

# REBELLION UNDER THE BANNER OF ISLAM



VERHANDELINGEN  
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94

C. VAN DIJK

REBELLION UNDER THE BANNER OF ISLAM

THE DARUL ISLAM IN INDONESIA



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## PREFACE

It was never originally my intention to write a book on *Darul Islam* in Indonesia. The idea of writing an article of this subject grew gradually while I was doing research for a study on political developments in Indonesia in general between 1959 and 1973, when it appeared necessary to gather more information on the various attempts to establish an Islamic state there. The volume of – for the greater part unused – material about these *Darul Islam* attempts, about which so far very little has been published, turned out to be so vast that the article developed into a book. This way I ended up with the present book on *Darul Islam* instead of the previously planned one on the political developments after 1959 (although a work on the latter subject has been mentioned under my name as a completed thesis in at least one bibliography on Indonesian politics, cf. Sritua Arief and Melanie Sritua Arief (1978)).

The point of reference, however, remained the same. Thus, one should not expect a treatise concentrating on the religious aspects of the efforts to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. The *Darul Islam* movement, which presented the Islamic State of Indonesia as an alternative to the religiously neutral Indonesian Republic, is dealt with within the framework of the political situation in Indonesia since 1945, and the varying outlooks of different competing groups on the concrete structure of the Indonesian state.

In the preparation of this study much valuable help and support was received from a number of people and organizations. Its completion would never have been possible without the generous assistance of the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV), which has helped me in many ways. First of all its board gave me permission to devote part of my time to research for the book. Later it granted me leave of absence for a considerable length of time for this purpose. It also contributed financially to the costs of my visits to Indonesia in June and July 1976 and from June to September 1978. The

second trip was made possible also by a travelling grant from the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO). Very kind assistance was also received from the library staffs of the KITLV and of the National Museum in Jakarta.

A special word of thanks is due to Anita G. van 't Oostende, who typed the draft of the manuscript. I am especially indebted to Hans Borkent for drawing the maps, and in conclusion, to the KITLV's Editorial Department for its contribution to the completion of the definitive version. Maria J.L. van Yperen corrected my "Dutch" English. Heleen Tigchelaar en Frieda de Back made the final draft ready for the press.

## A NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF INDONESIAN NAMES AND TERMS

Since in 1972 a new spelling system, the *Ejaan Bahasa Indonesia yang disempurnakan*, was introduced in Indonesia, a few words on the rules followed for the spelling of Indonesian names and workds in this book may not be amiss: The names of Indonesian organizations and associations are spelt according to the new system, as are all Indonesian words and sentences quoted in the text. For the spelling of geographical names, *Indonesia and Portuguese Timor. Official standard names approved by the United States Board on geographic names*, 2nd ed., Washington D.C., 1968, has been followed, with adaptations to the new orthography where relevant. For personal names the spelling used by the persons concerned themselves or that in general vogue during the period under consideration was chosen. As the resultant spelling is as a rule that of the old system, everywhere a person is introduced for the first time the transcription of his name in the new orthography is added between brackets in order to avoid confusion, though this procedure calls for an apology to scholars familiar with Arabic, who may be shocked at seeing such Arabic names as Ahmad and Wahid spelt, via the old spelling in Indonesian with "ch", as Akhmad and Wakhid. In personal names the (old) 'oe', however, is generally written as (new) 'u', except where the personal preference of the person concerned is known to have been for 'oe', as in the case of Soeharto, Soekarno and Roem.

For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the Indonesian language, it should be pointed out that the consonants ch, j, nj, sj, and tj of the old spelling have become respectively kh, y, ny, sy and c in the new one. For Arabic words in an Indonesian context the new Indonesian spelling has also been used. In the few instances in which this has not been done the system of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, New Edition, Leiden, 1960, was adopted.

## VIII

### ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Angkatan Bersenjata
ANP-Aneta	Indonesische Documentatie Dienst van A.N.P.- Aneta 's-Gravenhage
BBM	Berita Buana Minggu
BI	Berita Indonesia
BIES	Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
BKI	Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
DM	Duta Masjarakat
DP	Djakarta Dispatches
I	Indonesia
IB	Indonesia Berdjuang
IM	Indonesia Merdeka
IMM	Indonesië van Maand tot Maand
KB	Kalimantan Berdjuang
KITLV	Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volken- kunde
M	Merdeka
N	Nusantara
NIB	Officiële bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands- Indonesische betrekkingen 1945-1950
PR	Pikiran Rakjat
SMI	Soera Muslimin Indonesia



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## INTRODUCTION

Since 1945 there have been several attempts in Indonesia to change the Government by forcible means, either through a rebellion or through a coup d'état. Some of these attempts have been documented and studied in detail. So a veritable flood of books, articles and documents has seen the light on the coup d'état of September 1965. Also relatively well studied is the Madiun Affair of September 1948.

Strangely enough, and in sharp contrast, the rebellion which both as regards duration and number and size of the areas affected was the most important of all has up to now received scant attention from scholars. Very little has accordingly been published on this so-called *Darul Islam* rebellion, which strove for the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia. Only in the most recent years have some studies on it appeared (cf. Harvey 1974; Jackson 1971). These have invariably restricted themselves to only one particular area which experienced a *Darul Islam* rebellion, however, not treating the movement — operative as it was in different parts of Indonesia — as a whole.

The aim of the present book is to describe each of these several *Darul Islam* rebellions and to identify some of the factors which may help to explain their outbreak and persistence. Starting in West Java, where the Islamic State of Indonesia, or *Negara Islam Indonesia*, was proclaimed on August 7th, 1949, the movement subsequently spread to parts of Central Java, to South Kalimantan (Borneo), to South Sulawesi (Celebes) and to Aceh. *Darul Islam* activity was also reported in the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Moluccas and Halmahera. In these regions, however, it took the form of a process of infiltration from South Sulawesi, without developing into a full-scale guerilla, nor did it become as widespread as in the other regions. In most of these other areas the rebellious movement showed remarkable tenacity and spread over a fairly large area for quite some time. It was not until the early sixties that the Indonesian Army successfully suppressed the various risings. In West Java it was stamped out around 1962, in Kalimantan around 1963, and in Sulawesi around 1965. In the remaining areas this did not take quite as long. In Central Java

the irregularities came to an end around 1955, while in Aceh, where the rising began relatively late, in 1953, a compromise was reached in 1957, with the last rebels surrendering in 1962.

Each of these different *Darul Islam* movements of course has its own history. It is even open to question whether in treating them all as part of a single movement we are not distorting reality. Nevertheless, it is useful to look for common denominators. For in the first place, there were contacts between the various *Darul Islam* movements which resulted in a blueprint for an Islamic State of Indonesia Government encompassing the whole of the territory of Indonesia. Secondly, the tracing of common factors may provide some insight into the problems of nation-building in newly independent states in general.

This study sets out first of all to reconstruct the factual history of the *Darul Islam* rebellion and the events leading up to its outbreak. In the absence of easily accessible literature to which one may refer, the description of the movement in the various areas had necessarily become rather lengthy. Use was made primarily of books and articles with scattered references to the rebellions and/or connected events, such as regional monographs, military histories, biographies, and reports in national and regional newspapers. For the consultation of these materials the libraries of the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV) in Leiden and of the National Museum (*Museum Nasional*) in Jakarta proved invaluable.

The descriptions of the *Darul Islam* risings in the respective provinces are meant to serve three additional purposes. Firstly, because it is so scantily described, the great impact which the rebellion as a whole had at the time and the hardship which it caused tend to be easily overlooked or underestimated, whereas in actual fact it rendered large parts of Indonesia insecure for years, with many people actively supporting one of the two sides, either of their own volition or under duress, or being caught between two fires. Secondly, in the analysis of the motives inducing people to rise in rebellion it appeared to be necessary, in order to gain an understanding of the *Darul Islam*, to take the developments during the Indonesian struggle for independence between 1945 and 1950 into consideration. As the local circumstances varied greatly during this period, and each of the various regions was affected differently by the war against the Dutch, the relevant events in each area had to be described. This way it was possible to bring out the differences within the overall similarity, or, to rephrase the Indonesian national device, the "diversity in

unity". Thirdly, and connected with the preceding point, the emphasis on and relative strength of the contributing factors varied from region to region. In Aceh, for instance, the rebellion combined religious inspiration with opposition to the increasingly pervasive influence of the Central Government. In South Sulawesi the demobilization of former guerillas after 1950 was decisive. In South Kalimantan the underestimation of local achievements in the struggle for independence figured prominently. In West and Central Java the *Darul Islam* rising was the result of a conflict over territorial autonomy, with strong Islamic overtones, sometimes mixed with millenarian beliefs.

In all the areas concerned the social processes which provided a fertile soil for disorders and uprisings in general had been under way already for some time. The authority of the traditional elite had been undermined by its association with colonial rule; the established mechanism whereby rural society took care of its destitute members had been weakened by the commercialization of agriculture and the opening up of the interior; differences in wealth and land ownership had become more pronounced; and the mobile work force of the estates and the mining industry had increased in size.

The first chapter of this book sketches the life and background of the most important *Darul Islam* leader and the architect of the Islamic State of Indonesia: Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, generally simply referred to as Kartosuwirjo. It traces his prewar political career and describes his views on the attitude the Islamic community should adopt in a colonial society. In the same chapter attention is given to the constitutional debate in 1945 on the ideological basis of the Indonesian State. For the discussions in this connection taking place just before and after the proclamation of independence testify to the sensitive nature of this issue, the questions raised then still occasionally coming up today. It is impossible to understand post-war Indonesian political problems without taking them into consideration, in fact. This also applies to the *Darul Islam*. One cannot place this movement in its true perspective within the Indonesian Islamic community as a whole without being aware of the delicacy of these discussions and of the actual options open. Broadly speaking, there were three alternatives: an Islamic state, a state based on the *Pancasila* as set out in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution as the former's "secular" antipode, and a state form as defined in the Jakarta Charter as a compromise solution.

This Jakarta Charter, representing a variant version of the

*Pancasila*, prescribes the obligation for Muslims to observe Islamic law, being the reflection of a compromise reached between proponents of an Islamic and those of a “secular” state in June 1945. In the end, on August 18th, 1945, it was dropped from the constitution again. Its importance lies in the fact that in later years it became a political vehicle for those Muslims who rejected the violent *Darul Islam* course, and who wished to achieve their Islamic ideals by legal, constitutional means. This gives rise to the intriguing question of why some people were prepared to take up arms in the pursuit of their ideals and others were not, and why armed resistance was restricted to particular areas.

In the search for an answer to this question, which prompted the present study, the recent history of the regions concerned has been traced and an attempt has been made to identify those characteristics that set these regions apart from other areas in Indonesia. So in the next five chapters the political history of the relevant regions – West Java, Central Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Aceh – and their respective *Darul Islam* risings is outlined. Each of these historical outlines consists of two parts. The one deals with the relation between the official Republican Army and the irregular armed groups operating alongside it, in particular the Muslim ones, during the struggle for independence, as well as with the attempts to impose central authority and the reactions this provoked. The other is concerned with the *Darul Islam* itself in the relevant region: its activities, its struggle against the Republican Army, its internal conflicts, and its ultimate defeat.

In the seventh and concluding chapter the question of why people joined the *Darul Islam* is discussed. Four contributing factors are suggested. Two of these have already been mentioned above, namely the *relation between the official Republican Army and the irregular guerilla units*, and the *expansion of Central Government control* with its administrative and economic consequences. The other two are the *changes in landownership and Islam*.

The *first factor*, that of the *relation between the official Republican Army and the irregular guerilla units*, had its roots in the special conditions of the war of independence between 1945 and 1950. In Indonesia this war was not fought by one single official Republican Army. Many other armed groups participated in the struggle besides, and a great many irregular units, sometimes referred to as “wild guerilla groups”, operated alongside

the official Republican Army, which controlled these only on paper. These irregular units all possessed a local, an ideological and an ethnic character, but can be broadly classified into three groups, according to the emphasis that is placed upon one or other of these facets.

Firstly, there were the virtually purely local guerilla groups, which each operated in a small and well-defined area. They recruited their members almost exclusively from among the local population and had as sole concern the struggle against the Dutch. Even so, they might constitute a potential source of trouble for the Republican Army where the latter entered the home base of such local groups.

With the second type of irregular units the ideological, or religious, aspect was predominant. These units might be affiliated to or come under the auspices of a particular political party. Alternatively, they might have gradually broken away from the relevant political party and continued the struggle for the realization of their ideological or religious aims without an institutionalized relation with any political party. This type included such groups as *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah*, which were originally *Masyumi* units. Units of this type might also possess a strong local component. None the less, their ideological foundation gave them a national perspective that set them apart from the purely local groups.

In the case of the third type of irregular units the ethnic component was predominant. It included two sub-types, the one consisting of units operating in their home area, the other of units with headquarters in Java which were made up of people from other islands who had migrated to Java. The objective of this second sub-type was partly to fight the Dutch in Java, partly to achieve the liberation of their own region. Examples of this are the *Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi* (KRIS), *Pemuda Indonesia Maluku* (PIM), and *Ikatan Perjuangan Kalimantan* (IPK). Both sub-types differ from the first type, that of the purely local groups, in that the area for which they claimed responsibility and from which they recruited their members was very much larger, and comprised not just villages or districts, but entire ethnic communities, provinces, and even whole (large) islands.

Some of these "wild" guerilla units provided the core of the *Darul Islam Army*, the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII), or Islamic Army of Indonesia. In Java these were the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah*, in Sulawesi the KRIS (and the organizations that sub-

sequently developed from it), and in Kalimantan the ALRI Div. IV, or Fourth Naval Division.

Armed clashes between the Republican Army and the irregular units and between the irregular units themselves occurred as early as the first years of the struggle for independence. The causes of these were mostly conflicts over arms, which were very scarce at the time, alleged encroachments on regional and military autonomy, and competition for hegemony. The mutual hostility grew stronger from 1948 till around 1955, when the Republican Army's superiority was increasingly felt and the irregular units experienced the impact of its policy of reorganization and demobilization. The requirements for admission to and promotion within the Republican Army were such that the members of the irregular units – with their poor level of military training and general education – were at a distinct disadvantage. Disillusionment over their demobilization or at the position assigned them in the Republican Army induced many of the ex-guerillas to join the *Darul Islam*. In one instance, in South Sulawesi, this even constituted the immediate cause of an uprising of large units of former guerillas.

The problems with the irregular units are related to the *second factor*, that of *expanding central control*. The conflicts with the Republican Army had their parallel in those provoked by the Civil Administration. Here, too, local interests had to give way to Central Government ones. The attempts to build up a loyal regional administration gave rise to accusations that it was trying to Javanize the civil service. To make matters worse, in areas outside Java many local incumbents of functions in the Republican Civil Administration in 1945 and 1950 were replaced, or at any rate refused recognition as such. As in the case of the Republican Army, the confrontation was in part again one between knowledge and skill on the one hand and revolutionary élan on the other. An additional difficulty was that the loyalty of the Armed Forces and Administration in the outer regions was supposed to lie first and foremost with the Central Government and not with the region concerned. Furthermore, the Republic's acceptance of a federal structure for Indonesia meant a sacrifice of the interests of those inhabitants of the Member States who had carried on the struggle for a unitary Indonesian Republic and had established counter-administrations in these Member States, as was most evident in South Kalimantan.

In the economic field as well the Central Republican Government was accused of advancing the interests of the Javanese to



the detriment of the outer regions. It was felt that Java was getting a disproportionate share of the export earnings which ought in the first place to accrue to the exporting regions themselves. Moreover, local foreign trade was adversely affected by Central Government schemes aimed at establishing control over that sector, while other schemes regarding the production and quality of certain export crops gave rise to conflicts with local producers.

As the *Darul Islam* rising was a rural rebellion, the *third factor* discussed is that of the *agrarian structure*. It should be borne in mind here that this rebellion took place in relatively prosperous parts of Indonesia, and that it was not just an incidental, short-lived, local outburst of local discontent. On the contrary, it displayed considerable tenacity and encompassed large areas.

In attempts to explain the underlying basis of agrarian unrest in Indonesia and other areas in Southeast Asia some authors have pointed to the disruptive effects on village life of colonial rule or Western economic penetration. Under the influence of increasingly frequent contacts with the outside world a change occurred in the existing economic and social relations. Jacoby (1961:37), for example, has stressed the importance of "the introduction of Western economic methods, the disintegration of the old village economy, and the disruption of the traditional uniformity of village life" in his discussion of the strong rural base of the nationalist movement in Indonesia before 1950. Scott (1972) mentions the commercialization of agriculture and the effects of colonial rule on the patron-client relationship in this connection.

The problem is, however, as Van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:175) has pointed out, that the changes brought about by contact with the West took place gradually, and that "since in general these changes were not catastrophic, little attention was accorded to them in the pre-war years, and none at all in the troubled post-war period". He concludes that "although there are accordingly few guideposts to follow in this field of enquiry, it can safely be assumed that gradual changes have been taking place in Indonesian society for a considerable time, changes which verged on the catastrophic during the Japanese occupation and the post-war revolution and its aftermath".

Van Nieuwenhuijze is one of the few authors to have written about the *Darul Islam*, and one of the even fewer to have taken the socio-economic aspect into account, though he has simply acknowledged its existence without further elaboration. In fact, apart from studies dealing with the pre-war period, like Sartono

Kartodirdjo's (1966), there are none which treat rural risings in Indonesia, perhaps because the *Darul Islam* has escaped the attention of scholars. If any attention is given to the subject at all, this is only in the negative sense of explaining why this kind of movement was absent in this country (cf. Mortimer 1974). The present study argues that, with some modifications, the regions that experienced a *Darul Islam* rebellion were affected by processes which are generally suggested as contributing factors in explanations of peasant rebellions in other countries.

My point of departure is Wolf's observation (1969:278) that the changing status of land, namely from an attribute of the kinship group or community to a private commodity, is a factor underlying peasant rebellions. Indeed, pre-war studies on the relevant regions indicate that this process was most advanced here as compared with other parts of Indonesia. Its consequences were a certain concentration of land ownership and the growth of a mobile group of labourers available for work as farmhands or on estates and in industry. In the section on the agrarian structure this development is briefly outlined. With respect to West Java this is followed by a discussion of the study on the *Darul Islam* of West Java by Jackson (1971). The latter argues that the choice of villagers in the matter of whether or not to join the *Darul Islam* was determined by the position taken by their leaders, as bearers of traditional authority. The definition of this latter concept given by Jackson and the methods used by him in his study do not, however, justify his conclusion.

Judging from the literature on the regions concerned of before the war and the years immediately following it the *Darul Islam* areas, as Vink (1941) has shown, were those in which the individualization of land ownership was most advanced. Whereas in particular in Central and East Java the reaction to colonial pressure involved a process of "shared poverty", in the *Darul Islam* areas it led to one of increased differentiation in wealth and land ownership precisely because the social mechanism whereby traditionally a surplus was redistributed within the community lost in effectiveness. Outside backing diminished dependence on local approval and support, while improved access to the markets increased the opportunities for disposal of food and other commodities.

The *fourth factor* to be discussed is that of *religion*. The title of this book notwithstanding, religion is not discounted as a motivating force. Throughout Indonesian history people have rallied around the banner of Islam to resist the infidel foreign

colonizer. In the *Darul Islam* movement it was no longer foreigners who were singled out as an enemy and opposed, but fellow-Indonesians and fellow-Muslims. In view of this, and taking into account the religious character of the regions concerned, one may be tempted to regard *Darul Islam* as a movement of strict Muslims trying to establish a state in which a pure form of Islam was adhered to. The real picture is much more complicated, however, with such heterodox elements as belief in the coming of a Just King or of an era of peace and prosperity accounting for at least part of the popular support the movement enjoyed. Moreover, even faithful Muslims were subject to attacks for no other reason than that they were openly critical of the movement or withheld their active support.

I have not in the present study adopted a mono-causal approach to the *Darul Islam*. As Jacoby (1961:37) has observed, "It is always a plurality, a combination of factors, which leads to the final historical result". In our case the *Darul Islam* assumed its definite shape as the result of a combination of conflicts of interests and outlooks within the Armed Forces, resistance to an increasingly pervasive central authority, gradual changes in the agrarian structure, and Islamic views and ideals. Mutually distinct though these four were, they at the same time influenced one another. The first two, as was said above, were quite closely related phenomena. The hostile attitude towards Javanese dominance, moreover, was reinforced by distrust of the nature of the beliefs held by Javanese Muslims. Further, and in conclusion, Islam itself, with its regulations regarding private property, is only calculated to stimulate the individualization of land ownership.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE DARUL ISLAM, ITS PRELUDE

#### 1. Introduction

The area where the *Darul Islam* movement first started, and from which in later years it was to spread to other parts of Indonesia, is the mountainous region of West Java, extending eastwards from Bandung to the border with Central Java. Generally when people speak of the *Darul Islam* rebellion it is this area that they have in mind. It is often forgotten that similar and related rebellions also occurred in other parts of Indonesia, adding to the difficulties of the successive governments of Indonesia in suppressing the rebellion, as well as strengthening the gruesome connotation of the words *Darul Islam* in some circles.

*Darul Islam* (Arabic *dār al-Islām*) means literally the “house” or “home” of Islam, i.e. “the world or territory of Islam”. It refers to the Islamic part of the world where the Islamic faith and the observance of Islamic law and regulations are obligatory. Its opposite is the *Darul Harb*, “the territory of war, the world of the infidels”, which is gradually to be included in the *dār al-Islām*.

In Indonesia the words *Darul Islam* are used to describe the post-1945 movements which tried by force to realize the ideal of a *Negara Islam Indonesia*, or Islamic State of Indonesia.

During the first few years of the Indonesian revolution there was as yet no crystallization of the *Darul Islam* movement. Islamic leaders in Jakarta and other urban centres submitted to the agreements reached on the Constitution of 1945 and the *Pancasila* and recognized the Indonesian Republic as their state, which they had hopes of eventually, after the defeat of the Dutch, turning into an Islamic state. It was outside these urban centres and, as was to become clear in later years, independently of the urban or urbanized Islamic leaders that the *Darul Islam* would take shape. But in the rural areas as well it took some time for the *Darul Islam* movement to develop into a dangerous alternative to the Indonesian Republic.

The relatively late development of the *Darul Islam* was partly due to the fact that there was a common enemy to be defeated first. Unarming retreating Japanese units, opposing British interference and resisting the returning Dutch demanded everyone's full attention, and for a while relegated ideological differences to the background. It was partly due also to the fact that neither the *Darul Islam* nor the Republican leaders were at all prepared for the Japanese surrender and the subsequent proclamation of independence, and had first to organize and gain control over their following.<sup>1</sup>

The situation in Java, and even more so on the other islands of Indonesia in the months following the proclamation of independence by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta on August 17th, 1945, was unique. Independence was proclaimed, a Government was formed and a Parliament (actually a Central Indonesian Committee with only advisory powers) instituted, but that in fact was all. The leaders of the new Republic had had no opportunity to develop a bureaucratic and military apparatus. Formal control remained in the hands of the Japanese, made responsible by the Allies for preserving law and order until the allied troops landed. Sometimes the Japanese authorities were sympathetic to the cause of the Republic and assisted it in a number of ways, sometimes they took a neutral stand. In other instances they acted contrary to the interests of the Republic, which in some places resulted in serious clashes between Japanese troops and Indonesian armed groups trying to occupy Japanese premises or to seize Japanese arms.<sup>2</sup>

An indigenous bureaucratic and military apparatus, as indicated above, had still to be built up by the Republican leaders. In the main cities they could rely on the Indonesian personnel of Japanese government institutions for this. When after the first confusing days the news of the Japanese surrender and the proclamation of independence became more widely known, in fact, the more important central and regional government offices were taken over by their Indonesian employees, sometimes with the tacit support of the Japanese authorities, and in other cases after their threatened or actual occupation by large crowds of demonstrators.

The extension of Republican authority to the countryside met with many more difficulties. In the cities the building up of a Republican government apparatus was facilitated by the presence of a vast number of more or less educated, nationalistic and radical youth alienated from traditional society. They con-

stituted, as van Baal (1976:103–104) has put it, a separate “tribus”, no longer identifying themselves with the ethnic group they originated from, but thinking of themselves as members of a larger society: the Indonesian one. In the countryside, however, the Republican Government had to rely upon traditional civil servants, who had already been deprived of much of their prestige in the colonial period and were identified by the population with the much hated, cruel Japanese regime.

In the first months after the Japanese surrender the latent conflict between the local population and its traditional rulers, now no longer backed by the Dutch or Japanese regimes as they were, in many places violently erupted. Not only in Java but also elsewhere the Republican Government was confronted with popular rebellions against the traditional local leaders whom the Government, for lack of suitable alternatives, had chosen to be its representatives in the rural areas.

The situation was aggravated and complicated by the absence of a well organized Republican Army. True, an Army had been formed, first, in order not to embarrass the Japanese, in the guise of a People’s Security Corps (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*, BKR), later, after October 5th 1945, officially under the name of People’s Security Army (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*, TKR). But, as was also the case with the Civil Administration in the early phase of the revolution, its actual control of the local situation was more of a fiction than a reality. As Anderson puts it: “The TKR rose out of the revolution itself, from the lap of the people themselves, growing up according to local conditions, without planning, leadership, or equipment from the state. Each unit worked for itself, naturally no one knew how many there were, nor how many men or arms they contained” (Anderson 1972:236).

Besides the lack of effective control by the Army Command, the Army also had to cope with the spontaneous growth of a great variety of local armed units and organizations originating outside it. The local Army units seemed in those first months to be but a tiny few amongst the vast number of armed revolutionary groups.

It was these local groups, sometimes no more than mere bands, and often, in the tradition of the pre-war rebellious movements, headed by local Islamic leaders, that spearheaded the assault on traditional authority. As such, local discontent often developed along the dividing lines defined by the long-standing antagonism between Islam and customary law (*adat*), or between Islam and traditional rulers.

Some of these popular uprisings occurred in areas which were in later years to experience a *Darul Islam* rebellion. The most notable, and also best documented, of these took place in Aceh, and in Java around Tegal, but other regions also witnessed so-called social revolutions.<sup>3</sup>

As Islamic leaders played an important role in mobilizing the local population, not only against the Dutch but also against the traditional leaders, and moreover had no contact with the Republican centre, it is not surprising that the first efforts to organize society according to Islamic principles should have been made in the context of these uprisings.

C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, one of the first, and for a long time the only, author on the *Darul Islam*, in trying to trace the origins of the *Darul Islam* movement in West Java, identifies one of these local movements as the starting-point of the *Darul Islam* here. He mentions as such a movement in the Tasikmalaya-Ciamis area headed by "one of the famous '*ulama*' [Islamic scholars] of the southeastern portion of West Java". Describing the connected course of events he states: "Preparations for a demonstration at which the Islamic state of Indonesia was to have been proclaimed were halted at the last moment by certain local leading person-ages who feared trouble from the Japanese. No proclamation was issued, but this episode marked the beginning rather than the end of the *Dār ul-Islām* movement. Leadership of the movement, initially in the hands of the *kiyai* referred to above, was gradually assumed by a Muslim politician, S.M. Kartosuwirjo" (Van Nieuwenhuijze 1958:167).

Hiroko Horikoshi establishes the same connection. Identifying the famous *ulama* mentioned by C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze as Kiyai Jusuf Taziri (Yusuf Taziri), she describes the latter as "the real spiritual leader of the DI [*Darul Islam*] movement during its first phase", and goes on to say that "soon after the DI turned against the Republic, he discontinued his support" (Horikoshi 1975:61).<sup>4</sup>

The alleged intended proclamation of an Islamic state by Kiyai Jusuf Taziri may have influenced the development of the *Darul Islam* movement in West Java, but its importance should not be exaggerated. It was a symptom of the prevailing mood amongst the rural Islamic community, and as such is of importance for an understanding of later developments, rather than constituting an explanation for one of the salient features of the *Darul Islam*, its armed resistance to the "secular" Republic. As Hiroko Horikoshi points out, Kiyai Jusuf Taziri withdrew his support when

Kartosuwirjo (Kartosuwiryo) rebelled against the Republic in 1949. After his breach with Kartosuwirjo, he became the leader of *Darul Salam*, the World of Peace, a movement for the founding of an Islamic state by peaceful means. It must be noted that he afterwards gave quite a different version of the developments during the second half of 1945. So Pinardi quotes a statement by Kiyai Jusuf Taziri according to which: "At the time Japan surrendered in the Second World War, on August 15th, Kartosuwirjo invited me to proclaim the N.I.I. [*Negara Islam Indonesia*], but I refused" (Pinardi 1964:51).

Another version on the earliest beginning of the *Darul Islam* movement has it that Kartosuwirjo, by far its most important leader not only in Java but throughout Indonesia, himself proclaimed an Islamic State of Indonesia in the days surrounding the Japanese surrender. According to Alers, "Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo proclaimed his *Dar-ul-Islam* as early as August 14th, 1945", but revoked his proclamation after hearing of the declaration of independence by Sukarno and Hatta on August 17th (Alers 1956:73).<sup>5</sup>

Considering the date of Kartosuwirjo's alleged proclamation, one day before the Japanese surrender, as well as the places where this might have taken place, Alers' statement becomes extremely dubious. It is quite unlikely that Kartosuwirjo proclaimed his State in Jakarta. In the first place the Japanese would not have permitted it. Secondly, if Kartosuwirjo had indeed proclaimed an Islamic state at Jakarta, this would have been more generally known, unless of course the proclamation was made at a small and secret meeting. The possibility remains that Kartosuwirjo made his proclamation somewhere in Banten, where he was supervisor for a Japanese-sponsored guerilla-training programme, or around Malangbong, near Tasikmalaya, where he had lived for some time. But this also is unlikely. Rumours of a forthcoming Japanese surrender that might have inspired Kartosuwirjo in this act were confined to Jakarta and did not reach either Banten or Tasikmalaya.

Whether or not Kartosuwirjo proclaimed an Islamic state on August 14th or requested Kiyai Jusuf Taziri to do so, or whether or not Kiyai Jusuf Taziri in fact intended doing so, is not of any great relevance. This kind of knowledge may be helpful in reconstructing the factual course of events of 1945, but any supposed connection between early manifestations of the ideal of an Islamic state and the later *Darul Islam* may distort the picture. It is in the context of the political and social develop-



ments of 1945 and 1946 that we should view these early manifestations. Conditions during those years differed sharply from those in 1948, when the *Darul Islam* took concrete shape.

To begin with – and this should not be underestimated, as has been pointed out before – the situation in the second half of 1945 was chaotic. News of the Japanese surrender did spread, but was often distorted and mixed up with all kinds of false rumours, while Japanese authority crumbled. A power vacuum was the result. The Republic was not yet fully enough organized to be able to take the place of the Japanese, while the old colonial power was still absent. Dutch troops were only to arrive the next year, while the old colonial cadre was still in prison camps. The British troops, arriving before the Dutch, were, like the remaining Japanese forces, unable or reluctant to act.

Besides the fact that the Republic had still to build up an effective civil and military apparatus reaching out over the entire country, its activities in these first months were also seriously hampered by the lack of means of communication or access to these. News of the proclamation spread over the country only gradually, and when it reached the people they often did not know what it signified or how they were to react. How the news of the proclamation was received in Bandung, only a hundred miles from Jakarta, is described as follows by Smail: “To begin with, on the 17th [of August 1945] most people had not yet heard rumors of the Japanese surrender, let alone positive confirmation. Without this indispensable piece of context the ordinary man had no way of assessing the significance of the proclamation” . . . while many of the educated men, “familiar with the rapidly maturing plans for a Japanese-sponsored pseudo-independence, simply assumed on first hearing of the proclamation that it was part of the Japanese Program”. And, giving a condensed version of one of his interviews, he writes: “He (a lower-class man who had been a militant revolutionary) started off by giving an impression of the atmosphere immediately after the Japanese surrender. People were happy but at the same time they were *bimbang* (confused and worried). They were *bimbang* because they knew that Indonesia had become independent but didn’t yet know what this Independence was. It was like waking up still sleepy, looking around, trying to get your bearings, or like a dream.” (Smail 1964:15–26, 38). In the countryside people must have reacted even more confusedly to the news.

Kiyai Jusuf Tauziri’s alleged plan to proclaim an Islamic state was only one of the many instances in this anarchical situation

immediately after the Japanese surrender, with local groups acting independently without any knowledge of the situation in Jakarta and without any contacts with the Republican leaders.<sup>6</sup> The same holds true for the reported activities of Kartosuwirjo – if he did, in fact, act this way – in those days.

The second point to be taken into consideration in trying to understand the conduct of the rural Islamic leaders is their changed position in comparison with the pre-war period. This position had changed considerably during the Japanese occupation. Before the war the Dutch had pursued a policy of non-interference in strictly religious affairs, and of allowing, though not encouraging, social and educational activities undertaken by the Islamic community. In the political field, however, the Dutch Colonial Administration had adopted a less tolerant attitude. Political activities by Islamic groups had been subject to tight control and close supervision, which allowed the Islamic leaders little room for political manoeuvring.

All this changed in the Japanese period. The Japanese, much more than the Dutch, relied on the Islamic leaders to mobilize the population. At first it looked as if the Islamic leaders in fact were given preferential treatment over their rivals, the nationalist and traditionalist elite. As Wertheim has written: “The Japanese were well aware of the potential force which their influence upon rural society, combined with their fundamental anti-Western attitude, still could provide. They attempted to make use of this group to strengthen their grip upon the agrarian population, by calling them to the cities for short indoctrination courses and by imbuing them with Japanese propaganda”. (Wertheim 1959:226).

The Japanese attitude thus enabled the Muslim leaders, notably in the rural areas, to extend their influence in society. They were now recognized as a genuine force in society, a force no longer only to be distrusted and closely watched, but worthy of being drawn into the orbit of national affairs. This greatly enhanced their prestige and self-esteem, the more so as they were not involved in the more obvious acts of Japanese exploitation. The Japanese policy of activating the rural Islamic leaders moreover provided them with new opportunities for winning over the population to their cause, thus deepening the cleavage between them and the traditional rulers.

Another aspect of Japanese policy, which had the same result of causing a deepening rift between the two camps, seems at first sight to be in contradiction with the one mentioned above. Much

of what has been written on the strengthening of the position of the Islamic leaders at the expense of the nationalist and traditional ones applies only to the national politics of those days and to the situation in urban centres.<sup>7</sup> It was here that the manifestation of the Japanese Islam policy was most obvious. In the countryside the Japanese were confronted with a situation in which the only group that was suitably equipped for and capable of running the day-to-day administration was that of the traditional leaders – the same group that had been used for this purpose by the Dutch. Some adjustments were made here by the Japanese in that they extended the powers of Islamic leaders, but this was not enough to prevent the development of a feeling of frustration among Muslims, who had expected much more from their cooperation with the Japanese authorities.

When Japan surrendered, local antagonisms, which had been frozen by the Dutch, and preserved and activated but at the same time undermined by the Japanese, openly erupted. The resulting revolts, however, remained within local bounds. The local administrators were replaced by new ones, often Muslims, but in Java at least no national framework was developed.

In Java these so-called social revolutions quickly faded into the background when the Republican Army and Government became better organized and penetrated deeper and deeper into the rural areas. On the arrival of Republican Army units in regions which had experienced popular uprisings against their traditional leaders, the self-established new leaders were removed, and sometimes arrested if the revolt had taken too violent a turn. They were replaced by the old leaders again or by other representatives of the same social class which they had tried to destroy. It was only in Aceh that the social revolution had lasting effects. Here the instigators from the beginning also played an important, and after the end of 1945 a major, role in the national revolution. In Java the leaders of the national and those of the social revolution came from different groups with different backgrounds.

The social revolutions in Indonesia all occurred during the first year of the struggle for independence. They were, with the possible exception of Aceh, isolated outbursts of popular discontent at years of exploitation by a foreign power and its accomplices, members of the traditional ruling strata. They often included an Islamic component, but lacked a national framework. This second prominent feature of the *Darul Islam* movement – the first being its armed opposition to the Republic – only developed in later years.

For a proper *Darul Islam* movement to take shape, it was prerequisite that local sentiments and feelings no longer be voiced by only purely local leaders, but by people who had crossed local boundaries and could formulate an Islamic alternative to the Indonesian Republic without having lost touch with local society. This kind of leadership was to be found in Kartosuwirjo, who was experienced in national politics but close enough to the rural population to attract its support.

In the first years of the revolution both he and the other *Darul Islam* leaders and the Republican ones tried to ignore their difference in conception regarding the basis of the Indonesian state. The struggle against the common enemy – the Dutch – commanded everyone's full attention, and for a while the ideological difference was kept in the background. Even the setting up of an Indonesian Islamic Army, the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* or TII, early in 1948 did not result in an open rupture. Although its institution was clearly a preparatory step to the founding of an Islamic State, it was just possible for the TII, in the political and military context of the time, to be considered as just another military branch of a particular political grouping.

The Indonesian Islamic Army was founded shortly after the Renville agreement of January 1948. It was this agreement which was to give rise to troop movements that would eventually trigger off the civil war between the *Darul Islam* and the Indonesian Republic. One of the stipulations of the Renville agreement, concluded between the Dutch and the Republican Government, was that Republican troops should be withdrawn from areas formally controlled by the Dutch. It implied the restriction of the territory of the Indonesian Republic in Java to the small area of West Java west of Jakarta and to parts of Central and East Java. Republican troops had to leave almost the whole of West Java, Central Java from the border with West Java roughly to Kebumen in the south and Semarang in the north, and the area of East Java east of Malang.

The agreement met with enormous opposition in Indonesia, culminating in a cabinet crisis. As a result of waning support for his Cabinet, which was responsible for the signing of the agreement, the then Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin (Amir Syarifuddin), resigned.

Also many members of the Republican Army were opposed. Bound to abide by the decisions of its Government as it was, however, the Army simply had to obey and retreat to the areas defined as Republican territory in the Renville negotiations. A

different reaction came from many of the irregular guerilla units operating outside the Army, which still enjoyed a large degree of autonomy. Some of these units openly opposed the Renville agreement and refused to comply with its stipulations.

In West Java, as a consequence, a situation developed in which the Republican troops left the area, while many wild guerilla units stayed on. On February 2nd the Republican *Siliwangi* Division of West Java began what it itself styled its *hijrah* to Central Java. *Hijrah*, meaning “the severance of ties” or “emigrating”, is the word generally used to designate the departure of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D. In Indonesia the term is sometimes used to describe a course of action which appears at first sight to be defeatist and hence negative, but in the end will turn into a total victory. At the end of the thirties it had been used by Kartosuwirjo to explain the policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch Colonial Administration. Now it was deliberately chosen to give expression to the idea that the retreat of the *Siliwangi* Division to Central Java would only be temporary (just as the Prophet returned to Mecca at the end of eight years). According to Simatupang, who attended the Renville negotiations as military advisor, “Pak Dirman [Sudirman, the legendary commander-in-chief of the Republican Army] chose this word to denote the withdrawal operation because it expressed both the conviction that withdrawal was temporary and the notion that, at a more favorable time, we would return to these places as victors” (Simatupang 1972:139–140).

Among the troops which refused to be withdrawn were units of two Islamic guerilla forces, the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah*, which were the armed branches of the major Islamic party, *Masyumi*. Their decision to stay behind ran counter to the policy pursued by the leading politicians of *Masyumi*. Although the party withdrew its support of the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet because of the Renville agreement, it considered itself still committed to the stipulations of that agreement, since it had been signed by the legitimate Republican Government.

Besides the commanders of *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* units in West Java, a number of civilian *Masyumi* politicians, amongst them Kartosuwirjo, acted in opposition to official party policy. They took the view that, as the struggle against the Dutch should be continued, there was no other alternative but to remain in West Java and guide and coordinate the resistance there.

The absence of the Republican Army, together with the fact that the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* were the strongest of the

various guerilla forces remaining behind, gave Kartosuwirjo ample opportunity to build up a civil and military administration as a prelude to the proclamation of an Islamic state. The *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* units were transformed into the Islamic Army of Indonesia and a rudimentary government structure was set up. The new situation furthermore greatly enhanced the prestige of both Kartosuwirjo and the remaining guerilla units. When a year later the *Siliwangi* Division returned to West Java, it was confronted by a population and an army that felt let down by the Indonesian Republic and who considered themselves the true continuers of the struggle against the Dutch. Efforts by the Republican Army to regain control met with fierce resistance. It would be about fifteen years before the rebellion could be suppressed, after Kartosuwirjo's arrest in 1962. The period of roughly one year in which the champions of the Islamic State were left to their own devices in West Java proved decisive. For at the end of 1947 they as yet had no efficient organization of their own that transcended local boundaries, and any attempt to form an Islamic army or government would probably have failed, as any such body would have been put down by the Indonesian Republic before it had the chance to develop into a genuine force. At the end of 1948, however, they had a relatively strong army at their disposal, as well as a government structure that could compete with that of the Republic, although no Islamic State had yet been proclaimed. Within the space of one year they had succeeded in eliminating a time-lag of about three years with regard to the building up of their own administration.

## 2. *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo*

The success with which, in the course of 1948, the foundations for an Islamic State were laid can to a large extent be attributed to Kartosuwirjo. He combined in his person a number of qualities that made him the outstanding leader of the *Darul Islam* movements. Kartosuwirjo was a skilful organizer, and at the same time capable of attracting a large following among the rural population. He was experienced in national politics, having played a prominent part in the pre-war Islamic movement, but preferred country life to the urban setting of Jakarta. His political record, moreover, was excellent. Before the war he had always been strongly opposed to cooperation with the Dutch Colonial Administration, also at times when other nationalist and Islamic leaders had argued in favour of cooperation. He had not been too

prominent in the Japanese period, while in the early years of the Indonesian revolution he had invariably been critical of the policies pursued by the political parties and by the successive Republican Governments.

By disengaging himself from Republican political life he had evaded the difficult dilemma between waging an all-out war against the Dutch until the struggle should have been won on the battlefield and making concessions through negotiations in exchange for an early recognition of independence. Thus he remained clear of the negative impression which the conclusion of the Renville agreement created among the population of West Java, to whom it was difficult to explain why the Republican troops were retreating or what they hoped to gain by this.

Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo), as his full name ran, was not a native of West Java. He was born near Cepu, half-way between Blora and Bojonegoro, on the present-day border between Central and East Java, on February 7th, 1905.<sup>8</sup> In later years Cepu acquired some significance as a regional oil centre of the *Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij*. At the time Kartosuwirjo grew up at Cepu, however, it was still a very small, quiet town. It had some importance for local trade, situated as it was on the Solo River and on the tram-line to Surabaya, but had as yet none of the air of a busy oil centre.

Not much is known about Kartosuwirjo's social background. His father was a so-called *mantri penjual candu* a middleman in the government-controlled and -exploited distribution network of ready-for-use opium. Considering the education Kartosuwirjo enjoyed, his father must have been relatively well-to-do, while he himself must have been highly intelligent. He attended the best schools that were open to "natives", where only the children of the "native" well-to-do and aristocracy were admitted. It is paradoxical for a man who for many years was to be leader of an Islamic rebellion that his formal education was essentially secular in nature. There are no indications that Kartosuwirjo visited any of the many Islamic schools.

The quality of the education provided at the first school Kartosuwirjo was sent to at the age of six – the *Inlandsche School der Tweede Klasse*, or Native School of the Second Grade, of which there were only a few – was still quite modest. The standard of these schools was just a little above that of the ordinary *Volks-school* (People's School), intended to provide part of the population with some rudimentary and general knowledge, but nothing

more.<sup>9</sup> The level of education of the second-grade schools, whose pupils could qualify as teachers at People's Schools, although slightly higher, was still far below that of schools of the first grade. The major difference was the teaching of Dutch, a knowledge of which language in the colonial society of Indonesia was one of the prerequisites for further education and admission to administrative jobs. Subjects of "the first grade" might also be taught at "the second grade" by special permission, but the teaching of Dutch here was explicitly precluded.

On Kartosuwirjo's finishing of the four-year Native School of the Second Grade, he continued his education at primary schools of the first grade. First he entered the *Hollandsch-Inlandsche School* (Dutch Native School) and then, in 1919, after his parents had moved to Bojonegoro, the *Europeesche Lagere School* (ELS) (European Primary School). For the son of a "native" both were elite schools. The Dutch Native Schools were intended for the children of upper-class members of autochthonous society. The requirements for admission to a European Primary School were the most stringent of all. As the name implies, these were designed first and foremost as educational institutions for the European and Eurasian segment of society, though a limited number of natives was also admitted. The latter were in the first place children who could safely be expected, in view of their social background, to continue their studies at European institutions of secondary and higher education, and in the second place especially gifted children who could be assumed to continue their studies at one of the institutions for training native doctors, lawyers or civil servants.

Kartosuwirjo belonged to the second category. After completing European Primary School, he went to Surabaya to study at the *Nederlandsch-Indische Artsen School* (NIAS), or Netherlands Indies Medical School. The NIAS course for so-called *Dokter Jawa* or Javanese doctors, consisted of two parts. Because a proportion of the students admitted here had only a primary education, the first part constituted a three-year preparatory course providing the necessary secondary education. The medical course proper took another six years. The Javanese doctors turned out by NIAS were not treated as coequals of their Dutch counterparts. To be considered a genuine physician one had to have complete one's medical studies at a university in The Netherlands or at the *Geneeskundige Hoogeschool* in Jakarta.

Kartosuwirjo began the NIAS preparatory course in 1923, at the age of eighteen. After completing it he was admitted to the



medical course, but had to leave for political reasons the very next year, 1927. Like so many of his politically active compatriots, he was expelled upon his political activities becoming too open.

In those days Surabaya was one of the principal centres of the nationalist movement. In the words of the later President Soekarno, who lived there between 1916 and 1921, "... Surabaya was a bustling, noisy port, much like New York. It had a good harbor and an active trading center. A key industrial area with fast turnover in sugar, tea, tobacco, and coffee, it had keen competition in commerce from the sharp Chinese plus a large influx of mariners and merchantmen who brought news from all parts of the world. It had a swollen population of young and outspoken dockhands and repair workers. There were rivalries, boycotts, street fights. The town was seething with discontent and revolutionaries" (Soekarno 1965:34). What Soekarno noted about Surabaya may also have struck Kartosuwirjo. Although he arrived in that city two years after Soekarno had left it for Bandung, the political experience he acquired here were in many ways similar to those of Soekarno. Both had as their political mentor one of the most outstanding and popular nationalists of the time: the *Sarekat Islam* leader Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (Umar Said Cokroaminoto). They both lived at the latter's house for a longer or shorter period during their stay in Surabaya and acquired much of their early political experience there.

Soekarno stayed with Tjokroaminoto between 1916 and 1921, when the latter's fame was at its peak. Relations between the two were close for a while, but the two men became estranged after Soekarno left for Bandung. In the personal sphere the changing relation was reflected in Soekarno's marriage to Tjokroaminoto's daughter and subsequent divorce from her (Dahm 1966:60). Kartosuwirjo also lived at Tjokroaminoto's and developed a close relationship with him. Contrary to Soekarno, however, he never fell out with Tjokroaminoto, but remained loyal to his policies, as well as to the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, which developed out of Tjokroaminoto's *Sarekat Islam*. Kartosuwirjo came to live with Tjokroaminoto after his expulsion from NIAS in 1927 and after a short spell of teaching at Bojonegoro. He almost immediately became Tjokroaminoto's private secretary continuing in this function until 1929.

At that time Tjokroaminoto's influence was already declining. During Soekarno's stay with him he had still been the virtually unchallenged leader of the *Sarekat Islam*, the first Indonesian

mass movement, which at the top of its strength boasted a membership of over two million.<sup>10</sup> Between the founding of the *Sarekat Islam* in 1911 and its decline after 1920 he was one of the principal spokesmen – perhaps even the most important one – of the Indonesian opposition to the colonial regime. He headed the biggest nationalist movement of those days, became one of the Indonesian members of the *Volksraad*, the Netherlands East Indies quasi-parliament, which enjoyed very limited powers, and was actively involved in the labour movement. He seems to have had a very flexible mind capable of absorbing a combination of Islamic, nationalist and socialist ideas. According to a characterization of him by one of his contemporary opponents, he “at one time was or claimed to be a ‘social democrat, then a Communist, while at another time abandoning all isms’” (Noer 1973:123). His house was the centre of the anti-Dutch movement in Surabaya. It was a meeting-place for politically active Indonesians, and at the same time a boarding-house accommodating many of the later political leaders in their younger days. The latter included, besides Soekarno, among others future leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party like Alimin and Musso (Pahlawan 1972:143–151).

In 1927, at the time Kartosuwirjo was boarding with him, Tjokroaminoto’s position within the nationalist movement had changed, as was indicated above. He had become the target of much criticism, and his once powerful *Sarekat Islam*, uniting people of Islamic, communist and nationalist persuasions, had declined into a minor Islamic party. The communists, first working within the *Sarekat Islam* and trying to steer it onto a more radical course, had been expelled from the party in 1921. The decision accordingly had been taken at a party congress at which Tjokroaminoto was absent. He had subsequently been imprisoned by the Government on charges of entertaining relations with an illegal section of the *Sarekat Islam* which was aiming at the violent overthrow of the government.<sup>11</sup> The communists continued their activities in their own separate party, the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI), which a few years later was banned and its leaders gaoled after the abortive uprisings in West Java and Minangkabau of late 1926 and early 1927.

More important still for the decline of the *Sarekat Islam* than the loss of its radical leftist cadre was the rise of a secular nationalist movement. This movement and its prominent spokesman, Soekarno, gradually took over the former dominant position of the *Sarekat Islam* and Tjokroaminoto. The influence

of the *Sarekat Islam* within the Islamic community also declined. For in the religious field it had to compete with two new non-political Islamic organizations, the *Muhammadiyah* and the *Nahdatul Ulama*.

Paradoxically, it is precisely the decline of the *Sarekat Islam* and the development of succeeding parties out of it which highlight its significance. Its operation in two fields – the political as well as the non-political – made it the sole vehicle for those Muslims who wished to remain politically active without abandoning the principle of the primacy of religion. It is within this context that the pre-war political activities of Kartosuwirjo must be seen. He was one of those Islamic leaders who refused, or to put it less kindly, were unable, to make a choice between politics and religion for tactical reasons.

Besides Tjokroaminoto's influence, Soekarno and Kartosuwirjo had in common the fact that they both started their political career in the Surabaya branch of the youth movement *Jong Java* (Young Java), although in different periods, and that both eventually withdrew from it – Soekarno because he considered *Jong Java* too moderate, Kartosuwirjo, who rose to the position of chairman of the Surabaya branch, because of its religious stand.

That both felt ill at ease in *Jong Java* is not surprising. Although a little more radical than its mother organization *Budi Utomo*, it pursued the same cautious policy stressing traditional Javanese cultural values. In the process it clashed not only with its more radical members, such as Soekarno, but also with those members who wished to react to the dominance of Western power and Western culture by a return to the true face of Islam, stripped of its Javanese and heretical elements, rather than to Javanese culture. The latter group grew especially disappointed at the professed religious neutrality of *Jong Java* which in practice meant the neglect of Islam and the stressing of Javanese cultural expressions such as *wayang* and *gamelan*.<sup>12</sup>

In 1925 there was a rupture between the two schools of thought as the Muslim members left *Jong Java* to form the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, or Young Muslim League. The latter was to develop into a nursery for the future Islamic political cadre. "It grew into a training school for an Islamic leadership distinct from the 'secular' Western-oriented Indonesian intellectuals" (Benda 1958:49).<sup>13</sup>

The *Jong Islamieten Bond* was a more or less independent youth organization. However, Pluvier's opinion that it had no ties whatever with the *Sarekat Islam* is not quite correct (Pluvier

1953:153). To start with, there was the former organization's political outlook. It shared with the *Sarekat Islam* the view that Western domination could only be combated by stripping Indonesian Islam of its heretical components and adopting those achievements of Western civilization that had given the West its technical superiority. Furthermore, the *Jong Islamieten Bond* did not, like so many other Islamic organizations, withdraw from the political arena. As was observed above, it became the focus of leadership-training for what may be called the young Islamic intelligentsia, possessing a clear view of the requirements for an independent, preferably Islamic, state. Finally, there existed personal ties at least in its early period, between the *Jong Islamieten Bond* and the *Sarekat Islam*. The founder of the former, Haji Agus Salim, was in fact one of the principal *Sarekat Islam* leaders at the time, having been elected vice-president of this league in 1923 (Noer 1973:132). Likewise the first chairman of the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo (Wiwoho Purbohadijojo), originally came from the *Sarekat Islam*.

It is far from surprising that the politically and religiously conscientious person that Kartosuwirjo had developed into in those years joined the *Jong Islamieten Bond*. He himself does not seem to have played a decisive role in the secession of the Muslim youth from *Jong Java*. The reason for this may have been that the *Jong Islamieten Bond* was founded in Jakarta, far away from Surabaya, and that Kartosuwirjo only heard of this later. He left *Jong Java* to join the *Jong Islamieten Bond* within a few months of its foundation, however. In due course he became one of its leaders.<sup>14</sup> Eventually his activities in the *Jong Islamieten Bond* provided one of the reasons for his expulsion from NIAS. He was accused of being a political activist and of having in his possession literature with communist inclinations, which probably meant nothing more than that he had books that were critical of the colonial regime.

His expulsion from NIAS and his subsequent relationship with Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto marked the beginning of his career within the *Sarekat Islam*. At the time Kartosuwirjo joined the *Sarekat Islam* it had already changed its name into *Partai Sarekat Islam*, stressing its political function by the adoption of the qualification "party". The party changed its name again in 1930, this time into *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII), to express the fact that the struggle in Indonesia itself had taken precedence over its earlier professed international pan-Islamic ideals.<sup>15</sup>

Before discussing Kartosuwirjo's position within the *Partai Sarekat Islam (Indonesia)* it may be worthwhile pausing to consider whether he fitted into the intellectual and religious climate of this party and of the *Jong Islamieten Bond*. The *Partai Sarekat Islam (Indonesia)* and *Jong Islamieten Bond* are generally represented as organizations of modernist Indonesian Muslims, as opposed to traditionalist ones. In the opposition of modernist versus traditionalist Muslims the puritanical and intellectual aspects of modernism are generally stressed. The modernist movement within Islam has as its principal aim a return to the "true sources" of Islam, the Koran, or word of God, and the Tradition, or transmitted words and deeds of Muhammad. Accordingly, the modernists are generally associated with the fight against heresy, saint-worship, animistic beliefs, adaptations to local situations and adherence to practices of the pre-Islamic period in general. They are also associated with intellectualism, not only because of their hostility to superstition, but also because of their search for a *modus vivendi* between Islam and the modern way of life. "What seemed to have become the central problem of the Muslim modernists in Indonesia was their desire to alleviate the Faith from all its irreligious impurities which through time had been syncretized into it, and to liberalize it from its madzhab [i.e. the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence] rigidity so that it could be made compatible with the demands and needs of a progressively modern world. For that they believed that they had found the answer by returning to the true sources of Islam, which could be found in the Holy Koran and Hadith." (Alfian 1969:131).

Kartosuwirjo definitely does not seem to fit into this atmosphere. The picture of him emerging from the scarce biographical notes is that of a man whose Islamic training lagged far behind that of the leading exponents of Islamic modernism in Indonesia, and whose religious ideas were still very much influenced by the traditional setting. His initial Islamic education was very meagre. He acquired his knowledge of Islam in later years, and did so mainly from foreign, probably Dutch, books on the subject and via his personal acquaintance with prominent Indonesian Muslim teachers (Pinardi 1964:29–30; Horikoshi 1975:73; Noer 1973:148). Of course foreign, Western books were not the best sources for the study of Islam and the new religious movements within it. Kartosuwirjo, however, had no other option. As a result of his secular Dutch education his Arabic was poor. He even seems to have studied the Koran from Dutch translations.

This lack of fluency in Arabic also excluded Kartosuwirjo from direct contact with the works of Islamic thinkers. It may even have kept him from going on a pilgrimage to Mecca and visiting the Arabic centres of Islam and Islamic modernism. Unlike a number of other Indonesian Muslim leaders, he never went abroad to extend his knowledge of Islam through discussions or study with internationally outstanding Muslim teachers.

For a more thorough knowledge of Islam Kartosuwirjo had been dependent upon personal acquaintanceships with scholars he met more or less fortuitously. Part of this as in the case of his political education, he acquired from Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto and the Surabaya circle of *Sarekat Islam* leaders. More important for the development of his religious ideas were the rural Islamic leaders of West Java he became acquainted with after 1929, when for reasons of health he moved to Malangbong, a small town near Garut and Tasikmalaya. During this stay at Malangbong he studied Islam with a number of local *kiyais*, amongst them the above-mentioned Kiyai Jusuf Taziri and his father-in-law Kiyai Ardiwisastra.<sup>16</sup> The latter was not only one of the most prominent PSII members of the area, but, as Jackson points out, also “a very famous religious teacher from Malangbong” (Jackson 1971:437).

In Malangbong, as throughout rural Java in general, Islamic modernism had not yet penetrated very deeply. It had remained largely an urban phenomenon which had had no influence on the rural *kiyais*. As a consequence, the religious education Kartosuwirjo received from these local *kiyais* possessed few of the characteristics of modernism. Like his tutors, Kartosuwirjo became a “dedicated Sufist” (Horikoshi 1975:74).

Sufism, with its stress on mysticism and asceticism and its disposition towards saint-worship and other cultish forms of worship, is almost the direct opposite of modernism. The impact of his religious experiences at Malangbong were, in fact to set Kartosuwirjo apart from an important section of the PSII leadership and to contribute to his rupture with the party in later years, when his “mystical leaning had estranged him from the other *Sarekat Islam* leaders” (Noer 1973:148).

On the other hand, this did enable him to remain in close touch with the local population and to win its support. In fact, it is precisely his mystical leanings and the circumstance of his fitting into the longstanding tradition of rural rebellion with its Islamic leadership that are commonly singled out by authors on the *Darul Islam* movement as the major factors which gained the

latter popular support. According to these authors Kartosuwirjo's personality and way of life, along with his skilful exploitation of popular belief, contributed greatly both to the mass support given the movement and to its longevity.

One of the first scholars to draw attention to this aspect of Kartosuwirjo's leadership in later years was Pinardi. He explains Kartosuwirjo's appeal partly from his association with the ideal of *Ratu Adil*, or Just King, and his manipulation of other popular beliefs. As an example he mentions the wearing by Kartosuwirjo of two magical swords, *Ki Dongkol* and *Ki Rompong*, which when united, according to popular belief, would bring prosperity to the land and victory in battle to the person who succeeded in uniting them (Pinardi 1964:154–156).

Hiroko Horikoshi also points to the importance of mystical beliefs among the population of West Java in explaining Kartosuwirjo's appeal. "Many local ulama and villagers attributed his ability to recruit followers among the poor and unsophisticated peasants to his mystical powers. His mysticism is important above all because it is clear stories of his miraculous qualities contributed to the continuation of his movement . . . , it seemed likely that the D[arul] I[sлам]'s central leadership welcomed and even manipulated them [i.e. rumours about his magical powers] by shielding Kartosuwirjo from, and making him almost inaccessible to, his guerilla fighters in the field." (Horikoshi 1975:74–75).

Kartosuwirjo's stay at Malangbong was of importance in more than one respect. It not only shaped his future religious ideas, but also made him familiar with the culture and way of life of that part of West Java. It moreover fostered a life-long bond between Kartosuwirjo and Malangbong. Initially it was the PSII that would benefit. In later years, after being forced to leave the PSII, Kartosuwirjo used his influence in Malangbong for his own ends – first for the benefit of the shadow PSII founded by him, and later for that of the *Darul Islam*.

Upon Kartosuwirjo's moving to Malangbong in 1929 he was appointed PSII representative for West Java. Studious and ascetic as he was, he took this task very seriously and energetically devoted himself to the extension of PSII activities in the area. "As an E.L.S. graduate and a medical school 'drop-out', he in fact could have been reasonably well-off if only he had been willing to become a government employee or work at a private office. But Sekarmadji . . . appears to have preferred to remain poor and devote all his energies and thoughts to the life of his party."<sup>17</sup>

Kartosuwirjo's efforts did not remain unnoticed. In 1931 he was elected general secretary of the PSII, and in 1936 vice-chairman. At that time, however, the party was experiencing one of its major crises, being torn apart by growing internal strife. Kartosuwirjo at first belonged to the winning faction, which resulted in his election as vice-chairman, but later was forced to leave the PSII.

The main issue around which the conflict revolved was the attitude towards the colonial government and the question of whether or not the PSII should cooperate with the colonial regime. The differences on this point were aggravated by personal animosities within the party's leadership and by the struggle for control of the PSII after the death in 1934 of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto.

The PSII had a long-standing tradition of non-cooperation. The policy accordingly had first been formulated at its party congress of 1923 and 1924 (Noer 1973:142–143). Finding its inspiration in Gandhi's movement in India, and disappointed with the attitude of the Dutch colonial power and with the actual powers granted the People's Council, it developed the concepts of self-reliance (*swadeshi*) and repudiation of the existing colonial structure (*hijrah*).

In adopting the *swadeshi* principle the PSII was following the example of the Indian anticolonial movement and Gandhi, who had defined *swadeshi* as "the spirit in us which restricts us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the more remote" (Gunnar Myrdal 1968:1209, citing Unnikrishnan 1956:54). As such, *swadeshi* implied a rejection not only of colonial-style society, but of all manifestations of modern Western life. It signified a return to the traditional village economy and its products and a rejection of Western-made or -imported goods. At a superficial glance it seems to run counter to the principle of selective borrowing from the West, as professed by the modernists who had played such an important part in the early years of *Sarekat Islam*. The romanticizing of village life and its passive withdrawal from the influence of urban and Western society constituted, in fact, only one aspect of the movement. Throughout the years the PSII pursued an active policy of improvement of the life of the poor and effecting agrarian reform, nationalization of vital industries and improvement of labour relations. The stress on the traditional village was not inspired by any inability to cope with modern life or to comprehend the forces operating in colonial society, but by severe



disappointment at the colonial government's inattention to its demands. The solution hit on was typical for the PSII. It combined the rural rejection of Western penetration with the highly political outlook of its leaders.

The rather aggressive nature of the PSII's non-cooperation policy was reflected in the combination of *swadeshi* with *hijrah*. Thus *swadeshi*, which itself already implied a rejection of colonial influence, was intensified further by the *hijrah* idea, which enabled the PSII to formulate an aggressive policy of non-cooperation without the need to resort to open rebellion.

Looking back at Islamic history, in particular Muhammad's repudiation of the people of Mecca for rejecting his teachings, the proponents of non-cooperation found in the *hijrah* concept the necessary inspiration to sever all ties with the colonial power. In the same way that Muhammad had left the citizens of Mecca to their own devices to found a new Muslim society in Medina through *hijrah*, a total disregard of the Dutch for the sake of building up an independent Indonesian, Muslim-inspired society became the aim of the present *hijrah* policy. The colonial regime should be ignored not only in the economic, but also in the political field. *Hijrah* was, as it was put by the PSII leader Haji Agus Salim in 1927 "cooperation between ourselves for our own consolidation and the unity of all ideas, thoughts and deeds in all aspects of life, whether social, economic or political" (Noer 1973:143, citing Agus Salim 1927).

This combination of *swadeshi* with *hijrah* made the non-cooperation policy of the PSII attractive to men like Kartosuwirjo, who linked hatred of the colonial regime with an emphatically Islamic outlook and a deep-rooted suspicion of urban life. It not only combined idealization of village life with the actual political struggle, but in some respects also implied a linkage of the Hindu tradition with the Islamic one.

This non-cooperation policy came under discussion within the PSII itself in early 1935, when the then chairman Agus Salim pressed for a review of the *hijrah* policy. The arguments put forward by Agus Salim were of a distinctly tactical nature. The previous years had seen an increasingly repressive attitude on the part of the Colonial Government. Radical Indonesian political leaders had been arrested and the supervision of political meetings tightened. On an increasing scale political meetings had been prohibited or stopped in the middle by the secret police as soon as the speeches became critical in tone. It was Agus Salim's opinion that in this repressive climate, non-cooperation and the

hostile reaction it drew from the government could only hamper the party's activities.

Kartosuwirjo took quite a different view. Not easily inclined to compromise, he remained an unconditional supporter of non-cooperation. Together with Agus Salim's principal opponent within the PSII, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Abikusno Cokrosuyoso), the brother of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, he thereupon became the chief advocate of *hijrah*.<sup>18</sup> At the first suggestion of review of the *hijrah* policy by Agus Salim in 1935, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso resigned from the executive board of the PSII, and his example was followed by Kartosuwirjo (Noer 1973:145).

The conflict over cooperation with the Dutch developed into an outright confrontation between two opposed standpoints. On the one hand there were the pragmatists, who were prepared to modify their point of view where they felt this to be in the interests of what they considered to be the aims of the party. They were prepared to compromise thus not only in the political field, and as one of the major consequences of political cooperation to accept seats on the quasi-representative councils, but also in the religious field. They were inclined, much more than their opponents, though still of course within certain limits, to differentiate between politics and religion. When at the end of 1936 they formed an oppositional committee, the *Barisan Penyedar PSII*, or Front of the Awakening of Consciousness in the PSII, to propagate their views, their argument was that "because of *hijrah* the PSII had degenerated from a political party into a party for religious propaganda and Koran recitals" (Pluvier 1953:114). In the spectrum between those nationalists who should be characterized as Muslims guided by secular principles in their political outlook and activities and those who sought their inspiration in Islam, they took a middle position.<sup>19</sup> Like the latter, the pragmatists professed the ideals of an Islamic state and the organization of society according to Islamic principles. But unlike them, they were well aware that these ideals were not to be realized in the near future in a colonial context, nor in a situation where the secular nationalists were in the majority (like that which would arise after the Second World War).

The pragmatists' opponents, on the other hand, were more uncompromising. They were not ready as yet for any form of accommodation, and strongly emphasized the primacy of religion. They were moreover much less influenced by Western ideas concerning the state structure and democracy.

The showdown came at the twenty-second PSII congress, held in July 1936. Here it was immediately obvious that the faction of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Kartosuwirjo, who could command the support of the younger members of the party, was much stronger than that of Haji Agus Salim and his associates. At this congress, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso accordingly scored an overwhelming victory. He was elected “formateur”, which involved being given full powers to nominate all the members of the board. As a consequence, the board did not mirror the relative strengths of the conflicting factions. It was made up entirely of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso’s supporters. Kartosuwirjo became vice-chairman, or vice-president, as the function was styled.

Abikusno Tjokrosujoso saw his victory at the congress as an endorsement of his *hijrah* policy. The truth of this was disputed by Haji Agus Salim, however, who “maintained that the question was deferred by the congress and accused Abikusno of arbitrary action when he declared the question closed, thereby instructing *Sarekat Islam* branches to ignore Salim’s proposal to abandon the *Hidjrah* policy” (Noer 1973:145–146). Agus Salim tried to counter the move by instituting the above-mentioned *Barisan Penyedar* PSII, but in vain. He was expelled from the PSII, together with about thirty of his associates, early the next year.<sup>20</sup>

Abikusno Tjokrosujoso’s claim that the PSII congress of July 1936 had endorsed the *hijrah* policy was expounded in a two-volume brochure on the subject by Kartosuwirjo. Its title ran “The *hijrah* attitude of the PSII” and was, as the subtitle explained, ratified by the 22nd congress of the party (Sikap 1936).

Kartosuwirjo did not write this pamphlet on his own initiative, but at the request of the 1936 congress. The ideas outlined by him here were eventually to lead to his own expulsion from the party. On publication of the book, however, there was as yet no sign of any controversy on the *hijrah* policy between Kartosuwirjo and the other influential PSII members. His views were fully supported by the board. The foreword to the second volume, signed by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso as president and Arudji Kartawinata (Aruji Kartawinata) as secretary of the PSII, contains a statement that “the views, opinions and ideas on and interpretation of the PSII’s *hijrah* attitude which are expounded in this brochure were discussed at length with the President Elect of the Party Board and the Party’s Executive Committee before and after the writing [of this pamphlet] by the author” (Sikap 1936 II:3–4).

Most of Kartosuwirjo’s pamphlet is devoted to a discussion of

the true meaning and implications of *hijrah*.<sup>21</sup> It traces the places where *hijrah* is mentioned in the Koran and explains its meaning in the relevant context. Kartosuwirjo's interpretation of *hijrah* and views on the transposition of the concept to the colonial context are rigorous and far-reaching. Basing himself on the Koran, he states *hijrah* to be the duty of "all men and women, old and young", with the exception of the weak, and that it is not to be given up "until real Falah (Salvation) and Fatah (Victory or Opening) have been achieved" (Sikap 1936 II: 17–18, 22). It is interesting to note that Kartosuwirjo does not put forward any political reasons for committing *hijrah*. The major cause for such an act, according to him, is "Slander in Religion", which he defines in a very broad sense, encompassing "any act, whatever its nature or form, which may cause people to stray from the ways of Truth as defined by the teachings of the Islamic Religion" (Sikap 1936 II:25).

After the discussion of the meaning of *hijrah*, Kartosuwirjo goes on to say that in almost every place in which the word *hijrah* is mentioned in the Koran, it is associated with *jihād*. So he writes with regard to the PSII, "no act of *hijrah* can be considered valid if in *hijrah* the *jihād* ideal is not realized" (Sikap 1936 II:30).

While linking *hijrah* with *jihād*, Kartosuwirjo carefully avoids too aggressive an interpretation of the two concepts. Earlier in his brochure, where he deals with the different meanings of *hijrah*, he stresses that Muslims, in their entire conduct, and so also in *hijrah*, must be devoid of "hatred, malevolence, strikes, (or) enmity" (Sikap 1936 II:15). In his subsequent discussion of *jihād* he points out that this word does not mean "war in the sense in which it is often understood by Western or Westernized people" (Sikap 1936 II:45), but denotes a sincere effort or intention to follow "the path of God, the path of Truth, the path of Reality" (Sikap 1936 II:43).

Differentiating between *jihād ul-asghar* and *jihād ul-akbar*, the "little" and the "great" *jihād*, he urges his readers to give precedence to the latter, which is the more positive one, saying: "We refer to the little *jihād* as being negative in nature, because it constitutes only [an act of] defence, either self-defence or the defence of Religion against attacks from its enemies. And we claim that the great *jihād* is constructive and positive (. . .) in nature, because the *jihād* includes the element of building up and organizing both oneself and one's village and country, as well as the Islamic Community." (Sikap 1936 II:48).

At the time of writing his pamphlet, Kartosuwirjo still enjoyed the formal support for his interpretation of *hijrah* of the PSII board, as is evident from the approval expressed in the foreword to his brochure by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Arudji Kartawinata. Within a few years the situation changed, however. In 1939 Kartosuwirjo found himself involved in a bitter wrangle with the majority of the PSII leadership, headed by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. Again the point at issue was the party's attitude vis-à-vis the Colonial Government. Kartosuwirjo, who remained the uncompromising proponent of a radical *hijrah* he always had been, now found himself opposed by his allies of only a few years back, who had considerably modified their views in order to be able to cope with the increasing Government pressure.

Kartosuwirjo did not approve of the PSII's about-face, which in the course of 1939 resulted in the latter's participation in GAPI (*Gabungan Politik Indonesia* or Indonesian Political Federation), a federation of Indonesian political parties of which Abikusno Tjokrosujoso became general chairman.<sup>22</sup> He furthermore strongly objected to the GAPI-initiated and PSII-supported move for the institution of a truly representative parliament, even though he had at that time already been formally dismissed from that party.

The PSII's change of policy from its former non-cooperation line rendered Kartosuwirjo's brochure, which still in 1936 and 1937 had been of such great value in countering Agus Salim's influence, now obsolete and even in contradiction with party policy. The ideas outlined by Kartosuwirjo here were dismissed as anachronisms, and the author was asked to recant and to stop the distribution of the leaflet, being expelled from the PSII together with a number of his associates upon his refusal to do so (cf. Noer 1973:149; Horikoshi 1975:63; Pluvier 1953:117–118; Slametmuljana 1968 I:237–238). The other PSII-ers who were obliged to leave the party with him included Kiyai Jusuf Taziri and Kamran, the then leader of the youth section of the PSII and the future commander of the *Tentara Islam Indonesia*.

The decision to expel Kartosuwirjo and his associates was taken by the party's executive committee on January 30th, 1939, and approved by the party's congress of January 1940. Those who were thus deprived of their membership refused to accept the decision, however. On Kartosuwirjo's initiative an oppositional committee, the *Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran PSII* (KPKPSII), or Committee for the Defence of the Truth of the PSII, was then formed. Being intended to operate within the PSII, it hence

ignored the resolution of expulsion.<sup>23</sup> Upon this proving unfeasible, it was decided at the committee's first public meeting at Malangbong on March 24th, 1940, to form an independent party. The actual intention behind this was that the committee should develop into the real PSII. For Abikusno Tjokrosujoso's PSII was felt to consist of people who had betrayed the true struggle of the Islamic community and so to be no longer worthy of the name *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*. The new party, with Kartosuwirjo as chairman, which was sometimes referred to as the "Second PSII", in fact arrogated the name PSII to itself. It saw itself as the true continuation of the former PSII, and re-adopted the old PSII policy, stipulating that the *hijrah* policy not only should be continued, but should even be carried through in a more radical way (cf. Pluvier 1953:117; Horikoshi 1975:63).

It is impossible to estimate the extent of the support Kartosuwirjo and his Second PSII enjoyed. The new movement's free development was seriously hampered from the beginning by its anti-government stand. A greater impediment still to its growth was the general political climate of those days. The invasion of The Netherlands by the German army on May 10th, 1940, and the threat of a Japanese attack on the Indies included the colonial authorities to intensify their supervision and control of political activities. As early as May 10th martial law was duly proclaimed and public political meetings prohibited. The changed situation made it almost impossible for the Second PSII to extend its activities and carry through its plans for instituting branches in every place where the original PSII – sometimes called "the Parliamentary PSII", to stress its new cooperation policy – was represented.

The reports on the success of the Second PSII are contradictory. Judging from Pinardi's account, Kartosuwirjo's shadow-PSII did reasonably well where the formation of new branches was concerned. "Virtually everywhere branches of the Parliamentary PSII existed, sympathizers of S.M. Kartosuwirjo also appeared to found branches of the KPKPSII" (Pinardi 1964:26).<sup>24</sup> Pringgogido gives the same impression of rapid development. According to him the Second PSII "had in the beginning only 2 branches, but by March 1940 it already included 21 branches" (Pringgogido 1950:150).

