

Psychology and the Status Quo

A Dissertation Presented
to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
University of Manitoba

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By
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July 1989



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ISBN 0-315-54883-5

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BY

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would not have been started, and certainly not completed, without the determination, intellect, dedication and most of all friendship of my advisor, Dr. Frederick L. Marcuse. It fills me with great pleasure and personal satisfaction to look back at the past four years of our fruitful collaboration. He has given me one of the most precious gifts a person can give, confidence. I am truly honored to share this accomplishment with you Freddy.

My committee members, Drs. Jack Bailey, Kenneth Hughes, Joseph Pear, and Alfred Shephard have been very challenging, but extremely supportive at the same time. This combination has been very helpful. I also wish to thank Dr. James Forest, the Departmental Representative at the proposal oral, for his thoughtful comments.

I am indebted to Dr. George W. Albee for his willingness to serve as external examiner. His writings have been a definite source of inspiration.

My parents-in-law have helped in many ways. My mother-in-law, Mrs. Rachel Rapoport, has always been there when we needed her.

Mrs. Dvora Marcuse has been a good friend in moments of agony as well as happiness. Her hospitality, wise advice and support are greatly appreciated.

Discussions with my friend Dr. Edwin Buettner in the last three years have been most intellectually enriching. I thank him for the opportunity to share my thoughts with him.

Most of all I want to thank the two people who have made it all worthwhile, my wife Ora and my son Matan. Our love for one another has sustained me in difficult times and made the joy of this achievement doubly rewarding.

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Abstract

The present inquiry examines psychology's position vis a vis the societal status quo. A tradition of alleged value-neutrality in sociopolitical issues, and pseudo-immunity to non-scientific influences within the profession have obstructed a reflective analysis of the interaction between social forces and psychology. The central proposition advanced is that while assertions promoting social change can be found in psychological formulations and practices, these are outweighed by often implicit messages supportive of the status quo. This postulate was evaluated in six areas of psychology: (a) psychoanalysis, (b) behaviorism, (c) humanism, (d) cognitivism, (e) industrial/organizational and (f) abnormal psychology.

The analysis would indicate that psychology is instrumental in upholding the status quo in a number of ways. First, by offering solutions to human predicaments, almost exclusively, in terms of the self; leaving the social order conveniently unaffected. Such an approach derives from the widely held practice in psychology of studying the individual without satisfactorily considering socioeconomic and historical circumstances. Second, by endorsing and reflecting conservative social values such as individualism, male supremacy and political conformity. Third, by disseminating those values in the persuasive form of

so-called value-free scientific statements. In doing that psychology predisposes the public to accept its formulations as apolitical truisms rather than sociohistorically conditioned statements. As a result, many of psychology's prescriptive and proscriptive biases are erroneously interpreted as merely descriptive assertions about human behavior.

When actual or potentially progressive elements were identified in the various psychological fields, it was perceived that they needed considerable strengthening to become significant forces of social change.

The last section of the dissertation deals with some of the social and ethical implications of psychology's witting or unwitting endorsement of the societal status quo. If psychologists are supporting a social order in need of change, what can be done about it? Desiderata for a psychology at the service of social change are suggested. Following an educational process in which psychologists would become aware of the sociocultural determinants of their professional endeavors and justificatory functions, the discipline will be in a position to facilitate social change by uncovering the cultural and psychological mechanisms involved in the reproduction of the social system.

Section I: Main Propositions

Chapter 1: Introduction

There is little doubt that psychology has left its imprint on twentieth century society. There should also be little doubt that socioeconomic, cultural, and political trends have shaped to a large extent the methods and content of the discipline (e.g., Anderson & Travis, 1983; Chorover, 1985; Deese, 1985; Jacoby, 1975; Sampson, 1977; Sarason, 1981a). Nevertheless, a tradition of alleged value-neutrality in political matters and pseudo-immunity to ideological influences within the profession have obstructed an in-depth examination of the interaction between social forces and psychology. In order to gain a better understanding of the mutual influences in the dialectic psychology-society, an inquiry into the ideological elements that might have permeated psychological theories and practices is necessary.

In our era, depicted as "The age of psychology" (Haverman, 1957) and "The psychological century" (Koch & Leary, 1985, p. 33), the practice of behavioral science has far-reaching social and ethical implications. Is psychology promoting human welfare, as prescribed by both the Canadian and the American codes of ethics for Psychologists?; or is it perhaps hindering the betterment of social conditions by guarding the interests of the status quo? An analysis of the

moral, sociopolitical, and cultural values involved in psychological theories and practices will enable us to provide at least approximate answers to these crucial questions.

In view of the importance attributed in North America to psychology's position in a wide variety of social issues (Kipnis, 1987; Koch & Leary, 1985; Sarason, 1986), an investigation of its ideological biases is deemed necessary. Such an examination, to be attempted in the course of this dissertation, will bring us closer to determining the nature of the relationship between psychology and the social order. The main proposition to be advanced is that in the field of psychology, ideological elements supportive of the existing social order outweigh those conducive to macrosocial changes.

Although there has been a noticeable increase in the number of investigations dealing with the ideological aspects involved in the applications of modern psychology (e.g., Albee, 1981, 1982, 1986; Billig, 1979, 1982; Braginsky, 1985; Braginsky & Braginsky, 1974; Buss, 1975, 1986; Butcher, 1983; Chorover, 1985; Deese, 1985; Gergen, 1973, 1985; Halleck, 1971; Howard, 1985; Ibanez Gracia, 1983; Ingleby, 1972, 1974, 1981d; Jacoby, 1975; Jones, 1986; Nahem, 1981; Roffe, 1986; Sampson, 1978, 1981, 1983; Sarason, 1981a; Sullivan, 1984), the literature is still in its initial stages. While the

thesis being advanced here, namely--that psychology is instrumental in reproducing the extant state of affairs in society, has already been suggested by other psychologists, I contend that the existing literature: (a) is quite limited in its scope; (b) remains mostly, with a few noticeable exceptions (Albee, 1981, 1986; Anderson & Travis, 1983; Billig, 1979; Halleck, 1971; Sarason, 1981a, W. Ryan, 1971), at a rhetorical level without elaborating on the operational manner whereby psychological knowledge and practices are translated into conforming messages; (c) by and large, does not address the social implications of psychology's highly influential function in social reproduction; and (d) fails to consider how psychologists can deal, from an ethical point of view, with their witting or unwitting roles as social reproducers or reformers.

Although several authors (e.g., Braginsky & Braginsky, 1974; Braginsky, 1985; Deese, 1985) have dealt with the psychology--social reproduction dialectic, that has not been their principal locus of attention. Others have dealt with this issue from the perspective of a particular field. Albee (1970, 1981, 1986) and Sarason (1981a, 1981b), for instance, focused mainly on preventive and clinical psychology; Ingleby's Critical Psychiatry (1981a) analyzed the connection between psychiatry and social control; and Sedgwick (1982) examined recent critiques of conventional

theories of abnormal psychology and their inability to seriously challenge the hegemony of the primarily conservative medical model.

Jacoby's Social Amnesia (1975), undoubtedly one of the major and seminal works written on conformist psychology, is mostly devoted to arguments internal to the psychoanalytic school of thought and there is only brief mention of other influential trends such as behaviorism and humanism. Similarly, Anderson and Travis (1983) are primarily interested on the singular impact of cognitive psychology on social reproduction.

Social psychology is perhaps the most scrutinized field in psychology. Several books (e.g., Armistead, 1974; Billig 1982; Wexler, 1983) and articles (e.g., Gergen 1973; Ibanez Gracia, 1983) reflected upon the political character of social psychology and its failure to promote human welfare.

The ideological implications of areas in applied psychology such as behavior modification (Holland, 1978a; Nahem, 1981; Woolfolk & Richardson, 1984), family therapy (James & McIntyre, 1983; Poster, 1978), and industrial psychology (Baritz, 1974; Guareschi, 1982; Ralph, 1983) has been suggested but not fully developed. These areas will be addressed in the context of this dissertation.

In summary, these works have treated the problem as a relatively isolated occurrence in the different fields

investigated, but no single treatise has been devoted to the pervasiveness of this phenomenon in psychology. By analyzing the ideological components present in central theories of human behavior, and in some widely used psychological services, I hope to contribute to the expansion of this field of study.

My second concern as to the present literature has to do with the lack of emphasis in the actual ways through which psychology performs its role of conformity promoter. Most of the reviewed studies remain at a rhetorical and rather abstract level without elaborating on how a certain psychological activity is going to affect the individual's acceptance/rejection of society's values and norms. There is a conspicuous discrepancy between the number of allegations made against psychology for its role in preventing social change and the detailed argumentation offered to support these accusations. Allegations abound but relatively little evidence is usually provided. Some extremes examples are found in Iaroshevskii's paper The eclipse of consciousness in contemporary American psychology. "In the last stage of capitalism, the stage of stagnation and approaching collapse, bourgeois psychology increasingly assumes the function of plunging human consciousness into the abyss of the irrational, of depriving human life and activity of reason and meaning" (1950, p. 34). He also regards psychologists as the

ideologists of capitalism and states that they "try to perpetuate capitalist exploitation, wars, inequality, oppression and to ascribe the ugliness of bourgeois society to 'human nature'" (1950, p. 39).

Consider also the following "milder" statements: "Because mainstream psychology is embedded in the dominant political, economic, and religious ideologies, professional psychologists have upheld these ideologies rather than examining their impact upon the lives of others" (Braginsky, 1985, p. 881). "Because psychology seems to be unique among the social sciences in its inability to reflect on its place in the social order, it will, in this unreflective stance, function as an apologist for the status quo" (Sullivan, 1984, pp. 131-132).

What we are witnessing now is, an attempt by psychologists to awake up from the trance of their own unquestioning professionalism to a realization of who they are working for and what their real job is....and the answer is not, ultimately, to be found anywhere in their contracts, even in the small print. My hypothesis is that their unwritten contract is to maintain the status quo (Ingleby, 1974, p. 317).

Although some of these assertions are, in my view, justified in principle, they are not always accompanied by an exposition of the mechanisms involved in the

utilization of psychology in the maintenance or reproduction of the prevalent social system.

The third critical remark is of a more general nature and is concerned with the social implications of a conformist psychology. Particularly in view of the increasing authority attributed to the behavioral sciences in a wide array of issues.

Our services and advice are now sought and accepted in practically all fields of human activity.

Newspapers describe the activities and opinions of psychologists on marriage, love, child rearing, and other aspects of day-to-day life. In the fields of marketing, personnel, training, selection, and more, executives rely on the advice and opinions of consulting psychologists. To state it bluntly, psychologists have considerable power to influence the opinions and behavior of the public (Kipnis, 1987, p. 30).

Or in the words of Koch, "throughout this century (and before), psychology has been under gracious dissemination--whether in school, bar, office, or bedroom; whether by book, magazine, electronic propagation, or word of mouth--to a voracious consumership" (1980, p. 33).

Taking into account the popularity of psychological theories in the public forum, and the large number of children and adults consuming one type of psychological

service or another provided by an army of school and clinical psychologists, family therapists, psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, industrial counselors, etc., it is not difficult to realize the substantial impact the conforming message of psychology might have upon society as a whole. At best, it may be preventing changes that could enhance the well-being of the population. At worst, it may be silently endorsing unjust social practices.

In the context of the general late arrival of formal ethical education in the social sciences (Warwick, 1980), we should not be surprised to notice that there are few guidelines for psychologists on how to face the present moral dilemma. Are psychologists supporting a social system which may not promote human welfare by furnishing it with ideological ammunition? And if so, what should be done about it? The literature on this question has been characterized by denunciation more than annunciation, in that there are many accusations but very few suggestions on how to face this moral dilemma. Sampson and (1983) Sullivan (1984), who have written eloquently about the ideological functions of psychology, speak of an emancipatory psychology that will not ratify the social order but facilitate the advent of greater freedom for those in positions of disadvantage. Similarly, some Marxist writers such as Cohen (1986), Nahem (1981) and Seve (1978) conjecture

about the use of psychology in bringing about macrosocial changes. However, while these authors clearly adopt a non-conformist moral stance, they do not elaborate on the question of how we should proceed in our daily practice in order to avoid, or at least minimize, a purblind endorsement of the prevailing social system and its power arrangements.

Finally, a reading of the American and Canadian codes of ethics for psychologists reveals a lack of sensitivity to the question of ideological intrusions in our discipline. Although the Canadian "code" is much more definite than the American about the responsibility of psychologists towards society and contends that "psychology as a whole needs to be self-reflective about its place in society and about the ways in which it might be contributing to or detracting from beneficial societal changes" (Canadian Psychological Association, 1986, p. 16), it does not provide specific guidelines as to how to advance this objective. In synthesis, the codes do not address the vulnerability of the discipline to ideological and political biases. This study will attempt to address the criticisms mentioned above with the hope of providing a coherent argument as to the function of psychology in social reproduction.

A comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted aspects involved in social reproduction or the maintenance of the status quo would necessitate an

interdisciplinary approach with contributions from economics, political science, sociology, psychology, history, and philosophy, among others. The present study is intended to investigate only a small segment of the total machinery involved in social reproduction. That is, the conforming messages operating in psychological theories and practices.

The psychological theories and practices to be analyzed will be those representative of North American society in the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on current practices. This historical period has been selected simply because the phenomenon to be described has been already noticed in the early nineteenth hundreds. The incursion of ideology in psychology is not unique to any particular time within the suggested period. While the "phenotypical" manifestations of conforming messages in psychology change with the times and with the particular school of thought, the "genotype" remains the same. Hence, it will be argued that different psychological paradigms, in different times, have been partially constituted by and constitutive of the prevalent ideology.

No distinctions will be made between American and Canadian psychology. For our purposes, the affinity between the two justifies their classification under the heading North American psychology.

It can be argued that the multitude of changes that

have taken place in the North American social order since the beginning of the century precludes the treatment of this period as a unit of historical analysis. While this line of reasoning may apply to other fields, I would claim that the capitalist socioeconomic system, in its various forms, has always resorted to ideological means in order to legitimate its existence (Giddens, 1979; Silva, 1970; Wilson, 1977). Moreover, the fundamental values embraced by capitalism have basically remained the same in the period to be discussed (George & Wilding, 1976; Rand, 1967; Sargent, 1969; Webb & Webb, 1923).

An enterprise of this nature cannot be carried out within the classical paradigm of experimental methodology. This is not only because "experiments cannot be set up to control the environment or reduce the number of variables to manageable proportions" (Shafer, 1969, p. 5), but mainly due to the ubiquitous nature of the social order. The omnipresence of the social order precludes the experimental isolation of a certain variable in order to determine the possible influence of the latter on the former. In this particular case, psychology cannot be considered an independent variable or manipulated in order to establish any kind of causal relationship with the social order because it is itself part of the social order. Therefore, by approaching the issue at hand from

an experimental perspective we would engage in what is often referred to as circular or tautological reasoning.

These considerations preclude the utilization of the classical experimental paradigm, which can be thought of as the preferred one in psychology. Rather, this inquiry will follow a sociohistorical methodology. The methodological rationale employed by Levine and Levine in their book A social history of helping services (1970) is hereby adopted. According to it:

If method is to be adapted to the problem, and not the other way around, then it may be that historical study, viewing events in the context of their time, and in the perspective offered by temporal distance, is a major way of dealing with socio-psychological issues (p. 7).

The chosen method will probably lack the degree of certitude frequently associated with the experimental design, but this should not prevent us from adhering to it; for the dictum to be followed is that "method is to be adapted to problem, and not the other way around" (Levine & Levine, 1970, p. 7).

In general terms, this study is concerned with "the penetration of the social process into the intellectual sphere" (Mannheim, 1936, p. 268), and more specifically with the role played by ideology in scientific knowledge (Abercrombie, 1980; Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Mannheim, 1936; Eriksson, 1975). The present analysis, which views

ideas as being affected by, as well as affecting the social order, is congruous with the dialectical sociology of knowledge advocated by Haru (1987), and with the sociology of psychological knowledge endorsed by Buss (1975). Buss argues that "the developing scholar and his ideas, in part, both reflect and influence the underlying social structure" (1975, p. 990).

The dissertation is divided into three main sections. The first part, of which this introduction is the first chapter, elaborates on the propositions leading to the main hypothesis. The second segment compares confirmatory and falsificatory evidence drawn from several theories of human behavior and a number of applied fields. The last section deals with the social and ethical implications of the study.

Chapter 2: The Status Quo and its Preservation

According to the Dictionary of American English Usage (Nicholson, 1957), the term status quo refers to "the position in which things are." In the particular context of this inquiry, status quo pertains to the power structure of the present social system.

The evolution of capitalism has witnessed numerous economic changes and social reforms. Yet, the principal foundations of this mode of production, namely the unequal distribution of resources with its concomitant division of classes, have remained largely unaltered. Inequality of power between producers and owners of the means of production is a constitutive feature of capitalism (Edwards, Reich & Weisskopf, 1986). This inequality of power is the specific status quo which will be addressed in this analysis. (Capitalism manifests itself in numerous forms and levels which are beyond the scope of this study to articulate. For the purpose of this inquiry, we shall remain at a very general level of analysis of the capitalist system).

Of course there have been many changes under the umbrella of capitalism. From laissez faire capitalism to the Welfare State; from overt and unrestrained discrimination to legal protection of minorities (or majorities, such as women in this country); from technological ignorance to technological miracles. Some observers point out to these changes as proof of

the dynamic and humane character of capitalism (e.g., Murchland, 1984). Still others contend that even greater advances for the whole population could have been accomplished, had the power structure of society been challenged. For as things stand right now, the fruits of progress are not being apportioned equitably (Edwards et al., 1986; George & Wilding, 1976; see also chapter 12 of this study). Moreover, the claim could be made that in the long run it is the dominant groups who benefit more from these accommodating reforms; simply because they serve as containers of bigger, more radical changes (cf. Wells, 1987). Gross (1980) addressed this point very lucidly when he said:

If the establishment were a mere defender of the status quo, it would be much weaker. While some of its members may resist many changes or even "want to turn the clock back," the dominant leaders know that change is essential to preserve, let alone, expand power. "If we want things to stay as they are," the young nephew said to his uncle, the prince, in Lampedusa's The Leopard, "things have got to change" (Gross, 1980, p. 58).

The capitalist system has shown remarkable resilience. Its ability to survive crises may very well rest on its impressive flexibility and adaptability in coping with ever changing conditions by introducing new measures. Yet, these innovations at the operational

level do not necessarily transform the foundations of capitalism. These are changes of form rather than essence (Ralph, 1983; Wells, 1987). Therefore, when applied to the governing principles of capitalism, the term status quo is not deemed inappropriate. Such will be the meaning ascribed to it henceforth.

The status quo is upheld either by force or by fostering hegemony. We shall concern ourselves only with the latter. Hegemony refers to the tacit consent given by the majority of the population to the established set of rules regulating communal life (e.g., Femia, 1981; Gramsci, 1971; Kiros, 1985). According to Gramsci (1971) hegemony is promoted by the institutions of what he called civil society: schools, churches, the media, etc. This is done by depicting the doctrines in which dominant groups believe--and from which they profit--as possessing universal value (for a fuller discussion on Gramsci's concept hegemony, see chapter 13).

Every ruling group of an organized community requires the existence of cultural mechanisms designed to ensure, or at least facilitate, the perpetuation of its position. A variety of strategies are employed by these groups to persuade the public that the present social arrangement is not only the most desirable, but the only possible civilized one. It should not surprise us to learn that the repertoire of stratagems utilized to secure their position of privilege does not exclude

deception and disguise as valuable resources. These mechanisms, usually referred to as ideological, attempt to reproduce the prevailing system of ideas (Mannheim, 1936; Ricoeur, 1978; Sampson, 1983; Silva, 1970; Therborn, 1980; Wilson, 1977).

Dominant groups make efficient use of civil society in disseminating and promoting their sociopolitical beliefs. The mass media (i.e., radio, T.V., etc.) as well as many private (e.g., mental health clinics) and public agencies (e.g., school, welfare system) can be considered, at least partially, as simultaneously constituted by, and constitutive of the reigning ideology (Wilson, 1977; Therborn, 1980). The collective name assigned to the agencies of civil society assisting in the reproduction of the existing social order is ideological apparatuses (Therborn, 1980).

Ideological apparatuses operate on the basis of moral and legal restrictions, as well as persuasion. Their messages "so deeply penetrate the consciousness of a culture that people unquestioningly accept their premises without further thought....People are typically unaware of the ideologies that govern their existence, at least as ideologies" (Sampson, 1983, pp. 128-129). The subject is lead to believe, through a series of distortions, that the current state of social affairs is the best possible one (Sampson, 1983).

As we shall notice below, the characteristics of

these apparatuses bear great resemblance to the dominant social philosophy. Thus, in the case of capitalism, the specific ideological mechanisms employed are likely to "capitalize" on themes such as the possibility of self-improvement through self-help, and the complete trust in the ability of science to solve all human predicaments.

The Supreme Self

Probably one of the most significant pillars of capitalist society, along with the right to private property, is the promotion of self-interest through self-help (e.g., Zaretsky, 1986). The self is conceived as a supreme entity with magnificent powers. Both success and failure are attributed to it. This pervasive presupposition interferes, for the most part, with scrutiny and possible transformations of systemic causes of happiness and misery. In this world view, self supersedes the system, therefore, changes ought to come from the former and not the latter. Such is the way in which the supreme self assists in the conservation of the structural status quo.

Macpherson's theory of possessive individualism provides an account of the economic conditions that contributed to the rise of this highly individualistic culture (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985). According to it the market economy regards individuals simply as the proprietors of their manual or intellectual labor power, a possession they exchange for

monetary remuneration from capital owners or the state after competition with other potential employees (Macpherson, 1969). Macpherson claims that "possessive market society also implies that where labour has become a market commodity, market relations so shape or permeate all social relations that it may properly be called a market society, not merely a market economy" (Macpherson, 1969, p. 24).

Following Macpherson, then, social life would be very much determined by its economic grounds. This notion is well captured in the concept of utilitarian individualism. Bellah et al. (1985) contend that "utilitarian individualism views society as arising from a contract that individuals enter into only in order to advance their self-interest....Utilitarian individualism has an affinity to a basically economic understanding of human existence" (p. 336).

While self-interest was indeed promoted as an important ingredient of the capitalist system, it was not meant to contradict or come at the expense of social order. Proponents of the market system "posit a society of individuals...who, acting in their own self-interest, advance the social purpose by expanding private wealth" (Zaretsky, 1986, p. 40). It is not only claimed that social order would emerge from the market economy, but also that everyone would be able to foster his/her own individual welfare, for the system is to

provide "equality of opportunity." (George & Wilding, 1976). If everyone possesses at least one commodity to sell in the market, his/her labor power, and the system offers equal opportunities, then the path to prosperity is open to all. Israel argues that possessive individualism, as the predominant social philosophy of modern capitalism, manifests itself in the United States in the belief that

American society contains opportunity for everyone to get ahead, to be successful, to reach the top. Even if these opportunities are not distributed in equal proportion, everyone receives some opportunities. Thus, people are responsible for their success and for the status they achieve. Society cannot be blamed [italics added] (Israel, 1979, p. 251).

It will be later seen that this belief would be of crucial importance in analyzing the place of ideology in psychology, particularly as it manifests itself in the defect model of human functioning (Albee, 1981), implicitly adopted by more than one school of thought in psychology.

Having emphasized the individualistic nature of capitalism, the following legitimate question can be posed: Is a society based on an economic system driven by self-interest and minimal interference by the government able to meaningfully promote social welfare?

(for a definition and discussion of social welfare see chapter 12). This highly relevant moral question can hardly be avoided when dealing with the reproduction of the social order. Obviously, as can be expected, opinions on this issue can be found in favor as well as in opposition of the capitalist system. Murchland (1984), for instance, contends that "nowhere do individual efforts so quickly merge into public benefits" (p. 54). George and Wilding (1976), on the other hand, contend that the capitalist system, based on values such as achievement and competition, individualism and self-help, "is in clear opposition to the values needed to underpin a successful public welfare system. If such a system is to flourish, the stress on the virtue of self-help must be replaced by stress on the need to help others" (p. 118).

While I would not claim to provide comprehensive answers to the intricate philosophical problems involved in this question, namely what is the "good life" and the "good society," an attempt will be made in chapter 12 to provide some parameters for the discussion of such issues. It should be clearly stated, however, that the main thrust of the thesis is not the moral appraisal of capitalism but rather the actual function of psychology in its reproduction.

"Salvation Through Science and Technology"

Along with the primacy of the individual; a

reverence for science, not just any science but the Cartesian paradigm in particular, is at the core of modern society. In his Reenchantment of the World Berman (1981) is most persuasive in arguing that this specific scientific paradigm and capitalism are, "historically, inextricably intertwined" (Berman, 1981, p. 58). Capitalism proved to be a very fertile ground for the development of the Cartesian, mechanistic, atomistic world view (Berman, 1981). The present admiration of science "retains all the assumptions of the Industrial Revolution and would lead us to salvation through science and technology" (Berman, 1981, p. 189).

A central presupposition underlying the present social order is, indeed, the belief in the solvability of all social problems through science and technology (Alvesson, 1985; Anderson & Travis, 1983; Wilson, 1977). That science and technology will eventually alleviate human predicaments which fall beyond the realm of present day science, is a premise deeply embedded in capitalist cultures. A premise which has been under cultivation in the West since the seventeenth century (Berman, 1981). The atomistic explanation of nature, human beings and community included, as bodies given to manipulation and mechanical cures, gave rise to the attitude referred to as scientism, i.e., the process of ascribing to science powers which it lacks (Capra, 1982; Mullaly, 1980).

There are basically two reasons why the dominant Cartesian scientific paradigm cannot solve all our problems. First, by its own definition this mode of inquiry excludes values from its realm of interest. Facts and values should not be confused or mixed. Cartesian science is devoted to conquering nature and unveiling its "facts." As Berman (1981) pointed out, its primary concern is with the "how" of the events explored; not with their "why" or "for what" purpose. As a result, human welfare, ethics, and politics fall beyond the Cartesian field of attraction.

Second, when this paradigm has been forced to look at social and human predicaments, it has done so in such an atomistic fashion that it was bound to fail. In appealing to university based intellectuals for help, Government agencies did not identify the

real problem that underlies our crisis of ideas: the fact that most academics subscribe to narrow perceptions of reality which are inadequate for dealing with the major problems of our time. These problems are...systemic problems, which means that they are closely interconnected and interdependent. They cannot be understood within the fragmented methodology characteristic of our academic disciplines (Capra, 1982, p. 25).

No matter how equivocal and devoid of meaning (Berman, 1981; Capra, 1982) the Cartesian mentality

might be, it is almost an ineradicable feature of our culture. As Berman (1981) put it, "developments that have thrown this world view into question--quantum mechanics for example, or certain types of contemporary ecological research--have not made any significant dent in the dominant mode of thinking" (p. 2).

The tremendous progress achieved by science in many areas of our lives has fostered the conviction that social conflicts based on the political structure of the social order can also be given scientific remedies. This has led to the phenomenon described by Robinson (1985) as the externalization of scientific values.

What is a useful finding highly productive of illuminating research is offered to the public as equally useful for settling matters that are nonscientific in the first instance. More generally, this externalization takes the form of requiring nonscientific issues to be determined according to standards that are appropriate only to science itself (Robinson, 1985, p. 151).

Leibowitz (1985) cogently argues throughout his entire book that while science has proved extremely beneficial in solving innumerable problems, there are some ethical dimensions involved in the advancement of human welfare that cannot be approached by the methods of science (see also chap. 12).

Salvation through science--as the inquiry into and

manipulation of natural, human and social phenomena--is, by exclusion, an apolitical salvation. This is a formula for survival that, by its own definition, is supposed to challenge neither social values, nor, by implication, the power structure of society.

Chapter 3: Psychology in Modern Society

Although psychology can be conceptualized as a rather minor subsystem within the large social system, it will be argued that its ability to influence the latter is not inconsequential. The interdependency of scientific paradigms and society's cultural ethos has been well documented in the social sciences in general (e.g., Connerton, 1976; Deese, 1985; Sabia & Wallulis, 1983), and in psychology in particular (Braginsky, 1985; Buss, 1979; Gergen, 1973, 1985; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984; Larsen, 1986; Robinson, 1985; Sampson, 1977, 1978, 1983; Sarason, 1981a; and Sullivan, 1984). The mutuality psychology <--> society will next be presented under the headings "The socialization of psychology," and "The psychologization of society."

The Socialization of Psychology

The regnant cultural ethos would seem to predispose academicians to embrace scientific paradigms and sociopolitical beliefs congruent with the predominant ideology (e.g., Arditi, Brennan, & Cavrak, 1980; Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1984; Savan, 1988; Wilson, 1977). This process of scientific acculturation is conducted through direct institutional regulations and in a more indirect fashion through the dictums of the prevalent weltanschauung (Sarason, 1981a). Within the realm of psychology--as the study of human behavior and the

utilization of its postulates for the alleviation of individual and social predicaments--prevalent scientific, moral and cultural doctrines are reflected both at the theoretical and applied levels (Anderson & Travis, 1983; Gergen, 1973; Howard, 1985; Robinson, 1985; Sampson, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1983). Spence (1985) has given official recognition to this postulate in her presidential address to the American Psychological Association in 1985:

Contemporary analysts recognize that, whatever their intentions, scientists are the products of their society and time, and their construction of social reality is shaped by the world view and values of the culture in which they were reared. These belief systems can influence all phases of the research in which scientists engage, from choice of problem to interpretation of results (Spence, 1985, p. 1285).

In spite of numerous warnings such as Spence's, psychologists have persistently refused to elaborate upon the influence of nonepistemic convictions on their discipline. This attitude has clearly interfered with an understanding of psychology in social context (Deese, 1985; Toulmin & Leary, 1985).

Viewed from the perspective of what Capra (1982) named the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm, out of which psychology built its own framework and gained

considerable inspiration (Capra, 1982, chap. 6 in particular), the unwillingness expressed by psychologists to talk about ideological intrusions in their scientific endeavors is hardly surprising. For in the Cartesian-Newtonian world view, as its critics Berman (1981) and Capra (1982) so aptly point out, there is no relationship between "fact" and "value." Should such an association be revealed, it would be a disgrace for science. Science, Cartesian disciples claim, is first and foremost "value-free."

Faithful adherence of the scientific community, psychologists included, to the Cartesian mode of thinking, has made the acceptance of new paradigms very difficult. Thus, for instance, in the case of quantum mechanics and its philosophical implications, Berman comments that "we should not be surprised that the scientific establishment has managed to ignore the embarrassing intruder for more than five decades....for once these implications are fully accepted, it becomes unclear just what is involved in 'doing science'" (Berman, 1981, pp. 136-138).

But as the urgency to acknowledge value dilemmas in science has increased steadily, resistance to consider such issues has, reluctantly, decreased. This trend has apparently led Robinson (1985) to state that "where the social sciences once defensively insisted they were 'value-neutral,' they now tend to present themselves as

unavoidably 'value-loaded'" (p. 142). Gradually, more publications concerned with the place of values in psychology have appeared. As one psychologist wrote: "although philosophers of science still debate the role of values in scientific research, the controversy is no longer about whether values influence scientific practice, but rather about how values are embedded in and shape scientific practice" (Howard, 1985, p. 255).

Before we proceed with our discussion on values in psychology and their sociopolitical ramifications, a few conceptual clarifications ought to be made. Numerous meanings have been attached to the concept of value in the social sciences (see Robinson, 1985, chap. 5). Baier's article What is value? An analysis of the concept (1969) provides several useful distinctions. The value attributed to things must be distinguished from the values held by people. The former is an evaluative property whose possession and magnitude can be ascertained in appraisals. The latter are dispositions to behave in certain ways which can be ascertained by observation. The former are capacities of things to satisfy desiderata. The latter are tendencies of people to devote their resources...to the attainment of certain ends (p. 40).

Following Baier's terminology, then, when studying the capacity of something to make a favorable difference

in the life of the individual we are engaged in assessing value; when considering tendencies of individuals to advance certain ends we are imputing values. The second section of the present study will focus on the imputation of a specific value (perpetuation of the social order) to a particular professional community (i.e., psychologists). The last section will assess the values of psychology in promoting human welfare.

A possible objection that could be raised to the imputation of values to a group is that most or even all of its members may be unaware that they espouse such values. Indeed, as Martin (1977) points out, "there are connections within the world view of a people, just as there are happenings in its social institutions or in its ecosystem, of which individual persons are largely, perhaps wholly, unconscious" (p. 15); or at best are purblind (F. Marcuse, 1960). In our case, many psychologists may not realize that they value the social status quo. Hence, the following question can be raised: can a person who is not aware of his/her values, be said to promote these values? A negative answer would imply that a value can be promoted by a person only if he/she is aware of, and engages in deliberate actions to advance the same. Lack of awareness of a value does not, however, logically preclude the possibility of engaging in activities to promote the

value in question. In the present context, even if psychologists were totally unaware of their endorsement of the present social system, their very lack of awareness, in conjunction with their passivity can be said to maintain the existing state of affairs. The very fact that psychologists do not question or think about the status quo can be considered an ideological victory for those interested in perpetuating the predominant social system; for as the Latin maxim advises: Qui Tacet Consentit. At any rate, it should be clear that my primary concern is with the actions of psychologists and their ideological consequences, and not so much with their acknowledgment or recognition of possessing certain values. This debate can also be approached from the point of view of the distinction function/intent. Again, I would emphasize that my concern is with actual function and not with intent.

It can also be argued against the imputation of a set of values to an entire professional community that it neglects differences in value preferences within the discipline. Such an argument would be warranted only if we were dealing with scientific criteria, as opposed to social, moral, and political convictions. For as Krasner and Houts (1984) demonstrated, while groups of different theoretical orientations in the behavioral sciences differ in their discipline-specific epistemological assumptions, basically they share similar sociopolitical

values. Since the present study will concern itself with the imputation of the latter, the above mentioned criticism is somewhat irrelevant.

According to Krasner and Houts (1984), most behavioral scientists make statements in favor of social Darwinism (vs. social altruism), conservatism (vs. liberalism), and a value-neutral as opposed to value-laden view of science. The last one, as indicated, is of particular interest to the present discussion.

The notion of a "value-neutral psychology" is pivotal in our investigation for it lends itself to various ideological uses. First and foremost, it has the power to portray psychology as depoliticized and to use this image to promulgate the regnant ideology. Psychology "has shown a clear bias in supporting the interests of the powerful and the status quo, many times in the name of scientific objectivity" (Steininger, Newell & Garcia, 1984, pp. 216-217). By portraying itself as a strictly "objective" endeavor, many of psychology's prescriptive biases are erroneously interpreted as merely descriptive assertions about human behavior. "Value commitments are almost inevitable by-products of social existence, and as participants in society we can scarcely dissociate ourselves from these values in pursuing professional ends" (Gergen, 1973, p. 312). Consequently, it is highly unlikely that we, as psychologists, strictly describe what appears to be,

without at the same time subtly prescribing what we regard as desirable. And our definition of "desirable," as it will be argued below, is usually in conformity with that of the ideological apparatuses whose main function is to effect a successful socialization.

In addition, the value-neutral idea predisposes the public to accept psychology's assertions unquestioningly and to regard them as apolitical truisms rather than sociohistorically conditioned. Although there is enough evidence to indicate that this notion has been widely used for ideological purposes (see for example Albee, 1986; Billig, 1979; Sampson, 1983; Sarason, 1981a; and W. Ryan, 1971), its popularity cannot be solely attributed to sociopolitical interest but also to the hegemony of the positivistic-empiricist scientific paradigm (Sampson, 1978; Toulmin & Leary, 1985). The initial epistemic value ascribed to the concept of "value-neutral psychology" by positivism, can be thought to have opened the door for its use as an ideological non-scientific value. Whatever the precise degree of influence that ideological interests might have exerted upon the development of the above mentioned scientific paradigm, it should be clear that, once established, the concept "value-neutral psychology" has been utilized to advance ideological objectives. This apparent misuse of psychology motivated Sullivan to contend that "depoliticized at the level of theory and theory

language, the effectively neutral position masks political intentions" (Sullivan, 1984, p. 25-26). Moreover, Sullivan claims that a critical analysis of different orientations such as behaviorism and psychometric psychology

gives ample evidence that social science theories are intricately involved in value issues and have broad social policy implications....Social science theories are "legitimators" of the status quo, that is, they render interpretations which back up or legitimate a certain socio-political constellation of power. (1984, p. 26).

Sarason, who dealt extensively in his Psychology Misdirected (1981a) with the socialization of psychologists, contended that psychologists are, by and large, successfully conditioned not to deviate from the intellectual order prescribed by the contemporary predominant ideological atmosphere. Furthermore, he demonstrated how theoretical innovations in the field were frequently promoted by the establishment of new social policies. In Sarason's opinion (1981a), not only do psychologists rarely challenge the existing social beliefs but they actively endorse and facilitate the reproduction of the same.

