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Ranking the effectiveness of worldwide COVID-19 government interventions

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1 Ranking the effectiveness of worldwide COVID-19 govern- 2 ment interventions

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16

17 **Assessing the effectiveness of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to mitigate the spread**
18 **of SARS-CoV-2 is critical to inform future preparedness response plans. Here we quantify**
19 **the impact of 6,068 hierarchically coded NPIs implemented in 79 territories on the effec-**
20 **tive reproduction number, R_t , of COVID-19. We propose a novel modelling approach that**

21 **combines four computational techniques merging for the first time statistical, inference and**
22 **artificial intelligence tools. We validate our findings with two external datasets with 48,000**
23 **additional NPIs from 226 countries. Our results indicate that a suitable combination of NPIs**
24 **is necessary to curb the spread of the virus. Less intrusive and costly NPIs can be as effective**
25 **as more intrusive, drastic, ones, e.g., a national lockdown. Using country-specific what-if sce-**
26 **narios we assess how the effectiveness of NPIs depends on the local context such as timing of**
27 **their adoption, opening the way for forecasting the effectiveness of future interventions.**

28 **1 Introduction**

29 In the absence of vaccines and antiviral medication, non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)
30 implemented in response to epidemic respiratory viruses are the only option to delay and moderate
31 the spread of the virus in a population ¹.

32 Confronted with the worldwide COVID-19 epidemic, most governments have implemented
33 bundles of highly restrictive, sometimes intrusive NPIs. Decisions had to be taken under rapidly
34 changing epidemiological situations, despite (at least in the very beginning of the epidemic) a lack
35 of scientific evidence on the individual and combined effectiveness of these measures ²⁻⁴, degree of
36 compliance of the population, and societal impact.

37 Government interventions may cause substantial economic and social costs ⁵ as well as affect
38 individuals' behaviour, mental health and social security ⁶. Therefore, knowledge on the most
39 effective NPIs would allow stakeholders to judiciously and timely implement a specific sequence of
40 key interventions to combat a potential resurgence of COVID-19 or any other future respiratory
41 outbreak. As many countries rolled out several NPIs simultaneously, the challenge of disentangling
42 the impact of each individual intervention arises.

43 To date, studies of the country-specific progression of the COVID-19 pandemic ⁷ have mostly
44 explored the independent effects of a single category of interventions. These categories include
45 travel restrictions ^{2,8}, social distancing ⁹⁻¹², or personal protective measures ¹³. Some studies focused
46 on a single country or even a town ¹⁴⁻¹⁸. Other research combined data from multiple countries

47 but pooled NPIs into rather broad categories ^{15,19–21}, which eventually limits the assessment of
48 specific, potentially critical, NPIs, that may be less costly and more effective than others. Despite
49 their widespread use, relative ease of implementation, broad choice of available tools, and their
50 importance in developing countries where other measures (e.g., increases in healthcare capacity,
51 social distancing, or enhanced testing) are difficult to implement ²², little is currently known about
52 the effectiveness of different risk communication strategies. One reason for this knowledge gap
53 might be that many NPI trackers do not clearly code only-communication actions or cover such
54 measures rather superficially. For example, the WHO dataset ²³ and the CoronaNet dataset ²⁴ both
55 report communication strategies (or public awareness measures) in two broad categories. However,
56 an accurate assessment of communication activities requires information on the targeted public,
57 means of communication and content of the message. Other government communications are
58 sometimes summarized in non-communication categories (e.g., communication on social distancing
59 are included in "Social distancing" measures in the CoronaNet dataset and an extra data element
60 specifies the degree of compliance). Additionally, modelling studies typically focus on NPIs that
61 directly influence contact probabilities (e.g., social distancing ^{12,18}, self-isolation ²⁰, etc.).

62 Using a comprehensive, hierarchically coded, data set of 6,068 NPIs implemented in 79
63 territories ²⁵, here we analyse the impact of government interventions on R_t , using harmonised
64 results from a new multi-method approach consisting of (i) a case-control analysis (CC), (ii) a
65 step function approach to LASSO time-series regression (LASSO), (iii) random forests (RF) and
66 (iv) Transformers (TF). We contend that the combination of four different methods, combining
67 statistical, inference and artificial intelligence classes of tools, allows to also assess the structural

68 uncertainty of individual methods ²⁶. We also investigate country-specific control strategies as well
69 as the impact of some selected country-specific metrics.

70 All approaches (i-iv) yield comparable rankings of the effectiveness of different categories of
71 NPIs across their hierarchical levels. This remarkable agreement allows us to identify a consensus
72 set of NPIs that lead to a significant reduction of R_t . We validate this consensus set using two
73 external datasets covering 42,151 measures in 226 countries. Further, we evaluate the heterogeneity
74 of the effectiveness of individual NPIs in different territories. We find that time of implementation,
75 already implemented measures, different governance indicators ²⁷, as well as human and social
76 development affect the effectiveness of NPIs in the countries to varying degrees.

77 2 Results

78 **Global approach.** Our main results are based on the CSH COVID-19 Control Strategies List
79 (CCCSL) ²⁵. This data set provides a hierarchical taxonomy of 6,068 NPIs, coded on four levels,
80 including eight broad themes (level 1, L1) are divided into 63 categories of individual NPIs (level 2,
81 L2) that include >500 subcategories (level 3, L3) and >2,000 codes (level 4, L4). We first compare
82 the results for the NPIs' effectiveness rankings for the four methods of our approach (i-iv) on L1
83 (themes); see SI Figure S1. A clear picture emerges where the themes of social distancing and
84 travel restrictions are top-ranked in all methods, whereas environmental measures (e.g., cleaning
85 and disinfecting shared surfaces) are ranked least effective.

86 We next compare results obtained on L2 of the NPI data set, i.e., using the 46 NPI categories

87 implemented more than five times. The methods largely agree on the list of interventions that have a
88 significant effect on R_t , see Figure 1 and Table 1. The individual rankings are highly correlated with
89 each other ($p = 0.0008$, see Methods). Six NPI categories show significant impacts on R_t in all
90 four methods. In Table S3 we list the subcategories (L3) belonging to these consensus categories.

91 A normalised score for each NPI category is obtained by rescaling the result of each method
92 to range between zero (least effective) and one (most effective) and then averaging this score. The
93 maximal (minimal) NPI score is therefore 100% (0%), meaning that the measure is the most (least)
94 effective measure in each method. Amongst the six full consensus NPI categories, the largest
95 impacts on R_t are displayed by small gathering cancellations (83%, ΔR_t between -0.22 and -0.35),
96 the closure of educational institutions (with a score of 73% and estimates for ΔR_t ranging from
97 -0.15 to -0.21), and border restrictions (56%, ΔR_t between -0.057 and -0.23). The consensus
98 measures also include NPIs aiming to increase healthcare and public health capacities (increase
99 availability of personal protective equipment (PPE): 51%, ΔR_t -0.062 to -0.13), individual
100 movement restrictions (42%, ΔR_t -0.08 to -0.13) and national lockdown (including stay-at-home
101 order in US states) (25%, ΔR_t -0.008 to -0.14).

102 We find fourteen additional NPI categories consensually in three of our methods. These
103 include mass gathering cancellations (53%, ΔR_t between -0.13 and -0.33), risk communication
104 activities to inform and educate the public (48%, ΔR_t between -0.18 and -0.28), and government
105 assistance to vulnerable populations (41%, ΔR_t between -0.17 and -0.18).

106 Amongst the least effective interventions we find: government actions to provide or receive




Figure 1: Decrease in the effective reproduction number, ΔR_t , for 46 NPIs at L2, as quantified by case-control analysis (CC), LASSO, and the transformer (TF) regression. The left panel shows the combined 95% confidence interval of ΔR_t for the most effective interventions across all included territories. The heatmap in the right panel shows the corresponding Z-scores of the measure effectiveness as determined by the four different methods. Gray color indicates no significantly positive effect. NPIs are ranked according to the number of methods agreeing on their impacts, from top (significant in all methods) to bottom (ineffective in all analyses). L1 themes are colour-coded as in Figure S1.

107 international help, measures to enhance testing capacity or improve case detection strategy (which
108 can be expected to lead to a short-term rise in cases), tracing and tracking measures, as well as land
109 border and airport health checks and environmental cleaning.

110 In Figure 2 we visualise the findings on the NPIs' effectiveness in a co-implementation
111 network. Nodes correspond to categories (L2) with a size being proportional to their normalised
112 score. Directed links from i to j indicate a tendency that countries implement NPI j after they
113 implemented i . The network therefore illustrates the typical NPI implementation sequence in the 56
114 countries and the steps within this sequence that contribute most to a reduction of R_t . For instance,
115 there is a pattern where countries first cancel mass gatherings before moving on to cancellations
116 of specific types of small gatherings, where the latter associates on average with more substantial
117 reductions in R_t . Education and active communication is one of the most effective "early measures"
118 (implemented around 15 days before 30 cases were reported and well before the majority of other
119 measures comes). Most social distancing (i.e., closure of educational institutions), travel restriction
120 measures (i.e., individual movement restrictions like curfew, national lockdown) and measures to
121 increase the availability of PPE are typically implemented within the first two weeks after reaching
122 30 cases with varying impacts on the R_t ; see also Figure 1.

123 Within the CC approach, we can further explore these results on a finer hierarchical level.
124 We show results for 18 NPIs (L3) of the risk communication theme in the SI; see Table S2. The
125 most effective communication strategies include warnings against travel to and return from high
126 risk areas ($\Delta R_t = -0.14(1)$) and several measures to actively communicate with the public.