Hiroko Horikoshi takes a different view and qualifies Pinardi's evaluation of the strength of the Second PSII as an overstatement. She is of the opinion that "the KPK PSII was successful only in West Java", and points to the fact that at the KPKPSII's

first congress only “six former PSII branches attended: Cirebon, Cibadak, Sukabumi, Pasanggrahan, Wanaraja and Malangbong”. Her findings on the support for Kartosuwirjo’s movement make her remark also that: “Noer’s . . . statement that the KPK PSII branches were all in Central Java does not coincide with my informants’ claims” (Horikoshi 1975:63).

Hiroko Horikoshi’s assessment calls for some modification, however. It should be noted first of all that she did not read the relevant passages carefully. The fact that Pinardi uses the word “virtually everywhere” instead of, as Hiroko Horikoshi asserts, “at every PSII branch there was a KPK PSII”, may only be a trivial point. Of greater importance is her misinterpretation of Deliar Noer. The latter, probably following Pluvier, when speaking of Central Java is referring not to KPKPSII branches, but to the PSII branches which sided with Kartosuwirjo in his conflict over *hijrah* and which were expelled together with him. Deliar Noer writes: “together with some eight branches of the Sarekat Islam, all in Central Java, he (Kartosuwirjo) was dismissed in 1939 upon which he established the Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran PSII . . .” (Noer 1973:26; Pluvier 1953:117).

The second point to make here is that Hiroko Horikoshi is ignorant of the problems inherent in a party split. It is curious that she speaks only of “former branches” of the PSII. As Kartosuwirjo founded a counter-PSII which existed alongside Abikusno Tjokrosujoso’s old PSII on the central level, there must also have been established at least a number of counter-branches operating in opposition to local branches which still acknowledged Abikusno Tjokrosujoso’s PSII on the local level.

Thirdly, one should not overlook the contemporary political situation, which makes it almost impossible to draw relevant conclusions from the formal number of branches of the Second PSII in an attempt to assess the appeal of Kartosuwirjo’s movement. It must be remembered that Kartosuwirjo and his associates had only a few months to organize their party before the proclamation of martial law in May 1940 excluded all further open political activity. From then onwards any such activities had to be carried on secretly or semi-illegally. These circumstances make it difficult to judge the potential of the movement started by Kartosuwirjo. It may well be that, as Pinardi states, Kartosuwirjo had followers virtually everywhere Abikusno Tjokrosujoso’s PSII was present. The speculation does not even seem too bold that, if the Second PSII had had unlimited opportunity to develop, it might have grown into a powerful alternative of the official PSII.

In the rural areas in particular people neither were very interested in, nor had a clear understanding of, the quarrel between the PSII leaders about the finer points of ideology and tactics. It was much easier to activate and mobilize the rural population by means of unambiguous acts aimed at the improvement of its own situation and by a continuation of the fierce verbal attacks on colonialists and infidels. Another moot point is whether Kartosuwirjo's movement had the proper personnel and the necessary organizational skill to transform the potential support which hostile attitude towards the Dutch colonialists and infidels might have gained it into a massive and organized following.

In this respect Kartosuwirjo's PSII may have been at a serious disadvantage. So the fact that only six former PSII branches of West Java attended the first congress may be accounted for by organizational problems. If Hiroko Horikoshi's information on this point is correct, it is indeed strange that there were no representatives from the Central Java PSII branches that had been expelled at the same time as Kartosuwirjo was ousted present. Considering the short lapse of time between the formal dismissal of Kartosuwirjo and the branches supporting him and the date of the congress, it seems likely that Kartosuwirjo wanted to act quickly without fully realizing the problems involved in convening a meeting, and that in the end he had to fall back on his personal network in West Java.

In the light of later developments, the congress was of the utmost importance, in spite of its rather modest attendance. It paved the way for the indoctrination and training of leaders of the post-war West Javanese *Darul Islam*. The Second PSII itself provided a starting-point for the recruitment of a cadre for the *Darul Islam*. Even more important was the resolution passed by the Second PSII's first congress to establish an Islamic school for the education of a future Islamic leadership.

The idea of such a school was not a new one. Kartosuwirjo, who had a keen eye for the need for leadership training, and who had given attention to this problem in his *hijrah* brochure, had been entrusted with the task of establishing "an institute scheduled to train militant cadres of the party" by the PSII in December 1938 (Noer 1973:148). When the PSII steered its policy onto a more cooperative course the party had lost interest in the scheme, however. Kartosuwirjo had nevertheless continued with the preparations for the foundation of a training institute and adapted the idea to his own ends. The institute he had in mind would not serve the interests of the old PSII, which he felt



had betrayed the cause of Indonesian Islam. It was to become an educational institution, supervised by the Second PSII, at which students would be imbued with radical ideas congruent with a total *hijrah*.

Kartosuwirjo's plan was adopted by the Second PSII's congress of March 1940, which passed a resolution for the foundation of the so-called *Institut Supah* or *Suffah* Institute.<sup>25</sup> Situated at Malangbong, the *Suffah* Institute was originally intended to provide general and religious education, but, as we shall see, it eventually changed into an institution providing paramilitary training during the Japanese occupation. The institute was organized along the lines of Islamic boarding-schools, *pesantrens* and *madrasahs*. It formed a closed community, the student-members of which worked the institute fields, thus making it to a large extent self-supporting, where it was possible for strong personal ties to develop between students and teachers. At the institute, which provided a four- to six-month training-course, Kartosuwirjo himself taught Dutch, astrology and *ilm al-tawhīd*, or the doctrine of the Oneness of God (i.e. "dogmatics") (Noer 1973:149; Pinardi 1964:27). Its students came mostly from the Priangan area, in particular the eastern part. Students from outside Java, for instance from Toli-Toli in North Sulawesi, were also enrolled at it (The 1968:3; Pinardi 1964:29).

Within the limits imposed by martial law Kartosuwirjo's Second PSII, together with its *Suffah* Institute, continued operating alongside Abikusno Tjokrosujoso's original PSII for the two remaining years of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. During that period it remained isolated from other Indonesian political and non-political groupings, Islamic or otherwise. It never joined the federation of Islamic organizations, the *Majlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia* (MIAI), Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia.

For this MIAI, founded in 1937 on the initiative of two non-political Islamic organizations – the reformist *Muhammadiyah* and the traditionalist *Nahdatul Ulama*, originally set up as a counterpoise to the reformist Islamic movement – the PSII had at first remained aloof, joining it only in 1939 as part of its policy of reconciliation with other groupings. There are no indications that Kartosuwirjo ever considered the possibility of joining MIAI. His attitude towards the MIAI is explained in part by the fact that his former enemies in the PSII who had forced him to leave the party participated in it, and in part by the participation of the MIAI in the negotiations with the Colonial Government on political and constitutional reforms.

These negotiations with the Dutch turned out a bitter disappointment particularly for Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and other leaders of his PSII, who had had high expectations from their accommodating attitude towards the Colonial Government. Not only did their policy prove a failure in securing them a better deal from the latter, but moreover their expectation that the threat of an imminent Japanese invasion might induce the colonial authorities to make concessions in return for popular support turned out to be a gross miscalculation. Even more painful was the discovery that the abandonment of the non-cooperation policy had anything but halted the decline in membership and in the popularity which the party had enjoyed since the early twenties.<sup>26</sup> These feelings of disappointment, coupled with the anticipation of a Japanese victory, inspired the "Parliamentary" PSII to revert to its former principle of non-cooperation and withdraw from the negotiations with the Dutch.

The decision to sever formal relations with the Colonial Administration again was not simply prompted by the wish to abandon a sinking ship and prepare for a Japanese takeover. The proportion of the political active of those days who considered the Japanese their enemy was small. It included in the first place members of the Indonesian Communist Party, which had gone underground after the abortive, ill-prepared uprisings in Java and Sumatra at the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1927, as well as other Marxists. A second group which was opposed to the impending Japanese invasion, by reasons of the fascist totalitarian character of the Japanese regime, was formed by a number of intellectuals influenced by Western liberal ideas concerning democracy. The rest of the Indonesian political elite, including the great majority of Islamic leaders, took either a neutral or a positive stand, however. To some it did not seem to matter much whether the foreign overlords were Japanese or Dutch, and envisaged this as a transitional stage in the process towards full independence. The Japanese propaganda machine tried, in fact, to exploit the prevailing mood by representing the Japanese forces as forces of liberation, without, however, coupling liberation with independence. In their efforts to win Indonesian popular support the Japanese also turned their attention to the Islamic population, courting Islam and seeking contact with Islamic leaders.

In Aceh these contacts the Japanese sought to establish with the Islamic population sparked off an open rebellion immediately before the Japanese invasion. In Java there do not seem to have

occurred any organized acts of sabotage or rebellion on the part of Japanese-sponsored groups. Nevertheless, here as well the colonial authorities were apprehensive of actions by what they conceived of as an Islamic fifth column. So after the Dutch became involved in the war with Japan a number of Islamic leaders here were arrested. Amongst them was Kartosuwirjo, who was jailed for one-and-a-half months on suspicion of pro-Japanese espionage (Pinardi 1964:35).<sup>27</sup>

### 3. *The Japanese Occupation*

The Dutch East Indies became involved in the Pacific war almost immediately after the Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbour on December 8th, 1941. Immediately upon hearing the news of the attack and of Japan's declaration of war on the United States and Great Britain, the Dutch Government in exile in London declared war on Japan. This declaration was conveyed to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs on December 10th. The Japanese forces invaded the territory of the Dutch East Indies early the next month. The ill-prepared East Indies Army proved no match for the Japanese, and the East Indies forces surrendered on March 8th, 1942, without having been able to offer any significant resistance.

For the Indonesians the Dutch capitulation and the introduction of Japanese rule did not at first make much difference, except, perhaps, that it brought greater hardship and stricter official control. Hopes that Japan would allow Indonesians a more active part in the administration and in policy-making soon faded. The disappointment was most acute in Aceh, where the Islamic leaders had hoped for a definite improvement of their social and political position. The prominent role they had played in the anti-Dutch insurrection just prior to the Japanese invasion in their view warranted the replacement of the traditional elite, which had generally acted as an instrument of colonial rule. The Japanese authorities made only slight adjustments, however, and, like the Dutch before them, continued to rule through the medium of the traditional leaders.

In Java, or more precisely, in Jakarta as the centre of all-Indonesian political activities, it also soon became evident that the Japanese would continue the policy that had been fixed by the Dutch. In the political sphere they had no intention of giving former exponents of anti-Dutch nationalist and Islamic feelings a say.<sup>28</sup> Among the leaders of the pre-war PSII it was particularly

Abikusno Tjokrosujoso's group that entertained great hopes. In the days immediately following the Dutch surrender Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, probably misunderstanding the intentions of the Japanese, threw himself with verve into the activities of a section of the Indonesian political community aimed at forming an Indonesian Government to assist the Japanese War Administration. So he chaired a meeting on March 9th at which a "List of Ministerial Candidates for the Indonesian Government and their Assistants" was drawn up, and was himself mentioned by the newspaper *Tjahaja Timur* as an eligible candidate for the premiership (Sluimers 1968:347–348, 366–367).<sup>29</sup>

His hopes of becoming Prime Minister, if he ever cherished such hopes, were soon dashed. All speculation on the composition of a future Indonesian Government was quickly ended by the promulgation of a decree by the Military Commander of Java (Decree no. 3) on March 20th forbidding discussion of any kind on the political structure of Indonesia. The Japanese authorities had finally put their cards on the table. The decree was worded in such a way as to virtually preclude all further activity on the part of the pre-war political parties. The only organizations which were allowed to continue functioning were those which could be closely supervised and might be geared to the Japanese war effort. For the mobilization of the population the Japanese Occupational Administration preferred the institution of new mass organizations, headed by popular and cooperative Indonesian leaders, to working through the existing ones. As a consequence, the pre-war Indonesian political parties had to cease their activities. One after another they expired. This was true also of the Islamic parties. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso's PSII decided on March 9th to close its offices, while the party's executive committee decided on April 14th to suspend all activities (Benda 1958:112, M19-6-1947, 28-4-1947).<sup>30</sup> Kartosuwirjo and his Second PSII, too, were forced to discontinue their political activities.

The *Suffah* Institute, however, although designed as a training institute for a political cadre for the Islamic community, did continue functioning for some time. Situated at some distance from the centres of politics and administration, and having at least the appearance of an educational institution, it was initially left alone by the Japanese. The Institute's subsequent development during the Japanese occupation is not altogether clear. In most publications on the *Darul Islam* it is alleged to have changed in the course of the Japanese occupation from an institute

providing both general and specifically Islamic education into one for paramilitary training. As such its importance is usually stressed in explanations of the network of personal relations between Kartosuwirjo and the commanders of the Islamic Army of Indonesia which became manifest during the *Darul Islam* rebellion. It is subsequently argued in this connection that many students who received a military training at the *Suffah* Institute eventually joined one of the two principal post-war Islamic guerilla organizations, *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah*, which were to become the core of the Islamic Army in West Java.

This inference should not be drawn too hastily, however. The *Suffah* Institute may to some extent have been instrumental in building up a *Darul Islam* cadre. It provided Kartosuwirjo with an opportunity to expound his views on Islam and its position in society to numerous Islamic youths. This, together with the strong personal ties between pupil and teacher that are likely to develop in any Islamic school, must certainly have contributed to the following he commanded after 1945. But the link should be seen primarily as an indirect one. It is quite incorrect to suggest, as doen Van Nieuwenhuijze, that the Japanese used the *Suffah* Institute "as a training centre which, every two months, produced 300 Muslim candidates for incorporation in the *Sabili'llah*, one of the two armed suborganizations of MASJUMI that were to assist the Japanese army against the Allies" (Van Nieuwenhuijze 1958:168). Van Nieuwenhuijze, as well as those who quote him, like Jackson, here are overlooking the fact that the only armed suborganization of *Masyumi* that was formed during the Japanese occupation was *Hizbu'llah*, and then only around the beginning of 1945. *Sabili'llah* was only formed later (Jackson 1971:39).

Kartosuwirjo did for some time head the *Hizbu'llah* unit at Malangbong. He seems to have done so as one of the most influential Islamic leaders of the area, however, and not in his capacity as principal of the *Suffah* Institute, which had probably already been closed by that time (Horikoshi 1975:66).<sup>31</sup> His involvement in the Malangbong branch of *Hizbu'llah* does not appear to have been as intensive as might have been expected from a person like Kartosuwirjo. He divided his time between heading the Malangbong *Hizbu'llah* and acting as supervisor in the Banten Residency of a guerilla-training programme organized by the *Jawa Hokokai*, a mass movement dominated though not controlled by the "secular" nationalists (Benda 1958:285).

Kartosuwirjo's role in *Hizbu'llah* and *Jawa Hokokai* just about

sums up his political and military activities during the Japanese occupation. For some time shortly after the Japanese invasion and the discontinuation of the second PSII he was active in the MIAI, the only Islamic organization still to be tolerated by the Japanese at the time. In this connection he became one of the members of the central committee managing the *Bait al-Mal*, instituted by the MIAI for the purpose of collecting the religious tax and redistributing it among the poor (Benda 1958:259). When the MIAI at its congress of October 1943 dissolved itself and the *Bait al-Mal* had to be wound up, Kartosuwirjo ceased to play a prominent public role in the Islamic movement.

He never gained prominence in the *Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims. This new organization, commonly known by its acronym *Masyumi*, was founded in November 1943 to replace the MIAI. According to Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo did become secretary of *Masyumi*, but there is no evidence to support this view (Pinardi 1964:31).

It can safely be assumed that Kartosuwirjo never joined to the inner circle of prominent Indonesians who held key posts in the war-time Administration or in Japanese-sponsored Indonesian organizations. He did not belong to what is described by William H. Frederick as the “circumscribed number of recognized and prestigious Indonesians who filled multiple positions, often to what must have been a burdensome degree” (Frederick in Hatta 1971:38). Illustrative of the rather insignificant local role played by Kartosuwirjo during the Japanese occupation is the fact that he is not named among the roughly three thousand important Indonesians mentioned in *Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa*, a “Who’s Who” published by the Japanese Military Administration. It may well be that the Japanese Occupational Administration was a little afraid of the radicalism displayed by Kartosuwirjo in founding the Second PSII before the war.

Contrary to Kartosuwirjo, his pre-war adversary Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, in spite of his earlier failure to persuade the Japanese to allow the institution of an Indonesian Government, vigorously participated in the war-time political and public life. He was first advisor and later head of the Bureau of Public Works and fulfilled various important functions in the Indonesian political movements permitted by the Japanese.

The different roles played by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Kartosuwirjo were also to be reflected in the debates on the future political structure and constitutional basis of an independent Indonesia which took place in the closing period of the

Japanese occupation. As the tide of war turned, Japan, hoping to secure Indonesian support for its war effort, altered its attitude towards the Indonesian nationalists, allowing them a more active part in state affairs and greater freedom of movement. Indonesians now were permitted to form their own armed organizations. First, in October 1943, the *Peta* (*Pembela Tanah Air*, or Defenders of the Fatherland) and later, at the end of 1944, the *Hizbu'llah*, the armed branch of the Islamic *Masyumi*, was formed. On September 7th, 1944, moreover, the Japanese Prime Minister, Koiso, promised Indonesia "independence in the near future". On March 1st, 1945, this pledge was reiterated, this time by the Japanese Commander in Chief, who announced at the same time the establishment of a Study Committee for the Preparation of Independence (Benda 1958:173, 184).<sup>32</sup>

#### 4. *The Constitutional Place of Islam in Independent Indonesia*

The composition of the latter Committee was made public on April 29th. In all it comprised, at its first series of meetings, sixty-two members, among them such well-known personalities as Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta and Muhammad Yamin.<sup>33</sup> Its chairman was Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat (Rajiman Wediodiningrat). Abikusno Tjokrosujoso was one of the representatives of the Islamic community on it. Kartosuwirjo was not included.<sup>34</sup> The Committee's first series of meetings lasted from May 29th till June 1st. On the closing day Soekarno gave an address in which he outlined for the first time his ideas on the five principles or *Pancasila* which he felt should form the basis of an independent Indonesian state.<sup>35</sup>

Soekarno's exposition and the subsequent debates on the *Pancasila* as a proper basis for such an Indonesian state touched on the fundamental issues of the impending conflict between the proponents of a "secular" and those of an Islamic state. Soekarno, in his address, proposed Indonesian nationalism as the first principle on which the Indonesian state was to be based. He reminded his audience that nationalism was not intended to be allowed to degenerate into chauvinism, in the sense of "Indonesia über Alles". Hence he proposed internationalism or humanity as the second principle.

In expounding his views on the third principle, that of democracy, Soekarno rejected the idea that Islam should form one of the bases of the Indonesian state. In his view representative councils were the appropriate place in which to fight for the

realization of the Islamic ideals. So he advised the Muslim leaders present to try and secure a majority in these representative bodies if they wanted the Indonesian government to issue regulations that accorded with Muslim law. He added quite straightforwardly that only if sixty to ninety per cent of the elected representatives of the people pronounced themselves in favour of an Islamic constitution would it be proved that Islam was really internalized among the Indonesian population and that the latter was not simply paying lip-service to it.

With this statement Soekarno was confronting the Islamic leaders with the fact that, although the large majority of the Indonesian population, namely about eighty to ninety per cent of the total, is Muslim, a considerable proportion is fairly lax in the discharge of its religious duties and is decidedly in favour of a "secular" over an Islamic state. It was particularly the situation in Java which Soekarno had in mind when clarifying his view by stating that for him it was an objective truth that Islam was not yet truly alive among the people.

Democracy by itself was not sufficient, Soekarno continued. Hence the fourth principle on which Indonesia was to be based was social justice or prosperity. There was to be no poverty in an independent Indonesia.

As the fifth and final principle propounded by Soekarno was the belief in God. The Indonesian people should be a religious people. Every Indonesian should worship his own God in accordance with his own religious principles, and respect the religion of others.

In this first session of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Independence the idea of an Islamic state was also rejected by Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's future Vice-President, and by Supomo, the first Indonesian Minister of Justice. The latter did so more elegantly than Soekarno. Instead of going to the very core of the problem by hinting at the reluctance of part of the Islamic population to live in conformity with Muslim law in the strict sense, he evaded the touchy issue of the degree of acceptance of Islam by the Islamic community, and, illustrating his arguments with examples from Muslim States like Egypt, pointed out that acceptance of Islam as the basis of society would certainly not mean an end of all ideological differences. In countries like this, Supomo claimed, differences of opinion were apt to arise about the question of if and how Islamic law could be adapted to modern developments in the world at large. Another argument put forward by Supomo was that if Islam was



accepted as the basis of society, Indonesia could never become a unitary state. The establishment of an Islamic state would imply, according to him, that the state identified itself with the largest section of the population, which would give rise to the problem of minorities. Although an Islamic state would of course guarantee the protection of the interests of minorities, he continued, the minorities themselves would be unable to identify with the state (Yamin 1959–1960 I:116–117).

Soekarno's speech certainly did not put an end to the controversy between the advocates and opponents of an Islamic state at the end of the Japanese occupation.<sup>36</sup> After the Committee's first session thirty-eight of its members met at the headquarters of *Jawa Hokokai* on the initiative of Soekarno on June 22nd to discuss the problems to be settled at the Committee's next session. At this meeting a sub-committee of nine was appointed to study the position of Islam. The proponents of the "secular" state, or the nationalists, as Soekarno was to call them a month later in his report on the sub-committee's activities to the plenary meeting of the Study Committee, were represented on it by four members: Mohammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, Subardjo (Subarjo) and Maramis. From the Islamic camp Abdul Kahar Muzakir, Wachid Hasjim (Wakhid Hasyim), Agus Salim and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso participated. Soekarno acted as chairman.

The sub-committee of nine reached a compromise which would become known later as the Jakarta Charter. This was a preamble to the constitution on the formula of which all its members, "secular" and Islamic alike, seemed to be able to agree. This preamble incorporated, though in a slightly different wording, the *Pancasila* principles outlined by Soekarno early in June. There were two important modifications, however. In the first place the order of the five principles had been changed. Belief in God, mentioned by Soekarno as the fifth pillar on which Indonesian society should be based, now ranked first. The second, and most important, change concerned the position of Islam. When Soekarno had discussed Belief in God as one of the *Pancasila*, he had done so in general terms, without any mention of Islam in particular. In fact, he had gone so far as to refuse to make special provision for Islam in the constitutional framework of the future republic. This subsequently changed in the Jakarta Charter. The Muslim members of the sub-committee had pressed for a special provision for the Muslim community, and persuaded the other members to rephrase the principle of Belief in God. In

the Jakarta Charter, accordingly, Belief in God is stated as the first pillar on which the Indonesian Republic is to be based, and is expanded by the immediately following clause "with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law" (Boland 1971:27).<sup>37</sup> This provision, according to Boland, who was among the first to point out the significance of the Jakarta Charter, was to become known as "the seven words". It was to provoke considerable discussion in later years. Its relevance for the present study lies in the fact that the Jakarta Charter provided that segment of the Islamic community which was striving after the realization of the ideal of an Islamic state by peaceful means with a symbol which could guide them in their struggle. Acceptance of the Jakarta Charter after August 1945 was to become one of the legal Islamic parties' major short-term objectives on the longer road towards the realization of an Islamic state.

The Jakarta Charter was discussed during the second series of meetings of the Study Committee, lasting from 10th to 17th July, having been made public by Soekarno on July 10th in his report on the deliberations on the Indonesian constitution which had taken place in between the two sessions. It had not yet come up for discussion at that time, other matters being dealt with first. So amongst other things it had been agreed, by a majority of 55 of the 64 members present, that Indonesia should become a republic, and not a kingdom as suggested by some. It had also been decided that the territory of the republic should be defined by the boundaries of the former Dutch East Indies.

On July 11th three sub-committees were formed, one to draw up a constitution, and the other two to study the defence system of the new republic and to examine financial and economic matters respectively. The sub-committee on the constitution was headed by Soekarno. Of the earlier sub-committee of nine only he, Maramis, Agus Salim, Subardjo and Wachid Hasjim now participated. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso was not included in this sub-committee, but headed that on defence.<sup>38</sup>

The new sub-committee for drafting the constitution met on July 11th and 13th. Without much prior debate it almost unanimously pronounced itself in favour of a unitary state,<sup>39</sup> with only two of the nineteen members against. Then the preamble to the constitution came up for discussion. It came immediately under attack from Latuharhary, representing the Christian community of the Moluccas, who raised objections to the clause in the preamble stipulating that the adherents of Islam should

put Islamic law into practice. He was doing so, he said, because of the consequences the clause might have for the adherents of other religions, and because of difficulties it might give rise to in the relation between Islam and customary law. He was supported by Wongsonegoro and Husein Djajadiningrat, who both had a traditional Javanese aristocratic background, and of whom the latter had headed the Office of Religious Affairs instituted by the Japanese administration. They expressed their apprehension lest unconditional acceptance of the Jakarta Charter, with the inclusion of the clause at issue, encourage fanaticism on the part of a section of the Islamic community.

The objections were dismissed by Agus Salim and Soekarno, who had both had a part in the framing of the Jakarta Charter. Agus Salim made the rather ill-founded remark that "the conflict between religious and customary law was not a new problem, and generally speaking had already been solved". Soekarno emphasized that the Jakarta Charter was a compromise which it had taken great pains to reach and should therefore be left intact. He succeeded in persuading the other members to stop the discussion on the preamble and turn to the constitution proper. He could not, however, prevent the position of Islam being raised again in connection with some of the articles of the constitution. This time the attack came from the Muslim camp. It was Wachid Hasjim, one of the Islamic members of the earlier sub-committee of nine, who put the spark to the tinder. His proposals were such that they could not but increase the opposition to a dominant or special legal position for Islam. The first amendment moved by him was for the inclusion in the constitution of a provision stipulating that only Muslims could qualify as President or Vice-President. The second involved the formal incorporation in the constitution of the principle that Islam should be the state religion.<sup>40</sup>

Wachid Hasjim's proposals were supported by one other Islamic representative on the sub-committee, Sukiman. They were opposed, however, by Agus Salim, Wongsonegoro and Husein Djajadiningrat. The former two pointed out that acceptance of Wachid Hasjim's amendments might endanger the compromise reached in the preamble. In the brief discussion following Wachid Hasjim's proposals Wongsonegoro attempted to prevent the champions of Islam from using the preamble, or to be more precise, its clause on the observance of Islamic law, to impose a strict fulfilment of religious duties. Towards this end he proposed adding the words "and belief" to the article on religious freedom,

which it had already been agreed should read that the state should guarantee the freedom of all citizens to adhere to any religion whatever and to fulfil their religious duties proscribed by their religion.

The word used by Wongsonegoro, *kepercayaan*, which is generally translated as “belief” was used particularly in later years with reference to the heterodox mystical sects within Javanese Islam, with their numerous adherents among the *abangan*. It is interesting to see representatives of Javanese mysticism striving to achieve constitutional recognition of the existence of mystical sects as a separate phenomenon, free from interference by Islam, by having this word *kepercayaan* introduced even at the very beginning of the legal history of the Indonesian Republic. In the whole debate on the position of Islam in society, the fight for or against inclusion of the word in question in the law has been no more than a rear-guard action. Open rebellions to establish an Islamic state aside, inclusion of the word *kepercayaan* in the constitution or in individual Acts of Parliament is an issue that is invariably raised as a last resort when one of the two contending parties, the orthodox Muslims and the “secularists”, is threatening to gain the upper hand.<sup>41</sup>

For years the legal battle between the advocates and opponents of an Islamic state in Indonesia was to be waged with reference to the Jakarta Charter. The champions of the Islamic state urged for its inclusion in the constitution, or, what would only have complicated matters, for its recognition as being equivalent in status to the preamble of the constitution which did not include the much debated “seven words”.

The word *kepercayaan* surfaces only in particular cases. It did so, for example, in the debates of the sub-committee for drafting a constitution in 1945 upon its becoming likely that the Jakarta Charter would be adopted as the preamble to the constitution. The word was then introduced to safeguard the existence of mysticism and heterodox Islam. Since the Jakarta Charter in the end was not accepted after all, as we will see below, the debate about it subsequently drew all the attention, and the quarrel about the legal status of *kepercayaan* receded into the background.

It was only in the seventies that the word *kepercayaan* rose to the surface to become a bone of contention again. By that time, however, the situation had changed radically. The *Darul Islam* revolts had been put down, and even the mention of the Jakarta Charter had become taboo. At that time it was not the “secular-

ists” but the strict Muslims who were on the defensive – at least as they saw it. Thus they attacked the intended introduction of the word *kepercayaan* in legal documents as an attempt by the Government to weaken the position of Islam even further on a number of occasions.<sup>42</sup>

In July 1945 the suggested inclusion of *kepercayaan* with all its implications still went virtually unnoticed. The attention was monopolized by the debate on whether or not to include the stipulation for Muslims to observe Islamic law in the preamble. The sub-committee took note of Wongsonegoro’s remarks, and promised to look into his suggestion. It also agreed to a proposal by Otto Iskandardinata to include the provision that “the state is based on Belief in God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to observe Islamic law” not only in the preamble, but also in the section of the actual constitution dealing with religion.

In the series of deliberations on the constitution and other important issues, such as the wording of the declaration of independence, the full Study Committee for the Preparation of Independence met again on July 14th. Again the interest was concentrated on the preamble to the constitution. This meeting was opened with a report by Soekarno on the progress of his sub-committee, which was immediately followed by a serious discussion provoked by one of the advocates of a strict form of Islam, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo moving the deletion of the words “the adherents of Islam” in the clause “with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to observe Islamic law”.<sup>43</sup> This proposal of course was totally unacceptable. Again, as before, Soekarno spoke in favour of maintenance of the original text of the clause by pointing out that the Jakarta Charter was a compromise, and like every other compromise had been a matter of give and take. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo was not at all impressed and refused at first to give in. He only did so after the chairman of the meeting, Radjiman Wediodiningrat, stating that there was hence no other alternative than to put the issue to the vote, whereupon Abikusno Tjokrosujoso hastened to intervene. He came to Soekarno’s aid in defending the Jakarta Charter, echoing Soekarno’s words that it constituted a compromise involving some give and take. He strongly advised against voting on the issue, moreover, because of the bad impression this would create on the outside world. In the debates on the constitution the image of unanimity should be preserved, he said (Yamin 1959–1960 I:278–284).

The next morning the constitution itself and its individual articles came up for discussion. First, introducing the draft, the

general principles underlying it were outlined by Soekarno and Supomo.

The former said nothing new, and did not deviate substantially from his speech of June 1st or from any of his other reports to the Study Committee. Supomo once again admonished the members of the Study Committee not to become divided on the position of Islam, and to abide by the Jakarta Charter. He pointed out that the preamble and the actual constitution formed an inseparable unity and that the principles embodied in the preamble, on which the meeting had already agreed, should also be a guide for the spirit and the letter of the individual articles.

Supomo distinguished five such general principles, of which only the last two concern us here (Yamin 1959–1960 I: 302–303). Briefly summarized, the tenor of these two principles was that the Indonesian state should be based on Belief in God, and that the “special character of the largest section of the population in its territory, the Islamic population”, was recognized.

In his discussion of the meaning of the Jakarta Charter, Supomo once again urged his audience to abide by the compromise and not to press for more. He immediately added that the constitution itself in fact went further than the Jakarta Charter, alluding here to the unanimous decision by the subcommittee chaired by Soekarno, in which all the disputants had participated, to include a clause stating that “the State is based on Belief in God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to observe Islamic law” in the body of the constitution, instead of, as originally intended by the committee of nine which had formulated the Jakarta Charter, only in the preamble.

Supomo was well aware of the opposition to the clause and of the fear of Islamic dominance. He tried to convince the meeting, however, that such fears were groundless in view of the second clause of the article, which guaranteed freedom of religion and freedom for each individual citizen to fulfil his religious duties according to his own religion and beliefs (Yamin 1959–1960 I:315–316). It is doubtful whether Supomo’s arguments impressed his audience. Supomo was explicitly addressing only the non-Muslims in his attempts to win over the opponents of the Jakarta Charter, in spite of the fact that, as I have argued above, the basic opposition came from within the Islamic community (although opposition from the non-Muslims may have contributed to the controversy over the Jakarta Charter). He prob-

ably could not foresee at the time that most of the opposition would come from Muslim quarters.

In the discussions following Soekarno and Supomo's expositions which at first centred on such general matters as the status of the representative councils and care for the poor and for deprived children, the first to touch on the position of Islam again was Muhammad Yamin. He criticized the draft constitution for not fully reflecting the spirit of the preamble in its articles. This was the case with the position of Islam, for example, he said. Muhammad Yamin pleaded for the creation of a special Ministry of Religion to take care of specifically Islamic affairs, such as the maintenance of the mosques, as well as for the institution of an Islamic High Court. In his view the Supreme Court should not restrict itself to the administration of justice, but should also be responsible for ensuring that the laws introduced by Parliament were not in contradiction with the constitution, customary law or Islamic law. Hence his proposal for the institution of an Islamic High Court alongside a High Court for Customary Law as special sections of the Supreme Court.

The meeting does not appear to have given much attention to these suggestions of Yamin. Instead it launched into a lengthy discussion on citizenship and on the constitutional position of Cabinet ministers.

It was again Ki Bagus Hadikusumo who, at the evening session of July 15th, tried to reopen the debate on Islam. In retrospect, the discussion started by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo takes on a rather comic appearance. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo said five times in a row that he did not understand the clause "with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to observe Islamic law" and asked what it meant. He was answered by Radjiman Wediodiningrat, the chairman of the meeting, who concurred that it was a difficult question and replied each time Ki Bagus Hadikusumo pressed for an explanation that the matter had already been settled and that the debate should not be opened again. In the end Ki Bagus Hadikusumo was obliged to explain that he really did not understand. Politely thanking the chairman, he stated that, since he had not got a clear answer, he was forced to speak his mind. When it looked as if Ki Bagus Hadikusumo would indeed take the floor to expound his views, Radjiman Wediodiningrat interrupted by pointing out that this would mean a repetition of the discussion on the preamble of the previous day, while that preamble had already been unanimously accepted. So Ki Bagus Hadikusumo declared that he would have to leave the matter at that,

then. He had been stopped short by what he described as an order by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, who, as he put it, shouted “enough, enough, enough” before he had a chance to speak. Upon Ki Bagus Hadikusumo’s pointing out that any decision might still be changed, and that he in fact had no intention at all of discussing the preamble, but only the article of the constitution that contained the clause in question, he was again cut short by the chairman, who adjourned the meeting for about ten minutes. What was said in those ten minutes is not known. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo remained silent for the rest of that meeting, however (Yamin 1959–1960 I:371–374). The Islamic and “secular” leaders who had participated in drawing up the Jakarta Charter, in their eagerness to safeguard the Jakarta Charter, and forgetting that there were others as well who objected to the way in which the constitutional position of Islam was formulated, probably pressed Ki Bagus Hadikusumo to stop his opposition because of his persistence. In any case they succeeded in persuading Ki Bagus Hadikusumo in one way or another to refrain from further questions. Nevertheless, immediately upon reopening of the meeting the attack was renewed by yet another member, Abdul Patah Hasan. He did not touch on the Jakarta Charter or the relevant sentence in the draft constitution, but circumvented this controversial point by opposing the second clause of the article on religion in the constitution. (The first was that of the Jakarta Charter, though this is not mentioned by Muhammad Yamin.) This clause as reproduced by Muhammad Yamin read: “The state shall guarantee the freedom of all citizens to adhere to any religion whatever and to fulfil their religious duties in accordance with their own religion and belief”.<sup>44</sup>

Abdul Patah Hasan did not agree with this wording as he felt that the formula could imply “a subtle suggestion” to Muslims to abandon their religion. Consequently he proposed that the clause should read: “The state shall guarantee the freedom of all citizens who adhere to another religion to fulfil their religious duties in accordance with their own religion and belief”.

Supomo, speaking on behalf of the sub-committee that had drafted the constitution, did not object to this. He stated that it had been merely his committee’s intention to ensure freedom of religion to non-Muslims. If Abdul Patah Hasan’s wording was a more accurate reflection of this intention, he and his committee would not oppose the change in formulation.

If our view that the debate on the legal status of Islam can only be fully understood if it is related to the differences within the



Islamic community itself – differences that in arguments between the exponents of Islam and those of other religions often remain concealed – is correct, Supomo's reaction was rather imprudent. Acceptance of Abdul Patah Hasan's proposal would undoubtedly have provoked an open confrontation between the orthodox and the "liberal" Muslims on the committee and made for an even tenser atmosphere. It was the Christian members of the Study Committee who in a way prevented an open quarrel on the compulsory observance of Islamic law for all Indonesian Muslims.

Before "liberal" or heterodox Muslims like Wongsonegoro could react in protection of their interests, Latuharhary spoke out against changing the clause on freedom of religion, arguing that acceptance of Abdul Patah Hasan's proposal would imply a fundamental change in the original meaning of the clause. In his view the original clause had been formulated out of respect for religion, but in the event of its amendment as suggested by Abdul Patah Hasan, it would no longer be religion that was respected but the adherents of religion – a completely different matter.

After some discussion yet another version, this time proposed by Dahler, was accepted. It read that "The state shall guarantee the freedom of all citizens to adhere to their own religion and to fulfil their religious duties in accordance with their religion and belief". In spite of this new compromise, the attack by the Islamic members of the Committee on the draft constitution continued, as according to them it failed to give Islam its proper place in society. The issue seized upon by them to vent their dissatisfaction was that of the formal requirements for candidature for the Presidency. This new, and at times quite heated, discussion started was sparked off by Pratalykrama asking immediately after the unanimous acceptance of the Dahler formula whether the constitution should not contain a provision that the President should be at least forty years of age, an autochthonous Indonesian, and of the Islamic faith.

This point had been raised before, namely during the plenary session of the sub-committee for drafting the constitution chaired by Soekarno. At that time Agus Salim had rejected a similar suggestion by Wachid Hasjim by pointing out that a stipulation in the constitution that the President should be of the Islamic faith would put the compromise of the Jakarta Charter in danger. The choice of a President, should, he felt, be left to Congress, the institution empowered by the draft constitution to elect the President and the Vice-President. He had argued that a

written provision that Indonesia should have a Muslim President would immediately prompt other questions. If the President should be a Muslim, then what about the Vice-President and the ambassadors, he had asked rhetorically. And what would be left of the pledge to protect other religions? (Yamin 1959–1960 I: 262).

Upon Pratalykrama's again raising the question of the religion of the President on the evening of July 15th, Supomo reacted in almost the same way as Agus Salim. He stressed once again that the Jakarta Charter should be left unchanged, and urged his audience not to bring the subject up for discussion again. If it was, then the debates of the past few days would have been for nothing, and someone might propose special conditions for the ministers as well. Supomo's words had no effect. Masjkur (Masykur), a *kiyai* from East Java, rose to point out the discrepancy in the draft constitution between the stipulation that the President should be sworn in according to the rites of his religion, which might be one other than Islam, and the obligation for Muslims to observe Islamic law. According to him there were two ways of solving the problem. The first was by dropping the obligation for Muslims to observe Islamic law, but substituting it with a provision that the official religion of the Indonesian Republic should be Islam. The second was by stipulating that the Indonesian President should be a Muslim.

It all clearly became too much for Supomo and Radjiman Wediodiningrat. The latter asked Soekarno to reply, in the hope that Soekarno's authority might be great enough to modify the opposition from the Islamic members. Soekarno thereupon answered that he understood what Masjkur meant when speaking of a discrepancy in the draft constitution, but pointed out, as Supomo had done before him, though unsuccessfully so, that he and the members of his sub-committee had great faith in the wisdom of the Indonesian people, who would be certain to elect a Muslim as President. If Masjkur were to ask him personally, he, Soekarno, was absolutely convinced that the Indonesian President to be elected would be a Muslim, because the majority of the Indonesian population was Muslim. Soekarno called to mind his speech of June 1st, in which he had urged the Islamic leaders to try to achieve a majority on the representative bodies if they wanted to see an Islamic legislation enacted, saying: "As a Muslim myself, I urge the Indonesian Islamic community to work as energetically as possible at propagating the Islamic faith among the Indonesian people, so that, when the mind of a large propor-

tion of the Indonesian population really comes ablaze with Islamic ardour, and their spirit flares up with Islamic fire, not only will the future President of the Indonesian Republic be a Muslim, but also every Act to come from the representative council will – I predict – bear an Islamic stamp.” (Yamin 1959–1960 I:380).

At the end of this short speech Soekarno urged the Islamic leaders present once again to respect the Jakarta Charter. This implied that the draft constitution should remain intact as well. A gentlemen’s agreement had been made, the draft constitution being, Soekarno stressed, a reflection of that gentlemen’s agreement.

When Masjkur insisted on further deliberations and repeated his request for fuller information on some of the points of the draft constitution, Radjiman Wediodiningrat confronted him with the choice of keeping the relevant clauses of the draft constitution unchanged or putting the matter to the vote, a procedure which the Study Committee had consistently tried to avoid, especially where important and sensitive issues were concerned. Masjkur replied that he felt a compromise must be found. Soekarno immediately thereupon suggested, on behalf of his sub-committee, that the words “according to the rites of his religion” in the provision on the presidential oath of office should be scrapped. This in turn was rejected by Masjkur. As Soekarno continued pressing him to agree, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir intervened. Claiming to speak on behalf of all the Islamic leaders present, he angrily proposed deleting every reference to Islam in the preamble, in the constitution and in the declaration of independence, which had also been drawn up by the Study Committee. Radjiman Wediodiningrat continued pressing for a vote. The Muslim members of the Study Committee emphatically replied that it was impossible to vote on religion, however. The entire compromise, which had been reached with such pains, was in jeopardy.

The first member to indicate that the Muslim leaders of the Study Committee were no longer interested in any compromise was Achmad Sanusi (Akhmad Sanusi), who stressed that there were only two alternatives left, viz. to accept Masjkur’s proposals or to reject them and follow Abdul Kahar Muzakkir’s suggestion to delete all reference to Islam. It was impossible to vote on religion, he repeated. He was seconded by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, who urged that it should be decided here and now whether the Indonesian state was to be a “secular” or an Islamic state. If the

majority was against an Islamic state, then the state should be neutral with respect to religion. Under no circumstances, however, should the constitution contain only a vague and superficial mention of Islam. This would create a bad impression on the Islamic community, which knew quite well what was the issue. Hereupon Achmad Sanusi again took the floor around midnight to try and alleviate the tension by asking those present to remain calm and urging the chairman of the meeting to let the atmosphere quieten down before allowing the discussion to continue. Radjiman Wediodiningrat quickly availed himself of the opportunity to adjourn the meeting till the next morning.

After the closing of the meeting, representatives of both the Islamic and non-Islamic factions met informally on Soekarno's initiative to try and find a way out of the impasse. From this meeting must have stemmed the proposal made by Soekarno the next day – asking the non-Islamic members for a sacrifice, for “there is greatness in sacrifice” – to include the stipulation that the President should be an autochthonous Indonesian and a Muslim in the constitution, and to leave the article on religion, including the stipulation that Muslims should observe Islamic law, unchanged. After some further debating, mostly concerning the other points, the draft constitution, including of Soekarno's suggested amendments, was finally adopted unanimously.

##### 5. *The Proclamation of Independence*

The June and July discussions on the draft constitution have been described at some length above, as they illustrate the great difficulty involved in finding a *modus vivendi* between the demands of the Islamic leaders and those of more “liberal” Indonesians, Muslims or otherwise. As the description shows, a compromise like the Jakarta Charter was unable to satisfy both camps. It might suffice as a general ideological outline of society, but as soon as it had to be filled in and specific stipulations had to be made, even in such a broad framework as that provided by the constitution, problems arose.

As it would turn out, all the discussions had been for nothing, and the constitution drawn up by the Study Committee was never enacted. Independent Indonesia actually became a “secular” state, in which there was no question of any legal obligation for Muslims to observe Islamic law. This may have contributed to the outbreak of the later *Darul Islam* revolts. It is doubtful, however, whether the exclusion of the Jakarta Charter

from the preamble to the constitution was a decisive factor. Its inclusion might only have satisfied the moderates, who when all was said and done only sympathized with the aims of the *Darul Islam* movement and gave it some moral support, but never joined it, and in the end strongly denounced the violent course it took.

Leaving aside for a moment the fact that many non-religious factors contributed to the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* rebellions, it is not too bold a speculation that the “die-hards” on either side would never have accepted a compromise like the Jakarta Charter anyway. Particularly in the Javanese setting, where most of the early constitutional debates took place and where the first of a series of *Darul Islam* rebellions was to erupt, it would have put too strong a stamp on society for it to be acceptable to nominal Muslims or non-Muslims. Conversely, some of the religious and political leaders of the Indonesian Islamic community would never have stopped short of an Islamic state. The representatives of the Islamic community who participated in the discussions on the constitution from June till August can be characterized as moderates or middle-of-the-roaders as far as the question of finding ways of cooperating with other segments of society is concerned. But even some of them found it difficult to accept the Jakarta Charter and its implications. Islamic “die-hards” like Kartosuwirjo and Kamran, who before the Japanese occupation had championed a total *hijrah*, had not even had a chance to voice their opinions. They had become alienated from the Japanese occupational authorities as well as from the opinion-forming section of the Islamic community which was supported by the Japanese and for its part cooperated with them. Consequently they had been unable to secure seats on the Study Committee and state their position.

On July 16th, the substance of the constitution and its preamble seemed to have been finally decided on, and the constitution agreed upon by the Study Committee included the Jakarta Charter not only in its preamble, but also in the first clause of the article on religion. History, however, took a different course and the actual developments were much more rapid than had been planned or even anticipated. On August 14th, a few days after the United States had dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan unconditionally surrendered. Three days later, on August 17th, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence.

The next day, August 18th, the Indonesian Independence Pre-

paratory Committee<sup>45</sup> met. This Preparatory Committee, as it is commonly referred to, had been set up with Japanese consent for the purpose of making final preparations for independence early in August, since a Japanese defeat was imminent anyway. It had to complete the task of the Study Committee and prepare the final draft of the constitution. Its first meeting had, in fact, been planned for August 18th, but now took place under quite different circumstances from what had been envisaged. It was to have completed its task before the formal transfer of sovereignty by the Japanese, who had at first planned independence on September 7th, but later, because of the changing circumstances, on August 24th (Dahm 1971:110).

Originally this Preparatory Committee had twenty-one members, and was chaired by Soekarno, with Mohammed Hatta and Radjiman Wediodiningrat as vice-chairmen.<sup>46</sup> It differed from the Study Committee in that its composition was intended from the start to roughly mirror Indonesia's regional differences. While the Study Committee had been composed along the lines of ideological diversity, with a strong but not exclusive emphasis on Java, the reverse was thus true of the Preparatory Committee. The major criterion for its composition, as stated above, was the regional diversity of Indonesia, although the regional differences within the major islands were still overlooked. As a consequence of this change in emphasis, many of the members of the Study Committee who had actively participated in the debate on the constitutional place of religion did not reappear on the Preparatory Committee. Absent were, among others, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, Masjkur, Achmad Sanusi, Wongsonegoro, and, more strikingly, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Muhammad Yamin.

So the Preparatory Committee met on the morning of August 18th as planned. But as a result of the sudden Japanese surrender and the subsequent proclamation of independence, it took the form of a kind of emergency meeting taking place in a very confused atmosphere without the necessary preparations. Its change in composition provided the "secular" leaders, who had actually suffered a defeat by the double inclusion of the Jakarta Charter and by the stipulation that the President should be a Muslim, with the opportunity to redress the balance and push through a "secular" constitution. But first the remaining Islamic members of the Preparatory Committee had to be brought round. To this end the meeting was postponed for roughly two hours to provide Mohammad Hatta with the opportunity to

confer with the principal remaining representatives of the Islamic community. According to Sajuti Melik (1968) these were Teuku Muhammad Hasan and Ki Bagus Hadikusomo. Basing himself on “first-hand oral information” – i.c. from Mohammad Hatta himself, according to my own first-hand information – Boland (1971:35–36) writes that Wachid Hasjim was also present, however.

After Mohammad Hatta had succeeded in convincing them that only a “secular” constitution stood a chance of being accepted by the majority of the population, the Preparatory Committee meeting was then opened by Soekarno. In his opening address, he urged the members to take decisions quickly, to concentrate on essentials and to leave aside trivialities. With respect to the constitution, he pleaded that they should adopt the draft as composed by the Study Committee, and that if they deemed changes necessary they should introduce these only on major points. Soekarno disclosed that some members of the Preparatory Committee had suggested alterations to the draft constitution before the meeting and added that consultations had also already taken place – hereby hinting at Mohammad Hatta’s endeavours to bring the Muslim members round – and that a number of agreements had been reached. He then invited Mohammad Hatta to explain these latter.

Mohammad Hatta hereupon announced that it had been decided to return to the original text of the preamble, as drawn up before the committee of nine had composed the preamble that was to become known as the Jakarta Charter. He explained that, “In view of the mood that has developed up till now, and also [of] the historic moment which occurred yesterday, it will obviously be better for us to return to the old” (Yamin 1959–1960 I:401). He thereupon read out the text of this preamble which had been decided upon before the Jakarta Charter. The sentence about the Islamic population having to observe Islamic law was not included in it. The pillar on religion, although remaining the first of the five pillars of the *Pancasila*, now spoke of “Belief in the One and Only God”.

Two other changes to the constitution proposed by Mohammad Hatta at this time were a logical outcome of the first. The stipulation that the President should be a Muslim was dropped, because, according to Mohammad Hatta, it “is rather offensive, and moreover superfluous, as with a percentage of Muslims in Indonesia of 95, probably automatically a Muslim will become President, while its omission will make the entire Constitutional

Law acceptable to Indonesian regions that are not Islamic . . .” (Yamin 1959–1960 I:402). Besides, as indicated, the controversial Jakarta Charter clause stipulating that the Muslim population should observe Islamic law was dropped from the article on religion. Its first sentence now read simply that “The State shall be based on Belief in the One and Only God”.

These changes had been made, Mohammad Hatta explained, to ensure the unity of the nation in the critical and difficult times that were ahead and to avoid having anything in the constitution that was likely to sow discord. Mohammad Hatta also announced a number of other changes to the draft constitution. These did not concern the position of Islam, however.

After Mohammad Hatta had finished his speech, a confident Soekarno chaired the rest of the meeting. The draft constitution was accepted with some minor changes, including those explained by Mohammad Hatta. Furthermore Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta were elected as President and Vice-President of the Indonesian Republic respectively.

The Preparatory Committee met again the next day, August 19th. The subject of discussion this time was the government structure of the new republic. For the purpose of compiling a list of the ministries to be established another sub-committee had been set up, composed of Subardjo, M. Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo (M. Sutarjo Kartohadikusumo) and M. Kasman Singodimedjo (M. Kasman Singodimejo). They subsequently proposed setting up twelve ministries, of which one, mentioned last in the list, was to be a Ministry of Religion. The establishment of such a ministry was opposed by Latuharhary, who argued that the institution of a special Ministry of Religion might be offensive. If the minister were a Christian, for example, this would offend Muslims, and vice versa. There was no need to arouse feelings calculated to give rise to internal conflicts. Consequently Latuharhary proposed, instead of establishing a separate Ministry of Religion, placing religious affairs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. This way conflicts could be avoided, and at the same time expense avoided (Yamin 1959–1960 I:457). Latuharhary’s views were endorsed by Abdul Abbas, a Muslim representative from Sumatra, who stated that religious affairs, including the administration of the tax for the poor, which the sub-committee of three had intended placing in the charge of the Ministry of Welfare, should come under the Ministry of Education. Raden Iwa Kusumasumantri, a pre-war left wing nationalist, also spoke out against the establishment of a special Ministry of



Religion. He went further than Latuharhary and Abdul Abbas, attacking the special administrative facilities for the propagation of Islam created by the Japanese, and hinting that to his mind not even a special bureau for religious affairs was called for. He said that by and large he agreed with Latuharhary's proposal, but felt that for the time being not even a bureau for religious affairs should be established. "Up till now, during the past three years, Islamic matters have tended to be exaggerated, while in my view the government should possess simply and solely a national character". Yet another suggestion was made by Ki Hadjar Dewantara (Ki Hajar Dewantara), who proposed placing religious affairs not in the charge of the Ministry of Education, but in that of Internal Affairs. If religious affairs were to come under the Ministry of Education, the management of these affairs, with all their wide ramifications, would according to him overburden the Ministry.

The proposal for the establishment of a special Ministry of Religion was thus rejected, with only six of the twenty-seven members voting in favour of such a Ministry. Religious affairs thereupon came under the Ministry of Education.<sup>47</sup>

The Preparatory Committee met once more on August 22nd to discuss the constitution of a Parliament, the position and structure of the Armed Forces of the Republic, and the introduction of a single party system. The Parliament, named *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (KNIP), or Central Indonesian National Committee, was constituted on August 29th, on which same day the Preparatory Committee was dissolved. The Committee had completed its task, having given the Indonesian Republic a constitution and a blueprint for its governmental structure.

Unfortunately it had done no more than that. One of the basic weaknesses of the Preparatory Committee, as well as of the previous Study Committee, was that they had functioned too much in isolation and had been obliged to move too fast. It would be unfair and incorrect to accuse the two committees of being unrepresentative of the social, political and religious majority of the time. In fact they were representative, though in an as yet imperfect way. What made the decisions of the committees such weak ones was the lack of opportunity for their members to consult their followers, and the hurry in which all the decisions had to be taken. The Preparatory Committee did succeed in drafting a constitution, but, as would become evident during and after the struggle for independence, it failed to provide the anti-Dutch forces with a sufficiently strong ideological basis to ensure

unity, in spite of the fact that this was the very argument used by Mohammad Hatta to persuade the leading Muslim members of the Preparatory Committee to accept the "secular" constitution.

All this was not the fault of the Indonesian members themselves, but to a large extent of the Japanese. Like the Dutch, they were initially very reluctant to train Indonesians in the art of governing or to provide them with opportunities to gain experience in that field. They only permitted direct contact between Indonesian leaders and the population when it suited them. And they failed to follow up the vague promises for Indonesia's independence, with the necessary steps to prepare the Indonesians for independence. Only when a Japanese defeat was imminent were the Indonesians allowed to discuss independence and to deliberate on its content and the necessary institutions. The Indonesian leaders then had to be ready for independence within three months. Most of these three months were taken up in discussing the constitution.

As a consequence of all this the Indonesian revolution took place on two different levels, to some extent interrelated but often without any real communication. The first of these was in the centre — first Batavia as it was called by the Dutch, or Jakarta as it was called by the revolutionaries, and later Yogyakarta — were the Central Government of the Republic was located, with its constitution and government apparatus, complete with an army, ministries and regional governors, as well as its rightfully claimed sovereignty over the whole of the territory of the former Dutch East Indies. Although this Government, whose civil and military administration at first existed only on paper, was represented in Jakarta with its central government offices and in some of the major towns, it hardly reached out into the countryside.

The second was the local level, in the rural areas, where anti-colonial outbursts and uprisings took place virtually independently of and without directions from the central Republican Government as soon as news of the Japanese surrender spread. In theory these local movements acknowledged the Republican Government's claim to sovereignty, at least at the beginning of the struggle for independence. In practice the situation was much more complicated. In some cases the Central Government's authority was accepted unconditionally, on others only as far as this had no implications for the local situation itself. As soon as the Central Government began extending its *de facto* authority over the countryside, conflicts arose between it and the leaders of the local rebellions.

A situation thus arose in which the Republican Government, with its initially weak lines of contact into the countryside, together with the Republican Army, constituted only one of many other entities, be it the most viable one.<sup>48</sup> It owed its favourable start to the fact that it was supported by the most popular and well-known national leaders, as well as to the appeal of the proclamation of independence and the idea of an independent national state. Even so, the Republican Government and Army still had to justify their position as sole representative and instrument of the State, also in the course of the revolution. The extension of their authority over the rural districts, and in particular the Republican Army's attempts to control and supervise the numerous other, irregular guerilla units, met with a great many difficulties almost from the very beginning of the Republic.

The violent clashes occurring in the process were not simply the consequence of the Republican Army's desire to gain control and achieve the necessary coordination of the struggle against the Dutch. Nor were they exclusively a result of resistance to these attempts on the part of irregular local guerilla units and their leaders from fear of losing authority or being forced into a subordinate position. Regional, ethnic, religious and even educational differences contributed greatly to the rivalry and enmity between irregular guerilla groups and between them and the Republican Army, as well as to the differences on the tactics to be used in the struggle against the Dutch.

But there was more to it than that. If the conflicts between the various guerilla groups had been inspired solely by social differences, violence might have been avoided for a time, perhaps even till the end of the struggle against the Dutch. In fact, the leaders of the various ideological groupings – not only the communists with their emphasis on the necessity for the nationalist revolution to develop into a socialist one, but also Islamic leaders like Kartosuwirjo – at first did their utmost not to aggravate by words a situation which might result in internal violence. They were careful in their speeches and publications to divide their own struggle towards their personal revolutionary goal – the attainment of a socialist and an Islamic society respectively – into two distinct phases. The first was that on the struggle for independence, in which Indonesian revolutionaries of all persuasions should unite in the common cause. Only after completion of this first phase, and after the Dutch had been ousted, would the time come for them to fight for the achievement of their

individual ideals and to strive, preferably by peaceful means, to achieve a socialist or Islamic state.

There were no serious, large-scale internal risings until 1948, when the Madiun affair took place and the *Darul Islam* revolt in Java started in earnest. Troubles on a much smaller scale broke out as early as 1945, however. These minor clashes, which sparked off the later more important ones, might in some cases have been avoided if there had been ample resources, and especially an adequate supply of arms, for all rival groups from the beginning of the revolution. But this ideal situation was far removed from reality. Arms were in very short supply, which gave the Republican Army an extra stimulus to try and gain control of local guerilla units, thus in turn providing these local groups with a strong incentive to resist. Not only did arms constitute a prerequisite for a successful struggle against the Dutch, and thus for the increased prestige of the guerilla unit concerned, but failure to secure arms implied an immediate, irreversible loss of ground on which to negotiate a favourable position in the constellation of the Republic in the years to come. So there arose fierce competition for arms between the various guerilla groups almost at the beginning.

In some areas, such as Aceh, the internal violence in the first year of the revolution probably could not have been avoided; in other places, where social cleavages were less sharp and where there did not exist two distinct, well-organized camps each with a large following, however, it might have been.

There were two additional factors contributing to the fierce competition for arms. Firstly, there was no well-organized Republican Army reaching into the countryside at the time of declaration of independence, as was mentioned above. Not only had the Japanese disallowed the development of such an organization, but the Republican leaders themselves were hesitant at first, even immediately after August 17th, about calling one into being. Although they had discussed the formation of a Republican Army at the meetings of the Preparatory Committee, expressing the opinion that a National Army must soon be established, they had at the same time spoken out in favour of the dissolution of the *Peta* and other Indonesian armed organizations of the Japanese period (Yamin 1959–1960 I:463). In order not to anger or compromise the Japanese, whom the Allies had made responsible for the maintenance of law and order, they at first tried to avoid creating any impression that they were building up an army of their own. Fearing that the Japanese authorities

would disapprove of the formation of an Republican Army, on August 22nd what was called a People's Security Body or *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* (BKR) was formed in place of an army. Eventually a Republican Army was to develop from this body. For the time being, however, its task was nominally confined to the protection of the population in the insecure times following the Japanese surrender. Formally this BKR was part of the *Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang*, a relief organization for war victims.<sup>49</sup> Only on October 5th was a national Republican Army officially constituted. The absence until then of a well-organized army, coupled with the dissolution of the *Peta* and other Japanese-sponsored armed organizations, thus created a favourable atmosphere for the spontaneous development of manifold irregular guerilla units.

The second factor contributing to the competition for scarce arms between the various Indonesian military groups was the unwillingness of most of the Japanese authorities to hand over arms to Indonesians, thereby making for a dire shortage of the same. They were strengthened in their reluctance by the Allied War Command's instructing them not to do so.

Japan, which had so poorly prepared Indonesia for the realities of independence, had, to overstate the situation, saddled Indonesia with yet another problem: an army without arms. After its surrender, it had been made responsible by the Allies for the maintenance of law and order in the countries it had occupied until such time as Allied troops should land and take over from it. In Indonesia's case the additional unrealistic condition was imposed that the Japanese should reverse the political process which had developed under their rule and nullify the proclamation of independence, which was believed to be a completely Japanese-inspired and -sponsored affair.<sup>50</sup> This second condition it was impossible for the Japanese to fulfil. Admittedly the Japanese authorities in Indonesia had tolerated the Republic, often reluctantly, but sometimes assisting it in certain ways. In accordance with their obligation to preserve law and order, however, they had avoided doing anything that might be construed as offering active assistance to the Republic. It was a logical part of this policy not to hand out weapons to Indonesians voluntarily, and to disarm and disband those Indonesian armed organizations which they had created and trained during their rule.

Accordingly the Indonesian armed organizations established during the Japanese occupation, such as the *Peta* in Java and its counterpart the *Gyu Gun* in Sumatra, as well as the Indonesian

auxiliary troops of the Japanese armed forces, such as the *Heiho* and *Keibodan*, were for the greater part disarmed and sent home.

The result of this was that Indonesian guerilla groups – the official Republican Army as well as irregular units – were obliged to secure arms by force or intimidation from the Japanese or from fellow-units which has successfully looted Japanese or had escaped disarmament.

## CHAPTER TWO

### WEST JAVA, THE CRADLE

#### *1. The Guerillas of West Java*

At first the attempts to secure arms were directed only at Japanese barracks and arsenals. Whenever arms were not handed over voluntarily they were taken by force or threats of force. In the latter case large numbers of people armed with knives, bamboo spears and a few obsolete fire-arms would march against small concentrations of Japanese soldiers. Surrounded and outnumbered by such a large crowd the soldiers would have no alternative but to hand over their arms and retreat. To fight often meant almost certain defeat, even with the superiority of Japanese arms. One such incident is described as follows by Smail: "He (a student who was eighteen at the time) said that on one occasion his group came up to attack a few Japanese who were guarding some railway freight cars. The Japanese surrendered and told the *pemudas*, who hadn't known, that there were several boxes packed with pistols in one of the freight cars. They said that the *pemudas* could have the pistols if only they would not kill them." (Smail 1964:57.)

Such tactics could only be used at small and isolated posts, against individual Japanese, or at places where the Japanese soldiers were still demoralized by the effect of the sudden Japanese defeat and had not yet recovered from the shock of seeing the massive popular support for the new Republic.<sup>1</sup> As soon as there was a large concentration of Japanese soldiers, and especially after the first few weeks, when the Japanese had regained control of the situation, such tactics were ineffectual. The refusal of the Japanese to surrender their arms and their attempts to stem the revolutionary tide sparked off a number of greater and smaller armed conflicts between their own and Indonesian forces. Large-scale fighting occurred at Surabaya, for example, where on October 1st the headquarters of the Japanese Military Police were attacked, and at Semarang, where a five-day battle raged from October 15th to 20th.

As regards West Java, one of the best-known incidents surrounding the seizure of Japanese arms was the fighting that broke out between Japanese and Indonesian troops at Lengkong, near Tangerang, in January 1946. On the Indonesian side cadets and officers of the newly established Military Academy were involved. A group of cadets was directed towards Serpong, a village between Tangerang and Jakarta at the end of January. It had two assignments, namely to disarm the Japanese soldiers stationed at Lengkong and to organize a line of defence against Dutch troops advancing from Jakarta. The Indonesian troops did actually establish contact with the Japanese, using the transfer of some Gurkha prisoners of war captured by them as a starting-point for negotiations. At first all went well. The Japanese were prepared to hand over their weapons to the Indonesians, who immediately began collecting these. The situation changed when a shot was fired. The sources differ on who was responsible. According to one one of the Gurkhas had fired it unintentionally (Sekilas 1971:87). According to another account it had been fired by a "Muslim soldier" who had joined the troops from Tangerang, whose weapon just went off by accident.<sup>2</sup> At the sound of the shot, the Japanese and probably also the Indonesian forces each thought that it was they who had been fired at. A fight broke out, in which the Indonesian troops were defeated and thirty-three Indonesians killed. When the Indonesian Army threatened to march in fresh troops, the Japanese forces at Lengkong surrendered and handed over their arms.<sup>3</sup>

In general, compared with other areas in Indonesia, the guerillas in West Java seem to have been less successful in securing arms than for example those in the rest of Java and in Aceh. In a sense this proved to be to the advantage of the Republican Army, which, because of its superior equipment, was thus able to incorporate large portions of the irregular units. On the other hand, of course, it seriously hampered the armed struggle against the Dutch, who either directly or indirectly, through the puppet state of Pasundan founded in 1948, came to control large parts of West Java. The scarcity of arms, moreover, provided a constant source of conflict between the Republican Army and the irregular bands. Eventually these two factors created the necessary conditions facilitating the birth of the *Darul Islam*. This took place in early 1948, after the conclusion of the Renville agreement between the Dutch and the Republican Government. As a consequence of the agreement, Indonesian troops had to be withdrawn to Central Java from the so-called "pockets of resist-



ance" occupied by them in the Dutch-controlled parts of West Java. The official Republican Army abided by the agreement and did retreat. Many irregular units, however, in particular those of the two major Muslim guerilla organizations *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah*, refused to do so. These units also resisted the order to hand over their arms to the retreating Republican forces, which needed the extra arms to continue the war in Central Java. The Republican Army subsequently tried to disarm these units by force, but could not prevent armed Islamic guerilla units from remaining behind. Free from the active control of the Republican Army in Central Java, and mainly on the initiative of Kartosuwirjo, these units evolved their own military organization and administration, which within a year was to become the core of the Islamic State of Indonesia.

The tension between the official Republican Army and the irregular guerilla bands, which ultimately led to a final rupture between "secular" and Islamic troops in West Java, began relatively early. This is testified by armed conflicts over weapons at the time the Republican Army had to retreat to Central Java.

It is not possible to give a detailed account of all the conflicts with the official Republican Army, or even to list all the irregular guerilla units that sprang up in those days. Many of them were small and ill-equipped and were sooner or later absorbed by the Republican Army or by other bigger and better-armed irregular units. Some, in fact, were no more than bands of bandits continuing operations in the new revolutionary situation in the context of the old Javanese institution of groups of unsettled youths roving about the countryside. The Dutch, familiar with this institution, had difficulty in distinguishing between them and the larger nationalist guerilla groups fighting for independence. They tended to brand all irregular guerilla units as "gangs of bandits". Sometimes even the official Republican Army did not escape the stigma, preferring as it did guerilla warfare to regular war with open battles between two uniformed armies. A good example of the Dutch attitude is provided by P.M. van Wulfften Palthe in his brochure entitled *Over het bendewezen op Java*. Comparing the pre-war situation with the revolutionary period he writes: "Now the situation is essentially the same, except that the gangs have become more numerous and more dangerous, and are equipped with all kinds of weapons which formerly one did not find in their possession, such as hand-grenades, landmines and aerial bombs. In mopping-up operations most victims fall not in open battle, but as a result of all kinds of

mechanical devices such as wires stretched across the road, booby-traps and pitfalls. The desa population knows all about this, but has no patriotic sympathy for the bands as is found elsewhere in the case of guerilla and underground resistance movements; it welcomes our intervention with feelings of great relief and keeps mum!" (Van Wulfften Palthe 1949:18).<sup>4</sup>

Other groups were definitely not mere "gangs of bandits" or "bands of religious fanatics", to mention another label frequently used by the Dutch to discredit their opponents. Some of them really achieved regional or even national importance. A few became so powerful that they were able to successfully resist the Republican Army even after the struggle for independence was over and the Republican Army was able to concentrate its efforts on bringing the many irregular guerilla units under control. In West Java it was in particular the two big Muslim guerilla organizations *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* which belonged to the latter category.

The *Hizbu'llah*, or Allah's Army, had been founded at the end of the Japanese occupation to give Javanese Muslims their own defence force. Muslim leaders had pleaded for the establishment of such a force as early as September 1943. In that month they had asked the Japanese war authorities to "set up a Muslim volunteer corps" that might "become the trailblazer in the efforts to destroy America and England" (Benda 1958:139, citing *Djawa Baroe* I, 19:1). They made this request immediately following a similar request for the foundation of a general volunteer corps from "secular" quarters. In 1943 the Japanese still preferred the foundation of a general Javanese volunteer corps over a Muslim one. Hence in October 1943 they gave permission for the establishment of the *Peta*, a general corps which many Muslims also entered (cf. Notosusanto 1979).

The Javanese Muslims had to wait till the end of 1944 before their request was granted and they were permitted to form their own military organization in Java and Madura. The Japanese permission was given a few months after Japanese Prime Minister Koiso's promise of independence to Indonesia on September 7th, a promise which was greeted on the Muslim side with militant statements about the defence of the fatherland against the advancing Allies. The public learned of the Japanese approval on December 8th, the anniversary of the Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor which had initiated the "Great East Asia War". On that day the name of the Islamic volunteer corps, *Barisan Hizbu'llah* or *Hizbu'llah*, was mentioned in public for the first time by the

then commander of the Japanese forces in Java, General Kumakichi Harada. The latter, in a brief commemorative address, stressed the obligation for the people of East Asia, and in particular of Java, to defend their own country. In this context he then spoke of “Muslim youths, numbering over 400 thousand, [who] rose together to form the *Barisan Hizbullah* and who will plunge into the fight to the very end” (SMI 15-12-1944).

As soon as the Japanese consent had been given, *Hizbu'llah* was formally founded by *Masyumi*. According to its constitution, *Hizbu'llah* had both a military and a religious task (SMI 15-12-1944:24–26). Military it had to act as a *Peta* reserve corps in the war against the Allies. In the religious field it was supposed to propagate and defend Islam and to ensure that the Muslim community fulfilled its religious obligations. Its members should be model Muslims and should kindle the rest of the Islamic community's fighting spirit. Membership of *Hizbu'llah* was open to “Islamic youth, in particular *madrasah* and *pesantren* students between 17 and 25 years of age, who: a) were physically fit; b) were single; and c) had the permission of their parents (or *wali*)”.<sup>5</sup>

In January the composition of the *Hizbu'llah* central board was announced. Zainul Arifin, associated with the *Nahdatul Ulama* faction of *Masyumi*, was its chairman, and Mohamad Roem, later one of the prominent politicians of the post-war *Masyumi*, its vice-chairman. The board included ten ordinary members, viz.: S. Surowijono (S. Surowiyono) and Sudjono (Sujono), charged with general affairs; Anwar Tjokroaminoto (Anwar Cokroaminoto), K.J. Zarkasji (K.Y. Zarkasyi) and Masjhudi (Masyhudi), in charge of propaganda; Sunarjo Mangunpuspito (Sunaryo Mangunpuspito), Jusuf Wibisono (Yusuf Wibisono) and Muhammad Djunadi (Muhammad Junadi), responsible for planning; and R.H.O. Djunadi (R.H.O. Junadi) and Prawoto Mangkusasmito, charged with financial affairs (SMI 15-1-1945:13).

Although designed as a *Peta* reserve corps, there was not much cooperation or contact between the two organizations. *Peta* and *Hizbu'llah* operated almost independently of each other from the beginning, except for the participation of *Peta* members in *Hizbu'llah* training in the remaining months of the Japanese occupation. *Hizbu'llah* was and remained the armed branch of *Masyumi*, and thus of the Islamic community represented by it. Through *Masyumi*, *Hizbu'llah* after independence became subordinate, at least in theory, to the Republican Government and Armed Forces. In practice this indirect link was extremely weak,

if not non-existent. It became even more tenuous in the first years of the Indonesian revolution, when government diplomacy collided with revolutionary zeal, and when the PSII reappeared as a splinter party of *Masyumi*. As it turned out, the PSII leaders who broke away from *Masyumi* had a strong hold on many *Hizbu'llah* units.

The manner of the Japanese war authorities' eventual compliance with the Muslim leaders' request for their own voluntary defence force did not contain any implication that the *Hizbu'llah* would be allowed to develop into a powerful rival to *Peta*. *Hizbu'llah*, accordingly, did not emerge from the Japanese occupation as well-equipped and well-trained as *Peta*. Militarily speaking *Hizbu'llah* was no match for *Peta* on the point of training, equipment and personnel. For one thing, *Peta* recruits had real arms at their disposal. *Hizbu'llah* had to do without. *Hizbu'llah* was, as it is put by Muhammad Abdul Aziz, "trained politically and physically for a 'freedom' struggle which should be fought with bamboo spears and wooden rifles" (Aziz 1955:208). Moreover, as a result of its relatively late establishment alone, far fewer *Hizbu'llah* volunteers were trained than *Peta* men.

The first *Hizbu'llah* volunteers were trained at a training centre situated at Cibarusa, near Bekasi, about 28 kilometres from Bogor. The training was provided by Japanese soldiers assisted by a number of *Peta* instructors, and was supervised by the Japanese general Yanagawa. It did not constitute an ordinary course of military training as such, but was intended to build up a cadre of militant Muslim youths who on completion of their three-month course were to be sent back to their region of origin to set up local *Hizbu'llah* branches and to train the local Muslim youth.

The training centre was opened by Abdul Kahar Muzakir on February 28th, 1945. The first group of 500 trainees, among them the first chairman of *Hizbu'llah*, Zainul Arifin, completed their courses and graduated at a brief ceremony held in the presence of the central *Masyumi* board about three months later, on May 20th. They were to be the only fully trained cadre-members of *Hizbu'llah*. Before the second course was completed Japan had lost the war and Indonesia had proclaimed its independence. So *Hizbu'llah* could command only about 500 more or less properly trained members, scattered all over Java and Madura, at the end of the Japanese occupation.<sup>6</sup>

The number of *Peta* soldiers at that time was far greater. *Peta* had one battalion in each *kabupaten*, over sixty in all in the whole of Java and Madura. *Peta* strength varied between 35,000

men at the most moderate estimate and over 100.000 according to the highest estimate.<sup>7</sup>

*Peta* units, moreover, were better trained. Not only were they able to practise with real arms, but their training was much more protracted. *Peta* volunteers in fact had chosen the army as a career. They were professional soldiers with a full military training of several years rather than only months. Of *Hizbu'llah*, on the other hand, only cadre-members had received any military training, and then for only two months and of a much inferior quality to that of *Peta*. Its ordinary members, if there were many before August 1945, had enjoyed even less training, and were moreover unpaid (cf. Aziz 1955).

*Hizbu'llah* only developed into a genuine military organization after the proclamation of independence. Many new local branches were then set up and, with the influx of numerous Muslim youths, these and the small and insignificant *Hizbu'llah* groups from the Japanese occupation expanded into a powerful guerilla organization. *Hizbu'llah* units sprang up all over Java, and in early 1946 *Hizbu'llah* claimed a membership of 300,000 (NIB IV:261). According to Kahin the organization "probably mustered between 20,000 and 25,000 armed men" (Kahin 1970:163). The various *Hizbu'llah* units were coordinated by the organization's central board, but, as was also the case with the Republican Army, central control was stronger on paper than in practice. It should be borne in mind in this connection that the name *Hizbu'llah*, Allah's Army, was an obvious name for any Muslim group wishing to start a guerilla war. Furthermore, irregular *Hizbu'llah* units sprang up alongside official ones, thus complicating even further the intricate picture presented by the guerilla groups.

