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Radius of Trust

Social Capital in Relation to Familism and Institutional Collectivism

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Countries in which people believe that "most people can be trusted" and where citizens belong to a larger number of different voluntary associations are more individualistic, emphasizing the importance of independence and freedom to choose one's own goals. The present study examines the relationship between social capital and individualism/collectivism using a measure that distinguishes between familism and institutional collectivism. Familism correlated negatively with social capital, whereas institutional collectivism practices exhibited positive associations with social capital, especially with trust and participation in voluntary organizations such as church or religious organizations and labor unions. It is concluded that in societies where trust is limited to the nuclear family or kinship alone, people have lower levels of social capital. Social capital increases as the radius of trust widens to encompass a larger number of people and social networks among whom norms of generalized reciprocity are operative.

Keywords: *individualism; collectivism; social capital; radius of trust*

The topic of social capital, most frequently conceptualized as civic engagement and trust, has garnered increased interest in recent years. This is mainly because levels of trust and civic involvement have, as many studies have demonstrated, a significant impact on human life outcomes. Social capital has a substantial link to social and economic development, effectiveness of political systems, health effects, and other beneficial societal outcomes (for a review, see Almedom, 2005; Portes, 1998). For instance, higher levels of social capital have been associated with increased charitable giving (Brooks, 2005), decreased adolescent

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depression (Fitzpatrick, Piko, Wright, & LaGory, 2005), reduced smoking and illicit drug use (Lundborg, 2005), decreased risky sexual behaviors (Crosby, Holtgrave, DiClemente, Wingood, & Gayle, 2003), lower incidence rates of coronary heart disease (Sundquist, Johansson, Yang, & Sundquist, 2006), and lower mortality rates (Kaplan, Pamuk, Lynch, Cohen, & Balfour, 1996; Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrowstith, 1997). The burgeoning evidence reveals that social capital is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).

As argued by Portes (1998) in a comprehensive review of the topic, social capital has been treated both as an individual asset and as a feature of communities and nations. Although the original theoretical development of the concept by Bourdieu (1985) and Coleman (1988) focused on the individual as the unit of analysis, the concept of social capital was later extended to a group level (Putnam, 1993, 1995) where it became an attribute of communities and nations (Portes, 2000). "Social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam, 2000, p. 19); thus, social capital can be "simultaneously a private good and a public good" (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 7). Yet many national-level indicators of social capital—level of interactions with fellow citizens, participation in elections and voluntary organizations, prevalence of honesty and trust—have shown signs of decline during the past few decades in most Western countries, which has been interpreted as a major shift in social cohesion, the erosion of the glue that holds society together (Putnam, 2000).

One likely culprit in the decline of the social capital is the increasing individualism of developed Western countries. According to a typical definition, collectivism considers a group (e.g., family, tribe, or state) as the primary unit of reality and requires that individuals sacrifice themselves for the alleged interests of the collective. Individualism in turn is a system of beliefs, attitudes, and values according to which a human being should think and judge independently, respecting nothing more than the sovereignty of his or her own interests and goals. Although several researchers have recently questioned the ability of the individualism–collectivism construct to explain cross-cultural differences (Bond, 2002; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Voronov & Singer, 2002), many studies have shown that the dimension of individualism–collectivism almost always explains the largest amount of variance when a sufficiently large set of cultures is compared (Georgas, Van De Vijver, & Berry, 2004; Hofstede, 2001; Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). The most consistent finding is that industrialized, wealthy, and urban societies tend to become increasingly individualistic, whereas more traditional, poorer, and more rural societies tend to remain collectivistic (Hofstede, 1991). Based on these observations, many researchers and commentators have predicted that one inevitable consequence of modernization is the growth of selfishness and egoism, which poses serious threats to the organic unity of individuals and society by paving a road to social atomization, unbounded egoism, and distrust (Etzioni, 1993, 1996; Lane, 1994).

