

1 **Quantifying drivers of antibiotic resistance in humans:**
2 **A systematic review**

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4 Anuja Chatterjee MSc^{1*}, Maryam Modarai PhD¹, Nichola R Naylor MSc¹, Sara E Boyd MRCP^{7,2,1},
5 Rifat Atun FRCP^{3,1}, James Barlow PhD⁴, Alison H Holmes FMedSci^{1,2}, Alan Johnson PhD^{5,1}, Julie V
6 Robotham PhD^{6,1}

7
8 1. National Institute for Health Research, Health Protection Research Unit in Healthcare Associated
9 Infection and Antimicrobial Resistance, Imperial College London, Hammersmith Campus, W12 0NN,
10 United Kingdom

11
12 2. Imperial College London Healthcare NHS Trust, London. United Kingdom

13
14 3. Department of Global Health and Population and Department of Health Policy and Management,
15 Harvard University, 651 Huntington Avenue, FXB 634, Boston, MA 02115. USA

16
17 4. Centre for Health Economics & Policy Innovation, Imperial College Business School, South
18 Kensington Campus, SW7 2AZ. United Kingdom

19
20 5. Department of Healthcare-Associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance, National Infection
21 Service, Public Health England, London NW9 5EQ. United Kingdom

22
23 6. Modelling and Economics Unit, National Infection Service, 61 Colindale Avenue, Public Health
24 England, NW9 5EQ. United Kingdom

25
26 7. Antimicrobial Pharmacodynamics and Therapeutics, Department of Molecular and Clinical
27 Pharmacology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3GE

28
29 *Correspondence to: A. Chatterjee, 8th Floor, Commonwealth Building, Imperial College London,
30 Hammersmith Hospital, Du Cane Road, W12 0NN. Email: ac6315@ic.ac.uk.
31 Phone: +447817543458
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46 **Summary (150 words)**

47 A horizon scan linking the quality/quantity of data reported on the drivers of antibiotic resistance
48 (AR) in humans arising from the human, animal and environment reservoirs is needed to mitigate
49 risks of AR. We adopted a systematic reviewing methodology using a “One Health” approach to
50 survey the key drivers in humans.

51 565 studies from 2,819 title/abstracts were identified after two sets of reviewers selected studies
52 from Embase, MEDLINE, and Scopus (2005-2018), ECDC, CDC, and WHO (One Health data). Quality
53 assessment was carried out in line with Cochrane recommendations.

54 Prior antibiotic exposure, underlying disease, and invasive procedures were the key risk factors
55 identified from the 88 risk factors retrieved. Studies primarily reported a 2 to 4-fold increased risk of
56 AR due to these risks identified. Food/water transmission were frequently quantified from the
57 animal/environment-reservoirs respectively.

58 Uniformly quantifying relationships between risk factors will help researchers better understand the
59 cycle of AR in humans.

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97 **Introduction**

98 Antibiotic resistance (AR) is a growing, multifaceted health concern, resulting in increased morbidity,
99 mortality for patients, and financial costs for healthcare systems¹. Antibiotic-resistant bacteria (ARB)
100 are found in humans, diverse animal hosts and in the environment. Each of these contributes to the
101 epidemiology of AR²⁻⁵. (See Panel A)

102 Reviews, meta-analyses and observational studies determining drivers of the emergence and
103 transmission of AR have been published^{2,3,6-8}. Antibiotic use and failure to apply effective infection
104 prevention and control measures are well established as key drivers of AR^{9,10}. However, given the
105 recent international focus on reducing AR¹¹ and a greater attention to modelling the risk of the “One
106 Health” impact on humans (Panel A)⁴, there is a need for detailed knowledge of the reservoirs and
107 emerging cross-reservoir risk factors of AR. In particular, we need to broaden our understanding of
108 the natural selection and transmission patterns of ARB which currently threaten healthcare delivery,
109 particularly for patients undergoing invasive procedures such as surgery or those receiving
110 immunosuppressive therapies¹.

111 In an attempt to depict the links between the human, animal and environmental reservoirs of
112 antimicrobial resistance (AMR), a systems map was published by the UK Department of Health (DH),
113 as part of the UK’s national AMR strategy¹². However, these maps were created using expert opinion
114 rather than literature sources and the links were not quantified¹². There has been no systematic
115 retrieval or quality assessment of evidence for the risk factors for AR in humans, nor the
116 quantification of these risk factors among major bacterial species across the three reservoirs. A
117 synthesis of evidence is urgently required to aid policy-level decision making, ensuring that strategies
118 to minimise the burden of AR can be appropriately prioritised.

119 Therefore, the aim of this research was to conduct a survey of the evidence available on the
120 quantified risk factors of AR in humans by systematically retrieving and reviewing this evidence and
121 generating an overview of the quality and quantity of these studies. In addition, this data was used
122 to create an up-to-date map quantifying the drivers identified as part of this horizon scan for AR to
123 compliment and extend the UK AMR systems map¹².

