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Protesters as "Passionate Economists": A Dynamic Dual Pathway Model of Approach Coping With Collective Disadvantage

Martijn van Zomeren[1], Colin Wayne Leach[2], and Russell Spears[1,3]

Abstract

To explain the psychology behind individuals' motivation to participate in collective action against collective disadvantage (e.g., protest marches), the authors introduce a *dynamic dual pathway model* of approach coping that integrates many common explanations of collective action (i.e., group identity, unfairness, anger, social support, and efficacy). It conceptualizes collective action as the outcome of two distinct processes: *emotion-focused* and *problem-focused* approach coping. The former revolves around the experience of *group-based anger* (based in appraised external blame for unfair collective disadvantage). The latter revolves around beliefs in the *group's efficacy* (based in appraised instrumental coping potential for social change). The model is the first to make explicit the dynamic nature of collective action by explaining how undertaking collective action leads to the *reappraisal* of collective disadvantage, thus inspiring future collective action. The authors review empirical support for the model, discuss its theoretical and practical implications, and identify directions for future research and application.

After decades of neglect, the concept of emotion is enjoying a renaissance in theory and research on collective action against collective disadvantage. Scholars across the social sciences are examining the power of emotion to motivate individuals for collective action (for reviews, see Goodwin, Jasper, & Poletta, 2001; Klandermans, 1997; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Marcus, 2003). Much of this recent work emphasizes *anger* as stimulating individuals' willingness to act against the collective disadvantage caused by prejudice, discrimination, or structural inequality (e.g., Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006, 2007; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). The importance of anger in collective action against collective disadvantage was amply demonstrated in the wave of protests in the Arab world in the winter of 2011. For instance, on January 25, 2011, thousands of protesters took to the streets in Egypt in what was dubbed "a day of anger."

This example also illustrates the potential power of anger and collective action to enforce social change. After continuous protests at Cairo's Tahrir Square, on February 11, 2011, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak resigned, leading international commentators to speak of an "Egyptian Revolution" and even an "Arab Spring." Although anger seemed to play an important part in motivating the Egyptian protesters, the

renewed scholarly interest in emotion in general, and anger in particular, is nevertheless surprising. Emotion has long been viewed as too fleeting and irrational to motivate the presumably rational and instrumental choice to engage in collective action (e.g., Oberschall, 1973; Olson, 1968; Tilly, 1978). Anger in particular has long been seen as a spontaneous, uncontrolled, and thus destructive response to disadvantage that leads to unfocused rage, resentment, and rioting, rather than concerted collective action designed to protest injustice and to alter it (e.g., LeBon, 1895/1995; Stürmer & Simon, 2009; Tilly, 1978; for discussions, see Averill, 1982; Runciman, 1966; Useem, 1998). Thus, for a long time, the assumption that collective action is undertaken by rational and instrumental individual actors who aim to maximize their subjective utility arguably kept collective action theorists and researchers from studying emotion in general and

[1]University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
[2]University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
[3]Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

Corresponding Author:
Martijn van Zomeren, University of Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat 2/1, Groningen, 9712TS, Netherlands
Email: M.van.Zomeren@rug.nl

anger in particular (for reviews, see Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009; Walker & Smith, 2002).

Recent research makes it increasingly clear that viewing people as only "intuitive economists" (Tetlock, 2002) profoundly limits our understanding of collective action (for a similar point from economists, see Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Recent insights suggest that, like any decision to act, the decision to engage in collective action is based in *both* cost–benefit calculations and emotions (Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Thus, the prevailing opposition of emotion and rationality is unhelpful in examinations of collective action. The long-standing view that emotion is too irrational to motivate collective action is also questioned by contemporary conceptualizations of emotion as based in the process of cognitive appraisal (for reviews, see Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001) and coping (Lazarus, 1991, 2001). Both of these, now well-accepted, views of emotion make it difficult to characterize emotion as irrational and thus diametrically opposed to the careful consideration of the utility of collective action. In fact, the contemporary view of emotion emphasizes emotion as a rational basis for the decision to act (for reviews, see Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991) as well as for a wide variety of other decisions (for reviews, see Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Damasio, 1994; Frank, 1988). Thus, a contemporary approach must treat both emotion and cost–benefit calculation as equally rational and reasonable explanations of collective action against collective disadvantage. In other words, we must examine the protesters at Tahrir Square, and elsewhere, as "passionate economists."

To meet this aim, this article elucidates and extends Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004) to offer a *dynamic dual pathway model* that views collective action as an approach form of coping with collective disadvantage (in contrast to avoidance forms of coping such as acceptance of collective disadvantage, or disidentification with the disadvantaged group). Rather than viewing emotional and cost–benefit explanations of collective action as competing alternatives, however, the dual pathway model conceptualizes these explanations as complementary forms of approach coping with collective disadvantage. Group-based anger is proposed as an important form of *emotion-focused* approach coping and group efficacy is proposed as an important form of *problem-focused* approach coping. The dynamic dual pathway model of collective action builds on and moves beyond previous work in two main ways.

First, we elucidate and further specify how viewing collective action as an approach form of coping enables *an integrative theory* of collective action (based on Lazarus's, 1991, theory of emotion and coping). Thus, we build on Van Zomeren et al. (2004) to offer a fuller and richer account of how and why group-based anger and efficacy promote collective action in response to specific events. As such, the dynamic dual pathway model is also much more specific than the recent social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). As that model was based on a meta-analysis of a wide variety of studies, the SIMCA necessarily conceptualizes group identity and (affect about) group injustice as general explanations of collective action. The SIMCA is therefore a descriptive and predictive model. In contrast, the dynamic dual pathway model offers a *theory* of collective action that specifies the emotion-focused and problem-focused *processes* of coping with collective disadvantage that are evoked by specific events and unfold over time. For instance, rather than making the general claim that perceptions of or affect about injustice promotes collective action, the dynamic dual pathway model specifies how the psychological process of group-based appraisal of unjust collective disadvantage promotes the specific group-based emotion of anger. As an action-oriented emotion about perceived injustice, anger represents a particularly potent form of emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage that has an especially robust link to collective action.

The second way in which the dynamic dual pathway model builds on and moves beyond previous work is by using the unifying notion of coping to specify the *dynamic* interrelationships between the emotion- and problem-focused pathways of coping with collective disadvantage. Most previous work on collective action, like the SIMCA, offer only simple, unidirectional cause-and-effect models. In contrast, our coping framework allows us to specify *both* the *causal antecedents* and *the consequences* of collective action. Indeed, the model is dynamic exactly because it explains how the *cognitive appraisal* of an event evokes the specific approach coping efforts that motivate collective action, that, in turn, feed back into *cognitive reappraisal* (that determines further coping). Thus, our model is the first to specify how collective action and its explanations influence each other reciprocally.

To set the stage for our integrative model, we first review three of the most influential approaches to collective action and then integrate them into a dynamic dual pathway model by viewing them as particular forms of (approach) coping with collective disadvantage. After reviewing the empirical evidence for our model, we discuss implications for theory, research, and practice.

Three Approaches to Collective Action

Collective action is often defined as actions by group members that are aimed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole. Typical examples of collective action include petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, and riots (for a review, see Klandermans, 1997). After decades of isolated theorizing and empirical research, the last decade in the collective action literature can be characterized as an "age of integration." Recent work has moved beyond traditional theoretical boundaries to produce several attempts at integration (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009; Mummendey et al., 1999; Stürmer &

Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008). Thus, it is now common for empirical models of collective action to include multiple explanations. For example, in Stürmer and Simon's (2004) model, group identity and individual cost–benefit analysis are treated as independent predictors of collective action. We continue this trend by integrating work from relative deprivation, social identity, intergroup emotion, and resource mobilization theories. In contrast to other integrative models, however, we move beyond this trend by using the unifying notion of coping to offer a theoretical integration of the constructs offered by each approach. Using a coping perspective as an integrative theoretical framework allows us to specify the complementary processes by which individuals become motivated to engage in collective action. Conceptualizing collective action as a process of approach coping with collective disadvantage also enables us to use the notion that coping is dynamic to specify how collective action feeds back into what predicts it. In this way, a coping perspective generates a novel theory of collective action that is able to theoretically integrate a wider variety of constructs than previous attempts at integration.