Contrary to such a pessimistic prophecy, the analysis of available evidence (Allik & Realo, 2004) indicated that individualism is firmly associated with an increase in social capital, both within and across cultures. Paradoxically, in societies where individuals are more autonomous and seemingly liberated from social bonds, the same individuals are also more inclined to form voluntary associations and to trust each other and to have a certain kind of public spirit. Countries in which people believe that "most people can be trusted" and where citizens belong to a larger number of different voluntary associations were also

more individualistic, emphasizing the importance of independence, personal time, personal accomplishments, and freedom to choose one's own goals (Allik & Realo, 2004; see also Halman & Luijkx, 2006; Kemmelmeier, Jambor, & Letner, 2006). The present study goes a step further by examining the relationship between social capital and individualism/collectivism using a measure that distinguishes between different types of collectivism: familism (e.g., Hui & Triandis, 1986; Realo, Allik, & Vadi, 1997) and institutional collectivism (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004).

The Nature of Individualism/Collectivism

How to explain the seemingly conflicting relationship between individualism and social capital? This apparent contradiction may originate from the semantic breadth of the concepts: In addition to a semantic core, there are many other properties attributed to individualism that are more optional rather than fundamental. For instance, it is widely believed that individualism results in ruthless competition (e.g., Hsu, 1983; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and prevailing self-interests (Hui & Triandis, 1986). Although competitiveness may seem to be greater in societies in which the rights and goals of individuals are favored over those of the common good, it is certainly not an inevitable result of an individualistic way of life (Realo, Koido, Ceulemans, & Allik, 2002). A reasonable definition of a person as an autonomous and largely independent agent inevitably assumes that as an individual, he or she must accept responsibility for self and for his or her actions (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Ho & Chiu, 1994; Realo et al., 2002; Waterman, 1984). Thus, individualism does not necessarily jeopardize organic unity and social solidarity. On the contrary, the growth of individuality, autonomy, and self-sufficiency may be perceived as necessary conditions for the development of interpersonal cooperation, mutual dependence, and social solidarity (Allik & Realo, 2004).

Soon after gaining popularity, individualism–collectivism constructs underwent a series of modifications (Kagitcibasi, 1997). Hui and Triandis (1986) were among the first who argued that individualistic and collectivistic attitudes may differ in relation to the targets of interpersonal concern. A person may be characteristically individualistic if surrounded by acquaintances or strangers but extremely collectivistic among his or her family and close relatives. Based on these considerations, Realo and colleagues (1997) demonstrated that collectivistic relationships can be classified into three concentric circles according to their social distance: (a) the closest relations between members of family and significant others; (b) the intermediate relations between neighbors, schoolmates, and coworkers (peers); and (c) the distant relations between a person and the larger social groups and institutions. In a recent international GLOBE survey (House et al., 2004), which was conducted to study collectivistic practices and values among middle managers from 62 societies, a similar distinction was made (see also Hofstede, 2006; Smith, 2006). Two forms of collectivism were distinguished according to the social radius: familism, measured as the degree of loyalty and interdependence to one's family, and institutional collectivism, which was defined as practices and values that encourage and reward collective actions at a societal level (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004). Unlike many previous studies, the GLOBE researchers "used respondents as informants to report on the *gestalt* of their cultures" (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006, p. 900). In other words, the GLOBE's questions were about society (e.g., "In this society, leaders encourage group loyalty even if individual goals suffer"), not about the

respondents' own values, beliefs, and feelings (see also Hofstede, 2006). It is important to note that generally held beliefs in the society may not correspond exactly to the approval or disapproval of these beliefs by all participants. A majority of participants may find that the society in which they live encourages group loyalty too much while they themselves are more inclined to pursue their individual goals. Also, people's beliefs about characteristics of a typical member of their own cultures may not correspond to the average ratings of the same characteristic assessed by observer self-ratings (Terracciano et al., 2005; Wan et al., 2007).