Throughout the fight for freedom the central leadership of *Hizbu'llah* remained in the hands of Zainul Arifin, at first independently of the Republican Army, later on, after 1947, as part of it. From the central board the line of command reached right down to the local-level units. Highest in this chain of command were the provincial *Hizbu'llah* commanders. In West Java there were two *Hizbu'llah* divisions, commanded by Zainul Bachri (Zainul Bakhri) and Samsul Bachri (Samsul Bakhri). Other important *Hizbu'llah* commanders were Huseinsjah (Huseinsyah), Zainul Abidin and Kamran (Kutoyo, Sutrisno and Surachman 1977:5), the pre-war associate of Kartosuwirjo in his conflict with the rest of the PSII board. In East Java *Hizbu'llah* was commanded by Wahib Wahab, and in Yogyakarta by Kiyai Haji

Badawi. *Hizbu'llah* was represented on the central *Masyumi* board by H. Hasjim (H. Hasyim).

*Sabili'llah* or (the fighters in) *Sabil Allah*, the Way of God, was of a more recent date than *Hizbu'llah*. The initiative for its foundation was taken at the first *Masyumi* congress held after the proclamation of independence, in November 1945. Here it was decided that *Masyumi* needed, besides the genuinely military units of *Hizbu'llah*, an organization for the general mobilization of the Islamic population. *Sabili'llah* was thus meant by *Masyumi* to become a kind of citizen militia in the guerilla war against the Dutch. Its aim was to strengthen the Muslim population's preparedness for a *jihād fi sabīli 'llāh*, or "endeavour in the way of God" – hence its name.<sup>8</sup> *Sabili'llah*'s function as an organizational framework for a general mobilization dictated the conditions of its membership. It was open to all who for one reason or another could not enter *Hizbu'llah*, for example because they were too old. *Sabili'llah* had its headquarters at Malang, and like *Hizbu'llah*, was divided into provincial branches (SMI 10-12-1946:6). The top command of *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* was vested in the same hands. *Sabili'llah*, however, had its own representatives, Masjkur (Masykur) and W. Wondoamiseno, on the central *Masyumi* board. Its banner was the red and white Indonesian national flag, with *lā ilāha illa 'llāh* written in white Arabic script on the red bar, and *Muhammad Rasulu 'llāh* in red on the white bar. *Lā ilāha illa 'llāh*, "There is no God but Allah", and *Muhammad Rasulu 'llāh*, "Muhammad is the Apostle of God", together form the *shahāda* or Islamic confession of faith.

The distinction between *Sabili'llah* and *Hizbu'llah* was never as sharp and clear-cut as intended. Sometimes *Sabili'llah* functioned as an ordinary fighting unit, sometimes the name *Sabili'llah* was mentioned just as an appendix to *Hizbu'llah*. In the latter case the Islamic guerilla units were referred to indiscriminately as *Hizbu'llah/Sabili'llah*, without any differentiation between their distinct functions as a fighting unit and a militia respectively. To blur the distinction even more, *Sabili'llah* never really developed into a centrally controlled organization for the mobilization of the population as envisaged at its founding. As stated by Kahin (1970:163), *Sabili'llah* existed largely on paper, although in some areas its units were armed and of definite importance. In the struggle for independence in Java, which possessed many characteristics of a general guerilla war against the Dutch, *Hizbu'llah* units, moreover, disregarded the official age-limits stipulated in

its articles of incorporation, and admitted members irrespective of age, thus rendering the existence of a separate *Sabili'llah* corps with its specific function superfluous.

The fading of the distinction between *Sabili'llah* and *Hizbu'llah*, and the sometimes indiscriminate use of the two names, have inspired Smail in his book *Bandung in the early revolution* to draw a more theoretical distinction between the two. He does not distinguish between them according to their professed functions, but believes that "for a more detailed understanding of the organizations it is necessary, as always, when dealing with Indonesian Islam, to distinguish between urban and rural conditions" (Smail 1964:91). *Hizbu'llah* is accordingly associated by him with the urban section of the Indonesian Islamic armed organizations, *Sabili'llah* with the rural one. According to Smail, the terms *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* "are significant not so much in representing two different types of organizations within a single centrally-organized *Masyumi* as in representing, roughly but conveniently, differences between urban and rural Islam" (Smail 1964:92). Convenient and tempting though this typology may be, it seems better not to adopt it for our purposes. In a way it adds to the confusion of an already complicated situation, because *Hizbu'llah* was better known and more prevalent than *Sabili'llah* also in the rural areas.<sup>9</sup>

As has been pointed out above, *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* were just two of the many guerilla organizations fighting alongside the official Republican Army against the Dutch in West Java. They liked to regard themselves as the most important of these irregular units, and as subordinate only to the official Army. As it was put at a *Hizbu'llah/Sabili'llah* conference at Tasikmalaya in June 1946, they thought of themselves as the Indonesian Republic's "second army" (NIB IV:565–566); the first army being the *Siliwangi* Division of the official Republican Army in West Java.

This *Siliwangi* Division, as the West Javanese Division of the Indonesian Army is still called to this day, was formally constituted in May 1946.<sup>10</sup> Its foundation marked the conclusion for West Java of the first of a series of reorganizations of the Indonesian Army aimed at strengthening and streamlining its command. The *Siliwangi* replaced the three earlier divisions that had made up the First (West Javanese) Command of the Republican army. As commander of the new *Siliwangi* Division was appointed A.H. Nasution, hitherto head of one of the three prior West Javanese divisions, viz. the Third Division, which had had as its base of operation the Priangan region, in particular Bandung and surroundings.

Nasution had actively sought to incorporate the irregular guerilla units already as commander of the Third Division. He had been relatively successful in this, or at least in establishing control over the irregular units, in and around Bandung. How he went about this was explained by him in an interview in December 1976, in which he said, "Well, at a given moment, it was in Bandung, I recruited 50% of them [i.e. the irregular armed groups] to form one regiment with me first. The rest refused. Thereupon I secretly disarmed a fourth or third of the rest within the space of a few hours one night. After that the rest came of its own accord." (Brochure 1977:12.)

Nasution's task was facilitated by the fact that the irregular guerilla groups had already accomplished some form of coordination of their own. They had established their own headquarters, commonly referred to by the acronym MDPP,<sup>11</sup> at Bandung, one of the main centres of the anti-Dutch armed resistance movement in the first year of the revolution, in 1945. Its Board was made up of the leaders of the principal irregular guerilla organizations, among them Sutoko of *Pesindo* and Kamran of *Hizbu'llah*.<sup>12</sup> The latter two continued to play a key role in the MDPP after it changed its name and became the MPPP,<sup>13</sup> Sutoko as an advocate of closer cooperation with the *Siliwangi* Division, and Kamran as his principal opponent.

Sutoko and Nasution were on good terms with one another, which may account in part for the relative ease with which many irregular units in and around Bandung were eventually incorporated into the Republican Army. It was much more difficult for Nasution to gain control of such forces outside Bandung, where his own influence and that of Sutoko and the MDPP were still very weak. The further away from Bandung these irregular groups were, the more obstacles Nasution met in incorporating them. Some at times offered the *Siliwangi* Division resistance.<sup>14</sup> Others were for the time being left alone, and could develop independently.

Nevertheless, even taking into account the cases in which irregular units successfully resisted incorporation, the *Siliwangi* Division did fairly well at integrating the "wild troops" in the Priangan area, even outside the urban centres. One of the reasons for this was that the *Siliwangi* Division and the MPPP themselves were pushed out of Bandung into the surrounding areas, under pressure from the British forces at the end of March 1946. The *Siliwangi* Division thereupon established its new headquarters at Cicalengka, while the MPPP moved to Ciparay. Later on the two



were obliged to move still further southeast of Bandung, and established headquarters at Garut.

At Garut the MPPP reformed the organizational structure of the troops under its command and founded the *Resimen Tentara Perjuangan*, or Partisan Regiment, in the middle of May. It consisted of five battalions, one of them made up of *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* units commanded by one of their own officers, Huseinsjah.<sup>15</sup>

This *Resimen Tentara Perjuangan* also worked in close cooperation with the *Siliwangi* Division, but organizationally remained independent for another year. It was officially integrated into the *Siliwangi* Division after the Republican Government's declaration of its intention on May 5th, 1947, to "unite the Army of the RI and the irregular armed groups to become a single army organization" (Presidential Decree of May 5th, 1947). Subsequently, on May 17th, the *Resimen Tentara Perjuangan* was transformed into the Ninth Regiment of the Second *Guntur* Brigade of the *Siliwangi* Division at a ceremony at Garut.

Compared with other areas, in Priangan the process whereby the irregular guerilla groups became part of the official Republican Army within two years after the proclamation of independence was a smooth one. But this does not mean to say that there was no opposition at all. So mention is made by historiographers of the *Siliwangi* Division of the arrest of Kartosuwirjo by the military authorities, on the orders of Nasution, on account of alleged plans on Kartosuwirjo's part to attack the army barracks at Malangbong. Kartosuwirjo was released again a few days later (*Siliwangi* 1968:505–506). Furthermore, according to these historiographers, the fusion of the *Resimen Tentara Perjuangan* into the *Siliwangi* Division was obstructed by Kamran, one of the principal military leaders of the later *Darul Islam* movement. Depicting Kamran, who was head of the MPPP at the time, as "very ambitious to become a general", they claim that he tried in vain to prevent the incorporation of the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* units into the *Siliwangi* Division (*Siliwangi* 1968:184). The *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* unit of the *Resimen Tentara Perjuangan* nevertheless merged with the *Siliwangi* Division. Huseinsjah stayed on as commander of the battalion in the rank of major. It is even so doubtful whether, as the *Siliwangi* historiographers claim, Kamran failed completely in his attempts to dissuade *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* units from joining the *Siliwangi* Division. He was not entirely without influence, as his leading position in the MPPP testifies, and, as later developments

would prove, could command the loyalty of a large number of *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* fighters.

Although Kamran may have failed partly in preventing the incorporation of the *Hizbu'llah/Sabili'llah* Battalion of the *Resimen Tentara Perjuangan* into the *Siliwangi* Division, the manner of incorporation of the irregular troops at the same time enhanced his prestige. The position assigned to the newly incorporated guerillas was such that it strengthened the feelings of many of them that the official Republican Army considered them as only second-rate soldiers. When at the time of the *Siliwangi* Division's retreat to Central Java in early 1948 hostility arose between it and the *Hizbullah* and *Sabili'llah* units, this was not exclusively due to the latter's disapproval of the Renville agreement, but partly also to resentment at what they felt to be scurvy treatment by the Republican Army. Owing in part to lack of proper general and military education, their members were often passed over for promotion. Seeing others advance to better positions in the Army, they felt sadly discriminated against (Pinardi 1964:32). Moreover, their incorporation represented the first step towards the eventual discharge of some of the irregular guerillas. Although a so-called Depot Battalion was formed to accommodate those who could not get into one of the five battalions of the regiment, this battalion, instead of becoming a mustering centre for servicemen for future incorporation into new units, was in fact one where they merely awaited their discharge.

Compared with Priangan, in the Karawang area east of Jakarta the integration of guerilla units into the Republican Army met with much greater difficulties. Most of the trouble here was caused by the *Lasykar Rakyat* (People's Army) of West Java, which resisted incorporation by force. Ultimately this led to a two-day battle, on April 24th and 25th, 1947, in which the *Lasykar Rakyat* was supported by most of the irregular units in the area. What stand *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* took in this matter is not clear. Some of their units were incorporated into the Republican Army and together with units of the *Barisan Pembedrontak Republik Indonesia* (BPRI or Revolutionary Corps of the Indonesian Republic), the *Barisan Banteng Republik Indonesia* (Buffalo Corps of the Indonesian Republic), the *Pesindo* (short for *Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*, or Indonesian Socialist Youth), and the *Lasykar Buruh* (Workers' Army), made up a *Detasemen Gerak Cepat*, consisting of about 150 men in all. The men enlisted in this shock troop detachment took no part in the fight-

ing. The core of the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* groups probably joined the *Lasykar Rakyat* in its resistance to incorporation, which may have been a euphemism for disarmament (Siliwangi 1968:183–185; 206–209). Serious clashes between Islamic forces and the Republican Army also occurred in 1948, when, as a consequence of the Renville agreement, the *Siliwangi* Division was forced to retreat to Central Java. Many of the irregular guerilla units refused to join it in its retreat, and forcibly resisted disarmament by the *Siliwangi* Division, which claimed the weapons for the continuation of the war against the Dutch troops in Central Java.<sup>16</sup> The Islamic armed guerilla units that stayed behind were in due course to become the core of the Islamic Army of Indonesia, the military arm of the Islamic State of Indonesia.

## 2. *The Proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia*

Kartosuwirjo reappeared on the political scene after the proclamation of Indonesia's independence by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta on August 17th, 1945. He had remained in the background during the Japanese occupation, but became active in national politics again as soon as independence was declared. He was one of the founders of the new *Masyumi* in November 1945, in which organization, now a political party, he occupied the position of first secretary (Pinardi 1964:31). In those first years of the Republic he was also an appointed member of the Indonesian Central National Committee, or *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (KNIP), on which he represented *Masyumi*. At the KNIP's fifth session, held at Malang in February and March 1947, Kartosuwirjo was appointed one of the five *Masyumi* members of its executive committee, which comprised 47 members in all.

Kartosuwirjo had come to Malang to attend the KNIP meetings accompanied by *Hizbu'llah* fighters from West Java, probably particularly local commanders who were to attend the *Hizbu'llah* conference later in March. According to Sutomo, these had joined with members of a number of other irregular units to protect the members of the KNIP, notably from the *Masyumi* and the PNI, who were opposed to the Linggarjati agreement, which had been concluded by the Republican and the Dutch Governments in November 1946, and now had to be discussed by the KNIP, against possible attacks from irregular units supporting the leftist parties in favour of the agreement. Sutomo further

claims that when anti-Linggarjati members of the KNIP were, in fact, threatened by *Pesindo* guerillas, he had had to use all his power of persuasion to prevent Kartosuwirjo from ordering his troops to open fire on the *Pesindo* units (Sutomo 1977:8–9).<sup>17</sup>

The new *Masyumi* which Kartosuwirjo had helped to found replaced the *Masyumi* of the Japanese period. Contrary to the old one, the new *Masyumi* professed itself to be a political party. In other respects it closely resembled the old *Masyumi*. Continuing in the tradition of the *Masyumi* of the Japanese occupation, the new *Masyumi* was envisaged as the organizational vehicle for all Indonesian Islamic groups. It was intended to become a unitary political party for all Muslims, irrespective of their religious, social, educational or economic background. For a time, in fact, the post-war *Masyumi* comprised members from a variety of pre-war Islamic political and religious groups. It united within itself individuals and organizations which before the war had been mutually incompatible and had become involved in sometimes bitter quarrels. The organizations that entered the new *Masyumi* included, for example, not only the *Muhammadiyah*, but also its counterpart, *Nahdatul Ulama*, which had been founded in 1926 precisely to counter the spread of the reformism of which *Muhammadiyah* was an exponent.

*Masyumi* also brought together in the one fold the parties to the pre-war internal PSII conflicts. Looking at the *Masyumi* at the time of its refounding, we come across the leaders of the factions of the pre-war PSII and its offshoots again, this time working closely together. Leading positions in the new *Masyumi* were occupied by Agus Salim and Mohamad Roem, who had been expelled from the PSII in 1937 for their opposition to Abikusno Tjokrosujoso's *hijrah* policy, by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso himself, and by Kartosuwirjo, who had been expelled from the PSII in 1939 for wanting to continue the *hijrah* policy, this time against the wish of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso.

The new *Masyumi*'s heterogeneous character made it very difficult to keep the party together. Different factions with different political and religious outlooks had to operate alongside each other in it. One of the first signs of the difficulties confronting it was a *Masyumi* split in 1947 along almost the same lines as the conflicts which had torn the pre-war PSII. At the PSII's breaking away from *Masyumi* and refounding as an independent political party in the middle of that year, the same personages were involved as those who had played a key role in the pre-war PSII conflicts.

Those responsible for refounding the PSII were W. Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata. Both had supported Abikusno Tjokrosujoso in the conflict over the *hijrah* policy in 1935 and 1936, which in the end had resulted in the ousting of the faction led by Agus Salim and Mohamad Roem. Although in refounding the PSII, Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata were at first acting against the express wishes of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, they were soon joined by him.

The refounding of the PSII is generally attributed to “political opportunism” on the part of Wondoamiseno and Arudji Kartawinata. By this act they made possible the formation of a new Cabinet headed by Amir Sjarifuddin, and were rewarded for their help with ministerial posts.<sup>15</sup> Amir Sjarifuddin would never have turned to them for Muslim support – support that was withheld by *Masyumi* – for his new Cabinet, however, had not the existence of different factions with different outlooks within *Masyumi* permitted it. Around 1947 the members of the pre-war PSII, or what was left of that organization at the end of the Dutch colonial period, were steadily losing ground in *Masyumi* to those elements that were to determine its face in later years: pragmatic, well-educated Muslim politicians like Mohamad Roem and Natsir. The overtures by Amir Sjarifuddin thus provided them with a suitable opportunity to break away from *Masyumi*, which they felt was developing in an undesirable direction. By forming a new PSII they hoped to regain the leadership of the Islamic community and steer it onto the right course again.

In the internal *Masyumi* conflict provoked by Amir Sjarifuddin’s action, Kartosuwirjo took an intermediate position. He gradually dissociated himself from *Masyumi*, but for the time being did not formally break with the party. He was one of its former PSII members who were approached by Amir Sjarifuddin to support his new Cabinet, being offered the post of Second Vice-Minister of Defence. He is, in fact, mentioned as Second Vice-Minister of Defence representing the PSII in the official announcement of the composition of the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet. He rejected the offer at the last moment, however. As explained by him in a letter to Soekarno and Amir Sjarifuddin, he had refused the ministerial post because he “had not yet become involved with the PSII and still felt committed to *Masyumi*”. That Kartosuwirjo was indeed not actively involved in the refounding of the PSII, or, as the initiators of this move liked to call it, the revocation of the PSII’s decision of the beginning of the Japanese occupation to temporarily suspend all party activi-

ties, can be inferred from the composition of the various party boards just after its formation. Kartosuwirjo and his associates were conspicuous by their absence on these boards.<sup>19</sup>

Kartosuwirjo declined Amir Sjarifuddin's offer not only out of loyalty to *Masyumi*. His refusal to become a minister was also inspired by his intention to withdraw from the central political scene. Disenchanted with *Masyumi's* current policies he returned to Malangbong. He remained first secretary of the party, but was now appointed its representative for West Java as well. In the later capacity he began reorganizing the Islamic guerilla forces in the area. In November 1947 he founded the *Dewan Pertahanan Ummat Islam*, or Defence Council of the Islamic Community, in Garut and the *Majelis Ummat Islam Indonesia*, or Council of the Indonesian Islamic Community, in Tasikmalaya on behalf of *Masyumi* (cf. Van Nieuwenhuijze 1958:168–169; Horikoshi 1975:69). Both organizations were designed to intensify and coordinate the struggle of the local Islamic community against the Dutch. Reorganization of the guerilla struggle had become necessary in view of the circumstance that within three weeks after their launching a major military action, the first so-called *politioenele actie*, the Dutch had occupied the major towns in Priangan, such as Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis.

It is striking that in founding the two councils, Kartosuwirjo made explicit reference to the Islamic community. He hereby by-passed the more national and secular kind of organization which had been formed on the initiative of Sanusi Hardjadinata (Sanusi Harjadinata), vice-resident of Priangan, at the end of June. This latter organization, the *Perjuangan Pembelaan Nasional*, or National Defence Struggle, was designed as a federation of all political parties and guerilla organizations operating in Priangan. The organizations which had joined it included not only *Masyumi* and its subsidiaries, such as *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* and *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (GPII) or Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement, but also organizations like PKI, PNI, *Parkindo*, *Sobsi* and BTI.

It is not impossible that Kartosuwirjo was seriously considering proclaiming an Islamic state at that time. As we have seen above, according to some sources he had actually already done so in August 1945, but had retracted the proclamation after the declaration of independence by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta. For a time he had remained loyal to the Republic and accepted its "secular" base. He had still made a call for unity in July 1946, when in a speech at Garut he had warned his audience that

conflicts between fellow-Indonesians would only benefit the Dutch, and urged for a suspension of ideological differences. As soon as complete independence was achieved, then these differences could be solved in a democratic way, according to the principle of sovereignty of the people. If the majority of the people at that time wanted communism, the ideology of the state should be communist. If the majority of the people wanted socialism or nationalism, then socialist or nationalist it would have to be. But if Islam were victorious, the state, he stressed, should be organized in conformity with the principles of Islam (Kartosuwirjo 1946).

It is claimed by Kiyai Jusuf Tazuri that at the beginning of 1948 Kartosuwirjo asked him for a second time to proclaim an Islamic state, but that, as in 1945, he refused (Djawa Barat 1953:216). By that time the implications of the Renville agreement were already making themselves felt. One of these implications was the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from parts of West and East Java to Central Java. Being an agreement between the Dutch and the Republican Government, the official Republican Army – in the case of West Java the *Siliwangi* Division – complied with its stipulations. This was different with the other guerilla troops not incorporated into the official Republican Army. So a considerable proportion of the two Islamic guerilla organizations in West Java, the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah*, refused to comply. According to Kahin, “Within two months some 35,000 Republican troops were withdrawn . . ., about 4,000 irregular troops – for the most part Hizbullah battalions of the Masjumi – remaind behind)” (Kahin 1970:234). Among the *Hizbu'llah* units staying behind were those headed by Zainal Abidin in the Baluburlimbangan area and by Kurnia operating around Cicalengka. The *Sabili'llah* units that remained behind were under the command of Enoch (Enokh) in the Wanaraja and Garut areas and by Oni in the area around Mount Cupu, north of Tasikmalaya (Suherly 1965 1:27–28).

As a consequence of the Renville agreement, the rupture between Kartosuwirjo and *Masyumi* became definitive and irrevocable. *Masyumi*, although opposing the agreement itself, shortly after its signing became a government party, and so came to share the responsibility for the observance of the agreement and was obliged itself to comply with it. Hence it could not follow Kartosuwirjo in his rejection of it.

After the Renville agreement, the Republican Army Command tried hard to remain in control of the guerilla units which refused

to be withdrawn to Central Java. The Republican Commander-in-Chief, General Sudirman, proceeded to appoint Sutoko as coordinator of the guerilla bands in West Java. The latter was not very successful in his mission, especially with regard to those of the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* units that showed hostility not only by resisting disarmament, but also by trying to seize the arms of the retreating Republican troops. Sutoko was captured by the Dutch in August, within half a year of the end of the *Siliwangi* Division's *hijrah*. He thereupon unsuccessfully tried coordinating the guerilla groups in West Java from jail (Siliwangi 1968:346).

The first steps towards the formation of an Islamic Army of Indonesia were taken just before the Republican Army's retreat to Central Java. Shortly after the Renville agreement Oni, the then commander of *Sabili'llah* in the mountainous area around Tasikmalaya, had a meeting with Kartosuwirjo to discuss the current political and military situation. The two agreed that the Islamic forces should stay on in West Java, and that those "members of the *Sabili'llah* and *Hizbu'llah* who joined in the retreat should be disarmed, either peacefully or by force" (Pinardi 1964:57).<sup>20</sup> Both felt that it was desirable to hold a larger meeting to evaluate the changed situation. This meeting took place on February 10th and 11th in the village of Pangwedusan, in the district of Cisayong, within the triangle formed by Malangbong, Tasikmalaya and Garut. It was attended by leaders of the Islamic youth organization, *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (GPII), and of the *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah*. The most important decisions taken at the Cisayong conference were to freeze the *Masyumi* in West Java, to constitute a rudimentary regional government in West Java, and to form an Islamic Army of Indonesia. In this proposed rudimentary West Javanese Government – the Islamic Council, or *Majelis Islam*, sometimes also called *Majelis Ummat Islam* – the existing Islamic organizations were to merge. It was to supersede the two already existing Islamic Councils founded in Garut and Tasikmalaya the year before, being designed on more or less the same lines, although on a bigger scale. Chairman of this new Islamic Council was Kartosuwirjo, who was also responsible for defence. As secretary was appointed Supradja (Supraja), and as treasurer Sanusi Partawidjaja (Sanusi Pratawijaya), while the information and justice sections were headed by Toha Arsjad (Toha Arsyad) and Abdul Kudus Gozali Tusi respectively.<sup>21</sup> The members of the Islamic Council did not yet style themselves ministers, in order to avoid creating the impression that they had formed a real government.



They were simply referred to by the name of the department headed by them. The Council's principal task was to continue and direct the guerilla war against the Dutch in the areas that had been abandoned to Dutch control by the Republican Army and Government. In this capacity it also had to direct the future Islamic Army of Indonesia, which was to be subordinated to it. The Cisayong conference assigned Oni the task of designing a concrete structure for the Islamic Army of Indonesia which was to be founded in the near future.

In the next few weeks a number of conferences took place, and the principles agreed upon at Pangwedusan were elaborated. A few days after the Cisayong conference another meeting was held with the aim of giving concrete shape to the Islamic Army of Indonesia. Not only was an Islamic Army proper formed, but also a number of special corps such as the BARIS and PADI were created (Pinardi 1964:57).<sup>22</sup> The headquarters were established at Mount Cupu, the base of the *Sabili'llah* troops commanded by Oni. Oni himself was appointed area commander of the Islamic Army of Indonesia for Priangan. He also became commander of the PADI, as well as of a secret police force, the *Mahdiy'in* or Rightly Guided. A regular police corps was also founded. This was initially called *Badan Keamanan Negara*, or State Security Force, but changed its name to *Polisi Islam Indonesia* in October 1949, after the official proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (Siliwangi 1968:507; Pinardi 1964:94).

Early in March a second important conference took place, this time at Cipeundeuy, a village south of Malangbong. Here the decisions reached at Pangwedusan were confirmed, while further the need to prepare for a creation of an Islamic state was stressed. This was deemed necessary so as to be ready in case the Dutch should go ahead with their scheme to create an independent State of Pasundan in West Java, or if the Republican Government should resign (Van Nieuwenhuijze 1958:170).

An Islamic state itself was not yet formed. It was only stressed that some day, for example if the Republican Government was defeated by the Dutch and ceased to exist or lost its legitimacy, such a state might become a reality. Hiroko Horikoshi points out that an Islamic state was not as yet created because of opposition from the guerilla leaders present, saying: "The idea of establishing a Negara Islam, abandoning the unitary Republic, was beyond what most of the Islamic groups under Kiai Yusuf [Tauziri]'s influence were seeking. This ideological disagreement was partially resolved by the regional Hizbullah and Sabilillah and such

non-Islamic irregulars as the Pesindo from Cirebon returning to their respective areas to concentrate on local efforts against the Dutch, while maintaining loose ties to the DI as a sort of coordinating body of resistance. By the time the TII was formed only one Hizbullah group, that of Tasikmalaya led by Oni (later to become Prime Minister of the DI), remained with Kartosuwirjo" (Horikoshi 1975:71).<sup>23</sup>

But Kartosuwirjo and his fellow-proponents of an Islamic state had not yet made up their minds, either. They were strongly in favour of an Islamic government structure. Despite their opposition to the Republican Government, they were still hesitant about proclaiming a state of this kind embracing the whole of the territory of the former Dutch East Indies, however. They proceeded to form a provisional Government for West Java, which in fact possessed many characteristics of an independent state. Nevertheless, they did not formally turn against the Republic for about another year. In theory their actions were designed exclusively to counter the formation of the State of Pasundan. Accordingly only the Dutch and the State of Pasundan, and not the Republic, were pronounced enemies of the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Pinaridi 1964:58–59).

Although not openly expressed, the ideal of an Indonesian Islamic state was never absent from their minds. The military and governmental structure evolved by Kartosuwirjo and Oni, which was formally restricted to West Java, was clearly intended as a shadow government, to come into power in the event of the Republican Government losing the war against the Dutch (cf. Pinaridi 1964: 58–59, 63–66). Indicative of their designs in this direction was the Cipeundeuy decision to divide the *Darul Islam* movement's area of operation into three regions, to be D.I., D.II and D.III.

Different interpretations have been given of the meanings of these abbreviations, especially that of D.I. One of them is of course that D.I. stands for *Darul Islam*, or territory of Islam, but this meaning may only have been attached to it later. Alers believes D.I. to have originally stood for *Daerah Satu*, which he interprets as "unitary state", saying: "Its true meaning, viz. *dar al-Islam*, was not generally known . . . Only later did Kartosuwirjo change it almost unnoticed into (*D*)arul (*I*)slam . . ." (Alers 1956:243). Pinaridi denies that *Daerah Satu* should be interpreted as "unitary state", saying that it means "first area", "the mother area of Islam, which shall be the area in which Islamic law and authority will be exercised fully". By second and third

area is meant “those areas in Western Java that are only partly dominated by the Islamic community” and “those areas that are not yet controlled by the Islamic community” respectively (Pinaridi 1964:59).

Be that as it may, one should not reject the possibility that the division of the territory of the Islamic state into three different regions had a wider meaning. The conceivers of the Islamic state, in instituting a first, second and third region, may have had in mind some future division of the entire Indonesian territory into kinds of military command areas. They may have envisaged a territorial division like that of the Indonesian Army, whereby Indonesia is divided into command areas likewise designated by Roman numerals. When the Acehnese rebels joined the *Darul Islam* movement – at least in name – their commander, Daud Beureu’eh, for instance, styled himself commander of the Fifth (V) Territorial Division of the Islamic Army of Indonesia.

Kartosuwirjo refrained for more than a year from openly defying the authority of the Republic by officially proclaiming an Islamic State of Indonesia. He waited with this till August 1949. Between February 1948 and August 1949 he came to see himself more and more as the overlord of West Java, considering himself the leader of the anti-Dutch guerilla war here now that the Republican Government had handed over the area to the Dutch and the Republican troops had for the greater part left it. From this circumstance he claimed the right to demand that all guerilla troops operating in West Java accepted his authority. If they refused he would subdue them by force. So he attacked a company of the Republican Army that had remained in West Java and had established its headquarters at Banjuresmi by surprise and drove it away after its refusing three times in a row to submit to him (Suherly 1965 I:29).

Kartosuwirjo furthermore perfected the political structure of his organization. At a conference held at Cijoho on May 1st a draft constitution was prepared, to be completed around August, and a Cabinet Council, or *Dewan Imamah*, and Advisory Council, or *Dewan Fatwa*, were formed. Of this *Dewan Imamah* Kartosuwirjo himself became President, or *Imam*, with *inter alia* Kamran and Oni as Minister and vice-Minister of Defence respectively.<sup>24</sup> He is even alleged to have “appointed a representative of the Islamic State in Yogyakarta, the Republican capital, and instructed him to make clear that responsibility for operations in the Dutch-controlled territory of West Java rested exclusively with the *Imam*” (Van Nieuwenhuijze 1958:172). All these steps

for all practical purposes amounted to the establishment of an independent state that was not subordinate to the Republic. The final decision to formalize this independence by proclaiming an Islamic state was not yet taken, however.

The impression that Kartosuwirjo had broken with the Republic was further strengthened by a number of announcements made in the name of the *Negara Islam Indonesia*. To cite an example, after the launching of the second Dutch military action Kartosuwirjo, on December 20th 1948, called for a holy war against the Dutch as *Imam* of the Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia (Pinaridi 1964:61). This was made after the capture of the Indonesian Republican Government by Dutch troops and the arrest of its members, in which Kartosuwirjo saw the realization of the situation he had been hoping for when forming his *Dewan Imamah*. The fall of the Republican Government, whether as a result of internal political strife or through arrests by the Dutch, greatly enhanced the chances of putting forward the Government of the Islamic State as the rightful government of Indonesia. In fact, he went as far as construing the arrests of the most important Republican leaders as “the fall of the Republic as a State” (Pinaridi 1964:63-64). Consequently, in his call for a holy war, he urged the Indonesian Islamic Army – which this time he called *Anghkatan Perang Islam Indonesia* – to “guide and assist the people with a view to completing the Islamic Revolution and to see to it that the Islamic State of Indonesia is founded throughout the whole of Indonesia” (Pinaridi 1964:61). He further called a meeting of his closest friends and associates to discuss the changed situation since the capture of the Republican Government and the prospects of the Islamic state. Here he tried to win his comrades over by stating that his plan to proclaim an Islamic state in the event of the Republican Government’s ceasing to exist was known to and approved by that government.

The second Dutch military action, launched on December 19th, 1948, had yet other implications. The Republican Army regarded it as a violation of the Renville agreement. Consequently, the Army Command no longer felt itself committed to Renville, and gave orders for the evacuated *Siliwangi* Division to return to its home base, West Java.<sup>25</sup>

When after their so-called Long March the *Siliwangi* troops finally returned to West Java, they were given a rousing welcome, though different from the one they had expected. For they were greeted with pamphlets urging them to join the *Tentara Islam*

*Indonesia*, and when they refused, were viewed as intruders and members of an illegal “rebel army” (Siliwangi 1968:522–526). The first major incident between the *Siliwangi* Division and the TII occurred on January 25th, 1949, at Antralina near Malangbong. Officially the blame for the incident and the violent course it took was put on the *Darul Islam*. The entire way in which the incident took place, however, testifies that the *Darul Islam* leaders still believed it possible to induce the Republican troops to join their cause by gentle persuasion at the time.

For some reason or other the staff of the Fourteenth Brigade, on its return to West Java, had become separated from the troops that had guarded it during the Long March upon reaching the Antralina area. They were subsequently captured by troops of the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* and disarmed. The Republican troops – in this particular case Battalion III – on hearing of this, turned back and succeeded in freeing the prisoners. Thereupon one of the TII commanders, Kamran, proposed a meeting with Mohammad Rivai, the commander of the Third Battalion, with whom he had fought together against the Dutch in the early days of the struggle for independence. Mohammad Rivai rejected the proposal, however, because, as he said, he questioned the motives of the *Darul Islam* leaders, and sent two of his subordinates, Lieutenants Sueb and Aang Kanaefi, instead. They were given instructions to reclaim the weapons the TII had taken off the prisoners. As it became clear that Kartosuwirjo and Kamran had no intention whatever of returning the weapons, an ultimatum was set. When the deadline lapsed and nothing happened, the TII positions were attacked.

Both sides regard January 25th as the day on which the treacherous intentions of the other became apparent. Kartosuwirjo saw in the Third Battalion’s attack the beginning of the “first triangular war in Indonesia”, namely between his troops, the Republican Army and the Dutch Occupational Forces. According to him the incident was triggered off by the *Siliwangi* Division, after crossing the border between Central and West Java and entering the “de-facto Islamic Council territory”, “arrogantly and haughtily defying the laws and violating the legal rights of their ‘hosts’, the Islamic Council” (Pinardi 1964:65–66). In consequence of the Antralina incident, *Darul Islam* issued its first military proclamation, dated January 25th, on “Rebel Army Bands and Groups in West Java” (Siliwangi 1968:280). The 25th, moreover, was declared a special day, to be commemorated annually in the area under its control.<sup>26</sup>

The situation in West Java became rather complicated, with three, or even four, parties – the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch and, cooperating with the latter, the State of Pasundan – fighting each other. The Dutch soon dropped out of the fray, after first a cease-fire between the Dutch and the Government of the Indonesian Republic was agreed upon, and then the Round Table Conference took place, eventually leading to the recognition of Indonesia's independence and the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia.

The first steps towards the final agreement between the Republican Government and the Dutch were taken in May 1949, with the conclusion of the so-called “Van Royen-Roem agreement”. This agreement came under violent attack from Kartosuwirjo, who used it as an excuse to proclaim the *Negara Islam Indonesia*. In this “tragic event”, as he called the Van Royen-Roem agreement, which he further qualified as a total sell-out, he saw “one of the reasons prompting the descent of that great divine favour, the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia” (Pinardi 1964:72).

Apparently from the end of 1948 onwards the *Darul Islam* made the Indonesian Republic and not the Dutch its principal target. Accusing the Republican leaders of hesitancy in the struggle for complete independence and of submission to the colonialists, it was mostly Republican rather than Dutch troops which came to be attacked. Incidents with Dutch troops did occur – the Dutch blaming the Republican Army for this – but compared with the attacks on Republican troops and civilians they were few and far between. Alers even states that “Simultaneously with the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia the struggle against the Dutch was officially terminated” (Alers 1956:244). The Republican Army for its part tried in some cases to cooperate with the Dutch in the struggle against the *Darul Islam*. In March 1949, for example, Dodong Hamidjaja (Dodong Hamijaya), a Republican Army captain, proposed a cease-fire along with a joint anti-*Darul Islam* action to the Dutch troops stationed at Bandung (Siliwangi 1968:319). Other proposals to cease hostilities and jointly resist *Darul Islam* came from the State of Pasundan.

The Islamic State of Indonesia, or *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII), was finally proclaimed by Kartosuwirjo on August 7th, 1949. The proclamation was made at the village of Cisampang – referred to in the context of the *hijrah* metaphor as “Medinah” – in Cisayong. Cisampang had been renamed Medinah

by Kartosuwirjo because Republican troops had driven him away from his headquarters at Mount Sawal, his Mecca, whereupon his *hijrah* had taken him to Mount Galunggung. He even went so far as to equate a visit of his men to Mount Sawal with the *hajj*, or pilgrimage to Mecca (PR 7-5-1956). In the preamble to the proclamation no mention is made of the Van Royen-Roem agreement which had been so violently attacked by Kartosuwirjo. Instead, the Renville agreement of 1948 with the subsequent rising of “the Islamic community”, as it is called, is fixed upon as the point at which the struggle for liberation changed from a “national revolution” into an “Islamic revolution” (Pinardi 1964:74–76).

The political structure of the Islamic State of Indonesia is outlined in its constitution, the *Kanun Azasy*, drafted one year previously, in August 1948 (Boland 1971:256–264). According to that constitution, the Islamic State of Indonesia was a “Divine favour” being a “*Negara Kurnia Allah Subhanahu wa Ta’ala*”, bestowed on the Indonesian people (art. 1, clause 1). The state guaranteed the operation of Islamic law within the Islamic community and granted the adherents of other religions freedom to worship in accordance with their own rites (art. 1, clauses 3-4). Islam was the foundation and legal basis of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Koran and Tradition constituting the highest authorities (art. 2, clauses 1-2).

The form of its government was republican, designated by the Arabic loanword *Jumhuriyah*. The head of state was the *Imam*, who must be a native Indonesian, of the Muslim faith, and faithful to God and His Prophet (art. 12, clause 1). The *Imam* was to preside over the Cabinet, or *Dewan Imamah*, and appoint and discharge its members (art. 22). Besides this *Dewan Imamah*, there were to be three other constitutional bodies: the *Majlis Syuro*, the *Dewan Syuro* and the *Dewan Fatwa*. The *Majlis Syuro*, also referred to as “Parliament” in the constitution, was to have sovereign authority, except, as it is put, where a situation required that this be delegated on to the *Imam* and the *Dewan Imamah* (art. 3, clauses 1-2). This *Majlis Syuro* was to meet at least once a year, and its decisions to be taken by a majority of votes. It was to draw up the constitution and lay down the broad principles of Government policy (art. 4, clause 3, and art. 5). It was also to elect the *Imam*, for whose election at least a two-third majority was required. If such a majority proved impossible to reach, also at a second vote, the *Imam* would be chosen by a simple majority at the third vote (art. 12, clauses 2-3).

The *Dewan Syuro* is described in the constitution as the Executive of the *Majlis Syuro*. It lacked some of the powers of this latter – the members of the *Dewan Imamah* being accountable to the *Imam* and the *Majlis Syuro*, but not to the *Dewan Syuro*, for instance – but on the whole was designed to function as an ordinary parliament. It was to meet at least once every three months to put the decisions of the *Majlis Syuro* into effect, and, except in the most important matters, to represent the *Majlis Syuro* vis-a-vis the Government (art. 6). The constitution invested the *Dewan Syuro* with far-reaching legislative powers. Each Act required its consent, and its members had the right to introduce Bills (art. 7; art. 8, clause 1). In emergencies, the *Imam* would be entitled to promulgate decrees instead of statutes, but would have to revoke these if rejected by the *Dewan Syuro* in its next session. Conversely, if the *Dewan Syuro* passed a Bill which did not receive the assent of the *Imam*, it was not to reintroduce that Bill during the same session (art. 9; art. 8, clause 3).<sup>27</sup>

The *Imam* himself, apart from being chairman of the *Dewan Imamah*, had the supreme command of the Armed Forces, the *Angkatan Perang Negara Islam Indonesia*. He possessed the power of government in accordance with the constitution and Islamic law. Other powers with which the constitution invested him – subject to the consent of the *Majlis Syuro* – were those of declaring war, making peace and concluding treaties with other nations; declaring a state of emergency, for which the conditions were as yet to be laid down by statute; and, in consultation with the *Dewan Imamah*, promulgating decrees. The *Imam* would furthermore have the right to appoint ambassadors and grant amnesties and the like (art. 10; art. 11, clause 2; art. 13-20).

The *Dewan Fatwa* mentioned in the constitution was to be an advisory council, advising the *Imam* and his Government, either at its own discretion or at the *Imam's* request. It was to comprise maximally seven members, and to be chaired by a great *Mufti*. Its members were to be appointed and discharged by the *Imam* (art. 21).

The formal state structure as outlined above takes up the major and most detailed part of the constitution. Other sections, dealing with the territorial division of the state, finance and the juridical system, are brief, and refer to statutes which were still to be drawn up to make more detailed provisions on the relevant subjects. Citizenship and basic human rights are dealt with at some length, but the relevant articles do not differ substantially from those in the constitution of the Indonesian Republic.



As is pointed out by Wendelin Wawer, in his treatise on the relation between Indonesian Muslims and Christians, the Muslims in their struggle for the achievement of an Islamic state in Indonesia approached the matter in only general terms. They did not specify the concrete structure of this state, nor the implications of the enforcement of Islamic law. Discussing the arguments put forward by spokesmen of the Islamic parties in favour of the Islamic state, this author writes that these arguments clearly testify that the objective of realizing such a state was always present. What was lacking, however, were concrete suggestions as to what such a state was to look like in practice and how it was to be realized. In this connection it is significant, according to him, that there is only one Indonesian book dealing with the subject of the Islamic state at length (Wawer 1974:75, 91).<sup>28</sup>

In view of the absence of a clear and detailed blueprint for the structure and form of the Islamic state, as has been noted by Wendelin Wawer, who made a thorough analysis of the speeches and writings of Muslim political and religious leaders, it is worth investigating to what extent the Islamic State of Indonesia as proclaimed by Kartosuwirjo was actually defined as a state on Islamic lines.

The first question to be considered is to what extent the legal systems of the two states, the Republic and the Islamic State of Indonesia, differed from one another. It is impossible to compare the two legal systems in detail, as legal records of the Islamic State of Indonesia are conspicuous by their absence. This latter circumstance in itself is an indication, however, that the founders of the Islamic State of Indonesia concentrated on its formal structure, its Government and Army. Either the legal system was considered self-evident and not in need of immediate specification and codification, or it was deemed secondary in importance to the need to conclude the struggle against the Republic first.

Some insight may nevertheless be gained by comparing the constitutions of the two states – for both the primary, and for the legal system the most important document. The most obvious difference between the 1945 Constitution of the Indonesian Republic and the *Kanun Azasy* of the Islamic State of Indonesia is the use of Arabic and Islamic terminology in the latter. The name *Kanun Azasy* itself is derived from the Arabic expression *al-qānūn al-asāsī*, while the Republic is referred to by the term *Jumhuriyah*, which is explained between brackets as meaning republic. The President is referred to as *Imam*, and the

council he presided over as *Dewan Imamah*. The *Kanun Azasy* further provided for a *Majlis Syuro*, a term usually used to designate a council of *ulamas* deciding or advising on questions of religion, and a *Dewan Fatwa*, whose normal task it is to give *fatwas*, or legal advice, and which is made up of *muftis*, or those giving *fatwas*.

Apart from the difference in terminology and the acknowledgement of the *syari'ah*, or Islamic law, as the dominant legal system, the *Kanun Azasy* closely resembled the 1945 Constitution, which in fact was taken as its model, with some modifications.

The status of the *Majlis Syuro* is almost the same as that of the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*,<sup>29</sup> and the functions of the *Dewan Fatwa* the same as those of the *Dewan Pertimbangan Agung*. The only difference here is that the *Kanun Azasy* specifies the membership, while the 1945 Constitution stipulates that the composition of these bodies shall be prescribed by statute. Moreover, though again with some slight differences, the position of the *Imam* closely resembles that of the President of the Republic. The differences in their titles aside, both have the same constitutional rights and duties. In the Islamic State of Indonesia the *Imam* had to be a Muslim and to be sworn in according to the rites of Islam. There are no such provisions in the 1945 Constitution, which states no religious requirements, and even leaves room for an agnostic to become president by stipulating that the President must either be sworn in or take a solemn oath.

In general, however, the positions of the President of the Indonesian Republic as defined in the 1945 Constitution and of the *Imam* of the Islamic State of Indonesia as defined in the *Kanun Azasy* are the same. Both have the power of government and the supreme command of the Armed Forces, and both possess the right, though checked by and subject to consultation with the representative bodies, to draft statutes.

Even more important than the fact that the two constitutions differ little as regards the state structure is the circumstance that the provisions on basic human rights and citizenship are mostly the same. The *Kanun Azasy* contains no special regulations on the rights and duties of the Muslim population, or of members of other religions, and no stipulations on the enforcement of Islamic law, or on the attitude towards followers of heterodox mystical schools. There is one exception, however, which even then testifies more to the superficiality of the *Kanun Azasy* than to

any thorough attempt to draw up a truly Islamic constitution. While the *Kanun Azasy* copies the articles on citizenship of the 1945 Constitution, which include the stipulation that “all citizens without exception shall be equal before the law and the government, and shall be obliged to uphold that law and government”, it adds a clause that is in direct contradiction with this and virtually negates it, namely, “Important and responsible offices and functions in the government, both civil and military, are to be given only to Muslims”.

The *Kanun Azasy* also differentiates between Muslims and non-Muslims in the field of defence, and stresses the importance of an Islamic educational system. It furthermore does away with taxes, substituting these with what it calls *infaq*.<sup>30</sup> With regard to all these matters it states that they are to be regulated in more detail by statute.

The provisions of the *Kanun Azasy* were never put into effect. At the time of its drafting the *Majlis Syuro* had not yet come into existence. While the appendix to the *Kanun Azasy* states that in the absence of a Parliament, laws were to be passed by the *Dewan Imamah* in the form of decrees signed by the *Imam*, this *Dewan Imamah* did not come into operation for a long time, either. It was thereupon abolished again within a few weeks of the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia, to be replaced on October 3rd, 1949, by the High Command of the Armed Forces of the Islamic State of Indonesia, or *Komandemen Tertinggi Angkatan Perang N.I.I.* The reason given for this at the time was the need to coordinate civil and military affairs (Pinardi 1964:81–82).

### 3. *Darul Islam Activities in West Java*

In the course of 1949 *Darul Islam* activities posed an increasingly serious threat to the Republic and to the Dutch-backed State of Pasundan. In particular the latter found itself in an awkward position. It had no army of its own and had to rely on the Dutch forces and the Republican *Siliwangi* Division to protect its citizens. The situation became especially precarious for Pasundan when the Dutch Army prepared to withdraw in view of the forthcoming recognition of independence. The Dutch positions were taken over by Republican troops, which were to become the core of the Army of the independent Indonesian federation.

Contacts had been established between Pasundan and units of the *Siliwangi* Division even before the Van Royen-Roem negotia-

tions that were to pave the way for formal independence. So in March 1949 the Government of Pasundan, with the consent of the Dutch military authorities, had approached two battalion commanders of the Division, Achmad Wiranatakusumah (Akhmad Wiranatakusumah; a son of the Head of State of Pasundan) and Nasuhi, with the request to cease hostilities, to assist in restoring peace and order, and to help with the peaceful development of the State of Pasundan.

These contacts of Pasundan with the *Siliwangi* Division were quite ambivalent. Pasundan saw itself obliged to seek cooperation from groups which at most grudgingly recognized its sovereignty, but more often were opposed to this. It required the support of Republican units which regarded the State of Pasundan as a Dutch construction – an idea which would only be strengthened by acknowledgement of the fact that the State of Pasundan had made the relevant move with the approval of the Dutch Army.

Thus the State of Pasundan had to be careful to prevent that whatever agreement was reached should prejudice its existence and territorial integrity. To solicit the cooperation of the *Siliwangi* units in resisting *Darul Islam* was to admit both its own weakness and the Dutch troops' failure in defeating either *Darul Islam* or the Republican Army. It would have meant an especially great blow to its prestige if the State of Pasundan had had to admit the autonomy of the Republican troops in so many words.

The prestige of the Republican troops, conversely, was enhanced by the request to contribute to the maintenance of peace and order in the areas under their control. Their enthusiasm was not over-great, however, as they were asked to do so within the framework of the State of Pasundan. That the Republican Government was prepared to recognize this State as one of the member states of the future United States of Indonesia in its negotiations with the Dutch may later have been a mitigating factor. But it was certainly no more than that. The Republican troops were already involved in confrontations with *Darul Islam*, and in the process were trying to restore peace and order in areas under their control. In these circumstances a cease-fire was more than welcome. Unfortunately the Dutch Army made it look as though the *Siliwangi* units which accepted the State of Pasundan's proposals were coming over to them. So a communique issued by the Dutch area-commander of West Java, General E. Engles, at the end of March stated that initially only one battalion of the *Siliwangi* Division had ceased hostilities to help restore peace and security, but that eventually there had

been "five battalions siding with the Dutch" (M 1-4-1949).

Partly owing to this kind of publicity, the first contacts were far from successful or effective. At the first public announcement that the State of Pasundan had opened negotiations with battalions of the *Siliwangi* Division, the relations were broken off again, whereupon the Government of the State of Pasundan issued a statement that because of false reports it would refrain from stepping up its efforts to establish contact with units of the *Siliwangi* Division. It further denied that it had made any agreement with Republican troops or that units of the *Siliwangi* Division which were prepared to cooperate with it had surrendered. The only thing the Government had done, it stated, was to contact units of the *Siliwangi* Division and give material and moral aid to whatever units were found prepared to help the State of Pasundan alleviate the hardship of the population (M 2-4-1949, 4-4-1949, 5-4-1949).

Engles, who at the end of March had issued a statement to the effect that the said contacts had the approval of the Dutch military authorities, almost a fortnight later showed himself extremely disappointed at the outcome. According to him, the Government of the State of Pasundan was well aware that the Republican Army was virtually unable to hold its own, particularly against rebel forces like the *Darul Islam*. He claimed that the Head of the State of Pasundan had been misinformed by his Government. Neither Achmad Wiranatakusumah's nor Nasuhi's battalion had been able even to subdue one area. Moreover, as from April 12th, Nasuhi's Battalion had repudiated every form of cooperation with the Dutch Army, after he, Engles, had given it the opportunity for this when it had become clear to him at a discussion with Nasuhi that the latter could not meet the conditions for cooperation. Nasuhi, who failed to understand the situation, refused to place himself under Dutch command. Engles concluded on the basis of these experiences with the Indonesian troops that they obviously did not come up to standard either organizationally or on the point of equipment. Much still needed to be improved before they were able to assist in maintaining order and security (M 20-5-1949).

However, as it became more and more apparent after the commencement of the Round Table Conference that the Dutch Army was to leave Indonesia and that in future the Government of the State of Pasundan would have to rely on Republican troops to resist the *Darul Islam* forces, there was growing anxiety, especially in the areas where the TII troops were

strongest. No one knew what would happen after the Dutch troops retreated, and people doubted if the Republican troops that were to replace them would be strong enough to repulse a *Darul Islam* attack. In the course of 1949 *Darul Islam* activities were reported from almost every corner of West Java – not only in *Darul Islam*'s main areas of operation, the northeastern and southeastern part of West Java, and in particular the *kabutapens* of Bandung, Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis, but also in purely Republican areas such as Banten.<sup>31</sup>

But it was particularly the *Darul Islam* strongholds that inspired apprehension of the expansion of *Darul Islam*. One place where the situation was felt to be especially critical was in the town of Tasikmalaya, around which tens of thousands of *Darul Islam* members were reported to be concentrated, poised for an attack on the town as soon as Dutch troops left. In November 1949 questions were raised in the Pasundan Parliament with the Pasundan Government being asked for guarantees that the Republican troops to be stationed at Tasikmalaya could repulse an attack, and urged to see to it that these troops were fully equipped (M 26-11-1949, 28-11-1949).

Thus the collaboration between the State of Pasundan and the *Siliwangi* Division was born out of necessity. The State of Pasundan was obliged to resign itself to the fact that its former opponent, the Republican Army, was to form the core of the United States of Indonesia Army. The latter's superior authority placed Pasundan in a very weak position, as it was dependent on the Indonesian Republican Army, while its subjects did not wholly recognize its own authority, with a proportion being loyal to the Republic with its ideal of a unitary state, and a proportion to the Islamic State of Indonesia.

These weaknesses eventually rendered the State of Pasundan incapable of withstanding the pressure to transform the United States of Indonesia into a unitary state, involving the incorporation of the member-states into the Indonesian Republic. The more so after its becoming associated with the abortive attempt of the Dutch commando officer Westerling to seize Bandung and Jakarta with his own private army, the Army of the Just King or *Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil* (APRA).<sup>32</sup> The Government of the State of Pasundan adopted an irresolute stand with regard to the recognition of this army, commanded by Westerling and other former officers of the Dutch Special Forces and the KNIL. Westerling did not request such recognition before the end of 1949. Upon his doing so in January 1950, he stressed the ability

of his troops to deal with any army, claiming that these troops comprised about 20,000 well-armed men, and further appealed to his good relations with similar bands operating in other parts of Java, in Sumatra and in the southern part of Sulawesi (Alers 1956:216). When it became clear to him that recognition was not forthcoming, he attacked Bandung, occupying the city on January 22nd. The entire operation miscarried when the scheme to take Jakarta failed, however.

After the APRA coup the Cabinet of the United States of Indonesia introduced an emergency law placing the State of Pasundan under its virtual tutelage. This paved the way for the dissolution of that State. Its definitive end came in March, when the State of Pasundan made a formal request for incorporation into the Indonesian Republic.

There were alleged relations not only between the APRA and the State of Pasundan, but also between the APRA and *Darul Islam*, and between the latter and the State of Pasundan.<sup>33</sup> *Darul Islam* and the APRA were connected in two ways. The first was through an alleged meeting between Kartosuwirjo and Westerling just before the attack on Bandung. The second through a number of APRA soldiers joining the *Darul Islam* forces after the APRA's defeat.

Most of the information on *Darul Islam*'s external contacts in the early fifties is provided by records of the trials of Jungschläger and Schmidt, two Dutchmen accused of smuggling weapons to *Darul Islam*.<sup>34</sup> One of the principal witnesses for the prosecution here was Haris bin Suhaemi, a former courier to Kartosuwirjo. He disclosed at the Jungschläger trial that plans had been laid for a coordinated military action of the APRA and the TII at a secret meeting between Westerling and Kartosuwirjo in the Preanger hotel in Bandung. Hereby the APRA would attack several major towns in West Java, and the TII a number of Republican Army positions in the outer areas. Other informants to the Republican Government revealed that, had the coordinated action been successful, the occupied areas would have become part of the "*de facto* territory of the NII". There was, in fact, some intensification of *Darul Islam* activities around the time of the attack on Bandung, but no mass attack by *Darul Islam* troops took place. Alers concludes from all this that the supposed close contacts between Kartosuwirjo and Westerling will "probably always remain a myth" (Alers 1956:218).

#### 4. Java's Wild West

The Islamic State of Indonesia proved such more viable than the State of Pasundan. Kartosuwirjo succeeded in consolidating his position and even expanding his movement in the years following its foundation until the end of the 1950's. According to estimates by the *Siliwangi* Division, the *Darul Islam* troops of West Java attained their greatest strength in 1957, when they comprised 13,129 men armed with 3000 fire-arms, including brens and mortars (Pinardi 1964:99).

Between 1950 and 1957 *Darul Islam* activities were reported from all over Priangan. *Darul Islam* troops were operating from the mountain spur in the west, with occasional incursions into the Banten region, to Sidareja, across the border with Central Java, in the east. The Islamic State of Indonesia and its army made their influence especially strongly felt in southeastern Priangan, in the *kabupatens* of Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis. They controlled vast areas here for many years. Into these so-called "*de facto* territories of the Islamic State of Indonesia" no Republican Army soldier dared venture. At the loss of the Republican Army's support the Republican civil servants and village heads and their assistants had fled, leaving their territories under the absolute control of the Civil Administration of the Islamic State of Indonesia. In the adjacent areas Republican village heads made an appearance in their villages only during the day-time, and retreated to the safety of the towns and cities at night.

As late as 1956 the Islamic State of Indonesia was master of one fifth of the *kabupaten* of Tasikmalaya, of which 75 of the total of 201 villages were wholly or partially controlled by *Darul Islam*. These villages were located in four different main parts of Tasikmalaya — the area surrounding the mountains of Cakrabuwana, Telaga Bodas and Galunggung in the north; the *kewedanaans* of Cikatomas and Karangnunggal, in the rectangle formed by Cikatomas, Salopo, Cibalong and Karangnunggal, to the south of this; the area around Manonjaya bordering on Ciamis in the eastern part of Tasikmalaya; and between Taraju and Warungpeuteuy in the west. In the fertile region of Cikatomas the *Darul Islam* troops of the 441st battalion were commanded by Godjim (Gojim), while this region was also the seat of the NII *bupati* of Tasikmalaya, Iljas (Ilyas).

Of the *kabupaten* of Ciamis *Darul Islam* had about one seventh under its control, being strongest in the southern part, in the *kewedanaan* of Cijulang, roughly from Cigugur to the coast. The



village of Cigugur was the birth-place of the *Darul Islam bupati* of Ciamis, Affandi, while this area and neighbouring Cikatomas in Tasikmalaya came under the jurisdiction of the *Darul Islam* Resident of East Priangan, Dede Kartamihardja (Dede Kartamiharja). *Darul Islam* was also strong in the north, around Mount Sawal and between Ciamis and Banjar (cf. Jacoby 1956).

In the *kabupaten* of Garut, the *Darul Islam* forces were concentrated in the higher regions, such as the area around Mount Guntur, threatening Leles, Baluburlimbangan, Cibatu and Malangbong, and around Mount Cikuray. The *Darul Islam* guerillas called this area the *Suffah* region, indicating that it was a sacred area that had been purged of enemies. Both areas also served as a base for attacks on the town of Garut.

*Darul Islam* had another strong base in West Priangan, in the *kabupatens* of Sukabumi, Cianjur, Bandung and Bogor, and was making certain parts of it very unsafe. It controlled the areas around Mount Salak, south of Bogor, and the region south of Cianjur and between Gununghalu and Cililin near Bandung. In the latter area one of the best-known and most powerful *Darul Islam* leaders, Achmad Sungkawa (Akhmad Sungkawa), operated. In the first years following the transfer of sovereignty his troops, assisted by other bands such as the *Bambu Runcing* and some Dutch soldiers, engaged in full-scale battles with Republican troops. East of Bandung it caused a lot of trouble around Cicalengka and Ciparay. In February 1951 alone, *Darul Islam* troops in this region, estimated at about 600 men, launched seventeen attacks, setting fire to 200 houses.

For many years it took a great deal of courage to travel by road from Jakarta via Bogor to Bandung. Motor-cars and buses were frequently stopped, and their passengers robbed or sometimes killed. The only safe way to travel by road was under armed escort, but even then one had to be prepared for hold-ups. Almost as much courage was needed to stay in a bungalow on the Puncak pass, the holiday resort of West Java, where sometimes the country-houses of the Jakarta rich situated here were raided by *Darul Islam* bands. No exceptions were made for bungalows belonging to the Government or its officials. At the end of March 1955, for instance, a Central Government bungalow at Tugu was attacked by a group of between 40 and 60 men, and in June 1956 a villa belonging to the Department of Education was raided, while in October of that same year both bungalows were attacked again by about 300 men. The villa of Vice-President Mohammad Hatta was also raided and badly damaged once.

Hence in the first decade of formal independence West Java in general and the Priangan in particular was a very unsafe and troublesome region. Smaller and larger bands of former guerillas, *Darul Islam* troops, and outright bandits roved about the countryside, plundering and raiding; the strongest and widest-ranging of these groups was the *Darul Islam* one, operating in the area indicated above. Its members frequently moved about in groups of over a hundred, sometimes even six or seven hundred, raiding villages and towns and looting the houses of their inhabitants from their mountain bases. In the towns they also robbed banks, stole medicines and medical equipment from hospitals, and set free comrades who had been taken prisoner by Republican forces.

Tasikmalaya and Garut suffered particularly heavily. Up to mid-1951 there were shots to be heard in Tasikmalaya almost every night. These were fired not only from outside but also inside the town (IM 23-9-1951). On February 18th, 1951, Tasikmalaya was attacked by a band reported to be 500 strong commanded by Toha Arsjad. On the same day *Darul Islam* troops entered the nearby towns of Singaparna and Manonjaya. Two months later rebels again occupied Tasikmalaya and remained in the town for several hours. Garut, for years overflowing with refugees sleeping everywhere, was attacked many times, in the first quarter of 1953 even three times. Ciamis and Sumedang, and smaller towns like Pamanukan in the north and Parigi in the south, were also attacked. As a rule the *Darul Islam* troops stayed only a few hours, robbing and sometimes setting alight the houses of the inhabitants. An exception was formed by the occupation of Cisewu, a small town in southern Garut. It was entered on February 17th, 1953, by about 250 rebels, who held the town for almost a month, leaving it at the approach of units of the Mobile Brigade.

Even so, the people in the towns were relatively well off. Things were much worse in the countryside, where villages were raided, in some regions quite frequently, goods and crops seized, and houses, bridges, mosques and rice-barns set afire or destroyed.

The impact of the raids by *Darul Islam* troops was devastating. Official figures for the last quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952 mention respectively 414 and 428 persons killed, 4,046 and 3,052 houses burnt, and 3,244 and 6,192 lootings. In the last quarter of 1951 the number of people who fled their homes or were evacuated was 52,672, and the total damage inflicted by

*Darul Islam* troops came to Rp. 7,339,580,—. In the first quarter of 1952 *Darul Islam* inflicted damages to the tune of Rp. 9,981,366,—, and 11,016 persons were evacuated or fled their homes. From 1955 to 1962 the annual number of evacuees fluctuated between 209,355 in 1962 and 303,764 in 1958, with an average of about 250,000 a year. In 1957 *Darul Islam* troops killed 2,447 persons, burned 17,673 houses, and engaged in 102,984 lootings. Until 1961 more than 1,500 people were killed annually. In 1961 this figure dropped sharply to just over 500, however. From 1958 to 1960 the number of houses burnt was between 10,000 and 14,000 yearly, rising to 18,336 in 1961 and dropping to 414 in 1962 (Pinardi 1964:179).

Sometimes villages were attacked by way of reprisal by *Darul Islam* troops for suspected support to the Republican Army. At other times the aim was to collect tax or loot from plundering enemy property, in accordance with the Muslim law on *ghanima*, or war booty (Muslim 1953:9).

Many times villagers were caught between two fires, with both sides suspecting them of supporting the other and punishing them accordingly. So Republican troops might come marching into a village demanding food and information about *Darul Islam* activities in the vicinity in the daytime, and if the food and information was given, even under duress, retaliation by the Islamic Army of Indonesia or its Police might follow at night. Or Republican Army troops might seize all the food in a given village on the pretext of preventing the population from giving it to *Darul Islam* troops later, or vice versa. Then if Islamic troops came into the village asking for food and shelter, in the evening or night, and news of this reached the authorities, the Republican Army would again launch a punitive expedition in return. To characterize the situation of the rural population, which had to live with both the Republican Army and the *Darul Islam* troops and to protect itself against both, a new acronym was invented, namely *kongres*. This denoted that people would tell *Darul Islam* members they chanced to meet that they would support (*menyokong*) them, while telling the Republican troops that all was in order (*be-res*) (Jacoby 1956 n. 3).

Villagers might moreover be kidnapped by *Darul Islam* troops by way of reprisal for crimes which they had committed in the eyes of the Islamic State of Indonesia, or for compulsory recruitment into the Islamic Army. They might furthermore be forced to join in the posses and battues organized by the Republican Army or village guards.

At other times the villages and rice-fields would become the scene of battle, forcing the population to flee to the towns and cities. Or Republican troops might evacuate whole villages, on account of their support for the *Darul Islam* and its guerilla tactics to facilitate their own manoeuvres. Notably in the first half of the 1950's the number of evacuees was enormous. In January 1951, for example, 50,000 people were evacuated in seven sub-districts of Ciamis, to clear an area of circa 800 km<sup>2</sup> (N 13-1-1951). The conditions under which the evacuees and refugees lived were poor. Relief for them was badly organized or totally lacking. There were shortages of food, clothing and housing, and people had to sleep out in the streets, were often underfed, and suffered from numerous diseases, such as dropsy and malaria, to mention only two.

There was a noticeable difference between villages supporting the *Darul Islam* and those supporting the Republic. Each had to be prepared for reprisals by the other side. In Republican villages located within the range of operation of *Darul Islam* troops, people were afraid to stay inside their homes at night, and slept out in the fields or in the mountains, or went to the towns, sometimes many hours' walk away. In *Darul Islam* areas the reverse was true. People here were afraid to remain in their villages in the daytime, when Republican patrols might visit them, and stayed in the fields and mountains during the day to return at night. Any Republican troops entering these villages would only find frightened children, women and old men here.

As indicated above, the *Darul Islam* forces were not the only rebel group. In West Java itself the Republican Army had to deal with actions by APRA and other non-*Darul Islam* bands. The *Siliwangi* Division was obliged to continue its efforts to subdue these "irregular bands" in West Java and secure recognition as the Republic's sole, supreme military force throughout the 1950's.

These efforts, already in evidence in 1946, had been discontinued for a short while at the time of the *Siliwangi* Division's retreat to Central Java. In this interval the *Siliwangi* Division had had to content itself with establishing control over the guerilla units remaining behind from a distance. This it tried to do by appointing a co-ordinator of the struggle against the Dutch in West Java and by keeping in touch with the guerillas by courier, though without much success. Soon after its return on its "Long March" from Central Java other clashes with irregular guerilla bands – not only *Darul Islam* groups but also others – occurred.

After the recognition of Indonesian independence by the

Dutch, the *Siliwangi* Division saw itself obliged to continue its campaign against the irregular bands. The latter represented such groups as the *Barisan Sakit Hati*, the followers of Haji Item, the *Bambu Runcing*, and the Citarum Brigade. The *Barisan Sakit Hati* (BSH), or Aggrieved Troops, which operated in the *kabupaten* of Cirebon, were composed of former strongly anti-Government guerillas who refused to be integrated into the Republican Army, or, what often amounted to the same, to be demobilized. The Republican Army concluded an agreement with them whereby 1,260 of them were to be incorporated in it in November 1951. By the end of four months, however, many of their leaders, such as Leman, and their men had defected again (IM 24-11-1951, 21-5-1952; KB 24-11-1951). They continued fighting for years. The troops of Haji Item, or the Black Haji, operated on the rubber estates around Tangerang and Serpong. The Haji, and after his arrest his lieutenants, later extended the band's activities right into Jakarta. It much more possessed the character of a group of bandits than of a guerilla force with a definite ideology which continued fighting after 1949.

The principal non-*Darul Islam* rebels were the *Bambu Runcing* and the related *Citarum* Brigade, which were active in the heart of West Java. The *Bambu Runcing*, deriving its name from the bamboo spears used as weapons during the Indonesian revolution, was a leftist organization originally commanded by Chaerul Saleh (Khaerul Saleh). Along with the *Citarum* Brigade, with which it established close links, it continued to fight the Republic after the struggle for independence had been won. It was one of the many guerilla groups which were dissatisfied with the results of the Round Table Conference of 1949. In its eyes the independence granted by the Dutch was no complete independence of the kind envisaged in the proclamation of independence of August 1945. It had the character of a gift from the Dutch, whose economic presence was still strongly felt.

The *Bambu Runcing* operated in the north, in Jakarta and the *kabupatens* of Bekasi, Karawang, Purwakarta and Subang. In the Jakarta region, where its troops numbered over 500 men, it was much stronger than the *Darul Islam* (Muslim 1953:11). The same was true of the *kabupatens* to the east, in particular the troublesome Karawang region. In part the origins of the *Bambu Runcing* lay in the *Lasykar Rakyat*, which had resisted the Republican Army as early as April 1947. Alip, the vice-commander of the *Macan Citarum* Regiment, formed just before the battle with the Republican Army in 1947, became one of the *Bambu Runcing's*

foremost leaders after 1949. Together with Moh. Noor he headed the *Bambu Runcing* in the northern *kabupatens*. Here, in the areas surrounding the Citarum river, they operated mostly independently, without the cooperation of other guerilla groups.

In the south, in the *kabupatens* of Sukabumi, Cianjur and Bandung, the best-known leader was Tjetje Subrata (Cece Subrata), the commander of the *Citarum* Brigade.<sup>35</sup> The latter, as well as the *Bambu Runcing*, sometimes fought against, and sometimes cooperated with the Islamic State of Indonesia in this area. On some occasions they would engage in combat with or lay ambushed for the Republican troops together with Achmad Sungkawa's *Darul Islam* troops. At other times the two groups would find it impossible to forget their conflicting backgrounds and would vigorously oppose each other. Leaders were kidnapped on either side, and in 1951 the *Bambu Runcing* group of Sukabumi even threatened to massacre all Islamic *ulamas* during the Fast (IB 18-6-1951).

The *Bambu Runcing* had a strong leftish leaning, influenced as its leaders were by Tan Malaka. It presented an image of itself as a people's army, using the hammer and sickle as its emblem. In the areas under its control it established cooperative societies and communal village rice-barns and worked in the fields together with the people, asking no money but only food in return for their services.

Sometimes lesser leaders, using such colourful names as Pak Ribut (Mister Rowdy) and Pak Kabur (Mister Hazy), would forget about these noble ideals and rob and extort the population, so that they would have to be disciplined by their superiors. The guerillas of the *Bambu Runcing* and the *Citarum* Brigade were only subdued by the Republican Army as late as 1958.

### 5. Internal War

The acknowledgment of independence made it all the more urgent to work out a solution to the problem of the numerous irregular guerilla bands, which in most cases the Republican Army controlled only nominally. Some even showed themselves to be outright hostile to it. The bands had also caused difficulties in the earlier days, but then it had always been possible to prevent a final show-down until after the fight for freedom should have been won. Now that this goal had been achieved and the Republican Government was in a position where it had to enforce its authority over the whole of the territory, it had to act.

The Republican Government and Army felt caught in a dilemma. The latter was ill-suited for a forcible suppression of the guerillas, consisting as it did in part of unreliable units incorporated into it in the previous years. The loyal units that were suitable for the enormous task of purging the guerilla areas were too few in number and lacked the necessary arms and equipment. Moreover, their opponent, although looked down upon by the professional soldiers of the Army, commanded much popular goodwill. After all, the guerillas had participated in the armed struggle for independence, and had gained considerable credit in the process. That is why, from 1950 onwards, the relevant policies of the successive governments oscillated between a desire for military action and the inclination to grant an amnesty.

The skirmishes between Republican soldiers and guerillas of before 1950 not only in Java but also in the Outer Islands, continued in early 1950. Except in West Java and the area around Brebes and Tegal on the north coast of Central Java, where government troops were engaged in a full-scale campaign against *Darul Islam* forces, these actions were mostly of a minor kind, usually involving only small groups reluctant to give up their independence at the prospect of redistribution of functions and spoils. The arrival on the scene of Republican military and civilian personnel implied that not only would they have to give up the position they had attained during the revolution, but also to relinquish the lucrative right of levying taxes and other contributions from the local population.

Unless the Republican Army and Government acted with tact, there would be an escalation of hostilities. Even so, the general feeling was that a peaceful compromise should be sought and that the Republican Army should use force only in the last resort. Ironically, the Government and Army at the same time set out on a course which rendered such a solution almost impossible. Finding itself with a standing Army on its hand which was too big for peace-time purposes, an army reorganization and demobilization ranked topmost among the Government's priorities. Thus one of the avenues by which irregular guerilla units might be persuaded to lay down their arms was blocked, although the possibility was occasionally reopend. Many might have given themselves up had there been a likelihood of their integration into the Republican Army as soldiers on an equal footing.

The guerillas were urged at intervals to come out of the woods and mountains and hand over their arms, and promised an

amnesty. But no clear prospect of their being somehow integrated into the Army or channelled back into society was held out to them.

The first and only Cabinet of the United States of Indonesia, the Hatta Cabinet, and its successor the Natsir Cabinet – formed in September 1950 after the collapse of the federal state structure – were both confronted with the problem from the outset. It was to the latter that the conflict with the unruly guerillas manifested itself in its full magnitude. The Cabinet's seven-point government programme accordingly included as fifth point the streamlining of the Armed Forces and the reintegration into society of redundant members of the Armed Forces and guerilla troops.

The Natsir Cabinet at first tried persuading the guerillas who continued their opposition to the Republic to surrender. On November 14th the Government announced that it was giving the guerillas an opportunity to report to the authorities from the 28th of that month until December 14th, during which period they could surrender themselves and their arms at the Government's district offices. They were promised admission into the Armed Forces or the Police Force in accordance with the existing rules if they wished. If they did not, the Government would assist them in finding a new livelihood.

At the same time detailed directions were issued concerning the surrender procedure. Fearing lest the guerillas should take advantage of the opportunity to lay ambushes or secretly move their troops, the Republican Government decreed that they should openly carry what arms they had. Troops marching to the district offices to surrender should furthermore carry young coconut-palm leaf ribs as a sign of their sincerity. These rules were not in force for South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, two regions with their own guerilla problems for which separate solutions were being worked out.