L2 category	Score	Consensus	ΔR_t^{CC}	ΔR_t^{LASSO}	Importance (RF)	ΔR_t^{TF}
Small gathering cancellation	83%	4	-0.35 (2)	-0.22 (5)	0.020 (2)	-0.327 (3)
Closure of educational institutions	73%	4	-0.16 (2)	-0.21 (4)	0.028 (2)	-0.146 (2)
Border restriction	56%	4	-0.23 (2)	-0.12 (2)	0.017 (2)	-0.057 (2)
Increase availability of personal protective equipment (PPE)	51%	4	-0.11 (2)	-0.13 (2)	0.012 (1)	-0.062 (2)
Individual movement restrictions	42%	4	-0.13 (2)	-0.08 (3)	0.017 (2)	-0.121 (2)
National lockdown	25%	4	-0.14 (3)	-0.09 (2)	0.0020 (9)	-0.008 (3)
Mass gathering cancellation	53%	3	-0.33 (2)	0	0.012 (1)	-0.127 (2)
Educate and actively communicate with the public	48%	3	-0.18 (4)	0	0.018 (2)	-0.276 (2)
The government provides assistance to vulnerable populations	41%	3	-0.17 (3)	-0.18 (4)	0.009 (1)	0.090 (3)
Actively communicate with managers	40%	3	-0.15 (2)	-0.20 (4)	0.004 (2)	-0.050 (2)
Measures for special populations	37%	3	-0.19 (2)	0	0.008 (1)	-0.100 (2)
Increase healthcare workforce	35%	3	-0.17 (20)	-0.13 (3)	0.030 (8)	0.011 (2)
Quarantine	30%	3	-0.28 (2)	-0.2 (1)	0.0023 (9)	0.023 (2)
Activate or establish emergency response	29%	3	-0.13 (2)	0	0.0037 (9)	-0.121 (2)
Enhance detection system	25%	3	-0.19 (3)	0	0.0032 (9)	-0.106 (2)
Increase in medical supplies and equipment	25%	3	-0.13 (3)	-0.004 (3)	0.003 (2)	-0.200 (3)
Police and army interventions	23%	3	-0.16 (2)	0	0.003 (2)	-0.091 (2)
Travel alert and warning	20%	3	-0.13 (3)	0.0 (1)	0.002 (1)	-0.159 (3)
Public transport restriction	13%	3	-0.20 (4)	-0.01 (7)	0.004 (1)	-0.023 (3)
Actively communicate with healthcare professionals	11%	3	0	-0.08 (4)	0.003 (1)	-0.003 (2)

Table 1: Comparison of effectiveness rankings on L2. Out of the 46 different NPI categories, all four methods show significant results for six NPIs (consensus 4); three methods agree on 14 further NPIs (consensus 3). We report the average normalised score, the observed reduction in R_t for the various methods and the NPI importance for the random forest. The numbers in brackets give half of the amount by which the last digit of the corresponding number outside the brackets fluctuates within the 95% confidence interval.




Figure 2: Time-ordered NPI co-implementation network across countries. Nodes are categories (L2) with colour indicating the theme (L1) and size being proportional to the average effectiveness of the intervention. Arrows from nodes i to j represent that countries which have already implemented intervention i tend to implement intervention j later in time. Nodes are positioned vertically according to their average time of implementation (measured relative to the day where the country reached 30 confirmed cases) and horizontally according to their L1 theme.

127 These include to encourage, e.g., staying at home ($\Delta R_t = -0.14(1)$), social distancing ($\Delta R_t =$
128 $-0.20(1)$), workplace safety measures ($\Delta R_t = -0.18(2)$), self-initiated isolation of people with
129 mild respiratory symptoms ($\Delta R_t = -0.19(2)$) as well as information campaigns ($\Delta R_t = -0.13(1)$)
130 (through various channels such as press, flyers, social media, or phone messages).

131 **Validation with external datasets.** We validate our findings with results from two external datasets,
132 see Methods. In the WHO-PHSM dataset ²³ we find seven full-consensus measures (agreement
133 on significance by all methods) and 17 further measures with three agreements, see SI Figure S27.
134 These consensus measures show a large overlap with the consensus measures (three or four matches
135 in our methods) identified using the CCCSL and includes as top-ranked NPI measures aiming at
136 strengthening the healthcare system and the testing capacity (labeled as "Scaling up"), e.g., increase
137 healthcare workforce, purchase of medical equipment, tests, masks, financial support to hospitals,
138 increase patient capacity, increase domestic production of PPE). Other consensus measures consist
139 of social distancing measures ("Cancelling, restricting or adapting private gatherings outside the
140 home", adapting or closing "offices, businesses, institutions and operations", "cancelling, restricting
141 or adapting mass gatherings"), measures for special populations ("protecting population in closed
142 settings", encompassing long-term care facilities and prisons), school closures, (international and
143 domestic) travel restrictions (stay-at-home order – equivalent to confinement in the WHO-PHSM
144 coding – restricting entry and exit, travel advice and warning, "closing international land borders",
145 "entry screening and isolation or quarantine)". "Wearing a mask" exhibits a significant impact on R_t
146 in three methods (ΔR_t between -0.018 and -0.12). The consensus measures also include financial
147 packages and general public awareness campaigns (as part of "Communications and engagement")

148 actions). The least effective measures include active case detection, contact tracing, as well as
149 environmental cleaning and disinfection.

150 The CCCSL results are also compatible with findings from the CoronaNet dataset ²⁴; see
151 SI Figures S28–S29. Analyses show four full-consensus measures and 13 further NPIs with an
152 agreement of three methods. These consensus measures include general social distancing measures
153 (no specific coding available), restriction and regulation of non-essential businesses, restrictions of
154 mass gatherings, closure and regulation of schools, travel restrictions (e.g., internal and external
155 border restrictions, curfew), measures aiming to increase healthcare workforce (e.g., "Nurses",
156 "Unspecified health staff") and medical equipment (e.g., PPE, "Ventilators", "Unspecified health
157 materials"), quarantine (i.e., voluntary or mandatory self-quarantine and quarantine at a government
158 hotel or facility), and measures to increase public awareness ("Disseminating information related to
159 COVID-19 to the public that is reliable and factually accurate").

160 Twenty-three NPIs in the CoronaNet dataset do not show statistical significance in any method,
161 including several restrictions and regulations of government services (e.g., for tourist sites, parks,
162 public museums, telecommunications), hygiene measures for public areas, and other measures that
163 target very specific populations (e.g., certain age groups, visa extensions).

164 **Country-level approach.** A sensitivity check of our results with respect to the removal of individ-
165 ual continents from the analysis also indicates substantial variations between world geographical
166 regions in terms of NPI effectiveness (see SI). To further quantify how much the effectiveness of
167 an NPI depends on the particular territory (country or US state) where it has been introduced, we

168 measure the heterogeneity of the NPI rankings in different territories through an entropic approach
169 in the transformer (TF) method; see Methods. Figure 3 shows the normalised entropy of each NPI
170 category versus its rank. A value of entropy close to zero implies that the corresponding NPI has a
171 similar rank relative to all other NPIs in all territories. In other words, the effectiveness of the NPI
172 does not depend on the specific country or state. On the other hand, a high value of the normalised
173 entropy signals that the performance of each NPI depends largely on the geographical region.

174 The values of the normalised entropies for many NPIs are far from being one and below the
175 corresponding values obtained through a temporal reshuffling of the NPIs in each country. The
176 effectiveness of many NPIs therefore is, first, significant and, second, heavily dependent on the
177 local context, which is a combination of socio-economic features and NPIs already adopted. In
178 general, social distancing measures and travel restrictions show a high entropy (effectiveness varies
179 a lot across countries) whereas case identification, contact tracing and healthcare measures show
180 substantially less country dependence.

181 We further explore this interplay of NPIs with socio-economic factors by analysing the effects
182 of demographic and socio-economic covariates, as well as indicators for governance, human and
183 economic development in the CC method (see SI). While the effects of most indicators vary across
184 different NPIs at rather moderate levels, we find a robust tendency that NPI effectiveness correlates
185 negatively with indicator values for governance-related accountability and political stability (as
186 quantified by World Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank).

187 The heterogeneity of the effectiveness of individual NPIs across countries points to a non-




Figure 3: Normalised entropies vs rank for all the NPIs at level L2. Each NPI name is coloured according to its theme of belonging (L1) as indicated in the legend. The blue curve represents the same information obtained out of a reshuffled data set of NPIs.

188 independence among the different NPIs, therefore the impact of a specific NPI cannot be evaluated
189 in isolation. Instead, one has to look at the combination of NPIs adopted in a particular country.
190 Since it is not possible in the real world to change the sequence of NPIs adopted, we resort to
191 what-if experiments to identify the most likely outcome of an artificial sequence of NPIs in each
192 specific country. Within the TF approach, we selectively knock-out one NPI at the time from all the
193 sequences of interventions in all countries and compute the ensuing evolution of R_t compared to
194 the actual case.

195 To quantify whether the effectiveness of a specific NPI depends on its epidemic age of
196 implementation, we study artificial sequences of NPIs constructed by shifting the selected NPI to
197 other days, keeping the other NPIs fixed. In this way, for each country and each NPI, we obtain a
198 curve of the most likely change of R_t vs the adoption time of the specific NPI.

199 Figure 4 reports an example of the results for a selection of NPIs (we refer to the SI for a
200 larger report about other NPIs). Each curve shows the average change of R_t vs the adoption time
201 of the NPI, averaged over the countries where the NPI has been adopted. Panel A refers to the
202 national lockdown (including stay-at-home order implemented in the US states). Our results show a
203 moderate effect of this NPI (low change in R_t) as compared to other, less drastic measures. Panel B
204 shows NPIs with a "the earlier, the better" pattern. For those measures ("Closure of educational
205 institutions", "Small gatherings cancellation", "Airport restrictions" and many more in the SI) early
206 adoption is always more beneficial. Panel C, "Enhancing testing capacity" and "Surveillance",
207 exhibit a negative impact (i.e., an increase) on R_t presumably related to the fact that more testing

208 allows for surfacing more cases. Finally, Panel D, showing "Tracing and tracking" and "Activate
209 case notification", display an initially negative effect that turns positive (i.e., toward a reduction of
210 R_t). We refer to the Supplementary Information for a more comprehensive analysis of all the NPIs.

