Count Ioannis Capo d'Istria (or Capodistrias), by tying him to the Greek rebellion.⁴³ Metternich met Castlereagh in Hanover in October 1821 and they concocted to send similar messages to Russia.⁴⁴

If this deception and propaganda plan were much aided by forum diplomacy, it might offer support for the hypothesis that regimes can spread misinformation (H1'). However, H1' is undercut because Concert diplomacy itself should be downplayed. For example, Alexander had hoped that he could dominate the 1822 Congress of Verona with the subject of the revolt. He

⁴² Kissinger, *A World Restored*, pp. 293 and 300.

⁴³ in *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 255.

⁴⁴ Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning*, p. 323.

was foiled and the Greek Revolt took a back seat to the situation in Spain, described above. While not completely off the table, “it was a matter of common courtesy not to mention Turkish difficulties at Verona.” What was discussed regarding Greece was “anticlimactic,” though the Conference did give Metternich the chance to continue spinning his tales of Greek-inspired revolutionaries in Europe to Alexander.⁴⁵ Instead of Concert diplomacy, it was non-forum communication such as Metternich’s meeting with Castlereagh in Hanover and the exaggerated reports to Alexander that most influenced the course of events.

However, this incident is one of the clearest examples of pro-Concert, non-unilateral norms actually affecting behavior and leading to an outcome that would not have happened in the absence of those norms. Ironically, the norms were part of the deception campaign.

By mid-1822, Alexander had been persuaded not to go to war, however morally satisfying or lucrative it might have been. He acted to save the alliance, his Holy Alliance. This is the turning point in the crisis, and it casts doubt on the value of Concert diplomacy in doing anything other than facilitating the deception that helped stop Alexander.

If forum diplomacy was not crucial, was Alexander a norm-driven idealist, or was he duped by others’ misinformation? The answer bears on the issue of whether the Greek crisis is an information story at all, and whether there were such a thing as Concert norms as claimed by the optimists.

Schroeder calls Alexander’s decision a “triumph of diplomacy over the use of force” and the “easiest and simplest” counter-realist example of a state that has “foregone concrete material

⁴⁵ Nichols, *European Pentarchy*, p. 254 (the first quote is Nichols citing Friedrich von Gentz, the Austrian publicist).

advantages for the sake of moral principle.”⁴⁶ On the other hand, Kissinger makes the Tsar out to be a dupe and quotes Metternich as holding Alexander’s pliability in contempt:

After having robbed the world of a few months of peace, the Emperor Alexander takes his head in his hands and presents himself before me with the request that I explain its content to him....[He] wants to find his way in a labyrinth and asks his old Ariadne for yarn.⁴⁷

The Tsar’s most influential advisor, the pro-Greek Count Ioannis Capo d’Istria (or Capodistrias), seemed to agree. After Alexander decided not to intervene, he resigned and said that “with friends like Austria, Russia did not need enemies.”⁴⁸

On the question of whether or not Alexander was an norm-driven idealist or a dupe, the truth probably lies somewhere in between. According to Matthew Anderson, Alexander was willing to have his hands tied.⁴⁹

Assessment

The main turning point in this crisis occurred when Alexander was convinced not to intervene. This episode hints that mechanisms which are supposed to increase transparency may

⁴⁶ *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 621.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 304.

⁴⁸ paraphrased by Schroeder in *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 621.

⁴⁹ Matthew Anderson, “Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-1841,” in Sked, ed., *Europe’s Balance of Power*, p. 82. Other sources consulted for this section include René Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe: 1815: 1914* (New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), pp. 99-113; Barbara Jelavich, *Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 49-75; Kissinger, *A World Restored*, pp. 286-311; Matthew Tobias Rendall, *Russia, the Concert of Europe and the Near East, 1821-41: A Status Quo State in the Vienna System*, PhD Dissertation, (New York, NY: Columbia University, 2000); Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 614-621, 636-664; Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning*, pp. 319 - 362, 390-409; Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, pp. 349-400.

be used to manipulate the truth. As H1' suggests, it is likely true that anything that either transfers or generates information can also transfer or generate false information. In this case though, the forum was probably not used to spread misinformation, and thus H1' does not apply. However, questions that deserve more research are: when, how often, and under what conditions do mechanisms that increase transparency make deception easier?⁵⁰

The example of the Greek crisis alone is not sufficient to fully answer these questions, but Alexander's gullibility suggests that the degree to which transparency helps or hinder deception depends to a large extent on the vigilance of states and their leaders.

Fifth Crisis: Independence of Belgium

As with the Poland-Saxony episode, the crises surrounding the independence of Belgium show how Concert diplomacy speeded communications, helped states communicate threats, and helped avert miscalculation. Because of this, the case provides evidence H3 which contends that transparency can clarify bargaining positions and reduce conflict. But evidence for the contributions of forum diplomacy and transparency is by the considerable amount of bilateral diplomacy, which also helped resolve problems.

For hundreds of years, the area of the Netherlands/Belgium/Luxemburg had been a source of tension and a flashpoint for European wars. The 1815 Vienna settlement attached Belgium to the Dutch Netherlands in order to create a stronger buffer against France. But, in August of

⁵⁰ A good stab at this issue is found in the surprise attack literature, cited in footnote 45, p. 56.

1830, the Belgians began to rebel against Dutch rule. At the end of September, the Dutch had appealed to all the great powers save France for military help in suppressing the revolt. Russia and Prussia, the conservative Eastern Powers, were most favorable to intervention. In October, the Belgians declared their independence and on November 4, all five great powers met in London to discuss the problem.

Remembering Napoleon and aware of France's perennial appetite for Belgium, the rest of Europe feared French intervention. France in turn feared the consequences of a British or Prussian intervention. Russia mobilized intervention forces, but would not act unilaterally and was soon distracted by more proximate problems when Poland rebelled against it in November 1830. With everyone fearing intervention more than rebellion, the conference agreed in fairly short order to allow Belgium's separation. By late January 1831, the great powers had issued several joint Protocols specifying Belgium's new borders, guaranteeing its independence (primarily from the French), and providing for freedom of navigation on rivers.

Despite progress in the negotiations over Belgian independence at the London conference, Luxemburg remained occupied by Belgian troops and this caused a crisis by summer 1831. On August 2, the Dutch attacked Belgium, and this time Belgium appealed to France for help. France quickly entered Belgium and convinced Holland to take its troops home. France then reversed a promise to withdraw its own troops and left its forces in Belgium pending a full settlement between Belgium and Holland and resolution of France's concerns over fortresses on the Belgian border with France.

Alarmed by the French move, the British thought that continued occupation would lead to war. France's King Louis-Philippe, a generally pacific leader, waffled in responding to British

concerns. At the urging of Britain's foreign office, George Granville Leveson-Gower Granville, Britain's ambassador in Paris had a blunt discussion with France and made clear that continued French occupation risked serious consequences. At first, the French did not budge. Britain's foreign minister Viscount Henry Temple Palmerston wrote to Granville: "One thing is certain, the French must go out of Belgium, or we shall have a general war, and war in a few days." Prussia threatened to move into the Rhine Provinces, and Russia's threats to intervene regained their credibility as they came nearer to crushing the Polish revolt. Britain's Granville took the diplomatic lead and, with the support of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian ambassadors to France (in Paris), convinced the French to leave Belgium in early September.⁵¹

This was a turning point. The other powers were able to clarify and underscore their desire to have France leave. Here we see the regime providing transparency (H1), helping states signal their positions, and reducing conflict (H3). However, support for these hypotheses is tempered by the fact that much of the diplomacy seemed to take place in Paris, not at the ongoing London conference. It is hard to discern the relative contributions of forum diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy to the resolution of the crisis in this instance.

Even though the French occupation had been dealt with, matters between Belgium and Holland were unresolved. On October 15, 1831, the London conference put forward another plan for settling the situation. Among its numerous provisions, the Twenty-four Articles called for Luxemburg to be partitioned between Belgium and Holland.

A year later, the Dutch still rejected the Articles and were hindering shipping on the

⁵¹ G. W. T. Omond, "Belgium: 1830-1839," in Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy: 1783:1919*, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 144-146, quote on p. 145.

Scheldt river. Holland still occupied Antwerp; Belgium still occupied Luxemburg. To prevent escalation between Holland and Belgium, the Concert powers agreed to step up pressure on the Dutch. The Eastern powers wanted to apply economic pressure on Holland, but the British and French thought that these measures were insufficient. The French were prepared to unilaterally remove Holland from Antwerp by force. Unilateral French action risked wider war, while inaction risked unilateral Prussian intervention. Omond says this about the possibility of European-wide war, with France poised to move unilaterally against Antwerp:

One Prussian Corps was at Aix-la-Chapelle, and another was posted in reserve on the Rhine.... The danger of an explosion was increased by the temper of the Belgians; for it was quite possible that, if the two Western Powers did not act immediately, they might break loose and attack the Dutch. If so, Prussia would rush in to the help of Holland and, should she be victorious, would take from France Alsace and Lorraine... all of which she tried to obtain during the Congress of Vienna. If Prussia was defeated, France would endeavor to annex the Rhine Provinces and ... Luxemburg. Austria and the other States of the Germanic Confederation would be drawn into the struggle. Russia would intervene.... Great Britain, unless she deserted France, would find herself at war with more than one Continental Power; and soon not only Europe, but half the world, would be at war.

With such a prospect, hesitation would have been fatal. If Great Britain and France acted together...Prussia, it was known, would not oppose the coercion of Holland.⁵²

Prussia made this known in Paris, not at the London conference.

On October 22, the British and French agreed to joint sea and land operations to get the Dutch out of Antwerp, free up shipping, and restore other territories in the low countries to their allotted Belgian or Dutch owners. Russia left the conference, Austria and Prussia protested, but French troops re-entered Belgium on November 15 while the British blockaded the Scheldt.

⁵² Omond, *Belgium*, pp. 153-154.

According to Schroeder, this affront to the Eastern powers “caused suspension of the conference and created a war scare more serious than any earlier one.”⁵³ It also resolved the crisis.

It is difficult to judge whether tensions would have been higher or lower without the Concert. Problems in Belgium are problems in the center of Europe, and would have drawn in most of the great powers anyway. That said, diplomacy at the London conference, in Paris, and elsewhere did clarify the stakes and stances in the crisis. As this happened, tensions rose as predicted by H3' but then fell as the crisis broke; this later development supports H3. Depending on the dynamics of a crisis and the interests of the actors, reducing uncertainty about positions and stakes can raise tensions, reduce conflict, or both.

Because the bilateral and multilateral bargaining prevented unilateral action, it is possible (or even likely given the threats and fears of war) that the bargaining lessened miscalculation and prevented war. This is predicted by H3 which contends that transparency can reduce uncertainty and miscalculation, thereby promoting peaceful outcomes from strategic interaction. However, support for these hypotheses only exists to the extent that forum diplomacy helped achieve these results by speeding up the flow of information.

In the face of Franco-British actions, the Dutch quickly withdrew from Antwerp and the French pulled out their troops. This ended the immediate crisis, but the blockade persisted until May 1833. The Belgian situation was not fully resolved until, after nearly a decade of diplomacy, coercion, and 70 great power protocols, a treaty was finally signed by Holland and

⁵³ *Transformation of European Politics*, p. 690.

Belgium on April 19, 1839.⁵⁴

Assessment

There were two turning points in this crisis. The first was getting France to leave Belgium on September 9, 1831. This result was certainly aided by concerted diplomacy, but not necessarily by forum diplomacy. Inasmuch as it was the European diplomats to Paris who took the lead in convincing France, the key diplomacy therefore took place in Paris, and not in London where the conference was being held. To the extent that the forum was not used to speed the information flow, this undercuts support that would otherwise be generated for H1, which contends that regimes provide transparency.

The second turning point was when Britain and France joined forces to coerce the Dutch on October 22, 1832. Britain and France knew of the impending dangers of war and, calculating correctly, took joint action to prevent it. To calculate the danger of war correctly, the French and British had to know of Belgium's impending threat to attack Holland and of Prussian intentions to support the Dutch in case the French intervention crossed onto Dutch territory. Letters

⁵⁴ General sources consulted for this section include: Albrecht-Carrié, *Concert of Europe*, pp. 60-98 (which has the text of the final treaty and several of the 70 great power protocols - something in between minutes of meetings and a U.N.-type resolution - that document the diplomatic negotiations); Albrecht-Carrié, *Diplomatic History of Europe*, pp. 31-36; J. A. Betley, *Belgium and Poland in International Relations 1830-1831* (The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1960); J. S. Fishman, *Diplomacy and Revolution: The London Conference of 1830 and the Belgian Revolt* (Amsterdam: CHEV publisher, 1988); Fl. de Lannoy, *Histoire Diplomatique de L'Independance Belge* (Brussels: Librairie Albert Dewit, 1930); Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830-1848," in Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 61-100, esp. pp. 78-81; Omond, "Belgium;" Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 670-691; Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, eds., *Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)* (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 88-100; Sir Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841, Britain, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Question*, vol. 1 (London, Great Britain: G. Bell & Sons, 1951), pp. 89-176.

between Prince Talleyrand, the French envoy to the London Conference, and Victor Duc de Broglie, a French Foreign Ministry official, reveal that the French and British exchanged key information about their own intentions and capabilities and on the dangers of Prussian intervention in London and in Paris. Further, the Prussians had made their intentions clear in direct communications with French government representatives in Paris.⁵⁵

Here, the conference at London (or at least the diplomacy that took place in London) appears to have been helpful, but perhaps not crucial, in clarifying the situation. Thus, there is some modest evidence that forum diplomacy increased transparency (H1). Clarification of dangers and signaling of intentions first raised tensions (H3'), then led to Franco-British cooperation (H3). However, the most important clarifier in this episode was the fact of joint British and French action, not the diplomacy surrounding it. This action deterred Prussia and/or reduced its incentives to intervene, coerced the Dutch, and obviated Belgian action. Finally, the amount of diplomacy that happened outside of the London forum weakens support for the contention that forum-based diplomacy speeded communications, as predicted by H1.

It is plausible that war might have resulted had the powers been forced to undertake the time-consuming bilateral dance that characterized the partition of Poland in the 18th century. Even though the big picture is that the Belgium crisis persisted for years, some key aspects of it were resolved with relative alacrity, a possible indicator that transparency was increased. The best example is the speed with which the French were persuaded to leave Belgium in the summer of 1831, a major turning point. This crisis shows transparency enhancing realpolitik. The

⁵⁵ From letters between Talleyrand and the Duc de Broglie in de Broglie, ed., *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand*, Vol. 5, pp. 12-15, and footnote 1, p. 12.

Concert modestly and with limits enabled coercive transparency which in turn helped reduced miscalculation and helped keep the peace (H3).

Conclusion

The Concert increased transparency in varying degrees at turning points in most of the five crises. When it did, the effect was often to facilitate coercive bargaining. The Concert's institutional effects lie not with rules or norms, as the frequent war scares, blunt language, and forceful bargaining make clear. Instead, the Concert sometimes increased transparency, and transparency in turn helped realpolitik lead to peaceful outcomes. Crises often had to get worse as bargaining clarified the differences (H3'), before coercion worked and broke the deadlock (H3). There was little evidence that transparency ever seriously lessened unwarranted fears (H4), a notable finding because this is supposed to be a main peace-promoting benefit of transparency.

Castlereagh, the prime mover behind the Concert, expressed some hope that forum diplomacy would increase transparency and thereby reduce tensions. I am not sure how much this view persuaded others to form the Concert, but Castlereagh at least believed that increased transparency was a reason to form a regime; this evidence supports H2.

The mechanism of the forum diplomacy was used often. However, states often supplemented Concert diplomacy with meetings in other locations, bilateral contacts, side-meetings, and so forth. These may be valuable supplements to or byproducts of forums, and they may serve to increase transparency. But they may also serve to generate private information or diminish the importance of the forum in helping states communicate. While the Concert was clearly helpful in some instances, the Concert did not increase transparency as much as it might at first appear, so the first hypothesis (H1) receives only modest support.

The Concert helped states conduct power-political diplomacy and in three instances the

increased speed of communication helped reduce miscalculation (in the Poland-Saxony crisis and twice in the Belgian crisis). This provides support for H3, but because it is not clear that the states would have miscalculated in the absence of the Concert, I code this support as moderate to moderate/strong despite the gravity of these three instances.

There is only one bit of evidence that Concert diplomacy reduced fears, so H4 is only weakly supported. Instead, transparency often reduced uncertainty by helping states learn about the extent of the problems they faced, of new counter-coalitions, or that deadlock existed. When states clarify their positions and stakes, and it increases conflict, this supports H3'. However, in several instances during the Poland-Saxony and Belgian crises, this clarification was just a stage that then led to further action or resolution. When clarification of stakes, stances, and options during bargaining helps resolve a crisis, it supports H3, the contention that transparency promotes peace by reducing incomplete information and helping bargaining and coercion.

Thus, H3 and H3' may help describe different phases of a crisis. For example, in Poland-Saxony, forum diplomacy helped states make threats and for a while this increased the chance of war (H3'). In the end though, a final coercive threat broke the deadlock and this supported H3.

Table 3-1 summarizes the main findings by hypothesis:

Table 3-1: Findings by Hypothesis

Hypothesis:	Evidence:	Strength of Evidence:	Overall Strength of Hypothesis:
Regimes provide transparency (H1)	Poland-Saxony: forum enabled and quickened many discussions and deal making, esp. the semi-secret alliance, esp. p. 103. Naples and Spain: discussion of regime's functions; evidence throughout case. Belgium: communication of threats, discussion of stakes; evidence throughout case.	Strong Weak Moderate/ Weak	Moderate
Regimes spread misinformation (H1')	No evidence found that the disinformation campaign in the Greek case used the forum, p. 111.		
Anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2)	Castlereagh's statement about the purpose of a Concert, p. 97.	Weak	Weak
Anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2')	no evidence		
Transparency promotes cooperation and prevents conflict (H3)	Poland-Saxony: quick making and revealing of the crisis-resolving semi-secret alliance, p. 103. Poland-Saxony: Russia and Prussia back down, p. 103. Belgium: France convinced to leave (summer, 1831), p. 116. Belgium: France and Prussia from prevented from intervening unilaterally, p. 117. Belgium: getting British and French to intervene together, p. 117.	Strong Strong Moderate/ Strong Moderate/ Weak Moderate	Moderate/ Strong
Transparency hinders cooperation and causes conflict (H3')	Poland-Saxony: increased tensions and threats, p. 102. Naples and Spain: clarified Britain's objections; evidence throughout case. Belgium: war scare prior to joint 1832 intervention, p. 117.	Strong Moderate/ Weak Moderate	Moderate
Transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4)	Castlereagh's statement about meeting together reducing prejudice, p. 100.	Weak	Weak
Transparency confirms fears (H4')	no evidence		
Transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems (H5)	no evidence (less applicable to an informal regime like a forum)		

Transparency about the regime (or self-transparency) increases its effectiveness (H6)	no evidence (less applicable to an informal regime like a forum)		
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Coding: **Strong** means that the phenomenon or effect was clear and very influential if not decisive, producing behavior that would be hard to replicate without the regime. **Moderate** means that the phenomenon played a discernible and somewhat influential role. Other factors help explain the outcome. **Weak** means that the phenomenon was probably but only weakly present. Other factors explain most of the outcome. **Failure** means that the regime tried to do something and failed, or that something that the regime did was counterproductive. The **overall** ratings are judgements based on the significance of transparency and its effects for each hypothesis within the context of each case.

IMPLICATIONS

These findings occupy the middle ground in the debate between Concert optimists who have not fully explored the informational and transparency contributions of the Concert, and Concert pessimists who, in their rush to dismiss institutionalism, have ignored transparency altogether.

According to a number of scholars, the Concert contributed to peace because it fostered and operated according to several norms: states behaved with moderation; they compensated each other when territorial and other adjustments became necessary; they consulted with one another and did not act unilaterally; and they kept the general equilibrium in mind when judging the consequences of their actions. As a result, these scholars give the Concert credit for numerous peace-enhancing accomplishments: creation of buffer states, isolating regional conflicts, specifying spheres of influence, suppressing revolutions by multilateral action, and the general practice of multilateral conflict resolution.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe, A Fresh Look at an International System," *World Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (January 1976); Paul Gorden Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth Century Diplomacy," in Alexander L. George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); Paul

Paul Schroeder, among others, argues that all these effects amounted to a sweeping transformation, even “revolution,” of diplomacy and international relations.⁵⁷ Concert optimists make some of the strongest claims for the effectiveness of institutions and regimes to be found in any issue area.

Realists discard institutional arguments and contend that if the Concert worked at all it was because skilled diplomats knew how to play power politics. Realist interpretations of the Concert go back to Kissinger and others,⁵⁸ but only recently have a few Concert pessimists emerged to combine theory and history to challenge the post-Cold War wave of Concert optimism. Matthew Rendall, for one, offers a balance of power interpretation of Russian diplomacy during the Greek rebellion against Turkey in the 1820s, while acknowledging that the great powers were also content with the status quo. Korina Kagan’s analysis of the Greek case is more sweeping. She lays out the normative arguments made by the institutionalists, notes the significant amount of realpolitik in the case, and concludes that:

since the Concert of Europe is widely hailed as the major paradigmatic case of an effective security regime, these findings deprive institutionalism of its strongest

W. Schroeder, "The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1986).

⁵⁷ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics: 1763-1848* (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 580. For a symposium that largely reaffirms Schroeder’s interpretation, see *The International History Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (November 1994) including H. M. Scott, “Paul W. Schroeder’s International System: The View from Vienna;” Charles Ingraio, “Paul W. Schroeder’s Balance of Power: Stability or Anarchy?;” T. C. W. Blanning, “Paul W. Schroeder’s Concert of Europe;” and Jack S. Levy, “The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder’s International System,” and Schroeder, Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response.”

⁵⁸ Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973) and W. N. Medlicott, *Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe* (London, U.K.: University of London/Athlone Press, 1956).

case in the security area.⁵⁹

I argue that the Concert was neither a normative transformation of politics nor a phenomenon devoid of institutional benefits. Rather, there was an institutional benefit provided by the Concert: that of transparency.

The Concert of Europe is not a good place to find idealism, norms, rules, or even much enlightened self-interest. To this extent, recent realist critiques of the Concert from Kagan and Rendall are valid. The only significant norm evinced, and the only transformation to persist to this day, was the then-new practice of meeting together in a forum. However, the lack of norms and rules does not destroy the institutionalist argument because rules and norms are only part of the institutionalist repertoire.

Realist critics have neglected the informational arguments central to institutionalist claims. According to liberal institutionalists, a major benefit of institutions is their ability to provide more and higher quality information to participants. Chapters and articles by Jervis, Lipson, and Kupchan and Kupchan have looked at transparency and information in the context of the Concert of Europe.⁶⁰ While I stand on their shoulders, I grapple with the new arguments of the transparency pessimists, compare Concert diplomacy with prior, non-forum diplomacy, and show more precisely how and when the Concert increased transparency and helped crisis management. Transparency did not prevent serious war scares, but it did help avert escalation to

⁵⁹ Kagan, "Myth of the European Concert," and Matthew Rendall, "Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece 1821-29: A Test of Hypotheses about the Vienna System," *Security Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000). See also Bradley A. Thayer, "An Offensive Realist Examination of the Concert of Europe" presented at the American Political Science Association conference (Boston, MA: August 2002).

⁶⁰ See Introduction, footnote 13, p. 16.

war.

Many scholars and analysts use the Concert as the basis for recommendations that would shape the future of NATO, the U.N., and other regional security organizations from Asia to Africa. Whatever the deductive appeal of a Concert-like great-power discussion forum or mechanism for a great-power condominium, these recommendations lose some of their shine if the Concert's actual paths to peace were in fact more rough and tumble and less norm-driven than the optimists assert.

Chapter 4:

The United Nations Force in Cyprus

Introduction

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) went through two phases. In the first, from 1964 to 1974, the adversarial Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations were interspersed throughout the island. UNFICYP thus deployed across the island, hoping to avert conflicts wherever they might erupt. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, dividing it in two with a Turkish Cypriot Northern portion and a Greek Cypriot Southern portion. The U.N. mission changed to monitoring the buffer zone created between the two sides.

I look at both these periods, and answer these main questions: what does UNFICYP monitor and verify? What incidents occur along the buffer zone and what does UNFICYP do to manage them? Do the activities of UNFICYP affect tensions along the buffer zone and between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots?

Formation of UNFICYP

To test H2, the contention that the promise of regime-provided transparency promotes cooperation, I begin by examining the formation of UNFICYP to see if anticipated transparency helped the Greek and Turkish Cypriots make peace, or at least accept a peacekeeping operation.

After several years of revolutionary and intercommunal violence, Cyprus was granted independence from Britain in 1960 by agreement of the Guarantor Powers - Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Following a constitutional crisis, fighting broke out in 1963 between the majority (80%) Greek Cypriots and minority Turkish Cypriots (18%). Britain tried to stop the conflict, but turned to the U.S. and NATO when it failed. Risking an intra-NATO Greco-Turkish war, Turkey threatened to intervene to prevent Greek Cypriots from uniting the island with Greece and to protect the endangered Turkish Cypriots. While issuing stern warnings that prevented Turkish military action and thus a possible war between Greece and Turkey, Washington proposed sending a NATO force of 10,000 troops. The left-leaning (Greek) Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III rejected the U.S./NATO proposal, and the Soviets viewed the NATO move with alarm. To reconcile these competing interests, the parties turned to U.N. The U.S. and Britain wanted some sort of peacekeeping operation, even if was not run by NATO, while Makarios and the Soviets were only willing to accept a U.N. mission. So a U.N. mission it was, and in March 1964, the U.N. Security Council authorized the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation mandated to:

“to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”¹

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) quickly reached its peak strength of 6411 multinational soldiers in June 1964, declining to 4737 by the end of 1967.² In contrast,

¹ Karl Th. Birgisson, “United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 222.

² This section is based on Birgisson, “United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” pp. 219-222; Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Handbook for Cyprus* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1964), pp. 224-225; Eugene K. Keefe, “Historical Setting,” in Frederica M. Bunge, ed., *Cyprus: A Country Study*, 3 ed. (American University Press, 1980), pp. xiii, 17-53; Franz Georg Maier, *Cyprus: From the Earliest Time to the Present Day*, Peter Gorge, trans.

between 1964 and 1967, the Greek Cypriots and Greeks had roughly 33,450 men under arms on Cyprus while the Turkish side had 13,450.

While the forum of the U.N. helped the sides compromise, the peacekeeping force was imposed on Cyprus. The promise of U.N. peacekeeping did little to help the Cypriots to cooperate to achieve peace, and there is no evidence for H2.

The First Years of UNFICYP: 1964 - 1974

UNFICYP deployed along the Green Line dividing Nicosia, in towns where trouble was expected, and throughout Cyprus more generally. In the early to mid-1960s, the Greek and Turkish communities were spread across the island, although the violence of 1963-1964 led most Turkish Cypriots into purely Turkish villages or enclaves adjoining Greek areas.³ The “Green Line” dividing Cyprus’ capitol Nicosia into separate Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot areas was created by the British during their abortive peacekeeping efforts in late 1963-early 1964.

Although violence was frequent between 1964-1967, UNFICYP peacekeepers were often successful at interposing themselves between adversaries and deterring or halting conflict, as well as at mediating temporary cease-fires. Because of this, observers agree that in its first

(London, Great Britain: Elek Books Limited, 1968), pp. 127-163; Richard A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971* (Department of Geography, University of Waterloo, 1976), pp. 27-67; H. D. Purcell, *Cyprus* (London, Great Britain: Ernest Benn, 1969); Norma Salem, “The Constitution of 1960 and Its Failure,” in Norma Salem, ed., *Cyprus, A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution* (New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press for the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992), pp. 121-122; James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 15-72, 82-83; United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 2 ed. (New York, NY: United Nations, 1990), pp. 281-288.

³ See J. Jeffrey Hoover, “The Society and its Environment,” in Bunge, pp. 60-65; Patrick, *Political Geography*, esp. pp. 8-13, 340-348.

decade UNFICYP did a decent job at ameliorating (but not stopping) intercommunal violence.⁴

UNFICYP also used patrolling and observation to prevent violence. By being able to give accurate accountings of incidents, UNFICYP sometimes succeeded in deterring violence by preventing the aggressor from escaping in a fog of denials and mutual recriminations. When UNFICYP succeeded in using transparency about defections to bolster deterrence and compliance, this is evidence of H5 in action. H5 contends that regimes can detect defection and wield information to coerce more peaceful behavior by cheaters, rogues, and spoilers. Some of UNFICYP's (modest) effectiveness in its early years was due to the provision of transparency. The following text from Fetherston illustrates transparency reducing fear between adversaries, as predicted by H4, and clarifying the purposes of UNFICYP's activities, as predicted by H6:

Breaches of the ceasefire were dealt with through a liaison system...[the system also made] sure that information about any planned activities by UNFICYP (troop movements or removal of fortifications for example) was received by both sides well in advance. The liaison system was meant to reduce tensions by providing both sides with reliable information and in this sense facilitate communication between the antagonists (such liaison systems are employed in all UN peacekeeping operations).⁵

Today, the liaison system is still very important, but the post-1974 fixed buffer zone also helps increase transparency. Prior to 1974, the cease-fire lines were fluid – when they existed at all. Violence might occur anywhere. Since 1974, there has been only one cease-fire line, positions of the opposing forces are well known, and violence and rogue behavior is relatively

⁴ Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," pp. 227-28; Michael Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier* (London, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1970); Michael Harbottle, *The Blue Berets* (London, England: Leo Cooper, 1975); Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary*, Vol. 4, Europe 1946-1979 (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 312-314; Patrick, *Political Geography*, pp. 63-64; James D. Rudolf, "National Security," in Bunge, *Cyprus*, pp. 213-215; Stegenga, *United Nations Force in Cyprus*, pp. 81-156; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 2 ed., pp. 285-293.

⁵ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 51-52.

easy to spot and localize. In this way, the buffer zone itself increases transparency, thus potentially reducing unwarranted fears (H4) and incentives to cheat (H5).

Cyprus faced two major crises in 1964 and 1967, and transparency helped a little bit in the latter. In November 1967, the National Guard attacked two Turkish enclaves in Southern Cyprus. As the crisis continued, Turkey mobilized to invade Cyprus and attack Greece. Heavy weather and U.S. pressure on Turkey prevented the invasion and ended the crisis. UNFICYP arranged a cease-fire at one of the enclaves, Ayios Theodoros, and refuted exaggerated rumors about atrocities.⁶ Although it was not a big factor during the 1967 crisis, rumor reduction is transparency in action and this offers mild support for H4 which predicts that transparency can calm fears.

Refuting rumors may have played a bigger, more moderate role on a more routine (non-crisis) basis in the early years of UNFICYP. Its initiatives “acting as mediators on different levels, trying to dissuade the parties from the use of violence or counteracting false propaganda about atrocities and reporting what has actually taken place have served...the causes of peace in Cyprus.”⁷ Reporting the truth, thus increasing transparency and calming unwarranted fears, fulfills the predictions of hypothesis H4.

Following a pro-enosis coup on Cyprus, Turkey invaded in July of 1974. The conflict

⁶ See Parker T. Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War; Cyprus: A Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990); Harbottle, *Impartial Soldier*, 1970), pp. 145-167; Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 312-314, 343-357; Robert McDonald, “The Cyprus Problem,” *Adelphi Paper 234* (London, Great Britain: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 15; Patrick, *Political Geography*, pp. 63-72; Purcell, *Cyprus*, pp. 350-354, 380-384; Rudolf, “National Security,” pp. 213-217; Stegenga, *United Nations Force in Cyprus*, pp. 191-193; and United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 2 ed., pp. 294-298.

⁷ Andrestinos N. Papadopoulos, “Cyprus: A Case Study, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping by the United Nations” (Nicosia, 1969).

ended in August with a Turkish/Turkish Cypriot area in the North (comprising thirty-seven percent of the island), with the rest of Cyprus left for the Greek Cypriots. The area that existed (three percent of Cyprus) between the two opposing cease-fire lines at the end of the invasion became the current buffer zone. The buffer zone and de facto partition changed UNFICYP's modus operandi. Instead of trying to keep the peace throughout the interspersed or enclaved communities of Cyprus, UNFICYP now endeavored to maintain the peace and the status quo by protecting the integrity of the new buffer zone.⁸ Although the partition lowered inter and intra-communal violence, UNFICYP continued through 2002 to confront over 1000 incidents a year.

Peacekeeping in Cyprus in the 1990s

Here, I assess the role of transparency beginning with an overview of the operation that focuses on two of the main tools that help UNFICYP increase transparency and peacekeep more generally: the liaison system and the status quo. Then I assess the role of transparency when UNFICYP responds to several categories of violations and peacekeeping activities in and along the buffer zone.⁹ The role of transparency varies greatly by the type of incident, and this variation provides a number of insights into its effects.

⁸ See Harbottle, *Blue Berets*, pp. 100-107; Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Vol. 4, pp. 370-385; Eleni Meleagrou and Birol Yesilada, "The Society and Its Environment," in Eric Solsten, ed., *Cyprus: A Country Study*, 4 ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 56; Rudolf, "National Security," pp. 216-227; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 2 ed., pp. 301-309; United States Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, *Crisis on Cyprus* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974; reprinted in 1975 by the American Hellenic Institute), pp. 18-30. An estimated 6000 Greek Cypriots and 1500 Turkish Cypriots died and 214,000 Greek Cypriots and 42,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced.

⁹ Some categories of violations, such as overmanning of positions, overflights, and crossing of the Maritime Security Line are omitted because they are simultaneously trivial and offer no insights about transparency.

Overview

In 2002, there were roughly 130,000 (18%) Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus out of a total population of 760,000.¹⁰ Over 30,000 troops from Turkey joined 4000 Turkish Cypriot soldiers on Cyprus, along with 26,000 Turkish Cypriot reservists. There were two infantry battalions and 1300 officers and non-commissioned officers from Greece on Cyprus. Greek officers also control the 10,000 strong Greek Cypriot National Guard and the 88,000 Greek Cypriot reservists. Because of numbers, training, and proximity to their home country, the Turkish Forces enjoy clear superiority on Cyprus.

The Greek and Greek Cypriot governments combined pay about half of UNFICYP's budget.¹¹ Unfortunately, this payment arrangement reduces UNFICYP's impartiality in the eyes of the Turkish side. This in turn reduces their trust in the operation and limits UNFICYP's ability to increase transparency.¹²

To maintain surveillance of the buffer zone, the U.N. staffs 22 permanent observation posts along the buffer zone and uses another 120 observation posts less frequently. Routine patrols within the buffer zone are conducted from 19 patrol bases. Patrols are also sent out to investigate whenever one of the sides complains about the other's construction, overmanning, or harassment - all frequent occurrences. Patrols, investigations, and observation posts are all

¹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook*, Cyprus, at <<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cy.html>>>, viewed on January 9, 2002.

¹¹ United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, S/2001/1122, 30 November 2001, p. 3.

¹² Interview, Aytug Plumer, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, "TRNC," June 5, 1996.

possible mechanisms UNFICYP can use to increase transparency (H1). The buffer zone is 180 kilometers long, varies in width from 5 meters in Nicosia to seven kilometers in the countryside.¹³ See map 4-1:

¹³ United Nations, S/1996/411, pp. 1-3, United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 2 ed., pp. 306-307, and interview/briefing, Lt. Colonel Nick Parker, Chief Operations Officer, UNFICYP, May 9, 1996.

Map 4-1, UNFICYP in June, 2002¹⁴

¹⁴ United Nations, Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section, map No. 2930, Rev 51, June 2002.

UNFICYP's liaison system is the network of contacts between UNFICYP officers and soldiers with their counterparts on each side of the buffer zone. UNFICYP uses the liaison system to communicate to each side, and it is the primary vehicle each side uses to get the U.N. to deal with complaints about the other. The opposing forces also use the liaison system to indirectly communicate with each other. Thus, the liaison system is the primary mechanism with which UNFICYP can provide transparency (H1).

The system follows two guidelines: 1. deal with the problem at the lowest possible level and 2. be "firm, fair, and friendly."¹⁵ The standard operating procedure for dealing with violations and incidents involves discussions with the opposing forces in an attempt to calm things down, to find out the truth about what happened, and/or to cajole, persuade, or coerce proper behavior. Depending on the incident, the talks and investigations that follow may lead to increased transparency, reduced fears, or to disciplining of the violator.¹⁶

THE STATUS QUO

Hoping to foster the conditions helpful for negotiating a peace settlement, UNFICYP's chief responsibility is to preserve the cease-fire. The main way it does so is to maintain the status quo in and along the buffer zone. Because moving perceptions towards a common or base truth is one hallmark of increased transparency, the status quo's role as the base truth means that it is

¹⁵ Interviews with Colonel Ian Talbot, Chief of Staff, UNFICYP, May 9, 1996 and Lt. Colonel Andrew Snowdon, Commanding Officer Sector 2, May 10, 1996.

¹⁶ Interview, Chief of Staff Talbot, May 9, 1996; and discussions with the Chief Operations Officer, Lt. Colonel Parker.

crucial to UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency. The U.N. explains the status quo:

[The] cease-fire came into effect at 1800 hours on 16 August 1974. Immediately afterwards, UNFICYP inspected the areas of confrontation and recorded the deployment of the military forces on both sides. Lines drawn between the forward defended localities became respectively the National Guard and Turkish Forces cease-fire lines. In the absence of a formal cease-fire agreement, *the military status quo, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time, became the standard by which it was judged whether any changes constituted violations of the cease-fire. ...*

It is an essential feature of the cease-fire that neither side can exercise authority or jurisdiction or make any military moves beyond its own forward military lines. In the area between the lines, which is known as the U.N. buffer zone, UNFICYP maintains the status quo.¹⁷

The status quo means not only the location of the cease-fire lines but every militarily significant feature along the buffer zone. This includes the number of sandbags, the number of soldiers, the number of firing holes, and the quality of the concrete blocks in every observation post and position along the buffer zone. Keeping track of all these details – the base truth – is a daunting task and the knowledge must be passed on to each successive rotation of troops. If UNFICYP does not master the minutiae of the buffer zone, it will lose arguments with the opposing forces, be less able to provide transparency and calm incidents, and will slowly lose control over the buffer zone itself.

With varying degrees of thoroughness, UNFICYP maintains sketches, photos, written records, computerized records, and file folders of various positions, areas, and buildings along the buffer zone. A number of the buildings, barbed wire fences, barrels, and other terrain features in and along the buffer zone are marked with U.N. signs indicating what it is and who owns it.

¹⁷ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 2 ed., pp. 307-308; emphasis added.

Despite these efforts, there are numerous problems involved in keeping track of the status quo. There is no unambiguous record of the status quo. Files are often incomplete, and there is no comprehensive and centralized photo or video data-base of the buffer zone. Fearing espionage, both sides prohibit photographs of the buffer zone, even by the U.N. UNFICYP does have a limited supply of photos but because it cannot admit to them, UNFICYP must instead use its sketches to try to make its case about the status quo.

Another problem is that when the cease-fire lines were drawn, it was done on a large scale map (1:400,000) with a thick pencil. This invited numerous and continuing disputes about the actual location of the cease-fire lines because the swath of the pencil covered about 300 meters. Three hundred meters is wider than the buffer zone itself at many points.¹⁸

The consequences of an uncertain base truth are that if UNFICYP cannot tell if a position has been upgraded, or where the exact line of the buffer zone is, it cannot use information to coerce cheaters, rogues, and other violators into backing down (H5) or reduce unwarranted suspicions (H4). Thus, while UNFICYP generally succeeds at maintaining the integrity of the buffer zone and calming incidents, some of the problems it faces are due to or exacerbated by the difficulties of establishing the base truth. These are problems in the provision of transparency (H1).

DEALING WITH VIOLATIONS: PEACEKEEPING AND THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY

¹⁸ Interview with General Vartiainen, Force Commander, May 7, 1996. See also Harbottle, *Impartial Soldier*, p. 63. The exact same problem occurred when the maps were drawn between Israel and Syria when the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was created.

To provide a complete picture of UNFICYP's activities, the following subsections examine the principal categories of violations confronted by UNFICYP, including: antagonism, construction, shooting and weapon, and moves forward (and local agreements), as well as demonstrations. The importance of transparency varies by type of incident, and I remark on the limits of transparency in a number of places. While I am interested in variation in the successes, failures, and irrelevancies of transparency within and across cases, I do not process trace incidents which offer no lessons about transparency. In these incidents or categories of violation, I just note that transparency does not play a role.¹⁹

Antagonism Violations

Antagonisms are among the most common violations, constituting about thirty percent of all violations.²⁰ They consist of stone-throwing, insult-hurling, slingshotting, gesturing, and so forth between the two sides. Typically, one side antagonizes the other, the offended side calls the local U.N. headquarters, and a patrol is sent out. Less frequently, patrols come across incidents. In either case, UNFICYP talks to one or both sides, and tries to get them to calm down. Incidents end in one of three ways: first, they run their course and die down; second, UNFICYP increases

¹⁹ For those interested in fine-grained details about peacekeeping on Cyprus, please consult my dissertation, *Transparency and the Effectiveness of Security Regimes: A Study of Concert of Europe Crisis Management and United Nations Peacekeeping* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1998). With 200 pages devoted to the Cyprus case, there is considerably more interview material, redacted incident reports, situation reports, and diplomatic records. Of note are the histories of the Roccas Bastion construction, killings in the buffer zone, and the 1996 demonstrations.

²⁰ I estimated this (and the percentages in the following violations subsection) based on statistics in *Report of the Secretariat Review Team on the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus*, S/21982, December 7, 1990, paragraph 13. See Lindley, *Transparency and the Effectiveness of Security Regimes* for more on the estimates.

its presence and patrols and this calms the incident; or third, UNFICYP threatens or actually does report the incident up the chain of command and the incident is calmed. This third method, detecting defection and using this information to coerce violators, is fairly common and is an example of H5.