Protesters as Individual "Economists"

Individual cost–benefit analysis. Olson's (1968) theory of collective action represented the first major rationalist theory of collective action. The underlying rationale was that, for an individual rational actor, participation in collective action constitutes a social dilemma because it typically requires *individual* effort to achieve *collective* rewards. To achieve maximal subjective utility, the individual should thus be motivated to remain *inactive* (i.e., no individual costs) while hoping that others will act. In this way, individuals reap their share of the collective benefits of collective action without any individual cost. The fundamental block to collective action by "intuitive economists" is the temptation to "free ride," and thus mobilizing individuals for collective action is a matter of reducing the motivation to free ride. There was no place for individuals' emotions in this analysis as a rational basis for collective action, and the focus was on the benefits of engaging in action to the individual.

Olson's theory was highly influential, particularly in the development of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978). In resource mobilization theory, collective action is undertaken by individual rational actors to advance their individual interests (e.g., Gamson, 1992; McAdam, 1982). Thus, from this perspective, the key explanations of collective action are individuals' material resources to mobilize action. This emphasis of material resources reflects the theory's rationalist foundations, but it neglects individual subjectivity as an important way to understand exactly how resources affect individuals' motivation to undertake collective action.[1]

More recent versions of resource mobilization theory do focus on the *subjective utility* of collective action for the individual. For instance, Klandermans (1984) argued that individuals weigh the subjective value of their goals for collective action by their expectancy that these goals will be obtained. Consistent with this, collective action participation is greater among those who value being with disadvantaged others and expect social rewards to occur as a result of collective action (e.g., Simon et al., 1998). Collective action is also greater among those who value individual economic improvement and expect that collective action will bring it about (Klandermans, 1984, 1997). These findings are consistent with the wide and varied literature on self-efficacy—individuals' belief that they are capable of achieving their goals through their own action is a potent basis of action (e.g., Bandura, 1997). An instrumental perspective on collective action thus suggests that Egypt's "day of anger" was really a "day of personal efficacy," orchestrated by individualistic and rational actors seeking to improve their individual outcomes.

Group efficacy beliefs. Although there are circumstances where individuals engage in collective action to improve their individual outcomes, there are limits to this individualist strategy. According to Olson's (1968) "logic" of collective action, for example, one's own actions are unlikely to lead to collective benefits if others do not act as well. This problem fed the idea of *group efficacy beliefs*—beliefs that a group problem can be solved through joint effort (Bandura, 1997). This represents a shift from a focus on individual material resources to a focus on the subjective expectancy that individuals have about the group's ability to improve its disadvantage through collective action. As such, group efficacy beliefs are a group-level development of the cost–benefit calculus that was at the heart of Olson's individualist approach.

A number of studies have shown group efficacy beliefs to be a significant predictor of collective action (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; Mummendey et al., 1999). In a meta-analysis, Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al. (2008) found group efficacy beliefs to be a medium-sized predictor of collective action intentions ($r = .36$) and behavior ($r = .25$). However, there has been little effort to theorize *the process* by which individuals come to believe in their group's efficacy. In addition, there has been little effort to conceptualize group efficacy as part of a larger theoretical model of collective action against collective disadvantage. For example, in the SIMCA, group efficacy beliefs are simply one of three independent explanations of collective action. As we argue below, group efficacy beliefs may be conceptualized as a specific form of problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage that complements the emotion-focused form of approach coping represented by anger.

Protesters as Passionate Group Members

Relative deprivation. The classic resource mobilization perspective contrasts sharply with social psychological theories of relative deprivation (for a review, see Walker & Smith, 2002) and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner,

Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Given its emphasis on objective resources for collective action, classic resource mobilization theory argues that subjective states, such as relative deprivation or social identity, can do little to explain the presumably rational choice to engage in collective action (Useem, 1998). For this reason, classic resource mobilization theory and the instrumental approach more generally have often been portrayed as inconsistent with the emphasis of subjective states in social psychological theories of collective action.

Interestingly, early uses of relative deprivation theory to predict collective action emphasized the importance of objective deprivation as propelling collective action. Soon, however, the theory shifted to emphasize the subjective experience of deprivation relative to others (for reviews, see Crosby, 1976; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Walker & Smith, 2002). Specifically, it predicted that subjective feelings of deprivation develop on the basis of social comparisons. When intergroup comparisons result in subjective feelings of collective (or "fraternal") deprivation, collective action should be most likely (Cook, Crosby, & Hennigan, 1977; Runciman, 1966). This is because there is a conceptual fit between the intergroup comparisons on which group deprivation is based and the intergroup nature of collective action. Indeed, a meta-analysis by H. J. Smith and Ortiz (2002) showed that feelings of intergroup deprivation (such as dissatisfaction, frustration, and anger) are a much more powerful predictor of collective action than perceptions of it. In contrast, feelings of interpersonal deprivation predict poorer individual health and well-being, rather than collective action.

Although it now seems clear that feelings of (inter)group deprivation are an important explanation of collective action, it is unclear what this feeling is precisely. Although Runciman (1966) argued that anger was an especially potent emotion about group deprivation, most research based in relative deprivation theory assesses related feelings of frustration or resentment or more general feelings of dissatisfaction (for a review, see H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004). However, anger is the emotion with unique links to perceived injustice and to a desire for confrontational action (for a review, see Averill, 1982). So there is good reason to believe that anger at collective disadvantage has a special role in promoting collective action (for a discussion, see Leach et al., 2002). The feeling of relative deprivation, however, is perhaps too general to adequately capture the emotion at the heart of Egypt's "day of *anger*." Of course, relative deprivation theory also suffers from the fact that it does not account for the group efficacy beliefs that a more instrumental approach has shown to be an important explanation of collective action.

Social identity. The social identity perspective (i.e., the social identity theory [Tajfel & Turner, 1979] and the self-categorization theory [Turner et al., 1987] that developed out of it) specifies how individuals come to subjectively perceive their world in group terms, and act in their group's interests, when their group identity is salient (for reviews, see Ellemers,

Spears, & Doosje, 1999, 2002). More specifically, the social identity perspective suggests that individuals' identification with their collectively disadvantaged group enables them to experience disadvantage as shared with fellow group members. This is the reason that the degree of group identity is expected to be an important explanation of collective action. For example, in Stürmer and Simon's (2004) model of collective action, politicized group identity (e.g., being a member of the gay movement) is expected to "push" individuals to collective action independent of how instrumental cost–benefit calculations "pull" individuals toward collective action. In Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al.'s (2008) meta-analysis, group identification was a moderate-sized predictor of collective action intentions ($r = .37$) and behavior ($r = .30$). Politicized group identity ($r = .43$) was a stronger predictor than nonpoliticized ($r = .34$), but both had medium-sized effects.

Social identity theory also focuses on group members' subjective perception that their disadvantage is illegitimate as an important explanation of collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Consistent with this, the meta-analysis by Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al. (2008) showed that perceived group injustice predicted collective action intentions ($r = .36$) and behavior ($r = .21$). Thus, the social identity perspective shares relative deprivation theory's emphasis of group-level subjective perceptions of unfair collective disadvantage (Ellemers, 2002; Kawakami & Dion, 1995). However, social identity theory isolates these elements rather than combining them into a general feeling of relative deprivation. Neither approach focuses on the specific emotion of group-based anger or incorporates such emotion-focused explanations of collective action with the more instrumental explanations offered in classic or contemporary resource mobilization theory. Perhaps more importantly, the social identity perspective does not theorize how group identity might be part of more general social psychological processes that lead individuals to deal with collective disadvantage (although it does specify general identity management strategies; see Ellemers, 1993). Thus, group identity is one possible explanation of collective action that is theoretically distinct from other explanations, such as perceived injustice, group-based anger, social support, and group efficacy beliefs.

Toward an Integrative Theoretical Model

At present, the literature on collective action offers several potentially important explanations that come out of two contrasting traditions. The "individual economists" approach focuses on belief in group efficacy and the presence of other instrumental resources (such as the presence of others willing to take action) that better enable effective collective action. The "passionate group members" approach focuses on group identity, subjective perceptions of injustice (unfairness, illegitimacy), and feelings of group deprivation. To examine empirically why protesters, such as those in Egypt's Tahrir Square, undertake collective action, researchers can assess

several of the prevailing explanations and compare their predictive power (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; Simon et al., 1998). Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al.'s (2008) meta-analysis showed, for example, that group identity, feelings about group injustice, and group efficacy beliefs each had independent, medium-sized effects on collective action intentions and behavior. Stürmer and Simon's (2004) review showed politicized group identity and a wider range of cost–benefit calculations to each predict collective action.