It should not be forgotten that most social scientists belong to a social class whose political and economic interests are usually in accordance with these

of the dominant sectors (Holland, 1978a; Sarason, 1981a; Sullivan, 1984). While it is not my intention to reduce the scientific endeavors of psychologists to only legitimating the status quo and their professional practice to a class weapon, as some Marxists would seem to do (e.g., Nahem, 1981; see also A. Ryan, 1970), it is perceived that the potential impact of their class background on their practice has been seriously underestimated (J. F. Brown, 1936).

No conspiracy theory, however, should be inferred from the above argument, i.e., that psychologists contribute to the confirmation of cultural practices that help strengthen the underlying principles of social organization. Psychologists are not perceived as deliberately misleading the public in an attempt to guard social stability. Their assistance in perpetuating the current state of affairs does not derive, in my opinion, from a conscious effort to serve themselves by deceiving the population as to the nature of power relations in society. It derives mainly from a very efficient socialization that taught them not to question, to any threatening degree, the existing social system (Sarason, 1981a, 1981b, Chorover, 1985). However, it could be argued that it is this very lack of intent that makes it more insidious. Sarason (1981a) described the socialization of psychologists as follows:

As a group, they have undergone a socialization

process. We may call the process education or training: a long series of rites that make them eligible for certain roles in certain places. It is a process in which self, others, and the nature of society get defined. It is, of course, a continuation of a process that begins at birth. They do not come to "higher" education without their society already being in them. The more prolonged, systematic, and effective the socialization, the less self-conscious people are about the different factors and forces that shaped them. To be socialized means that one has absorbed and accommodated to predetermined conceptions of the way things are and ought to be [italics added]. One may resist and resent the process but if one wants to occupy a certain place and role in society (e.g., lawyer, physician, psychologist) one has to traverse successfully the rites of passage. The socialization may be partial but its effects are never absent. For most people the process is far more than partial; it is so successful that for all practical purposes there is no questioning, no self-consciousness, about the forces that shaped them and their conception of society (p. 148).

The partial attribution of their conservative attitudes to the process of socialization does not

exempt psychologists from facing the ethical dilemma implicit in this practice. Lack of intent does not free individuals from confronting the moral consequences of their actions. The first step in approaching this dilemma is to explore how psychologists help solidify the social system.

The Psychologization of Society

The second corollary of our leading assumption is that psychology, in turn, has an impact upon society's institutions and their regulations. Psychology is intermingled in social life in countless forms. Hence, psychology's potential to exercise an enduring impact upon society's establishments and their policies is substantial. Such has been the case since the beginning of the century.

Historically, North America offered psychology a unique opportunity: To come out of the academe into the practical world of business, government, education and the military; and to dissociate itself from philosophy to become an independent discipline (Danziger, 1979; Samelson, 1979). In the early 1900s the American elite was searching for practical answers to a multitude of social problems. The prospect of having a science devoted to finding solutions to these riddles was very appealing. Psychology, as Danziger (1979) has claimed, did not hesitate to volunteer its services in exchange for recognition as the Master science of human affairs.

Danziger's summary of the social dynamics that led to this development is worth quoting:

Control of university appointments, research funds, and professional opportunities was vested in the hands of either businessmen and their appointees, or politicians who represented their interests. If psychology was to emerge as a viable independent discipline, it would have to be in a form acceptable to these social forces. The inclinations of those on whose decisions the fate of American psychology depended were clear. They were men in positions of genuine social power who were anxious to use their positions to control the actions of others. They were interested in techniques of social control and in tangible performance. Their image of man was hardly of the contemplative philosopher: A huge system of secondary and professional education had to be built practically from scratch; the human fallout from wide-scale migration and urbanization had to be dealt with; man had to be made to adapt to a rapidly rationalized industrial system; products had to be sold. In view of the weakness of alternative sources of professional expertise, psychologists might become acceptable if they could reasonably promise to develop the technical competence needed to deal appropriately with these problems

(Danziger, 1979, p. 35).

The turn of the century witnessed a rapid consolidation of a professional group interested in transforming a speculative psychology into an applied field. Society was about to be psychologized. Judging from psychology's penetration in almost every aspects of every-day existence, that prophecy was largely fulfilled.

Several parameters can be utilized to support the claim that psychological formulations do in fact affect the state of affairs in society. One of them is the large audience of psychological magazines such as Psychology Today, Parenting, etc. A section called "Behavior" in the widely read magazine Time is another indication of the public's interest in psychology. Ann Landers, the celebrated newspaper columnist, often refers her readers to mental health workers. In addition, the popularity of "How to ..." books dealing with emotional issues, are frequently written by psychologists, and demonstrate that the community in large is exposed to what psychologists prescribe (e.g., Rosen, 1987). Similarly, radio shows advising on issues of emotional well being and sexual behavior are being broadcast all across North America.

At the governmental level, advisory committees composed of social scientists and psychologists often play a decisive role in recommending the adoption or

rejection of certain policies (see for example: The joint commission on mental health of children, 1973; Nahem, 1981; and also Rein, 1976). Desegregation, deinstitutionalization, affirmative action, child abuse, drug abuse, educational reform, aging, divorce, mental and physical handicaps, smoking, distribution of health services, are among the social problems for which legislation has been, directly or indirectly, influenced by the input of psychologists as individuals or as special interest groups (Sarason, 1986). The judicial system, schools, industries and corporations, the military and many other agencies employ psychologists as consultants. Szasz (1984) has illustrated the overwhelming intrusion of psychology and psychiatry in official matters in his recent collection of articles published under the name The Therapeutic State.

Haverman (1957), studying the influence of psychology on our lives has arrived at the conclusion that the present era deserves to be declared "The age of psychology," and Koch and Leary (1985), as previously stated, have defined the present times as "the psychological century" (p. 33). Koch and Leary are quite eloquent in their view that psychology has invaded almost every single aspect of our civilized existence:

Not a few psychologists, in the first century of their "science," have been willing to serve as self-anointed prophets in relation to virtually any

issue that can bear upon the human condition. If that condition be, in any context, problematic (or anxiety-ridden, or even mildly irritating), then surely a science attuned to the "lawfulness" of human function will have something to say about the remedy. Perhaps everything to say! Thus, for a century the world has been increasingly rife with scientifically based advice concerning a limitless (if untidy) dispersion of matters....The fact that, at any given moment, expert advice is bewilderingly multifarious and that the central tendency or dominant technologies in any given period tend to be fads which are displaced and often reversed, on cycles of a few years, lessens society's enthusiasm not one whit (Koch and Leary, 1985, p. 33).

It would appear reasonable to propose that the dissemination of psychological knowledge and expertise indeed make a difference in people's ideas about themselves and about society. Psychology can be thought of as influencing society in two opposite directions: (a) Reaffirming or reinforcing existing policies and consequently ratifying the status quo, or (b) criticizing the social order and thus fostering changes. While there is evidence to substantiate, to some extent, either claim, it would seem that the former is a much more pronounced and pervasive phenomenon than the latter. An evaluation of this claim requires an

understanding of the concept of ideology.

Chapter 4: Ideology and Psychology

Ideology as a Research Instrument

As the majority of authors studying ideology would assert, this is probably one of the most debated and controversial terms in the social sciences. Writers talk about its connotations as positive, neutral, and/or negative. The categorization of ideology along these lines is not related to its descriptive or explanatory values but rather to its added meanings, usually associated with politics. These political connotations, in turn, elicit partisan and emotional responses that have interfered with the development of ideology as a useful research instrument (cf. Shepard & Hamlin, 1987). I contend that if ideology's controversial connotations can be neutralized, it has the potential to be a valuable aid in the investigation of social reproduction. An overview of the various meanings previously associated with the construct is an important step in attaining the desired neutralization. It would be necessary to realize, from the outset, that an attempt to arrive at the "correct" definition of ideology is considered futile. Rather than establishing the concept of ideology, my goal is to describe the numerous ways in which it has been used, and the one to be adopted in the present inquiry. The question to be asked is not which concept of ideology is the right one, but which one is being used.

The brief historical outline that follows is based primarily on the works of Geuss (1981), Giddens (1979), Larrain (1979), Mannheim (1936), Ricoeur (1978), Therborn (1980), Thompson (1984), and the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (see Johnson, 1968; and Shils, 1968). Destutt de Tracy is considered the first author to have used the term ideology at the end of the eighteenth century. He was concerned with the development of a science of ideas, called "Ideology." His treatment of the concept was regarded as highly positive in that it provided the basis for its later connotation of ideology as the study and eradication of irrational beliefs about the world. A depreciative connotation was attached to it by Napoleon, who called his enemies, the intellectuals, "ideologues" for they were not in touch with "reality." The negative meaning given to ideology by Napoleon is kept alive in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976) where ideology is defined as "an extremist sociopolitical program constructed wholly or in part on factitious or hypothetical ideational bases."

The writings of Marx generated a great deal of discussion on the issue at hand. When the notion of distortion is introduced in his metaphor of camera obscura, according to which social circumstances appear upside down, Marx was conveying the message that people "are deluded about themselves, their position, their

society, or their interests" (Geuss, 1981, p. 12) by those in positions of power. At this point ideology came to be identified with either ideological delusion or false consciousness. Distortion of societal conditions in order to preserve the status quo can be regarded as the central contribution of Marx to the ideology debate.

The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the dominant material force in society is at the same time its dominant intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time of mental production, so that in consequence the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are, in general, subject to it (Marx, 1964, p. 78).

The meaning implied here gave rise to the conception of ideology as the ideas of the ruling class. When the two definitions given by Marx are linked together, as it is often the case, ideology represents a system of ideas espoused by the dominant segments of society utilized to preserve their position of power by portraying a distorted image of societal conditions.

The views of Marx on ideology have been a constitutive part of the Critical Theory of society developed by the Frankfurt School of sociology (Connerton, 1976; Geuss, 1981). This is clearly seen in one of its basic postulates: "Ideologiekritik is not

just a form of 'moralizing criticism,' i.e., an ideological form of consciousness is not criticized for being nasty, immoral, unpleasant, etc. but for being false, for being a form of delusion" (Geuss, 1981, p. 26).

Still in the Marxist tradition, Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia (1936) was an attempt to apply the concept of ideology to the realm of epistemology. His thesis was that the same sectional interests operating in the field of politics are also present in the creation of social knowledge. Mannheim went beyond criticizing the ideology of the "other" and claimed that one's own ideas must be subjected to ideological analysis. Such enterprise would be undertaken by the sociology of knowledge. His important legacy to the study of ideology was to emphasize its ubiquitous nature.

According to Ricoeur (1978), another common meaning ascribed to ideology is a set of notions that a group holds about itself whose primary function is to foster cohesiveness and integration. This interpretation refers to ideology as group identity. When this definition is expanded to society in general, across class and sectional boundaries, it is used in the sense of social cement and social cohesion. This variation is usually attributed to Althusser (Abercrombie, 1980; Giddens, 1979; Therborn, 1980).

Currently, the term is used in the literature in two fundamentally differing ways. The first, called by Thompson (1984) the neutral conception, refers to its use as a purely descriptive term. In this sense authors identify ideology with different systems of thoughts, values and beliefs which generate social action or political projects. "Ideology is present in every political programme, irrespective of whether the programme is directed towards the preservation or transformation of the social order." (Thompson, 1984, p. 4).

The second meaning commonly seen in the literature "is essentially linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power--that is, to the process of maintaining domination. This use of the term expresses what may be called a critical conception of ideology" (italics in the original) (Thompson, 1984, p. 4). This interpretation has a definite bias against the status quo. Ideology in this sense refers to the study and critique of stratagems employed by "those in power to conceal their real interests and advantages" (Sampson, 1981, p. 731).

As can be deduced from this overview, not all interpretations are mutually exclusive. Ideology as "social cement," for instance, does not conflict with the definitions given by Marx. It simply adds another dimension to them.

Among the plethora of definitions available in the literature for ideology, Berger and Luckmann's "ideas serving as weapons for social interests" (1967, p. 7) is the one with the most potential to be translated into a research instrument. This is due to a number of qualities. First, the term ideas is comprehensive enough to include the other two key elements usually associated with ideology: values and beliefs. Second, it is broad enough to encompass ideologies for and against the status quo. Most definitions are quite restrictive in that they limit ideology to a system of ideas or beliefs in defense of a power elite. Illustrative of the latter is Reading's version of ideology as "a belief system which protects the interest of an elite" (1977) (cf. ideology in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Johnson, 1968). Third, unlike most definitions in the Marxist tradition, it does not necessarily imply the notion of conscious deception by the group holding these ideas. Therefore, these ideas would function to promote certain objectives, but are not necessarily intended to do that.

We are now in a better position to consider the concept of ideology advocated for the purposes of this investigation. Simply stated, ideology as a research instrument can be defined as ideas affecting the social order; where (a) ideas are broadly conceived to encompass moral, cultural, and sociopolitical values and

beliefs; (b) no specification is made as to the direction in which ideas influence the social order; and (c) ideas can affect the social order in ways that people holding them were not necessarily aware of, or intended them to. In my view this is a viable concept of ideology for an inquiry into the sociopolitical implications of psychology.

As previously indicated, this conception can be given whatever directionality the investigator desires. It can be used as ideas in support or in opposition to the status quo. Thus, when dealing with ideological elements of psychological theories and practices that support the status quo, these will be understood as: a component of a theory or applied field in psychology which functionally, albeit not necessarily intentionally, contributes to the maintenance of the prevailing social order. Conversely, when discussing ideological elements that foster social change the implied definition will be: a component of a theory or applied field in psychology which functionally, albeit not necessarily intentionally, contributes to the promotion of social change.

Ideological Elements in Psychology

In effect, psychology can be said both to support and criticize the status quo; and evidence could be found to support both arguments. This is possible due to the fact that psychology is not a unitary entity. It is

comprised of several schools of thought, and thousands of individual professionals who happen to differ in their appraisal of the social order. The question is asked, however, what kind of evidence can be marshalled to support either argument. This author is of the opinion that while a case can be made to support either psychology's endorsement or opposition to the status quo, the literature seems to indicate that the predominant bias is towards the affirmation of the existing state of affairs.

Undoubtedly, there have been numerous attempts to make the discipline an instrument of social change. Some of these challenges have been undertaken by prominent figures such as presidents of the A.P.A. Among those are Kenneth Clark (1974) and George Albee (1981, 1986). Other initiatives to develop a psychology at the service of social change include the "Radical Therapist" movement (Agel, 1971; P. Brown, 1973); community psychology (Heller & Monahan, 1977; Sarason, 1982, 1984b), as well as some behavior analysts (Holland, 1978a; Nevin, 1982, 1985). The section for the psychological study of social issues of A.P.A. (SPSSI), as well as the section for social responsibility of C.P.A. are also concerned with matters related to social change. Though eloquent and forceful, these social critiques remain isolated occurrences within the discipline.

Psychology at the service of the status quo, on the other hand, represents a much larger and pervasive phenomenon than the sporadic efforts of psychology to promote significant social change. As it will be later exemplified in section II, some of the ideological elements supportive of the status quo in psychology are part and parcel of mainstream theories and practices in the behavioral sciences.

Beneficiaries of the present social structure regard psychological science as one of their more treasured possessions (e.g., Woolfolk & Richardson, 1984). At the structural level, a pervasive dichotomy between the individual and society is observed in psychology (e.g., Ingleby, 1972, 1981d; Sarason, 1981a, 1981b, 1982; Wexler, 1983). An immediate ideological benefit is derived from such a dichotomy--namely, the individual is studied as an asocial and ahistorical being whose life vicissitudes are artificially disconnected from the wider sociopolitical context. Following this ideological reasoning, solutions for human predicaments are to be found almost exclusively, within the self; leaving the social order conveniently unaffected (Albee, 1981; Fox, 1985; W. Ryan, 1971). In this context, Bevan argued in his 1982 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association that

One of the most powerful intellectual tides of this century is a general propensity, by psychologist

and nonpsychologist alike, to think of all human issues in psychological terms. It is a temptation that often leads to oversimplification [italics added], but it is a temptation that is hard to resist (1982, pp. 1305-1306).

Further support to the reigning ideology can be found in concrete governmental policies and in the advancement of heralded cultural beliefs. Activities carried out in the name of psychological science can and have been used, to rationalize social policies whose purposes were not always the pure promotion of "human welfare." The testing movement (Kamin, 1974; Sarason, 1981a; Sedgwick, 1974) and social Darwinism (Albee, 1986; W. Ryan, 1971; Thielman, 1985) are salient examples that reflect psychology at the service of political thought. As well, psychology has been instrumental in upholding the predominant ideology by promulgating values such as individualism (e.g., Sampson, 1977; Spence, 1985), male supremacy (Nahem, 1981; Shields, 1975), political conformity (Jacoby, 1975); and a purblind faith in technology's ability to solve human predicaments (e.g., Skinner, 1972; also cf. Woolfolk & Richardson, 1984).

Some concrete examples of the ways psychology operates as a prototype agent of socialization are now in order:

1. Values that benefit the dominant segment of

society are portrayed as benefiting society as a whole (Giddens, 1979; Sampson, 1983). This mechanism is recognized in industrial psychology, whereby steps intended to advance managerial goals are depicted as invariably valuable for the workers as well (Baritz, 1974; Ralph, 1983; Wells, 1987).

2. Social problems that originate in the structure of the socioeconomic system are discussed in terms of psychological maladjustment (W. Ryan, 1971). The essence of this ideological stratagem is best captured in the title of Ryan's seminal book Blaming the Victim (1971). According to it almost all unfavorable experiences in a person's life are attributed to faulty mechanisms within himself/herself. When this approach is applied to the analysis of "maladaptive" behavior it often results in what Albee (1981) has termed the defect model. An excellent illustration is provided by Caplan and Nelson (1973). Their research indicates that eighty percent of psychological studies dealing with Black Americans attributed their predicaments to some intra-personal variable rather than to sociohistorical circumstances.

This approach results in therapeutic efforts being almost exclusively directed at changing the individual and not the socioeconomic situation (Albee, 1981; Holland, 1978a; W. Ryan, 1971; Sarason, 1981a, 1981b; Wineman, 1984; for reviews on the influence of socioeconomic conditions on mental illness see Albee,

1986; and Grusky & Pollner, 1981, part two, section C). This model has been proposed not only by psychologists and psychiatrists but by sociologists and social workers as well (Mills, 1943; Wilding, 1981; Wineman, 1984). Its origins can be traced to a market system whose entrepreneurial morality promulgates the notions of self-help and equality of opportunity. One's welfare is one's responsibility. No matter how adverse the societal conditions may be, an ingenious, diligent, strong willed individual would be able to face them with dignity and would eventually attain happiness (London, 1969). Thus, remedies are rarely advocated in terms of community changes.

An extensive lexicon of person-blame concepts supports the defect model. Among them, "maladaptive coping mechanisms," "cognitive deficiencies," "weak-ego," "maladjusted personality," "character disorder," etc. This language is not at all surprising considering that "American psychology has been quintessentially a psychology of the individual organism" (Sarason, 1981b, p. 827).

3. Social realities are abstracted from their sociohistorical context and regarded as unavoidable (Ingleby, 1972). In Sampson's words, "...the present moment is reified and so made natural and inevitable" (1983, p. 128). This is a basic assumption upon which many psychological explanations are constructed--namely,

an acontextual view of people. That is, the analysis of human behavior without taking into account social and historical circumstances. Claiming that "human nature" or "genetic factors" account for the majority of certain individual differences, such as sex roles and intelligence respectively, is only one instance of this phenomenon (e.g., Ingleby, 1981d).

Inasmuch as terms such as "human nature" treat human phenomena as realities independent of "the particular sociohistorical conditions of [their] constitution" (Sampson, 1981, p. 737), they can be justifiably regarded as psychological reifications (Sampson, 1981).

Psychological reifications clothe existing social arrangements in terms of basic and inevitable characteristics of individual psychological functioning; this inadvertently authenticates the status quo, but now in a disguised psychological costume. What has been mediated by a sociohistorical process--the forms and contents of human consciousness and of individual psychological experience--is treated as though it were an "in-itself," a reality independent of these very origins (Sampson, 1981, p. 738).

4. "Dislocation is a process whereby something new is brought into a cultural system and has the ability to mute the partial critical insight of that cultural

system" (Sullivan, 1984, p. 165). In other words, changes of a minor nature are allowed into the system with the purpose of creating an image of flexibility. The unfortunate downward aspect of it is that significant modifications are delayed due to the preoccupation with insignificant reforms.

Family therapy is a case of dislocation. Facing the pressure to move away from a highly individualistic model of psychological intervention, instead of endorsing a truly systemic and community based approach to therapy, psychology "invented" family therapy (James & McIntyre, 1983; Poster, 1978; Wineman, 1984). Another one is the expansion of forensic services. In an address to correctional psychologists Judge Bazelon made this point in a vary eloquent manner:

Why should we even consider fundamental social changes or massive income redistribution if the entire problem can be solved by having scientists teach the criminal class--like a group of laboratory rats--to march successfully through the maze of our society? In short, before you respond with enthusiasm to our plea for help, you must ask yourselves whether your help is really needed, or whether you are merely engaged as magicians to perform an intriguing side-show so that the spectators will not notice the crises in the center of the ring. In considering our motives for

offering you a role, I think you would do well to consider how much less expensive it is to hire a thousand psychologists than to make even a minuscule change in the social and economic structure (In Caplan & Nelson, 1973, p. 210).

Chapter 5: Framework of Analysis

The main propositions advanced in this section can be summarized as follows:

1. Psychological theories and practices are affected by, as well as affect, the social order;
2. Psychology is ascribed considerable authority in an increasing number of human affairs;
3. Social, cultural, and political values are present in the formulation and dissemination of theories and practices in psychology;
4. There is significant affinity between these values and those typical of dominant segments of society;
5. Prominent among these values is the maintenance of the existing state of affairs in society;
6. Psychology's affirmation of the social order does not necessarily reflect intent;
7. While extra-scientific values fostering macrosocial change are also present in psychology, their social impact is outweighed by those stated in 5.

The seventh and principal proposition calls for a comparative evaluation of the relative strength of confirming and disconfirming evidence. Answer to this question would entail the identification and comparison of instances where psychological theories and practices operate as (a) conforming and (b) as change promoting forces in society. A number of problems are elicited in

considering evidence. These are addressed next.

What constitutes confirming evidence?

In order to argue that certain theories of human behavior and applied fields of psychology act in support of the social system, some criteria must be developed that will serve as, at least, tentative confirming evidence. Consequently, a definition of what constitutes a conforming message or activity is needed. This is provided in the conception of an ideological element supportive of the status quo as a component of a theory or applied field in psychology which functionally, albeit not necessarily intentionally, contributes to the maintenance of the prevailing social order.

The reviewed literature suggests the following such ideological elements in psychology:

1. Tendency to attribute excessive weight to individual factors, such as genetic or psychological constitution, in explaining individual and/or social behavior. This also implies a disposition to omit socioeconomic and political variables or to portray an asocial and ahistorical image of persons (Albee, 1981, 1986; Henriques et al. 1984; Sampson, 1983; Sarason, 1981a, 1981b)

2. Propensity to analyze social problems that originate, at least in part, in the structure of the socioeconomic system in terms of psychological

maladjustment (Caplan & Nelson, 1973; W. Ryan, 1971).

3. Reification of behavioral phenomena. That is, the treatment of human behavior as if it were an "in-itself," an entity abstracted from the socioeconomic conditions where it developed (Ingleby, 1972, 1981d; Sampson, 1981).

4. Tendency to endorse technical solutions for social, economic, political, and ethical problems. Inasmuch as such technical solutions divert attention; more fundamental changes are postponed or evaded (Anderson & Travis, 1983; Holland, 1978a; Woolfolk & Richardson, 1984).

5. Insufficient consideration of the potentially conformist prescriptive bias inherent in theories or practices; leading the recipient of psychological knowledge or counseling to believe that these theories or practices are essentially "value-neutral," a reflection of "truth" or "objectivity" and are not affected by the psychologist's set of nonepistemic values (Gergen, 1973; Jacoby, 1975; Sampson, 1978).

6. Propensity to portray values that benefit the dominant segments of society as benefiting society as a whole (Baritz, 1974; Clark, 1974; Ingleby, 1974, 1981d; Nahem, 1981; Sampson, 1974).

7. The introduction of new knowledge or services that are likely to result in the dissipation of some critical insight of the social system. Criticism is

silenced when innovative techniques purported to create significant modifications are brought into the social system. Often, however, they only deal with superficial problems and are quite inconsequential in solving systemic predicaments (Anderson & Travis, 1983; Jacoby, 1975; Sullivan, 1984).

These ideological components are likely to reduce the probabilities that the recipient of psychological knowledge and/or practice (a) would become aware of the importance of adverse social influences on his/her life conditions, or (b) that she/he would engage in activities to promote macrosocial change.

What constitutes disconfirming evidence?

Disconfirming evidence, or instances where psychology promotes macrosocial change, is defined as a component of a theory or applied field in psychology which functionally, albeit not necessarily intentionally, contributes to the promotion of macrosocial change.

The following are some examples whereby psychology can be considered to foster macrosocial changes:

1. Consideration of the social determinants and the need to modify the environmental conditions conducive to psychopathology (Albee, 1986; Grusky & Pollner, 1981; Holland, 1978a, 1978b).

2. Promotion of prevention programs that question the capacity of the present social system to enhance the

well-being of the population (Heller & Monahan, 1977; Sarason, 1982).

A second kind of disconfirming evidence would be the lack of apparent implications of any of the psychological fields researched for social reproduction or social change. However, inasmuch as all the fields chosen for analysis hold an implicit or explicit assumption about the nature of functioning of the human being in society, and they are all widely practised, they all impact upon the continuum social reproduction--social change.

Several potential ways whereby psychology can be used to help in changing or reproducing the social system have been suggested. The following chapters will attempt to show how these ideological mechanisms manifest themselves in a sample of psychological interpretations of human behavior. Psychology is not a unified science (Koch, 1985), and as a consequence different systems in the discipline portray the individual and society in a different fashion. Little congruence is to be found among their definitions of psyche, mind, or even of their very subject matter.

It should be understood that the theories to be analyzed will neither bluntly and openly support the status quo, nor portray modern society as a source of innumerable opportunities for self-actualization. The conforming components of psychological conjectures are

conveyed to the general public often in a very subtle way.

What are the sources of evidence?

This question deals with the problem of sample. It could well be argued that enough controversy and debate would be found in one school of thought or psychological area to justify a separate dissertation. At the same time, by focusing on only one single area, what I consider a pervasive phenomenon could not be revealed. The study is limited to the most prominent ideological aspects of each field.

In total, the presence of ideological components is explored in six separate fields: (a) behaviorism, (b) psychoanalysis, (c) humanism, (d) cognitivism, (e) industrial psychology, and (f) abnormal psychology. The first three are well-established schools of thought within the discipline and are usually represented in books dealing with systems of psychology (e.g., Lundin, 1972; Marx & Hillix, 1979; Notterman, 1985) and/or theories of personality (e.g., Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981; Sahakian, 1977). The fourth area constitutes a trend whose recognition and wide acceptance are considered to have caused a "revolution" in psychology (Gardner, 1985; Baars, 1986). The last two are applied fields that impact upon large sectors of the population.

A study of this nature can do justice neither to the scope, nor to the range of internal differences

existent in each school of thought. Emphasis will be placed on these applied aspects that are likely to have a direct impact on the public, the more obvious being therapeutic methods derived from these theories. While such a selective approach may leave important contributions untouched, it is not deemed as illegitimate but a beginning.

Basically, three kinds of sources have been used in reviewing the different areas:

1. Whenever possible, writings by major influential figures in each system have been consulted. Thinkers such as Skinner in the case of behaviorism; Maslow and Rogers in humanism; and Freud in psychoanalysis are examples of this type of source.

2. Reviews and books about the different systems have also been consulted. Books on systems, history of psychology and theories of personality exemplify this source.

3. The third source is comprised of writings dealing specifically with the ideological dimensions of the theories and practices chosen for analysis.

It can be argued that the lack of quantitative data detracts from the certitude of the conclusions. While this can be construed as a weakness, I would maintain that the very lack of quantification can also be regarded as desirable at this stage of the analysis; for it allows for the flexibility needed in exploring the

numerous dimensions of the phenomenon under investigation.

Also, the present author cannot claim the absence of personal convictions. Neither the selection, nor the analysis of the arguments could be "objective." And in all likelihood the inescapable ubiquitous character of ideology has permeated the present manuscript. Finally, the limited scope of this inquiry places definite restrictions on the generalizations to be made from its conclusions. As stated above, the focus of the investigation are the applied aspects of the areas selected for analysis. This is by no means a comprehensive list of the limitations of the present project. It is only intended to draw attention to the most conspicuous of them.

Section II: Analyses of Ideological Elements
in Psychology

Chapter 6: Psychoanalysis

An elucidation of the progressive or conservative social repercussions of psychoanalysis must, of course, take into account Freud's contributions as well as the fact that his life span was a long one (1856-1939). At the same time, one should bear in mind that the current implications of psychoanalysis for social change do not necessarily derive from Freud's original postulates but from ramifications, interpretations, and elaborations of the same. Consequently, this analysis will not be limited to Freud. Considerable attention will also be paid to his followers.

The Politics of Freud

As in the cases of Skinner, Rogers, and Maslow, I shall not concern myself with the personal motives or convictions of Freud, but rather with the social functions for which his views have been appropriated. Adaptations of Freud's ideas to justify ideologies, be them in favor or against the status quo, have taken place within and without psychology and have changed from era to era. An interesting contrast between the progressive connotations of psychoanalysis outside psychology and its conservative reverberations within the discipline will be noted.

Given his voluminous writings, the evolution of his

thinking and a lack of categorical political commentary on his part, it is not at all surprising that contradictory social positions have been ascribed to Freud. Under the headings "Freud the conservative" and "Freud the progressive," I shall present some of Freud's views which may have had, in varying degrees, serious political significance. An analysis of the sociopolitical impact of his followers will follow.

Freud the conservative

Freud has been accused of generating conservative thought on many accounts (e.g., Bartlett, 1939; Brooks, 1973; Cohen, 1986; Nahem, 1981, Wortis, 1945). Three representative charges deal with his (a) isolated view of the individual, (b) emphasis on "biologism" and alleged inevitability of war, and (c) anti-feminist implications.

The first claim has been forcefully presented by Freud's contemporary Bartlett (1939). The phylogenetic basis of developmental stages, their relative independence from environmental circumstances, and their claimed universality are the central points of contention for Bartlett. Armed with the well-known research of Malinowski, which refuted the omnipresence of the Oedipus complex, Bartlett questioned the validity of Freud's assertions in respect to the primarily asocial character of sexual and psychological maturation (see for example Freud, 1940/1949). Moreover, Bartlett

(1939) attributed to Freud a social atomism, according to which society was depicted more along the lines of a human conglomerate rather than a human gestalt. In Freud's view, Bartlett (1939) argues, "society as a system of active, practical relationships, evolving according to laws which are not deducible from the nature of individuals, does not exist" (p. 70). To document his claim Bartlett quotes Freud saying that "sociology, which deals with the behavior of man in society, can be nothing other than applied psychology" (in Bartlett, 1939, p. 70). Wortis (1945) wrote that Freud "not only neglected the social situation...but stood everything on its head by regarding social situations as the expression of people's ideas or unconscious strivings" (p. 815). He further noted that "from this point of view war, for example, is the expression of aggressive instincts" (1945, p. 815). A similar reading of Freud has been more recently voiced by Brooks (1973), who argued that "Freud's individualistic concepts are not merely asocial, but define society as only a collection of atomized individuals connected by cathected libidos" (p. 361).

Bartlett's and Brooks' individualistic interpretations of psychoanalysis converge in their allegation against Freud as conservative. When specific socioeconomic factors are not fully taken into account, the resulting theory of human behavior is not only

partial in its explanatory value, but also ideological. Ideological in that problems that may have originated in the social structure are situated in the individual and call, therefore, for individual solutions (Bartlett, 1939; Brooks, 1973).

Whereas these critics may have presented a picture of human predicaments more individualistic than what Freud's writings warrant (as we shall see below), their ideological indictment of the "Freudian" way of solving these problems seems to be well founded. The preferred way of treating the unconscious instead of environmental factors (e.g., 1940/1949) lends considerable support to that assertion. Inasmuch as the unconscious obscures "the power relations between people by locating the dynamics and issues of intersubjective life inside the individual" [italics in the original] (Brooks, 1973, p. 344), it can be argued that psychoanalysis serves to depoliticize human relations where the opposite may be what is needed.

Closely related to the first, the second accusation made against "Freud the conservative" is the primacy attributed to the instinctual roots of human behavior (i.e., Cohen, 1986; Ingleby, 1981d; Nahem, 1981; Wortis, 1945). The political significance of such a tenet is clearly articulated by Freud himself in Civilization and its Discontents (1930/1961) where, given the pervasive nature of the destructive instinct, he basically

precludes the possibility of peaceful civilized co-existence.

The existence of this inclination to aggression, which we can detect in ourselves and justly assume to be present in others, is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbour and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure of energy. In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration (Freud, 1930/1961, p. 59).

When asked by Albert Einstein in 1932 for his participation in preserving peace, Freud replied in an open letter that war "seems quite a natural thing, no doubt it has a good biological basis and in practice it is scarcely avoidable" (In Nahem , 1981, p. 25).

In Civilization and its Discontents, which can be considered one of his more explicit political commentaries, Freud derogates socialism in no uncertain terms. In his opinion socialism fundamentally contradicts human nature. Thus, "the psychological premises on which the (socialist) system is based are an untenable illusion" (Freud, 1930/1961, p. 60).

Luria summarized the critique against Freud's isolated view of persons and emphasis on drive by stating that instead of understanding the "psychic processes and needs of man as a product of a social and

historical development, psychoanalysis derives them from instincts inherent in the organism, thereby giving a narrowly biological interpretation to all forms of a man's psychic activity" (In Cohen, 1986, p. 6).

Although Freud may not have envisioned the practical ideological uses of his theories, Nahem (1981) contends that Freudianism is highly advantageous to the ruling segments of society.

What could be more pleasing to a dominant class than to convince people that their problems are due to their unconscious conflicts? And what could pay off more handsomely than the idea that human history today, with its wars, racism and oppression, is due to unconscious, destructive and libidinous forces and not to capitalism? (Nahem, 1981, p. 34).

In addition to Freud's individualistic and instinctual reductionism, his anti-feminist remarks have also contributed to his characterization as a highly conservative thinker (Brooks, 1973; Henriques et al. 1984; Hyde & Rosenberg, 1980; Zaretsky, 1986).

One of the salient features of women's psychology, according to Freud, is their immature superego. "The work of civilization," wrote Freud, "has become increasingly the business of men, it confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and compels them to carry out instinctual sublimations of which women are little

capable" (1930/1961, p. 50).

Other central personality traits of women in Freudian theory are passivity and masochism. Freud maintained that young girls have a desire for a penis, hence their "penis envy." Since their desire for a penis cannot be fulfilled, that wish is transformed into an urge to be impregnated by their father. "In choosing the strategy for obtaining the desired penis by being impregnated by the father, the girl adopts a passive approach--to be impregnated, to be done to, not to do--and this passive strategy persists throughout life" (Hyde & Rosenberg, 1980, p. 38). That very wish to be penetrated is also the source of masochism, for intercourse and childbirth are said to be painful (Hyde & Rosenberg, 1980). These, among other Freudian observations on the female psyche, might have led Henriques et al. (1984) to the conclusion that Freud's "anti-feminist implications are indisputable" (p. 206).

Thus far we have dealt with those elements of Freud's thinking that could be used as supportive of the status quo. The definition and treatment of human predicaments in individualistic and biological terms, a well-known ideological strategy to avert any grave menace to the status quo (Caplan & Nelson, 1973; Rose, Lewontin, & Kamin, 1984; W. Ryan, 1971), might have gained considerable impetus from psychoanalysis.

And yet, there is another, more progressive aspect

to Freud. To this we now turn.

Freud the progressive

Against the charges that Freud fostered cultural myths, such as women's inferior capacity for sublimation, by undermining the role of specific social constellations, not a small number of authors have come to Freud's defense. The latter have set out to "prove" that Freud was not only progressive, but in many ways a radical (e.g., Jacoby, 1975; Jones, 1955). Jones (1955), Freud's friend and biographer, stated for instance that

Freud would have been in favor of any obvious social reforms, but on a longer view he was not sure that they would produce a really satisfactory civilization. Something more radical was needed, and he was a revolutionary rather than a reformer (p. 414).

Counteracting the accusations made in the previous section, three arguments are advanced: (a) Freud's cultural critique, (b) the social, or at the very least interpersonal nature of his theories on human behavior, and (c) his contributions to personal liberation.

As a critic of his culture, Freud astonished many contemporaries with his claims on sexuality, particularly infant sexuality (Freud, 1940/1949). Wortis (1945) correctly noted that Freud "helped shatter the taboos against an examination of sexuality" (p. 814).