There is little miscalculation or misperception between the adversaries in most antagonism incidents. After all, either you are hit on the head by a rock, or you are not. However, what each side says to UNFICYP about who started the incident and who did what to whom is a different story. In these cases, the peacekeeper has to conduct an investigation to see who really did what to whom in order to get the right people in trouble. To use information to coerce violators into backing down, as contended by H5, the peacekeepers must cut through opacity and deliberate disinformation. Examples of investigations that ended up resolving false claims by one of the sides include peacekeepers physically climbing around barriers in the buffer zone to see if one side's claims to have seen an enemy soldier might be true, or trying to throw pebbles through a wire mesh to see if the pebbles at a broken window could be what caused the broken window (nope).²¹

The ability of UNFICYP to get violators in trouble often rests on the coercive use of information (H5). This ability provides an operation definition of consent to a peacekeeping operation, a crucial precondition for the success of traditional peacekeeping operations. With consent, there is always someone of higher rank than the troublemaker who can get the troublemaker in trouble and make amends. Violators ultimately get disciplined because they are

²¹ The dated Immediate Reports (IMREPs) upon which this section is based are from IMREP folder, Sector 2, West, Kingston, as well as a number of interviews on the line, and in particular with Bombardier Elwyn Jones who gave me a line tour, May 10, 1996, Sector 2, East, Maple House (central Nicosia).

going against a policy the government at the highest levels has agreed to. Consent means that, in the end, a damper can be put on potentially aggravating incidents.

Unfortunately for UNFICYP, both sides' militaries intentionally provoke each other and then rely on UNFICYP to calm things. They are "masters of provocation."²² Yet, I believe the provocations would continue or escalate without UNFICYP, and thus that the probability of war would be higher without UNFICYP.²³ The violations end up being a combination of winked- at provocation along the buffer zone, as well as indisciplined roguish behavior by bored or angry soldiers. Either way, they are a threat to the peace, albeit usually minor. And either way, if UNFICYP can find out who did what to whom when, it can often use this information to restore order (H5).

Construction, including the Roccas Bastion Incident

Part of UNFICYP's mission to preserve the status quo includes assuring that construction along the buffer zone adds no military advantage to either side. Construction is limited to maintenance of current military positions. New positions may not be built, and repairs may not improve positions. This means that when repairs are made, each brick should be replaced with

²² Interview, Spokesman Rokoszewski, May 6, 1996. Several UNFICYP officials suggested that the authorization or planning for some incidents can occur as high up as the battalion or regimental level of the opposing forces.

²³ It is in part for this reason that I disagree with Nicholas Sambanis that UNFICYP is a failure. His pre-1967 history is interesting, but he holds UNFICYP to a very high bar. That said, this analysis supports Sambanis' overall model in that the multifunctional missions in particular reveal a relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking, and that "peacekeepers can shape the parties' peacemaking preferences." Sambanis, "The United Nations Operation in Cyprus: A New Look at the Peacekeeping – Peacemaking Relationship," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Spring 1999), quote p. 85. See Dan Lindley, "Assessing the Role of U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, eds., *The Work of the U.N. in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development* (New York, NY: Palgrave/St. Martins Press, 2001) for a longer version of my argument that UNFICYP helps promote peace.

the same sort of brick, regular concrete should not be replaced by reinforced concrete, and so forth.

UNFICYP deals frequently with construction incidents, which constitute about twenty percent of the violations it confronts. New construction may be found by a patrol, be reported by one of the opposing forces. UNFICYP can usually calm nerves if it determines that the reported construction is not an improvement, or when it succeeds in telling the violating side to take down the new construction.

Because it can be hard to tell exactly what the other side is constructing or whether it is improving its positions, inspections and transparency can be important in construction incidents. Only UNFICYP is in a position to conduct on site investigations and determine the nature of constructions. Such inspections are an information-generating activity, an observable implication of H1 which contends that regimes can provide transparency. This information can then be used to either calm fears and de-escalate tensions, as predicted by H4, or help coerce compliance from violators as predicted by H5. UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency depends on its ability to recognize and make convincing arguments about the status quo/base truth (see section above, p. 138). To distill insights about transparency, this section surveys a variety of construction incidents, including the controversial construction of a supposed playground was built at the Roccas Bastion in Nicosia.

The first incident is a dispute over the base truth, and shows how difficult it can be for UNFICYP to argue about the status quo. In May 1996, the National Guard replaced some barrels in one of their positions with the same number of similar barrels - exactly the way maintenance is supposed to be performed. The Turkish Forces tried to convince UNFICYP that the position had

changed, in part by using a photo taken at a different location 100 meters down the line, but the Turkish Forces maintained their stance even after walking to this location with UNFICYP officers and after being shown UNFICYP sketches of the various positions. Nothing UNFICYP did moved the Turks closer to the base truth.

In the second incident, UNFICYP calms a construction/security spiral. This was a classic tactical demonstration of H2, which contends that the promise of transparency can promote cooperation, and of H4, which contends that transparency reduces security spirals based on unwarranted fears. In early 1996, the Turkish Forces began refurbishing a bunker position. The National Guard claimed it was an improvement, so on February 2 they responded by building a position of their own on top of a nearby building. The National Guard soldiers cocked their weapons and called in a quick reaction force while the Turkish Forces waited for a meeting with UNFICYP. In the meeting, the UNFICYP captain told the Turkish Forces major that the National Guard undertook their construction believing that the Turkish Forces were improving their position and that the National Guard had been told that the Turkish Forces construction was not an improvement. However, this information from UNFICYP had not calmed the Greeks, so there is no evidence yet of transparency reducing fears. On February 9, the Turkish Forces' responded by building a new wall near their position. Much blaming, meeting, and argument ensued.

A few days later, transparency resolved the standoff. An UNFICYP lieutenant colonel stood in the buffer zone close enough to the Turkish Forces to talk to them, while talking on the phone to the National Guard, helping each side simultaneously and step for step deconstruct their improvements. Resolution of this incident depended on the verifying presence of the lieutenant

colonel in the buffer zone to get the opposing forces to de-spiral and take down their constructions. This is a tactical example of the hypothesis that the promise of transparency can help two sides make peace by allaying fears of cheating, and this supports H2. Once the peacekeeper actively managed the implementation of the agreement and increased transparency, that supported H3.

The third is a case where UNFICYP recognizes that transparency might confirm fears and aggravate tensions, and opts not to tell the full truth. Here, the Turkish Forces replaced sandbags with a wall outside of an observation post. The Greeks complained to UNFICYP, UNFICYP spoke to the Turkish Forces, and the Turkish Forces said the wall had been there for years. But it was clear that the wall had been put up overnight, and the Turkish Forces promised UNFICYP that they would get rid of the wall. That night, an UNFICYP observation post saw what they thought was the wall being taken down, but later analysis revealed that the Turkish Forces had just covered the wall with sandbags. The National Guard could only see the sandbags and were happy, so that brought the matter to a close.²⁴ If UNFICYP had told the truth, transparency would have inflamed the National Guard and confirmed their fears, as predicted by H4'. Transparency is not a blanket good.

“TRNC” CONSTRUCTION AT ROCCAS BASTION²⁵

²⁴ This section on typical construction incidents is from “Folder 8: OPFOR Character Profiles (CPs) and OPFOR Meeting Notes,” Sector 2, West, Kingston, and various interviews, including Lt. Col. Snowdon, May 10, 1996.

²⁵ The majority of this section is based on detailed notes taken from UNFICYP’s Roccas Bastion file, as well as numerous interviews. The file contained cables from UNFICYP to U.N. headquarters and vice-versa, inspection reports, notes on meetings, press releases, diagrams, and so forth. I was not allowed to use specific names, addresses, or direct quotes. See my dissertation for many more details on this incident.

In June 1995, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) began construction of a supposed playground in the strategically sensitive Roccas Bastion in North Nicosia by.²⁶ The playground contained concrete underground tunnels, and its construction raised a furor in the South which suspected that it was built military purposes. This story is worthy of space because UNFICYP battled for inspections, a mechanism that could help provide transparency as suggested by H1, in the hope that the information would reduce fears and tensions as predicted by H4. It offers numerous and specific details on what information the inspections revealed and what effects the information had.

The Roccas Bastion is a protrusion from the Venetian walls that surround inner Nicosia. It measures about seventy meters by sixty meters, and overlooks the main node of the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) in the South.

In early June, UNFICYP, having been notified by the “TRNC” of the impending construction, twice relayed this news to the Greek Cypriot National Guard (H1). The Greek Cypriot side nonetheless became enraged when excavation began on the 20th. The National Guard Chief of Staff wrote UNFICYP charging that talk of a playground was certain to be a ruse to disguise military construction and asking that the U.N. correct the situation. There were 10-15 highly suspicious stories a day in the Greek Cypriot press about the construction as it took place.²⁷

Quickly responding to Greek fears, UNFICYP requested inspections at the military level

²⁶ In 1983, the North declared itself to be the independent state of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." It has only been recognized by Turkey, and because of non-recognition elsewhere, it is standard convention to put the “TRNC” in quotes.

²⁷ Interview, Spokesman Rokoszewski, May 13, 1996.

on the 21st, but were referred to “TRNC” political authorities. UNFICYP tried to gather information (H1), but the Turkish side built obstacles to obstruct UNFICYP’s view, and burned down an UNFICYP observation post that overlooked the bastion. UNFICYP resorted to helicopter overflights.

The effort to get inspections, the sine qua non for UNFICYP to provide transparency in this case (H1), went as high up the diplomatic pecking order as UNFICYP could go: to the U.N. Security Council and the Secretary-General.²⁸ The effort to muster diplomatic leverage worked, the “TRNC” backed down under the international spotlight – thus supporting H5. On July 12, the “TRNC” agreed that UNFICYP’s Chief of Mission could visit the Roccas Bastion the next day, followed by a UNFICYP technical team inspection on the 14th. On July 18, the “TRNC” finally agreed to regular inspections during the construction and periodic inspections thereafter.

Following the initial inspections, the Chief of Mission met with the Greek Cypriot President and later with a Greek official to explain that, while the construction raised a number of doubts, the materials used were below military specifications and that the design of the construction conformed to no military logic. The Chief of Mission told the President that UNFICYP was arranging visits in order to keep the construction that way. None of this allayed the Greek Cypriots’ fears who in fact remained almost hysterical.

A few days later a Greek Cypriot ambassador brought to UNFICYP a Turkish mainland newspaper (*Hurriyet*, July 20) article that included photographs of Turkish fortifications and tunnels, and fumed that it was about the Roccas Bastion. In short order, the U.N. determined that neither the photographs nor the article’s text were about the Roccas Bastion. So far, despite

²⁸ S/1995/561.

UNFICYP's inspections and meetings with the Greek Cypriot President and others, there is not much sign of transparency reducing fears (H4).

A notable provision of transparency by the U.N. (H1) occurred on July 25 when the Secretary-General publicly reported the findings of the technical inspection, including a detailed diagram of the Roccas Bastion and its underground contents (S/1995/618). The Secretary-General wrote that "the construction on Roccas Bastion to date, including the material used, does not indicate work carried out to normal military specifications, or to any evident military logic. At the same time, the construction appears unnecessarily elaborate and costly for its stated purpose." He noted that the Turkish Cypriot authorities had promised unhindered regular and periodic access to the bastion and that "these arrangements will enable UNFICYP to satisfy itself that the new infrastructure being built on Roccas Bastion continues to be used exclusively for civilian purposes." By emphasizing continued inspections, the Secretary-General was trying hard to reduce the uproar with transparency, an effect predicted by H4.

The Greeks did not believe the calming parts of the report, and this was reinforced by the more dangerous "unnecessarily elaborate and costly" aspects noted by the Secretary-General. The information in the report justified a certain amount of fear on the Greek Cypriot side, and thus, there is some evidence for H4' in that transparency confirmed fears. Even if the facts justified it, I doubt that a completely exculpatory report would have overcome the Greek's pre-formed worst-case assumptions about the Turks. In a meeting with UNFICYP's Force Commander, the head of the Greek Cypriot National Guard said that he did not believe UNFICYP's assessment about the non-military nature of the trenches. This suggests that transparency has a hard time reducing fears (H4) in the face of strong suspicions or bias.

Transparency is supposed to create common understandings and base truths, yet a year after the construction, divergent views remained. Dr. Leonides Pantelides, a political officer in the Foreign Ministry's Cyprus Problem Division, said that the inspections helped resolve some of the acute aspects of the crisis. However, he said that the Greek Cypriots still do not believe it is playground, and think that the deep digging and concrete indicate a possible future military use.²⁹ Dr. Aytug Plumer, an under-secretary at the "TRNC" ministry of foreign affairs and defense, said that UNFICYP had clearly reported that the construction was not military in its reports and that these reports show that the Greek Cypriot's big fuss was a big lie.³⁰ John Koenig, First Secretary for Political Affairs at the U.S. embassy, said that the U.N.'s actions helped reassure each side, but that he was still not entirely satisfied with the situation: the way the Turks handled it was designed to raise doubts and Greek Cypriots still think it is a military construction.³¹

This raises an interesting issue: what kind of information is needed to reassure a status quo party (H4) if the other party is intent on making provocative bluffs? Perhaps it is impossible. Provocation is provocation, so even if the Turks ended up constructing a playground on the Roccas Bastion, the nighttime construction and obstruction of UNFICYP still convey hostile intent. Surely a playground beats a minefield and artillery emplacements, but if the goal is to rile up the other side, provocations will likely always succeed.

On two visits to the Roccas Bastion, I tried to use the underground bathrooms (and thus see the tunnels) and both times I was not allowed in. The above-ground doors leading to the

²⁹ Interview, May 16, 1996.

³⁰ Interview, June 5, 1996.

³¹ Interview, June 4, 1996.

underground tunnels and bathrooms are clearly marked as bathrooms, yet they are constructed of thick metal, have small peephole windows, and resemble doors on old-fashioned armored cars. I doubt this is an ordinary park. As far as I know, UNFICYP never reported on the armored nature of the doors. Even if this helped calm the situation in the short term, this puts their long-term credibility at risk and credibility is a key component when using transparency to promote peace.

In sum, transparency was provided by the U.N. inspections, supporting H1. But the effects of transparency were mixed, something not unexpected given the mixed reports. Greek alarm without the inspections would have likely been even higher, and this counterfactual suggests that transparency did reduce fears, as predicted by H4. However, the inspections also helped justify the suspicions, and when transparency confirms fears, this supports H4'. Despite the conflicting messages in the UNFICYP reports, most Greeks felt that the inspections helped calm the crisis and the beneficial effects of transparency in reducing fears (H4) modestly prevail in this case.

Looking at construction incidents overall, UNFICYP's role and the role of transparency should not be overstated. The U.N. *Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus* almost always express disapproval about continual construction and military buildups on Cyprus – with no effect. Most of this construction is out in the countryside, which is less inflammatory than in sensitive, strategic, and closed-in areas like downtown Nicosia.

Shooting and Weapons Incidents and Violations

Shooting deaths within the buffer zone are rare, but have more potential than other incidents to escalate. From the 1974 cease-fire through 2002, six Greek Cypriot and three Turkish soldiers had been killed in or along the buffer zone, a casualty rate far below that of the 1950s through 1974.³² The last deaths occurred between June and October of 1996 when a Greek Cypriot National Guard soldier, a Turkish Forces soldier, and three Greek Cypriot civilians were killed in and along the buffer zone.

Non-fatal shootings and weapons discharges are more common; the most dangerous of these are deliberate shots that cause strike marks on an opposing forces position. There were three or four of these types of shooting incidents in the Nicosia area during the first five months of 1996.³³ Cocking and pointing of weapons by the opposing forces at each other or at UNFICYP soldiers is frequent, as are accidental shootings and discharges. All told, weapons incidents account for about ten percent of all violations. Transparency is not a big factor in most weapons violations, although some incidents demonstrate the value of UNFICYP investigations, as well as the ability of rumors to outpace those investigations.

General Vartiainen said that the opposing forces load and cock at each other at least once a week in the Nicosia area (where the density and proximity of opposing forces are highest). Often loading and cocking is the highest rung on the escalatory ladder of insults: finger and other gestures (“international signs,” said the General), throwing of bottles and stones, and

³² In part from figures from Chief Clerk, Operations Branch (UNFICYP), Memorandum to the Chief Operations Officer, “OPFOR Deaths Within the BZ” June 6, 1996. Totals do not include deaths by mines, hunting or other accidents.

³³ Lt. Col. Snowden, May 10.

slingshotting.³⁴ The opposing forces sometimes point their weapons at UNFICYP soldiers and many peacekeepers told me that loading and cocking was the scariest thing that happened to them on Cyprus.

UNFICYP's ability to investigate and provide information (H1) faces a number of barriers in shooting incidents. For example, shots are so quick that it can be hard to tell where they came from, especially at night. Evidence like bullets and casings is hard to find and easy to conceal. Since many if not most shootings are accidents ("negligent discharges" in UNFICYP-speak), soldiers are highly motivated to lie and cover them up. A frequent technique of soldiers to disguise an accident is to fire off a couple of rounds after the accident to make it appear as if a more serious shootout occurred.³⁵ When UNFICYP's investigations succeed and they report their findings to the perpetrator's officers, the shooters are often disciplined. These are instances of H5, which contends that disclosure of information coerces aggressors.

THE SHOOTING OF STELIOS PANAYI

Killings in the buffer zones are among the most severe challenges faced by UNFICYP. Does transparency play a role? National Guard private Stelios Panayi was shot on June 3, 1996,³⁶ the first of several killings in and along the buffer zone in the summer of 1996.³⁷ This

³⁴ Interview, May 7, 1996. Colonel Talbot, the Chief of Staff, thought that loading and cocking incidents occurred somewhat less frequently. Interview, May 8, 1996.

³⁵ Interviews with Lt. Col. Parker, Lt. Col. Snowdon, and Bombardier Raymond Cowie, May 9, 10, and 24 respectively, and IMREP folder, Sector 2, West, Kingston.

³⁶ The sources for this section include the "Temporary Hot Spot File," for the incident which included a number of UNFICYP situation reports, cables, memorandums, faxes, incident logs, and so forth. In addition to these and other

killing shows how quickly rumors can spread, and reveals UNFICYP's limited ability to combat them when the rumors outpace its investigations. Over the longer term, UNFICYP's thorough investigation calmed Greek Cypriot anger at UNFICYP. This is modest evidence of self-transparency reducing unwarranted fears and clarifies purpose, predicted by H6.

At roughly 6:15am in an area just West of central Nicosia, an UNFICYP soldier heard shouting between a National Guard observation post and a Turkish observation post. A Turkish Forces soldier, carrying his rifle, was observed walking into the buffer zone and going down into reedbeds where he would no longer be seen.

At 6:30, the UNFICYP soldier heard a single shot while he was calling his supervisor. A Turkish Forces soldier was then seen running back towards Turkish lines. At some time prior to this, Panayi, unarmed and off-duty, had apparently gone into the buffer zone. Proceeding toward the scene of the shooting at 6:35, the UNFICYP soldier was told by a National Guard soldier that a National Guard soldier had been shot. The UNFICYP soldier tried to approach Panayi but was ordered to halt by Turkish Forces who pointed their weapons at him. By 6:40 the UNFICYP soldier had returned to his observation post to report the incident and call an ambulance. When a U.N. captain and another soldier reached the scene, the three UNFICYP personnel tried to approach but were again told to halt. As the peacekeepers continued forward, the Turkish Forces fired a warning shot and UNFICYP backed off. They tried to move forward two more times, but each time backed off after warning shots were fired. The captain's efforts to negotiate with the

documents, I arrived at UNFICYP headquarters soon after the shooting, had free range there during the day, and spoke at length about the shooting thereafter. See Lindley, *Transparency and Security Regimes* for more details.

³⁷ Most occurred during Greek demonstrations (see that section below).

Turkish Forces were unsuccessful.

Between 7:05 and 7:10, UNFICYP soldiers escorted a civilian ambulance forward to the closest National Guard observation post. Two of the three UNFICYP soldiers who tried found a faint pulse on Panayi but he was pronounced dead at the hospital. A National Guard cap with the name of another National Guard soldier was found near Panayi and another cap was found in his pocket. UNFICYP's investigation later revealed the Panayi had entered the buffer zone intending to trade caps with a Turkish counterpart.

In the meantime, both sides were rapidly built up their forces in the immediate area. Up to ninety Turkish Forces soldiers had arrived by the time the body was removed. Machine guns and RPG-7 rocket launchers were brought in by one or both sides. Both sides built down their forces rapidly as well. UNFICYP's chief operations officer noted that the situation was calm at 8:45.

At 11:08, a TV news flash broke the news of the killing to the Greek Cypriots. Before noon, Cyprus President Clerides issued a televised statement expressing sympathy to Panayi's parents and calling the shooting "cold blooded murder." The parents were shown crying at the hospital.

As the Cypriot press geared up for the story, rumors became mixed with facts,³⁸ and UNFICYP tried to figure out exactly what happened - how many shots were fired, where the body was found, where the shots came from, how many soldiers from each side were in the buffer zone, why Panayi entered the buffer zone, and so forth. In UNFICYP's operations center, officers sorted through incoming reports that contained conflicting answers to many of these

³⁸ Jean Christou, "Was soldier lured to his death by Turks?" *Cyprus Mail*, June 7, 1996, p. 3.

questions. UNFICYP's Spokesman Rokoszewski could not address many of the rumors because UNFICYP had yet to complete its own investigation. Many rumors cast the Turkish Forces in the worst possible light (the light was pretty grim already, but the rumors consisted of false reports of multiple shooters and multiple bullet wounds, making it seem like a slaughter). The rumors outpaced fact-finding activities such as the autopsy as well as UNFICYP's abilities to coordinate the information it was receiving.

This shows that the provision of transparency (H1) depends on the availability of correct information in the first place. Had UNFICYP had complete information from the start, perhaps some of the rumors could have been dispelled (H4). Instead, it had to wait for its investigations to yield results.

The National Guard and Government of Cyprus vigorously protested the killing.³⁹ That afternoon, UNFICYP's Force Commander met with the commander of the Turkish Forces to protest the incident - both the killing and the warning shots. The commander of the Turkish Forces expressed sadness about the death, but said that the soldiers were acting according to standard operating procedures. The Force Commander followed up with a letter of protest on June 5. And on June 7, the Turkish Forces commander counter-protested with a letter claiming that the whole incident took place on "TRNC" territory. He tried to support his claims with photographs and a map, and it was amusing watching the UNFICYP operations staff uncover all the inaccurate and misleading elements. While UNFICYP protested the Turkish story at the highest levels, especially the claims that the shooting was not in the buffer zone, the Greek

³⁹ From Cyprus News Agency, "Cyprus protests to UN over soldier's murder" June 3, 1996 at: <<<http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/>>>.

Cypriots were never told of this letter and its errors. The “TRNC” political authorities continued to insist that although the incident was unfortunate, Panayi was to blame for failing to heed warning shots and for crossing into “TRNC” territory.⁴⁰

On the Greek side, there was initial dismay and anger at UNFICYP’s slow response. This sentiment changed after UNFICYP made it clear to the Greek Cypriots that repeated warning shots prevented UNFICYP from reaching Panayi. The *Cyprus Mail* wrote “No UNFICYP officer in his right mind would risk walking into the buffer zone after warning shots were fired.”⁴¹ Here, UNFICYP’s efforts to clarify why it responded as it did to the multiple warning shots reduced anger at the operation. When clarifying the actions of the operation helps calm local perceptions of the operation, this effect of self-transparency is evidence for (H6) .

The overall reaction of the Greeks was muted, and contrasts with the protests and shootout after Athanasios Kleovoulou’s death in 1993. An UNFICYP investigation revealed that Kleovoulou had gone into the buffer zone to trade brandy with the Turks, and this caused the National Guard to crack down on their troops. In 1996, the mood in the Greek Cypriot press and in the streets soon combined a sullen ‘Turks will be Turks’ attitude with a recognition that the Panayi had made a fatal mistake. Newspapers and government authorities spoke of the poor training of Greek Cypriot soldiers. The *Cyprus Mail* editorialized: “It may seem insensitive, but in the final analysis, the guardsman died because he disobeyed army orders.”⁴²

⁴⁰ Statement by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash on June 3, Nicosia BRTK Television Network, 16:30 GMT in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report*, FBIS-WEU-96-108, June 4, 1996 and interview with Aytug Plumer, under-secretary, ministry foreign affairs and defense, “TRNC.”

⁴¹ “Murder on the Green Line,” June 5, 1996, p. 9.

⁴² “Murder on the Green Line,” June 5, p. 9, see also: “Need for tougher discipline,” *The Cyprus Weekly*, June 7-13, 1996, p. 4.

UNFICYP and its investigations can take some credit for this rare level of blunt introspection and learning.⁴³ UNFICYP's information has helped the Greek Cypriots realize the dangers of their own lax discipline along the buffer zone. While not justifying the Turkish shootings of Panayi or Kleovoulou, UNFICYP helped the Greek Cypriots understand their soldiers' unwise actions, calming their reactions to the killings. There is no transparency hypothesis for this effect, but it combines elements of H4 (reducing fears) and H5 (coercing better behavior) because the Greek Cypriots came to place some blame on themselves and thus take responsibility for their own actions.

Finally, the killings illustrate how quickly things can escalate on Cyprus, and shows that UNFICYP's presence is critical in rare circumstances. Immediately following the June 3 killing, for example, both opposing forces quickly built up their forces. What if UNFICYP had not been there? What if the Turkish warning shots had been fired at National Guard soldiers coming into the buffer zone to pick up the body, rather the UNFICYP soldiers?

Moves Forward and Local Agreements

Moves forward include instances when the opposing forces enter the buffer zone, and these account for about 20% of all violations. As seen in the deaths of Kleovoulou and Panayi, going into the buffer zone sometimes results in shooting. However, most moves forward into the buffer zone are minor. UNFICYP's response is usually just hustle the violators back to their

⁴³ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, for the period 11 December 1995 to June 10, 1996, S/1996/411 dated June 7, 1996, pp. 3-4 and *Corrigendum*, S/1996/411/Corr.1 dated June 14, 1996.

side. Little transparency is needed or used in these instances.

Two quite serious forms of moves forward threaten the status quo and challenge UNFICYP's authority and freedom of movement in the buffer zone. First, the opposing forces may challenge the status quo by trying to move the actual cease-fire lines forward. Second, they may contest UNFICYP's right to patrol in a given area. For example, these sorts of challenges probably explain why the *Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus* went from describing the minimum width of the buffer zone as 20 meters in the June 15, 1995, (S/1995/488 report p. 3), to describing it as a "few" meters in the next report on December 10, 1995, (S/1995/1020 p. 1).

"Local agreements" makes these challenges even worse by codifying new borders of the buffer zone. A local agreement is when new lines are drawn or patrol routes adjusted in the buffer zone by lower-level officers. These agreements essentially legitimize a new status quo. Local agreements are very difficult for UNFICYP to deal with because the local commanders often do not notify their superiors or successor rotations.

According to one of UNFICYP's folders on moves forward, local agreements are due to a "lack of understanding and weakness of UNFICYP at [the] local level" over time. And it is "clear that local agreements and understandings have far reaching effects when changes are made to activities within the buffer zone without clearance from HQ UNFICYP." UNFICYP's spokesman echoed these concerns, saying that local agreements are "hell in this mission."⁴⁴

Moves forward and local agreements blur the base truth about the status quo and thus

⁴⁴ Folder "Move Forward of TFCFL Nicosia," 20/002-1303, 5/24/89 and interview with Spokesman Rokoszewski, June 6, 1996.

reduce UNFICYP's ability to increase transparency (H1). UNFICYP can not easily facilitate bargaining, reduce misperceptions, or coerce better behavior (H3, H4, H5) if they can not establish a base truth. Without a base truth, there is no way to refute either side's claims, no way to help move each side closer to the truth and away from miscalculation and misperception, and no way for UNFICYP to press its side with certainty.

Moves forward are often accompanied by arguments about the true location of the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP should be able to win these arguments hands down, but sometimes it does not and this is because of ambiguities about the base truth. As mentioned, UNFICYP has no comprehensive database of photographs or videos of the whole buffer zone, and the cease-fire lines were drawn ambiguously. When UNFICYP cannot master the facts, it has a harder time providing transparency.

The extent of the difficulties posed by local agreements are hard to judge because they are a self-concealing phenomenon. Who would admit to making a side-deal that reduced UNFICYP's authority? Yet local agreements and disputes about patrol tracks and the delineation of the cease-fire lines came up in a number of my interviews, and were also covered in several folders I reviewed.⁴⁵

For example, UNFICYP's Chief Operations Officer, Lt. Colonel Parker, said that different maps revealed three different cease-fire lines in the "4 Minute Walk" area of the buffer zone in central Nicosia. He noted more generally that he had huge files on unresolved cease-fire line interpretations. Parker said that if the cease-fire line problems could be resolved, this would

⁴⁵ See sources cited as well as "Folder 8: OPFOR Character Profiles (CPs) and OPFOR Meeting Notes," both from Sector 2, West, Kingston, and interview Major Walsh, Sector 2 West battery commander, May 25, 1996 . See Lindley, *Transparency and Security Regimes* for details on incidents at Bourhan Tan, Wayne's Keep, and the 4 Minute Walk.

calm both sides and generate lots of peace.⁴⁶ In other words, establishing and monitoring a base truth (H1) would go a long way toward reducing unwarranted fears (H4), as well as limiting accidental and intentional cheating (H5). It is hard for each side to negotiate agreements to limit these fears and incidents when there is no base truth, and this uncertainty helps cause these fears and incidents in the first place. This implies that transparency would promote cooperation (H3) if it could be established (H1).

Government officials not fully aware of the tactical rough and tumble in and along the buffer zone, so it would take a fairly drastic change in incidents along the buffer zone for them to view the peacekeeping mission differently. For example, Government of Cyprus officials believe UNFICYP successfully maintains control of the buffer zone, preserves the status quo, and keeps small things small. Dr. Pantelides of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called UNFICYP “extremely successful.” Thalia Petrides, Director for European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that UNFICYP helped keep the Turkish side from gaining ground in the buffer zone.⁴⁷

On the “TRNC” side, Dr. Plumer, an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense was much less supportive. Even though he said that UNFICYP’s job had gotten easier since the creation of the buffer zone in 1974, he thought that the Turkish Forces were doing the real peacekeeping on Cyprus and that UNFICYP was not big enough to do its job adequately. He also noted with displeasure the U.N.’s reluctance to recognize the “TRNC” and

⁴⁶ Interviews with Bombardier Jones and Lt Colonel Parker, May 10, 1996 and May 9, 1996 respectively.

⁴⁷ Interviews, May 16 and 15, 1996, respectively.

said that UNFICYP was 70% paid for by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots.⁴⁸ Thus, he argued that UNFICYP's benefits appear to accrue more to the Greek than Turkish side.

Demonstrations and Crowd Control

Although not counted by UNFICYP as "violations," a major problem confronted by UNFICYP is demonstrations. Most demonstrations are held by Greek Cypriots to protest the Turkish invasion and occupation. The demonstrators create havoc for UNFICYP as they frequently try to cross into the buffer zone. Some throw rocks, bottles, and occasional molotov cocktails at Turkish Cypriots or other targets of opportunity, including UNFICYP personnel. Injuries can result, and as happened in 1996, even death.

UNFICYP's responsibility during the demonstrations is to protect the integrity of the buffer zone. The Cyprus police (CYPOL) are supposed to help control the demonstrators and protect UNFICYP. UNFICYP learns about demonstrations from a variety of sources, including the media and the protesting groups themselves. The Cyprus police are supposed to notify UNFICYP of upcoming demonstrations, although the Cyprus police's level of cooperation in this and other ways is spotty at best. Occasionally, UNFICYP is taken by surprise by demonstrations.

The Turkish Cypriots often learn of demonstrations through liaison with UNFICYP. According to Colonel Talbot, UNFICYP tells the Turkish side what they are going to do about the upcoming demonstration and this helps build trust. He said it was very important for him to

⁴⁸ Interview, June 5, 1996. The correct figure is 50%, suggesting that UNFICYP might benefit from some self-transparency (H6).

say “I’m doing this” about the demonstration and ask about their (Turkish) concerns and respond to them. He believed the trust this engendered may help disengagement over the long-term.⁴⁹ UNFICYP’s information gathering about demonstrations and Colonel Talbot’s remarks about using this information and self-transparency to build trust support H1, which contends that regimes can increase transparency by providing new information and H6 which predicts that information about the regime’s activities can calm fears.

The number of demonstrators can vary from several tens to the low thousands, and demonstrations vary in their level of hostility and danger. Motorcycle protests are the most violent and troublesome for UNFICYP to confront. With belligerence, speed, walkie-talkies, and portable phones, these demonstrators often run around and outwit UNFICYP troops. With UNFICYP’s “limited resources, the protestors just entangle you.”⁵⁰

In 1996, the demonstrations became lethal. On the morning of August 11, 1996, as many as 7000 motorcyclists were set to cross the buffer zone from the South into the North. The demonstration was in part a deliberate provocation whipped up by escalating rhetoric from the Government of Cyprus.⁵¹ Members of the Turkish mainland militant right-wing group the Grey Wolves came to confront the demonstration, and were joined by many Turkish Cypriot civilians. In the ensuing violence, Greek Cypriot Tasos Isaac was clubbed to death, and 50 or more other Greek Cypriots, about 12 Turkish Cypriots, and 12 UNFICYP personnel were injured. On

⁴⁹ Interview, May 9, 1996.

⁵⁰ Spokesman Rokoszewski, interview, May 6, 1996.

⁵¹ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, December 10, 1996, S/1996/1016, p. 1.

August 14, Isaac was buried and at his funeral, the “heroic death” of this “symbol of freedom” was eulogized as a “source of inspiration” by the Primate of the Church of Cyprus.⁵² Another demonstration followed the funeral. Several hundred Greek Cypriots charged the cease-fire lines and entered the buffer zone. As the protestors threw stones, Solomos Solomos, a cousin of Isaac, began to climb a flagpole to take down a Turkish Cypriot flag. He was killed and four others were wounded (including two UNFICYP personnel) when Turkish Forces opened fire and shot 25-50 rounds into the crowd.⁵³ Lots of protests from the U.N. and Greek Cypriot ensued, culminating in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1092, December 23, 1996, which deplored the deaths.

Transparency played a role in preventing the violence from getting even worse during the August 1996 demonstrations. According to UNFICYP’s journal, *The Blue Berets*:

UNFICYP played a unique role in defusing tension between the two parties. During the height of the crisis, rumours and disinformation were rampant on both sides which could easily have triggered military clashes. UNFICYP’s liaison officers attached to the police and military headquarters were instrumental in keeping both sides informed of developments and in quickly clarifying any misperceptions.⁵⁴

In tactical terms, UNFICYP appears to have increased transparency by keeping both sides informed, as predicted by H1. By so doing, they reduced misperceptions and miscalculations which were worsening tensions and heightening risks of escalation; these are the effects of

⁵² Cyprus News Agency, “Buffer zone killing strengthens will for freedom” August 14, 1996, 1345, at: <<<http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/>>>.

⁵³ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, December 10, 1996, S/1996/1016, pp. 1-2; Elizabeth Neuffer, “Greek, Turkish foes clash on Cyprus” *Boston Globe*, August 11, 1996, p. A2; and Elizabeth Neuffer, “Turkish troops kill protester as strife worsens on Cyprus” *Boston Globe*, August 15, 1996, p. A1.

⁵⁴ Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1996, p. 3.

transparency predicted by H3 and H4. That said, each side maintains dramatically different interpretations of the August demonstrations. For example, the dead Greek Cypriots are hailed as hero patriots by their side.⁵⁵

Despite UNFICYP's success with near-real time transparency during these exceptionally violent demonstrations, transparency generally does not play a large role in demonstrations. The facts of the case in demonstrations are fairly clear, as are each side's interpretation of them.

The limits of UNFICYP's ability to wield information to coerce the adversaries into more helpful behavior are shown in UNFICYP's repeated scoldings of the Cyprus police who frequently aid the protestors and not UNFICYP. No amount of criticism from the U.N. provokes anything more than temporary improvement in cooperation. This weakens support for H5 which contends that disclosure of information can coerce better behavior.⁵⁶

HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES AND SOCIETAL TRANSPARENCY

Part of UNFICYP's mandate is to help Cyprus "return to normal conditions."

Accordingly, UNFICYP engages in a number of humanitarian activities on the island designed to bring the two sides together to foster communication and cooperation. These are called

⁵⁵ For more on these demonstrations, see Lindley, *UNFICYP and a Cyprus Solution: A Strategic Assessment* (M.I.T. DACS/Security Studies Program Working Paper, May 1997).

⁵⁶ Interviews with Lt. Colonel Parker, May 14, 1996; Colonel Talbot, May 9; and Lt. Colonel Snowden, May 10 and *Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*: November 30, 1988, S/20310, p. 5, May 31, 1989, S/20663, p. 5, November 22, 1993, S/26777, p. 18, and December 10, 1995, S/1995/1020, pp. 2-3. Various UNFICYP demonstration folders note problems with the Cyprus police including their complicity in letting schoolchildren through to the South Ledra Checkpoint. A scathing 8/9/95 Sector I report in a folder on the 8/6/95 Cyprus Motorcycle Organization rally noted that the Cyprus police obstructed U.N. personnel, did not stop demonstrators, did not arrest anyone, and that the Cyprus police helped the demonstrators remove U.N. obstacles.

bicommunal activities and they range from concerts to coordination of the electrical, water, and sewer systems (which are still linked between the North and South). Embassies (especially the U.S. and British) and businesses also sponsor and promote bicommunal events, but these often have be coordinated with UNFICYP since they involve crossing the buffer zone.

UNFICYP promotes these exchanges believing that:

Bicommunal contacts can contribute significantly to facilitating an overall settlement. It is obvious that the encouragement of tolerance, trust and reconciliation between the two communities through increased contact and improved communication is an essential part of the peace process.⁵⁷

This quotation evokes H1 with its emphasis on communication, and especially H4 as communication is seen to reduce the lack of trust, racism, and enemy-imaging (fears and worst-case assumptions) hindering peace.

Bicommunal activities are efforts to increase what I dub societal transparency – what societies know about each other. It is important to figure out the provision and effects of societal transparency. For example, the issue is at the center of debates about whether globalization is increasing cross-cultural understanding, and societal transparency informs the hopes of scholarships like the Fulbright and the Rhodes that support international educational exchanges.⁵⁸

Unfortunately, on Cyprus it is hard to tell whether bicommunal activities increase transparency, promote peace, or reduce misperceptions. Organizers of bicommunal activities claim that the various activities do have positive effects on participants' views toward the other

⁵⁷ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, 7 June 1996, S/1996/411, p. 9.

⁵⁸ Though not an analysis of transparency per se, one scholarly analysis of these sorts of exchanges is Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) in which he argues that the transnational arms control community and other societal contacts influenced Soviet/Russian security policy and helped end the Cold War.

side, yet acknowledge that these effects are hard to measure more concretely. Moreover, while thousands of people may attend a concert, far fewer attend more lengthy and intensive workshops. It is hard to discern any changes in behavior or attitude associated with these events and whatever large-scale effects bicomunal activities may have are likely to take place over a very long time. This does not make bicomunal events irrelevant or unworthy of pursuit; they have a lot of intuitive appeal. It just means that there is little hard data with which to measure the impact of bicomunal contacts.

In addition to measurement difficulties, bicomunal activities are often politically manipulated, whether being used for propaganda by the South, or cancelled or attended by plants and plainclothesmen by the North.⁵⁹ Further, pervasive bias, especially in the press and schools hinder societal transparency. Much of the press is politically affiliated, highly nationalistic, and one-sided. With twenty-five newspapers for a country the size of Indianapolis, journalists “go off the deep end” and blow small things way out of proportion.⁶⁰ General Vartiainen, UNFICYP’s Force Commander, said that “what they know [about each other] is what is in the newspapers and that is bullshit.”⁶¹ Initially segregated into separate Greek and Turkish systems by the British, the schools continue to inculcate malignant nationalism. Feissel said it was

⁵⁹ Interviews with UNFICYP Chief Humanitarian Officer, Lt. Colonel Jorge Tereso, May 14, 1996; Asim Altiok, Director/Representative of the Consular and Minority Affairs Department, “TRNC” June 5, 1996; Dr. Pantelides, Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 16, 1996; Petrides, Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 15, 1996. See also *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, December 10, 1996, S/1996/1016, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Quote from Gustave Feissel, UNFICYP Chief of Mission, interview May 8, 1996; Also, interviews with Rokoszewski, May 6, 1996 and Eliza Kimball, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 18, 1996; and see Ellen Laipson, “Government and Politics,” in Solsten, ed., *Cyprus: A Country Study*, pp. 188, 197, and 262.

⁶¹ Interview, May 7, 1996. He followed up this point by saying he was “optimistic that [the bullshit] is not the opinion of the people.”

“education that made things bad” on Cyprus, while Vartiainen said that the schools teach the children to view the other side as “beasts.”⁶² Teachers often lead their students to the demonstrations. It is hard to expect lasting peace in a situation where, as pithily summed up by General Vartiainen, “the Greeks don’t remember what happened before 1974 and the Turks can’t forget it.”⁶³

Even after the opening of the intra-Cypriot border in 2003, the communities remain distant. ““There are no results of all those 20 years of citizens being involved...There are no pages on our newspaper on the life of the other side. The Green Line is open physically for us to move but there is an invisible barrier that stops us.” says Greek Cypriot Katie Economidou, a bi-communal activist.”⁶⁴

Conclusion

UNFICYP enjoys considerable success patrolling the buffer zone and keeping small incidents small. A modest amount of UNFICYP’s peacekeeping effectiveness depends on transparency, and UNFICYP also relies on cajoling, interposition, deterrence, mediation, and getting violators in trouble. These tools are not mutually exclusive, and many incidents are

⁶² Interviews, May 8 and May 7, 1996, respectively; and Meleagrou and Yesilada, “The Society and Its Environment,” in Solsten, ed., *Cyprus: A Country Study*, pp. 72-73, 85-87.

⁶³ Interview, May 7, 1996.