Radius of Trust

As a result of its growing recognition, the concept of social capital has undergone a similar refinement. Putnam (2000) distinguished between two forms of social capital—whether it is *bonding* (or exclusive) and/or *bridging* (or inclusive). The former may be more inward looking and have a tendency to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. The latter may be more outward looking and encompass people from different social groups (Putnam, 2000). Development and modernization require that the network of trust is extended to others outside of the traditional circle of family, neighborhood, and village. A narrow radius of trust and the centrality of the family at the exclusion of broader society becomes a hindrance to the free market economy and democratic society (Harrison, 1985). The gradual widening of this radius of trust, however, cannot be accomplished without giving up unquestioning loyalty to nuclear family and kinship (Fukuyama, 1995). All authors seem to agree that the concept of social trust constitutes the core of social capital. It is also recognized that the level of trust is dependent on the social distance: not only the amount of interpersonal trust is important, but also how it is distributed along the social distance. One of the best indicators of social capital is the percentage of respondents who say "most people can be trusted." Thus, social capital is typically measured as generalized trust toward people, not only immediate family and kinfolk.

Civic Involvement

Membership in voluntary organizations is another important facet of social capital that is usually regarded as a useful indicator of community involvement. The core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value—networks of civic engagement and social interaction foster norms of mutual trust and generalized reciprocity (Putnam, 2000). Thus, both across individuals and across countries, generalized trust and civic engagement are in a tight reciprocal relationship (Allik & Realo, 2004; Brehm & Rahn, 1997). Civic engagement, however—as social capital in general—takes many different forms, ranging from more local and inclusive (e.g., participation in local community action) to broader and more general forms of social networking (e.g., protection and promotion of human rights and peace movement).

Aim of the Study

This study aims to examine whether societies in which individuals highly value and are strongly attached to their nuclear and extended kin have lower levels of social capital, namely, of generalized trust and civic involvement. Furthermore, we will investigate the

relationships between familism, institutional collectivism, and different forms of civic engagement. In countries where family ties are very strong and where people have high levels of loyalty and interdependence to their families, we expect people to be less involved in all types of voluntary organizations. As for countries that encourage and reward collective action at a societal level, we expect to see higher levels of civic engagement, especially in those associations that deal with societal-level issues such as social welfare or political participation.

Method

Measures

Collectivism. Collectivism scores for 58 countries were obtained from a book by Robert J. House and his colleagues (2004), *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. The long-term GLOBE project aims to conceptualize, operationalize, test, and validate a cross-level integrated theory of the relationship between culture and societal, organizational, and leadership effectiveness. This study focuses on the individualism–collectivism dimension, although many others were also measured. Because individualism and collectivism are multidimensional constructs (see Realo, 2003, for an overview), the constructs were measured with two different scales at both the societal and organizational levels (Gelfand et al., 2004). The items in these scales were designed to assess individualism and collectivism as poles of the same dimension. Questions also differentiated between collectivism practices (e.g., "In this society, people *are* generally . . .") and values (e.g., "In this society, people *should* . . ."). In this article, we use only societal-level collectivism practices ("as is") scales.

The in-group collectivism (we prefer to call it *familism*) construct was assessed through a set of four questions that "assessed the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and interdependence to their families" (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 463). The items, for instance, assessed whether children take pride in the accomplishments of their parents and vice versa and whether aging children live at home with their parents until they get married. The institutional collectivism was also measured by four items that "focused on the degree to which institutional practices at the societal level encourage and reward collective action" (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 463). More specifically, the items measured whether economic systems in a society are designed to maximize individual or collective interests, whether leaders encourage group loyalty at the expense of the individual interests, or whether being accepted by the other members of a group is important in a respondent's society.