211 **3 Discussion**

212 Our study dissects the entangled packages of NPIs²⁵ and quantifies their effectiveness. We validate
213 our findings using three different datasets and four independent methods. Our findings suggest
214 that no NPI acts as a silver bullet on the spread of COVID-19. Instead, we identify several
215 decisive interventions that significantly contribute to reducing R_t below one and should therefore be
216 considered to efficiently flatten the curve facing a potential second COVID-19 wave or any similar
217 future viral respiratory epidemics.

218 The most effective NPIs include curfews, lockdowns, and closing and restricting places where
219 people gather in smaller or large numbers for an extended period of time. This includes small
220 gathering cancellations (closures of shops, restaurants, gatherings of 50 persons or less, mandatory
221 home office, etc.) and closure of educational institutions. While in previous studies based on
222 smaller numbers of countries, school closures had been attributed a little effect on the spread of
223 COVID-19^{19,20}, more recent evidence has been in favour of the importance of this NPI^{28,29}. School
224 closures in the US have been found to reduce COVID-19 incidence and mortality by about 60%
225²⁸. This result is also in line with a contact tracing study from South Korea, which identified
226 adolescents aged 10–19 as more likely to spread the virus than adults and children in household




Figure 4: Change of R_t as a function of the adoption time of the NPI, averaged over the countries where the NPI has been adopted. Negative (Positive) values here mean that the adoption of the NPI has reduced (increased) the value of R_t . Panel A: "National lockdown" (including "stay-at-home Order in the US states). Panel B: A selection of NPIs that display the "The earlier the better" behaviour, i.e., their impact is better if implemented at earlier epidemic ages. Panel C: "Enhancing testing capacity" and "Surveillance". Panel D: "Tracing and Tracking" and "Activate case notification".

227 settings³⁰. Individual movement restrictions (including curfew, the prohibition of gatherings and
228 movements for non-essential activities or measures segmenting the population) were also amongst
229 the top-ranked measures.

230 However, such radical measures present with adverse consequences. School closure interrupts
231 learning, can lead to poor nutrition, stress and social isolation in children^{31–33}. Home confinement
232 has strongly increased the rate of domestic violence in many countries, with a huge impact on women
233 and children^{34,35}, while it has also limited the access to long-term care, such as chemotherapy, with
234 significant impacts on patients' health and survival chance^{36,37}. Governments may have to look
235 towards less stringent measures, encompassing a maximum of effective prevention but enabling an
236 acceptable balance between benefits and drawbacks³⁸.

237 Previous statistical studies on the effectiveness of lockdowns came to mixed conclusions.
238 Whereas a relative reduction of R_t of 5% was estimated using a Bayesian hierarchical model¹⁹, a
239 Bayesian mechanistic model estimated a reduction of 80%²⁰, though some questions have been
240 raised regarding the latter work²⁶. Our results point to a mild impact of them due to an overlap with
241 effects of other measures adopted earlier and included in what is referred to as “national (or full)
242 lockdown”. Indeed, the national lockdown encompasses multiple NPIs (e.g., closure of land, sea
243 and air borders, schools, non-essential shops, prohibition of gatherings, of visiting nursing homes)
244 that countries may have already adopted. From this perspective, the relatively attenuated impact of
245 the national lockdown is explained as the little delta after other concurrent NPIs have been adopted.
246 This conclusion does not rule out the effectiveness of an early national lockdown but suggests that a

247 suitable combination (sequence and time of implementation) of a smaller package of such measures
248 *can* substitute a full lockdown in terms of effectiveness while reducing adverse impacts on the
249 society, economy, humanitarian response system, and the environment^{6,39-41}.

250 Taken together, the social distancing and movement restriction measures discussed above can
251 therefore be seen as the “nuclear option” of NPIs: highly effective but causing substantial collateral
252 damages on society, the economy, trade, and human rights^{4,39}.

253 We find strong support for the effectiveness of border restrictions. The role of travelling in the
254 global spread of respiratory diseases has proved central during the first SARS epidemic (2002-2003)
255⁴², but travelling restrictions show a large impact on trade, economy, and humanitarian response
256 system globally^{41,43}. The effectiveness of social distancing and travel restrictions is also in line
257 with results from other studies, which used different statistical approaches, epidemiological metrics,
258 geographic coverage, and classifications of NPIs^{2,8-11,13,19,20}.

259 We also find a number of highly effective NPIs that can be considered to be less costly. For
260 instance, we find that risk communication strategies feature prominently amongst consensus NPIs.
261 This includes government actions intended to educate and actively communicate with the public. To
262 the best of our knowledge, our study provides the first quantitative evidence for the effectiveness
263 of such measures. The effective policies include encouraging staying at home, promoting social
264 distancing and workplace safety measures, encouraging the self-initiated isolation of people with
265 symptoms, travel warnings, as well as information campaigns (mostly via social media). All these
266 measures are non-binding government advice, contrasting with the mandatory border restriction and

267 social distancing measures that are often enforced by police or army interventions and sanctions.
268 Surprisingly, communicating on the importance of social distancing has been only marginally
269 less effective than imposing distancing measures by law. The publication of guidelines and work
270 safety protocols to managers and healthcare professionals was also associated with a reduction
271 of R_t , suggesting that communication efforts also need to be tailored toward key stakeholders.
272 Communication strategies aim at empowering communities with correct information about COVID-
273 19. Such measures can be of crucial importance to target specific demographic strata found to play a
274 dominant role in driving the COVID-19 spread (e.g., communication strategies to target individuals
275 aged <40y ⁴⁴)

276 Government food assistance programs and other financial supports for vulnerable populations
277 (via taxation) also turned out to be highly effective. Such measures are, therefore, not only impacting
278 the socio-economic sphere ⁴⁵ but have also a positive effect on public health. For instance, facilitating
279 people's access to tests or allowing them to self-isolate without fear of losing their job, may help
280 reducing the R_t .

281 Some measures are ineffective in (almost) all methods and datasets, e.g., environmental
282 measures to disinfect and clean surfaces and objects in public and semi-public places. This finding
283 is at odds with current recommendations of the WHO for environmental cleaning in non-healthcare
284 settings ⁴⁶ and calls for a closer examination of the effectiveness of such measures. However,
285 environmental measures (e.g., cleaning of shared surfaces, waste management, approval of a new
286 disinfectant, increase ventilation) is seldom reported by governments or media, and therefore not

287 collected by the NPI trackers, which could lead to an under-estimation of their impact. We also find
288 no evidence for the effectiveness of social distancing measures in public transports. While infections
289 on busses and trains have been reported ⁴⁷, our results may suggest a limited contribution of such
290 cases to the overall virus spread. A heightened public risk awareness associated with commuting
291 (e.g., people being more likely to wear face masks) might contribute to this finding ⁴⁸. However,
292 we should notice that measures aiming a limiting engorgement or increasing distancing in public
293 transports have been highly diverse (from complete cancellation of all public transports to increase
294 in frequency of the traffic to reduce traveler density) and could therefore lead to largely different
295 effectiveness, also depending on the local context.

296 The effectiveness of individual NPIs is heavily influenced by governance (see SI) and local
297 context, as evidenced by the results of the entropic approach. This local context includes the stage
298 of the epidemic, socio-economic, cultural and political characteristics, and other NPIs already
299 implemented. By focusing on individual countries, the what-if experiments using artificial country-
300 specific sequences of NPIs offer a novel way to quantify the importance of this local context with
301 respect to measure effectiveness. Our main takeaway here is that one and the same NPI can have a
302 drastically different impact if taken early or later, or in a different country.

303 It is interesting to comment on the impact that "Enhancing testing capacity" and "Tracing
304 and tracking" would have had if adopted at different points in times. Counterintuitively, tracing,
305 tracking and testing measures should display a short-term increase of R_t if they are effective, as
306 more cases will be found. For countries implementing these measures early this is indeed what

307 we find. However, countries implementing these NPIs later did not necessarily find more cases,
308 as shown by the corresponding decrease in R_t . We focused on March and April 2020, a period
309 in which many countries had surged in positive cases that overwhelmed their testing and tracing
310 capacities, which rendered the corresponding NPIs ineffective.

311 **Strengths & Limitations.** The assessment of the effectiveness of NPIs is statistically challenging,
312 as measures were typically implemented simultaneously and because their impact might well depend
313 on the particular implementation sequence. Some NPIs appear in almost all countries whereas
314 others only in few, meaning that we could miss some rare but effective measures due to a lack
315 of statistical power. While some methods might be prone to overestimating effects from an NPI
316 due to insufficient adjustments for confounding effects from other measures, other methods might
317 underestimate the contribution of an NPI by assigning its impact to a highly correlated NPI. As
318 a consequence, estimates of ΔR_t might vary substantially across different methods, whereas the
319 agreement on the significance of individual NPIs is much more pronounced. The strength of our
320 study, therefore, lies in the harmonization of these four independent methodological approaches,
321 combined with the usage of an extensive data set on NPIs. This allows us to estimate the structural
322 uncertainty of NPI effectiveness, i.e., the uncertainty introduced by choosing a certain model
323 structure. Moreover, whereas previous studies often subsumed a wide range of social distancing
324 and travel restriction measures under a single entity, our analysis contributes to a more fine-grained
325 understanding of each NPI.

326 The CCCSL data set features non-homogeneous data completeness across the different

327 territories and data collection could be biased by the data collector (native versus non-native) as
328 well as the information communicated by governments. Moreover, the coding system presents some
329 drawbacks, notably because some interventions could belong to more than one category but are
330 only recorded once. Compliance with NPIs is crucial for their effectiveness, yet we assumed a
331 comparable degree of compliance by each population. We tried to mitigate this issue by validating
332 our findings on two external databases, even if those are subject to similar limitations. Additionally,
333 we neither took into account the stringency of NPI implementation, and not all methods were able to
334 describe potential variations of NPI effectiveness over time, besides the dependency on the epidemic
335 age of its adoption.