⁶⁴ Tabitha Morgan, “Cyprus keeps its hidden barrier,” BBC News, October 5, 2005, at <<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4313016.stm>>>.

calmed by some combination of them.

With respect to each side's overall assessment of the other's capabilities and intentions, UNFICYP adds very little.⁶⁵ It is possible, but hard to prove, that UNFICYP's general presence on the island helps deter aggression by increasing the probability that the initiating aggressor would be identified.

This chapter offers four main lessons about transparency. First, the variation in the importance of transparency by category of violation and by incident within categories of violations underscores a simple, but fundamental point: that transparency can not be of use unless there is some underlying uncertainty or lack of information to begin with. For example, construction may create more suspicion than slingshotting because the uncertainties surrounding construction are likely to be larger. Likewise, transparency may be of help combating rumors during crises. Second, it is hard to move adversaries toward a common truth if the base truth itself is not well-identifiable by the regime. As transparency is fundamentally about reducing misperceptions and moving parties toward a base truth, the inadequately established base truth hinders UNFICYP's ability to provide transparency (H1). This in turn hurts UNFICYP's ability to help the sides make bargains to reduce tensions (H3), to reduce unwarranted fears, and to coerce the opposing forces into compliance (H5).

A number of policy recommendations for UNFICYP result from this observation, and are applicable to many other peacekeeping operations. Local agreements should not be recognized and should be prohibited unless signed by the UNFICYP Force Commander and opposing forces counterparts. UNFICYP should set up a commission that would work with the opposing forces

⁶⁵ Interview General Vartiainen, May 7, 1996.

to identify and resolve different interpretations of the cease-fire lines and the status quo. Video and photographic records could help establish the agreed-upon status quo, the location of patrol tracks, and so forth. UNFICYP should also delineate the cease-fire lines more clearly with rocks, barrels, barbed wire, and so forth. They should use the global positioning system (GPS) to indicate positions of these markers on the markers themselves and in record books. This would deter the opposing forces from trying to move the markers, and help accurately replace those that do get moved. Finally, to increase UNFICYP's ability to investigate and gather facts, audio triangulators could help UNFICYP figure out where shots came from, how many were fired, and so forth. Remote video and sensor monitoring could leverage UNFICYP's stressed resources. UNFICYP's night vision capability should be augmented and upgraded.⁶⁶

Third, the provision of transparency faces barriers when there are large amounts of ingrained bias, or when adversaries already know a lot about each other.

Finally, this chapter confirmed the necessity of including H5 in this study, the hypothesis which contends that information can be used to deter and coerces cheaters, rogues, and spoilers.

⁶⁶ Reynolds M. Salerno, Michael G. Vannoni, David S. Barber, Randall R. Parish, and Rebecca L. Frerichs note in "Enhanced Peacekeeping with Monitoring Technologies," SAND2000-1400 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, June 2000) and Dorn, "Blue Sensors" argue that advanced monitoring technology is not often used in peacekeeping operations.

Table 4-1 summarizes the findings by hypothesis:

Table 4-1: Findings by Hypothesis

Hypothesis:	Evidence:	Strength of Evidence:	Overall Strength of Hypothesis:
Regimes provide transparency (H1)	<p>The liaison system is used in almost every instance</p> <p>UNFICYP investigations of incidents</p> <p>Patrols and monitoring are constant</p> <p>The buffer zone clarifies cease-fire lines, p. 133</p> <p>Bicommunal activities, p. 165</p> <p>NOTE: overall ability to provide transparency weakened by difficulties establishing base truth; buffer zone could work better.</p>	<p>Strong-Weak; depends on incident</p> <p>Depends on incident</p> <p>Depends on incident</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Effects unknown</p>	Moderate/Weak
Regimes spread misinformation (H1')	Because it fears exacerbating tensions (H3'), sometimes UNFICYP does not reveal everything it knows or uncovers; examples on pp. 146, 148, and 157	Moderate/Weak, depending on incident – but UNFICYP is wise to be discrete	Moderate/Weak
Anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2)	Some tactical agreements catalyzed by transparency (construction despiraling, p. 145)	Moderate/Weak	Weak
Anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2')			
Transparency promotes cooperation and prevents conflict (H3)	<p>The buffer zone itself clarifies the status quo and reduces miscalculation, especially compared to pre-1974, p. 133</p> <p>UNFICYP's claim to have prevented clashes by using transparency during 1996 demonstration, p. 164</p> <p>Investigations and verification despiral some construction incidents, p. 145</p> <p>NOTE: Local agreements muddy the base truth, hindering bargains that could calm the buffer zone, and increasing uncertainty and miscalculation, pp. 160, 161.</p>	<p>Moderate/Weak</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Moderate/Weak</p>	Weak

Transparency hinders cooperation and causes conflict (H3')	no evidence		
Transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4)	<p>Sharing information about opposing forces' activities reduced tensions in the early years, p. 132</p> <p>The buffer zone itself clarifies the status quo and reduces miscalculation, especially compared to pre-1974, p. 133</p> <p>UNFICYP refuted atrocity rumors in 1967 crisis, p. 133</p> <p>Investigations and verification despiral some construction incidents, p. 145</p> <p>Some aspects of the U.N.'s Roccas Bastion reports and inspections, and the overall effects of their efforts in this case, p. 149</p> <p>UNFICYP-provided information helps Greek Cypriots accept blame for ill-discipline in lethal shootings, p. 158</p> <p>Local agreements cause misperception, pp. 160, 161</p> <p>UNFICYP defused rumors in 1996 demonstration, p. 164</p>	<p>Moderate</p> <p>Moderate/ Weak</p> <p>Moderate/ Weak</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Failure</p> <p>Moderate</p>	Moderate/ Weak
Transparency confirms fears (H4')	Some aspects of the U.N.'s Roccas Bastion reports and inspections confirmed fears, while the incomplete or overly optimistic U.N. reports imply that more information would have further angered the Greek Cypriot side, p. 149	Moderate/ Weak	Weak
Transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems (H5)	<p>Investigations help get the right people to cease and desist and/or get them in trouble:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in antagonism incidents, p. 141; - in construction incidents, p. 143; - in non-lethal shootings, p. 153 <p>UNFICYP-provided information helps Greek Cypriots take responsibility for ill-discipline in lethal shootings, p. 158</p> <p>UNFICYP's ability to get the Cyprus police to contain demonstrations, p. 165</p> <p>NOTE: Difficulty establishing base truth also limits ability to coerce cheaters and rogues into better behavior pp. 160, 161.</p>	<p>Strong/Weak Depends on incident, but overall:</p> <p>Moderate/ Weak Moderate Weak</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Failure</p>	Moderate/ Weak

Transparency about the regime (or self-transparency) increases its effectiveness (H6)	Sharing information about UNFICYP activities reduced tensions in the early years, p. 132	Moderate	Moderate/ Weak
	UNFICYP explaining why it could not get to the wounded Panayi, p. 158	Moderate	

Coding: **Strong** means that the phenomenon or effect was clear and very influential if not decisive, producing behavior that would be hard to replicate without the regime. **Moderate** means that the phenomenon played a discernible and somewhat influential role. Other factors help explain the outcome. **Weak** means that the phenomenon was probably but only weakly present. Other factors explain most of the outcome. **Failure** means that the regime tried to do something and failed, or that something that the regime did was counterproductive. The **overall** ratings are judgements based on the significance of transparency and its effects for each hypothesis within the context of each case.

Chapter 5: The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) operates a formal and elaborate inspection and arms control regime on the Golan Heights. The numbers of Israeli and Syrian troops, tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft missiles are sharply and explicitly limited in the Areas of Separation and Limitation (AOS/AOLs) dividing the two sides. In addition to regular patrols and monitoring from observation posts, U.N. troops on the Golan inspect 500 Israeli and Syrian military locations on a bi-weekly basis. In theory, these mechanisms should greatly increase transparency. In reality, they do not.

This chapter answers two sets of questions: First, was UNDOF put into place because verification was needed to help seal the cease-fire agreement? This question bears on H2, the hypothesis that contends that the promise of regime-provided transparency can promote cooperation and help adversaries reach peace agreements. I argue that transparency did not help each side agree to the cease fire. Instead, the buffer zone blurred the endstate of the war because it was land that neither side possessed, this helped end haggling over the last ‘square inch’ of land. This blurring or figleaf over the endstate, not transparency, promoted peace.

Second, what does UNDOF monitor and verify and how well does it do so? What incidents does UNDOF confront and how does it deal with them? Do these activities affect relations and help keep the peace between Israel and Syria? Answering these operational questions not only identifies a number of barriers to the provision of transparency, but also calls into question the oft-heard claim that UNDOF is a model peacekeeping operation.¹

¹ See for example, UNDOF's *The Golan Journal*, No. 65, March-April 1996, p. 4 and James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, pp. 333-334. I also heard this claim many times in my interviews. For the record, Syria objects to

This chapter makes two main arguments about transparency. The first is that mechanisms designed to increase transparency may look good on paper, but may not work well in practice. U.N. troops cannot in fact conduct thorough inspections. This provides a cautionary note to a number of arms control agreements currently on the table. Can agreements like the Chemical or Biological weapons conventions really tell us what we need to know?

The second argument is that a regime cannot add value to the information flow when both sides already know more than the regime. The ability of regimes to provide transparency (H1) runs into difficulties when information is hard to gather, and when the regime is operating in an information-rich environment. In contrast, the relatively poor information environments in Namibia and Cambodia help explain the U.N.'s successes with information in those operations.

THE FORMATION OF UNDOF: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE SYRIA - ISRAEL DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS

In the Spring of 1974, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger negotiated a disengagement between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights, bringing an end to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.² The settlement included the creation of UNDOF. UNDOF was supposed to monitor the phased disengagement of forces and withdrawal from the lines of confrontation, observe the cease-fire, and conduct inspections throughout the Area of Separation

the term peacekeeping because they view the Golan Heights as their land. As the Syrians do not want to admit to having lost any land, UNDOF is an observer force overseeing a cease-fire, not a peacekeeping force overseeing a peace agreement. On this, see John Mackinlay's very instructive *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface* (London, Great Britain: Unwin Hyman 1989), pp. 131-132.

² Technically, there had been a cease-fire in the Golan since October 25, 1973. The intensity of the fighting calmed markedly but there were still a number of artillery duels in the months that followed.

and Areas of Limitation to make sure the terms of the cease-fire and disengagement were being respected.³

If either side, or better both sides, needed an UNDOF to be assured of compliance with the cease-fire before they would be willing to sign it, this would provide evidence that the promise of transparency promoted cooperation (H2). This was not the case. Instead, Kissinger's filtering of information helped the negotiations, offering implicit support of H3' which contends that transparency hinders cooperation.

On October 25, a U.N. force was created to help bring peace to the Sinai front of the October War.⁴ This provided something of a model for calming the situation on the Golan Heights, where Syria and Israel were still in conflict. In addition, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) had been monitoring a buffer zone in the Golan since the 1967 war. From the start then, the idea for a U.N. force on the Golan may have been in the air. However, it appears that Syria's first proposal for a disengagement on January 20, 1974 did not mention the U.N. or a buffer zone.⁵

On the other hand, when the Israelis tendered a counteroffer on February 27, their idea was modeled on the Egypt-Israel accord and included a U.N.-monitored Area of Separation and

³ Ensio Siilasvuo, *In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 1967-1979* (London, Great Britain: Hurst and Company, 1992), pp. 255-261.

⁴ Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force II, 1973-1979" in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 133-136.

⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 937-939. This account is not definitive proof that the Syrians had no U.N. role in mind.

Areas of Limitation (AOS and AOL).⁶ The Area of Separation is a buffer zone which separates the two sides. Areas of Limitation flank the two sides of the buffer zone and are where the forces of each side are limited to fixed numbers.

At this point, both sides had proposed forward lines that the other would not accept. Indeed, Kissinger thought that the distance between the two proposals was so great that he did not communicate all the details of each plan to each side for fear that the agitation this would provoke might be enough to break off the negotiations. Even though Israel made some concessions on its original position by March 29, Kissinger continued to filter the information given to each side: “My usual report to all interested parties – a procedure designed to minimize the dangers of suspicions fed by rumors – would be pretty skimpy this time.”⁷ Kissinger revealed “no” aspects of Israel’s original February 27 plan to Syria – skimpy indeed.⁸

Kissinger said in discussing the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement: “In mediation I almost invariably transmitted any proposal about which either side felt strongly, thus reassuring the parties that their viewpoint would receive a fair hearing.” But in the Israel-Syrian negotiations, Kissinger clearly believes that too much transparency would be a bad thing. In maintaining ambiguity, Kissinger is trying to avoid a situation where clearer information would harden positions and hinder bargaining (H3').

⁶ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 964 and William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), p. 208.

⁷ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 1043.

⁸ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 814 (first quote); pp. 965-966 (second quote), emphasis in original. I noted this finesse and nuance in manipulating information at several points in the UNFICYP chapter when UNFICYP personnel withheld telling everything to the opposing forces.

According to Kissinger, the Syrians had embraced a U.N. buffer zone and Areas of Limitation by April 13.⁹ But mutual embrace of these U.N. confidence-building measures did not break the deadlock. Acceptance of steps to increase transparency did not create a turning point, so there is no evidence as yet of anticipated transparency promoting cooperation (H2).

Exacerbated by the fact that each side was governed by relatively weak leaders or coalitions who could not afford the image of giving into the other side, there were serious and difficult disputes that hindered the disengagement agreement. The two sides debated the disposition of a hotly contested town in the Golan called Quneitra, Palestinian terrorism, and prisoner of war issues. In general:

From Kissinger's point of view, the negotiations took the form of an endless series of haggles, and central to every exchange was the question of the Golan. Each village and field, every ridge line and watercourse, was contested step by step; such was the significance of this watershed between the two nations.¹⁰

There were also disputes about what type of U.N. force would be put into place. The Syrians wanted a small unarmed observer group that would not stand out amidst the 20,000 or Syrian civilians that would return to the Golan. These civilians would likely think Syria gained more (or lost less) in the negotiations if the observer group was small. A small group would appear less threatening to the sovereignty Syria claimed on the Golan. On the other hand, Israel wanted as large a force as possible and proposed an armed force of up to 3000 U.N. troops.

⁹ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 1044. It is possible my time line is not accurate. None of the accounts cited in this chapter explicitly examine the role of UNDOF in the negotiations. For example, UNDOF could have appeared earlier in Syria's proposals and simply not been mentioned by Kissinger or the other scholars.

¹⁰ Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, pp. 126-127. Mackinlay notes that even when the two sides went to Geneva to cut the final cease-fire deal, they would not sit at the same table or take part in ritual handshakes and photographs.

Many observers believe that a large force would help Israel solidify its gains on the Golan.¹¹

However, Aronson says that the Israelis wanted a large U.N. force so that it could actually help deter Syria and so that it could do its monitoring effectively.¹²

If Aronson's interpretation is correct, then the part of Israel's argument about monitoring provides evidence that the promise of regime-provided transparency helped bring at least Israel to the peace table (H2). Israel also appears to believe that this transparency would continue to promote peace, perhaps by lessening unwarranted fears (H4) or by deterring the Syrians from provocations if it could not afford being identified as an aggressor in a new conflict, a contention dependent on the power of information to deter aggression (H5).

By May 31, 1974 these various disputes had been sufficiently resolved for a cease-fire and disengagement agreement to be signed. In most of the cited accounts, there is surprisingly scant indication of why each side wanted UNDOF or what benefits they really thought it would bring. Reich offers the most detail on UNDOF's strategic and transparency-related significance (see also Aronson's interpretation above). He says that Israel's generals and strategic planners thought the new lines of defense were as good as the previous, pre-1973 War lines and that the buffer zone and Areas of Limitation "would act as additional inhibiting factors (albeit minor ones) to the outbreak of hostilities." In addition, Reich says that the disengagement agreements, which established UNDOF and specified the exact mechanics of disengagement:

¹¹ See Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: 1978), p. 242, James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, p. 328, Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1089-1090, Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, pp. 130-132, Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 213, Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States - Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1977), pp. 266-267, and Siilasvuo, *In the Service of Peace in the Middle East*, p. 260.

¹² Aronson, *Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East*, p. 242. Aronson also says that the Israelis wanted between 3000-5000 U.N. troops.

significantly diminished the prospects for war by reducing the tension resulting from the unstable postwar troop movements, while setting in motion a possible movement toward further negotiations for a settlement...The general feeling was that the consummation of the two technical agreements improved the prospects for a broader settlement involving the political concepts and attitudes of the parties involved.¹³

It certainly seems likely that UNDOF's establishment helped each side make peace and that the provision of transparency played a role. Reich's argument that UNDOF's monitoring helped reduce tension during the disengagement and that these agreements fostered further movement towards a settlement reinforces support for H2, supports H3 as it shows that transparency promotes peaceful outcomes, and indicates that transparency reduced fears (H4). Adrian Verheul, a political affairs officer in the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations said that transparency is useful only when it is useful and that the 1974 disengagement was one of those times. He said that UNDOF provided information only to the two sides, and the Secretary-General.¹⁴

At the strategic level, neither side wanted war. The promise of these benefits, especially the monitoring (as anticipated by Israel according to Aronson), in turn supports H2 because it helped promote peace.

In a backhanded way, Lieutenant General Siilasvuo, Chairman of the U.N. Military Working Group that determined the technical aspects of UNDOF's deployment, supports the argument that the anticipation of transparency promotes peace (H2). He says:

In everything one could see the deep distrust between the parties and the illusion

¹³ *Quest for Peace*, pp. 267-268.

¹⁴ Interview, April 23, 1996.

that security would increase if only the limitations were defined in great detail and UNDOF had the task of verifying them. It was hard for me to understand such endless distrust and I could hardly bear the continual hair-splitting. A detailed scheme of limitations would not resolve the situation on the Golan or ensure the success of UNDOF. Only increasing trust between Israel and Syria would calm the tension, while UNDOF would succeed only if the parties had the political will, based on mutual interests, to maintain the peace.¹⁵

While he chides Syria and Israel for not seeking a more durable and profound peace, he nonetheless confirms the existence of their fears and their belief (however illusory in his view) that UNDOF's verification would promote peace.

Complementary Explanations

Three other factors contributed to the eventual success of the negotiations and thus vitiate support for H2: Transparency Promotes Cooperation. First, it is clear that the U.S. used significant leverage to make these negotiations succeed. Kissinger put a large amount of personal and U.S. prestige on the line with his exhaustive shuttle diplomacy. In addition, the U.S. combined carrots and sticks by threatening to reassess its relationship with Israel if it did not make reasonable compromises, while hoping to foster compromise by waiving \$1 billion out of \$2.2 billion that Israel owed the U.S. for arms purchases. President Nixon was prepared to make even larger adjustments in aid to help get both sides to make concessions.¹⁶ Kissinger and Nixon applied pressure with threats of public embarrassment if Israel blocked an accord and subsequent

¹⁵ *In the Service of Peace*, p. 265.

¹⁶ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1056-1057, Quandt, *Peace Process*, pp. 210-212, and Siilasvuo, *In the Service of Peace in the Middle East*, p. 261.

loss of the U.S. public's support as well as with threats to suspend the negotiations after having promised Quneitra to Syria (thus giving Syria real reason to want to continue the negotiations and gain this prize).¹⁷

Second, the disengagement agreement had benefits for both sides, independent of UNDOF's inclusion in the agreement. The agreement pushed Israel back from the 1973 war's Saassa salient, only twenty-five miles from Damascus. Syria also gained back some of the land it had lost in 1967, especially Quneitra – a key bargaining goal for Syria. Aronson argues that the turning point in the disengagement negotiation was on May 16 when Israel agreed to cede Quneitra and let it become part of the Syrian administered U.N. demilitarized zone (Syria accepted on May 18).¹⁸ This concession also allowed Syria to paint the agreement as a success and a step towards further concessions. For Israel, the agreement put an end to a costly war while it still retained very good positions in the Golan.¹⁹ Finally, the U.S. made various security guarantees to each side that reduced the risks of the agreement. This included supporting Israel's right to retaliate for any terrorism staged from Syrian territory against Israel and U.S. promises to Syria that Israel would place no heavy weapons on the hills surrounding Quneitra.²⁰

Third, UNDOF's most important role in the negotiations may have resulted from putting a figleaf over the final territorial disposition, not transparency. UNDOF's areas of responsibility

¹⁷ Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 255-257.

¹⁸ Aronson, *Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East*, p. 242. See also Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1079-1089.

¹⁹ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1079-1110 and Reich, *Quest for Peace*, pp. 266-267.

²⁰ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 1088 and Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, pp. 258-259.

were adjusted several times in the course of negotiations and I argue that both sides were able to make territorial concessions to UNDOF which they could not make to each other. They could allow UNDOF to control and patrol land (i.e. have the land become part of the Area of Separation or Areas of Limitation) that they could not give to the other side. Kissinger makes this point at several junctures. In *Years of Upheaval*, Kissinger says:

Having let [his aide] Shihabi agree to a UN buffer zone, Asad now informed me it was unnecessary to have zones of limited armaments as well – to which Shihabi had also agreed. But it was inconceivable that Israel would tolerate having the main force of the Syrian army follow it into territories evacuated as a result of the agreement. I was thus faced with two conditions certain to blow up the negotiations: If Israel maintained its view about the location of the line of separation, the negotiation would collapse in Damascus. If Asad insisted on his second thought about zones of limited armaments, the shuttle would come to a halt in Jerusalem.²¹

In the end, Israel did agree to move the line of separation, but it could only do so because Syria agreed to have Areas of Limitation. UNDOF's Areas of Separation and Limitation meant that Syrian troops would not follow Israel's withdrawal and occupy all the territory Israel gave up. UNDOF's impending existence seems to have facilitated compromise by creating a figleaf effect that took the edge off an otherwise tightly zero-sum negotiation. The figleaf meant that each side did not have to end the negotiation with a bargain that explicitly gave every square inch on the Golan Heights to one side or the other. The figleaf created by UNDOF's zone enlarged each side's apparent win-set while reducing apparent losses, allowing each side to make territorial 'compromises' to the zone that they could not to each other. It also made the agreement easier to sell domestically. A pretty neat trick when there is haggling over each meter

²¹ p. 1047.

-- an apparent indivisible zero-sum game if there ever was one.

Similarly, the whole point of Kissinger's use of the "United States Proposal" was that each side could seem to be agreeing with the U.S., and not with each other.²² In addition, the reason Kissinger had to engage in shuttle diplomacy in the first place is because the two sides refused to talk face-to-face. The negotiation itself necessitated a third party.²³

The Quneitra issue was central in the disengagement negotiations and resolving it was the main turning point.²⁴ Discussion of UNDOF's role was an integral part of the Quneitra negotiations that preceded the turning point. For example, on May 2, Israel's Moshe Dayan formulated a proposal in which "the Israeli line of separation be pulled West a bit (by broadening the UN buffer zone) so that the eastern part of Quneitra could be given to Syria." On May 14, Assad counter-proposed "to divide the hills west of Quneitra between Israel (on the Western slopes) and Syria (on the Eastern slopes), with the ridge under UN control."²⁵ These proposals underscore the importance of the U.N.'s lines and the placement of the buffer zone in the negotiations over Quneitra.

The evidence about this third point shows that when each side considered compromises in the Golan and in particular around Quneitra, they considered UNDOF's future lines and zones of

²² In *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 1079-1099. The obviousness of the purpose this proposal is shown by Kissinger putting the term in quotes to help indicate that it is being used as a figleaf term to help the negotiations. A "United States Proposal" was also used in the Sinai negotiations.

²³ One area for further transparency research is the role of third party mediators. In contrast with the Concert which was a passive forum, third party mediators can be seen as active forums which make sure information is exchanged. While not a one-man security regime, Kissinger and his shuttle diplomacy can be viewed as an active forum whose effectiveness was due in part to the provision of transparency.

²⁴ Aronson, *Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East*, p. 242.

²⁵ First quote, Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 1057; second, p. 1075, emphasis in the original. See also p. 1090.

control. Further, it is clear that contrivances were necessary to help each side compromise and even negotiate. Thus, I argue that UNDOF's Areas of Separation and Limitation lines facilitated compromise because, when they were manipulated, each side could appear to be making way for something other than its enemy's border. This does not mean that the positions of the lines were not taken seriously, just that having UNDOF lines to negotiate over made moving the lines seem like less of a zero-sum game. I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin argue that ambiguity is "usually" the key to agreements because it allows both sides to claim some degree of victory.²⁶ This does not necessarily support the contention that anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2'), but it is another way in which transparency and uncertainty reduction can have downsides.

In conclusion, there is some evidence that the strategic and transparency benefits promised by UNDOF's creation encouraged the successful disengagement negotiations. However, the negotiations were also successful because of U.S. leverage and because the agreements were mutually beneficial. The strategic and transparency benefits are not mutually exclusive, but the number of complementary factors certainly dilutes support for H2, which contends that the promise of transparency can help adversaries cooperate.

Finally, deliberate opacity and ambiguity – not transparency – also played a significant role in UNDOF's creation. The first example is Kissinger's filtered reporting during the negotiations. The second is the figleaf effect created by the Areas of Separation and Limitation that lessened the zero-sum nature of the bargaining over territory. Without these steps, clarity

²⁶ in "Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation," in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., *Power and Negotiation* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 286-287.

would have increased tensions. When transparency increases tensions during bargaining, this supports H3'.

UNDOF'S MANDATE AND OPERATIONS

UNDOF's creation and mandate was part of the May 31, 1974 separation of forces agreement and protocol between Israel and Syria. Its name, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and strength of 1250 troops combined elements of Israeli and Syrian demands (see above).²⁷ UNDOF was tasked to maintain and observe the cease-fire and to supervise and inspect the Areas of Separation and Limitation. The exact details of the disengagement and specific limitations in the Areas of Limitation were worked out by the U.N. Military Working Group and signed on June 5 in Geneva.

No Syrian or Israeli armed forces were allowed in the 80 kilometer long and 15 km to 300m wide Area of Separation (buffer zone). However, Syrian civilians were permitted to return to towns and land in the Areas of Separation and Limitation, and Syrian police were allowed to help provide law and order in this Syrian administered area. Three layers of Areas of Limitation were established on each side. In the Areas of Limitation closest to the Area of Separation, two brigades' worth of armed forces were allowed on each side, with specific limits set on tank (75), short range 122mm or less artillery (36), and 6000 total troops. In the middle Areas of Limitation, 162 artillery pieces were allowed with a maximum range of 20 kilometers, 450 tanks

²⁷ UNDOF is supplemented by 80-90 observers from UNTSO. While I go into some of the details of the operational and organizational relationship between UNDOF and UNTSO, the reader can refer to the subsequent cites in this chapter for more information on this somewhat baroque arrangement.

were allowed, and there were no limits on personnel. Finally, from the Area of Separation to the outer Area of Limitation, no surface to air missiles were allowed.²⁸ Table 5-1 below depicts the summarizes this agreement:

Table 5-1: Summary of the Areas of Separation and Limitation²⁹

<----- Israeli side/Syrian side ----->

Outer Area of Limitation (zone 20 to 25 kilometers from AOS)	Middle Area of Limitation (zone 10 to 20 kilometers from AOS)	Inner Area of Limitation (first 10 kilometers from AOS)	Area of Separation (a.k.a. buffer zone; width varies – See map 5-1)	Inner Area of Limitation (first 10 kilometers from AOS)	Middle Area of Limitation (zone 10 to 20 kilometers from AOS)	Outer Area of Limitation (zone 20 to 25 kilometers from AOS)
Limits: no surface to air missiles. No limits on soldiers, tanks, or artillery.	Limits: 450 tanks; 162 short range artillery pieces; no surface to air missiles. No limits on soldiers.	Limits: 6000 soldiers; 75 tanks; 36 short range artillery pieces; no surface to air missiles.		Limits: 6000 soldiers; 75 tanks; 36 short range artillery pieces; no surface to air missiles.	Limits: 450 tanks; 162 short range artillery pieces; no surface to air missiles. No limits on soldiers.	Limits: no surface to air missiles. No limits on soldiers, tanks, or artillery.

From June 14 to June 27, 1974, UNDOF monitored and verified the phased withdrawal that took the forces on each side down to the specified levels in the Area of Separation and Areas of Limitation. The disengagement was successful and peaceful. Siilasvuo notes no problems,

²⁸ This section has so far drawn from: Ghali, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," pp. 152-155, Siilasvuo, *In the Service of Peace*, pp. 260-269 as well as its appendix 8a "Separation of Forces Agreement," 31 May, 1974, appendix 8b, "Protocol concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," and appendix 9, "Statement by the Chairman as agreed by the parties [operational plan for UNDOF]," pp. 369-374, and United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 73-75.

²⁹ Adapted from Mackinlay, *Peacekeepers*, p. 129

save for a mine accident that killed four Austrian peacekeepers.³⁰

After overseeing the initial disengagement, UNDOF turned to delineating the Areas of Separation and Limitation. Clarity about these areas would provide a base or commonly accepted truth, similar to the buffer zone on Cyprus. UNDOF had some difficulties measuring and marking the lines for the Area of Separation, in part because there were no map experts among the U.N.'s military observers (Siilasvuo hoped that, in the future, professional surveyors could do the job). The ambiguities only led to minor disputes, even though some persist. This contrasts with Cyprus, where the same difficulties, in the same year, 1974, led to various more severe incidents and continued disputes in and along the buffer zone.³¹ Cease-fire lines created

³⁰ Ghali, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," p. 159, James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, p. 331, Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, p. 136, Siilasvuo, *In the Service of Peace*, pp. 269-271 and 371-374, and United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 77. UNDOF helped as well with the sensitive issue of repatriation of POWs and war-dead. Unfortunately, according to Mackinlay, there is no official record of how UNDOF contributed on the ground to the success of the disengagement and Siilasvuo's account -- the next most likely source -- says little about the operation as well (as do the others). One can imagine that this was a time when UNDOF's ability to provide transparency could have been quite important to calming tensions and preventing miscalculation (H3 and H4). The calm success of the disengagement could indicate UNDOF's success or show that it was unnecessary.

³¹ When I visited, UNDOF was trying to fix these problems with what they called pinpointing operations in conjunction with U.N. Military Observers (UNMOs) from UNTSO. They were re-measuring the lines and trying to put the numbered barrels that mark these lines precisely where they should be. The barrels are often moved or removed by locals, but this is not too serious because UNDOF photographs the locations of the barrels.

The story of the lines is in Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, p. 137. Because of its similarities with what happened on Cyprus, it is worth summarizing. Mackinlay notes that the Military Working Group (MWG) in Geneva had only been able to negotiate the boundary lines down to at best 100 meters and that every terrain feature on the Golan was bitterly fought over in the war and in Geneva. To finalize the exact locations and lines agreed on in the negotiation, the MWG worked with four 1:100,000 maps and thick pencils. The lines subtended several hundred (often at least 300) meters. The four maps were from different series or editions, so they did not align well, and their inaccuracies made them inadequate for field use. Later, on 6/9/74, the Israelis provided 1:50,000 maps with their own version of the Area of Separation lines marked. These were agreed to by non-specialized UNDOF staff, but rejected by the Syrians. On 7/20/74, an American DMATL 1:50,000 map was provided and this was agreed to by the Syrians. It is now the official UNDOF map and is regarded by the Israelis as accurate. That said, the Israeli defense forces do not recognize the UNDOF map and vice-versa and this has led to a number of compromises over the years. I have supplemented Mackinlay's with information primarily from UNDOF's standard operating procedures (SOPs), dated January 1994 (copy made January 1995), p. 3-10; and also from interviews with UNDOF personnel on May 22, 1996, a briefing by UNTSO Captain Richard Deschambault (Canada), Military Public Information Officer (MPIO), May 20, 1996, and a briefing by UNTSO Captain Sander Luijten, (Netherlands), May 20, 1996.

in the summer of 1974 appear to be of poor quality. Uncertainty about the base truth leads to disputes and hinders the ability of peacekeepers to provide transparency.

Monitoring and Verification

To monitor the Area of Separation and verify the absence of troops within it (the heart of H1: Regimes Provide Transparency), UNDOF used to staff some 30 permanent positions and 17 other observation posts, but is currently shrinking the number of permanent positions to 17. It will use the freed-up forces to boost foot and vehicular patrols in the Area of Separation.³² These armed observer forces are supplemented by unarmed UNTSO observers who permanently staff 11 observation posts along the Area of Separation lines.³³ Map 5-1 shows how these forces are deployed, as well as some of the patrol routes.³⁴ The triangles are UNTSO observation posts and the circles are UNDOF positions.³⁵

³² Interview, Susan Allee, Senior Political Affairs Officer and desk officer for UNDOF, U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 16, 2003. A current map of UNDOF is available here: <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/undof.pdf>>>, but it does not indicate any shrinkage in the number of observation posts as of July 17, 2003.

³³ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 76-78; and United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force*, S/2003/655. UNDOF now numbers 1060, including 372 Austrian, 357 Polish, 191 Canadian and 94 Slovakian troops. Japan contributes 45 soldiers, which for them marks a significant foray into peacekeeping. UNTSO observer officers number 78, and because each of the eleven UNTSO OPs is supposed to be staffed by two officers from different countries, the UNTSO force is made up of 20+ nationalities. UNDOF cost \$41 million from July 2002 through June 2003.

³⁴ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 79.

³⁵ Thanks to the hospitality of UNDOF, UNTSO, and their host countries, I was able to spend ten days in Syria and Israel visiting U.N. offices in Jerusalem, Damascus, and Tiberias as well as Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani in the Golan Heights, and positions 10, 71, 16, 60, 52, and 55 (in North - South order). These positions cover the entire length of the AOS, except for the heights of Mt. Hermon. See map 5-1, p. 190).

Map 5-1, UNDOF and UNTSO Positions

One must examine the details of UNDOF's inspection system to assess how well UNDOF is able to gather information and provide transparency. To verify the Areas of Limitation, UNDOF, using UNTSO observers, conducts biweekly inspections of at least 500 Syrian and Israeli positions. The U.N. observers are accompanied by liaison officers from whichever side they are inspecting. According to UNDOF's standard operating procedures (SOPs), inspectors are not supposed to physically count the troops at each base in the first 10 kilometer Area of Limitation. Instead, they ask for head-counts from the local commander. In the first and second 10 kilometer zones, tanks are supposed to be counted by the inspectors, and they are supposed to distinguish between combat tanks, fixed tanks, and support tanks. APCs are ignored. Artillery pieces are counted, and these are to be distinguished by range or caliber. MLRS systems count as one artillery piece. In all zones, surface to air missiles are automatic violations to be reported. Inspectors are not allowed to be intrusive during inspections, meaning that they can not go into buildings. They can only count what they can see out in the open.³⁶

After inspections, UNDOF reports the results to both sides. To the violators, it gives fairly specific information: the exact type and number of the offending weapon(s) and personnel and their location down to 1000 yards. The other side receives more general information about the category of the violation (although UNDOF can apparently threaten to release more specific information if the violator does not comply with the agreed limits). For political reasons, even if reports of violations are made public, the identity of the violating side is never released. Even though violators remain cloaked, this shaded reporting system shows that UNDOF understands that it can use information to coerce potential violators into backing down and thus offers modest

³⁶ UNDOF SOPs, p. 3-37.

support for H5.

With their clear zones and limitations on capabilities, the Areas of Separation and Limitation should greatly increase transparency and offer strong support for H1. However, there are five operational problems with the inspection system, the first three of which are built into the non-intrusive and rigid SOPs for the inspections. These problems offer lessons for improvement of UNDOF, and other operations.

First, the inspectors have to trust the troop figures that the local Israeli and Syrian commanders give them. Second, inspectors can only count weapons that are visible. Combined, these points indicate that the inspections are less thorough and precise than carefully calibrated AOS and AOL limits imply. On paper, the limitations are clear and specific. In practice, the inspections can not ensure compliance.

Third, there are no surprise inspections, and the routinization of the biweekly inspections allows for exploitation of the SOPs by the Israelis in particular. Several sources mentioned that the Israelis sometimes take advantage of the rigid biweekly inspection schedule to move weapons up for exercises and then move them back to avoid the inspections. Despite the fact that several high level UNDOF and UNTSO officials were aware of this problem, the “fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the areas of limitation” continue with the same routine.³⁷

When the Israelis move equipment forward to conduct exercises in between inspections, this indicates disrespect for the AOL limits, and shows that the Israelis ultimately choose military readiness over compliance as their fundamental priority. It seems probable that if UNDOF tried to be more intrusive, or if they randomized their inspections to better catch the Israelis, then the

³⁷ S/2003/655, para. 3.

Israelis would restrict UNDOF's freedom of movement and would exercise anyway. This point is reinforced by the Israeli response to violence in the Shab'a farms area near Mount Hermon, just above the northern perimeter of UNDOF's area of operations. In late 2000 and into 2001, conflict erupted between Israel and Hizbollah. Israel shut down UNDOF's freedom of movement in its northern area (Area 6), even though the Shab'a farms is technically in the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) area of operations. When the violence lessened after a number of months, UNDOF's freedom of movement was restored.³⁸ When push comes to shove, UNDOF gets shoved out of the way.

Fourth, both sides routinely deny the inspectors some freedom of movement in the AOL and access to areas that should be inspected (the intelligence gathering stations, in particular). This difficulty is just as routinely reported in the *Reports of the Secretary-General* on UNDOF. Denial of access reveals the physical limits of UNDOF ability to gather information and provide transparency (H1). Fifth, both sides commit 'permanent violations,' which refer to the forward locations of some of the early warning and surveillance posts.

There are several problems with the monitoring/OP system as well. Although UNDOF's buffer zone is fairly short at 80 kilometers, there are still not enough troops or technology to provide round-the-clock, all weather, very high confidence monitoring. Several factors bear this out. According to UNDOF's Force Commander, Major-General Johannes C. Kusters (Netherlands), the night vision equipment is inadequate. In his 1989 book, Mackinlay wrote that there was no night vision equipment at all, and it is uncertain whether better night vision gear is

³⁸ S/2001/499, para 2; S/22001/1079; and *Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*, January 22, 2001, S/2001/66.

included in the 2002-2005 three year modernization plan.³⁹ Even if they were better equipped, the OPs are not sufficiently staffed to provide complete surveillance. This is in particular true of the two officers in the UNTSO OPs who can scarcely be expected (and they are not) to maintain a constant watch during their lengthy shifts. Several peacekeepers told me that at night and/or in the fog, smugglers often come quite close to UNDOF/UNTSO OPs (as they must because of the OPs' locations and/or the locations of mine fields). Mackinlay also wrote of 'reports' that neither side wants to see the surveillance equipment of UNDOF updated. This would seem to downgrade the stock they place in UNDOF's provision of transparency.⁴⁰ However, advanced monitoring technology is rarely used in any peacekeeping operation, so UNDOF's experience may simply be par for the course.⁴¹

Given UNDOF's political constraints, it might be hard for it to be more intrusive or to upgrade its information-gathering capabilities. UNDOF (and the U.N. more generally) is too politically weak relative to Syria and Israel to bargain its way to a new deal or status of forces agreement (SOFA). U.N. operations deploying to the developing world may be able to wield greater leverage and be able to arrange better inspection regimes.

Some of UNDOF's inspection and monitoring problems are not as severe as appearances suggest. First, both sides generally keep so far below the agreed limits that there is virtually no question about compliance. Typical personnel counts are about 2000, where 6000 are permitted.

³⁹ Kusters, interview, May 21, 1996. Major R. H. Chase (U.S. Marines), said that the AN/PVS-5/7s which were available have limited depth perception, conversation, May 30, 1996. Interview, Susan Allee, Senior Political Affairs Officer and desk officer for UNDOF, U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 16, 2003.

⁴⁰ *The Peacekeepers*, pp. 141 and 151.

⁴¹ Salerno, et. al., "Enhanced Peacekeeping with Monitoring Technologies" and Dorn, "Blue Sensors."

Equipment is generally at 40-60% of allowed levels.⁴² Even if the counts are off by fifty percent, the troops would still be one-third below the limit, equipment one-quarter below. Second, one would predict that if either side thought the other was committing a violation (or cared about it), then they would report it to UNDOF and request a special inspection. However, this almost never happens. According Major-General Kusters, in the one and a half years he had led UNDOF, there had not been a single request for a special inspection and this was because both sides trusted that UNDOF was doing its work. “They never argue our verification.”⁴³

Had any of the above-mentioned operational problems caused serious disputes, UNDOF’s ability to provide transparency (H1) would be clearly called into question, and its operational flaws might increase tensions on the Golan. But they do not cause disputes. The fact that UNDOF’s inspection reports are accepted unchallenged could mean that UNDOF is sufficiently accurate with its monitoring, does provide some level of transparency, and that H1 receives some support. After all, if UNDOF was inaccurate, or if one side committed unacceptable violations that the other side detected and UNDOF did not, then we would likely see more calls for special inspections. The counterargument is that unchallenged acceptance of UNDOF’s inspection reports could mean that the inspections do not matter very much. I think the latter is more true, because of the frequency with which I heard about Israeli violations during exercises, and the

⁴² Captain Deschambault, May 20, 1996.

⁴³ Interview, May 21, 1996. It was difficult evoking any stories at any level of UNDOF or UNTSO about problems on the Golan serious enough for either side to call on UNDOF to go fix or investigate things (quite a contrast with Cyprus where UNFICYP intervenes on a daily basis). Still, at lower levels of authority, some stories emerged about one side or the other calling on UNDOF to help solve a problem. One UNDOF company commander thought that perhaps one or two times a month one side would complain about some suspected military problem on the other side. For example, on the night before this interview, the Golan Israel Defense Force Liaison Officer (GILO) reported about 20 mysterious searchlights to UNDOF. UNDOF sent out a ready reaction patrol. The problem turned out to be the headlights on a farmer’s tractor. And so it goes on the Golan. These examples are on the local or field level. They are not examples of either side calling the AOL inspections into question.

frequency with which I heard that neither side protests. This contrasts with Cyprus where both sides protest every minor violation.