On the face of it the amnesty offer looked fair enough. The condition that the guerillas were to be drafted into the Republican Army in accordance with the existing rules, however, left the Government every latitude. In spite of the likely sudden influx of large numbers of new soldiers, the Republican Government felt free to go ahead with its scheme for reduction of the size of its Army. If the appeal had been successful, it would in most cases probably at most have provided a transit station for guerillas who did not meet the military, physical and intellectual standards the Army had set for its soldiers. According to the Government's



plans at the beginning of 1951, the Army was to have a maximum strength of 200,000. As Natsir revealed at the end of September 1950, this implied the discharge of about 80,000 soldiers in the last three months of that year (N 27-9-1950). An announcement like this was not exactly calculated to increase the faith of guerillas being asked to surrender. Moreover, as became clear in the subsequent months, the Republican Army and Government were less interested in the guerillas than in their arms. The amnesty provided an opportunity of seizing the many firearms still in circulation among the people after the struggle for independence. Guerillas surrendering without arms, in fact, counted for nothing.

In the event, the amnesty offer turned out a big failure, as regard both the number of people and that of arms. At Cimahi and Lembang, both in the vicinity of Bandung, for instance, three and two guerillas respectively had had themselves registered at the end of one day. In nearby Ciparay a small group of about fifteen was reported to be on the march, presumably on its way to the district office (I 30-11-1950). More successful was the appeal for surrender in Purwakarta. Here about one hundred members of an organization called the Guerilla Police, and about two hundred of a group styling itself the *Barisan Berani Mati*, or “dare-devil troops”, surrendered (I 2-12-1950, 29-12-1950).

In West Java as a whole, 1,180 people had reported by December 18th. Only 46 firearms had been handed over, however. The highest single number of guerillas turning themselves over — 418 — was recorded at Subang, while the largest number of weapons — 13 — were handed in at Cianjur.<sup>36</sup> Of these men, about 10% were stated to have expressed the wish to enter the Army and another 10% the Police Force. The remainder wanted to return to normal civilian life (I 7-12-1950).

The area commander of the *Siliwangi* Division on December 8th, while the amnesty was still in force, classified sixteen organizations as illegal (Peraturan Panglima TT III, 25).<sup>37</sup> This number is somewhat exaggerated, however, as some of the rebel groups were entered under different names in the list. For instance, it recorded the *Darul Islam* as well as the *Negara Islam Indonesia* and the *Tentara Islam Indonesia*. It furthermore included the name of the *Pasukan Surya Kencana*, or Golden Sun Troops, a group that was closely affiliated with the *Darul Islam* operating in Cianjur. Also separately listed were the *Citarum* Brigade and the *Bambu Runcing* Division. Furthermore, the APRA, which had been suppressed long ago, was mentioned on it, as well as

another band of former KNIL soldiers, the *Batalyon Arends*, sometimes also referred to as the White Eagle Battalion.<sup>38</sup> The other groups listed on the list of banned organizations were: the *Angkatan Umat Islam*, or AUI, the *Pasukan Semiaji*, the *Pasukan Angling Darma* (the name of a ruler of Malawar), the *Tentara Rakyat Indonesia*, or Indonesian People's Army, the *Pasukan Banteng Wulung*, or Black Buffalos, the *Ratu Adil Persatuan Indonesia*, or Just King of Indonesian Unity, the *Republik Maluku Selatan*, or Republic of the South Moluccas, and the S.P. 88, the *Kesatuan Pemberontakan* (Rebellion Unit) operating in Karawang.

A few days earlier the area commander of West Java, that is, the commander of the *Siliwangi* Division, had also issued two decrees forbidding the use of military terms and the wearing of uniforms by people other than members of the Armed Forces or government employees. Hereby the use of words like "staff", "headquarters", or "division" in social or political organizations was proscribed to civilians, as was the wearing of uniforms resembling those of the Armed Forces or the Government (Peraturan Panglima TT III, 20–21).

At the failure of the appeal for surrender, harsher measures were again restored to by the Republican Army troops. Once again mass arrests took place. Where from January to November 10,000 people had been taken prisoner in West Java, about 7,000 of whom had been released again shortly afterwards, now, 3,400 new arrests were made in one month (N 19-1-1951). Among those detained were many members of *Masyumi*, a party that was distrusted for its alleged *Darul Islam* sympathies. In a few instances local *Masyumi* cadre members sustained bullet wounds while being arrested. In some areas of West Java local authorities, moreover, forbade Koran recitals and Muslim public sermons.

According to the West Java branch of *Masyumi*, 973 of its members in all were arrested in the area in December 1950, most of them in the *kabupatens* of Sukabumi and Bandung. In Sukabumi 300 *Masyumi* members were reportedly taken prisoner. When one compares this figure with the total number of arrests in Sukabumi – 400 – *Masyumi* in this *kabupaten* at least seems to have borne the brunt of the purge instituted by the Republican Army and Government (N 19-1-1951, I 2-1-1951, 5-1-1951, 12-1-1951).

Besides the call to surrender, attempts to establish contact with *Darul Islam* leaders and negotiate some sort of an agreement also failed. In time a number of committees were formed for the

purpose of finding a political, that is to say, peaceful, solution. None of them achieved anything much, however. The Republican Government had set up such a committee, chaired by Natsir, still during the struggle for independence, namely in September 1949. It had been commissioned to study the *Darul Islam* problem and advise the Government on the proper steps to be taken with regard to it. This committee was generally considered a failure, with the Minister of Information, Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo, even publicly calling it worthless. This committee had unsuccessfully attempted to establish contact with Kartosuwirjo through Ijet Hidajat (Iyet Hidayat), a former *Darul Islam bupati* and chairman of the *Majelis Islam* of Bandung (Van Nieuwenhuijze 1958:173). Failing to achieve any clear results, the Natsir committee simply faded out of existence.

At the time of recognition of independence and the imposed reality of a federal United States of Indonesia instead of the ideal of a unitary Republic, new attempts at finding a solution had been made. The Federal Government had formed an interdepartmental committee, made up of Zainul Arifin, representing the Department of Religion, Mr. Makmun Sumadipradja (Makmun Sumadipraja), of the Department of Internal Affairs, and Colonel Sadikin of Defence, within weeks of its installation.<sup>39</sup> Besides it, two other committees had come into being. One, investigating mainly the treatment of the numerous people arrested on suspicion of *Darul Islam* sympathies or collaboration, was headed by Wachid Hasjim. The other was chaired by Raden Wali al-Fatah.

The latter was an old acquaintance of Kartosuwirjo's, and, according to Boland (1971:60), had even been a close friend of his. Both had been prominent in the pre-war PSII, and both had left it, be it for different reasons. Both, moreover, came from East Java. Kartosuwirjo and Raden Wali al-Fatah may have known each other well from the pre-war Islamic political movement, but their religious and political outlooks differed. Wali al-Fatah, for example, felt much more at home in modernist Islamic circles, and was to be for years a leading *Muhammadiyah* figure. In the power struggles in the pre-war PSII his stance had differed sharply from that of Kartosuwirjo and his associates, and although, as was said above, both had left the PSII, Wali al-Fatah even twice, they had done so in different years and for different reasons. The second occasion on which Wali al-Fatah had left the PSII, in December 1938, to become one of the co-founders of a small new Islamic party, the *Partai Islam Indonesia* or PII, the *hijrah* policy had been the dividing issue. In contrast to Kartosu-

wirjo, who was to be ousted from the PSII about a year later for his refusal to moderate his views on *hijrah*, Wali al-Fatah and his friends had left the PSII precisely because they felt that the party still placed too much emphasis on the *hijrah* principle at that time (Pluvier 1953:74, 116–117).

Be that as it may, Wali al-Fatah in 1950 was confident that he could talk Kartosuwirjo into surrender. He set out to meet Kartosuwirjo probably on his own initiative, but with the tacit consent of the Government. Like most *Masyumi* members, including the later Prime Minister Natsir, he was convinced that the utmost should be done to put an end to the *Darul Islam* rebellion through negotiations. In fact, Wali al-Fatah had been one of the initiators at the end of 1949 of a big Muslim conference at Yogyakarta at which the *Masyumi* view that a peaceful solution to the problem of the *Darul Islam* insurrection should be found if possible had been endorsed.<sup>40</sup> The preference of *Masyumi* and its members for negotiations over military action repeatedly brought them into conflict with leftist and nationalist parties like the PKI and PNI, as well as with the military authorities. The latter's criticism that the committees formed to study the problem or establish contact with the *Darul Islam* functioned badly or were useless stemmed in part from this difference of view on the way in which to tackle the problem.

Wali al-Fatah, who during the revolution had been *bupati* of the troublesome area of Pekalongan and after the transfer of sovereignty had received an appointment with the political department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also as *bupati*, set out with a view to meeting the principal *Darul Islam* leaders on May 14th, 1950. He and the three assistants accompanying him – Tasik Wira, Muslich (Muslikh) and Zainuddin – succeeded in establishing their first contact with the rebels a week later, when they were taken to Cipamuruyan, on Mount Cakrabuana, north of Ciawi, one of the *Darul Islam* strongholds. Here they were welcomed with every respect and treated as important guests. The envoys were guarded by TII troops, with the understanding that their safety could not be guaranteed if government troops should attack the base. It was subsequently reported from Cipamuruyan that from here the party would travel on to Selaawi, near Antralina, where Kartosuwirjo had agreed to meet them.

After that nothing was heard of Wali al-Fatah for a while. It had been pre-arranged beforehand that whatever happened, he would return by May 27th. When that date came round there was still no news of him, however. There was finally word of him two

weeks later, and on July 14th the *Darul Islam* Red Cross delivered a letter from him to the authorities, in which Wali al-Fatah wrote that he was suffering from a malaria attack and asked to be picked up. He was rescued by government troops after an attack on *Darul Islam* positions on July 19th (M 26-5-1950, 20-6-1950, 24-6-1950; *Siasat* 11-6-1950).

Wali al-Fatah's mission had failed. In his disappointment he at first stated that the only alternative left now as far as he could see was military action. He furthermore alleged that Kartosuwirjo had been prepared to meet him in view of the defeats the *Darul Islam* troops were suffering, but that Oni, the TII commander, had upset the plans accordingly by having his troops take him to a different place from that where he was supposed to meet Kartosuwirjo. He had been missing for some time as a result of this (M 24-6-1958, 1-7-1950).

Others believed that Kartosuwirjo himself had refused to talk to the envoys. According to their version, he had been prepared to negotiate, but only with senior government officials and not with comparatively unimportant people like Wali al-Fatah (The 1968:10). This is more in line with the stance adopted for years by the *Darul Islam* leaders that negotiations could only take place on a Government-to-Government level and hence after the Republic's recognition of the Islamic State of Indonesia. At the end of 1950 Kartosuwirjo in fact informed Wali al-Fatah that he was prepared to negotiate only subject to prior recognition of his Islamic State (N 13-12-1950).

The failure of Wali al-Fatah's mission and the hard stance of Kartosuwirjo may well have been conditioned partly by the conduct of the Army of the United States of Indonesia. At the time of Wali al-Fatah's attempt to establish contact with the *Darul Islam* leaders the Army continued its attacks on Kartosuwirjo and his men. According to one prominent Islamic leader, Affandi Ridhwan, chairman of the West Javanese branch of the GPII, the Army had even attacked *Darul Islam* troops two hours before Kartosuwirjo and his then chief advisor, Sanusi Partawidjaja, were due to go to the rendezvous with Wali al-Fatah. In the subsequent exchange of fire several people had been killed, among them Toha Arsjad, the Minister of Information of the Islamic State of Indonesia (PR 26-2-1953).

The relevant information was disclosed by Affandi Ridhwan during his trial in 1953, after his arrest on suspicion of supporting *Darul Islam*. Like Wali al-Fatah, he was convinced of the necessity of a solution through negotiations. As a member of the

Provincial Parliament of West Java he had been one of the supporters of the "security memorandum" drawn up by that Parliament in December 1951, urging that military action should not be considered alone. He had also been spokesman of the *Komite Nasib Rakyat*, or Committee of the Fate of the People, which pleaded in meetings with civilian and military authorities for a cautious approach to the entire *Darul Islam* problem.

Affandi Ridhwan's contacts with *Darul Islam* which led to his arrest dated from the first half of 1952, when at the invitation of Sanusi Partawidjaja, whom he had known from the early days of the GPII, he visited the latter's headquarters at Cikadu, about 10 kilometers from Cianjur. During their meeting, at which Achmad Sungkawa was also present, Affandi Ridhwan and Sanusi Partawidjaja had discussed the appointment of Kawilarang as military commander of West Java, exchanging views on the repercussions the appointment of a Christian commander in a predominantly Islamic area was likely to have within and outside the Army. The two also discussed the possibility of negotiations with the Republican Government at length, concluding that such negotiations might still be opened. Sanusi Partawidjaja, however, imposed the two conditions that the Republican Government should give proof of its sincerity by getting its Army to refrain from attacks while talks were underway, and, more importantly that it should recognize the Islamic State of Indonesia first.

Affandi Ridhwan had tried already here to persuade Sanusi Partawidjaja to drop the second condition, and continued his efforts in subsequent correspondence. He pointed out in his letters that recognition of the Islamic State of Indonesia would imply the concurrent existence of two Indonesian states, both claiming to be the one and only legitimate state — a rather strange situation, in his view. He further indicated that a request for recognition was illogical because the Islamic State of Indonesia itself did not recognize the Indonesian Republic. Such a request would moreover lower the standing of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Affandi Ridhwan added the advice that the Islamic State of Indonesia should ask Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for recognition. At his trial he stated in his defence that he had meant this latter as a joke. Both the Republic and the Islamic State, however, had taken the suggestion seriously. For the Republican Government it constituted conclusive proof that Affandi Ridhwan had actively supported *Darul Islam*. The leaders of the Islamic State, on the other hand, had been induced by it to assign Ijet Hidajat, Natsir's former envoy in 1949, the task of

contacting foreign embassies for the purpose of explaining to them the ideals and aims of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Ijet Hidajat, also known as Suparman Amawidjaja (Suparman Amawidjaya), proved most ill-fitted for the task. He had no idea of how to start and had seen himself obliged to ask the PSII leader and Minister of Social Affairs, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, how to approach the personnel of a foreign embassy. He does not seem to have established any contacts at all.<sup>41</sup> His appointment as such nevertheless constituted an aggravating circumstance for Affandi Ridhwan, who was sentenced to 3½ years' gaol.

There are indications that, had the Republican Government adopted a more lenient attitude, a rapprochement with at least a section of the *Darul Islam* movement in West Java might have been achieved. Affandi Ridhwan, in his correspondence with Sanusi Partawidjaja, was successful in persuading the latter to drop recognition of the Islamic State of Indonesia as a condition for negotiation. The Government beyond any doubt knew of these developments, since Affandi Ridhwan definitely informed Vice-Premier Prawoto Mangkusasmito of his earlier contacts with Sanusi Partawidjaja, and later on also of the progress he had made. Affandi Ridhwan had accordingly believed himself to be acting in the capacity of a government representative, or at least to have had the Government's support. His arrest consequently came as a big surprise to him (PR March 1953).

Affandi Ridhwan's mission took place at a time when the voices demanding action and decrying any form of reconciliation in both the Republican camp and *Darul Islam* circles were becoming increasingly louder. At the failure of the Natsir call for surrender, subsequently, the Republican Army launched its *Operasi Merdeka* or Operation Freedom, a military operation against former guerillas and rebels all over the archipelago. Moreover, upon the fall of the Natsir Cabinet in April 1951, the Government fell into the hands of people who were much less inclined to seek a solution through negotiations. Natsir's successor, Sukiman, though also a *Masyumi* politician, adopted a much harder line in this matter. To accommodate the PNI ministers in his Cabinet, he decided to step up the military efforts to suppress the various rebellions (Feith 1962:211). Calls for military action were raised not only by the military, but also by secular parties like the PNI and PKI, which, Sukiman's firm promises notwithstanding, began attacking *Masyumi* for alleged links with and support of *Darul Islam*. In addition they urged Soekarno to make an official declaration branding the *Darul*

*Islam* insurgents rebels against the state, or *pengacau negara*. In the course of 1953 in particular delegations from the West Javanese branches of, among others, *Sobsi*, PKI, PNI, *Murba*, and *Partai Buruh*, approached both central and local authorities with requests for the issuing of such a decree. Mass meetings to press these demands were also organized. The campaign received the support of the acting Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Suprpto, and organizations of civil servants who suffered especially severely under *Darul Islam* attacks. The Indonesian Government reacted by introducing a Bill proposing that 13 movements should be declared illegal, among them Kartosuwirjo's *Darul Islam* in West Java and related rebel movements elsewhere in the country, such as those of Daud Beureu'eh in Aceh, Kahar Muzakkar in South Sulawesi, and Ibnu Hadjar in South Kalimantan.<sup>42</sup> For the time being, however, the proposal was shelved.

The Islamic State for its part also intensified its actions, partly to remove any impression that the Republican Army operations were effective and that the Islamic Army was being forced onto the defensive. In this connection the Islamic Army of Indonesia launched a so-called "moment instant action" in July 1953, within the framework of which *Darul Islam* units increased their raids. The *Darul Islam* commander of South Ciamis, Uchjan Effendi (Ukhyan Effendi), for example, instructed his troops to step up their retaliatory actions against the enemy, and to cut telephone wires, to disrupt traffic, and so on – in fact, to carry out any acts calculated to upset the enemy. The Police Force of the Islamic State, which had as main task the punishment of enemy subjects and of disloyal *Darul Islam* citizens, and in theory was supposed to leave all military actions against regular Republican troops to the Islamic Army of Indonesia, had the lion's share in all this assigned to it. Uchjan Effendi gave the individual units of this Police Force operating at the *kecamatan* level the orders for killing at least one enemy subject and setting fire to at least five buildings erected by the Republican Government or owned by the enemy within a fortnight, threatening their members with legal prosecution in case of failure (PR 20-7-1953).

The decision for this offensive was inspired partly also by an assessment of the national and international situation. Kartosuwirjo was convinced that a third World War was imminent and that such a war would involve a struggle between the communist and non-communist blocks. He had evolved his theory according-



ly in the light of the Korean crisis in the early 1950's. Upon a truce being reached in Korea in July 1953, the subsequent cold war seemed to confirm him in his opinion. So he argued that it was inevitable that the Republican Government should be forced into the anti-communist camp in the long run. Not only on a world scale, but also in Indonesia itself, a confrontation with the communists was unavoidable. If things came to this Islam would be the only sound basis on which to withstand the communist onslaught, according to him. The nationalist ideology by itself was not strong enough, he felt, and predicted that the nationalist forces in Indonesia would meet with the same fate as those in China, and would be crushed.<sup>43</sup>

On the basis of this analysis Kartosuwirjo hoped that some kind of an understanding might be reached. At the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951 he sent two letters to Soekarno offering him his support in the coming confrontation which he thought was imminent. In return the Republic would have to recognize the Islamic State of Indonesia (Boland 1971: 244–255). Kartosuwirjo's views in this respect may account in part for his mildly positive reaction to the conciliatory efforts of Raden Wali al-Fatah and Affandi Ridhwan. After a while, however, it began to dawn on him that the Republican leaders did not share his conviction that their days were numbered. Except for a short interval in August 1951, the Communist Party and its supporters were not suppressed by the Government, as recommended by Kartosuwirjo, but on the contrary, were given scope for further development. Recognition of the Islamic State of Indonesia by the Republican Government was out of the question, moreover, and the opposite, a strong official denunciation, more likely.

Not getting the response he had been hoping for, Kartosuwirjo for the time being remained in the belief that in the end the Republican Government would fall under communist attacks any way. The offensive subsequently planned by him was aimed at weakening the Republic's position and thus accelerating the process. To achieve this end, he even contemplated working together with the Dutch in Indonesia, of whom some still had not recovered from the shock of the official recognition of independence, and finally even with the Dutch Government.<sup>44</sup>

The Republican Government did not collapse as a result of the increased *Darul Islam* activities, however. Nor did the communists take over. Nevertheless, they put the Republican troops in a difficult position. Thus the chroniclers of the *Siliwangi*

Division came to the conclusion that, after the initiative being regularly taken at first by the Army, in the years between 1952 and 1957 the *Darul Islam* gradually went into the offensive again, in the year 1957 reaching its peak (Siliwangi 1968:520).

There is nothing, however, to justify the suggestion that the Republican Army at first – from 1950 to 1952 – had the initiative in the struggle with *Darul Islam*. It might be better to speak of a stalemate situation here. Although Republican Army actions did have some success – in January 1950, for example, Malangbong was occupied –, this did not stop the *Darul Islam* forces from raiding villages and towns. In a large part of West Java the Republican Government now found itself in the same position as the Dutch had been in during the Indonesian struggle for independence. It controlled the towns and larger villages, whereas the rural areas remained unsafe, and one had to be constantly on the alert against *Darul Islam* ambushes when travelling through them.

The Republican Army's early anti-*Darul Islam* actions soon decreased as other rebellious movements claimed its attention. So troops had to be sent to Sulawesi to suppress the Andi Abdul Azis rebellion at Ujungpandang, and to the Moluccas, where in April 1950 the Free Republic of the Moluccas was proclaimed. Then, shortly after Andi Abdul Azis' surrender, another uprising took place in Sulawesi, deriving its greatest strength not from former KNIL soldiers, as in Andi Abdul Azis' case, but from former Indonesian guerilla fighters commanded by Kahar Muzakkar. In Kalimantan and in Central and East Java as well discontented ex-guerillas, led in Kalimantan by Ibnu Hadjar and in East Java by Abdul Malik<sup>45</sup>, took to the forests and started a guerilla war against the Republican Government.

The situation became even graver for the Republican Government when some of these other rebellious movements, such as those of Kahar Muzakkar in Sulawesi and Ibnu Hadjar in Kalimantan, joined the Islamic State of Indonesia, and Aceh broke away from the Republic to join the Islamic State of Indonesia, at least in name. So in 1955 the Government of Indonesia was confronted by a rival Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia with Kartosuwirjo as President, Daud Beureu'eh as vice-President, Kahar Muzakkar as first vice-Minister of Defence, and Ibnu Hadjar as minister without a portfolio (Amin 1956:99). At that time the territory of the Islamic State of Indonesia encompassed large parts of West Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan.

In West Java itself, the civil war was fought largely in the rural areas in the first half of the 1950's. Attacks by *Darul Islam* troops on towns and cities gradually diminished, and as time went by became a rare phenomenon. Raids on villages and plantations, on the other hand, became more and more frequent, especially after both sides had decided to step up their military activities. The strategy pursued by the *Darul Islam* bands in the regions not firmly under their control was one of hit and run. Villages would be occupied for a few hours and isolated Army posts attacked with great speed, with the rebels retreating into the forests and mountains before the Republican Army had time to react.

There were conspicuous peaks in *Darul Islam* activities at particular times of the year. As a rule the *Darul Islam* Army and Police Force operations reached their greatest peak in August, with August 7th and 17th as two important historical dates. Attacks would be staged first in commemoration of the birth of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Rumours that the Islamic State planned to celebrate its proclamation of August 7th in the towns and cities of West Java were especially frequent, but more often than not proved false, and no attacks on the urban centres eventuated. In the rural areas, however, August was usually greeted rather nervously, as there the *Darul Islam* units invariably used the 7th to show that they were still present. A second wave of attacks then followed around August 17th. These were calculated either to disrupt the festivities organized to celebrate the proclamation of independence of the Indonesian Republic, or to punish those who participated in them. Yet another date that provoked the *Darul Islam* to intensify its activities was *Lebaran*, the end of the Fast.<sup>46</sup>

Aside from the occasional concurrence in the increase in activities there does not appear to have been much co-ordination between the various *Darul Islam* units. Sometimes conferences of their military and civilian leaders were held, but mostly the local commanders acted independently.

There existed an elaborate governmental structure on paper, reaching down from Kartosuwirjo as *Imam* and head of the Central Government through the *residens* or residents, *bupatis* or regents, *wedanas* or district chiefs, *camats* or subdistrict chiefs, and *lurahs* or village heads, to the villagers. Though at first this was a strictly West Javanese affair, later on representatives from other regions were also included. In spite of the existence of a full Cabinet of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the system did not

function well, and the actual power was exercised by Kartosuwirjo and his military advisors and commanders.

The same was true for the local level, where the military commanders were much more influential than their civilian counterparts, if they did not already combine military and civilian functions. The Civil Administration, moreover, was subordinate to the military, while its officials, notably the lower-ranking ones, were frequently harassed by Republican troops. Arrests or death in action was the fate of many civil servants of the Islamic State of Indonesia. The result was discontinuity. Military commanders of course also were killed. But they had a better chance of escape to military strongholds after a raid, and if they were killed there were many subordinates eager to take over.

Kartosuwirjo was also the commander of the Islamic Army of Indonesia. In this capacity he was assisted in the first years of the *Darul Islam* State by Kamran and Oni. After the former moved to Central Java to organize *Darul Islam* activities there even before 1950, and the latter was killed by Republican troops in 1951, Sanusi Partawidjaja became his chief military aid, in the function of general chairman of the Supreme Command, or *Komandemen Tertinggi*, the second highest function in the Islamic State. The latter lost much of his influence in 1954, when he was made to share his responsibility with Haji Achmad Djamaluddin (Akhmad Jamaluddin) (one of the pseudonyms used by Kartosuwirjo). Kartosuwirjo thereupon assigned him the task of coordinating the struggle in the Outer Islands. In this capacity he was to command the 4th, or *Hasanuddin*, Division, in South Sulawesi, the 5th, or *Rencong*, Division in Aceh, and the 6th Division in South Kalimantan. These functions existed largely only on paper, however, as communications with the *Darul Islam* rebels in the Outer Islands were extremely difficult, while these rebels did not exactly fancy direct control from Java.

Achmad Djamaluddin had the overall command of the divisions in Java, namely the 1st, or *Sunan Rakhmat*, Division of West Java, the 2nd, or *Syarif Hidayat*, Division of Central Java, and the 3rd, or *Maulana Ishak*, Division of East Java (PR 4-9-1954). The first two were really existing and active, and actually caused the Republican Army much trouble, but the third, despite all efforts to get it properly off the ground, never had any importance. In addition there was a 7th, or *Heru Cokro*, Division operating in West Java, which was formed at a later date, in contradiction with the principle that there was to be only one division in each province.

As in the case of the Civil Administration, there existed a complete blueprint for the military organization. Hereby a division of the Islamic Army of Indonesia was made up – on paper – of four regiments, which in turn were divided into four battalions. Each battalion comprised four companies, and each company consisted of units of about fifteen men.

In the first half of the 1950's two regimental commanders were especially frequently involved in engagements with Republican troops and attacks on villages. The first was Achmad Sungkawa, who had his base of operation around Cililin, but whose troops, sometimes comprising several hundred soldiers – there are reports of concentrations of 400 and even 800 men – ranged as far afield as Cianjur and Sukabumi in the west and Garut in the east. He was killed at Cisaat, near Sukabumi, in the course of 1954. The second was Haji Engkar, operating with between 400 and 500 guerillas in the area around Bogor and Cianjur. Operating partly in the same area, these two came into conflict with one another. In the course of this Achmad Sungkawa tried to merge Haji Engkar's troops with his, taking advantage of the ambition of one of Haji Engkar's sub-commanders, Utji (Uci), to replace him. In May 1954 the mutual rivalry culminated in an armed clash between the troops of the two commanders, in which the victor was Achmad Sungkawa, who subsequently replaced Haji Engkar with Utji. Haji Engkar, who was forced to flee, formed his own guerilla organization, called the *Sunnah wal Jama'ah*, with those of his followers who had remained loyal to him. It fought against the Republican Army as well as the *Darul Islam* forces.<sup>47</sup> The *Sunnah wal Jama'ah* met its end a year later, when Haji Engkar was taken prisoner by Republican troops.

Further to the east, in Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis, it was people like Kadar Solihat, a regimental vice-commander, Uchjan Effendi, who succeeded the latter after his death in July 1953, Machfud (Makhfud) and Godjim (Gojim) who made the area unsafe. The Republican Army had great difficulty in resisting the attacks of the troops of these men and the many smaller bands. It experienced even greater problems in protecting the citizens in the areas nominally under its control against them.

This nevertheless does not mean that the Republican Army did not score any successes. Some *Darul Islam* bands were pursued by Army units and defeated and some *Darul Islam* leaders, major and minor, arrested or killed. Sometimes internal conflicts within the rebel camp, like that between Achmad Sungkawa and Haji Engkar, contributed to the Republican Army's success. Such

internal disputes usually were connected with the struggle for power among the higher functionaries of the Islamic State, the *ulul amri* and the representatives of the *Imam*, or *naib al-Imam*. In other cases they sprang from discontent over the division of booty or of the tax levied in the name of the Islamic State of Indonesia.

The Republican Army scored its biggest success in June 1951, however, when several top leaders of the *Darul Islam* were caught or killed at the same time. The latter, being pursued by Army units, had taken refuge in a cave hidden from view by a waterfall on Mount Galunggung, in the vicinity of Cisayong. In the shoot-out following their discovery, Oni, the TII commander, was killed and two ministers of Kartosuwirjo's Cabinet, Abdul Kudus Gozali Tusi and Kusumah, taken prisoner.

It was years before the Republican Army was to score another success of the same magnitude. The Republican troops – poorly fed and clothed as they were – were extremely hard pressed. The turning-point came in 1957. General A.H. Nasution, the chief commander in charge of the campaign against the *Darul Islam* and other rebellious movements, in retrospect believed the main reason for the *Siliwangi* Division's ineffectualness to have been lack of coordination of its anti-*Darul Islam* operations.<sup>48</sup> On the basis of this assessment, he became the prime mover of "Basic Plan 2.1". The idea behind this plan was simple. The enemy was to be contained in specific areas, and the Republican actions to be concentrated on one of these areas at a time, thus wiping out the enemy bases one by one.

It soon became apparent that the *Siliwangi* Division lacked the necessary manpower to bring this basic plan to a successful conclusion, however. Thus it was unable to isolate *Tentara Islam Indonesia* units in selected areas, in which to deal these local *Darul Islam* troops the final blow, on its own. Even with the assistance of units from the other two Javanese divisions, the *Diponegoro* and *Brawijaya* Divisions, it was unable to vanquish the TII. Some modifications had to be made in the plan if the *Darul Islam* was to be finished off, therefore. Hence in 1960 the civilian population of West Java was drawn into the operations, and battues were organized under the name of "Human Fence" (*Pagar Betis*).<sup>49</sup>

In these battues, lasting sometimes for days, the civilian population would form a slowly advancing line, with at certain intervals, not too distant from each other, small units of three to four soldiers. In theory the human fence was supported by military

units in the van as well as the rear. The van was supposed to ensure the advancing fence of a free zone. The soldiers at the rear acted as a kind of reserve that could be directed to threatened points in the fence. In ill-accessible places another tactic was adopted, however. Instead of entering these, they would be put under siege. By cutting off all supplies, it was endeavoured to starve the bands in these places and thus force them to surrender. In practice the Republican Army sometimes used the "human fence" as a "human shield". "After the mountain was entirely surrounded by civilians the TNI would march them up the mountain, forcing the D.I. to fire upon the civilians. Once having drawn enemy fire with the civilians, the TNI military forces would reconcentrate to close in upon the D.I. detachments. According to former Dar'ul Islam officers, the effectiveness of the *pagar betis* varied according to the religious beliefs of the civilians used to bait the trap. The D.I. commanders said it was difficult to shoot non-combatants in cold blood if they were 'good Moslems'." (Jackson 1971:46).

Another technique used to force the rebels to surrender was to occupy the rice-fields owned or worked by their relatives in order to prevent the harvest being used to feed the *Darul Islam* troops.

Kartosuwirjo reacted to the increased pressure by the Republican Armed Forces by ordering an all-out war against his enemies in early 1961. In the villages that actively or passively supported the Republic nobody should be spared, according to his *Perintah Perang Semesta*, not even the young and old (DM 7-3-1962, 16-5-1962).

Although the successive military operations after 1957 were successful in pushing back and isolating the *Darul Islam* bands in certain areas, such as the mountain strongholds of Guntur and Galunggung in the Garut area, and Gunung Gede between Bogor and Bandung, *Darul Islam* actions continued to pose a serious threat. This became especially evident on the occasion when *Darul Islam* members dressed up as Republican Army soldiers almost succeeded in kidnapping Khrushchev on his way from Bogor to Bandung in February 1960.

To wind up the anti-*Darul Islam* campaign in West Java once and for all, in April 1962 the Republican military actions were stepped up. In the resultant so-called "*Brata Yudha Operation*", units of the *Brawijaya* and *Diponegoro* Divisions once again took part.

Kartosuwirjo was captured, together with his wife and the commander of his bodyguard, Kurnia, at a hide-out on the summit of

Mount Geber, near Cipaku in South Cicalengka, on June 4th, 1962. He had been pursued for more than a month and had three times escaped capture by the skin of his teeth. At the time of his arrest Kartosuwirjo was seriously ill, suffering from haemorrhoids and tuberculosis and lameness as a result of a bullet-wound in his right thigh sustained at an encounter with Republican troops, at the end of April (Siliwangi 1968:550–553; DM 1-6-1962, 5-6-1962, 6-6-1962, 8-6-1962).

Kartosuwirjo and Kurnia were among the last prominent *Darul Islam* leaders to be arrested in West Java. Most of the early *Darul Islam* leaders, such as Oni and Kamran, had died in the course of the fighting. Their successors had for the most part been arrested or killed, or had surrendered in 1961 – when a general amnesty was declared and the guerillas were given the chance to report until October – and the first half of 1962. These included his principal military commanders Haji Zainal Abidin, Djaelani Setiawan (Jaelani Setiawan), Danu Mohammad Hasan and Adah Djaelani Tirtapradja (Adah Jaelani Tirtapraja), and the “Head of his Household”, Halinis Sospati (DM 6-3-1962, 12-3-1962, 14-3-1962, 22-5-1962, 1-6-1962; Siliwangi 1968:548).

After Kartosuwirjo’s arrest one of his sons, Dede Mohammad Darda, also called Dodo, who had been his father’s secretary for years, issued an instruction in the name of the *Imam* and President of the Islamic State of Indonesia ordering all *Darul Islam* members who were still fighting to surrender (DM 7-6-1962). The majority, including the only important *Darul Islam* commander still at large – Agus Abdullah, commander of the First Division and of Java and Madura – complied, and swore allegiance to the Indonesian Republic on August 1st, 1962.

Kartosuwirjo himself was sentenced to death after a three-day trial on August 16th, 1962. He was executed a month later together with four other *Darul Islam* members, who had been involved in a plot to assassinate President Soekarno on *Idul Adha*, the Day of the Sacrifice, i.e. May 1st, 1962 (DM 18-8-1962, 13-9-1962).

With the arrest and execution of Kartosuwirjo the organized Islamic revolt in West Java, which had gone on for more than ten years, soon came to an end. Things remained quiet in West Java until 1976, when new large-scale *Darul Islam* activities were reported in the area for the first time in nearly fifteen years.<sup>50</sup>



## CHAPTER THREE

### CENTRAL JAVA, THE OFFSHOOT

In Central Java the *Darul Islam* rebels came from three different groups. One had its origins on the north coast, in the *kabupatens* east of the border with West Java, which *kabupatens*, in particular that of Brebes and Tegal, formed the *Darul Islam* core for Central Java, being the territory of operation of *Darul Islam* leader Amir Fatah. This group was inspired and partly controlled from West Java. The other two had their roots in the *Angkatan Umat Islam* in Kebumen, which had defied the Indonesian Government, and in a group formed by mutineers from the Republican *Diponegoro* Division. These two joined the first group after being defeated by the Indonesian Army.

#### 1. *The Social Revolution on Java's North Coast*

Immediately after the proclamation of independence the *kabupatens* of Brebes and Tegal, together with that of Pemasang, had become the scene of one of the more violent popular risings against the traditional ruling class. In the power vacuum following the Japanese surrender, before the Republican Army and Government or the returning Dutch succeeded in asserting their authority, mass actions were staged against this traditional ruling elite, or *priyayi*. Latent conflicts, which had been kept dormant by the Dutch Colonial Administration and later by the Japanese, now erupted in all their violence. By some this sudden outburst of violence in Indonesian society in the first months following the proclamation of independence is attributed to the native Civil Administration's complicity in the brutal exploitation of the peasantry during the Japanese occupation (cf. Djoko 1974; Lucas 1977). In Java native officials, from the *bupatis*, or regents, down to the village heads, had played a key role in the recruitment of corvée labourers, or *romushas*, and in the organization of the compulsory rice deliveries.

The recruitment of *romushas*, who were taken from their villages to be put to work elsewhere in Java or to be sent abroad

in large numbers, coupled with the burden imposed by the compulsory food deliveries, had led to deteriorating living conditions and uprooted rural society.<sup>1</sup> Widjojo Nitisastro, for instance, summarizing the effects of these Japanese measures, writes: "Under the occupation the harsh and arbitrary mobilization of available manpower and foodcrops for the Japanese war effort brought about a rapid decline in the people's living conditions. Village societies were shaken by the exorbitant compulsory deliveries of crops, by the conscription of hundreds of thousands of men and women for forced labor in other regions of Indonesia and on the Asian mainland, by the virtual disappearance of such essential commodities as textiles and agricultural tools, and by the total disregard by the Japanese administration of any measures to cope with famine and other calamities. Tremendous social dislocations and population displacements resulted, which in turn had significant repercussions on the course of fertility and mortality." (Nitisastro 1970:115).

The repression and exploitation of the Javanese population had already helped provoke the mutiny of a *Peta* Battalion as well as minor Muslim-led local uprisings during the Japanese occupation.<sup>2</sup> After August 1945, in the turmoil of the new revolutionary situation, in which all kinds of armed groups and bands were being formed and the surviving *romushas* returned home, the bitter experiences of the Japanese occupation provided a direct stimulus for mass actions against the native administrators and their families.

But that is not all. The conduct of the indigenous civil servants in the Japanese period and their lukewarm support of the independence movement may have made for an explosive situation at the end of the war, but resentments had been smouldering under the surface for a long time before. The penetration of Dutch colonial rule, and in particular of the Western economy, in the rural areas had exacerbated the existing antagonism between the peasants and their rulers. The *Pax Neerlandica*, with its emphasis on law and order and economic gain for the Europeans, had given rise to many frustrations. The history of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia is full of examples of sudden violent outbursts, mostly on a small scale, and often but not always led by Islamic leaders.<sup>3</sup> It is against this historical background that we must place the social revolution of 1945. On the one hand Western influence had drastically changed the social and economic structure of the villages, for example through the establishment of sugar estates and other kinds of plantation; on

the other hand it had left the native administrative structure on the whole intact.

At the collapse of the Japanese power in August 1945 there was nothing to stem the tide of local popular risings. The native bureaucracy, which in the past had had to lean on the Dutch and Japanese, had no power of its own. The rudimentary Republican Military and Civil Administration was still too under-developed to be able to deal with the various risings. This provided the necessary conditions for the so-called *daulat* actions, defined by Anderson (1972:334) as “the deposition, humiliation, kidnapping, or murder of hated officials or other representatives of authority, usually carried out by groups of armed pemuda youth”.

As elsewhere, the unrest at Pekalongan started with the hoisting of the Indonesian flag and attempts to disarm Japanese units.<sup>4</sup> In Tegal the initiative in these first actions was taken by railway labourers, whose jobs placed them in an excellent position to take the lead. As railway employees they were one of the best-informed groups as a result of easy access to information on what was happening outside their own area. Moreover, the railway unions had always been among the most militant groups in the labour movement.

A railway station employee at Tegal, Rahmat, was the first to hoist the Indonesian flag in that town. His comrades, headed by Muh. Junus, formed an independent revolutionary group called the *Angkatan Muda Kereta Api* (AMKA), or Railway Youth, which was the first organized youth group in the area and soon developed into one of the armed guerilla groups at Pekalongan. After establishing contact with Jakarta, AMKA members in early September kidnapped a number of local leaders. The idea of abducting these leaders in order to force them to change their wait-and-see attitude and to actively support the cause of the revolution arose after the arrival in Tegal of a representative of the revolutionary Jakartan youth, united in the *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* (API). This young man, Mansjur (Mansyur), had given an account of the latest events in Jakarta and of how impatient youths there on August 16th had kidnapped Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta and brought them to the *Peta* barracks at Rengasdengklok with a view to forcing them to proclaim independence (Pranata 1976, n. 3).

Inspired by this story, Muh. Junus and his friends set out to take three people prisoner: the superintendent of Police at Tegal,

Kadarman, the mayor of the town, Raden Sungeb Reksoatmodjo (Sungeb Reksoatmojo),<sup>5</sup> and a factory director. The latter, who seems to have been notorious for his treatment of his employees, was soon released again after being made to promise that he would treat his workers better in future. The two others were released three days later, upon making a promise to join in the struggle for independence.

In these kidnappings the example of Jakarta was carefully imitated. Their sole aim was to secure, be it by force, the support of the heads of the Municipal Administration and Police and urge them into action. There was no intention of ousting them, nor were the actions directed against the native Civil Administration or the *priyayi* class as such. So there was no attempt, though there was every opportunity, to abduct the resident of Pekalongan, Besar. It was a minor affair compared with what was to happen a few weeks later. The actions were confined to the town of Tegal, and were aimed at only a very limited number of officials. These features set it apart from the turmoil that was to follow in later weeks. Only after the action shifted from the urban to the rural areas did a mass movement arise which would be worthy of the name of social revolution, and in which the anger would be directed at the local elite as such.

In the months following the proclamation of independence, Pekalongan displayed the familiar pattern of all kinds of youth and guerilla groups springing up alongside the Republican Army. The Pekalongan unit of the Republican Army was made up for the greater part, if not exclusively, of men who had received some military training as members of the *Peta* or *Heiho* auxiliary forces during the Japanese occupation. Its commander was Kiyai Haji Iskandar Idris.<sup>6</sup> Another organization from the Japanese period, the Pioneer Corps or *Barisan Pelopor*, had transformed itself into a revolutionary group after August 1945. Moreover, a variety of local youth groups were founded, commanded by what can only be described as petty war lords. It was these latter groups, which had arisen spontaneously and had no connections with any larger organization, that constituted the motor of the social revolution. They were joined in their actions by members of the *Barisan Pelopor*, who provided them with a limited number of firearms and some form of coordination. The members and leaders of these local groups were far from gentle, and the acts of cruelty they committed, but also their responsibility for the massive scale of the actions, earned these groups the name of gangs and their leaders that of assassins.

The movement's centre lay in Talang, a district seven kilometres south of Tegal. It was the home of ex-barber Sachjani (Sakhyani), popularly known as Kutil, or The Wart, who was the most notorious leader of the entire movement. From Talang, where at the end of September he had firmly entrenched himself as the most powerful person in the area, he tried to extend the area of his influence further afield. He launched an attack on the town of Tegal in early November, when thousands of his followers, shouting *Allahu akbar* (Allah is Great), and *La ilaha illallah* (There is no God but Allah), marched northward from Talang. They occupied the major part of the town, including the strategic railway station, and forced the local Republican Army onto the defensive. The barracks of the Republican Navy, which had Tegal as one of its bases, were also threatened.

The situation became so precarious for the Republican forces that they decided, in view of the impending mass attack on Tegal, to abandon the town and retreat to Pekalongan. This plan could only be partly implemented. As Kutil was in control of the railways, the troops had to be withdrawn by sea, but the boat used for their withdrawal broke down, so that part of the troops were forced to remain behind. They took up their position in the northern port area of Tegal. Here they succeeded, because of the superiority of their arms, in repulsing an attack by Kutil's rebels, who were mostly only armed with sharp implements such as bamboo spears and swords. The Republican forces were not strong enough, however, to launch a counter-attack. Kutil's authority was unchallenged in the rest of the town and in its environs.

Elsewhere in the residency of Pekalongan similar groups were operating. Uprisings occurred in the *kabupatens* of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang, from which circumstance the social revolution on Java's north coast derived the name *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah*, or Three Regions Affair. Local Republican senior civil servants, who had mostly inherited their functions from the Japanese era, were sacked everywhere. Some managed to escape before the arrival of the angry mobs, others were captured, and some of them were maltreated or killed. Members of ruling class families, such as the wife of the *bupati* of Tegal, were paraded around wearing gunny sacks. In other cases a form of public trial was held, at which the shortcomings of the official concerned were expounded at length and the verdict was passed by the spectators that he should be sacked (Diponegoro 1971:60).<sup>7</sup>

At Tegal the *bupati*, R.M. Slamet Sunarjo (Slamet Sunaryo),

and the *wedana*, R. Basirun, managed to escape from the town just before Kutil came marching in. The new *bupati* appointed by the rebels was Kiyai Abu Sudjai (Abu Sujai), an Islamic scholar from Talang.<sup>8</sup> Kutil himself became superintendent of Police. At Brebes and Pematang as well the *bupatis* were sacked and replaced by Kiyai Haji Sjatori (Syatori) and R. Supangat respectively. How confused the situation was at the time can be deduced from the events surrounding the appointment of a new *wedana* at Tegal. The candidate for the position, Tjitrosatmoko (Citrosatmoko), who was chairman of the Indonesian National Committee of Tegal, happened to have been arrested by Kutil's own men at Talang.

The actions at Brebes, Tegal and Pematang were coordinated to a certain extent by the *Gabungan Badan Perjuangan Tiga Daerah*, or Federation of Combat Organizations of the Three Regions.<sup>9</sup> This Federation, made up of the leaders of local guerilla bands, a number of outside advisors, and representatives of the *Barisan Pelopor*, functioned as a provisional Government. It confirmed, sometimes retrospectively, all appointments of new officials, and sought the Republican Government's approval of these.

The Republican Government for its part, too, tried to come to some sort of an accommodation with the rebels. It duly gave its approval for the new appointments, while the provincial Republican Government of Central Java delegated Sajuti Melik and Lieutenant-Colonel Kiyai Haji Iskandar Idris, commander of the army units at Pekalongan, to negotiate with the Federation. Their mission failed as Kutil, acting on his own authority, proceeded to arrest the two.<sup>10</sup>

These arrests further strained the relations between the rebels and the Government, and in particular with the Republican Army. For the Army this was not the first time it collided with Indonesian guerillas, but it was the first time that its position was really challenged by an internal opponent and that it was obliged to admit defeat. Before the Republican Army might react by launching a counter-attack, the rebels tried to advance further. Their troops, among them Kutil's forces, entered Pekalongan early in December.<sup>11</sup> One of their aims here was to effect the replacement of the resident of Pekalongan and his assistants by their own candidate, Sardjio (Sarjio), and his men.<sup>12</sup> Sardjio himself with his troops attacked and occupied the resident's offices.

By that time, mid-December 1945, the Republican Army was striking back, however. Without awaiting orders from headquarters, and probably acting contrary to the decision taken by

the Central Government, local Republican troops reoccupied Pekalongan.<sup>13</sup> Thus before the year was out the residency of Pekalongan was under Republican control again. The Republican Government dealt quite mildly with the rebels, only seven of whom were to be tried although more were arrested. Kutil was sentenced to death in October 1946, and executed in 1951. The other six were tried by the Pekalongan court in 1947 and released in July of that year. A proportion of the officials appointed in the course of the Three Regions Affair, among them the *bupatis* of Tegal and Brebes, were continued in office.

The rebellion in the residency of Pekalongan was compounded by various elements, linking Islam with primitive socialism as well as with more advanced revolutionary ideas. In its context also a conflict between a number of different armed groups, of which the Republican Army units and Kutil's band were the most prominent ones, was fought out. This mixture of various factors lying at the root of the revolution here makes the latter of interest for the study of the *Darul Islam* rebellions, which, in varying degrees, display the same characteristics.

Like many uprisings in Indonesia, before and after 1945, the Three Regions Affair had a strong Islamic component. Islam was a powerful force in mobilizing the population, as is apparent from the slogans used in the attack on Tegal. Islamic leaders moreover provided a reservoir on which to draw for the replacement of members of the old Administration. The ideas of primitive socialism are often difficult to distinguish from Islamic notions of social justice, as is exemplified by the confiscation and redistribution of rice supplies during the uprising at Pekalongan, occasioned as this was by the poor living standard of the times. The influence of members of the pre-war nationalist and leftist parties, which was especially strong in the *Barisan Pelopor* and the Federation of Combat Organizations of the Three Regions, gave the ideas involved a more modern cast. Even so, these modern ideas were as yet filtering down in quite a distorted way, witness the refusal of Kutil's followers to pay railway fares because they considered the railways common property (Pranata 1976, n. 10; Lucas 1974:168–170).

It would be too gross a generalization to describe the Three Regions Affair in terms of a confrontation between Islam and secular powers, or between the Republican Army and irregular guerilla units. These oppositions did play a role, but there were others cutting across them, perhaps the most important of which was that between urban and rural groups. As was indicated

above, only after the initiative was taken by certain rural groups did the unrest in the residency of Pekalongan develop into a general violent uprising against the Republican Government. The urban youth who had initiated the anti-Japanese actions had been contended with the verbal declaration of the traditional elite that they supported the Republican cause, and hence made no move to replace the administrators concerned. Although Islam figured prominently in rallying the rural population to the movement's support, this did not prevent opposition from other Muslim groups. So the Pekalongan *Hizbu'llah* unit, commanded by Haji Ismail Idris, a younger brother of the arrested Army commander Iskandar Idris, joined the Republican Army in its operations against the rebels. Other local irregular guerilla units as well, among them the *Pesindo*, BPRI and AMKA, sided with the Republican Army in its suppression of the insurrection (Diponegoro 1971:60–61; Djoko 1974:161).<sup>14</sup>

## 2. Amir Fatah's Darul Islam Movement

After Kutil and his associates were defeated, dragging the local units of the *Barisan Pelopor* with them in their downfall, things remained quiet for a time. After a brief period of mass arrests and brutal retaliations in which the Republican Army "taught the people a lesson", a more lenient approach was adopted.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, to ease the situation, Soekarno, accompanied by vice-President Mohammad Hatta, Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir (Sutan Syahrir), and the Commander of the Republican Army, Sudirman, visited the area. At a mass rally held at Tegal he urged the people to remain loyal to the Indonesian Republic, saying: "People of Tegal-Brebes-Pekalongan do not form your own republic. People of Tegal-Brebes-Pekalongan, do not form miniature republics, a Republic of Talang, a Republic of Slawi, a Republic of Tegal" (Pranata 1976, n. 11).

In January 1946 the Republican Army twice changed its name. On January 7th the *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (TKR), or People's Security Army, became the *Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat* (TKR), or People's Welfare Army. On January 25th again it changed its name to *Tentara Republik Indonesia* (TRI), or Army of the Indonesian Republic. Soon after that the Army was reorganized, and in May and June the ten Javanese divisions were reduced to seven new ones.

This organization also affected the Army unit in Pekalongan. A scruting of the changes in the divisional and regimental structure



of the Indonesian Army in Java over the years reveals the rather ambiguous position of the residency of Pekalongan and its *kabupaten*s. Initially, immediately after the proclamation of independence, the residency had its own military unit, functioning on an equal footing with the others, which was commanded by Kiyai Haji Iskandar Idris. In October 1945, after the official constitution of the Republican Army, this unit was transformed into the 17th Regiment, with Iskandar Idris still in command. The Republican forces at Tegal hereupon came to form the 3rd Battalion of this Regiment, under the command of Djuweni (Juweni), a former *Peta* company commander. The 17th Regiment formed part of the 4th, later the 5th, Division, which at that time came under the Central Java Command.

After the Three Regions Affair the troops in the residency of Pekalongan were split up. A special Brebes-Tegal Regiment was formed, headed first by Rachim Gondosuwito (Rakhim Gondosuwito), and later by Muh. Susman, a former *Peta* Battalion commander. Together with the Pekalongan Regiment, it constituted part of the above-said 5th Division. In the June 1946 reorganization the Brebes-Tegal Regiment was transferred to the 2nd *Sunan Gunung Jati* Division, operating on both sides of the border between West and Central Java. The Pekalongan Regiment was incorporated into the 3rd or *Pangeran Diponegoro* Division, and Iskandar Idris promoted to commander of the *Nusantara* Brigade, of which the Pekalongan Regiment formed part (Pranata 1976, n. 4–5; Nasution 1956:141, 207; Cuplikan 1972:43–54).

More importantly, steps were taken at the same time to integrate the irregular guerillas into the Republican Army. The relevant legislation came into operation on June 3rd, 1947, on which date the Republican Army changed its name for the fourth time, to become the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI) or Indonesian National Army. The irregular units operating in the Tegal area were also obliged to comply with the said regulation and enter the Republican Army. The oldest of these units were the *Barisan Pelopor*, which after the *Tiga Daerah Affair* had lost most of its strength, and the AMKA, or *Angkatan Muda Kereta Api*, which had already, in March 1946, merged with another group, the *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* (API) or Indonesian Youth, to form the *Puspongoro Regiment* of the BPRI. Other irregular bands in the region were the *Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia* (AMRI), or Youth of the Indonesian Republic, the *Pesindo*, and the *Lasykar Rakyat*. In addition there were two Islamic groups operating in the area, the *Gerakan Pemuda Islam*

*Indonesia* (GPII), or Movement of the Indonesian Islamic Youth, and the *Hizbu'llah*. The *Hizbu'llah* unit of Tegal comprised five battalions and was commanded by Kosim Nachrowi (Kosim Nakhrowi), who doubled as chairman of the Tegal GPII.

To accommodate these irregular units a special brigade was formed, the *Joko Untung* Brigade, in which the guerilla units operating in the territory of the *Sunan Gunung Jati* and the *Pangeran Diponegoro* Divisions were supposed to be joined together (Pranata, n. 11, 13; Diponegoro 1971:272). Forces by the circumstances of war, however, the irregular units in practice continued operating in their home areas. To coordinate the guerilla operations on the local level new command structures were evolved.

In the *kabupatens* of Brebes and Tegal a special command was established, after August 1947 styled the Territorial Command of Brebes and Tegal, or the 13th Territorial Command. A little later the *kabupaten* of Pemalang was also placed under this. It was headed by the commander of the local Republican troops, Lieutenant-General Muh. Susman. He coordinated the various war efforts against the Dutch with the assistance of leaders of irregular units such as Muh. Junus of the *Pusponegoro* Regiment of the BPRI and Kosim Nachrowi of the *Hizbu'llah*, and of officers of the naval base of Tegal and of the Police and the Civil Administration. Such coordination had become increasingly pressing, and at the same time increasingly difficult, in view of the Dutch attacks. The Dutch launched their first "military action" on July 21st, 1947, by the end of which their troops had occupied the towns of Tegal, Brebes, and Slawi and driven the Indonesian troops into the rural areas. Muh. Susman was thus obliged to move his headquarters from the town of Tegal to Bumijawa, just south of Tegal. He thereupon lost virtually all contact with the headquarters of the *Sunan Gunung Jati* Division (cf. Pranata 1976–1977, n. 1–9).

To the Indonesian Republic the first "military action" posed a serious threat. As a result of it, the urban centres in a large part of West Java and west Central Java were occupied by the Dutch, who, in spite of continuing Indonesian resistance in the outer districts, laid claim also to the areas surrounding these centres. The residency of Pekalongan formed part of the Dutch-controlled area, and under the terms of the Renville agreement of January 1948, like the greater part of West Java, had to be evacuated by the Indonesian troops. Both the regular and irregular Indonesian forces operating in the residency of Pekalong-

an were ordered to leave here by the end of January. The Republican Army units subsequently withdrew to the village of Karangobar in Banjarnegara, and the irregular units, such as the BPRI and *Hizbu'llah*, to Wonosobo (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 11).

As in West Java, in Brebes and Tegal, this evacuation provided the immediate stimulus for the rise of *Darul Islam*. The latter's genesis in many ways resembles that of the *Darul Islam* in West Java. There were a number of military units, most of them irregular ones, which refused to retreat and remained behind. There moreover existed discontent at the way the Republican Army treated the irregular forces.

In Brebes the guerillas remaining behind operated in two groups, called *Gerakan An(an)tareja Republik Indonesia* (GARI), or *An(an)tareja* Movement of the Indonesian Republic,<sup>16</sup> and *Gerilya Republik Indonesia* (GRI) respectively. The resistance movement was joined a few months later by dissatisfied *Hizbu'llah* units, which at first had joined the Republican Army in its withdrawal, but now returned to their home base. Their secession had been inspired by a new wave of reorganizations within the Indonesian Army (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 12).

These new attempts of streamlining the Army in part were a corollary of earlier ones, and in part were provoked by new and difficult circumstances. They provided the Republican Army and Government with yet another opportunity to cut back and contain the many irregular units. The influx of troops from the Dutch-occupied areas after the Renville agreement had made the situation in Central Java an extremely difficult one, as all kinds of guerilla groups were crowded into the area. All these men had to be fed, clothed and housed in a relatively small area that simply was not equal to the situation. Reorganization, but in particular demobilization, had therefore become a must. As vice-President Mohammad Hatta, who at that time was also Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, said in February 1948, Army rationalization had become a matter of life and death (M 21-2-1948). The Republican territory had shrunk considerably, while what was left of it had to sustain many more people than before, having to accommodate all the soldiers from West and East Java and their families.

Particularly the members of the irregular guerilla groups fell victim to the new policy. Certain standards were imposed, and whoever did not meet these was demobilized. Those of the irregular guerilla fighters from Brebes and Tegal who were admitted to the Army were accommodated in two new bat-

talions, the BPRI and *Lasykar Rakyat* in the 51st Battalion, and the *Hizbu'llah* unit of the Pekalongan residency in a battalion of its own, the 52nd. Both battalions were incorporated into a new 3rd or *Pangeran Diponegoro* Division, in which the old *Pangeran Diponegoro* and *Sunan Gunung Jati* Divisions had merged. As is noted by Pranata, the newly formed battalions were quite strong, being made up of ordinary soldiers and non-commissioned and commissioned officers who had all been medically examined and had their previous military record taken into account. Moreover, all the soldiers now bore firearms whereas in the past only a proportion of them had been armed (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 11).

Although as a consequence of the changes and rationalization the Army's combat capacity may have improved, at the same time the frustration and anger of the members of the irregular units, whether or not demobilized, mounted. This was probably one of the main reasons for *Hizbu'llah* units reinfiltrating the Brebes and Tegal areas. The first group to return here was headed by Abas Abdullah, who on his return set up a *Majelis Islam* or Islamic Council, and renamed his troops *Pasukan Mujahidin* (Fighters in the way of Allah). He regarded the Islamic Council as the legitimate provisional regional government, and tried to subdue the GARI and GRI by force (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 12).<sup>17</sup>

An independent Islamic movement, however, gained momentum only a few months later, after Amir Fatah appeared on the scene. Amir Fatah, whose full name was Amir Fatah Widjajakusuma (Amir Fatah Wijayakusuma), was a native of Kroya in Banyumas. He claimed to be the chairman of the *Dewan Pembelaan Masyumi Pusat*, or Central *Masyumi* Defence Council.<sup>18</sup> He was a close associate of Kartosuwirjo's, and had commanded the *Hizbu'llah* troops escorting the latter to Malang to attend the fifth plenary session of the Central Indonesian National Committee as a kind of bodyguard in February 1947. At Malang he had become Chief of Staff of the August 17th Division, a conglomeration of troops opposing the Linggarjati agreement – the subject which constituted the main item on the agenda (Sutomo 1977:8–9).

Thus Amir Fatah came to Tegal from West Java. What exactly the status and role of his *Hizbu'llah* units in West Java had been is not clear. They may have formed part of the troops from Brebes and Tegal stationed near Bandung to fight the Dutch in that area; or possibly he had retreated to West Java after the defeat of Three Regions Affair. Nor are his reasons for moving to Central Java in 1948 clear. There are rumours that he had been

requested by *Masyumi* to try and prevent the establishment of an Islamic state by Kartosuwirjo, and that he had been forced to retreat to Brebes after unsuccessful negotiations with Kamran (Djawa Tengah 1953:202). It is also alleged that Republican commander Sudirman had ordered Amir Fatah to try and foil Kartosuwirjo's plans. Sudirman supposedly ordered Amir Fatah at the same time to continue the guerilla activities against the Dutch in West Java, thus filling in the gap left by the retreat of the *Siliwangi* Division (Basri n.d.:3).

Neither version seems very plausible. In the period in which Amir Fatah is said to have been assigned the task of checking Kartosuwirjo, neither the *Masyumi* nor the Republican Army and Government were inclined to even consider the possibility of a break-away state in West Java. Moreover, as we have seen above, the Republican Army had already appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Sutoko as coordinator of the guerilla operations in West Java. It is furthermore unlikely that either Sudirman or the *Masyumi* should have assigned an important task to a commander whom they could not wholly trust.

It is more likely that Amir Fatah's *Hizbu'llah* units formed part of those troops that had refused to withdraw from West Java after the Renville agreement. For some reason or other Amir Fatah then fell out with Kamran, and was thereupon obliged to retreat to the Brebes-Tegal area, whence most of his men came. As turned out later, this latter circumstance was one of the factors influencing the success of Amir Fatah's guerilla activities against the Republic in 1949. In its attempts to suppress these activities, the Republican Army came up against serious obstacles because of the support given the rebels by the people of Brebes and Tegal, many of whom had kinship relations with them (Djawa Tengah 1953:202).

Amir Fatah probably entered Brebes and Tegal via Wonosobo, where the *Hizbu'llah* 52nd Battalion was stationed, around October 1948. He succeeded in persuading the latter Battalion to return to Brebes and Tegal with him, in spite of the opposition of its commander, Muh. Bachrin (Muh. Bakhtrin). When the Battalion, now under Amir Fatah's own command, reached the demarcation line, it was blocked by Republican troops. Pretending to turn back, it crossed the border elsewhere (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 12, 13). After entering the Dutch-controlled zone, Amir Fatah, following the example of Abas Abdullah, created "cells of an Islamic Government" and instituted a *Majelis Islam*, or Islamic Council. He renamed his troops *Mujahidin* (Basri n.d.:2).

Despite these steps towards the creation of an Islamic state, Amir Fatah did not at first oppose the Republican Government. At the return of the Republican troops after the launching of the second military action by the Dutch, no immediate open conflict broke out between Republican troops and *Hizbu'llah* units as in West Java. On the contrary, the Islamic Council and the Republican Government agreed to cooperate. The highest military and administrative functions were relinquished to the Republican Government. Major Wongsoatmodjo (Wongsoatmojo) was appointed commander of the Indonesian troops in the area, including the *Hizbu'llah* units.

Wongsoatmodjo was the commander of the Republican troops from Brebes and Tegal which after their retreat had been incorporated into the 3rd Division as the 3rd Battalion. At the return of his troops to the area they had been joined by the greater part of the 51st Battalion, which had been formed out of BPRI and *Lasykar Rakyat* guerilla units. The latter's motive in joining the 3rd Battalion on its march to Brebes and Tegal, whence its men originated, had been that it preferred this to moving on the Pemalang as ordered by the Army Command. On arrival in Brebes and Tegal, Wongsoatmodjo had formed the *Sub Wehrkreise Slamet III*, SWKS III for short. This *Sub Wehrkreise* (as it was called in Indonesian), as a division of the current Military Government of Java, had combined military and civil administrative functions. Although it did not appoint military personnel to the Civil Administration, civilian personnel were subordinate to the military.<sup>19</sup> The *Sub Wehrkreise*, as part of the Republican Army command structure, also united the regular and irregular forces within itself. At its constitution it had not only banned the future use of the names 3rd, 51st or 52nd Battalion, which were to be replaced by the abbreviated name TNI-SWKS-III, but also prohibited all reference to *Hizbu'llah*, *Mujahidin*, and so on. The irregular troops referred to by these names had now been merged with the Republican Army, and could hence only be referred to as part of the National Army of Indonesia (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 14).

Amir Fatah had been appointed chief security coordinator of the *Sub Wehrkreise*. One of his tasks in this capacity had been to supervise the incorporation of the irregular guerilla units into the Republican Army. The cooperative relationship between Amir Fatah and the Republican Army and Government continued for some time. It was not a smooth one, with each partner looking upon the other as a rival. This was especially so with respect to

the regional government, for which the Republic and the Islamic Council each had their own personnel. The Republic, furthermore, did all it could to persuade people to accept the civil servants appointed by it, feeling that the functionaries backed by the Islamic Council should resign. These efforts to thwart the Islamic Council's participation in the administration and thus to counteract its influence did not exactly contribute to a friendly atmosphere. Soon the situation grew extremely tense. Things eventually came to such a pass that the Republican Army was forced to send in a company of the Mobile Brigade and Police Force to reinforce its own troops (Basri n.d.:2-3).

At the end of April, just a little over two months after the constitution of *Sub Wehrkreise Slamet III*, Amir Fatah resigned from it. According to Jusmar Basri he did so upon receiving an appointment, after talks with an envoy of Kartosuwirjo's, as commander for Central Java of the Islamic Army of Indonesia in the rank of major-general. As the name of this envoy Jusmar Basri (n.d.:3) mentions Kamran. The talks between them took place in the village of Pengarasan, west of Bumiayu, near the southern border of the *kabupaten* of Brebes. Pranata, in his description of the events in Pengarasan on the eve of the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia in Central Java, does not mention Kamran. He does note the presence of Sjarif Hidajat (Syarif Hidayat), a West Javanese *Hizbu'llah* commander, however.

Amir Fatah had also secretly withdrawn the guerillas of the former *Hizbu'llah* Battalion of Brebes and Tegal to the village of Pengarasan. When this became known, the military commander of Brebes, Captain Prawoto, dispatched about 50 men to find out what Amir Fatah was up to. From the account of the experience of these men given by Pranata it seems that the prospect of successful negotiations on the formation of a federal United States of Indonesia between the Republican and Dutch Governments was a contributing factor in Amir Fatah's breach with the Republic. It should be noted, however, that the events described by Pranata took place on April 22nd and 23rd, 1949, two weeks before the Van Royen-Roem agreement was made public.

Amir Fatah differentiated between three kinds of struggle: the Islamic, communist and federal ones. The Islamic struggle was the superior of the three, in part because the Republic had betrayed its own ideals. The federal struggle was the one carried on by the Republican Government, which, by signing the Renville and Linggarjati agreements, Amir Fatah claimed had

given in to the demands of the Dutch for a United States of Indonesia (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 16, 17).<sup>20</sup>

The Islamic State of Central Java was proclaimed in the village of Pengarasan at the end of April 1949. So, in fact, Central Java officially proclaimed an Islamic State before West Java. Amir Fatah became its Commander-in-Chief as well as commander of the SHWK Battalion, these letters being the initials of Sjarif Hidajat, who was appointed advisor, and Widjajakusuma, the last part of Amir Fatah's name (Pranata 1976–1977, n. 17, 18, 20; Tentara Pelajar 1979:164–175).<sup>21</sup>

The first military actions carried out by Amir Fatah and his *Darul Islam* troops were successful. They proceeded to attack Republican positions immediately following the proclamation, with the *Darul Islam* soldiers succeeding in seizing the *Sub Wehrkreise's* command post at Bentarsari, which had been abandoned by the Republican troops for fear of encirclement by the numerically stronger Islamic Army. The latter here captured the commander of the Military District (KDM) of Brebes, Abduldjalil (Abduljalil), who for some reason had refrained from joining the retreating Army. They further attacked and disarmed the Mobile Brigade unit sent here some months previously for the purpose of reinforcing the Republican troops in view of the problems with the Islamic Council, and took its commander, R.M. Bambang Suprpto, prisoner. He and Abduldjalil were executed by the *Darul Islam* a few days later.

Amir Fatah's first actions might have been even more successful had the Republican troops at Tegal joined with him. Such a move was, in fact, contemplated by the military commander of the *kabupaten* of Tegal, Captain Imam Sudjadi (Imam Sujadi), and some of his officers, such as Captain Irfan Mustopa, a former Brebes member of *Hizbu'llah*, and Major Djohan (Johan), commander of the troops from Sulawesi in Tegal. Their plans had been thwarted by their subordinates, however (cf. Suputro 1959:67; Pranata 1976–1977, n. 18–20). Amir Fatah nevertheless gradually extended his influence in the following months. With the surroundings of Bumiayu as his stronghold, he moved north into Pekalongan, where his troops attacked army posts in various places, such as at Margasari, Prupuk, Larangan and Tonjong. Then, at the end of 1949, he tried several times in vain to enter and occupy Brebes. On November 11th *Darul Islam* troops entered Wonosari and Siasem, two villages on the outskirts of Brebes, setting fire to 45 houses. This attack was led by Amir Fatah personally, directing his troops from a chair carried by his



soldiers, as he had been wounded in the head in an earlier skirmish with Republican troops (BI 17-11-1949, 10-1-1950). The next step contemplated by the rebels was the attack of Brebes itself. To show how they felt about the “transfer of sovereignty”, the date set for this was December 27th. Because they made their plans in this respect too widely known, however, the attack was easily beaten off. Amir Fatah was more successful a few days later, on New Year’s Day, when his troops finally did enter Brebes and occupied part of the town. The rebels, who entrenched themselves in the city’s main mosque, could only be driven out after a four-hour battle. Two days later the city was again attacked, but this time in vain.

Recalling the region’s turbulent past and realizing that there must still be many weapons in the population’s possession, the Republican Government was quick to react. To pacify Brebes and Tegal, both towns were declared a prohibited area and sealed off, so that no-one could move in or out. A count was made of the population and the fire-arms in its possession (BI 6-1-1950, 10-1-1950). This completed, a counter-offensive was launched by the Republican troops. After some minor operations in the coastal villages and in Bumiayu, the National Buffalo Operation, or *Gerakan Banteng Nasional*, was launched in Tegal, Brebes, Bumiayu, Purwakarta, Majenang and Cilacap. In this operation, better known as the GBN, infantry units of the three Javanese Army divisions – the *Diponegoro*, *Brawijaya* and *Siliwangi* Divisions – participated. Its objective was to isolate Amir Fatah in Tegal and Bumiayu and to prevent him and his soldiers from establishing contact with West Java (cf. Cuplikan 1972:250–252). In one sense the operation was a success, in another sense a failure. Partly by persuasion, backed by military force, a number of important Central Javanese *Darul Islam* leaders were made to surrender. The objective of closure of the provincial border, on the other hand, was not achieved. So there were frequent raids by *Darul Islam* units from Brebes and Tegal into the West Javanese *kabupaten* of Cirebon. These raids, in fact, accounted for a large proportion of the *Darul Islam* activity in the area.

Within the Central Javanese *Darul Islam* there was a comparatively greater readiness to surrender than in West Java. As early as February 1950 Wachid (Wakhid), a *Darul Islam* commander operating in Bumiayu, surrendered together with 120 of his men near Tonjong (BI 21-2-1950, 24-2-1950; M 21-2-1950, 24-2-1950). Moreover, Amir Fatah was reported to be contem-

plating surrender on the condition that the military governor of Central Java, Colonel Gatot Subroto, guarantee that no harm would be done to his men. Talks about this began in earnest after Natsir's amnesty offer of November 1950. As in West Java, the offer itself ended in failure. In the whole of Central Java only 6,962 people reported themselves, more than one third of them in Surakarta, and 578 firearms were handed in, almost none in Brebes and Tegal. The response in Banjumas was a little better, but the overall result was disappointing (I 7-12-1950).<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, Natsir's offer did set serious negotiations in motion. These were held in Karangasari at the end of November. On the Republican side Muslich (Muslikh), the head of the Department of Religion of Central Java, took part. Muslich knew some of the guerillas quite well, having commanded a battalion in which they had fought during the revolution. He was received cordially by Amir Fatah and his men. As it was formulated, agreement and an understanding were soon reached on the content of the amnesty offer, with which Amir Fatah and 2,000 of his men pledged themselves to comply. Kamran was also rumoured to be thinking of surrendering. It was furthermore alleged that Amir Fatah, before giving himself up, would go to West Java to see Kartosuwirjo and try to persuade him to capitulate as well.

Amir Fatah did, in fact, go to West Java, but it is doubtful whether he did so indeed to confer with Kartosuwirjo on the cessation of hostilities. His march was more in the nature of a flight on which he was being constantly pursued and attacked by Republican troops. In the course of this he entered Ciamis accompanied by about one hundred and fifty of his soldiers. On further pursuit by Republican troops he finally surrendered at Cisayong on December 22nd, after losing one third of his men. The Republican Government claimed that one of the factors which had induced him to surrender was lack of support from the local population. According to the account of his surrender put out by it, Kartosuwirjo had somehow persuaded Amir Fatah that Ciamis was one of the *de facto Darul Islam* territories that enjoyed the full backing of the population. When on arrival in Ciamis Amir Fatah introduced himself as commander of the TII, the population remained apathetic, however. Upon his stating that he was a member of the Republican Army, on the other hand, he was enthusiastically hailed (I 8-12-1950, 23-12-1950, 30-12-1950, 13-1-1951; N 13-1-1951).

After his surrender, Amir Fatah ordered his sub-commanders to

stay where they were, to refrain from action, and to contact the local Republican commanders to discuss the terms of their surrender. Some of his followers did indeed report themselves. Others went on fighting. Operations against remnants of Amir Fatah's Army had to be continued until far into the 1950's. Amir Fatah's function as commander of the Islamic Army of Central Java was taken over by Mughny, who was killed near Bumiayu in October 1954 (IB 6-10-1954).

In 1956 there were some reports circulating of internal strife in the Central Javanese *Darul Islam* and of the murder of some of its leaders by their own men (ANP/Aneta 1956:739). After that the movement totally collapsed.

### 3. *The Troops of the Islamic Community*

Pekalongan was not the only region in Central Java where adherents of the principle of an Islamic state came into action. So the south coast of Central Java, the Kebumen area, was the area of operation of the *Angkatan Umat Islam* (AUI), or Troops of the Islamic Community. These latter had been constituted by Kiyai Haji Machfudz (Makhfudz) in September 1945. Their objective was the defence of the newly proclaimed Indonesian Republic "in the way instructed by Allah and shown by his Messenger". Another objective of the AUI was the consolidation of the Islamic community's loyalty to Islam (I 7-8-1950, Djawa Tengah 1953:63).<sup>23</sup>

Kiyai Haji Machfudz, who at the time of the founding of the AUI was about 40 years of age, was better known as Romo Pusat or Kiyai Sumolangu, Sumolangu being the name of his home village, located about four kilometres north-east of the town of Kebumen. He was one of the most important Islamic scholars of the area and claimed descent from Ngabdulkafi (sometimes also called Kiyai Lemah Lanang), who is said to have brought Islam to Kebumen.

Among the other *kiyais* of the area Machfudz enjoyed a reputation as a pious, learned man of good character. At the end of 1945 he had assumed a leading role in the disarmament of Japanese soldiers in the area. He had also set up a small shop in his village of Sumolangu, where he sold *jimats* (amulets). These were bought by people, according to some sources thousands of them, with a view to obtaining strength for the fight against the Japanese and the Dutch and achieving invulnerability (N 3-10-1952).