124 **Methods**

125 **Search strategy and selection criteria**

126 The PRISMA protocol was followed to conduct this systematic review¹³. Quantified evidence on the
127 risk factors from human, animal and environment, which result in AR in humans, were identified.
128 EMBASE, MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations, MEDLINE(R) were searched via
129 Ovid, and Scopus was searched separately. Only full text articles published in English between
130 01.01.2005 - 14.02.2018 were included. Grey literature quantifying the most recent primary data on
131 One health from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and Centers for
132 Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organisation (WHO) websites were
133 searched. Additional meta-analyses studies on risk factors of AR in humans were also included from
134 Pubmed (Section II in supplementary web appendix) to capture any missed risk factors not identified
135 from the primary data search in Ovid and Scopus. Population, Intervention, Comparator, Outcome,
136 and Study design (PICOS) criteria were utilised for inclusion/exclusion decisions. (Table S1). No
137 studies were excluded based on the quality of the papers or the sample size. From the included
138 studies, study characteristics and outcomes were extracted into a pre-specified Data Extraction Table
139 (in Microsoft Excel© 2016) (Table S2).

Panel A: Study Terminology

- ❖ Antibiotic resistance is defined as bacteria with acquired or inherent resistance to at least 1 antibiotic.
- ❖ Community setting includes a setting outside of a healthcare environment such as households. The animal and environment reservoirs are included within this setting.
- ❖ Environmental reservoir includes non-meat related food (e.g. vegetables), soil or water related sources.
- ❖ Healthcare setting includes hospitals and long-term care facilities.
- ❖ Invasive procedures include procedures carried out at a healthcare setting, for example, use of indwelling devices such as catheterisation or intubation.
- ❖ Multidrug resistant bacteria are defined as bacteria with acquired resistance to at least 3 drugs from different classes of antibiotics⁷⁷.
- ❖ ESBL-Bacteria have been separately coded to MDR-B despite ESBL-B being a type of MDR-B since there has been a surge of international concern around these organism types, and a large number of papers were also identified for this group of organisms.
- ❖ One Health is defined as the inter-relationship between the human, animal and environmental reservoirs, and how these relationships impact AR in humans.
- ❖ 'Risk factor' is used as a proxy term for drivers of antibiotic resistance.

"A risk factor is any attribute, characteristic or exposure of an individual that increases the likelihood of the individual:

i) being colonised/infected by antibiotic-resistant bacteria, or

ii) transmitting such types of bacteria to another individual or the surrounding environment"

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Study selection and quality assessment

Four reviewers conducted the review and applied the PICOS criteria to select the relevant articles. One reviewer (AC) assessed all title/abstracts (T/A) and full texts (FTs) for inclusion, a second reviewer (MM) assessed 50% of all T/A and FTs, and a third (SEB) and fourth reviewer (NRN) assessed 25% each of the remaining T/A and FTs titles. In the event of a disagreement, a senior researcher (JR), independent of the four reviewers, was consulted. After final study selection, duplicates were removed by identification of the same Ovid ID alongside hand searching. Following the identification of the FTs, one reviewer (AC) conducted the quality assessment of all papers and a second reviewer (MM) independently checked 12 randomly selected articles. Quality was determined using the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) based on Cochrane guidelines^{7,14-16}, in which selection, information and confounding bias were assessed. Reporting bias criteria were defined in line with methodology utilised in a recently published meta-analysis on observational studies in AR¹⁴. (Supplementary Section III)
The full study protocol was prospectively registered with PROSPERO (CRD42016038450).

Panel B: Search strategy*

Microbial-drug-resistan\$.tw. or ((microb\$ or antimicrob\$ or anti-microb\$ or anti microb\$) adj2 resist\$).tw. or ((antibiot\$ or anti-biot\$ or anti biot\$) adj2 resist\$).tw. or Multidrug resist\$.tw. or multidrug-resistant bacteria.ti,ab. or exp Drug Resistance, Microbial/ or (superbug\$ or super-bug\$ or super bug\$).tw. or Superinfection/ or (resistant adj2 infection\$).ti,ab.

AND

(emergence or spread or outbreak* or prevalence or incidence or acquisition).tw. or exp cross infection/ or exp infectious disease transmission, patient-to-professional/ or exp infection control/ or (patient-to-patient adj2 transmission).tw. or exp infectious disease transmission, professional-to-patient/ or exp disease transmission, infectious/ or infectious disease transmission.tw. or disease transmission.tw. or ((transfer or transmission) adj2 resist\$).ti,ab. Or contamination.tw. or ((bacterial pathogen* and coloni\$) or Coloni?ation).tw. or (resist\$ adj2 develop\$).tw

AND

((cause or drive or driving or driver or predictor or determinant or determinants or mechanism) adj4 resist\$).ti,ab. or exp risk factor/ or risk factor.ti,ab. or risk score.tw. or infection reduction.tw. or infection risk.tw. or risk assessment.tw. or risk benefit analysis.tw. or (antibiotic adj2 (use\$ or usage or consum\$ or prescri\$)).tw. or (food chain or (water and (supply or quality)) or animal husbandry or food producing animal or food-producing animal).tw. or (poor adj2 hygiene).tw. or (poor and (infection control or infection-control)).tw.