Things do not change much on the Golan Heights. There was only one publically revealed protest from the mid-1990s to 2003 in the bi-annual *Reports of the Secretary-General* on UNDOF. In late 1997-early 1998, Israel protested that the way the Syrians were re-arranging rocks in an agricultural project might have military benefits. In response to the protest, Syria removed some of the new stone walls. No other such incidents were reported in the fourteen Secretary-General reports from May 1996 to June 2003.⁴⁴ Even during a period of tension which raised the possibility of armed conflict in Fall of 1996, the U.N. reported that forces and armaments remained “well below” their respective ceilings in the Areas of Limitation.⁴⁵ Overall, since my field research in 1996, “pretty much nothing” has changed for UNDOF.⁴⁶

On the positive side, the facts that personnel and equipment levels are always below allowed limits and that the opposing forces never refute or question the inspection reports and verification indicate that levels of tension are fairly low on the Golan Heights.⁴⁷ While it is good for the Golan that miscalculation and fear (H3 and H4) do not seem to be much in play, this makes it is hard to judge the effects of UNDOF’s activities by examining variance in the levels of

⁴⁴ See S/1998/391. The reports I surveyed are: S/1996/959; S/1997/372; S/1997/884; S/1998/391; S/1998/1073; S/1999/575; S/1999/1175; S/2000/459; S/2000/1103; S/2001/499; S/2001/1079; S/2002/542; S/2002/1328; and S/2003/655.

⁴⁵ S/1996/959.

⁴⁶ Interview, Susan Allee, Senior Political Affairs Officer and desk officer for UNDOF, U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 16, 2003.

⁴⁷ To further underscore the lack of tension on the Golan, while the Israelis conduct real exercises on the Golan, one UNTSO official said that Syrian exercises consist of forty men, one rifle, and half a bullet. I heard several other tales of woe about the state of Syrian forces on the Golan. Syria sends its best troops to Lebanon and also harbors significant fears of Turkey. Some suggested that one reason that the Golan is so peaceful is that Syria is (was) able to harass Israel through Lebanon.

tensions.

In sum, although there are a number of reasons why doubt is cast on the ability of UNDOF to provide transparency (H1), these problems turn out not to substantially affect UNDOF's operations. It is possible that transparency may not be all that important to UNDOF.

Violations

There are a number of categories of possible violations that UNDOF confronts, including military entry into the Area of Separation, overflights, firing into or across the Area of Separation, military construction in the Area of Separation, and civilian crossings of the wrong A and B lines (the A line is the Israeli side of the AOS; the B line is the Syrian side). Military entry into the Area of Separation does occur from time to time, but these incidents are of little consequence. The same is true of overflights. For example, sometimes Syrian vehicles take shortcuts through the Area of Separation. Unlike on Cyprus, violators usually have a practical excuse for these minor violations (or they are lazy), and they are not trying to annoy UNDOF or Israel. Israel commits less of these violations because a mildly electrified touch-sensitive, alert-sending technical fence runs the length of their side of the buffer zone (actually, the fence is a short distance in from the A line, often as close as 200-300 meters, but also sometimes kilometers away).⁴⁸

According to UNTSO Lt. Colonel Ray Martin, the head of Observer Group Golan - Tiberias, there had not been a major violation in 22 years. He attributed this to a clear mandate,

⁴⁸ Israeli patrols generally arrive within five minutes after the fence is touched.

to a system that was “very transparent” in that everyone knows where everything is, to the cooperation of both sides, and to UNDOF’s deterrent effect. He made an analogy that UNDOF was like a police car on a highway. If people see the police car, they will slow down. When asked if the U.N. had made peace work on the Golan, he said it was a chicken and egg problem: “Who can tell?”⁴⁹

This brings us to sheep. By far the largest problem UNDOF faces, at least in numerical terms, is sheep and shepherd violations. Shepherds become violators if they go beyond the grazing line, which runs between the Israeli A line and the Israeli technical fence. They are often motivated to do so, because this forbidden zone often contains good grazing land. Sheep are technically not violations, but as shepherds often follow their sheep, errant sheep are often good indicators of soon-to-be errant humans. At least two sources said they constituted ninety-nine percent of all violations (the other one percent are unidentified civilians, sometimes defectors, according to one of these sources). Another source indicated that there were 100-130 sheep and shepherd violations a week. And at the UNTSO morning briefing I went to in Tiberias (May 30, 1996), the briefer said that there had been six civilian and twenty-one shepherd violations in the last day.

UNDOF’s response to these violators is to send out a patrol and persuade the shepherds to return to their side of the line. UNDOF’s patrols use various placards with appropriate messages in local languages to help them with this and other tasks. These incidents are reported to UNDOF, but typically not to the U.N. in New York.

⁴⁹ In this May 30, 1996 briefing and interview, Martin also noted that things could change very quickly on the Golan Heights. During Israel’s Grapes of Wrath Operation in Lebanon (only twenty kilometers from the Golan), some Syrian military forces crossed the B line and within ninety seconds, two Israeli F-16s came flying along the A line.

These incidents can be serious, especially for the sheep and shepherds involved. Often, they move into heavily mined area, and the sheep or shepherds become purple clouds (in the words of UNDOF soldiers). Sometimes the shepherds move the mines onto UNDOF patrol paths. In other cases, Israeli soldiers will shoot warning shots to shoo away the approaching sheep and shepherds. Sheep are shot on a fairly regular basis by Israelis wary of terrorists and bombs which can appear in any guise. When UNDOF sends out a ready reaction patrol to reign in shepherds, it is more of a humanitarian than peacekeeping gesture.⁵⁰

The reason that there are so few problems on the Golan is that neither side wants problems. This point was underscored when Israel fought Syria in Lebanon in 1982, and while Israel built up its forces on the Golan, Syria actually drew down its Golan forces. It is implausible to believe that Syria did this because UNDOF's 1200 troops provided a shield or contributed to Syria's threat assessments. Instead, war itself on the Golan appeared implausible to Syria, despite the fact that Syria and Israel were fighting heavily only a short distance away.⁵¹ Likewise, both sides seemed to gloss over a shooting incident on January 8, 2003. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shot two Syrian soldiers in civilian clothing who had passed beyond the AOS and were approaching the Israeli technical fence. One died and one was wounded. UNDOF recovered the body from the IDF the next day; and Israel returned the wounded Syrian to Syria via UNDOF. The Syrians were apparently in a wadi they had used for washing clothes for years, so something went wrong somewhere. There were perfunctory protests, but both sides

⁵⁰ The source for these last paragraphs is briefing, Captain Deschambault, May 20, 1996; interview, Captain Ken-ichi Kawazu, Japan, Deputy MPIO, May 20, 1996; interview, Lt. Colonel Mats Torping, Sweden, Chief, Observer Group Golan, May 21, 1996, and other interviews. See also Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, p. 144.

⁵¹ Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Ina Friedman ed. and trans., *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 117-118 and 155; and Yair Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue* (London, Great Britain: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 190.

cooperated readily with the U.N., and a U.N. official noted that neither side allowed the incident to escalate.⁵²

Finally, it may be that the fact of physical distance provided by the Areas of Separation and Limitation promotes peace. Physical distance, coupled with the UNDOF-monitored arms control agreement of the Areas of Limitation, offers some assurance to each side that the other side was not building up for an attack. Breaking the AOL's limits could signal an impending attack, and avoiding that signal complicates attack planning. Seen this way, monitored physical distance offers stability in part because transparency is helping each side calculate more clearly (H3), calming fears (H4), while helping deter attacks as UNDOF might identify the aggressor (H5). Distance also shifts the offense/defense balance towards the defense by making it easier for the defense to anticipate and plan. The case of Cyprus demonstrates that physical proximity allows the opposing forces a number of ways to harass each other, methods that would not be available if the buffer zone was wider (slingshotting, stone throwing, verbal insults, etc). Incidents are most frequent where the buffer zone is narrow (as in Nicosia) and diminish where it is thicker. The 2½ mile wide buffer zone in Korea certainly does not prevent all antagonisms and more severe incidents, but things would likely be worse if it were narrower.

Scholar and Practitioner Assessments of UNDOF and the Role of Transparency

If UNDOF is supposed to provide transparency, it must be able to add value to each

⁵² Report of a briefing from Kieran Prendergast, United Nations Security Council, S/PV.4685 January 16, 2003; David Rudge, "Captured Soldier, body of second returned to Syria," *Jerusalem Post*, January 10, 2003; and Hua Jiang, "Highlights of the Noon Briefing; UN: Situation Returns to Normal Following Shooting in Golan Area," January 10, 2003. Also, interview, Susan Allee, Senior Political Affairs Officer and desk officer for UNDOF, U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 16, 2003.

side's own threat assessments. Thus, a central question is how much transparency UNDOF can add to what each side already knows or can learn. Mackinlay argues that when UNDOF was deployed in 1974, UNDOF's monitoring ability may have been "as effective as that of the Syrian and Israeli armies." This situation has changed as both sides rebuilt and improved their intelligence-gathering capabilities, while those of UNDOF remained largely stagnant. Mackinlay says that this means that neither side relies much on UNDOF's monitoring, except to the extent that it serves as a backup.⁵³ However, he adds that the two sides can communicate through UNDOF if there are problems in the Areas of Separation and Limitation (as shown above, this does not happen much). Mackinlay and UNDOF's Force Commander (and several other UNDOF and UNTSO officers in interviews) agree that, even though both sides have adequate intelligence, the Israelis have a much better picture of what goes on on the Golan than the Syrians.⁵⁴ This discussion suggests that, in terms of strategic threat assessment, there is little that UNDOF can add to each sides' unilateral capabilities, especially to the Israelis.

One high ranking UNDOF officer said that "UNDOF clarifies all real or supposed violations, but we don't have many serious violations here." He added that both sides are aware that serious violations would threaten the peace process.⁵⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Torping, whose

⁵³ On the argument that UNDOF serves as intelligence backup, the Deputy Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Colonel Jaako Oksanen, Sweden, made something of a counterpoint by suggesting that, because each side knows pretty much what the numbers are (especially on their own sides, of course), UNDOF's inspections can be seen as tests of UNDOF. Interview, May 28, 1996. UNDOF only reports specifics to the inspected side.

⁵⁴ Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, p. 151. Interview, Major-General Kusters, May 21, 1996. Mackinlay says that the Syrians and Israelis both have huge surveillance towers on the Golan. From what I could tell, they are not equivalent. The Israeli observation stations are much more prominent and there are at least two huge stations atop the dominant point of Mt. Hermon, as well as several others on top of Hills throughout the Golan. Mackinlay also noted that it is a "popular joke among the UN troops that with these [surveillance] devices the Syrians and Israelis can not only pick out individual soldiers in the Area of Separation but read the nametags on their shirts," p. 150.

⁵⁵ Interview, May 21, 1996.

experience with UNDOF spanned eleven years, said that Syria and Israel “want a guarantee that the other side won’t take unexpected steps and they know that neither side has tried anything for 20 years.” He also said that the U.N. has been doing its job in a good way, but that it was more important that both sides want peace and trust the U.N.⁵⁶ Major-General Kusters cautioned not to make too much of the confidence-building effects of UNDOF; the chance of conflict is very low and UNDOF’s force is only “barbed wire and nothing more.”⁵⁷ Zenon Carnapas, UNTSO’s Senior Advisor, said that with UNDOF/UNTSO the two sides get an objective opinion about each side respecting the Geneva agreement. He thought that if UNTSO were withdrawn it might serve as a political trigger.⁵⁸ With the exception of Force Commander Kusters, the general sense I got from high level U.N. staff was that they believed they were increasing transparency (H1), and thereby lowering already low levels of fear about supposed violations and unexpected steps (H4).

Alan James says that the inspections “are a means of helping to keep anxiety at a somewhat lower level than it would otherwise reach and as such are of value” (H4).⁵⁹ Mackinlay argues that UNDOF’s liaison system provides a “limited but important diplomatic link between the Syrians and the Israelis.” By facilitating communication, this may be another way UNDOF increases transparency (H1). He notes that UNDOF “will certainly cry the alarm to the whole world if either opponent force attempts to maneuver to regain the Golan.” If fears of the alarm deterred the attempt, it would support H6 as an example of information deterring or coercing

⁵⁶ Interview, May 21, 1996.

⁵⁷ Interview, May 21, 1996.

⁵⁸ Interview, May 27, 1996.

⁵⁹ James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, p. 332.

aggressors.⁶⁰

Something like this happened in the case of the U.N. Emergency Force I. When Egypt asked UNEF I to leave the Sinai/Gaza armistice line with Israel in 1967, it helped signal impending conflict and helped identify the aggressor.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers*, pp. 150 and 152.

⁶¹ Mona Ghali, "United Nations Emergency Force I," in Durch, ed., *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 124-125; James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, pp. 220-223; Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, *Thin Blue Line*, pp. 58-70; and Stein, "Detection and Defection," p. 620.

Conclusion

UNDOF is the most formal arms control and verification mission in this study, and it offers a number of insights about transparency. First, the promise of transparency was not crucial to each side's willingness to accept U.N. forces on the Golan, and mostly seemed a factor only for Israel. Thus, the hypothesis that the anticipation of transparency promotes cooperation, H2, received modest to weak support. Superpower leverage was the biggest factor that led to the U.N. monitoring of the cease-fire.

Second, there was evidence that the management and selective communication of information promoted peace. Kissinger edited and withheld information as he shuttled between Israel and Syria. Indeed, these adversaries might have deadlocked had they known how far apart their respective positions were at certain points. This supports H3' because here incomplete information promotes cooperation. One way to view Kissinger's diplomacy is as an active forum where the information between states is transmitted and manipulated by an outside actor; he also had the leverage and power of the U.S. at his disposal.

Third, even though H2 receives little support, the buffer zone created by UNDOF's deployment helped each side make territorial compromises. Because of what I called the figleaf effect, they could give up territory to the U.N. zone that they would not be willing to concede to each other.

Fourth, UNDOF's day-to-day operations on the Golan do not increase transparency very much. Both sides, but especially the Israelis, know a lot from their own sources about the other

side's forces. Information from UNDOF can add little. While UNDOF's elaborate monitoring and verification mechanisms in the Areas of Separation and Limitation would seem to be able to increase transparency considerably, in fact they do not. There are numerous manpower, equipment, and procedural difficulties. Both Syria and Israel have taken steps to block and limit UNDOF's capabilities. The relative power and capabilities of UNDOF compared to the OPFORs is limited, and this in turn reduces its effectiveness. Despite appearances, UNDOF is unable to add much information and its ability to provide transparency is less than meets the eye; H1 receives only moderate/weak support.

Fifth, there are virtually no tension-raising incidents on the Golan and the sides never dispute UNDOF's observations. These tranquil conditions preclude much of a role for transparency to reduce fears, as contended by H4. After the initial disengagement, H4 receives only moderate/weak support, and this strength is less due to evidence that I found than to the arguments of other scholars that UNDOF exerts a calming effect.

Sixth, the distances and limitations created by the Areas of Separation and Limitation may alter the offense/defense balance somewhat in favor of the defense and this may reduce miscalculation. If true, this means that distance rivals or perhaps surpasses transparency in reducing miscalculation. Further, as war has so far been virtually off the table on the Golan, there has been little opportunity for calculation or miscalculation. For these reasons, after the disengagement, only very weak support is offered for (H3), the hypothesis that contends that transparency can reduce miscalculation, reduce uncertainty, and promote cooperation.

Seventh, the last two points reinforce important preconditions for regime-provided transparency to be effective. The sides have to have incomplete information, uncertainty, or

harbor unwarranted fears for regime-provided transparency to have a shot at reducing miscalculation (H3) or lowering misperceptions (H4).

Eighth, despite all these caveats, analysts tend to concur that UNDOF's presence promotes peace. Although the peace-promoting effects of transparency may be less than all the AOS/AOLs and monitoring imply, physical distance and the presence of the U.N. and international community likely add some marginal increment towards peace.

The basis for these findings are summarized in Table 5-2:

Table 5-2: Findings by Hypothesis

Hypothesis:	Evidence:	Strength of Evidence:	Overall Strength of Hypothesis:
Regimes provide transparency (H1)	Monitoring during disengagement, p. 180 Sophisticated monitoring mechanisms (on paper), p. 192 Existence of AOS/AOLs, p. 200 Liaison between Israel and Syria, p. 202 Others' assertions that transparency is provided, p. 202	Strong Moderate/ Weak Moderate Weak Moderate/ Weak	Moderate/ Weak
Regimes spread misinformation (H1')	no evidence		
Anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2)	Israel wanted a large UNDOF in part to monitor effectively, p. 179, 180 Assessments by scholars and practitioners, pp. 179, 180	Weak Moderate	Moderate/ Weak
Anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2')	no evidence		
Transparency promotes cooperation and prevents conflict (H3)	Significantly, but only during the disengagement and only on a tactical/incident level, p. 180 Physical distance, p. 200	Strong Weak	Weak

Transparency hinders cooperation and causes conflict (H3')	Kissinger filters information during negotiations to prevent breakoff and deadlock, p. 177 The “figleaf effect” provided by the AOS/AOLs during the negotiations implies support for H3', because greater clarity would have increased the chance of deadlock, p. 186	Strong Moderate/ Weak	Moderate
Transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4)	Significantly, but only during the disengagement, p. 180 Yes, according to assertions by others that this is UNDOF's effect, p. 202 Physical distance, p. 200	Strong Moderate/ Weak Moderate/ Weak	Moderate/ Weak
Transparency confirms fears (H4')	no evidence		
Transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems (H5)	Reporting system, p. 192 Could sound alarm and identify aggressor, pp. 200, 202	Moderate in theory, Weak in practice Weak	Weak
Transparency about the regime (or self-transparency) increases its effectiveness (H6)	no evidence		

Coding: **Strong** means that the phenomenon or effect was clear and very influential if not decisive, producing behavior that would be hard to replicate without the regime. **Moderate** means that the phenomenon played a discernible and somewhat influential role. Other factors help explain the outcome. **Weak** means that the phenomenon was probably but only weakly present. Other factors explain most of the outcome. **Failure** means that the regime tried to do something and failed, or that something that the regime did was counterproductive. The **overall** ratings are judgements based on the significance of transparency and its effects for each hypothesis within the context of each case.

Chapter 6: The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia

UNTAG's media efforts clarified the operation's purpose and defused rumors and fears that would have otherwise threatened the successful execution of the mandate. This provides support for the hypotheses that regimes provide transparency (H1), and that transparency and self-transparency reduce unwarranted fears (H4 and H6). After discussing the conditions which led to UNTAG's deployment, I then assess UNTAG's mandate, operations, and the extent to which its considerable success relied on transparency. Information operations and the provision of transparency greatly assisted UNTAG, and without them, the hurdles it faced would have been much greater.

ORIGINS OF UNTAG

UNTAG helped free Namibia from South African rule, marking the end of one of the world's longest processes of decolonization. From 1884-1914, Namibia was a German colony, then known as South-West Africa. Under the League of Nations' mandate system, South-West Africa was turned over to South Africa following World War I. When World War II ended and the League of Nations dissolved into the U.N., South Africa refused the U.N.'s requests to place South-West Africa under trusteeship – direct administration by the U.N. In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly voted to end South Africa's mandate, but this changed little on the ground.

Formed in 1960, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) aimed to gain

independence for the country, and resorted to violence in 1966. SWAPO became a full-fledged a guerilla rebel group, operating out of Zambia and then Angola when the latter became independent in 1975. SWAPO's reliance on Angolan bases swept it into Cold War politics as superpower support for various Angolan factions made Angola one of the central battlegrounds for influence in sub-Saharan Africa. Conflict between SWAPO and South Africa smoldered for years. The U.N. General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people in 1976. This fueled South Africa's perception that the U.N. was biased in favor of SWAPO and motivated some of its efforts to undermine the Namibian election. During the 1989 transition period, however, SWAPO was supposed to forgo its U.N.- granted special privileges, and it was to be treated as just "one political party among others."¹

South Africa offered a plan for Namibian independence in 1975. The plan was flawed because it preserved apartheid in Namibia. In response, the West (the U.S., France, Britain, Canada, and West Germany) formed a Contact Group to try to help manage a peaceful transition to independence, while avoiding apartheid, civil war, and Soviet influence. By 1978, the Contact Group had come up with a plan to grant Namibia independence. As specified in U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, a key element in Namibia's move to self-determination and self-governance was to be free elections assisted by the U.N., and a United Nations Transition Assistance Group in particular.² It took a decade, though, before South Africa decided to leave Namibia and UNTAG could be activated.

¹ "UNTAG: What It Will Do and How," *UN Chronicle*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1989), p. 13.

² *Report of the Secretary-General* submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia (U.N. Document S/12827 of 29 August 1978).

The reason for the delay was that South Africa viewed Namibia as a buffer between itself and the 50,000-strong Cuban military contingent in Angola. Because of this, South Africa insisted that the Cubans withdraw from Angola before they would grant independence to Namibia. Thus, the main reason South Africa left Namibia was Cuba's late-1988 decision to leave Angola.

Cuba's departure from Angola relied in part on transparency provided by the U.N.

According to Virginia Page Fortna:

South Africa was capable of verifying the Cuban withdrawal with its own technology, but charges of Cuban noncompliance would carry little weight coming from South Africa alone. South Africa was uncomfortable about the UN's impartiality but trusted UN monitors to report what they saw. Angola and Cuba wanted verification of their compliance with the peace plan to be indisputable to ensure they were not blamed for any attempt by South Africa to back away from the plan.³

This passage offers support for H2 because the promise of transparency is helping the peace process. It also shows various parties using transparency instrumentally, albeit still in the service of peace.

However, the influence of transparency is diminished by several factors. First, by 1988 the international political climate started to shift. Soviet political and economic support for its clients was shrinking, and this was a major trigger for the Cuban departure from Africa. As the U.S. and Soviets began to cooperate to bring peace and independence to Namibia, the stage was set for effective U.S. mediation by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker.

Second, domestic politics in South Africa had become more liberal and South Africa was

³ "The United Nations Angola Verification Mission I," in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, p. 379.

increasingly unwilling to bear the cost of conflict in Namibia. In Crocker's words, "the right alignment—the proper constellation—of local, regional, and international events" necessary to create peace in Namibia (and Angola) had come about.⁴

Finally, the basic plans for UNTAG had been sitting on the shelf for years. The promise of transparency (monitoring, etc) had been on offer for a decade, but had been ignored. This suggests that factors other than transparency, such as international and domestic politics, caused the turning point towards peace in Namibia.⁵

UNTAG'S MANDATE, OPERATIONS, AND TRANSPARENCY

UNTAG's mandate had two main components and each depended to some degree on transparency for its effectiveness. The mission of the military and police component was to supervise the cease-fire and verify the withdrawal of South African forces. By so doing, this first component was supposed to create the necessary preconditions for the election. In addition, SWAPO forces, named the People's Liberation Army of Namibia or PLAN, were to be demobilized or cantoned while UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) monitored the remaining South

⁴ Daniel S. Papp, "The Angolan Civil War and Namibia," in David R. Smock, ed., *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa* (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 186.

⁵ This section was based on: Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, pp. 59-62; Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Transition Assistance Group," in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*; Vivienne Jabri, *Mediating Conflict: Decision-making and Western Intervention in Namibia* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990); Robert B. Oakley, "A Diplomatic Perspective on African Conflict Resolution," in David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker, eds., *African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking* (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), pp. 61-66; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 203-209; United States, Department of State, "Background Notes: Namibia, April 1995," <<(gopher://gopher.state.gov)>>; "What the Two Agreements Say," UN Chronicle, Vol. 26, No. 1, (March 1989), p. 36; and I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Prevention in Africa*, updated edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989).

African controlled South West African Police (SWAPOL).

The civil component's mission was to sponsor free and fair elections. This was the most important part of the mandate, as elections were the sine qua non of independence and self-governance.

UNTAG started formal operations on April 1, 1989 when it began to deploy its forces of 300 military monitors, 2550 troops (one battalion each from Kenya, Malaysia, and Finland), 1500 civilian police from twenty-five states, a number of logistics and other units, and various support and political personnel. UNTAG numbered about 8000 when the November 1989 elections began. UNTAG lasted until March 1990, and cost about \$370 million, not including voluntary contributions to the operation.⁶

MILITARY COMPONENT

SWAPO launched a major incursion south from Angola into Namibia on April 1, the day the cease-fire began. UNTAG was just beginning to deploy, had only 100 staff and 921 troops in Namibia, and could do little to stop the 1500-strong incursion. In fairly short order, the U.N. agreed to let South Africa repel the SWAPO forces. Although the South African forces were supposed to be confined to base, the agreement with the UN was eased in part because they had already been beating SWAPO. Facing disproportionate losses, SWAPO agreed the Mount Ejo Declaration, which stipulated that they would withdraw ninety miles into Angola under UNTAG supervision. Even though the deal to end the incursion was reached in little over a week,

⁶ United Nations, Blue Helmets, 3 ed., pp. 210-214, 228.

SWAPO's actions threatened UNTAG's whole mission at its outset, delayed the mission, cost UNTAG and SWAPO some credibility, and was a "bitter experience" that "revived the mistrust and division which had begun to be assuaged during the seven months of de facto cease-fire."⁷

Several of UNTAG's early radio programs (and parts of other information efforts) were devoted to covering the events of early April and subsequent monitoring of the cease-fire. Fortunately, after early April, there was good news to report and UNTAG's monitoring and information efforts worked to help calm fears, as predicted by H4. More details about these efforts are offered below in the section on the civilian component.

Except for the SWAPO incursion, UNTAG enjoyed nearly complete cooperation and consent from the parties. UNTAG even demobilized most of the armed elements in Namibia, including the almost 12,000 strong, South Africa-trained militia named the South West Africa Territorial Force. Consent was the major reason for UNTAG's success, and it became a virtuous circle as UNTAG's information efforts spread what became calming news. There was very little pre-election violence.

CIVILIAN COMPONENT

The civilian component educated Namibians about democracy and elections. Namibians knew little about self-governance, and many did not believe the U.N. was impartial or did not even know what it was supposed to do. According to the U.N.:

⁷ Quotes from interview, Ayman El-Amir, Chief, Radio Section, United Nations, Department of Public Information, April 26, 1996, and United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 219, respectively. See also, "Namibia Independence Back on Track," and "The Crisis Unfolds," in *UN Chronicle*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (June 1989).

UNTAG personnel found that the Namibian people were, in many cases, perplexed about what was happening and what UNTAG actually was. As a result of many years of colonialism and apartheid, Namibia had a public information system which was geared to maintain this situation, with deeply partisan newspapers and a public broadcasting system prone to disinformation. UNTAG had to neutralize these processes and to provide Namibians with relevant and objective information.

The effort was led by UNTAG's information service which used radio, television, all kinds of visual materials, and print, as well as the traditional word of mouth.... Information proved to be one of the key elements in UNTAG's operation; by the end, more than 200 radio broadcasts (usually translated into the country's many [13] languages), 32 television programmes, and more than 590,000 separate information items had been produced.⁸

According to Cedric Thornberry, Director of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Namibia, "ignorance has been generated by deliberate misinformation, and by rather unprofessional print media, sapping the capacity for independent judgement."⁹

Because of these background uncertainties and fears, and because of the poor and biased information environment, the situation was ripe for UNTAG to calm Namibians about the security situation in two ways. If UNTAG could use information to calm peoples' fears about their own security, this would support H4 which contends that transparency can lessen unwarranted fears. And if UNTAG could explain its mission to a skeptical populace, this would support H6 which predicts that self-transparency improves mission effectiveness by reducing unwarranted fears and uncertainty about the purpose of the operation.

Yet the idea of mounting an information operation to help with elections was new for the

⁸ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 220.

⁹ Quoted in Fetherston, *Towards a Theory*, p. 67. See also, Jane Madden, "Namibia: A Lesson for Success," in Kevin Clements and Robin Ward, eds., *Building International Community: Cooperating for Peace Case Studies* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen Unwin, 1994), p. 258.

U.N. Indeed, the information component was left out of the mandate, and only received a budget at the last moment. Thornberry, responsible for day-to-day political operations, initially sat with fifteen of his staff trying to figure out “What is an information campaign? Video, brochures, pamphlets for elections...”¹⁰

Radio, television, print, and other such tools are mechanisms for providing transparency, and are observable implications of hypothesis H1. Of these though, the level of education in Namibia was too low for newspapers to be of great use, and television broadcast coverage was too limited. Many areas lacked telephone service. Thus, radio, simpler print products such as pamphlets, buttons, and stickers, and direct people-to-people contact became the main mechanisms for the information campaign.¹¹ Over 100 mobile teams were sent into the rural areas (home to seventy-five percent of the population) and forty-two regional or district offices were established, to help educate people about the elections. The district centers were also tasked to gather information, and help the information team fine-tune their messages.¹²

The main topics and themes for the information campaign were: voter registration, the code of conduct for the elections, secrecy of ballots, the process of voting repatriation of refugees, explaining the role of U.N. civilian police (UNCIVPOL) units, and explaining the disarming and removal of South African units. So much emphasis was placed on voter education

¹⁰ Interview, Fred Eckhard, Senior Liaison Officer, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 19, 1996, and Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, p. 33.

¹¹ Interview, Ayman El-Amir, Chief, Radio Section, United Nations, Department of Public Information, April 26, 1996. UNTAG itself had to rely on radios and satellite phones for much of its internal communications. Fortna, “United Nations Transition Assistance Group,” p. 366. See also Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, pp. 37-38 and 42 for more details on the poor media infrastructure in Namibia.

¹² Transcript of Programme No. 17, UNTAG Information Service (airdate is listed as July 3, 1989 on the transcript, but as July 4 on the index) and Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, pp. 43-44.

because Namibia lacked a history of free and fair elections, and the election was the capstone of UNTAG's mandate. To help target its messages and keep up with current events in Namibia, the UNTAG information officers received weekly briefings from the Special Representative's office. UNTAG tried to enhance its messages by relying on professionalism, repetition of key themes, and avoidance of overt controversy. UNTAG's explanations about its mission and activities, or self-transparency (H6), successfully overcame much of the initial distrust and helped calm Namibians' suspicions about UNTAG, including worries about what UNTAG was doing in the country, or fears that UNTAG was not impartial.

An example of using the media on the issue of impartiality occurred when Thornberry took to the radio to respond to allegations from some that UNTAG was partial to SWAPO and from others that it was partial to South Africa: "I think if you are being criticized by both sides for being partial to the other, then the likelihood is that you must be getting some of it right, some of the time...impartiality is an extremely important concept within 435," the UN resolution authorizing UNTAG.¹³

Related to educating Namibians about its mission and activities (H6) was UNTAG's "identity program" in which it tried to build up a positive 'brand' image with its uniforms, as well as with posters, decals, sales of UNTAG clothing, and so forth. Catchy on-message slogans reminded Namibians that "It's your time to Choose for Namibia," "Free and Fair Elections mean...Your Vote is Secret," and "UNTAG Supervises and Controls the Voting Process."

¹³ Transcript of Programme No. 6, UNTAG Information Service, airdate: June 19, 1989. Another program specifically addressing impartiality was No. 89, October 12, 1989.

Giving schoolchildren UNTAG stickers and buttons were a “great tool” for gaining sympathy.¹⁴

UNTAG built credibility by being honest and not glossing over obvious problems. For example, on September 21, 1989, UNTAG reported on the radio that political intimidation was rife and increasing in the North as the political campaigning got more serious.¹⁵ Intimidation in the North subsided and did not threaten the elections.¹⁶

Namibians harbored a number of specific, but often unwarranted, fears. The U.N. used information and the media as it worked to reduce them. For example, many refugees were fearful of returning home. In response, the U.N. told stories of successful repatriation in all the media. Others feared the return of South African forces. In response, the U.N. reported on the agreements South Africa had signed, on the departure of tanks, on the monitoring former trouble spots along border, and so forth, as well as on the attention being paid the problem by the international community. Some worried that there would be no jobs when the U.N. left (these U.N. jobs were helpful in winning over the hearts, minds, and wallets of Namibians). In response, the U.N. featured all the U.N. agencies who would remain to help after UNTAG left: the UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFP, and UNESCO, among others.¹⁷ Radio was used to defuse unwarranted fears rumors about vigilantes, or confrontations between blacks and whites, as well

¹⁴ Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, pp. 39-41, 36.

¹⁵ Transcript of Programme No. 74, UNTAG Information Service, airdate: September 21, 1989.

¹⁶ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 224.

¹⁷ Interview, Lena Yacoumopoulou, Film/Video Archives, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 23-24, 1996; sample radio broadcasts addressing some of these issues include numbers 42, 49, 54, 176, and 177.

as to channel rivalries between political parties into “honest confrontations.”¹⁸ Rumors that National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) members were coming into Namibia and registering to vote were addressed and refuted.¹⁹

Techniques for calming fears and rumors are revealed by looking at the transcripts of the radio programs.²⁰ The U.N. did not run its own station but had to use the state radio facilities. The broadcasts were only five minutes long and, to ensure tight control over content, none were performed live. The broadcasts’ reputation and audience grew, in part because of the dearth of other media outlets, and also because of the Namibians’ need for reliable information about UNTAG. Here are excerpts from a radio program that dealt with the fears of returnees:

Yacoumopoulou (host): Today, more on the situation of the returnees. Returnees are naturally concerned about their future in Namibia....Jeff Crisp, Information Officer for UNHCR, has recently returned from a visit to the reception centers - with this report.

Crisp: Now of course UNHCR’s primary responsibility is to ensure that refugees can come back to their homeland in conditions of safety....it’s quite certain at the moment that there will be severe problems for some of the returnees in finding shelter...employment...medical care....So there is a growing effort amongst the UN agencies ... to see how [these problems] can be tackled.

...
Yacoumopoulou: Another element that Jeff Crisp feels has been exaggerated in the press is that returnees are overwhelmed with fear.

¹⁸ Interview, Ayman El-Amir, Chief, Radio Section, United Nations, Department of Public Information, April 26, 1996.

¹⁹ Transcript of Programme No. 17, UNTAG Information Service, airdate: July 4, 1989 (transcript is mis-dated as July 3).

²⁰ I am grateful for the help of Lena Yacoumopoulou, who was a UN radio information officer in Namibia, for allowing me to review these transcripts and for talking with me at length about the U.N.’s operations in Namibia and elsewhere. Almost everyone I talked to at the U.N. was helpful, but she went beyond the call of duty. According to Fred Eckhard, then in the DPKO and now the Secretary-General’s spokesperson, Yacoumopoulou single-handedly produced the radio programs in Namibia – something confirmed by the radio show transcripts which show she was the interviewer for the vast majority of programs

Crisp: Of course there's a degree of caution amongst people and it's totally understandable that if you've been out of your country for 10 or 12 years, you're not really sure where you're going back to...what reception you are going to get....It is quite understandable that people should be cautious and perhaps even a little bit apprehensive. But I wouldn't say there was any genuine atmosphere of fear in the reception centres.

Yacoumopoulou: On the whole, though, Jeff Crisp reports that the mood in the reception centres in the north is one of excitement and liveliness.

Crisp: As soon as they jump off the buses, they are looking around to see people they may not have seen for several years. Often there's spontaneous singing...and various forms of jubilation.²¹

In this excerpt, UNTAG is using information to calm the refugees' unwarranted fears for their safety, to refute overblown rumors about the extent of these fears, as well as to clarify its own actions. The U.N. is being honest about the fears, but also reporting that things are not as bad as rumored in the local press and that the U.N. is working hard to fix whatever problems remain. This is evidence of UNTAG using information mechanisms to provide transparency, an observable implication of H1. The effects of these transparency-increasing efforts to reduce fears and clarify the operation's purpose were confirmed in interviews, and this provides evidence for H4 which contends that transparency reduces fears and H6 which predicts that self-transparency can help parties understand the actions of the regime.²² Forty-three thousand refugees were

²¹ Transcript of Programme No. 22, UNTAG Information Service, airdate: July 11, 1989. Most of the radio programs were of this short interview format where an expert or responsible official was asked to comment on various topics of concern.

²² Interviews with Lena Yacoumopoulou, Film/Video Archives, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 23-24, 1996 and Fred Eckhard, Senior Liaison Officer, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 19, 1996.

successfully repatriated.²³

There were many similar broadcasts explaining the election process, assuring voters about the secrecy of ballots, giving details about how UNTAG was monitoring South African forces, and so forth.²⁴

A dramatic example of the power of information and investigations occurred in the days just prior to the elections. South Africa escalated its longtime claims that SWAPO, operating from bases in Angola, was about to invade Namibia. South Africa cited intercepted messages between UNTAG military units who had supposedly been monitoring pre-invasion activities. UNTAG's special representative, Martti Ahtissari, investigated the charges, reviewed the transcripts, quickly proved them to be fraudulent, and the South African Foreign Minister publically withdrew the charges two days later. This was last event "in what had appeared to be a campaign by certain quarters to disrupt the independence process through disinformation and other, more direct, means, including an attack on UNTAG's regional office in Outjo..." This episode is clear evidence in support of H5 which contends that regimes can conduct investigations, and use the resulting information to coerce more lawful or peaceful behavior from aggressors and troublemakers.²⁵

Overall, "the ability of the United Nations to overcome the suspicions and hostility it faced...was also a key to its success" and UNTAG's information program "was probably the best

²³ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 225. A story, "UNTAG Goes Home," in the *UN Chronicle*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1990) claims that 433,000 exiles were repatriated, but *Blue Helmets* is authoritative.

²⁴ See for example, transcripts of UNTAG Information Service Programmes 11-19, 93-94, and 100-104, among many.

²⁵ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 222; see also *Reports of the Secretary-General* S/20943, November 3, 1989, and S/20947, November 4, 1989.

that the United Nations is capable of mustering in the field.”²⁶ Why were UNTAG’s media, liaison, and outreach efforts so effective? In good part because they increased transparency and thereby reduced rumors and fears.

In the end, UNTAG succeeded in holding the pivotal elections. UNTAG registered 701,000 voters, out of the total Namibian population of 1.3-1.5 million people. Ninety-six percent of eligible voters voted between November 7 and 11, 1989. A scant 1.4 percent of the ballots were rejected. SWAPO received 57% of the vote and the U.N. declared the elections free and fair on the 14th. The new Constituent Assembly quickly set about the task of writing a constitution. Thanks primarily to the overall cooperation and consent of relevant local, regional, and international actors, Namibia’s conflict was over. While cooperation and consent were crucial, UNTAG’s information operation and its efforts to increase transparency played a clear role in helping create the conditions necessary for a free and fair election.²⁷

CONCLUSION: UNTAG AND TRANSPARENCY

UNTAG came into being largely because of political changes at international and domestic levels. Transparency involved with the Cuban departure from Angola helped trigger

²⁶ Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 54 and Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, p. 46.

²⁷ In addition to specific references, general sources for this chapter include: Paul F. Diehl and Sonia R. Jurado, “United Nations Election Supervision in South Africa: Lessons from the Namibian Peacekeeping Experience,” *Terrorism*, Vol. 16 (January/March 1993); Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), part IV, section K; Fetherston, *Towards a Theory*, pp. 62-78; Fortna, “United Nations Transition Assistance Group;” Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, chapter 3; and United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., chapter 11.

peace in Namibia, and this offers support for H2, the hypothesis that transparency promotes cooperation. On the other hand, the promise of transparency was not a factor in UNTAG's actual deployment. Thus, overall, H2 is at best only moderately supported.

Fortunately, UNTAG's military component faced largely consensual adversaries (after an initial debacle). Thus, the information division could report mostly good and calming news about the durability of the cease-fire and departure of foreign troops. This information helped reduce fears, this supports H4 which contends that transparency can reduce unwarranted fears.

Transparency was a larger factor in the civilian aspects of the mandate, and UNTAG reduced rumors and fears in a number of areas, including the electoral process and repatriation of refugees. These efforts provided a lot of clear evidence for H4. UNTAG also expended considerable effort clarifying the purposes of its mission, and calming fears that it was partial to one side or another. Success here provided evidence for H6, which predict that self-transparency reduces unwarranted fears and clarifies purpose. Table 6-1, below, summarizes these findings.

Table 6-1: Findings by Hypothesis

Hypothesis:	Evidence:	Strength of Evidence:	Overall Strength of Hypothesis:
Regimes provide transparency (H1)	Monitoring, radio, and other information tools used in military component, p. 213 Radio, television, print, and other tools used in civil component, p. 215	Moderate Strong	Moderate/Strong
Regimes spread misinformation (H1')	no evidence		
Anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2)	Monitoring Cuban withdrawal from Angola helped spur Namibia accord, p. 210	Moderate/ Weak	Moderate/Weak
Anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2')	no evidence		
Transparency promotes cooperation and prevents conflict (H3)	no evidence		
Transparency hinders cooperation and causes conflict (H3')	no evidence		
Transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4)	After initial setback, information used to calm fears about possible violence during cease-fire, p. 213 UNTAG calmed fears about repatriation, South African forces, and even jobs, pp 214-219	Moderate/ Strong Strong	Moderate/Strong
Transparency confirms fears (H4')	no evidence		
Transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems (H5)	Investigating claims of a SWAPO pre-election incursion, and getting South Africa to withdraw those claims, 220	Strong	Moderate
Transparency about the regime (or self-transparency) increases its effectiveness (H6)	UNTAG used information to tell suspicious Namibians about its mission and about how elections worked, pp. 214-219	Strong	Strong

Coding: **Strong** means that the phenomenon or effect was clear and very influential if not decisive, producing behavior that would be hard to replicate without the regime. **Moderate** means that the phenomenon played a discernible and somewhat influential role. Other factors help explain the outcome. **Weak** means that the phenomenon was probably but only weakly present. Other factors explain most of the outcome. **Failure** means that the regime tried to do something and failed, or that something that the regime did was counterproductive. The **overall** ratings are judgements based on the significance of transparency and its effects for each hypothesis within the context of each case.

Why did UNTAG succeed with information and transparency? The country had a poor

media infrastructure and the media that did exist lacked credibility. This made it relatively easy for the U.N. to provide credible, authoritative, transparency-increasing information. These themes are reinforced in the next chapter on Cambodia.