336 To compute R_t , we used time-series of the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases ⁴⁹. This
337 approach is likely to over-represent patients with severe symptoms and may be biased by variations
338 in testing and reporting policies among countries. We assume a constant serial interval (average
339 time-span between primary and secondary infection), however, this number shows considerable
340 variations in the literature ⁵⁰ and depends on measures such as social distancing and self-isolation.

341 **4 Conclusions**

342 Here we presented the outcome of an extensive analysis on the impact of 6,068 individual NPIs on
343 the effective reproduction number R_t of COVID-19 in 79 territories worldwide. The adoption of the
344 CCCSL data set ²⁵ on NPIs and the use of two external validation datasets, encompassing together
345 more than 48,000 NPIs over 226 countries, makes our study the largest on NPI effectiveness to

346 date^{20,21,24,51}.

347 The emerging picture reveals that no one-size-fits-all solution exists, and no single NPI can
348 decrease R_t below one. Instead, in the absence of a vaccine or efficient anti-viral medication,
349 a resurgence of COVID-19 cases can only be stopped by a suitable combination of NPIs, each
350 tailored to the specific country and its epidemic age. These measures must be enacted in the optimal
351 combination and sequence to be maximally effective on the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and thereby
352 enable a faster re-opening.

353 We showed that the most effective measures include closing and restricting most places where
354 people gather in smaller or larger numbers for extended periods of time (businesses, bars, schools,
355 etc). However, we also find several highly effective measures that are less intrusive. These include
356 land border restrictions, governmental support to vulnerable populations and risk communication
357 strategies. We strongly recommend governments and other stakeholders to first consider the adoption
358 of such NPIs, tailored to the local context, should infection numbers (re-)surge, before choosing the
359 most intrusive options. Less drastic measures may also foster better compliance from the population.

360 Notably, the simultaneous consideration of many distinct NPI categories allows us to move
361 beyond the simple evaluation of individual classes of NPIs to assess the collective impact of specific
362 sequences of interventions instead. The ensemble of these results calls for a strong effort to simulate
363 “what-if” scenarios at the country level for planning the most likely effectiveness of future NPIs,
364 and, thanks to the possibility to go down to the level of individual countries and country specific
365 circumstances, our approach is the first contribution to this end.

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540 **5 Methods**

541 **Data**

542 **NPI data.** We use the publicly available Complexity Science Hub Vienna COVID-19
543 Control Strategies list (CCCSL) dataset on NPIs ²⁵. Therein, NPIs are categorised using a four-
544 level hierarchical coding scheme: L1 defines the theme of the NPI: “Case identification, contact
545 tracing and related measures”, “Environmental measures”, “Healthcare and public health capacity”,
546 “Resource allocation”, “Returning to normal life”, “Risk communication”, “Social distancing” and
547 “Travel restriction”. Each L1 (theme) is composed of several categories (L2 of the coding scheme),
548 that contain subcategories (L3) which are further subdivided to group codes (L4). The data set
549 covers 56 countries; data for the USA is available at the state level (24 states). This makes a total
550 of 79 territories. In this analysis, we use a static version of the CCCSL, retrieved on 17 August
551 2020, presenting 6,068 NPIs. A glossary of the codes is provided on github. For each country, we
552 use the data until the day to which the measures have been reliably updated. NPIs that have been
553 implemented in less than five territories are not considered, leading to a final number of 4,780 NPIs
554 of 46 different L2 categories to be used in the analyses.

555 Secondly, we use the CoronaNet COVID-19 Government Response Event Dataset (v1.0)
556 ²⁴ that contains 31,532 interventions and covers 247 territories (countries and US states) (data
557 extracted on 2020-08-17). For our analysis, we map their columns "type" and "type_sub_cat" onto
558 L1 and L2, respectively. Definitions for the total 116 L2 categories can be found on the GitHub
559 page of the project. Using the same criterion as for the CCCSL, we obtain a final number of 18,919
560 NPIs of 107 different categories.

561 Thirdly, we use the WHO Global Dataset of Public Health and Social Measures (thereafter
562 called WHO-PHSM) ²³ which merges and harmonizes the following data sets: ACAPS ⁴¹, Oxford
563 COVID-19 Government Response Tracker ⁵², the Global Public Health Intelligence Network
564 (GPHIN) of Public Health Agency of Canada (Ottawa, Canada), the CCCSL ²⁵, the United States
565 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, Atlanta, USA) and the HIT-COVID data set
566 ⁵³. The WHO-PHSM Dataset contains 24,077 interventions and covers 264 territories (countries
567 and US states) (data extracted on 2020-08-17). Their encoding scheme has a heterogeneous coding
568 depth, and for our analysis we map "who_category" onto L1, and either take "who_subcategory"
569 or a combination of "who_subcategory" and "who_measure" as L2. This results in 40 measure
570 categories. A glossary is available at: [https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-](https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/phsm)
571 [2019/phsm](https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/phsm).

572 **COVID-19 case data.** To estimate the effective reproduction number R_t , and growth rates
573 of the number of COVID-19 cases, we use time series of the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases
574 in the 79 considered territories ⁴⁹. To control for weekly fluctuations, we smooth the time series

575 by computing the rolling average using a Gaussian window with a standard deviation of two days,
576 truncated at a maximum window size of 15 days.

577 **Regression techniques.** We apply four different statistical approaches to quantify the impact of a
578 NPI M on the reduction of R_t (see details in the SI).

579 **Case-control analysis.** The case-control analysis (CC) considers each single category (L2)
580 or subcategory (L3) M separately and evaluates in a matched comparison the difference ΔR_t in
581 the R_t between all countries that implemented M (cases) with those that did not implement it
582 (controls) during the observation window. The matching is done on epidemic age and the time
583 of implementing any response. The comparison is made via a linear regression model adjusting
584 for (i) epidemic age (days after the country has reached 30 confirmed cases), (ii) the value of R_t
585 before M takes effect, (iii) total population, (iv) population density, (v) the total number of NPIs
586 implemented and (vi) number of NPIs implemented in the same category as M . With this design,
587 we investigate the time delay of τ days between implementing M and observing ΔR_t , as well as
588 additional country-based covariates that quantify other dimensions of governance and human and
589 economic development. Estimates for R_t are averaged over delays between 1 and 28 days.

590 **Step function Lasso regression.** In this approach, we assume that without any intervention,
591 the reproduction factor is constant and deviations from this constant are caused by a delayed onset
592 by τ days of each NPI on L2 (categories) of the hierarchical data set. We use a Lasso regularization

593 approach combined with a meta parameter search to select a reduced set of NPIs that best describe
594 the observed ΔR_t . Estimates for the changes of ΔR_t attributable to NPI M are obtained from
595 country-wise cross-validation.

596 **Random forest regression.** We perform a random forest (RF) regression, where the NPIs
597 implemented in a country are used as predictors for R_t , time-shifted τ days into the future. Here, τ
598 accounts for the time delay between implementation and onset of the effect of a given NPI. Similar
599 to the Lasso regression, the assumption underlying the random forest approach is that without
600 changes in interventions, the effective reproduction number in a territory remains constant. But
601 contrary to the two methods described above, the random forest represents a nonlinear model,
602 meaning that the effects of individual NPIs on R_t do not need to add up linearly. The importance of
603 a NPI is defined as the decline in the predictive performance of the random forest on unseen data if
604 the data concerning that NPI is replaced by noise, also called permutation importance.

605 **Transformers modelling.** Transformers⁵⁴ have proven themselves as suitable models for
606 dynamic discrete elements processes such as textual sequences due to their ability to recall past
607 events. Here we extended the Transformer architecture to approach the continuous case of epidemic
608 data by removing the probabilistic output layer with a linear combination of the Transformer output,
609 whose input is identical to the one for the random forest regression, along with the values of R_t . The
610 best performing network (least mean squared error in country-wise cross-validation) is identified
611 as a Transformer encoder having four hidden layers of 128 neurons, an embedding size of 128,

612 eight heads, one output described by a linear output layer, and 47 inputs (corresponding to each
613 category and R_t). To quantify the impact of a measure M on R_t , we use the trained Transformer
614 as a predictive model and compare simulations without any measure (reference) to simulations
615 where one measure is presented at a time to assess ΔR_t . To reduce the effects of overfitting and
616 multiplicity of local minima, we report results from an ensemble of Transformers trained to similar
617 precision levels.

618 **Estimation of the effective reproduction number.** We use the R package EpiEstim⁵⁵ with a
619 sliding time window of 7 days to estimate the time series of the effective reproduction number R_t
620 for every country. We choose an uncertain serial interval following a probability distribution with a
621 mean of 4.46 days and a standard deviation of 2.63 days⁵⁶.

622 **Ranking of NPIs.** For each of the four methods (CC, Lasso regression and TF), we rank the NPI
623 categories in descending order according to their impact, i.e., the estimated degree to which they
624 lower R_t or their feature importance (RF). To compare the rankings, we count how many of the
625 46 considered NPIs are classified as belonging to the top X ranked measures in all methods and
626 test the null hypothesis that this overlap has been obtained from completely independent rankings.
627 The p -value is then given by the complementary cumulative distribution function for a binomial
628 experiment with 46 trials and success probability $(X/46)^4$. We report the median p -value obtained
629 over all $X \leq 10$ to ensure that the results do not depend on where we impose the cutoff for the
630 classes.

631 **Co-implementation network.** If there is a statistical tendency that a country implementing NPI i
632 also implements NPI j later in time, we draw a directed link from i to j . Nodes are placed on the
633 y -axis according to the average epidemic age at which the corresponding NPI is implemented; they
634 are grouped on the x axis by their L1 theme. Node colours correspond to themes. The effectiveness
635 scores for all NPIs are rescaled between zero and one for each method; node size is proportional to
636 the rescaled scores, averaged over all methods.