Participants were asked to give their responses on a 7-point scale in which 1 = *low collectivism* and 7 = *high collectivism*. To eliminate the response bias, the regression-based response bias corrected scores for the two collectivism measures (see Table B.2 in House et al., 2004) were used in this article.[1] Familism and institutional collectivism practices were negatively related to each other, $r(58) = -.33$, $p = .011$, which indicates that if they do capture the same concept at all, then it is in the opposite direction. Furthermore, according to the findings of the GLOBE project (Gelfand et al., 2004), familism (In-Group Collectivism Practices Scale) was highly negatively ($r = -.82$, $p < .01$) correlated with Hofstede's individualism score (Hofstede, 1980). The Institutional Collectivism Practices Scale, however, was not related to any well-known individualism–collectivism scales in the literature (Gelfand et al., 2004).

Social capital. To measure social capital at the national level, we used two separate indices that would assess the two core aspects of social capital: interpersonal trust and membership in voluntary associations. The scores for those measures were based on the 1999-2002 World Values Survey published in *Human Beliefs and Values* by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004). The interpersonal trust score (percentage of respondents saying "most people can be trusted") and the percentage of citizens belonging to 15 types of voluntary associations were available for 81 and 61 countries,[2] respectively. These two indicators of social capital are positively correlated: $r(61) = .34$, $p = .01$ (Allik & Realo, 2004).[3] Overlapping data for social capital and collectivism measures were available for 45 (interpersonal trust) and 33 (membership in voluntary associations) countries, respectively (see Table 1 for country values). In the subset of overlapping countries, the two indicators of social capital were significantly correlated, with $r(33) = .52$, $p = .002$.

The survey covered the following organizational types: social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people (A064); religious or church organizations (A065); education, arts, music, or cultural activities (A066); labor unions (A067); political parties or groups (A068); local community action groups (A069); Third World development on human rights (A070); conservation, environmental, animal rights groups (A071); professional associations (A072); youth work (A073); sports or recreation organizations (A074); women's groups (A075); peace movements (A076); voluntary organizations concerned with health (A077); and other groups (A079). A summary index was computed as a cumulative percentage of people belonging to 15 types of voluntary associations. The overall standardized alpha of the 15-item measure was .95 with an average interitem correlation of .61. In factor analysis, all 15 indicators loaded on a single factor with an average factor loading of .77. The one-factor solution explained about 62% of the total variance.

GDP per capita (US$). Because in previous research both measures of collectivism and social capital have been found to be highly related to national wealth (Allik & Realo, 2004; Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000), we also looked at the relationships between collectivism and social capital while controlling for GDP per capita in 2003. GDP per capita refers to gross domestic product converted to U.S. dollars using the average official exchange rate reported by the International Monetary Fund, divided by midyear population. GDP per capita (US$) in 2003 was taken from the *Human Development Report 2005* (United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

Results

Trust and Collectivism

As found in our previous research, the interpersonal trust variable correlated highly with familism (i.e., in-group collectivism practices) in the expected direction, $r(45) = -.62$, $p = .001$. When controlling for GDP per capita in 2003, the magnitude of the correlation dropped to –.38 ($p = .011$). Figure 1 shows that the countries with the lowest levels of interpersonal trust (i.e., social capital) are the countries most characterized by high levels of familism, including many Latin American and African countries and several Asian countries. On the contrary, cultures

Table 1
Scores for Interpersonal Trust, Membership in Voluntary Associations, Collectivism and GDP (2003) per Capita for 45 Cultures