According to Yacoumopoulou, another key variable was that there was no government in place opposing UNTAG's broadcasting. She noted that government opposition explained why the U.N. radio in Rwanda never worked and that the refugees there were still in fear, and she pointed out the troubles Slobodan Milosevic caused for independent Yugoslav broadcaster Studio B92.

Chapter 7: The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

This chapter begins by describing the negotiations leading to the creation of UNTAC in Cambodia. The promise of transparency played a small part in getting the Cambodian parties to agree to peace (H2), but the biggest factor behind UNTAC's formation was shifts in regional and great power politics. I then assess UNTAC's extensive operations on the ground, which included everything from refugee repatriation to holding elections. Although many aspects of UNTAC's activities did not involve much transparency, a number of analysts laud UNTAC's effective use of the media to promote its message and reduce fears and rumors. UNTAC helped Cambodians understand its mission, taught people how to vote and not to fear elections, and it refuted rumors of polling place violence during the election. This chapter provides vivid evidence supporting H4 which contends that transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions, and H6 which predicts that self-transparency reduces unwarranted fears and clarifies purpose. In the history of U.N. peacekeeping, UNTAC provides the exemplar of information operations and the effectiveness of transparency in promoting peace.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY (H2)

UNTAC was created in 1991 after two decades of murderous turmoil in Cambodia. Cambodia gained independence from France in 1954. In 1970, the U.S.-backed General Lon Nol overthrew the French-installed Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The China-backed Khmer Rouge

under Pol Pot quickly began an insurgency against Lon Nol that succeeded in toppling him in 1975. During their short rule, the Khmer Rouge killed at least one-million Cambodians (one in eight), targeting the educated elites in particular. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978, in part to put an end to border skirmishes with the Khmer Rouge. With Soviet support, Vietnam installed its own puppet party under Heng Samrin and Hun Sen. A counter-coalition of rebel factions involving Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge, and backed by China and the U.S., then formed against the new but internationally unrecognized government in Phnom Penh.

The civil war continued along for years until April 1989 when Vietnam announced its troops would leave the country. This coincided with a number of developments that led the major outside powers to rethink their commitments to their clients and that helped make the end of the conflict possible. The end of the Cold War made strange bedfellows less necessary. The U.S. stopped backing China's support of the Khmer Rouge, which in the Cold War context had fought against the Soviet-backed, Vietnam-installed Hun Sen government. Perhaps more importantly, China backed off, because the Soviets pulled away from Vietnam and began to warm up ties with China (and of course with the U.S.) as the Cold War ended. Finally, within Cambodia, the civil war had "reached something of a 'mutually hurting stalemate.'"¹

Earlier peace conferences sponsored by Indonesia in 1988 and February 1989 brought all the Cambodian factions together but did not bring peace. However, Vietnam's announced withdrawal prompted the French and Indonesians to rededicate themselves to the peace process and the first Paris Conference was held in July 1989. The negotiations bogged down over power-

¹ Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, SIPRI Research Report No. 9 (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3, quoting I. W. Zartman's well-known phrase.

sharing arrangements during the interim period before elections. Hun Sen rejected power-sharing in general and sharing with the Khmer Rouge in particular.

The idea that broke the deadlock was to transfer most political power in Cambodia to the U.N. during the interim period. A weak Supreme National Council (SNC) made up of members from each of the factions would hold or symbolize national unity and sovereignty, but real administrative power would lie with what become UNTAC. Under the accords, the SNC granted the U.N. all powers necessary to assure the peace agreement's implementation. The U.N. was mandated to:

“organize and conduct free and fair elections; coordinate the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons; coordinate a major programme of economic and financial support for rehabilitation and reconstruction; supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces, the cease-fire, the cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian factions, and the demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the military forces of the factions; coordinate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees; and foster an environment of peace and stability in which all Cambodians could enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”²

One reason that the U.N. was given such an unprecedented degree of authority was that the “parties could not trust each other enough to rule together [so the U.N. had to] take over the administration of Cambodia during the period between a political settlement and the installment of freely, democratically elected leaders.”³ Because a security regime had to be brought in to overcome this mistrust, this is confirming evidence for H2, which hypothesizes that the

² United Nations, Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995*, United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume II (New York, NY: United Nations, 1995), p. 9.

³ Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 23.

anticipation of regime-provided transparency promotes cooperation.

Setting the stage for the provision of transparency, Article 6 of the Paris Agreements paid special attention to several areas, one of which was information. The U.N. Secretary-General's implementation plan for UNTAC also gave a role for information including the establishment of radio broadcasting capabilities. The new Advisor on Information to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (a brand new post), Tim Carney, said that the parties to the Paris Peace Accords acknowledged early on "the vital, central role of information" and these various encouragements let him "treat information imaginatively."⁴

Two specific areas of the U.N.'s mandate required significant monitoring and verification by the U.N. for them to work: the elections and the cease-fire and other limits on forces and arms. Here again, the prospect of increased transparency might have assuaged the fears of participants and helped lead them to sign the accord (H2). For example, Hun Sen's State of Cambodia party (SOC) during the negotiation said they felt endangered by the prospect of military demobilization.⁵ Seeking reassurance in the form of U.N. monitors, Sihanouk in his role as President of the Supreme National Council requested "200 UN personnel sent to Cambodia as 'observers' in September 1991 in order to assist the SNC in controlling the cease-fire and the cessation of foreign military assistance, as a first step within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement."⁶ For their part, the U.N. permanent five and Indonesia insisted on U.N.

⁴ Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, pp. 60-61, quoting Carney on p. 60.

⁵ Carlyle A. Thayer, "The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: The Restoration of Sovereignty," in Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce, and Malcolm Dando, eds., *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 150.

⁶ Letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, transmitting the final communique of the SNC's meeting in Pattaya, 26-29 August, 1991. A/46/494-S/23066, 24 September 1991, Document 15 in United Nations, *The United Nations and*

verification for the military aspects of the accord.⁷

It appears that the anticipation of transparency played some role in helping bring the leaders of the factions to sign the Paris Accords in October of 1991, and H2 receives some support.

However, two other factors were more important than transparency in bringing about the peace accords. First, most of what became the peace accords was worked out ahead of time by the U.N. Permanent Five and other outside players, including Australia, Indonesia, and Japan. The draft framework reached by these players was then sold to or forced on the Cambodian factions. Findlay notes that “To a great extent the Accords were pressed on a mostly reluctant Cambodian political elite by an international community eager to be rid of the Cambodian problem.”⁸ Of particular importance appears to be a secret agreement between Vietnam and China to pressure their clients (Hun Sen and the coalition that included Sihanouk for Vietnam, and the Khmer Rouge for China) into compliance.⁹ This agreement was in turn made possible by the political shifts occurring as the Cold War ended and because China wanted to repair its image after the bloody suppression of the uprising at Tiananmen square. Power politics played the

Cambodia, p. 122.

⁷ Letter dated August 1, 1991 to the U.N. Secretary-General, from China, France, Indonesia, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States transmitting communique of the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the five permanent members of the sc issued in Beijing, 18 July 1991. A/46/340-S/22889, 5 August 1991, Document 12 in United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 118.

⁸ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 16. See also Tali Levy, “The 1991 Cambodia Settlement Agreements,” in *Words Over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, for the Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2000), p. 148-156; and James A. Schear, “Riding the Tiger: The United Nations and Cambodia’s Struggle for Peace,” in Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping*, p. 139.

⁹ Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia* (New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund, 1994), p. 23.

greatest role in getting the war-weary factions to accept the draft framework for peace.

Second, even if the promise of transparency played a role in getting the factions to accept the peace accord, the promise of the U.N.'s physical presence probably played an even larger role as an anticipated deterrent to their adversaries' aggression or trouble-making. Physical deterrence likely outweighed transparency in calming fears of adversaries. That said, deterrence and transparency are not mutually exclusive products of UNTAC because the same peacekeepers provide both functions.

Finally, fights over transparency-related issues also bogged down negotiations - further undercutting the role of transparency in promoting agreement (H2). For example, Hun Sen and the SOC tried to maintain their leadership and political advantages by lobbying to limit the size of U.N. monitoring during the negotiations. On the other hand, most of the opposition groups tried to counters these advantages by pushing to increase the size of any monitoring force that would deploy subsequent to a peace deal.¹⁰ A twist on this was the Khmer Rouge's position that it wanted maximum disarmament, knowing the Phnom Penh-based SOC's forces would be easier to monitor than its more far flung troops.¹¹

Although the factions accepted the draft framework in September of 1990, it took months of wrangling over still more demobilization and election issues until the final Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991. During these negotiations, the civil war raged until being

¹⁰ Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot Box* (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 40, 45.

¹¹ Jin Song, "The Political Dynamics of the Peacemaking Process in Cambodia," in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, eds., *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 75.

tempered by a cease-fire in May of 1991.¹²

THE U.N. ADVANCE MISSION IN CAMBODIA (UNAMIC)

The U.N. sent the Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) in November 1991 to pave the way for UNTAC's March 1992 deployment. UNAMIC's primary mission was to maintain the cease-fire until the arrival of UNTAC. It also began de-mining the country.

To maintain the cease-fire, the plan for UNAMIC "called for a team of 50 military liaison officers who would, in a good-offices role, aim to facilitate communications between the military headquarters of the four Cambodian factions by, for example, passing messages between the factions and arranging meetings between them."¹³ UNAMIC was also supposed to work with the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG), a forum established by the Paris Accords to bring together military representatives of the Cambodian factions.

One could not ask for a clearer plan to increase transparency. From liaison officers to forums to a commitment to facilitating communication, lot of mechanisms and intentions to increase transparency are evident (H1). Yet the evidence raises doubts about UNAMIC's

¹² The general sources for the preceding text include: Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, "Cambodia," in James Mayall, ed., *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 25-36; MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, *Cambodia Confronts the Peacemakers: 1979-1998* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), chapter 2; Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, pp. 13-31; Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 1-20; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 9-31; Peou, *Conflict Neutralization*, chapters 1, 2, 4; Steven R. Ratner, "The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for the Resolution of Internal Conflicts?" in Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 241-252; Schear, "Riding the Tiger," pp. 136-151; Song, "Political Dynamics" in Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr, eds., *Keeping the Peace*; United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, pp. 5-9; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, pp. 449-458; and United States, Department of State, "Background Notes: Cambodia, January 1996," (gopher://gopher.state.gov).

¹³ United Nations, *The United Nations and Cambodia*, p. 10.

performance as a liaison. For example, Sihanouk said that UNTAC's absence during the early phases of the peace left the factions without a neutral mediator to deal with political and military tensions. This was said despite UNAMIC's presence, and thus serves as a critique of its service as liaison. Second, the Khmer Rouge repeatedly violated the cease-fire and boycotted a meeting of the MMWG during UNAMIC's tenure. Third, UNAMIC lacked investigative rigor. Finally, UNAMIC personnel also had trouble communicating with the Cambodians due to language difficulties.¹⁴ Communication is a prerequisite for providing transparency.

Because of these difficulties, the U.N.'s initial involvement reflects a failure for H1, which contends that regimes can provide transparency. There is thus no need to search for the effects of transparency.

Further, UNAMIC's overall effectiveness in maintaining the cease-fire was poor. The entire Cambodian settlement was on the verge of unraveling by the time UNTAC began its deployment four months later in March of 1992 (by the end of April, 3,600 UNTAC troops and personnel had arrived out of a planned full strength of 22,000). UNTAC was not fully operational until September 1992. UNTAC's late arrival and slow start combined with UNAMIC's small size to create a crisis in Cambodians' faith that the U.N. could keep the peace and fulfill its ambitious mandate.

In February of 1992, four months after the Accords were signed, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 745 establishing UNTAC. The deployment began in May, and UNTAC's size grew to 22,000 staff, including 16,000 peacekeepers from more than 30 countries. The operation cost \$1.9 billion, and had just eighteen months to accomplish its wide array of

¹⁴ Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 24-26, 119; Peou, *Conflict Neutralization*, pp. 177-184.

mandated tasks. These tasks ranged from disarming and cantoning 200,000 regular troops and disarming 250,000 militia to repatriating 360,000-370,000 refugees and holding a nationwide election. UNTAC did not achieve its full strength and was not fully operational until about a third of the way through its mandate. Cambodia is a country of 181,000 square kilometers, about the size of Oklahoma, and its population in the early 1990s was around nine million.¹⁵

UNTAC: MANDATE, ACTIVITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY

UNTAC's mandate falls into two broad categories: a military component and a civilian component. I review these two areas and assess the role that transparency played in UNTAC's performance.

UNTAC's Military Component

In military affairs, UNTAC was mandated to:¹⁶

1. Monitor the cease-fire and disengagement of forces.
2. Monitor withdrawal of foreign forces (Vietnamese forces) from Cambodia.
3. Facilitate and monitor the demobilization and disarming of seventy percent of each factions' forces.
4. Facilitate and monitor the cantonment of the remaining thirty percent of each factions' forces.
5. Conduct mine clearance.

¹⁵ Schear, "Riding the Tiger," pp. 144-145; United States, CIA, *World Factbook* at: <<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>>>; 1990 population figures at World Health Organization, *Tobacco or Health: A Global Status Report Country Profiles by Region, 1997* at: <<<http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/who/cambodia.htm>>>.

¹⁶ The following is drawn largely from Schear, "Riding the Tiger," pp. 146-149.

In theory, transparency should have contributed significantly to UNTAC's military missions. From the cease-fire and disarming to cantonment, UNTAC's monitoring and verification could have given each side the assurance that others were indeed adhering to the accords, which could have further increased compliance and helped build peace. Unfortunately, obstructionist policies primarily by the Khmer Rouge (but also by Hun Sen's party, the State of Cambodia or SOC) torpedoed most of UNTAC's military mandate and made efforts to increase transparency in this area irrelevant. A transparency lesson here is regimes cannot provide transparency (H1) when adversaries reject the regime and do not want to cooperate in the first place.

UNTAC's military mission fell apart in several ways. First of all, fighting continued sporadically throughout UNTAC's tenure, albeit at a lower level than before. No one needed UNTAC to tell the factions that fighting and violence continued. A major exception to this was during the election, discussed below. UNTAC's ability to tell the people that there was no electoral violence greatly increased the turnout and the overall success of the elections.

Second, UNTAC lacked the power to enforce or effectively coerce demobilization, disarming, and cantonment. As Schear points out, UNTAC was between a rock and a hard place. UNTAC would look bad if it tried to coerce the parties because UNTAC's relative weakness and inability to resort to force meant that it would inevitably fail. On the other hand, voluntary compliance was likely to fail as well because the Khmer Rouge resisted the military aspects of UNTAC's mandate almost from the start.¹⁷ Seeing the writing on the wall, UNTAC made cantonment voluntary and partial. By November 1992, UNTAC had completely suspended its

¹⁷ Schear, "Riding the Tiger," p. 154.

efforts to disarm, demobilize, and canton the factions.¹⁸

Because of these failures, there was little to verify with respect to demobilization, disarming, and cantonment and transparency was not relevant. Again, the factions did not need the U.N. to tell them the agreements had been violated.

Related to this problem were deficiencies in gathering military intelligence. The U.N. is wary of intelligence gathering, fearing for its image of peaceful impartiality. Because of this, much of whatever intelligence U.N. operations do collect is comes from the press and information components of the operations. UNTAC could not determine the real strength of the Khmer Rouge, definitively refute Khmer Rouge claims that Vietnamese forces were still in Cambodia, or even adequately monitor its own operation. Within the military component, there were many ways in which UNTAC failed to obtain information, making it impossible to provide transparency (H1).¹⁹

Third, there were a number of ways in which UNTAC's specific efforts to increase transparency failed. For example, the Khmer Rouge simply did not believe potentially calming reports (H4) from UNTAC's Strategic Investigation Teams that monitored the presence of foreign forces and cease-fire violations. Although its intelligence capabilities were weak, UNTAC found almost no evidence of Vietnamese or Vietnam-controlled forces in country. The Khmer Rouge disputed these findings, disagreed with the definition of foreign forces, never provided to UNTAC the required information on the manpower and materiel of its own forces. Willful disbelief, preformed judgements, resistance to UNTAC, and UNTAC's inadequate

¹⁸ United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., p. 476; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 70-72.

¹⁹ Berdal and Leifer, "Cambodia," pp. 48-49.

intelligence capabilities all undermined the peacekeepers' ability to provide transparency (H1) and exploit transparency to reduce fears and lessen tensions (H4).

Fourth, some 50,000 troops were sent into cantonment and as many weapons were turned over to the U.N. Most of these were from the SOC. However, many of the weapons were not operable and the troops (if they were soldiers at all) were of such poor quality that the SOC actually improved its army by getting rid of them. Many of these soldiers left the cantons on agricultural leave.²⁰ Hence, even here, there was little calming news for the U.N. to spread.

Fifth, UNTAC made serious efforts to start de-mining Cambodia. It trained 2300 Cambodians and disposed of 37,000 out of six to ten million mines. Admirable as this was, de-mining's success has little to do with transparency.²¹

In sum, where UNTAC could have increased transparency in the military mission, non-compliance meant that there was little to verify or monitor. Investigative and monitoring capabilities were weak with respect to military intelligence. For this reason, and bias, the Khmer Rouge dismissed UNTAC's reports that foreign forces had left Cambodia. Failures in the military mission and weakness in transparency-mechanisms (H1) left no hope that fears could be assuaged (H4). Given this, the peaceful elections seem remarkable and the later failure of democracy predictable.

UNTAC's Civil Components

²⁰ Heining, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 71.

²¹ The preceding section was based on Berdal and Leifer, "Cambodia," pp. 36-43; Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 36-51, 72; Schear, "Riding the Tiger," p. 156-158; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 476-477; Jianwei Wang, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia*, UNIDIR/96/17 (New York, NY: United Nations, 1996).

In civil affairs, UNTAC was mandated to:

1. Repatriate approximately 360,000-370,000 refugees.
2. Restore and rehabilitate aspects of Cambodia's infrastructure in areas including housing, transport, utilities, education, and so forth.
3. Control most major aspects of civil administration (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information) and supervise those other aspects of governance that could influence the elections.
4. Promote human rights with an education campaign, monitoring, investigations, and supervision of local law enforcement.
5. Organize and conduct free and fair elections, including civic education and election monitoring.
6. Conduct an information program to support UNTAC's activities and educate Cambodians about the Peace Accords and the UNTAC's missions.

UNTAC's civil mandate was complex, had mixed results, and each element depended in varying degrees on transparency for its success. In the order outlined, I assess UNTAC's effectiveness with its civil mandate and the role of transparency in whatever was achieved. Information/education was explicitly part of several aspects of UNTAC's civil mandate: in human rights and especially in preparing Cambodians for the election – the *sine qua non* of UNTAC's mandate. In contrast to the military component, transparency played a large role in UNTAC's success in sponsoring the elections.

REFUGEE REPATRIATION

Refugee repatriation worked well. Slightly more than the estimated 360,000-370,000 refugees returned to Cambodia. There were many reasons for this success. The refugees' desired to return. Thailand, where most refugees were, wished to get them out. The Cambodian factions

cooperated with their return. And the U.N. offered cash, jobs, food, and/or land to returning refugees. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees helped logistically, and this engendered cooperation from the Khmer Rouge who were much more willing to cooperate with the UNHCR than with UNTAC. In addition, Cambodia's factions all saw the refugees as returning members or as potential new members. There was not a single deliberately disruptive incident in the whole endeavor.²²

Despite all these interest and incentive-based reasons for the success of repatriation, transparency played a modest role in UNTAC's success. "Making certain that all factions were apprized of developments in the repatriation process, which entailed endless dialogue and negotiation, helped allay their suspicions and gain their cooperation."²³ In other words, UNTAC increased transparency (H1) and reduced apprehensions (H4).

REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction did not work out as well as planned and the results had little to do with transparency. Although the international community ended up pledging \$880 million for Cambodia's reconstruction, well over the \$593 million planned, disbursement of funds was slow. Only \$100 million had been spent prior to the election.²⁴ Logistical and political difficulties

²² Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 52-54; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 48-54; and Schear, "Riding the Tiger," p. 163.

²³ Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, p. 54.

²⁴ Brown and Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers*, pp. 124-125.

plagued planned projects.

Long-term, large scale projects were difficult to start, much less complete, during UNTAC's short tenure. Much of the aid ended up being focused on the Phnom Penh area simply because that was where it was easier to get things done. This helped the SOC which was dominant in that region and angered the rural Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge blocked some rehabilitation projects, even though considerable funds would have been spent in areas it controlled. On the positive side, jobs were created and the basis was laid for further reconstruction of war-torn Cambodia.²⁵

CIVIL CONTROL

UNTAC's mandate for civil control called for supervision of the five main branches of government (defense, foreign affairs, finance, public security, and information, as well as any other branch that could affect the elections). This in turn required monitoring and gathering of large amounts of information. To do this, UNTAC attached teams to all major sectors of government and maintained a separate investigations division. The purpose of such massive oversight was to maintain a neutral political environment during the pre-election interim period. According to its mandate, UNTAC should have been in a good position to gather information, correct abuses, introduce transparency in government, and reassure all factions that the interim government was working fairly, effectively and impartially. Because of these roles and intended

²⁵ Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 69-72; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 54-64; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 480-481.

effects, any success UNTAC enjoyed with its civil control mandate should have depended to a significant degree on transparency (H1) for reassurance (H4), and to deter (or catch) spoilers (H5).

As it turned out, UNTAC faced numerous difficulties in civil control, many of which affected its ability to provide transparency (H1), calm the factions (H4) and stop spoiler (H5)s. First, the parties varied in their cooperation with UNTAC. The Khmer Rouge, as usual, resisted UNTAC's efforts. The smaller factions, including Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif),²⁶ had very little structure to monitor at all. As a result, UNTAC focused its monitoring on the SOC in Phnom Penh. The SOC viewed this disproportionate attention as discriminatory and it became uncooperative. UNTAC's greatest failure in this respect was its inability to reign in the SOC's security forces and secret police. Their continued activity endangered the neutral political environment UNTAC was trying to create.²⁷ The SOC's resistance to UNTAC's monitoring supports H2' which contends that anticipated transparency hinders cooperation.²⁸

Second, despite its relatively elaborate and formalized organization, the SOC did not govern in ways that could be effectively monitored. Power often resided with army officers, provincial governors, local officials, relatives of bureaucrats, and so forth. Many decisions were made informally and without written record.

²⁶ United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia.

²⁷ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 60.

²⁸ This supports H2': Anticipated Transparency Hinders Cooperation rather than H3': Transparency Hinders Cooperation because the SOC resisted the attempts to monitor, and this hurt the operation. H3' is supported when the effects of transparency hurt cooperation

Finally, UNTAC was simply overwhelmed by this very sophisticated task. UNTAC was slow to assert its authority and never caught up. The quality of its personnel varied and was sometimes poor.

All of these factors meant that UNTAC did not do very well at civil control, had difficulty monitoring government functions, and therefore could not provide much transparency. While this is a near failure for H1, UNTAC did introduce “a fair amount of transparency into Cambodia’s institutions,” and this might in turn have deterred abuses through by helping identify fraud or partisan use of government power or facilities. Had this worked, it would have provided evidence that information disclosure deters or coerces cheaters and spoilers (H5).²⁹ However, it did not work very well because the SOC in particular “evaded UN controls” and often prevented information from being gathered in the first place.³⁰ Thwarting of monitoring by the U.N. Civilian Administration Component included creative use of wireless phones by government officials and switching of government functions to agencies not under U.N. supervision.³¹

Despite this, analysts agree that without UNTAC attempts at civil control, the situation would have been worse. Even more abuses, violence, and political harassment would have occurred. Some analysts suggest that UNTAC planted a seed for further maturation of Cambodia’s political institutions.³² Nonetheless, the litany of problems lead me to code this as

²⁹ Schear, “Riding the Tiger,” p. 159.

³⁰ Thayer, “United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,” p. 158.

³¹ Brown and Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers*, pp. 105-106.

³² Brown and Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers*, pp. 107-108; Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 59-63; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 83-90; Schear, “Riding the Tiger,” pp. 158-161.

“weak/failure” for H5 because U.N. efforts to monitor cheating, rogues, and spoilers were so frequently thwarted, and the U.N. could not use information to coerce better behavior.

PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

UNTAC had limited success with its mandate to promote and protect human rights. Although information and education were central to UNTAC’s efforts to promote human rights, transparency appears not to have played much of a part.

Human rights abuses continued throughout UNTAC’s tenure, though no where near the level of Pol Pot’s murderous regime. UNTAC’s small human rights staff documented a number of abuses, but could not arrest violators or fire them from government posts. Although the Secretary-General’s Special Representative could transfer personnel found to be hindering the peace agreements,³³ UNTAC mainly had to rely on the SOC to police and judge the human rights violators it had identified. This often amounted to the bad guys watching the bad guys, so enforcement was rare.³⁴ Asia Watch harshly criticized UNTAC for failing to take concrete actions to defend human rights and punish abusers. This represents a failure for H5, because UNTAC did not even try to stop cheaters, rogues, and spoilers even though it knew violations were occurring.

Further, UNTAC often had to work with violators in other areas of its operations, so

³³ Thayer, “United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia,” p. 152.

³⁴ These same failings plagued the Civilian Police efforts more generally. Brown and Zasloff, *Cambodia Confronts the Peacemakers*, pp. 108-112.

antagonizing these officials (or others) on the basis of human rights violations jeopardized other aspects of the mandate. UNTAC therefore focused more on human rights education, than on accusing human rights violators.³⁵ While UNTAC tried to train judges and lawyers, it did not have the resources to conduct a more sweeping overhaul of Cambodia's judicial system. Most lawyers and judges and others with any sort of higher education and training had been killed by Pol Pot's regime, leaving Cambodia ill-prepared to govern itself.

On the positive side, all four major factions including the Khmer Rouge signed onto major international human rights agreements. UNTAC helped gain the release of several hundred political prisoners. UNTAC undertook a large-scale, country-wide human rights education campaign. Using a wide range of information tools from radio to puppets and cartoon flyers, UNTAC raised awareness in Cambodia about human rights. About 150,000 Cambodians joined human rights groups. Cambodia also gained what Doyle called the freest press in Southeast Asia and the citizens enjoyed what was for them unprecedented freedom of movement and association.³⁶ UNTAC's ability to teach Cambodians peace-promoting ideas such as human rights supports H6 which says that regimes can use information to promote the purposes of their missions and increase effectiveness.

ELECTIONS

³⁵ Interview, Adriaan Verheul, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 23, 1996.

³⁶ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, pp. 45-47; Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 63-68; Heining, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 91-100; Schear, "Riding the Tiger," pp. 163-164; Thayer, "United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia," p. 158; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 474-476.

Organizing and conducting free and fair elections was the centerpiece of UNTAC's mandate and it was here that UNTAC enjoyed its most prominent success. This success depended to a large degree on the provision of transparency. I will discuss UNTAC's effectiveness with the elections in this section and leave most of the discussion of transparency for the next section on information and education.

Ninety-six percent all eligible voters were registered before the May 23-28, 1993, elections. Ninety percent of Cambodia's eligible voters then voted. Despite considerable violence and intimidation prior to the election, Cambodia was surprising peaceful during the actual voting. Since March 1, there had been 200 deaths, 338 injuries, and 144 abductions attributed to politically motivated pre-election violence. The Khmer Rouge committed most of the violence. However, the Khmer Rouge, for reasons still unknown, did not disrupt the elections and the polling period was one of the "least violent in Cambodia for years."³⁷

UNTAC operated and monitored some 1400 fixed polling stations and 200 mobile stations. U.N. peacekeepers guarded most of these stations and the collected ballots were even more heavily guarded.

Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC won the election with 45.47 percent of the vote. Hun Sen's SOC party, called the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) won 38.23 percent. The Buddhist party got 3.81 percent of the vote and seventeen other parties split the remaining 12.56 percent. As a result, FUNCINPEC won fifty eight seats in the new Constituent Assembly, while the CPP won fifty-one. There was some post-election bickering about vote-counting and so forth. Control of the executive was disputed. In the end, Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and Hun

³⁷ Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 81-83.

Sen shared the executive and became co-prime ministers, the former as “first” prime minister and the latter as “second” prime minister.

The election calmed the civil war, lessened the power of the Khmer Rouge, and brought, at least temporarily, a multiparty system into a traditionally one-party ruled state.³⁸

INFORMATION/EDUCATION AND TRANSPARENCY

The Information/Education Division of UNTAC had a number of diverse tasks and is widely recognized by analysts as being extremely successful in its support role. Among these tasks were educating Cambodian journalists on establishing a free press, helping candidates get out their messages, educating Cambodians about what UNTAC was doing and how elections worked, countering propaganda and rumors, and addressing unwarranted fears.³⁹ The Information/Education Division served other aspects of UNTAC’s mandate including promoting human rights, repatriation, and so forth.

Information conditions prior to the start of Radio UNTAC and other UNTAC information efforts were poor. The media in Cambodia had been controlled by the political parties and factions. The SOC dominated with a wide ranging but sporadically broadcasting radio and television network out of Phnom Penh, as well as an established newspaper. The opposition parties of FUNCINPEC, the Khmer Rouge, and the Khmer People’s People’s National Liberation

³⁸ Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, pp. 55-58; Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 75-90; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 100-116; Schear, “Riding the Tiger,” pp. 168-172; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 470-471.

³⁹ UNTAC also conducted education activities in support of its human rights efforts as well. Please see the human rights section above.

Front (KPNLF) began the UNTAC period with radio facilities in Thailand or near the Thai border. By mid-1992, some opposition bulletins and newsletters began to be published out of Phnom Penh, but radio and television were particularly important because fifty-two percent of the men and seventy-eight percent of the women in Cambodia were illiterate.⁴⁰ Radio was key for reaching the countryside, because the broadcast range of television only reached seventy-five kilometers out of Phnom Penh.⁴¹

It took until July 1992 for more independent sources such as the English language *Phnom Penh Post* to begin to appear. Newspapers and newsstands proliferated in early 1993, although many newspapers folded quickly, were intimidated or bribed into partisanship, and/or were biased from the outset. In February 1993, FUNCINPEC began broadcasting radio from Phnom Penh; their TV programs began in April.

More generally, Cambodia had suffered from years of isolation and inadequate education. It was a “traditional society dominated by rumors.”⁴² Cambodians knew little of the outside world, or of how the elections and campaigning of democracy were supposed to work. UNTAC was a novelty and many Cambodians did not know why it was there and were suspicious of the new operation.

Given the poverty of quality information, considerable level of uncertainties, as well as longstanding suspicions between the various factions, the need for information and education

⁴⁰ Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 82-83.

⁴¹ Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, p. 61. See also, John Marston, “Neutrality and the Negotiation of an Information Order in Cambodia,” in Price and Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace*, pp. 177-179, 190.

⁴² Interview, Takahisa Kawakami, Principal Officer, Asia and Middle East Division, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 25, 1996.

was critical, and the situation was ripe for the provision of transparency. As it turned out, UNTAC successfully calmed many fears about itself, taught Cambodians about elections, and calmed fears of election-period violence.

The initial paucity of competing media outlets, and their technical backwardness, limited reach, partisanship, and limited credibility made it relatively easy for UNTAC to dominate the news flow. People were eager to hear credible, frank, and well-presented news and information. UNTAC became “the one source of news and information they [Cambodians] felt they could rely on.”⁴³

These points about the poor quality of information in Cambodia suggest two preconditions for similar information efforts. First, the U.N. (or other information source) has to be able to compete with the information flow in the target area. This is partly a technical and quantitative issue: it is better to be one radio station among five than among 100, and it is better to have more area coverage than less. Second, the value added and credibility of the new information has to be high. A security regime whose message is implausible and has no impact cannot provide transparency.

Overall, the ability to be an “information competitor” is a pre-requisite for a regime to provide transparency (H1). For example, the U.N. could not hope to make much of a dent in a developed state’s dense news flow. But in Namibia and especially Cambodia, the U.N. became quite influential. These factors offer some hope that the U.N. (or any other information

⁴³ Quote from interview, Frederick Schottler, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 25, 1996. See also John Marston, “Cambodian News Media in the UNTAC Period and After,” in Steve Heder and Judy Underwood, eds., *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-keeping* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 212-227

producer) might become influential when there is a media monopoly, if it could penetrate the target area.

To accomplish its information missions, UNTAC availed itself of radio, television, video, puppet shows, billboards, singers, local artists, cartoon flyers, banners, leaflets and other resources. It published guidelines and directives and ran discussion groups. UNTAC brought the candidates together for round-table discussions and gave them access to its television, video, radio, and other facilities to help them spread their messages. UNTAC even ended up running its own radio station, Radio UNTAC, a first for a U.N. operations. All of these are transparency-increasing mechanisms, and are observable implications of H1, which contends that regimes provide transparency.

At its peak, Radio UNTAC broadcast 15 hours a day and was the most popular station in the country. To give some sense of the scale and penetration of UNTAC's information efforts, Japanese NGOs and political parties contributed 347,804 hand-held radios for distribution throughout Cambodia (along with 849,400 batteries and 1000 radio-cassette recorders).⁴⁴ Crowds would gather in marketplaces to listen to U.N. broadcasts. Relay stations were installed by UNTAC so that its broadcasts would reach the whole country, because in-country facilities were unable to do so. Before installation of the relays, UNTAC had to rely on borrowed transmitter time from VOA to broadcast throughout Cambodia. UNTAC's estimates for its radio station's audience ranged from almost the entire population to even more than the population (by including listeners in neighboring countries).

To see if UNTAC's messages were getting through, a six-person Analysis/Assessment

⁴⁴ Marston, "Neutrality," p. 191.

Unit of the Info/Ed Division conducted public opinion polls, traveled throughout the country, and monitored Cambodia's newspapers, radio and television programs, and political newsletters. It synthesized the information it gathered for distribution throughout UNTAC, helping UNTAC prepare its political reports and respond to emerging problems. The Unit's data helped UNTAC improve its image and credibility, prepare its information programs, and even vet the factions public statements.⁴⁵ Gathering information is crucial for UNTAC to be able to provide transparency (H1), while tracking rumors and propaganda are necessary for UNTAC to be able to reduce fears among parties and about itself (H4 and H6).

The main message and function of the Information/Education campaign was to teach Cambodians about the elections, and a major theme was convincing Cambodians that their ballots were indeed secret. Many feared retaliation if they did not vote for one party or another. In response, UNTAC instructed Cambodians about the mechanics of elections and the procedures for insuring ballot secrecy. In doing so, UNTAC made its own system transparent (H6), and also reduced unwarranted fears (H4). Another message involving self-transparency (H6), was UNTAC's also assurance Cambodians that it was not there to take over the country, and that they would leave.⁴⁶

Sometimes potential voters' fears were wildly unfounded. Some feared that the pencils for marking ballots contained radio beacons that linked up to satellites and would reveal who had voted for whom.⁴⁷ Others feared secret electronic eyes in the polling places. These and other

⁴⁵ Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, p. 64.

⁴⁶ Interview, Michael Doyle, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy, April 19, 1996.

⁴⁷ Interview, Michael Doyle, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy, April 19, 1996.

concerns about ballot secrecy and fears of retribution were expressed by Cambodians in letters to the station and in frank discussions on talk shows. UNTAC officials could then respond appropriately with necessary information. Thanks to repeated messages over Radio UNTAC that their ballots would be secret, “People started to whisper around the assurances the UNTAC had given, such that there was no such thing as a secret electronic eye to detect who they were voting for.”⁴⁸ The success of UNTAC in reducing these rumors and unfounded fears about retribution and its election again offers strong evidence in support of H4 and H6.

A second function of UNTAC and especially Radio UNTAC was to help all the parties get out their messages. Radio UNTAC gave free air time weekly to all the political parties. In a transparency-related assist to the parties, it also gave a right of response to parties that felt particularly aggrieved by misstatements or lies in other’s broadcasts. These efforts helped defeat the SOC’s media near-monopoly, and increased the fairness of the election. Unfortunately, one downside to opening up the process was that it antagonized the SOC.

Another division of UNTAC, the Control Unit, liaised with the local media, trying to promote higher and more neutral standards of journalism, promulgating media guidelines, and arm-twisting to prevent false and defamatory news stories that were not conducive to the elections and UNTAC’s mission. They also surveyed other campaign materials, and helped enforce the four day, post-campaign cooling off period before the elections. Unfortunately, the unit did not have enough speakers of Khmer to adequately monitor the Cambodian media.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Tan Lian Choo, “The Cambodian Election: Whither the Future?” in Timothy Carney and Tan Lian Choo, *Whither Cambodia? Beyond the Election* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 23.

⁴⁹ Marston, “Neutrality,” pp. 180-186, and interview, Joao Lins de Albuquerque, Media Division (and former chief of information control in Cambodia), United Nations Department of Public Information, April 24, 1996.

A third function of the Information/Education Division and Radio UNTAC was to reduce Cambodian's fears, and combat hostile propaganda and rumors, especially about UNTAC, its mission, and the U.N. In accomplishing these various tasks, Radio UNTAC became a "powerful tool."⁵⁰

The SOC and Khmer Rouge often propagandized against UNTAC, the U.N., and the elections.⁵¹ One of the main messages of the SOC was that UNTAC could not protect the Cambodians and that only the SOC could do so. The SOC accused U.N. soldiers of coming to Cambodia to sleep with "Vietnamese bitches."⁵² The SOC also tried to confuse Cambodians about UNTAC's role in Cambodia. For example, the SOC claimed to be able to register people to vote, even though this was UNTAC's sole responsibility. UNTAC successfully combated this sort of propaganda and this show how self-transparency can help the mission (H6).

Similarly, the SOC tried to confiscate people's voter registration cards in an attempt to intimidate non-supporters. UNTAC used its media resources to convince the people that this was against electoral law and the SOC's efforts blew up in its face. This embarrassment shows how information can be used to punish those who misbehave, an example of H5 in action. The SOC also coerced people to join their party, then falsely told these people that they had to vote for the party they belonged to. This intimidating misinformation was largely defeated by UNTAC

⁵⁰ Findlay, *Cambodia*, p. 152.

⁵¹ Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood point out that sometimes the SOC propagandized that UNTAC and the SOC were cooperating closely. This hurt UNTAC's image of impartiality, especially with the Khmer Rouge. They do not make clear the SOC's motive for doing this. In "Politics of Violence," in Heder and Underwood, eds., *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia*, pp. 32-33.

⁵² Interview, Joao Lins de Albuquerque, Media Division, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 24, 1996.

information efforts, offering evidence of transparency reducing fears (H4). Another SOC propaganda message was to try to tie FUNCINPEC and other opposition parties to the Khmer Rouge.

Although UNTAC was forced to confront a number of specific SOC transgressions, one item of craft knowledge for those dealing with media issues in the U.N. is that it is often unwise to combat propaganda with tit-for-tat counterpropaganda.⁵³ Doing so often degenerates into a war of words and adds credibility to the hostile propaganda.⁵⁴ Instead, the strategy is to stick to one's own message, repeat it a lot, and subtly change the focus as needed to combat whatever rumors are the most pernicious. This is why UNTAC Force Commander General Sanderson remarked that the U.N.'s information campaign allowed UNTAC to "bypass the propaganda of the Cambodian factions."⁵⁵ This is an operational aspect of using information to reduce fears and misperceptions (H4 and H6).

The Khmer Rouge waged a serious information campaign against the elections, with the main message being: do not vote because not all parties are participating (i.e. the Khmer Rouge were not participating). Some of their physical attacks before the elections were conducted with

⁵³ Lehmann believes that the topic of counterpropaganda a subject particularly ripe for future research, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, p. 151.

⁵⁴ Interviews Steve Whitehouse, Video Section, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 24, 1996; Joao Lins de Albuquerque, Media Division, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 24, 1996; Frederick Schottler, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 25, 1996; and Takahisa Kawakami, Principal Officer, Asia and Middle East Division, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 25, 1996.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Michael W. Doyle, "Authority and Elections in Cambodia," in Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr, eds., *Keeping the Peace*, p. 152.

the express purpose of expanding the areas over which they could propagandize.⁵⁶ Despite these efforts which ranged from print to radio, Khmer Rouge propaganda was generally unsuccessful in convincing people not to vote. UNTAC's inability to shut down the Khmer Rouge disinformation campaign was mostly due to were physical challenges to UNTAC's freedom of movement in Khmer Rouge controlled-areas and escalating authorizations from Khmer Rouge leaders to attack UNTAC personnel. However, because UNTAC's own information also failed to stop Khmer Rouge propaganda, this is a weak failure for H5.

Sometimes, Radio UNTAC combated fears generated by pre-election violence and rumors of election-time violence. When the Khmer Rouge captured the symbolic town of Siem Reap near Angkor Wat three weeks before the election, Radio UNTAC sent a reporter and broadcasts from the town helped convince Cambodians not to be intimidated and to continue with plans for the elections. Radio UNTAC assured voters that the Khmer Rouge was not tearing up their voting cards.⁵⁷

One source claims that jamming of Khmer Rouge radio (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea) by UNTAC information officers prevented codes from getting to Khmer Rouge operatives and was crucial in preventing election-time violence. This was done apparently without the consent or knowledge of the heads of UNTAC's info-ed division. However, Timothy Carney, director of Info/Ed and Stephen Heder, deputy director, counter that the

⁵⁶ Steve Heder, "The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizers,'" in Heder and Underwood, eds., *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia*, p. 101.

⁵⁷ Interview, Ayman El-Amir, Chief, Radio Section, United Nations, Department of Public Information, April 26, 1996.

jamming had no effect, and called this claim “fanciful” and “fanciful nonsense,” respectively.⁵⁸

At other times, though, news of violence encouraged more fear. When the Khmer Rouge attacked Vietnamese targets in Phnom Penh, news of these attacks reported by Radio UNTAC greatly increased fears in Cambodia. Even though it may have hurt the mission in the short term, UNTAC strove to tell the truth and remain impartial. In the end, Radio UNTAC built up considerable credibility going into the election. This was crucial because fears of election violence ran high.