At the time that Freud developed and made public his theories on sexuality, he and "his followers were regarded not only as sexual perverts but as either obsessional or paranoid psychopaths as well, and the combination was felt to be a real danger to the community" (Jones, 1955, p. 109).

Not only did he shock people with his unprecedented notions about sexuality, but also horrify them by dethroning religion of its unimpeachable podium in his Future of an Illusion (Freud 1927/1964). Freud stripped religion of its sacrosanct apparel to make it a mere psychological mechanism "born from man's need to make his helplessness tolerable and built up from the material of memories of the helplessness of his own childhood (Freud, 1927/1964, p. 25). As to the idea of God, Freud argued that "when man personifies the forces of nature he is following...an infantile model (Freud, 1927/1964, p. 31). In his recent account of Freud's moral and political thought Abramson (1984) states that for the former "God is our own creation, an illusion we believe in precisely because it illustrates the world according to our infantile liking (p. 69).

Judging from the fierce response of his culture, there is little doubt that Freud was unsettling the "natural order of things" by questioning the validity of some very basic social pillars (e.g., Jones, 1955). Freud's unorthodox views on sexuality and religion are

exemplified in a letter sent in 1935 to an "American Mother" in regards to her son's homosexuality: Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness....It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality, and a cruelty too (In Bayer, 1981, p. 27). While Freud's opinion on homosexuality may not seem too unusual today, it certainly was in 1935 (cf. F. Marcuse, 1980). (It is of interest to note that while homosexuality does not constitute at present a separate nosological entity in the Third Revised edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 1987), it does appear in the index as homosexuality-ego dystonic. One cannot help but wonder whether the activists who fought vehemently for the complete deletion of homosexuality from the manual are aware of its inconspicuous presence).

Another line of defense in arguing that Freud was neither a self-declared, nor by implication, a conservative, has been the attempt to register his noticeable awareness of social and political circumstances. Bartlett's charge of Freud's treatment of the "isolated individual" would appear to pertain more to therapy than to theory. At the therapeutic level Freud no doubt focused on the individual. At the theoretical level, however, Freud appears to have taken

into account micro and macrosocial determinants, as Badcock (1983), Caruso (1964), Jacoby (1975), and Zaretsky (1986), among others, have eloquently argued.

Social interpretations of Freud endeavor to show his alertness to both micro and macrosocial factors. At the macro level, for example, in his Future of an Illusion Freud did nothing less than criticize class societies. Commenting on the living conditions of the "underprivileged classes" (Freud's words), Freud wrote: "a civilization which leaves so large a number of its participants unsatisfied and drives them into revolt neither has nor deserves the prospect of a lasting existence" (Freud, 1927/1964, pp. 15-16). Another blunt critical statement of the social structure and its institutions is contained in a communication with Putnam. In that letter Freud stated:

I believe that your complaint that we are not able to compensate our neurotic patients for giving up their illness is quite justified. But it seems to me that this is not the fault of therapy but rather of social institutions. What would you have us do when a woman complains...that she has been deprived of the joy of living for merely conventional reasons? She is quite right, and we stand helpless before her...But the recognition of our therapeutic limitations reinforces our determination to change other social factors so that men and women shall no

longer be forced into hopeless situations [italics added] (In Zaretsky, 1986, p. 138).

Badcock (1983) has argued that the portrayal of Freud as oblivious of societal complexities is "a major distortion of Freud's thinking of which many analysts and nearly all writers in the social sciences who have used psychoanalytic ideas are guilty (p. 69). In an attempt to recover the broad scope of Freud's theories, which in his opinion neglected neither the individual nor the environment or the social system, Badcock (1983) introduced the term social psychoanalysis. In doing that he has hoped to counteract the common misconception of Freud as an intrapsychic thinker par excellence.

Similar arguments have been advanced by Caruso (1964). Taking issue with the solipsism ascribed to Freud by Wells, Caruso noted that such a reading of Freud is a very simplistic one. Caruso (1964) claimed that in addition to the import of intra-psychological processes, "psychoanalysis--and this goes back to Freud--is also founded on the concrete and overall relations of the patient with the world" (p. 265).

Freud's concerns with micro-social institutions, such as the family, can be hardly disputed. Whereas Freud might not have fully elaborated upon the impact of social power structures on the individual, he definitely contributed to an understanding of the power structure of the family and its consequences (see Caruso, 1964;

Kovel, 1981a; Jacoby, 1975; Zaretsky, 1986).

The final argument to be presented in support of "Freud the progressive" is his development of what might be called, after Abramson (1984), personal liberation. What is meant by personal liberation is the process whereby the individual frees himself/herself from intrapsychic conflicts which may elicit anxiety, phobias, fears, etc. Few thinkers have assisted so much in promoting such therapeutic mentality. And although the risks of focusing on personal liberation to the exclusion of politics are well known, it would be unfortunate to discredit en bloc individual therapy. Moreover, it can be conjectured that unless individuals liberate themselves from personal fears, repression, etc. they will likely lack the necessary energy to engage in social transformation. This notion will be further elaborated below.

There should be no doubt, however, that as a "liberator," Freud was more of a personal rather than a social liberator. And, once again, one may question both the feasibility and the ultimate validity of individual salvation in a disturbed society. However, one cannot ignore Freudian thought.

Having presented some of the most common arguments reported in the literature when trying to portray Freud as either conservative or progressive, what kind of conclusions can be arrived at? My tentative conclusion

would be that Freud's statements and theories defy classification as either in favor or against the status quo (cf. Abramson, 1984; Jacoby, 1975; Rieff, 1961). Whereas Freud has made numerous assertions indicting class society and its repressive institutions; he has, at the same time, helped create one of the more powerful ideological stratagems of capitalism. His work suggests the possibility of attributing personal unhappiness almost exclusively to intrapsychic conflicts.

Jacoby (1975) contends that these contradictory tendencies derive mainly from the divergent interests of theory and therapy in Freud. In his view Freudian theory contained the necessary elements to unravel the problematic human condition, to indict repressive institutions, and hence its potential to promote well being. Therapy, on the contrary, operates within an oppressive society to alleviate personal predicaments and does not purport to have social curative effects. In Jacoby's view, to take psychoanalysis only as therapy "is to blunt psychoanalysis as a critique of civilization, turning it into an instrument of individual adjustment and resignation. The point is not to play one against the other; both theory and therapy exist within Freud in contradiction" (Jacoby, 1975, p. 120).

The Politics of Freud's Followers

Much of the political ambiguity reflected in

Freud's writings dissipates considerably in the work of his followers. At least three well defined groups, which can be placed along the political continuum, are identified among Freud followers. These may be termed the Radical Freudian Left, the Neo-Freudian Left, and the Conservative Freudians.

Prior to studying their sociopolitical trends and how they manifest themselves in Twentieth century North American psychology, it is necessary to appreciate the metamorphosis experienced by psychoanalysis in its transition from Europe to North America. As Jacoby's (1975, 1983) research indicate, fundamental transformations in the intellectual spirit of psychoanalysis have taken place since its arrival from the old continent to the United States and Canada.

The major change observed by Jacoby (1983) was what he called the "repression" of psychoanalysis. By that Jacoby meant the almost complete eradication of radical political agendas from psychoanalysis. Whereas in Europe psychoanalysis could not be conceived without its cultural and social interests, in certain circles in America it can hardly be conceived with them. Although many of its precursors in Europe, as its followers in America, were medical doctors, a marked difference could be observed between them. Jacoby maintains that "European doctors have tended to be more cultured than their American counterparts; European medical education

reflects, and partly causes this richer humanist vision. American physicians obtain a more specialized education" (1983, p. 18). Furthermore, Jacoby argues that the socialization of North American physicians "filters out mavericks, humanists, and dissenters" (1983, p. 18).

Since its incipience, European psychoanalysis has been characterized by a close association with reformist groups. In America, on the contrary, psychoanalysis became very much part of the medical establishment (Jacoby, 1983; Turkle, 1978). Turkle summarizes well the "assimilation" and "accommodation" of psychoanalysis into the American scene:

Americans accepted psychoanalysis, but they shaped it to their image of what would be "helpful." American psychoanalytic ego psychology, directed toward an active adaptation of the patient to reality, toward what came to be called "coping," brought Freudianism in line with American beliefs about the virtue and necessity of an optimistic approach....The optimistic revisions of Freud focused on adaptation to a reality whose justice was rarely challenged (1978, pp. 7-8).

In order to qualify for the optimistic revisions that Turkle talks about, psychoanalysis had to be "desexualized" and "stripped of its emphasis on irrationality" (Ingleby, 1981d, p. 12).

Next, we shall see that only a small fragment of the reformist spirit of psychoanalysis has survived in America; mostly outside psychology and psychiatry. At the same time, most of its more conservative features have been fortified in medical and psychological circles (Jacoby, 1973).

The Radical Freudian Left

In the past there have been numerous attempts to arrive at a synthesis between Freud and Marx. Besides the pioneer work of W. Reich and the significant contributions made by the Frankfurt School (see for example Bocock, 1983; and Jacoby, 1983), other well known studies have been carried out by Fromm (1955) and Schneider (1975). A more recent similar enterprise has been undertaken by Castilla del Pino (1981). While the significance of their efforts is not in question, I shall delimit this section only to some relevant aspects of psychoanalysis that seem to have persisted in the North American left.

If psychoanalysis was to be made compatible with Marxism, and especially with historical materialism, its instinctual foundations had to be reinterpreted. This situation led to a new reading of drive theory: Instincts were no longer the exclusive product of intrapsychic constitution but also, and perhaps mainly, of internalized cultural practices. H. Marcuse (1966) was very influential in advancing this conceptualization

of the instincts. He does not only claim that "Freud (was) well aware of the historical element in man's instinctual structure" (H. Marcuse, 1966, p. 133), but expands on that theme himself. Although H. Marcuse gives full recognition to the phylogenetic-biological level, he argues that the sociological level is the one to determine the particular historical character of the instincts. According to his thesis the "organization [italics added] of the instincts in the struggle for existence would be due to exogenous factors--exogenous in the sense that they are not inherent in the 'nature' of the instincts but emerge from the specific historical conditions under which the instincts develop" (H. Marcuse, 1966, p. 132). This approach, which emphasizes the sociological moment in drive theory, is sometimes referred to as "second nature." The latter being the reflection of the sociohistorical circumstances in the composition of the personality (e.g., Jacoby, 1975, pp. 31 and 88).

Marcuse's sociological elaboration of Freud is epitomized in his concept surplus-repression. This is defined as "the restrictions necessitated by social domination. This is distinguished from basic repression: the "modifications" of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization" (H. Marcuse, 1966, p. 35). Departing from Freud's explanation of organized society in Civilization and its

Discontents, H. Marcuse contends that repression is not only required for the continuation of the race, but also for the perpetuation of a social configuration of domination. "The specific interests of domination," he asserts, "introduce additional controls over and above those indispensable for civilized human association" (H. Marcuse, 1966, p. 37).

The political implication of Marcuse's analysis is that society has still a long path to traverse in order to reduce or minimize surplus-repression. Particularly for those who are placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Albeit significantly influential in the left (see for example Lasch, 1984), it should be stated that Marcuse's views as well as elaborations of the same by Jacoby were not uniformly accepted by those pursuing social change (e.g., Bramel & Friend, 1982; Brooks, 1973). This is, in large part, due to a great reluctance in many left circles to endorse Freudian concepts or any variations of the same (see section "Freud the conservative") (Bramel & Friend, 1982; Brooks, 1973; Nahem, 1981).

H. Marcuse is representative of the non-clinical branch of the Freudian Left. In contrast to his vociferous indictment of capitalist society, a much more silent, almost underground kind of social critique has been conducted by Freudian clinicians in America.

Jacoby (1983) has documented at some length the radical thought of Fenichel, Jacobson and A. Reich. As Jacoby puts it "Fenichel or Jacobson or Annie Reich were not merely outstanding theorists and clinicians, they were also radicals devoted to a social psychoanalysis (1983, p. 7). While in many respects their thinking was similar to H. Marcuse's, the fate of their political convictions would be much different.

Almost all of these politically progressive Freudians came to the United States as refugees from Europe in the 1930s. As such, "they were fearful of jeopardizing their tenuous legal status" (Jacoby, 1983, p. 19) by publicizing their rather unpopular views on social matters. "They generally desired social and political invisibility" (Jacoby, 1983, p. 19). As a result of their hidden positions on such issues, almost nothing is left for the public to study of their critiques. In fact, these analysts are well remembered for their clinical--not sociopolitical--contributions to psychoanalysis.

The political seclusion observed in the European refugees is a trademark of the medicalization of psychoanalysis in North America. As has been noted by several commentators of psychoanalysis in this continent, since its arrival at the beginning of the century, psychoanalysis has become a medical expertise deprived of whatever social connotations it might have

possessed in Europe (e.g., Jacoby, 1983; Kovel, 1981a, 1981b; Turkle, 1978, 1981). As Turkle (1978) pointed out, "in America, medical professionalization contributed to defusing much of what was most radical in (Freud's) vision" (p. 150).

Concurrent to its medical professionalization, American psychoanalysis underwent a process of political sterilization. This is not to say that psychoanalysis became apolitical but rather that it aspired and pretended to be apolitical. As Kovel (1981a) has noted, only a few have survived this procedure. Kovel being one of them. It would probably be safe to assume that Kovel is a specimen of an almost extinct species.

Kovel's (1981a, 1981b) Marxist orientation to psychoanalysis can be summarized along three lines of reasoning. First, he utilizes Marxism to criticize the ideological uses of psychoanalysis; i.e., its diverting attention from political issues, its individualistic approach to human predicaments, etc. Second, Kovel denotes the affinity of goals between psychoanalysts as interested parties in a class society and their functions as socialization agents. Third, at the level of praxis, he combines psychoanalysis to help individuals deal with their psychological repressions, with a Marxist view of the whole person that does not end in the therapy room. "It is absurd to think of caring for someone in a purely psychological way, i.e.,

without seeing to his/her so-called material needs. Care is given to a whole person, not just the psyche" (Kovel, 1981a, p. 252).

Kovel's personal attempt to reconcile Freud with Marx is unique in that he does not artificially attempt to reduce one in order to make it compatible with the other. While he realizes, and emphasizes, that both systems fight repression; at the same time acknowledges their different targets and scope and does not confuse them, i.e., Psychoanalysis focusing on the individual and Marxism on the community at large.

Although not definite, a few conclusions can be attempted from this brief overview of the Freudian left. If the left is a small minority within the political scenario of North America, then the Freudian left is only a minority within an already small minority. And if psychoanalysis is only a small subspecialty of medicine and psychology, then it would not be difficult to argue that left psychoanalysis is indeed a rare occurrence (e.g., Bramel & Friend, 1982; Ingleby, 1981d, Jacoby, 1975, 1983; Kovel, 1981a; Turkle, 1978, 1981). Hence, I would pose that the impacts of progressive psychoanalytic forces upon society at large are very limited.

The Neo-Freudian Left

It should be made clear at the outset of this discussion that authors disagree widely in their

interpretation of the sociopolitical contributions of the Neo-Freudian leftist. Fromm (1955) provides a good example. According to P. Brown (1981), Fromm would belong in the Radical Left fraction. According to Jacoby (1975, 1983), and H. Marcuse (1966), Fromm's sociopolitical legacy is revisionist and far from radical. Yet Lasch (1984), whose position is endorsed here, places Fromm somewhere in the middle and calls him a Neo-Freudian leftist.

This section will concern itself primarily with the work of Fromm, Horney and Sullivan. All of them have been identified, with slight variations, as belonging to the more progressive branch of Neo-Freudianism (e.g., Bartlett, 1945; P. Brown, 1981; Jacoby, 1983; Thomas & Sillen, 1972). Fromm's The sane society (1955), Horney's The neurotic personality of our time (1937), and Sullivan's The interpersonal theory of psychiatry (1953), are representative of this cultural trend of psychoanalysis. In their respective studies, these thinkers deviate from Freud in the significance attributed to social and cultural factors. Variables that were, in their view, underestimated by Freud. Their position is succinctly presented by Lasch: They tried to press psychoanalysis into the service of social reform by emphasizing cultural instead of biological determinants of personality. The cultural school had set out to strip Freudian

theory of its 'biological determinism,' its 'disregard of cultural factors' and 'social conditions,' its undue emphasis on sexuality at the expense of 'feelings of inferiority' and the 'hunger of appreciation or affection,' its neglect of 'interpersonal relations,' its 'patriarchal' bias, its 'hydraulic' theory of psychic energy-- everything, in short, that allegedly stamped Freud's thought as a product of nineteenth-century mechanistic science and bourgeois culture (Lasch, 1984, pp. 227-228).

According to H. Marcuse (1966), the main objections of the Neo-Freudian to Freud "may be summed up as follows: Freud grossly underrated the extent to which the individual and his neurosis are determined by conflicts with his environment" (H. Marcuse, 1966, p. 248). And P. Brown claimed that Fromm and Horney "emphasized the manner in which competition radiated from its economic origins to play a dominant role in personality development" (1981, pp. 21-22).

Although their works have been regarded as very sensitive to social influences and as a result quite progressive, the Neo-Freudian's ultimate political impact is difficult to ascertain. That is so because their critique of society as pervaded by competition and injustice might have been undermined by their "optimism" regarding the individual's ability to attain happiness

in such society (e.g., Ingleby, 1981d). In other words, the emphasis placed on the curative effects of therapy and the potential of the individual to overcome circumstantial barriers might have drawn attention away from the need to "cure" society as well.

Ironically, albeit the leftist Neo-Freudian's have been called the cultural, social, and interpersonal school, when it comes to improving the well-being of the population they rely heavily on the therapy room. Such attitude has gained them the adjective of idealists. Idealists in the sense that they hope to change society by altering ideas and predispositions without effecting major modifications in the material and economic conditions (Caruso, 1964). Objecting to this trend Caruso (1964) asserted: "No one wants to fall back into the error of those ready to construct a New Society by means of psychoanalysis" (p. 275). Stating his own discomfort to such a situation Caruso admitted:

we psychoanalysts, orthodox or not, so often lull ourselves, as Erich Fromm does, with idealistic illusions; that is the reason why we are ready to believe that the couch in which our clients extend themselves is the bed whereon a New Humanity will be born (1964, p. 278).

In order to make psychoanalysis conform with the spirit of the times, and place, the Neo-Freudians had to make it "practical." As a result, the radical opponents

contend, they have advanced therapy at the expense of critical social theory (Bartlett, 1945; Caruso, 1964; Jacoby, 1975, 1983; H. Marcuse, 1966).

When the cultural and social repercussions of the Neo-Freudian Left are compared to that of the Radical Freudian Left, two differences are apparent. First, the Neo-Freudian message appears to be by far less challenging and more conforming than that of the Radicals. Second, the reformist spirit of the Neo-Freudians has reached a much greater audience; both within and without psychology. That is mainly, I think, due to the popularity of Fromm's books in the general public, and Sullivan's acceptance in clinical psychology.

To be sure, the Neo-Freudians were at least social reformists. And if when compared to the Radical Freudians they look quite conformist; when evaluated against the psychoanalytic groups to be discussed next they look quite radical.

The Conservative Freudians

Although psychoanalysis can be thought to have numerous progressive implications, "there is a marked tendency for these to be suppressed in favor of therapeutic techniques which in effect focus on fostering the individual's adjustment to his or her environment" (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 207). As we have seen in this and previous chapters, a common

strategy utilized by conservatives to avert opposition to the status quo is to "blame the victim" for their own misery, and propose solutions based on personal changes. In this section I shall provide a few examples of human suffering whereby psychoanalysis has been invoked to stress individual or group "pathology" and at the same time to exculpate society.

Few writers have so clearly exposed the "blaming the victim" ideology as W. Ryan (1971). His detailed documentation of instances where social and economic factors are undermined or omitted from the etiology of poverty contains illustrative examples of the role played by psychoanalysis in upholding that ideology. W. Ryan (1971), for instance, takes issue with Kardiner, a psychoanalyst who believes that poverty will not be eradicated "merely [italics added] by housing, more jobs or improved education" (in W. Ryan, 1971, p. 140), but by some kind of compensatory emotional education. Kardiner's proposed plan would be

to organize cadres of women who, after a short training program, would go into emotionally impoverished homes where they would attempt some educating and guiding of the adults as to how they can provide some of the needed nurture....Whatever the plans, we must treat the causes of the disease, not the symptoms (In W. Ryan, 1971, p. 140).

Kardiner states in no uncertain terms that for him the

emotional problems are not symptoms, but the very cause of poverty.

W. Ryan (1971) also quotes extensively from Chilman, an expert in poverty. All too familiar with the language of psychoanalysis, Chilman asserts that the poor has less "ego strength," is "immature," and has a marked tendency towards "impulsivity." W. Ryan himself acknowledges that some of these characteristics may apply to some poor people. But he correctly points out that under no circumstances the emotional problems of some should lead to the conclusion that they are generating poverty and as a result these, and not the economic roots of poverty should be treated.

According to the psychoanalytic view, "the problems of the poor are, at bottom, manifestations of neurosis or character disorder. That is, they are intrapsychic problems that can only be corrected by therapeutic intervention in the psychic processes of the poor person himself" (W. Ryan, 1971, p. 147).

Another case of psychoanalysis at the service of conservative interests can be observed in psychoanalytic explanations of the behavior of Blacks. Since the turn of the century there have been numerous psychoanalysts whose writings, benevolent as they might have been intended, were in effect quite injurious to Black people (Thomas & Sillen, 1972). Thomas and Sillen (1972) provide extensive evidence of psychoanalytic conjectures

concerning the almost "inevitable" differences between whites and Blacks in the social order given the "inferior" constitution of the Black psyche. Their study revealed that such views were repeatedly expressed by psychoanalysts since the first issues of The Psychoanalytical Review in 1913, and The American Journal of Psychiatry in 1921, up until the publication of their book in 1972 (Thomas & Sillen, 1972).

Thomas and Sillen's incisive account of the use made of psychoanalysis to justify the oppression of one race by another is replete with examples of degrading commentaries about Blacks. Although the anguish and torment experienced by the latter are seldom directly attributed to their "inferior" mental development, many psychoanalysts insinuate, in one way or another, that the Black is incapable of conducting an independent life. This is due to an either passive submissive character, or a chronic dependency on whites. The stigmatization of Blacks as submissive goes back to McDougall's "instinct of submission." In 1921 McDougall claimed that "in the great strength of this instinct of submission, we have the key to the history of the Negro race" (In Thomas & Sillen, 1972, p. 15). Both the submissive trait and the dependency on whites were resorted to by psychoanalysts Hunter and Black in their explanation of the Black's inability to function autonomously. They claimed that "in view of his

unprepared ego, the permission to individuate, given by law to the Negro slave in 1863, was essentially a useless privilege" (In Thomas & Sillen, 1972, p. 61). It may very well be that it was a privilege Blacks could not benefit from, but certainly not because of an "unprepared ego."

"Also characteristic of psychoanalytic explanations," Thomas and Sillen note, "is the misevaluation of the objective cause of black anger--the real oppression....The black man's anger is stripped of its genuiness and validity" (1972, p. 63). Instead, anger and protest are largely discredited as manifestations of psychological--not material--needs. Similarly, if the fate of Blacks was to improve, few talked about reshaping social institutions and attitudes, instead a "supernigger" was to be created (F. Marcuse, 1983). Psychological oversimplifications of the kind presented above are a trade mark of the many psychoanalytic authors reviewed by Thomas and Sillen (1972).

Homosexuality has been yet another area in which psychoanalysts have, intentionally or otherwise, upheld the status quo. Whereas Freud's view on homosexuality was one of tolerance and acceptance as an alternative way of life, many of his American followers hastened to declare that it was a pathological state (Bayer, 1981). Bieber, author of Homosexuality, a major study of the

New York Society of Medical Psychoanalysts conducted in the 1950s, is quoted by Bayer as saying that "all psychoanalytic theories assume that homosexuality is psychopathologic" (In Bayer, 1981, p. 30). Like Bieber, Socarides was to become, two decades ago, a major representative of the psychoanalytic position that homosexuality constituted a severe psychopathology (Bayer, 1981). Bayer's review of his work revealed that according to Socarides "almost half of those who engage in homosexual practices have a concomitant schizophrenia, paranoia, or latent or pseudoneurotic schizophrenia, or are 'in the throes of a manic-depressive reaction'" (Bayer, 1981, p. 35). These analysts go into great detail explaining homosexuality as a result of pathological family relationships or other psychological distortions. Although their arguments concerning the basic pathological nature of homosexuality have been refuted numerous times (e.g., Halleck, 1971; Spiers, 1973), their assertions were not easily dismissed (Bayer, 1981). Indeed, their assumptions hampered the efforts of those interested in having homosexuality deleted from the nomenclature of psychiatric illnesses (Spiers, 1973). Ultimately, the work of psychiatrists such as Halleck and homosexual activists (see for example Spiers, 1973) resulted in the deletion of homosexuality as a major entity from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in

1973 (Bayer, 1981).

Two final examples of the way in which psychoanalysis indirectly endorses conservative policies and discredits reform are provided by analysts Bettelheim and Hendin (Nahem, 1981). Commenting on activist student leaders the former is quoted as saying that they are "emotionally fixated at the age of the temper tantrum" (In Nahem, 1981, p. 24). Similarly, Hendin writes of students who protested against Nixon's policies:

These young radicals have suffered in families...which ignored and frustrated their personal needs and continue to be blind to them as people...Identification with the poor and the oppressed permits these radical students to react to poverty and oppression without having to face how personally impoverished, victimized and enraged they feel (In Nahem, 1981, p. 31).

In sum, two distinct psychoanalytic features with direct and indirect conservative repercussions have been reviewed. The first is the "pathologizing" of certain segments of the population, such as the poor, Blacks, and homosexuals, with the clear implication that whatever problems these people may experience are largely the result of their own pathology and not of society. The second is the discreditation of protest as a manifestation of unmet psychological needs.

Final Comment

The diversity of trends within the psychoanalytic movement precludes a conclusive assertion as to the political effects of psychoanalysis in general. For that reason I have preferred to present the social and cultural views of the different factions. Each faction, from progressive to conservative, have exerted some influence on the North American scene. Which is more potent? My personal reading of the situation is that the conservative branches of psychoanalysis have penetrated psychology more than the reformist or progressive groups. The latter seem to have exerted greater influence on the left in general than on the "psychological" left (cf. Bramel & Friend, 1982).

Finally, I would pose that psychoanalysis can be potentially employed to either support or oppose the status quo. As Ingleby stated: "If psychoanalysis reifies and reinforces the conditions of our upbringing, it provides the strongest buttress for our civilization. If, on the other hand, it exposes and criticizes them, it becomes a powerful catalyst for change" (Ingleby, 1981d, p. 13).

Chapter 7: Behaviorism

The use of analogies and metaphors is not unusual in psychology. "The conceptualization of similarities between two constructs in analogical fashion, or the use of language syntax in such a way that figures of speech are taken literally, as in metaphor" (Rychlak, 1968, p. 55) are helpful devices in understanding the major principles of theoretical systems. Recently, Deese (1985), and Sullivan (1984) have employed the mechanical metaphor in analyzing the image of the human being portrayed by operationalism and behaviorism. Pioneers of behaviorism have invested considerable effort in attempting to create a physics-like science of psychology. Such an attempt was primarily designed to enhance the credibility of psychology in the scientific community by complying with the dominant zeitgeist (Larsen, 1986b). According to Toulmin and Leary (1985), Watson's "resolution was to make psychology as close to experimental physics as he knew how, banishing all subjective appeals to introspectable data and focusing exclusively on public, observable reactions to arbitrary stimuli" (p. 601). Whereas Skinner differs from Watson on other issues, he was also interested in pursuing a physics model for the science of human behavior. In his Verbal Behavior, Skinner indicated that "there is a promising possibility that meanings will be kept outside the skin. In this sense, they are as observable as any

part of physics" (1957, p. 8).

Behaviorism has fostered a reactive, machine-like image of the human being. The individual is viewed mostly as a physical entity responding to external stimulation. His/her actions and movements are the objects of study, and the measurement of human behavior is the main concern within this framework. Control and prediction of behavior were considered the parameters of a successful psychological science (Deese, 1972). At the level of philosophy of science, a reductionist, elemental, deterministic image of people is adopted by the promoters of the mechanical metaphor (Deese, 1985; Sullivan, 1984).

Prior to our inquiry into the more ideologically sensitive themes of behaviorism it should be pointed out that this school of thought is not a unitary entity. Krapfl and Vargas (1977a) distinguish between two major orientations within behaviorism: (a) Methodological behaviorism, and (b) Radical behaviorism. The former differs from the latter in that it deals "only with public and not with private events" (Krapfl & Vargas, 1977a, p. X). Methodological behaviorism, as a branch of philosophy, suggests that mental episodes are "equivalent in meaning to statements about the behaviour of the embodied persons in whose minds the events or states are said to occur" (Quinton, 1988, p. 75). Radical behaviorism, as representative Michael (1984)

observes "does not exclude private stimuli...from scientific consideration" (p. 120). A second distinguishing factor has to do with their overall world view. Whereas the former views behaviorism mainly as a method of research, the latter's "principal interests are in the extension of behaviorism to all facets of human activity" (Krapfl & Vargas, 1977a, p. X). Radical behaviorists, say Krapfl & Vargas (1977a), "identify themselves with the works of Skinner, and are interested in behaviorism as a social and intellectual movement as well as in its technological development. Radical behaviorism is behaviorism in its broadest sense in that it incorporates all behavioristic methodologies" (p. XI) (see also Michael, 1977).

A third group, noticeably removed from Skinner, is cognitive behavioral psychology. Some of the ideological repercussions of that trend will be dealt with in the chapter entitled cognitivism.

Given that my interests lie in the broad social implications of the practices and beliefs generated by the teachings of Skinner, this chapter may be said to address primarily the branch known as radical behaviorism.

Social Betterment Through Behaviorism

It is not difficult to find the commonalties between the terminology of behaviorism and the semantics of technocracy. In a society where technology has been

many times uncritically used as a synonym of progress (Ellul, 1964), psychology was bound to acquire not only the procedures but also the weltanschauung of technology. The "geometric expansion of the (behavior modification) field" (Bellak, Hersen, and Kazdin, 1982, p. XI) in the last three decades attests to society's faith in the more technologically oriented psychologies.

An unfortunate side-effect of this innovative weltanschauung was the notion that technology possesses the necessary tools to answer moral and ethical questions. In my view, this epistemological error has been a constitutive part of behaviorism. This conceptual confusion about the proper domains of a technology of human behavior has been a major feature in Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1972).

"If a scientific analysis can tell us how to change behavior, can it tell us what changes to make?" (Skinner, 1972, p. 97). In understanding Skinner's position, as Day (1977) pointed out, "the important thing to realize is that Skinner's answer to this question is essentially yes" (p. 12). Skinner, then, suggested solving ethical concerns by means of a technology of behavior. Such a technology could assist in designing a desired type of human being, but it cannot determine what image is to be created (cf. Freedman, 1972; C.B. Rogers, 1977).

Skinner (1972) implicitly equates scientific and

technical knowledge with what is morally right. What is good for science is necessarily good for human welfare. Such a position is questionable on two accounts. First, it contends that an "ought" statement can be derived from an "is" statement; a view which many regard not only as untenable but also incompatible with the positivistic, "value-free" scientific paradigm endorsed by behaviorism (e.g., Freedman, 1972; C.B. Rogers, 1977). Being able to account for the values held by individuals is not the same as knowing which values are intrinsically advantageous for the promotion of human welfare. As Freedman (1972) put it "the statements of the 'values or goals sought' cannot come from science, even though behavioral scientists may be able to explain why an individual holds one set of values rather than another" (p. 6-1).

The second objection against the implied identity "what is good for science is good for human welfare" emanates from the plethora of problems elicited by the image of the Scientist King. In this variance the Psychologist King. Two of these difficulties should suffice to illustrate the intricate issues involved. If scientific expertise does not confer any superiority whatsoever in the choice of values to be promoted, then "Skinner, as a behavioral scientist, is no more nor less qualified than anyone else to decide what is right and wrong" (Freedman, 1972, p. 6-3). Similarly, C. B.

Rogers (1977) contends that

subjecting statements to possible falsification is at the heart of the scientific enterprise. If a behaviorist suggest that y type of behavior should be valued by society...there is no way to subject such a statement to possible falsification....When a behaviorist asserts that he/she knows what society should be like, I have no great problem....The point at issue is, does expertise as a behaviorist [italics added] put one in a better position than others to determine what should be the nature of their society?....In the same sense that nuclear physicists shouldn't determine the conditions under which an atomic bomb should be used, or doctor's shouldn't determine whether patients have a right to live or die, behaviorists shouldn't determine the desired type of behavior to be sought from people in a society....Behaviorism has much to offer, both as a science and as a technique for attaining a variety of goals. It has no more to offer than any other group when it comes to deciding what those goals should be (pp. 361-362).

An answer frequently given by behaviorists to the above proposition is that they value "survival" (e.g., Michael, 1977; Skinner, 1972). But even if they were able to prove that survival would be achieved by

behaviorism, the point remains that survival is itself a matter of choice over which human beings may disagree. Survival under what conditions? Survival of which culture? (for a fuller discussion of this point see Machan, 1974, chap. 4).

As well, people can be justifiably concerned about the prospect of having Psychologist Kings choose the "right" ways of either surviving or self-fulfillment; for as benevolent as scientists might wish to be, and as efficient as counter-controls may be, there is enough evidence to indicate that the personal interests of scientists and those who support them, at times, come before the welfare of the community (Savan, 1988).

Behaviorism and Technicism

Woolfolk and Richardson (1984) contend that behavior therapy is consonant with the ideology of modernity, of which technicism is an indispensable feature. This ideology is mostly promoted by the ruling institutions in society which play an essential role in maintaining the societal status quo. The conforming message behind its ideology is that problems of inequity and social injustice can be solved through the development of "technics" of social engineering, and more efficient managerial strategies. By masking social and moral conflicts with the appearance of mere "technical" inconveniences, the individual is led to believe that in principle the present state of affairs

in society is really adequate and only "technicalities" stand between suffering and the attainment of a happier life. In other words, fundamental issues pertaining to the moral and ethical values preserved by the ruling institutions may be eluded by offering solutions to social riddles in terms of efficiency, re-organization, better management, and technical progress (cf. Brandt, 1979). Questions of essence are distorted into questions of form. Furthermore, in our dynamic society where technological changes occur at a rapid pace, the individual is likely to think that indeed measures are being taken in order to alleviate his/her situation. More often than not, those changes serve the dominant ideology and its supporters, thereby justifying in effect the maxim that: "the more things change, the more they remain the same."

Behaviorism has absorbed and has been absorbed by the mechanical spirit of our century, promoting the view that the betterment of society depends mainly on the progress of technology in general, and of a specific technology of human behavior in particular. A considerable risk is run when the main thrust of behaviorism is placed on technical concerns about change, for they may divert attention from cardinal ethical issues. The eagerness to control human behavior and change it should not precede, or be at the expense of, questioning the moral implications of change for the

individuals involved and for society as a whole. A case in point is Oppenheimer's comment about the development of the hydrogen bomb: "When you see something that's technically sweet you go ahead and do it and argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success" (In Marcatillo & Nevin, 1986, p. 63). Fully aware of this risk Krasner reports about one of his interventions: "To the extent that we were successful in developing a token economy program on a hospital ward, we were helping maintain a social institution, the mental hospital, that in its current form, was no longer desirable in our society" (1976, p. 635).

Progressive Behaviorism vs. Conservative Behaviorists

In principle, behaviorism may be lauded as progressive in that it stands in direct opposition to the "blaming the victim" philosophy. Behaviorism brought into sharp focus the issue of external controls. One's pleasure as well as one's misery are largely determined by controlling factors in the environment (cf. Geiser, 1976, p. 151). Contrary to popular wisdom and naivete (cf. Krapfl & Vargas, 1977b), behaviorism did not impose "controls where none existed before" (Bandura, 1969, p. 85), it simply drew our attention to the determining variables in an unprecedented manner. Such an experimental analysis of behavior thus enables a systematic study of social circumstances conducive to

human suffering (Holland, 1978a). An important first step in altering social structures.

Yet, behaviorism's progressive potential is severely curtailed by an occupational myopia. While it in fact professes the need for social changes (Marcatillo & Nevin, 1986; Nevin, 1982, 1985; Skinner, 1948, 1985), at the applied level behaviorism has almost exclusively concentrated on the re-organization of the individual's behavior and her/his immediate environment. The present writer would concur with Holland (1977) that many of "those who sell their talents as behavior modifiers accept the victim-blaming definitions which (actually) serve power and attempt to fix, not environments, but the inner nature of the individuals" (p. 203). Having reviewed the literature on this very point Stolz (1978) arrived at the conclusion that

In the practice of behavior modification, then, as with other psychological therapies, society has controlled the definition of deviance, located the problem within the individual, and directed treatment toward changing the individual.