However, previous efforts provide *empirical models* that integrate several constructs into one predictive model. As such, previous integrative models of collective action do not provide an overarching or unifying conceptual framework that integrates explanations of collective action into a single *theoretical model*. We believe that conceptualizing collective action as a form of approach coping with collective disadvantage enables a theoretical model that can integrate the major explanations of collective action by viewing individuals as "passionate economists". In addition, the coping approach views collective action and its explanations as dynamically related—undertaking collective action can feed back to affect its explanations. Thus, a coping approach allows us to offer a theoretical model of collective action that, for instance, views group identity, group-based anger, and group efficacy as both causes and consequences of collective action.

A Dynamic Dual Pathway Model of Approach Coping With Collective Disadvantage

The dynamic dual pathway model (depicted in Figure 1) assumes that collective disadvantage represents a contextual demand with which individuals need to cope. According to Lazarus's (1991, 2001) cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion and coping, *coping efforts* are aimed at successfully negotiating the person–environment relationship. Thus, collective action is one particular way of coping with collective disadvantage to overcome it. Although a coping perspective has been most regularly applied to individuals' negotiation of their individual circumstances, individuals also cope with their group circumstances (see C. T. Miller & Kaiser, 2001; C. T. Miller & Major, 2000). Thus, structural discrimination (e.g., based on gender, race, or ethnicity) and other collective disadvantages (e.g., higher taxes, environmental issues) are important contextual demands with which people cope.

Because collective action is a type of action designed to alter one's circumstances, it is a form of what is called approach coping. As our model aims to explain collective action, we focus on *approach coping* rather than on the *avoidance coping* (e.g., Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004) that should explain why individuals respond passively to collective disadvantage.[2] Thus, we follow relative deprivation and social identity theories by

Figure 1. The dynamic dual pathway model of coping with collective disadvantage
Black pathways indicate emotion-focused approach coping, whereas gray pathways indicate problem-focused approach coping. Dashed lines indicate dynamic pathways of reappraisal.

focusing on the conditions of collective disadvantage where there is at least some hope and scope for social change. We thus assume that collective disadvantage *can* be appraised as unfair and that group goals *can* be appraised as achievable. It is unclear if any structural conditions can fully eliminate all hope and scope for change. However, apparently stable and legitimate collective disadvantage may constrain individuals' appraisals and therefore limit their approach coping (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).[3]

Following Lazarus (1991, 2001), we view *cognitive appraisal* as a central psychological process in people's coping efforts. According to Lazarus, two broad types of cognitive appraisal guide coping—*primary* and *secondary* appraisal (see Figure 1, top left).[4] Primary appraisal is the individual's interpretation of the relevance that collective disadvantage has for the (individual and group) self. Secondary appraisal is the individual's interpretation of the circumstance of collective disadvantage and how she

or he can most effectively cope with it. It may already be clear that the major explanations of collective action fit neatly within the more general notions of primary and secondary appraisal. For instance, social identity theory's emphasis on group identity as a basis for perceiving disadvantage as collective and relative deprivation theory's claim that a perception of group-based deprivation leads to collective action both fit within the notion that a process of primary appraisal determines the self-relevance of collective disadvantage (for a discussion, see Iyer & Leach, 2008). In addition, the process of secondary appraisal appears to encompass the notion of cost–benefit analysis in resource mobilization theory as well as relative deprivation theory's emphasis of blaming an external agent for unfair group-based deprivation. Thus, we believe that the major explanations of collective action can be successfully integrated within a unifying coping framework.

Primary Appraisal: Self-Relevance

Primary appraisal is focused on interpreting whether an event is sufficiently *self-relevant* to initiate coping effort. Only events that are sufficiently important to one's self-concept, or to one's goals, require coping effort. According to Lazarus (1991), there are three interrelated facets of primary appraisal: ego involvement, goal relevance, and goal congruence. Thus, in primary appraisal one can interpret an event as relevant to a particular aspect of one's ego (e.g., the personal vs. the social self, one's morality, one's competence) and as relevant to a particular goal (e.g., to meet one's moral ideals, to be kind to others, to be esteemed and respected). The event with which one must cope is appraised as either congruent or incongruent with the particular goal. Although Lazarus's model has mostly been used to examine the appraisal of individual self-relevance (e.g., health), it applies equally well to the self-relevance of group phenomena such as collective disadvantage (Iyer & Leach, 2008).

In the context of collective disadvantage, individuals' group identity must be(come) relevant to initiate coping efforts (see Figure 1, top). This is because collective disadvantage needs to be(come) self-relevant in this case. When put in the terms of the social identity tradition, the notion of primary appraisal states that individuals must self-categorize as members of a disadvantaged group to enable a collective response (see Ellemers, 1993; Turner et al., 1987). Individuals can self-categorize as a group member because the collective nature of the event makes their social identity salient (e.g., I am being discriminated against, like other women, because I am a woman). Or, those who highly identify with their group can self-categorize as a group member because they come to the event with their group identity chronically salient (e.g., Leach et al., 2008; for discussions, see Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Thus, acute self-categorization as a group member or chronic group identification both make it more likely that individuals' group identity becomes salient when faced with collective disadvantage (for a discussion, see Iyer &

Leach, 2008). The salience of group identity in response to collective disadvantage is what makes collective disadvantage relevant to the group-level self (e.g., Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). To illustrate, in Van Zomeren et al. (2004, Study 1) students from one university read that they were disadvantaged by their university in one condition, whereas in the other condition they read that students from *another* university were disadvantaged by that university. In line with our reasoning, results showed that in-group disadvantage made the in-group more salient to participants than did out-group disadvantage.

Note, however, that the dynamic dual pathway model does not presume that all participants engage in collective action because collective disadvantage is seen as relevant to their *group-level* self. As can be seen in Figure 1 (top), when personal identity is salient (or when individuals identify only weakly with the group), the decision to engage in collective action is presumed to be based on an individual cost–benefit calculus regarding collective disadvantage and collective action against it. In this sense, the individualist and rationalist explanation of collective action as assumed by classic resource mobilization theory is not incorrect. It applies best to those who appraise collective disadvantage as most relevant to their individual, rather than their group, self. Such individuals should most support collective action when it offers individual benefit with little individual cost (for a review, see Klandermans, 1997). This individual-level coping resembles Olson's (1968) analysis of collective action in which individuals are looking for a free ride by offering low-cost support (e.g., signing an online petition) to those who engage in collective action on behalf of the group as a whole.

Secondary Appraisal: Blame for Unfairness

According to Lazarus (1991), the secondary appraisal of blame for unfairness is an important antecedent of approach coping. Approach motivation needs to be oriented toward an agent (i.e., the self, the other, the institution), and hence one must judge who is to blame for unfairness. In addition to identifying an agent, the appraisal of blame for unfairness involves a judgment of whether the agent's action is unfair, illegitimate, immoral or otherwise unacceptable. Blaming an external agent for an injustice has long been considered a fundamental basis of anger (for reviews, see Averill, 1982; Frijda, 1986; Scherer et al., 2001). This is why Lazarus (1991, chap. 6) conceptualized anger as a response to a "demeaning offense against me and mine" (p. 222) that is relevant to one's esteem. Lazarus viewed anger as strongly linked to the "action tendency" of an "attack on the agent held to be blameworthy for the offense." Thus, attack is a form of approach coping based in a particular pattern of appraisal tied to the specific emotion of anger. Indeed, recent research confirms anger as a potent basis of approach-oriented motivation and action (for a review, see Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). However, when group members fail to blame an external agent for unfair collective disadvantage,

they are likely to feel less agitated negative emotions than anger, such as dissatisfaction or sadness (Walker & Smith, 2002). Obviously, these less action-oriented emotions provide little basis for collective action.[5]

In the context of collective disadvantage, individuals may make the primary appraisal that their disadvantage is collective and thus relevant to their group-level self. As such, they may make the secondary appraisal that their collective disadvantage is an unfair event for which an external agent is to blame (e.g., a dominant out-group, the government). This pattern of appraisal should make the emotion of anger likely and thus facilitate approach coping efforts that motivate collective action against the external agent. Lazarus (1991) refers to this particular coping effort as *emotion-focused* because an emotional experience is at its heart and it is emotion that motivates the coping effort (also see Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Although many seem to believe that Lazarus viewed emotion-focused coping as an avoidant (e.g., denial, distraction, suppression) and thus maladaptive coping effort, emotion-focused coping can be either approach or avoidance oriented (see Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Lazarus, 2001).[6] Because anger toward an external agent is one of the more approach- and action-oriented emotions, anger about injustice is one of the more obvious types of emotion-focused *approach* coping.