When the voting began on May 23, Radio UNTAC reporters were stationed around the country. Many Cambodians (as well as UNTAC) anticipated Khmer Rouge attacks on polling places, and many hesitated to vote, fearing for their safety. Radio UNTAC reports that voting was being conducted safely throughout the country are widely credited with helping bring Cambodians to the polls. Thus, during the crucial election period, Radio UNTAC and other UNTAC information efforts successfully lessened unwarranted fears, helped generate the ninety percent turnout, and thus provided clear evidence for H4. The election might have been severely impaired without these information efforts. Of course, the physical presence of the 16,000 peacekeepers also helped calm these fears.

After the elections, Radio UNTAC continued to play transparency-related roles and helped protect the election results from attacks launched by the political parties.

On 31 May 1993, Chea Sim, President of the CPP [Cambodian People’s Party] who controlled the Interior Ministry (and its 40,000 police force) demanded that Radio UNTAC should stop broadcasting the results. Radio UNTAC was accused of misleading and confusing the public. UNTAC rejected the allegations.

⁵⁸ Not for attribution telephone interview; email correspondence Timothy Carney, November 10, 2003 and Stephen Heder, November 10, 2003; see also Marston, “Neutrality,” p. 184.

UNTAC's stand was broadcast over Radio UNTAC that day:

“The decision to make the progressive results of the counting available to the media, and through the media to the people of Cambodia and of the World, flows from UNTAC's commitment to the principle of openness and transparency in the administration and conduct of the election. In addition, it reflects the fact that since progressive results are made available to all registered political parties (whose agents have the right to be present at the counting and to observe every aspect of that process), they are in effect already in the public domain.”⁵⁹

The SOC had expected to win the election and became bitter as the results came in showing FUNCINPEC in the lead. Had the SOC gotten away with its anti-election message, the election might have failed amidst recriminations and disagreements about the election's fairness. Again, Radio UNTAC told the truth, dispelled rumors and lies, and thereby helped consolidate the election results. This is evidence of self-transparency and transparency reducing suspicions (H6 and H4).⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Zhou Mei, *Radio UNTAC of Cambodia: Winning Ears, Hearts, and Minds* (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Press, 1994), p. 57. Mei was chief of production for Radio UNTAC.

⁶⁰ This section on the Information/Education Division was based on the following sources: Brown and Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers*, pp. 127-129; Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia*, pp. 30-31, 34, 54-55; Findlay, *Cambodia*, pp. 40-43, 75-76, 152; Kate Freison, “The Politics of Getting out the Vote in Cambodia,” in Heder and Underwood, eds., *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia*, pp. 184-201; Steve Heder and Judy Legerwood, “Politics of Violence: An Introduction” in Heder and Underwood, eds., *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia*; Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition*, pp. 84, 109-111; Jeffrey Heyman, “The Story of Radio UNTAC: The United Nations First Peace-Keeping Radio Station,” 1994; Judy Legerwood, “Patterns of CPP Political Repression and Violence during the UNTAC Period,” in Heder and Underwood, eds., *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia*, pp. 122-130; Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, chapter 4; Marston, “Cambodian News Media” in Heder and Underwood, eds., *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia*, pp. 209-227; Marston, “Neutrality;” Mei, *Radio UNTAC of Cambodia*; Peou, *Conflict Neutralization*, pp. 207-211; Schear, “Riding the Tiger,” p. 169; United Nations, *Blue Helmets*, 3 ed., pp. 479-480; United Nations, Secretary-General, *Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC*, S/25154, (New York, NY: United Nations, January 25, 1993); United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 792 (1992)*, S/25289, (New York, NY: United Nations, February 13, 1993); United Nations Secretary-General, *Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC*, S/25719, (New York, NY: United Nations, May 3, 1993).

In addition to places where they are specifically cited, the following interviews were helpful, particularly for the UNTAC and UNTAG chapters. I interviewed these U.N. officials at the U.N. in New York over the period April 12-28, 1996: Joao Lins de Albuquerque, Media Division, Department of Public Information; Henry Breed, Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Ayman El-Amir, Chief, Radio Section, Department of Public Information; Fred Eckhard, Senior Liaison Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Kevin Kennedy, Chief, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information; Frederick Schottler, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information; Steve Whitehouse, Video Section, Department of Public

CONCLUSION: CAMBODIA AND TRANSPARENCY

UNTAC had several failings and shortcomings, but the core of its mandate – the holding of free elections – was a success. In achieving this success, transparency was not a sufficient tool, but it was a necessary tool. UNTAC's experience offers clear and unambiguous support for the ability of regimes to provide transparency (H1), reduce fears (H4), and especially to clarify the purposes of its own operation (H6).

The promise of transparency (H2) was mildly helpful in getting the Cambodian parties to agree to the Paris Accords. Power politics and historical circumstances were far more important. Hence, H2 receives very modest support.

The Cambodian factions resisted many of the military aspects of the Paris Accords. There was little for UNTAC to monitor and verify. And when it reported what it did successfully verify, the departure and subsequent absence of Vietnamese forces, the Khmer Rouge did not believe UNTAC. As with Cyprus, we see the ability of transparency to reduce suspicions (H4) undercut by willful disbelief and bias.

Turning to the civil part of the mandate, UNTAC failed at civil control. This effort could have depended to a large degree on transparency for its success. But like the military aspects of UNTAC's mandate, resistance by the factions torpedoed UNTAC before transparency could help.

Information and education played a large role in UNTAC's human rights campaign, although transparency was not much of an issue. UNTAC had difficulty in this area because of

Information; Lena Yacoumopoulou, Film/Video Archives, Department of Public Information.

its very limited capabilities for coercion and enforcement.

UNTAC's greatest success was the election, and here transparency played a large role. Through information and education, with Radio UNTAC in particular (H1), UNTAC defused many rumors, calmed many fears (H4), clarified UNTAC's role (H6), stopped interference with electoral procedures, and helped end disputes about the election's results. Without information/education and transparency, the elections might have been marred or ruined. Lehmann, citing five scholars and UNTAC officials, says that "Radio UNTAC was, according to most observers, one of the prime success stories of the U.N. operation in Cambodia."⁶¹ Kevin Kennedy, Chief of the Peace and Security section of the UN Department of Public Information said that Radio UNTAC was "extremely useful" and "critical."⁶²

Table 7-1 summarizes these findings:

⁶¹ Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, p. 65.

⁶² Interview, April 24, 1996.

Table 7-1: Findings by Hypothesis

Hypothesis:	Evidence:	Strength of Evidence:	Overall Strength of Hypothesis:
Regimes provide transparency (H1)	<p>UNAMIC failed in many attempts to communicate, liaison, monitor, and investigate, pp. 232, 241, 242</p> <p>Inadequate military intelligence gathering capabilities, p. 235</p> <p>Dialogue with factions about refugee repatriation, p. 238</p> <p>Had difficulty monitoring government functions as part of civil control mandate, p. 241</p> <p>Radio, television, video, puppet shows, singers, local artists, cartoon flyers, banners, leaflets and other tools used by Information/Education Division, p. 248</p>	<p>Fail</p> <p>Fail</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Fail</p> <p>Strong</p>	Moderate
Regimes spread misinformation (H1')	no evidence		
Anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2)	Promise of transparency helped factions overcome fears and agree to Paris Accords, but great power coercion/persuasion and transparency-related disputes undercut support for H2, pp. 227-230	Moderate/ Weak	Moderate/ Weak
Anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2')	SOC successful resistance of UNTAC civil control monitoring, p. 240	Moderate	Moderate
Transparency promotes cooperation and prevents conflict (H3)	no evidence		
Transparency hinders cooperation and causes conflict (H3')	no evidence		
Transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4)	<p>Khmer Rouge did not believe UNTAC reports that Vietnamese forces had left Cambodia, p. 235</p> <p>Allayed suspicions about refugee repatriation, p. 238</p> <p>Reduced fears of election violence, helping turnout, p. 254</p> <p>Stopped SOC from coercing people to vote for it, p. 252</p> <p>Defeated rumors that the election was rigged and that UNTAC was manipulating the results, p. 255</p>	<p>Fail</p> <p>Moderate</p> <p>Strong</p> <p>Strong</p> <p>Strong</p>	Moderate/ Strong

Transparency confirms fears (H4')	no evidence		
Transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems (H5)	Could not adequately monitor or control SOC; poor civil control, p. 241	Weak/Failure	Weak/Failure
	Inability to stop SOC human rights abuses, p. 242	Failure	
Transparency about the regime (or self-transparency) increases its effectiveness (H6)	UNTAC taught about human rights, p. 243	Moderate	Strong
	Clarified UNTAC's purpose and secrecy of voting system, p. 250	Strong	
	Refuted SOC's propaganda about UNTAC's role and ability to protect voters, p. 251	Strong	
	Defeated rumors that the election was rigged and that UNTAC was manipulating the results; helped to consolidate the results, p. 255	Strong	

Coding: **Strong** means that the phenomenon or effect was clear and very influential if not decisive, producing behavior that would be hard to replicate without the regime. **Moderate** means that the phenomenon played a discernible and somewhat influential role. Other factors help explain the outcome. **Weak** means that the phenomenon was probably but only weakly present. Other factors explain most of the outcome. **Failure** means that the regime tried to do something and failed, or that something that the regime did was counterproductive. The **overall** ratings are judgements based on the significance of transparency and its effects for each hypothesis within the context of each case.

The U.N.'s successes in Namibia and Cambodia suggest conditions under which an security regime can promote peace with transparency. Transparency is about information. Making information provided by the U.N. (or others) count is easier to do in areas where information is otherwise hard to come by or the current sources are blatantly biased and/or are under monopoly control. This is more likely to be the case where poverty, underdevelopment, and/or dictators reign. Before the U.N.'s arrival in each country, the existing media were extremely biased, had limited coverage, and were based on relatively outmoded technologies. There was considerable room for improvement, and this helped the U.N. step in and increase transparency. The information provided by these U.N. operations added value by being credible, by covering wide areas, and by using a range of methods from radio relays to town meetings and puppet shows.

EPILOGUE

In the Summer of 1997, Hun Sen staged a coup and took over Cambodia's government. However ominous a development, he still allowed elections in 1998. The turnout was ninety-three percent, Hun Sen's CPP received forty-one percent of the vote while FUNCINPEC came in second with thirty-two percent. The election was largely free and fair, even though only 500 international observers were on hand to monitor the voting.

This suggests that Cambodia took a step forward with UNTAC's help. Having tasted a multi-party election, a free press, and progress in human rights, Cambodians did not let their country take too many steps back. Indeed, the training and socialization resulting from the 1993 election helped Cambodians prepare for the 1998 election.⁶³

⁶³ Brown and Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers*, epilogue, esp. p. 307.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This book examines the provision and effects of transparency in order to help us understand when transparency can best be used to promote peace. Here I offer the lessons learned from looking at diverse cases, from forums to different kinds of peacekeeping, and a number of incidents in each case.

My findings about transparency ranged from dramatic success to modest usefulness to outright failure. The variance in results across the cases raises such questions as: why is the strongest evidence of success for transparency located in the multifunctional, democracy-promoting peacekeeping operations? Why is transparency limited to moderate and weak success in the traditional buffer zone monitoring operations? Why is transparency's role in bargaining in Concert of Europe case found to be consistent with *realpolitik*? What do the answers to these questions tell us about when security regimes can best use transparency to promote peace?

To address these issues, this conclusion first reviews the findings about the hypotheses on transparency. I then offer the implications of these findings for international relations theorists and policy makers. An appendix describes the current status of U.N. information operations, to further the policy relevance of the book's findings.

FINDINGS

As shown here in Table 8-1, the strength of each hypothesis varied widely by case.

Table 8-1, Summary of Findings by Case and Hypothesis

Hypothesis	Concert of Europe	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
Regimes provide transparency (H1)	Moderate	Moderate/Weak	Moderate/Weak	Moderate/Strong	Moderate
Regimes spread misinformation (H1')		Moderate/Weak			
Anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2)	Weak	Weak	Moderate/Weak	Moderate/Weak	Moderate/Weak
Anticipated transparency hinders cooperation (H2')					Moderate
Transparency promotes cooperation and prevents conflict (H3)	Moderate/Strong	Weak	Weak		
Transparency hinders cooperation and causes conflict (H3')	Moderate		Moderate		
Transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4)	Weak	Moderate/Weak	Moderate/Weak	Moderate/Strong	Moderate/Strong
Transparency confirms fears (H4')		Weak			
Transparency reduces cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems (H5)		Moderate/Weak	Weak	Moderate	Weak/Failure
Transparency about the regime (or self-transparency) increases its effectiveness (H6)		Moderate/Weak		Strong	Strong
For more information, see each chapter's summary table on:	p. 124	p. 171	p. 206	p. 223	p. 258

To explain the table, I will now summarize the findings by hypothesis.

Do security regimes provide transparency (H1)? For informal regimes like forums which do not actively generate or exchange information, a primary benefit is increased speed of communication. Multilateral communication can be faster than bilateral communication, and face-to-face communication can be faster than communication from a distance. The effects of increasing the pace of diplomacy on fears, miscalculation, and bargaining are discussed below, but the bottom line is that forums facilitate bargaining. In the case of the Concert, the bargaining reflected many of the same *realpolitik* elements seen in the pre-Concert era. Coercive arrangements were made and coercive threats were communicated more quickly than before.

The ability of more formal security regimes to generate and add value to information depends on a number of factors, but a key variable is the quality of information already available to the adversaries. Active attempts by security regimes to provide and increase transparency will only work if they can generate and exchange information over and above the independent information-gathering capabilities of the adversaries. This means that efforts to increase transparency by security regimes will work best when there is poor unilateral (intelligence) and ambient (press, trade, travel) transparency. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights operate in fairly developed areas of the world where the adversaries can themselves gather high quality information, especially about matters concerning the strategic military balance. The level of background information available to the adversaries is already high, and uncertainty tends to be low.

In contrast, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia and

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operated in the developing world where the information quality was relatively poor: lack of media outlets, biased media outlets, rampant illiteracy, and lack of education. These conditions create a greater need for information and transparency, and make it easier for the U.N. to add value to the existing flow of information. The ability to provide transparency also depends on the relative information power of the regime compared to the adversaries. As the U.N. is relatively weak compared to developed states, the U.N. is likely to fare better with transparency in the developing world. U.N. information may also be more likely to be accepted as credible in the developing world.

A sad case is UNMEE, where peacekeeping could be quite helpful, in part because a border dispute creates considerable uncertainty and tension, and because unilateral and ambient transparency is low. Thanks to these background conditions, U.N. monitoring and provision of transparency could help calm tensions, but each side has imposed restrictions on the peacekeepers. In December 2005, Eritrea ordered Western peacekeepers to leave the country.¹ Even when UNMEE had more opportunity to do so, it made little effort to exploit information operations and use transparency to create peace (see footnote 15 below).

Table 8-2 summarizes these arguments about how background information conditions are likely to influence the effectiveness of transparency. These arguments also apply to information operations and public diplomacy more broadly. It is a truism that if transparency is already high, then efforts to increase transparency are not so helpful. However, it is worth noting that the level

¹ Susannah Price, "UN pulls out Eritrea peacekeepers" BBC News, December 15, 2005, at <<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4530410.stm>>>.

of information competition is a key variable in making transparency and information operations work.

Table 8-2: Information Conditions and Likely Operational Effectiveness of Transparency in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

	Low Uncertainty and Opacity	High Uncertainty and Opacity
Strong Information Competitors (well-equipped news outlets, well-organized political parties, and powerful intelligence services – all potential sources of ambient and unilateral transparency, if accurate and unbiased)	1. Transparency not likely to be relevant to mission effectiveness as there are few information-related problems to solve. (cases of UNDOF and UNFICYP offer evidence for this contention, especially with issues related to strategic military balances)	2. Transparency could help mission, but the U.N. faces uphill battle making it work. (UNFICYP offers evidence for this, in instances when political opportunists and the abundant press play on biases and blow things out of proportion).
Weak Information Competitors (fewer and less credible media outlets, disorganized political parties, weak intelligence services)	3. Transparency not likely to help as there are few problems to solve. However, U.N. can fairly easily provide its own mission-aiding information.	4. U.N. provided transparency stands a good chance at working, and providing meaningful help to the operation. (cases of UNTAG and UNTAC offer evidence for this, in many instances)

Note that strong information competitors may also be a factor in creating low uncertainty and opacity because these information sources may increase ambient or unilateral transparency. However, the link is not tight because one can have strong information competitors and high uncertainty and opacity at the same time when the competitors are biased or untruthful. As noted during the UNFICYP case study, for example, South Cyprus has many newspapers, but almost all of them have a strong Greek Cypriot - tilt in addition to their often explicit political party affiliations and leanings. In this case, Box 2, UNFICYP has to compete not just against a high baud rate generated by the Cypriot press and political opportunists, but also the biases that these influences help build and sustain. On the other hand, UNDOF's inspections contribute less transparency than they otherwise might due to the intelligence services of each side. It is not

axiomatic that a strong press presence automatically increases ambient transparency, or that intelligence efforts necessarily yield credible unilateral transparency.

In addition to information competitors, the cases revealed other barriers to the provision of transparency (H1) ranging from procedural issues such as inadequate forces and faulty standard operating procedures to operational failures and political resistance. From areas held off-limits to the U.N. on the Golan Heights to Khmer Rouge intransigence on disarmament and cantonment, these failures often reflected the power imbalance between the U.N. and the local parties.

There was little evidence that security regimes spread misinformation (H1'), although there were instances of shading the truth or withholding information in the case of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

Finally, if active peacekeeping operations face the challenge of adding value to existing information, this hurdle is even higher for forums. A forum is most useful when states have few other means of communication. Given the number of forums and other means of communication available in the late twentieth century, this condition is increasingly rare – at least among the more powerful states. However, the policy part of the conclusion argues that forums may still be useful particularly in parts of Asia and Africa.

Does the promise of security regime-provided transparency help adversaries make peace, the contention of hypothesis H2? Although this is an intuitively appealing proposition, there was only modest or weak evidence for this in the cases. Castlereagh, the Concert's prime architect, looked forward to better communications with the forum, but there was no evidence that he tried to sell others with this argument. Coercion and persuasion by outside powers was the primary

explanation for the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping operations, though the promise of monitoring and transparency was mildly helpful in three of the four peacekeeping operations. There was moderate support for the contrary hypothesis that anticipated transparency can hinder cooperation (H2'), and this was found when the SOC in Cambodia resisted and thwarted UNTAC's attempts to monitor its governance.

Does transparency promote cooperation by reducing uncertainties and miscalculations that hinder bargaining, as H3 contends? There was solid evidence that forum diplomacy reduced miscalculation during the Concert period, but there was little evidence for H3 in the peacekeeping operations.

Because the Concert period was permeated by war scares and hard bargaining, I do not offer the most enthusiastically optimistic interpretation of the Concert's effects, and I do not believe the Concert period represented a transformation of diplomatic and international relations. Yet it is precisely because war was possible and the stakes were high that the effects of forum diplomacy and transparency are worth noting. However, it is natural that H3 is more prominent during the Concert than during the peacekeeping operations because the conditions under which each come into play are different. Crisis management forums are convened because war is in the air. Peacekeeping operations are not normally put in place until there is a peace to consolidate. On Cyprus, the peacekeepers can help tactical bargains about rock throwing or construction. During the Concert, the forum helps states avoid war on several occasions. The fact that there were several war scares during the Concert's crises may also explain why the Concert facilitated hardball diplomacy, reduced uncertainty and miscalculation (H3), and also clarified the existence of deadlock or conflict (H3 and H3').

Bargaining helps establish each side's stakes, positions, and can clarify the existence of deadlock. Does this reduce conflict, as contended by H3, or increase conflict, as suggested by H3'? Does transparency help resolve the crisis, or cause it to escalate? The answer is: both. The Concert's crises often showed H3 and H3' operating in the same case or incident. This is because they describe the dynamics of a crisis: escalation and de-escalation. Crises can of course escalate to war, but this did not happen in my cases. Even when conflict initially spiked, the Concert powers in the end were able to avoid war. In the most serious crises (Poland-Saxony and Belgium), this was due to coercion, restraint, and re-configuring of alliances.

Ultimately, these findings tend to support a modest but generally optimistic view of transparency. On the whole, transparency was moderately helpful in a number of instances across the cases, and rarely harmful. There were a few home runs for transparency during the Concert and UNTAG and UNTAC, but also a number of instances where its effects were weak, or where attempts to increase transparency failed. While the great majority of observations about the provision and effects of transparency were positive, their magnitude was on the whole moderate. Although more research needs to be done across different domains, these findings suggest that added transparency entails few risks, and many possible benefits, but that expectations for gains should not be overblown.

An interesting counterpoint to this optimistic view is found during the peace negotiations between Syria and Israel when Kissinger filtered, limited, and slowed information exchange and almost certainly helped prevent deadlock or worse. This supports H3' because it clearly implies that more transparency would have hindered cooperation (H3'). How and when to filter

information in mediation is worthy of more study.²

Does transparency reduce fears and worst-case assumptions, as suggested by H4? UNDOF could not reduce fears because there were none, while UNFICYP had trouble because of deeply ingrained biases. In contrast to UNDOF and UNFICYP, UNTAG and UNTAC did a great job reducing fears. Fears about violence and retribution were widespread yet not deeply ingrained. Some fears, like the idea of Khmer Rouge radio transmitters in voting pencils, were so outlandish that they could be easily calmed. These missions were able to dominate the information flow and provide some of the most credible information in the country.

This suggests that there is a fairly narrow band – a Goldilocks zone – where transparency can help allay fears. On the one hand, if transparency is to reduce fears, there have to be unwarranted fears for the regime to address. On the other, these fears and suspicions (and tensions more generally) cannot be so great that nothing the regime does can reduce them. In addition, the discussion above argues that the ability of regimes to use transparency is also helped when ambient and unilateral transparency is low, when the regime can compete with the local information competitors.

There was little evidence that security regime-provided transparency confirmed or justified what might have been unwarranted fears or worst-case assumptions (H4'). In contrast

² For example, there appears to be no consensus in the field of mediation on how to deal with information asymmetries between disputants. See Alexis Gensberg, "Mediating Inequality: Mediators' Perspectives on Power Imbalances in Public Disputes," Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School (Cambridge, MA: 2003) and Zartman and Rubin, "Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation," p. 286. Nor there does there appear to be consensus on when filtering in general is wise or unwise, a point confirmed by John Darby, Professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, in a conversation on November 2, 2005. See also: Christopher W. Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, 2 ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1996), pp. 182-186, 217-223, 329 who discusses all sorts of variables involving framing and information flow, but does not specify the effects of those variables or how they work in different conditions (except to say that reframing disputes over values is harder than in disputes over interests, p. 219).

however, Appendix 2 has cases where IAEA inspections confirmed fears or revealed that things were worse than previously assumed.

Were security regimes able to prevent or stop cheaters, rogues, or spoilers by using information to deter or coerce them, the contention of hypothesis H5? This happened at moderate or weak levels in all of the peacekeeping cases. The lesson here is that the same information gathering and disseminating mechanisms that can be used for transparency, such as patrols, monitoring, and liaison systems, can also coerce. They constitute instruments of power for peacekeeping operations. Regimes with more elaborate rules, benchmarks of behavior, and reporting procedures are more likely to be able to avail themselves of this tool. It is much more difficult to define cheating, identify defection, and coerce behavior in the absence of rules.

Did transparency and the use of information help regimes reduce fears about their own operations, as contended by H6?³ Clearly yes. UNTAG and UNTAC faced suspicions and doubts about their missions and mandates. For the same reasons they succeeded with H4, UNTAG and UNTAC also strongly succeeded using transparency to clarify their roles and practices and thereby help their missions achieve their mandates (H6). This reinforces a prior insight about the provision of transparency: where the U.N. presence and activities like elections, voting, and campaigning are novel, much more attention has to be paid to explaining the mission. Fortunately, the U.N. is most likely to succeed with information campaigns and transparency precisely where the need for self-explanation is highest (see Table 8-2, p. 265). In the developed world the mission itself is less likely to need explanation.

³ This hypothesis is less relevant for informal and passive regimes like the Concert which have no mission or institutional capacity to actively gather and disseminate information, and the same applies to H5.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARS

The key issue in the study of transparency is to figure out how and under what conditions it will promote peace or conflict. To summarize my main contributions to this effort, I show that in the context of forums transparency can facilitate hard bargaining, but that crises may be made worse by transparency before they are made better. In the context of peacekeeping operations, transparency works best when the regime can dominate the information flow and information competitors such as other media or intelligence are limited. Transparency needs some prior level of uncertainty, incomplete information, and misperception to work, otherwise it is irrelevant. However, transparency hits hurdles when biases and misperceptions run so deep that new information can not affect attitudes or refute rumors. Transparency therefore operates best in a Goldilocks zone defined by few information competitors, and some – but not too much – bias, misperception, and incomplete information. This Goldilocks zone is most likely generalizable to efforts like public diplomacy which actively try to shape information environments.

The most important observation that generates the need for more research is that transparency has conflicting effects. Although this book ends up being modestly optimistic about transparency, this book does not resolve the optimist versus pessimist debate. This is because, although I hope I have furthered the study of transparency, more work remains to be done to figure out how the positive and negative effects of transparency work in additional cases and circumstances. That said, my findings suggest that transparency optimists, those who believe that transparency almost always has benevolent effects, have to rethink their arguments. Transparency is often helpful, but it falls short of being an elixir of peace.

Second, because transparency can both exacerbate and calm conflict, more analysis needs to be done to figure out the relationship between the two effects – especially in the context of bargaining. Models need to be constructed that depict transparency at first causing rising tensions while clarifying stakes, capabilities, and resolve and then helping reduce tensions, redefine win-sets, and seal a bargain (or helping coercion work). The reverse may also be true in some situations, with initial calming giving way to increased tension. The models must also depict increased transparency ending in conflict, depending on the circumstances. Empirical work on transparency and incomplete information is scanty. More process tracing needs to chart these multiple effects to help determine when rising tensions are a precursor to a bargain, or part of the path to war. Process tracing can test the competing contentions that the rationalists in particular have done a good generating. As I hope this book shows, these rationalist and qualitative efforts should be mutually reinforcing in providing new insights into the workings of transparency.

The cross cutting effects of transparency also apply to anticipated transparency as it can help seal a deal or make states resist cooperation. The Soviets in particular felt threatened by transparency and arms control in the earlier days of the Cold War (and throughout, really). Despite this rather prominent – though not unique – example, the distributional consequences of transparency are underappreciated by most political scientists. As seen in Appendix 2, such concerns are often evident in historical accounts about arms control, but it may be that arms control became largely passe for political scientists just as they became more interested in the influence of incomplete and asymmetric information on outcomes.

Third, another issue that deserves more research is: when, how often, and under what

conditions do mechanisms that increase transparency make deception easier. A common critique of arms control by its critics is that it can create a lulling effect. Is this true? How easy is it to dupe a regime or misuse its mechanisms?

A fourth area for more research is the role of mediators and how they control information flow. Kissinger's mediation between Syria and Israel suggests that filtering of information can be beneficial. As is, this is a counterargument against the transparency optimists. But it is only one case, and its generalizability has yet to be determined. From what I can tell, there is no consensus or in depth analysis on the opposing effects of transparency or information provision in the literature on mediation, so this suggests a research program for a scholars in this area.⁴ Kydd and Walter note that the "role of third-party information provision" in providing reassurance is a worthy topic for future research.⁵

Fifth, I have yet to see an article or book on "When Does Familiarity Breed Contempt?"⁶ The cases here revealed some instances where transparency hindered bargaining, and even rarer instances of transparency confirming fears. However, there are surely more cases out there and the conditions under which transparency breeds contempt (leads parties to confirm their worst fears and to break off negotiations H4' and H3') need more exploration. Appendix 2 has mini-cases where IAEA and UNSCOM inspections had this effect.

Sixth, a major area for more research lies in tying together the multiple expertises which

⁴ See footnote 2 above, p. 269.

⁵ "Sabotaging the Peace," p. 290.

⁶ Gaddis in *Long Peace* says that history is replete with examples of this on page 225, but his examples such as Greece and Turkey need examination to make sure that familiarity is not the same as proximity leading to geopolitical contests over narrow waterways, for example.

bear on transparency. Among others, the institutionalist, qualitative and rationalist causes of war, misperception/cognition/political psychology, media/propaganda/advertising, and negotiation/mediation literatures all offer insights on influence of transparency. Yet crossover studies (much less in depth crossover citations) are rare. Significant cross-disciplinary borrowing remains to be done among political scientists (and our sub-fields), psychologists, sociologists, historians, and others. I have tried to touch on and integrate several literatures, but I have only kicked the can down the road.

A final subject for more research is the tactical use of transparency and its relationship to strategic goals. The cases here suggest that tactical interventions in specific places or about specific rumors can make a difference in helping strategic goals such as elections (UNTAC and UNTAG). Walter is surely correct to argue that security guarantees are a key to peaceful settlements. But she undervalues the role of transparency and information operations, especially in light of the relatively high cost of providing security guarantees.⁷ Transparency and information operations will not make as much of a difference as boots on the ground, but they are easier and cheaper to bring to bear.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS

Concert and Forums

My findings about the Concert and transparency have three main implications. First,

⁷ Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

scholars continue to advocate Concerts for everything from replacing NATO to helping deal with terrorism. There would be much wisdom in a working Concert of great powers to confront terrorism and achieve other political goals, and indeed when the U.N. Security Council works well it resembles an effective Concert. However, there is only mixed historical justification for using the Concert of Europe as a precedent to justify policy recommendations. The Concert period shows more *realpolitik* than rule-guided or norm-driven behavior. I argue that when the Concert worked to dampen conflict it did so by facilitating hard bargaining. This is a worthy contribution, but, it is not a transformation of international politics in the direction of rules, norms, or enlightened self-interest. The Concert did establish the norm of meeting together to try to manage crises and in this way, the Concert of Europe was a milestone in international relations. Yet the meetings themselves evinced much power-politics, and their chief benefit was to increase transparency.

Second, expectations about what forums can achieve should be modest. Simply put, forums make power politics easier. Forums bring leaders together, making it easier to engage in confrontation, as well as to find common ground. Forums do not actively defuse crises or actively help adversaries overcome fears of cooperation or of each other the way more formal methods of increasing transparency (such as peacekeeping operations) do. That said, forums do help states communicate, which often helps reduce miscalculation and clarify bargaining positions, stakes, and relative power. This in turn can spur agreement, successful coercion, or acceptance of deadlock. Even modest results for security forums are to be welcomed, because

effective tools to promote peace are hard to come by.⁸ And modest results for security forums do not necessarily indict other regimes, which have been much more effective and beneficial, especially in the realm of international political economy.⁹

Do forums necessarily improve transparency and facilitate power politics across space and time? To extrapolate from the above findings, it is probable that forums generally increase transparency, though it follows from my peacekeeping findings that they would do so most in areas where communications are minimal. While I find that forum-provided transparency facilitates power politics, it seems reasonable to conclude that forums act as conveyor belts for the predominant political tone of their members, whether it be power politics, a politics of enlightened self-interest, or perhaps something more altruistic. However, there is no evidence in the cases that increased transparency causes enlightened self-interest or altruism. This point is underscored by the high level of coercion and war scares that prevailed during the Concert.

Third, Concert-like forums, periodic summits, or hot lines may be useful when states and other adversaries lack the means to communicate on a regular basis, or at all. Transparency depends on boosting the availability of information, so the utility of forums in adding information depends on the level of pre-existing mechanisms to exchange information. A plethora of Concert-like forums already exist – especially for the great powers, including the U.N. Security Council, the G-8, the O.S.C.E., the E.U., and ASEAN.

Nonetheless, when communication is minimal, summits or forums may be desirable and

⁸ Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October, 1984).

⁹ See for example Ikenberry, *After Victory* which depicts the striking growth of international institutions over time.

may be the only way to get adversaries to communicate. U.S. Army General Gary Luck, commander of U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea said: “They [North Korea] refuse to meet us at Panmunjom on armistice-related issues, and they refuse to talk to us on the telephone when we’ve called to protest armistice violations.” He believes that “the lack of communication is dangerous because it would inhibit efforts to defuse a border situation.”¹⁰ There are no regular meetings and not even a hotline between North and South Korea. Contact between India and Pakistan is better, but still sporadic.

Despite ASEAN, more forums may be useful in Asia. The *Economist* reported in June 2002 that ASEAN has “floundered” as a regional forum for discussing security issues. It recommended that a recent conference of defense ministers from across East Asia become an annual event, because it was “needed in order to increase transparency” in a region “riven by suspicions,” rivalries, and arms races.¹¹

Finally, forums may be especially helpful in areas of the developing world, particularly Africa, where networks of communication between states and adversaries are less well established. For example, the U.N. notes the use of forums to reduce tensions between adversaries in the Congo:

In view of the pervasive fear and mistrust that characterize relations between the Lendu and the Hema [in the Ituri district of Congo], it is essential that a dialogue between the two groups... be initiated and maintained. In the past, the organization of forums and round tables involving community leaders and

¹⁰ Bill Gertz, “U.S. Commander in Korea sees North Near Disintegration,” *The Washington Times*, March 16, 1996, p. 7. The first statement quotes Luck’s testimony before the U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security; the second is Gertz’s paraphrase of what Luck said. See more generally “Mistrust and the Korean Peninsula: Dangers of Miscalculation,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, October 1998, which notes that reliable information about North Korea is “sparse” and that its decision-making process is “opaque.”

¹¹ “China Feels Encircled,” *Economist*, June 6, 2002.

traditional chiefs has helped defuse tensions.¹²

The past record sounds like a good success for forum diplomacy and the effects of transparency, and local conflict resolutions initiatives involving U.N.-facilitated meetings have helped calm parts of the Congo. However, forums and meetings have had less success in the Ituri district. As part of the Luanda Agreement of September 2002, the U.N. did subsequently establish a formal forum, the Ituri Pacification Committee, to bring the parties in the area together. Unfortunately, the conflict continues between the Hema and Lendu and serves as a reminder of the limits of forums.¹³

Peacekeeping

My findings about peacekeeping and transparency result in three policy recommendations. First, policy makers and U.N. officials should recognize the value of increasing transparency to the success of their peacekeeping operations. A tool will only be correctly used if its effects are well studied and its potential is appreciated. Although it is no elixir of peace, transparency and information operations have proven potential for reducing tension and defusing crises and hostile incidents.

¹² United Nations Security Council, *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic of the Congo*, S/2002/1005, (September 10, 2002), para. 59, 10.

¹³ United Nations Security Council, *Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic of the Congo*, S/2003/1098, (November 17, 2002). Frank Nyakairu, Kefa Atibuni and Tabu Butagira, "Hema, Lendu peace deal flops in Arua," *The Monitor*, Kampala, Uganda, January 1, 2003, Posted to the web January 2, 2003 at <<<http://allafrica.com/stories/200301020580.html>>>.

This recommendation is surprisingly necessary: during my research interviews when I explained that I was researching whether and how peacekeeping operations increase transparency, the person I was interviewing did not understand transparency or assumed I meant that I was investigating whether or not the operation itself was transparent to others. While increasing self-transparency is important, whether and how peacekeeping operations could increase transparency between adversaries appeared not to cross many practitioners' minds until I explained further. Even those who realize the need to use information to educate local parties about the role of the U.N. often do not grasp the other roles of information and transparency examined in this study: reducing fears between adversaries, reducing miscalculation, or making violators back down. Information is a crucial tool in helping peacekeepers become peacemakers by shaping the interests and preferences of adversaries.¹⁴ The major argument of appendix one is that the U.N. continues to avoid exploiting information and transparency to help their missions.¹⁵ Unfortunately, the same is largely true of the U.S., where public diplomacy receives little respect within the State Department, despite the media profile of under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes and several new broadcasting efforts into the Middle East.¹⁶

Once aware of the importance of the informational aspects of their missions, peacekeepers might be more willing to devote adequate personnel and resources to information

¹⁴ Sambanis in "The United Nations Operation in Cyprus" offers a general model in which peacekeeping can have positive or negative effects on peacemaking, pp. 83-85.

¹⁵ This remains true as of September 26, 2005 when I received an email from an UNMEE official stating: "I'm writing to commend you on your excellent article Untapped Power? I currently work with UNMEE and sadly agree with your analysis of the lost opportunities." See "Untapped Power? The Status of U.N. Information Operations," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 608-624.

¹⁶ Stephen Johnson, "Public Diplomacy Needs a Commander, Not a Spokesman," WebMemo #869, Heritage Foundation, September 30, 2005, <<<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm869.cfm>>>.

gathering and dissemination. Five minute or one hour a week broadcasts are inadequate. For peacekeepers to provide information that mitigates fears, they must be able to learn about whatever rumors and misperceptions are circulating. Greater use of information technologies must be accompanied by the development and deployment of experts on the area of operations for each peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping operations often do not have enough in-house expertise or information-gathering capability to help them adequately separate myth from fact or provide tension-reducing information.¹⁷

A greater emphasis is needed on up-to-date monitoring technologies from audio-triangulators to motion-sensors and night vision goggles. Much of this equipment would end up saving money by increasing the effectiveness of each peacekeeper.¹⁸

Second, if peacekeepers become more aware of their transparency-increasing roles, this could lead them to a number of new roles and missions. For example, peacekeepers could go beyond often passive border patrols and post-hoc incident reports and take the initiative to try to increase transparency. They could monitor each sides' policies and statements and try to supplement these with relevant facts to help get the adversaries operating with more common and accurate information. While U.N. peacekeeping operations may have resources devoted to media monitoring, this usually amounts to a news-clipping service, not the purposeful collection of data for later analysis. There appear to be no formal procedures for using media monitoring as part of

¹⁷ For the U.N.'s difficulties in intelligence gathering, see Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1994); for details on how the U.N. can successfully gather information and direct media campaigns to address specific problems and defuse tensions, see Chapter 7 on the U.N. mission in Cambodia, especially discussion of Radio UNTAC.

¹⁸ For more, see Salerno, et. al., "Enhanced Peacekeeping with Monitoring Technologies," and Dorn, "Blue Sensors."

more active information operations.

U.N.-flagged aerial surveillance planes could help track rebel and government forces in internal conflicts, which would allow the possibility of subjecting them to the international spotlight and international condemnation. Refugees in these conflicts occasionally become literally lost, making aid deliveries impossible. An ancillary but non-trivial benefit of the aerial surveillance would be to help locate refugees.¹⁹

Peacekeepers could set up truth squads and seek to quash or defuse myths and rumors before they get out of hand. To do this, doctrines, procedures, and capabilities would have to be provided to the in-house information and media departments organic to most peacekeeping operations. In cases where a full scale peacekeeping operation is not possible or desirable, the U.N. could experiment with limited information operations that seek only to increase transparency. A U.N. news radio located near a troubled area might do some good if helped quash rumors and deflate myths held by each side. In general, among the peacekeepers' jobs is to talk to both sides. This means that even the lowest ranked peacekeepers on the line should be educated about the conflict their mission is trying to defuse.

Third, this research, combined with the recognition that hate-mongering is a major cause of ethnic conflict, suggests that information and anti-propaganda campaigns might be effective tools against ethnic conflict. My research shows that the U.N.'s information campaigns, by substituting facts for rumors, helped defuse tensions in Cambodia and Namibia. The U.N.'s radio station in Cambodia became the most popular in the country and competed with stations

¹⁹ Suggested to me in a November 9, 2005 email from Francis X. Stenger, Deputy Division Chief for implementation of the Open Skies Treaty at the DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

run by the rival political parties. Research indicates that many ethnic conflicts are started by ethno-nationalist political entrepreneurs who are quick to grab control of the media and use hate-mongering to come to power and/or cause harm to others.²⁰ These two observations provide the logic for the recommendation that the U.N. and other actors should launch information and anti-propaganda campaigns to try to defang the hate-mongers whose propaganda manipulates ethnic histories and politics and thus fuels many deadly conflicts.

These three sets of recommendations are more likely to apply to smaller and less well-developed states. The active provision of transparency – such as that achieved in peacekeeping operations – will be most helpful to states whose own unilateral abilities to gather intelligence are limited. Similarly, information and anti-propaganda campaigns are more workable and are more likely to succeed in areas with relatively undeveloped media infrastructures.

²⁰ See V.P. Gagnon, Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95); Misha Glenny, “Yugoslavia: The Revenger’s Tragedy,” *New York Review of Books*, August 13, 1992; and Brown, *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*.

Appendix 1: Information Operations in Recent U.N. Peacekeeping Missions

Experience from the peacekeeping cases discussed above show that information operations can achieve a number of objectives, including:

- Reducing false rumors that adversaries may have about each other (examples: reducing fears of election-day violence, rumors of troop movements or military construction). This effect is expressed by hypothesis H4, which contends that transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions.
- Confirming or reinforcing positive developments (examples: confirming troop withdrawals or disarmament). This is also H4.
- Disclosing violations by local parties (and the threat of disclosure), which can help spur compliance (example: disclosure reducing pre-election fraud and dirty tricks). This outcome reflects H5, which contends that disclosure coerces aggressors.
- Reducing false rumors that local parties may have about the U.N. operation (example: informing locals that the U.N. is not there to displace people or support one side or another). This result is captured by H6, which contends that transparency about the regime and its mission increases its effectiveness.
- Helping local parties understand why and how to vote, or how to fulfill other functions helpful to society (example: instructions on how to use ballot boxes explaining why votes are secret). This is also H6.

Information is power, and UNTAC and UNTAG show that information in the hands of the U.N. is power to help promote peace. Yet the U.N. remains reluctant or unable to use this form of power. There has been no sustained program to experiment with information operations, and the United Nations' (U.N.) information capabilities and expertise are getting better but remain inadequate. Why do these problems persist more than a decade after the recognized information successes of UNTAC and UNTAG? How can these problems be fixed?

In this appendix, I examine why the U.N. does not use information to maximum advantage, and I note a few positive trends. I begin by reviewing a number of recent U.N. reports and show that information is under-appreciated at the leadership level of the U.N., but that the

U.N. is taking steps in the right direction.