Rebellious school children are taught to follow rules; questions are seldom raised about whether the classroom activities are boring or aversive. Alcoholic persons are punished for drinking or trained to make social responses considered more adaptive; questions are seldom raised about the

many pressures for the consumption of alcohol, such as cocktail parties, attractive advertising, and interpersonal activities for which drinking alcohol is an essential entrance behavior. Homosexuals are shocked in the presence of photographs of males or given orgasmic retraining; questions are only recently being raised about the societal pressures forcing homosexuals to request redirection of their sexual interests (Stolz, 1978, pp. 48-49).

Larsen (1986b) summarized this argument commenting that Behaviorists "frequently overlook the (macro) social context of behavior" (pp. 222-223).

It may be argued that since behaviorists stress the modification of environmental conditions in helping the individual that it is in fact a highly progressive theory. This argument would hold only if the social changes proposed would be comprehensive enough to diminish the environmental factors involved in the perpetuation of human suffering. Behaviorists have traditionally concentrated on the alteration of immediate external conditions, as opposed to more social-oriented changes. Given the fact that basic factors are left undisturbed and the roots of the problems not extirpated, this may not be regarded as a radical approach.

At the applied level, behaviorists have almost exclusively directed efforts at re-organization at the

micro-level. Institutions where the behavior occurs are seldom challenged. These merely undergo a small scale rearrangement of their contingencies. This has been the case in penitentiaries, mental hospitals and schools (Geiser, 1976; Winett & Winkler, 1972). The school system, where behavior modification has had a tremendous impact, provides an illustrative example. More often than not, interventions are designed to neutralize rebellious children, pacify "trouble-makers," and simply make them more docile (Geiser, 1976; Winett & Winkler, 1972). This kind of behavioral engineering is very appealing to those reluctant to take another look at their educational practices. Embarrassing questions dealing with the structure of the educational system as a whole (such as: is the school serving the needs of all the children or only those who can learn by ancient techniques? or may it be that educational practices need serious reform to foster motivation in all children?) may be strategically avoided when those who do not follow the rules can be labelled attention deficit disorder or conduct disorder and given behavioral treatment. As Geiser (1976) pointed out, "a great danger of behavior mod technology is its tendency to reinforce the status quo and to discourage the uncomfortable questions" (p. 92). On the particular issue of behavior modification in the schools Geiser (1976) observed:

Because the methods do work to a degree, behavior

mod has strengthened the reign of law and order in poor school systems....Behavior moders...are hired by those in power in institutional settings, and their methods serve the status quo of the establishment....Their extremely narrow focus concentrates on a subject's behavior in an immediate situation....(They) redesign the child to fit the existing environment (p. 97).

A similar case is made by Holland (1978a) against the correctional system. Wittingly or unwittingly the behavior analyst strives to "correct" the offender "even though the behaviorists' knowledge of the principles of behavior control should inspire a search for the controlling variables in the world [italics added] of the criminal." (Holland, 1978a). After all, as Corsini (1955) wrote about the treatment of criminals, "the use of therapy is a cheap way of assisting men to better adjustment" (p. 163). Cheap? Yes. Effective? Likely not (Corsini, 1955; Holland, 1978a). From a behavioral point of view it is indispensable to address the contingencies facing the criminal in her/his own natural environment.

Holland's paper Behaviorism: Part of the problem or part of the solution? (1978a; see also replies by Azrin, Birnbrauer, and Goldiamond; as well as rejoinder by Holland, 1978b, in same issue) is a landmark contribution in understanding both the functional ideological role of behaviorists in supporting the

present social order, as well as in delineating the unrealized potential of behaviorism as a catalyst for social change. To put it in his own words, while "behaviorism stands ready to be part of the solution, the applied behaviorist has too often been part of the problem" (Holland, 1978a, p. 163).

In applying behavioral principles to behavior therapists' contribution to the social reproduction of the present social order, Holland concludes that their dependence on those who control society largely determines their selective concern with micro-level environments. According to him, the proposition that large scale institutional reforms be carried out, be it in order to eliminate certain behavioral problems or to enhance the welfare of the population, may be justifiably perceived by those in power as a threat to their privileged position. Moreover, he argues that behavioral analysts themselves may not be interested in fostering macrosocial changes, for in the present system their rewards are substantial. It should be immediately pointed out that Holland's conclusions can be easily generalized to all the helping professions.

Following a denunciatory analysis that portrays behaviorists as part of the problem due to their reluctance to promote macro-social changes or at the very least radical institutional changes, he proceeds with an annunciatory discussion of how behaviorism can

be part of the solution to social problems. Holland argues that "ironically, even as we serve power, our behavior--modification systems are beginning to give the social reformer an advantage. Behavior modification models the normal societal control process and makes the process explicit and clearer" (Holland, 1978a, p. 171). The experimental analysis of behavior can be employed in discerning the mechanisms involved in the perpetuation of systemic inequity and exploitation, and in designing the way for improvement.

If the people of a society are unhappy, if they are poor, if they are deprived, then it is the contingencies embodied in institutions, in the economic system, and in the government which must change. It takes changed contingencies to change behavior. If social equality is a goal, then all the institutional forms that maintain stratification must be replaced with forms that assure equality of power and equality of status. If exploitation is to cease, institutional forms that assure cooperation must be developed. Thus, experimental analysis provides a supporting rationale for the reformer who sets out to change systems (Holland, 1978a, p. 170).

In conclusion, Holland's contribution has been to distinguish between how behaviorism is being currently applied and how it should be applied. The manner in

which it is widely utilized at present serves to support the present social order; the ideal way in which it should be employed would promote macro-social changes.

Statements urging social scientists to utilize behaviorism to advance social reforms have been recently made by radical behaviorists (Michael, 1977). They plea to create a "more peaceful and productive world" (Skinner, 1985, pp. 24-25), and to "use our knowledge and our skills as psychologists" in social action (Nevin, 1985, p. 43). Similarly, growing interest in the fields of behavioral ecology (Rogers Warren & Warren, 1977; Rozytko, Swift, Swift & Boggs, 1973; Willems, 1974), and behavioral community psychology (Jason & Glenwick, 1984) may be a sign of greater awareness of the crucial roles played by largely forgotten macro-environmental factors in assisting "diverse subgroups of our society in better meeting their needs" (Jason & Glenwick, 1984, p. 110).

These can no doubt be considered positive developments in that they counteract the overwhelming tendency to deal mainly with the individual and the immediate surroundings. Nevertheless, thus far the focus on the immediate stimuli affecting the behavior under treatment seems to have monopolized the behavioral literature. Therefore, the attention given to social conditions that might have contributed to the evolution of the problems being dealt with is yet unsatisfactory.

As radical behaviorist Michael (1977) observed: "At present, behaviorists use too much time and energy on cure and not enough on prevention" (p. 303).

Chapter 8: Humanism

Numerous meanings have been ascribed to the term "Humanism." In the present context I shall refer to Humanism as formulated and practised by Humanistic psychologists. In 1962 Maslow described the field of psychology as having been dominated by two comprehensive schools of thought, the Freudian and the experimentalistic-positivistic-behavioristic. Maslow also contended that a new trend, called the "Third Force," had become an important player in the arena of psychological movements. This new force has been usually identified as Humanistic Psychology. The following excerpt, taken from the statement of purposes of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, will be helpful in understanding the wide spectrum of interests and the philosophy adopted by the emerging movement.

The Journal of Humanistic Psychology publishes papers dealing with Humanistic Psychology, defined as "primarily an orientation toward the whole of psychology rather than a distinct area or school. It stands for respect for the worth of persons.... As 'third force' in contemporary psychology it is concerned with the topics having little place in existing theories and systems; e.g., love, creativity, self, growth, organism, basic-need gratification, self-actualization, higher values, being, becoming, spontaneity, play, humor,

affection, naturalness, warmth, ego-transcendence, objectivity, autonomy, responsibility, meaning, fairplay, transcendental experience, peak experience, courage, and related concepts" (Sutich, cited in Maslow, 1970, p. 70).

It has been argued that Humanistic Psychology gained many of its supporters due to its reaction to Freudian (e.g., Buhler, 1962; Kunkel, 1989) and Skinnerian determinism (e.g., Rogers, 1961). The humanistic approach clearly emphasizes the human potential for change and growth. This school believes in the capability of the psychological organism to "liberate" itself from circumstantial barriers and to overcome external constraints. It advanced the notion (wishful thinking?) that human beings are capable of making choices and being in charge of their own lives, as opposed to the regnant Freudian and/or Skinnerian interpretation that our lives are controlled by impulses, the unconscious, or external stimulation.

Humanistic psychologists took upon themselves the task of creating a self-generated image of persons. An organism that would rise above environmental conditioning and be able to conduct her/himself through life as a self-guided, self-governed individual. "The suggestion implicit in the humanist concept of 'psychological freedom' is the individual ability to transcend society" (Larsen, 1986b, p. 227). Moreover,

they mandated themselves to rescue the "self" from the lack of reflection and contemplation endorsed by behaviorism and the imposition of unconscious drives advanced by Freudian psychology. Buss (1986) contends that many liberal psychologists could not reconcile the pursuit for self-determination with either behaviorism or psychoanalysis; for both paradigms are highly deterministic. In this regard humanistic psychologists may have confused the messenger with the message. To the extent that psychoanalytic and behavioral principles can be found to be correct, they represent a certain situation, they do not necessarily create conditions for control or determinism. The claim would be tantamount to accusing Newton for the existence of the law of gravity.

On the basis that neither behaviorism nor psychoanalysis advanced liberal values (i.e. freedom, liberty, individual development), humanistic psychologists "launched their critique of the two 'traditional' psychologies" (Buss, 1986, p. 138). In its battle against determinism, however, humanism overlooked some environmental variables that exercise considerable influence upon human personality and behavior. In its eagerness to show how flexible and adaptive the human "soul" is, it did not, until recently, pay enough attention to ecological determinants of human suffering and the need to modify those adverse socioeconomic conditions. Such omission resulted in an excessive

burden or expectations on some individuals seeking personal relief; and at the same time in an exculpation of social structures and institutions in seeking global relief. As we shall see below, the conservative implications of these attitudes are accentuated by a marked political innocence and a notable "retreatism," a form of passivity which will be defined more fully below.

To be sure, humanistic psychologists aspire to promote human values that would enhance not only personal well-being, but community well-being as well. Witness for instance the attributes ascribed to the ideal humanist type by Maslow and Rogers. Among others, Maslow's study of what he called self-actualized or psychologically healthy individuals revealed the following characteristics: independence, enhanced sense of morality and justice, unselfishness, appreciation of beauty, spontaneity, humor and creativity, living in peace with oneself, ability to listen and learn from others, etc. (e.g., Goble, 1970, pp. 23-36). Another insight into the ideal humanist type is provided by Rogers (1986) when he describes the "Person of Tomorrow." Rogers talks about this person's "desire for intimacy, closeness, and community...openness to his own and others' feelings...spontaneity" (1986, p. 30). Both the Rogerian and the Maslovian types serve as role models for humanistic psychologists wanting to create a

better world. Yet, these noble sentiments of morality, justice, unselfishness and community, remain mostly dreams to be dreamt by humanistic psychologists suffering from a rather severe case of political naivete (Aron, 1986; Jacoby, 1975). Simply put, good intentions are not enough. Or as Thibault (1981) observed: "Working for the people's cause does not necessarily guarantee that we work for the people" (p. 278).

Voices of discontent over the political implications of the politically insensitive, self-oriented humanistic attitude are being heard. Articles by May, Nord, Buss, Lafferty, and Marien in the new volume: Politics and Innocence: A Humanistic Debate compiled by Greening (1986) raise critical questions about to the place of humanistic psychology in the social order. Some of May's remarks illustrate this trend: "No amount of sweetness and light is going to solve our political problems or is going to keep us out of nuclear war" (May, 1986a, p. 9). Analyzing an optimistic Rogerian outlook of our culture May writes in an open letter to Rogers: "You paint a seductive and enticing picture, and anyone would like to believe it. But I recall the words of Warren Bennis in the film of you and him, when he characterized your viewpoint as 'devilishly innocent'" (May, 1986b, p. 16).

An unfounded optimism about an illusory autonomous

self along with an overtly bland and individualistic approach to social reform co-exist with sincere declarations of caring and respect for the person and human community in the politics of humanism. These will be explored below.

The Perils of "Salvation" Through Self-Actualization

The emphasis placed on personal and global liberation through self-actualization, or the fulfillment of one's potential, is one of the principal tenets of the humanist movement. That notion entails a number of political implications that require attention. These have been succinctly presented by Buss (1986):

The excessive individualism contained in the doctrine of self-actualization serves to mask the larger social questions surrounding society's structures and institutions. A theory that predisposes one to focus more upon individual freedom and development rather than the larger social reality, works in favor of maintaining that social reality (p. 140).

Albeit inadvertently, the combination of (a) unlimited faith in the potential of the self to evolve and overcome adversities, with (b) limited criticism of societal structures, may result in what has been earlier referred to as a "blaming the victim stance." The emphasis placed on therapy and on the almost unlimited possibilities of change in the individual, along with a

rather constricted social critique, might well lead to the conclusion that nothing is wrong with society, it is the "I" who has to change.

A parallel between the idolization and/or idealization of the "self" by humanistic psychologists and the cherishment of individualism in modern America can be easily drawn. As Lasch (1984) put it, "Rogers's own approach to therapy, as a follower put it, was 'as American as apple pie'" (p. 211). The American dream is ratified by humanistic psychologists who lead people to believe that they have the absolute power to satisfy all their aspirations, regardless of adverse material and social conditions. Interestingly enough, humanistic psychologists have emphasized the need to study "healthy individuals," those "who made it" in capitalist America, probably conveying the message that we can all make it if we have the spirit. As Jacoby (1975) says:

The fetish of health, success, adjustment finds expression in the case histories presented...This psychology is the ideology of conformism and synchronization in the era of late capitalism. The reality of violence and destruction, of psychically and physically damaged people, is not merely glossed over, but buried beneath the lingo of self, meaning, authenticity, personality (pp. 56-57).

Rogers, a pioneer and leading figure in humanistic psychology, fostered the idea that personal problems are

basically of an internal or endogenous nature (Rogers, 1961). Sarason is quite right in asserting that Rogers's Counseling and Psychotherapy "defined the problems of people in terms of an individual psychology: Problems were personal or narrowly interpersonal and for all practical purposes independent of the nature and structure of the social order" (Sarason, 1981b, p. 830). While Rogers does not deny the existence of acute social problems and their reflection on the mental health of the population (Rogers, 1986), his elucidation of their origin is seriously misguided. In his view, problems of social order are reduced to the lack of exposure of individuals to a growth-promoting interpersonal climate. Accordingly, if "therapy gives us favorable conditions for continuing our psychological growth" (Rogers, 1967, p. 21), a psychologically mature person would evolve who will possess "the qualities which would cause him to value those experiences which would make for the survival and enhancement of the human race. He would be a worthy participant and guide in the process of human evolution" (Rogers, 1967, p. 20). In my opinion, the fundamental error committed by Rogers is to believe that society is run as a therapeutic session, or an encounter group, in which feelings of equality and community arise as part of the healing process. However, social, economic, and political predicaments require solutions of a social, economic, or political nature.

Psychology might occasionally facilitate understanding between persons and groups but it is definitely not the only, or even preferred, tool for the promotion of human welfare. By attributing the cause of socioeconomic and political conflicts to psychological roots, Rogers also contributes to the perpetuation of the status quo, for as long as the political and socioeconomic roots of problems remain uncovered, societal changes will inevitably be postponed.

Whether or not humanistic psychologists intentionally support the predominant ideology is a debatable question. Much less ambiguous is the conclusion that by diverting attention from social problems and presenting them as a matter of individual "psychological immaturity," the "third force" in psychology is doing a great favor to those interested in prolonging the existing state of affairs in society. For as Larsen (1986) recently asserted, "those who believe that self-actualization will occur in a socio-economic vacuum support the status quo" (p. 226).

Another latent conservative facet of humanistic psychology is the phenomenon known as retreatism. This is a form of

system maintenance by encouraging or aiding those who experience frustrations with the system to retreat into the self or into groups embracing emotional but not political expression. The

clearest case is the encounter group movement, which...has strong elements of sociopolitical withdrawal (Bermant & Warwick, 1978, p. 393).

An even more insidious conservative process has been depicted by Marien (1986), who draws an analogy between the activities of humanistic psychologists and children playing in a sandbox. The sandbox syndrome, as Marien refers to it, symbolizes the area where children play without disturbing the adults, or where humanists entertain ideas of change without considering the political complexities surrounding the sandbox. In the sandbox, humanists nurture each other and foster the belief that a better world is inevitably coming. While Marien's portrayal of humanistic psychology embodies many of the risks contained in a caricature (mainly simplification), and should be interpreted with caution, there is value in his representation. For, as he writes, "the widespread belief in a transformation that is happening in fact keeps it from happening" (Marien, 1986, p. 53), simply by deflecting concern from the structural, material, economic modifications to be pursued if changes are to be meaningful and to last.

Global "Salvation" Through Humanism

A reading of works by leaders of the humanist movement (e.g., Ferguson, 1986; Maslow, 1965, 1971, 1986; Rogers, 1967, 1986) reveals a sensitivity to social and such global issues as alienation, war, the

environment and human rights. Humanistic psychology's hope is to expand the rewarding experiences of self-actualization to as many people as possible. Such an honorable goal is commendable, but the strategy--or lack of it--in achieving this state of affairs is not. The transition from self to communal actualization may not be as simple as envisioned by Humanists such as Ferguson (1986), Maslow (1971) or Rogers (1986).

Though conceptualized as global, the primary mode of addressing these issues is a highly personalistic or individualistic one. The underlying thread is that if we all become better individuals through self-actualization, constructive changes in the structure of society will necessarily follow. Societal conflicts are treated here as if they were merely interpersonal or intrapsychic (cf. Van Hoorn, 1984), but the applicability of models that have been helpful in fostering cohesion and cooperation in small groups (regardless of their size) to large societal processes is most questionable. As Doyle (1986) observed, "humanists and psychologists...are addressing change at the interpersonal level of politics rather than structural change" (p. 203). Consequently, caution is recommended when predicting the humanization of society through methods whose feasibility has been chiefly proven in artificial collectives created for the purposes of self-development (Back, 1978). Such caution

is doubly necessary when facing a most embellished picture of the future and somewhat exaggerated claims about the ability of humanist technology to bring about such an ideal state of affairs. Here is one such claim made by Rogers (1986):

I believe that our American way of life will be radically altered by the growth of a new value system, a new culture in which feelings and subjectivity and openness (rather than hypocrisy) have a prominent place, alongside intelligence. We are going to have a new America, in my judgment, an America of change and flow, of people rather than objects. We have the know-how, the skills, to bring about this new America [italics added]. And now, in an increasing number of significant persons, mostly young but also older, we have the determination and the will to bring it into being. I think it is not unrealistic to believe that there will come into being a portion of the global community, residing on this North American continent, of which we will no longer be ashamed, but in which we will feel a quiet, peaceful pride (p. 32).

If words were historical events, this would mean something, but one can only wonder about Rogers' sources for such extravagant optimism.

Personal accounts tend to confirm that encounter groups and humanistic therapy in general have

facilitated the process of self-actualization for some people. Some report considerable improvement in the way they feel about themselves and the way they get along with others. Lafferty (1986) notes that his humanistic therapy "produced profound and highly rewarding personal results" (p. 47). These satisfying personal outcomes, however, should not be confused with, or taken as, social amelioration. The individual spiritual elation and happier general outlook on life that may be occasioned by humanistic therapy do not automatically translate into steps for a better society. That is the realm of social and political action. "Without action toward social change, humanistic psychology will remain a class psychology for upper middle class families" (Larsen, 1986b, p. 226).

So far, the beneficial effects of humanistic therapy appear to have been reserved for a small privileged community whose socioeconomic position and environmental conditions afford them the luxury of seeking personal development. As Campbell (1986) concedes, "it is true this (humanistic) movement has been primarily a self-help group of middle class, mostly white Westerners....We have been blessed with the luxury to explore levels beyond survival" (pp. 196-197). This would be no problem were it not for the fact that humanistic psychologists claim that only personal salvation for middle class white Westerners, but global

salvation through a humanistic therapeutic world culture (Ferguson, 1986; Maslow, 1971; Rogers, 1970, 1986).

Global "salvation" through self-actualization presupposes that social relations can be changed through individualistic means par excellence (Aron, 1986; Nord, 1986). In other words, there is a somewhat unwarranted tendency to extrapolate from personal salvation to global salvation.

One cannot question the desire of humanists to change the world and to make it a more just and better place to live. But their effusive enthusiasm, originated in the positive personal transformations experienced by individual members, may have led them into believing that beneficial societal transformations are also occurring. Thus, Ferguson (1986) offers as evidence for these humanist progressive social changes the fact that she was invited to lecture to many big corporations as well as other institutions throughout the world. As opposed to her conclusion that this is indicative of changes in attitude that favor a humanist culture, it may be argued that the very fact that she is invited to "lecture" serves the purpose of controlling dissidence by promoting debate which rarely expands beyond the boundaries of a clearly established consensus. Such stratagem, vastly researched by Herman and Chomsky (1988, also Chomsky, 1988) is one of many used in manufacturing consent. In sum, the promotion of

debate and controversial viewpoints cannot be said to necessarily guarantee change. On the contrary, it may be utilized as a means of containing change. As a result, a very different conclusion from that asserted by Ferguson may be arrived at, i.e. that instead of becoming more humane, big corporations are becoming more articulate in the rhetoric of humanism.

Finally, a word about power. This is not an entirely neglected issue for Maslow (1986) and Rogers (1986), but certainly an underemphasized one. Attitudinal changes are given much more consideration than power redistribution. As with many other issues, political power is conceptualized in psychological terms such as authoritarianism (Maslow, 1965, 1986), and as such it can be given psychological remedies. As to alienation, fragmentation of the human experience, and racial tensions, T-Groups are recommended (Maslow, 1986; Rogers, 1970). Humpden-Turner's observation that Maslow "was not very sophisticated in political affairs" (1986, p. 112) may be an understatement.

Humanists have their "heart in the right place," but they may also have their "head in the sand." As Nord (1986) has recently observed: "much of humanistic psychology may be too psychological to be effectively humanistic" (p. 136).

Chapter 9: Cognitivism

Various currents of research and thought may be incorporated under the comprehensive umbrella of cognitive psychology. Theories referred to as cognitive are prevalent, inter alia, in the areas of personality (Kelly, 1971; Hjelle & Zigler, 1981); clinical (Beck, 1976, 1982; Freeman & Greenwood, 1987; Mahoney, 1977; Mahoney & Freeman, 1985); development (Buck-Morss, 1979; Gholson & Rosenthal, 1984; Sampson, 1981); social psychology (Israel, 1979; Furby, 1979); learning (Anderson & Travis, 1983); information processing, perception, and artificial intelligence (Baars, 1986, Costall & Still, 1987; Gardner, 1985). Cognitive psychology's objects of study are the internal processes according to which the individual filters and manipulates physical and/or psychological stimulation. Its purpose is to unravel the mystery of the mind and how it affects behavior. Following Sampson (1981), I shall refer to cognitive psychology as "that broad and diverse range of psychological approaches which emphasize the structures and processes within the individual's mind that are said to play the major role in behavior" (pg. 730). At the same time that they emphasize cognition, I concur with Gardner (1985) in that it de-emphasizes affect, context, culture and history (pp. 41-42).

With these defining characteristics, the modern

cognitive paradigm may be in fact considered the vivid legacy of Cartesianism. As Gardner (1985) observed, "Rene Descartes is perhaps the prototypical philosophical antecedent of cognitive science" (p. 50). Descartes has largely set the parameters not only of cognitive psychology but of psychology as a whole. Capra (1982) has stated rather categorically that "the science of psychology has been shaped by the Cartesian paradigm. Psychologists, following Descartes, adopted the strict division between the res cogitans and the res extensa" (p. 164). And while behaviorism attempted to do away with mind altogether and restrict psychology to the science of the observable, we witness today in psychology a resurgence of dualism in favor of res cogitans. Skinner (1987) has recently admitted, with some disdain, that psychology has remained "primarily a search for internal determiners" (p. 780). "The 'new' cognitive sciences are to some extent retracings of an older 'mentalism' that the behaviorists had attempted to bury" (Robinson, 1985, pp. 18-19). Although this trend has not gone unchallenged, and some psychologists try to promote anti-dualism and mutualism (Still & Costall, 1987), opposition has done little to undermine its supremacy (Costall & Still, 1987; Sampson, 1981).

The Cartesian dualism created difficulties not only for understanding how mind and body interact but also how mind and social context interact. Reconstituting the

mind as an autonomous entity relegated both organic and environmental variables to a second place. To the extent that cognitive psychology has adopted the Cartesian "mind," it has propounded and affirmed an abstracted person (Sampson, 1983, chap. 9; Still & Costall, 1987), a person conceptualized primarily as a self-generated being:

In this Cartesian viewpoint, the individual was presumed to be a substance or entity (a thinking entity as distinct from a material body) rather than a relation....Insofar as our psychology insistently extirpates the actor from the scene, we become incapable of learning that the scene is as important in shaping the actor's performance as the actor is in shaping the scene (Sampson, 1983, pp. 96-97).

This epistemological position of cognitivism has sociopolitical repercussions that, given the place of prominence enjoyed by cognitive theories in psychology today (Baars, 1986; Skinner, 1987), must be subjected to scrutiny. Two important works have dealt with the sociopolitical implications of cognitive theory: Sampson's Cognitive Psychology as Ideology (1981), which focuses mainly on its research and theory construction, and Anderson's and Travis's Psychology and the Liberal Consensus (1983), which centers on the educational applications of cognitive theory. Neither has addressed

the growing specialty of cognitive therapy. The present analysis will attempt to fill that void.

Cognitive Theory and Research

Central to understanding the social and political implications of cognitive theory and research is the concept of reification. Reification refers to

The act of regarding an abstraction as a material thing. An analysis of any relationship in a complex world involves a process of simplification through a set of abstractions in which certain aspects of a given phenomenon are selected and stressed....If they are taken as a complete description of the real phenomenon and the resulting abstractions endowed with a material existence of their own, the process exemplifies...a special case of the fallacy of reification (Labeledz, 1988, p. 735).

In other words, reification is the treatment of one particular instance of a phenomenon as a discrete entity accounting for the phenomenon itself. In the case of human behavior, certain cognitions that may be involved in the overall phenomenon of behaving are regarded not only as distinct events, standing on their own, but also as causative forces of the behavior under examination. Two intimately related cognitive tendencies, obvious derivatives of Cartesianism, may be said to be conducive to reification in cognitive psychology: (a) Personal cognitive causation, and (b) De-emphasis on context.

These practices, as I shall point out, have significant implications for the social and political realm.

Personal cognitive causation.

Personal cognitive causation refers, in the explanation of human behavior, to the primacy given to individual thought processes that have been conceptually disconnected from the sociohistorical context. In the study of personality this is a common practice, for "most researchers of personality use measures (and concepts) that are taken out of context" (Gergen, Fisher & Hepburn, 1986, p. 1261).

A popular analogy (attributed to Kelly) is that of the "person as scientist" (Hjelle & Zigler, 1981). A person acts as a scientist in that s/he selects the information available to him/her, interprets, and functions accordingly. This process entails the elaboration of hypotheses, their confirmation or rejection, and the building of personal theories that assist the individual in her/his daily decision making and performance. Much like scientists, lay people differ in their interpretation of the world. A number of these cognitive moments involved in decision-making and acting become reified when they are "abstracted from the particular sociohistorical conditions of (their) constitution" (Sampson, 1981, p. 737). As a result, cognitive abstractions are granted a "timeless, objective standing" (Sampson, 1981, p. 737).

An illustrative case of the personal cognitive causation tendency is the construct locus of control. Locus of control "refers to the individual's perception of where the causal agent of an observed environmental change is located" (Furby, 1979, p. 170). That individuals who attribute change to internal or personal causes behave, under certain circumstances, quite differently than external attributors (e.g., Mikulincer, 1988) is not disputed here. What is debatable is the privileging of "internalizers" in the literature.

Several authors have documented the explicit preference of psychologists for those with internal, as opposed to external locus of control (Anderson & Travis, 1983; Furby, 1979; Gergen, Fisher & Hepburn, 1986; Gurin, Gurin & Morrison, 1978; Sampson, 1981). Following the desirability of the former, great efforts have been directed at finding ways to both reduce external and increase internal locus of control (Furby, 1979). Why, it may be asked, have psychologists idealized those with internal locus of control? The answer does not lie in correlates of psychological well-being, for under certain conditions "externalizers" have been found to cope with adversity better than "internalizers" (e.g., Mikulincer, 1988); but rather in the belief that "events in any individual's environment are generally contingent on that individual's behavior" (Furby, 1979, p. 173). Psychologists' long standing love affair with this

version of self-contained individualism has been eloquently presented by Sampson (1977) in his Psychology and the American Ideal. This is the belief referred to earlier as the supreme self--an omnipotent individual empowered to cope with misfortune. It is quite amazing that, in spite of the fact that countless events in one's environment are not controlled by one's actions, psychologists continue to foster the (illusory?) concept of internal locus of control.

At this point the sociopolitical implications of the nurturance of internal locus of control become quite clear. By praising those who attribute success and failure to internal causes, supporters of the internal model reinforce the existing Protestant ethic, a constitutive element of American society. Hard work and determination, in spite of societal obstacles, will lead to prosperity (Bellah et al., 1985). Furby (1979) summarized the political effects of the promotion of internal locus of control as follows:

Those in positions of power and affluence have much to gain from increasing the internality of beliefs about locus of control, and much to lose from increasing externality. If one perceives the inability to find a job as the result of one's own actions, then the response is likely to be either apathy or 'self-improvement.' In contrast if one perceives unemployment to be the inevitable result

of an economic system incapable of supporting full employment, then one's response might be much less pleasant for those in power (p. 176).

Locus of control was presented as one instance of personal cognitive causation. In reinforcing the internal type, psychologists may be preventing the advent of social changes by fortifying the belief in the individual's potential to change him/herself to cope with misfortune, rendering social structures more or less intact. Other examples of personal cognitive causation, such as motivation, may be found in Anderson and Travis (1983, chap. 4), Israel (1979) and Sampson (1981).

De-Emphasis on context, culture, and history.

Gardner (1985) contends that a constitutive element of cognitive science is the demotion of context, culture, and history. By definition, "cognitivism is the attempt to explain human...cognition in terms of internal representations and rules" (Costall & Still, 1987, p. 15). The search for internal operations and avoidance of environmental contamination has led cognitive psychologists to rely heavily on the computer. Not only has the human being been compared to the "bright machine" (Robinson, 1985), but there are mounting projects attempting to reveal something fundamental about human thought through Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1987). Although

this is not the place to examine the merits of AI, I shall only say, as did Robinson (1985), that the psychological aspects of AI remain entirely with the programmer and not with the machine. At any rate, it is quite obvious that cognitive psychology has gone to great length to sterilize its subject matter from material pollution.

By focusing almost exclusively on internal processes the cognitive psychologist is exposed to the risk of losing sight of sociohistorical variables that may influence our way of thinking and operating in society. Behavior is not the sole product of thinking but also of external conditions.

What are the possible sociopolitical repercussions of this asocial position? Inasmuch as cognitive psychology may be considered the psychology of the day, and its acontextual theories and postulates extend to applied fields such as psychotherapy, education, social problem-solving and conflict resolution, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the latter would stress the need to adjust the mind, and not society, in order to promote well-being (Sampson, 1981). Conceptual changes would take precedence over social changes (Anderson & Travis, 1983).

Cognitive Psychology and Education

The social impact of the applications of cognitive psychology in education has been discussed at length by

Anderson and Travis (1983). Therefore, I shall delimit this section to their main arguments and more recent developments.

According to Anderson and Travis (1983) the technocratic philosophy regnant in North America helped develop the notion that social problems will be solved by the social sciences--through education in particular. Although this belief gained credence at the beginning of the century with people like Dewey, it was only after the Second World War that the approach flourished. This formula for social improvement proved to be particularly appealing for those in positions of power as the basic social structures would not be threatened, or even questioned. "The social change envisaged was not institutional but conceptual" (Anderson & Travis, 1983, p. 10).

If poverty could not be eradicated before, proponents of the liberal consensus argued, it was mainly because there were not educational methods, endowed with cognitive theories, to successfully teach slum children. Although no one within the "liberal consensus" would deny the detrimental effects of growing up in a ghetto, a set of priorities was established that placed educational change in front of environmental change. In the sixties and seventies cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner was highly instrumental in supporting a national agenda in the United States that

stressed the improvement of minds over settings (Anderson & Travis, 1983, chap. 3). This was based on a vacuous promise that educational "know-how" would enable children to rise above deleterious living conditions and attain upward social mobility. "The problem of the poor environment is dodged by arguing that what counts is training the child to get as much as possible out of his environment by way of acquiring problem solving skills" (Anderson & Travis, 1983, p. 27).

Though Anderson's and Travis' analysis pertains primarily to the sixties and the seventies, there is evidence to suggest that cognitive psychology's drive and actual impact on numerous areas of daily life, including of course education, has not diminished. Witness for instance the recent establishment of the academic journal Applied Cognitive Psychology. In one of its latest issues Sternberg (1988), a leading psychologist in the area of intelligence, concludes that "cognitive psychology has given the study of intelligence a 'new lease on life', and that the testing and teaching of intelligence can and should be viewed as a primary focus of application for the principles of cognitive psychology" (p. 231). He further makes the point that "in education, the time is truly at hand for the application of cognitive theory to testing and training" (p. 250). Undoubtedly, many benefits could be

derived from a refined cognitive psychology, and Sternberg (1988) does an excellent job of showing its potential. These advances, however, are undermined by the primacy attributed to the improvement of the mind by mind-techniques exclusively. While certain affluent sectors of the population may derive great enjoyment in perfecting their cognitive skills by intellectual exercise, others less fortunate worry about more fundamental needs.

When combating social ills governments usually focus on a limited range of variables. Very rarely do governments approach a systemic problem from a systemic point of view. They are more likely to concentrate their efforts on a well defined and narrow piece of the puzzle. It is because of this mode of functioning that explanatory preferences and priorities established by social scientists are of crucial importance. When theorizing about social mobility, a social scientist speculates about the percentage of variability accounted for by cognitive and environmental factors. Should his/her theories give more weight to the cognitive part of the equation, governments will be more than happy to quote that scientist and focus their attention on reshaping the mind and not the environment. Anderson and Travis (1983) cogently argue that this was precisely what happened with the work of Bruner, and if history has something to teach us, it is not unlikely that

Sternberg's contributions would be used in a similar manner.

Cognitive Therapy

In the last fifteen years the prominence of the cognitive modality in the therapeutic community has become almost indisputable. Cognitive therapy, largely shaped by the initial work of Beck with depressed patients (Beck, 1976), has by now expanded significantly and is being applied in numerous settings to a variety of populations, including children, the elderly, chronic patients, alcoholics, etc. (Emery, Hollon & Bedrosian, 1981; Freeman & Greenwood, 1987).

The primary objective of cognitive therapy is to modulate and eventually eradicate irrational thoughts that are said to be conducive to emotional disorders (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1985; Ellis & Harper, 1961; for an updated overview see Freeman, 1987). "The therapist helps a patient to unravel his distortions in thinking and to learn alternative, more realistic [italics added] ways to formulate his experiences (Beck, 1976, p. 3). Beck (1976) further argues that "psychological problems can be mastered by sharpening discrimination, correcting misconceptions, and learning more adaptive [italics added] attitudes" (p. 20). Notice the similar emphasis on "reality" and "adapting" by Freeman (1987): "The goal of therapy is to help patients uncover their dysfunctional and irrational thinking, reality-test

[italics added] their thinking and behavior, and build more adaptive [italics added] and functional techniques for responding both inter- and intrapersonally" (pp. 19-20). The "reality" alluded to both by Beck and Freeman is never questioned.

To be sure, therapists are not expected to be leaders in social change. But, also to be sure, their activities may inadvertently generate not an insignificant degree of conformity in their clientele and, furthermore, promote individualistic--as opposed to institutional--changes (cf. Beit Hallahmi, 1974; Halleck, 1971). Cognitive therapists, by virtue of their focal attention on thought processes, are particularly prone to foster both of the above. A few examples will illustrate this claim.

Ellis (1985; with Harper, 1961), founder of Rational Emotive Therapy, and one of cognitive therapy's pioneers, has compiled a list of irrational thoughts said to interfere with healthy psychological functioning. Irrational idea No. 9 deals with accepting reality (Ellis & Harper, 1961, chap. 18). Basically, it contends that you should not feel terrible if things are not the way you would like them to be. And if you do, you engage in irrational thinking. Ellis and Harper (1961) explain: "When people and events are the way you would like them not to be, there is actually relatively little pernicious effect they can have on you unless you

think they can" (p. 163). The immediate implication is that if you change your thinking about people and events they will obviously stop annoying you. Once again, the implication here is modify your mind, not the material circumstances. Irrational thought No. 9 may be in fact renamed prescription for conformity No. 1. In another source, Ellis (1982) details how one of his patients was not pleased with his working conditions and some of the demands placed on him by his employer. While there certainly might have been room for negotiation for improvement in working conditions, Ellis chooses to guide his client to a quiet, peaceful, and "rational" acceptance and resignation in the work place. These were but two examples of the numerous conforming messages implicit in Ellis' Rational Emotive Therapy.