637 **Entropic country-level approach.** Each territory can be characterised by its socio-economic
638 conditions and the unique temporal sequence of NPIs adopted. To quantify the NPI effect, we
639 measure the heterogeneity of the overall rank of a NPI amongst the countries that have taken that
640 NPI. To compare countries which have implemented different numbers of NPIs, we consider the
641 normalised rankings, where the ranking position is divided by the number of elements in the ranking
642 list (i.e., the number of NPIs taken in a specific country). We then bin the interval $[0, 1]$ of the
643 normalised rankings into 10 subintervals and compute for each NPI the entropy of the distribution
644 of occurrences of the NPI in the different normalised rankings per country:

$$S(NPI) = -\frac{1}{\log(10)} \sum_i p_i \log(p_i), \quad (1)$$

645 where p_i is the probability that the considered NPI appeared in the i -th bin in the normalised
646 rankings of all countries. To assess the confidence of these entropic values, results are compared
647 with expectations from a temporal reshuffling of the data. For each country, we keep the same NPIs

648 adopted but reshuffle the timestamps of their adoption.

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659 **Author contributions**

660 NH, LG, AL, VL, PK conceived and performed the analyses. VL, ST, PK supervised the study.
661 ED contributed additional tools. NH, LG, AL, ADL, BP and PK wrote the first draft of the paper.
662 ADL supervised the data collection on NPIs. All authors (NH, LG, AL, ED, ADL, VL, BP, ST, PK)
663 discussed the results and contributed to the revision of the final manuscript.

664 **Competing interests**

665 The authors declare no competing interests.

666 6 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

667 **Case-control analysis.** We perform a case-control regression analysis to quantify the impact of
668 implementing an NPI measure on the effective reproduction number, R_t . The central idea is to
669 compare all countries that have implemented a certain measure with all countries that have not
670 implemented this measure at the same stage of the epidemic while adjusting for several country-
671 specific covariates through regression analysis. These covariates include timing (time-span between
672 the day on which more than 30 cases were confirmed and the day the measure was implemented),
673 baseline R_t (reproduction number before the measure was implemented), size and population
674 density, as well as covariates for how many other measures have already been implemented. It is
675 assumed that implementing a NPI on day t will have measurable impacts on R_t at day $t + \tau$. We
676 also study how various country-specific indicators for economic and human development as well as
677 governance impact on these results.

678 **Exposure variable.** We consider each NPI implemented in more than ten countries. We
679 include measures published by ²⁵ on two different resolution levels (L2 and L3) separately. Let T_M
680 be the day on which a country implemented measure M . The covariates and outcome variables
681 are measured relative to this point in time. As an exposure variable, we use a dummy variable, X ,
682 encoding whether a country has implemented the measure during the observation window or not.

L1 themes	CC	LASSO	RF	TF
Social distancing	1	1	1	1
Travel restriction	2	2	2	2
Healthcare and public health capacity	5	4	4	3
Risk communication	6	3	3	5
Resource allocation	4	6	5	4
Case identification, contact tracing and related measures	3	5	6	6
Environmental measures	7	7	7	7

Figure S1: Comparison of effectiveness rankings on the coarsest hierarchical level for the case-control analysis (CC), LASSO regression (LASSO), random forest regression (RF), and transformer analysis (TF). To obtain a ranking of the eight different themes (L1) of NPIs, we sum the impacts of the 3 highest ranked categories of each theme and then rank the themes according to this cumulative impact. All methods indicate that NPIs belonging to the themes of social distancing, travel restrictions as well as healthcare and public health capacity lead to the most significant reductions of R_t . Environmental measures (e.g., cleansing public places) are ranked least effective in each approach.




Figure S2: Normalised scores of the NPI categories in CCCSL, averaged over the four different approaches.



Figure S3: Normalised scores of the NPI categories in CoronaNet, averaged over the four different approaches.




Figure S4: Normalised scores of the NPI categories in WHOPHSM, averaged over the four different approaches.

683 **Covariates.** We include the following covariates in all analyses. First, a country's epidemic
684 age when measure M was implemented, $A(M)$, defined as the number of days between the
685 implementation of the measure, T_M , and the first day with more than 30 confirmed cases, denoted
686 by T_0 , giving $A(M) = T_M - T_0$. Second, the baseline effective reproduction number, R_t^{BL} , is taken
687 at day $T_M + \tau$. Third and fourth, we include for each country the logarithms of its total population
688 P and population density D ⁵⁷. Furthermore, we include the number $N^{All}(T_M)$ of all implemented
689 L2 measures and the number $N^{L2}(T_M)$ of all measures (L2 or L3) from the same categories as M
690 that have been implemented before T_M . These covariates are supposed to capture whether a country
691 introduces the intervention under consideration early or late in relation to its epidemic age and the
692 number of measures already taken.

693 **Outcome variable.** As a dependent variable in the regression, we consider the change in
694 effective reproduction number after implementation of the measure, $\Delta R_t(\tau) = R_t^M(\tau) - R_t^{BL}$,
695 where R_t^M is the value of R_t taken on day $T_M + \tau$. We report the average of $\Delta R_t(\tau)$ taken over
696 time lags $0 < \tau \leq 28$.

697 **Matching.** As cases we include all countries implementing a given measure at a time
698 $A(M^c) > \tau$. As controls we consider all other countries that have not implemented this measure
699 within the observation window but that implemented any other intervention not more than one day
700 sooner or later than its matched case. These matching criteria ensure that we do not introduce a bias
701 by comparing countries that implemented any response with countries that did nothing at all and

702 maybe had the epidemics already under control.

703 **Additional country variables.** We consider variables that capture economic and human
704 development, as well as different dimensions of governance. Economic development is measured by
705 the country's per capita GDP adjusted for power purchasing parity (PPP)⁵⁸. Human development is
706 quantified by the human development index (HDI), an indicator provided by the United Nations
707 Development Programme taking life expectancy, education, and per capita income into account⁵⁹.
708 Finally, we consider six different dimensions of governance as quantified by the World Governance
709 Indicators (WGI)⁶⁰. These indicators include Voice & Accountability (free media, the extent to
710 which citizens participate in the government), Political Stability (including the absence of violence),
711 Government Effectiveness (quality of public services), Regulatory Quality (the ability of government
712 to implement sound policies), Rule of Law (the extent to which citizens abide by the rules of society)
713 and Control of Corruption.

714 **Statistical analysis and multiple testing.** A linear regression model of the form,

$$\Delta R_t \sim R_t^{BL} + A(M) + P + D + N^{All}(T_M) + N^{L2}(T_M) + X \quad , \quad (S1)$$

715 is evaluated for all NPIs meeting the inclusion criteria. We evaluate the above model for all measures
716 and permissible delays τ . We adjust for multiple testing by controlling the false discovery rate at
717 level 0.0001 via the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. We investigate the impact of the additional
718 country variables by evaluating models as in Eq. (S1) with an additional term for the considered
719 indicator.

720 **Lasso regression.** We assume that without any implemented NPIs, the $R(t)$ is constant, and
721 deviations are caused by a time-delayed onset of the effects of each NPI on L2. This hypothesis is
722 an oversimplification of the reality, but it allows to estimate this time-delay itself and to quantify
723 magnitudes of impacts for each NPI. A similar approach has been reported, for instance, in ¹⁹,
724 although the authors use a smaller list of NPIs.

725 Formally, this model for a single territory c is captured in the expression

$$\mathbf{R}_c^{\text{model}}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \tau) = (\beta_{\text{avg}} + \beta_c) \mathbf{1} + \sum_{\text{NPIs } M} \beta_M \boldsymbol{\Theta}_{A(M,c)+\tau} \quad (\text{S2})$$

726 Here, bold symbols indicate vectors containing discrete time-series, starting at 30 confirmed
727 cases for each country. The vector $\boldsymbol{\Theta}_t$ models a discrete version of the Heaviside function with
728 $\boldsymbol{\Theta}_t = (0, \dots, 0, 1, \dots, 1)$, with the step from 0 to 1 at position t . In Eq. (S2), $A(M, c)$ indicates
729 the day when a NPI M is implemented in territory c , and τ is the offset in days to account for
730 the time-delay until the NPIs affect the case numbers. The first term in Eq. (S2) is a constant
731 composed of the average effects β_{avg} and potential territory-specific effects β_c . For inference, we
732 concatenate all territories into one large vector. Thus, in total we need to estimate 126/326/265
733 coefficients $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_{\text{avg}}, \beta_{c_1}, \dots, \beta_{M_1} \dots)$ (1 constant, 79/218/224 territories and 46/107/40 NPIs
734 for CCCSL/CORONANET/WHOPHSM) in this model.

735 Regression is carried out by minimizing the target function

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\beta}} \left\{ \|\mathbf{R}^{\text{model}}(\boldsymbol{\beta}, \tau) - \mathbf{R}^{\text{data}}\|_2^2 + \alpha \|\boldsymbol{\beta}\|_1 \right\}, \quad (\text{S3})$$

736 to obtain values for $\boldsymbol{\beta}$. The first term is the Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) of the model with
737 respect to actual observation data. The second term penalises too large values of the coefficients

738 β , with α a penalty parameter that indicates the weight of this penalization in the optimization
739 procedure. Here, $\|\cdot\|_2$ and $\|\cdot\|_1$ denote the 2-norm (euclidean distance) and 1-norm (sum of absolute
740 values), respectively. The 1-norm for the penalizing term is characteristic for lasso regression ⁶¹,
741 which acts as feature selection by estimating multiple coefficient values β as zero. Formally, this
742 additional penalty term can be shown to be equivalent to assuming a Laplace-distribution prior
743 on all values in β . Thus, the tuning parameter α effectively balances the trade-off between two
744 objectives: the goodness of fit to the data (RSS) with the complexity of the model (second term)
745 ^{61,62}.