Although Lazarus (1991) focused on anger as a form of emotion-focused coping with individual demands, his conceptualization of anger as an "offense against me and mine" allows for group-based anger about collective disadvantage and other collective circumstances. Indeed, recent theory and research combines appraisal theories like Lazarus's with the social identity perspective to specify how individuals feel emotion about their group and its relation with other groups (E. R. Smith, 1993; for reviews, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Leach et al., 2002). Consistent with the approach orientation of anger in general, group-based anger about collective injustice tends to be a medium-sized predictor of approach-oriented motivation (e.g., Leach et al., 2006, 2007; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; for a review, see Iyer & Leach, 2008).

As shown in Figure 1 (middle left), our dynamic dual pathway model therefore proposes that the appraisal of external blame for the unfairness of collective disadvantage is an important antecedent of *emotion-focused approach coping*. Blaming an external agent for unfair treatment is a basis for anger at this agent. This anger can be validated and reinforced by emotional social support—sharing one's appraisal of blame and one's feeling of anger with like-minded others (e.g., Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, in press; Peters & Kashima, 2007; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; also see Mackie et al., 2000). Emotional social support is a coping resource that is best provided by a group who shares one's circumstances (Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Klandermans, 1997). Given that it is a group-based emotion, anger at collective disadvantage can be viewed as a state of action readiness that prepares the individual for adaptive

action on behalf of the group. This is why our model proposes that appraising external blame for the unfairness of collective disadvantage leads to collective action through group-based anger.

Secondary Appraisal: Coping Potential

Secondary appraisal also involves a judgment of one's *potential* to cope effectively with a demand. High coping potential results from a calculus whereby one's (psychological, social, and material) resources are thought to outweigh the demands placed on one. High coping potential also suggests the power to alter the event through action. Thus, high coping potential is an important antecedent of *problem-focused approach coping* (Lazarus, 1991). As can be seen in Figure 1 (middle, right), our model proposes that appraising coping potential as high leads to collective action through group efficacy beliefs. This coping effort aims at directly altering the precipitating event of collective disadvantage.

Coping potential refers to the individual's appraisal of the resources that can be marshaled. As it is a group-based action, collective action requires individuals to focus on their group-based resources (also see Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Our model focuses on the important group-based resources provided by appraisals of instrumental social support (also known as action support; see Figure 1, middle right). Instrumental social support provides the resource of others who are willing to take direct action to alter the group's collective disadvantage. Thus, instrumental social support increases the more material resource of group efficacy. Indeed, others' willingness to engage in collective action suggests stronger mobilization resources that increase individuals' belief in group efficacy (Klandermans, 1997). Individuals who perceive themselves as having greater instrumental social support should thus have a greater sense that the group has the efficacy to take direct action to alter its circumstances. A greater belief in the group's efficacy should in turn lead to a stronger willingness to undertake collective action. Group efficacy represents *problem-focused* approach coping with collective disadvantage because it mobilizes individuals for the direct purpose of changing their circumstances.

At this point, it should be clear that the differentiation between emotion- and problem-focused approach coping does not indicate an "emotional" versus a "cognitive" pathway to action. *Both* coping efforts are based in cognitive appraisal. Group-based anger is based in the secondary appraisal of external blame for unfairness, whereas group efficacy is based in the secondary appraisal of coping potential. In fact, Lazarus's (1991) theory is devoid of a dualism between cognition and emotion, and so is ours. This is why we view individuals as "passionate economists," whose decision to act is based in two distinct motivational pathways. Thus, the emotion-focused and problem-focused pathways of coping are complementary rather than competing. Indeed, Lazarus (2001) warned against viewing emotion- and

problem-focused coping as opposed processes or as competing explanations of action: "The distinction, which has been widely drawn on in coping measurement and research, leads to their treatment as distinctive and competing coping action types, which is a too literal and misleading conception of the way coping works" (p. 49). Indeed, both pathways are equally cognitive, "rational," and potentially adaptive.

Cognitive Reappraisal: The Key to a Dynamic Model

One clear advantage of a coping perspective is that it enables us to view collective action as a *dynamic process* by specifying both causal antecedents and consequences of collective action (see Figure 1). Our dynamic dual pathway model assumes not only that appraisal feeds into coping but also that coping feeds back into *reappraisal* (Lazarus, 1991, 2001). This makes the model dynamic because, in line with Lazarus (1991), coping is treated as a continuous process of appraisal and reappraisal. The notion of reappraisal is important because it suggests feedback loops through which coping informs future appraisal and coping effort such as to optimize effective coping. Individuals thus continue coping as long as it is appraised as necessary (Lazarus, 1991). More concretely, our model specifies how approach coping efforts and outcomes affect primary and secondary appraisals of collective disadvantage subsequent to initial coping efforts (see Figure 1). For instance, coping efforts can lead to undertaking collective action, which in turn increases the primary appraisal of self-relevance (i.e., an increased sense of group identification, or social identity salience). The dynamic dual pathway model is the first model of collective action that makes such specific feedback loops explicit and testable. This is important for theory and research on collective action because surprisingly little is known about the psychological *consequences* of undertaking collective action (and how this feeds back into later behavior). This has led to calls to view the psychology of collective action as a more dynamic process (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009; Reicher, 1996). The dynamic dual pathway model is in a unique position to answer these calls through the unifying notion of coping because coping involves a dynamic process of cognitive appraisal and reappraisal.

Predictions of the Dynamic Dual Pathway Model

The dynamic dual pathway model views *group-based anger* as key to emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage and *group efficacy beliefs* as key to problem-focused approach coping. The model uniquely specifies which psychological variables stimulate or impede emotion- and problem-focused approach coping. Specifically, variables that indicate coping potential, and thus stronger group efficacy beliefs (e.g., instrumental social support) stimulate

problem-focused approach coping, whereas variables that indicate stronger blame for unfairness and thus group-based anger (e.g., unfairness and emotional social support) stimulate emotion-focused approach coping. Group-based anger and group efficacy each have complementary effects on collective action because they are not mutually exclusive.

The model further specifies how social identity relates to emotion- and problem-focused approach coping. On one hand, group identification and social identity salience increase the appraised unfairness of *collective* disadvantage and the attribution of external blame, and hence the experience of group-based anger. The dynamic dual pathway model thus predicts that the relevance of group identity *facilitates* emotion-focused approach coping. However, lower identifiers do not necessarily appraise collective disadvantage as irrelevant to the self—after all, collective disadvantage might still harm their *personal* goals and outcomes (for reviews, see Ellemers et al., 1999, 2002; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Lower identifiers are only likely to act on behalf of the group when they believe that personal goals are likely to be achieved through group action (e.g., Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002). Lower identifiers should therefore rely on their group efficacy beliefs to calculate whether undertaking collective action is worth the effort (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). The dynamic dual pathway model thus predicts, different from the SIMCA, that the relevance of group identity *moderates* problem-focused approach coping: Individuals' group efficacy beliefs become *more* predictive of their willingness to undertake collective action when their group identity is *less* relevant to them.

Finally, our model offers specific predictions regarding crucial feedback loops from coping to cognitive reappraisal. For instance, it predicts that stronger approach coping, as indicated by stronger collective action tendencies or actual collective action, can increase the primary appraisal of self-relevance. We thus predict that group efficacy beliefs increase group identification through the experience of "putting one's identity into action" with collective action. This is consistent with more general evidence that individuals' belief that social change is possible increases their group identification (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002; Mummendey et al., 1999; for a review, see Ellemers, 1993). Moreover, it fits with evidence that group efficacy and attendant collective action tendencies can redefine individuals' group identity in terms of the collective action for which group members are prepared (Drury & Reicher, 2009). As such, a shared tendency for collective action can serve as a concrete means by which the value of the group is affirmed and strengthened in individuals (Drury & Reicher, 2005). This all implies that a stronger belief that social change is feasible mobilizes individuals for collective action and increases the group-level self-relevance of collective disadvantage. Therefore, greater problem-focused approach coping should lead to the greater self-relevance of collective disadvantage (e.g., higher group identification). This constitutes a feedback loop whereby

problem-focused approach coping feeds back into a key aspect of primary appraisal.

In a second crucial feedback loop, our model predicts that undertaking collective action can increase the secondary appraisals of coping potential. In other words, undertaking collective action can *empower* individuals by increasing their coping potential. This is consistent with qualitative field research by Drury and Reicher (2005). They found that undertaking collective action can result in the positive experience that one is challenging the status quo as an active agent of social change (i.e., *empowerment*). This is as an excellent indicator of coping potential because it implies confidence in achieving group goals despite potential short-term failure (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Moreover, we predict that undertaking collective action can increase individuals' appraisal of blame and/or unfairness and thus increase their experience of group-based anger. In fact, Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that taking collective action can increase perceptions of unfairness as part of feeling empowered. Thus, we predict feedback loops whereby undertaking collective action increases the secondary appraisals of coping potential and external blame for unfairness.