Other instances where cognitive therapy may inadvertently strengthen the status quo, even when environmental changes are required for immediate therapeutic purposes, come from the fields of School and Child-Clinical Psychology. Cognitive therapies for school-age children have become very popular in the last decade. An array of cognitive therapies have been suggested to treat learning as well as social and behavioral problems (Di Giuseppe, 1981; Gholson & Rosenthal, 1984; Kendall & Braswell, 1984). The many virtues of these mechanisms can frequently be questioned because of their lack of emphasis on environmental

changes required to suit the particular needs of the youngster. In the same way that governments prefer a "mind-fix" over a "setting-fix," many school administrators, teachers, and parents favor "mind" therapies that focus on the child and leave the adults, the classroom, and the social order of the school unaltered.

A final and recent example of the way cognitive therapy may serve the status quo has been furnished by Stoppard (1989). Her review of the literature on the cognitive-behavioral treatment of depressed women led to the conclusion that these theories fail to address the external factors conducive to that psychological state. Instead, there is a marked emphasis on internal deficits. This type of theorizing is likely to promote victim-blaming and to exculpate social norms and conditions that may in fact be pathogenic. Stoppard (1989) observed that

because these therapies are based on deficit models of depression, the message likely to be given to clients is that they have become depressed because they are deficient in some way. Therapists risk falling into the trap of victim-blaming when they interpret the depressed person's negative cognitions as solely the product of distorted cognitive processes or dysfunctional attitudes, rather than exploring the possibility that negative

cognitions may reflect a negative reality....Areas of presumed vulnerability are emphasized as targets for change, whereas the potential clinical importance of changing the person's situation receives little attention in therapy goals (p. 46).

Though the preoccupation of cognitive psychology with individual thought processes lends itself to solving social problems by individualistic--thus conservative--means, this particular branch of psychology may play an important role in resisting indoctrination by guardians of the status quo. It is within the realm of cognitive psychology to develop techniques to help people discern whether the present social system is indeed "rational." Once cognitive psychologists start questioning the sacredness of the external world, their formula to solving human problems will likely incorporate sociopolitical elements and not only intellectual ones.

Chapter 10: Industrial/Organizational Psychology

As an applied field, industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology impacts upon the life of thousands, if not millions, of workers around the world (see for example Bass & Drenth, 1987; Catano & Tivendell, 1988; Wells, 1987). As such, it plays an important role in the promotion or containment of change, not only in business but in society as a whole.

The main argument to be advanced in this chapter is that the social sciences in general and psychology in particular have been typically used by and for those interested in preserving the industrial status quo (Baritz, 1974; Ralph, 1983; Shore, 1982; Wells, 1987). Interestingly enough, it was not until very recently that psychologists began to question the moral and ideological implications of this state of affairs (Bramel & Friend, 1981; Huszczo, Wiggins, & Currie, 1984; Warwick, 1978).

Historically, social scientists were brought into business for the purpose of increasing productivity. Baritz (1974) stated it rather bluntly when he wrote that "managers, as managers, are in business to make money. (And) only to the extent that social scientists can help in the realization of this goal will management make use of them" (p. 196). Cognizant of that situation, organized labor has been traditionally apprehensive of psychological "services" (Huszczo et al., 1984). In this

regard Huszczo et al commented that "unions have perceived the contributions of psychologists, at best, to be unrelated to their needs and, at worst, to be antithetical to their interests (1984, p. 432). In reviewing the literature describing the relationship between psychology and unions they identified, inter alia, the following reasons for labor's distrust of psychologists:

- A. because of their association with management.
- B. because of their association with F. W. Taylor's Scientific Management (i.e., emphasis on efficiency, time and motion studies)....
- C. because unions are ignored in textbooks and journals of I/O psychology.
- D. because methods (e.g., attitude surveys) have been used to avoid or bust union organizing attempts or lower pay demands....
- E. because methods of psychological testing emphasize differentiation among workers (thus antisolidarity and antiseniority principles)....
- F. because "talking cure" methods probe the past and emphasize internal rather than external sources of mental stress and relief (Huszczo et al., 1984, p. 434).

Despite the pseudo-neutral language of "Organizational Development," and the humanistic flavor of numerous "Human Relations" courses, "Quality of

Working Life" projects and "Industrial Democracy" programs, the fact remains that these innovations were merely instrumental in improving business and as such had a clear pro-management bias (Alvesson, 1985; Hollway, 1984; Warwick, 1978; Wells, 1987). This point was made very clear by J.A.C. Brown (1954). Commenting on the pro-management bias of Mayo's research, he correctly argued that "no industrial psychologist has ever shown anything else, and....under the circumstances in which all industrial research is carried out, such bias is inevitable" (J.A.C. Brown, 1954, pp. 92-93).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine in more detail the argument outlined above; namely, that I/O psychology is highly instrumental in preserving the status quo. Simply put, this section will ask why and how I/O psychology helps in the maintenance of the present conditions in industry and in society. In order to do that I will (a) briefly review the history of I/O psychology, (b) present its basic premises, (c) analyze the techniques used in I/O psychology to affirm the existing state of affairs, (d) consider some ethical conflicts and, finally, (e) elaborate on how can I/O psychology be used to challenge, rather than ratify the status quo.

Origins of I/O Psychology

Broadly defined, I/O psychology is "a branch of applied psychology covering applications of psychology

in the industrial field" (Babington Smith, 1988, p. 418). Traditionally, the primary goal of mainstream I/O psychology has been to increase efficiency, productivity, and profitability (e.g., Maier, 1946). The achievement of these objectives necessitated the application of psychology in a wide range of industrial areas. Among others: personnel selection, performance appraisal, motivation, mental health of workers, interpersonal relations in the workplace, environmental variables, etc. The variety of these tasks called for a variety of professionals specializing in the different aspects of workers' behavior. Given their prominent role in what may be called the politics of I/O psychology, the following discussion will focus on the contributions made by experts in human relations, occupational mental health and psychological testing.

Mayo, regarded by Whyte (1957) as the father of the "Human Relations" school in industry, was undoubtedly one of the pioneers in the field of I/O psychology (see also Bramel & Friend, 1981). In the late 1920s Mayo, a professor of industrial research at Harvard, became involved in the "Hawthorne" experiments being conducted at the Chicago Western Electric Plant (Bramel & Friend, 1981). This study, which was initially concerned with the effects of illumination on workers' output, evolved in a monumental industrial research project which included the interview of twenty thousand employees

(J.A.C. Brown, 1954).

Early in the study, specifically in the illumination experiments, researchers were surprised to find out an increase in output in the experimental as well as in the control group. The investigators arrived at the conclusion that "output shoot up in both groups because in both groups the workers' participation had been solicited and this involvement, clearly, was more important than physical perquisites" (Whyte, 1957, p. 38). In other words, the productivity of workers went up not as a result of better illumination but rather as a result of the attention paid to them by supervisors and managers. Presently, the Hawthorne effect is the name usually associated with the "observation that the output of the workers seemed to be responding to the transformed interpersonal relationship to the 'boss'... rather than to the explicitly introduced variations in physical conditions of work" (Bramel & Friend, 1981, p. 870).

The Hawthorne experiments were said to have confirmed Mayo's convictions that co-operative human relations between labor and management is the key for both industrial productivity and tranquility. Following this principle of cooperation Mayo promoted a technique according to which managers would be able to gain workers' trust and avert industrial unrest. This technique, referred to as the "non-directive interview,"

was premised on the assumption that any problems employees may have can be "talked out." Thus, counselors were trained to conduct non-directive interviews to provide workers with an opportunity to express their feelings about whatever problems they might have. Whyte described as follows the philosophy of that technique:

He (the worker) is to adjust to the group rather than vice versa; and the alternative of actually changing reality is hardly considered. If a worker is sore at his foreman the chances are good that he is not really sore at his foreman because of some rational gripe but is merely venting on the foreman certain repressed feelings. By listening patiently, like a psychiatrist, the counselors help such persons understand that what they are really sore about flows from inner, subjective conflict (Whyte, 1957, p. 41).

The implication of this technique for industrial or social change are rather obvious: if workers have problems, they should change something within themselves, not in the working conditions. An implication which is entirely congruent with the well known "blame the victim" ideology (W. Ryan, 1971).

Based on the high regard acquired by the Hawthorne experiments and the work of Mayo on human relations, it would be safe to argue that they have shaped, to a large extent, the field of I/O psychology (Bramel & Friend,

1981; Ralph, 1983). Moreover, they may have provided the basis for the relatively recent emergence of the sub-specialty called "Organizational Development" (Hollway, 1984). This branch of I/O psychology is concerned with "training managers in interpersonal skills such as expressing feelings honestly and learning how to listen and empathize. Such managerial styles would produce... less conflictual relations with subordinates who would thus experience commitment to the organization and become more highly motivated" (Hollway, 1984, p. 32).

Another important point of departure for I/O psychology was occupational mental health. The origins of occupational mental health in North America can be traced roughly to the 1920s, the same decade the Hawthorne experiments were to commence (McLean, 1985). In 1919 Southard, once a Director of the Boston Psychopathic Hospital and Professor of Neuropathology at Harvard, was invited to conduct a study on the possible psychiatric problems of discharged workers. In 1920 he reported that "60 percent of more than 4000 cases reached discharge status through traits of social incompetence rather than occupational incompetence" (In McLean, 1985, p. 32). The same year he stated that "industrial psychiatry ought to exist....I think that we will have a place in the routine of industrial management, not as permanent staff,...but as consultants. The function of this occasional consultant

would be preventive rather than curative of the general conditions of unrest" (In McLean, 1985, p. 33). McLean noted that the first full time psychiatrist in an American company was hired in 1922. This was Dr. Lydia Giberson, who worked for Metropolitan Life Insurance most of her life. Macy's department store also introduced in 1924 a team of mental health workers which included a psychiatrist, a social worker and a psychologists. McLean's (1985) review of the field attests to the steady expansion and ramification since the early 1920s of occupational mental health. At present, many companies offer mental health help in the form of Employee Assistance Programs to their employees. These programs are becoming increasingly popular in large corporations. This is largely because "the most conservative figures indicate that comprehensive employee assistance programs return \$2.00 or \$3.00 in increased productivity for every \$1.00 spent" (Wells, 1987, p. 7).

The field of psychological testing also furnished considerable impetus to I/O psychology. In 1946 Maier wrote: "That psychological testing has an obvious application to employee selection has been recognized by many large industries, which have not only welcomed the application of existing tests, but have co-operated in the development of new ones" (p. 151). More recently, Hollway (1984), Shackleton and Anderson (1987), and

Kavanagh, Borman, Hedge and Gould (1987) have demonstrated the vitality and utility of testing not only in personnel selection but also in job performance, training and vocational guidance.

Though different in their focus, the fields of human relations, occupational mental health, and psychological testing converge in their ultimate objective: increased profitability for management (Baritz, 1974; Ralph, 1983; Wells, 1987). This is not to say that I/O psychology cannot offer concrete help to workers, but that it has typically shown a distinct preference for working with management rather than with unions (Huszczco et al., 1984). Such bias has been mainly attributed to psychologists' class interests and financial considerations (Baritz, 1974; Bramel & Friend, 1981; Huszczco et al., 1984). In my view, another set of factors should be emphasized. That is the social and cultural presuppositions upon which I/O psychology is based. These assumptions simply elude the conflictual nature of labor-management relations and operate under the premise that what is good for business is necessarily good for workers.

Two Basic Premises of I/O Psychology

The pro-management bias ascribed to I/O psychology derives, in large part, from two intimately related basic premises. These can be summarized as follows: (a) Industry is a class-conflict-free enterprise, and (b)

I/O psychology is social science, science is good for society; therefore I/O psychology is good for society. If one takes both assumptions for granted, one is likely to arrive at the conclusion that I/O psychology is good for both parties concerned; employers and employees. A completely different conclusion is drawn when these fundamental premises are challenged.

Premise #1: Industry as a class-conflict-free enterprise.

Premise #1 is a recurring theme in I/O psychology. Critical organizational theory (Alvesson, 1985) suggests that management can obtain tangible benefits by advancing the tacit assumption that they and the employees are all working towards the same goals. Such a view is intended to eliminate notions of fundamental contradictions between the interests of employers or their representatives and employees. Yet, to the extent that employers' profits are increased by controlling wages, serious differences do, and will continue to exist. As Ralph (1983) argues, an increase in profit is frequently accompanied by a reduction of wages or deterioration in the working conditions. This situation "creates an implicit and irreconcilable conflict between management and labor....This conflict of interests between employers and employees is an inherent characteristic of capitalism" (Ralph, 1983, pp. 60-61). If not for profit, wages and/or the conditions of labor

are sometimes adversely impacted upon simply because businesses are having a hard time surviving. Wells explains:

The adversarial relationship between labor and management does not derive from some historical accident or from a colossal misunderstanding that "better communications" or a "more mature approach" can resolve. It stems from the fact that businesses survive by beating their competitors and, other things being equal, this means squeezing as much as possible out of workers. Unions did not cause this conflict; they arose as a response to it (Wells, 1987, p. 13).

Despite these arguments, which point to the conflictual nature of labor-management relationship, I/O psychology has nonetheless operated as though business were a "co-operative" enterprise whereby all parties benefit equally and conflicts are the result of either mismanagement or misunderstandings.

Bramel and Friend (1981) contend that Mayo and his associates were instrumental in promoting a portrayal of "the capitalist factory as nonexploitative and free of class conflict. This view, which is clearly identified with the defense of the capitalist mode of production, persists to the present time in discussions of the psychology of industry" (p. 867). Two examples of this classic attitude in I/O psychology are provided by

Stagner and Rosen (1965) and by Maier (1946).

Stagner and Rosen's Psychology of Union-Management Relations (1965) is quite oblivious of the fundamental political and economic differences between both parties. When they speak of conflict, they do so in a psychological, as opposed to a class language. Conflict is viewed as the result of psychological misunderstandings; not as a result of unequally distributed power.

The following quote is an illustrative example of their general approach: "In the long run...every manager and union leader who honestly wants to reduce the frequency of conflict in industry must take account of the perceptions, goals, frustrations, and aggressions of workers [italics added] (Stagner & Rosen, 1965, p. 117). Three points are of interest here. First, if disputes are to be averted, psychological--as opposed to material--variables are to be taken into account. Second, though they are careful to state in the introduction that their treatment is "neutral toward the values of managers and unionists" (Stagner & Rosen, 1965, p. 7), one has to question the neutrality of their treatment when they selectively talk about the aggression of workers and fail to mention the aggression of managers. Third, another significant implication of that quote is that disputes are undesirable. While disputes affect workers as well as employers, Stagner

and Rosen fail to recognize that, albeit painful in their short term effects, strikes and conflict are some of the few tools labor has to advance their long-term interests. In my opinion, their book is a good illustration of how a new, "class-free" interpretation of conflict is introduced by I/O psychology into business with the purpose of keeping fundamental structures unchallenged, for as they clearly wrote: "power need not be taken away from management" (Stagner & Rosen, 1965, p. 131).

Similarly, Maier's (1946) Psychology in Industry also reduces conflicts between labor and management to inter or intrapsychological variables. Workers' frustrations are almost always accounted for by personal problems. The class dimension is noticeable in its absence. Needless to say, by presenting employee's frustrations as the manifestation of "psychological maladjustment" Maier helps vindicate current practices of management and the distribution of power.

The last chapter of Maier's book serves as a brief guide for supervisors, counselors and managers on how to increase productivity. In that chapter he differentiates between two types of union. One that goes along with management and another that challenges it. While he condones the former, he condemns the latter because of its political aspirations. Thus, Maier approves of those unions which see conflict only as "classless." In that

context, Maier warns management against the risks of frustration. It is important to appreciate, Maier wrote, "the role which frustration plays in labor and political movements. Frustrated individuals are readily organized and led, and their activities are militant in nature....Poorly adjusted individuals are inclined to be militant and seek the union which suits their inclinations" (Maier, 1946, p. 419). Maier's dislike of militant unions derives mainly from the basic assumption that industry is a co-operative enterprise between owners and workers. In this view, whatever problems there may be can always be solved by constructive dialogue. Militant workers are not perceived as politically conscious but rather discredited as misguided and maladjusted individuals. Such a stand has been quite common in I/O psychology (Bramel & Friend, 1981).

The failure of I/O psychology to deal with power differentials in industry has been recently brought into sharp focus by Barling (1988). In an empirical investigation of the teaching, research and practice of I/O psychology Barling arrived at the conclusion that "industrial relations" is the "blind spot" of the field. Barling studied the extent to which I/O psychology pays attention to unions. A review of all the articles on the subject from the 1980-1986 issues of the Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Occupational Psychology,

Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, and Academy of Management Journal led him to conclude that "union membership is ignored almost invariably" (Barling, 1988, p. 105). Addressing the question "how much coverage is devoted to industrial relations issues in frequently-used I/O textbooks" (Barling, 1988, p. 105), he reviewed 39 such introductory texts as well as 3 advanced texts. Results showed that "15 of these texts make no mention of unions...(and) 29 suggest that less than 1% of their contents consider union issues" (Barling, 1988, p. 105). He also asked a sample of Canadian I/O psychology teachers to what extent their courses dealt with industrial relations issues. Responses were received for 22 courses: "Ten of the 18 undergraduate courses, and three of the four graduate courses did not deal with industrial relations at all" (Barling, 1988, p. 106). Furthermore, 7 of the 15 texts used in these courses make no reference to union issues whatsoever.

One cannot help but wonder just what leads I/O psychologists to ignore the topic of industrial relations. Two plausible explanations may be considered. The first would indicate that it is in their economic and political interest not to disturb the industrial status quo. Social scientists employed by management realize that treatment of issues such as industrial relations is an open invitation to include politics in a

field that they would prefer to keep "neutral." For as long as industrial unrest can be prevented or minimized by the presence of "objective scientists," both management and scientists alike are said to benefit: the former by keeping politics out of industry, the latter by lucrative contracts.

An alternative explanation to account for the omission of class and power issues in I/O psychology is simply that social scientists believe in technical, as opposed to political, solutions. Consequently, unions--identified as political forces--are not even considered to be part of their occupational endeavor. This argument cannot be easily discarded, for the pervasive character of the technical rationality of our times has hardly left an area of social inquiry without its imprint (Alvesson, 1985; Benson, 1977).

Whether because of a partisan interest in preserving things the way they are, or because of a sincere belief in the solubility of all social problems by technical means, the situation remains that I/O psychology has paid negligible attention to the class and political nature of labor--management conflicts. And inasmuch as politics is a potent tool for the transformation of power arrangements in society, the clear beneficiaries of that situation are those who would like to see things in the future stay the way they are in the present.

If I/O psychologists are interested in serving all sectors of industry, it is imperative that the working assumption that industry is a class-conflict-free enterprise be challenged. I would concur with Barling in that "I/O psychologists must accept the inevitability... of union-management conflict in its many manifestations in organizations, and discard their attitudinal indifference toward, or ideological bias against labour unions" (1988, p. 108).

Premise #2: I/O psychology is science and science is good for society.

"Social science is science; science contributes to human welfare; therefore social science contributes to human welfare" (Warwick, 1980, p. 31). This syllogism, premised on a great deal of naivete, protected the moral conscience of many social scientists for a long time. I/O psychologists, as social scientists, found in it an elegant way to amalgamate their pursuit of scientific knowledge with what they termed a contribution to society as a whole.

It is not my intent here to challenge the scientific status of I/O psychology but rather its supposed contribution to "human welfare." As Steininger et al (1984) succinctly put it: "psychology can be used to serve the interests of the powerful or the interests of the powerless" (p. 196). I/O psychologists may have intended to serve all classes, but the actual results of

their efforts have benefited, almost exclusively, the powerful (Baritz, 1974; Huszczo et al, 1984; Ralph, 1983; Shore, 1982; Wells, 1987).

I/O psychologists, as is the case with many other social science practitioners, endorse a technical rationality according to which social problems will, eventually, be solved by scientific and technical means to the exclusion of political solutions. This approach to human dilemmas has been termed by Anderson and Travis (1983) the "liberal consensus." It consists in the belief that society will be bettered by "neutral" scientists and professionals. The spirit and political implications of this technocratic philosophy, so much a part of I/O psychology, are well summarized by Alvesson:

In the technological-capitalist society, there is a general tendency to re-define problems concerning purposes, aims, and values so as either to make them appear to be technical issues, or to make them seem irrelevant. Questions involving such matters as alienation, and the content and value of work, are defined as problems which socio-technical and other organizational principles should solve within the framework of prevailing conditions....In the technocratic consciousness, the distinction between communication concerning political frameworks and social norms on the one hand and technical problem-solving on the other has been erased at the expense

of the former. This consciousness...contributes to the blocking of a dialectic where the negation of prevailing conditions is envisaged as a possibility. In this way, a world picture which supports the predominant rationality is transmitted (Alvesson, 1985, p. 127).

This technocratic doctrine treats all human problems as technical ones. Inequality, power, discrimination, and the like; are not the result of injustice but of lack of scientific progress. Thus, I/O psychology, which embraced this weltanschaaung since its origins, became oblivious to the politics of production. Mayo was absolutely convinced that "scientific management," equipped with the newest techniques of human relations would advance the welfare of employers and employees alike. "Mayo argued with passion that social and clinical psychological approaches could be incorporated into an enlightened management in such a way that the social-emotional needs of workers would be met" (Bramel & Friend, 1981, p. 868). This would in effect prevent workers from organizing to protest unfavorable working conditions or low wages.

Indisputable faith in the assumption that science is good for human welfare might have precluded posing the simple question: Good for whom in society? If I/O psychologists had asked that question, the socio-political repercussions of the field might have been

radically different. As it turned out, however,

In seeming disregard for APA's vision of psychology "as a means of promoting human welfare," the mainstream of industrial psychology has traditionally labored to promote employer welfare as its principal goal. While the single-minded quest for efficiency / productivity / profitability inevitably encounters the obstruction of unions, it also results in a regard for workers--all workers, not just union members--as little more than instrumentalities for achieving management objectives (Shore, 1982, p. 334).

Thus far I have examined the basic premises that have led I/O practitioners to side with management and thereby support the status quo. The actual ways whereby these premises are translated into actions will now be discussed.

How I/O Psychology Upholds the Industrial Status Quo

I/O psychology contributes to the maintenance of the industrial status quo through three different, yet related mechanisms. Through (a) the personalization of conflict, (b) the co-operative approach, and (c) the professionalization of managerial decisions.

The personalization of conflict.

The attribution of workers' problems to internal causes has been pioneered by Mayo in the interview phase of the Hawthorne research (Bramel & Friend, 1981; J.A.C.

Brown, 1954), and is exemplified in the books by Maier (1946) and Stagner and Rosen (1965). In essence, employees are guided to view their lack of satisfaction in life as a product of their own personal inadequacies. While managers--as the administrators of capital--are doing "all they can to help" by providing counselors; the internal nature of the workers predicaments demand corrections of an intra-or interpsychical character. Quoting Whyte again: "the alternative of actually changing reality is hardly considered" (1957, p. 41).

This method of counseling not only leads to an inadvertent self-blame attitude in its clients, but also exculpates management for whatever role it might have played in the workers' difficulties in the first place. An additional bonus that the personalization of conflict furnishes to owners is that the latter comes across as caring and personally interested in the welfare of the employees, thus strengthening loyalty and commitment to the firm. As Wells (1987) has recently put it, counseling programs

are aimed at helping workers deal with their (productivity-reducing) problems of anxiety, alcohol use, depression, drug dependency, and so on. Workers are persuaded that these problems are 'personal' problems not related to the workplace, but problems that management nevertheless cares enough about to lend a hand" (p. 6).

It should be remembered, counseling services are part of comprehensive employee assistance programs which result in increased productivity for every dollar invested in it by management (Wells, 1987). But increased productivity is not the only benefit for managers. In addition, psychological expertise has been able to pacify trouble makers and diffuse resentment against owners and supervisors (Baritz, 1974; Ralph, 1983).

With time, unions began to realize that counseling provided by employers had an undesirable side-effect. It was conducive to workers' passivity and conformity. It "helped" "workers and their dependents adjust to increasingly alienated, degraded, and pressured conditions, in order to prevent labour unrest" (Ralph, 1983, p. 47). Haverman (1957) wrote that unionists started referring to this kind of psychological help as "cow psychology." They saw it as "an attempt to get more production out of the worker by keeping him placid and uncomplaining...on the ground that any advice paid for by the company is almost bound to favor the company's desires over the worker's psychological needs (p. 52). The increased awareness of these side-effects led unions to oppose such "benefits." Although "employers often have been able to slip mental health 'services' into a broad occupational health package...many unions have managed to see through this stratagem" (Ralph, 1983, p.

141). This situation forced the introduction of innovative methods to gain workers' compliance and prevent industrial unrest. A suitable term for this new technology of human relations may be the "co-operative" approach.

The "co-operative" approach.

The argument has been made that the most efficacious method of social control is that which does not elicit resistance (Skinner, 1976; Zimbardo, 1984). Schacht (1985) has called this type of controlling influence "softened power."

Softened power decreases individuals' experience of political impact on their lives and thought, promoting uncritical internalization of prevailing ideologies and anesthetizing persons to the ways in which they are being led, influenced, or controlled. Softened power circumscribes their consciousness, allowing illusions of free choice to persist while available choices are curtailed through a subtle foreshortening of their imagination (Schacht, 1985, p. 513).

Fully aware that the times require "softened power," industrialists enlisted the assistance of social scientists in designing programs of worker control that would not elicit the latter's resistance. In response to that demand, two innovative approaches to human relations have been introduced. These are Organizational

Development (OD), and Quality of Working Life (QWL).

The concept of OD refers to interventions based on behavioral science intended to increase the effectiveness of an organization (Hollway, 1984; Walton, 1978). "Specifically," Walton (1978) wrote, "OD attends to the use and development of human capacities and social integration in the work place" (p. 124). Sensitivity training programs designed to enhance interpersonal understanding, team building, and reward systems for employees are key features of its methodology.

Despite its apparent humanistic aspirations of improved co-operation and quality of working life for everybody concerned (Hollway, 1984; Walton, 1978), OD faces criticisms similar to those leveled against employee counseling. Namely, it may not be as benevolent and neutral as it purports to be. Its very name Organization Development is somewhat misleading, for the word development usually has a positive connotation and implies unfolding towards a desired goal, a state of maturity. Yet, as Warwick (1978) has argued, development and health for "the manager or owner may well be disease for the worker" (p. 148). Pseudo-neutral terms such as "team building," "problem solving," and "effectiveness" are very common in OD. To the extent that this vocabulary ignores the power structure of companies and promotes a so called conflict-free

language, one has to question the purity of the motives behind OD interventions.

"Effective OD intervention," Warwick (1978) noted, "will almost always change or reinforce the balance of power, influence and authority in a system. Some individuals and groups will gain in the ability to pursue their interests and intentions, while others will lose" (p. 149). If that indeed is the case, and OD practitioners "most often enter the system as management consultants" (Warwick, 1978, p. 149), it would not be unreasonable to conclude that in the majority of instances OD lends its "scientific support" to keeping or even reinforcing the prevailing distribution of power in industry. It could probably be argued that if that was not the case, managers would think twice before hiring OD experts. For, after all, they are brought into business with the purpose of increasing output.

Probably the single, most important feature of OD is its impartial and humanistic facade. These specialists are portrayed as neutral third parties merely interested in "improving the effectiveness of organizations that produce useful goods and services and in enhancing the quality of human experience in the workplace" (Walton, 1978, p. 124). Their "impartial" and "caring" approach is reinforced by the emphasis placed on the "collaborative" model. If you want to increase productivity you don't fight with your workers,

you collaborate with them; you don't force them, you talk them into doing it. Owners and workers dialogue "as if" they were equal; thus gaining the latter's cooperation and subtly dissuading them from organizing politically to fulfill their aspirations. Similar allegations have been made against Quality of Working Life (QWL) projects. These programs, which are typically carried out by "someone who is well versed in the social psychology of small groups" (Wells, 1987, p. 3), are intended to bring labor and management together in an effort to make use of workers' full physical and mental abilities in a more creative and productive fashion (Wells, 1987). In addition to the job redesign involved, "QWL programs are always characterized by their focus on greater participation by workers, usually through labor-management committees" (Wells, 1987, p. 2). The main thrust of these committees is to foster a purely psychological orientation to conflict in the workplace. When conflict is defined along these lines, cooperation is much easier to attain than when it is conceptualized in political terms. "The cooperation between workers and managers in these meetings is supposed to foster a more general cooperation outside the meetings: the whole point of QWL is to create a new kind of cooperation on the job" (Wells, 1987, pp. 3-4). Wells (1987) concluded that in effect, the principal objective of management in implementing QWL is to "undermine the main form of power

that workers and their unions normally resort to--the negative power of resistance or refusal to obey" (p. 69).

Promises made to workers by QWL advocates depict these programs as very attractive. They offer "opportunities to fulfil one's potential," "pride," "enjoyment," "decision-making power," etc. But over and above these pronouncements, the elemental question for unions remains: Do these projects ultimately benefit workers? Wells' (1987) response is a categorical no. His study of such enterprises revealed that the cooperation advertised by QWL exponents is a highly selective, management-biased kind of cooperation which, in the final analysis, "reduces the quality of working life" (Wells, 1987, p. 5).

Wells' (1987) investigation of two QWL large projects in North America led him to claim that, contrary to the expectations created by QWL proponents, "the programs were clearly designed to adjust workers to jobs, not jobs to workers. More broadly, they were designed to adjust workers to their own continuing subordination in the workplace" (Wells, 1987, p. 68). As to the decision-making power promised to employees, "the only participation that either workers or union leaders were involved in was strictly consultative, involving them, at best, in minor modifications to decisions that had already been made by management"

(Wells, 1987, p. 69).

In the end, QWL is simply a softer, subtler management-control strategy, yet one that is more ambitious and all-embracing than anything seen before. Management is no longer satisfied with making workers obey: it now wants them to want to obey (Wells, 1987, pp. 5-6).

In sum, both OD and QWL interventions have promoted an approach whereby worker control is gained through cooperation. These techniques are refined versions of human manipulation, congruous with the spirit of our age.

The professionalization of managerial decisions.

The professionalization of managerial decisions can be of assistance to those with a vested interest in upholding the industrial status quo. As in the cases of "the personalization of problems" and the "cooperative approach," in professionalizing its decision making process management benefits by diverting attention from the political arena. When, for example, detrimental working conditions, delayed promotions and the lay off of workers can be at least partially based on "expert advise," the owners do not have to take all the responsibility for worker discontent. Ascribing these decisions to organizational and psychological science helps management deal with the frustrations elicited by some of these measures. Not only because it wasn't

strictly their own doing, but also because science is supposed to be removed, impartial and fair.

The belief that "psychology is a science and that psychological assessment is therefore objective" (Hollway, 1984, p. 35), is being continuously promoted in organizations, both by I/O psychologists and by management (Hollway, 1984). Occupational assessment is rarely perceived as a tool that can be used to rationalize decisions whose impact on workers is negative. For the most part, psychological testing in industry is viewed as "fair" (see Hollway, 1984, pp. 35-36). "The role of the assessor is seen...as neutral and external, and as one of fact gathering" (Hollway, 1984, p. 54).

A similar role may be performed by OD. Changes in organizations with unfavorable consequences for part of the staff can always be justified on the basis of professional, scientific expertise. Warwick (1978), who has carefully analyzed the ethical and political implications of OD, contends that these

may be obscured when OD is cloaked in the garb of science. The introduction of the OD practitioner as "Dr. Smith, a social scientist who is an expert on organizations" may create an image of impartiality and scientific neutrality that is not justified by the circumstances. Union leaders and employees in the organization would be well advised to look

beyond such professional camouflage to the gritty realities of sponsorship and latent agendas (pp. 151-152).

Ethics in the Practice of I/O Psychology

Human manipulation has been a constitutive part of I/O psychology. Its ability to overcome workers' resistance, prevent industrial unrest, discredit discontented employees as maladjusted and subtly control labor are some of the features that made the field indispensable for some companies. In the past, attempts to control workers were more in the open. Each party knew, more or less, where the other stood. But with the advent of psychology, control strategies became much more refined and covert.

Time was when a man knew that his freedoms were being curtailed. Social scientists, however, are too sophisticated for that. The fires of pressure and control on a man are now kindled in his own thinking. Control need no longer to be imposed. It can be encouraged from within...A major characteristic of the twentieth century has been the fact that it blinds the victim to the fact of manipulation (Baritz, 1974, pp. 209-210).

The witting or unwitting use of I/O psychology to manipulate workers, as described in the previous section and summarized by Baritz in the above quotation, raises an important ethical dilemma. It follows from the

basic premises of the field that I/O practitioners should remain neutral (e.g., Stagner & Rosen, 1965). Interestingly enough, when I/O psychologists have expressed values, these have been typically humanistic--the kind that are supposed to benefit everyone involved (Alvesson, 1985; Hollway, 1984; Walton, 1978). Yet, the assumption that the practice of I/O psychology is neutral or equally advantageous to all sides has been refuted numerous times and rather persuasively (Baritz, 1974; Ralph 1983; Warwick, 1978; Wells, 1987). The latter have eloquently argued that I/O interventions have significant political repercussions, and, as a rule, owners gain and workers lose.

I/O psychologists face a difficult decision. On one hand, they may feel pressured to acknowledge the political implications of their work in order to avoid the ethical dilemma of duplicity; i.e., creating expectations that cannot be fulfilled. On the other hand, acknowledgment of their pro-management bias will decrease considerably their attractiveness. For, as it would be remembered, it is the very "neutral" facade of social science that business find so appealing. Given that situation, an admission of partisanship on the part of I/O professionals would be a somewhat self-defeating move, at least in a financial sense.

Personal distress and financial loss notwithstanding, the ethical issue will not be resolved

until I/O psychologists fully realize and articulate the political reverberations of their occupation. Instead of trying to be "more" impartial, they ought to come to grips with the political nature of industrial relations and accept the responsibility implied in siding with one party. In doing so they would, at the very least, take care of the duplicity involved in promising to be apolitical and serving power at the same time.

The political and ethical responsibility ascribed to psychologists working for management applies all the same to those willing to collaborate with labor. The idea is simply to overcome the naivete implicit in aspiring to be apolitical, and to disclose the inevitable presence of a socio-political bias.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to identify some of the socio-political implications in the practice of I/O psychology. The evolution of the field, it was claimed, has been characterized by an unreflective stance on the political nature of industrial relations (Babington Smith, 1988; Barling, 1988). Operating under the assumption that they are merely offering an apolitical service that will impact favorably on owners and workers alike, I/O practitioners have often acted as "servants of power" (Baritz, 1974). A remarkable disregard for the political repercussions of their occupation has placed I/O psychologists in a difficult

situation whereby their promise of neutrality is simply untenable.

A number of recent developments in the literature, however, lead one to believe that I/O psychologists may have begun to face some of the criticisms that have been advanced. Huszczo and his associates (1984), for instance, made a strong case for psychologists to admit and express their attitudinal bias in working for management. At the same time, they urged those psychologists with a pro-labor bias to identify and avail themselves to unions; thereby counter-acting the long standing pro-owner bias in psychology and discarding the neutrality myth.

The historical predilection favoring management and upholding the basic status quo does not preclude the prospect of I/O psychologists challenging it. Though few in number, some psychologists have already started collaborating with labor in advancing workers' interests (Huszczo et al., 1984). Several roles can be envisioned for a psychology devoted to helping unions. Among others: training in bargaining techniques, assistance in establishing educational programs for workers, teaching skills to counteract manipulation methods employed by managers, etc. Psychologists willing to contribute their expertise to labor will be well advised not to commit the same error as those who have typically served employers, that is, to pretend to being apolitical in a

field where the distribution of power is as salient an issue as can be.

Chapter 11: Abnormal Psychology

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the political extensions of predominant models of abnormal psychology. Contained in each paradigm are powerful implications for social change or support for the status quo. These derive mostly from the effect attributed to societal factors in the etiology, emergence, and reproduction of problems usually referred to as psychological. In most cases, the lesser the concern with and for societal variables, the greater the likelihood that the political message will be a conservative one. Conversely, as the concern with and for societal variables increases, so does the likelihood that the political message will be a progressive one (e.g., Wineman, 1984).