746 **Cross-validation and meta-parameter search.** This model includes two meta-parameters
747 (τ, α) , which are estimated by cross-validation to obtain a minimal RSS: At first, countries are
748 randomly assigned to one of 10 groups. Then, each of these country groups is dropped from the
749 vectors \mathbf{R} , and coefficients β are estimated via the minimization in Eq. (S3). These coefficients β
750 from the training group are used to compute an R_{Test}^2 value of the model on the dropped countries
751 to test how good the model can predict previously unseen observations. As the different country
752 groups can contain a different number of observations, we compute the overall R_{Test}^2 for a given set
753 of (τ, α) as

$$R_{\text{Test}}^2(\tau, \alpha) = 1 - \sum_{\text{groups } g} \text{RSS}_g(\tau, \alpha) / \sum_{\text{groups } g} \text{Var}(\mathbf{R}_g), \quad (\text{S4})$$

754 which weighs the individual coefficients of determination r^2 for each test with the variance in the
755 reproduction number \mathbf{R}_g within the test group. This whole procedure is carried out on a grid of
756 possible (τ, α) values, to find a set of meta-parameters, where the model Eq. (S2) can best describe

757 the data. Fig. S5 depicts the resulting values of R_{Test}^2 for a sufficient large range of meta-parameters.
758 As the overall curve for R_{Test}^2 is relatively flat, we repeat the cross-validation 30 times with different
759 assignments to the 10 country groups, which reduces the overall noise. The final R_{Test}^2 is then
760 computed using the same weighting procedure in Eq. (S4) for the set of all 20 repetitions and each
761 of the 10 territory groups within a repetition. We find that a time-offset of $\tau = 11/11/15$ days
762 and a penalty parameter $\alpha = 0.005623/0.00100/0.004217$ are the best parameters to describe the
763 observations with this model for the CCCSL/CORONANET/WHOPHSM, see Fig. S5.

764 **Final coefficient estimation.** We estimate the ranges of each NPI effectiveness shown in
765 Figs. S12, S16 and S20, using a territory-wise cross-validation, i.e., by reducing the sizes of test
766 groups to one. For each estimation leaving out one territory, we compute the coefficients β_M for
767 each NPI M and β_c for all territories c . We identify these coefficients β_M and β_c as the change
768 ΔR_t . Shown intervals contain 95% of all observed values, with the center indicating the median.
769 From the overall 126/355/305 coefficients β , the feature selection aspect of lasso regression finds
770 23/19/23 relevant NPI coefficients and 1/1/23 relevant territory coefficients, while other coefficients
771 are estimated as zero (for CCCSL/CORONANET/WHOPHSM) Note that this does not indicate that
772 these NPIs are useless to reduce the spread of the virus, but rather that the algorithm can explain all
773 observations with a smaller number of coefficients. The number of selected coefficients is highly
774 sensitive to the value of the penalty parameter, however, the more impactful NPIs are consistently
775 present with similar coefficients (see Fig S5CFI).




Figure S5: Cross-validation results for LASSO regression. (A,B,D,E,G,H) R^2 values for the test and training data, averaged over 30 repetitions of assigning countries into 10 groups for each of the three data sets (CCCSL/CORONANET/WHOPHISM). With smaller penalty parameters α , R^2_{Training} increases as the algorithm uses more NPIs to explain the training data. This overfitting, however, reduces the ability to fit the previously unseen test data. In contrast, for large penalty parameters α , not enough NPIs are used to explain the data, and the method cannot explain either training or test data. The optimal meta parameters are found as $(\tau, \alpha)_{\text{CCCSL}} = (11, 0.005623)$, $(\tau, \alpha)_{\text{CORONANET}} = (15, 0.004217)$ and $(\tau, \alpha)_{\text{WHOPHISM}} = (11, 0.00100)$ (C,F,I) Effects of all NPIs and territories vary when changing the penalty parameter α . However, most of the effects of the significant NPIs (see Figs. S12, S16 and S20) stay roughly constant, only the number of significant NPIs increases.

776 **Random forest regression.** We use random forest regression ⁶³ as a third method to assess the
777 impact of the implemented measures on the spreading of COVID-19, measured in terms of the
778 effective reproduction number R_t .

779 We represent for each country and each day of the observation period the NPIs which have
780 been implemented in that country until that day in the form of a binary vector. The analysis is
781 performed on the NPI categories (L2). The binary data on implemented NPIs in a given country on
782 day t is regressed on the value of R_t in that country τ days later, $R_{t+\tau}$. The time shift τ accounts
783 for the time delay between infection and case confirmation. We vary τ between $\tau = 0$ and $\tau = 20$.

784 Each random forest consists of 500 decision trees with maximum depth d . At each split of a
785 node in one of the trees in the random forest, m randomly selected NPI categories out of the total
786 number of 46 categories are considered. We employ bootstrapping, meaning that each decision tree
787 is fitted on a different random subset containing 75% of the rows of the predictor matrix.

788 To implement the random forest regression, we use the `RandomForestRegressor` class from
789 the python library `scikit-learn` ⁶⁴.

790 **Cross validation.** For each $0 \leq \tau \leq 20$, we use 10-fold country-wise cross validation to
791 determine the optimal values of the maximum tree depth d and percentage of considered features m .
792 We vary the parameters d and m in the range $1 \leq d \leq 15$ and $1 \leq m \leq 100$. For each combination
793 of d and m , we randomly split the set of all territories into a training set and a test set. The random

794 forest is trained on the training set data; subsequently, we measure the performance of this random
795 forest in predicting the time series of $R_{t+\tau}$ for the countries in the test set. As a performance metric,
796 we quantify the difference between the predicted time series of $R_{t+\tau}$ and the observed one by using
797 the coefficient of determination r^2 . We repeat the same procedure 10 times with different random
798 splits of the set of territories into training and test set. Then we take the mean of the coefficient of
799 determination over the 10 splits to obtain the average out-of-sample performance of the random
800 forest for this combination of d and m . The heatmap in Fig. S6 shows the dependence of the
801 performance of the random forest on unseen data depending on the parameters d and m for fixed
802 time shift $\tau = 10$.

803 **Feature importance.** To quantify the importance of a NPI, we measure the loss of predictive
804 performance of the random forest if the information carried by the given NPI is replaced by noise.
805 This measure of feature importance is also known as permutation importance. If the loss in
806 performance is high for a given NPI, then we conclude that knowledge of the implementation status
807 of this NPI is important for predicting $R_{t+\tau}$.

808 Specifically, for each time shift $0 \leq \tau \leq 20$ and each NPI M , we measure the reduction in
809 performance of the random forest in predicting $R_{t+\tau}$ for unseen data when the values in the column
810 corresponding to M are randomly shuffled. The maximum tree depth d and the percentage m of
811 features considered are set to their optimal values as determined in the cross-validation step. To
812 obtain sharp estimates for the permutation importance of the different NPIs we use repeated 10-fold
813 country-wise cross validation with 100 repetitions. Different NPIs attain their maximum value for




Figure S6: Heatmap of the predictive performance of the random forest depending on the maximum tree depth d and the percentage of features m considered at each split for time shift $\tau = 10$. The predictive performance is measured in terms of the coefficient of determination (r^2) on unseen data, averaged over 10 random splits of the territories into training and test sets.

814 different values of τ .

815 **Transformers modelling.** The temporal and dynamic nature of epidemic propagation finds a
816 suitable tool to model such a temporal evolution in Transformers⁵⁴. This neural network can recall
817 past events presented at the input by leveraging its innate ability to take into account the previous
818 information. The intrinsic Transformer architecture ensures this ability for all the temporal data is
819 represented and considered at once without recurrent connections as in Recurrent Neural Networks.
820 At a generic time t , to approximate the value of the effective reproduction number at time $t + 1$,
821 R_{t+1} , we use a Transformer whose input is the daily representation of the adopted measures in a
822 given country in binary form, similar to the encoding performed in Random Forest, along with the
823 value of R_t measured in the same day. The best performing network has been identified as having
824 four hidden layers of 128 neurons, an embedding size of 128, 8 heads, one output described by a
825 linear output layer, and 54 inputs ($measures \oplus R_t$, where \oplus is the concatenation operator). NPIs
826 are represented through a theta function over time, whose step position corresponds to the day when
827 the specific measure has been adopted in the selected country. For the neural network training,
828 10 out of 78 territories were chosen as the validation set, and the best neural network was found
829 when the mean square error between the values of the validation set and the corresponding network
830 outputs reached the minimum amount. Different Transformers training can lead to slightly different
831 predictions. Although the main trends of forecast maintain a substantial similarity across the
832 various training, the corresponding time evolution may change when some containment measures
833 are perturbed. This issue is possibly due to a large number of local minima affecting the neural
834 network's energetic panorama. To address this problem and to provide an adequate assessment of

835 the importance of the measures, we built an ensemble of trained Transformers with a comparable
836 level of training precision.

837 **Transformer ranking assessment.** This approach has been chosen to be consistent with
838 the other methods implemented in this paper, in which the impact of the NPIs is related to the
839 comparison between countries having or not having implemented a measure. Therefore the com-
840 parison is performed between the normal prediction of the Transformer after the application of a
841 given NPI and the corresponding prediction when the same measure is removed. The difference
842 between the predictions quantifies the impact of that NPI on the overall behaviour of R_t of the
843 selected country. The final relative importance of the containment measure $meas_i$ is then given
844 by $mean_{TF} [\sum_t (R^{TF}(t) - R_{meas_i}^{TF}(t)) / T]$, where $mean_{TF}(\cdot)$ is the mean operator over the RNN
845 ensemble, $R^{TF}(t)$ is the reproduction number predicted by the TF th network, $R_{meas_i}^{TF}(t)$ is the
846 corresponding temporal prediction when the measure $meas_i$ is removed, and T is the period over
847 which the assessment is performed.

848 **Transformer model at country level.** Implementing a Transformer as a general model for
849 describing the dependence on the measures of R_t allows, at the same time, to evaluate the impact
850 of the measures on a single country. Each country is identified by a specific temporal sequence of
851 applied measures and a unique R_t evolution over time. Then, we can interrogate the Transformer to
852 assess the importance of every single measure for that particular context by removing the measure
853 under investigation from the specific sequence as in the general knockout case and building an

854 associated ranking of NPIs for each country. For example, Fig. S7 shows the impact on R_t of the
855 NPI "Small gathering cancellation" in Italy when such a measure is removed from the temporal
856 sequence of adopted NPIs. This approach allows us to assess the country-specific NPI ranking.
857 By comparing these ranking across all countries, we measure the specificity of the impact of its
858 measures.