AND

(risk ratio or relative risk or odds ratio or hazard ratio or statistical correlation or correlation coefficient or statistical analysis or multivariable analysis or regression).tw. or epidemiology studies.ti,ab. or exp odds ratio/ or exp epidemiologic studies/ or exp Statistics as Topic/ or exp Epidemiologic Study Characteristics as Topic/ or estimat\$.tw. or quantif\$.tw.

Limits: English language, full texts, 2005 onwards

Excludes: book or book series or chapter or conference abstract or editorial or erratum or letter or note

exp: Explosion terms (in Embase) /MESH terms (in Medline)

*Search strategy developed with medical librarian

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200 **Data analysis**

201 Quantitative evidence which included statistically significant results and point estimates for the risk
202 factors of AR from the human reservoir or AR prevalence levels from food or water sources as
203 potential transmission routes into the human reservoir were extracted. Only statistically significant
204 risk factor estimates based on p-values were extracted from the human reservoir studies. If there
205 were discrepancies between what was stated as statistically significant and reported p-values, then
206 these results were not extracted. For the multivariate sub-analysis, only complete results with
207 significant p-values, complete confidence intervals and sample size were included. If odds ratios
208 were reported as significant with confidence intervals that included 1, these results were excluded. In
209 addition, these result discrepancies were captured under reporting bias during the quality
210 assessment stage.

211 Due to limited quantified evidence from the animal and environment reservoirs, prevalence levels
212 were extracted (e.g. Prevalence of resistant bacteria from retail meat or prevalence of resistant
213 genes from water sources as proxies for indirect transmission routes into the humans reservoir).
214 Following data extraction, all data was imported into R version 3.4.1 and analysed using the 'dplyr'
215 package.

216 A meta-analysis was deemed inappropriate given the heterogeneity in terms of patient population,
217 definition of outcomes and risk factors under study. Mean quality assessment scores were reported
218 with their respective standard deviation (SD) on a range from 0-1. Due to cell structure differences,
219 compared to Gram-positive bacteria, Gram-negative bacteria are more resistant to antibiotics, thus,
220 the results of the review were often split based on this classification criterion.

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222 *The drivers of AR map and risk factor grouping*

223 All risk factor estimates were coded based on their study-specific definitions, for example prior
224 antibiotic use, with or without underlying disease (Table S4). Based on classification methods utilised
225 in previous AR related meta-analyses¹⁷⁻¹⁹ and risk factor framework studies in medical literature²⁰⁻²²,
226 the themes arising from these risk factors were split into the following risk domains: 1) Patient
227 clinical history: Includes underlying disease or comorbidities ; 2) Demographics : age, gender,
228 ethnicity; 3) Healthcare factors: includes various procedure related contact with hospital / intensive
229 care unit / nursing home/ long-term care facility/ outpatient services or hospital environment related
230 factors ; 4) Antibiotic use related factors: includes prior history of antibiotic use or impact of
231 antibiotic use in animals on humans 5) Community-level factors: where risk factors were neither
232 related to healthcare contact, nor due to the clinical condition of the patient. Cross-reservoir drivers
233 such as meat related food transmission, occupational and domestic exposure to animals from the
234 animal reservoir, or water and vegetable related food transmission from the environment reservoir
235 were included within this community domain. Notably, these domains are not mutually exclusive,
236 and the potential for causal relationships across and between these domains are discussed within the
237 discussion section, as identifying such links between the domains was not within the scope of this
238 review.

239 To be able to report on all the risk factors we had identified in the review (see Table S4 in the
240 supplementary index for a full list of risk factors), creation of these domains was needed to enable
241 description of the overall evidence on risk factors of AR impacting humans in a holistic way.

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243 **Results**

244 In total 2,819 title and abstracts were screened. The PRISMA flow diagram (Figure 1) describes the
245 selection process.

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247 *Figure 1: PRISMA flow diagram**

248 *Please refer to the PICOS exclusion criteria in supplementary appendix for further explanation (Table S1)

249 *[Figure supplied in PDF to be inserted here.]*

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251 1,883 title/abstracts were excluded, following which 936 full text articles were reviewed, out of
252 which 371 articles were ineligible for inclusion. In total, 565 full text articles were included for data
253 extraction and quality assessment. Out of the 565 full text articles, 527 were primary studies and 38
254 were meta-analysis studies.

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257 **Study population and reservoirs**

258 *Overall*

259 Out of the primary studies, a total of 469 studies (89%) were reporting on risk factors from within the
260 human reservoir and 58 studies (11%) were reporting on cross reservoir risk factors on the
261 relationship between the animal or environment and human reservoir (Figure 2). Four meta-analyses
262 studies pooled quantified risk factors from the animal and human reservoir. No meta-analysis was
263 identified for the overlap between environment and human reservoir.