Unlike I/O psychology, which until recently was not heavily scrutinized for its pseudo-neutral political stance, the field of abnormal psychology has had to endure severe criticisms for some time now. Yet, as can be argued, these criticisms have failed to address a key issue with enough potency to generate a meaningful change of course in the discipline. That is, the analysis of abnormal behavior in a comprehensive socioeconomic, political, and ideological context. Undoubtedly, there have been serious attempts to place so called "abnormal behavior" in a social context as the following review will document. But these formulations

have been for the most part only social, as opposed to sociopolitical. Politics and economics have been largely excluded from the study of the behavior of mental patients. Although there are epidemiological studies to direct our attention to the rather important role played by economic factors (Grusky & Pollner, 1981, part II section C), these have not entered the mainstream of psychopathology to the required degree. Politics, as the inquiry into the attainment of social power, its maintenance through ideological apparatuses, and its concomitant inequalities in wealth and resources, is a largely neglected issue in the study of abnormal psychology (For a rare exception see Joffe & Albee, 1981a, 1981b).

If one were to schematically depict the sociopolitical history of the field in the last forty years, one would notice a progression from an asocial approach, through an enhanced awareness of its micro-social elements, to an increased alertness of macro-social variables. While this portrayal may be somewhat more linear than what the data may suggest, it is believed to represent what has been happening in the field. As well, it provides a heuristic insight into the ideological trends in the field.

The main task of this chapter is to elucidate the direct or indirect impact of such approaches and to show how they tend to preserve society in its present form.

The medical model, either in its organic or psychodynamic version, captures the essence of the asocial stage whose political implications are markedly conservative. Theories with a salient interpersonal and transactional component such as labeling and family therapy are representative of the micro-social phase. Highly progressive and conservative interpretations can be derived from these models of abnormal behavior. An effort will be made to clarify their political repercussions. Community psychology, prevention, and the ecological approach are examples of the macro-social paradigm. Inasmuch as these target the social moment of psychopathology and advocate social reform, they contain a strong progressive element. Unfortunately, at least for those interested in social change, they have not gone far enough in addressing the ideological and political context. Recommendations to rectify that situation will be advanced by the author in the paradigm termed macro-sociopolitical.

None of these approaches have entirely superseded the rest. Rather, they co-exist in a state of tension in which different approaches momentarily dominate the field. Currently, in terms of its derivatives for social change, the field is at a crossroads. On the conservative side, there is a growing "movement to 'remedicalize' psychiatry" (Reiser, 1988, pp. 148-149) and abnormal psychology in general. Hence, there is a

distinct possibility of a retreat into the original conservative apolitical stance. On the progressive side, there is an effort to enhance the understanding of macro-social events and how they may impact on the mental health of the population. Should the former prevail, we would likely face a devolution into the era of the asocial.

Abnormal Psychology I: Asocial

Albee (1981) has aptly conceptualized the asocial approach to the study of abnormal behavior as the defect model. The defect method, also known as medical (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1976) or mental medicine (Foucault, 1954/1987), analyses "inappropriate" behavior in terms of an internal organic or psychological malfunction.

Like organic medicine, mental medicine first tried to decipher the essence of illness in the coherent set of signs that indicate it. It constituted a symptomatology in which the constant, or merely frequent correlations between a particular type of illness and a particular morbid manifestation were picked out (Foucault 1954/1987, p. 3).

Similarly, Braginsky and Braginsky (1976) explain that in the medical model

aberrant behavior is seen as a symptom of an underlying illness. Like other medical symptoms, such as fever or vomiting, the behavior reflects

some underlying disease process....With respect to bizarre behavior, therefore, it is the task of the psychiatrist or psychologist to determine the cause (e.g. biochemical imbalances, weak ego boundaries), to diagnose the disorder (e.g. schizophrenia, manic-depressive, etc.), and to intervene with the appropriate treatment (pp. 70-71).

In the medical view, then, whatever inability the person may suffer from is located within the individual. As a result, etiological reasoning and intervention strategies are predominantly directed at an identified isolated patient (e.g. Nelson, Potasznik & Bennet, 1985). Environmental factors are not entirely disregarded, but they are given only secondary priority and remain largely in the background. At best, these are variables to be thought of, but not acted upon.

The defect model bifurcates into an organic and a psychological branch (e.g., Braginsky & Braginsky, 1976; Foucault, 1954/1987). Its organic or biochemical form, mostly espoused by psychiatrists but also by many psychologists, contends that conduct deemed as "irrational" is determined by biological, neural, or chemical abnormalities. It follows, then, that most mental diseases would ultimately be cured by biochemical methods. "In recent years, a multitude of psychopharmacological preparations have been advanced as the treatment, if not the cure, for a variety of mental

diseases" (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1976, p. 72).

The expression Homo Psychologicus (Foucault, 1954/1987, p. 74) represents the immense importance ascribed to the individual psyche in the psychological version of the defect model. As a supposedly autonomous entity, the person carries within him/herself the causes of his/her own malady, and is therefore to be modified and returned to the community as a well adjusted citizen. Unprecedented impetus for this treatment modality was furnished by psychoanalysis. An entire language was created to account for the operations and malfunctions of the psyche. "According to this approach, mental illness is viewed in terms of a faulty mental apparatus caused not by biochemicals but by early life experiences, in particular, traumatic ones" (Braginsky & Braginsky, 1976, p. 72).

As Braginsky and Braginsky (1976) asserted, "although seemingly disparate, both psychodynamic and biochemical approaches share the assumption that abnormal behaviors are symptoms of a mental illness which exists somewhere within the structure of the mind" (p. 73). As such, both deemphasize the role played by "out of the skin" elements in the etiology of any maladjustment.

While still very influential, the dominance of the medical-defect model has been undermined by a variety of writings pointing to its major shortcomings. As a matter

of fact, in the last three decades the field of abnormal psychology has witnessed the emergence and gradual consolidation of a body of literature characterized by a disillusionment with the classical medical model (e.g., Foucault, 1961/1965, 1985; Ingleby, 1981c; Laing, 1967, 1972, 1980, 1985; Kovel, 1981a, 1981b; Magaro et al., 1978, Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980; Sedgwick, 1982). Though varied in their specific orientation, these critiques converge in their view that the medical approach studies mental illness as a separate entity, as something going on within the person that needs to be repaired, much in disregard for environmental factors. Moreover, they claim that it fails to realize the connection between mental conditions and the historical, political, economic, and sociocultural context in which these occur. Consequently, the individual is too frequently dissociated from the wider systems of society which shape her/his behavior extensively, thus creating an ahistorical and asocial image of persons (Sarason, 1981a, 1981b).

The political extensions of this asocial abnormal psychology are not difficult to discern. By dichotomizing individuals as sick or healthy, the defect paradigm helped to promote the notion that maladapted persons are the sole product of a less able organism and/or a genetic handicap. This notion was, in the first decades of the century, very popular not only in mental

health circles but among policy makers as well (e.g., Hofstadter, 1955; Rose, Lewontin & Kamin, 1984). Congruent with the theories of social Darwinism and eugenics, the organic perspective of psychopathology facilitated the formulation of restrictive and discriminatory immigration policies in the United States (Kamin, 1974; Thielman, 1985).

Perhaps one of the most potentially conservative repercussions of the medical model has been its utilization by power elites in developing a sophisticated stratagem according to which systemic contradictions are either denied or presented as personal problems (e.g., Gross, 1980; W. Ryan, 1971). Some examples are in order: "Urban unrest is attributed to the lack of impulse control among young men raised in households without strong father figures" (Sampson, 1983, p. 123). Carothers, a former official of the World Health Organization, commented: "The African makes very little use of his frontal lobes. All the particularities of African psychiatry can be put down to frontal laziness" (in Nahem, 1981, p. 151).

When human suffering is predominantly interpreted as the result of a deficient organism, a conforming message emerges quite clearly. From this perspective, poor nutrition, detrimental living conditions, unemployment, and poverty in general are "determined" by the inability of those people to help themselves (W.

Ryan, 1971, 1981). "To blame the problems of those who are most severely affected by destructive conditions primarily on the deficits of 'character disorder' or 'pathology' of individuals is a classic case of blaming the victim" (Wineman, 1984, pp. 44-45). Among the devastating effects of this person-blame theorizing is the acceptance of its premises by the victims themselves. Pervasive social injustice is distorted into cases of biological or psychological inferiority. A distortion that not only its precursors, but their victims as well, grew to accept.

Because the poor within the Western nations as well as the colonial peoples of the world were seen as naturally inferior, there was ample ideological justification for exploitation of industrial workers, including children and women, for colonialism, and for racist policies leading to genocide....Although occasional voices of protest were heard, it is clear that women and the colonized, the lower class, and the rest largely accepted the view that they were, indeed, inferior (Albee, 1986, p. 895).

The last, but by no means the least, conservative implication of the defect-medical-asocial model is its noticeable apathy, to say the least, towards preventive action. Such attitude, voiced not long ago by Lamb and Zusman (1979) is highly symptomatic of the resurgence of

the asocial model in abnormal psychology. Their attack on preventive programs translates into less efforts at advancing our understanding and treatment of social constellations of factors affecting the mental health of the population, thereby averting challenges to social structures and the status quo. While Lamb's and Zusman's views have been refuted on numerous accounts (Albee, 1986; Nelson, Potasznik & Bennet, 1985), they have managed to influence the recent policies of at least one province in Canada: British Columbia has adopted their propositions in its mental health planning report (see Nelson, Potasznik & Bennet, 1985).

The fact that the asocial paradigm is gaining momentum, in spite of mounting evidence linking social factors and mental illness (see Fried, 1976; Gesten & Jason, 1987; Kessler, Price & Wortman, 1985; Nelson, Potasznik & Bennet, 1985; and Marmor, 1988), speaks in favor of the hypothesis that the mental health agenda may be heavily prescribed by the ideological atmosphere of the times (Levine & Levine, 1970; Wineman, 1984). As the Levines have persuasively demonstrated in their historical analysis, individualistic modes of therapy tend to thrive during conservative times (Levine & Levine, 1970).

Albee (1986) has cogently argued that for as long as psychologists, psychiatrists, and most importantly social policy legislators continue to believe that

mental illness, criminal tendencies and low intelligence derive mainly from a deficient organism, early compensatory education programs and primary prevention programs in general will never be satisfactorily implemented. To the extent that branches of psychology have contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the asocial perspective, they have equally contributed to the maintenance of the societal status quo.

Abnormal Psychology II: Micro-Social

The micro-social approach refers to a series of studies and writings whose primary concern is the identification of psychopathogenic and/or iatrogenic interpersonal processes in the context of a specific setting such as the psychiatric hospital or the family. Although the following individuals differ in many respects, not the least of which is their political preferences, the early contributions of Laing (1959, 1967, Laing & Esterson, 1964) and Szasz (1963, 1965, 1974) have converged in their attention to what may be termed micro-socially induced mental disorders via a stigmatizing process engendered by either family members or mental health professionals. Further interest in the micro-sociogenesis of mental illness was generated by the research of Rosenhan (1981) which provided a severe "blow" to the psychiatric establishment, by Goffman (1981), who unveiled the deleterious side-effects of prolonged hospitalization, and by Scheff (1976), who

advanced the labeling theory in mental illness.

Micro-social may be said to be a misnomer, for the relevance of these postulates are potentially broad. Yet, while potentially significant for society at large, the proponents of these theses have not, for the most part, transcended the constricted physical or psychological environments of the specific settings where their work was conducted. In contrast to the progress made by community psychology and the ecological approach in addressing larger social issues, the name micro-social represents adequately a mid-position between the asocial and macro-social models.

Whereas the content of these writings is well known by now, their political implications have not received as much attention. Witness for instance the vast confusion surrounding Szasz's social philosophy (Vatz & Weinberg, 1983). Unlike the almost uniform conservative stance of the asocial model, the political reverberations of the micro-social model will be somewhat ambiguous and less readily visible.

The micro-social approaches to abnormal psychology to be presented are labeling and family therapy. The former has been selected for discussion primarily due to the vast confusion surrounding the political views of Szasz. Contrary to popular perceptions, his beliefs embody highly conservative principles (cf. Sedgwick, 1982; Vatz & Weinberg, 1983). Family therapy is worth

examining because of its somewhat deceiving political stance. Though allegedly progressive when compared to asocial models, its preoccupation with the family unit mitigates against a comprehensive analysis of structural forces in the genesis of abnormal behavior.

The politics of labeling.

By now a well known body of literature has been devoted to examining the iatrogenic aspects of psychological and psychiatric practices in mental health settings (for reviews see books by P. Brown, 1985; Grusky & Pollner, 1981; and Dean, Kraft & Pepper, 1976). A common theme in these writings has been the contribution and solidification of mental illnesses through labeling.

Regardless of the particulars that may have brought an individual into contact with a mental health agency, the latter are said to contribute to the perpetuation and possible exacerbation of the behavior deemed abnormal through negative societal reactions and micro-social oppression. Labeling theorists agree that most individuals engage, at some point in their lives, in some kind of socially "unacceptable" conduct. Whereas the majority of incidents go unnoticed, the few that are observed and reacted upon adversely by significant others are likely to be cemented in the person's behavioral repertoire. If these acts are "responded to and regarded as instances of mental illness, a self

fulfilling process is initiated that culminates with the individual capitulating to pressures and rewards to accept the role of a mentally ill individual" (Grusky & Pollner, 1981, p. 41). Or, as Scheff (1976) noted, when labeling occurs and the person who breaks the rule is stigmatized as deviant, "the rule breaking which would otherwise have been terminated, compensated for, or channeled may be stabilized; thus, the offender, through the agency of labeling, is launched into a career of 'chronic mental illness'" (p. 213).

Behavior deemed intolerable by relatives, teachers, co-workers, employers, friends, is drawn to the attention of clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, etc. When diagnosis by the mental health professional results in a classificatory statement, apparent "scientific" justification is furnished to those who sought professional help in the first place. At this stage the wheels of the labeling process have been put into motion on a devastating journey that may result in transformation of transitory behaviors into permanent destructive patterns. This argument, supported by research conducted in naturalistic mental health settings (e.g., Goffman, 1981; Rosenhan, 1981; see also final chapter under Pygmalion) furnishes evidence for the "deleterious social consequences of labeling persons as mentally ill" (Nevid & Morrison, 1980, p. 72). In the specific case of psychiatric hospitals, labeling is

conducive, inter alia, to stigmatization, lack of independence, degradation and humiliation (e.g., Grusky & Pollner, 1981, part III).

Two sharply contrasting political uses have been made of labeling theory and research. Left-wing interpretations indict the mental health establishment as a sophisticated means of social control. Right-wing interpretations indict the same on charges of furnishing an "excuse" for deviant individuals. According to the latter the mental health system is too liberal. It helps criminals go unpunished by classifying them as mentally ill. Both interpretations will be briefly explored.

Labeling is intimately related to social control. The proliferation of the term disease and the medicalization of social deviance for purposes of social control are widely documented phenomena in our culture (e.g., Conrad, 1981; Glenn & Kunes, 1973; Pearson, 1975; Scheff, 1976). The notion of mental illness has been strategically utilized as a non-judicial mode of treating social deviants, political dissidents and nonconformists not only in the communist block (Fireside, 1979; Medvedev & Medvedev, 1971) but in North American society as well (Bayers, 1981; Foucault, 1985; Halleck, 1971; Nahem, 1981; Schacht, 1985; Spiers, 1973).

Moreover, left-wing readings contend that labeling theory has demonstrated quite convincingly that mental

illnesses are not only the product of intrapsychic mechanisms but also of interpersonal transactions based on inequality of power. Expectations placed on helpless individuals by mental health professionals, relatives, friends, and society at large help determine the behavior of the former. In exposing these transactions labeling theory has been instrumental in undermining the hegemony exercised by the medical model and its concomitant conservatism. Simply put, "the community response is critical in shaping and organizing the nature and extent of what will come to be seen as pathology" (Grusky & Pollner, 1981, p. 40).

The broad political repercussions of labeling as a means of social control have been succinctly articulated by Scheff (1976), who claimed that "to the extent that medical (and psychiatric) science lends its name to the labeling of nonconformity as mental illness, it is giving legitimacy to the social status quo" (p. 215). Or as Dean (1976) observed: "When used to support the status quo, labeling is one mechanism of social control--a device for restoring or maintaining the social order" (p. 193).

Conservative psychiatrists, such as Szasz (1963, 1965, 1974, 1984) and Wood (1986) oppose the use of labels because (a) they are supposedly "myths" concocted by professionals, and (b) provide an excuse for people who engage in deviant behavior and/or "lack moral

fiber." In advancing the former proposition they have at least theoretically and potentially deprived of services individuals requiring help. The risks involved in the "myth" argument have been cogently expressed by Coulter:

That there are economic, political, juridical, temporal and ideological pressures to which some clinicians succumb is a well-documented and socially important fact; but to conclude from a documentation of abuses to the non-discriminability of mental illness or to its 'non-existence' is to indulge in a distracting and potentially harmful metaphysics (Coulter, 1979, p. 149).

Yet, in spite of counter-arguments such as Coulter's, the "myth" position keeps strengthening (Wood, 1986). Perhaps the most conservative derivation of this notion is that if mental illness is basically a myth, then crimes are never committed because of a mental illness. By promoting that postulate, Szasz, who has been erroneously regarded as a progressive and even a radical, has been acting as a protector of the status quo; for in avoiding the issue of mental illness he also eludes placing society on the stand. Vatz and Weinberg have already noted that indeed "a basic conservatism is central to Szasz's work" (1983, p. 17). Consider, for example, his desire to abolish the insanity plea:

Should people also be free to be a danger to others? This problem disappears once we recognize

that criminals cannot be divided into two categories--that is, persons who break the law because they choose to and persons who break it because their "mental illness" compels them to do so. All criminal behavior should be controlled by means of the criminal law (Szasz, 1984, p. 31).

Szasz avoids the question of intention and possible environmental precipitating factors completely. Matza is quite right in asserting that according to Szasz "everyone who has done something wrong should go to prison....He thinks that the whole idea of mental illness isn't helpful at all and that we shouldn't get into the question of intent or the question of insanity" (in Pearson, 1975, p. 43).

Much like Szasz, Wood (1986) perceives deviant behavior not as madness but rather as "badness."

The view is taken here that such people are bad rather than mad, and should be treated as such, being far better off in prison than in a hospital if they have broken the law....The deficiency in sociopathy is a moral deficiency. The individual exhibits no conscience, cannot hear, or chooses to ignore, its dictates. He chooses to be bad in exactly the same way as others choose consistently to be good. He represents the inferior end of the good-bad continuum (Wood, 1986, p. 41).

Both Szasz and Wood oversimplify an intricate issue in

terms of a hardly defensible dichotomy between good people and bad people. By vehemently espousing the politico-legal postulates of individual responsibility and individualistic solutions, they overlook the possibility that some individuals might engage in criminal behavior due to emotional instability, however caused, and/or due to societal precipitating factors, however distant and complex. As psychiatrist Marmor recently pointed out, it must be remembered that some criminal patterns "are due not to individual psychopathology per se, but to basic institutional factors that makes such behavior almost inevitable under certain circumstances....our society is so structured that many people are driven to destroy, impair or threaten the interests of other people" (Marmor, 1988, pp. 489-490). Societal explanations make no difference for Szasz or Wood. The autonomous individual is considered fully responsible for his/her behavior and should therefore be treated on an individual basis. Society remains unquestioned. In Szasz's opinion, one has "the obligation to take responsibility for the choices one has made without psychiatric or other forms of exculpation" (Vatz & Weinberg, 1983, p. 17).

It would seem then that theorists concerned with the politics of diagnosis in the mental health setting have drawn significant attention to social determinants of abnormal behavior. In the case of self-fulfilling

prophecy through labeling or in the case of discrediting nonconformists via psychiatric diagnosis, they have dislodged the field from the medical model which asserted the psychopathologist was a neutral humanitarian scientist. These putative reforming trends are, however, attenuated by those who utilize labeling to endorse a highly conservative and individualistic social philosophy. The latter would hold people always fully responsible for any non-physically coerced actions, in total disregard for psychiatric labels, valid or not.

The politics of family therapy.

Since the late fifties family processes have been identified as a source of major psychological disorders such as schizophrenia. Through elaborate interactions among family members, one person is subjected to a particular kind of treatment that may be referred to as psychological oppression. As we proceed, we shall note that this insight was historically highly relevant in the evolution of the family therapy movement. A trend whose often contradictory political implications need to be spelled out.

Research conducted in the fifties and sixties by Bateson, Jackson, Haley and Weakland (1956), Laing and Esterson (1974), and Bowen (1978), facilitated a clearer view of the function of the family in the course of schizophrenia. In their seminal article "Towards a

theory of schizophrenia," Bateson and his associates (1956) proposed the double bind theory. According to it, contradictory instructions or messages of love and rejection are given to a family member by the same person, without giving to the former an opportunity to comment on the perceived inconsistencies. Double bind is defined as a "situation in which no matter what a person does, he 'can't win.'" It is hypothesized that a person caught in the double bind may develop schizophrenic symptoms" (Bateson et al., 1956, p. 251).

Two years after the publication of Bateson's research, Laing and Esterson (1974) launched a study of families of schizophrenics in England. Their conclusions were similar to Bateson's. Both groups of researchers concurred in that the incapacity to comment on the double bind, and the necessity to invalidate one's own feelings in order to survive may be conducive to schizophrenic patterns.

In 1960 Bowen reported his experiences and conclusions from a study in which schizophrenics, their parents, and normal siblings lived together in a psychiatric ward. Bowen asserted that schizophrenic psychosis is "a symptom manifestation of an active process that involves the entire family" (Bowen, 1978, p. 45).

The findings of these pioneer investigations lend support to the development and eventual establishment of

family therapy. Founded primarily on the principles of General Systems Theory, originally postulated by Bertalanffy (1968), family therapy became an essential tool in analyzing and modifying family dynamics. The notion of a system as a "complex of interacting elements" (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55), was readily applicable to the family situation. The introduction of general systems theory into the field of abnormal psychology represented a shift from mechanistic, linear cause and effect reasoning to a more holistic, interactive, and circular mode of thinking (Goldenberg & Goldenberg, 1985; Hoffman, 1981; Karpel & Strauss, 1983; Levant, 1984; Tomm, 1980). In addition, the adoption of a systemic frame of reference cultivated the aspiration that not only would the individual be studied in the context of the family, but that also the family would be investigated in the larger context of society. In Busfield's words, "we cannot hope to understand what goes on inside families if we study them in isolation from the wider society. Without such a setting much of the meaning and significance of what happens in the family is lost" (1974, p. 158). That very expectation, which contained the progressive seed of family therapy, remains unfulfilled (Jacoby, 1975; Mannino & Shore, 1984; Poster, 1978; Wineman, 1984).

What, then, has been the political legacy of the "discovery" of family induced psychopathology and family

therapy? I would respond that following an initial progressive stage, family therapy suffered a severe atrophy which resulted in political stagnation. Consequently, much of what family therapy is all about today is an expansion and updated version of the traditional medical model. "Spurred by research into the dynamics of families with psychotic children, family therapy now justifies itself by calling the family the 'sick' unit" (Glenn & Kunnes, 1973, p. 109). Some amplification is required.

The political legacy of family therapy may also be described as an unfulfilled promise. Given the strong influence exerted by General Systems Theory, a theory with a very broad scope, it would have been reasonable to predict that family therapy would not delimit its mandate to intra-familial vicissitudes. Nevertheless, by and large, this is exactly what happened.

Laing's writings (Laing, 1969; Laing & Esterson, 1974) as well as the others' reviewed above contributed to the momentum necessary for a paradigm shift in abnormal psychology. Laing ardently denounced the medical model whereby people examined "heads, blood, urine, or...some pathology exclusively 'in' the 'psyche'" (Laing, 1969, p. 7). His conceptualization of psychopathology as an interpersonal, rather than intrapersonal phenomenon is clearly reflected in Sanity, madness and the family: "We are concerned with persons,

the relationship between persons, and the characteristics of the family as a system composed of a multiplicity of persons" (Laing & Esterson, 1974, p. 19). Briefly stated, "Laing has been successful in his project of removing the 'disease' from a person to his family nexus" (Mitchell, 1974, p. 256). In that sense, Laing, and for that matter all the recruits who have been joining the family therapy movement for the last three decades have demonstrated a progressive attitude in moving abnormal psychology away from the asocial model. Away from the asocial model? Yes. How much? Not enough.

A minimalist reading of systems theory has led the field to perceive the family as the ultimate system to be concerned with, and to pay only lip service to wider societal systems. Systems family therapy has been operating under the working assumption that intervention is with all the family, and nothing but the family (e.g., Mannino & Shore, 1984; Pearson, 1974). Pearson's (1974) observed that family therapy "rips family structure out of wider social structure and proceeds to lay the fault at the door of the family itself, labeling it a 'sick' family" (p. 147). More recently, Mannino and Shore (1984) have summarized the truncated evolution of family therapy. Their account is quite lucid:

Recent writings on the family, especially in the area of family therapy, place great emphasis upon

systems theory and the importance of interactions, communications, and patterns of relationships. Too often, however, family therapists tend to concentrate their efforts entirely on the "family," to the neglect of...the environmental context of the family's activities....Thus, it appears that we may have moved (not in a sense of growth) from the boundaries of the individual personality structure unrelated to the environment, to the boundaries of the family unrelated to the environment....The latter substitutes a family orientation for the individual. Thus, we look to the family system for indications of the problem and, when found, direct treatment on this relationship system as the intervention target. In both of these approaches the ecological context is ignored and either the individual or the family, depending upon the orientation, is viewed as the only level necessary to focus upon for diagnosis and intervention. Disregarded in these approaches is the concept that the problem could lie at the level of the ecological system, of which the individual and the family are components parts (Mannino & Shore, 1984, pp. 76-77).

The transition effected by family therapists from an individualistic model to a systemic one has been rather myopic. As James and McIntyre (1983) pointed out,

"despite family therapy's claim to a broader perspective, it is a perspective which is itself limited by its failure to take account of powerful and pervasive social forces" (p. 123). A considerable risk is run when the family is isolated from the nexus of macro-social systems and is accused for the psychological suffering of the individual. This erroneous selective attribution portrays the family as the main generator of certain kinds of dysfunctions and omits the fact that the family is very much a product of social forces. Family therapy's analysis is reductionistic in that "society is shuffled out....a social constellation is banalized to an immediate human network. It is forgotten that the relationship between 'you and me' or 'you and the family' is not exhausted in the immediate: all of society seeps in" (Jacoby, 1975, p. 136). By depicting the family as a central perpetrator in the infliction of psychological distress, attention is deflected from macro-social conflicts that may actively shape and perpetuate the mental health of the population as well as that of the individual and his/her family.

Mediators should not be confused with origins. And given the socio-historically conditioned characteristics of the family in its present form, it is more likely that the family would be a precipitating, rather than a causal factor (James & McIntyre, 1983; Mitchell, 1974; Poster, 1978; Zaretsky, 1986).

Evidently the mediations are crucial, and the family is one of them. But they are mediations, not origins; the family does not exist in a no-man's-land. It is snarled in a historical dynamic; it has changed in the past, and it is changing now. It is as much victim as victimizer (Jacoby, 1975, p. 139).

It might be argued that family therapy protects the societal status quo not only by neglecting to reflect upon its negative effects on the family, but also by directly bolstering the nuclear family (James & McIntyre, 1983; Poster, 1978). Poster (1978) claims that the entire family therapy industry "is devoted to the preservation of the current family form, as well as to the preservation of the general institutions of society...which are seen as dependent upon healthy families but in no way damaging to them" (p. 121).

To recapitulate, research conducted by family theorists supported the assumption that psychopathogenic processes occurring in the family setting were conducive to psychopathology. The establishment of a by now strong family therapy movement followed. Whereas significant progress has been attained in re-conceptualizing abnormal behavior in more interpersonal terms, the promise to look for systemic causes has been limited to intrafamilial dynamics. Thus, the epistemological shift has been more quantitative than qualitative. Family

therapists have advanced from a small systemic part, i.e., the individual, to a slightly bigger systemic part, i.e., the family.

As we have seen, the political dimensions of micro-social approaches to abnormal psychology are numerous. Through an exposition of human transactions in a micro-social context, an insight into the many facets of power and how it affects behavior was attained. It may be that changes ought to be made in social practices and in the structure of social power to prevent abnormal behavior. On the conservative side, some authors have used labeling theory to denounce the mental health system as too liberal. In the case of family therapy, the promise to adopt a systemic, thereby comprehensive and social view of mental illness, was not delivered. Systemic family therapy has focused too much on the family, and too little on society.

Abnormal Psychology III: Macro-social

We have witnessed the progression from individualistic to micro-social conceptualizations of abnormal psychology. This third paradigm represents a much broader perception of the role played by society in contributing to mental health/illness. This position, furthered through community psychology (e.g., Heller & Monahan, 1977; Rappaport, 1977) and the ecological approach (O'Conner & Lubin, 1984), has gathered impetus in the last twenty years. Rather than rejecting the two

paradigms previously presented, community psychology endeavors to integrate their accomplishments with the firmly held view that psychological disorders can be neither understood nor treated in isolation from social factors.

It will be argued that while "on paper" community psychology endorses a discernment of human behavior that incorporates personal, communal, and global forces such as economy and politics; in practice it has fallen short of properly addressing a key constituent in the sociogenesis of psychopathology: the unequal distribution of power in society and its concomitant fragmentation into opposed interest groups. That is to say, in principle community psychology promotes the politicization of abnormal behavior, a much needed emphasis. However, when community psychologists become involved in the political arena, the kind of politics advocated by them is not a radical one. Their politics does not threaten the status quo. An elaboration of this proposition is in order.

Declarative statements about the purposes of community psychology include explicit mention of dissatisfaction with the status quo and a clear desire to alter it.

Community psychology is interested in social change, particularly in those systems of society where psychologists are active participants. Change

in society involves relationships among its component parts, encompassing those of individuals to social systems such as schools, hospitals, and courts, as well as to other individuals. Change toward a maximally equitable distribution of psychological as well as material resources is sought [italics added] (Rappaport, 1977, p. 3).

To eliminate any doubts about the scope of its endeavor, Rappaport asserts that "community psychology is by its very nature dedicated to a challenge of the status quo" (1977, p. 29). These words by Rappaport, author of the influential book Community Psychology (1977) and present editor of the American Journal of Community Psychology clearly illustrate the intent to change societal structures. This aspiration emanates from the realization that "an ecological perspective, focusing on the match or 'fit' between persons and environments, rather than on 'fixing up' those who are seen as inferior...is the most sensible" (Rappaport, 1977, p. 3).

Political activity, then, is an inherent part of this paradigm. Simply because environments and social structures cannot otherwise be transformed to suit the needs of individuals and pursue the prescribed "fit." Community psychologists have, at least in principle, "overstepped the limits of the available psychological paradigms and are now interested in social change,

social justice, politics, economics and social systems as well as individuals" (Rappaport, 1977, p. 19). Here was, finally, a paradigm to address the human experience in a global and integrative, as opposed to fragmentary fashion.

As envisioned by Rappaport in 1977, community psychology was indeed very promising. However, as evaluated by Sarason in 1984 (Sarason, 1984b), the field was at best making its very first steps in the political scenario, at worst it was still too attached to the comforts of the academic world to venture into the uncertainties of the political arena. Sarason's (1984b) observations gain further support from the lack of both political awareness and activity recently documented in the literature on ecological (Jason & Glenwick, 1984; O'Conner & Lubin, 1984) as well as social and community interventions (Gesten & Jason, 1987). Gesten and Jason (1987) conclude their review stating that "Psychologists in the past have largely avoided participation in public policy matters. The concerns of the future may render such involvement on the part of a significant subgroup far more essential" (p. 451). But it is not enough to note that psychologists have done little in that area. It is also crucial to examine where they have failed when such projects were attempted.

"Deinstitutionalization" is illustrative. This is an area where community psychologists demonstrated

interest in public policy and had, indirectly at the very least, an impact (Dimirsky, 1985; Levine, 1981). By now it is almost common knowledge that many of the well intentioned effects of deinstitutionalization have been severely undermined by many unanticipated side-effects, not the least of which is degrading and unbearable living conditions for many ex-hospital mental patients. As a result, an acute crisis now persists both in Canada (Capponi, 1985) and the United States (Bassuk & Gerson, 1985; Levine, 1981). The piecemeal approach that has characterized this procedure exemplifies how the problem of mental illness cannot be treated in isolation from numerous other social dimensions. Proponents of deinstitutionalization were not counting on unscrupulous landlords to exploit the discharged patients. Yet, this is precisely what happened repeatedly (Bassuk & Gerson, 1985; Capponi, 1985; Levine, 1981). Similarly, they omitted to take into account that funding for the recommended community mental health centers may not be available, or sufficient, to look after the needs of the mentally ill in the community. Moving only one piece in society's puzzle without re-allocating the rest is tantamount to what Piaget would term assimilation without accommodation. No meaningful adaptation can take place without the latter. Thus, to the extent that psychologists were promoting deinstitutionalization without being cognizant of its many negative reactions,

they engaged in problem creation rather than problem solution. Colliding economic, social and bureaucratic interests of different groups have largely determined the fate of the discharge program. To have overlooked such forces might be thought of as political naivete.

There is then a noticeable discrepancy between the theory and the practice of community psychology. Whereas in principle it is conceptually designed to address the sociopolitical components inherent in mental health issues, in effect it has not been politically conscious in dealing with them. This is in part due to the fact that community psychologists have taken into account the influence of systemic variables such as social classes and institutions, but by and large their analyses have stopped there. An academic consideration that was not accompanied by a serious challenge of these very structures. The term coping more than changing typifies community interventions. Though few, attempts at the latter are beginning to emerge. Examples of empowerment projects testify to that effect (Bermant & Warwick, 1978; Gesten & Jason, 1987).

If meaningful social action is to occur, an adjustment in community psychology's priorities and vision of the political world is called for. These are presented in the next and last paradigm to be discussed.

Abnormal Psychology IV: Macro-Sociopolitical

This model commences where community psychology

stops: in the failure to enhance critical political awareness. It is not intended to replace the macro-social perspective endorsed by community psychology but rather to complete its task. The following is primarily an outline for a paradigm that, though already advocated by some psychologists, (e.g., Albee, 1970, 1981, 1986; Rappaport, 1977; Sarason, 1984b) still needs strengthening.

Proposed here is a coalition between community psychology and radical politics. While the former brings the scientific and research background necessary for understanding the impact of societal structures on the human experience, the latter provides the insight required not only for scrutinizing the social system, but also for modifying it. Radical politics is differentiated from conventional politics in that it may question the effectiveness of the current political process itself for bringing about meaningful reforms, not the least of which is equality for all sectors of the population (W. Ryan, 1981). This is simply due to the fact that governments are largely utilized to protect interests entrenched in the preservation of the present system. When the conventional political process, as well as most major endeavors affecting public life, are manipulated by the rich and powerful (Domhoff, 1986; Gross, 1980; Reich & Edwards, 1986), it is not at all certain that the interests of under-

represented constituencies such as the mentally ill or the poor will be meaningfully served (Wineman, 1984). Radical politics seeks to empower the underprivileged to affirm their rights and interests.

Power is a key element either in the preservation or change of the existing social order. Consequently, community psychologists ought to be more appreciative of its role and realize that such need may best be satisfied by the proposed unification between community psychology and radical politics. These two enterprises are highly compatible in that both pursue social changes to better serve the needs of particularly vulnerable populations. The infusion of activism hoped to be attained by this model may revitalize important community psychology practices which have been dormant or unduly relegated to a second place.

In order to further the advocated amalgamation of forces, a few directions are outlined below. They represent an effort to establish new priorities in practices that are either already in existence, or that have been waiting to be articulated. In either case, I believe the suggestions made below are entirely congruent with the paradigm community psychology has been attempting to promote. Recommendations, as will be seen, are offered in the form "From...To..." to emphasize the shift in priorities from current practices to a more desirable state of affairs.

1. From public policy to political public.

Currently, whenever community psychologists become involved in politics it is mostly through the legislative process. This is a process whereby decisions are made by individuals who are too removed from the vicissitudes of the suffering population, be they mental patients, visible minorities, women, the poor, etc. Public policy makers are not necessarily in touch with these people's plight unless the latter loudly voice their concerns. This should be accomplished by politicizing the public.

Individuals should be educated to present their cases in front of legislators, instead of having professionals do that for them. Professionals too often are quite removed from the suffering of their clients. Rather than going up to the legislators to advocate for the people, community psychologists ought to go down to the people to help them organize to affirm their interests. Encouraging empowerment projects of this sort are being conducted with what appear to be promising results (Bermant & Warwick, 1978; Gesten & Jason, 1987).

W. Ryan (1981) has claimed that the main task in promoting the long-term well-being of the large and silent suffering mass is to assist them in understanding the basic inequality inherent in the system. It is highly unlikely that equality will be advanced by policy makers whose interests are maintained by inequality. In

making the public more political, Ryan's proposition is furthered at least one step. Public policy may at present be the most important catalyst for change, but a political community may be even more important in that they may set the tone for the policies to be legislated (cf. Wineman, 1984).

2. From interdisciplinary to interclass thinking and action.

The need to engage professionals from other disciplines in the solution of community problems (e.g., Bechtel, 1984) is heard more often than the equally, if not more, important need to involve community members. This may entail a shift from more expert advice to more interclass dialogue. The professional helper, who usually belongs to the middle class, needs to be educated about the plight of community members, who in many cases belong to the lower class. This interclass communication may be more fruitful than interdisciplinary communication. This is not to devalue expert opinions but rather to convey a change in priorities and to suggest supplementary procedures.