859 **What-If experiments with Transformers.** As mentioned above, Transformers offer the
860 possibility to perform what-if experiments, i.e., exploring different scenarios corresponding to
861 time-series of events different from the actual ones. This approach opens the possibility to ex-
862 amine scenarios corresponding to different combinations of NPIs. In the specific case of the
863 Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, starting from the actual
864 sequence of NPIs adopted by one particular country, we tested the efficacy of artificial sequences
865 by removing specific NPIs or shifting their adoption to other days. In this framework, one can
866 compare the actual evolution obtained through the synthetic sequence of actions to suitable reference
867 sequences. More specifically, we adopted the Transformers to assess what would have happened if
868 a given NPI had been adopted on a different day with respect to the actual day of adoption. To this
869 end, we adopted the following procedure:

- 870 • for each country and each NPI, we first compute a *knockout evolution* of the system by letting
871 the Transformer simulate the evolution of the system once the specific NPI has been removed.
- 872 • we create a synthetic sequence by keeping the sequence of NPIs of the country untouched




Figure S7: Example of the country-specific impact of an NPI. The plot shows the R_t increase when the NPI "Small gathering cancellation" is removed from the temporal measures sequence in Italy. Shaded areas are the standard deviations of the Transformer prediction averaged on the networks ensemble.

873 except for the specific NPI that is positioned in a generic day t_i . For that sequence, we
874 compute the evolution of the system as given by the Transformer, i.e., we calculate the time
875 evolution of R_t for the specific synthetic sequence.

876 • We repeat the above operation for a generic choice of the day of adoption, t_i , of the specific
877 NPI.

878 • For each country and each NPI, we compute the average difference between the synthetic
879 evolution of R_t with the specific NPI positioned at t_i and the knockout evolution over the 30
880 days following t_i . The average here is performed over several realisations of the Transformers.

881 • The outcome is a series of curves that, for each NPI, report the variation of R_t , ΔR_t , averaged
882 over all the countries that adopted that NPI and over several realisations of the Transformers.

883 Fig. S8 shows the effect of the selected NPI “Small gathering cancellation” in Italy if it had been
884 adopted on different days, compared to the case where the same NPI is absent (knockout evolution).

885 The reduction of R_t is visible, while the overall impact decreases as one shifts the day of adoption
886 ahead. The Transformer evolution, when the selected NPI is adopted on any other day, takes into
887 account the effect of all the other NPIs adopted in Italy and kept fixed throughout the simulation.

888 Fig. S9 reports the evolution of ΔR_t for a selection of NPIs that display a “the earlier, the better”
889 behaviour, that is, whose ability to reduce R_t tends to decrease with the epidemic age of their
890 adoption.




Figure S8: Example illustrating the what-if experiment described in the text. Here we consider the NPI “Small gathering cancellation” in Italy and we simulate what would happen if it had been taken at epidemic ages 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60. We then compare this evolution with an evolution obtained through a knowknout of the same NPI (knockout evolution). The other concurrent NPIs and their days of adoption are kept fixed throughout the simulation (green rectangles at the bottom).




Figure S9: Outcome of the what-if experiment performed with the Transformers. We report, for several NPIs, the behaviour of the averaged variation of R_t , ΔR_t (see text for the definition), when the NPI is adopted at a generic epidemic age compared with an evolution in which that NPI has been knocked-out. Negative (Positive) values of ΔR_t indicate a decrease (increase) of R_t .

891 **Results from the Case-control Analysis on country covariate effects.** The impact of different
892 country variables, including demographic and governance indicators, as well as measures for human
893 and economic development, are shown in Fig. S10. This heatmap presents the average standardised
894 coefficient values from all regression models for a given NPI category (L2) that yield a significant
895 impact on $R(t)$ for various delays (the average is taken over the delays). The standardised coefficient
896 values are the coefficient values (estimated change in R_t) divided by its standard error (SE); the
897 t -Statistic. The significant NPIs show effect sizes in reducing R_t of about 5 standard errors. Note
898 that no statements concerning causal relationships can be made based on these findings; we report
899 correlations from a cross-sectional analysis.

900 A number of NPIs appear to be less effective in countries with a high population density and
901 low GDP⁶⁵. Human development, as quantified by the Human Development Indicator, has no or
902 only very mild impacts on measure effectiveness. The governance indicators Political Stability and
903 Voice & Accountability are negatively correlated with the effectiveness of most measures. Most
904 of the remaining governance indicators show either no or moderately negative correlations. There
905 are, however, exceptions for some interventions that show consistently positive correlations with
906 government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, in particular
907 measures to increase the availability of medical supplies and PPE. It is unlikely that these results
908 are confounded by poor reporting in less developed countries, as such biases would affect R_t values
909 from before and after measure implementation similarly and hence cancel each other out. Although
910 there is no clear pattern concerning the influence of the total number of NPIs already implemented,
911 there seems to be a trend regarding the number of NPIs of the same category. As a general tendency,

912 having already implemented measures from a given category makes additional NPIs from the same
913 category more effective, hinting at a relationship where one measure (e.g., closure of restaurants)
914 amplifies the effectiveness of other related measures (e.g., home office).

915 **Results from the Random forest regression.** Figs. S13, S17 and S21 give the rankings of the
916 different NPIs in descending order according to their feature importance for the three analyzed
917 datasets.

918 **Results from Transformers Analysis.** We trained 20 different Transformers after selecting the
919 best out of 100 training procedures to build a representative ensemble of networks to address
920 multiple local minima issues. All the Transformers reached similar values of test loss with a relative
921 deviation of less than 5%. The NPIs impact evaluation is performed by averaging the difference
922 between the prediction and the prediction when a given measure is removed. The area under such a
923 difference normalized by the temporal amplitude represents the mean variation of $\Delta R(t)$.

924 **7 Robustness check and validation**

925 We check the robustness of the results obtained against removal of the Americas (North and South
926 America), Asia+Oceania, and Europe+Africa in the CCCSL dataset — see Figs. S24–S26. Note
927 that the only African countries in the data set are Ghana, Senegal and Mauritius, and the single
928 Oceanian country is New Zealand. Table S1 shows the number of consensus measures (i.e. NPIs
929 with a significant effect in all methods), as well as the expected number of consensus measures one
930 would expect under the assumption that the significant measures would be distributed independently




Figure S10: Impacts on $R(t)$ of country variables on measure effectiveness. The heatmap gives the average effect size (t-statistic) for a given NPI category (L2) (rows) and a country variable (columns). Blue (red) color indicates that the variable is positively (negatively) correlated with measure effectiveness.




Figure S11: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the CC analysis for CCCSL. The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S12: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the LASSO analysis for CCCSL. The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S13: Feature importance of the different NPIs in the random forest model for CCCSL. The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S14: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the Transformer analysis for CCCSL. The bars marking the 95% confidence intervals are too small to be visible.




Figure S15: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the CC analysis for CORONANET. The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S16: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the LASSO analysis for CORONANET.

The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.



Figure S17: Feature importance of the different NPIs in the random forest model for CORONANET.

The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S18: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the Transformer analysis for CORONANET.

The bars marking the 95% confidence intervals are too small to be visible.




Figure S19: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the CC analysis for WHOPHSM. The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S20: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the LASSO analysis for WHOPHSM. The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S21: Feature importance of the different NPIs in the random forest model for WHOPHSM.

The horizontal bars mark the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S22: Effectiveness, ΔR_t of the different NPIs in the Transformer analysis for WHOPHSM.

The bars marking the 95% confidence intervals are too small to be visible.

931 for the different methods.

932 Two external datasets further corroborate our findings. These datasets also contain dedicated
933 entries for policies related to mask wearing, which appear to show moderate reductions in R_t when
934 compared to the other measures discussed above. We further confirmed the estimated impact of all
935 consensus measures using two external datasets presenting a broader geographical coverage (and
936 therefore counting more individual NPIs). This large analysis is, to date, unique, and proves the
937 robustness of our results. It also shows that, although the NPI trackers have been built independently,
938 sometimes for different purposes, and present different semantics and structure (which is a limitation
939 to harmonizing results), their analysis provides convergent results with four methods, and the use of
940 a smaller number of countries (56 in the CCCSL versus ~ 200 in the CoronaNet and WHO-PHSM
941 datasets) does not qualitatively affect the outcome. This finding is of importance when analysis of
942 government policies needs to be conducted in emergency, to save computational time.

943 **8 Discussion of results, organized by L1 theme**

944 **Social distancing.** Bans of small gatherings (gatherings of 50 persons or less) and the closure of
945 educational institutions have a more substantial effect on R_t (but are also more intrusive to our
946 daily lives) than the prohibition of mass gatherings, measures targeting special populations (e.g.,
947 elderly, vulnerable populations, hospitalised patients, prisoners or more exposed non-healthcare
948 professionals) or adaptive measures for certain establishments (e.g., places of worship, admin-
949 istrative institutions, entertainment venues, nursing homes). While in earlier studies based on




Figure S23: Observed values for R_t (solid lines), together with the range of values for R_t as predicted from the different methods (shaded regions).




Figure S24: Analogue to Fig. 1 of the main text if the analysis is done on all countries except those in Europe and Africa.




Figure S25: Analogue to Fig. 1 of the main text if the analysis is done on all countries except those in Asia and Oceania.




Figure S26: Analogue to Fig. 1 of the main text if the analysis is done on all countries except those in North, Central or South America.