The *Angkatan Umat Islam*, thanks to the personal influence of Machfudz, which went back to before the Second World War, and because of the appeal of its Islamic principles gradually attained the strength of a battalion. It operated independently. When *Masyumi*, at that time still the only Islamic party, asked Machfudz to join it, he refused, arguing that the AUI was a military unit and not a political organization.

In the struggle for independence the *Angkatan Umat Islam* fought alongside the Republican Army. Throughout the revolution Machfudz and his AUI troops invariably succeeded in holding their positions and never suffered defeat at the hands of Dutch troops.

At the time of its foundation the *Angkatan Umat Islam* had professed as one of its aims the creation of an Indonesian state based upon the principles of Islam. Even so, there were no conflicts with the secular Republican Government before the end of the struggle for national freedom. It was only after the Round Table Conference, the terms of which the AUI rejected, that a serious conflict with the Republican Government began to brew.

The growing antagonism between them was subsequently fanned by the Government's endeavours to curb the AUI's influence in Kebumen. The Republican Army made several attempts to get the organization under its control. Ostensibly in reward for the *Angkatan Umat Islam*'s contribution to the struggle against the Dutch, it was transformed into a regional battalion in 1949. Actually, however, this move was designed as a means of establishing control over the AUI and preparing it for demobilization. The new battalion was named the *Lemah Lanang* Battalion, after a mountain called Lemah Lanang north of Sumolangu, where Machfudz's saintly ancestor Ngabdulkafi lay buried. Machfudz was appointed its commander, with his younger brother Haji Nursidik as his second-in-command.

The *Lemah Lanang* Battalion was further joined by members of a former *Hizbu'llah* unit, currently called the *Surengpati* troops, under the command of Masduki. Although both components of the *Lemah Lanang* Battalion were strictly Muslim, the members of the *Angkatan Umat Islam* and the *Surengpati* troops did not get on well with each other. Machfudz and his followers experienced the fusion with the *Surengpati* troops as a blow to their identity. Soon enmity arose between the two components, and the battalion broke apart (Cuplikan 1972:244).

For Machfudz this spelt the end of all cooperation with the Republic. He did not yet dissociate himself from it formally, but

withdrew to Sumolangu, taking his followers with him. His brother Nursidik adopted a different course, however, and continued cooperating with the Republican Army. The result was that he and Machfudz temporarily drifted apart.

With Machfudz's retreat, the first attempt to incorporate the *Angkatan Umat Islam* into the Republican Army miscarried. At the same time it became apparent to the units under Nursidik's leadership which had remained loyal to the Republic that the formation of the *Lemah Lanang* Battalion had been more than just a change of name and a reward for the guerillas' resistance efforts against the Dutch. The Republican Army, in fact, had plans for retraining the AUI soldiers with a view to "instilling the military spirit" into them and for bringing them firmly under its control (Djawa Tengah 1953:205). This scheme formed part of the Army Command's plans for streamlining the entire Army into a relatively small but well-trained force. In such an organization there was no room, to its mind, for the members of irregular guerilla units. They considered these soldiers of too inferior a military, physical and intellectual standard. What they really wanted was for the members of the *Angkatan Umat Islam* to return to civilian life after termination of the fighting. Towards this end they intended transforming the *Lemah Lanang* Battalion into a reserve battalion, in which the guerillas were to await selection for the Army or, upon their failure to meet the required standards, demobilization.

A fresh attempt to break the regional power of the *Angkatan Umat Islam* was made after the formal recognition of independence. By that time the AUI had come to behave more and more as an independent authority, having begun collecting taxes, buying its own weapons and to patrolling the area. On May 17th, 1950, the *Lemah Lanang* Battalion was once again reorganized, and formally incorporated into the 3rd (*Diponegoro*) Division as the 9th Battalion of the 10th Brigade.

Only a small section — two companies — of the *Lemah Lanang* Battalion actually joined this Division. Machfudz himself did not want to hear of any incorporation. To show his dissatisfaction with the relevant policy of the Indonesian Government and Army, he stayed away from the installation ceremony. This sign of disapproval and protest was followed ten days later by the founding by Machfudz of his own military unit, the *Khimayatul Islam* (Protectors of Islam) Battalion. The majority of his men followed him and joined his Battalion. Only a small group abstained and followed Nursidik, who was appointed commander

of the 9th Battalion by the Republican Army (Djawa Tengah 1953:206).

Machfudz's reaction did not come as a total surprise. Members of the *Lemah Lanang* Battalion had a feeling that the formation of the new battalion would lead to their disarmament and demobilization. Moreover, the Military Police in January had tried, in vain, to discipline Machfudz's followers (Cuplikan 1972:245). The staff of the *Diponegoro* Division, however, was probably completely ignorant of how the irregular guerillas felt about their treatment, as well as of their reaction. At any rate, the commander of the *Diponegoro* Division, Colonel Gatot Subroto, sent a letter to Machfudz thanking him for his contribution to the struggle for independence and for all his cooperation in ensuring the incorporation of his troops into the Republican Army (N 27-5-1950).

The ensuing months the Republican Army and Government tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with Machfudz. An invitation to come to Purworejo to talk things over was declined by him. He on the other hand also refused to receive representatives of either the Republican Government or Army who wished to come to him in his stronghold of Sumolangu. Nor did he agree to speak to representatives of *Masyumi*. He further refused to see the Minister of Religion of the United States of Indonesia, K.H. Wachid Hasjim, who had travelled to Central Java especially to talk to the rebels and try to persuade them to cease their resistance. Machfudz dubbed the Army of the United States of Indonesia the Army of the *Bule Putih*, or White Kerbau (a contemptuous term for the Dutch), and the Government of the United States of Indonesia the accomplices of the Dutch. To show his dissatisfaction at the diplomacy of the Republican Government, which in his view had failed to achieve total independence, he forbade his followers from 1949 to use the nationalist call *Merdeka* (Freedom). Besides, he and his followers had a suspicion that the Republican Army had been infiltrated by communist officers involved in the Madiun rising (I 8-5-1950, 12-8-1950, 29-9-1950; N 16-9-1950).

Fighting broke out on July 30th, 1950, one day before the expiry of an Army ultimatum. It was started by Machfudz, who arrested every civil servant of the United States of Indonesia his troops could lay hands on, about seventy in all. The *bupati* of Kebumen and remaining government officials and civil servants were forced to flee; they returned again in September, when most of the fighting had stopped. Machfudz was now joined by

Nursidik and most of the soldiers who had joined the army of the United States of Indonesia in May.<sup>24</sup> Nursidik was hereupon appointed commander of the rebels.

The Army reacted on August 1st. It first disarmed all former guerillas who had not deserted, and then advanced on the village of Sumolangu. This village, where Machfudz had established his headquarters, and which he had subsequently styled the "Sumolangu Heaven"<sup>25</sup>, sustained considerable damage in the fighting, about 85 of its houses being destroyed. The *Khimayatul Islam* troops were subsequently forced to retreat.

After a month's fighting, in which 700 rebels were claimed to have been killed and 1,500 arrested, the Government troops eventually succeeded in dispersing the *Angkatan Umat Islam*. One division of about 200 guerillas commanded by Nursidik moved north to Brebes and Tegal to join up with the *Darul Islam* troops there. Another division of about 600 commanded by Machfudz fled westward to Banyumas. Machfudz was killed near Kroya on August 26th, 1950. Hereupon the remnants of his division also fled to Brebes and Tegal (Cuplikan 1972:246; Basri n.d.:8-9; N 6-10-1950).

After the fighting had ended, the population of Sumolangu asked the Government to give their village another name. In order to dispel all associations with Machfudz's movement the village was renamed Summersari. The damage suffered in Kebumen was very great. Thousands of people had fled and hundreds had been killed. Eighteen villages had been severely damaged in the course of the fighting (I 10-10-1950).

The *Darul Islam* movement in Central Java never caused the Indonesian government such serious headaches as those in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh. After being joined by the *Angkatan Umat Islam* guerillas, the *Darul Islam's* fighting force here was estimated by the Republican commander of Pekalongan at 1,200, while another estimate mentions 2,000 (I 24-11-1950, N 13-1-1951). The *Darul Islam* troops conducted raids and sometimes committed acts of cruelty, but such acts as holding up trains, for example, were a rare phenomenon.

#### 4. *The 426 Battalion*

Only once did the Indonesian Army get into serious trouble and face a real challenge in Central Java. This was when members of the Central Javanese *Diponegoro* Division gave the *Darul Islam* their support, first secretly and later openly.

It was first discovered from information from prisoners taken in the Brebes-Tegal area in 1951 that the *Darul Islam* rebels operating here had received support from officers and other ranks of the *Diponegoro*'s 423 and 426 Battalions. After that, a document incriminating officers of the 423 Battalion was found on the body of an officer killed in action against *Darul Islam* troops in Brebes. This document contained orders for the members of the 423 Battalion, which, consisting in part of former *Hizbu'llah* guerillas, had been sent to Brebes to fight *Darul Islam* troops, to defect and join the Islamic Army. In addition it was brought to the notice of the *Diponegoro* Division staff that a number of officers of the 423 Battalion had meetings with Central Javanese *Darul Islam* leaders in order to discuss the matter of defection. Upon confirmation of the information accordingly, the officers involved were put under arrest by the Divisional Command. As a result the 423 Battalion remained loyal to the Indonesian Republic and continued its anti-*Darul Islam* operation in Brebes (Alers 1956:254; Cuplikan 1972:246–247; Subekti 1952:14–15).

The problems with the 426 Battalion were not so easily solved. This whole battalion was made up of a former *Hizbu'llah* unit. Its members still resented their incorporation into the *Pragolo* Brigade, commanded by the then Lieutenant-Colonel Soeharto, who led the subsequent military operations against the mutinous Battalion. It had come into conflict with the Republican Army Command as early as the Madiun rising in September 1948. The Battalion had participated with great zeal in the quashing of this rebellion of the communist infidels, and had even gone as far as capturing – and later killing – the Chief of Staff of the Surakarta *Wehrkreise* and a number of his officers, which had subsequently provoked occasional fighting with other Republican units. Strangely enough, it had also participated in the suppression of the *Angkatan Umat Islam*, and had admitted surrendering AUI guerillas to its ranks.

On hearing the first rumours of a possible defection of the 426 Battalion the *Diponegoro* Command was at first irresolute. In view of past experiences, the Divisional Command did not wish to provoke the former *Hizbu'llah* fighters. When finally it decided to act it was too late. Reports that the *Diponegoro* Division had evidence of the collaboration of officers of the 426 Battalion with the *Darul Islam* movement leaked out before the officers involved could be interrogated. Even so, two officers of the 426 Battalion, Major Munawar and Captain Sofjan (Sofyan),



were summoned to the *Diponegoro* headquarters on December 7th, 1951.

Sofjan, who was rumoured to have been offered the post of commander of the Islamic Army of Indonesia for Central Java, in replacement of Amir Fatah, refused to come, as he knew that headquarters were informed of his *Darul Islam* contacts. Instead he admitted that he and three companies commanded by him belonged to the Islamic Army. Munawar did not obey the order to come to headquarters, either. He was arrested wearing civilian clothes at Klaten a few days later (IM 16-12-1951; KB 15-12-1951).

After Sofjan's refusal to surrender, Republican troops attacked his barracks at Kudus. With the assistance of the local population Sofjan managed to break through the cordon, however. His rebellious troops were joined a few days later by two other companies of the 426 Battalion, commanded by Captain Alip, which had been confined to their barracks at Magelang. The latter had left these barracks on December 10th, their families having fled the previous day. The Government, which was also not sure of the units encamped at Salatiga and Semarang, confined these to their barracks as well from fear that they might side with Sofjan. A number of soldiers of the 427 Battalion at Salatiga nevertheless joined the rebels (IM 14-12-1951; KB 14-12-1951).

Sofjan's band reached Klaten, the region of origin of the *Hizbullah* soldiers of the 426 Battalion, who had fought here at the time of the second Dutch military action, four weeks later. Sofjan himself, who was reportedly wearing a red suit with a white turban with Arabic characters at the time, was killed on January 2nd. According to the commander of the *Diponegoro* Division the rebels had been planning their defection a long time beforehand, and had even buried some of their weapons just after the second Dutch military action in order to collect these again when needed later. It was furthermore reported that the 426 Battalion had been building up a cadre for months and had been collecting gold and cash through robbery as well as through voluntary contributions to finance their revolt (KB 21-12-1951; N 5-1-1952).

In Klaten they received the active support of the population, in particular the better-off Moslim landowners. The latter espoused the rebel cause among other reasons so as to be able "to defend their interests as *sawah* owners against the demands of agricultural labourers, who of old desired changes in the distribution of land" (Subekti 1952:14–15). This support was not restricted to

Klaten itself, but extended as far as Surakarta. The latter city and its surroundings had always constituted a troublesome area. Hence the prospect of an armed rising here was not calculated to please the authorities. In view of Surakarta's character as a region with numerous and complex problems, the Resident of Surakarta, Salamun, took a much more serious view of the activities of the 426 Battalion than of those of the *Darul Islam* in Pekalongan and the *Angkatan Umat Islam* in Kebumen (IM 16-1-1952).

Even so, the movement was short-lived and the rebels were beaten by the end of five months. A proportion of them hereupon joined the *Darul Islam* forces in the northwestern part of Central Java, as the remnants of the *Angkatan Umat Islam* had done, or tried to reach the *Darul Islam* forces in West Java. Others joined the bands operating in the mountain range north of Klaten, the area known as the Merapi-Merbabu Complex (MMC).<sup>26</sup>

The motive of the members of the 426 Battalion in rebelling and choosing the side of *Darul Islam* was partly religiously inspired. As Islamic troops and former *Hizbu'llah* fighters they sympathized with the Islamic ideals of *Darul Islam*. Furthermore, they were in close contact with the Moslem population not only of Klaten but also of urban Surakarta. In Klaten scores of people were accordingly interrogated on suspicion of aiding the rebels, and in Surakarta, too, many people were arrested in this connection. In one raid in Surakarta on the evening of December 12th alone seventy-five people were taken into custody. On January 3rd, 1952, this was followed by the arrest of prominent Moslem leaders in the Surakarta *Kauman*, or Islamic centre, including R.H. Adnan, the Chairman of the *Mahkamah Tinggi Islam*, or Islamic High Court.

As elsewhere, however, Islamic ideals were not the only impetus towards rebellion. Feelings of dissatisfaction played an important part, too. The soldiers of the 426 Battalion who did not originally come from the regular Republican Army felt discriminated against. Thus, when Lieutenant-Colonel Bachrun (Bakhrun), a Republican officer, tried at the end of January to persuade the rebels to surrender, he put the blame for everything on the officers of the Battalion, claiming that they had incited their soldiers to rebellion by telling them that they were being treated unfairly by their Division. Bachrun promised that no action would be taken against any soldiers who repented and reformed (IM 1-2-1952).

The *Diponegoro* Division launched a large-scale campaign

against the rebellious Battalion and followed it in hot pursuit. Hour-long, sometimes even day-long battles were fought, in which many people lost their lives. All the main roads around Yogyakarta and Surakarta were closed during the operations. The rebels were ultimately worn out by constant harassment. As one newspaper reported in early April: "Often human victims are found by the TNI who are already dead or in a deplorable condition. Many weapons that cannot be carried have to be hidden under the ground" (IM 6-4-1952).

The Republican Army did not always act very tactfully in its operation. On the contrary it had the unhappy knack of arousing people's indignation. In February 1952, consequently, a written query was submitted to the Government by Prawoto Mangkusasmito, a Member of Parliament representing *Masyumi* – a party which, by virtue of its Islamic character, was not without sympathy for the *Darul Islam* rebels. The examples of alleged misconduct on the part of Republican soldiers adduced here were illustrative of a type of behaviour that was calculated to augment the Islamic community's resentment. In Klaten, in the village of Kardirejo, for example, Republican Army soldiers had allegedly set fire to mosques. In the Surakarta region they had desecrated mosques by entering them with shoes on and taking dogs inside.

Prawoto Mangkusasmito further drew attention to the arbitrary treatment of the local population and of prisoners. He alleged that sometimes people were taken into protective custody simply to prevent them assisting the rebels, whether voluntarily or under duress. In other cases people were taken prisoner as substitutes for relatives who had escaped or disappeared. He moreover referred to reports of the killing of prisoners taken not in combat but in cleaning-up operations. All this, according to him, had driven the population over to the rebels' side, thus making it so difficult to subdue the 426 Battalion (*Suara Partai Masjumi* v.7, n. 3, March 1952:7–8).<sup>27</sup>

After the defeat of this Battalion the Republican Army concentrated its mopping-up operations on Brebes, where remnants of it and of the AUI had fled. Specially trained troops – the *Banteng* or Buffalo Raiders, the predecessors of *Diponegoro* Division's commandos – were deployed for these. After two military campaigns, in May 1952 and June 1954 – the one directed against *Darul Islam* strongholds in the woods south of Pekalongan and the other aimed at preventing *Darul Islam* troops from breaking through the cordon and escaping to West Java – the *Darul Islam* troops along the border with West Java were con-

siderably weakened. Throughout the whole of the 1950's, however, the *Diponegoro* Division had to deal with small remaining bands of guerillas in the former *Darul Islam* areas of Central Java.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE REBELLION OF SOUTH SULAWESI – DISAFFECTED GUERRILLAS

In South Sulawesi (Celebes) a rebellion against the Indonesian Republic broke out shortly after the formal recognition of Indonesian independence. In the initial stages it was simply a rising of former guerilla fighters who were disgruntled at the mode of their incorporation into the Republic Army, or partial demobilization. After several years the rebels linked up with Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State of Indonesia, however. The rebellion in Sulawesi was led by Kahar Muzakkar.<sup>1</sup> It was to affect large parts of South and Southeast Sulawesi for many years.

#### *1. Kahar Muzakkar and the Struggle for Independence*

Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, who in his youth was named La Domeng, was born in the village of Lanipa, near Palopo, on the north-west coast of Bone Bay, on March 24th, 1921. He was the son of a farmer who was reasonably well-off and belonged to the low aristocracy (Andaya 1976:2). At the age of seventeen he was sent to Surakarta to study at the *Perguruan Islam*, a *Muhammadiyah* college. Before completing his education here he returned in 1941 to Palopo, where for a short while he taught at a *Muhammadiyah* school. He also became one of the local leaders of the *Pemuda Muhammadiyah*, or *Muhammadiyah* Youth, and of the *Hizbul Wathon*, the *Muhammadiyah* boy scout movement. At the beginning of the Japanese occupation he worked for a brief period for the Japanese at Ujungpandang (Makassar).<sup>2</sup>

Soon Kahar Muzakkar came into conflict with the local *adat* chiefs. Why he provoked their hostility is not fully known. Kahar Muzakkar in any case "was accused of sedition" against the *adat* chiefs (Tjatatan 1950:17). He is even said to have gone further and to have "denounced the existing feudal system in South Sulawesi and advocated the abolishing of the aristocracy" (Harvey 1974:182). Banned from the island, or to be more precise, ostracized<sup>3</sup> for life, Kahar Muzakkar returned to Sura-

karta in 1942, where he set up as a trader. He remained in Java, where he took an active part in the armed struggle for independence, for about ten years.

From the descriptions of him, Kahar Muzakkar emerges as a brave man with great personal appeal. He is attributed with “reckless bravery in combat, unmatched skill in the use of arms and in sports, and a piercing intelligence, coupled with brilliant daring initiatives”, while “his ability to move men by his speeches is compared favourably with that of Sukarno’s...” (Andaya 1976:6–7).

Kahar Muzakkar participated in the struggle for independence from its very beginning, one might say. He was a member of Soekarno’s bodyguards when the latter gave one of his first mass speeches on Freedom Square in Jakarta on September 19th, 1945. About this meeting Kahar Muzakkar himself boasts that he was the only person (armed with a machette) prepared to protect Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta against the bayonets of the Japanese soldiers who tried to disperse the meeting and who encircled the car in which Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta were driving (Muzakkar n.d.:8).

After the proclamation of independence he became one of the co-founders of the Movement of Young Indonesians from Sulawesi living in Java, the *Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi* (GEPIS).<sup>4</sup> As early as October 21st, 1945, the GEPIS merged with another guerilla organization made up of youths from Sulawesi, namely the *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia Sulawesi*, or APIS. The resultant new organization was named *Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi* (KRIS), i.e., Devotion of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi. The majority of the youth joining the KRIS, according to Harvey (1974:173) even all of them, came from Minahasa, the north-eastern Peninsula of Sulawesi. A large proportion of the people from Minahasa and Manado were Christian and belonged to one or other of the ethnic groups from which before the Second World War the Dutch East Indies Colonial Army, or KNIL, had recruited many of its soldiers. Because of this association with the Dutch colonial regime the Minahasans and Manadonese were generally suspected of being pro-Dutch and of working as Dutch agents. In Java, in the territory of the Indonesian Republic, they thus found themselves in a hostile environment. Hence the KRIS was formed by them with a view to defending themselves and showing their willingness to fight against the Dutch on the side of the Republic.<sup>5</sup> Similar organizations were founded for similar reasons by people from

Ambon living in Java, such as the API (*Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia*) Ambon and the PIM (*Pasukan Indonesia Maluku*). The KRIS in particular because of its KNIL association had a reputation as a well organized and disciplined military unit.

Kahar Muzakkar was made first secretary of the KRIS,<sup>6</sup> in which capacity he was assigned the task of setting up branches in Central and East Java. There were KRIS units fighting against the Dutch in Java alongside the Republican Army, and, as in the case of other guerilla units, conflicts arose between them and the official Republican Army. Republican Army attempts to incorporate and thus control the irregular units resulted in among other things the disarming of KRIS troops at Karawang and in Rengasdengklok at the beginning of 1947 (ANP-Aneta 30-4-1947).

Kahar Muzakkar did not confine himself to setting up KRIS branches in Java. Upon leaving the KRIS, he played an important part in the foundation of the *Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia* at the end of 1945 and in organizing the infiltration of Sulawesi – where the Dutch had re-established their control – by proa from Java. The core of the *Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia*, or Indonesian Unity Battalion, was formed by prisoners from the Nusakambangan and Cilacap prisons originating from the Outer Islands. At Kahar Muzakkar's intercession these prisoners were released and subsequently given a brief military training. The *Batalyon* is said to have served as escort for President Soekarno at the Republican Government's transfer from Jakarta to Yogyakarta, and to have been turned into "the shock-troops for the Special Military Intelligence Unit (PMC – *Penjelidik Militer Chusus*) of Colonel Zulkifli Lubis" in Yogyakarta (Harvey 1974:174).<sup>7</sup> This was for only a few months, however. In March 1946 the *Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia* became the core of the *Tentara Republik Indonesia Persiapan Sulawesi*, i.e., Indonesian Republican Army for the Preparation [of the Liberation] of Sulawesi. It was commonly referred to as *TRI Persiapan Sulawesi* or TRIP(E)S. This TRIPES was formed by Kahar Muzakkar on being assigned the task of preparing the formation of a Republican Army in Sulawesi by Sudirman, the commander of the Republican Army, on March 24th, 1946.

To accomplish this task Kahar Muzakkar set out to organize the above-mentioned infiltration of South Sulawesi by proa from Java. At first things worked out quite well. By his own account about 1,200 soldiers were sent to Sulawesi in the course of 1948 (Bardosono 1956:88) and more than ten expeditions were dis-

patched from Java by the TRIPES. Particularly the fourth and sixth of these expeditions were of importance for the later course of history. In the course of these expeditions Mohammad Saleh Lahade and Andi Mattalatta, who had come to Java to discuss the coordination and consolidation of the guerilla movement in Sulawesi at the end of 1945, returned to Sulawesi (Nasution 1977 III:607). It had been as a result of the latter's contacts with Soekarno and Sudirman that the idea of forming the *Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia* had been born. Although the idea had not originated with him, Kahar Muzakkar had nevertheless become the battalion's commander, while Mohammad Saleh Lahade was appointed its Chief of Staff and Andi Mattalatta vice-commander. After their return to Sulawesi, the latter founded the *Hasanuddin* Division, with himself as commander and Mohammad Saleh Lahade as Chief of Staff, on January 21st, 1947 (Harvey 1974:178).<sup>8</sup>

After 1946, however, the infiltration activities virtually came to a standstill. From that year onwards the outlook for the Republican forces in Sulawesi was rather gloomy. The effects of the infiltration were soon brought to naught by Dutch counter-insurgency tactics as applied by Westerling. Most of the guerilla fighters who had come from Java were either captured or killed. The rest returned to Java.<sup>9</sup>

The local guerillas, who had never been away from Sulawesi, were struck a heavy blow by Westerling's actions, too. It took them many years to recover. This was the more serious because it had taken so much effort to build up a guerilla force that had some strength and posed something of a threat to the Dutch. But then the entire guerilla struggle of South Sulawesi suffered many ups and downs. In the first months after August 1945 the proclamation of independence had been hailed with enthusiasm by the population here. Initially the local nobility, including, for instance, the Prince of Bone, Andi Mappandjuki (Mappanjuki), and the chiefs of Luwu — Kahar Muzakkar's area of origin — and of Bonthain, had also given it their support. At that time anti-Dutch feeling had been so strong that one Dutch civil servant concludes a report with the words that "one might conclude that the situation in South Sulawesi is beyond hope, and as a result of Japanese influence or for whatever reason the feeling is generally anti-Dutch", quickly modifying this remark by adding that this is not altogether true, and that, although there are many people who are anti-Dutch, there are also many who are not (NIB, I:518). Within a short time things changed for the better for the



Dutch, however. As early as December 1945 another high Dutch official was able to write that “the political sky of this region, which before looked rather gloomy and threatening, over the past few days has cleared considerably because the ‘autonomous’ governments of Bone, Wajo Soppeng and Luwu, as well as the principal Arus from the subdistricts of Sinjai and Bulukumba, have declared their readiness to cooperate with the Nica [Netherlands Indies Civil Administration]” (NIB II:222).<sup>10</sup>

In spite of the initial support from part of the nobility and the population, it had taken some time for the Republican forces in South Sulawesi to organize local resistance. The principal reason why the efforts in this direction had been so slow to take effect had been the failure of the Republican leaders in South Sulawesi to take full advantage of the situation arising immediately after the proclamation of independence. They had let the opportunity provided by the circumstance that the first Allied troops set foot on Sulawesi only at the end of September 1945 simply go by. In contrast to Java and Aceh, for instance, there had been no attempts to seize Japanese arms, while there was furthermore a lack of men with sufficient military training to be able to assume the leadership of any anti-Dutch actions. During the Japanese occupation Sulawesi had had no indigenous Japanese-sponsored force comparable to the *Peta*. Moreover, those in South Sulawesi who had received some military training as members of the *Heiho* auxiliary forces or of the *Seinendan* Youth Corps had failed to form into revolutionary groups to oppose the Dutch troops, but had simply gone home (Said n.d.:1).

Of course some guerilla groups had sprung up, notably around Ujungpandang. In Polongbangkang, to the south of the latter city, a regional Republican movement, the *Gerakan Muda Bajeng*, or Bajeng Youth Movement, had been formed on the initiative of the *karaeng* (prince), Haji Pajonga Daeng Ngalle. This also had a military branch, the *Lipang Bajeng*, made up of former *Heiho* members, some former KNIL soldiers, and other youths.<sup>11</sup> It was at this headquarters that the *Lasykar Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia* (LAPRIS), or Revolutionary Militia of the Indonesian Republic, comprising 17 guerilla groups in the region<sup>12</sup>, was formed in July 1946. The latter was chaired by the *karaeng*'s secretary, while one of the most famous guerilla leaders of Sulawesi, Wolter Mongisidi – who after being captured by Dutch troops was executed in September 1949 – was appointed its secretary-general, and Ranggong Daeng Romo, who headed the *Lipang Bajeng*, became its military commander.

Westerling's counter-insurgency program thus left the local guerillas in disarray, in particular after the troops which had re-infiltrated from Java were virtually eliminated. The many local groups did continue fighting for an independent Indonesian Republic, but on a smaller scale. They included the *Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia*, the *KRIS Muda*, and the *Pasukan* or *Lasykar Harimau Indonesia* (Indonesian Tigers), a unit founded by Wolter Mongisidi and Muhammadsjah (Muhammadsyah) (or Muhammad Dimar) after the occupation of the LAPRIS headquarters by Dutch troops and the latter's dispersal of the guerilla troops. Seriously weakened and operating among a population which was too afraid to give them much active support, they no longer posed a real threat to the Dutch or the Dutch-sponsored State of East Indonesia, however. It was this State of East Indonesia, constituted at the end of 1946, which reaped the fruits of Westerling's actions. It was able to erect and maintain an administrative structure without too much harassment from resistance activities until the end of 1949.

In Java, meanwhile, people from Sulawesi continued to participate in the fight against the Dutch. In the course of the struggle the name and status of the TRIPES changed several times. Shortly after the Linggarjati agreement of November 1946 it was renamed *Lasykar Sulawesi*. Around this same time Kahar Muzakkar constituted his own shock troops, the *Barisan Berani Mati*, or "dare-devil troops", while he and his men were in Madiun. They were made up of the best TRIPES soldiers, and in theory also had a branch in Sulawesi (Mattulada 1978:179).<sup>13</sup>

As a *lasykar*, the *Lasykar Sulawesi* was integrated into the *Biro Perjuangan* of the Ministry of Defence, and a few months later became the *Hasanuddin* Regiment. This incorporation in the *Biro Perjuangan* implied that the control of the *Lasykar Sulawesi* or *Hasanuddin* Regiment ultimately lay with the Ministry of Defence, not with the commander of the Republican Army. When in June 1947 the latter was renamed the National Army of Indonesia (TNI), all irregular units were obliged to merge with it. As a consequence the *Hasanuddin* Regiment became the Brigade II.X. Together with the other *lasykars* from the Outer Islands fighting in Java, sometimes also referred to as the *Pasukan Seberang*, or Overseas Troops, the Brigade formed part of the KRU-X (*Kesatuan Reserve Umum*, or General Reserve). The then Indonesian Army Chief of Staff for Operations, A.H. Nasution, intended the KRU-X to become a well integrated unit of all *lasykars* from the Outer Islands operating in Java. Initially the

scheme failed, mainly because of hostility and distrust among the *lasykar* commanders and because each group wanted to preserve its own identity. For some time each region or island in fact continued to have its own brigade. The next year, 1948, however, the fusion became a fact and a new brigade, the Brigade XVI, was born (Nasution 1968:210–211). Its major components were Kahar Muzakkar's Brigade II.X and the Brigade I.X commanded by J. (Jopie) F. Warouw, who now also became the commander of the new Brigade XVI, with Kahar Muzakkar as second in command, while H.N. Ventje Sumual (Vence Sumual) was appointed Chief of Staff.<sup>14</sup>

Soon conflict arose between J.F. Warouw and Kahar Muzakkar. After the second Dutch "military action" their troops even split up. Kahar Muzakkar and his men, after operating in East Java, now went to Yogyakarta, while J.F. Warouw and his soldiers remained in East Java. In Central Java Kahar Muzakkar again came into conflict with one of his commanding officers, this time Lieutenant-Colonel Soeharto. Kahar Muzakkar was thereupon reprimanded and degraded. After the re-occupation of Yogyakarta by Republican troops, he and his men were forbidden to enter that city (Mussaffa 1951 n. 1). To ease the tension Kahar Muzakkar was given a new assignment. In October 1949 he became commander of the *Komando Grup Seberang*, the Overseas Commando Group. His transfer did not solve all the problems, however. In November internal fighting broke out as units of the Brigade XVI operating in the region around Lawang, between Surabaya and Malang, renounced their allegiance to the Republic. These units were allegedly communist, and may possibly have tried to link up with other Republican units in the area, namely those commanded by Abdullah, which were likewise suspected of communist "contamination". J.F. Warouw was given orders to take action against these latter units, but because he was unable to "find a peaceful solution", Dutch troops were eventually brought in (M 16-11-1949, 19-11-1949, 28-11-1949).<sup>15</sup>

In his new capacity Kahar Muzakkar, who by this time had been promoted to the rank of "acting" lieutenant-colonel, was put in charge of the coordination of the guerilla units in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Nusa Tenggara – in fact, the entire *Seberang* area. Besides, he was charged with the task of building up a military cadre in these areas, the attempt at this in the years 1946 and 1947 having failed because of the Westerling actions. Kahar Muzakkar had made a modest start with this by sending two of his staff officers – Saleh Sjahban (Saleh Syahban)

and Bahar Mattaliu – to Sulawesi to establish contact with the remaining guerilla forces there even before his October appointment.

## 2. *The Republican Army, the KNIL and the Guerillas in Sulawesi*

Around 1950 the political and military situation in Sulawesi was affected to a great extent by the issue of whether there was to be a federal or a unitary Republic of Indonesia. Sulawesi, or to be more precise South Sulawesi, constituted the military and administrative centre of the State of East Indonesia. This State – created as early as December 1946 as one of a number of states which were planned by the Dutch Government to comprise the federal United States of Indonesia in the near future – experienced a fairly favourable development up to 1950. Militarily the Republican guerillas, who were virtually annihilated after the actions of Westerling and his troops, constituted no threat. Politically there was no opposition of any significance – a few internal government scandals aside – after the pro-Republican fraction walked out of Parliament in early 1947. Economically the State of East Indonesia prospered because of the demand for its products (Alers 1956:143–152).

Perhaps the most important factor contributing to its apparent prosperity during the Indonesian struggle for independence was its isolation from other parts of Indonesia. When in 1950 the federal state structure of Indonesia was put to the test and this particular State was lifted out of its Dutch-backed isolation, the hitherto repressed differences came into the open and by the end of a few months the State of East Indonesia had crumbled. This was the first time pro-Republican forces, demanding the revocation of the State and the incorporation of its territory into the Republic of Indonesia, were able to act as free agents in Sulawesi. Their demands were voiced in Parliament as well as in public declarations and in demonstrations staged by mass organizations here. In some instances the expression of these demands assumed a more violent nature. A proportion of the former guerilla fighters refused to comply with the resolutions of the Round Table Conference, and continued attacking the military force of the State of East Indonesia, comprising former KNIL units which in theory now were their allies. These guerilla organizations included the *Harimau Indonesia* and the *Gerilya Pengikut Proklamasi* (cf. Bardosono 1956:83–97).

Aside from the trouble with former guerilla units, a bitter conflict broke out about the degree of autonomy of the State of East Indonesia. Essentially the dispute revolved around the question of whether or not troops of the United States of Indonesia, really meaning troops from Java, were to be allowed to be stationed in the territory of the State of East Indonesia. In early 1950 the issue culminated in an armed confrontation between the Government of the United States of Indonesia and former KNIL units in Sulawesi.

The immediate cause of the conflict was provided by the dispatch of troops from Java to Sulawesi. The Government of the United States of Indonesia in which the Republic of Indonesia played a prominent part, took the decision to station troops in South Sulawesi early in 1950, against the express wishes of the Government of its largest member-state, the State of East Indonesia. The latter warned that the dispatch of troops from Java might provoke hostilities and argued that the KNIL was quite capable of maintaining law and order in the area by itself. It on the other hand, agreed to the proposal that the territorial commander of East Indonesia should be someone who had served in the Republican Army. This function was subsequently given to Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Mokoginta (A.Y. Mokoginta), who, however, was obliged to accept the assistance of Major Nanlohy of the KNIL and of Ir. Putuhena, the later Prime Minister and head of a pro-Republican Cabinet of the State of East Indonesia.

The objective of the dispatch of troops was a strengthening of the position of the Republic of Indonesia, in particular of its Army. In the period immediately following the formal recognition of Indonesian independence the number of Republican soldiers in South Sulawesi was quite small. Apart from the few local guerilla bands operating in the area, which were difficult even for the Republican Government to control, a handful of staff officers and a small Military Police unit of about 80 men constituted the entire Republic of Indonesia force in the region. This handful of soldiers was no match for the relatively large KNIL unit. To achieve a better balance more troops hence had to be shipped from Java to Sulawesi. These were accordingly to provide a counterbalance for the KNIL troops, which might, if left unchecked, assume an important role in the State of East Indonesia's resistance against incorporation into the projected unitary Republic of Indonesia.

The plans for sending troops to Sulawesi had been conceived as early as the end of 1949. The units considered best fitted for the

task were a number of contingents of the Brigade XVI. The latter itself was disbanded in February 1950 and its commander, Warouw, stationed at Army headquarters in Jakarta. The part of the Brigade commanded by Colonel H.V. Worang was singled out for dispatch to Sulawesi. To justify the move, the rumour was circulated that President Soekarno intended to pay a visit to East Indonesia, but that the troops of the United States of Indonesia – meaning Republican troops – had to be stationed there first to guarantee his safety (BI 19-12-1949, 15-2-1950, 1-3-1950; M 18-2-1950).<sup>16</sup>

On April 5th two ships, the Waikelo and the Bontekoe, carrying about one thousand soldiers, arrived at Ujungpandang. Here former KNIL units prevented the troop's disembarkment. These rebellious KNIL units, which had been incorporated into the Army of the United States of Indonesia less than a week before, were led by Captain Andi Abdul Azis. They styled themselves the *Pasukan Bebas*, or Free Troops. Besides sealing off the harbour, Andi Abdul Azis took prisoner all the Republican soldiers already in Ujungpandang. One of these was Lieutenant-Colonel Mokoginta, who had come here to set up the Military Administration of the State of East Indonesia at the end of 1949.<sup>17</sup> He was released again within a day, however, after Andi Abdul Azis had conferred with the President of the State of East Indonesia, Sukawati. Later, in the course of his trial, Andi Abdul Azis repeatedly stressed that he and his men had acted as members of the Army of the United States of Indonesia, and not as KNIL soldiers. Their aim had been simply to prevent fighting between the (former) KNIL soldiers, who were infuriated at the dispatch of troops from Java, and the Republican troops (PR 18-3-1953, 2-4-1953).

The Government of the United States of Indonesia in Jakarta nevertheless considered Andi Abdul Azis' move an unequivocal act of rebellion. On April 7th it accordingly issued orders for him to report in Jakarta within three days to answer for his behaviour. He ignored the order, however, only arriving in the capital on April 16th. He claimed that he had been prevented from reporting earlier because of the tenseness of the situation at Ujungpandang.<sup>18</sup>

That there would be trouble had been foreseeable. KNIL soldiers at Ujungpandang had publicly protested against the stationing of troops from Java as early as January. In a motion concerning their integration into the Armed Forces of the United States of Indonesia they had agreed only to a conditional

voluntary integration. One of the conditions was that they would be commanded by KNIL officers, another that they would not be combined with Republican troops for at least a year. When this condition had come up for discussion again on March 27th, a statement was added saying that the KNIL soldiers were embarrassed (*malu*) at the dispatch of troops from Java, as the KNIL had shown itself perfectly capable of maintaining order over the past two years (IB 23-1-1950, 6-4-1950).

Andi Abdul Azis provided the Central Government with a perfect excuse not only for sending the Worang Battalion to South Sulawesi, but also for extending its military presence there even further. It decided to send a military expedition to South Sulawesi while his rebellion was still in progress, which decision it did not, however, reverse after his surrender. This expedition ushered in the subsequent build-up of Republican troops comprising soldiers originating from Java in the area. It constituted the first instance of the stationing of the three post-war Javanese divisions in Sulawesi.

The expedition was commanded by Colonel Kawilarang, whose sub-commanders were Lieutenant-Colonels J.F. Warouw and Soeharto. Warouw had the co-command of the Mobile Brigade from East Java which formed part of the expeditionary force. Soeharto was in command of the *Mataram* Brigade of the *Diponegoro* Division. Kahar Muzakkar did not take part in the expedition. He had been ordered back to Sulawesi just after the outbreak of Andi Abdul Azis' rebellion and had boarded the corvette *Hang Tuah*, which had been sent to Ujungpandang by the Indonesian Government, as a passenger, arriving in South Sulawesi on April 9th. He was recalled to Jakarta on April 16th, after Andi Abdul Azis' surrender, and more than a week before the military expedition set foot on Sulawesi.

After the said surrender, preparations for the expedition nevertheless continued, as was indicated above. This was prompted partly by suspicions about the political reliability of the former KNIL units in South Sulawesi, and partly by the determination of the Government of the United States of Indonesia in Jakarta to show that the ultimate authority over the whole of the territory of Indonesia lay with it. Upon its disembarkation the expeditionary force indeed came to blows with the (former) KNIL troops. Fighting occurred between them on May 15th and August 5th, 1950. Notably the latter encounter was quite serious, with a fierce battle continuing for days. According to official figures, over one thousand civilians were killed in the

course of this, and 350 houses were destroyed. The Indonesian troops emerged victorious. On August 9th a cease-fire was declared and the KNIL units involved were compelled to leave South Sulawesi. Within a fortnight all former KNIL soldiers received orders directing them to places outside South Sulawesi. Those originating from Manado were sent there. The remainder was transported to Java, where they were stationed in Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung and Jakarta (N 1-9-1950, 25-9-1950, 14-12-1950). Colonel Kawilarang was subsequently appointed territorial commander of East Indonesia. With the departure of the KNIL, there was no longer anything to obstruct the dissolution of the State of East Indonesia. On August 17th 1950, the unitary Republic of Indonesia was officially proclaimed, putting an end to the brief existence of the federal United States of Indonesia.

Following the defeat of the KNIL units the Indonesian Republican Government was still left with the problem of the guerilla fighters in South Sulawesi to solve. In its efforts to deal with this problem it was able to use the attempts at coordination by the guerillas themselves as point of departure. Even before Kahar Muzakkar's appointment as commander of the *Komando Grup Seberang*, in April 1949, two of his staff officers, Saleh Sjahban and Bahar Mattaliu, had gone back to South Sulawesi for the special purpose of co-ordinating the guerilla struggle. On August 17th, 1949, the South Sulawesi Guerilla Unit, or *Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan* (KGSS), had thereupon been founded by Saleh Sjahban, with the aim of uniting the multitude of scattered and isolated guerilla bands operating independently in the area.<sup>19</sup> Saleh Sjahban himself became co-ordinator of the KGSS, with Bahar Mattaliu as his secretary.

The Indonesian Government made an attempt to gain control of the guerilla units of South Celebes through the KGSS in the first month after the formal recognition of independence. Its aim in this was twofold. First, it wanted to establish control over the guerillas here so as not to experience any obstacles in "its confrontation with the guerilla troops" (Bardosono 1956:84). Secondly, and connected with the first aim, the KGSS was envisaged as an instrument in effecting the "return of the guerillas to society", in other words in demobilization (Cuplikan 1972:254).

The guerillas had soon grown disappointed at the Indonesian Government's policies. They had disagreed with the declaration of an armistice between Indonesian and Dutch troops, and continued fighting the KNIL also after 1949. This in turn had



brought them into conflict with the Republican troops. What they opposed in particular was the incorporation of large KNIL units into the Republican Army, while a request by themselves to be incorporated *en bloc* had been rejected. The conflict about incorporation was exacerbated by the guerilla fighters' having the fact that they were not wanted by the Republican Army brought home to them for a second time. Many of them had come to Sulawesi after being shown plainly by a Republican Army reorganization and the dissolution of the Brigade XVI in early 1950 that there was no room for them in the Army of the United States of Indonesia. The Brigade XVI, as we saw above, was dissolved in January 1950. A battalion under the command of Andi Mattalatta and the Worang troops were all that was left of it. Some of its men were further sent to Kalimantan to form part of the Military Police there, or were stationed at Army headquarters (Said n.d.:8; Harvey 1974:188). An additional point at issue was the place of the Minahasans in the Government of the State of East Indonesia. The American anthropologist Raymond Kennedy (1953:24) noted in the course of a visit to Ujungpandang in August 1949, for instance, that the town "is full of ministries and they in turn are full of Minahasans", adding that he "had heard that bad feeling is growing between the Minahasans and the local Makassarese-Buginese over the former's taking over control here". In the Republican Army in South Sulawesi as well those appointed to the highest positions were Minahasans, e.g., A.J. Mokoginta, J.F. Warouw and Kawilarang (though the latter two had been born in Java).

So the guerillas in the interior continued their struggle. Freed from the threat of interference by the KNIL, and with the Republican Army still tied down in Ujungpandang, they occupied Bonthain, Bulukumba, Sinjai, Parepare, Sengkang, Palopo, and Watangsoppeng in April. Their usual procedure was to collect all the arms they could lay their hands on and to dismiss all government officials they considered reactionary or whom they knew to have collaborated with the State of East Indonesia, including the rulers of small principalities (M 28-4-1950, 4-5-1950, 10-6-1950).

In this atmosphere Kahar Muzakkar returned on the scene. The formal recognition of independence by the Dutch had put an end to his commandship of the *Komando Grup Seberang*. For months after this he was an unemployed officer – as he himself puts it in a letter dated April 30th, 1950, and addressed to the Central Government and Army Command – only returning to

Sulawesi for a short interval at the time of Andi Abdul Azis' rebellion. As reasons for his forced inactivity the same letter mentions the distrust in which he was held by the Armed Forces Command, and the general view of him as a trouble-maker and agitator bent on sowing sedition within the Army. In this letter he also puts forward a number of recommendations for the improvement of the situation in Sulawesi, including a suggestion to incorporate all former guerilla fighters into the Republican Army as a separate territorial unit. Only after the recognition of these guerillas as soldiers would it be possible to make a start with their gradual reintegration into society.

Kahar Muzakkar did not at this stage claim for himself the command of such a unit. He writes that he personally, "as an officer who is not trusted by his superiors, might at best be given some harmless function, for example in the Information Department for East Indonesia" (Bardosono 1956:68–80). In spite of this show of modesty, Kahar Muzakkar was soon thereafter, in fact, to become the former guerillas' leader in their struggle for recognition by the Republican Army. Unable to keep the former freedom fighters under control, the Central Army Command ordered him back to Sulawesi once more.<sup>20</sup>

Kahar Muzakkar had good reason to call himself an unemployed officer held in distrust in the Army. His assignment in South Sulawesi in effect may have been envisaged as his last commission as a soldier. Mohammad Saleh Lahade, the then Army information officer in South Sulawesi, in point of fact stated a year later that Kahar Muzakkar had come to South Sulawesi with his notice of dismissal in his pocket. Before being sent back to civilian life he had had to accomplish one last task and explain the Government's policy with regard to the guerillas to them (IM 13-10-1951). If this is true it can hardly be called a wise move, and may explain much of Kahar Muzakkar's later behaviour. His mission to South Sulawesi was, moreover, strongly censured by senior officers such as Kawilarang and Soeharto, the latter of whom warned that "Kahar Muzakkar never kept his promises" . . . and that he . . . "would only create more unrest in the region" (Roeder 1976:213).

Kahar Muzakkar arrived at Ujungpandang on June 22nd. For the first few days after his arrival he lent the representatives of the Indonesian Government and Army his full cooperation. After an interview with Kawilarang, who had replaced A.J. Mokoginta in April 1950 as territorial commander for East Indonesia, he made a short tour of South Sulawesi to try and persuade the

guerillas to accept the condition proposed by the Republican Army that “they should be recognized as soldiers first, and that there should only be rationalization after that” (Tjatatan 1950:12). This condition, according to Harvey (1974:219), was in line with a compromise earlier advanced by the leaders of the KGSS themselves. On his return from his tour Kahar Muzakkar, however, put forward a counterproposal made by the guerillas. They insisted that the number of guerillas to be admitted to the Indonesian Army should run to at least the strength of a brigade. Kahar Muzakkar and the guerillas moreover wanted these men to form a separate brigade, instead of being spread over a number of different units. This brigade should then be named the *Hasanuddin* Brigade, after the 17th-century ruler of Goa who for a time successfully opposed Dutch penetration. So the guerillas stipulated that “in South Sulawesi a National Army of Indonesia brigade consisting of former South Sulawesi guerillas be formed under the name *Hasanuddin* Brigade” (Sulawesi 1953:337). They agreed to the remainder of the guerillas, for whom there was no place in this brigade, being put in a special “depot” battalion, where they would be able to prepare themselves for their return to society.

The guerillas had formulated these demands first at a conference of their leaders at Maros. It was stated by one of their spokesmen later, at the end of October, that they had originally considered the idea of the formation of a *Hasanuddin* Division. However, after considering “several facts”, as it was put, the guerillas themselves had “rationalized” the strength of this unit down to that of a brigade (I 19-9-1950, 1-11-1950).

Kawilarang, at a meeting with Kahar Muzakkar on July 1st, 1950, rejected the guerillas’ demands. He issued a decree liquidating the *Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan* and prohibiting all further activities in pursuit of this unit’s objectives on the same day. No new guerilla organizations were to be instituted, because, as Kawilarang put it, the period of integration of the guerillas into the Army had ended. In August Kawilarang claimed that 70% of the guerillas had entered the Army, and that only 30% had refused to do so. Against the latter the Army would take action, he hereupon warned (I 6-7-1950, 24-8-1950).

Kahar Muzakkar, on hearing Kawilarang’s reaction to the proposals he had brought back with him, resigned from the Army and handed over his insignia to the commander. A few days later he took to the forest. In actual fact, he was kidnapped by the KGSS, on the initiative of Andi Sose, although it is very likely

that the latter was acting on the orders, or at least with the tacit consent of Kahar Muzakkar himself.<sup>21</sup>

In the attitude adopted by Kawilarang, Kahar Muzakkar could not but see confirmation of his suspicion that, the promise that the guerillas were to be recognized as soldiers first notwithstanding, the Army was in reality only aiming at the liquidation of the former guerilla units. They would not constitute a separate unit, and there were no guarantees about the number of guerillas to be admitted. Indonesian books on the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion admit that Kahar Muzakkar had some justification in withdrawing into the jungle, and that the demands of the former guerilla fighters were not unreasonable.

Tiardjono (1959), for instance, points out in explanation of Kahar Muzakkar's behaviour that while he was exerting himself to persuade his men to enter the Republican Army, the latter was showing signs of a determination to destroy the KGSS. According to this same author (1959:59), "several battalions of his men were disbanded and disarmed by the TNI, while those who surrendered were simply sent back into society". A monograph on Sulawesi published by the Department of Information (Sulawesi 1953:337–338) states three reasons for the demands of the former guerillas. Firstly, it points out, there were brigades, and even whole divisions, made up of men from the relevant region in other parts of Indonesia as well. Secondly, it argues, the number of guerilla fighters in South Sulawesi was high enough – a figure of 15,000 is quoted – to make up at least one division meeting the conditions of entry into the Armed Forces, even after thorough selection. Thirdly, it asserts it was only reasonable that the guerillas should have been treated in the same way as the former KNIL units, which were admitted to the Republican Army without much fuss and red tape at all.

Kahar Muzakkar had the other rebels ignored the ban on the KGSS. The latter continued functioning, though now as an illegal organization. The whole situation became the more ironical as in August the guerillas went to the Republican Army's assistance in the fighting that broke out with former KNIL units in Ujungpandang which had been confined within the so-called KNIL zone at Mariso since the May incidents. This was the third occasion on which the guerillas helped the Army. At the time of Andi Abdul Azis' rebellion they had ensured the *Worang* Battalion a safe landing-place, and at the outbreak of fighting in Ujungpandang in May KGSS troops had entered the city – which had been re-occupied by the KNIL – to assist the Army. And so the same

thing happened again on Sunday, August 6th, 1950, when troops of the KGSS – which under Kawilarang’s decree of July 1st was considered as having been dissolved – on hearing that there was once again heavy fighting in Ujungpandang, attacked the city from several directions (Sulawesi 1953:312). Even in the midst of this fighting, however, an incident between guerilla fighters and Republican soldiers occurred. At a meeting between the guerillas and Republican units commanded by Captain Latief of the *Mataram* Brigade, two guerilla leaders, Arief Rate and Abbas Bangsawan, commander and Chief of Staff of the *Mobile Battalion Ratulangie* (MBR) respectively, came under fire and were killed along with a number of their men. Arief Rate’s contingent, furthermore, was wiped out after some very serious fighting. The shooting was alleged to have started by the Republicans with the intention of getting rid of the troublesome guerillas. According to Roeder, Soeharto’s biographer, Captain Latief had acted contrary to Soeharto’s orders. Roeder even so admits that the fighting “aroused the population’s hatred against ‘the Javanese’” (Roeder 1976:213). This hatred continued for many years, and was to be a valuable asset to Kahar Muzakkar in his rebellion against the Republic.

### 3. *Guerilla War*

After the fighting at Ujungpandang the guerilla troops quickly returned to the jungle. They were afraid that, if they remained a moment longer in Ujungpandang, they might be disarmed by the Republican Army. There now developed what can best be described as a full-scale war between the latter and the guerillas. Trees were cut down and bridges destroyed all over South Sulawesi, with the exception of Bonthain, to block communications. All the roads from Ujungpandang to Watanpone, from Watanpone via Senkang to Siwa, and from Sengkang to Tanrutedong were obstructed, while the guerillas put up barricades of cut down trees to impede the progress of the Republican Army along the roads the Enrekang and from Parepare to Majene. Only the roads in Bonthain, and as a consequence that from Ujungpandang to Watanpone via Bonthain, Bulukumba and Sinjai, remained open. Because this brought lumbering in the area to a virtual standstill, the financial losses inflicted by the guerillas were considerable. In October the regional head of the Civil Administration of South Sulawesi estimated these losses at Rp. 1 million per day (I 12-10-1950).

Besides, the guerillas made continual attempts to attack and disarm Republican units. In reply the Army, which had tried bringing the guerillas to heel before, reiterated its decree of July 1st, with Kawilarang stressing that the Army had not changed its attitude and warning that it would continue its operations against the guerillas (N 10-10-1950). The Republican Army accordingly began a cleaning-up operation, clearing the roads and rebuilding the bridges that had been destroyed. It also engaged in military actions with the rebellious guerillas, and on October 12th, after a four-hour battle, occupied one of the rebels' principal headquarters at Siwa. Three days later it occupied Tanrutedong, Kahar Muzakkar's headquarters, in which operation it met with no resistance. Kahar Muzakkar and his troops had left before the Army's arrival.

According to the official Army explanation put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Kokasih, Republican Army Chief of Staff for South Sulawesi, the Army decided to launch an offensive against the guerillas at the end of the year because their ranks had been infiltrated by bandits. Kokasih here distinguished four categories of guerillas. The first, and to his mind the only good one, was made up of what he called true, patriotic guerilla fighters, who had already been active before the Army's arrival in South Sulawesi, and hence before 1950. He claimed that of this group seventy percent had already entered the Army. There were, however, three other categories, against which the Army was obliged to take action, namely: (a) those guerillas who wantonly disturbed the peace, (b) bandits, robbers and the like, and (c) opportunists lacking a firm conviction of their own who thus were easily influenced by the enemy. These latter three categories, Kokasih alleged, consisted of men who claimed to be true patriots, but who in reality were puppets manipulated by other elements. He concluded rather cryptically by saying that although they, too, had a country, this was not the Indonesian Republic but some other state (N 29-12-1950). At the time of Kokasih's statement there existed as yet no links between Kahar Muzakkar or other guerillas and the Islamic State of Indonesia. Kokasih may therefore have been implying that the guerillas in fact were siding with the Dutch, an accusation which at that time was often made with a view to bringing into discredit anyone who did not agree with the policies of the Republic and continued to defy the latter. By dividing the guerillas into the above four categories he was moreover reducing the number of guerillas who were eligible for admission to the Republican Army. This

classification would in the years to come account for the many different estimates of the strength of the guerilla bands, as well as for the Army claim that seventy percent of the guerillas had already entered the Army. Although there were of course bandits among the guerillas, the estimates were highly exaggerated.

The severe and uncompromising Army attitude was not shared by civilians either in South Sulawesi itself or in Jakarta. Contrary to Kokasih and his officers, who harboured a profound distrust of the guerillas and were inclined to regard them as mere bandits and no-good ruffians, they were convinced of the latter's good faith and patriotism. In South Sulawesi there was actually much more sympathy for the guerillas, who were given food by the people from whose midst they sprang, than for the Republican Army, made up as it was in part of strangers. About this support from the local population Andaya (1976:6, 8) writes: "From the very beginning Kahar and the guerillas received overwhelming support from the local people who exhibited great empathy with the plight of these men", and, "They regarded the ever increasing presence of Javanese troops, government leaders, and cultural elements within their shores as an insult to the people of Sulawesi who had contributed so much and suffered so dearly to gain independence from the Dutch".

Moreover, there were strong indications that it was much more the Republican Army that was to blame for the fighting because of its occupation of guerilla bases. This strengthened the distrust of the rebels, who for their part intimated that they had retreated into the bush to avoid bloodshed, and that they would only fight back in an emergency. The guerillas showed themselves still prepared to work out a compromise. In September Kahar Muzakkar made it known that the demand for a *Hasanuddin* Brigade, with himself as commander, was not an unconditional demand. In the event of the admission of himself and his men into the Army, he was quite prepared to leave it to the latter to decide exactly how many and who should stay and who should be demobilized.<sup>22</sup> This position was underscored once more by a guerilla spokesman at the end of October. The latter stressed that the difference between the Republican Army and the guerillas was not one of principle or ideology. The only problem which remained to be solved, in his view, was that of the integration of the *Hasanuddin* Brigade into the Republican Army. Once this was cleared out of the way, he pointed out, the guerillas would be prepared to enter a "depot" battalion and would obey the orders of their superiors like loyal soldiers (I 1-10-1950).

The fact that the guerillas had come to the Army's assistance in May and August was seen as a clear sign of their loyalty. There were pleas from many sides to try and find a peaceful solution. A resolution urging the Government to refrain from the use of violence was passed by twenty-two South Sulawesi political parties and organizations, as well as the regional Parliament, on the initiative of the *Kerakyatan* (People's) fraction (N 9-9-1950). On August 18th, moreover, a Committee of Good Services was formed by prominent local residents.<sup>23</sup> This Committee was headed by Jusuf Bauti, a member of the Governing Council of South Sulawesi, and included as one of its most active members Mrs. Salawati Daud, the wife of a government official at Maros, one of the rebel strongholds.

Mrs. Salawati Daud went to Jakarta a number of times to plead the guerillas' cause with the President and senior government officials. In September she persuaded them to send the Minister of Defence, Dr. A. Halim of the Natsir Cabinet, to Ujungpandang to study the problem on the spot. In October the heads of the Civil Administration of South Sulawesi and of Parepare flew to Jakarta to see the Minister of Defence and ask him to do his utmost to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between the Army and the guerillas. In the event of such an outbreak the guerillas were unlikely to be completely beaten for at least several decades, they maintained. They further asserted that the guerillas had only started fighting after the Republican Army had occupied some of their bases and so had aroused their distrust (I 12-10-1950).

In return a parliamentary mission went to Sulawesi to conduct an investigation. This mission consisted of eight persons headed by PNI member Sunarjo (Sunaryo).<sup>24</sup> They arrived at Ujungpandang in early November and from there made a five-day trip into the interior. The mission did not, as it had hoped, get to see Kahar Muzakkar, however, and so returned to Jakarta without having achieved its purpose at the end of about ten days. This mission had been received with much distrust by the military of South Sulawesi. The Army officers did not want meddlers prying about and did all they could to frustrate the mission's efforts. Upon the latter's making clear its intention of travelling north to meet Kahar Muzakkar, no facilities for this journey into the interior of South Sulawesi had been provided.

The mission for its part on its return wrote a report containing scathing criticism of the Army, which it even went so far as accusing of fascist behaviour. It sympathized completely with the



guerillas in the bush, recommending to the Government that it recognize the latter and create the requested *Hasanuddin* Brigade, and appoint Kahar Muzakkar as commander in the rank of major. It also urged the Government to forget everything that had happened during the conflicts between the Army and the guerillas in the past and to grant Kahar Muzakkar and his troops a general amnesty. Another of its recommendations – which was to crop up from time to time again in the future – was that, if West Irian was not handed over to the Republic by the Dutch, the guerillas earmarked for demobilization should be formed into a voluntary corps for West Irian's liberation.

As was said above, the mission was extremely critical in its evaluation of the Republican Army in South Sulawesi. Without mentioning specific names it accused some of its members of fascist behaviour, and observed that the Army as a whole suffered from a superiority complex, its behaviour being experienced by the people of South Sulawesi as that of an occupying force. As a result the relation between the Army and the local population had become strained, while the latter's sympathy for the guerillas had increased. The mission particularly deplored the Army's habit of commandeering private cars on the pretext that it needed these for its actions against the Andi Abdul Azis, KNIL and RMS rebels. About Kawilarang's decree and the declaration of the guerillas as enemies of the state it claimed that this had been inspired by a "biased attitude" arising from personal feuds in the past. With respect to the guerillas themselves the mission noted that because they were mainly of noble families, leaders of society and peasants, their ties with the local people were generally very strong (N 11-12-1950).<sup>25</sup>

The mission's report was ignored by the Army. The Minister of Defence confined himself to a brief statement in which he observed that the Army would not engage in a debate with Parliament and so would not give a detailed rejoinder to the report, which it described as containing many mistakes and falsehoods (N 13-12-1950). The parliamentary mission's remarks were, in fact, rather superfluous. Its criticism of the Army and indication of the people's sympathy for the guerillas nevertheless had some use, as it made for a more favourable political climate for the rebellious guerillas. On the whole, however, the suggestions it made fell flat.

The new Central Government headed by Natsir, only two months in office, on the other hand, was very quick to act. It published its own views on the matter, which as it turned out

were initially acceptable to Kahar Muzakkar and his men while the parliamentary mission was still in South Sulawesi. The Natsir Cabinet, in its efforts to find a solution, followed a different course with respect to South Sulawesi from that pursued for Java. In Java all guerillas reporting with the authorities were granted a pardon and, if they met the standards, a place in the Army, this being calculated as an appeal to small independent groups. In Sulawesi the Government had to take into account the fact that the guerillas formed a much more integrated whole requiring a dominant place in the military organization of the region.

The Government's position in this connection was outlined in a decree issued by Prime Minister Natsir in November. The principles advanced here provided some scope for at least a temporary agreement. For it stipulated that the former guerillas, described as "national fighters in South Sulawesi", should be admitted to the Republican Army as part of the National Reserve Corps, or *Korps Cadangan Nasional*, to ultimately form part of a *Hasanuddin* Brigade. To facilitate the transition from the status of irregular guerilla to regular soldier, training battalions should be formed, which, after completion of the training, should be recognized as army infantry battalions.<sup>26</sup> Then, if later a *Hasanuddin* Brigade was in actual fact constituted, these battalions should become part of it. It further emphasized that during the training period the guerilla leaders should remain in command of their own troops.

A few days after the issuing of this decree the Natsir Cabinet's general amnesty offer was made public. After initially outlining a special solution for Sulawesi, the offer now made applied to the whole of Indonesia with the exclusion of South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The guerillas in the latter regions, who felt discriminated against by the Government in Jakarta as it was, must have been indeed unpleasantly surprised at such an exception being again made for them.<sup>27</sup>

In his decree for South Sulawesi Natsir made no mention of the general amnesty, nor did it specify the number of guerilla eventually to be admitted to the Army. More information on these points was provided at the end of November, when Makmun Sumadipradja, chairman of a special interdepartmental committee former for solving the guerilla problem in South Sulawesi, set out for Ujungpandang to further work out the decree. On his departure from Jakarta it was announced that no legal measures would be taken against the guerillas, while at the same time it

was stressed again that the former guerillas would only form part of a *Hasanuddin* Brigade, in contradiction with the wishes of Kahar Muzakkar and his fellow-guerillas, who wanted to form a separate brigade. This latter idea in turn was unacceptable to the Government because of the possible dangers of a brigade made up exclusively of former guerillas.

With respect to the number of guerillas the Government was prepared to accept into the Army, Maknum Sumadipradja's mandate contained the vague formula that in principle all guerillas were acceptable. They were to form part of the National Reserve Corps. But, as it would turn out, the Government had not the least intention of letting them all stay in the Army. The majority was to be demobilized. The Government's scheme provided for the permanent admission of only a small proportion – originally a figure of between three and four thousand being quoted. The remainder – according to a contemporary estimate about ten thousand – would have “to return to society”, as the phrase ran (IM 13-10-1951).<sup>28</sup>

The rebels accepted the proposals formulated by the inter-departmental committee. In anticipation of a solution Kahar Muzakkar on October 22nd, while still in fugitive, had converted the KGSS into the *Persiapan B(rigade) Hasanuddin*, or provisional *Hasanuddin* Brigade, headed by himself and Saleh Sjahban, the former staff officer of his who had founded the KGSS. After the rebels' acceptance of the Government's proposal, fighting between the Republican Army and the *Persiapan Be Hasanuddin* accordingly stopped. The two forces thereupon began to take joint action against groups which continued committing acts of robbery and intimidation. So Kahar Muzakkar launched an operation against bands on the Island of Selayar which had forced several local government officials to flee to Ujungpandang (I 24-11-1950).

It took some time for the procedure of the guerillas' enlistment in the Army to get underway. To begin with, the Army, out of dissatisfaction with a solution formulated by civilian politicians, made no move to negotiate with the guerillas about the mode of implementation of the agreement. Its hesitancy in turn strengthened the distrust of the guerillas, who refused to come out of the bush until negotiations started.

Special committees to work out the details of the agreement were set up at the end of December. Lieutenant-Colonel Kokasih announced the formation of two such committees in the radio broadcast in which at the same time he accused the guerilla force

of being infiltrated with bandits, trouble-makers and opportunists. The one, chaired by T.I.A. Daeng Tompo, head of the Civil Administration of South Sulawesi, was designed to supervise the guerillas' reception in prescribed territorial zones and their selection.<sup>29</sup> The other, headed by J. Latumahina and with Captain Idrus as vice-chairman, was charged with the supervision of the return to society of guerillas who were to be demobilized. The members of the latter included Jusuf Bauti and Mrs. Salawati Daud of the former Committee of Good Services, and the heads of the Offices of Agriculture, Industry and Fishery of South Sulawesi.<sup>30</sup> Not all the members of these committees had the interests of the guerillas for whose fate they were responsible equally at heart. In February 1951, for instance, Jusuf Bauti was arrested by the authorities on charges of misappropriation of money and food entrusted to him for handing over to the guerillas (N 14-2-1951, 15-2-1951, 19-2-1951).

In January 1951 the guerillas began their march to the various territorial zones where they were to await their definitive incorporation. Kahar Muzakkar had given them orders accordingly after the settlement of differences with the Army about the size of the zones. In mid-January 2,000 guerillas were reported as already having registered in each of the zones of Malino, Enrekang and Pinrang already (N 10-1-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar, moreover, in his capacity as commander of the *Persiapan Be Hasanuddin*, to show his good faith declared all identification papers, instructions, orders and insignia issued by the KGSS or the *Persiapan Be Hasanuddin* between July 5th and January 15th null and void, and ordered these to be handed in (I 7-2-1951). At his headquarters in the Latumojang mountains he furthermore instituted the GUKRINDO, short for *Gabungan Usaha Kemajuan Rakyat Indonesia* (Association for Furthering the Progress of the Indonesian People), with the aim of assisting the Government with the development of South Sulawesi and aiding the population in its economic activities (N 14-4-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar's cooperative attitude nevertheless did not spell the end of all trouble, and South Sulawesi remained far from safe. In spite of Kahar Muzakkar's and the Army's joint efforts to put an end to the unrest, bands varying in strength from a few individuals to five hundred men continued operating. Robbery remained a common phenomenon. In Bonthain, for instance, eleven robberies in one evening were reported (N 30-1-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar and his men most probably had no part in all

this. His troops marched from their positions in the bush to the regional units as agreed. On March 25th, 1951, the long-awaited day of the *Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin*'s official constitution as part of the Republican Army National Reserve Corps finally came. On this same day Kahar Muzakkar left his hiding-place. A special ceremony to welcome him was held at Maros, where a crowd of between five and six thousand had gathered to witness his and his soldiers' entry into the town at seven in the evening. The troops were addressed by Salawati Daud and Kahar Muzakkar himself. The latter, in a speech lasting about half an hour, went at considerable length into the accusations that he was over-ambitious, that he had retreated into the bush solely to further his own ends, and that he had unnecessarily drawn out the negotiations in order to ensure his confirmation in the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Although many people believed him and Saleh Sjahban to be "rank- or position-hungry" he denied these charges by pointing out that in spite of the fact that he had possessed "big chairs, big tables, and had confronted important people" in the past, all that was not his sole aim in life. "I am suspected of hungering after [the position of] lieutenant-colonel, but I had the lieutenant-colonelcy thrust on me", he asserted, adding that if there was anyone who wanted to take over the command of the *Hasanuddin* Brigade, let them come forward and do so; only he would not commit it to the charge of men who had burnt down the houses of innocent people (N 28-3-1951).

From Maros Kahar Muzakkar then went to Ujungpandang accompanied by his fully armed troops. Here he was officially installed as commander of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi. At his inauguration, which was again attended by thousands of people, he swore his allegiance to the Government and the State of the Indonesian Republic.<sup>31</sup>

#### 4. *The Fate of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi*

The National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi was made up of five battalions. These were the *Batu Putih* Battalion, commanded by Kaso Gani; the *Wolter Mongisidi* Battalion, commanded by Andi Sose; the *40,000* Battalion, commanded by Sjamsul Bachri (Syamsul Bakhri); the *Arief Rate* Battalion, commanded by Azis Taba; and the *Bau Massepe* Battalion, commanded by Andi Selle.<sup>32</sup>

The members of the corps continued styling themselves the *Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin*. The Republican Army and

Government, on the other hand, preferred to speak of the *Korps Cadangan Nasional* of South Sulawesi.<sup>33</sup>

These were not just two different names for one and the same organization. The former guerillas, by referring to themselves as the *Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin*, implied that they were expecting to be incorporated into the Republican Army *en bloc*. The Indonesian Government and Army, by using the term National Reserve Corps, deliberately established a connection with the reserve corps in other parts of Indonesia, which had been formed with the sole aim of facilitating the demobilization of former irregular guerilla fighters. The different status of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi was, however, recognized. It was admitted that in this area a “selection had still to be made between those who would return to society and those who would stay in the Army . . .” (ANP-Aneta 1951:310).

The constitution of the National Reserve Corps in March in no way meant that Kahar Muzakkar’s guerillas had become regular soldiers of the Republican Army yet. Their formal incorporation was planned for August. Between March and August 1951, however, a series of incidents took place which resulted in renewed friction between the Army and Kahar Muzakkar. These new conflicts in the end led to an open and irreconcilable rift.

There were three specific factors which fanned the enmity between the two. First, there was the difference on the number of guerillas to be accepted into the Republican Army, second, the Army Command’s refusal to constitute a brigade made up exclusively of soldiers who were former “wild” guerilla fighters, and third, the encroachment – intended or unintended – on Kahar Muzakkar’s authority.<sup>34</sup>

Kahar Muzakkar and the authorities had opposed views on the former guerillas’ *en bloc* incorporation into the Republican Army. The former, although sometimes expressing himself to the contrary, favoured the integration of all guerillas who evinced a desire accordingly. The latter – already burdened with an excess of regular soldiers as it was – was inclined to admit as few guerillas as possible. The official viewpoint had been reiterated on March 14th, a few days before the formal constitution of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi. On this date Prime Minister Natsir, in a letter on the procedure of the reserve corps’ incorporation, had stated that “it would be investigated immediately [after admission to the National Reserve Corps] whether the applicants met the requirements for entering the Army” (ANP-Aneta 1951:310).

These requirements were far from easy to satisfy. Of the guerillas who had already tried in the early months of 1950 to gain admission to the Army many had failed the relevant tests. Thus quite likely the guerillas looked upon these tests as a Government device to get rid of them. To be admitted to the Army one had to pass a medical as well as a psychological examination. Physically the candidates were tested on “body weight and height, chest width, eyesight, hearing, presence of venereal diseases, etc.”, and psychologically on “intellectual ability, fluency of speech and general knowledge” (Bardosono 1956:92). By May 1950, 3,248 guerillas had undergone the tests, and only one third had passed (Bardosono 1956:92).

The composition of the *Hasanuddin* Brigade, if it was to be constituted at all, caused uneasiness, too. Was it to be made up entirely or only partially of former guerillas? And who was to become its commander, Kahar Muzakkar or someone else – for instance Warouw, who was less acceptable to the guerillas but more so to the Army?

Kawilarang, commenting on the rumours about renewed tension between the guerillas and the Army in July 1951, underscored once again that the members of the Reserve Corps would only form part of the new brigade. As a cause of the current tension he mentioned the demand that Kahar Muzakkar should become commander of the *Hasanuddin* Brigade – a demand he personally could not agree to. Another point at issue, he said, was the definition of the brigade’s task as a strictly regional one, in other words, the question of whether the *Hasanuddin* Brigade was to be stationed exclusively in Sulawesi or in other parts of Indonesia as well.

Kahar Muzakkar, in his response to Kawilarang’s statement, put forward other reasons for the renewed tension between his troops and the Army. So he mentioned the desertion of Army soldiers to the National Reserve Corps in consequence of their refusal to submit to examination, warning the Republican Army leaders to be mindful of the real reasons for these desertions. In the second place he protested against the Army’s intention of incorporating the National Reserve Corps battalion by battalion, which, according to him, testified to gross ignorance of the reality of that Corps’ unity. Furthermore, he lashed out at what he called the reactionary Army officers in South Sulawesi, and against the Army’s refusal to let his men participate in the peace-keeping operations in the area. He claimed that the National Reserve Corps’ incorporation was being retarded by a number of

reactionary officers on the staff of the Military Command of East Indonesia whose highest officer he wanted to see removed. This officer, whom he also described as reactionary, was Kawilarang, the territorial commander. There were, in fact, rumours at the time that Kawilarang's transfer was being contemplated because of Kahar Muzakkar's charges (IM 21-9-1951). Three other of the allegedly reactionary officers are identified by Barbara Harvey, who writes (1974:237): "There is unanimous agreement that Saleh Lahade headed the list. Major Mochtar, who was a member of the committee to determine who among the CTN members wished to enter the TNI, was probably included; and the third was possibly Captain Idrus, who was on the committee charged with supervising demobilization." Mohammed Saleh Lahade and Mochtar (Mokhtar) had both fought alongside Kahar Muzakkar in Java.

Kahar Muzakkar's disappointment at the Army's refusal of his request to take part in the peace-keeping operations in South Sulawesi constitutes one of the basic reasons for his growing antagonism towards the Army. He felt personally responsible for the behaviour of the guerillas of South Sulawesi. Throughout 1950 and 1951 there were repeated skirmishes between Republican Army and irregular units. Sometimes these latter units behaved like mere bandits, at other times they were motivated by federal or even APRA sympathies. Kahar Muzakkar felt that the ultimate responsibility for troublesome units which did not have such sympathies lay with him. He claimed a share in the operations against these bands on the basis of this belief. The Republican Army not only denied him the right to participate in these operations with his guerillas, but in most instances did not even inform him of its plans beforehand (Sulawesi 1953:342).