3. From a single issue to systemic-political thinking and action.

While concentration of energies on a single issue, such as deinstitutionalization, is useful in that it helps gather momentum for much needed changes or at least palliatives, it is also dangerous in that it

promotes a very fragmentary view of systemic complexities. A few examples should suffice to illustrate this point. In a typical primary prevention example "efforts to reduce the incidence and management of diarrhea in infants through parent education in simple health care practices were constrained by the fact that many families had limited access to uncontaminated water" (Halpern, 1988, p. 257).

In the case of poverty, it is becoming increasingly obvious that it will not be eradicated by the occasional few more jobs or the acquisition of a few more skills by the individual but by the elimination of a system which perpetuates inequality (W. Ryan, 1981).

That large numbers of discharged mental patients are exploited by landlords, live in subhuman conditions, lack shelter and have less access to psychiatric services (Bassuk & Gerson, 1985; Capponi, 1985; Levine, 1981) are not unpreventable natural disasters; they are primarily the consequences of a tradition of solving social problems without seeing through the full ramifications. In reviewing the implementation of the 1963 American "Community Mental Health Centers Act" (PL 88-164) Levine (1981) concludes:

The problem of caring for mental patients is part of the larger problem of welfare in a capitalistic and individualistic society, and funds to implement programs for assistance to the elderly and the

handicapped depend upon welfare economics and health care economics and politics....Everything is connected to everything else, ideas to politics, politics to economics, economics to bureaucratic organizational dynamics. One cannot understand one without looking at all the others (p. 77).

It should not be concluded that local changes are irrelevant until all of society changes. What should be concluded is that local changes are only to be considered initial steps in an effort to reform larger societal structures that interfere with the solution of the specific problem at hand.

4. From psychological to environmental prevention.

Being an offspring of clinical psychology (Sarason, 1984b), it may be only natural that many of community psychology's most successful preventative efforts be psychological. Witness the progress made in the areas of social support and competence building (Gesten & Jason, 1987; Nelson, Potasznik & Bennet, 1985; Saulnier, 1985). While the psychoeducational focus of prevention projects is vital, it may not be as essential as environmental prevention. Environment "in this context is interpreted in its broadest sense, and includes not only our physical surroundings, both natural and artificial, but also the social, cultural, regulatory and economic conditions and influences that impinge on our everyday lives" (Health & Welfare Canada, 1988, pp. 4-5).

Recently, an important proposition has been eloquently argued in Mental Health for Canadians: Striking a Balance (Health & Welfare Canada, 1988). The paper incisively pinpoints structural deficits conducive to psychological vulnerability in general and mental illness in particular. Based on the assumption that "whatever makes it difficult for the individual, the group and the environment to interact effectively and justly (for example, poverty, prejudice or poor coordination of resources) is a threat or barrier to mental health" (Health & Welfare Canada, 1988, p. 8), the document addresses the imperative needs to reduce social inequality, discriminatory social attitudes, and to enhance social justice. Though somewhat lacking in specific recommendations and only time will tell whether the government is seriously committed to changing these societal adversities, the document does a much better job than recent scholarly reviews (e.g., Kessler, Price & Wortman, 1985; Strauss, 1979) in stating that the "distribution of power among individuals, groups and their environments is a crucial determinant of mental health" (Health & Welfare Canada, 1988, p. 10).

As Halpern (1988) has recently observed, the factors a primary prevention program such as early intervention "can influence directly (parent child-rearing behavior, knowledge, and attitudes) are themselves strongly influenced by other factors much

more difficult to alter in a discrete social program (e.g., economic insecurity, limited access to services, dilapidated housing)" (p. 253). Consequently, it is necessary to establish priorities and determine how much effort should be invested in remodeling each portion of the communal puzzle.

Attitudes, coping strategies, education, and interpersonal support are indeed unquestionably important parts of prevention projects. Yet, efforts in reshaping the psychological world of persons may be wasted if the environmental world, as broadly defined above, is not reshaped first. This notion may be foreign to many psychologists, but it certainly should not be to community psychologists; for they are committed to promoting the fit between persons and environments.

5. From scientific to political activities.

It should be restated that what is suggested is a change in priorities necessitated by the neglect of certain inactivated principles of community psychology. Thus, a move from scientific to political activities is not intended to detract from the scientific base of community psychology, but rather to convey the opinion that, at this juncture, political awareness may be restricted by what may be termed a too scientific-academic approach.

"Politics is not wrong or bad. It is bad or wrong only if we blind ourselves to those inevitabilities"

(Levine, 1981, p. 9). According to Levine (1981), professional helpers are blind to the political context where their endeavors take place. Unfortunately, it would seem that this situation has been at least partially created by the unbalanced priority given to more "credible" enterprises such as science.

Levine (1981) has documented at length the political innocence of mental health workers in the United States for the most part of this century. His indictment is followed by this conclusion:

The field of mental health by no means belongs exclusively to the professional mental health workers no matter how fervently we wish it....It may be that it is our task as professionals, and as teachers of the next generation of professionals, to engage in consciousness raising so that political science, law, and economics become as much parts of the mental health curriculum...as abnormal psychology or psychotherapy (Levine, 1981, p. 206).

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this chapter has been to review the political repercussions of different models of abnormal psychology. Four paradigms have been presented and discussed. Whereas the first three are widely practised, the last one, namely the macro-sociopolitical constitutes more of a desideratum than an existing

model. The fourth paradigm was outlined with the clear intent of activating dormant tenets of community psychology, one of the branches of psychology with the most potential to reshape the environment in order to make it more suitable for the promotion of well-being. Unless community psychology enacts a new set of priorities to vivify its seeds of political activism, it will likely regress to the stage where preoccupation with psychological dimensions only enables the social order to proceed unchallenged.

Countless obstacles will be encountered by those willing to invigorate the field of abnormal psychology by entering the turbulent political scene of community life. Psychologists prepared to give up some of the comfort afforded by the scientist-professional model to question existing social structures are likely to risk severe opposition from their employing institutions. In addition, by revoking their membership in the "politically-neutral" academic club, they will face isolation from colleagues who may perceive their activities as derogating the painfully gained reputation of so called scientific objectivity. This embroilment is occasioned by a model whose chief goal is the promotion of human welfare, as opposed to paradigms designed to dissect the human experience in the hope of finding replicable laws of behavior. The latter may be conducted without disrupting the social order. The former is bound

to perturb the status quo.

Section III: Social and Ethical Implications

Chapter 12: Human Welfare and the Status Quo

It has been argued in Section II that at least some psychological formulations and practices seem to be instrumental in upholding the societal status quo. This state of affairs has far-reaching social and ethical implications. Given that both the American and the Canadian codes of ethics for psychologists clearly state the promotion of human welfare as one of their primary aims, it would be pertinent to elaborate on the repercussions of psychology's endorsement of the present social order for the attainment of such goal. Before we arrive at any tentative conclusion in this regard, a number of questions need to be addressed: (a) what is human welfare? (b) what is the good society that is likely to enhance the well-being of its members? and (c) is human welfare being promoted in the present social system?

The Good Life

The question of what is human welfare is posed here in the language usually used by philosophers, i.e., what is the good life, simply because the former can be perceived in a rather limited way. Whereas human welfare may be associated mainly with subsistence, the good life goes much beyond that point. At the same time, the good life should not be treated as identical with pleasure, for as we shall see below it is conceivably

more than a life of pleasure.

What constitutes and how to achieve the good life are fundamental concerns in ethics. Sidwick (1922) defines ethics as "the science or study of what is right or what ought to be, so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals" (p. 4). Right, at least according to philosophers Frankena (1963), Sidwick (1922) and Williams (1972), can be interpreted as actions that will enhance personal, as well as the well-being of fellow community members. Such reasoning is implied in Frankena's assertion that "morality is not to be a minister merely to one's own good life but to that of others as well" (1963, p. 77). This segment will focus primarily on personal well-being. More will be said about duty and the well-being of others when we consider the good society.

Consensus cannot be easily reached as to what is the good life. Nevertheless, Olson (1978) contends that there is some agreement among contemporary philosophers that the good life cannot be attained by a single good-making characteristic. Among the constitutive elements of the good life Olson mentions pleasure, purposeful activity, satisfying human relationships, sense of personal worth, and physical well-being. Interestingly enough physical well-being is placed last, for Olson himself points out that it "is a condition of the successful experience of any of the four intrinsic goods

thus far mentioned" (1978, p. 25). This short list bears great resemblance to the human needs presented by Maslow in his theory of self-actualization, which is the model to be advocated for the purposes of this discussion.

Maslow's theory of self-actualization (also referred to as self-fulfilment) has a well respected tradition in philosophy, from Aristotle (1978) to the contemporary Blanshard (1961). Aristotle's conception of happiness was in terms of self-fulfilment. Norman (1983) correctly asserts that the first postulate in Aristotle's theory of self-fulfilment is that "the ultimate end of human action is happiness" (p. 38). In Aristotle's words:

We always desire happiness for its own sake and never as a means to something else, whereas we desire honor, pleasure, intellect, and every virtue, partly for their own sakes (for we should desire them independently of what might result from them) but partly also as being means to happiness, because we suppose they will prove the instruments of happiness. Happiness, on the other hand, nobody desires for the sake of these things, nor indeed as a means to anything at all (Aristotle, 1978, p. 158).

The word happiness contains only some of the connotations of the original eudaimonia. In Greek eudaimonia refers to well-being, flourishing (Norman,

1983), and also to prosperity, the good/best life, and good fortune (Harsthouse, 1986). Clearly, eudaimonia encompasses more than pleasure. According to Aristotle it is "an activity of soul in accordance with complete or perfect virtue....Virtue or excellence being twofold, partly intellectual and partly moral" (Aristotle, 1978, p. 159). The way to attain the first is by teaching and demands time and experience. The second can be achieved by habit (Aristotle, 1978).

The emphasis placed by Aristotle on fulfilment as a spiritual enterprise does not detract from his awareness that certain material conditions need to be present in order to reach such a desired state. "Aristotle recognizes as a constraint on his account of eudaimonia that the flourishing life should contain the real advantages of (some) material wealth and pleasure to which the vicious attach such importance" (Harsthouse, 1986, p. 53).

One of the difficulties with the Aristotelian doctrine is that instead of providing a descriptive account of what are the human needs that will account for eudaimonia, it appeals to the idea of human nature or human function. The argument is as follows: If individuals behave according to "human nature" or perform their "human function," this activity will foster the good life (Norman, 1983). Philosophers have interpreted these concepts in various forms: (a) as an

activity characteristic of human beings, (b) as a distinctive quality that differentiates man from the animal kingdom, usually rationality, and (c) as the fulfilment of some divine purpose (Norman, 1983; Olson, 1978). Authors agree that the meaning given by Aristotle to human nature and/or human function remains obscure and problematic; and inasmuch as these are central concepts of the doctrine, his account of fulfilment is not entirely satisfactory. As Norman puts it, "something more is needed than the bald Aristotelian argument that because a certain activity is distinctively human, it is therefore constitutive of a good human life; nor does the concept of function render the argument any more valid" (1983, p. 48). As we shall see later, Maslow's model is more helpful in that it defines fulfilment in terms of specific needs to be satisfied.

The notion of needs plays an important role in Blanshard's (1961) model of fulfilment. "Man is a creature of impulses, needs, and faculties; what he seems to be bent on is the fulfilment of those impulses, the satisfaction of those needs, the realization of those faculties" (Blanshard, 1961, p. 292). This is an important addition to the Aristotelian conception of the good life because needs are easier to define and identify than the elusive term human nature. Blanshard describes the good life as consisting of

experiences that are "directly or immediately good. When they are good intrinsically, they perform a double function: they fulfil an impulse, drive or need, and in so doing they give satisfaction or pleasure. Both components, fulfilment and satisfaction are necessary" (1961, p. 293). To be more precise, Blanshard defines fulfilment as "achieving the end that our impulse is seeking" and satisfaction as "the feeling that attends this fulfilment" (1968, p. 309).

While Blanshard is certain about the role of needs in fulfilment, he falls short of articulating specifically what these needs are. This is one of Maslow's most valuable contributions to understanding what the good life consists of.

Maslow's exposition of the good life is guided by the central concept of the hierarchy of needs. Self-actualization or personal fulfilment, the highest of human needs according to Maslow (1970), may ordinarily be attained only after more basic needs have been at least partially satisfied. As can be seen in figure 1, the human needs (also called desires or motives) are arranged in ascending order of priority. The satisfaction of each category may be conceived as an intrinsic good in itself, and as an extrinsic good in that they facilitate the advent of the next higher need.

The basic needs require little explanation, for they are the most obvious of all. Included here are




Figure 1 Maslow's hierarchy of needs

such indispensable things as water, food, shelter, air, sleep and sex. Without them subsistence becomes unbearable and the person cannot be expected to aspire to higher needs, for all the energy is directed towards achieving these basic elements. Once the physical needs are reasonably satisfied, safety needs emerge. These are characterized by the search for predictability, security, order, certainty, and structure in one's environment.

Growth needs or meta-needs are associated with the human tendency to realize the potential inherent in the

individual. These cannot be developed unless the basic needs are satisfactorily fulfilled. Belongingness and love needs express the desire to be part of a reference group, and to establish affectionate relationships. The gratification of these enables the emergence of self-esteem needs. Two types of esteem needs are identified: (a) self-respect, and (b) esteem from others. The former is embodied in the notion of personal confidence; the latter in recognition, acceptance, and appreciation by others. Finally, when all the above mentioned needs have been sufficiently gratified the person reaches the highest stage of human desire and becomes concerned with the attainment of self-actualization. Essentially, this process entails the realization of one's potentials, and the desire for self-improvement. At this stage the individuality and uniqueness of the person express themselves fully. As Maslow points out, "self actualization is idiosyncratic since every person is different" (1968, p. 33). An appreciation of beauty, order, justice, and goodness characterizes the self-actualized individual.

Goble (1970) as well as Hjelle and Ziegler (1981) report empirical data that would substantiate Maslow's claim that human desires are hierarchically ordered. Another important empirical finding was that self-actualized people indeed exist, enjoy life fully and again would confirm Maslow's ideas about fulfilment

(Maslow, 1968).

Maslow (1970) placed heavy emphasis on the minimal environmental requirements conducive to the satisfaction of the basic needs. He enumerates justice, fairness, freedom and order as some of the pre-conditions for the fulfillment of the most fundamental needs.

It appears then that the self-actualization theory advanced by Maslow represents a viable model for the understanding of the constitutive elements of the good life. Its most helpful features are the arrangement of needs in hierarchical manner, a descriptive account of what these needs are, the empirical validation of these tenets, and the consideration of social pre-conditions for the gratification of essential needs. Now, it is necessary to examine the society that is likely to be conducive to this good life.

The Good Society

The purpose now is to delineate some of the essential attributes a society should have in order to facilitate the individual well-being of its members. In an ideal state of affairs the good society would or should comprise the majority of these features. While an outline of the social qualities to be cultivated cannot do justice to the intricacies involved, the aim here is to introduce some criteria of the desired features of the good society that will (a) enable us to conduct an initial moral appraisal of capitalism, and (b) provide

preliminary desiderata for social change.

A comprehensive and sensible exposition of indispensable social ideals is provided by Olson (1978). His elucidation of the good society consists of six prerequisites: stability, harmony, social cohesion, justice, freedom, and material prosperity. (Inasmuch as harmony and social cohesion deal mainly with the same issue they will be treated as one under the heading social harmony). These ideals, which resemble the pre-conditions for well-being previously attributed to Maslow, can only be partially attained. It is quite illusory that any one society would be able to reach these ideals fully. Yet, there is merit in portraying them as facilitators of well-being as well as desiderata.

Stability.

The maintenance of some degree of order and predictability in major institutions of society such as the economy and the legal system is a minimal requirement for the satisfaction of basic needs. The anxiety created by the lack of economic stability, for instance, consumes considerable mental energy aimed at procuring vital necessities. A social system that does not guarantee secure employment is bound to generate fear and justified preoccupation with money, leaving little time or consideration for self-fulfilment.

When the rules of society are unpredictable,

as in the case of anarchy and many military dictatorships, people do not feel safe enough to engage in self-improvement. They are justifiably preoccupied with trying to anticipate unpredictable rules and, hence, with survival.

The emphasis on stability does not detract from the importance of social change. At times, a period of instability is necessary in order to bring about greater stability. That may be the case when social justice is advanced at the expense of temporary social instability. The promotion of greater social justice is likely to create the conditions for a more stable socioeconomic order. "Instability follows not from change itself but from unpredictable change. Predictable change is wholly compatible with stability" (Olson, 1978, p. 30).

It would not seem erroneous to speculate that Maslow probably thought of stability as essential for the gratification of physiological and safety needs.

Social harmony.

According to Olson (1978) there are four kinds of dangers that beset any animal species: "(1) the weakness of the body, disease, and physical pain, (2) natural catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes, and tornadoes, (3) the aggression of other animal species, and (4) the aggression or noncooperation of other members of one's own species" (p. 32). Whereas the first three are prominent among the lower animals, the fourth

predominates among humans. Social harmony can be achieved when the fourth danger listed above can be at least partially neutralized.

The main question that Olson poses here is "how does society manage to reconcile different individual interests so as to produce social harmony" (1978, p. 33). He indicates that there are two main means of achieving social harmony. The first is the institution of external sanctions, both negative and positive; and the second is the process of socialization, whereby human beings are trained to live with each other. His answer would appear to be rather superficial in that he does not address the origins of the differing interests, and furthermore does not distinguish among various types of interests. Are differing interests bound to emerge as part of human nature? Are differing interests always conflicting interests? Are not interests shaped to a large degree by the socioeconomic order? Unfortunately, Olson does not elaborate on these questions. Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable to follow Olson in that social harmony constitutes a necessary condition for the furtherance of self-fulfilment. As in the case of stability, it would appear that Maslow would view social harmony as a pre-condition for the satisfaction of basic needs.

Social justice.

Whereas the problem of precise definition is always

present in discussing moral issues, Sidwick points out that "there is no case where the difficulty is greater, or the result more disputed, than when we try to define justice" (Sidwick, 1922, p. 264). Having stated the arduousness of this enterprise, clarification as to just what is meant by social justice and how it impacts upon personal welfare follows.

An elucidating introduction to the concept of justice is found in Miller's book Social Justice (1976). Miller commences his essay by asserting that "the most valuable general definition of justice is that which brings out its distributive character most plainly: justice is suum cuique, to each his due" (1976, p. 20). Following this broad conception of justice Miller specifically notes that social justice

concerns the distribution of benefits and burdens throughout a society, as it results from the major social institutions--property systems, public organizations, etc. It deals with such matters as the regulation of wages and (where they exist) profits, the protection of persons' rights through the legal system, the allocation of housing, medicine, welfare benefits, etc. (Miller, 1976, p. 22).

As can be seen from the definitions given, the distributive character of justice is fundamental. Distributive principles are to be distinguished from

aggregative principles. An aggregative principle is concerned with the total amount of good enjoyed by a particular group of people. A distributive principle, on the other hand, is concerned with how that good is shared among the individual members of the group (Miller, 1976).

Much of the present discontent with traditional utilitarianism, according to which a just act is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, is that it is perceived to be in essence an aggregative notion of justice (Miller, 1976; Mullaly, 1980; Olson, 1978; Rawls, 1972). As such, there are situations in which the rights of an individual can be violated for the benefit of the public at large. An example frequently given to illustrate this point is that of a sheriff who has in custody a person accused of a murder (e.g., Olson, 1978). The sheriff knows that the individual is innocent but the angry mob outside the jail is convinced that the prisoner is guilty and they are determined to lynch him. If the sheriff does not go along with the mob there will be a riot and many people will die.

Irrespective of the particular school of thought embraced, the cardinal question of justice according to Sidwick (a utilitarian) seems to be: "Are there any clear principles from which we may work out an ideally just distribution [italics added] of rights and

privileges, burdens and pains, among human beings as such" (1922, p. 274). Contemporary writers have tried to identify a specific criterion that would justify fair distribution.

Miller (1976) gives three possible answers to the question of how to allocate to each his/her due. To each, he says, according to their (a) rights, and/or (b) deserts, and/or (c) needs. The problem is to determine which one of these possibilities takes priority, for at times they are bound to conflict. That is the case when an individual inherits wealth. While that person may have the right to inherit the wealth, it can be argued that he/she does not deserve the money unless they have performed some services to the benefactor prior to his/her death. Similarly, it may be said that the person does not need the money or possessions inherited. While Miller outlines the contending criteria, he does not provide clear guidelines on how to prioritize them. Olson adds to Miller's list the notions of social utility and contribution. But he too fails to provide a "differential diagnosis" as to when to apply which criterion in cases of conflict.

A viable method of selecting and prioritizing criteria for social justice, in my view, is furnished by Facione, Scherer and Attig (1978). They introduce the notion of social circumstances to assist in the

resolution of conflicts between competing alternatives. According to them, there are two main criteria in determining the distribution of burdens and benefits. These are (a) work and (b) need. According to the first criterion differential treatment may be considered justified in cases where there are noticeable differences in terms of ability, productivity, or effort. Concerning the need criterion, Facione et al. (1978) claim that it is "reasonable to suggest that persons are strictly equal as persons. This means they all have some very basic human needs....On this criterion people are equally deserving of having these needs met" (1978, p. 186). The applicability of one criterion or the other would be influenced by the reigning social circumstances. Consider the following social conditions described by Facione et al:

(a) there is sufficient work so that there are jobs for all who need them, (b) the jobs available to each person include jobs that the person has the abilities to perform, and (c) the jobs pay well enough so that whenever a person takes one, it will enable him or her to earn enough so that his or her needs are met (1978, p. 190).

The authors point out that in circumstances such as these, preference will be given to the criterion of work.

Consider now the following scenario:

(a) It may be that there are fewer jobs than there are people who need them. (b) Persons may be unable to perform the jobs that are available owing to simple lack of ability...The lack of ability may be socially dependent in the sense that skills that people do have can become outmoded and no longer needed in a rapidly changing and technologically progressive society. Or it may be that in a nation as a whole there are sufficient jobs to match the abilities of the people, but the people with the abilities are not located where the jobs are...It could also be that some are denied opportunities to do the work for which they are qualified owing to various forms of job discrimination. (c) It may be that the jobs for which some people qualify, or that they are able to handle given their other responsibilities, simply do not pay well enough to meet their needs. The wages may be extremely low, or the work may be part-time or seasonal (Facione et al. 1978, pp. 190-191).

If any of the circumstances just depicted occurs, preference will likely be given to the criterion of need. For if we accept the proposition that there are some needs that human beings, as human beings, are entitled to, then they deserve to have these needs gratified.

The notion of social justice is indispensable in

the construction of the ideal good society. As we saw in the preceding discussion, there are times when the just distribution of resources becomes imperative in order to fulfil basic needs, without which we can hardly expect self-actualization.

Social freedom.

Basically, social freedom can be thought of in two different ways: (a) positive freedom or freedom of choice, and (b) negative freedom or freedom from restraint (Facione et al, 1978; Olson, 1978).

Freedom from restraint has to do with the ability to pursue one's goals without undue or excessive frustration. In this respect, a free society is that which facilitates the attainment of objectives set by its members. Obviously this is only an ideal state. Nevertheless, it would not be erroneous to evaluate societies comparatively by the different degree of freedom of restraint their members are subjected to. Complete negative freedom may not only be impossible to achieve but also undesirable; for then individuals will be subjected to the will of other less moral persons that may infringe upon their capacity to seek the goals they set for themselves. It is precisely for that reason that societies may justifiably limit their constituents. Facione et al. (1978) argue that restrictions may be rightly imposed for the purposes of:

- (a) treating people equally under the law, (b)

giving all people a fair chance in society, (c) preventing anyone's doing bodily harm to others, to their property, or to himself or herself, (d) promoting further development of each person's positive freedom, and (e) restricting socially offensive or morally distasteful behavior. (p. 115).

These social restraints are imperative if conflicts of interests are to be resolved fairly. The importance of limiting freedom from restraint can be conveyed by paraphrasing an old saying: "one person's negative freedom ends where another person's positive freedom begins."

Freedom of choice refers to "the number of options, or possible courses of action, society makes available to its members and the extent to which individual choices are informed and rational" (Olson, 1978, p. 45). Following that description society can increase freedom of choice by (a) enhancing the range of options from which people can choose, and (b) informing people about the existing options and educating them how to arrive at a rational choice that will benefit them.

A delicate balance ought to be maintained between negative and positive freedom if everyone is to benefit from them. The intricacies involved in such delicate balance is beyond the scope of this discussion. It should be clear, however, that freedom is an

indispensable ingredient in the making of the good society, and as Maslow asserted--an essential one in the good life.

Material prosperity.

The last condition cited by Olson as a prerequisite for the good society is the presence of material prosperity. In many respects it is an obvious expectation. An impressive list of desirable goods is associated with economic progress. Among them improvements in health-care, transportation, production technology, communication systems, etc.

The question that is less self-explanatory is how these goods ought to be distributed, which brings us back to the above discussion on social justice. For the purpose of this section it would suffice to say that material prosperity--when achieved without violating the principles of distributive justice--is a desirable attribute of the good society, and much in the same way that basic needs are elementary for the attainment of fulfilment, so are material goods.

Thus far we have considered criteria for the good life and the good society. However tentative and incomplete that criteria may be, it is a first step in the portrayal of an ideal state of affairs against which the present social system may be evaluated.

The Good Life in the Present Social Order

Is the present social order conducive to the good

life? In order to answer that question it will be necessary to explore (a) to what extent criteria for the good society are met in the North American social order; and subsequently, (b) what degree of good life is attainable under these social conditions. Task (a) will be carried out by examining the presence (or absence) of the social ideals already described. It should be appreciated from the outset of the discussion that the existing social structure precludes treatment of society as a uniform conglomerate. Not only the relevance but also the prevalence of some social ideals are highly dependent on the division of classes. Material prosperity and positive freedom, for instance, are more prominent in upper classes. Socioeconomic status, then, will be a source of variability when considering the fulfilment of criteria for good society.

Another point to bear in mind is that the analysis will endeavor to compare the dominant social order with an ideal or desired state of affairs and not with other forms of social structures or political arrangements. Mention of other systems will be limited to illustrative examples.

Finally, scrutiny of the criteria will reveal that most social ideals may be regarded as subordinate to social justice. Hence, special attention will be given to that criterion. While I am painfully aware that no definite answers can be given, it seems instrumental to

approach the issue in the form of leading questions.

Is there stability?

As we saw in the preceding discussion, stability refers to some degree of order and predictability in major institutions of society. Observation of two such institutions, the political system and the economy, suggests that whereas the former enjoys considerable stability, the latter is continuously affected by fluctuations (Edwards, Reich, & Weisskopf, 1986).

The reality of an "economic crisis" forced itself upon most Americans in the 1970s. Soaring rates of unemployment and inflation, declining levels of consumption, and widespread economic difficulties unmatched since the Great Depression of the 1930s shattered the prevailing myth that economic prosperity and stability could be taken for granted in a modern capitalist society. At first, many people thought the problems were temporary and would soon go away; but continuing economic difficulties in the 1980s suggest otherwise....We are now all obliged to come to grips with the persistence of capitalist economic crises (Edwards, Reich, & Weisskopf, 1986, p. 359).

Undoubtedly, crises affect the population overall, but the disadvantaged is likely to be hit the hardest. The unemployed, obviously the most vulnerable segment of all, constitutes a significant percentage of the

population in times of recession. Rates of unemployment in the United States, for instance, reached 18.3% in the 1929-1937 depression, and 6.9% in the 1973-1981 crisis (Bowles, Gordon, Weisskopf, 1986). In Canada, statistics for 1986 show that, with an average unemployment rate of 9.6%, some provinces had rates as high as 14.4% (New Brunswick) and even 20% (Newfoundland) (Statistics Canada, 1987).

The cyclical character of crises and the different degrees of resilience with which people confront them lead to the notion of distributive justice. Whether crises in capitalist systems are the result of unplanned economy and socially irresponsible policies, or an inevitable result of unknown dynamics or of natural disasters, the cardinal question would remain: how is the burden shared in the present social order.

Is there social harmony?

This ideal is accomplished when "aggression or noncooperation of other members of one's own species" (Olson, 1978, p. 32) is eradicated. A society aspiring to meet this goal would strive to keep aggression or noncooperation to a minimum. Aggression or noncooperation can be interpreted in numerous ways. For our purposes, aggression of one nation against another and violent acts performed in crimes will be excluded. The former can be rationalized as acts of self-defense, and the latter as deviant behavior of sick individuals.

It would seem congruent with this analysis to outline forms of noncooperation that are constitutive of the social system. Following Edwards et al. (1986) it can be argued that at a structural level there are at least three prominent sources of social tensions: (a) socioeconomic inequality, (b) male dominance, and (c) racism. The pervasive divisive effects of these phenomena would seem to be an integral part of the social order under examination (see Edwards et al., 1986, particularly chapters 6, 7, and 8).

Illustrative of economic inequality is a comparison between the poorest and the richest twenty percent of the families in the U.S. since World War II. While the former "have consistently received less than 6 percent of total family income,...[the latter] have gotten more than 40 percent" (Ackerman & Zimbalist, 1986, p. 218). The authors also note that "in 1983 the top 5 percent of all families received nearly 16 percent of total family income, more than three times as much as the entire bottom twenty percent" (Ackerman & Zimbalist, 1986, p. 218). As for individuals who do not live in families, Ackerman and Zimbalist report that income is even "more unequally distributed than that of families" (1986, p. 218). Finally, it should be pointed out that inequality of economic welfare is further exacerbated by the uneven distribution of wealth.

Despite the recognition that women do not enjoy the

same economic opportunities as men, that they still have the primary responsibility of looking after the children and doing housework, whether or not they work outside the house, and that they are stereotyped by much advertising; and "despite the undermining of patriarchy and advances in women's rights, male dominance has survived in contemporary capitalism" (Edwards et al., 1986, p. 251).

On the question of racism, Reich writes that in the "early 1960s it seemed to many that the elimination of racism in the U.S. was proceeding without requiring a radical restructuring of the entire society" (1986, p. 305). However, Reich notes that the optimism of the sixties has vanished in the eighties. "Despite new civil right laws, elaborate White House conferences, special government employment and training programs, the War on Poverty, and affirmative action in hiring, racism and the economic exploitation of blacks remain with us" (Reich, 1986, p. 305). Reich's final assessment of racism in the present social order is that "instead of disappearing, seems to be permanent" (1986, p. 305).

As the reviewed literature would appear to confirm, much of the tensions created by the conflicting interests of the different parties involved (management and labor; men and women; Blacks, Hispanics, Natives or other minorities and whites), have to do with the way burdens and benefits are distributed in society.

Is there freedom?

It should be remembered that we distinguished between negative freedom or freedom from constraints, and positive freedom or freedom of choice. Rand (1967) regards freedom as the pillar of the capitalist system. In comparison to other social arrangements, such as in some communist countries, people in the present social order enjoy a great deal of negative freedom. And while Benne is correct in asserting that "those who have wealth and power have access to legal defenses that gives them a huge advantage over ordinary citizens" (1981, p. 215), and this could therefore expand their potential negative freedoms; all citizens remains equal before the law.

In principle, all people have the freedom to choose what they want to do with their lives. However, the economic factors and the cultural conditioning of the individual will likely limit the range of both perceived and feasible options (Sennett & Cobb, 1972). Since positive freedom depends on the range of options available to the individual, it would then seem reasonable to infer that it would vary with one's socioeconomic status. For it is unquestionable that the rich have much more alternatives to choose from than the poor. Once again, we are drawn to the conclusion that the way benefits and opportunities are shared in society will impact upon the degree a certain social ideal is

experienced and enjoyed by a person.

Is there material prosperity?

The initial response to this question is yes: "American capitalism has produced the most stupendous wealth any society has ever known" (Edwards et al., 1986, p. 2). This statement, however, has to be qualified. As it was the case with the social ideals previously considered, this desirable social feature does not benefit the population as a whole, but rather those who can afford to purchase the material, technological and scientific advances that financial prosperity has fostered.

American capitalism's wealth has much that glitters. Yet as we proceed through the closing decades of the twentieth century, we hardly need to be told that American capitalism has another side as well, a less affluent, less eternally happy, less secure, less sensible, and less decent side....Rising economic indexes can measure rising prices, unemployment, and misery as well as increasing output. And what are we to make of the booming sales of Valium and other drugs that seem to be necessary to keep masses of Americans from being chronically overanxious or depressed?....Or of the startling but repeated reports of children's malnutrition at home as the food stamp program is unable to service all those who need aid? Or of the

visible deterioration in urban housing?....These are also very much part of American capitalism (Edwards et al., 1986, 2).

Although Canadians may wish to think that the situation in their country is much better than in the United States, the statistics on poverty in this country are also quite devastating (see Taylor, 1989 and entire welfare section on March 1989 issue of Canada and the World).

The mixed response hereby presented is only consistent with the main thread of this discussion, namely, that the relevance and prevalence of a criterion for good society varies according to socioeconomic status.

Is there social justice?

Social justice seems to emerge as the principal criterion for a good society. Given that desired social qualities are unevenly distributed in the population, it is incumbent upon us to examine just how the distribution is determined; for the overall appraisal of the social order would invariably be affected by the rule followed in making such a decision.

In studying social justice a number of criteria for the distribution of what can be summarized as pains and pleasures were identified. Miller (1978) named rights, deserts, and needs. Facione et al. (1978) limited the criteria to work and needs. Deserts, as used by the

former, and work, as used by the latter, are basically equivalent and will therefore be treated as one. It is likely that Facione et al. do not include rights because this particular criterion has often been classified as conservative justice, i.e., the enforcement of the law (e.g., Sidwick, 1922), and distributive justice deals mainly with ideal justice, i.e., a desired state of social justice. Although rights may at times conflict with the other criteria for justice, the application of what is regarded as conservative justice (Sidwick, 1922; Miller, 1978) or the enforcement of the law, by and large, does not seem particularly problematic in the society under scrutiny.

Serious difficulties arise, however, when trying to prioritize between desert and needs in cases of conflict. Facione et al. (1978) suggest what appears to be a viable solution for this dilemma. In their view the decision making process is greatly facilitated when social circumstances are taken into account. Briefly stated, when social conditions are such that there are jobs for everyone and these jobs have adequate pay; it would probably be justifiable to adopt work as the standard for distributive justice. On the other hand, when jobs are scarce and people are unemployed, not because of choice but due to socioeconomic factors; it would then be appropriate to adopt needs as the ruling criterion. Given that the present socioeconomic

circumstances largely resemble the second scenario depicted above, it would be reasonable to expect that the dominant principle of distributive justice would be to each according to his/her needs; yet, the market system greatly favors "the conception of justice as the requital of desert" (Miller, 1978, p. 291). Such interpretation of justice is a natural extension of the reigning individualistic social philosophy that characterizes market societies, both in their early (*laissez fairez*) and advanced (welfare state) stages. Individualistic particularly in the sense that a person's will and determination can outweigh the effects of socioeconomic circumstances. Miller captures the essence of this doctrine: "no barriers of a legal, social, or economic type would prevent the man with determination to succeed from gaining his rewards" (Miller, 1978, p. 291). In sum, Miller argues that

this interpretation of justice as the requital of desert was bolstered by the view that a man's character was made by him, not for him, so that the various abilities, skills, and efforts which formed the basis of desert were seen as being within a person's own control. Conversely, incapacity and failure of will were seen as the results, not of external circumstances, but rather of inner weakness. (Miller, 1978, p. 292).

Undoubtedly, the needs criterion has become more

prominent in "welfare state" capitalism than it was in its earlier periods (e.g., Mishra, 1977). Nevertheless, an implementation of the need rule of distributive justice to the extent required by the social circumstances is very unlikely in free enterprise societies such as the U.S., Canada, or other Western industrial states. This is mainly due to the conflicting values underlying the competing conceptions of justice. Inasmuch as individualism, competition, and achievement are the prominent values in the capitalist system it is hardly surprising that welfare policies have failed to reduce social inequalities (Mishra, 1977). If a public welfare system, attuned to the needs of society's members

is to flourish, the stress on the virtue of self-help must be replaced by stress on the need to help others. Individualism must be replaced by a concern for the community at large; competition by co-operation; achievement must be defined in social and communal rather than individual terms (George & Wilding, 1976, p. 118).

In sum, it has been argued that whereas the current social circumstances would seem to justify a conception of social justice based on the criterion of needs, the present system largely favors the criterion of desert. As a result, it might be claimed that this social order is at a great distance from meeting what

has emerged as probably the most important criterion for the good society: social justice.

Is the social order conducive to the good life?

Needless to say, in comparison to other countries, the lot of people in North America could be substantially better. But, as was stated above, it was not my goal to draw comparisons with other existent social systems, but with a desired one.