	Social Capital		Collectivism		
	Interpersonal Trust	Membership in Voluntary Associations	Familism	Institutional Collectivism Practices	GDP per Capita in 2003
Albania	23.2	172.4	5.5	4.3	1,933.0
Argentina	15	61.9	5.5	3.7	3,524.0
Australia	39.5	–	4.1	4.3	26,275.0
Austria	31.3	147.8	4.9	4.3	31,289.0
Brazil	2.8	–	5.2	3.9	2,788.0
Canada	38.4	196.2	4.2	4.4	27,079.0
China	52.5	39.4	5.9	4.7	1,100.0
Colombia	10.7	–	5.6	3.8	1,764.0
Denmark	64.1	191.3	3.6	4.9	39,332.0
Egypt	37.5	–	5.5	4.4	1,220.0
El Salvador	14.1	–	5.2	3.7	2,277.0
Finland	56.7	185.8	4.2	4.8	31,058.0
France	21.4	61.4	4.7	4.2	29,410.0
Georgia	17.7	–	6.2	4.0	778.0
Germany	33.1	83.8	4.2[a]	4.0[a]	29,115.0
Greece	20.5	124.8	5.3	3.4	15,608.0
Hungary	21.4	42.5	5.3	3.6	8,169.0
India	38.9	125.7	5.8	4.2	564.0
Indonesia	45.7	–	5.5	4.3	970.0
Ireland	34.6	114.7	5.1	4.6	38,487.0
Israel	23	–	4.6	4.4	16,481.0
Italy	31.8	77.9	5.0	3.7	25,471.0
Japan	39.6	83.9	4.7	5.2	33,713.0
Korea, Rep. of	27.3	147.4	5.7	5.2	12,634.0
Mexico	20.8	88.8	5.6	3.9	6,121.0
Morocco	22.9	11.6	6.4	4.2	1,452.0
Netherlands	59.4	306.5	3.8	4.6	31,532.0
New Zealand	48.4	–	3.6	5.0	19,847.0
Nigeria	25.3	–	5.3	4.0	428.0
Philippines	8.3	130.8	6.1	4.4	989.0
Poland	18.3	40.3	5.5	4.5	5,487.0
Portugal	9.8	32.5	5.6	4.0	14,161.0
Russia	22.9	39	5.8	4.6	3,018.0
Singapore	16.7	86.6	5.7	4.8	21,492.0
Slovenia	21.2	98.1	5.5	4.1	13,909.0
South Africa	11.5	188.3	4.8[b]	4.5[b]	3,489.0
Spain	34.5	48.4	5.5	3.9	20,404.0
Sweden	63.7	323.8	3.5	5.3	33,676.0
Switzerland	37.9	–	3.9[c]	4.3[c]	43,553.0
Taiwan	36.9	–	5.4	4.3	–
Turkey	15.6	3.2	5.8	4.0	3,399.0

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

	Social Capital		Collectivism		
	Interpersonal Trust	Membership in Voluntary Associations	Familism	Institutional Collectivism Practices	GDP per Capita in 2003
United Kingdom	28.6	60.5	4.1	4.3	30,253.0
United States	35.5	325.7	4.2	4.2	37,648.0
Venezuela	15.8	145.5	5.4	4.0	3,326.0
Zimbabwe	11.7	147.8	5.5	4.1	–

Note: Interpersonal trust = average percentage of respondents saying "most people can be trusted" (Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004; Table A165). Membership in voluntary organizations = cumulative percentage of citizens belonging to 15 types of voluntary associations (Inglehart et al., 2004; Tables A064-A079). Familism (in-group collectivism practices) and institutional collectivism practices (response bias corrected scores; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004, Table B.2). GDP per capita in 2003 = gross domestic product per capita in 2003 (US$) (United Nations Development Programme, 2005).

a. The data were collected in the former West Germany.

b. House et al. (2004) reported separate scores for South African Blacks and Whites. These scores were averaged for the purpose of this study.

c. Scores of French- and German-speaking populations were averaged for the purpose of this study.

that score low in familism (including Scandinavian as well as several Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries) have higher levels of interpersonal trust.

Unlike familism, the correlation between interpersonal trust and institutional collectivism practices was positive, $r(45) = .58$, $p = .001$. Controlling the relationship for GDP per capita slightly reduced the magnitude of the correlation to $r(45) = .48$, $p = .001$. As shown in Figure 2, countries with the highest levels of interpersonal trust also had the highest levels of institutional collectivism practices (e.g., China, Denmark, and Sweden). On the other hand, countries with low levels of interpersonal trust had correspondingly low levels of institutional collectivism practices. Examples include Greece and Latin American countries such as Argentina, El Salvador, and Colombia.