The infringement upon Kahar Muzakkar's authority over the irregular bands reached a climax on August 7th, 1951, when one of the National Reserve Corps battalions was officially incorporated into the Republican Army. The battalion in question was the *Bau Masseppe* Battalion commanded by Andi Selle, one of the most influential guerilla leaders operating around Parepare.

In the newly arisen conflict between Kahar Muzakkar and the Army, Andi Selle had sided with the latter. And when he submitted the request for the integration of his *Bau Masseppe* Battalion, this request was granted without Kahar Muzakkar being consulted.

For several days it nevertheless seemed as though a definitive breach between Kahar Muzakkar and the Army might still be



avoided. New negotiations were set afoot at Enrekang, where the respective leaders of the guerillas and of the Army met. The former included Kahar Muzakkar himself, his Chief of Staff B. Sutrisno, the battalion commanders Andi Tenriadjeng (Tenriajeng) (who had taken over the command of the *Batu Putih* Battalion), Andi Sose, Azis Taba and Sjamsul Bachri, and Reserve Corps staff members Usman Balo and Hamid Gali. The Army was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Warouw, the commander of the so-called “A-troops”, and two members of his staff, Major Ibnu Subroto and Lieutenant Asmanu. (“A-troops” was the new name for the 18th Brigade of the *Brawijaya* Division, which had joined the expeditionary force sent to South Sulawesi after the Andi Abdul Azis rising. It had received this name after the other units of this force had returned to Java.<sup>35</sup>

Within a day a new agreement was reached with Kahar Muzakkar. Under the terms of this the integration of the other four battalions of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi would follow that of the Andi Selle Battalion soon. The official ceremony was to take place on August 17th, the day of commemoration of the declaration of independence of the Indonesian Republic. Kahar Muzakkar was promised the position of acting deputy commander of the “A-troops”, in which capacity he would for the second time in his life serve under Warouw and would receive as special duty the command of the guerilla battalions entering the Army. The four existing commanders of these battalions would then continue in their function in the rank of acting captain. The other members of his staff would be either appointed to the staff of the “A troops” or incorporated into the battalions. Who was to be appointed in which function was left to Kahar Muzakkar and Warouw to decide. Furthermore, it was resolved to institute a special committee for supervising the guerillas who were to be demobilized, to which Kahar Muzakkar was to be advisor.

On August 17th, however, Kahar Muzakkar and his troops did not turn up for the grand incorporation ceremony, which as a result fell through. The officials who had been invited and the brass band which had been especially sent for from Manado came to a place that was totally deserted. The National Reserve Corps guerillas had retreated into the jungle and, to make the *débâcle* complete, had taken with them about Rp. 1,5 million in cash and 5,000 uniforms provided them by the Army as a kind of present in celebration of their incorporation.

In justification of this breach of agreement Kahar Muzakkar

had one day previously issued a statement accusing the Republican Army of violation of the agreement of August 7th. The military command had, he alleged, failed to transfer its reactionary staff officers, and to release members of the National Reserve Corps arrested in the preceding months. On the Army side Kawilarang responded by claiming that these two points had never formed part of the agreement (Sulawesi 1953:346). There was, indeed, no mention of them in the agreement of Enrekang. There were persistent rumours, however, that the officers representing the Army at the negotiations had, without actually putting this in writing, promised the fulfilment of these two conditions by word of mouth.

Among the various reasons put forward in explanation of Kahar Muzakkar's behaviour on this occasion have been mentioned his alleged personal ambition, his dislike of Warouw and short-sightedness which induced him to renounce his allegiance.<sup>36</sup> Although personal ambition may have played some sort of a role, these interpretations fail to take into consideration the support which Kahar Muzakkar was able to command and the general feeling of distrust of the Republican Army. The negotiations of 1950 and 1951 and the Army's behaviour in those years seem to warrant the conclusion that Kahar Muzakkar and his followers had at least some reason for distrusting the Republican Army and Government with regard to the latter's treatment of former "wild" guerillas. The rumour that after their integration into the Army the guerillas would be sent to Kalimantan probably further strengthened this distrust (Djarwadi 1959:124).

According to other explanations Kahar Muzakkar was not responsible at all for the decision to retreat into the jungle again. Allegedly it had been forced upon him by Usman Balo, Andi Sose, Azis Taba and Hamid Gali at a meeting of guerilla leaders on August 16th. It was these same leaders who, according to this explanation, at the end of August stopped Kahar Muzakkar and Sjamsul Bachri from reporting to the authorities (Mussaffa 1951 n. 6).

On August 29th Indonesia's new Prime Minister, Sukiman, issued an ultimatum giving the rebels five days in which to report. Sukiman stated at the same time that in the Government's view the problem of the former guerillas was no longer a problem of the National Reserve Corps, as this had ceased to exist in South Sulawesi on August 17th (ANP-Aneta 1951:372-373). Mrs. Salawati Daud and other civilians who tried to get in touch with Kahar Muzakkar failed. After a journey

of 500 km by car and 16 hours on horseback they only met some minor leaders (IM 6-9-51).

On expiry of the ultimatum a military operation – the *Operasi Merdeka*, or Freedom Operation, as the general name ran for the campaign that was undertaken against bands of former irregular guerilla units all over Indonesia at the time – was launched. At the start of this the Army was over-confident that the rebellion could be quickly suppressed. It regarded most of the guerillas who had retreated into the woods as “wobblers” (*kaum pembimbang*) and believed that Kahar Muzakkar was only really supported by a small group of die-hards. Besides, its members, as regular soldiers, had a very low opinion of the fighting capacity of their opponent. It estimated that there were only about 800 armed guerillas and felt that, had there been no interference from civilians who by sending a parliamentary mission to the area had hardened Kahar Muzakkar in his attitude, the matter would have been satisfactorily settled long before (IM 19-9-1951). Even later, when it turned out that the rebellion was not as easy to suppress as was originally believed, the Army maintained an outward appearance of confidence. At the end of 1952, when in an internal power struggle in the Army Warouw supplanted his superior, Colonel Gatot Subroto (who for his part had replaced Kawilarang in January of the same year), and took over the military command of East Indonesia, the supposition was even expressed that the rebellion would now probably soon end because there were strong ties of friendship between Warouw and the guerilla leaders (IM 12-12-1952). This supposition, which was far beside the truth, was prompted more by a desire to justify Warouw’s insubordination than by any aspiration to give an assessment of the real situation, however.

At first all did, in fact, go well for the Army. On the first day of the campaign Kahar Muzakkar’s headquarters at Barakka, north of Enrekang, were occupied and burnt down, with Kahar Muzakkar himself being forced to retreat to the Latumojang mountains. And at the end of October the Army claimed that its campaign was already half completed, Kahar Muzakkar’s troops having been put to flight and dispersed. Kahar Muzakkar had, in point of fact, been forced to move further inland and march in the direction of Siwa, with as ultimate destination the Batu Putih area. This latter was described by the Army as a good choice, as the region was most suitable for guerilla warfare and difficult for an outside enemy to attack (IM 15-9-1951, 31-10-1951). The Army in those first months engaged mainly in minor skirmishes

with the rebels, and in only a few larger-scale battles in which guerilla bands of between two and three hundred men were attacked. Contrary to its claim, the Army did not succeed in defeating the guerillas, however. Avoiding battle, the latter even extended their range of operations and guerilla groups were active in Wajo, in particular around Siwa and Sengkang, in Soppeng, notably around Parepare, and in Bone, Gowa, Jenepon-to and Bonthain. In fact, people had to be prepared for guerilla actions throughout the whole of South Sulawesi, including the city of Ujungpandang. The guerillas were moreover active in Southeast Sulawesi, especially around Kolaka and to the north.

That the guerillas were anything but defeated became painfully clear at the end of 1951. On New Year's Eve to celebrate the coming of the new year, and by way of reaction to the statement of Deputy Prime Minister Suwirjo (Suwiryo) that the rebellion in South Sulawesi no longer constituted a problem, they attacked the towns of Parepare, Malino, Malakaji and Jenepon-to, even entering the latter. In Ujungpandang, too, shots were fired.

The skirmishes and attacks in the last months of 1951 and the first months of the next year notwithstanding, neither Kahar Muzakkar nor the Republican Government altogether excluded the possibility of a peaceful solution. Kahar Muzakkar may even initially have intended his retreat into the forests as a tactical move aimed at strengthening his bargaining position in future negotiations. In any case, he ordered his men never to attack first, and to offer resistance only if there was no alternative (Tiardjono 1959:60).

The Republican Government for its part also made a number of gestures indicating that it did not yet consider a peaceful settlement out of the question, notably on discovering that Operation Freedom was not as successful as it had hoped. For it was obliged to admit as early as the end of 1952 that the so-called fortress or *benteng* strategy by means of which the Army had expected to be able to deal with the rebel problem had been a failure. This strategy, which before the Second World War the Dutch had used with some measure of success, involved the establishment of small outposts all over South Sulawesi, from which detachments were frequently sent on patrol into the interior. It was unsuccessful now as it required many more soldiers than the Army was able to provide, while communications between the outposts were poor because of the impassable terrain, making the isolated posts an easy prey for Kahar Muzakkar's bands. Even the build-up of Republican forces in the area from twelve battalions in

January 1952 to nineteen at the end of that year had little effect on the situation (Djarwadi 1965:32–33).

Forced by circumstances, after Kawilarang's replacement by Colonel Gatot Subroto, the Indonesian Government aimed at a peaceful settlement. Thus at a conference organized to discuss the security situation in Sulawesi in February 1952 it decided that a "politico-psychological" solution should have priority over a military one (Sulawesi 1953:348). In this connection it promised a pardon for all former members of the National Reserve Corps who had returned to society to build up a lawful existence of their own accord as well as the release of all prisoners who had formerly belonged to the National Reserve Corps. In its view, the prisoners who still remained to be released all belonged to the criminal category. The remainder, who did not, had already been released in May of the previous year. The Government further tried to persuade Kahar Muzakkar to resume negotiations, in spite of the failure of an earlier attempt in this direction at the end of 1951. These new attempts likewise proved in vain. Even so, part of Kahar Muzakkar's troops surrendered to the Indonesian Army between March and July.

##### 5. *Kahar Muzakkar and the Darul Islam Movement*

At the same time as the Republican Government was advocating a "politico-psychological" solution, Kahar Muzakkar was hardening his position. This was the period in which renewed relations were established between him and Kartosuwirjo. The first contact between them had been made in August of the previous year, when Kahar Muzakkar had taken to the bush. The latter had at that time been pressed through the agency of Buchari (Bukhari), then vice-chairman of the Islamic youth organization GPII, and Abdullah Riau Soshby, one of the top leaders of the Islamic Army of Indonesia in West Java, to establish a "*Kommandemen TII*" for Sulawesi. Kartosuwirjo had personally sent Kahar Muzakkar a letter offering him the Sulawesi command of the Islamic Army of Indonesia a few months later.

Kahar Muzakkar officially accepted this offer on January 20th, 1952. Thus he became commander of the Fourth Division of the Islamic Army of Indonesia, also called *Hasanuddin* Division. Sjamsul Bachri was appointed Military Governor of South Sulawesi. In a letter of the said date written by Kahar Muzakkar in acceptance of his appointment, he stated himself to feel grateful and to hold in high esteem the confidence shown him by Karto-

suwirjo through the decision to appoint him commander of the Islamic Army of Indonesia for Sulawesi. At the same time he was reluctant to fully commit himself, pointing out various circumstances which might impede any actions undertaken by him as commander of the Islamic Army. He further observed that of the five battalions commanded by him some included groups of non-Muslims who had been influenced by Communist ideas. He continued by stating that he had wanted to start an Islamic revolution as early as August 16th, 1951, and had had everything planned with his sub-commanders Saleh Sjahban and Abdul Fatah, but that the latter had proved inconsistent so that the plan had fallen through. He had been thwarted, he said, by a more powerful force with greater influence in society, namely “the feudalists and the common people”. About the Islamic population of South Sulawesi he observed that “it would take time to implant and cultivate the true Islamic spirit in them”. Kartosuwirjo replied in a letter of February 27th urging Kahar Muzakkar to do his utmost to make the population “Islam-minded” and “Islamic State-minded” and further to do anything else recommended by Islamic law in times of war (IM 13-5-1952, 14-5-1952).<sup>37</sup>

The contacts between the *Darul Islam* movement in South Sulawesi and in West Java do not seem to have been very close. There are no indications of any intensive sort of ideological guidance being provided by Kartosuwirjo. Nor does one get the impression that Kahar Muzakkar attached much value to the political concept of an Islamic State of Indonesia. Only for a relatively short time – in the years between August 1953 and 1960 – did he act in the name of the Islamic State of Indonesia.

Notwithstanding his appointment as regional commander of the Islamic Army of Indonesia, Kahar Muzakkar refrained for the moment from the use of this name for his troops. In March 1952, in fact, he renamed them *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat* (TKR), or People’s Liberation Army.<sup>38</sup> As an alternative to the *Pancasila* he put forward the concept of *Trisila*, or Three Pillars, viz.: Belief in the one and only God, social justice, and humanitarianism (IB 1-9-1954). Only on August 7th, 1953, exactly four years after Kartosuwirjo’s proclamation of his Islamic State, did Kahar Muzakkar represent Sulawesi and surrounding areas i.e., the rest of East Indonesia, including West Irian, as forming part of the Islamic State of Indonesia. At this same time he actually referred to his troops as the Islamic Army of Indonesia.<sup>39</sup> The decision to finally merge with the Islamic State had been taken at the end of

July, at a conference of guerilla leaders near Palopo. It is typical for the low frequency of contacts between Java and South Sulawesi that Kahar Muzakkar in fact proclaimed Sulawesi part of the Islamic Republican State of Indonesia, or *Negara Republik Islam Indonesia*, instead of simply the Islamic State of Indonesia.<sup>40</sup>

In the copy of the proclamation that was smuggled into Ujungpandang, Kahar Muzakkar furthermore announced that as from the date of issue of the proclamation his previous “total people’s defence plan” was cancelled, to be replaced by a general mobilization scheme. He ordered the local newspapers to publish the proclamation at the risk of being treated otherwise as enemies, with all the consequences that this might have. That this was not altogether an empty threat and that his troops were indeed very close at hand had been discovered the preceding days, when the heaviest fighting for two years had occurred around Ujungpandang as these troops had tried to disrupt communications between Ujungpandang and the surrounding area and to isolate the city. The sound of automatic weapons and mortars being fired had been audible even in the city. This was followed by more heavy fighting to the east and north of the city in the night of August 16th, when Republican troops attacked the rebels’ hide-outs (PR 8-8-1953, 21-8-1953; IB 4-11-1953).

In August 1953, moreover, Kahar Muzakkar started collecting taxes – e.g., a development tax, a ‘struggle’ tax, a livestock tax, and an income tax – in the name of the Islamic State (PR 14-8-1953). He founded a youth organization, called *Pemuda Islam Jihad*, while his wife Corry instituted a women-fighters’ corps, or *Lasykar Wanita* (PR 10-8-1953). In support of the proclamation Kahar Muzakkar urged the population to carry on with what he called “the Islamic revolution”, trying to persuade them to take his side and to repair and improve their mosques.

Kahar Muzakkar became even more involved in the Islamic State of Indonesia at his appointment on January 1st, 1955, as First Deputy Minister of Defence of a government of the Islamic State of Indonesia that covered the whole of the territory of the Indonesian Republic.

Kahar Muzakkar’s more aggressive policy in the early months of 1952 is attributed by some observers, in fact, to his contacts with the *Darul Islam* movement of West Java.<sup>41</sup> He himself justified his attacks on positions of the Indonesian Army and Government by describing them as a retaliation for the Army’s military actions against him. He did so explicitly in an order issued on April 5th,

1952, in which he referred to his *moment operasi*, whereby he instructed his troops to apply hit-and-run tactics, that is to say, to surprise the Republican troops with lightning attacks and to retreat before the army could strike back, as a return action for the Army's *sweeps operasi*. These purely military tactics were to be combined with psychological warfare, in which the most was to be made of the crimes of the Indonesian Government (Sulawesi 1953:350).

Besides the Indonesian Army's actions and the possible influence of Kartosuwirjo, there is yet another factor that should be considered in explaining Kahar Muzakkar's change in attitude, namely the Indonesian Government's current attempts to induce his subcommanders to defect and let themselves be integrated into the Indonesian Army. Kahar Muzakkar announced his *moment operasi* on April 5th. The official incorporation into the Republican Army of one of his subcommanders, Andi Sose, and his detachment had become a fact one day earlier.

At the conference of guerilla commanders preceding the proclamation of Sulawesi as part of the Islamic State of Indonesia, a constitution of the *Negara Republik Islam Indonesia*, or, as it was also called, *Republik Islam Indonesia*, was drafted. This constitution is known as the Makalua Charter, after the place where the conference was held.

The Makalua Charter is one of the surviving documents that can give us at least some insight into the nature of Kahar Muzakkar's movement. Another is a pamphlet written by Kahar Muzakkar entitled *Tjataan Bathin Pedjoang Islam Revolusioner* (Notes on the Morality of the Revolutionary Islamic Fighter). Both documents are quoted in part by Bahar Mattaliu (1965:50–57) and Radik Djarwadi (1963:12–17). It would be an understatement to say that these two were no friends of Kahar Muzakkar's. Bahar Mattaliu had long been a comrade in arms of his, joining him already in the fighting in Java during the Indonesian struggle for independence, and following Kahar Muzakkar when the latter had finally taken to the bush in 1951, where for a time he had been one of his most trusted commanders. The relation between the two men had gradually deteriorated, however, until finally in 1959 Bahar Mattaliu defected. After his return to Indonesian society he wrote a book on Kahar Muzakkar to whitewash himself and to blacken Kahar Muzakkar. The passages of the two documents quoted by him are clearly intended to represent Kahar Muzakkar as an immoral blackguard hungry for power and money.



The documents testify in the first place that, compared with the *Darul Islam* movement in West Java, Kahar Muzakkar placed greater emphasis on the social and economic organization of the state. The Sulawesi *Darul Islam* documents contain more, and more precise, articles regulating the social and economic life.

The second point that emerges from them is that Kahar Muzakkar aimed at the creation of an egalitarian, and in some respects puritan, kind of society. He was keen to eliminate all vestiges of traditional social forms, envisaged a modest land reform, and aimed at erasing differences in personal wealth in general. Lack of experience and proper guidance brought most of these well-intentioned regulations to naught in practice, however, which obviously was all grist to Bahar Mattaliu's mill.

Neither of the said two main tendencies was very new. Kahar Muzakkar was a long-standing enemy of the traditional rulers and had come into conflict with the *adat* leaders as early as 1943. A proportion of his followers, too, moreover wanted social reform. The traditional rulers' initial backing of the proclamation of Indonesian independence and the subsequent strong Dutch military presence in the area may well have prevented the outbreak here of a "social revolution" of the kind that took place in Pekalongan and Aceh. There were some indications of the rudimentary start of such a social revolution in 1950, after the Dutch had left and before the Republican Government had established its control over the region. So Jusuf Bauti observed at the end of 1950 that there were signs in the direction of a "social revolution" in Makale. The groups that favoured the abolition of traditional institutions and practices were very strong according to him (N 11-12-1950). A similar situation was reported for Mandar, where Republican guerillas tried to eliminate the traditional rulers by force even during the revolution. A number of them had been killed, in fact. Nevertheless, the relevant trend never gained momentum, as the ruler of the region, the Maraddia of Balanipa, espoused the Republican cause. It was he, too, who was elected head of the Civil Administration of his district by the people in 1950 (Masri 1959:10). These same tendencies are discernible in the objectives of GUKRINDO, which was founded by Kahar Muzakkar in 1951. As is apparent from its statutes, its aims included the protection of the people against monopoly capitalism, the establishment of institutions for the education of the people and of policlinics in the villages, and the eradication of illiteracy and unemployment (N 14-4-1951).

Kahar Muzakkar tried to stamp out traditional practices in

South Sulawesi by tackling their outward trappings. So the Makalua Charter provides for the suppression of the use, deliberate or unintentional, of traditional titles or honorifics. Accordingly the use of such titles as *andi*, *daeng*, *gede-bagus*, *teuku* and *raden* was prohibited. In his zeal to establish equality he also prohibited the use of such a purely Islamic title as *haji*, as well as any generally used terms of respect, as *bapak* or *ibu*, branding these terms feudal, too. The Makalua Charter furthermore declared war on all persons of noble or aristocratic descent who refused to give up their titles, as well as on fanatic mystical groups (art. 15–16).

Part of the Makalua Charter is devoted to the regulation of marriage. Some of the relevant stipulations are quite plain and easy to understand. So the Charter prescribes that everyone who breaks the rules of Islamic law on social intercourse and on relations between the sexes shall be prosecuted. Then there are rules designed to restrict the costs of marriage (art. 44, 47). Other regulations create rather an odd impression on first reading, on the other hand. So it is stipulated that people who oppose polygamy shall be prosecuted and that no proposal of marriage may be rejected except where the suitor is a juvenile, is impotent, is suffering from a contagious disease, or is of abject character (art. 45, 46). Much has been made of these latter two articles by Bahar Mattaliu and Radik Djarwadi, as they allegedly tacitly legitimize promiscuity, as of the abuses for which they give scope. Boland (1971:66) points out, however, that the article on polygamy was “intended as a solution to the social problem of widows of the war dead, and may therefore be considered an authentic Islamic solution”.<sup>42</sup>

The section of the Makalua Charter regulating “the way of life and the proprietary rights of the Mujahidin [Fighters in the way of Allah] and their families in the revolutionary process” testifies most clearly to the rebels’ egalitarian ideals. The purchase and ownership of cattle and land, as well as of shops, factories, hire-cars, sailing proas, etc., was prohibited, except with the permission of the revolutionary organization (art. 49). This article later provided the starting-point for the implementation of modest land reforms. The manner of implementation was later defined in more detail by Kahar Muzakkar. On this subject Bahar Mattaliu writes that “in the ‘Notes on the Morality of the Revolutionary Islamic Fighter’ the prohibition on the ownership of land, *sawahs* and *ladangs*, cattle and luxury houses by members of the *Darul Islam* is also stressed”. All such property was to be handed over to the revolutionary organization, to be thereupon sold according

to regulations laid down by Kahar Muzakkar in the “interests of the revolution” (Mattaliu 1965:45). By “revolutionary organization” is probably meant the monopolistic government trading organization founded by Kahar Muzakkar under the curious name *Usaha Rahasia Khusus Organisasi*, which may be translated as “The Organization’s Special Secret Venture”.

Another part of the same section deals with the ownership of personal effects by “revolutionary Islamic Fighters” and their families. So they were forbidden to own or wear gold and jewelry, to wear clothes made of expensive materials such as wool or silk, to use pomade, lipstick or face-powder, and to consume foods and beverages bought in towns under enemy control, such as milk, chocolate, butter, cheese, canned meat or fish, biscuits, wheat, cane sugar and tea (art. 50). If such goods had come rightfully into the possession of the current owner, then the revolutionary organization was to buy or borrow them; if, on the other hand, the goods had been acquired through “moral deception”, they were to be confiscated (art. 52).<sup>43</sup>

Stricter rules still in this connection were laid down in the ‘Notes on the Morality of the Revolutionary Islamic Fighter’. Here Kahar Muzakkar pursues the point of a moral and spiritual revolution. According to Bahar Mattaliu he became convinced of the necessity of such a revolution on perceiving the behaviour of his men and on realizing that no revolution could succeed the people’s support. He moreover believed that no material improvement was possible without a revolutionary change in thinking (Simatupang and Lapien 1978:10).

On hearing the people’s complaints and witnessing the “moral crisis” and “the inclination of his men towards pleasure and a life of luxury”, Kahar Muzakkar embarked upon a campaign of primitive socialism. This campaign was to start on March 1st, 1955, and was planned to last six months, during which period Kahar Muzakkar’s soldiers and their families would have to hand in all possessions which Kahar Muzakkar considered to be of a luxury or superfluous nature. Gold and polished diamonds would have to be “lent” to the Military Government, which would convert these objects into cash through trusted dealers in the towns. With the money collected in this way weapons and other necessities of war would be purchased. All persons who so surrendered their gold and diamonds would be compensated as soon as the situation became stable. The regulation also applied to wrist watches, which were allowed only for military purposes, gas-

lamps and radios, which were only allowed on military or government premises. It was furthermore stipulated that no family might save more than Rp. 30.— a month, while the wardrobes of soldiers and their families were also made subject to stringent restrictions (cf. Mattaliu 1965:50–57), with Kahar Muzakkar urging them to hand over all clothing in excess of the prescribed maximum to people who were in greater need of it, or otherwise to sell it to the Government.<sup>44</sup>

As in the Makalua Charter, rules on the consumption of food and drinks were also laid down here. Soldiers and their families were forbidden to smoke foreign cigarettes, and to eat or drink chocolate-milk, butter, cheese, canned fish and “other delicacies originating from the cities”, except if seized in battle or produced by the owner himself.

The strict observance of these rules seems to have given rise to certain excesses. So Bahar Mattaliu complains how he “was filled with compassion at the sight of wives of members of the DI/TII who were pregnant or who had just given birth with pale faces and thin bodies because the Notes on Morality forbade them to eat tasty foods and drink wholesome drinks” (Mattaliu 1965:45). He also hints that no-one knew whether weapons and other necessities of war actually were purchased with the proceeds from the goods handed in by the people.

In the same year that the moral revolution was scheduled to take place, a conference organized by Bahar Mattaliu was held at Wanua Waru which resulted in the drafting of a Revolutionary Islamic Program, or *Program Islam Revolusioner*. One of the points agreed upon here was that polygamy should be propagated. This conference was also attended by a representative of the *Darul Islam* movement in Aceh.

Kahar Muzakkar, in an attempt to give substance to his ideas, proceeded to establish policlinics, schools and hospitals and an academy of literary science. To help the latter to the necessary materials his troops ransacked the library of Majene, where 2,500 titles were reported to have disappeared (IB 11-1-1955). He also kidnapped doctors to work at his policlinics.

Kahar Muzakkar was a pious Muslim. Although occasionally Christians were victims of the raids conducted by his troops, of which cases much was usually made, it appears that the people concerned were only killed if they resisted the rebels and refused to give them food and information. As a rule civilians — Muslims and Christians alike — were well treated by him. Thus it was reported that “the bands under Kahar Muzakkar still respected

human rights” . . . and . . . “what was a fact was that the bands exerted pressure upon Muslims to comply faithfully with the demands of God and pray five times daily” (IB 26-9-1954).

### 6. *Rifts Within the Rebel Force*

The Republican Army tried to deal with the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion by means of a series of military operations and, especially in the early years of the rising by attempts at disaffecting segments of the rebel force. Where this latter point was concerned, the Republican Army was able to take advantage of quarrels among the guerillas themselves. These disputes were occasioned partly by personal ambitions and animosities, partly by ideological differences as regards the course the rebellion should take.

After the constitution of the *Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan* it was joined by some twelve guerilla groups. Opinions on the total strength of these forces, sometimes referred to as battalions, and the quality of their soldiers varied. Officers of the official Republican Army, as we have seen, tended to entertain a rather low opinion of the strength, morale and fighting capacity of the guerillas, considering the majority of them as mere bandits. They were prepared to admit at most three to four thousand guerillas to the Army. This was about one third of the total number of guerillas, whose strength must have lain at somewhere between ten and twelve thousand. Even this latter figure may represent a moderate guess. The Department of Information (Sulawesi 1953:336) quotes a figure of 15,000, Feith (1962:213) mentions one of 20,000, and Natsir (Sulawesi 1953:351) speaks of “not 10,000 . . . but a multiple of this number”.<sup>45</sup> Putting the number of those demobilized at between five and six thousand, and those integrated into the army at another four thousand, the number of guerillas must still have exceeded ten thousand.

As we saw above, in the second half of 1950 there seemed to be certain prospects of a compromise between the guerillas and the Republican Army. Pending a definitive settlement, and in the belief that a *Hasanuddin* Brigade would take shape in the near future, the guerillas began to prepare themselves for the formation of such a brigade. An internal reorganization was undertaken. As was mentioned earlier, five battalions – the *Bau Maseppe* Battalion in Parepare, the *Batu Putih* Battalion in Palopo, the *Arief Rate* Battalion in Bonthain, the *Wolter Mongisidi* Battalion in Enrekang, and the *40,000* Battalion in Rappang –

were formed, together constituting the *Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin*.

In the weeks preceding the day fixed for the official integration of the National Reserve Corps, the first internal conflicts among Kahar Muzakkar's followers broke out when Andi Selle chose the Government's side in the question of whether or not the integration of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi should take place battalion by battalion.

The incorporation of Andi Selle's *Bau Masseppe* Battalion into the Army as the Battalion 719 on August 7th, 1951, only aggravated the conflict between Kahar Muzakkar and the Army still further. Nevertheless, not the entire *Bau Masseppe* Battalion followed its commander, but part of it with Hamid Gali and Usman Balo as principal leaders, remained loyal to Kahar Muzakkar. After some fighting with Andi Selle's followers they retreated to another part of Parepare and formed a new battalion, commanded by Hamid Gali (Sulawesi 1953:344). Nor were the ties between Kahar Muzakkar and Andi Selle completely severed, and in time the relation between the two improved again. Bahar Mattaliu mentions Andi Selle as one of Kahar Muzakkar's principal sources of weapons, in fact, saying, "This meant that raw materials continued to be sent by Kahar to Andi Selle, who paid for these with bullets, with heavy and light arms, and with army uniforms" (Mattaliu 1965:40).

Yet more followers of Kahar Muzakkar became disaffected when the Republican Army, in consequence of its "politico-psychological" approach, in March 1952 re-opened the opportunity for them to be incorporated into the Army or return to society without further ado. The Eastern Indonesia Territorial Command announced that it was prepared to recognize the former guerillas as soldiers and expressed the hope that a number of guerilla units might be integrated soon. The term set for the operation of the amnesty offer was from March 11th till June 10th. The Army repeated its appeal and reiterated its preparedness to admit all "true" guerillas in a communique of May 10th.

In early April, during another of Mrs. Salawati Daud's peace missions it became apparent that some of Kahar Muzakkar's sub-commanders were prepared to accept the amnesty offer. Although Mrs. Salawati Daud's mission was only partly successful, as she did meet Kahar Muzakkar but failed to persuade him to surrender, she did bring back letters from Hamid Gali and Usman Balo, both from the *Bau Masseppe* Battalion, and from Sjamsul Bachri of the 40,000 Battalion, and Azis Taba, of the

*Arief Rate* Battalion, stating that they and their men were willing to enter the Army as soon as possible (IM 11-4-1952).

Hamid Gali and Usman Balo soon changed their minds again, but the incorporation of the other battalions eventuated. On May 25th the *Arief Rate* Battalion became Battalion 722, and the 40,000 Battalion the Battalion 723. The latter, however, was not commanded by Sjamsul Bachri but by M. Arief, as Sjamsul Bachri had stayed in the bush and remained loyal to Kahar Muzakkar. Nor did the whole of the *Arief Rate* Battalion join the Republican Army. Besides guerillas of the 40,000 and *Arief Rate* Battalions, members of the *Wolter Mongisidi* Battalion also reported to the Army authorities. For the commander of the latter, Andi Sose, this opportunity provided by the Army came at just the right moment, as he had come into serious conflict with Kahar Muzakkar and had even contemplated forming his own independent guerilla force. He and his men were integrated into the Republican Army as the Battalion 720. In the same period smaller guerilla groups and bands which had not entered the KGSS or the National Reserve Corps, such as the *Lipang Bajeng* and the *Mobile Brigade Jeneponto*, surrendered as well.

On expiry of the term of the amnesty the Army cleared parts of Palopo, Wajo, Enrekang and Southeast Sulawesi of civilians who had not been living and working there for some time already. In this way it hoped to isolate the guerillas and to facilitate the operations of its own troops. Guerillas surrendering after the deadline were not treated as well as the larger groups that had reported earlier. When a small group of guerillas surrendered in July and expressed the wish to enter the Army, it was refused, as this did not fit in with the Army Command's and Central Government's plans to keep the size of the Army down as much as possible. Instead, these men were to be sent to other parts of Indonesia in conjunction with the transmigration scheme the Government had evolved for former guerillas.

Worried by the mass defection of his troops, Kahar Muzakkar set about reorganizing what remained of them. Again he formed five battalions, sometimes also referred to as brigades: the *Latumojang* Battalion, commanded by Hamid Gali and with Usman Balo as second in command, which operated around Enrekang and Parepare; the *Batu Putih* Battalion, commanded by Andi Tenriadjeng, which operated between Palopo and Siwa; the *Lereng Cinta* Battalion, commanded by Bahar Mattaliu, which operated in Soppeng; the *Rante Mario* Battalion, commanded by Sanusi Daris, which operated in Enrekang; and the 40,000 Battal-

ion, commanded by Sjamsul Bachri, which operated in Wajo.<sup>46</sup> To bring his troops up to strength again he conceived the idea of giving the population in the regions under his control some rudimentary military training. Not much came of these plans, however, although he did succeed in recruiting a number of new soldiers, even from among the youth, while the *Lereng Cinta* Battalion even trained a number of secondary school pupils (IB 11-1-1955).

The most serious setback suffered by Kahar Muzakkar in those initial years of his rising came at the end of 1952. In December of that year a rebellion within a rebellion, brought about by internal factors, took place. Starting as a conflict between sub-commanders about the territories under the control of their respective units and the rights of other units to enter these, it soon assumed an ideological dimension. Kahar Muzakkar had assigned each of his battalions a fixed area at the time of the reorganization of his Army. The realities of guerilla warfare and the pursuit of the guerillas by the Republican Army had made the crossing of the boundaries between these inevitable, however. So in December 1952 Usman Balo of the *Latumojang* Battalion entered the territory of the *Rante Mario* Battalion. There was subsequently some fighting, in which units of the latter battalion were put to flight. Kahar Muzakkar thereupon took Usman Balo to task for the conduct of his men, levelling the accusation against them of betrayal of the ideals of the struggle of the rebelling guerillas by stooping to rape and plunder.<sup>47</sup> Usman Balo did not bother to reply and proceeded to sever all ties with Kahar Muzakkar.

To start off with, he and Hamid Gali again sent a written request to the authorities to be admitted to the Army as regular soldiers. This request was refused by the Army, however, which pointed out that the incorporation of Usman Balo's and Hamid Gali's units would be in contradiction with the plans for its future development. It was having trouble enough with lack of discipline among its own soldiers and the admission of members of guerilla bands who for the greater part had lost their morale and discipline would only aggravate the problem (IB 12-10-1953).

This possibility thus for the time being precluded, Usman Balo and Hamid Gali now had to defend themselves against the Republican Army as well as against Kahar Muzakkar's troops. Kahar Muzakkar, who had sworn to annihilate them, had given his troops orders to attack the defectors at every opportunity.



Usman Balo was subsequently attacked, defeated and put to flight. He then turned for protection to the Republican detachment of his former commander, Andi Selle. The latter handled the situation very skilfully, defending Usman Balo's troops not only against Kahar Muzakkar's attacks and thus giving them a reprieve, but also against the Republican troops who were after Usman Balo. As a result fighting occurred among Republican soldiers themselves.<sup>48</sup>

For a while it looked as though Usman Balo and Hamid Gali would lay down their arms, both issuing statements to the effect that they supported the government of Soekarno and were willing to enter the Republican Army, Usman Balo adding that it was better to betray Kahar Muzakkar, who had deviated from the principles of the struggle for independence, than the revolution itself. Subsequently, on November 30th, 1953, 1,200 of Hamid Gali's guerillas reported themselves, after the Army, more or less under pressure from Soekarno, had re-opened the opportunity accordingly. However, they pulled the same trick Kahar Muzakkar had played in August 1951 and returned to the bush after receiving food, money and clothing from the Republican Army (Alers 1956:265). Thereat they once more began disturbing the peace in the northern and eastern parts of Parepare, a region that was extremely difficult of access to the Republican Army. By the end of 1953 they had regained control of the roads in this area and were obstructing the traffic passing along them again. As in the case of certain other guerilla leaders, also outside Sulawesi, there were many tales circulating about the supposed wealth amassed by Usman Balo in robbing and stealing. He allegedly possessed as many as ten bags of gold and a pistol case of pure gold (IB 9-2-1954, 3-3-1954).

By that time the latter's conflict with Kahar Muzakkar had assumed an ideological character. Usman Balo rejected the *Darul Islam* course that Kahar Muzakkar was now publicly pursuing and advocated communism instead. To what extent their ideological differences constituted a cause or were only a consequence of the conflict between them is difficult to say. Owing to lack of data it is impossible to assess how consistent and well-defined Usman Balo's communist philosophy was, as well as in what way it differed from Kahar Muzakkar's ideas on social change. In any case, upon Kahar Muzakkar's changing the name of his force from *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat* to *Tentara Islam Indonesia* in August 1953, Usman Balo and Hamid Gali continued operating under the former name.

The Republican Army left nothing undone to exploit the rift. It sent officers to the rivals' respective headquarters to make sure there was no reconciliation between Kahar Muzakkar and Usman Balo, and even to aggravate the conflict (Djarwadi 1959:145). This conflict reached its peak in December 1954, when a three-day battle was fought between the rivals' respective forces to the north-east of Pinrang starting on December 14th. Here Kahar Muzakkar put into the field about 900 soldiers commanded by Sjamsul Bachri. Hamid Gali, who was his major target, had to deploy his entire force and was even obliged to mobilize the male population of the area under his control. Later, after Kahar Muzakkar's troops succeeded in occupying the TKR headquarters, Usman Balo and 300 of his guerillas came to Hamid Gali's aid.

Kahar Muzakkar's troops would have been able to deal the TKR its death-blow at this time had not the Republican Army decided that it could well use the TKR in the suppression of the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion. Of all the existing rebel forces it considered the TKR the weakest as well as ideologically the least far removed from the Republican State. Moreover, if it won over the TKR, it could have the assistance in its operations of soldiers who knew the area well and could provide information on the whereabouts of Kahar Muzakkar's troops.

Accordingly the Republican units engaged in the campaign against Kahar Muzakkar decided to give the TKR some breathing space. In return the TKR assisted the Republican Army in its pursuit of Kahar Muzakkar's troops, who now in their turn were forced to retreat under the Army's attacks. When in January a second battle was fought between the TKR and TII, the Republican Army went to the aid of the former. The following month, when the TKR and TII engaged in their third battle, it looked for a short time as though the Republican Army would attack the TKR as well, despite the fact that a tacit understanding appeared to have been reached between the latter two. But headquarters had issued orders to the effect that the troops in the field should attack both guerilla forces – the TKR and as well the TII – so that these now faced the problem of which of the two guerilla forces to attack first. It took a while for them to reach the decision to pursue their previous course and to attack the positions of the TII while trying to secure the cooperation of the TKR.

There was no more fighting between the Republican Army and the TKR from the end of February 1955 onwards, when the

cooperation between the two was consolidated. In August they held a joint celebration of Indonesia's independence at the TKR's headquarters. On this occasion the "sacred" red and white flag which had been the first Republican flag to be hoisted in Rappang, and which had been kept by Hamid Gali and Usman Balo for almost ten years, was flown (PR 23-8-1955). In consequence of the truce between the Republican Army and the TKR the military posts in the area were gradually dismantled and replaced by Police ones. But it was to be another two years before the TKR was finally integrated into the Republican Army, in October 1957 (cf. Djarwadi 1959).

### 7. Consolidation

The Republican Army's operations against TKR and TII concentrations briefly described above formed part of the *Operasi Hali-lintar*, or Thunderbolt Operation, launched in October 1952. In the first years the results of this operation were meagre. Later, at the end of the 1950's, the tide turned, however.

In the beginning the initiative remained with Kahar Muzakkar. His troops controlled large parts of the rural districts, isolating the Army in the towns and cities. Even these were not safe, however, and the towns people, too, had to be constantly on the alert against attacks by *Darul Islam* troops. Army efforts to keep the roads open were futile. Road travel was possible, but only under armed escort. Wherever they could people travelled by sea. By mid-1954 the situation had grown so grave that there were fears of the rebelling guerillas' sealing off Ujungpandang from its hinterland unless there was a change for the better. Provisions could only reach the city by sea, and it was apprehended that the people of Ujungpandang would in the very near future suffer directly from the rebellion. Also indicative of the serious situation is the fact that a Government party on an inspection tour to Bone was forced to travel by sea because the roads in the interior were impassable.

Compared with the rest of South Sulawesi Ujungpandang and environs were still relatively well off. The areas which suffered most, and had the highest number of refugees, were Bone, Luwu, and Parepare. In mid-1955 there were reported to be about 290,000 refugees in the whole of Sulawesi, over 88,000 of them in Bone, over 96,000 in Luwu, and over 45,000 in Parepare. These figures admittedly are slightly distorted, being released immediately after a military operation in Bone during which

many houses were burnt down. Other official figures usually show Luwu and Parepare to have the highest number of fugitives. In Luwu it was particularly the region around Palopo from which people fled, though there were also many refugees in the extreme north, near the border with Southeast Sulawesi. The situation of these refugees was deplorable. The government tried to relieve their suffering to some extent by sending food and clothing. But there were still people dying of hunger, and many others suffering from extreme malnutrition and beriberi (PR 31-5-1955, IB 5-4-1955).

The towns of Palopo and Parepare, having large concentrations of rebelling guerillas in their vicinity, became the latter's target a number of times. At the end of 1952 about 3,000 people fled the town of Parepare for fear of an imminent attack by Kahar Muzakkar's troops. In 1955 again over 2,000 of Kahar Muzakkar's soldiers were concentrated in the area in an effort to gain control of the rice fields around Parepare. A year previously Kahar Muzakkar had mobilized his troops for an attack on Palopo, but had seen his plans thwarted by Republican troops.

The situation in the *kabupaten* of Mandar was also extremely difficult. The roads here were still virtually impassable as late as 1959, as many bridges had been destroyed either by floods or by the *Darul Islam* forces. Communications with the rest of Sulawesi had almost come to a stop. The only means of reaching the outside world — and hence of importing rice and exporting copra — was by proa. No motor-vessels called at any of the ports of the area except to supply the Armed Forces (Masri 1959:3).

As in 1950 and 1951, there were many people who, mindful of the guerillas' merits during the struggle for independence, continued urging for a solution through negotiations. The Eastern Indonesia Army Command at first adopted a moderate attitude, and as a result succeeded in the first half of 1952 in luring away some of Kahar Muzakkar's subcommanders. When after the October Affair J.W. Warouw took over the command of the Republican Army it became much more uncompromising, however.

One of Warouw's first acts in his new function was the rejection of a peace offer by Kahar Muzakkar in December 1952. The latter, inspired by the October Affair, had sent a letter to Soekarno in which he stated himself to be prepared to support the President in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Republican Armed Forces, and one to Warouw suggesting that his and Warouw's forces should cooperate in keeping the peace in South

Sulawesi. The Army immediately replied that it wanted to hear nothing of such a suggestion, however, with the spokesman for the command, Captain Rahasia, flatly stating at a press conference that it could not cooperate with rebels. It further announced that Operation Thunderbolt would be continued. All rebels wishing to return to society would have an opportunity to do so, on condition that all those who had been involved in criminal acts should be handed over to the appropriate authorities for punishment. Under no circumstances would those surrendering be accepted into the Army, however (IM 12-2-1952, 18-12-1952).

Warouw and his command displayed the same uncompromising attitude in February of the next year, when President Soekarno visited South Sulawesi and asked Kahar Muzakkar to give himself up – one of Soekarno's many personal attempts to persuade rebellious groups in Indonesia to cease fighting. This particular visit of Soekarno's was part of a kind of tour of special trouble-spots. Before coming to South Sulawesi he had been to Kalimantan, in fact, where there had also been a rising of former guerillas, who some time later were to join the *Darul Islam* movement. The tour was an indication of the tension and nervousness prevailing in the first years after 1949, when the Republican Government was confronted with all kinds of major and minor uprisings and internal disturbances and conflicts.<sup>49</sup>

Kahar Muzakkar had written his above-mentioned letters to Soekarno and J.F. Warouw just two months prior to Soekarno's visit to South Sulawesi. There was some hope of a settlement being reached. There were even rumours circulating of a meeting between Kahar Muzakkar and Soekarno at the latter's visit to Parepare. Soekarno himself did not exclude a peaceful solution, either. In his speech at Parepare, in fact, he indirectly appealed to Kahar Muzakkar to come out of the bush, saying that "The independence of Indonesia is not the property of Bung Karno or of the people in the cities alone, but of the guerillas, of Kahar Muzakkar, of Hamid Gali, and of others as well" (PR 6-2-1953). The emphasis on unity and the desire to bury past differences are also evident from a written message left behind by Soekarno in Pangkajene. In it he said, "People of Pangkajene, Indonesia's independence is the fruit of our common struggle. Let us be watchful that there does not come a point where it is disgraced by our own acts" (PR 6-2-1953).

The Republican Army thought otherwise, however. Captain Rahasia immediately reacted by warning people not to get the

wrong idea about Soekarno's words. He hastened to point out that the Eastern Indonesia Army Command considered Soekarno's speech logical and understandable, and agreed that independence was the property of one and all – of people in the towns and cities as well as in the countryside. On the other hand, however, it regarded everyone who upset that independence, whether they lived in the bush or anywhere else, as a rebel. He stressed that Kahar Muzakkar's troops constituted an illegal organization against which the Army was obliged to take action. He further pointed out that if Kahar Muzakkar was indeed fighting for justice and prosperity, he must admit that every citizen had the legal duty to hand over criminals to the authorities and agree that equal treatment should be given to all, whether they be his own followers, many of whom had joined him only recently, or Army soldiers who had fought and suffered in the performance of their duty for years. He wondered whether it was wise to try and solve the problems in South Sulawesi simply by admitting all of Kahar Muzakkar's men as soldiers of the Army, pointing out that the guerillas were asking recognition as such exactly at a time when the Republican Government was forced to retrench and to send hundreds of thousands of its soldiers back into society. The only gesture the Army was prepared to make was to admit Kahar Muzakkar's guerillas to the so-called development units, in which former guerillas who wanted to return to civilian life were collected. If Kahar Muzakkar agreed to this, then the Army for its part would show its good faith by releasing all prisoners who had merely been followers of Kahar Muzakkar's (IM 13-2-1953; PR 6-2-1953). A few days later Warouw intimated that it was not altogether out of the question that the demand of Kahar Muzakkar and his guerillas for admission to the Army would be partially met, in view of the Army's need for specialists, under observance of the normal procedures. If agreement on this point could be reached with Kahar Muzakkar, his Command would press for its acceptance by the authorities, Warouw asserted (IM 7-2-1953). Considering the low esteem in which the Army held the rebels' technical capacity, Warouw's kind words in reality implied nothing other than a flat refusal to integrate a significant number of guerillas into the Army.

In October, while on a second short visit to Sulawesi, Soekarno repeated his appeal to the guerillas and pleaded with Kahar Muzakkar once more to return to the right path and call a halt to the disturbances in the island. Army opposition notwithstanding,

Soekarno's renewed appeal signified a new opportunity for the guerillas to surrender. Leaflets explaining that they would have a chance to report to the authorities between October 20th and November 1st were dropped by plane. The Army nevertheless made it clear that Soekarno's appeals would in no way affect its military operations, which would continue as usual. It regarded Soekarno's speech only as a guide to the tactics to be adopted in the case of rebels reporting themselves, and stressed that bargaining about the conditions of surrender was ruled out. The rebels were an undisciplined lot and would never be admitted to the Army *en bloc* (PR 21-10-1953; IB 12-10-1953).

At first the appeal seemed to be having some success, with Warouw even announcing that as many as 12,500 rebels were prepared to surrender. It was moreover rumoured that Kahar Muzakkar had panicked because of the large number of his followers in favour of replying to Soekarno's appeal. He was reportedly on the run in fear of capture by his own men. All these reports turned out to be ungrounded and inspired by mere wishful thinking, however. The rebels mentioned by Warouw were the soldiers of Usman Balo and Hamid Gali, who did, in fact, report but returned to the jungle again shortly afterwards, upon its becoming clear that the Army had no intention at all of honouring Hamid Gali's persistent claim that all of his men should be incorporated into the Army first and about two-thirds demobilized later (IB 19-11-1953, 8-12-1953, 13-12-1953; PR 7-12-1953, 27-12-1953).

Soekarno made his third appeal in May of the next year. This time he warned that he could not go on forever asking the guerillas to lay down their arms, and that his patience might run out, in which event he would give all branches of the Armed Services orders to crush the rebels (PR 7-5-1954). Again the appeal was in vain. Although the then Vice-Premier, Wongsonegoro, reported the surrender of two-thirds of the rebels, his statement was far beside the truth and it is not clear where he obtained his information. The Central Government, in the belief that at least thousands were involved, sent a team to South Sulawesi to arrange their reception. On arrival there was a big surprise awaiting this team, for only a few individuals turned out to have surrendered. There was even a figure of only nine quoted (IB 11-9-1954).

One of the reasons for the Republican Army's early lack of success in the area was that the partially East Javanese units had to fight on unfamiliar terrain and in unfriendly surrounding. This

put them at a serious disadvantage, the more so because the topography of the region made it difficult for them to benefit from their superior arms. It was sometimes impossible to give soldiers on field patrol artillery support. Because of lack of communication artillery or air support usually came either too late or not at all.

Kahar Muzakkar's guerillas, moreover, adhering to the principles of their leader's *moment operasi*, avoided battle where possible wherever circumstances were not in their favour. It took the Republican troops years to evolve a method of dealing with these guerilla tactics. To make things worse for the Army, co-ordination between the separate guerilla units improved with time, while Kahar Muzakkar also succeeded in stepping up the fighting capacity of his troops. This latter he accomplished by forming four crack units, partly for the purpose of crushing the revolt of Balo's *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat*. These were named *Momok*, an abbreviation for *Moment Mobile Kommando*, which is perhaps best translated as Instantaneous Mobile Commando. The four *Momok* units each had its own standard in the colour expressed by its name – red, black, green and white – with the Muslim *bulan bintang*, or crescent and star, painted on it (PR 3-3-1955). According to a Battalion 711 intelligence report from early 1955, Kahar Muzakkar personally commanded the white one, while the green, the black and the red *Momok* were under the command of Pattawari, Sjamsul Bachri and Andi Masse respectively (Djarwadi 1959:146).

Radik Djarwadi (1965), analysing the various military struggles in the first decade after independence, distinguishes two separate phases in South Sulawesi. The first was the period between 1950 and 1954, when Kahar Muzakkar's troops operated in small numbers in small and isolated pockets – fifty-five in South and Southeast Sulawesi in 1952, according to him. The year 1954 marked a change in the situation. Then, in the second phase, between 1955 and 1958, the guerilla force displayed a vast improvement in its manoeuvring ability, as was evident, according to him, from the fact that "the enemy never fell into the traps set by us in advance" (Djarwadi 1965, III:62–63).

In general this evaluation of Radik Djarwadi's is correct. Nevertheless, Kahar Muzakkar was occasionally able to put larger concentrations of troops into the field before 1954, while the Republican Army was not totally without significant successes after that year. The latter gained a few victories where it was able to engage larger concentrations of the enemy in battle and bring



into action its heavy artillery as well as the combat planes of the Air Force, with which it dealt the *Darul Islam* troops some serious blows. In some of these operations the Navy also participated, not only for the purpose of shelling the coast, but also in order to stop Kahar Muzakkar's pirate ships from attacking trading-vessels, as they occasionally did.

The Army's only successful operations as a rule were those carried out along the coast. In the interior it experienced much more difficulty in mounting effective offensives. In 1953 and 1954 large-scale attacks on guerilla concentrations involving units of the Army, Navy and Air Force were launched, for instance, against concentrations of *Darul Islam* units which had their base in the swamps to the north and east of Ujungpandang, from where they occasionally infiltrated into the city. In September 1955 another combined operation was launched on the coast of Bone Bay, where hundreds of rebels were killed. During the latter attack rebels fleeing from the Republican Army became an easy prey for the combat planes of the Air Force as they tried to cross Bone Bay by canoe to retreat into the *Darul Islam* areas in South-east Sulawesi. Two months later Government troops landed at Wawo, in Southeast Sulawesi, to occupy one of the rebels' civil and military administrative centres (PR 26-9-1955, 9-11-1955).

Not only the ineffectualness but also the bloody nature of the Army's offensives attracted criticism. So the prominent politician from South Sulawesi Bebas Daeng Lalo, in a last appeal for a peaceful solution to the conflict in early 1955, asserted that what was needed was an operation that claimed few victims and had a great deal of effect, instead of one which, as was currently the case, claimed many victims and had little effect. At the same time he once again took out of mothballs the proposal to indirectly recognize Kahar Muzakkar's troops by transforming them into a special division for the liberation of West Irian. Any embarrassment the Government might feel at even considering the proposal must be irrelevant, he said. Alleviation of the suffering of the people was much more important than any Government loss of face (IB 5-3-1955).

The situation improved for the Republican Army, and its operations became more successful, after the mid-1950's. This was a result partly of the assistance it received from the *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat*, partly of a change in tactics. Instead of spreading its troops over a large number of small field posts, it now began concentrating them in large units (cf. Djarwadi 1959:161–165). Army headquarters in Jakarta, moreover, dis-

appointed at the meagre results of the previous military operations, in July 1956 instituted a special military command, the *Komando Pengamanan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara* (KoDPSST), or South and Southeast Sulawesi Pacification Command, with as special assignment the suppression of the *Darul Islam* revolt (cf. Harvey 1974:313–320; 1977:38–40). Its commander was Colonel R. Sudirman, as whose Chief of Staff Mohammad Saleh Lahade was appointed a few months later.

The change implied that the Republican Army was for the first time in many years taking the ideological aspect of the conflict into consideration in dealing with the rebellion. For it tried to enlist the support of the social and religious leaders of the region for what it described as its “methaphysical” operation aimed at ending the rebellion (Djarwadi 1965, II:30). As R. Sudirman argued: “Peace for the region could only be achieved if there were peace in the villages; peace in the villages could only be attained if each household were at peace; peace in the family required that each individual felt at peace – and this could only be obtained through faith” (Harvey 1974:318).

This change in approach nevertheless also failed to have the desired results. For the attention gradually shifted to internal Army conflicts, notably the antagonism between Javanese and soldiers from the other islands. The culmination of these tensions in the PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion deflected the Army’s attention from the military campaign hitherto waged against Kahar Muzakkar and his *Darul Islam* activities.

Kahar Muzakkar himself meanwhile declined every offer of peace. He had firmly committed himself to the *Darul Islam* cause and did not want to know of any settlement short of a recognition of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Things were still going quite well for him, and in addition to exercising the control of parts of South and Southeast Sulawesi, he was trying to extend his influence to areas outside Sulawesi. Thus he sent troops to South Kalimantan to assist the rebels of Ibnu Hadjar, and to Halmahera and the Moluccas to get a *Darul Islam* rebellion under way in these parts. Although there were reports of some *Darul Islam* activity in the latter two regions, this did not amount to much. In the Moluccas Kahar Muzakkar sought to secure the cooperation of what was left of the RMS. There were, in fact, plans for proclaiming the Moluccas part of the territory of the Islamic State of Indonesia on February 1st, 1955. Before these plans could materialize, however, the commander-to-be of the Islamic Army of the Moluccas, Latang, was arrested (Bung

Penonton 1977:121; IB 12-2-1955; PR 20-11-1955; Fransz 1976:22).<sup>50</sup>

In South Sulawesi Kahar Muzakkar, in token of his hostility towards the Republic, tried to disrupt the polling for the general elections in September 1955. People who intended participating in these elections he branded as infidels. Officials in charge of the registration of votes were threatened and in some cases kidnapped. And all voters who had had themselves registered risked being fined. He was even said to foster the ambitious plan of occupying the more isolated subdistricts before the end of August to make voting there altogether impossible. To put this plan into execution 200 proas with reinforcements were to have been sent from Java, according to one captured *Darul Islam* leader, Mazdiono Iakandutju (Mazjono Iakanducu), who styled himself Commander in Chief of the Special all-Indonesian Student Division (PR 25-6-1955). Notwithstanding this opposition of the *Darul Islam*, as well as of the *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat* — which demanded recognition as a regular Army unit before allowing people to cast their vote — the election was a success. The percentage of the electorate of South and Southeast Sulawesi taking part in the voting, though lower than for the rest of Indonesia, still came to over seventy (Feith 1971:54).

### 8. *The United Republic of Indonesia*

The PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion brought about a drastic change in the situation. In the first place, the Government saw itself obliged to deal with yet another rebellious movement in Sulawesi. Secondly, the rising once more impressed on the Government the urgency of the regions' claims for wider autonomy and a greater share in the State revenues. It was now forced to give in at least partly to these demands and to remove some of the causes of regional discontent which had also inspired Kahar Muzakkar and his followers. In 1957 Parliament subsequently passed a new Law on Regional Administration, in which the regions' authority to conduct their own affairs was extended. Steps were also taken to gradually abolish the existing civil service corps, or *pamong praja*, through the instrumentality of which the Central Government, through its Ministry of Internal Affairs, administered the regions. Understandably enough, however, the Central Government did not want to lose its control over the regional export earnings, but on the contrary, even tried to consolidate this control. It was prepared to discuss at most the

distribution of the export earnings and other State revenues over the different provinces. More or less the same held true for the Central Army Command, which had no desire to relinquish its control of the regional commands, but on the contrary, wanted to take back from the regional commanders the right of independent action which the latter had arrogated to themselves with time.

The half-heartedness with which the Central Government reacted to the demands for greater regional autonomy – giving in a little where matters of civil administration were concerned, and trying to extend its authority in matters concerning the Army or vital exports – greatly upset the regions outside Java. This reaction of the Government's anything but diminished the fear of Javanese dominance; nor did it remove the feeling prevailing in the outer regions that they were being neglected and exploited by the Javanese. Two islands in which this feeling was particularly strong were Sumatra and Sulawesi, both of which were to become the centres of a second rebellion (the PRRI/*Permesta* one), which, claiming the whole of Indonesia as its territory, presented itself as an alternative to the Indonesian Republic alongside the Islamic State of Indonesia. What opposed it to the Republic was not religion, as in the case of the Islamic State of Indonesia, but a second constitutional problem which had troubled Indonesian political life from 1945, namely the question of the relation between the Central Government and the individual regions, each with their own ethnic, economic and religious characteristics. This actually amounted to the problem of whether Indonesia should form a unitary state or should have a federal structure.

The Sulawesi variant of the rebellion went by the name of *Permesta*, short for *Perjuangan Semesta* or Total Struggle. In it two of Kahar Muzakkar's long-standing adversaries played a decisive role, viz. Mohammad Saleh Lahade and J.F. Warouw. A Charter stating the *Permesta*'s demands was made public by the former on March 2nd, 1957.<sup>51</sup> This urged for greater autonomy, financial as well as otherwise, for the four provinces of East Indonesia and for more intensive efforts to step up regional development. It also asked for a full mandate to solve the security problems of the region and put an end to the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion. One of the other major points of the Charter was its rejection of a Central Army headquarters plan for dissolving the Eastern Indonesia Military Command, which, although applauded at the lower levels, posed a threat to the higher echelons of the command.<sup>52</sup>

The supporters of the Charter did not initially repudiate the Republic, its signatories asserting that they wanted to achieve their aims “by assuring leaders of all strata of society that *we are not separating ourselves* from the Republic of Indonesia” (Harvey 1977:166). They did take up arms against the Republic one year later, however, when on February 15th, 1958, the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI), or Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic, was proclaimed. Besides Mohammad Saleh Lahade, who became Minister of Information, the rebel Cabinet included Kahar Muzakkar’s second long-standing foe who played an important role in the *Permesta*, Colonel J.F. Warouw, who was appointed Minister of Construction and Industry (Harvey 1977:87).<sup>53</sup>

Two months after the development of the *Permesta* reaction into an open rebellion, Kahar Muzakkar joined forces with the movement, a formal agreement being concluded between the “Government of the Eastern Section of the Islamic Republic of Indonesia” and the “Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic” on April 17th, 1958. Hereby the two rebel Governments agreed to cooperate in opposing Indonesian as well as international Communists, who were influencing and manipulating the Soekarno group in both a direct and an indirect way, so it was alleged. Both rejected the sovereignty of the Republic, again by reference to the alleged communist influence. They agreed on a mutual armistice and promised to help each other in the struggle against the common enemy (PR 17-5-1958).

Up to a point this gave Kahar Muzakkar what he had always wanted. The agreement was drawn up as one between two independent states. Where he had after he had joined the Islamic State of Indonesia always countered every call for negotiations on the cessation of hostilities with the demand that such negotiations be preceded by recognition of the Islamic State, now, with the agreement with the PRRI/*Permesta* (represented in the negotiations by Mohammad Saleh Lahade and the PRRI Minister of Religion, Mochtar Lintang (Mokhtar Lintang)), that State was for the first time recognized by outsiders. All reference to the ideological foundations of the two different rebel States was, however, carefully avoided. The agreement explicitly stated, in fact, that such subjects as the form of government, the state ideology and the international status would for the time being be left out of consideration. These matters would be discussed by the Central Governments of the two States at some future point of time when the situation permitted it.

The military cooperation between the *Permesta* and Kahar Muzakkar's *Darul Islam* never came to anything much, however. For one thing the *Permesta* was mainly a North Sulawesi (Minahasa) affair, while Kahar Muzakkar's forces operated in South and Southeast Sulawesi. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the *Darul Islam* rebellion, the PRRI/*Permesta* one was short-lived. Government troops had occupied the major centres of rebellion and driven the *Permesta* into the jungle within half a year. Although the latter continued operating from here till 1961, it no longer posed a serious threat to the Indonesian Republic (Dahm 1971:186).

Kahar Muzakkar was given some arms by the *Permesta* rebels. In return he promised to send food up north (DM 26-2-1959). He moreover received a reinforcement of some 200 *Permesta* guerrillas, commanded by one Gerungan, who had been driven away by Republican troops (Harvey 1974:405). But that was all. Nevertheless, he did formally join the *Republik Persatuan Indonesia* (RPI), or United Republic of Indonesia, which was originally the outcome of negotiations in February 1960 between the PRRI and *Darul Islam* leaders in Sumatra who continued their resistance after the majority of the *Darul Islam* leaders there had come to an agreement with the Indonesian Republic.

So Kahar Muzakkar's Army in later years comprised three different forces: the *Momoks*, the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (now made up of only two "divisions", namely Bahar Mattaliu's 40,000 and Sjamsul Bachri's *Hasanuddin* Division) and a *Permesta* Unit. At the time of the PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion he instituted another re-organization, whereby he established a new *Momok*, the *Momok Ansharullah* (Allah's helpers), into which he appears to have intended integrating not only the old *Momoks*, but also the greater part of the remaining two TII divisions. This plan brought him into conflict with some of his subcommanders, however, notably his two principal lieutenants at the time — Bahar Mattaliu and Sjamsul Bachri. The former of these accused him of aiming at the destruction of the Islamic Army of Indonesia in Sulawesi, and later wrote, speaking of the *Momok Ansharullah*: "Only after the formation of the *Momok Ansh[a]rullah* did it transpire that Kahar Muzakkar's idea in forming this *Momok* was nothing other than the introduction of a wholesale rationalization of the TII, or even its total abolition, for the reason that the TII was infected with the disease of moral crisis, which had led to a total decline of its fighting power" (Mattaliu 1965:62). As a result of the opposition of these commanders the

TII was kept in existence, be it in an inferior status. The *Momok* units functioned as crack troops, and were much better armed than the rest. In confrontations with Republican troops the TII generally had to attack first, along with units armed only with small daggers and choppers. After they had taken the first blows, the *Momok* units were then brought into action, advancing “on a large scale, wave after wave” (Harahap 1956:6).

There was almost an armed clash between the two parties, in fact, with Kahar Muzakkar leading his troops against Bahar Mattaliu and the other commanders of the 40,000 divisions who refused to be incorporated into the *Momok Ansharullah*. In the end Kahar Muzakkar gave Bahar Mattaliu the choice of either becoming vice-Minister of Defence of the Islamic State of Indonesia — instead of himself —, or going abroad for a study-tour. Bahar Mattaliu claims that he opted for the second alternative for fear of being accused of entering into rivalry with Kahar Muzakkar (Mattaliu 1965:92–93).

In actual fact he prepared himself to surrender. On September 5th, 1959, an envoy of his visited the Military Command of South and Southeast Sulawesi, saying that Bahar Mattaliu had taken over the command of the *Darul Islam* troops in protest against Kahar Muzakkar’s instructions to burn down the houses of civilians. On hearing of Bahar Mattaliu’s intention to surrender, the Military Command then proclaimed an amnesty.

On September 12th Bahar Mattaliu, styling himself Commander of the DI/TII of South and Southeast Sulawesi, formally gave himself up and appealed to the rest of the Islamic Army to do the same (DM 10-9-1959, 11-9-1959, 19-9-1959). Pamphlets were dropped by Republican Army planes, moreover, in which Bahar Mattaliu, in his capacity as Commander of the Fourth, or *Hasanuddin*, Division of the DI/TII, ordered all military and civil officers of the Islamic State in South Sulawesi to surrender to the Republic. He further forbade members of the DI/TII to join the *Momok Ansharullah* or *Permesta*, because, he asserted, the activities of these two rebel groups were responsible for the destruction of South Sulawesi (DM 21-9-1959).

In his appeal to the other members of the Islamic Army to surrender he explained that his own decision to return to the Republic had been inspired by Soekarno’s decree ordering a return to the 1945 Constitution which marked the beginning of Guided Democracy (Pemulihan 1959:518). Kahar Muzakkar had, in fact, gathered his commanders together shortly before the Indonesian Republic’s return to the Constitution of 1945 to

discuss the future course of his rebellion, on which occasion apparently some of the commanders declared themselves in favour of surrender. Later Bahar Mattaliu adduced his conflict with Kahar Muzakkar and the moral decadence of the latter's troops as reason, which seems more to the point. He was particularly critical of the behaviour of the *Momok Ansharullah*, as well as the order Kahar Muzakkar had allegedly given its members to marry women-prisoners (Mattaliu 1965:93–98).

The *Momok Ansharullah* is also the target of an attack in a pamphlet written by Bahar Mattaliu entitled *Manifesto Tahun 1379 H*, in which he argues that “all of Kahar Muzakkar's steps were in defiance of Islam” (Mattaliu 1965:97). This pamphlet, although dated in its introduction September 25th, 1950 [1959], i.e. two weeks subsequent to the author's surrender, creates the impression of being written while the latter was still in the bush. In it he mentions a number of factors which were detrimental to the Islamic revolution, among them the development of the *Momok Ansharullah* into something quite different from what had originally been intended or what he had agreed to, namely a special unit operating alongside the Islamic Army and functioning at the same time as Kahar Muzakkar's bodyguard. He deplors the latter's policy of providing this *Momok* with only the best of arms and his attempt to incorporate the other military units into it. A second such detrimental factor mentioned by him is the failure to transform Gerungan's *Permesta* troops into an auxiliary force to support the TII in its struggle for an Islamic state (Mattaliu 1965:98–103).

On November 28th President Soekarno issued a decree granting an amnesty to all those in South Sulawesi who had surrendered between September 12th and November 28th.<sup>54</sup> Bahar Mattaliu was thus treated with considerable leniency by the Republican Government. His surrender was attributed to the success of the Republican Army's military operations (Harahap 1965:7) and accordingly used for propaganda purposes. The rebels, on the other hand, accused him of treason and venality and tried to belittle the effects of his defection. In their view, as the magazine *PRRI Information* states (December 1959, no. 9:25), “. . . Bahar Mattaliu and a small fraction of his unit, but together with some tens of thousands of villagers from the neighbourhood who could not stand the present economic-pressure any longer, ‘went over’ to the Djakarta government and were received with open arms and a promise of a Rp. 250,000 subsidy”.

Bahar Mattaliu (1965:119) himself boasts that in the period



immediately following his surrender Kahar Muzakkar lost about seventy percent of his followers. His defection indeed meant a setback for Kahar Muzakkar, who for the second time in the period of his *Darul Islam* rebellion lost part of his followers on account of internal dissensions. On the other hand, it freed him of one of his rivals, against whom, as we have seen above, he had contemplated steps to relieve him of his command. With Bahar Mattaliu and Sjamsul Bachri – whom he had sent abroad<sup>55</sup> – out of the way, he had rid himself of two major potential opponents. Before he could be again firmly in control, however, he also had to solve his problems with Gerungan's troops. These, mostly Christian, troops were likewise contemplating defection and had to be forcibly brought to heel. Fighting occurred between the two opposing forces in early 1960, with Kahar Muzakkar emerging victorious. He thereupon arrested Gerungan and 150 of his followers (DM 1-4-1960, 16-5-1960), who were subsequently converted to Islam. After this Gerungan became one of Kahar Muzakkar's "most trusted followers" (Harvey 1974:412) and eventually even his Minister of Defence (Siliwangi 1968:574).

The end of the 1950's even so marked Kahar Muzakkar's downfall. In these years the Republican Army's military operations, better organized and coordinated as they now were, finally began to bear fruit. In the extreme south the roads were gradually cleared, and the road connecting Ujungpandang with Bone through Maros and Camba could again be used normally for the first time in many years. Kahar Muzakkar was pushed further and further into the interior and had to fall back to two strongholds of the early years of his rebellion, the one located in Southeast Sulawesi, in the mountains north of Kolaka, the other in the Latumojang region, near Palopo, which had of old been a refuge for people escaping from prosecution for violation of the *adat* laws. The first indications that he was prepared to negotiate were given by him in mid-1960, after launching a futile attack on Cimpu, near Mount Latumojang. He subsequently proposed to the regional Republican commander, Andi Sose, that they should establish a cease-fire and enter into negotiations in "an Islamic way" (DM 25-6-1960). In 1961 he in fact started negotiations with the Republican Army, even meeting the then head of the Military Command of South and Southeast Sulawesi, M. Jusuf (M. Yusuf) (Harvey 1974:416–420). He had first sent his wife Corry to Jusuf as his private envoy. She had arrived in Ujungpandang on September 24th, and left for Jakarta to meet Nasution the next day (DM 28-9-1961). Following this Jusuf and Kahar

Muzakkar themselves met in a small village north of Watangpone (DM 23-10-1961). On November 12th Kahar Muzakkar declared his loyalty to Soekarno, Nasution and Jusuf at the military headquarters of Bone in the presence of Jusuf. The next year hostilities were resumed, however. The Republican Army, as a result of its successful suppression of rebellious movements in other parts of Indonesia, was now able to concentrate all of its efforts on South Sulawesi.

The definitive end of the *Darul Islam* movement followed in the course of 1964 and 1965. In the successive military operations preceding this Kahar Muzakkar lost gradually more ground. The Republican Army owed its present success partly to the fact that it was able to bring more troops into action, but partly also to the circumstance that soldiers originating from South Sulawesi itself were playing an increasingly important role in the planning and execution of these operations. These latter included the above-mentioned military commander of South and Southeast Sulawesi, Jusuf, who was a native of Bone, and Kahar Muzakkar's old comrades in arms Andi Sose and Azis Taba. M. Jusuf, as military commander of the region, personally headed the final operations against Kahar Muzakkar's *Darul Islam*, the *Tumpas* (Extermination) and *Kilat* (Lightening) Operations, with as Chief of Staff Solihin, who as commander of the *Siliwangi* Division had gained considerable experience in counter-insurgency actions. Although Andi Sose initially also took an active part in the campaign against Kahar Muzakkar, for a time even commanding the principal operations against him, the Army Command remained distrustful of him as a former KGSS battalion commander who still commanded much support among his soldiers and among the local population, and who tended to act as he pleased. Eventually he was transferred from his unit, finally in 1964, to be arrested (cf. Harvey 1974:424, 478–479).

Another former KGSS battalion commander who fell victim to the South and Southeast Sulawesi Army Command's policy of tightening its control over its military commanders and, like Andi Sose, lost his command, was Andi Selle. The show-down in his case came in 1964. He had taken the jungle and, to talk out the differences between them, had invited Jusuf to come and see him near Pinrang. At this meeting at first all seemingly went well, and an agreement was actually reached. Following this, however, as Andi Selle accompanied Jusuf in his car for a ride to Parepare in order to show the population "that he really was prepared to cooperate" (AB 25-4-1978), some of his men who were driving

along in separate cars cut in on the one in which he and Jusuf were sitting. Hereupon Jusuf and Andi Selle both got out, and the latter ordered his men to fire at Yusuf. He was not hit, but in the ensuing skirmish Andi Selle himself, who succeeded in escaping, was shot in the shoulder. He was subsequently formally branded a rebel (BBM 13-2-1977). From then on Republican military actions had to be directed not only against Kahar Muzakkar, but also against Andi Selle, who operated in the Sawitto mountain range near Pinrang. The latter's rebellion was not granted a long life, however. Betrayed by one of his own followers, his camp was raided by Republican troops at the end of August. He himself managed to escape but in his flight fell into a ravine, and died from his injuries the next day, September 1st, 1964. Now the Army was able to concentrate its undivided attention on Kahar Muzakkar. First it purged the Latumojang region, forcing Kahar Muzakkar to retreat to Southeast Sulawesi. Here he was followed in hot pursuit by the Republican troops, which — as in the case of the units brought into action against Andi Selle — had orders not to return until they had captured the rebel leader dead or alive. On February 1st, 1965, they finally discovered Kahar Muzakkar's hiding-place at the Lasolo River, which on February 3rd they proceeded to attack. The hut in which Kahar Muzakkar was believed to be sheltering was riddled with shots, which sent him running out of it. He was shot and killed before he had come five metres (BBM 5-12-1976; cf. Tamatlah 1965).

With Kahar Muzakkar's death the *Darul Islam* rebellion in South Sulawesi virtually ended. His Minister of Defence, Gerungan, was captured in July, and subsequently tried and executed (cf. Siliwangi 1968:580—583; Harvey 1974:428). After that the Government remained on the alert against rebel remnants until as late as the end of the 1960's. During a visit of Soeharto's to Southeast Sulawesi in 1969 the possibility of *Darul Islam* activities around Kolaka and Kendari was still a security consideration, although it was announced at the same time that they no longer posed a real threat to the general security of the area (cf. Rentjana 1969).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SOUTH KALIMANTAN – THE REBELLION OF THE OPPRESSED

As in Sulawesi, a rebellion against the Republican Government broke out in Kalimantan (Borneo) just after formal Indonesian independence in 1950. The main area affected by this *Darul Islam*-affiliated resistance movement was the southeastern part of Kalimantan, roughly coinciding with the present-day province of South Kalimantan. Its centre was the *kabupaten* of Hulusungai, in particular the area between Barabai and Kandangan. In addition the region to the east of this, comprising the *kabupaten* of Kota Baru, and that to the south, namely the *kabupaten* of Banjar, were frequently plagued by the actions of the *Darul Islam* troops of Ibnu Hadjar (Ibnu Hajar). Even Banjarmasin, the provincial capital, for many years was not safe from guerilla attacks.