264 The top three resistant bacteria under study were multidrug-resistant bacteria (excludes extended
265 spectrum beta-lactamase-producing bacteria) (MDR-B: 20% (104 studies)), meticillin-resistant
266 *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA: 19% (98 studies)), and antibiotic-resistant *Escherichia coli* (R-EC: 15%
267 (78 studies)) (Table S5). Most (42% (16) meta-analysis studies quantified risk factors of MRSA. The
268 full list of included articles and their study characteristics are reported in Table S2. Of the 469
269 human-only studies, 65% related to an adult population, and 8% did not explicitly specify age groups.

270

271 *Cross reservoir*

272 Antibiotic-resistant *Escherichia coli* (R-EC) was the most frequently studied organism (38% (22
273 studies)) among cross-reservoir drivers.

274 The potential transmission routes from the animal to human reservoir were either via food
275 sources^{25,27-46}, or from animal contact^{24,36,45-52}. In contrast, environment to human reservoir routes
276 were water^{39,46,53-59} and vegetable related sources⁶⁰. The highest reported resistant isolates out of all
277 the cross reservoir risk factors were from broiler meat which were ESBL-EC samples (43% (resistant
278 isolates: 36,241) followed by meat from turkey which were R-EC samples (25% (1714 resistant
279 isolates).

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281 **Study types and quantification techniques**

282 The majority of studies (55% (312)) adopted a cohort design, while 26% (146) adopted a case-control
283 methodology. A cross-sectional, prevalence or time-series study approach was used for 12% (65)
284 (Figure SF1), and 7% (38) were meta-analyses. There were no meta-analyses that included links
285 between human and environmental reservoirs. In the human reservoir, an odds ratio (OR) was
286 frequently used to quantify the risk factors; incidence and prevalence rates were the common
287 outcome measures in the other reservoirs (Figure SF2). The majority of studies were based in
288 Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (76% (404)), whilst 19%
289 (99) were based in non-OECD countries, and 1% (3) were global. The meta-analyses studies primarily
290 (92% (35) had a global scope.

291

292 **Study quality**

293 Quality assessment showed that overall there was a low risk of bias among the 527 observational
294 studies (Table S2, Figure SF3). 56% (312) of the observational studies were reported well; failure to
295 report study design (18% (96)) and baseline characteristics (13% (71)) were the commonest reasons
296 for studies to score poorly (Panel 1: Figure SF3). However, around 30% of the studies were subject to
297 confounding bias (34% (177)) and information bias (29% (155)) when it came to identification of
298 exposure variables (Panel 2: Figure SF3). The meta-analyses studies were primarily of good quality
299 according to the PRISMA assessment tool. (Mean: 0.90 (0.09))

300 Primary studies focusing on the human reservoir showed on average the highest quality score ratings
301 (mean: 0.66 (SD: 0.18), indicating a lower risk of bias. In comparison, the other reservoirs had a
302 higher risk of bias (mean 0.33-0.47 (SD: 0.16-0.17)) (Figure 2).

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*Figure 2: Reservoir specific number of studies, quality and top risk factors
[Figure supplied in PDF to be inserted here.]*

Risk factors

The 527 primary studies were utilised to construct an AR drivers' map (Figure 3). Most studies quantify links between antibiotic use (56%), healthcare contact (53%) or patient clinical history (47%), and AR in humans. (Figure 3).

Fewer studies reported risk factors from the community factors (20%) and patient demographics (18%) domains.

The studies from the healthcare factors domain were on average of better quality (0.68 (0.18)) compared to studies reporting community factors (0.46 (0.18)). (Figure 4)

A detailed table with the five domains and their respective risk factors are presented in Table S4 along with the number of studies retrieved and their respective quality scores.

318 *Figure 3: Percentage of studies quantifying the drivers of antibiotic resistance in humans N = 527 studies*

319 Please note the bubble size represents the percentage of studies out of the total number of primary studies (n =
320 527) for both the risk domains and their individual risk factors.

321 For ease of presentation and clarity only the top 5 risk factors from the individual risk domains have been
322 presented - these percentages may not add up to the total risk domain percentage. A singular study may report a
323 variety of risk factors across all of these domains so there will be duplicate studies present in the domains. The
324 distance between the bubbles are not indicative of anything.

325 *[Figure supplied in PDF to be inserted here.]*

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369 *Figure 4: Quality of studies quantifying the drivers of antibiotic resistance in humans*

370 *[Figure supplied in PDF to be inserted here.]*

371 *Bubble size represents mean quality score*

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374 *Sub-analysis of outcomes reported across the domains*

375 The risk factors identified in the review were reported for various outcomes of AR in humans. Figure
376 5 describes the type of outcomes and number of studies extracted from each risk domain. AR-related
377 infections were most frequently reported, followed by colonisation with ARB across all studies.