Then, to understand recent trends in the use of information at the field level, I survey three of the most recently launched peacekeeping operations. These operations are the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Without doing field research, and without the time for scholarship to develop on these missions, I cannot tell too many stories about the provision and effects of transparency. I do not have enough details to answer the questions: “who said what to whom and what effects did it have?” However, I can assess the U.N.’s overall commitment to information operations from U.N. documents and interviews. The overall picture is mixed, with some signs of hesitancy and inadequacy, and other signs of innovative uses of information.

Finally, I show how problems ranging from hardware and training to bureaucratic inertia stand in the way of the U.N.’s more aggressive use of information.

The Status of Information Operations at the Headquarters Level

The August 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, better known as the Brahimi report, remains a keystone for assessing and critiquing peacekeeping operations.²¹ The report reveals the U.N.’s inadequate appreciation of information operations in peacekeeping operations. The report’s assessment of the causes of conflict does not recognize the information

²¹ United Nations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (New York, NY: August 2000). Lakhdar Brahimi chaired the panel that wrote the report.

environment as a factor that can affect the difficulty of coming to or implementing a peace accord. The report ignores issues of whether the media in the conflict area is independent or partisan, sparse or dense, or whether the adversaries are illiterate, or full of rumors, fears, and misinformation.²² If information-related factors are not recognized as parts of the problem, they are less likely to be recognized as parts of the solution. Information tools such as radio and television broadcasting are only mentioned once in a laundry list of expertises that have proven hard to deploy on short notice.²³ The report does not mention broadcasting or print hardware.

The report strongly recommends an Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). This sounds promising for information operations, but the focus of this ultimately unsuccessful recommendation was instead to gather and coordinate information about operations and world events.

Only five of the report's 280 paragraphs are devoted public information (PI). One is a summary paragraph, and two relate to strengthening internal communications within operations. Only two paragraphs relate to the external face of operations. This is .7% of the report, coincidentally in line with paragraph 149's observation that public information rarely exceeds one percent of an operation's budget.²⁴

The most encouraging paragraph for information operations is number 146:

An effective public information and communications capacity in mission areas is an operational necessity for virtually all United Nations peace operations. Effective communication helps to dispel rumour, to counter disinformation and to

²² S/2000/809, p. 4.

²³ S/2000/809, p. 22.

²⁴ S/2000/809, p. 26.

secure the cooperation of local populations. It can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of rival groups, enhance security of United Nations personnel and serve as a force multiplier. It is thus essential that every peace operation formulate public information campaign strategies, particularly for key aspects of a mission's mandate, and that such strategies and the personnel required to implement them be included in the very first elements deployed to help start up a new mission.²⁵

While the report is to be commended for recognizing the role of information in dispelling rumors and acting as a force multiplier, the following paragraphs describe how the report led to only one "relatively minor" recommendation for improving information operations.²⁶

The Brahimi report's most critical information-related finding was that "no unit at [U.N.] Headquarters has specific line responsibility for the operational requirements of public information components in peace operations." They note that the small, but soon expanding, team of four in the Peace and Security Section of the DPI "has had little capacity to create doctrine, strategy or standard operating procedures for public information functions in the field."²⁷

To address this concern, an August 2001 implementation report proposed setting up a team of four information specialists within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).²⁸ The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions soon blocked this worthy initiative:

²⁵ S/2000/809, pp. 25-26, quote on p. 25.

²⁶ David Wimhurst, "Preparing a Plebiscite under Fire: The United Nations and Public Information in East Timor," in Monroe E. Price and Mark Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 307.

²⁷ S/2000/809, p. 40. The team now numbers five.

²⁸ See United Nations, *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Programme Budget Implications of Draft Resolution A/C.4/55/L.23* (New York, NY: United Nations, August 8, 2001), A/C.5/55/46/Add.1, p. 13, para 5.12.

The Committee is of the opinion, however, that the Department of Public Information should have a dedicated technical unit to perform the functions described. The operational activities and related programmes should be requested in the context of each peacekeeping mission. Accordingly, the Committee does not agree to the establishment of this functional capacity in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.²⁹

This assessment implies the improbable: that the DPI is more likely to consider the context of each mission than the DPKO. While the Department of Public Information does much good work, an information unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is more likely to think creatively about using information in ways that go beyond self-promotion or clarification of an operation's purposes (valuable as those functions are). A subsequent implementation report avoids the issue of the technical unit, perhaps because of bureaucratic politics issues hinted at above.³⁰ As is, there is currently only one information specialist, David Wimhurst, within the DPKO. I argue below that the U.N. should greatly expand this capacity.

A source close to the initial Brahimi report and subsequent implementation reports thinks the above critique is too strong. He noted that the short mention of information operations was meant to "tee-up" the issue and give reformers license to reform. In this way, a few paragraphs helped lead to the attempted initiative to put an information unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Moreover, he said that the few paragraphs on information should be put in context. Many other important issues received few or even no words at all, including gender, medical support, HIV/AIDS, transitions, and safety of personnel. In the end though, he

²⁹ See United Nations, *Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (New York, NY: United Nations, October 16, 2001), A/56/478, p. 7.

³⁰ United Nations, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Report of the Secretary-General* (New York, NY: United Nations, December 21, 2001), A/56/732.

said that it was still “hand to mouth” with information operations.³¹ A response to this comment is that perhaps the information initiative failed because it was not tee’d up more prominently.

An outside report, “Refashioning the Dialogue,” that gathered international reaction to the Brahimi report hints at why the Brahimi report may have shied away from discussion of information operations: governments fear spying or any impingement of their sovereign control. For example, “Refashioning the Dialogue” reported that some member states were “alarmed” by the plan for an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), even though the EISAS is primarily intended to improve the flow of information from the field to headquarters and vice-versa. Many governments in Africa resist even fact-finding missions, so some hostility to EISAS is not surprising.³² On a general level, information operations and radio stations are “threatening and provoke caution in an organization where sovereignty is king.”³³

On the other hand, peacekeeping operations are routinely preceded by survey missions and other analysis. It is a bit contradictory that member states fear better information gathering and analysis (as well as active information dissemination) by the U.N., when the executive summary of “Refashioning the Dialogue” said that many simultaneously argued that: “Impartiality should be seen in terms of the fair application of a mandate, not as an excuse for moral equivocation. In Africa in particular, there was strong support for more robust mandates

³¹ Not for attribution.

³² International Peace Academy and Center on International Cooperation, “Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations” (New York, NY: International Peace Academy, April 2001), p. 9, quote on p. 16.

³³ Interview, Frederick Schottler, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 25, 1996.

for peacekeepers to deal with spoilers.”³⁴ Why are information operations so sensitive when there are calls for the U.N. to be strong enough to take on spoilers?

The Status of Information Operations in the Field

A survey of three recently launched operations presents a complex picture, with successes in areas where missions undertake local initiative and innovation, and room for improvement where information operations are under-appreciated. The reason that there is so much variation between missions is lack of leadership and innovation from U.N. headquarters.

UNMEE operates between Ethiopia and Eritrea, where misperceptions run high between adversaries and about the U.N. However, the current chief of mission does not value information, so information efforts are scant. In Kosovo, UNMIK started out with very high UNTAC-like ambitions, but peaked with moderate print and broadcast operations, which were then scaled back. UNMIK appreciates the role of information and is leveraging its limited resources in part by coordinating with and urging stories upon the local media. In Congo, MONUC helps run the most ambitious radio operation in the U.N.’s history, Radio Okapi, developed by an innovative partnership between the U.N. and a Swiss NGO, the Fondation Hironnelle. However, the use of other media by MONUC seems wholly inadequate to the scale of the mission. On the whole, recognition of the potential of information operations is uneven, and information resources are generally insufficient.

³⁴ International Peace Academy, “Refashioning the Dialogue,” p. 5.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (UNMEE)

Following a successful and bloody 30-year liberation struggle, Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in a referendum in April of 1993. Despite the prior conflict and pervasive insecurity in the Horn of Africa, hopes for a more permanent peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea grew through the mid-1990s. Optimism peaked when President Clinton viewed Ethiopia and Eritrea as exemplars of the African Renaissance. A border dispute re-opened conflict in May of 1998, and the war waxed and waned until December 2000.³⁵

In July 1999, the two sides accepted a Framework Agreement mediated by the Organization for African Unity. Although fighting continued, the Agreement called for separation of forces, demilitarization and delimitation of the border areas and monitoring of the new temporary security zone (buffer zone) by international observers. In mid-June 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed an OAU-brokered cease-fire, and on June 31, the U.N. Security Council established UNMEE with resolution 1312. Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a permanent peace agreement on December 12, which required “establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission to ‘delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border.’” UNMEE quickly deployed, reaching and then exceeding its mandated strength of 4,200 troops (including 220 observers) in early 2001. It costs about \$231 million per year. The core of UNMEE’s mandate is to monitor

³⁵ Paul B. Henze, “Ethiopia and Eritrea in Transition: The Impact of Ethnicity on Politics and Development,” Rand publication number P-7937 (Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1995); Terrence Lyons, “Great Powers and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa,” in I. William Zartmann and Victor A. Kremenyuk, *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Jane Perlez, “U.S. Did Little to Deter Buildup as Ethiopia and Eritrea Prepared for War,” *New York Times*, May 22, 2000; John Prendergast and Mark Duffield, “Liberation Politics in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in Taiser M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999);

the cease-fire, the redeployments of the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, and the subsequent buffer zone, as well as to assist the Boundary Commission and to help with demining and humanitarian activities.³⁶

Information operations started slowly, suffered setbacks, and remain inadequate. UNMEE radio first broadcast from Eritrea in January 2001. The broadcasts lasted for one hour, and were repeated twice a week. Eritrea suspended broadcasts in October 2001, and permitted resumption of the one-hour shows in June 2002. Ethiopia does not want to cede control of its airwaves, and refuses to give UNMEE free air time. To help circumvent these local difficulties, UNMEE began shortwave broadcasts from the United Arab Emirates, with one hour shows on Tuesdays and Fridays. Considerably reducing the effective length of its shows, UNMEE divides each hour into English and anywhere between three to five local languages.

The central purpose of the broadcasts, and the two outreach centers originally put in each country, is to explain and publicize the mission's mandate and work. These goals are on the modest end of the information operations continuum, but UNMEE's means remain insufficient for the task. For example, the information centers have staff and documentation to help citizens understand the U.N., the peace process, and to increase mine awareness. Before the Eritrean government shut down its two centers in mid-summer, 2003, the center in the Eritrean capitol of Asmara (population: 435,000) served only several hundred people a week. UNMEE's weekly press briefings are still the "key instrument for disseminating news about the Mission's

³⁶ "Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Background," (New York, NY: United Nations 2002) at: <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/background.html>>>; "Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Facts and Figures" (New York, NY: United Nations 2003) at: <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/facts.html>>>; and "Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE - Mandate" (New York, NY: United Nations 2002) at: <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/mandate.html>>>.

activities.”³⁷ A weekly press briefing does not a meaningful information operation make.

This is unfortunate because, according to Chris Coleman, team leader for UNMEE at the DPKO, there are still many misperceptions and misunderstandings to clear up. A March 2002 U.N. report notes that there remains tensions and suspicions between the two side’s forces. Coleman stressed that the biggest need was for the proactive use of information, to clarify the role of UNMEE and especially that of the Boundary Commission.

Both Eritrea and especially Ethiopia resist U.N. information efforts. However, another U.N. official (not Coleman) placed the blame for inadequate use of information by UNMEE on current chief of mission: he “does not subscribe to the importance of public information on a regular basis.”³⁸

U.N. INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK)

On June 10, 1999, Security Council Resolution 1244 created the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was to help Kosovo move towards autonomy from Serbian-led Yugoslavia. This followed years of tension and sometimes conflict

³⁷ United Nations, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea* (New York, NY: United Nations, June 23, 2003), S/2003/665, p. 7.

³⁸ This section is based on: UNMEE, “Near-Verbatim Transcription of Press Briefing,” 06 September 2002 at <<<http://www.waltainfo.com/Conflict/Articles/2002/September/article1.htm>>>; UNMEE Public Information, “Edited Transcript of 2 November 2001 Press Briefings at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unmee/pc021101.htm>>>; United Nations, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea* (New York, NY: United Nations, August 30, 2002), S/2002/977, p. 5; United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea* (New York, NY: United Nations, July 10, 2002), S/2002/744; United Nations, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea* (New York, NY: United Nations, March 8, 2002), S/2002/245, pp. 1-2, 7; Dr. Hansjoerg Biener, “Radio for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights: Eritrea,” at <<<http://www.evrel.ewf.uni-erlangen.de/pesc/peaceradio-ERI.html>>>; telephone interview with Chris Coleman, Team Leader for UNMEE, U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, January 29, 2003; email correspondence with Dr. Hansjoerg Biener, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Nürnberg, Denmark, January 2003; and email correspondence and a telephone interview with a U.N. official (not for attribution).

with Belgrade, culminating in the U.S.-led NATO military campaign against Serbia and its leader Slobodan Milosevic in Spring 1999. More specifically, UNMIK was mandated to help with civilian administration and promote self-government in Kosovo, help coordinate the humanitarian efforts of international agencies, help maintain law and order, promote human rights, and assist with refugee repatriation.

The broad range of the mandate requires education of the populace on a range of issues, including the operation of a free market economy to political developments and the new Constitutional Framework. To service these needs, UNMIK produces a weekly 25 minute television broadcast on issues from human rights to health, including “themes that are still too sensitive for local media to cover.”³⁹ UNMIK also produces a monthly program on crime, and another on the economy.

On radio, UNMIK broadcasts a five minute daily program in Albanian, Serbian, and English, and a six-minute weekly roundup. UNMIK borrows station time for its TV and radio programs from Radio Television Kosovo (RTK). RTK is the national public broadcaster in Kosovo, supervised by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and managed by the European Broadcasting Union. UNMIK’s print unit produces a number of items covering a similar range of topics as the broadcast division: a bimonthly magazine, fact sheets, booklets and leaflets, UNMIK newsletters, and they used to produce weekly inserts for the local newspapers.

The print effort is more substantial than the broadcast activities, but all seem to pale before the scope of the mandate, before the number of other information sources in the area

³⁹ “UNMIK: Television,” (UNMIK-DPI, 2001) at <<<http://www.unmikonline.org/tv/tv.htm>>>.

(some 92 radio stations, 24 television stations, and seven daily newspapers), and before the precedent set by UNTAC and its variety of information operations – especially Radio UNTAC. This is not an indictment per se; it is difficult for the U.N. to compete in a dense media environment.

Nonetheless, some in UNMIK went in hoping to replicate the UNTAC model – but the resources and political support were not there. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UNMIK divided media responsibilities, but cooperation between the two soon soured. Instead of sharing the information burden, OSCE and UNMIK policies often conflicted and/or their initiatives were redundant.⁴⁰

There are three notable positives about the use of information in Kosovo. The first is UNMIK's Temporary Media Commissioner who monitors the media and ensures adherence to print and broadcast codes. The aim is to prevent libel, overtly hostile hate radio broadcasts, and the like. The Commissioner has the authority to fine violators, and this appears to be an aggressive effort by the U.N. to control the information flow and reduce tensions.⁴¹

The second was the cooperation between UNMIK and the Fondation Hirondelle to set up the Blue Sky radio station. Funded by the Swiss government, the station was a step towards increasing the amount of independent journalism in Kosovo. Independent media efforts have been opposed by everything from organized crime to political parties. Blue Sky started up in October 1999, but was folded into RTK in July 2000. Blue Sky covered UNMIK's activities,

⁴⁰ Julie Mertus and Mark Thompson, "The Learning Curve: Media Development in Kosovo," in Price and Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace*, pp. 261-264, 270, 272.

⁴¹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo* (New York, NY: United Nations, October 2, 2001), S/2001/926, pp. 10-11.

and other developments in Kosovo, thus was an information-multiplier for UNMIK and demonstrated productive collaboration between the U.N. and an NGO to meet common goals. However, UNMIK does not coordinate routinely with NGOs about information issues.

Finally, UNMIK officials influence the information flow in a number of peace promoting ways that are more subtle than direct UNMIK broadcasting. According to UNMIK press officer Eleanor Beardsley, in one instance in August 2002, UNMIK began arresting major Kosovo Liberation Army heroes for war crimes. As the anti-Serb KLA enjoys considerable support in Kosovo, there were huge and violent protests in the street involving 10,000 Kosovars. UNMIK got the top police people on the TV that night and shown that those arrested had tortured Albanians (Kosovars and Albanians are cultural brethren or even co-nationals to many). The protests “stopped on a dime.” UNMIK also hosts dinners for editors and intellectuals to talk on background, and they bring journalists along for police operations. This sort of relationship-building gets good stories out. Having locals help produce UNMIK’s print and broadcast output helps build credibility. Ms. Beardsley said “We are in the business of changing society and hearts and minds here....There is so much twisting of information and misinformation out there, especially in the Balkans. So we don’t try to counter all of it. But we do fight back.”⁴²

UNMIK’s intentions are good, and they are doing the best they can with limited resources.⁴³

⁴² Email correspondence, Eleanor Beardsley, Press Officer, UNMIK, and Senior Editor, Focus Kosovo, Kosovo, January 2003.

⁴³ Other sources for this section include: Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon: *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000); Julie Mertus and Mark Thompson, “The Learning Curve: Media Development in Kosovo,” in Price and Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace*; United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo* (New York, NY: United Nations, January 15, 2002), S/2002/62; United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration*

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (MONUC)

Supported by Rwanda and Uganda, Zaire was taken over by Laurent Kabila in 1997 and renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, a schism developed between Kabila and his backers, causing a rebellion in 1998. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sided with Kabila against Rwanda and Uganda, turning the Congo into a multinational war zone. A peace agreement was signed by most of the parties in December 2002. Some foreign forces have withdrawn, but Uganda and Rwanda still appear to control much of Eastern Congo, and there is still conflict between various ethnic groups within Congo.

U.N. involvement in the Congo conflict began to increase in July 1999 when U.N. Security Council resolution 1258 authorized the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel to the region. In November, the U.N. formed MONUC at a strength of about 600 (500 observers plus the previous 90 liaison and survey personnel) with resolution 1279. Then in February 2000, resolution 1291 expanded MONUC to more than 5,500 military personnel. The deployed strength as of December 31, 2002, was 4,420 military personnel, 49 civilian police, and 559 international and 675 local civilian personnel.

According to resolution 1291, MONUC was mandated to monitor the cease-fire, establish

Mission in Kosovo (New York, NY: United Nations, October 9, 2002), S/2002/1126; and Larry Wentz, contributing editor, *Lessons for Kosovo: The KFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, 2002) as well as Radio Netherlands Media Network Dossier: Peace Radio: Outside Africa, updated September 25, 2002 at: <<<http://www.rnw.nl/realoradio/dossiers/html/peaceradioest.html>>>; Dr. Hansjoerg Biener, "Radio for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights: Yugoslavia (Kosovo)," at <<<http://www.evrel.ewf.uni-erlangen.de/pesc/peaceradio-YU.html>>>; "UNMIK: Radio," (UNMIK-DPI, 2001) at <<<http://www.unmikonline.org/radio/radio.htm>>>; "UNMIK: Publications," (UNMIK-DPI, 2001) at <<<http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/pub.htm>>>; "UNMIK: At a Glance," (UNMIK-DPI, 2001) at <<<http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm>>>; BBC News, "Country Profile: Yugoslavia," January 29, 2003, at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1039269.stm>>; "Blue Sky - Fact Sheet" and "Communique de Presse, 3 Aout 2000," both available at the website of Fondation Hirondelle at <<<http://www.hirondelle.org>>>.

liaison with all parties, collect information on the parties' forces, help to disarm and demobilize those forces, supervise and verify the disengagement of forces, monitor the disengagement line, as well as to assist with humanitarian activities and demining.

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) deployed into a violent and complicated ongoing conflict. The situation is fluid, and it is hard to gather data on the information-related activities of MONUC.

However, there are some transparency-related stories and facts: for example, in September-October 2002, MONUC verified that 20,941 Rwandan forces had withdrawn from Congo, but the Rwandan forces claimed the withdrawal of 23,760. This left MONUC to investigate the discrepancy. There are 90 military observer teams at 50 sites, but the bulk of MONUC's force (3,590 out of 4,258) is assigned to protect MONUC headquarters and other facilities.⁴⁴ Overall though, it is hard to discern what MONUC has verified or what effects monitoring and verification has had in prompting the adversaries to trust and cooperate with the peace process. This is not an indictment of MONUC for it is hard to imagine a peace operation facing a more difficult environment.

Turning to its public information efforts, MONUC produced some 60,000 posters and 50,000 bumper stickers from June to October 2002. It puts out a monthly magazine in French with a circulation of 5,000, a weekly newsletter, and a biweekly bulletin; as well as compiling a daily press review with news clippings. MONUC is using information to encourage combatants

⁴⁴ United Nations, *Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (New York, NY: United Nations, October 18, 2002), S/2002/1180, pp. 2-3, 5.

to disarm and repatriate, and to this end, they are trying to obtain 3 mobile FM transmitters.⁴⁵

The population of Congo is about fifty million, and the country covers an area almost equal to one-fourth of the U.S.

There is one significant exception to this otherwise typical and modest information effort, and that is Radio Okapi. Radio Okapi is the most extensive U.N. radio project ever, broadcasting twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and reaching the whole Congo on FM via eight relay stations and on shortwave via three transmitters. Launched in February 2002, Radio Okapi's content ranges from music to news, and includes material provided by the U.N. or interviews with MONUC officials. The main topics that aim to promote peace are: disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration. According to David Smith, MONUC's chief of information:

There is no single voice that unites all the Congolese people. This radio project will allow people in the rebel-held territories to speak to people in government-controlled territories for the first time since the war broke out. A big role of the radio will be to convince people that it's in their interest to lay down their arms and either be repatriated to their home country, if they come from somewhere else, or to find ways to join civil society and leave the war behind.⁴⁶

Radio Okapi is a joint project between MONUC and the Swiss-based NGO Fondation Hironnelle. Smith and David Wimhurst of the U.N. and the Fondation Hironnelle began planning the station in June 2001. The Fondation Hironnelle raised the funds, bought the equipment, and donated it to the U.N. which then deployed it out of Brindisi, Italy (the location of the U.N.'s rapid deployment logistics base (UNLB). The NGO currently pays about eighty-

⁴⁵ United Nations, *Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2002/1180, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁶ Radio Netherlands Media Network Dossier: Peace Radio: Democratic Republic of Congo, updated December 10, 2002 at: <<<http://www.rnw.nl/realoradio/dossiers/html/congo-p.html>>>.

five percent of the operating expenses. The main station is located in MONUC's Kinshasa headquarters but Radio Okapi is sufficiently independent that, says Smith, it might even criticize the U.N.'s role in the country.⁴⁷

Beyond sheer ambition, Radio Okapi innovated in a number of ways: bypassing the U.N. procurement system, direct ties between the U.N. and an NGO (including legal agreements between them), and speed of deployment: concept to broadcast in seven months. According to Wimhurst, "The U.N. can't do this by itself. The partnership model is successful for the audience, the donors, the mission, and it will leave behind a well-funded independent radio for the Congo."⁴⁸

Asked what effect the radio had in the Congo, an official at the Fondation Hironnelle said it was hard to judge as yet, but that in-country polling revealed that it had become the most popular station in the country within six months of its launch.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Telephone interview, January, 2003.

⁴⁸ Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice, "Peace and Justice Update," (San Diego, CA: University of San Diego, March 8, 2002), Vol. 3, No. 6; telephone interview, David Wimhurst, October 24, 2003.

⁴⁹ Telephone interview, Dario Baroni, Desk Officer, Fondation Hironnelle, Geneva, Switzerland, January 28, 2003. Other sources consulted for this section include: U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Democratic Republic of Congo at <<<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm>>>; BBC News, "Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo," December 18, 2002, at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1076399.stm>>; United Nations, "Democratic Republic of Congo - MONUC- Background" (United Nations, 2002) at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/background.html>>>; United Nations, "Democratic Republic of Congo - MONUC- Facts and Figures" (United Nations, 2002) at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html>>>; United Nations, "Democratic Republic of Congo - MONUC- Mandate" (United Nations, 2002) at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html>>>; Dr. Hansjoerg Biener, "Radio for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights: Kongo (Kinshasa)," at <<<http://www.evrel.ewf.uni-erlangen.de/pesc/peaceradio-ZAI.html>>>; Juakali Kambale, "Ondes Pacifiques," Journal Decouverte, April 3, 2002, at: <<<http://www.afrik.com/journal/decouverte/dec-487-6.htm>>>; Radio Okapi.net, "Programmation de Radio Okapi a l'heure de Kinshasa, Mis a jour le 19/12/2002," at <<<http://www.monuc.org/radio/programmation.asp>>>.

Conclusion: Impediments to U.N. Information Operations

Despite some areas of progress, there are many hurdles to overcome before the U.N. can use information operations to maximum advantage. These include difficulties with personnel, planning, and hardware, and bureaucratic resistance. There are also fears about keeping information operations impartial, and fears that information operations are tantamount to spying by the U.N. or member states. The fundamental problem for information operations at the U.N. is that they remain ad hoc, with little institutionalized support, and without sufficient planning and resources coming from the highest levels.

PERSONNEL CAPABILITIES: PROBLEMS WITH RECRUITMENT, STAFFING, AND TRAINING

The major personnel problem is that there is insufficient training for information operations. As a result, it takes too much time to assemble an information team. There is still a long way to go towards developing a useful rapid deployment roster and some of the reported progress in the years-long effort is “just PR” [public relations].⁵⁰

The DPI and the DPKO have organized some public information-related workshops and training exercises, including one in Dakar in late 2003 to train public information officers in Africa how to handle issues that come up with demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR). Unfortunately, the DPKO resisted this effort and sent a lower level staffer than the DPI had wished for.

⁵⁰ Telephone interview, David Wimhurst, October 24, 2003.

The U.N. received a grant from the British government's Department for International Development to train information officers, but has yet to find a teacher.⁵¹ Unfortunately, the few people who could teach the course are too busy helping in the field to teach. Finally, training for public information issues related to tasks such as DDR is worthy, but there is no training for the nuts and bolts of public information: how to set up an office when deployed, logistics, budgeting, procurement, and so forth. Some "fifty percent of staff are not adequately trained or prepared for missions in the field. This is major...the single greatest weakness in public information."⁵² Recruitment is another problem, in part because there are no hiring and recruitment staff with a background in public information.

INFORMATION PLANNING: BECOMING A HIGHER PRIORITY, BUT PROBLEMS WITH DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES REMAIN

Planners must fully integrate information operations when preparing peacekeeping missions. On the positive side, on July 23, 2003, the Secretary-General sent out a "Guidance to Special Representatives of the Secretary-General: Public Information and Media Relations in United Nations Peace Operations," giving general guidance for how Heads of Mission should work with their respective spokespersons and public information officers and what kinds of information they should be gathering and disseminating. Another positive is a chapter on Public Information in a forthcoming U.N. handbook on multidimensional operations. The book leaves specific operational instructions aside, but goes into admirable depth on the need for information

⁵¹ Telephone interview, Susan Manuel, Chief of Section, Peace and Security Programs, U.N. Department of Public Information, November 24, 2003.

⁵² Telephone interview, Simon Davies, December 19, 2003.

operations to confront hate media, to explain the purpose of the mission to the local population, of developing independent media capabilities in-country, to play a proactive role in countering misperceptions, and to engage in counter-propaganda.⁵³

Despite these developments, there seem to be perpetual delays in formulating information standard operating procedures (SOPs), and public information staff face hurdles trying to communicate their needs to the planners.⁵⁴ According to one source, the SOPs were in draft form in October 2001, and have been almost done for two years, but the DPI's Peace and Security Section has been too overwhelmed to finalize them. Another problem in designing information missions and tailoring them once they are in place is that there are no metrics (polling, surveys, etc.) for measuring the impact of various media efforts. The U.N. can get messages out, but it can not assess their effects.

HARDWARE CAPABILITIES: CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL

The U.N. has made considerable progress with hardware in two ways. The first is the pioneering cooperative effort between the Fondation Hironnelle and the U.N. in MONUC to provide radio coverage across the Congo (see above). This is a real hardware (and expertise) multiplier for the U.N., and provides a model for future innovation. Increasing numbers of NGOs such as Search for Common Ground, Clandestine Radio, and the Open Society Institute

⁵³ U.N., "Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations" (New York, NY: United Nations, February 2004), Chapter IV, pp. 45-54, available at: <<<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/handbook.aspx>>>.

⁵⁴ United Nations, "Meeting of Information Chiefs," report of a conference held 11-13 December, 2001, pp. 21-23, and telephone interview, Susan Manuel, November 24, 2003.

have joined the information fray and are trying to combat hate radio and promote peace in various areas.⁵⁵ Many governments recognize the value of positive information and the necessity of combating hate radio; the British, Swiss, and U.S. governments are the three largest funders of Radio Okapi, and they channel the funds through their support of the Fondation Hironnelle.

The second is the acquisition of Public Information Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) for rapid deployment of media operations, located at the UNLB in Brindisi. The U.N. has procured about \$1.5 million in equipment, mostly for radio broadcasting, along with materiel for print and video media. However, the procurement and deployment mechanisms are convoluted and inefficient. Information materiel is procured through two different U.N. entities (supply and communications), and arrives in Brindisi in a haphazard way with no assurance of compatibility. From there, materiel is stored in different locations, and in part because different departments must release the equipment, it gets sent out from Brindisi in different packages.

The U.N. first used the SDS in its recent deployment to Liberia. The information team barely got a minimal broadcast out the first day. The information officers could not find their main transmitter for seven weeks, and they personally had to unload and search through hundreds of tons of equipment looking for the information materiel. Instead of being rapidly deployable, poor shipping procedures and inventory management meant that equipment languished on the docks.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ For more on this issue, see Helen Darbishire, "Non-Governmental Perspectives: Media Freedom versus Information Intervention?" in Price and Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace*.

⁵⁶ Telephone interview, Simon Davies, December 19, 2003 and telephone interview, David Wimhurst, October 24, 2003.

BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS

Bureaucratic problems exacerbate several of the above mentioned hurdles facing information operations at the U.N. First, coordination will be hampered so long as the DPKO continues to have only one information officer in its 600 person-strong department. Second, physical distance between the DPI and the DPKO within U.N. headquarters limits cooperation. Third, the DPKO still does not pay enough attention information operations.

Fourth, the DPI focuses almost entirely on producing content, and the DPI has no one who focuses on technical issues (the technical people are outside contractors). The DPI also has no specialists in the logistics chain necessary to support information operations.⁵⁷ Finally, many sources lamented that the DPI is over-centralized, lacks innovation, is self-absorbed, is insufficiently focused on peacekeeping (and other) missions in the field, and lacks respect from member nations and other units within the U.N.

One way to ameliorate these problems is to create a strong, dedicated information unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Such a unit is more likely to think creatively about using information in ways that go beyond self-promotion or clarification of an operation's purposes (valuable as those functions are). The sole focus of the DPKO is the mandates of missions, while the DPI has responsibilities throughout the U.N. Hence, from a bureaucratic politics perspective, the DPKO is more likely to use information aggressively and creatively to serve the mission, and have less institutional incentive or momentum to divert information resources away from the mandate. There are staffers with DPKO experience in the Peace and

⁵⁷ Telephone interview, Simon Davies, December 19, 2003.

Security Section of the DPI. This kind of cross-pollination helps both the DPI and the DPKO, and should be increased, as should rotations between the field and the U.N. in New York.

An information unit within the DPKO would be the kind of bureaucratic shakeup that would lead both units to innovate. For example, if the DPKO gained more control of information operations, the DPI might feel increased competitive incentives to help more aggressively in the field. As is, information operations face greater structural hurdles than they should because most of the DPI is innovation-averse. Likewise, those in the DPKO who undervalue information operations might reassess if the DPKO contained more information advocates. A final argument for more information-resources to go to the DPKO is that for each civilian component in the field (finance, personnel, etc), the DPKO has a corresponding support unit in house – except for public information.⁵⁸

Some may fear increased information operations will cause resource loss from their own divisions. Luckily, information operations are cheap. For example, MONUC cost 608 million dollars from July 2002 through June 2003. Yet Radio Okapi, the most ambitious radio operation in the history of the U.N. costs about four million dollars a year – about two-thirds of one percent of MONUC's expenses.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Wimhurst, "East Timor," in Price and Thompson, eds., *Forging Peace*, p. 307.

⁵⁹ MONUC's budget is from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations fact sheet: "Democratic Republic of Congo – MONUC – Facts and Figures (U.N., 2003), at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html>>>. The budget for Radio Okapi was about four million dollars total from all sources in its first year, so this figure might include some start up costs. See Radio Netherlands Media Network Dossier: Peace Radio: Democratic Republic of Congo, updated December 10, 2002 at: <<<http://www.rnw.nl/realradio/dossiers/html/congo-p.html>>> and European Broadcasting Union, Radio Department, "'Newsletter' No. 12 Des Radios Internationales," April 22, 2002, DR/10093, AS/AD-nll.

FEARS OF LOSING IMPARTIALITY AND FEARS OF SPYING

A source of resistance for information operations is that member states fear spying by the U.N. and are suspicious of activities with the word “information” in their titles. In addition, many in the U.N. fear that the more active use of information would jeopardize its impartiality. I address these concerns in turn.

First, fears of spying can not be waved away; it will take time and experience with information operations. Those who fear can be reminded that survey missions and strategic analysis routinely precede peacekeeping operations, and all peacekeeping operations collect information (on such topics as the sources and nature of rumors, location and armament of adversaries, etc.), just to be effective. Despite this, some governments, particularly in Africa, resist even fact-finding missions. In this context, it is understandable that information operations and radio stations are “threatening and provoke caution in an organization where sovereignty is king.”⁶⁰

Second, fears that information operations will impair the U.N.’s impartiality are off base. Consider the Brahimi report’s sage advice about operations which may find themselves in violent situations:

Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and

⁶⁰ International Peace Academy and Center on International Cooperation, “Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations” (New York, NY: International Peace Academy, April 2001) and quote from interview, Frederick Schottler, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, United Nations Department of Public Information, April 25, 1996.

victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.⁶¹

The U.N. will not lose impartiality by using truthful information. In any operation which deploys thousands of peacekeepers, it strains credulity to think that radio broadcasts will be the determining factor that makes the mission seem biased or partial. Indeed, information operations are often necessary to help combat misperceptions of bias.

Where aggressors are determined, little will stop them - including information. But where peace and war hang in the balance, there is evidence that information operations can coerce violators into better behavior. Combined with the clear benefits of explaining the mission, teaching about elections, defusing rumors and misperceptions, there are few if any sound reasons not to proceed with more robust information operations.

This book examined whether information can be used to promote peace. I found that it can, and that it is most likely to be successful in areas such as the Congo or Horn of Africa where U.N. missions are deployed and are likely to be deployed in the future. In this appendix, I showed that the U.N. does not adequately understand the power of information or use information as aggressively as it should. While the U.N. continues to face barriers and problems as it plans for the future of information operations, this book should strengthen the arguments of those who wish to overcome these barriers and use information to more actively promote peace.

⁶¹ S/2000/809, p. 9. Uncited background sources for this appendix are telephone interviews with: Tory Holt, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2003; Caroline Earle, Research Analyst, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2003; Susan Manuel, January 29, 30, 2003; Colonel Mike Dooley, Joint Logistics Officer, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 29, 2003; William Durch, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center and former Project Director for the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, May 16, 2003; and Frederick M. Schottler, Information Officer, Peace and Security Section, Department of Public Information, November 10, 2003.

Appendix 2: Insights on Transparency from the Open Skies, Strategic Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Regimes

This appendix surveys other regimes to explore how transparency is provided and what effects it has under different conditions. The aims are to reinforce or weaken my findings, to suggest areas for more research, and to get a sense of how my findings might have been different with different cases. The section on Open Skies is about a Treaty which epitomizes transparency, but whose effects are hard to discern in most cases. However, a bilateral version of Open Skies was signed and implemented between Hungary and Romania. None of my main cases has anything near this clear an example of anticipated transparency motivating cooperation. The section on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaties shows how transparency-related technologies (especially satellites) enabled arms control, but that arms control itself was buffeted by the larger political forces of the Cold War. I argue that the greatest transparency-related benefit of superpower strategic arms control was to make the future more certain and predictable. Finally, the section on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) shows the nonproliferation regime confirming fears (or worse), illustrates how hard it is to monitor evasive parties, and shows that transparency can not calm fears when conditions justify the fears.

This appendix helps demonstrate the tradeoffs in my case selection. My cases let me say a lot about forums, and about the abilities of peacekeepers to monitor buffer zones, arms control agreements, and elections. I examined how multifunctional operations tried to shape their

information environments, and explained why they need to explain themselves in difficult environments. This analysis helps me shed light on public diplomacy and information operations more generally because I showed transparency working better when there are relatively few information competitors and when biases are not so high that new information can not penetrate.

Had I focused more on superpower arms control, or arms control and confidence-building more generally, I suspect I would have been able to make stronger arguments about the distributional issues involved with transparency. This is because negotiation and ratification of many arms control agreements are more often accompanied by debates about operational security versus verification, and about security seeking through transparency versus security seeking through secrecy. These issues are less prominent for informal regimes like the Concert, or in the deployment of peacekeeping operations where, at least in my cases, great power politics played a large role in setting up or imposing missions.

Other arguments that the arms control cases open up are the extent to which surveillance and verification technology must precede arms control. To the extent it is a prerequisite, it may diminish the transparency contribution of arms control. They may also be mutually-reinforcing, so this is a question for further research.

The IAEA/NPT cases in particular contained examples in which bargaining (and about transparency, no less) sometimes did lead to hostile deadlock or war. This contrasts with the successful bargaining during the Concert, and again I note that more study needs to be done on what influences these divergent outcomes.

Despite these opportunities suggested by the mini-cases in this Appendix, these cases also present opportunity costs compared to my main cases. I am not sure I would have been able to

document as many effects of transparency as well had I used these as main cases, and the other contributions I made would have been diminished by a focus on arms control. With space and time constraints, there are tradeoffs when picking between cases. This is true in terms of target audiences, as well as with the kinds of arguments explored and foreclosed. From what I can tell and with the exception of the IAEA/NPT cases, the transparency-related effects of arms control agreements are often harder to measure than the effects of forums (at least the Concert, thanks to the comparison with pre-forum diplomacy) and peacekeeping operations. It was the variations between and within my cases in both transparency provided and its effects that formed what I hope are my useful conclusions about the provision and effects of transparency under different conditions. Finally, I would like to say more to the arms control community. But I am happy being able to explore cases and make arguments of interest to the security regimes community which is drawn like bees to honey to the Concert, and to those interested in insights about forums, bargaining, peacekeeping, information operations, and public diplomacy.

Open Skies

Perhaps nothing symbolizes transparency as much as the concept of Open Skies, which is agreed-upon surveillance overflights between countries. Analysis of Open Skies regimes highlights several themes. First, negotiations over Open Skies and information-sharing reinforce the argument that transparency has severe distributional consequences. This is not a value judgement, but it is clear that there are legitimate security-seeking arguments held by those who value secrecy and those who value transparency. How can one tell under which circumstances

which argument is the more wise? In negotiations over regimes that increase transparency, these distributional questions seem much more severe in arms control agreements between rough equals, than in peacekeeping operations where a major factor for their deployments were shifts in superpower relations, and/or great power pressure. While this is logical, the point is that even though I highlighted distributional issues above in the main text, there are circumstances when they cut even more deeply.

Second, one factor that influences distributional consequences is the extent of prior means of intelligence collection. The less one has, the more valuable Open Skies becomes. This is similar to the argument that transparency in the context of information operations works best when information competitors are scarce. Redundant sources of information make new sources less valuable. Third, transparency and intelligence are complex beasts, and the prior argument is a bit simplistic. Open Skies benefits the U.S. in multiple ways, despite its intelligence advantages. Open Skies allows the U.S. to devote other intelligence assets such as satellites to hot spots, while letting Open Skies flights compensate, and it establishes a bar of openness for the Russians to meet. That bar is itself a transparency-increasing device.

All this said, it is very hard to find documentable examples of threat assessments being altered on the basis of Open Skies overflights. There is one clear case though, and that is the bilateral Open Skies agreement between Hungary and Romania, which I examine at the end of the section.

The idea for Open Skies became public with President Dwight Eisenhower's July 1955 proposal to the Soviet Union to allow mutual overflights of each other's territory, and reduce fears of surprise attack. Eisenhower's proposal was generally welcomed on Capitol Hill, and

apparently the few conservative Senators who dissented did so because they were not consulted. Some, such as Eisenhower, supported the proposal as a move to calm tensions and promote peace. However, others including General Arthur Radford envisioned a net intelligence gain for the open U.S. which had more difficulty penetrating the closed Russian security apparatus than vice-versa.¹ While the Soviets publically professed that the proposal did not go far enough to promote peace, they in fact rejected it as a “Western espionage plot.”² Eisenhower was motivated by mutual gains, but the Soviets were gripped by fears about relative gains.

The Open Skies proposal lay dormant until May 1989 when President George Bush rekindled the idea in a speech. In the intervening three decades, however, the U.S. had opened the Soviet’s skies with U-2 and SR-71 spy plane overflights and both sides deployed a series of increasingly sophisticated spy satellites. While this may have limited the amount of transparency derived from new aerial photography, the Bush proposal did aim to increase transparency in that he was testing Russia’s commitment to greater openness. He was also countering the good publicity created by Mikhail Gorbachev’s many initiatives.³ The Canadians subsequently prodded Bush into making Open Skies a multilateral agreement, and it came to encompass the 27 NATO and former Warsaw pact members. Even if Russia and the U.S. could rely mostly on

¹ W. W. Rostow, *Open Skies: Eisenhower’s Proposal of July 21, 1955* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 57-62. Rostow is firmly convinced of Eisenhower’s sincerity, p. xii. However, Jonathan B. Tucker sees the Open Skies proposal as a “public relations maneuver,” in “Negotiating Open Skies: A Diplomatic History,” in Michael Krepon and Amy E. Smithson, “Introduction” in Michael Krepon and Amy E. Smithson, eds., *Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security* (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 6. Gaddis seems to side with Rostow in *Long Peace*, pp. 198-199.