These predictions differ in scope and precision from those by previous integrative work. No other integrative model (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2009; Mummendey et al., 1999; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008) offers specific causal predictions about *both* the antecedents and consequences of collective action. It is our use of Lazarus's (1991) dynamic theory of coping as an integrative theoretical framework that enables us to offer a dynamic theory of collective action as approach coping with collective disadvantage. This dynamic approach enables us to depart from the assumptions of simple cause-and-effect empirical models that view collective action as the product of one or more, sometimes competing, explanations. For example, our dynamic model allows us to depart from the widely held view that group identity is *only* a causal antecedent of collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008). Consistent with an emerging view that group identity can be both a cause and a consequence of social action (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002; Leach, Rodriguez Mosquera, Vliek, & Hirt, 2008), we conceptualize group identity as dynamically interrelated with collective action. Group identity is a primary appraisal that feeds the coping efforts behind collective action, and collective action can promote stronger group identity by suggesting the group's power and value to its members. Of course, collective action that is ineffective or invites brutal retaliation may also feed back to undermine group identity by suggesting the group's disempowerment and its danger to members. The important advantage of a dynamic coping model of collective action is that group members are understood to be active co-constructors of their psychological and social reality who engage in coping efforts aimed at successfully negotiating the person–environment relationship. As such, our model aims to better theorize collective action to better represent its complex nature and thus to better enable its empirical examination.

Review of Empirical Evidence

Evidence From Our Research Program

We first turn to the empirical evidence for the dynamic dual pathway model generated by our research program of experimental and field studies. The typical paradigm in our first set of studies (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) was that we confronted our participants with a real-life example of collective disadvantage, manipulated their appraisal of the situation, and measured their appraisal and coping responses through self-report. In three experiments, we led Dutch university students to believe that the actions of a powerful authority (e.g., the national government or their university) led to students' collective disadvantage. For instance, we used the issues of increased tuition fees or alleged increase in first-year students' obligatory research participation as a self-relevant collective disadvantage that placed serious demands on the Dutch college students who were our participants (for a discussion, see Leach, 2010).

In all three studies, we tested whether group-based anger and group efficacy uniquely predicted collective action tendencies and whether specific appraisals of the situation predicted group-based anger and/or group efficacy. Manipulations of appraised *unfairness* were designed to affect the secondary appraisal of external blame for unfairness, whereas manipulations of appraised *emotional* and *instrumental* types of social support were designed to affect the secondary appraisal of coping potential. Emotional social support (termed *opinion support* in these studies) was operationalized as the expectation that fellow group members share one's opinion that collective disadvantage is unfair. Instrumental social support (termed *action support* in these studies) was operationalized as the expectation that fellow group members are willing to do something against collective disadvantage.

The dynamic dual pathway model predicts that stronger appraisal of procedural unfairness increases group-based anger but not necessarily group efficacy. Stronger emotional social support also increases group-based anger because it socially validates the appraisal of unfair collective disadvantage and thus makes the experience of unfairness more group based. However, stronger emotional social support does not necessarily imply group member's willingness to act. Hence emotional social support predicts group-based anger but not necessarily group efficacy. In line with the idea that collective action is more likely when individuals "put their money where their mouth is," we expected *instrumental* social support to increase group efficacy because stronger action readiness among the disadvantaged group indicates that the group will be more efficacious.

Figure 2. Partial test of the dynamic dual pathway model of coping with collective disadvantage
Pooled results from Van Zomeren et al. (2004). Bold lines reflect significant parameter estimates; dashed lines reflect nonsignificant parameter estimates.

Figure 2 shows the pooled results from the three experiments that we obtained by meta-analyzing the correlation matrices.[7] Results support the unique predictive power of group-based anger and group efficacy and their hypothesized antecedents. Group-based anger and group efficacy both uniquely predicted collective action tendencies across the three experiments, and the association between group-based anger and group efficacy was so small that it could be dropped from the model. These findings corroborate our view of the emotion-focused and problem-focused ways of coping with collective disadvantage as distinct. In further support of the distinct pathways to collective action, appraisals of procedural unfairness and emotional social support increased group-based anger, but not group efficacy. In contrast, instrumental social support increased group efficacy beliefs much more than group-based anger. These results support the notion of distinct emotion-focused and problem-focused approach coping efforts that motivate collective action on the basis of different group-based appraisals of the situation.

We note that our manipulations of appraised unfairness and social support enabled important evidence for the *causal* arrows between these appraisals and the other variables in the model. To further test the model's internal validity, using the same paradigm, Van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears (2010) directly manipulated individuals' group efficacy beliefs and measured their collective action tendencies. We manipulated

students' group efficacy beliefs by having an expert state that collective action would or would not achieve the group's goals. In line with the previously untested assumption that group efficacy beliefs are a cause of the increased tendency to undertake collective action, the manipulation of group efficacy increased individuals' collective action tendencies.

We have also extended the model to include a *behavioral* measure of collective action. This was partly in response to meta-analytic evidence that effects for actual action are smaller than for reported action tendencies (Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008). Thus, in Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (in press, Study 2), we offered Italian participants the opportunity to sign a petition at the end of a study about genetically modified food. In the study, we confronted participants with information about European legislation that allowed food producers to use genetically modified ingredients without mentioning this clearly on food labels. The issue thus concerned consumers' "right to know." In line with Figure 1, group-based anger and group efficacy predicted collective action tendencies, which in turn predicted signing the petition. Thus, as specified by the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and in line with Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al.'s (2008) meta-analytic findings, collective action tendencies predicted actual collective action.

Another set of studies focused on primary rather than on secondary appraisal (e.g., group efficacy, social support).

We thus tested our predictions that a greater relevance of group identity should increase individuals' experience of group-based anger and their collective action tendencies (i.e., it *facilitates* emotion-focused approach coping). In contrast, group efficacy beliefs should be more predictive of collective action tendencies for those for whom their group identity is less relevant (i.e., lower identifiers). That is, relevance of group identity should *moderate* problem-focused approach coping.

In Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2008), we combined a field study among participants in a student protest with a follow-up experiment to test both the internal and external validity of these ideas. We measured group identification in the field study, and as an experimental follow-up we conducted a laboratory study in which we manipulated the salience of students' group or personal identity. The other variables were measured through self-report. The results of both studies supported our predictions. As can be seen in Figure 3a, the field study results showed that group identification predicted collective action tendencies through group-based anger. Thus, group identification facilitated emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage. Moreover, group efficacy beliefs were more predictive of collective action tendencies for lower identifiers (see Figure 3b). Thus, group identification indeed moderated problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage. The follow-up experiment replicated these results in the laboratory where we first asked students to write about a day in their life as a student or as a unique individual (thus manipulating the salience of group versus personal identity) and then confronted them with collective disadvantage (i.e., increased tuition fees). Replicating the field study, the relevance of group identity facilitated emotion-focused approach coping and moderated problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage. Thus, a greater relevance of group identity increased individuals' experience of group-based anger and their collective action tendencies, whereas group efficacy beliefs were more predictive of collective action tendencies for individuals whose group identity was less relevant.

A third line of research offered the first experimental examination of the feedback loop from coping efforts to primary appraisal. In this experiment, we manipulated individuals' group efficacy beliefs and measured their collective action tendencies (Van Zomeren, Leach, et al., 2010). Although the original articulation of the dual pathway model predicts a causal effect of group efficacy on collective action tendencies, our dynamic model moves beyond this hypothesis by predicting that collective action tendencies also increase the relevance of group identity. Employing a similar setup as in Van Zomeren et al. (2004), we successfully manipulated students' group efficacy beliefs by having an expert state that collective action would or would not achieve group goals. As predicted, this manipulation increased individuals' collective action tendencies, which, in turn, increased their group identification (see Figure 4). This supports the idea that approach coping with collective

Figure 3a. Relevance of group identity *facilitates* emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage
Derived from Van Zomeren, Spears, et al. (2008, Study 1).
*$p < .05$.

Figure 3b. Relevance of group identity *moderates* problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage
Derived from Van Zomeren, Spears, et al. (2008, Study 1).

disadvantage can feed back into primary appraisal (e.g., group identification).