Because both collectivism variables were significantly correlated with each other (in the subset of 45 countries used in this article, $r = –.37$, $p = .011$) and with GDP per capita in 2003, $r(43) = –.78$ and .37 for familism and institutional collectivism practices, respectively, both correlations significant at $p < .01$, we conducted a multiple regression analysis in which the interpersonal trust variable was simultaneously regressed on familism, institutional collectivism practices, and GDP per capita in 2003.[4] Approximately 50% of the total variance in the interpersonal trust score was explained by collectivism measures: Both familism ($\beta = –.40$, $p = .03$) and institutional collectivism practices ($\beta = .39$, $p = .002$) made an equally strong contribution to the prediction of the interpersonal trust variable whereas the effect of GDP was not significant ($\beta = .10$, $p = .58$).

Civic Engagement and Collectivism

The cumulative percentage of citizens belonging to 15 types of voluntary associations was also highly negatively related to familism (in-group collectivism practices), $r(33) = –.65$,

Figure 1
Interpersonal Trust and Familism (In-Group Collectivism Practices) in 45 Countries



Source: Familism (in-group collectivism practices; response bias corrected scores), House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004), Table B.2. Interpersonal trust score (per country percentage of respondents saying "most people can be trusted"), 1999-2002 World Values Survey, Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, and Luijkx (2004), Table A165.
Note: Higher scores indicate higher levels of interpersonal trust and familism.

p = .000. The correlation did not change after accounting for the country's wealth (r = –.66, p = .001). The correlation between the index of civic engagement and institutional collectivism practices, however, was significantly positive, $r(33)$ = .38, p = .03. When controlling for GDP per capita in 2003, the relationship decreased to $r(33)$ = .25 and became nonsignificant (p = .18).

To evaluate the contribution of collectivism measures and national wealth simultaneously, we performed a multiple regression analysis to predict civic engagement from familism, institutional collectivism practices, and GDP per capita in 2003. The results showed that only familism made a significant contribution to the voluntary association membership, β = –.80 (p = .002), accounting for 44% of the variance.

Figure 2
Interpersonal Trust and Institutional Collectivism Practices in 45 Countries



Source: Institutional collectivism practices (response bias corrected scores), House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004), Table B.2. Interpersonal trust score (percentage of respondents saying "most people can be trusted" per country), 1999-2002 World Values Survey, Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, and Luijkx (2004), Table A165.
Note: Higher scores indicate higher levels of interpersonal trust and collectivism.

Finally, we investigated the associations between two measures of collectivism and participation in 15 different types of voluntary organizations and activities. The correlations are shown in Table 2. In the case of familism, all correlations except for one (A076) were negative. Out of 15 correlations, 11 were statistically significant at $p < .05$. The highest correlations were observed between the scores of familism and participation in sports and recreation activities (A074), $r(33) = -.74$; in other groups (A079), $r(31) = -.73$; and in labor unions (A067), $r(33) = -.67$; all correlations were significant at $p < .001$. Familism was not related to belonging to the following voluntary associations: local community action groups (A069), women's groups (A075), peace movements (A076), and voluntary organizations concerned with health (A077).

Only 4 of the 15 correlations between institutional collectivism practices and participation in specific voluntary organizations were statistically significant at $p < .05$ (see Table 2). These

Table 2
Correlations and Regression Coefficients of Familism, Institutional Collectivism Practices, GDP per Capita, and People's Participation in 15 Different Types of Voluntary Organizations and Activities ($N = 33$)