² Tucker, “Negotiating Open Skies,” p. 5. See also Staff Sergeant Kirk W. Clear, USAF and Steven E. Block, *The Treaty on Open Skies* (Dulles, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, April 1999), p. 2 and Rostow, *Open Skies*, pp. 63-64.

³ Tucker, “Negotiating Open Skies,” pp. 6-8. See also James J. Marquardt, “Open Skies: Not a Moment Too Soon,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 58, No. 1, (January/February 2002), pp. 18-20.

their satellites, the multilateral version of Open Skies would diffuse the transparency benefits of the aerial flights more broadly.

The State and Defense Departments and the intelligence community had to figure out what kind of sensors the surveillance aircraft would use, what kind of restrictions would be placed on flight plans, who would have access to gathered data, and so forth. As these agencies moved to make the proposal concrete and firm up the U.S. bargaining position they split among and within each other between those who wanted intrusive inspections and were willing to give up some secrecy in return, and those who placed a higher priority on secrecy. This conflict of priorities is “central” to aerial surveillance negotiations, and this applies to bureaucracies within countries as well.⁴ Ultimately, the U.S. opening position was to have unrestricted flight plans (with limits only for safety), a ban on sensors for signals intelligence (SIGINT), and unlimited types of other sensors.

In the end, the U.S. aimed for an agreement in which flight plans had to be announced in advance, SIGINT sensors were banned, and four types of other sensors were allowed: two cameras, one infrared, and one radar, all with specifically limited resolutions. This proposal went through some intra-NATO discussion and modifications, and the two sides opened negotiations in February 1990.

The Soviets rejected the U.S./NATO proposal because of U.S. sensor superiority, and countered by proposing a common aerial fleet with a central data processing facility. On a number of points, NATO wanted to use its sensors to advantage, while the Soviets sought to prevent spying. Moreover, the Soviets thought that the confidence-building aspects of Open

⁴ U.S. Congress, OTA, *Verification Technologies*, p. 22.

Skies could be accomplished with sensors adequate to detect large scale movements of troops and materiel, while NATO, which maintained low day-to-day readiness and depended on fine-grained advance warning to mobilize reserves and prevent surprise attack, wanted better sensors. As turbulence gripped the Baltics and the Soviet ‘near-abroad,’ the Russian military gained a greater voice in the negotiations, and their position hardened. A key sticking point was Soviet resistance to unrestricted territorial access. By late 1991 however, the Soviets acceded to phased-in but more intrusive inspections with no territorial limits. In March 1992, the Open Skies Treaty was signed.⁵

The Treaty was quickly ratified by the U.S. and most of the NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. But it did not come into force until January 1, 2002, after the Russians finally ratified the Treaty. Despite participating in a number of trial flights in the 1990s, the Russians delayed ratification because the Duma was hawkishly suspicious of the Treaty, the Russians did not want any Open Skies scheme in place during the troubles in Chechnya, and they did not want to reveal the depth of their implosion. A number of factors from the election of Vladimir Putin, diplomacy by the U.S. and its allies, to the decline in Russian satellite capabilities turned the Russians around.⁶

⁵ Marquardt, “Open Skies” and Tucker, “Negotiating Open Skies.” U.S. Congress, OTA, *Verification Technologies* has a table depicting the tradeoffs of Open Skies for each superpower, and its allies on page 55.

⁶ Ernst Britting and Hartwig Spitzer, "The Open Skies Treaty," in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., *VERTIC Verification Yearbook*, (London, UK: Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) 2002), Chapter 13, pp. 223-238, esp. p. 226; Zdzislaw Lachowski, *Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe*, SIPRI Research Report No. 18 (Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 177-186; and telephone interview with Francis X. Stenger, Deputy Division Chief for implementation of the Open Skies Treaty at the DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), November 3, 2005.

As the Russians feared Open Skies overflights of Chechnya, NATO feared a Ukrainian request for a practice overflight of Italy when its bases were being used to help bomb Serbia during the Kosovo conflict. For discussion of the military/security implications of Open Skies see Jeffrey D. McCausland, “‘Squaring the Circle’: Cooperative Security and Military Operations,” INSS Occasional Paper 45 (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, CO:

The aims of the treaty are well expressed here:

....According to the agreement of 24 March 1992, twenty-five states from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the former Warsaw Pact, and the former Soviet Union will conduct unarmed overflights of one another's territories to assess the disposition, strength, and preparedness of opposing military forces.

These flights will allow states to evaluate the nature of security threats – based on facts collected independently or collaboratively, not on unfounded suspicions or worst case analyses. They will permit nations to survey the status of events in countries of interest, glean early indications and warning of troubling developments or reassurance of a neighbor's peaceful intent. Thus, the possibility of wars caused by accident, or by a buildup of tensions based on rumor and suspicion can be significantly reduced.⁷

Like almost all the literature on Open Skies, this passage echoes my hypotheses which contend that transparency promotes cooperation by reducing uncertainty and miscalculation (H3) and that transparency reduces unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4).

With the exception of the Hungary/Romania case, it is unfortunately hard to tell from the sparse Open Skies literature what concrete effects Open Skies flights have had on international politics and levels of tension. Tension levels between the U.S. and Russia are now so low that they have now signed a strategic nuclear arms control agreement with no verification provisions at all. In addition, the growth of civil remote-sensing satellites and the diffusion of military surveillance satellites have threatened to make aerial surveillance, and therefore Open Skies, redundant.⁸ Another critique of Open Skies is that because flights and flight plans are pre-announced, important secrets can be sheltered from view (or ruses set up).

July 2002).

⁷ Krepon and Smithson, *Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security*, p. 1.

⁸ Johan Swahn, "International Surveillance Satellites: Open Skies for All?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September, 1988), pp. 229-244. See also Marquardt, "Open Skies," p. 20.

Arguably however, the Open Skies Treaty succeeded in one of its major political goals which was to test and demonstrate Russia's commitment to transparency and openness. Officials who negotiated Open Skies, implementing agencies, and other proponents argue that Open Skies still offers a number of transparency and other benefits. Its symbolic importance is said to fuel further cooperation and trust. It helps level the intelligence playing field for participating countries, as all sides have access to the data gathered. Even though satellites have proliferated, most NATO and former Warsaw pact countries do not operate them. Finally, like most arms control agreements, if the time does come when the Treaty is violated (flights denied in this case), then that sends a signal of malign intent. Such signals are less obvious when there are no agreements to break.⁹

Francis Stenger, Deputy Division Chief for implementation of the Open Skies Treaty at the U.S. Department of Defense Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) revealed a number of more specific details. He reinforced the argument that the decline in Russian intelligence assets meant that Open Skies gave them real, hard intelligence. However, even though the U.S. has much greater capabilities, Open Skies lets the U.S. keep more expensive and hard to maneuver assets (satellites) focused on hotspots, while overflights help monitor the Eurasian areas within the Treaty zone. For states that lack overhead reconnaissance platforms, the Open Skies Treaty affords access to otherwise impossible to get data about neighbors.

⁹ Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Fact Sheet: "Treaty on Open Skies" (November 2005) available at <<http://www.dtra.mil/press_resources/fact_sheets/display.cfm?fs=os>>; Hartwig Spitzer and Rael Wiemker, "Perspectives for Open Skies: Technical, Operational, and Political Aspects," presented at the Fourth International Airborne Remote Sensing Conference and Exhibition, 21st Canadian Symposium on Remote Sensing, Ottawa, Ontario, June 21-24, 1999; and Ambassador John Hawes, U.S. representative to the Open Skies Conference, "Open Skies: From Ideas to Negotiation," NATO Review, web edition, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 6-9, updated March 5, 2002, available at <<<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1990/9002-02.htm>>>.

Stenger noted that no one trusted commercial satellites because images can be manipulated, are hard to read, and do not have as good a resolution as Open Skies platforms. Further, commercial satellites are between extremely expensive to impossible to direct where you want them and when. Because Open Skies planes are manned by the inspecting side, there is a verifiable chain of custody of the images that contrasts with commercial sources, providing insurance of accuracy. For specific instances of tensions calmed and suspicions assuaged, Stenger said that the conflict-ridden history of the central-European region fueled a near-perpetual level of fear. He noted that the Russians take particular care to overfly Poland to make sure they are not threatened by its turn toward the West. Stenger said that the point of Open Skies was to reveal national intentions, such as fleet or mass army movements, not national secrets; it is “Open Skies not Open Spies.” For this reason, the 72 hour warning before flights does not corrupt the purpose of Open Skies because national secrets may be cloaked in that time, but not signals of national intent. Stenger would not discuss any instances of countries trying to use Open Skies flights to perpetrate ruses and spread misinformation.¹⁰

Finally, Stenger mentioned a number of places where Open Skies overflights might be of use, including between India and Pakistan where the withdrawal of forces beyond mutual firing ranges could be monitored, for starters.¹¹ Other areas of tension that could profit from Open Skies and confidence-building measures include the Middle East and the Koreas. He also noted that overflights could be used in the “three borders” area between Brazil, Argentina, and

¹⁰ Telephone interview, November 3, 2005.

¹¹ See also Air Marshal Mohammed Arshad Chaudry (PAF) and Air Marshal K.C. Cariappa (IAF), “How Cooperative Aerial Monitoring Can Contribute to Reducing Tensions between India and Pakistan,” SAND-98-0505/22 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, December 2001).

Paraguay to monitor smuggling, and can be used to monitor environmental problems such as flooding and deforestation. Indeed, a number Open Skies flights have been sent over the Balkans, and flights also helped assess the damage from Hurricane Mitch to Central America in 1998, and from the flooding of the Oder River in 1997. Numerous proposals exist to expand Open Skies flights to regions ranging from Central Asia to Africa and for purposes ranging from environmental monitoring to verification of arms control agreements such as the NPT.¹²

HUNGARY/ROMANIA: BILATERAL OPEN SKIES

The area of Transylvania has grown and shrank and gone back and forth between Hungary and Romania several times during the war-torn history of the Balkans. At the end of World War II, Romania gained control of the territory. With the end of the Cold War, hardliners in both Hungary and Romania used the substantial Hungarian population in Transylvania to stir up tensions. The withdrawal of Russia's heavy hand and fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu raised the specter of malignant ethno-nationalism in Transylvania.¹³ This threat was

¹² Ernst Britting and Hartwig Spitzer, "The Open Skies Treaty," in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., *VERTIC Verification Yearbook*, (London, UK: Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) 2002), Chapter 13, pp. 223-238; Clear and Block, *Treaty on Open Skies*, p. 49; John Hawes, "Open Skies: Beyond 'Vancouver to Vladivostok'" Stimson Center Occasional Paper, No. 10 (December 1992); and Spitzer and Wiemker, "Perspectives for Open Skies."

¹³ George W. White, "Transylvania: Hungarian, Romanian, or Neither?" in Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, eds., *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale* (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 267-288, esp. p. 273; George W. White, *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe* (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 67-178; Marton Krasnai, "Cooperative Bilateral Aerial Inspections: The Hungarian-Romanian Experience," in Krepon and Smithson, *Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security*, pp. 135-146; and Marton Krasznai, "Scenarios for Co-operative Aerial Observations in Support of Crisis Prevention and Post-conflict Settlement: Lessons from the Bosnia Experience," comments prepared for a seminar "Perspectives for Co-operative Aerial Observation and the Treaty on Open Skies," at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm, November 30 - December 1, 2004 <<<http://www.sipri.org/contents/director/esdp/KrasznaiOS.html>>>.

underscored by the disastrous experience in neighboring Yugoslavia following the rule of Josip Tito. Hungary and Romania had rich historical ties to Transylvania, and there had been a long tradition of Transylvania's 'owners' reframing history to suit their own glorious past, renaming places and monuments to suit, and other attempts at cultural and political domination.

So it was no surprise when tensions rose and violence broke out, most notably at Tirgu Mures in March 1990 when almost 20,000 ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians fought in a bloody clash.¹⁴ Fortunately, cooler heads began to prevail, and both sides sought to calm tensions within themselves, between themselves, and to demonstrate to the outside world that the region was stable and worthy of investment. As part of this process, Romania proposed a bilateral Open Skies agreement with Hungary in July of 1990. Hungary, though, was more interested in the multilateral version of Open Skies as proposed by Bush. However, with the Bush proposal stalled, Hungary agreed to talk and bilateral negotiations began in February 1991. This was a textbook case of anticipated transparency promotes cooperation (H2), as "the perception by both sides of the immediate need for greater transparency led to rapid negotiation and implementation of an agreement."¹⁵

The main points were hammered out in three days, and a Treaty signed on May 11, 1991. The treaty allowed for four eight hour flights per year for each country, with seven day advance notice (and any flights taken under the multilateral Open Skies Treaty add to this number). A demonstration flight with a multinational crew went up in June 1991, and media coverage helped

¹⁴ Section "ROMANIA, Human Rights Developments" from *Human Rights Watch World Report 1990* available at: <<<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/HELSINKI.BOU-02.htm>>> and White, *Nationalism and Territory* pp. 93-107, 147-153. Tirgu is spelled Targu in some sources.

¹⁵ Arian L. Pregoner, Michael Vannoni, and Kent L. Biringer, "Cooperative Monitoring of Regional Security Agreements," SAND96-1121 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, November 1996), p. 23

boost popular support for the program. Observers from seventeen of the states participating in the multilateral Open Skies negotiations were on hand “to get the message through to their governments: Hungarian-Romania (sic) relations were stable.”¹⁶

One analyst cites personal communication with the Hungarian treaty negotiator Marton Krasznai who claims “enormous” impacts of the bilateral Open Skies Treaty. Stenger agreed that the flights had calming effects. As of 1996, the overflights still got glowing press coverage, the flights reassure politicians and people on the street about each side’s peaceful intentions, and helped them in “overcoming or reframing enemy images.”¹⁷ If true, this is transparency reducing unwarranted fears and worst-case assumptions (H4) in action.

In the end, although it appears that both sides were interested in increasing transparency, what they got from their four yearly flights was probably as much the appearance of transparency as a real increase in transparency. However, the symbolic importance was a real and significant factor in convincing the respective publics in each country that peace should prevail, in helping the overall bilateral peace process, and helping outsiders perceive the situation as stable.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

Arms control has a number of goals, some of which are aided by transparency. The most

¹⁶ Quote in Krasznai, “Scenarios for Co-operative Aerial Observations.” See also Pregoner, Vannoni, and Biringer, “Cooperative Monitoring of Regional Security Agreements” and Hartwig Spitzer “The Open-Skies Treaty as a tool for confidence building and arms control verification,” expanded version of a paper for the 18th ISODARCO Summer Course, Siena, Italy, July 29-August 8, 1996.

¹⁷ Spitzer “The Open-Skies Treaty,” p. 23. See also Krasznai, “Cooperative Bilateral Aerial Inspections.”

important goal of arms control is to reduce the probability of war. Secondary goals are to reduce the costs of preparation for war, and to reduce the consequences of war if it occurs. Arms control can reduce the probability of war reducing offensive weapons and thus increasing crisis stability, by limiting arms races and the tensions they produce, and by embodying or symbolizing improving relations between adversaries and thus prompting better relations.

Transparency can play a role at several junctures to promote peace in the context of arms control. First, no agreement to limit offensive weapons is likely to be signed unless it can be mutually verified (SORT excepted). Further, an agreement that limits specific types of weapons will require far more intrusive verification than Open Skies-type agreements which only seek to verify broad indicators of national intent. The sensitivity of these inspections sharply escalates the tradeoffs between security seeking through transparency versus security seeking through secrecy. Second, agreements can themselves send signals that an adversary is willing to be open or make compromises. Third, a major benefit of arms control (and about regimes in the literature on cooperation more generally) is that it extends the shadow of the future. In this context, proponents argue that strategic arms control, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) in particular, limited arms racing not only by the obvious fact that it limited arms, but also because it reduced worst-case assumptions by making the future more predictable.¹⁸ Finally, an ongoing arms control negotiating process serves as a de facto forum for involved parties – though with very hard to measure effects.¹⁹

¹⁸ Overviews of arms control arguments can be found in footnote 1 on page 32.

¹⁹ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), p. 191.

In this space, I can not hope to provide a detailed account of transparency and its effects within the context of strategic arms control. I do, however, survey the negotiations and effects of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (I and II) and the associated ABMT. By 1968, the Soviets and the U.S. came to broad agreement to pursue arms control. After being delayed by the 1968 uprisings in Eastern Europe, formal negotiations started in late 1969. Catalysts included the need to restrain the resources devoted to the growing strategic arms race, as well as growing perceptions that an arms race involving missile defenses would be particularly costly and destabilizing.

Two background factors enabled strategic arms control. First, the U.S. recognized that the Soviets had essentially achieved strategic parity, meaning that arms control would not result in disproportional gains for the Soviets. Likewise, once the Soviets gained parity, arms control would not lock them into perpetual inferiority. The second was advances in satellite and remote sensing technologies. Arms control could not take place in the absence of capabilities for verification. This raises the issue of how (unilateral and ambient) transparency existed before arms control, provided by satellites, and so forth. What increment of cooperative transparency was added by arms control, or were they mutually reinforcing? It seems clear that unilateral transparency came first, and provided perhaps the lion's share of Cold War transparency, at least up until near the end of the Cold War. Even legitimization of satellite reconnaissance preceded strategic arms control. Gaddis argues that through mid-1963, the Soviets had insisted that satellite reconnaissance was illegal, but they tacitly accepted it by the end of the year - perhaps because of their own growing capabilities.²⁰ The SALT agreements made tacit acceptance more

²⁰ Gaddis, *Long Peace*, pp. 200-206.

explicit, and built in a few relatively minor provisions to make verification easier (below). Some argue that it was arms control that led to the "overcoming [of] longstanding Soviet resistance to satellite reconnaissance," but Gaddis' history is convincing. If Gaddis is right that 1963 was a turning point for Cold War transparency, then the contribution of arms control to transparency is less than some believe.²¹ It took almost twenty years for arms control to provide transparency breakthroughs on its own, with the on-site inspection provisions of the December 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) being the most notable. By this time though, Gorbachev was at the helm in Russia and the tectonic plates of Cold War politics were shifting. The INF Treaty reflected and helped cause this shift.

Congress overwhelmingly approved SALT I with votes of 88 - 2 in the Senate and 307 - 4 in the House, and it entered into force in October 1972.²² It limited the number of delivery vehicles and launchers on each side, while allowing a variety of modernization options. The U.S. insisted that MIRV (multiple warheads per missile) technology not be capped as it was in the lead and wanted to exploit this advantage – even though many critics saw MIRVS as destabilizing.

Much more significant was the ABMT, signed alongside SALT I in May 1972. The ABMT limited deployment of missile defenses to 100 defensive missiles at two sites. This capped a defensive and offensive arms race, the latter because ABMs hinder each side's offense. For both SALT and the ABMT, verification was provided by two main clauses: one that

²¹ See for example Jane M. O. Sharp, "Restructuring the SALT Dialogue," *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981-1982), pp. 144-176, esp. p. 145. Gaddis is supported by Herbert Scoville, Jr., "A Leap Forward in Verification," in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelanders, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1974), pp. 160-184, esp. p. 165

²² SALT I was an executive agreement, not a formal treaty.

permitted the use of national technical means (NTMs – satellites) and another that prohibited attempts to interfere with verification. SALT II added a provision that each side not encrypt the radio signals (telemetry) sent by test missiles, and it required satellite-observable differences between different aircraft and cruise missile designs. In a sense, SALT II also incorporated some worst-case assumptions in that once a missile type was tested with MIRVs, deployments of that missile were assumed to all be equipped with MIRVs.

Surprisingly, questions about verification did not plague the SALT I talks, at least on the U.S. side. In the midst of the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration was anxious to the point of “hyperbolic...overselling” of SALT I to appear as a peacemaker. And as the Congressional votes above indicate, the Congress and public were eager for good news as well.²³ Public concerns about SALT I compliance were not raised until 1975. The organization created to work out compliance issues, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), was able to resolve six of eight issues raised by the U.S. side in 1978.²⁴

SALT II was signed in June of 1979, it reduced the number of launchers slightly, capped warheads on ICBMs to ten, and placed some limits on modernization. SALT II disappointed liberals because it did so little, while it infuriated hawks who were concerned about disproportional limits that they believed favored the Soviets, and about anticipated difficulties with verification. In contrast to SALT I, verification issues were among the “most intractable” in

²³ Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, pp. 192-193.

²⁴ Mark M. Lowenthal and Joel S. Wit, “The Politics of Verification,” in William C. Potter, *Verification and Arms Control* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 153-168, esp. pp. 154-157. “Very little is known about the SCC,” but because it’s major task was to reduce uncertainty, a study of its workings would likely shed considerable light on transparency. Sidney Graybeal and Michael Krepon, “Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission,” *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall, 1985), pp. 183-199, quote on p. 183.

debates about SALT II ratification.²⁵ During the Senate debate, the Carter administration claimed that every compliance issue raised about SALT I had been successfully resolved.²⁶ Many disagreed. Moreover, the backdrop for these rising concerns about compliance problems was a general worsening of Cold War tensions. There were Soviet-backed Cubans in Angola, a Soviet brigade reported in Cuba, and hope for ratification of SALT II died with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. SALT II was never ratified, though both countries generally abided by its terms.

During the Reagan administration, concern grew over Soviet compliance with both SALT I/II and the ABMT. The administration accused the Soviets of building an ABM radar at Krasnoyarsk, far away from its permitted location. The U.S. also accused the Soviets of building too many new intercontinental ballistic missiles, and encrypting their missile telemetry. In 1983 when the Cold War seemed to be about as tension-filled as it had been prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution 93-0 requiring the Reagan administration to submit a report on Soviet compliance with existing agreements.²⁷ In 1986, the U.S. said it would no longer adhere by the SALT structure, and broke out later in 1986 by converting too many B-52s into cruise-missile launching platforms. Just as successful agreements and verified compliance can signal good will, and help good will grow, suspicions about compliance can poison relations. While debates about compliance and verification are about transparency, the successes and

²⁵ Strobe Talbott, "Scrambling and Spying in SALT II," *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Autumn 1979), pp. 3-21, quote on p. 3.

²⁶ Arms Control Association, *Arms Control and National Security*, p. 146.

²⁷ Lowenthal and Wit, "Politics of Verification," p. 154.

failures and ultimate influence of transparency are all hard to discern in the greater ebb and flow of superpower relations during the Cold War.

The subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II in 1991 and 1993, respectively) did succeed in substantially reducing strategic weapons. Both START Treaties were made possible by the end of the Cold War. But with regard to transparency, neither surpassed the INF Treaty's on-site verification provisions.

Perhaps the most remarkable evidence for the argument that arms control agreements are symptoms as much as causes of political relations is the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) of May 2002. It cuts nuclear warheads significantly by about one half from START II levels. Yet instead of the minutiae about each weapons system found in previous treaties, the text reads instead: "Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads." For implementation and verification, all SORT has is Article III, which reads in its entirety: "For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission." In other words, the SORT Treaty had no verification provisions at all, another symptom of the low levels of U.S. - Russian tensions.²⁸

While arms control was made possible by the confluence of technology, political will,

²⁸ The text of SORT can be found at the Arms Control Association website, here: <<<http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/sort.asp>>>.

Other sources consulted for this section include: Dan Caldwell, "The SALT II Treaty," in Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell, eds., *The Politics of Arms Control Verification* (New York, NY: St. Martin's for the Henry L. Stimson Center, 1991); Steven E. Miller, "Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 67-90; John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989); William C. Potter, ed., *Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); and Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1979).

and parity in capabilities, it's fortunes were clearly tied to overall superpower politics. Yet the counterfactual seems fairly chilling. In the absence of arms control, it is easy to imagine a world of much greater instability, of greater offensive and defensive arms racing, and of greater fear. Arms control put a lid on this possibility. Perhaps the greatest transparency-related contribution of arms control was to make the future more certain and more predictable.

IAEA/NPT: Iran, Iraq, North Korea

This section offers a transparency-eye overview of how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have performed in monitoring and constraining the nuclear weapons activities of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

A theme that runs through all three cases in this section is that no level of inspections, on-site and other, can fully assuage the suspicions of skeptical countries. There are two reasons for this. First and obviously, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea all give countries who would be threatened by them ample reason to feel threatened. Covert programs, lies, and deception all provide sound bases for suspicions. Second, the Iraq case shows that even with on-site inspections, it is very hard to verify to an adequate level of assurance when the inspected country resists inspections.

Iran's recent experience with the IAEA includes a private arms control group using commercial satellite photography to help discover and publicize illicit proliferation activities.

The story of Iraq involves Israel and the U.S. attacking Iraq because of the IAEA's inability to provide sufficient transparency, and the 1991 Gulf War ending with a major coercive transparency regime – but one that failed in the face of determined resistance.

The case of North Korea (and Iraq) shows that breaking agreements can send signals, and that regimes can increase transparency, even in their death throes. It is also possible that North Korea is using the regime precisely to send dangerous signals, and increase its leverage at the bargaining table.

BACKGROUND ON THE IAEA AND NPT

The NPT entered into force in March 1970, with two main provisions known as the ‘grand bargain.’ First, the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) pledged not to obtain nuclear weapons, while the five original nuclear weapons states (NWS) of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom were allowed to keep their weapons, on condition that they pursue complete nuclear disarmament. In exchange for forgoing nuclear weapons, the second provision under Article IV gave the NNWS the “inalienable right” to acquire and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.²⁹ In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely, putting an end to periodic review conferences.³⁰

Under Article III, signatories had to establish a safeguards inspection agreement with the IAEA. Almost every state has signed and ratified the NPT, with three notable exceptions: Israel, India, and Pakistan. In January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT.

Right from the beginning, several transparency-related points emerge. First, a deal that

²⁹ The text of the treaty can be found at the IAEA website:
<<<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf>>>.

³⁰ John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, “The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 41-71 and Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century* (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).

prohibits weapons while allowing nuclear power and research is inherently murky. Even though the IAEA is supposed to monitor the civilian programs, civilian programs are a precursor to weapons development for states who so desire. States can go to the brink of a weapons capability, and still be members in good standing of the NPT.³¹ Second, as each state negotiates its own safeguards agreement, each agreement is idiosyncratic. While this tailoring may be effective, it is also somewhat opaque and uneven. As we saw with UNDOF, inspection agreements that look good on paper, may not necessarily work well in practice.

Third, the IAEA is usually limited to monitoring civilian nuclear programs, leaving any illicit programs essentially in the clear. This led to the rather stunningly obvious insight by Jan Lodding that “Experience with *Iraq*, *DPRK* [North Korea] and *South Africa* underlined the need to focus more on the possibility that States have undeclared nuclear material and activities.”³² Fourth, the fact that the newer nuclear weapons states of Israel, India, and Pakistan never signed is an indication that at least some countries take obligations seriously and are honest proliferators.³³ As I argued above, making and breaking agreements send signals, and here we see that not signing is also a signal. Likewise, North Korea’s withdrawal from the IAEA and threat to withdraw from the NPT in 1993-1994 helped signal its intentions to the world, and

³¹ Leonard Spector, “How to Be Weapon-Ready NPT Members,” August 16, 2005, Yale Global Online at <<<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6153>>>. If the aim is a dirty bomb, then almost any nuclear research provides for a nearly instant weapon capability.

³² Jan Lodding, “Verification pursuant to the NPT: Concluding safeguards agreements and additional protocols,” 2005 NPT Review Conference Briefing, May 2005 at <<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Npt/npt2005_ppt_020505.pdf>>, emphases in original.

³³ Echoing Sartori’s argument in *Deterrence by Diplomacy* that honesty is indeed a powerful commodity in international relations.

galvanize a response.³⁴ Finally, in response to problems with the safeguards that have appeared over time, the safeguards have been progressively strengthened. Most notably, in 1997, an Additional Protocol to the NPT allowed IAEA inspectors greater access to states' facilities.³⁵

IRAN

Iran ratified the NPT in 1970, and has developed a fairly extensive civilian nuclear infrastructure in a program it accelerated during the Iran-Iraq war and then again after the 1991 Gulf War. Russia has been the main supplier, but Iran also purchased equipment and sought aid from China, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Due to the hostage crisis under President Carter, the U.S. has long been suspicious of Iran. Relations deteriorated further after President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union speech where he labeled Iran as a member of the "axis of evil."³⁶

Later that year, secret Iranian nuclear facilities were discovered, in part by an analysis of commercial satellite photography done by the private arms control group Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), whose mission is in part to bring "about greater transparency of

³⁴ Jean de Preez and William Potter, "North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT: A Reality Check," Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) Research Story of the Week, April 9, 2003, at: <<<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm>>>.

³⁵ Other sources consulted for this section include: United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs, "Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2-27 May, New York," 05-24713-April 2005-2,735.

³⁶ The text of the speech is available on the White House website at: <<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>>>.

nuclear activities worldwide.”³⁷ U.S. intelligence satellites and Iranian expatriates also helped reveal parts of the Iranian nuclear program. The pioneering use of commercial satellites by ISIS brings what I called Ambient Transparency to a new level, and makes it harder for governments to keep secrets. The proliferation of satellites is why, when I teach about the Gulf War, one of my points is that General Schwartzkopf's surprise left hook might not be possible in today's world.

Iran acknowledged these facilities in December 2002. In early 2003, the IAEA inspected the newly discovered enrichment facility at Natanz, found that it was much more extensive than anyone had thought, and learned of Iranian plans to expand the operation. Iran then admitted having additional facilities, some of which were elaborately concealed.³⁸ This added to suspicions, already grounded in the puzzle of why oil and gas-rich Iran needed any nuclear facilities at all. From a transparency point of view, one interesting observation is that here we see private groups, national intelligence services, and the IAEA all working together to shed light on what the Iranians are up to.

These revelations helped catalyze a European effort to cap the Iranian programs. In late 2003, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom worked together to put pressure on Iran to fully

³⁷ On the discoveries, see David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran Building Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: International Transparency Needed,” ISIS Issue Brief (December 12, 2002) at <<<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranimages.html>>> and Global Security Newswire Story, “Iran: Photos Show Building at Nuclear Sites, Group Says” December 13, 2002, at <<http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/12/13/5s.html>>. On the mission of ISIS, see <<<http://www.isis-online.org/about/about.html>>>.

³⁸ Roger Howard, *Iran in Crisis? Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response* (London and New York: Zed Books 2004; Distributed in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 98-100 and Brenda Shaffer, “Iran at the Nuclear Threshold,” Arms Control Association (November 2003) at: <<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Shaffer.asp>>.

address IAEA concerns. Russia has been slow to sporadic in wanting to slow the Iranians, while the U.S. has supported the Europeans, but not with much vigor. As I write, a complicated diplomatic dance continues, with the Europeans and the U.S. threatening to push harder unless Iran opens up, and Iran periodically threatening to withdraw any cooperation unless the West backs off.

The endgame remains hard to predict. Muhammad el-Baradei, head of the IAEA, recently said that the Iranians have made some progress but that “There are still some important issues about the extent of the enrichment program, but we are moving in the right direction; and the earlier Iran would allow us through transparency measures to do all that we need the better, of course, for everybody, including Iran.” In response, the U.S. State Department’s head nonproliferation official, Robert Joseph, “told yesterday’s conference that Iran has provided a ‘dizzying array of cover stories and false statements’ about its nuclear program. He said the best way to assure its compliance with the IAEA is through UN Security Council pressure.”³⁹ Although the IAEA has strengthened its safeguards procedures, it seems unlikely that any conceivable level of inspections would satisfy a suspicious U.S. and allies. For example, in late 2003, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency told Congress that “even with intrusive IAEA safeguards inspections in Natanz, there is a serious risk that Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities.”⁴⁰ In response, Iran makes a few good points including noting

³⁹ Robert McMahon, “Iran: Nuclear Agency’s Chief Urges Greater Iranian Transparency,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (November 8, 2005) at: <<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2005/iran-051108-rferl02.htm>>>.

⁴⁰ Howard, *Iran in Crisis?*, p. 7. For additional summaries of developments, see Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profile Iran at <<http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1788_1772.html>> and NTI’s Nuclear Profile Iran at <<http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html>>. Other sources consulted for this section include Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990* (Boulder, CO:

that its nuclear programs began under the Shah. And, treaty obligations aside, Iran, like Iraq, Israel, India, and Pakistan, all live in tough neighborhoods.

IRAQ

Iraq ratified the NPT in 1969, and in the 1970s, it began to build the Osiraq nuclear reactor at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center with French help. Israel destroyed the reactor with an airstrike on June 7, 1981. Israel acted in part because it was “not convinced” by the ability of IAEA safeguards and inspections to prevent diversion of nuclear material and to prevent Iraq from building nuclear weapons.⁴¹ Put another way, distrust in the transparency provided by the IAEA helped spark the bombing. As the world later learned, that distrust was well placed because Iraq engaged in a long term and systematic effort to deceive the IAEA.⁴²

Following the Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. The resolution ordered Iraq to declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, and to do so under international supervision and on-site inspections by the IAEA for nuclear programs, and by a special commission, UNSCOM, for biological, chemical, and missile

Westview Press, 1990).

⁴¹ Anthony D'Amato, “Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,” *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 77, No. 3. (July, 1983), pp. 584-588, quote on p. 587. For a counterpoint, see Richard Wilson, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Case of Iraq,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol 20, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-15. See also: Federation of American Scientists, fact sheet: “Osiraq / Tammuz I 33°12'30"N 44°31'30"E”, at <<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq.htm>>>.

⁴² Khidhir Hamza, “Inside Saddam's Secret Nuclear Program”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 54, No. 05 (September/October 1998), pp. 26-33.

programs. Iraq accepted – it had no choice – the resolution within days. An exchange of letters granted UNSCOM and the IAEA unrestricted access to all records and all facility above or below ground, with no advance warning.⁴³ This is perhaps the clearest example of coerced transparency.

From almost the very beginning, UNSCOM and the IAEA were obstructed and lied to. For example, in June 1991, Iraqi forces fired warning shots at an inspection team and inspectors found plutonium and a uranium enrichment program, neither of which had been declared. To make a long story short, much of the 1990s were filled with cat and mouse games in which Iraq would try to obstruct inspectors, and the U.S. and the U.N. would try to pressure Iraq into cooperating. In August 1998, Scott Ritter resigned as head UNSCOM inspector, saying that Iraq “is not disarmed anywhere near the level required by Security Council resolutions,” that Iraq had lied since “day one,” that significant capabilities remain, and that the “illusion of arms control is more dangerous than no arms control at all.”⁴⁴ By late 1998, Iraq had made it impossible for the UNSCOM and the IAEA to be effective, the inspectors were withdrawn, and the U.S. and Britain launched a punitive bombing campaign, Desert Fox.

During the 1990s, inspectors nonetheless ended up finding and destroying dozens of missiles and hundreds of tons of chemical weapons agents, and they dismantled extensive biological and nuclear weapons program.⁴⁵ Despite this, there were large gaps in the quantities

⁴³ United Nations, Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996*, United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX (New York, NY: United Nations, 1996).

⁴⁴ William S. Ritter, resignation letter to UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler, August 26, 1998.

⁴⁵ Colin Norman, “Iraq’s Bomb Program: A Smoking Gun Emerges,” *Science*, Vol 254, No. 5032 (November 1, 1991), pp. 644-645 and United Nations fact sheet, “Unscm Main Achievements,” March 1998, at: <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Achievements/achievements.html>>>

of WMD materials indicated in Iraqi documents, and what was known to have been destroyed. Hence, the consensus of weapons inspectors, and the assessment of many intelligence services around the world was that Iraq retained significant WMD research and weapon capabilities.⁴⁶ Inspectors with boots on the ground, aided by U.S. intelligence, could not seem to find sizable portions of Iraq's WMD programs. This suggests that even under the most favorable circumstances, it is hard to coerce transparency from a resistant party.

After September 11, 2001, the U.S. became increasingly concerned with WMD terrorism, and looked to confront threats from what President George Bush called the "Axis of Evil:" Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Of these, Iraq became the target of particular concern and the U.S. threatened war unless Iraq accepted a new inspection regime and proved that it had disarmed. Although it became apparent after the ensuing war that Iraq did not possess WMD, it was not forthcoming in helping prove that it had no more WMD. For example, it produced a 12,000 page collection of documents to show what it had done to its WMD materials and programs, but these documents were unsatisfying, often recycled from years before.⁴⁷ Whether or not the new inspection regime would be able to conclude anything decisive, and how long it would take, was a matter of debate between proponents and opponents of the war. My opinion is that for all the important players, their position on the possible war seemed to dictate their position on the prospects for the new verification regime. Reasonable arguments existed on all sides, but in the end, nothing the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) could

⁴⁶ David Albright, "Masters of Deception," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 54, No. 03 (May/June 1998), pp. 44-50; Richard Butler, "Letter dated 15 December 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Secretary -General," S/1998/1172 (December 15, 1998).

⁴⁷ Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2004), pp. 104-108.

do seemed likely to change the course of the Bush administration. Without meaning to open up a debate on the war, the point is that a major declared motivation for war for the Bush administration was the inability to make Iraq transparent. There were indeed plenty of reasons to believe Iraq still had WMD, but I also think that later evidence about Bush's determination for war highlights a theme from Cyprus: transparency has a hard time influencing those whose minds are already firmly locked into a way of thinking.⁴⁸

NORTH KOREA

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) ratified the NPT in December 1985, but did not follow through with IAEA inspections until January 1992. Shortly thereafter, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect two nuclear waste facilities, while continuing to operate a reprocessing unit. With inspections blocked, tensions rose. As the IAEA was preparing its report to cite North Korea for non-compliance, North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 (the report came out in April). The withdrawal threat galvanized a global response with relative alacrity. The U.N. passed a resolution urging North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA in May, and the US began high level talks with North Korea in June and the North Korean suspended the threat to withdraw. The talks soon deadlocked, and a crisis erupted in May 1994 when North Korea began to take fuel out of a reactor, presumably for reprocessing into weapons grade fissile material. The IAEA began to

⁴⁸ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster 2004). See also Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (New York, NY: Random House, 2002) and Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions*.

take a tougher line, and North Korea withdrew from the IAEA. This shows that breaking agreements can send signals, but of course so do actions like removing fuel.

A visit by former President Carter to North Korea rekindled the talks, and the U.S. and North and South Korea made a deal called the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to abandon its weapons programs and cooperate with the IAEA in exchange for the construction of two proliferation-resistant light water nuclear reactors. This achieved a quasi-‘cease-fire’ between North Korea and the outside parties. There were no major crises until 2002, but no real progress was made by either side in implementing the Agreed Framework. Between 1994 and 2001, seventeen rounds of technical talks were held to try to resolve outstanding issues, but “no progress has been achieved on key issues.”⁴⁹

In October 2002, the DPRK revealed to a U.S. diplomat that it had a program to enrich uranium whose purpose was to build nuclear weapons. The IAEA passed a resolution condemning North Korea, North Korea rejected the resolution, the U.S. cut off heavy oil shipments due North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework, and North Korea responded by cutting safeguard seals, disabling surveillance cameras, kicking IAEA inspectors out of the country, and finally withdrawing from the NPT in January 2003. Later in 2003, North Korea said it had produced enough plutonium to make six nuclear weapons, and in February 2005, the North Korea Foreign Ministry declared that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons.

⁴⁹ Quote from IAEA, "In Focus : IAEA and DPRK. Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards," at <<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml>>. The sheet is undated. The URL implies May 2003, but the last event on the sheet is March 2005. For more on the Agreed Framework and surrounding events, see Federation of American Scientists fact sheet at: <<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html>>>; Mel Gurtof, "South Korea's Foreign Policy and Future Security: Implications of the Nuclear Standoff," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 8-31; Samuel S. Kim, "North Korea in 1994: Brinkmanship, Breakdown, and Breakthrough," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1994: Part I (January 1995), pp. 13-27.

Alongside these developments were on and off diplomatic efforts by the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China to re-engage North Korea and try to get back on track towards disarmament. The negotiations, known as the six-nation talks, have been going one step forward, one step back since they began in August 2003. However, in September 2005 joint statement, North Korea pledged to give up its nuclear weapons program and rejoin the NPT, while the U.S. promised not to attack. The pledges left many details, including verification, for the future, and the next day, North Korea said it would not give up its weapons program until it had received a civilian nuclear reactor.

Regarding transparency, the continued ups and downs in the bargaining with North Korea are worth more fine-grained study to see how transparency, institutions, uncertainty, bluffing, and posturing affect outcomes. I do not know enough to address these issues confidently. However, I am in good company because no one really knows what the North Koreans are up to, or what their true capabilities are. The main debate about North Korean intent is whether they are trying to bargain/extort for maximum economic gain or whether they are motivated by insecurity or both. Another debate is whether North Korea is really an irrational rogue state or not. North Korea is one of the world's most closed societies, so answers are nearly impossible to come by.⁵⁰ But even U.S. foreign policy was oddly and inexplicably low key for a number of years.

That said, certain transparency arguments may be worth illuminating. It is possible that the North Koreans are playing an exquisite bargaining game, and are using the IAEA inspectors, IAEA safeguards, and the NPT to send dramatic signals, to create tension, and to offer carrots.

⁵⁰ David C. Kang, in "Rethinking North Korea," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (March 1995), pp. 253-267 gives a good rundown of myths and "stylized facts" about North Korea.

Hypothesis H5 contends that transparency can reduce cheating, rogue, and spoiler problems in part because regimes can shine the international spotlight on cheaters and coerce better behavior. It is possible that North Korea is playing jujitsu with the spotlight effect and using the regime to send its own messages to the wider world. To what ends, we do not know, but as the 1998 missile test over Japan showed, North Korea does have a flair for signals.⁵¹

⁵¹ In 1998, the first stage of the rocket landed to the West of Japan, the second stage to the East, while the final pieces landed near Alaska. See Taewoo Kim, "South Korea's Missile Dilemma," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 486-503.

Other sources consulted for this section include Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 92-122 and Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions*.

The Bibliography can be found here: <http://www.nd.edu/~dlindley/handouts/PPIBIBLIO.htm>