In a fourth set of studies, we examined the feedback loop between collective action and coping potential. Drawing on Drury and Reicher's (2005, 2009) qualitative data, we predicted a feedback loop from collective action to group efficacy beliefs to capture an important aspect of *empowerment*. In three experiments, Van Zomeren, Drury, and Van der Staaij (2011) confronted Dutch students with different collective disadvantages. In one experiment, they manipulated whether or not participants had the opportunity to sign a student union

Figure 4. Group efficacy beliefs increase group identification through collective action tendencies
Derived from Van Zomeren, Leach, et al. (2010).
*p < .05.

petition. Participants then completed questions about their group identification, group-based anger, and group efficacy beliefs. This design allowed us, for the first time, to investigate experimentally the psychological *consequences* of collective action. Results showed that those who had, and took, the opportunity to sign the petition indeed reported stronger group efficacy beliefs than those who did not have the opportunity to sign the petition, or those who had the opportunity but did not sign it. The two other experiments replicated this effect in different contexts. These findings demonstrate the predicted feedback loop between approach coping and coping potential. In fact, these findings supplement the Van Zomeren, Leach, et al. (2010) experimental findings by showing that the link between group efficacy and collective action tendencies is *reciprocal*. Indeed, the effect sizes of both causal effects were similar (η^2 = .11 for the effect of group efficacy on collective action tendencies and η^2 = .13 for the effect with the reversed causal order).

Evidence From Other Sources

We can also find evidence for the dual pathways in our model in past and present work by other researchers. For instance, our model is corroborated by Mummendey et al.'s (1999) survey of members of the disadvantaged East German group in the context of German unification (also see Kessler & Mummendey, 2002). Their measures of group-based resentment and efficacy both independently predicted wanting to engage in competition with the advantaged group of West Germans (a proxy of collective action intentions). Consistent with our conceptualization of group identification as a primary appraisal of self-relevance, identification as East German predicted social competition only indirectly by promoting group-based anger and efficacy. Several similar studies by Klandermans and colleagues also fit with predictions from the dynamic dual pathway model. For example, Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk (2009) found that efficacy beliefs predicted individuals' motivation to engage in Dutch labor union protests independent of unfairness perceptions (also see Klandermans et al., 2008). Our

theoretical model uniquely explains why these empirical links were found in quite different contexts.

Furthermore, Tausch et al. (2011) recently examined dual pathways to collective action intentions in studies of German students' protest of tuition hikes, Indian Muslims' reactions to their collective disadvantage, and British Muslims' protest of British foreign policy. In all three contexts, appraised injustice against the group was associated with group-based anger rather than belief in group efficacy. Also consistent with our model, anger and efficacy were distinct predictors of intentions to engage in the collective action that participants were most willing to perform (e.g., protests, petitions). Moreover, in a study of a community sample of African Americans, Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, and Branscombe (2009) found that higher reported group identification was most associated with reports of using what we refer to as instrumental and emotional social support. Group identification was less strongly associated with reported problem-focused coping through collective action (e.g., "By working together, Blacks change discriminatory practices"). This is consistent with our view that group identity is a primary appraisal that leads to secondary appraisals of coping potential (i.e., social support) rather than directly to the coping effort most closely linked to collective action.

In addition, in a modified role-play study about gender inequality in salaries, Martin, Brickman, and Murray (1984) manipulated the severity of the inequality and whether women were informally and formally organized at the company. Only the manipulation of inequality severity affected individuals' sense of group-based deprivation (i.e., perceived group injustice and a feeling of discontent). Thus, only a manipulation of unjust disadvantage affected what we view as a secondary appraisal of blame for unfairness and resultant emotion-focused coping. In contrast, Martin et al. found that the formal (rather than informal) organization of women in the organization increased their willingness to do something about their collective disadvantage (also see Klandermans et al., 2008). Thus, in the terms of our model, instrumental social support led to a willingness for collective action through a pathway of problem-focused coping independent of the appraisal of injustice central to the pathway of emotion-focused coping. Thus, Martin et al.'s findings are broadly consistent with our conceptualization of emotion-focused and problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage as distinct processes.

Ellemers and Barreto (2009) provide better experimental evidence for the specific links among external blame for unfairness, group-based anger, and collective action. In their studies, women were confronted with either blatant or subtle expressions of prejudice. In regard to the dynamic dual pathway model, the key difference between blatant and subtle prejudice is that blatant prejudice is easier to identify and therefore easier to blame on the (unfair) prejudice of the outgroup. As our model predicts, blatant prejudice led to stronger group-based anger than subtle prejudice. In addition,

group-based anger led to greater willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of women as a group. Similarly, Iyer and Ryan (2009) also found evidence for emotion-focused approach coping in their recent study of women's responses to being confronted with lesser-known examples of gender discrimination. They found that the perceived illegitimacy of the women's poorer position led individual women to experience group-based anger, which in turn motivated their willingness to engage in collective action. Thus, there is clear evidence of emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage in all these studies.

Importantly, there is also evidence from other researchers regarding the *dynamics* of collective action specified in our model. Research by Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) has used qualitative methods to document the psychological consequences of participation in actual collective action in the field. Of particular interest to our model is the question of how people cope when their participation in collective action does *not* have the desired outcome of achieving the group's goal. Drury, Reicher, and colleagues find that undertaking collective action can empower individuals in a way that shields them from disappointment about the objective outcomes of their actions. This fits with the link between collective action and increased coping potential proposed in our dynamic dual pathway model.

Recent work provides further support for our model's proposition that coping effort and eventual collective action can feed back to affect antecedents of collective action such as group identity. In their studies of actual protests, Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) have repeatedly found that participation solidifies and extends group identity in ways that promote further collective action. Thomas and McGarty (2009) showed that intragroup discussions forge new social identities that motivate individuals to engage in action on behalf of that group. Specifically, individuals develop new social identities through discussing collective disadvantage with like-minded others. In two experiments, Becker, Tausch, and Wagner (in press) experimentally led some students to protest against increased tuition fees. They found that such collective action increased group identification, especially when it was focused on the protest movement. In a similar study, Becker, Tausch, Spears, and Christ (2011, Study 2) asked students to imagine engaging in various forms of collective action to protest tuition increases. Imagined collective action increased students' identification with a student protest movement.

Recent research by others offers further support for our proposal that collective action can lead to anger in a dynamic feedback loop. Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) have consistently found participation in collective action to feed emotions such as anger. In Becker et al.'s (in press) experiments, leading students to protest against increased tuition fees led to increased anger at the government, which was blamed for the collective disadvantage. In line with field studies of protesters in political science (for a review, see Goodwin et al.,

2001), Becker et al. also found that students who engaged in collective action had increased positive feelings about their individual self. Similarly, Outten et al. (2009) found African Americans' reported problem-focused coping through collective action to be an especially strong predictor of individual life satisfaction and self-esteem. In terms of our model, positive emotion and well-being can be viewed as individual benefits of collective action (also see Klandermans, 1997). These individual benefits can in turn feed back into future cost–benefit calculations of engaging in collective action.

In sum, there is accumulating evidence for the dynamic dual pathway model of coping with collective disadvantage. It is especially noteworthy that other researchers, not always guided by our theoretical model, produce results quite consistent with the predictions of our model. Although the methods and measures employed by individual studies do not always offer a precise test of our predictions, taken together these studies offer broad support for our model. Of course, the studies that we have conducted to directly test the model offer more specific support for the dynamic dual pathway model of approach coping with collective action. Nevertheless, we believe that conceptualizing collective action as a form of approach coping with collective disadvantage provides a broad theoretical framework within which a great deal of theory and research can be integrated.

Implications

Implications for Theory and Research on Collective Action

Integrative models. In line with previous integrative attempts in the literature, it is clear that the different explanations of collective action that are integrated in the dynamic dual pathway model should be viewed as complementary rather than as competing. It is also clear that approaches to collective action that dismiss either emotion or "rational" motives for collective action, or approaches to collective action that do not view individuals as individuals as well as group members, represent incomplete models of collective action. Indeed, our model views individuals as "passionate economists" who pursue individual or group interests to cope with events that are relevant to their individual or group self.

The dynamic nature of our coping model offers an important pointer to the largely uncharted issue of the psychological *consequences* of collective action. Researchers have only just started to explore this issue from an experimental point of view (Becker et al., in press; Van Zomeren et al., 2011), and our coping perspective offers some helpful theoretical grounding to this enterprise because it focuses on cognitive *reappraisal* as an explanatory process. This is particularly relevant for the question of when collective action should be considered "effective" in objective terms (e.g., Did it achieve social change?) or in subjective terms (e.g., Did it increase

well-being and/or a feeling of group solidarity?). We believe that individuals indeed reappraise their collective disadvantage after having participated in collective action and that they can do so even when the action was unsuccessful in objective terms (Drury & Reicher, 2009). This fits with other findings that protesters often do not have one single goal in mind when protesting (Hornsey et al., 2006) and that group members' sense of empowerment grows when they are confronted with authorities' unresponsiveness to their demands (Van Zomeren, 2011). Moreover, our proposal that collective action feeds back to affect the things that explain it fits with the classic idea that "action changes actors" (e.g., Bem, 1967). Thus, by virtue of its dynamic nature, our coping perspective is in a unique position to guide the study of collective action in general and of its consequences in particular.