378 Gram-negative bacteria were the most frequently estimated resistant bacteria across all outcomes
379 with the exception of carriage of ARB, where Gram-positive bacteria predominated. In terms of risk
380 domains driving the respective outcomes, healthcare contact was most frequently reported to result
381 in AR-related infections (64% (113 studies)), whereas patient clinical history was most frequently
382 reported to result in colonisation with ARB. Antibiotic use was reported to result in acquisition (57%
383 (48 studies)), emergence (66% (40 studies) or carriage (55% (31 studies) of AR. In contrast,
384 community-level factors were driving indirect routes arising from cross-reservoir transmission. (45
385 studies)

386 The quality of the studies reporting on infection (mean: 0.65 S.D:0.2) and colonization (mean: 0.63,
387 S.D: 0.2) were better with lower risk of bias compared to the transmission related studies (mean:
388 0.45 S.D: 0.23).

389 Majority (39% (15 studies) of the meta-analyses studies quantified AR outcomes for infection,
390 followed by colonisation (21% (8 studies).

391

392 *Figure 5: Overview of the risk factor domains stratified by outcomes[†] of AR. Panel A: Total number of studies*
393 *split based on type of outcome for AR across the five risk domains; Panel B: Total number of studies split based*
394 *on type of outcome for AR and bacteria type*

395 *[Figure supplied in PDF to be inserted here.]*

396 **Mixed includes estimates from resistant genes or studies reporting pooled results for Gram-positive and Gram-*
397 *negative bacteria*

398 Please note: 1) Studies reporting on resistant genes have not been presented in Panel B – this is the reason behind
399 fewer studies in e.g. transmission outcome in Panel B compared to Panel A,

400 2) one study may report on both Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria types, this overlap is the reason
401 behind e.g. higher infection studies in Panel B compared to Panel A

402 †Infection: ARB causing infection; Colonised: Colonised but not infected by ARB; Acquisition: Directly
403 acquiring ARB (including infection) from another host or the surrounding environment; Emergence:

404 Determinants, predictors, factors increasing prevalence of antibiotic resistance in humans; Carriage: Includes
405 nasal / faecal / skin carriage; Indirect transmission: Indirect acquisition routes which facilitate the transfer of
406 ARB from one host to another host (human to human / animal to human) or from environment to host (and vice
407 versa). Prevalence of ARB from uncooked/cooked food sources as well as water sources have also been used as
408 proxies for these routes; Other: includes combination of ‘colonisation/infection/acquisition’,

409 ‘transmission/carriage’ or specified as a ‘risk factor of resistant organism’

410 Note: Transmission, emergence or acquisition routes are often difficult to determine clinically, in particular from
411 retrospective studies. These terms have been directly elicited from the studies giving rise to i) overlap between
412 these outcomes and ii) heterogeneity across their study specific definitions.

413

414

415 *Sub-analysis of odds ratio estimates reported from multivariate analysis results and meta-analyses*

416 Up until this point the drivers of AR were expressed in terms of the quantity and quality of evidence
417 extracted. To determine the strength of the evidence, a sub analysis was conducted of the odd ratio
418 (OR) from independent risk factors reported from studies which conducted a multivariate analysis
419 (does not include the meta-analyses results). Within this analysis, only studies reporting complete
420 datasets (i.e. number of cases, OR with significant confidence intervals) were included.

421 (Table S6 provides the OR ranges elicited from this analysis along with the number of studies and
422 their quality) Table 1 provides the percentage of studies reporting the specified OR ranges split for

423 the top two outcomes and for Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria. Risk of AR due to antibiotic
 424 use and community level factors had wide OR ranges, compared to the other domains. Table 1
 425 displays the OR distribution, where the odds of ARB in humans was primarily reported to be between
 426 2 to 4 fold higher due to the impact of the different risk domains. The distribution from the meta-
 427 analyses studies in Table 2 shows that odds of AR in humans are primarily reported to be between 2
 428 to 3 fold higher given these risk domains. A larger number of studies reported odds of AR due to
 429 healthcare contact risk between 1 and 2. Whereas, the number studies reporting on odds for AR due
 430 to antibiotic use were spread between 2 and 4.

431
 432 *Table 1: Percentage of studies per domain reporting specified odds ratio ranges* from the multivariate analysis*
 433 *results*