	Pearson's r		Regression Coefficient (β)			
Participation in Voluntary Organizations and Activities	Familism	Institutional Collectivism Practices	Familism	Institutional Collectivism Practices	GDP per Capita in 2003	Adjusted R^2
A064: Social welfare services	–.63***	.42*	–.74**	.27	–.24	.42
A065: Church or religious organizations	–.37*	.33	–.70*	.34*	–.41	.30
A066: Education, arts, music, or cultural activities	–.63***	.26	–.67*	.07	–.08	.33
A067: Labor unions	–.67***	.53***	–.75**	.37*	–.25	.53
A068: Political parties or groups	–.37*	.12	–.67*	.04	–.36	.10
A069: Local community action	–.29	.16	–.63*	.11	–.46	.07
A070: Third World development on human rights	–.55***	.26	–.84**	.12	–.41	.30
A071: Conservation, environment, animal rights groups	–.49**	.16	–.68*	.02	–.25	.18
A072: Professional associations	–.53***	.14	–.49	–.04	.06	.21
A073: Youth work	–.36*	.11	–.36	–.01	.00	.04
A074: Sports or recreation	–.74***	.40*	–.57*	.17	.13	.53
A075:[a] Women's groups	–.10	.07	–.37	.09	–.32	.00
A076:[a] Peace movements	.16	–.07	–.30	.02	–.57	.03
A077: Voluntary organizations concerned with health	–.29	.18	–.38	.10	–.15	.00
A079:[b] Other groups	–.73***	.50**	–.65**	.22	–.03	.52

a. $N = 32$.
b. $N = 31$.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

included social welfare services (A064), $r(33) = .42$; labor unions (A067), $r(33) = .53$; sports or recreation (A074), $r(33) = .40$; and other groups (A079), $r(31) = .50$.

Finally, a series of multiple regression analyses was conducted to predict participation in different forms of civic engagement from familism, institutional collectivism practices, and national wealth as measured by GDP per capita in 2003. The regression coefficients (β) and adjusted R^2 values are given in the last four columns of Table 2. More than half of the total variance (53%) in the level of participation in labor unions (A067), sports and recreation activities (A074), and other groups (A079) was due to the independent variables, whereas for five forms

of civic engagement (A069: local community action groups; A073: youth work; A075: women's groups; A076: peace movements; and A077: voluntary organizations concerned with health), the coefficients of multiple determination (adjusted R^2) were virtually zero.

Familism was a significant negative predictor ($p < .05$) of participation in 10 types of voluntary organizations (out of 15), most important in Third World development on human rights (A070), labor unions (A067), and social welfare services (A064). Institutional Collectivism Practices Scale made a significant independent contribution ($p < .05$) only to the prediction of two forms of civic engagement: participation in labor unions (A067) and church or religious organizations (A065), respectively. In all analyses, the effect of GDP was not significant.

Discussion

It is known that high-trust countries (defined as the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm if they can avoid it) are characterized by ethnic homogeneity, Protestant religious traditions, good government, wealth (GDP per capita), and income equality (Delhey & Newton, 2005). Furthermore, previous research has shown that countries in which people believe that "most people can be trusted" are also more individualistic, emphasizing the importance of independence, personal time, personal accomplishments, and freedom to choose one's own goals (Allik & Realo, 2004). The findings of the current study confirm the negative relationship between social capital and collectivism found by Allik and Realo (2004): In those countries where people have a lower level of general trust and civic engagement, the individuals are also believed to be more familistic, that is, they are believed to express their pride, loyalty, and interdependence primarily to their families (in-group collectivism). In societies where deference to the authority of family is emphasized, people are less engaged in almost any form of civic participation. Most remarkably, strong family ties were a negative predictor of participating in the protection and promotion of human rights, social welfare services, and labor unions. At the same time, in societies where people are encouraged and rewarded for collective actions outside their family, at the institutional level (institutional collectivism), people are generally more trusting and they are more eager to participate in voluntary organizations such as church or religious organizations and labor unions. All relationships remained significant even after controlling for national wealth.

As we have already argued elsewhere (Allik & Realo, 2004), a plain correlation between measures of social capital and collectivism can of course tell nothing about their causal linkage. On the basis of our findings, we can only conclude that low levels of generalized trust and civic engagement contribute to higher levels of familism and that strong familism is conducive to lower levels of social capital. Only careful experimental or longitudinal research will be able to draw the causal arrows between the two constructs.