Compared with similar movements elsewhere in Indonesia, the rising here was a relatively minor one. Never did the rebels control a large area, nor were they able to bring into action large concentrations of troops. The movement was nevertheless a persistent one, lasting until 1963, which year saw the arrest of its leader, Ibnu Hadjar.

#### 1. *The Fourth Navy Division*

During the struggle for national independence between 1945 and 1950 Hulusungai had been a bastion of anti-Dutch resistance. Accordingly, Ibnu Hadjar's troops, like Kahar Muzakkar's, were for the greater part made up of former guerilla fighters who had grown disappointed with the way they were treated after 1949.

The developments in Kalimantan resembled those in Sulawesi in other respects, too. After an initial upswing in the first months after August 1945, the resistance broke down after the Dutch returned and re-established their authority. After that it was to take the freedom fighters years to re-organize and build up their force sufficiently to be able to pose a serious threat to the Dutch and their local allies. But when it finally regained its strength, at

the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949, the guerilla movement in Kalimantan caused the Dutch much more trouble than that in Sulawesi. It succeeded in virtually crippling the administration of South Kalimantan.

As in Sulawesi, an important part in the struggle for independence in Kalimantan was played by emigrants to Java who returned to their native region in secret after August 1945. In Java, these people from Kalimantan were concentrated on the north coast, in the traditional centres of trade between the two islands. For South Kalimantan it was particularly the coast of East Java, from Tuban to Surabaya, that was of importance. From here the first sea transports of revolutionaries to South Sulawesi were launched.

The initiative for the infiltration of Kalimantan was taken by a number of persons forming the Kalimantan branch of the *Pemuda Republik Indonesia* (PRI), or Youth of the Indonesian Republic, in Surabaya. This group consisted of about 250 people, including some who were soon to become famous guerilla leaders, such as Hassan Basry, Gusti Aman, Firmansjah (Firmansyah), Darmansjah (Darmansyah) and Husin Hamsyah (Husin Hamsyah).<sup>1</sup> Immediately after the proclamation of independence this Kalimantan PRI branch, or *PRI-Kalimantan* (PRIK), took steps to send seven of its members to Kalimantan for the purpose of taking stock of the situation there and inquiring into the possibilities of lending the local revolutionary forces support and guidance. The command of this tiny expeditionary force was given to Hassan Basry, a Muslim religious teacher at Ponorogo originating from Kandangan, where he had been born around 1922 (KB 5-9-1949).

Hassan Basry left Surabaya in the middle of October 1945, carrying with him instructions from the local Republican Army branch to form a guerilla body in South Kalimantan. He arrived here on October 30th. The situation encountered by him was an extremely difficult one. The Dutch had been carrying on a “pacification” campaign, arresting young Republicans, for some weeks. Those lucky enough to escape were forced to retreat into the mountains and jungle of South Kalimantan. Hassan Basry, too, had to go into hiding, and withdrew to the mountains around Kandangan. Here he founded the *Lasykar Saifullah*, or “The sword of Allah” troops, in November (Nasution 1977, II: 548). This accomplished, he tried in vain to return to Java for further instructions. A Dutch naval blockade had made all sea travel to Java impossible, however. So Hassan Basry returned to

Kandangan. On arrival here, he learnt that during his absence almost all the members of the *Lasykar Saifullah* had been captured. Hence he proceeded to establish a second organization, the *Banteng Indonesia*, or Indonesian Buffaloes, in its place.

The emigrants from Kalimantan in Java, meanwhile, continued sending expeditions from the latter island. Although as a result of the Dutch naval blockade sea travel between the two islands remained very difficult, it is claimed that by the end of 1946, 1,500 repatriates had reached Kalimantan (Kalimantan 1953:142). The majority of them were backed by one of three different groups.

Firstly there was the Kalimantan branch of the PRI, which after the PRI changed into the *Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia)*, or Indonesian Socialist Youth), changed its name to *Pesindo Kalimantan*.<sup>2</sup> This group had as Chief of Staff Husin Hamsjah, with Firmansjah as deputy and Darmansjah as secretary. After the change of name the leaders of the Kalimantan *Pesindo* travelled to Yogyakarta to obtain the formal permission of Mohammad Noor, the first Republican Governor of Kalimantan, and Urip Sumohardjo (Urip Sumoharjo), Republican Army Chief of Staff, to send some of their people to Kalimantan, in particular to Hulusungai and the rest of South Kalimantan. After that the organization changed its name once again, and became the *Dewan Pimpinan Ekspedisi ke Kalimantan*, or Board in Charge of Expeditions to Kalimantan. In preparation for these expeditions about seventy members of the organization underwent a brief military and political training in Yogyakarta, where their teachers included Lieutenant-Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, Head of the PMC military intelligence unit.

The latter, who had also been supervisor to Kahar Muzakkar in his efforts to send troops to Sulawesi, was the inspirer of a second group organizing the infiltration of Kalimantan. The M.N. 1001, which name was meant to suggest the devising of a thousand and one schemes to seize Kalimantan from the Dutch under the leadership of Governor Mohammad Noor, was founded at his instigation. This M.N. 1001, which was headed by Tjilik Riwut (Cilik Riwut), was to operate mainly further to the west, in what now constitutes the province of Central Kalimantan.

A third group organizing expeditions of resistance fighters to Kalimantan was the *Ikatan Perjuangan Kalimantan*, or Union of Kalimantan Partisans, which had its headquarters at Surakarta. Generally known as the *Sabili'llah Kalimantan*, it was headed by Gusti H. Muis (Nasution 1977, II:470–473).

In Kalimantan these repatriates fought either in the name of the relevant mother organization in Java or as members of the small and isolated local guerilla groups. In South Kalimantan, where the influence of the *Pesindo Kalimantan* and the *Ikatan Perjuangan Kalimantan* was particularly strong, the struggle was coordinated as far as possible by the Fourth Division of the Republican Navy, the *Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia Divisi IV*, or ALRI Div IV. The latter had been constituted on April 4th, 1946, as an aid to the guerilla struggle in Kalimantan itself as well as the dispatch of reinforcements from outside. Prior to that there had only been small and isolated groups of persons originating from Kalimantan fighting without much coordination, especially in Kalimantan, but also in Java. The lack of a central command in both Kalimantan and Java was felt to be a serious disadvantage in the struggle against the Dutch. Thus, to remedy this situation, it was proposed, on the initiative of Governor Mohammad Noor and the *Ikatan Perjuangan Kalimantan*, supported by the Kalimantan branch of the *Pesindo*, to form a new organization which would unite within itself all the guerilla groups in and from Kalimantan (Nasution 1977, III:600). In view of the importance of sea communications between the two islands, which was the more keenly felt as a result of the current naval blockade, it was moreover thought wise that the new unit should be a naval one.

This put Kalimantan in a very special position. It had guerilla troops operating on land coming under the theoretical supervision of the Republican Navy. At the end of the Indonesian revolution, in 1949, when the Republican Armed Forces were streamlined, these troops were treated as Army units and came under the command of the Republican Army again.

With the permission of Navy headquarters, a special preparatory committee thereupon proceeded to form the proposed new organization,<sup>3</sup> their efforts culminating in the official installation of the ALRI Div IV at Malang on April 4th, 1946. The Division's headquarters were in Java, first at Lawang, later at Mojokerto. A base was established at Tuban, on the north coast of East Java, in October. The ALRI Div IV was intended to unite within itself all the guerilla organizations and all private individuals originating from Kalimantan who were resident in Java and who participated in the struggle against the Dutch. Its aim was to defend the Indonesian Republic in Kalimantan and to incorporate Kalimantan into the Republic territory, although its troops were also brought into action in Java. Its headquarters, in fact, remained in

Java throughout the revolution. The Javanese division was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Achmad Zakaria (Akhmad Zakaria), with Major Firmansjah as Chief of Staff.

To try and achieve the same sort of coordination in Kalimantan as in Java the *Gerakan Rahasia*, or Secret Movement, headed by Lieutenant A. Zaidi of the ALRI Div IV, in September sent two of its members, Asli Zuchry (Asli Zukhry) and Mursjid Seman (Mursyid Seman), to Kalimantan. Because of the Dutch sea blockade, which was still tight, the crossing took them almost two months. When they finally arrived the first person they contacted was Hassan Basry, at that time still head of the *Banteng Indonesia*, whom they met in the village of Tabihi Kiri, on the outskirts of Kandangan, early in November. At this meeting Hassan Basry gave his approval to the proposals from Java. Consequently the Secret Movement of the ALRI Div IV was officially constituted at a brief ceremony on November 18th. The relevant official papers were signed by Asli Zuchry, representing the divisional headquarters in Java, and Hassan Basry, who represented the local guerillas. The latter established his headquarters at Padang Batung, east of Kandangan, which he renamed Kota Seribu Jaya (City of a Thousand Victories). His principal assistants in those days were Budy Gawis, who became head of the Partisan Department, and Daeng Ladjida (Daeng Lajida), head of Security (Mussaffa 1954:n. 2). As the virtually total lack of communication between Java and Kalimantan continued, Hassan Basry and his comrades mostly acted on their own authority and without instructions from Java. Communications were, in fact, so poor that when in November 1948 the headquarters in Java were dismantled, Hassan Basry remained uninformed of the fact for some time.

On the same day that the Kalimantan branch of the ALRI Div IV was constituted, representatives of two other guerilla organizations in South Kalimantan, the M.N. 1001 and the *Mandau Telabang Kalimantan Indonesia* (MTKI), or Sword and Shield of Indonesian Kalimantan, agreed – at least orally – to incorporation into the new unit. In spite of their promises, however, Hassan Basry did not at first succeed in creating unity among the guerillas of South Kalimantan. A meeting held early in December with a view to persuading other guerilla leaders to join the organization turned out a failure (Nasution 1977, III:386). Moreover, Daeng Ladjida was forced to disarm the MTKI troops (Mussaffa 1954:n. 2).

The situation became more precarious still when at the end of the



same month Dutch troops launched a pacification campaign and Hassan Basry saw himself obliged to flee the area. It was two years before the ALRI Div IV recovered its strength sufficiently to be able to gain control of large parts of the interior of South Kalimantan and wage a successful guerilla war. The ALRI Div IV's viability in later years was to a large extent due to the merits of Gusti Aman.<sup>4</sup> The latter came to Kalimantan at the end of 1947. After living in Banjarmasin for about one year, he joined Hassan Basry in the interior in October 1948.<sup>5</sup> His assistance was invaluable to Hassan Basry in the execution of the task he had been assigned as deputy Commander of the ALRI Div IV.

After Gusti Aman and a friend of his, P. Arya, joined the guerillas at Hulusungai the structure of the ALRI Div IV visibly improved.<sup>6</sup> They devised a new organization structure for the Division, complete with a Civil Administration, as well as making a blueprint for a new economic system. Gusti Aman, a skilful organizer, was particularly active and established a number of guerilla bases around Martapura. He further paved the way for the establishment of a central South Kalimantan Military Government. Towards this end he called a special meeting of guerilla leaders at Telaga Langsat, north of Kandangan, which was attended by, among others, H. Aberani, H. Damanhuri and Daeng Ladjida. In charge of the security for this meeting was Ibnu Hadjar, the most important guerilla leader of the region. Hassan Basry was not present, but the resolutions passed were submitted to him for approval.

The Republican Military Government of South Borneo was announced by Hassan Basry on May 17th, 1949, a little over a week after the signing of the Van Royen-Roem agreement. As such, its proclamation represented a protest against the recognition — which seemed to have become a fact with the signing of this agreement — of the Autonomous Areas of South-East Kalimantan and Banjar (the latter comprising Hulusungai and Banjarmasin) which had been created in the preceding years. In fact, in the remaining months of 1949 the ALRI Div IV did everything in its power to demonstrate that the Autonomous Areas of South-East Kalimantan and Banjar only existed on paper and had no real substance.<sup>7</sup>

The Military Government was headed by Hassan Basry in the function of military governor. His Chief of Staff, Colonel H. Aberani, was head of the Department of Public Administration. The Department of General Affairs was also headed by Hassan Basry, while the deputy head of this department was P. Arya,

who in addition was head of the Departments of Finance and of Prosperity (of the latter under the *alias* Maksin Lamjati (Maksin Lamyati)). Gusti Aman was Minister of Armaments. Budy Gawis and Natsir respectively were the heads of the Departments of Information and Religion. Another important functionary was the head of the Department of Defence and Commander of the Troops, M. Hamy (Mussaffa 1954:n. 3–4; Nasution 1971, III: 45).<sup>8</sup>

The most diligent administrator of this Military Government seems to have been P. Arya. Although the other ministers had accepted their offices as such, they did not devote much time to them. P. Arya, on the other hand, must have loved all his many functions. He set out with great zeal to organize things throughout the whole of South Kalimantan. Besides his functions as deputy head of the Department of General Affairs and Minister of Finance and Prosperity, he became H. Taberani's deputy, hence deputy Chief of Staff and deputy head of the Department of Public Administration. Moreover, Gusti Aman handed over to him the seals of the Department of Armaments, while the Minister of Religion did likewise. In addition the seals of a newly formed department, that of Infiltrations, were entrusted to him (Mussaffa 1954:n. 6).

Governors were appointed in each of the various districts of South Kalimantan. These governors were the regional military commanders, who, because Hassan Basry's Government was a military one, at the same time managed civil affairs. The western part of South Kalimantan, Banjar, where the ALRI Div IV's influence was strongest, was divided into six such districts, each with its own military commander. P. Arya was commander of Banjarmasin and Pleihari; Hasnan Basuki and his successor, Daeng Ladjida, of Martapura; Gusti Aman of Kandangan and Rantau; Budy Gawis of Negara; H. Aberani of Barabai; and M. Hamy of Amuntai and Tanjung (KB 29-8-1949, 7-10-1949).<sup>9</sup>

After the formation of the Military Government a letter was sent to Java by Gusti Aman and P. Arya asking for recognition of the new Government. This letter furthermore urged that the Republican Government, in whose name they were fighting, press for a withdrawal of KNIL troops from Kalimantan in its negotiations with the Dutch (Mussaffa:n. 6).

The new Military Government, with a view to extending its authority, strove to incorporate the other guerilla organizations operating in the region. With some of these Hassan Basry had been on a war footing for quite some time, with mutual raids

taking place off and on. This time, however, Hassan Basry was reasonably successful in winning them over to his side. He persuaded these other guerillas, partly by force, to sign a statement whereby they agreed to integration with the ALRI Div IV of South Kalimantan. So he issued an order early in August 1949 commanding all armed groups and individuals operating independently of the ALRI Div IV to report with and hand over their arms to local ALRI units. Those who refused would be tried under martial law, so he threatened (KB 9-8-1949). Among the groups complying with the order was the *Tentara Kucing Hitam*, or Army of the Black Cat, a group of about fifty guerillas headed by Haji Hasjim (Hasyim) who operated around Barabai. Its leaders made a pledge to cease all acts of terror and plundering raids against ALRI Div IV positions. On making its intention to join the ALRI Div IV known to the Military Government, it expressed the hope that its barracks would no longer be attacked either (KB 20-8-1949), so that it in turn must have been subject to harassment by the ALRI Div IV. Other guerilla groups, too, yielded to the superior force of the ALRI Div IV, e.g., the *Gerakan Repolusi Rakyat Indonesia*, or Revolutionary Movement of the Indonesian People, the Sword and Shield of Indonesian Kalimantan (MTKI), and the *Tentara Lawung*.<sup>10</sup> They only did so, however, after the fact had been driven home that without the co-operation of the ALRI Div IV peace in the area was impossible.

The importance of the ALRI Div IV was officially recognized by the Republican Government in Java in September. On September 2nd a representative of the Republican Army headquarters, deputizing for the army Chief Commander, General Sudirman, gave Hassan Basry orders to unite all the other armed groups under his command. From that moment on, particularly in October and November, Hassan Basry intensified his efforts to incorporate and establish control over the remaining smaller guerilla bands that were still operating independently. He sent his officers to various parts of Kalimantan to discuss their integration.

Of course there were also some groups which continued to refuse to be integrated with the ALRI Div IV or to hand over their weapons. In September the most important of these, the *Lasykar Rakyat Murba*, also known as the *Dipisi Tengkorak Putih* (White Skull Division), circulated a pamphlet in Kandangan advising other armed groups against surrendering their arms to the ALRI Div IV. These arms were still needed to fight the Dutch capitalists and the bourgeoisie, it asserted (KB 26-9-1949).<sup>11</sup>

## 2. *The ALRI Strikes*

By the end of 1948 the ALRI Div IV had grown into what was described by the resident of South Kalimantan as a modern and fully equipped army (KB 6-6-1949). In the course of the following year it succeeded in establishing its control over the greater part of the rural areas of South Kalimantan. After the second Dutch military action in December 1948, and more especially after Hassan Basry's proclamation of the establishment of his Military Government in May 1949, the ALRI Div IV managed to make life very difficult for the Dutch and their Indonesian "collaborators". The Division not only controlled the rural areas, literally as well as figuratively, but it also made its influence felt in the administrative centre of South Kalimantan, Banjarmasin.

In the interior travel for Dutch persons was only possible in convoy and under armed guard. In Banjarmasin itself they had to be on the alert against sporadic guerilla attacks. Dutch troops, moreover, had difficulty in keeping open the road from Banjarmasin to the airport at Ulin, covering a distance of about twenty-five kilometres. In fact, in the second half of 1949 the ALRI Div IV reigned supreme in South Kalimantan. Because of this, and in view of the frequent attacks on Dutch individuals, on July 3rd it addressed a letter to all Europeans advising the latter to keep as much as possible together in places that were adequately protected against attacks by "irresponsible individuals" in areas that were still under Dutch authority, in which the ALRI Div IV hence could not yet guarantee peace and order (KB 5-8-1949).

As 1949 progressed the chances of a final agreement between the Republican and Dutch Governments grew increasingly high. Upon its becoming evident at the same time that South Kalimantan would not become part of the territory of the Indonesian Republic, but would form part instead of the Autonomous Areas of Banjar and South-East Kalimantan, two member-states of the projected federal United States of Indonesia, Hassan Basry intensified his actions. He virtually undermined the administration of the Dutch-backed Autonomous Area of Banjar and demanded that the ALRI Div IV be consulted on ways of establishing a cease-fire.

In the interior of the Autonomous Area of Banjar the ALRI Div IV had its own government structure. The six regional governors of the Military Government jointly headed a *Komisi Umum*, or General Committee, which was in charge of civil and military affairs. So it appointed village heads, called *pangkalan*, in

the villages. Some of these *pangkalans* were the old village heads who had made common cause with the guerillas. In other cases they fulfilled their function side by side with the old village heads, who continued on as functionaries of the Dutch administration. In these latter cases, however, it was the *pangkalan* who actually ran the village affairs, the old village heads being merely tolerated for practical reasons. For whenever a villager for one reason or another had to get in touch with the administration of the Autonomous Area of Banjar in town, or required a travelling-pass from the Dutch or a passport as a Dutch citizen, he needed official papers issued by the old village head (KB 22-9-1949).

In controlling the rural areas, the ALRI Div IV indirectly controlled the urban areas as well. Even in Banjarmasin there were ALRI Div IV police pickets guarding all entrance points in an effort to stop food and other daily necessities being brought into the city. People caught smuggling goods into the towns and cities were liable to have these goods confiscated. Initially the ALRI Div IV also prohibited rubber-tapping in South Kalimantan, arguing that the rubber would only be used by the Dutch to get more money to buy arms. When this policy proved injurious to the population itself the ban was lifted to some extent. People now were allowed to tap the trees again provided that all the labourers involved in the entire process from tapping to smoking were members of cooperative societies and that the sale of the finished product also took place through the cooperatives (Mus-saffa 1954:n. 5).

The establishment of cooperative societies was part of the ALRI Div IV scheme for establishing a new economic order. Another aspect of the same scheme involved the appointment of special functionaries to buy rice from the farmers and sell it in the towns and cities. In the latter, however, and notably in Banjarmasin, there were complaints that these middlemen were exploiting their monopoly position to buy the rice cheaply off the farmers and sell it at high prices to the urban consumers (KB 4-10-1949). To augment its revenues the ALRI Div IV moreover levied a tax on the sale of latex, and on market transactions in general. It also tried to levy an income tax (KB 15-9-1949).

The ALRI did more than just levy taxes and control the flow of goods and people. It actually crippled the administration of the Autonomous Area of Banjar, and successfully obstructed the functioning of the Banjar Council, a semi-parliament, in a much more direct way. To start off with, it urged the members of this Council to abandon the “Made in Holland Theatre” and to set up

an Indonesian National Committee (Mussaffa 1954:n. 5). Next it declared the Banjar Council and its counterparts, the Councils of Dayak Besar (Great Dayak) and South-East Kalimantan, dissolved and replaced by Indonesian National Committees, as the local parliaments within the Republic were called (KB 23-8-1949). The Indonesian National Committee of Banjar was chaired by Burhanuddin.<sup>12</sup>

Because the ALRI Div IV was opposed to people turning to the Dutch administration for permits or for other assistance except where absolutely necessary, its soldiers used threats against everyone intending to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca, for which a Dutch permit was required. The pilgrims were only used by the Dutch for propaganda purposes, the ALRI Div IV claimed (KB 11-7-1949; Mussaffa 1954:n. 5).

The ALRI Div IV, in its attempts to cripple the administration of the enemy, also intimidated and abducted civil servants working for the Autonomous Area of Banjar and employees of Dutch firms. It first tried inducing them to cooperate through friendly and peaceful persuasion. Some in fact, were sympathetically disposed towards the rebels. In general, however, the ALRI Div IV had to cope with the problem of poor relations with prominent administrators in the cities.

When the method of gentle persuasion failed, the ALRI Div IV began using force to get civil servants to come to its headquarters. Its most spectacular action was staged on August 15th, 1949, when the guerillas abducted the three most prominent civil servants of the Autonomous Area of Banjar. They were Mr. Moh. Hanafiah, the Premier and chairman of the Banjar Council, Achmad Basuni (Akhmad Basuni), the *kiai kepala* or district head of Banjarmasin, and the latter's principal assistant, H. Raden, the *kiai besar*.<sup>13</sup> Moh. Hanafiah had just returned from Jakarta, where he had discussed the political and military situation in South Kalimantan, the day before. He had been scheduled to issue a joint statement with the Dutch resident about a cease-fire for South Kalimantan the next day. As a result of the kidnapping, along with a large-scale attack on Banjarmasin in the night of August 15th, the Dutch resident forbade all public festivities in commemoration of the proclamation of independence of August 17th.

In the following weeks more high officials were abducted or simply disappeared. They included M. Jusran (M. Yusran), who had just been appointed *kiai besar* of Banjarmasin in replacement of H. Raden, and Gusti Hidajat (Gusti Hidayat), who had taken

over Achmad Basuni's function as *kiai kepala* (KB 25-8-1949).<sup>14</sup> Because of these many kidnappings, South Kalimantan, and in particular Banjarmasin, became known as the *daerah culik*, or kidnap area (KB 24-9-1949). To make things worse, in early September five members of the executive body of the Banjar Council announced their resignation as such.<sup>15</sup>

The attack on the city and the kidnapping of the three senior government officials caused much anxiety among the civil servants and among other employees of the Autonomous Area of Banjar and of Dutch firms. A number of organizations sent telegrams to Jakarta requesting the Dutch to give in to the guerillas' demands for negotiations about a cease-fire in South Kalimantan. These organizations included the *Persatuan Pegawai Indonesia*, or Indonesian Employees' Union, the *Gabungan Buruh Kalimantan*, or Kalimantan Labour Federation, and the *Persatuan Pangreh Praja*, Civil Servants' Union, of which latter the three officials kidnapped on August 15th were chairman, advisor and commissioner respectively.<sup>16</sup> The *Persatuan Pangreh Praja* in its telegram pointed out that the Government apparatus was functioning under conditions of extreme stress and that the life of its members was in danger. The *Persatuan Pegawai Indonesia*, too, pointed to the difficult situation, which, it said, was growing graver and more dangerous every day. It referred to an order issued by the ALRI Div IV to the effect that all civil servants should leave their jobs and asserted that unless a cease-fire was reached civil servants would be afraid to carry on with their work (KB 20-8-1949). In addition the executive boards of the Banjar Council and the Great Dayak Council requested the Dutch Government to meet the ALRI Div IV's conditions.

By that time the ALRI Div IV had become so popular that it no longer had to resort to force to achieve its aims. At the end of August it called on all civil servants and other people working in the service of the Dutch to go on strike. Government employees in Banjarmasin received a letter, signed by P. Arya in his capacity as general representative for Banjarmasin, urging everyone employed by the Dutch in the administrative and economic fields to stay at home from August 30th onward. They should contact the Military Government or simply stay where they were until the successful conclusion of negotiations about a cease-fire.

The Colonial Government tried to thwart the ALRI Div IV's plans by warning its servants that no salaries would be paid to people laying down their work in response to what was referred to as "threats" (KB 30-8-1949). The warning was to no avail. On

August 30th a virtually general strike was held. Only a few post offices remained open, as did hospitals and schools (KB 30-8-1949, 2-9-1949). All other government offices were closed, while at banks and commercial firms only the European and Chinese employees turned up for work. The educational institutions were able to remain open because, in view of the importance of education, the ALRI Div IV had made an exception for teachers (KB 3-9-1949).<sup>17</sup>

The strike soon spread to other parts of South Kalimantan. On September 16th over 150 white-collar workers and labourers in Hulusungai working for the Colonial Government in Kandangan, Rantai and Negara, issued a statement to the effect that they would leave every office and firm that obstructed the struggle for independence. They would only return to work on successful completion of the Round Table Conference (KB 17-9-1949).

The strike continued until early October, when, following upon negotiations between the ALRI Div IV and the Dutch, the former made a call to the strikers to resume work. It ended definitively in the middle of that same month.

### 3. *Peace Talks*

The ALRI Div IV had instigated the strike with a view to strengthening its position and lending force to its demands for treatment as a full partner in the negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic. Although it endorsed these negotiations, it was of the opinion that where South Kalimantan was concerned it should be consulted.

Shortly after the proclamation of the establishment of the Military Government on May 17th, 1949, a difference of opinion in this connection had arisen between Hassan Basry on the one hand and the Republican and Dutch Governments on the other. The conflict was occasioned by the armistice agreed to between the Republican and Dutch Governments, to take effect on August 1st, as a follow-up to the Van Royen-Roem agreement. Both this agreement and the armistice were in essence agreements between the Indonesian Republic, with its territory in parts of Java and Sumatra, and the Dutch. Although the other States and Autonomous Areas which were to make up the United States of Indonesia were represented through a special organization formed by them, the *Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg* (BFO), or Federal Consultative Meeting, the agreements only involved Java and Sumatra.



The armistice of August 1st called for “A cease-hostilities order to be issued simultaneously by both parties on 3 August and to be effective in Java from midnight 10/11 August 1949 and in Sumatra from midnight 14/15 August 1949” (Collins 1950:186). It did not so much as mention the situation in the States and Autonomous Areas of the BFO. A central Joint Board set up to monitor the armistice, and made up of representatives of the Republic, The Netherlands, the BFO and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), had thirteen Local Joint Committees. Again, however, these local committees were formed only for Java and Sumatra, and not for the other regions of Indonesia (Collins 1950:186–187).

In spite of the fact that the agreements only concerned Java and Sumatra, they had strong implications for the other islands. They involved the recognition of the right of existence of the States and Autonomous Areas by the Indonesian Republic, at least on paper. Moreover, as the hostilities there as well should cease, the Republican Government and Army also had to call all local guerillas fighting in the name of the Republic to order.

In Kalimantan, Hassan Basry resisted the Republic’s authority. As he controlled a large part of the region, he felt that South Kalimantan should be treated in the same way as the Republican territories in Java and Sumatra. Although the ALRI Div IV promised to obey the instructions of the Republican Government and Army headquarters in Java, its actual behaviour was in contradiction with this. Hassan Basry insisted that a cease-fire for Kalimantan should be reached through the mediation of a Central Joint Board. As long as such a board was not established, the ALRI Div IV would, as it was formulated by Gusti Aman on August 17th, “continue to act in the line of the revolution” (KB 30-8-1949).

When after a long lapse of time the ALRI Div IV’s demands still had not been met, this Division, as was mentioned above, started kidnapping important civil servants and called a general strike. It further intensified its attacks on Dutch troops. All this was calculated to demonstrate the strength of its position.

South Kalimantan, which for some time had seemed fairly quiet, now witnessed a sharp increase in fighting.<sup>18</sup> In August attacks were launched in and around Kandangan, Martapura, Rantau, Barabai, Amuntai and Banjarmasin. Kandangan, whose hinterland harboured one of the guerilla’s strongholds, was abandoned by its population after a rumour had been spread that the ALRI Div IV had ordered all civilians sympathizing with the

Republican cause to move to Republican territory, those who remained behind making themselves liable to suspicion of Dutch sympathies. According to reports of September 3rd and 4th, some 30,000 people living within a radius of three kilometres from the city centre left the town, causing serious problems of overcrowding in the nearby villages, where some houses had to be shared by a score or so of people. An appeal by the Dutch resident and Army commander to these people to return to Kandangan was to no avail. People only went back on being ordered to do so by the ALRI Div IV in the middle of that same month. But even then some were hesitant because another guerilla organization, the White Skull Division, had warned them against returning (KG 9-9-1949, 17-9-1949).

Kandangan had been the scene of fighting for some weeks already before its evacuation. Shots were audible outside the town almost every day, and also inside at night, when it was infiltrated by guerillas (KB 26-8-1949). Banjarmasin was attacked, as we have seen, in the night of August 15th and the early morning of August 16th. One of the main targets here was the KNIL barracks. These were attacked again a week later, on August 23rd, when the barracks of the Military Police also came under fire.

The result of the increased guerilla activities was that the Republican Government's intercession and assistance became necessary. This Government had already announced through its spokesman Major-General R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo (R. Suharjo Haryowardojo), a senior officer of the Ministry of Defence, early in August, after the armistice agreement, that wherever outside Java and Sumatra a cease-fire agreement proved impossible to reach it would send officers to mediate. Now it was time to fulfil this promise. Not until after considerable pressure from the Dutch and the Autonomous Areas of South-East Kalimantan and Banjar, however, did it decide that R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo should visit South Kalimantan to talk to representatives of the ALRI Div IV. R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo's arrival was planned for August 24th. Before he was able to depart for Kalimantan a number of formal obstacles still remained to be removed, however.

The Dutch and the Republic were at first unable to agree about R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo's status. The Indonesian Republic demanded that the latter's mission be granted formal status and that it should take place under the auspices of the UNCI, but this was rejected by the Autonomous Areas (KB 22-8-1949,

26-8-1949). Then, when R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo at last arrived, he was accompanied not only by two officers of the Republican Army but also by Colonel Neals, an Australian military observer of the UNCI, against which the Dutch resident, A.G. Deelman, protested. The latter issued a statement that the presence of Colonel Neals might create a false impression, and reiterated that R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo's visit was an informal one for the purpose of promoting the restoration of peace and order. R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo, on the other hand, insisted that he was officially under orders from the Commander in Chief of the Republican Army, General Sudirman (KB 26-8-1949, 29-8-1949). It was admitted one day later, in a joint statement by R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo himself, the resident and the commander of the Dutch troops in South and East Kalimantan that the former had, in fact, come on the orders of his Government (KB 29-8-1949).

On August 31st contact was established between R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo and Hassan Basry through couriers, and on September 2nd the two met face to face at Munggu Raya.<sup>19</sup> The meeting was witnessed by Colonel Neals, by senior Dutch military and civil officers, including the assistant resident, A.R. Holmann, and by members of the Banjar Council. Hassan Basry was accompanied by eight members of his military staff. He told R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo that he had 30,000 men under his command.

At Munggu Raya the official status of the ALRI Div IV was formally confirmed, as were the military ranks of its officers. Major-General R. Suhardjo Harjowardojo, in a solemn ceremony, stated that: "Herewith I in the name of the Commander in Chief, pronounce as official the constitution of the Fourth Navy Division as [part of] the Republican Army [ . . . and . . . ] formally convey the order for all fighting and other acts of hostility between the Republican Army's ALRI and the Dutch Army to cease" (KB 3-9-1949).

Hassan Basry was once more entrusted with the responsibility for all the armed guerilla bands in the area and had to see to it that all hostilities ceased within a fortnight, before September 16th. He was furthermore invited to choose a representative to negotiate with the local authorities. With this task he charged P. Arya. On the Dutch side assistant resident Holmann was appointed chief negotiator.

It was some time before the guerillas were really prepared to cooperate, however. For a while it looked as though they might

refuse to even start negotiating. The ALRI Div IV officers adopted the view that, where they had received an official order to end the hostilities, the way in which a cease-fire was to be achieved should be an official one as well. Towards this end a Central Joint Board for Kalimantan should be set up, along with Local Joint Committees. To lend their arguments extra force they accused Dutch troops of trying to occupy positions which before September 2nd had been held by the ALRI Div IV.

On September 12th the Dutch commander of South and East Kalimantan, H.J. Veenendaal, expressed his disappointment at the fact that so far no ALRI Div IV negotiators had come forward. He warned, rather pompously, that if they continued to fail to do so Hassan Basry would be in violation of the order of September 2nd and thus make himself an outlaw (KB 13-9-1949). Resident Deelman, too, was anything but pleased with the guerrillas' reaction. What particularly upset him was that, although the ALRI Div IV had ceased most of its military activities, it was showing no signs of preparedness to relinquish its authority. The ALRI Div IV continued acting as though it constituted the legitimate Government of South Kalimantan and disregarding the Autonomous Areas.

Both Deelman and Veenendaal pointed out a number of times that the Indonesian Government on September 2nd had only confirmed Hassan Basry's status as commander of the ALRI Div IV, and not as military governor of South Kalimantan. They further stressed that although Hassan Basry might have complied with the order to stop firing, he had certainly not ceased all hostile acts (KB 4-9-1949, 12-9-1949), between which two concepts in their view there was a vast difference. They deplored the guerrillas' persistence in exercising the *de facto* government in the areas under their control, if not in others as well, where possible.

So when Hassan Basry, accompanied by his lieutenants Gusti Aman and Subandi, at last, on September 14th, conferred with Deelman and Veenendaal, the principal subject of their discussions was the interpretation of the term "hostile act". It was concluded that the term meant not only "to shoot at one another", but involved much more. As interpreted by Deelman it denoted: 1) all acts aimed at disrupting the functioning of a free economy, such as, for example, the obstruction of food transports and the use of coercion to induce people to strike; 2) the levying of illegitimate taxes, such as on the sale of latex or other market commodities or on market transactions in general, and of a contribution, in money or in kind, for the benefit of a

guerilla army; 3) the unlawful capture of citizens, especially government employees; and 4) the violation of the prevailing law in the political field, such as by liquidating the Banjar Council and similar institutions (KB 15-9-1949).<sup>20</sup>

After a consensus was reached on the interpretation of “hostile act”, with as the most important result the ALRI Div IV’s pledging itself to end the strike and to stop collecting all kinds of taxes, negotiations were able to start in earnest. The chief ALRI Div IV negotiators were P. Arya and Gusti Amam, assisted in questions concerning non-military affairs by Burhanuddin and Dr. Gambiro. At these negotiations it was agreed that a *Panitia Penyelenggara Keamanan*, or Security Committee, would be instituted, with a number of local sub-committees in various towns, such as Banjarmasin, Amuntai and Kandangan. Both sides rightly submitted that these committees bore no comparison with the Local Joint Committees of Java and Sumatra. No UNCI representatives sat on them, and they were made up only of representatives of the ALRI Div IV, the Indonesian Republic and the Dutch. At the same time it was pointed out, however, that the authority of the committees in Kalimantan was actually greater, because they were also authorized to discuss political matters (KB 27-9-1949).

With the successful completion of the negotiations, the atmosphere in South Kalimantan improved greatly. At the end of September Moh. Hanafiah was released by the guerillas, soon to be followed by the others who had been kidnapped. Early the next month the strike was called off and soon thereafter joint patrols by the Dutch Army and the ALRI Div IV were instituted.

#### 4. Jakarta Assumes Control

For the ALRI Div IV the agreement spelt the beginning of the end. Gradually its strong military position and its influence among the population declined. This process had started at the time Major-General Suhardjo Harjowardojo had been sent to Banjarmasin by the Republican Government. The object of his mission had not been to help the ALRI Div IV reach a favourable agreement with the Dutch, but to assist the Dutch, who did not know how to deal with the ALRI Div IV. He had probably also had instructions to pave the way for a take-over of the command in South Kalimantan by officers from Java, and to make it easy for them to establish firm Republican Army control over troops whom in their hearts they distrusted.

Suhardjo Harjowardojo, who had left South Kalimantan after the official recognition of the ALRI Div IV, returned here on September 21st. This time he brought with him from Java not two but thirteen officers as members of what was referred to as a military delegation, which was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel K. Sukanda Bratamenggala, who was soon to become Territorial Commander of Kalimantan. Suhardjo Harjowardojo helped to work out a final agreement between the ALRI Div IV and the Dutch, and tried, in vain, to end the strike. The strikers would only go back to work on the orders of the ALRI Div IV.

Suhardjo Harjowardojo left Kalimantan again on September 27th, taking with him to Java P. Arya, who was later to become communications officer in Yogyakarta, thus depriving Hassan Basry of one of his most trusted lieutenants and advisers. After Suhardjo Harjowardojo's departure South Kalimantan came under the command of Sukanda Bratamenggala.

The latter made a joint tour of the region with Hassan Basry to see that all kinds of matters in connection with the conclusion of the agreements were settled. Hassan Basry in addition sent orders to all his officers to get the local guerillas in line, and drew up instructions designed to put an end to the independent image which the ALRI Div IV had hitherto projected. On October 4th the ALRI Div IV announced that from that day on its seal would no longer have legal force (KB 4-10-1949), and Sukanda Bratamenggala made a statement to the effect that the ALRI Div IV had agreed to all of its written orders and circulars issued in the past being declared null and void (KB 4-10-1949).

The next step followed on October 11th, when the *Panitya Pembantu Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (PPTNI), or National Army Relief Committee, was set up in South Kalimantan with the aim of collecting contributions from the population for the maintenance of the guerilla bands, thereby supplementing the sums already promised by the Dutch Army at the time of its agreement with the ALRI Div IV. Sukanda Bratamenggala, who made the announcement of the institution of the new committee, asserted that the money collected by the PPTNI together with the contribution promised by the Dutch would from that time onward have to constitute the Army's sole source of income. The ALRI Div IV was forbidden to collect contributions direct from the population any longer, he said. This meant the end of the Military Government set up by the ALRI Div IV and of its tax-collecting activities in name of the revolution (KB 13-10-1949).<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, on October 27th Republican officers from Java began the medical examination of the ALRI Div IV guerillas. Under the supervision of Dr. Suharsono the latter were checked to see who was physically fit enough to stay on in the Republican Army, and who should be demobilized and “returned to society”. The guerillas who had the misfortune of being classified in the second category would, it was promised, be given an honourable discharge (KB 29-10-1949, 3-11-1949).

As elsewhere in Indonesia, these tests and the imposition of strict military rules aroused feelings of resentment among the members of the guerilla organizations. Not only the ordinary soldiers of the ALRI Div IV, but also their officers had to submit to the discipline and norms imposed by the Republican officers from Java. So the ALRI Div IV commanders were instructed to follow a training course evolved by the Javanese officers.

These professional soldiers of the regular Republican Army for their part looked upon their Kalimantan colleagues with scorn and contempt. They inclined to the view that the ALRI Div IV had been formed at a time of revolution when the norms and regulations governing the formation and functioning of an army had been made rather light of. Now that the fighting had ended, however, the time had come for the ALRI Div IV to be converted as quickly as possible into an efficient and well organized army unit, it was argued (KB 3-11-1949).

The definitive end of the ALRI Div IV came on November 10th, 1949, the day of the commemoration of the Battle of Surabaya, or Heroes' Day, when it was transformed into the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division in a brief ceremony at Kandangan.<sup>22</sup> Hassan Basry remained its commander. He did not become Commander of the Republican Army for the whole of Kalimantan, as he had hoped. On December 22nd the ninth Sultan of Yogyakarta, Lieutenant-General Hamengkubuwono IX, the then Indonesian Minister of Defence, visited Banjarmasin in his capacity as Security Coordinator and proceeded to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Sukanda Bratamenggala, then still head of the Military Delegation, in that function, under the title of Commander of the *Tentara dan Territorium* (TT) (Army and Territory) VI. Hassan Basry was made commander of one of the four sub-territories created at the time, namely sub-territory III, comprising Banjar. As the state of war and siege still continued, the civil administration was subordinate to the military one. In civil affairs Hassan Basry was to be assisted by Moh. Hanafiah, it was announced (KB 24-12-1949).

Thus the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division was made responsible for peace and order in the Banjar region. The state of war and siege notwithstanding, routine matters in connection with the maintenance of law and order were left for the Police to deal with, who since November 25th had been under the jurisdiction of the Banjar Council. The principal duty of the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division was the take-over and continuation of the various tasks of the Dutch Army and the KNIL troops, who from November 26th onwards were gradually leaving the area, starting with Barabai, to be stationed in special areas.

Quite possibly the Republican authorities, with formal independence definitely in view, wanted to move the Army troops to barracks and leave the Police in charge of the public order. This hypothesis does not, however, take account of the confused situation during the closing months of 1949. The ALRI Div IV, now the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division, as a division could be kept under control by the Republican Army leaders. Its individual members, and the members of other guerilla organizations – both those which at least in name had fused with the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division and those which had refused to do so – were much more difficult to keep in line.

The situation was so precarious, in fact, that before the year was out Hassan Basry, in his capacity as commander of the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division, twice had to issue a warning that his Division would take firm action against anyone disturbing the peace or continuing to act arbitrarily. He thus found himself in a situation very similar to that of the Dutch a few months earlier, when the latter had had to deal with the Military Government of the ALRI Div IV. Now he in turn was obliged to take action against people refusing to recognize the Autonomous Area of Banjar.

In an announcement made at the end of November he launched an attack on certain groups for trying to increase their influence in society by using the name of the ALRI Div IV or the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division (KB 1-12-1949). At the end of December, furthermore, he explicitly asserted that the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division was the loyal instrument of the Autonomous Area of Banjar. As a consequence the Division would take firm steps against anyone troubling society, so he warned, including people doing so as soldiers or on behalf of the Army or the struggle for independence. As examples of the activities meant he cited the borrowing of cars ostensibly for military purposes, the use of threats to make people lend or sell goods, the levying of con-



tributions from private citizens or firms, the imposition of taxes on the sale of latex, etc. At the same time he pleaded with the population not to interpret such firm action by the Army or Police against the elements concerned as an attempt at general repression. People should realize that the Army was striving to give substance to the ideals of independence and security, as well as to stimulate social development (KB 30-12-1949).

The groups the Republican Army saw itself obliged to keep under control at the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950 were numerous. So it had to keep a variety of larger and smaller local guerilla units in check. Meanwhile the situation was complicated further by occasional clashes with KNIL troops. In the whole of South Kalimantan – not only Banjar, but also to the east and west of that region – as well as in Central and South-East Kalimantan it was the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division that had to deal with the irregular guerilla units. These latter included, among others, its old enemies of the White Skull Division, who circulated pamphlets with the warning “Be careful, the White Skull is coming” all over South-East Kalimantan (KB 29-1-1950).<sup>23</sup>

There was also trouble with Warouw’s and Kahar Muzakkar’s Brigade XVI, which, consisting as it did of people from outside Java and Sumatra, also included youths from Kalimantan fighting both at home and in Java. The former constituted the so-called *Komando Grup Kalimantan* of Brigade XVI and the *Kinibalu* or *Panglima Batur* Battalion.<sup>24</sup> There were indications that the Brigade XVI guerillas in Kalimantan might prove difficult to control as early as September 1949, when the Army Command contemplated sending one of the Brigade commanders, Kamaruddin Noor, to that region. Later, in early December, four officers of the Brigade XVI were sent to Kalimantan to work out a merger of the Kalimantan section of this Brigade with the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division. Upon failure of their attempt yet another officer, Firmansjah, went to Kalimantan to try and appease the Brigade XVI guerillas.<sup>25</sup>

The problems with the Brigade XVI guerillas increased when after the official recognition of independence the officers and soldiers of the Brigade who had been stationed in Java returned to Kalimantan, in particular after the dissolution of the Brigade. As in the case of other guerilla units, the returning soldiers of this Brigade were also ordered to report to the authorities and to stop acting independently or in name of the Brigade. The order did not have the desired result, however. So the Army Command of Kalimantan was constrained to contact the military governor of

East Java, the area where the troops had previously been stationed, and ask him to see to it that a stop was put to what it called the "smuggling", that is, illegal entry, of Brigade XVI soldiers into Kalimantan (KB 27-1-1950).

The use of the term "smuggling" is once again indicative of the disregard, or even contempt, in which the regular professional soldiers of the Republican Army held the former irregular guerilla fighters. This, coupled with the central Army Command's attempts at streamlining the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division into a modern army unit, with the inevitable attendant process of demobilization, was only calculated to increase the prevailing tension. The bad feeling was the more aggravated by the extension of central authority over troops who for years had fought independently and for a just cause. Not only did they now have to obey the orders of the central Government and Army Command and its representatives in Kalimantan, but, what made matters worse, the most important military and civil functions either continued to be held by those who, in their eyes, had cooperated with the Dutch, or were given to people from outside the region. Many guerillas did not understand, and Hassan Basry was obliged to make a public announcement to the effect that the civil servants and police personnel formerly working for the Dutch had retained their positions as such, but had become employees of the United States of Indonesia instead (KB 30-12-1949).

A few months after the formal recognition of the ALRI Div IV, and only a few weeks after Indonesian independence, the situation got out of hand. Within the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division itself there were a number of soldiers and officers guilty of insubordination. As early as January 14th, 1950, Lieutenant H. Damanhuri was arrested on charges of extortion of goods and money for the purpose of building up and maintaining his own Army in the area of Barabai. On the same day a more important personage, Achmad Zakaria, the former commander of the ALRI Div IV, was arrested. He was accused of sedition against the United States of Indonesia by making inciting speeches in mosques and Islamic training institutions and trying to persuade former guerillas to rebel (KB 17-1-1950, 18-1-1950).

There was also trouble in Birayang, north of Barabai, where the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division arrested about 300 people. These were alleged to have tried to infiltrate the Army with rebel elements and to have organized military training courses in the villages (KB 22-1-1950).

In the beginning the Republican authorities pretended that there was nothing wrong in Kalimantan. They even so admitted that there had been some fighting, and that the Government had decided to transfer former KNIL units from the area as a result of this and in order to prevent further trouble (M 24-1-1950). At the same time, however, they played the problems down by asserting that nothing serious was wrong. Both Hassan Basry and Sukanda Bratamenggala, for instance, stated on being questioned about the activities of the White Skull Division that only a small section of this Division was continuing to fight. Its activities, they assured, posed no threat to the peace and order of the area. The “real” White Skull Division had become integrated into the Army (KB 1-1-1950, 27-1-1950).

Because of the precarious situation the citizens of South Kalimantan formed a Committee for the Preservation of Unity and the Prevention of Dissension, or *Panitia Penyelenggara Persatuan Pencegah Perpecahan* (P5), in January 1950. This committee subsequently sent a delegation to Jakarta to try and convince President Soekarno that the best way of ending the disorders in Kalimantan was to give the command of the Kalimantan section of the Republican Army to Hassan Basry and Firmansjah. To lend force to its arguments it stated that the committee had the backing of 10,000 soldiers (KB 18-1-1950, 20-1-1950).

The committee’s suggestions were not followed. On the contrary, Army headquarters adhered to its policy of destroying the ALRI Div IV’s special identity. The *Lambung Mangkurat* Division was composed in such a way that it comprised not only former ALRI Div IV soldiers, but also members of other guerilla units and former KNIL soldiers who had expressed the wish to enter the Republican Army. Notably the latter were viewed with distrust by the ALRI Div IV guerillas. The former ALRI Div IV and KNIL soldiers, who in the past had been enemies, now, since the end of 1949, had to share the same quarters.

Moreover, after the institution of the Army and Territory of Kalimantan and its sub-divisions the name *Lambung Mangkurat* Division gradually fell into disuse, finally to disappear altogether, and a proportion of its members were stationed in other parts of Indonesia. Hassan Basry’s troops were therefore simply referred to as the troops of the Third Sub-Territory.<sup>26</sup> Units of these comprising former ALRI Div IV guerillas were sent to East, South-East and West Kalimantan. Others were dispatched to West Java to assist in the suppression of the *Darul Islam* movement there. The Division further lost many of its officers when forty

to fifty of them were sent to Yogyakarta to follow a special course for officers at the National Military Academy (KB 1-1-1950). Probably owing to faulty communications – rather than malicious intentions – these officers arrived in Yogyakarta only to discover that the National Military Academy had been closed for over a year, ever since the occupation of the city by Dutch troops during the second “military action”. A number of them thereupon travelled on to Surabaya, where a military training centre did exist. Only one of them eventually completed his course. The others returned to Kalimantan, where after a while they joined the guerillas in the bush who refused to join the Republican Army or to be demobilized. Hence this time they had taken to the jungle to oppose the Republican Army.

The latter included Ibnu Hadjar, whose original name was Haderi. Born in Kandangan in April 1920, he was said to have had a fierce, pugnacious disposition even as a child, and to have been a real ring-leader in any conflict (IB 20-3-1954). Haderi had assumed the name Ibnu Hadjar on joining the fight for independence against the Dutch. He later became an officer with the ALRI Div IV in the rank of second lieutenant, commanding guerilla units around Kandangan.

In the initial period after his defection in the first quarter of 1950 he had a following of only about sixty men. For about the first three months they lay low and did not undertake any actions. The first attack on Republican troops was launched in mid-1950. By that time Ibnu Hadjar’s force had swollen to about two hundred men armed with about fifty guns (IB 27-2-1954, 20-3-1954). In spite of this quick growth as more and more disgruntled former guerillas joined his band, the possibility of an agreement was still not excluded. Early in October, in response to a Republican attempt to find a peaceful solution to the problem, Ibnu Hadjar reported to the authorities at Kandangan. After being released in order to try and persuade his troops to surrender too, he disappeared into the bush for good.

### 5. *The Rebellion*

Ibnu Hadjar called the new guerilla organization headed by him the Union of the Oppressed Indonesian People, *Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Yang Tertindas* (KRIYT).<sup>27</sup> The name is indicative of the feeling of the former guerillas. The Republican Government blamed them for the troubles in Kalimantan, but they for their part accused that Government of treachery and oppression.

There were two factors contributing to this feeling: the way the demobilization of former guerilla fighters was managed in Kalimantan, and the Republican Government and Army's treatment of the rural population of the area.

According to official figures provided by Sukanda Bratamenggala for the period until February, when the troubles with the former guerillas in Kalimantan began, approximately 16,000 former guerillas entered the Army. In the subsequent period they received training and awaited medical examination and other tests to see whether they met the standards for admission to the Republican Army. According to Sukanda Bratamenggala many of them soon left the Army again, and in March only 6,000 were still left. One of the reasons for this mass defection was the paltriness of the allowance of Rp. 3.— a day. As Sukanda Bratamenggala points out, a rubber tapper could earn much more (Sulawesi 1953:151; I 10-12-1950).

Those remaining in the Republican Army who eventually were demobilized felt discriminated against by the treatment they received in comparison with that of their fellows in Java. In Kalimantan this category was fobbed off with a gratuity of Rp. 50.— on demobilization. The Government argued, in justification of its niggardliness, that the guerillas should be content with the spiritual reward for their sacrifice to the nation, a sacrifice which surely God would not forget (Sulawesi 1953:157). To add insult to injury, the men thus demobilized, in contrast to the demobilized guerillas in Java, were not even recognized as veterans and as a consequence were not entitled to a pension.

A proportion of those who had left the Republican Army of their own accord and of those who had been compulsorily demobilized joined Ibnu Hadjar's force in the jungle. In contrast to their January statement, the authorities now were forced to admit that something very serious was wrong. In South Kalimantan, as in various other parts of Indonesia, discontented former guerillas experiencing difficulty in returning to civilian life resorted to acts disturbing the peace. In Martapura, Banjarmasin, Rantau and Kandangan there were moreover a number of desertions from the Army and Police Force to the side of the guerillas. These deserters took their arms with them, thus augmenting the rebels' military potential.

The task of solving the problem was assigned to the man most qualified for this: Hassan Basry, the guerillas' former commander. On September 20th, 1950, he was given the command

of the *Komando Penyelesaian Hulusungai*, or Hulusungai Solution Command. The following month the region was given Military Assistance (*Militaire Bijstand*), and Republican Army units moved in again to restore the peace. Hassan Basry first looked for a peaceful solution. Accordingly he issued an order to all guerillas who had not yet surrendered to do so before October 10th, and got in touch with guerilla leaders in order to try and find out their wishes.

As we saw above, Ibnu Hadjar was among those who responded. But he disappeared, never to return again, on being given the opportunity to return to the bush to get in touch with his followers and persuade them to surrender as well.

The rebels' demands contained a number of now familiar themes. Among other things they requested the replacement of certain functionaries in the Civil Administration, the Army and the Police Force (N 30-9-1950).<sup>28</sup> The guerillas felt that too many important posts were occupied by people from outside Kalimantan, notably from Java, and by individuals who had collaborated with the Dutch. Because the Government and Army had no intention whatever of giving in to the guerillas' demands and replacing some of the higher regional civil servants and officers, the two parties reached total deadlock.

When the guerillas in the bush persisted in their refusal to surrender and continued their actions, at first in the area of Barabai, Birayang, Batumandi and Paringin and later also around Kelua and Kandangan, Hassan Basry's patience ran out. Although he must have felt some sympathy for their demands, he decided to take military action against them. Accordingly on October 16th the Hulusungai Solution Command announced that a peaceful solution was now ruled out, and that the Army and Police had begun a purge of the area. At the same time a curfew was imposed – in North Hulusungai from 2 a.m. till 5 a.m., and in South Hulusungai, where the situation was considered to be especially dangerous, from 8 p.m. till 5 a.m.

So far (namely between October 10th and 15th) only about 670 guerillas, carrying about 50 firearms, had reported to the authorities. According to Sukanda Bratamenggala, who made these figures public, 13 of these guerillas stated the wish to enter the Civil Service, 30 the Army Police Force, and 130 the Army. Of the latter 130, only 10 eventually satisfied the requirements (I 10-12-1950).

Ibnu Hadjar reacted to the purge launched by the Government by stepping up his own activities. Within the ten days following

the commencement of the Army and Police campaign the rebels attacked the town of Kandangan three times (N 2-11-1950). Even so, the Military Assistance for Hulusungai, which had lasted for just one month, was withdrawn at the beginning of November.

So the Hulusungai Solution Command's efforts had come to naught. On November 11th the command was dissolved, its methods, in particular Hassan Basry's use of force, being repudiated by the authorities. These argued in justification of their move to dissolve the command that what was needed was a peaceful solution. The responsibility for peace and order was now entrusted to the Northern Defence Command Section, or *Komando Petak Pertahanan Utara*, comprising Hulusungai and Barito (N 15-11-1950). Not long after that Hassan Basry resigned his command of the Republican troops in South Kalimantan — now called the F Brigade — which was taken over by Major H.T. Sitompul.<sup>29</sup>

The decision to dissolve the Hulusungai Solution Command and to try again to persuade the guerillas to lay down their arms through negotiations was taken just a few days before the Central Government's announcement of its amnesty offer, in November 1950. As we saw above, the offer did not apply to South Sulawesi and Kalimantan, for which areas separate solutions were to be worked out. In Kalimantan the term within which rebels were to have the opportunity to surrender ran from December 5th, 1950, to January 15th, 1951. The guerillas giving themselves up were first screened as to criminal record. If this record was clean, they were given a choice of service with the Armed Forces or the Civil Administration, or a return to civilian life (N 25-11-1950).

The result of the appeal was disappointing, however. Although there had been rumours that Ibnu Hadjar was prepared to surrender, this did not eventuate. Zafry Zamzam, the then chairman of the Regional Parliament of Hulusungai, was delegated to negotiate with him. He did, in fact, meet Ibnu Hadjar and explained the terms of the Government offer to him, but failed to persuade him to give himself up. Ibnu Hadjar reiterated his demands of a few months previously, stating that he was prepared to cease his opposition and to surrender if certain civil and military officials were replaced. He also asked for time to rally his followers and discuss the Government's offer with them (N 20-1-1951).

As in October, the Government refused to meet Ibnu Hadjar's conditions, and after January 18th, 1951, operations against him

and his rebels were resumed. Only a few guerillas had surrendered – in Kandangan only eight, none of them carrying firearms. Outside Kandangan the results were a little better, with 1,063 guerillas surrendering. But the number of firearms handed in still was disappointingly small, namely only about thirty (I 19-1-1951, 27-1-1951). The majority of those surrendering (c. 400) belonged to a group styling itself *Perkumpulan Banteng Borneo*, or Buffalo Association of Borneo.<sup>30</sup>

At the commencement of the renewed military actions Kandangan was declared a military zone, and army posts were set up all over the area. On February 26th the first large-scale battle with a group of about one hundred guerillas took place here, which lasted about three hours (N 2-3-1951).

In the tense atmosphere prevailing in South Kalimantan the presence of Hassan Basry, who was still held in high esteem by the guerillas, was considered too dangerous. The Ministry of Defence therefore gave him a grant for study abroad. Hassan Basry hereupon left Kalimantan, first for Jakarta and then for Egypt, in February 1951. His departure was encouraged by the authorities because they were apprehensive of his influence among the dissatisfied soldiers and demobilized guerilla fighters and considered him a security risk. Though Hassan Basry was to stay in Egypt for over four years, his trip was no great success. He failed to matriculate in Egypt, and was obliged to continue his studies at a lower level, doing courses in religion and military science (IM 20-9-1951, 15-8-1952; IB 12-8-1953, 29-9-1955).

The departure of Hassan Basry, who would remain absent from Banjarmasin until December 1955, strengthened the suspicion that the military authorities were trying to undermine the influence of the former ALRI Div IV and to disperse its members. It further confirmed Ibnu Hadjar and his rebels in their conviction that those who had sacrificed themselves for the Republican cause in South Kalimantan during the revolution were now being put in a subordinate position. All this provoked a so-called “anti-Java campaign”. The spontaneous character of this campaign was denied by the authorities, who gave the blame for rousing anti-Javanese feelings to certain elements ambitious for power. The population itself did not bear the Javanese a grudge, so the Banjarese Inspector of Police, Mahmud, claimed (ANP-Aneta v. 5, n. 40, 24-11-1950:383).

The manning of the Civil and Military Administration in Kalimantan remained a major bone of bitter contention between the Union of the Oppressed Indonesian People or KRIYT and the



Republic. The posting of government officials from Java to replace local civil servants continued to be a sensitive subject and a source of resentment and conflict. The Central Government's control over regional affairs and over the composition of the Regional Government was strongly resented not only by the advocates of a federal state structure, but also by people who, like the former ALRI Div IV guerillas, had from the beginning been in favour of a unitary Republic.

The problem had already reared its head before the formal recognition of independence, at the time the ALRI Div IV and its successor, the *Lambung Mangkurat* Division, had been obliged to submit to the authority and instructions of Republican officers from Java. It was aggravated after the establishment of the unitary Republic and the dissolution of the Autonomous Areas of Banjar and South-East Kalimantan, when the changes the people of South Kalimantan had probably been hoping for failed to materialize.

Far from such changes taking place, the command of the Army and Territory of Kalimantan remained in the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Sukanda Bratamenggala, a Sundanese. He was replaced in November 1951 by Colonel Sadikin, also from West Java. Hassan Basry never obtained the coveted command, and in November 1950 was even replaced as Commander of South Kalimantan by Major Sitompul, a Batak. The latter was succeeded in due course by Lieutenant-Colonel Suadi Suromihardjo (Suadi Suromiharjo), from Central Java, who had gained counter-insurgency experience during the military operations in the Merapi-Merbabu Complex.

The Civil Administration was headed by a Javanese governor, Dr. Murdjani (Murjani). Here it was particularly the many changes introduced in the lower ranks that aroused resentment. Existing functionaries were removed from their positions and replaced by Javanese, or by other people the Government felt it could trust. Most of these changes, as well as the import of Javanese, were ostensibly implemented for the sake of improvement of the quality of the government apparatus. At the continuing refusal of the Government, or to be more exact the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to change its policy in this respect, the criticism in Kalimantan of what was generally referred to as "the import of officials from Java" grew. The replacement of such officials in the Civil Administration, the Army and the Police Force was only one of a series of demands put forward by Ibnu Hadjar on the occasions when the Government made reconcili-

ation overtures to the guerillas and offered them an opportunity to surrender. Over the years the demand was regularly repeated by the KRIYT. So early in 1953 the latter advised the Central Government to appoint Mohammad Noor, the very first Republican governor of Kalimantan, as governor to replace Murdjani. At the same time it urged that Hassan Basry should be made commander of the Army and Territory of Kalimantan, and that Zafry Zamzam, a former member of the Banjar Council from Kandangan, who had been arrested by the Dutch for a short time in 1949, be appointed head of the Civil Administration of South Kalimantan. It warned that Indonesia would never be safe as long as "Dutchmen in Indonesian guise" continued to occupy important positions in the Administration (IB 8-9-1953, 11-9-1953).

Two other points besides which caused vexation, not only in Kalimantan but also in other parts of Indonesia, were, firstly, the incorporation of the guerillas into the Republican Army and the subsequent demobilization of a proportion of them, and secondly, uncertainty about the nature of the independence achieved. A sense of unfair treatment induced the demobilized ex-guerillas to take to the jungle. Once there, they hoped to be able to enforce their demand for recognition as regular soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Indonesian Republic. The guerillas in Kalimantan may have been inspired to go on fighting in the early years after their defection by the seeming success of Kahar Muzakkar in South Sulawesi in gaining the Central Government's recognition and by the widespread sympathy which his movement enjoyed. KRIYT leaders still made their men promises as late as 1953 that they would one day be officially recognized again as soldiers of the Republic, as during the fight for independence (IM 14-1-1953).

The second vexatious point, as indicated, was the feeling which many people had, also within the Republican Army, that no true independence had been achieved. At first particularly the Dutch-imposed federal state structure and the Dutch Government's refusal to cede West Irian to Indonesia – and in some cases also the continuing Dutch economic presence – caused resentment. In addition people were being made to feel that the formal transfer of sovereignty was a present from the Dutch. Accordingly the Government, first of the federal and later of the unitary Republic, was considered as having betrayed the original ideals of the Indonesian revolution. So groups of former guerilla fighters together with demobilized soldiers in many parts of Indonesia

proceeded to oppose the Republican Government and Army in the name of the revolution. Describing themselves as “defenders” or “adherents” of “August 17th, 1945” and of the *Pancasila*, or sporting names to that effect, they professed themselves to aim at social and political change.

Ibnu Hadjar was one of those claiming to be acting in defence of the *Pancasila*. Until 1954 he solicited financial aid for the purpose of achieving a “one hundred per cent independence” (PR 16-12-1953). Generally the “defenders of August 17th, 1945” did not exactly specify their aims. They unquestionably wanted to see the Republican Government or its representatives replaced in the outlying regions, but the nature of the social and economic changes envisaged by them remained vague. Some interpreted freedom as freedom from all government interference in the widest sense of the word. To them independence meant a golden era, free from poverty and taxes and from government pressure. Certain KRIYT members were not free from these ideas either, or at least used them to gain popular support. In a KRIYT letter of 1952, sent from “the Kalimantan bush” and signed by two local commanders by the name of Rasjaidi (Rasyaidi) and Mardjajana (Marjayana), the Republican Government was alleged to be worse than the colonial one. Conveniently overlooking the fact that people were obliged to pay a contribution to KRIYT as well, the writers criticized the Republican Government for continuing to collect taxes. That was why the KRIYT would intensify its struggle to achieve the objective of a society that was truly inspired by the *Pancasila* (KB 2-12-1953). Later, in another letter, the KRIYT’s aim was described as being the perfection of the freedom of the country, the people and religion (IB 15-9-1953).

## 6. *The Ups and Downs of the Guerilla Movement*

After Hassan Basry’s failure to crush the rebellion, the Freedom Operation, led by his successor Major Sitompul, was launched by the Army in early 1951. Although on the one hand resulting in an increase in public safety and a drop in the number of robberies and killings of local civilians, on the other hand the connected military operations stirred up existing feelings of discontent. The Republican Army was not exactly gentle in its treatment of civilians, either, whom it did not shrink from harassing and killing in the pursuit of its enemy.

The effect of the Republican Army’s pacification campaign in

Kalimantan is difficult to assess. Regionalists claim that it provided former KNIL soldiers and federalists with a good opportunity to take revenge on the ALRI Div IV and to regain the economically superior position they had lost between 1945 and 1950. It is also alleged that in the Army operations scores of villages were set afire and thousands of people were killed, while at one time there were about half a million refugees in Banjarmasin.

It is probable that the objectives of the Republican Army campaign were not solely military and political. The guerillas' struggle had been quite successful, achieving one of the main aims of guerilla warfare: control of the rural areas and the isolation of the enemy in urban centres. The ALRI Div IV, moreover, had established a Military Government which according to P. Arya was based on democracy, respected all religions, and was bent on eliminating the capitalist bourgeoisie and eradicating colonialism, corruption, crime and other evils (KB 23-8-1949). Besides, the ALRI Div IV, by founding rural co-operative societies and checking the approaches to the cities, had succeeded in preventing or at least decreasing, the sale of rural products to the towns, thereby disrupting the urban trade network reaching down into the villages.

During the period of the ALRI Div IV's control South Kalimantan, again according to P. Arya, experienced some economic improvement, as the co-operative idea won wide support. The rubber trade had come for one hundred per cent into the hands of the people, he claimed, while the Military Government had closely supervised the functioning of the co-operative societies. The co-operative principle had met with so much enthusiasm from the people because of the monopoly on forest products hitherto exercised by a few big firms such as Bruynzeel, according to him (KB 1-10-1949).

One of the effects of the military campaign after 1950 was the destruction of the co-operative system introduced by the ALRI Div IV and the re-establishment of the urban traders' control over rural areas. Although the mushrooming of co-operative societies after 1948, notably in the *kabupatens* of Hulusungai, Kapuas, Barito and Banjar, had not gone unnoticed by the Republican Government, the latter tended to question the motives behind this, pointing out that these attempts had been inspired by people "who fished in troubled waters". In addition it noted how strange it was that the system flourished especially in insecure areas. From all this it concluded that the founding of

co-operative societies and the construction of “illegal co-operative as well as private rubber smoking plants” must have taken place at the instigation of “certain people with certain motives” (Sulawesi 1953:196).

In this climate Ibnu Hadjar and his Union of the Oppressed Indonesian People came into prominence. Compared with the rebellions in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh this movement was only a minor one. With an initial following of only a few hundred, it grew steadily in the first years, but nevertheless remained a small movement. It never operated in groups of more than a hundred men, whereas in other parts of Indonesia concentrations of bands of between three and six hundred were no exception, especially in the early period. The local KRIYT units mostly operated independently. As a rule they only comprised five to fifty guerillas. They were, moreover, poorly armed and constantly pursued by Republican troops and the Police.

At the time Ibnu Hadjar took to the jungle the rebels were estimated to have in their possession four Bren and six Sten guns and a few scores of rifles (N 19-10-1950). Later estimates speak of a total of respectively fifty (IB 27-2-1954) and 148 (IB 26-11-1953) firearms for the early period, which are still low figures. The remainder of Ibnu Hadjar's men were armed with weapons such as knives, swords, spears and the like.

Partly because the KRIYT groups were so poorly armed and so small in size the Republican Army campaign initially was a success. Most of the rebels' few arms were seized, so that it looked as though the KRIYT would not survive. The Republican Army's tactics were directed at isolating the enemy in the mountains and starving them into surrender. Accordingly it closed all roads leading to the areas to which the guerillas had retreated, allowing anyone wishing to travel along them to take with them only enough food for one day (IM 25-10-1951). Consequently many rebels gave themselves up because of lack of food (KB 13-12-1951). Others were captured by the local population, who were promised a money reward for every guerilla turned in. This provided a welcome source of extra income. It also led to a situation where people tried to keep the location of guerilla hiding-places to themselves. In some instances there was even fighting over who could claim a captive as his own and so rake in the reward (KB 23-3-1952). For obvious reasons a request to hand out arms to the population in its resistance against the KRIYT was refused (IM 4-11-1951). Only in Rantau were some arms distributed. When at the end of 1952 the people of Riam

Kanan put in a request for weapons, this was dismissed with the remark that, if during the revolution it had been possible to defeat the Dutch with no more than bamboo spears, why could not the rebels, who were obviously criminals, be defeated with such weapons (IM 6-1-1953).

At the end of 1951 the Government had reason to believe that the KRIYT bands had been isolated in Hulusungai (IM 4-11-1951, 22-11-1951, 8-1-1952). East and West Kalimantan (the latter area with the exception of Ketapang) were both considered safe and free from guerillas and bandits. The responsibility for maintaining law and order here was accordingly transferred to the Police and the Civil Administration by the Republican Army (IM 1-2-1952). In Hulusungai, on the other hand, the situation was still felt to be critical. A *Staat van Oorlog en Beleg* (SOB) or State of War and Siege, was proclaimed for the entire region on November 1st, 1951. The other *kabupatens* of South Kalimantan, in particular Kotabaru, were regarded as being in an intermediate position. There were guerillas operating here, too, but on a smaller scale than in Hulusungai. Over the years, Kotabaru enjoyed the special attention of the authorities because of the landings here of reinforcements for Ibnu Hadjar sent by Kahar Muzakkar.

The KRIYT even so survived the pacification campaign, and after the lifting of the SOB in July 1952 gradually recovered from the first blows. This was due in part to a miscalculation on the part of the authorities. At the time of the termination of the SOB they decided, in view of the continuing guerilla activities, that the Republican Army should go on providing military assistance. Six months later they revoked this decision, however. The damage caused by the KRIYT in the two and a half years of its active existence up to then was considerable, although it seemed nothing compared with that in West Java and South Sulawesi. According to official estimates 1,656 houses had been burnt or looted, bringing the total damage to around Rp. 6 milliard, while some 1,055 people had been kidnapped, killed or wounded. The number of refugees was estimated at 35,000 (IM 21-2-1953).

The civil government, which after the termination of military assistance became solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order, embarked on its task with enthusiasm. The governor of Kalimantan, Dr. Murdjani, immediately initiated a series of talks with the most important members of the civil service and Police Force, Muslim scholars, representatives of political parties, and other social leaders of South Kalimantan. During these he

tried to persuade the religious leaders to issue a religious instruction (*fatwa*) to their followers to resist the KRIYT, and announced that he was drawing up a battle plan against the rebels. Alluding to the lack of communication and understanding between the Republican Army, the Police and the Civil Administration in previous operations, Murdjani stated that he personally would direct all future operations. He finally disclosed his plans, after days of talks, on February 24th, 1953.

Although it had been rumoured that priority would be given to a peaceful solution now that the military had been withdrawn, Murdjani's scheme, which he named *Konsepsi Kita* (Our Plan), placed strong emphasis on military methods. The supreme command of the projected operations was to be held by himself jointly with the Chief of Police, Sulaiman. Special headquarters were to be established at Kandangan under the supervision of the *bupati* of South Hulu Sungai, Sjarkawi (Syarkawi), and of the Police commissioners Nafiah and Tjokrodiningrat (Cokrodiningrat). Units of the Police Mobile Brigade, whose number was to be increased, were to be stationed in the most strategic areas around Rantau, Kandangan and Barabai (IM 11-2-1953, 13-2-1953, 14-2-1953, 20-2-1953). Appeals to the Government to grant the rebels an amnesty, as was advocated by, for example, social leaders in Banjar and the Kalimantan branch of the *Persatuan Indonesia Raya* (PIR), were ignored. Murdjani was of the opinion that people who had committed crimes should not simply be pardoned, even though he still professed himself to believe in a peaceful solution, pointing out that "the door to surrender was still open". If the rebels surrendering asked God for mercy and truly regretted their misdeeds, the Regional Government of Kalimantan would, Murdjani promised, intercede with the Central Government for leniency towards them (IM 20-2-1953). By the end of one month, however, Murdjani had become convinced that the persuasive method had failed and that military actions were the only means left (PR 28-3-1953).

The Police Force, which now had to conduct the operations against the KRIYT on its own, proved too small for its task. It had in addition the full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order at a time, in early 1953, when areas which for a while had been relatively safe, such as Riam Kanan and Martapura, were again becoming troubled (IM 6-1-1953). Members of the KRIYT and its Police Force were emerging from the jungle once more to collect taxes and impose fines. From Riam Kanan there were reports of people being forced to pay a tax of Rp. 5.— a

month (IB 22-12-1953). Special tax officers styled market or tax *mandurs* (supervisors) were moreover visiting the villages to collect a kind of sales tax (IB 24-12-1953).

In other areas where they had been operating for a long time as well the KRIYT rebels were intensifying their activities. Ibnu Hadjar himself was operating between Kandangan and Barabai. He had established his headquarters on a mountain not far from the first-named town, in the village of Datar Laga. This was commonly referred to, because of its shape and possibly also because it accommodated the KRIYT headquarters, as Gunung Hantu (Mount Ghost). It provided an ideal hiding-place, being accessible from only one direction, from which, moreover, an advancing enemy had to march through three kilometres of tall grass and thus was easily spotted (IB 20-7-1954). From any of the other directions the place could only be approached through mountainous country, harbouring many KRIYT camps. From these headquarters Ibnu Hadjar travelled all over Hulusungai to confer with his commanders or to personally lead attacks, and frequently made incursions into the *kabupaten* of Kotabaru.

Further to the north, around Tanjung, there was a group headed by Kartolo operating since the beginning of 1950. Kartolo, whose real name was Asmuni,<sup>31</sup> had Tanjung as his base but also made forays into Hulusungai and ranged as far south as Alabio. He was captured after a joint operation by Army units and the local population in January 1953 (IM 7-1-1953). In the Balangan River area the principal KRIYT leader was Utuh Tjilik (Utuh Cilik), while to the south of this, in the Batumandi area, Kurdi, alias Subrata, and Dahlan were operating (IM 20-2-1953, 1-3-1953). Dahlan, who had a bad name for cruelty, was killed by the local population in early 1954. His head and hands were thereupon severed and presented to the authorities (IB 26-2-1954).