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Overall	OR >1 - <2	OR ≥2 - <3	OR ≥3 - <4	OR ≥4 - <5	OR ≥5 - <6	OR ≥6 - <7	OR ≥7 - <8	OR ≥8 - <9	OR ≥9 - <10	OR ≥10 - <12	OR ≥12 - <14	OR ≥14 - <16	OR ≥16 - <18	OR ≥18 - <20	OR ≥20
Patient clinical history (n = 147)	16%	34%	22%	15%	7%	8%	8%	3%	5%	3%	3%	4%	2%	3%	5%
Health care contact (n = 184)	24%	35%	27%	20%	12%	7%	6%	4%	3%	5%	4%	2%	4%	1%	9%
Antibiotic use (n = 189)	15%	32%	20%	13%	16%	7%	10%	3%	4%	5%	7%	4%	1%	2%	8%
Community level factors (n = 34)	21%	29%	29%	12%	12%	9%	3%	9%	0%	3%	3%	3%	3%	6%	15%
Patient demographics (n = 54)	28%	37%	19%	11%	6%	2%	4%	0%	2%	2%	4%	4%	0%	0%	2%
Comparison of top two outcomes from the review															
Infection	OR >1 - <2	OR ≥2 - <3	OR ≥3 - <4	OR ≥4 - <5	OR ≥5 - <6	OR ≥6 - <7	OR ≥7 - <8	OR ≥8 - <9	OR ≥9 - <10	OR ≥10 - <12	OR ≥12 - <14	OR ≥14 - <16	OR ≥16 - <18	OR ≥18 - <20	OR ≥20
Patient clinical history (n = 53)	19%	36%	17%	15%	9%	6%	8%	4%	6%	4%	6%	0%	2%	0%	6%
Health care contact (n = 73)	26%	30%	27%	26%	12%	3%	5%	3%	5%	10%	4%	1%	3%	0%	8%
Antibiotic use (n = 69)	6%	32%	20%	13%	17%	7%	9%	1%	4%	6%	12%	4%	0%	0%	6%
Community level factors (n = 7)	14%	14%	29%	0%	0%	0%	14%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	14%	14%
Patient demographics (n = 18)	33%	33%	22%	6%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Colonisation	OR >1 - <2	OR ≥2 - <3	OR ≥3 - <4	OR ≥4 - <5	OR ≥5 - <6	OR ≥6 - <7	OR ≥7 - <8	OR ≥8 - <9	OR ≥9 - <10	OR ≥10 - <12	OR ≥12 - <14	OR ≥14 - <16	OR ≥16 - <18	OR ≥18 - <20	OR ≥20
Patient clinical history (n = 40)	15%	33%	30%	18%	8%	3%	10%	8%	10%	5%	0%	15%	0%	3%	8%
Health care contact (n = 39)	23%	36%	21%	15%	15%	15%	5%	3%	3%	3%	3%	0%	8%	0%	13%
Antibiotic use (n = 40)	23%	38%	20%	5%	15%	0%	15%	8%	0%	8%	3%	3%	3%	3%	10%
Community level factors (n = 12)	25%	25%	50%	17%	8%	25%	0%	8%	0%	8%	0%	8%	0%	8%	8%
Patient demographics (n = 16)	13%	44%	13%	13%	13%	6%	6%	0%	6%	0%	13%	6%	0%	0%	0%
Comparison of Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria type															
Gram-positive	OR >1 - <2	OR ≥2 - <3	OR ≥3 - <4	OR ≥4 - <5	OR ≥5 - <6	OR ≥6 - <7	OR ≥7 - <8	OR ≥8 - <9	OR ≥9 - <10	OR ≥10 - <12	OR ≥12 - <14	OR ≥14 - <16	OR ≥16 - <18	OR ≥18 - <20	OR ≥20

Patient clinical history (n = 50)	18%	36%	26%	12%	6%	10%	8%	4%	2%	6%	0%	6%	0%	0%	6%
Health care contact (n = 52)	27%	42%	25%	6%	12%	0%	4%	0%	4%	0%	4%	4%	2%	0%	10%
Antibiotic use (n = 42)	17%	26%	21%	17%	7%	7%	5%	5%	5%	5%	2%	7%	0%	0%	5%
Community level factors (n = 13)	23%	38%	31%	23%	8%	8%	0%	15%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	15%
Patient demographics (n = 23)	35%	30%	17%	0%	4%	0%	4%	0%	4%	0%	0%	9%	0%	0%	4%
Gram-negative	OR >1 - <2	OR ≥2 - <3	OR ≥3 - <4	OR ≥4 - <5	OR ≥5 - <6	OR ≥6 - <7	OR ≥7 - <8	OR ≥8 - <9	OR ≥9 - <10	OR ≥10 - <12	OR ≥12 - <14	OR ≥14 - <16	OR ≥16 - <18	OR ≥18 - <20	OR ≥20
Patient clinical history (n = 88)	15%	27%	24%	15%	6%	8%	8%	2%	7%	2%	6%	3%	2%	3%	6%
Health care contact (n = 111)	22%	31%	24%	22%	14%	11%	8%	5%	4%	6%	5%	1%	5%	2%	8%
Antibiotic use (n = 130)	15%	31%	20%	12%	18%	7%	11%	3%	3%	5%	9%	2%	1%	2%	9%
Community level factors (n = 19)	16%	26%	26%	5%	11%	5%	5%	5%	0%	0%	5%	5%	5%	0%	16%
Patient demographics (n = 27)	19%	48%	19%	15%	0%	0%	4%	0%	0%	4%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%

435 *Blue to red scale represents the highest to lowest reported odds ratio using the number of studies as the measure
 436 of frequency (Highest reported = 100% and least reported = 0%)

437 Please note: Since some studies would report multiple odds ratios for multiple factors within each domain there
 438 are duplicate studies and the individual rows will add up to >100%.