It is highly intriguing that familism and institutional collectivism practices were both related to social capital (especially to trust) but in opposing directions. Countries with the highest levels of social capital had high levels of institutional collectivism practices and low levels of familism (e.g., Sweden). Because two subtypes of collectivism, familism and institutional collectivism practices, are related to the social capital in an opposite manner, this indicates that they are not identical concepts. Technically speaking, this was expected

because familism and institutional collectivism practices by themselves were negatively correlated. Thus, it is quite clear that familism and institutional collectivism practices are two separate or even opposite dimensions. Previous studies have shown that three positively interconnected types of collectivism—familism, companionship, and patriotism—can be distinguished according to the social distance of relationships (Realo & Allik, 1999; Realo et al., 1997). Therefore, it is unclear why the institutional collectivism practices measured in the GLOBE project were inversely related to the in-group collectivism or familism measure. In other words, in countries where respondents agreed with the statement that in their society parents take pride in the individual accomplishments of their children, people also tended to believe that the economic system in their society is designed to maximize individual interests (Gelfand et al., 2004). Because the institutional collectivism practices measure was related to neither Hofstede's individualism scale nor any other well-known individualism–collectivism scale in the literature (Gelfand et al., 2004), it is logical to assume that it does not measure collectivism as traditionally conceptualized. As for social capital, the institutional collectivism practices measure was only related to trust but showed a weak and an inconsistent pattern of relations with civic engagement. Thus, it is not quite clear exactly what the Institutional Collectivism Practices Scale does measure. We may only speculate that it measures people's beliefs about social connections at the more abstract, general level of their society and the norms of trustworthiness and reciprocity that arise from those connections. Therefore, we agree with Hofstede (2006) that many of the GLOBE items may convey hidden meanings not intended or understood by their designers.

This does not mean that trust is absent in societies with high levels of familism. Instead, a different type or particularized trust seems to exist (Uslaner, 2000). Particularized trust may be centered for example within families or ethnic groups (Uslaner & Conley, 2003). This duty to in-group could result in polarization from other groups and less trust in society's diverse members, namely, decreased generalized trust. In societies where trust is limited to the nuclear family or kinship alone, individuals do not trust each other and do not feel obligations to larger groups such as neighbors, fellow citizens, or nation (Banfield, 1958). Thus, instead of talking about trust in general, it is more informative to specify the particular radius of trust (Fukuyama, 1995). All groups have a certain radius of trust, that is, the circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative. The radius of trust can expand from a narrow radius limited to a nuclear family to a larger radius including broader society, so bridging the "gap" between the family and state. The World Values Survey measures generalized trust ("Most people can be trusted"), which in fact specifies a wide radius of trust that goes beyond nuclear family and kinship. Those who trust not only their close relatives but also coworkers and even strangers are also less inclined to perceive society as divided into separate compartments in which different standards and ethical principles are applied. Individuals with a wider radius of trust are more inclined to support institutional collectivism, that is, higher levels of encouraging and rewarding collective actions and interests. Thus, the bridging or inclusive social capital provides a kind of sociological superglue (Putnam, 2000) that creates a social cohesion among those citizens who are eager to join different voluntary associations and who are more individualistic and emphasize the importance of independence, personal accomplishments, and freedom to choose one's own goals.

Notes

1. Table B.2 provides response bias corrected scores for societal cultural scales for 60 cultural samples. For the analyses of this article, the scores of South African Black and White samples and the scores of Swiss German and Swiss French samples were averaged, thereby providing a single score per country. Thus, the data were available for 58 countries.

2. Complete information regarding all 15 types of voluntary organization was available for 55 countries.

3. When Tanzania, an obvious outlier on the plot with the highest cumulative membership level in voluntary associations and nearly the lowest level of interpersonal trust, was excluded from the analysis, the correlation increased to $r(60) = .44$ ($p = .000$).

4. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

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