950 smaller numbers of countries, school closures had been attributed only a little effect on the spread
951 of COVID-19^{19,20}, more recent evidence has been in favour of the effectiveness of this NPI^{28,29}.
952 This is also in line with a contact tracing study from South Korea which identified adolescents
953 aged 10–19 as the biggest spreaders in household settings³⁰. Social distancing measures are less
954 effective in countries with a high population density and a high degree of citizen participation in the
955 government, as well as freedom of expression or free media (WGI Voice & Accountability). The
956 country-level analysis confirms that these NPIs have a particularly high entropy, meaning that their
957 effectiveness varies indeed substantially across countries. An exception to that are the measures for
958 public transport and work safety protocols, where the latter mostly refers to mandatory guidelines
959 for, e.g., physical barriers or fever checks at workplaces. These two social distancing measures have
960 a low effectiveness rank (little significance across the methods) and low entropy, meaning that they
961 had no impact on R_t consistently across most countries.

962 **Healthcare and public health capacity.** An increase in the availability of personal protective
963 equipment (PPE) to the healthcare workforce, together with measures aiming to reduce the num-
964 ber of non-COVID-19 or non-critical COVID-19 patients in medical centres and hospitals (by
965 promoting self-isolation of mildly symptomatic patients, setting up health hotlines, etc.) are also
966 essential building blocks of successful containment strategies. All of these measures combine high
967 effectiveness of early implementation and low entropy, meaning that they are similarly effective
968 in most countries. Actions aiming to enhance the health system are critical. They are the primary
969 response to patients and have no (or few) negative repercussions on individual rights of liberty
970 (exception on the travel restriction for healthcare workers imposed by several countries). Our results

971 demonstrate that government support to the health system needs to be a priority during a health
972 crisis in order to reduce mortality⁶⁶. In line with our result "the earlier, the better", we argue that
973 those actions must be taken early enough to prepare for a surge in healthcare demand. Compared to
974 other interventions, increased medical supplies and availability of PPE show substantially stronger
975 positive correlations with several governance indicators including government effectiveness and
976 control of corruption. Indeed, there are increased news reports currently on scandals related to
977 government procurement of PPE⁶⁷⁻⁶⁹.

978 **Travel restrictions.** Different types of travel restrictions also show significant effects, in particular
979 border restrictions (e.g., border closure, border controls), individual movement restrictions (e.g.,
980 curfews, the prohibition of non-essential activities) and cordons sanitaires (containment zones).
981 The high effectiveness of border restrictions is driven by European countries (its impact on R_t
982 turns insignificant in two of our methods after removing all European countries); most likely for
983 geographic reasons. This finding is in line with a high entropy score of border, airport, port and ship
984 as well as individual movement restrictions.

985 Effectiveness of ultimate measures such as stay-at-home orders or lockdowns is still con-
986 troversial. Recent studies suggest that a national lockdown reduces R_t by an average of 5%¹⁹ to
987 80%²⁰, whereas other interventions seem to reduce the virus spread by 5%²⁰ to 30%¹⁹. In some
988 countries or territories, the effect of a lockdown decided in the late stage of the epidemic may not be
989 more effective than previously implemented bans on gatherings^{19,20,70}. Our analysis highlights the
990 importance of early national lockdowns by showing how the relative effectiveness of that measure

991 correlates with the epidemic age of its adoption. However, the reduced effectiveness of lockdowns
992 at higher epidemic age, as observed in Fig. 4, does not necessarily imply that taking this NPI late is
993 useless.

994 **Risk communication.** In terms of risk communication, we find that pro-active communication with
995 stakeholders from the private sector (e.g., business owners or chief executive officers) to promote
996 voluntary safety protocols in enterprises, businesses, event organization, government administrations,
997 etc., shows a significant effect in each of the four analyses, mainly when implemented early. Three
998 out of four approaches also indicate a substantial impact of public health communication strategies
999 (i.e., non-binding NPIs) encouraging citizen engagement and empowering them with information.

1000 **Resource allocation.** Measures for resource allocation show limited impacts on R_t in our analysis
1001 (e.g., police and army interventions being insignificant in all studies) with relatively high entropy,
1002 meaning that country-level effects are important. Surprisingly, the implementation of crisis manage-
1003 ment plans turns out to be highly effective, except for the Americas. After removing countries from
1004 North and South America from the analyses, all four of our methods agree on significant effects of
1005 crisis management plans with an ΔR_t of down to -0.3 , suggesting a lack of *effective* crisis plans
1006 in American territories. For instance, US states had to focus on providing health insurance and
1007 economic stimulus as well as facilitating administrative procedures, while European countries could
1008 develop their plans on top of a stronger socio-economic basis^{71,72}. Crisis management plans are
1009 also more effective in countries with a non-participatory government, meaning that countries with
1010 increasingly authoritarian practices might be at an advantage at implementing such policies, as can

1011 be seen in the swift response of Singapore ⁷³.

1012 **Case identification, contact tracing and related measures.** NPIs related to case identification
1013 and contact tracing show some of the lowest effectiveness ranks and in some cases even increase R_t ,
1014 consistently across most countries (NPIs with the five lowest entropy scores all belong to this theme).
1015 This result is to be expected, as, e.g., increased testing and faster contact tracing will on the short-run
1016 increase the numbers of found cases in return for reduced numbers in the long run. We do not assess
1017 such long-term effects (over timespans of more than a month) in the current work. Furthermore,
1018 note that our analysis considers mostly data from March and April 2020 where many countries
1019 experienced surges of case numbers that most likely hindered effective contact tracing and other
1020 case identification measures. This also applies to the relative ineffectiveness of quarantining people
1021 who either are infected or were exposed to infected persons, while the promotion of self-isolation of
1022 people with symptoms was one of the most effective NPIs. This result confirms a tendency in our
1023 results where voluntary measures are more effective than similar mandatory ones.

1024 **9 Additional tables**

L2 category	L3 subcategories
Small gathering cancellation	Complete prohibition of gathering; Closure of restaurants/bars/cafes; Closure of non-essential shops; Limit up to 5 persons; Implement part-time work; Mandatory home office; Limit up to 10 persons; Restriction on private and familial events; Limit up to 30 persons; Limit up to 2 persons; Remote Psychotherapy Consultation; Limit up to 6 persons; Limit up to 20 persons; Closure of short-term accommodation; Limit up to 1 persons; Closure of student dormitories; Reduce close physical contact in workplaces; Mandatory 2m distance in public spaces; Limit up to 3 persons; Limit up to 50 persons; Limit up to 4 persons; Limit up to 25 persons; Non-critical court operations suspended
Closure of educational institutions	Complete closure of kindergartens; Complete closure of primary and secondary schools; Complete closure of universities; Reduction of excursions, out-of-house events; Complete closure of all educational institutions; Cancellation of exams; Partial closure of primary and secondary schools; Partial closure of universities; Complete closure of secondary schools; Extracurriculars cancelled; Partial closure of educational institutions; Rules for exams; Partial closure of kindergartens; Restrictions on exams; Closure of adult educational schools; Complete closure of scientific institutions; Complete closure of research institutes

L2 category	L3 subcategories
Border restriction	Land borders closed; Land borders closed; Entry ban to people from high-risk areas other than China; Land border controls; Entry ban to non-citizens; Conditional entry of persons from neighboring countries; Conditional entry of citizens; Entry ban to non EU citizens; Temporary reduction of service; Entry ban to people from China; Entry ban to refugees; Entry ban for symptomatic people and case contacts; Travel ban to high-risk areas; Total entry ban; Close land border to prevent virus spread; Entry ban to infected persons; Entry ban to people with a travel history to China; Ban on passenger transport from China; Force departure of Chinese nationals; Border control; Suspension of passenger railway transports crossing the country border; Restriction of freight transport; Ban on road passenger transport from high risk areas
Increase availability of PPE	PPE for healthcare professionals; Face masks; PPE (not specified); PPE other than face masks; Prohibition of export of protective personal equipment; Hand sanitizers; Increase domestic production of PPE
Individual movement restrictions	Movements for non-essential activities forbidden; Curfew; Non-essential travels abroad/out-of-state forbidden; Segmentation of the population; Partial restriction on movements; Prohibition of moving out the municipality of residence; Restrictions on the movements of children
National lockdown	for 21 days; For 2 weeks; Stay-at-home Order; Safer-at-home Order

Table S3: Subcategories (L3) belonging to the eight consensus categories (L2) identified as significant by all four methods.

Continents	Number of consensus measures	Expectation value
Europe and Africa	4	1.05
Asia and Oceania	2	1.05
Americas	6	2.40

Table S1: Number of consensus NPIs after removal of the indicated continents, compared to the expected number of consensus NPIs if the significance of the NPIs in the different methods was statistically independent.

L3 category	L2 category	ΔR_t (SE)	p -value
Warning against travel to and return from high risk areas	Travel alert and warning	-0.14(1)	< 10⁻⁷
Encourage stay at home	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.14(1)	< 10⁻⁴
Promote social distancing measures	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.20(2)	< 10⁻⁴
Promote workplace safety measures	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.19(2)	< 10⁻⁴
Promote self-initiated isolation of people with mild respiratory symptoms	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.19(2)	0.0001
Information campaign	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.13(2)	0.0003
Respiratory etiquette	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.10(1)	0.0005
Answer to questions	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.077(1)	0.0007
Call for return of nationals living abroad	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.25(2)	0.0009
Recommendations for work safety protocols	Actively communicate with managers	-0.13(2)	0.0013
Encourage self-initiated quarantine	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.19(2)	0.005
Communication targets protection of vulnerable populations	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.14(2)	0.007
Guidelines	Actively communicate with managers	-0.14(2)	0.02
Information about travels	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.17(3)	0.02
Direct government communication	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.072(2)	0.02
Encourage hand hygiene	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.084(2)	0.03
Direct advice to vulnerable populations	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.14(3)	0.04
Foster community assistance	Educate and actively communicate with the public	-0.14(2)	0.04

Table S2: Results of the CC analysis for risk communication NPIs on level L3. For each measure we give the change in R_t with the SE in brackets and its p -value. Measures with significant effects after a multiple testing correction are highlighted in bold.