Based on the documented economic instability, social tensions, unequal distribution of material prosperity, positive freedom, and most importantly, a dominant conception of justice that is incongruent with the social circumstances, it would appear that the present social order does not satisfactorily meet the pre-conditions for the good life and self-fulfillment.

This conclusion is reaffirmed by the massive inability of some people to realize their own basic and/or growth needs and the same needs those for whom they care. Homeless and hungry children growing under the poverty line (both estimated to be in the millions in North America) are dramatic reminders of this state of affairs (Bassuk & Rubin, 1987; Hamilton, 1989; McDowell, 1989). As far as growth needs are concerned, numerous publications in the last forty years have reported on the large scale incapacity to gratify Maslow's first growth need, i.e., belonging. Titles such as Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society

(Josephson & Josephson, 1962) and The Quest for Community (Nisbet, 1969) capture the essence of that literature (see also Geyer & Schweitzer, 1981, part I; and Pappenhaim, 1959). Lasch (1984) contends that far from seeking self-actualization people in contemporary North America merely care about the survival of the self. Unstable social and economic conditions have led, perhaps justifiably so, to a preoccupation with survival as opposed to growth.

Everyday life has begun to pattern itself on the survival strategies forced on those exposed to extreme adversity. Selective apathy, emotional disengagement from others, renunciation of the past and the future, a determination to live one day at a time--these techniques of emotional self-management, necessarily carried to extremes under extreme conditions, in more moderate form have come to shape the lives of ordinary people (Lasch, 1984, pp. 57-58).

While section II of the dissertation advanced the proposition that psychology supports, at least partly, the status quo; the first part of section III has attempted to evaluate the status quo in comparison to criteria for the society that is likely to be conducive to the good life. The negative appraisal of the social order that emerged from the inquiry has direct ethical implications for psychology. By reason of their at

least partial endorsement of a social system that would not seem to be as conducive to a good life as it might, neither American nor Canadian psychology are living up to one of their chief self-imposed mandates, namely, the promotion of human welfare. It would therefore be pertinent to reflect upon the social ethics of the discipline.

Chapter 13: Psychology at the Service of Social Change:

Desiderata

The analysis conducted in the previous chapter suggested that the present social system does not satisfactorily meet some essential requirements for the existence of the good society. Consequently, this is not the most conducive environment for human welfare. It would then be reasonable to expect that a psychology determined to promote human welfare would engage in activities that would bring about an improvement in the social preconditions for well-being. This expectation is in line with Principle IV (Responsibility to Society) of the Canadian code of ethics for psychologists (CPA, 1986). Unfortunately, this expectation has largely remained just that, an expectation.

That situation is largely due to the rather narrow concept of ethics that psychologists have adopted as their working moral code. Such a model focuses primarily on the obligations towards the individual client at the expense of both proactive and reactive moral behavior towards society at large. This bias is reflected in the American ethical principles for psychologists where there is very little explicit mention of duties towards society (APA, 1981), and also in some textbooks of ethics for psychologists (e.g., Carroll, Schneider, & Wesley, 1985).

If personal welfare is largely determined by the

social conditions of the individuals's existence, then it would be incumbent upon psychologists to pay attention to environmental factors as well. Although the plea to engage in community action as a way of fulfilling their moral obligations with respect to society goes as far back as Dewey (1900), psychologists have only recently begun to revive that plea.

Albee, one of the most eloquent contemporary psychologists dedicated to the eradication of social injustice, used his 1970 presidential address to the American Psychological Association to ask that "psychology throw its resources into the efforts" (Albee, 1970, p. 1077) to eliminate social ills such as war and racism. This, Albee felt, was necessary if psychology was to persist. Following the premise that "community discourse ...[is] vital to ethical behavior" (Hillerbrand, 1987, p. 117), Hillerbrand maintains that "to engage in dialogue about our social role would be to fulfill our community covenant and foster our ethical awareness" (1987, p. 117). He concludes by stating that "the challenge is to encourage ourselves and our colleagues to become ethically engaged in a socially active community" (1987, p. 118). In a similar vein, Steininger et al., have suggested that "psychologists should increasingly question the values base of their activities and openly discuss questions of fairness and justice" (1984, p. 217). Sarason (1982, 1984b), who

has been a very vocal and ardent supporter of a community oriented psychology, has been extremely influential in resurrecting what could be called the "social ethics" of the discipline.

In spite of these recent calls for a more community attuned psychological ethics, these pleas do not seem to have been followed by programmatic action. This chapter is intended to contribute toward bridging the gap between the vast literature dealing with moral duties towards the individual and the relatively underdeveloped area of social ethics in psychology. Two noticeable exceptions to the latter are the works by Bermant, Kelman, and Warwick (1978) The Ethics of Social Intervention, and Steininger et al. (1984) Ethical Issues in Psychology. Both books are helpful in discerning the moral dilemmas to be confronted in community interventions. Yet, both seem to fall short of recommending a proactive plan of action to remedy some of the problematic situations that they so aptly describe.

Conscientization

A preliminary and partial proposal for furthering the social ethics of psychology will be attempted. This blueprint, under the general term conscientization, entails the concurrent implementation of two tasks: (a) denunciation and (b) annunciation. While the former endeavors to deconstruct ideological messages that

distort people's awareness of sociopolitical circumstances that shape their lives, the latter seeks to elaborate means of advancing the social ideals conducive to the good life. Both concepts, borrowed from the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, have received considerable attention in educational circles (Bruss & Macedo, 1985; Giroux, 1985; Martin, 1986) but very little in psychology (e.g., Alschuler, 1986).

An approximation to the social ideals thought to be conducive to the good life must be preceded by a lucid perception of the political and economic forces regulating current society. Such understanding is often impeded by the distortion radiated by ideological apparatuses. Unless individuals become reasonably aware of the ideological deception of which they are victims, it is unlikely that they will be able to engage in any process of social change. And while consciousness does not, in and of itself, guarantee constructive action, it is indisputably one of its sine qua non conditions. In making explicit the mechanisms of the dominant ideology, psychology can no doubt assist in the course of social change.

The function hereby advocated for psychology is best captured in Freire's use of the concept conscientization (Freire, 1970, 1975). According to him conscientization refers to the process whereby people attain an insightful awareness of both the

socioeconomic, political, and cultural circumstances which affect their lives and their potential capacity to transform that social reality. In Freire's words, "conscientization is first of all the effort to enlighten men [and women] about the obstacles preventing them from a clear perception of reality. In this role, conscientization effects the ejection of cultural myths which confuse the people's awareness" (Freire, 1975, p. 51).

Women groups, many of them coordinated by psychologists, have been operating under the propositions of conscientization for over two decades now with encouraging results.

Consciousness-raising (CR) groups have evolved as a way for women to understand the intricate relationship between public, systemic conditions and the individual aspects of their experiences. Through CR "the personal becomes political." In addition to their significant social and political impact, CR groups have served as an important mental health resource for women (Kravetz, 1987, p. 55).

Increased self-esteem, reduction in passivity, and greater understanding of systemic dynamics involved in women's oppression are among the positive effects of these groups (Kirsh, 1987; Kravetz, 1987). As to the societal repercussions of CR groups, Freeman observes

that these are "probably the most valuable contribution by the women's liberation movement to the tools for social change" (in Kirsh, 1987, p. 46).

Briefly stated, conscientization is both the antithesis and the antidote to the predominant ideological message. As such, its primary target is what Freire has called "domestication" (1970, 1975) and Gramsci cultural "hegemony" (1971). Both concepts imply the phenomenon of assent achieved by persuasion rather than force.

According to Gramsci, hegemony is the function of civil society, i.e., schools, churches, clubs, media; as opposed to direct domination which is the role of the political society or the State, i.e., police, army, courts, etc. (Gramsci, 1971). Kiros (1985) explains that in civil society "a set of ideas are used to achieve one coherent end--consent combined with conformity. In 'political society',...consent and conformity as ends are achieved not through the spread of ideas but through the threat of use of force." (p. 100). Consent, a key element in the concept of hegemony, has been interpreted to mean "a psychological state, involving some kind of acceptance--not necessarily explicit--of the social order or of certain vital aspects of that order" (Femia, 1981, p. 37). Boggs summarizes well the concept of hegemony:

By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout

civil society...of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it....To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of 'common sense'" (1976, p. 39).

It is precisely this "common sense," which Gramsci understood as the "uncritical and largely unconscious way in which a person perceives the world" (Simon, 1982, p. 25), that conscientization should attempt to make conscious.

Before we further develop the concept of conscientization, the idea of domination--central in Gramsci's "hegemony" as well as in Freire's "domestication"--requires two clarifications. The first has to do with the issue of intentionality. Freire, for instance, asserts that domestication implies "the introjection by the dominated of the cultural myths of the dominator" (1975, p. 33). This statement may be interpreted as the existence of a dominator master mind of deception creating cultural myths to preserve her/his position of privilege. Furthermore, it may ascribe a deceptive intent to all dominators. That seems to me quite problematic. I do not mean to question the existence of domination in a class society. My difficulty, rather, is with the possible attribution of

malevolent and deceptive intent to the dominators as a group. It would seem that many people in positions of privilege and power are not aware that their social and political statements are in fact deceiving. The presence of individuals engaged in affirmative propaganda, both at the civil and political levels, does not justify the treatment of all persons belonging to the dominant sectors as such. Therefore, I suggest not to ascribe a myth-creating intent to the powerful segments of society as a whole.

The second aspect of domination requiring elaboration concerns the target population of conscientization. The emphasis placed by Gramsci and Freire on the urgency of the dominated to liberate themselves, may lead to the conclusion that they are the only ones in need of conscientization. Such conclusion would be unfortunate. If social ideals are to be advanced, it is necessary that as many people as possible realize the potential benefits of transforming society, for it would ultimately be of benefit to all.

As previously indicated, the main object of analysis for conscientization is the process whereby hegemony is attained. Some of the questions that need to be addressed include: How does hegemony work? What are its main components? How is it achieved? What psychological phenomena are involved? To these questions we now turn.

Understanding Hegemony

The process of hegemony seems to be constituted of two main stages. The first entails the definition of a situation or a problem whose understanding or solution does not threaten the established order of things in society. The second involves the inculcation of these definitions to the public at large. What follows is an elaboration of these stages, after which some ideas of what contributions psychology can make to the process of conscientization will be presented.

Stage I: Definition.

The way a problem is defined pre-determines the means by which it is to be solved. Therefore, the statement of the problem is crucial. In order to attain hegemony, social conditions and problems are to be defined in such a way that they will not pose a threat to the status quo. Thus, the dominant ideology resorts to two sorts of explanations for social conditions: (a) "natural" causes; and (b) person-blame. They differ only in that the latter holds people responsible for their own fate, and the former places responsibility on organismic factors. I shall term these hegemonic definitions.

Natural causes refer to the explanation of social phenomena on the basis of biological determinism. This version of ideology justifies power inequalities of class, race, and gender as being genetically originated

(Rose, Lewontin, & Kamin, 1984). The biological inevitability associated with these inequalities fosters fatalism, pessimism, and eventual resignation (Alschuler, 1986).

The person-blame definition of social circumstances attributes unequal distribution of wealth, income and power to personality deficiencies. Laziness is a frequently used example of this kind. Improvement of personal conditions, according to this concept, largely depends on modifications of character. This model views the individual as entirely responsible for his/her fate, and society as a conglomerate of individuals where there are opportunities for everybody to get ahead (W. Ryan, 1971).

Whether they lie in the genes or in the psyche, systemic accounts of social problems are strategically kept out of sight. Systemic reasons are seldom admitted, and when they are, it is only as "lip service" designed to contain dissatisfaction. This recognition is usually followed by an insignificant systemic change.

The numerous system-preserving effects that can be derived from the above definitions of social riddles have been documented by Caplan and Nelson (1973), Rose et al. (1984), and W. Ryan (1971).

Stage II: Inculcation.

If hegemony is to be established, its definitions must be propagated. I shall refer to this process as

inculcation. In analyzing the psychological phenomena involved in that process, psychology can help not only in discerning why people give their tacit consent to the prevalent ideology but also in inoculating them against the potentially deleterious consequences of such a doctrine.

Figure 2 is a schematic representation of some influential psychological phenomena involved in the interaction hegemony agent <----> hegemony target during the process of inculcation. The different psychological processes (to be described below) are named along the vertical interactive arrows. Power is the main variable distinguishing the primary hegemony agent (upper part) from the hegemony target and secondary hegemony agent (bottom part). While the former has the power to define a situation or problem in his/her interest (usually in terms of person-blame or natural causes), the latter has to be subjected to these definitions. The bottom part shows hegemony targets also in their roles as secondary agents. Once a target has internalized some of the world-views prescribed by an agent, she/he also starts functioning as an hegemony agent by exerting pressure to conform at the peer level.

As Gramsci (1971) pointed out, hegemony is propagated by institutions such as schools, churches, community clubs, the family, and the work place. Each of these institutions has its chief hegemony agents:

teachers, parents, ministers, employers, etc. In that capacity, their role is fulfilled through a number of psychological mechanisms that have been the subject of methodic investigations.




Figure 2 Some psychological phenomena involved in the process of inculcation

In isolation, each of the psychological phenomena to be examined would account only for a portion of inculcation, but their compounded effect is likely to be very powerful in the permeation of hegemonic

definitions. Understanding how these operate is a first step in counter-acting some of their undesirable results. A major limitation in the analysis that follows is that some of the propositions advanced are based on research conducted in the laboratory. As a result, generalizations and extrapolations to every-day life events cannot be easily established and have to be carefully made.

Pygmalion effect.

Pygmalion effect is the name usually associated with the phenomenon known as self-fulfilling prophecy. It refers to a process whereby data are significantly altered in the direction of the expectation held by the individual, regardless of validity (e.g., Schmuck & Schmuck, 1988). This phenomenon operates by inadvertently modifying the behaviors of (a) the carrier of the expectation, and (b) that of its target (Babad, Inbar & Rosenthal, 1982; Rosenthal, 1981; Schmuck & Schmuck, 1988).

Not surprisingly, some of the variables found to be significantly associated with teachers' differential expectations of students include attractiveness, student conduct, race and social class (Dusek & Gail, 1983). As we shall see, when the expectations favor a certain population, that group is likely to benefit from these predictions. Conversely, when the prophecies are negative, the subjects are adversely affected.

A much publicized study on the effects of Pygmalion in the Classroom was carried out by Rosenthal and Jacobson (see Schmuck & Schmuck, 1988, chap. 4). In that study, teachers were presented with false information regarding their students. Teachers were given names of youngsters who were evaluated and considered to be "academic spurters." These students were expected to show great improvement during the school year. In fact, assessments were never performed and students were assigned the label "academic spurters" randomly. At the end of the school year data gathered from the teachers on a number of measures about the "academic spurters" showed that they did much better than their nonlabeled peers.

Although the study was criticized by many authors, Schmuck and Schmuck (1988) argue that "the research on the self-fulfilling prophecy in the classroom leaves little doubt that the expectations of teachers have important and real effects on students" (p. 87). Similarly, Gergen and Gergen (1981) concluded that many related "demonstrations of the Pygmalion effect have left little doubt about the power of social expectations in shaping behavior" (p. 128).

In the above investigation the subjects about whom predictions were made were positively affected by the expectations. But this is not always the case, for pygmalion effect operates on negative prophecies as

well. In a classroom investigation, Cooper and Fazio (In Gergen & Gergen, 1981) reported that when teachers perceive students as being unable to take care of themselves, they may produce in the student the helpless behavior that they had anticipated. In another classroom study, Babad, Inbar and Rosenthal (1982) concluded that low-expectancy students of highly biased teachers received a more negative treatment and performed less well than their peers.

In a hospital setting, Rosenhan (1981) showed the direct adverse impact of self-fulfilling prophecies on their carriers, and the indirect harmful effects on their target. Rosenhan contends that labeling has a powerful negative impact, both on those who attach the label and those on whom the label is attached.

Such labels...are as influential on the patient as they are on his [her] relatives and friends, and it should not surprise anyone that the diagnosis acts on all of them as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Eventually, the patient himself [herself] accepts the diagnosis, with all of its surplus meanings and expectations, and behaves accordingly (Rosenhan, 1981, p. 312).

What are the possible implications of these studies for the inculcation process? Inasmuch as (a) hegemony agents create expectations (conscious or non-conscious) about the behavior of hegemony targets based on

hegemonic definitions, and (b) since it has been shown that expectations are likely to influence the course of events in the direction predicted by such prophecies; then (c) it is probable that hegemony agents as well as targets behave according to, and ratify, the expectations prescribed by the former.

Obedience to authority.

Psychological research shows that people not merely obey authority figures, but will even perform acts deemed by themselves to be immoral, simply because they are asked to do so by a person of higher perceived status (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1981; Sampson, 1971). This is one of the most alarming lessons to be learned from Milgram's studies on obedience (R. Brown, 1986, chap. 1; Milgram, 1963).

The paradigm devised by Milgram to study obedience consisted of a supposedly "learning" investigation where a naive subject was instructed to administer increasingly more severe electric shocks to a confederate of the experimenter in response to failures in a task. The shocks' intensity ranged from "Slight" to "Danger: Severe Shock." Although no shocks were actually delivered, the subjects believed they were. This was apparent by the anxiety most subjects exhibited.

Unpredictably, 63% of the participants in the initial study delivered shocks up to the most potent and

deadly (marked XXX: 450 volts) (Milgram, 1963). This figure represents what Milgram called the "baseline condition." As R. Brown pointed out, "that baseline condition has been reproduced in about half a dozen countries, and there is one great unchanging result. About two thirds of every sample tested proved willing under orders to shock to the limit" (1986, p. 4).

Milgram's studies on obedience to authority may be regarded as the strongest experimental support to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. If Milgram's results can be extrapolated to life outside the laboratory, as R. Brown (1986) seems to indicate they would, then hegemonic agents, by virtue of being authority figures, may be expected to successfully prescribe and proscribe, without resorting to physical threats, the behavior of at least two thirds of hegemonic targets.

Introjection.

Introjection has to do with the adoption by hegemonic targets of the expectations and world-views of hegemony agents. This phenomenon, intimately related to the previous two (i.e., obedience and pygmalion), is fundamental to the course of socialization. While the internalization of beliefs and expectations has been given various explanations by different schools of thought, there is little doubt that most people come to accept as their own, and follow, the opinions instilled in them by hegemonic agents (e.g., Kinch, 1973). Whether

because of super-ego, need for approval, or positive reinforcement, the overwhelming majority of the population does not create new codes of behavior or beliefs that deviate significantly from the pre-established ones (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1981; Sampson, 1971).

Whereas introjection is an indispensable feature in organized societies, it may also have some devastating effects. One such effect is when the powerless introject denigrating views about themselves imposed by the powerful. This has been the case with some segments of the poor (Huber & From, 1973), the colonized (Fanon, 1965; Sampson, 1971), Blacks (Thomas & Sillen, 1979) and women (Burden & Gottlieb, 1987; Hyde & Rosenberg, 1980).

Dramatic examples where victims introject the views of the powerful are reported in the child abuse literature. Zimrin (1986), for instance, notes that abused children believe they are "bad, stupid, and worthless. They have heard this from a very early age and they even have 'proof' since in their opinion only bad children can feel as they feel towards their parents whom they are supposed to love" (p. 344). One of the children in Zimrin's investigation commented: "It is impossible that they beat me like that if I don't deserve it" (1986, p. 344).

Learned helplessness.

Learned helplessness refers to a state of passivity

developed in response to exposure to repeated failure. A recent investigation pertinent to this discussion found that after a few unsuccessful attempts to solve a problem, individuals who attribute failure to internal factors tend to develop more learned helplessness than those who blame external causes (Mikulincer, 1988).

The following proposition can be derived from that research: If (a) hegemonic definitions (equivalent to internal attributions) are efficiently disseminated in the public domain, and (b) people repeatedly fail to improve their lot in life, then (c) they may develop a learned helplessness response towards the system and stop trying to change it. This picture is not inconceivable. Research on the reasons people give for poverty, for instance, lends support to such an assumption. In their investigation on the relationship between income and ideology, Huber and Form concluded that "individualistic factors were thought much more important than structural...factors in explaining why people were poor" (1973, p. 101).

Hence, if person-blame definitions are successfully conveyed, in at least part, as Huber and Form indicate, and Mikulincer's research predicts anything about behavior outside the laboratory; then it is not unlikely that many people do not challenge the status quo simply because they have acquired a learned helplessness attitude towards it. This proposition gains further

support from observations on the behavior of some colonized people who, by accepting the colonizers' definitions of their problems (e.g., laziness, genetic inferiority, etc.), ceased to oppose domination (Fanon, 1965).

Shaping of behavior.

In general terms, shaping of behavior refers to the application of behavior modification principles to mould and regulate behavior. Based on the popularity and wide acceptance of behavior modification techniques in settings like schools, hospitals and industries (see journals Behavior Modification, Journal of Applied Behavioral Analysis, and Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior), it may well be argued that this efficacious method of behavior control is highly instrumental in attaining hegemony.

Albeit with different degrees of sophistication, parents, teachers, therapists and employers utilize learning techniques to obtain the desired conduct in hegemony targets. In their capacity as hegemony agents, they have the power not only to define social situations and problems but also to determine why, when, how, and to whom reinforcements are to be delivered.

Conformity.

Like obedience, conformity can be considered a social force: people exerting influence on the behavior of other people. But there is an important difference

between the two. "In the case of obedience those who affect behavior do so by direction, not example, and they are invested with the special status called authority" (R. Brown, 1986, p. 36). On the other hand, "in the case of conformity behavior is affected by example rather than direction, and those setting the example are not authorities but equals or peers" (R. Brown, 1986, p. 36).

The potent effects of group pressure have been documented in the classic Asch experiments (Asch, 1981). Asch (1981) asked 7 to 9 college students, assembled for the purpose of participating in a psychological experiment in "visual judgment," to compare lengths of lines. Two large white cards were shown. One of them contained the standard line whose length was to be matched. The other contained 3 lines of various lengths. Subjects were asked to find the line in the second card that was equal in length to the line in the first one. While one of the three was actually of the same length, the other two differed substantially. The difference ranged from three quarters of an inch to an inch and three quarters. In most trials, all subjects but one gave wrong answers. The dissenter being the focus of interest in the experimental situation. The rest were confederates who were instructed to provide wrong answers in 12 out of the 18 trials. Asch writes that out of a total of 123 subjects, "a considerable

percentage yielded to the majority" (1981, p. 17). He indicates that "whereas in ordinary circumstances individuals matching the lines will make mistakes less than 1 percent of the time, under group pressure the minority subjects swung to acceptance of the misleading majority's wrong judgments in 36.8 percent of the selections" (Asch, 1981, p. 17). Although this figure can be reduced by variations in the size of the majority and the minority, it can be assumed that when facing a group "alone," a person is likely to succumb to pressure approximately one third of the time. Later we shall see what conditions are likely to help the individual remain less susceptible.

In another series of studies on conformity, Walker and Heyns (1962) manipulated the level of ambiguity of the stimulus. Stimulus ambiguity can be conceptualized as the number of alternate solutions conceivable for a problem and the intricacies involved in it. Following this reasoning, the Asch experiments were low in ambiguity. The task was very easy and the solutions readily available. Through a number of hypothesized situations ranging from low to high on ambiguity, Walker & Heyns (1962) found that the more ambiguous and unstructured the task presented to subjects, the more successful group pressure is likely to be in persuading the individual into conforming with the rest. As they concluded: "The greater the ambiguity of a situation,

the greater the amount of conformity which can be expected to occur" (Walker & Heyns, 1962, p. 20). It is interesting to note that in the experimental condition more similar to the Asch paradigm (low stimulus ambiguity), only 18% obtained high conforming scores, whereas in the high ambiguity situation 39% obtained high conforming scores (Walker & Heyns, 1962).

What speculations can be made from these studies about the process of inculcation? If individuals can be expected to yield to peers about one third of the time when the stimulus situation is very structured, as in the Asch experiments, it would probably be more so when an authority figure endorses the majority opinion (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1981, chap. 5), and when there is more stimulus ambiguity. This would in all likelihood be the case in discussing social and ethical dilemmas (Walker & Heyns, 1962). In conclusion, once hegemonic definitions have been at least partly internalized, through one or more of the above described mechanisms, group members, as secondary hegemony agents, can be expected to exert considerable pressure on the individual to conform.

Counter-acting Hegemony: Future Directions

Now that we have briefly reviewed the roles of definition and inculcation in attaining hegemony, the following question should be posed: How can psychology help conscientization? One way psychology can be of assistance is by trying to make inferences about

the naturalistic process of counter-acting hegemony from data obtained in controlled studies. Following such an attempt, some suggestions on how to further the profession's contributions will be advanced.

Research conducted by psychologists can help realize how the process of counter-acting hegemony may




Figure 3 Counter-acting hegemony

be facilitated. Some of that research provided the basis for Figure 3, which shows some important steps to be followed in counter-acting hegemony.

The first and most crucial stage of that process is denunciation. As previously indicated, denunciation refers to the act of making explicit the mechanisms implicated in preventing an understanding of social problems that may lead to systemic changes. Three such essential mechanisms are to be made explicit. The first, hegemonic definitions, has been already discussed and can be summarized by saying that they preclude systemic considerations in problem definition. The second, illegitimate authority, refers to the moral stature ascribed to hegemonic agents by virtue of their being regarded experts, or holding positions of power. Power and expertise are not necessarily a source of moral virtue. Yet, it has been found that people tend to change their attitudes on social issues in the direction expressed by individuals whose expertise and qualifications lie in fields unrelated to the issue at hand (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1981). The third mechanism to be addressed is group pressure. As we already saw, this is a potent source of conformity. Walker and Heyns clearly pointed out that if conformity is to be achieved, the person "need not be aware" (1962, p. 98) of the effects of group pressure. Thus, if reduction of hegemonic conformity is desired, then the person "need

be aware" of these effects.

The denunciation of these three mechanisms may be conducive to three simple realizations:

1. That a certain unsatisfactory condition may not be the result of personal, but rather systemic deficiencies.

2. That people who might have tried to convince one to take personal blame may be wrong.

3. That although groups may pressure one to conform, it is not necessarily beneficial to follow the majority.

Exchange of information is the next step in counter-acting hegemony. As R. Brown (1986, chap. 1) reports in his analysis of research on obedience and rebellion, sharing views with group members about erroneous, unjust or immoral aspects of a situation may prepare the ground for remedial action. This is exemplified in a variation of the Milgram experiment. When 3 subjects were in charge of punishing the person for making errors (as opposed to 1 in the baseline condition), 2 of whom were confederates instructed to rebel against the experimenter who requested that they deliver the shocks, the "real" or "true" subject of the investigation tended to rebel as well. Whereas in the baseline condition (only 1 subject) about 63% of the subjects shocked to the limit, only 10% did so when supported by 2 other people.

Similarly, in the Asch paradigm (1981) the presence of one supporting partner "depleted the majority of much of its power. Its pressure on the dissenting individual was reduced to one-fourth: that is, subjects answered incorrectly only one-fourth as often as under the pressure of unanimous majority" (p. 19).

Exchange of information, then, is not only important in alerting other people about crucial aspects of a situation but also in motivating them to do something about it. Be it to resist group pressure or rebel against circumstances perceived as unfair or unjust.

The next step in counter-acting hegemony is triggering action. R. Brown (1986) contends that it is not enough to prepare or motivate people to rebel or do something about it. "It is important in a group to have one or more individuals with low thresholds for action" (R. Brown, 1986, p. 35). Otherwise, even though a group may perceive a situation as immoral, they will not take action. In other words, the absence of a person with previous political or activist experience of some sort may paralyze a group. Research reviewed by R. Brown clearly supports this conclusion.

Before discussing the annunciation stage, attention to the issue of reactance should be drawn. So far we concentrated on the vertical arrows. The horizontal arrow from denunciation to reactance will now be

considered. Reactance has been defined by Gergen and Gergen (1981) as "a negative emotional state that may result when a person's freedom of choice is reduced" (p. 498). Furthermore, they contend that "reactance can be a source of independence (as a reaction to perceived dependence)" (Gergen & Gergen, 1981, p. 498). Such a reaction is likely to emerge from the denunciation process. When people realize that hegemonic definitions, for instance, have been designed in large part to constrict their perception of social conditions and consequently their freedom of choice, they may experience reactance. And "the individual who experiences reactance will attempt to reduce it by trying to reclaim the lost freedom" (Gergen & Gergen, 1981, p. 368). Inasmuch as reactance may lead to action to remediate a situation, as some of the research reviewed by Gergen and Gergen (1981) suggest, it is also instrumental in counter-acting hegemony. In Figure 3 it is placed at the same level of denunciation because it is more of a parallel rather than a subsequent stage.

As the figure shows, the vertical and horizontal arrows converge at the annunciation box. In simple terms this is the stage where the question what can be done? is addressed. Short term annunciation pertains to immediate social action designed to improve a specific condition. Long term annunciation refers to the conception of an "utopian" or "ideal" society where

human welfare may be maximized. These are by no means easy questions. This, however, should not prevent those dissatisfied with the present state of affairs from trying to provide at least tentative answers.

What of annunciation within the realm of psychology? How can psychology become part of the short and long term annunciation processes? At the short term level of annunciation, suggestions can be divided along the lines of psychologists as practitioners, teachers, and scientists.

As practitioners, i.e., therapists and counselors, psychologists come in contact with people at all levels of the social ladder. In that capacity they have the opportunity to make the process of hegemony explicit. At the same time, they can make an effort to seriously bear in mind systemic variables affecting the behavior of their clients. Not only in explaining their behavior but also in suggesting treatment.

The psycho-therapist, social worker or social reformer, concerned only with his own clients and their grievance against society, perhaps takes a view comparable to the private citizen of Venice who concerns himself only with the safety of his own dwelling and his own ability to get about the city. But if the entire republic is slowly being submerged, individual citizens cannot afford to ignore their collective fate because, in the end,

they all drown together if nothing is done; and again, as with Venice, what needs to be done is far beyond the powers of any one individual. In such circumstances...the therapist can no longer afford the luxury of ignoring everything that is going on outside the consulting room (Badcock, 1983, pp. 74-75).

As Caplan and Nelson (1973), Albee (1981, 1986) and Sarason (1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1984b) have eloquently argued, psychology has not yet overcome its predominant individualistic bias, neither in diagnosis nor in therapy. But psychologists, it should be added, are not the only culprits of such bias. So are, it has been argued, most people in the helping professions, including social workers (Mills, 1943; Wilding, 1981; Wineman, 1984).

As educators, and particularly as educators of teachers, psychologists are presented with the opportunity to challenge their students to question the very definition of problems which constitutes the first step in obtaining hegemony. Freire envisioned this task as a pedagogy of the question. In my view Freire is quite right in his assessment that "educators are using more a pedagogy of answers than one of questions...no matter whether we teach in the primary school, secondary school, or at the university" (Bruss & Macedo, 1985, p. 8). Contrary to a pedagogy of the answer, "which

reduces learners to mere receptacles of prepackaged knowledge" (Bruss & Macedo, 1985, p. 8), Freire's approach stimulates students to doubt, challenge and reject preconceived notions about the social sphere. As Shor put it, this type of education has the potential "to penetrate the enormous myths that we're all surrounded with and socialized into" (In Martin, 1985, p. 6). Among these myths the person-blame and "natural" causes definitions of political, cultural, and economic affairs.

But this is not enough. In addition, it is essential to provide people with some tools that will enable them to scrutinize the ideology implicated in the definition of social problems. To begin with, the language in which these definitions are presented is to be examined. In order to do that, it should first be realized that "there is no neutral language or discourse of Truth: there are simply different forms of discourse, employed for different purposes" (Hughes, 1986, p. 18). Then, students will be in a better position to learn and apply elements of literary criticism along the lines suggested by Hughes (1986), and, eventually, to read a text always "as a constructed TEXTUAL WORLD distinct from the EMPIRICAL WORLD" [capitals in original] (Hughes, 1986, p. 18). Hughes' (1986) appraisal of the current state of education indicates that "despite the massive amounts of money spent on teaching

language...students are not taught the theory and practice of discourse in our schools" (p. 18).

Undermining conformity and mass thinking is another task that psychologists, as teachers, can fulfil. Lessing (1986) has recently envisioned what an educators' message for independent thinking would or should be like:

"You are going to have to live in a world full of mass movements, both religious and political, mass ideas, mass cultures. Every hour of every day you will be deluged with ideas and opinions that are mass produced and regurgitated, whose only real vitality comes from the power of the mob, slogans, pattern thinking. You are going to be pressured all through your life to join mass movements, and if you can resist this, you will be, every day, under pressure from various types of groups, often of your closest friends, to conform to them.

"It will seem to you many times in your life that there is no point in holding out against these pressures, that you are not strong enough.

"But you are going to be taught how to examine these mass ideas, these apparently irresistible pressures, taught how to think for yourself, and to choose for yourself (Lessing, 1986, p. 73).

As Lessing herself points out, "we cannot expect this kind of thing to be in the curriculum laid down by any

state or government currently visible in the world. But parents may talk and teach like this, and certain schools may" (Lessing, 1986, p. 74). So may psychologists!

Psychologists can facilitate conscientization at this stage by exposing the limitations of individualistic and reductionist research rooted in the Cartesian mode of thinking (Capra, 1982), and by offering alternate paradigms. Bateson (1972) has been influential in furthering a conceptual integration between individual, social and ecological variables in understanding human behavior. He contended that when "you separate mind from the structure in which it is immanent, such as human relationship, the human society, or the ecosystem, you thereby embark...on fundamental error" (Bateson, 1972, p. 485). Along the lines proposed by Bateson, a systemic approach for the study of behavior in cultural context has been recently outlined by Sullivan (1984). He proposed to elucidate "the peculiar or typical character of a specific culture" (1984, p. 158) by means of ethnography.

It is somewhat ironic that psychologists, who have for a long time been trying to emulate physicists, are still attempting to apply and promote mechanistic models that are no longer regarded as predominant in physics (Capra, 1982). While psychology might have benefited from keeping some distance from physics at the beginning

of the century, now it would seem to be a good time to dialogue with physics on the advantages of systemic modes of inquiry (Capra, 1982).

As professionals committed to the promotion of human welfare, all psychologists, I believe, would benefit from undergoing constant self-conscientization. If psychologists are to be a vehicle of conscientization for other people they should be the first ones to subject themselves to this very process. Otherwise, scrutiny of the society of which they are a constituent part will be seriously hindered. Psychologists are not, and cannot, be insulated from inculcation. Yet, it would seem as if we were operating under the premise that we can exclude ourselves from the ubiquitous nature of the hegemonic process (e.g., Larsen, 1986; Prilleltensky, in press).

Under the heading "Beneficial Activities," Principle IV: "Responsibility to Society" of the Canadian code of ethics for psychologists it is recommended that psychologists "participate in the process of critical self-evaluation of the profession's place in society and about the ways the profession might be contributing to or detracting from beneficial societal functioning and changes" (CPA, 1986, p. 17). In my opinion, it would be advantageous to have some built-in mechanisms for self-conscientization in the training of psychologists. Such procedure might ensure

that the recommendation stated above be implemented and not left to the discretion of individuals who might place it low, if at all, in their list of priorities. One systematic way whereby psychology's functions in promoting or impeding beneficial societal changes may be evaluated is in courses dealing with ethics. Such courses, which were very rare in the social sciences a decade and a half ago (Warwick, 1980), provide an opportunity to discuss how the discipline might impact upon the advent of the good society. But this is only one possible route. Workshops, study groups, conferences, etc. are alternative ways. If the recommendation is not pursued it would be, I think, not for lack of means but rather interest. Such lack of interest would not derive from apathy to social welfare. It would derive from a professional socialization that trained psychologists to be so far removed from the social scene that any activity directed at improving social conditions is not necessarily seen as falling within the primary realm of psychology (Sarason, 1981a).

There still remains the question of long-term annunciation: How do we make progress in delineating the ideal society? The act of conceiving a social arrangement where the well-being of the population could be advanced is a task psychologists have begun to study, but are not yet well prepared to undertake on their own (cf. Fox, 1985). Such an assignment would be greatly

facilitated by collaborating with moral philosophers. At least two foreseeable barriers would have to be overcome in order to foster this interdisciplinary dialogue. The first has to do with the belief that the psychologist, as scientist, contributes to social betterment by making progress in her/his area of specialty, regardless of how remote this field may be from the social arena. This assumption is rooted in the following syllogism: "social science is science; science contributes to human welfare; therefore social science contributes to human welfare" (Warwick, 1980, p. 31). As argued elsewhere, "unless psychologists extricate themselves from this moral naivete, the advent of annunciation will remain an illusion" (Prilleltensky, in press).

The second source of resistance to be encountered will be psychology's historical quest for independence from philosophy. One can only hope that psychology has reached the necessary level of maturity where a dialogue with philosophy does not longer pose a threat.

One might best conclude this dissertation by paraphrasing a comment by George Bernard Shaw: Some people see things as they are and ask why; some people see things as they are not and ask why not?

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