439

440

441 *Table 2: Percentage of studies per domain reporting specified odds ratio ranges* from the meta-analyses*
 442 *studies*

Meta-analyses studies (n = 22)*	OR >1 - <2	OR ≥2 - <3	OR ≥3 - <4	OR ≥4 - <5	OR ≥5 - <6	OR ≥6 - <7	OR ≥7 - <8	OR ≥8 - <9	OR ≥9 - <10	OR ≥10 - <12	OR ≥12 - <14	OR ≥14 - <16
Patient clinical history (n = 11)	27%	73%	9%	9%	0%	18%	9%	9%	0%	0%	9%	9%
Health care contact (n = 12)	58%	50%	25%	25%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%
Antibiotic use (n = 15)	27%	53%	47%	40%	7%	7%	7%	7%	0%	7%	13%	0%
Patient demographics (n = 2)	50%	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

443 *Out of 38 meta-analyses studies, 22 reported Odds ratio which were included in this analyses to maintain a measure of
 444 comparison across the primary and meta-analyses studies.

445 OR: Odds ratio, OR > 16 were not reported in any of the estimates extracted from the meta-analyses, No odds ratios reporting
 446 on community level factors were identified from the meta-analyses

447 Blue to red scale represents the highest to lowest reported odds ratio using the number of studies as the measure of frequency
 448 (Highest reported = 100% and least reported = 0%)

449 Please note: Since some studies would report multiple odds ratios for multiple factors within each domain there are duplicate
 450 studies and the individual rows will add up to >100%.

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461 **Discussion**

462 This review is aimed at providing an evidence-base for the drivers of AR across the human, animal
463 and environment reservoirs. Understanding the underlying epidemiology of AR is an important step
464 towards the formulation of interventions to control its' emergence and transmission in humans.
465 The review found that the largest quantified drivers of AR evidence were from within the human
466 reservoir, with little evidence supporting a direct relationship from the cross-reservoir drivers.
467 Among this evidence, the impact of the animal reservoir on humans was the most frequently studied
468 aspect. Minimal evidence exists to support the environment as a common transmission route to the
469 human reservoir. Evidence for cross-reservoir drivers were primarily from cross-sectional and
470 prevalence studies, where methodological limitations such as greater selection, misclassification and
471 confounding bias reduced their reliability. Such types of bias are usually avoided within well-
472 conducted, cohort and case control studies.

473
474 This review describes five risk factor domains of AR in humans. Based on the results from the top
475 three risk factors, determined by the frequency and the quality of the quantified evidence, the
476 review finds underlying disease, antibiotic use and invasive procedures in healthcare settings as the
477 risk factors with the most supporting evidence. The majority of case-control and cohort studies
478 collected data on patient characteristics in hospitals. This suggests the feasibility of retrospectively
479 accessing hospital records to assess potential risk factors. In contrast, the risk factors from the
480 community domain are less frequently included in case-control and cohort study protocols. This
481 suggests that either it is less feasible to collect this data or investigators do not feel they merit
482 inclusion when designing these studies

483
484 This review highlights three key gaps in our understanding of the drivers of AR in humans.
485 Firstly, there is a lack of studies investigating causal relationships amongst the risk factor domains
486 and reservoirs. Instead, well-established risk factors such as prior antibiotic exposure and invasive
487 procedures during healthcare contact have been the emphasis of most studies investigating risk
488 factors for AR in humans. The lack of evidence in other areas, for example of risks across cross
489 reservoirs, may not necessarily be indicative of the lack of risk, and the numeric load of evidence
490 should be interpreted with caution.

491
492 Secondly, local-level factors correlated with the increase of AR from hospital settings are
493 underrepresented in literature. For example, the impact of scarce resource allocation on staff to
494 patient ratio⁶¹, infection control practices⁶², the role of inter-staff transmission of pathogens, and
495 patient isolation rates^{63,64} cannot be determined from the current literature. At the time of the
496 review, only one meta-analysis reported the impact of prior room occupation on increased risk of
497 AR⁶⁵.

498 Thirdly, methodologically rigorous studies capturing community-level risk factors are limited. These
499 include impact of environment-related transmission, primary care conditions (e.g. GP contact
500 hours/availability)⁶⁶, impact of education, income, food source, household size, or influence of
501 ethnicity on travel patterns and on health-related behaviour.

502
503 Based on these research gaps, the following suggestions for future research can be made. Inclusion
504 of the risk factor domains framework from this review within standardised data collection protocols
505 for AR risk factor studies would ensure inclusion of not only clinical characteristics but also
506 community and hospital-specific characteristics to rule out their confounding effects. Repeated
507 quantification and focus on established risks may in turn lead to more studies being conducted in
508 these similar established risk areas rather in entirely novel areas. There is a need for in depth
509 qualitative research to help justify exploration of underlying factors and raise the profile of certain
510 understudied areas. Thus to further highlight local level risk factors, studies could incorporate
511 qualitative techniques such as surveys and interviews⁶⁷ to support the quantified data from hospital
512 patient records from the retrospective studies.