Our model does not suggest, however, that collective action is the *only* form of coping with collective disadvantage. Individuals can focus their coping efforts on achieving other outcomes, such as improving their individual standing within the group (Ellemers, 1993), which may in turn lead to cognitive reappraisal of the situation. Although such individual coping strategies are not included in our model, our model suggests when they should occur. Not recognizing the illegitimacy of collective disadvantage suggests that collective disadvantage (a) has little self-relevance for one's group identity (which blocks either form of approach coping) or (b) is not blamed on an external agent (which blocks emotion-focused approach coping specifically), or that collective disadvantage (c) is not appraised in a way that feeds belief in the group's efficacy (which blocks problem-focused approach coping specifically).

Our model thus proposes that what individuals (can) appraise determines how they cope. Indeed, the model has clear boundary conditions. For the dynamic dual pathway model to be able to predict collective action, the sociostructural context needs to allow for the appraisal of structural illegitimacy and instability. This means that the dynamic dual pathway model does not apply in contexts where collective disadvantages are perceived to be legitimate and stable. However, perfectly stable and legitimate systems of inequality are rare, and hence the scope of our model is large. For example, our model should be able to predict collective action against both more structural (e.g., gender or race discrimination) and more incidental disadvantages (e.g., increased tuition fees). Meta-analytic evidence certainly shows that affect about appraised group injustice as well as group efficacy beliefs predict collective action against both structural and incidental collective disadvantage, although effect sizes tend to be smaller in the case of structural collective disadvantage (Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008).

Directions for future research. Our model is not complete, as all theorizing is provisional and progressive to some degree. We view the model as a step on the road to developing a broader social and psychological theory of social change through collective action. This model still offers considerable

scope for specification, integration, and innovation. One logical direction to follow would be to systematically study the secondary appraisal of *out-group blame* for unfair collective disadvantage. Although research on group deprivation (for a review, see H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004), perceived injustice (e.g., Leach et al., 2007), and conflict (Mackie et al., 2000) has all focused on the emotion of anger for this reason, most research has assumed, rather than examined, its role in collective action. Indeed, most work has focused on the appraised unfairness of collective disadvantage (Van Zomeren, Postmes, et al., 2008). The dynamic dual pathway model suggests, however, that appraising external blame is crucial. In line with this prediction, H. J. Smith, Cronin, and Kessler (2008) found that out-group blame correlated positively with individuals' group-based anger about collective disadvantage. Future research can test this relationship experimentally and explore how the dynamic feedback loops in the model can lead to a cognitive reappraisal of external blame.

Further work can be done by considering group-based emotions other than anger in collective action. Appraisal theories suggest that specific patterns of appraisal are associated with distinct emotions that have specific implications for action (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001). A different appraisal pattern therefore leads to emotions other than anger and thus other forms of emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage. However, our model accommodates such emotions to the extent that they give rise to an approach motivation. Indeed, there is mixed evidence as to how different forms of emotion-focused coping are related to protest. For example, Van Zomeren, Spears, et al. (2010) found that *fear* of (rather than anger about) the negative consequences of climate change increased collective action tendencies to combat the climate crisis independent of group efficacy beliefs. However, in a study of perceived inequities of university faculty pay and benefits, H. J. Smith and colleagues (2008) found that group-based anger predicted collective action independent of fear (also see Mackie et al., 2000). D. A. Miller, Cronin, Garcia, and Branscombe (2009) even found that fear of negative consequences of signing a petition *decreased* the change of signing it while *increasing* the predictive value of group-based anger. These findings attest to the importance of further exploring the role of multiple emotions in emotion-focused coping with collective disadvantage.

Nevertheless, our model suggests that anger is an especially potent predictor of approach coping because, unlike most negative emotions, it is an approach emotion (for a review, see Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). In this respect, anger differs from fear and disgust where the action tendency is more often avoidance than approach. However, contempt, which is a subtype of anger, might be relevant to violent and other nonnormative forms of collective action (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011) precisely because contempt is approach oriented. Unlike anger, however, the approach orientation in

contempt is guided by the goal of excluding the target from one's social environment (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).

Another avenue for theory and research lies in examining the specific *appraisal pattern* of group-based anger. The dynamic dual pathway model offers a unifying psychological process model in which specific appraisal patterns predict specific emotions. Although we have examined the (causal) effects of a number of specific appraisals (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2004), it is unclear how these appraisals relate to each other (see Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003). This issue is not a new one in the context of collective action—it arose in the 1980s among relative deprivation theorists who were seeking conceptual specificity of the construct. Relative deprivation was argued to have two preconditions: wanting something that one does not have and feeling entitled to it (Crosby, 1976, 1982). Folger (1987) extended this by suggesting that people also need to perceive that they are unlikely to get it in the near future (for discussions, see Ellemers, 2002; Mummendey et al., 1999). This hints at at least four group-based appraisals that lead to the experience of relative deprivation: a "blend" of group-based unfairness, deservingness, other blame, and feasibility. However, it is unclear how such an appraisal pattern should be conceptualized and analyzed—as additive predictors, as necessary and thus interactive elements, or as a more "fuzzy" *gestalt* (Kuppens et al., 2003). Future research might examine this issue by designing experiments that manipulate multiple appraisals and hence allow a test of such complex interactions.

Future research could also focus on identifying *moderator* variables. One important moderator of problem-focused approach coping might be the type of collective action in question and its ultimate goal. Up to this point, the dynamic dual pathway model has focused on collective action engaged with the goal of directly altering collective disadvantage. For this type of collective action, greater belief in group efficacy is important. However, Tausch et al. (2011) showed that views of violent and other nonnormative collective action had small negative correlations with the belief that the group has the efficacy to bring about change. It seems likely that those who engage in violent collective action may have a goal other than directly altering collective disadvantage. For instance, they may wish to disrupt "business as usual," or they may wish to simply register a radical protest of an appraised injustice (for discussions, see Hornsey et al., 2006; Useem, 1998). Our model suggests that radical collective action should be predicted by belief in the group's efficacy to achieve the goal at which radical action is aimed (also see Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). This is an important avenue for future research.

Stürmer and Simon (2009) recently hinted at a moderator of emotion-focused approach coping by suggesting that providing individuals with an opportunity to regulate their anger (e.g., a joke) should lower its predictive power. Their thinking is based in Freud's notion of catharsis, which has been generally disconfirmed in modern research (Bushman, 2002). Their

argument also confuses approach coping with avoidance coping as they assume that anger predicts collective action as an irrational, maladaptive motivation. Needless to say, this line of thought is reminiscent of outdated assumptions regarding emotion in general (e.g., Oberschall, 1973; Olson, 1968) and anger in particular (see Averill, 1982; Frijda, 1986; also see Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004). From a contemporary coping perspective, it is doubtful that anger is so maladaptive. Instead, it is clear that contemporary work on appraisal, emotion, and coping views emotions like anger as a rational basis for thought and action (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Damasio, 1994; Frank, 1988; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001) and thus views group-based anger as a rational basis for collective action (e.g., Leach et al., 2006, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000; D. A. Miller et al., 2009). Future research should therefore focus on moderators of emotion-focused approach, not avoidance, coping.

Implications for Theory and Research on Coping

Our model highlights at least two complexities of group-based coping. First, there might be more to the notion of group identification than meets the eye. As noted, the dynamic dual pathway model conceptualizes group identification and social identity salience as determinants of the self-relevance of collective disadvantage. As such, group identification and social identity salience are a primary appraisal and therefore a determinant of whether coping is initiated. However, the dynamic feedback loops in our model, and several studies, attest to the fact that group identification and social identity salience are also affected by coping efforts. For example, Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) argue that participation in collective action leads to an empowered group identity. This new sense of group identity becomes a resource for future coping efforts and thus increases coping potential (also see Leach et al., 2010). In addition to conceptualizing and examining group identity as a dynamic feature of coping with collective disadvantage, future research on group-based coping might do well to conceptualize and measure group identity in a more nuanced way to determine which aspects of group identification operate as more of a primary appraisal of self-relevance and which aspects operate as more of a secondary appraisal of coping potential (for discussions, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Leach et al., 2008). The construct of group identification is likely to be central to the dynamic process of group-level coping. Thus, the construct will need to be conceptualized and examined with sufficient nuance to capture its dynamic operation.

A second complexity in a coping approach to collective disadvantage lies in the appraisal of this situation as *threatening* or *challenging*. In coping, if demands are thought to outweigh resources, the situation is experienced as *threatening*. When resources outweigh demands, the situation is experienced as *challenging* (Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Lazarus &

Folkman, 1984). Given our focus on collective action as approach coping, we think it likely that those who engage in collective action view themselves as possessing sufficient resources to be challenged by collective disadvantage. The secondary appraisal of coping potential seems the likely place where group members make this judgment. It will be important to examine this assumption empirically in future work. In keeping with the dynamic nature of our model, it will also be important to examine how group members reappraise threat as challenge in response to coping efforts. There is already some evidence that strong group identification operates as a resource that encourages viewing collective disadvantage as a challenge rather than a threat (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Leach et al. (2010) recently argued that satisfaction with group membership is the component of group identification that best operates as a resource for coping with the devaluation of the group. Other components, such as solidarity, may be an especially important resource for enacting the approach coping of collective action.

Practical Implications

A key practical implication of the dynamic dual pathway model is that it is important to stimulate individuals to make primary appraisals that increase the self-relevance of their group identity. What is often less clear is how to achieve this in the context of collective disadvantage. After all, collective disadvantage often reflects negatively on individuals, and hence they might distance themselves from the group (Ellemers, 1993). Importantly, the dynamic dual pathway model suggests *indirect* ways of increasing the self-relevance of group identity. Because problem-focused approach coping can affect primary (re)appraisal, increasing coping potential that stimulates problem-focused approach coping efforts will increase the relevance of group identity (Van Zomeren, Leach, et al., 2010). Indeed, Barack Obama's "Yes we can!" slogan is a good example of a focus on coping potential to build identification with a group and thus increase the self-relevance of collective disadvantage.

Another practical implication of the dynamic dual pathway model is that, at the end of the day, *accumulating coping resources* is what mobilizes individuals for collective action. Such resources reflect those variables that stimulate or reflect emotion- and problem-focused approach coping efforts (e.g., power, strength, support, networks). Increased resources therefore motivate individuals to engage in collective action. This fits with the emphasis in resource mobilization theory on mobilizing resources (e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977), although coping resources are distinctly psychological. The fit with Klandermans's (1984, 1997) analysis is therefore even better, especially with respect to his ideas about *consensus mobilization* and *action mobilization*. Increasing the appraised unfairness of collective disadvantage and emotional social support and thus group-based anger reflects *consensus mobilization*, whereas increasing instrumental social support and thus group efficacy beliefs reflects *action mobilization*. Stimulating individuals to make these appraisals is therefore a form of subjective resource mobilization and constitutes a second key practical recommendation.

Both recommendations relate to an important "missing link" in the collective action literature, namely the issue of leadership. Obviously, mobilization attempts are often set into motion by leaders, yet few have connected insights in how to mobilize individuals for collective action with insights into leadership processes (but see Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). Nevertheless, this enterprise seems fruitful because our model suggests which motivational pathways could be important for the leader to appeal to (e.g., emotion- and problem-focused approach coping). That is, effective leaders should be those who can make collective disadvantages self-relevant for their followers and help them to cope in approach-oriented ways. Future theory and research should therefore seek to integrate insights from these at present unconnected literatures.

Finally, we note that the very same knowledge about which factors afford collective action among the disadvantaged also offer insights into how to *prevent* collective action from occurring. Indeed, our model suggests that collective action is unlikely when collective disadvantage is not viewed as self-relevant. Collective action is also unlikely when it is impossible to blame those responsible for the unfairness of one's collective disadvantage and when individuals do not believe in the group's efficacy to achieve social change. Just as the disadvantaged may benefit from the knowledge accumulated in our model, of course this is also true for the advantaged (or the relevant authorities who represent the social system) if they want to prevent collective action and thus prevent social change.

Conclusion

In this article, we proposed a dynamic dual pathway model of collective action that integrates a variety of explanations by conceptualizing collective action as a form of approach coping with collective disadvantage. Our view of individuals who participate in collective action as "passionate economists" who are motivated by individual and/or group interests seems to fit with recent developments in economics that move toward putting psychology, and more specifically the self, at center stage (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). Our model explicates feedback loops that make it a truly dynamic model of collective action, which has many important implications for future theory and research. In fact, we hope that this article raises new and interesting questions for the field to ponder. We further hope that the model sheds new light on important and timely questions about real-life collective actions such as those leading to the recent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Arab world. These "days of anger" in the spring of 2011 are inspiring individuals to undertake collective action around the world,

including individuals in Israel and in Spain. For example, the 15 May movement of *Indignados* ("the outraged") in Spain occupied a main square in Madrid, and main squares in several other cities, demanding increased democracy and attention to the plight of working people in the current economic crisis. Their manifesto nicely matches our analysis of humans as "passionate economists" who are moved to collective action through a dynamic process of emotion-focused and problem-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage. After listing their collective grievances, the *Indignados* say,

> For all of the above, I am outraged.
> I think I can change it.
> I think I can help.
> I know that together we can.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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Notes

1. Historically, resource mobilization theory (RMT) was in part a response to the perceived "irrationalism" in LeBon's (1895/1995) work, which resurfaced in RMT's perception of relative deprivation theory as a theory about frustration and violence (see Useem, 1998; Walker & Smith, 2002). The avoidance of "irrational" psychology made RMT rely on either no psychology at all or (implicit or explicit) rational choice models (see Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). However, RMT has been challenged by scholars who see the need for stronger psychological explanations in explaining collective action, such as those studying identity (Klandermans, 1997; Melucci, 1995) and framing (Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1988). Thus, in line with broader trends (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), it seems the pendulum is currently swinging toward psychology again. This makes the need for an up-to-date, integrative, and dynamic psychological theory of collective action even more timely.

2. Although avoidance coping is often viewed as maladaptive (e.g., related to poor health outcomes; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004), there might also be conditions under which it may be adaptive (Lazarus, 2001). In the context of collective disadvantage, our analysis suggests that sociostructural conditions of intergroup stability and legitimacy (i.e., no hope or scope for social change) might be circumstances under which strategies such as denial actually become quite adaptive because denial then represents a challenge to social reality. Other examples besides denial include disengagement from the group and accepting the situation by changing one's self-image (e.g., Ellemers, 1993). This shows the promise of a coping perspective to more broadly explain responses to collective disadvantage.

3. A recent argument in the literature is that collective action actually is likely even in these circumstances because "desperate times call for desperate measures" (Tausch et al., 2011). More theorizing and research are needed, however, to examine the question of how individuals cope with stable and legitimate collective disadvantage.

4. Lazarus also specified a third form of secondary appraisal ("future expectancy"). This type of appraisal identifies whether circumstances are generally likely to change (i.e., whether they become more or less goal congruent). There are some clear links between this concept and the status instability concept in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the feasibility concept in Folger's (1987) version of relative deprivation theory (for a discussion, see Ellemers, 2002; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Although we believe that collective disadvantage often implies that things will not automatically change for the better, we can imagine contexts in which this can become an issue. For instance, the 2008 election of Barack Obama as president of the United States might lead individuals to perceive African Americans as less disadvantaged than they were.

5. If the collectively disadvantaged blame themselves, or are unable to blame anyone, for their disadvantage, then they have little basis for emotion-focused approach coping through anger (Lazarus, 1991, chap. 6). Similarly, if the collectively disadvantaged attribute their disadvantage to an external agent without appraising it as unfair, then there is little basis for blame or emotion-focused approach coping through anger. In fact, an appraisal of external agency for collective disadvantage, without an appraisal of injustice, is more likely to lead to emotion-focused coping through less agitated negative emotions such as dissatisfaction (see Walker & Smith, 2002) or sadness (Lazarus, 1991).

6. This misunderstanding seems to be based in the fairly narrow focus of theory and research *preceding* Lazarus's (1991) cognitive-motivational-relational theory (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Stress was thought to be the instigator of coping, and thus the alleviation of stress was thought to be the goal of coping. However, this classic analysis did not specify how cognitive appraisal and emotion relate to experience or coping motivation and effort. Lazarus's (1991) theory moved beyond previous thinking by providing an integrated model of appraisal, emotion, motivation, and coping as a dynamic process by which individuals negotiate their relationship with their environment. Indeed, it is for exactly this reason that the unifying notion of coping enables a psychological theory of collective action.

7. We used a conservative random effects model analysis, with weighted averages of the effect sizes Fisher-transformed with the inverse of the variance used as weights (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Rosenthal, 1994).

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