513 Given the highly variable outcomes, along with variable individual outcome definitions (e.g. carriage
514 of or acquisition of resistant bacteria), identified from the data extraction in Figure 5, there is a need
515 for clarity and uniformity of these definitions across the field of AR. This would serve to improve
516 granularity and enhance understanding of the methods of transmission or emergence to, in turn, aid
517 efficacy of interventions targeted towards AR in humans
518

519 Some limitations of this review should be noted. Firstly, the data extraction and quality assessment
520 was conducted by one reviewer, which may have led to discrepancies in data collection and analysis.
521 All measures have been taken by double checking of data extractions and conducting stress tests
522 when coding the data to limit any discrepancies. The authors (of the studies which were included in
523 this review) were not contacted to clarify the data extractions and should be considered a limitation
524 of this review. The quality assessment was randomly checked by a second reviewer to minimise any
525 bias.

526 Secondly, due to the recent surge of publications related to AR and the broad search terms which did
527 not use drug-bug combinations as search strings, and the language restriction, this review will not
528 have identified all risk factor studies across all drug-bug combinations and settings. However, the
529 meta-analyses search in Pubmed which utilized the drug-bug combinations from the WHO's
530 antibiotic priority list for the search terms should minimise the risk of missed risk factors

531 Thirdly, better quality and greater quantity of evidence was retrieved from studies specific to the
532 human reservoir. The key risk domains: antibiotic use, healthcare contact and patient history, were
533 studied to a greater extent possibly due to them being easier to study in terms of data availability
534 from healthcare records and limited resources that are required to conduct retrospective analysis on
535 such data. As a result, there is potential publication bias towards retrospective studies using hospital
536 data to determine risk factors of AR in humans.

537 Last of all, the review included only studies that provided quantitative evidence on the drivers and
538 risks in humans from within the human reservoir and across the other two reservoirs. Descriptive
539 studies were not included in this analysis, meaning evidence of risk factors from such studies was not
540 captured, and comparison between quantitative and descriptive evidence could not be conducted
541

542 In conclusion, this systematic review provides an essential reference document upon which to assess
543 the current state of risk factor studies for AR in humans over the past 10 years. Essentially, this
544 review provides an indication as to the relative importance of risk factors as well as where
545 information is lacking.

546 The added value of this study is that it emphasises the need for researchers to use standardised data
547 collection protocols for observational studies aiming to report on AR risk factors in humans to
548 increase the clarity with which risk factors are being captured. A simple framework utilising risk
549 factor domains established in this review could enable a better representation of the underlying local
550 level risks of AR in humans by increasing the granularity amongst the established risk being captured
551 to improve our understanding of the risks of AR in humans. This framework could also be amended
552 to enable health policy makers and funding bodies to allocate research funding towards setting
553 specific factors which may contribute to the risk of AR in humans and in turn effectively prioritise
554 resource allocation decisions to tackle AR. Thus by promoting alternative research agendas targeted
555 towards a better understanding of underlying risks our understanding of the risks of AR may be
556 altered. We hope that research agendas would benefit by moving away from convenient easy to
557 produce studies to more exploratory studies hypothesizing the potential importance of the
558 understudied areas arising from the community as clearly demonstrated in this review. These
559 understudied areas may lead to further important factors which impact AR in humans, which may
560 change our understanding of the transmission dynamics of AR in humans. This overview could be
561 utilised to prioritise resources in terms of intervention choice and intervention evaluation, as well as
562 direction of further research needs highlighted under recent AMR related funding initiatives.⁷³⁻⁷⁶
563
564

565 **Contributors**

566 Anuja Chatterjee, Julie Robotham, Rifat Atun, Sara Boyd and Nichola Naylor were involved in the final
567 study protocol development. Anuja Chatterjee carried out the literature search, independent review
568 of all title abstracts and full texts, completed quality assessment, data analysis, result dissemination
569 and manuscript write up. Maryam Modarai, Sara Boyd and Nichola Naylor were the three
570 independent reviewers. Maryam Modarai checked at random the quality assessments conducted by
571 Anuja Chatterjee. Julie Robotham and James Barlow were involved in the manuscript development
572 and first draft. James Barlow, Nichola Naylor, Alison Holmes and Alan Johnson contributed to the
573 final structure and content of the manuscript. The corresponding author and all co-authors
574 contributed to the final version of the manuscript.

575

576 **Declaration of Interests**

577 All authors have completed the ICMJE uniform disclosure form and declare no competing interests
578 relevant to the submitted work. SEB reports that outside of this work she receives research support
579 from Roche Pharma, Allegra Therapeutics and Antabio. Outside of this work AHH has consulted for
580 bioMérieux.

581

582 **Acknowledgments**

583 The authors would like to acknowledge Dr Ceire Costelloe for her suggestions and feedback during
584 the protocol development and results analysis stages. The authors would also like to acknowledge
585 the National Institute for Health Research Imperial Biomedical Research Centre and the National
586 Institute for Health Research Health Protection Research Unit (NIHR HPRU) in Healthcare Associated
587 Infection and Antimicrobial Resistance at Imperial College London, in partnership with Public Health
588 England.

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