Other guerrilla commanders of these early years were Daeng Matelo, operating in the Amandit River area, Rasjaidi and Mardjajana in Rantau, Tamberani in Sei Pinang, Chairul Muis (Khairul Muis, succeeded after his death in 1954 by A.K. Mungsi) and Gusti Surjah (Gusti Suryah) (who, along with many others, was "shot while trying to escape" in August 1954) in Banjar, and Mawardi and his deputy Raden Mochtar Djaja (Mokhtar Jaya) between Martapura and Pleihari. Tamberani was shot at the end of 1953 and was succeeded by his deputy, Ipul, who in turn shortly afterwards was executed by one of Ibnu Hadjar's lieutenants, Djumberi (Jumberi), for alleged terrorization of the popula-



tion (IB 19-2-1954). Mawardi was killed in 1954, but lived on among the population as a ghost, one villager, for example, describing the appearance of a ghost with a big body and long fangs growing out of its mouth which introduced itself in a deep voice as Mawardi (IB 22-6-1954). There were, for that matter, many other superstitious beliefs surrounding dead rebels. So in the case of the burial of Masri the grave kept filling up with earth because the sides caved in. At a second attempt to dig a grave, the hole almost closed completely. In a united effort, whereby some of the people present did the digging while others forced the body into the grave, it was finally possible for the body to be buried, even though the hole still tended to collapse. This macabre incident was interpreted as a sign that even the earth refused to accept Masri because of the crimes he had committed in his lifetime (IB 23-7-1954).

The intensification of rebel activities in 1953 may have been intended by the KRIYT as an indication that it still existed. The rebels were stimulated in this not only by the termination of military assistance, which could be interpreted as a sign that in the authorities' view the security problem in South Kalimantan had faded into insignificance, but by two other possible factors. The first of these was internal dissension, the second an ill-fated visit to Kalimantan by Soekarno.

As a consequence of the new appeals by the authorities to the guerillas to surrender, and because of the difficult position the KRIYT units had got into as a result of the Republican military actions, the guerillas were divided among themselves. One group, which after fighting a losing battle for more than two years, was in favour of surrender included one of the rebels' chief commanders, Haji Machfudz Sidik (Makhfudz Sidik). The latter at the beginning of the rebellion had been one of Ibnu Hadjar's most trusted assistants and was believed to be almost as powerful as Ibnu Hadjar himself. In December 1950, at the time of Zafry Zamzam's negotiations with Ibnu Hadjar, it had been Haji Machfudz Sidik and not Ibnu Hadjar who had issued an order to the KRIYT soldiers not to surrender. Two years later, however, after suffering a loss of influence in the KRIYT, he became the main advocate of surrender. As a result he was shot by one of Ibnu Hadjar's men on the latter's orders while taking a bath on February 16th, 1953 (IM 29-2-1953). He was subsequently replaced by Dardiansjah (Dardiansyah), a younger brother of Ibnu Hadjar, who in his capacity as deputy KRIYT commander occasionally directed the KRIYT troops in Hulusungai whenever

Ibnu Hadjar was away in the *kabupaten* of Kotabaru (IM 28-11-1953, 4-3-1954).

Soekarno's visit to Kalimantan took place within the framework of an inspection tour of trouble-spots in Indonesia at the end of January 1953. In Kalimantan he visited among other places Banjarmasin, Negara, Barabai, Kandangan, Martapura and Amuntai. The keynote of the entire visit to South Kalimantan was provided by the place of Islam in society and the controversial issue of whether or not Indonesia should become an Islamic state. These and the problem of security were the main themes of all Soekarno's speeches. The President was able to see the effects of the KRIYT rebellion with his own eyes while travelling from Martapura to Kandangan. In Kandangan some KRIYT rebels had stopped an army truck and set it afire just before Soekarno's arrival and the burnt wreck had not yet been removed when Soekarno passed. Soekarno repeatedly pleaded for the restoration of peace and unity. At Kandangan he observed that "murder and arson as well as the disturbance of order are clearly in violation of the principles of Islam", adding that, "unless we are destroyed by our own people, Indonesia will survive" (PR 29-1-1953).

A great deal of commotion was provoked by Soekarno's remarks on the subject of religion and the ideological foundation of the state. That a proportion of the Muslims of South Kalimantan were opposed to Soekarno's position on the role of Islam and his propagation of Marhaenism became clearly evident on his arrival in Hulusungai. In what was described as a tense atmosphere a Koranic verse was presented to him, which ran: "Be faithful to God and be faithful to the Messenger and the authorities among you" (Sura 4:59).

The climax came at Amuntai, where Soekarno held a speech that was bound to enrage many devout Muslims, not only in South Kalimantan but also in most other parts of Indonesia. The speech was improvised, with Soekarno reacting to the slogans displayed by the crowd, which read: "Please explain: [do you want] a national state or an Islamic state?" and: "Bung Karno, what is the meaning of Marhaenism?". The passage of this notorious speech that most infuriated Indonesian Muslims was that in which Soekarno expounded his views on the Islamic state, the subject which from 1945 on had preoccupied Muslim and secular politicians alike. Here Soekarno put forward the argument that if an Islamic state were founded, many regions whose populations were non-Islamic would break away from the Republic. As

examples of such regions he mentioned the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands and parts of Sulawesi, adding that West Irian might not want to join Indonesia, either (PR 13-2-1953). Soekarno, in fact, was using the same argument which Mohammad Hatta had advanced in August 1945, with a view to gaining Islamic support for the Constitution of 1945.

At first Soekarno's speech, delivered as it was in a remote corner of Indonesia, did not draw much attention. Later, as the contents became more widely known, it drew a flood of protests. Soekarno was attacked not only for supporting the constitutional argument in favour of a secular state, but also for failing to differentiate between those who wanted to achieve an Islamic State by peaceful means and those who tried to bring it about by violent methods. Moreover, some accused him of expressing himself against the propagation of Islamic ideals.

The South Kalimantan *Masyumi* branch was one group which reacted angrily to these words of Soekarno's. It pronounced the speech one-sidedly propagandistic, as it failed to put forward the alternative choice of a political party with an Islamic ideology or with the ideal of founding an Islamic State (IM 8-2-1953). There were also indignant reactions in Aceh, where Soekarno had to give an explanation for his words at Amuntai on his visit to North Sumatra a few weeks later, and in Jakarta, where a mass demonstration was staged at Lapangan Banteng. Also in Jakarta protests were voiced by M. Isa Anshary of the *Masyumi*, who branded to speech as "undemocratic, unconstitutional, and in conflict with the ideology of Islam", and by such Muslim organizations as the *Nahdatul Ulama* and the GPKI (Feith 1962:281). Moreover, Dachlan Ranuwihardjo (Dakhlan Ranuwiharjo), chairman of the Islamic student organization (HMI), wrote Soekarno a letter urging for an explanation.

Soekarno gave his reply on May 7th, 1953, in a lecture at the *Universitas Indonesia* in Jakarta. Here he explained that: "When I stood at Amuntai facing the question: 'Bung Karno, we want an explanation of whether we should have a National State or an Islamic State' – when I stood there at that time as President of the Republic of Indonesia, I did not for a moment harbour the idea of prohibiting Muslims from putting forward or propagating Islamic ideals" (Soekarno 1953:45). He continued that as President, and hence in duty bound to defend the constitution, he had had to reply that Indonesia was a "national state", but had not, in so doing, belittled the citizens' right to propagate their own views and ideals (Soekarno 1953:46).

Soekarno's words at both Amuntai and Jakarta, where he further stressed that the *Pancasila* constituted a compromise in which one had to acquiesce if one wished to avoid division, bear a close resemblance to the arguments advanced in 1945. But they also contain a new element which, although it escaped the attention at the time, may be indicative of the latent feelings and anxieties of the secular politicians of those days. In 1952 preparations for a general election, not only for Parliament but also for a Constituent Assembly which would have the task of drafting a new constitution, had begun in earnest. There was a general apprehension that the Islamic parties might emerge victorious, with as ultimate consequence the attainment of the Muslim ideal of an Islamic State. As Feith observes (1962:275): "Among members of non-Islamic parties the fear was widespread that elections would mean the end of the state based on the Pantja Sila and its replacement by an Islamic State".

Soekarno, too, may have foreseen such an outcome. In 1945 he had exhorted the Muslims to strive for a majority on the representative bodies if they wanted Indonesian society to be based upon Islam. Now, however, he stressed that a majority did not count for everything: Indonesia was no "majorocracy". He impressed upon his audience, of whom the greater part may be described as devout Muslims, that he had "never come across the word 'democracy' in Islamic terminology... only 'musyawarah'... never encountered the term 'elections' in Islamic vocabulary" (Soekarno 1953:56). Democracy in his view was not synonymous with elections but with *musyawarah*. He further stated himself to be convinced that, rather than a simple vote on things, what Islam wanted was *musyawarah*, "to achieve what is aimed at by all of us... to the satisfaction of every party" (Soekarno 1953:57).

In Kalimantan the KRIYT actions hereupon became more savage. The first major action was launched even during Soekarno's visit, when KRIYT units set fire to about fifty houses in a village whose entire population had turned out to see the President pass. In the evening the remaining houses in the same village were burnt down, this time by the Republican Army as a reprisal for alleged KRIYT support (IM 28-1-1953, 4-2-1953). The following month the guerillas set fire to over sixty houses and a mosque in a village near Telaga Langsat. In March, moreover, a concentration of about three hundred rebels – a size of force which the rebels had not been able to rally for years – was reported at a few miles' distance from Martapura (IM 21-3-1953).

By attacking isolated Police posts and engaging in minor skirmishes with Police units the KRIYT had, what was more, come into possession of some arms again. As it gained in strength it also became more daring. KRIYT bands ventured out of the mountains and began attacking smaller and more isolated towns with only small Police detachments or none at all. So in September the understaffed Police posts of Pengaron and Karang Intan were attacked by a force of about one hundred guerillas (IB 8-9-1953, 29-9-1953). Bigger towns were not safe, either. In September Rantau and Pengaron were both attacked on the same day (PR 10-9-1953); in November it was Negara's turn, while Kotabaru also was occupied for a short while by the rebels (IB 29-11-1953). In the night of December 12th, 1953, Kandangan was attacked from four directions. Judging from the tone of the voice shouting the commands this attack was presumably led by Ibnu Hadjar in person (IB 15-12-1953).

In Banjarmasin, too, the population was growing nervous. In July and August governor Murdjani had begun a series of talks with political party representatives to discuss the city's infiltration by guerillas, claiming that the situation had deteriorated steadily since KRIYT soldiers had broken through the cordon at Hulusungai and had entered not only Banjarmasin but also the *kabupatens* of Banjar and Kotabaru. The political parties used the opportunity to air their grievances against the government. Their representatives asked not only for firm action against the KRIYT, but also for internal disciplinary measures in the government apparatus against what was described as "robbery behind the desk" (PR 18-8-1953). There were moreover rumours spreading that Ibnu Hadjar intended attacking Banjarmasin on August 17th and 18th, when large-scale manifestations in celebration of Indonesia's independence were scheduled. This attack never took place, however. Towards the end of the year there was a report from the national news agency Antara that Ibnu Hadjar had been planning attacks on Banjarmasin, Rantau and Kandangan simultaneously on New Year's Day, but that the Mobile Brigade had succeeded in nipping these plans in the bud (IB 29-12-1953).

Although the attacks on Banjarmasin never eventuated, the city nevertheless did not remain free from acts of sabotage. In early December a KRIYT unit reportedly consisting entirely of women set fire to a rattan warehouse belonging to a big Dutch firm, Internatio. At the place of the fire a note by the KRIYT Defence Command of Banjarmasin was left, saying: "This is the revenge of the Union of the Oppressed People" (IB 5-12-1953, 6-12-1953).

In the same period the KRIYT tried to increase its influence over the population by appointing new village heads, much in the tradition of the ALRI Div IV. It concentrated these efforts in areas where it had been strong at the beginning of its rebellion in 1950 and early 1951. According to the head of police of South Kalimantan, Commissioner Kampono, the KRIYT was relatively successful in this attempt (IB 4-9-1953).

Because of the increased KRIYT activities the Army was again called in to assist, while the Mobile Brigade was reinforced with a fresh company from East Java. Even the institution of a volunteer corps was contemplated. But this idea was generally received with much reserve (IB 1-9-1953), as its opponents feared that such a volunteer corps might become an instrument whereby former guerillas might yet enforce their demand for recognition as regular soldiers of the Republican Army.

### *7. The Islamic Kingdom*

One of the outstanding features characterizing the ALRI Div IV during the revolution had been its strict adherence to the tenets of Islam. Its Military Government, besides aiming at radical social and economic reform in the rural areas, devoted much of its energy to the promotion of Islam and the enforcement of its laws. It proudly observed that under its rule Islam flourished. Religious education and Koran reciting experienced a revival, it claimed, while there was also a marked improvement in people's observance of their religious duties and an increase in attendances at mosques and religious training centres. It further alleged that as a consequence of all this such crimes as theft, gambling, adultery and prostitution had disappeared (KB 22-9-1949).<sup>32</sup>

The KRIYT, too, including as it did many guerillas from the ALRI Div IV, professed to be acting in the interests of Islam. Besides a general Information Department, it soon also established a special organisation for the diffusion of religious information (IM 25-10-1951). KRIYT guerillas were observed to be very conscientious in the performance of their daily prayers, while Ibnu Hadjar was said to fly into a temper if his soldiers were neglectful in this respect (IB 29-1-1954).

Whenever KRIYT soldiers visited a village, they would urge the people to obey Islamic law, to pray five times daily and to visit the mosque regularly. People who were remiss in this were threatened, and sometimes fined. So there was a report in 1953 of villagers neglecting the performance of the daily prayers being

made to pay a fine of between Rp. 900.– and Rp. 1,000.– (IM 6-1-1953). On other occasions KRIYT rebels singled out for attack people who had failed to pay the religious tax (*zakat*) or had paid too little, looting their houses by way of “punishment” (IM 25-1-1955). The penalties with which the KRIYT threatened potential wrongdoers were far from light. In an appeal to Islamic law, it warned that persons found guilty of theft would have their hand cut off, gamblers would have an ear severed, and adulterers would be stoned to death. Nowhere does it appear that such sentences were actually carried out, however (IB 30-12-1953, IM 1-6-1953).

The Republican Regional Government of Kalimantan, in reaction to the rebelling guerillas’ appeal to religion, made efforts to enlist the support of the Islamic scholars and religious leaders of the area in its campaign against the KRIYT. It asked all religious leaders sympathizing with the Republic to publicly condemn the KRIYT and its activities, and to issue a *fatwa*, or authoritative Islamic instruction, to that effect (IM 16-2-1952). In this the Government scored some measure of success. On November 16th, 1952, a group of Islamic leaders of Hulusungai published a statement at Amuntai in which they expressed the hope that the rebels would repent of their error, and censured the rebels’ attempts to lead astray people whose religious knowledge was still very slight, as they put it. The statement concluded with the pronouncement: “By Allah, heretics are they who are continually plaguing and disturbing their neighbours” (IM 3-12-1952). To thus speak out against the KRIYT was not without danger. In March 1953 two of the Islamic scholars supporting the statement, Haji Fadhli from Kandangan and Haji Kusan of Rantau, were killed (PR 20-2-1953).

In view of this Islamic foundation of the local rebel organization it is not surprising that there were from its beginning rumours and speculations about *Darul Islam* infiltration in Kalimantan, notably the southern regions, in which the KRIYT was operating and where during the struggle for independence the ALRI Div IV had been most influential. These rumours became more persistent after the arrest of certain people with a *Darul Islam* background and after *Darul Islam* pamphlets and letters began circulating, be it on a small scale.<sup>33</sup>

In June 1952, for example, a man named Anang Sulaiman was arrested on a charge of maintaining relations with leaders of the Islamic State of Indonesia in West Java (IB 4-9-1953).<sup>34</sup> At the end of that year a fugitive from the *Angkatan Umat Islam* of

Central Java who had fled to Kalimantan after the said organization's suppression was captured in West Kalimantan. His escape to Kalimantan was alleged to have been arranged by prominent citizens of West Kalimantan who sympathized with the *Darul Islam* movement in Java (IM 8-1-1953). All this was still of only minor significance, however, and the scant reports of *Darul Islam* activities reaching the area originated from outside South Kalimantan and Hulusungai.

In February 1953 there was a PCJ (Dutch World Service) radio report that Kalimantan was intended soon to become a second Java. In the light of the actual situation this news, and in particular the statement that the interior of Kalimantan was a den of *Darul Islam* sympathizers, was a gross exaggeration (IM 5-2-1953). The same is true of the demands to crush the *Darul Islam* in South Kalimantan which were frequently to be heard in mid-1953. People in Kalimantan were simply stirred up by the current protests in West Java to join in the chorus demanding a decree banning the *Darul Islam* as a movement that was dangerous to the state led by the nationalist and communist parties. At Banjarmasin a committee "for the security of Kalimantan" was formed. It organized meetings at which slogans such as "DI-TII and other rebels are enemies of the State and the People", "The rebels are responsible for greater unemployment", and "Crush the rebels, black marketeers and corruptors", were displayed (IB 20-8-1953). As was rightly remarked by Zafry Zamzam, it was most curious that the demonstrators did not demand the suppression of the KRIYT, rather than of the *Darul Islam*, which at that time was still almost non-existent in Kalimantan (IB 25-8-1953).

There nevertheless were some indications that the thought of joining the Islamic State of Indonesia was being played with in Kalimantan, particularly after Kahar Muzakkar had gone over to it in Sulawesi. Shortly after Kahar Muzakkar's declaration of Sulawesi as part of the territory of the Islamic State of Indonesia, pamphlets stating that the areas controlled by the KRIYT had entered the *Darul Islam* territory were discovered in Hulusungai (IB 4-4-1954).

There were some signs of *Darul Islam* activity also on the east coast of Kalimantan. Here Imbran Kamarullah, styling himself Chief of Staff of the *Panglima Batur* Division of the KRIYT, had founded a *Darul Islam* branch (PR 27-10-1953). He signed all his instructions in the name of the KRIYT and the Islamic Army of Indonesia, using an oval seal showing the crescent and star. Imbran Kamarullah was said to have joined the Islamic Army in



the hope of becoming its commander for Kalimantan, over Ibnu Hadjar's head. This *Darul Islam* branch never amounted to anything, however. Imbran Kamarullah was soon arrested (in August 1953), and in the course of his trial it became apparent that his force existed only on paper. By the time of his arrest he had done no more than select the members of his staff. Imbran Kamarullah's dream of becoming leader of the Islamic State of Indonesia for Kalimantan was a mere idle fantasy (IB 5-8-1953, 3-12-1953; PR 27-10-1953).<sup>35</sup>

In Java, meanwhile, Kartosuwirjo still considered Ibnu Hadjar and his KRIYT as a potential ally. He accordingly instructed his first lieutenant, Sanusi Partawidjaja, in February 1954 to step up the efforts to bring Kalimantan within the *de facto* territory of the Islamic State and to establish a Sixth Territorial Command of the Islamic Army of Indonesia there (PR 4-9-1954).

Ibnu Hadjar himself only made up his mind about joining the Islamic State definitely at the end of 1954. This was after Kartosuwirjo offered him a seat on the Government of this State, which included ministers from the rebel movements of West Java, Aceh, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The relatively small scope of the KRIYT rebellion in Kalimantan in comparison with the insurrections in West Java, Aceh and Sulawesi is reflected in the composition of this Cabinet. For Ibnu Hadjar was not assigned a full portfolio in it, but was only appointed *Menteri Negara*, a minor function comparable to that of Minister without Portfolio. He was also appointed Commander of the TII for Kalimantan.

Thereupon Ibnu Hadjar proceeded to reorganize his forces. He began styling himself *ulul amri* (or what would have been more correct, its singular form *wali al-amri*), meaning "The Authority", i.e. of the *Kerajaan Islam* or Islamic Kingdom (IB 23-6-1955). He likewise renamed his headquarters, bestowing such fanciful epithets as *Istana Islam Merdeka* (Free Islamic Palace) or *Istana Agama Islam Agung* (Great Islamic Palace) on them. His troops gradually assumed the name *Angkatan Perang Tentara Islam* (APTII), Islamic Army War Force, while they were sometimes also referred to as *Pasukan Islam*, or Islamic Troops, both names with or without the addition of KRIYT. Commander of these troops (*Kepala Pasukan Islam*) (KAPAI) was "His Excellency" (*Paduka Yang Mulia*) Ibnu Hadjar. To underline his rupture with the secular Republic, Ibnu Hadjar further had an alternative version of the national anthem composed. To this end *Indonesia Raya* was rewritten and adopted to the Islamic context of the KRIYT rebellion.<sup>36</sup>

Aside from these new names nothing much changed, however. No fresh offensive was launched. Even the general elections of 1955 were not seized on by the KRIYT to step up its activities. The latter raided no villages, nor did it harass the organizers or voters. It refrained from obstructing the elections in spite of threats to do so expressed by it in early 1955, and contended itself with urging the population to vote for an Islamic party (IB 4-9-1955, 25-9-1955).

The command remained firmly in the hands of Ibnu Hadjar, who by this time had become a legendary figure. He was reported from "reliable sources" to be invulnerable to "iron and bullets" (IB 30-4-1954). There were moreover tales circulating about the fabulous riches he had allegedly amassed as a result of the looting raids of his troops. The speculations were that he had accumulated gold and polished and rough diamonds to a total value of Rp. 5 million over the years. This treasure was reportedly hidden somewhere in the bush on the border between South and Southeast Kalimantan. He was further supposed to possess a map showing the location of rich deposits of gold and diamonds. These, according to the stories, lay somewhere in the depths of the jungle and could be reached only by passing some very steep slopes and dense undergrowth (IB 9-11-1955).

Ibnu Hadjar's alleged wealth provoked the envy not only of outsiders. Within the KRIYT or APTI itself conflicts arose about its distribution, as well as about the division of the proceeds from looting raids and taxes. Junior commanders felt that their superiors kept too much for themselves. The KRIYT band in Katingan, in the *kabupaten* of Kapuas, which was commanded by A. Adjai (A. Ajai) and Idjun (Ijun), even split over the issue. Of this group's receipts only twenty-five per cent was divided among its members. The remaining seventy-five per cent was supposed to be kept in reserve for the KRIYT's general expenditures. A. Adjai and Idjun, however, were later accused by their followers of embezzling these funds and using the money to buy clothes and the like with (IB 30-1-1955).

Ibnu Hadjar, too, was alleged to think first and foremost of his own and his family's good. What is more, the latter gradually came to dominate the movement. As is evident from the execution of Haji Machfudz Sidik in February 1953, Ibnu Hadjar was moreover a harsh and stern commander, who issued his orders in an extremely blunt manner. Surrendering subcommanders complained that they had been continually spied upon and were liable to punishment by Ibnu Hadjar for even the smallest error.

This severity in their chief commander actually induced two KRIYT leaders, Balhum and Aman, in north Amandit, near Kandangan, to surrender after their immediate commander, Samsi (also called Samsuardi), being taken prisoner by Ibnu Hadjar (IB 9-3-1955). At the end of 1954 there was even a report of an abortive attempt on Ibnu Hadjar's life, and of a purge among the KRIYT rank and file (IB 16-9-1954; PR 11-11-1954).

After Ibnu Hadjar's joining forces with the *Darul Islam* movement the KRIYT, as it was still referred to, or APTI, as its new name ran, continued operating in small groups. Raids were conducted by extremely small bands consisting of at most a score or so of men. Nevertheless, by 1955 a more precisely defined command structure had developed. Thus regional commanders had been appointed, who doubled as heads of the rebels' Regional Government Administration and each had their own specific area of operation.

In North Hulusungai, for instance, Bahraru was head of the Defence Command of Paringin and Batumandi (IB 1-7-1955). In North Amandit, aside from the earlier-mentioned Balhum, Aman and Samsi, Dardiansyah, the younger brother of Ibnu Hadjar, was the most prominent KRIYT commander (IB 9-3-1955). In South Amandit Djohansjah (Johansyah), whose real name was Djahri bin Bako (Jahri bin Bako), was commander, until his arrest in 1954 (IB 17-4-1955).<sup>37</sup> Another well-known KRIYT commander of those days was Djarman (Jarman) in Pleihari (IB 5-2-1955, 13-4-1955, 15-4-1955). Riam Kanan was the operational base of Guru Budjanab (Guru Bujanab) and Djenggot (Jenggot or Beard) (IB 19-1-1955, 21-5-1955).

Much more notorious than the above-mentioned leaders were the two KRIYT commanders Djumberi and Raden Mochtar Djaja. Djumberi, who was Commander of the KRIYT *Garuda Putih* or White *Garuda* Battalion, operated around Riam Kiwa and fell in action in August 1955 (IB 17-7-1955, 24-8-1955, 27-9-1955, 18-10-1955). Raden Mochtar Djaja, who had started his career with the KRIYT as lieutenant to Mawardi, operating around Martapura, in time became KRIYT commander for the whole *kabupaten* of Banjar, commanding the Mobile KRIYT troops. In the latter capacity he was one of the most wanted guerilla leaders and one of the principal targets of the Government's security operations. Once, in 1952, he was captured, but managed to escape again. The following year he was almost caught a second time while participating in a soccer match in the village of Sungai Ulin. As the Army troops were approaching the

soccer-ground, he just managed to escape in the nick of time (IB 28-4-1953).

These men were responsible for the minor KRIYT actions which nevertheless disturbed life in South Kalimantan considerably. Especially troublesome were the guerillas' frequent hold-ups of cars, buses, and even ambulances, which completely disrupted the traffic in South Kalimantan. By 1955 these actions had become so frequent that the Kalimantan Association of Bus Operators threatened to suspend services if the Government did not take measures and the security situation did not improve (IB 20-2-1955).

As in the preceding years, there were still sporadic attacks on the smaller towns and raids on plantations. So in April 1955 a group of about fifty rebels entered Barabai (IB 28-4-1955). In November Kotabaru was attacked after rebel activities had been reported in the whole *kabupaten* for months (IB 23-7-1955, 25-11-1955). In various areas where the Police and the Mobile Brigade still could not cope with the situation military assistance had to be called in again. The lack of well-trained personnel was one of the gravest problems here; notwithstanding, a request to the Central Government to send sixteen fresh Police companies to Kalimantan was refused. Military operations were conducted in Kandangan from May till August. A proportion of the Government troops brought into action were local troops who had gained experience in anti-*Darul Islam* operations in West Java. Occasionally the population would assist in these actions, participating particularly in mass battues in the jungle and mountains.

Special mention should be made of the Dayak in this connection. They founded their own defence organization, the *Laung Kuning*, to fight the KRIYT or APTI. This was in mid-1954, near Barabai, after increasing harassment by KRIYT troops of the Dayak living in Hulusungai. In July 1955 the *Laung Kuning* was officially recognized by the Regional Government and transformed into a village security force (IB 6-5-1955, 5-7-1955, 7-7-1955, 2-8-1955). The *Laung Kuning* was relatively successful in the pursuit of its objective and, for instance, fatally wounded Djumberi (IB 24-8-1955).

### 8. *Decline and End*

Civilians meanwhile continued pressing for a general amnesty. At the end of 1953 the Amandit PNI branch urged that President

Soekarno should publicly request Ibnu Hadjar to cease his resistance. All those surrendering should be given the opportunity to enter the Armed Forces or some other Government organization. The Amandit branch further pressed for Murdjani's replacement as governor by Burhanuddin, the former ALRI Div IV negotiator (IB 8-1-1954). It expressed the view, which was shared by others, that President Soekarno should make a similar appeal to Ibnu Hadjar as he had made to Kahar Muzakkar during his visits to South Sulawesi in 1953.

It took Soekarno a long time in fact to do so. Only on another visit to Banjarmasin at the end of 1955 did he appeal to Ibnu Hadjar in one of his speeches to lay down his arms (IB 10-12-1955). But there was no positive response to this from the side of the guerillas, and KRIYT activities did not decrease. On the contrary, the next year military assistance was again necessary for South Kalimantan. To enhance the chances of the army operations' success Hassan Basry was recalled to active service to lead them. It was hoped that he might take advantage of the influence he still enjoyed with the guerillas to quash the rebellion once for all. Hassan Basry himself, too, was optimistic about the success of his mission, for which he had been given a year in all. The operations actually lasted from May until the end of the year.

One of Hassan Basry's first steps was to launch "a mouth to mouth campaign" to convince the rebels that they would be treated well and in accordance with the prevailing law if they surrendered. Besides he appealed to them to surrender through the medium of pamphlets and radio broadcasts. To increase the moral pressure, visits to South Kalimantan by two other "sons of the region" – Firmansjah, the former Chief of Staff of the Kalimantan *Pesindo*, and Idham Chalid (Idham Khalid), a well-known *Nahdatul Ulama* politician – were arranged. The latter tried to enlist the support of the religious leaders for the Government's efforts to put an end to the rebellion. These leaders responded by issuing a request to the rebels to give themselves up (PR 7-5-1956, 18-5-1956, 14-6-1956).

The reaction was overwhelming. Within one month about four hundred rebels reported to the authorities, among them some well-known guerilla leaders, such as Raden Mochtar Djaja (PR 14-5-1956). In August these were followed by Dardiansjah, Ibnu Hadjar's younger brother, and Tjinaby (Cinaby), the rebels' Chief of Staff and Attorney General. Both were sent to Jakarta for talks with the Republican Army Chief of Staff, Major-General

Nasution, on ways of definitively solving the conflict. Dardiansjah, a few days previously, while still in Banjarmasin, in a radio broadcast had spoken in praise of the Central Government's intentions of bringing the rebellion to an end (PR 3-8-1956, 6-8-1956, 28-8-1956).

For a while it looked as though the rebellion in South Kalimantan had, in fact, ended. Ibnu Hadjar had lost his most trusted associates, such as Dardiansjah and Tjinaby, and there were strong rumours, encouraged by these facts, that he, too, was seriously contemplating surrender. In September Hassan Basry even travelled to Pegatan, on the coast of Kotabaru, to negotiate personally with him about surrendering (PR 14-9-1956).

In the end these hopes of Ibnu Hadjar's surrender were dashed, however, and he continued to offer resistance for another seven years. He was even able to profit by the general upswing in regionalist sentiment outside Java in the late 1950's. Although in Kalimantan this did not culminate in an open rebellion as in Sumatra and Sulawesi, dissatisfied people here did proceed to establish a regional council, the *Lambung Mangkurat* Council, headed by the regional commander. As a consequence the military in the area directed much more of their time and energy to their conflict with the Central Government and the Army Command than to the suppression of the *Darul Islam* movement, thus providing Ibnu Hadjar with an opportunity to intensify his activities once more (Miles 1976:120).

This resistance movement came to an end only in July 1963, at the end of which month Ibnu Hadjar and his men officially surrendered to the authorities at a brief ceremony in the village of Ambutun in South Hulusungai. The next day he attended a mass meeting in Banjarmasin organized within the framework of the Malaysia Confrontation that was going on at that time. While in Banjarmasin, he stated to the press that if the country needed him he was willing to serve the Republic anywhere he was needed. He and his "14,000 soldiers" were also prepared to participate in the Malaysia Confrontation. In addition he expressed the hope that he might be pardoned. Promises to that effect may, in fact, have been made. At the time of his surrender it was still thought likely that he might be sent out of the country for a while to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. In early September he was put under arrest, however. In March 1965 he was tried by a Special Military Court and sentenced to death. At his trial Ibnu Hadjar wore an Army uniform with the insignia of second lieutenant (DM 1-8-1963, 23-3-1965, 24-3-1965).

## CHAPTER SIX

### ACEH, THE REBELLION OF THE ISLAMIC SCHOLARS

The last area in Indonesia in which a rebellion against the Indonesian Republic broke out, and where the rebels joined Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State of Indonesia, at least in name, was Aceh. This rebellion erupted in September 1953, when one of the most influential Islamic leaders of the region, Daud Beureu'eh, declared Aceh and adjacent areas part of the Islamic State of Indonesia. His followers simultaneously attacked a number of towns, for a while occupying some of them, and seized control of the surrounding rural areas.

In the first weeks the rebels gained control of almost the whole of Aceh. Only the major towns and cities, such as Banda Aceh (or Kutaradja, as it was still called at the time), Sigli and Langsa in the north, and Meulaboh on the south coast remained in Republican hands. Within a few weeks the *Darul Islam* troops were driven out of the urban centres again, however, and were forced to continue their struggle in the rural areas. For years they were especially strong in the northern part, in the *kabupatens* of Greater Aceh, Pidie and North Aceh.

Contrary to the other *Darul Islam*-inspired revolts, this particular rebellion ended peacefully through conciliation instead of military defeat. This was after the Central Government in 1959 finally gave in to a persistent demand of the people of Aceh and granted the region the status of a Special Province, with autonomy in the fields of religion, customary law and education. Moreover, the most important leader of the rebellion by far, Daud Beureu'eh, who was one of the last rebels to return from the bush in 1962, was not killed in combat or executed, but was granted a pardon.

As with the other *Darul Islam* movements, the origin of the Acehnese one can be traced back to the struggle for independence – when Aceh constituted one of those parts of the Indonesian Republic that was never occupied by Dutch troops – and, after the achievement of independence, to the problems created by the compromise that had to be struck between the conflicting

demands of regional autonomy and Central Government interference. In Aceh the situation was complicated by the bloody confrontation between two opposed social groups: the traditional elite and the religious leaders.

### 1. *The Acehnese Islamic Scholars' Association*

In May 1939 the *Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Aceh* (PUSA), or Acehnese Islamic Scholars' Association, was founded. One of its founders was Teungku Mohammad Daud Beureu'eh, a prominent Islamic leader, born around 1900 at Beureu'eh, in the district of Keumangan (present-day Mutiara), near Sigli. Co-founders were Teuku Haji Chik Djohan Alamsjah (Johan Alamsyah), Teuku Mohammad Amin and Teungku Ismail Jacob (Ismail Yacub). Daud Beureu'eh was elected general chairman of the Association.

In time the PUSA developed into the main vehicle of the Acehnese Islamic scholars (*ulama*), who styled themselves *Teungku* (Tgk), in their fight against the traditional elite – the district chiefs or *ulèëbalang* – who used the title *Teuku* (T.). When after the Second World War the *ulama* dealt their adversaries a decisive final blow, it was particularly the former founders and prominent members of the PUSA who played a key role and took over the administration of Aceh. These included Teungku Amir Husin al Mudjahid (Amir Husin al Mujahid) and Husin Jusuf (Husin Yusuf), chairman and secretary respectively of the *Pemuda PUSA*, the youth section of the PUSA, and Teungku Ismail Jacob, Teungku Mohammad Nur el Ibrahim (son-in-law of Daud Beureu'eh) and Teungku Said Abubakar, all three of them teachers at the *Perguruan Normal Islam*, a teachers' training college founded by the PUSA.

At first the PUSA did not look like becoming a strong anti-Dutch and anti-*ulèëbalang* bulwark. There were *ulèëbalang* among its founders or acting as advisors, and for a time the PUSA was merely a modernist Islamic organization. Soon, under the influence of Amir Husin al Mudjahid, however, it grew more radical. In the latter days of the Dutch East Indies it developed into a genuine nationalist organization, aiming at ousting not only the Dutch, but also the local *adat* chiefs, the *ulèëbalang*, through whose instrumentality the Colonial Government ruled the area.

The PUSA in those years was, in fact, the only nationalist movement of importance in Aceh. A secular nationalist move-



ment was lacking. Few of the *ulèëbalang*, rooted as they were in the colonial system, could be expected to provide the leadership for such a secular anti-colonial movement. Those *ulèëbalang* who were opposed to the Colonial Government had the PUSA to turn to.

Another alternative was provided by the *Muhammadiyah*. In Aceh this had been in existence for longer than the PUSA, but, like the latter had a modernist Islamic origin. In contrast to the situation in other parts of Indonesia, and because of the absence of a nationalist movement in Aceh, the Acehnese *Muhammadiyah* branch functioned partly also as a political organization, and not solely as a religious or educational one. Yet it did not appeal to the Acehnese Islamic leaders and their followers. This was partly because it lacked roots in Acehnese society and remained an urban phenomena. Its members came mostly from outside the region, or were Acehnese with a formal education who had outgrown their traditional environment. And it was partly also because, having links with many other parts of Indonesia, it extended beyond the local boundaries, thus possessing the character more of an all-Indonesia than of an all-Aceh movement.

The PUSA, on the other hand, was strongly rooted in Acehnese society. It could count on the support of the Islamic scholars there, and through them could exercise an influence in the villages. Its leaders had an open eye for the advantages of modern education in the attempt to bridge the gap in knowledge and administrative experience that separated them from the *ulèëbalang*. At the same time they were careful not to lose touch with their Acehnese cultural and religious background and to avoid the mistake of putting up a barrier between themselves and the people. The PUSA remained “purely Acehnese”, as it is put by Pluvier (1953:84). Its frame of reference was Aceh, not Indonesia.

The PUSA's adoption of an anti-Dutch and anti-*ulèëbalang* policy coincided with the extension of Japan's hegemony in Southeast Asia. In Japan the PUSA sought and found an ally against the Dutch. Through the agency of Acehnese living in Malaya contacts were established with the Japanese, and plans laid for an anti-Dutch rebellion on the eve of the Japanese landings in the Dutch East Indies.

Instrumental in the execution of these plans was to be the so-called F-Organization, named thus after the Japanese Fujiwara family. The core of this F-Organization was made up of Acehnese living in Malaya who gradually re-infiltrated into Aceh, where

they co-ordinated their actions with those of other movements of malcontents. In February and March 1942 this F-Organization did, in fact, initiate a rebellion against the Dutch. Telephone wires were cut, train services disrupted, and a number of Dutch citizens killed. Members of the organization appeared in public wearing a white arm-band with the letter F inscribed on it. Although primarily an Acehnese, and moreover *ulama* uprising, other groups participated as well, such as people from the Minangkabau and Batak areas, and *ulèëbalang*.

The leadership of this rebellion was provided predominantly, though not exclusively, by Islamic scholars. It included not only Teungku Said Abubakar, a leading PUSA figure who was later to play an important part in attempts to supply Acehnese *Darul Islam* rebels with arms, but also Teuku Nja' Arif (Nya' Arif), Member of the Dutch East Indies Parliament and after the war first Republican resident of Aceh, and Teuku Panglima Polim Mohammad Ali, who after August 1945 became deputy resident of Aceh.

The uprising made Aceh the only area in Indonesia where the Japanese invasion drew active armed support from the population. It was not exclusively inspired by anti-Dutch feelings. The Islamic leaders hoped that by staging and participating in a rebellion they would be rewarded by the Japanese with appointments to functions in the administration hitherto occupied by *ulèëbalang*. To some extent their expectations were fulfilled. The *ulèëbalang*'s monopoly was broken. Nevertheless, as in other parts of Indonesia, the Islamic scholars, although benefiting from the Japanese occupation, did not manage to secure a position of supremacy during it. The *ulèëbalang* lost their hold over the administration of justice, no longer presiding over the law courts, including the Islamic ones, but were kept on as local officials in the Civil Administration. The Japanese upheld the former Dutch colonial policy of dealing with the population through the *ulèëbalang* and leaving routine affairs to them.

The Islamic scholars of Aceh even so emerged from the Japanese occupation much strengthened and very confident, waiting for a chance to deal their adversaries a final blow. In this they were able to rally widespread popular support. The *ulèëbalang*, because of their position in the Colonial Administration, were identified with the much hated infidel colonial power. There were apprehensions that after the Japanese surrender they would go over to the Dutch to try and regain and preserve their former position in society. They moreover constituted the

wealthier segment of society, many of them owning considerable areas of land. In Pidie, for instance, *ulèëbalang*, according to Siegel (1969:27), owned between a third and half of the total ricefields. So where the *ulèëbalang* hoped for the return of the Dutch, the *ulama*, on the other hand, were quick to side with the Indonesian Republic, styling the Indonesian revolution a holy war against the Dutch.

## 2. *The Social Revolution of Aceh*

Civil war erupted in Aceh a few months after the Japanese surrender. *Ulèëbalang* were attacked by *ulama* and their followers all over the province. An explanation of the upheaval merely in terms of a conflict between custom and religion or between the lackeys of the Dutch and the advocates of Indonesian independence is too facile. In the former case too sharp a distinction is drawn between custom and religion, which are actually both conceived of as being Muslim in a society of which all members profess to be Muslims. A classification of the two opposing parties into a group of adherents of a purer or stricter form of Islam and one of persons professing more heterodox ideas would be more to the point, but still not absolutely appropriate. Likewise the distinction between advocates and opponents of the Republic cause, although of some use, does not explain everything. In the conflict in question economic and political motives even so did play a major part, and were actually even more important than the religious ones. As Boland (1971:70) writes: "It was in fact in no way a religious conflict, merely a political and social one".

Be that as it may, through the social revolution the *ulama* definitely succeeded in eliminating the *ulèëbalang*'s social, political and economic lead. Within two months, namely from December 1945 and January 1946, the latter were virtually exterminated, while the survivors were made to renounce their hereditary rights and had their possessions confiscated. By the end of another three months all *ulèëbalang* who had come to occupy important positions in the Indonesian Republic's Civil and Military Administration in Aceh had been forced to resign.

The positions vacated by the *ulèëbalang* were mostly seized by the *ulama*, in particular the PUSA leaders. The same probably happened with the *ulèëbalang*'s land and other possessions. It was evidently the Islamic leaders, and not the common people, who benefited by the confiscation of the *ulèëbalang*'s wealth. Accord-

ing to Alers (1956:90–91), “Their property and prerogatives were divided among the victorious ulamas . . . a feudal adat class was destroyed, a priestly class substituted . . .”.

In retrospect the “social revolution in Aceh of 1945”, as the event is commonly referred to, is frequently justified by describing it as a punishment inflicted on traitors to the Indonesian Republic. This is only partly correct, however, as the branding of all *ulèëbalang* alike as opponents of the Indonesian struggle for independence is of course a distortion of the facts.

In the first months following the declaration of independence many *ulèëbalang* actively supported the Republic. Because the Republican Government, like the Japanese and the Dutch before it, in Aceh looked to the better-educated and more experienced *ulèëbalang* to represent it, *ulèëbalang*, in fact, assumed a leading role in the initial stages of the struggle for independence here. The first Republican governor of Sumatra was Teuku Muhammad Hasan, who had represented Sumatra in the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee. The first Republican resident of Aceh was Teuku Nja’ Arif, a former leader of the F-Organization, who was later replaced, first unofficially and in January 1964 officially, by Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah (Mohammad Daudsyah). Deputy resident of Aceh in those early months, moreover, was Teuku Panglima Polim Mohammad Ali, while the National Committee of Aceh was headed by Tuanku Mahmud, a member of the Sultan’s family.

As a consequence of the important position occupied by the *ulèëbalang* in the – still rudimentary – Republican Administration, the first steps towards the formation of a Republican Army in Aceh were also taken by them. About one week after the proclamation of independence, which in Aceh did not become known until after August 20th, Nja’ Arif, in his capacity as resident of Aceh, invited officers of the *Gyu Gun*, an Indonesian volunteer corps dating from the Japanese occupation, to discuss the constitution of a Republican Army here. Subsequently, on August 27th the *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* (API), or Indonesian Youth Force, was founded. According to the latter’s first commander, Sjammaun Gaharu (Syammaun Gaharu), the word *pemuda* was deliberately chosen. For the Japanese, responsible as they were for public order, would never have permitted the formation of an army. Later, as soon as conditions became more favourable, the name of the organization might be changed without much trouble from *Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia* to *Angkatan Perang Indonesia*, Indonesian War Force (Gaharu 1960:31). At

the time of its foundation, API headquarters announced that the API was to constitute “the cornerstone of the Indonesian Republican Army” in Aceh. In the same proclamation it invited the Acehnese population to form auxiliary units to assist the API in its struggle (Dua Windhu 1972:83–84). In December 1945 the API officially changed its name to *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*, the current name of the Republican Army. Still under Sjammaun Gaharu’s command it became the Fifth Division of the Sumatra Command.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile other armed organizations had also been founded. Because the API represented the official Republican Army, however, these other armed units operated independently of it, and became the *lasykars* of Aceh. The two most important of these were the *Mujahidin* (Fighters in the way of Allah) and the *Barisan Pemuda Indonesia* (BPI), Indonesian Youth Corps.

The *Mujahidin* was formed by leading Islamic scholars around the time of their declaration of the struggle against the Dutch as a Holy one. Its most important commander by far was Amir Husin al Mudjahid, viz. Amir Husin, the Fighter in the Way of Allah. He was the same person who before the war had been leader of the PUSA Youth. The *Mujahidin* was obviously a PUSA and *ulama* organization.

The political and social colouring of the BPI is more difficult to assess. *Barisan Pemuda Indonesia* was the name bestowed on November 6th on the *Ikatan Pemuda Indonesia* (IPI), or Indonesian Youth League, which had been founded in Banda Aceh a month previously. In an account of its genesis BPI leader A. Hasjmy (A. Hasymy) (1960:56) writes: “Youth from the Gyu Gun, Heiho and Tokubetsu Keisatsutai [Special Police Force] formed the API . . . others formed the IPI (Ikatan Pemuda Indonesia), which subsequently became the B.P.I. (Barisan Pemuda Indonesia), P.R.I. (Pemuda Republik Indonesia), and finally the Pesindo with its Kesatria Dipisi Rencong”. Hasjmy does not specify who these “others” were, however. The information on the background of the BPI members in other sources points in two different directions. A contemporary Dutch report, written by the then governor of Sumatra, Spits (NIB II:519), states that “the Ulëëbalang are for 75% members of the PRI . . .”. Nasution (1956 I:79), on the other hand, writes that, “Besides the API, there also existed the Barisan Pemuda Republik Indonesia, mainly as a result of the efforts of PUSA people”.<sup>2</sup> The supposition that the BPI may have been a PUSA organization is strengthened by the personal background of its commander, A. Hasjmy,

who before the war had been a PUSA Youth leader in Greater Aceh. The BPI's other leaders, too, came from the circle of Islamic scholars. Its regency representatives were, for instance: in Greater Aceh Teungku Abdul Djalil Amin (Abdul Jalil Amin), in Pidie Hasan Aly, in North Aceh Teungku Abdul Gani, in East Aceh Teungku Usman Peureula, and in West Aceh Teungku Hasan Hanafiah and Teungku Muhamad Abduh (Sumatera Utara 1953:30–31). Finally, the very first meeting of the BPI, at that time still called IPI, was attended by Amir Husin al Mudjahid, among others.

The Acehnese *Pesindo* shared only the name with *Pesindo* groups in other parts of Sumatra and in Java. The BPI or PRI followed suit when it was decided in Java to change the name of the organization to *Pesindo*, but not when the *Pesindo* elsewhere adopted a leftist course. In fact, in mid-1947 it dissociated itself from the mother-organization.<sup>3</sup> It is still asserted today that the Acehnese *Pesindo* was made up of Muslims, while in other areas it was Communist-influenced.

The main source of arms for the API, the BPI and the *Mujahidin* alike was the Japanese. Arms were obtained from them in a variety of ways. In some instances individual Japanese were persuaded to hand over their weapons. In other cases important Japanese civil and military authorities were sent threatening letters by an organization styling itself NICOI (short for *Nihilis Communisme Indonesia*), which in reality, however, formed part of API. These warned the addressees that, because of their past conduct, their safety was no longer ensured except on their way to and from work. Thereupon the telephone connections with their homes would be cut. Finally, groups of youths would call upon them demanding their arms – a demand that could generally not be refused with impunity. In other cases again small groups of Japanese soldiers were forced to hand over their arms in almost the same way. API followers would be directed to towns and cities where Japanese were stationed in groups carrying all kinds of weapons – such as spears and sabres – to threaten the Japanese. The latter, in fear of their lives, would beseech the API group for mercy, which would reply that they would not be harmed, but on the contrary, would be protected and provided with food if its demand for arms was satisfied. In some instances the weapons had to be seized from the Japanese by force, giving rise to hand-to-hand fighting (Gaharu 1960:35–39; Dua Windhu 1972:88–102).

This mode of disarming Japanese constituted the immediate

cause of an armed conflict between *ulama* and *ulèëbalang*. A quarrel over weapons thus seized from Japanese at Sigli at the end of 1945 set in motion a course of events which eventually led to the local *ulèëbalang*'s downfall.

The stories of what happened at Sigli are mutually contradictory. According to a number of Indonesian publications fighting started after Aceh Republican Army and *lasykar* units tried to disarm a group of *ulèëbalang*, who in turn had come by their weapons by seizing them from the Japanese. This version is given in a book published by the Regional Government of Aceh entitled *Revolusi Desember '45 di Atjeh atau Pembasmian Penchianat Tanah Air* (The December '45 Revolution in Aceh, or the Extermination of Traitors to the Fatherland).<sup>4</sup> According to it a number of *ulèëbalang*, shortly after the Japanese surrender, started preparing for the return of the Dutch with a view to strengthening their personal position. They established their own political organization, the *Pembangunan Indonesia* (Development of Indonesia), and their own army, the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* (Security Guard).<sup>5</sup> Commander of the latter was Teuku Daud Tjumbok (Daud Cumbok), from the village of Cumbok, near the town of Lammeulo, about ten miles from Sigli. His name is also mentioned as that of the person who, through the agency of a former KNIL soldier, Sukardi, together with another Indonesian, named Ibrahim Pane, contacted the former Dutch district officer Van Swier in Medan (Sumatera Utara 1953:64).

Amin (1956:13), then deputy governor and at the time of the *Darul Islam* rebellion governor of North Sumatra, is of the opinion, on the other hand, that "no facts or circumstances have been discovered to justify" the accusation that the *ulèëbalang* were traitors. He mentions that people sympathizing with the cause of the Islamic scholars and defending the action taken by them against the *ulèëbalang* generally like to point to a letter from the *ulèëbalang* at Pidie to the Dutch at Medan asking the latter for help. This letter was allegedly intercepted by *Pesindo* (BPI) soldiers checking train travellers at Bireuen. According to the same account the persons carrying the letter had tried to destroy it by tearing it up. But the *Pesindo* soldiers had discovered its contents by pasting the pieces together again. Those referring to this incident only knew of it from hearsay, however, and never saw the letter. It is further likely that the story of Daud Tjumbok's contacts with the Dutch is a later concoction.

The fighting in and around Sigli began as one of the many instances in the early history of the Indonesian Republic of rival

armed groups striving each to assert its authority in a particular area. In the earliest phase the principal rivals were the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* and local BPI/*Pesindo* groups, who engaged in skirmishes around Lammeulo, Daud Tjumbok's stronghold. Republican Army units did not participate in these fights, no Republican soldiers being stationed near Lammeulo, because the Army command was fully aware of the strength of the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* and feared defeat in the event of an armed clash (Revolusi n.d.:17–18). Serious fighting broke out after the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* left Lammeulo to march on Sigli with the aim of seizing arms from the Japanese – although their enemies accuse them of having had another motive as well, as the possession of Sigli meant control of all the roads in north Aceh and the certainty of a landing-base for a Dutch invasion force (Revolusi n.d.:19–23) – and proceeded to occupy strategic positions in the town. The other armed groups, including the Republican Army units, could not tolerate the existence of a rival army, all the less one which by securing Japanese arms was becoming too well equipped. They in turn laid siege to Sigli in an attempt to disarm the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan*. As a result the Japanese forces in Sigli were confronted with two mutually opposed forces, each pressing them to hand over their arms to it. In the town itself the *ulëëbalang* put them under pressure. The Republican Army units and other armed groups encamped all around Sigli tried to induce the Japanese to hand over their weapons to the representatives of the Republican Government of Aceh instead of to the *ulëëbalang*, threatening that they would otherwise attack Sigli. These other armed groups, as on previous occasions when they had wanted to seize Japanese arms, had directed their members to Sigli en masse. Here they posed a threat to the Japanese as well as to the *ulëëbalang*.

The authors of “December Revolution” (n.d.:20–21) depict the situation as follows: “To prevent Japanese arms falling into the hands of the *Ulëëbalang*, people in the end came in their hundreds of thousands and, because they were unable to enter the town, surrounded it on all sides so that subsequently the *Ulëëbalang* army occupying the town appeared to be hemmed in by hundreds of thousands of people and in the end dared not leave the town”. As the *ulëëbalang* tried to break through the beleaguering circle, firing at the enemy with carbines and machine guns, fighting broke out. After a while a cease-fire was called. The Republican Army thereupon allowed the *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* to retreat to Lammeulo on condition that



they hand all the arms taken from the Japanese at Sigli over to it. The *Barisan Penjaga Keamanan* left Sigli, but without surrendering its weapons. According to the account in “December Revolution” (Revolusi n.d.:21–22) it in fact retreated to Lammeulo, murdering and plundering all the way. On arrival there it resumed its attacks on members of the other armed groups, notably the BPI/*Pesindo*, and tried to occupy the surrounding villages.

In the meantime the *Markas Besar Rakyat Umum*, or People’s Headquarters, had been established by the other armed groups on December 22nd, 1945. These headquarters thereupon coordinated the operations of the Republican Army, the BPI/*Pesindo* and the *Mujahidin* among others. A number of political parties, such as the PNI, PKI and PSI, also participated. It was these People’s Headquarters which, in joint statements with the Republican Government of Aceh, first declared the *ulèëbalang* traitors of the Indonesian Republic, and on January 8th, 1946, issued an ultimatum, signed by Teuku Panglima Polim Mohammaun Gaharu (Syammaun Gaharu) as chairman of the People’s Headquarters, demanding that the *ulèëbalang* at Lammeulo surrender before noon on January 10th. On expiry of this term Lammeulo was attacked and three days later occupied, thus putting an end to the hostilities which had lasted twenty-two days. Daud Tjumbok fled, but a few days later was captured and killed. In commemoration of the battle, Lammeulo was renamed Kota Bakti, City of Devotion.

The battle around Lammeulo provided the starting-signal for the persecution of *ulèëbalang* all over Aceh. Many of them were killed, and others thrown in prison or taken into protective custody.

Nevertheless, the top officials of the Republican Regional Government and Army, who had provisionally sanctioned the actions against the *ulèëbalang* at Lammeulo, were not for the time being dismissed. The Central Republican Government, as yet unaware of what was happening in Aceh, in fact even strengthened their position. For in January it proceeded to appoint Teuku Nja’ Arif to the staff of the Republican Army general headquarters in Sumatra in the rank of major-general and at the same time to make him Republican Army “organizer and coordinator” in Aceh. It furthermore consolidated Sjammaun Gaharu’s position as commander of the Fifth (Acehnese) Division, making him chief of defence for Aceh.

Teuku Nja’ Arif and Sjammaun Gaharu were not destined to

hold these functions for long, however. In March 1946 they were seized by Amir Husin Al Mudjahid and his *Mujahidin*. The latter's coup was preceded and triggered off by *ulèëbalang* risings around Lhokseumawe in North Aceh and around Langsa in East Aceh in February. After the suppression of these risings most of the *ulèëbalang* who had so far escaped death or imprisonment were put under arrest (Revolusi n.d.:30–31).

A short time after this units of the *Mujahidin* – about one thousand men in all – marched on Banda Aceh, making for the headquarters of the Republican Army's Acehnese Division. According to an "Insider" [S.M. Amin] (1950:20), Amir Husin al Mudjahid felt that there were still too many members of the traditional elite left in the administration, and began a campaign to root them out in his place of residence, Idi, where he formed the *Tentara Perjuangan Rakyat*, or People's Struggle Army. Starting off with only a few men, this army grew in size as it marched along the coast to Banda Aceh. On this march, according to the same "insider", it killed or captured every person crossing its path who was believed to belong to the traditional elite.

In Banda Aceh Amir Husin al Mudjahid's troops continued taking so-called "corrective measures" against senior members of the Administration and the Army (Dua Windhu 1972:113). The Republican Army surrendered without a blow, Nja' Arif giving orders not to offer any resistance. This course of action was of little avail to him, however. Nja' Arif was captured and imprisoned at Takengon, a place where other *ulèëbalang* had also been taken. There he died early the next month, March 1946; the cause of his death was identified as diabetes. Amir Husin al Mudjahid's action represented the final blow to the *ulèëbalang*. In August 1946, the resident of Aceh, T.M. Daudsjah, assigned a special residential area to the persons suspected of involvement in the Daud Tjumbok incident, ostensibly to protect them against the revenge of the masses (Sumatera Utara 1953:90). The arrests of these people were ordered by him because "It is impossible at present for relatives or close friends of the victims of the social revolution to remain amongst the rest of the population", and "it is the Government's duty to maintain public order and ensure the safety of the people as well as of the afore-mentioned party". He thus ordered the arrests of 62 people and their relatives (Ke te tapan Residen Atjeh 13 Augustus 1946 in S.M. Amin 1975:69–70), including Sjammaun Gaharu, who according to the list attached to the resolution in question had already fled (S.M. Amin 1975:70).

*Ulèëbalang* who were not killed, voluntarily resigned their functions and renounced their hereditary rights for fear of repercussions.<sup>6</sup> Their places were taken mostly by PUSA men. In the words of the Central Government after the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* revolt, “A large majority of important functions came into the hands of PUSA people and their followers . . . Only to positions requiring expert skills were people from outside the area appointed” (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:100).

Nja' Arif's function as resident of Aceh was taken over by the above-mentioned Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah, also an *ulèëbalang*, but since long a loyal PUSA member. Another *ulèëbalang* PUSA member, Teuku Mohammad Amin, was appointed deputy resident. The same function was also given to Daud Beureu'eh, who later in addition became head of the Religious Department of Aceh. Nja' Arif was replaced as member of the Republican Army General Staff in Sumatra by Amir Husin al Mudjahid, who promoted himself from the rank of major to major-general in early March, when he issued a statement announcing a number of changes in the composition of the Republican Army Command of Aceh. His close associate, Husin Jusuf, former secretary of the *Pemuda* PUSA, for instance, was promoted from the rank of major to colonel, replacing Sjammaun Gaharu as commander of the Fifth Division. These changes were introduced at the wishes of the population as represented by the *Tentara Perjuangan Rakyat*, so it was emphatically stated.<sup>7</sup>

At the end of 1946 Amir Husin al Mudjahid himself fell victim to a plot. He was kidnapped from the “Hotel Atjeh” in Banda Aceh and taken to Sigli. Allegedly his kidnapers intended handing him over to a local Islamic scholar by name of Husin Sab, who wanted to revenge the murder of his brother on the orders of Amir Husin al Mudjahid. In the end, however, he was handed over to the authorities and was sentenced to imprisonment by a military court (Insider 1950:25–26; Amin 1975:79), but was soon released again.

Teungku Amir Husin al Mudjahid's intention had been not only to take over the command of the Republican Army in Aceh, but also to join the Military and Civil Administrations together. Opposition from non-*ulèëbalang* and non-PUSA organizations, and perhaps also from within the PUSA,<sup>8</sup> thwarted these plans. For a proposal by the Army, now headed by himself, to bring the Civil Administration under military control was rejected after being discussed at a meeting attended by, besides the new resident, representatives of the Army, the *Komite Nasional*

*Daerah, Pesindo, Mujahidin, Masyumi*, the PSI, the PKI and a number of minor organizations on April 6th, 1946. They decided that for the moment the situation was such that “the Civil Government need not yet be replaced by a military one” and that “the time had not yet come for a proposal to be made to the authorities to change the Civil Government into a military one” (Sumatera Utara 1953:116).

Although the Civil Administration remained separated from the military one and some of the principal civil administrators still originated from *ulèëbalang* circles, the *ulama* and the PUSA had gained firm control of both. They had also made considerable advances in the economic field. The possessions of the defeated *ulèëbalang* were confiscated and divided up, most of them probably going to the *ulama*. These latter further claimed the most lucrative positions in the economy for themselves. Said Abubakar, for instance, became a manager of both foreign- and state-owned estates, while Amir Husin al Mudjahid was rewarded with the function of general director of the North Sumatran oil company. Another PUSA leader, Njak Neh (Nyak Neh), carved out a career for himself in commerce (Meuraxa 1956:261).

The changes aroused much opposition on the part not only of relatives of the deceased *ulèëbalang* whose possessions had been confiscated, but also of commoners and Islamic scholars who did not belong to the inner PUSA circle. Two of the latter, Teungku Hasan Krueng Kale and Teungku Hasbullah Indrapuri, proceeded to condemn the appropriation of the wealth of the *ulèëbalang* as *haram*, or forbidden by Islamic law. To placate the critics of the redistribution of power and wealth somewhat, the Regional Government of Aceh instituted *Majelis Penimbang*, Councils of Review, in the *kabupatens*.

These Councils had to see to it that the distribution of the confiscated goods was fair and just. Their institution was provided for and the rules for the distribution of the confiscated goods laid down in the “regulations for the control and ownership of the property of deceased traitors to the State of the Republic of Indonesia in Aceh” (Keresidenan Republik Indonesia daerah Atjeh. Peraturan daerah no. 1). The Councils were put in charge of all the former possessions of the late *ulèëbalang*, from the proceeds of which the damages inflicted by the *ulèëbalang* in the past as well as in the months immediately before and during the social revolution were to be compensated. Goods unrightfully seized by the *ulèëbalang* were to be returned to their rightful owners. Likewise the original owners of goods purchased by the

*ulèëbalang* at unrealistically low prices were to be given the opportunity to buy these goods back at the price originally received. The balance, according to the regulations, was to be shared out among the heirs of the deceased *ulèëbalang*.

There does not seem to have been much money left to return to these heirs at the end of 1949 when the Councils began to function properly, however. For at the time of their institution the Councils faced the problem not only of the difficulty of collecting the *ulèëbalang*'s possessions – which in many cases had already been seized by the people in the course of the “social revolution” – but also of a shortage of funds resulting from a resolution that allowances should be paid to all invalids as well as to the wives and children of those killed during the social revolution out of the *ulèëbalang*'s collective wealth. So little money was left, in fact, that especially the Council of Review of Pidie, where the “social revolution” had been most violent, was obliged to ask the Government to take over responsibility for the payment of the allowances.

The institution of the Councils of Review in July 1946 did not fail to arouse opposition, either. For one thing they were made up almost entirely of Islamic leaders. Secondly, they appear to have failed in the performance of the task for which they were appointed (Alers 1956:92; Meuraxa 1956:20–21).<sup>9</sup> The Councils' failure is admitted by their own members, by whom a number of factors are cited in extenuation, e.g., the war against the Dutch and the fact that registration of the property of the *ulèëbalang* commenced almost a whole year after the social revolution, making a reconstruction of events and the determination of what goods had been illegally seized extremely difficult, as well as the galloping inflation, which made determining the amounts of the compensation for damages virtually impossible.<sup>10</sup>

The confiscation of the *ulèëbalang*'s possessions and the functioning of the Councils of Review continued to be controversial issues in later years as well. At the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* rebellion in Aceh in 1953, the Republican Government and those political parties which disapproved of the rebellion continually harped on these two issues to put the leaders of the rebellion in a bad light and to draw attention to the supposedly still strong popular opposition to them. Passive sympathizers of the uprising, on the other hand, disputed the allegations that the confiscations and redistributions had been unfair and in turn accused the *ulèëbalang* of wrongful dispossession of the people ever since their integration into the Colonial Administration, and

of misappropriation of the *bait al-mal* (funds of the Islamic community) and mismanagement of the *wakaf* (religious foundations) entrusted to their care.<sup>11</sup>

### 3. *Opposition to the PUSA Administration*

Even if the redistribution of the property of the *ulèëbalang* had taken place in a fair way and the Councils of Review had functioned properly at an earlier stage, opposition would still have been inevitable. Criticism was levelled not only at the *ulama*'s seizure of the *ulèëbalang*'s possessions, but also at the advance of leading PUSA members in the Military and Civil Administration. Many of the new administrators were accused of incompetence, which judgment, though not unjustified, was a little on the harsh side. The problems with which the new, inexperienced administrators had to cope were manifold and complex. The transition from colony to independent state was not in any way an easy one. A new government apparatus had to be built up from scratch. And to make matters worse, there was a Dutch blockade which led to a rapidly deteriorating economic situation and rising inflation.

The dissatisfaction both with the current economic situation and at the alleged usurpation of power by PUSA leaders found concrete expression in early 1948. In that year the opposition to the Regional Government of Aceh, led since August of the previous year by Daud Beureu'eh as military governor, reached a climax. Accusations of large-scale corruption — illicit trading, murder of political opponents, disregard of the Central Government's instructions and embezzlement of the proceeds from the oil-fields and plantations — were levelled against people who had recently acquired seats on the Regional Government.

The opposition rallied around Sajid Ali Alsaqaf (Sayid Ali Alsaqaf) and Waki Harun. These two leaders in March and April 1948 sent letters to the governor of Sumatra urging for the introduction of measures designed to improve the quality of the Regional Government of Aceh. A few months later, in August 1948, in the course of Soekarno's visit to the area, they attempted to organize a demonstration. This attempt was frustrated by the authorities, however.

In the intervening months the criticism of government officials had assumed such proportions that Amin, the then governor of North Sumatra, saw himself obliged to announce that "The desire of a section of the population of the area for improvement

of the Regional Government through the replacement of existing officials coincides with a wish which the Government has since long entertained . . .". "Nevertheless", Amin continued, "the Government cannot agree with a wish for immediate changes on the basis of accusations which are either unfounded or are founded on anything but clear, well attested evidence" (Sumatera Utara 1953:202).

Early in August Said Ali Alsaqaf and his associates were put under arrest and prosecuted for defamation of senior Regional Government officials. A few days later, following their release, they made their first attempt at a coup d'état. They had stated their intention accordingly in a letter to the Regional Government of Banda Aceh announcing a "Revolution directed against unprincipled persons, because the Government itself evidently would not purge them out" (Amin 1975:83). In the following night a crowd assembled at Lam Baro to receive orders directing them to Banda Aceh to capture a number of officials. Before this plan could be carried out the Regional Government, which was informed of it, sent Tjek Mat Rachmani (Cek Mat Rakhmani) and Teungku Hasbullah Indrapuri to Lam Baro to placate the potential rebels and prevent them from going ahead with it.

On November 4th Sajid Ali Alsaqaf and Waki Harun made a second attempt to seize the power. They tried to take advantage of the presence on that day of almost all the senior government officials of Aceh in Banda Aceh for the purpose of discussing government matters to arrest them all in one stroke. Again, however, the Government had been warned of these plans beforehand and so arrested the conspirators. They were released again and were temporarily banished from Aceh in November 1949, on the eve of the official transfer of sovereignty (Sumatera Utara 1953:202–209; Amin 1956:15–16, 262–266; Insider 1950: 26–32).

The attempted coup of Sajid Ali Alsaqaf and Waki Harun has been described as an *ulèëbalang* affair as well as an affair of discontented religious scholars whose access to power had been blocked. Amin (1956:15) describes it as "the best organized of the many attempts by the Ulubalang to seize back the power". Alers (1956:92), on the other hand, following the Government's statement in Parliament in 1953, writes: "Discontented *Ulamas* formed an illegal organization under the leadership of Sajid Ali . . . to gain control of the PUSA". Yet another explanation, put forward by Teuku Jusuf Muda Dalam (Yusuf Muda Dalam), is that the attempt was an internal PUSA affair and is illustrative

of the divisions within that organization (Sekitar n.d. I:292).

None of these interpretations appears to be entirely correct, however. Although Sajid Ali Alsaqaf, in his confrontations with the regional authorities, did plead in the imprisoned *ulèëbalang*'s favour, this does not imply that he headed an *ulèëbalang* movement. It may just be that, like many others, he had more faith in the administrative talents of the *ulèëbalang*. Conversely, Islamic scholars were in the majority in the leadership of the organization.

#### 4. *The Status of Aceh*

Within a few weeks of Sajid Ali Alsaqaf's arrest a new conflict broke out, this time over the Central Government's intention to incorporate Aceh into the province of North Sumatra. Like the "social revolution" and the quarrels over the distribution of the economic, political and military power, the difference about Aceh's administrative status remained to be a cause of discontent and division for many years. Opposition to the province of North Sumatra and to the growing interference of the Central and Provincial Governments was even to become one of the immediate causes of the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* rebellion here.

Aceh had emerged from the Japanese occupation as a virtually autonomous area. In 1945 it constituted one of the residencies making up the province of Sumatra. Although the Provincial Parliament of Sumatra – which included only ten Acehnese among its hundred members – resolved in its first session that Sumatra was to be divided into three sub-provinces, of which North Sumatra, comprising Aceh, Tapanuli and East Sumatra, was to be one, Aceh continued functioning as an almost independent area. In the confused years following the Japanese occupation the Acehnese conducted their own administrative and military affairs without much interference from outside. For a short time between August 1947 and June 1948, after the launching of the first Dutch military action, this situation was even officially confirmed through the declaration of Aceh, together with Langkat and Tanah Karo, as a military region headed by a military governor. The situation changed, however, as the administrative structure of the Indonesian Republic assumed a clearer outline and the influence of the Central and Provincial Governments was increasingly felt. In April 1948 the sub-provinces were given provincial status, and the new province of



North Sumatra, likewise made up of Aceh, Tapanuli and East Sumatra, had as first governor S.M. Amin, hitherto deputy governor of the sub-province of North Sumatra. Hence at first sight nothing seemed to have changed. The move was, however, an indication of the normalization of administrative life and of the growing influence of the Central Government.

Governor S.M. Amin, in his opening speech at the first meeting of the Regional Parliament of North Sumatra, testified to a sound insight into the problems inherent in the creation of this particular province by stating: "The changes which will be introduced in the administration will be radical, fundamental changes. Up to now the basis of the Regional Government has been the unity of the residency, this unity of the residency in turn being based above all on ethnic factors. So the residency of Aceh was founded on the unity of the Acehnese, the residency of Tapanuli on the unity of the Batak and the residency of East Sumatra on the unity of the Malays. It is obvious that this kind of unity is defined by a restricted sense of national unity, which is no longer valid in our Republic. That is why the formation of the projected province will no longer be based on the old foundations but on new ones, namely foundations connected with economic and political unity, and so on" (Sumatera Utara 1953:188–189). He further remarked: "Our State is based on amongst other things the nationalist feelings of a united Indonesian people; there is no room in it for an Acehnese people, a Batak people or a Malay people. As far as the State is concerned there is only one people, the Indonesian people, which is made up of a number of groups, namely of people from Tapanuli, from Aceh, from East Sumatra, and so on. Religious difference should not become a problem for us, as we shall be free to adhere to whatever religion we believe in. Religious differences shall not destroy the unity of our nation" (Sumatera Utara 1953:1901). The two factors to which S.M. Amin drew attention in this address, namely the ethnic and religious differences between Aceh and the other two regencies of North Sumatra, were, in fact, to play a key role in Aceh's demands for regional autonomy.

The regional government issue was temporarily relegated to a place of secondary importance when in December 1948 the Dutch launched their second military action and put the entire Republican Government in Yogyakarta under arrest. In the arrangements for the area's defence against Dutch attacks Indonesia's administrative division of the end of 1948 was abrogated and the system in force prior to that re-introduced. Under this

latter system Indonesia was divided into military regions, one of which comprised the regencies of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo. In 1947, and so again at the end of 1948, Teungku Daud Beureu'eh was military governor in the honorary rank of major-general. A major change which this involved was that Daud Beureu'eh as military governor now was head of the Civil Administration as well as the Army, whereas in 1947 the military governor had only possessed authority in military affairs and those civil affairs which were connected with defence.

The new arrangement was officially confirmed in May 1949 by an Emergency Government headed by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (Syafruddin Prawiranegara) which had been formed after the arrest of Soekarno and his Cabinet and which had its seat first at Bukit Tinggi and later in Banda Aceh. This Government announced on May 16th that in the special military regions all civil and military powers would be vested in the military governors (Keputusan Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia no. 21). The next day the function of provincial governor was abolished in Sumatra, and changed into that of government representative (Keputusan Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia no. 22).

Upon the old Cabinet's resuming office in July 1949, after the release of its members by the Dutch and the dissolution of the Emergency Government, a special deputy premiership for Sumatra was created. This function was given to Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. In view of the still very poor communications between Java and Sumatra he was given wide powers. So he had the right to enact regulations having the force of laws after due consultation of an Advisory Council, whose members were to be appointed by the President. He could also issue "ordinary" government regulations without consulting the Council (Undang-undang no. 2, 1949).

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara visited Aceh in August 1949, and was immediately confronted there with a number of problems, such as the aftermath of Sajid Ali Alsaqaf's attempted coup and the strong demands of PUSA leaders to grant Aceh provincial status. The pressure was so great, in fact, that he was forced to commit himself to the creation of the province of Aceh. As it is put in the Government's statement to Parliament in 1953 (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:101), "the autonomous province of Aceh was created through force majeure".

Exercising his special powers, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara on December 17th, 1949, issued a regulation having the force of a government regulation in which North Sumatra was divided into

two new provinces: the province of Aceh (including a part of Langkat), and the province of Tapanuli/East Sumatra (Peraturan Wakil Menteri Pengganti Peraturan Pemerintah no. 8, 1949). The preamble to this regulation stated that the creation of the province of Aceh had been a matter of urgency in which the usual legal procedure had not been followed. So it pointed out that, whereas the creation of a new province should normally have taken place by Act of Parliament, in the present case this had been substituted by a regulation of the Deputy Prime Minister without consultation of the Advisory Council, firstly because no such Council had as yet been formed, and secondly in view of the urgency of improving the administrative structure.

The appointment as governor of the new province of Aceh was at first refused by Teungku Daud Beureu'eh, who suggested Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah, who during Daud Beureu'eh's term as military governor of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo had held the function of resident of Aceh, for the position instead. The reason stated by him for his refusal was that he found it impossible to judge his own qualifications, although the real reason may well have been that he foresaw considerable opposition. In any case, he changed his mind the next day. He was installed as governor of Aceh on January 30th, 1950.

In the light of the developments in Aceh from 1945 to 1950, it is not surprising that there was considerable opposition to the installation of Daud Beureu'eh as governor, and a strong suspicion that the creation of the province of Aceh was just another attempt by PUSA members to consolidate and extend their hold on Aceh. Conversely, it is quite understandable that the Government and its supporters, after Daud Beureu'eh's proclamation of Aceh as a *Darul Islam* area, should have been drawn attention to the popular opposition to Daud Beureu'eh's appointment as governor of Aceh. The Government statement of 1953 (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:101) claims, in fact, that the reaction of Acehnese society to the appointment was quite cool. It further points in this connection to the failure of the attempts of Zainuddin, one of Aceh's most prominent businessmen, to form a committee to organize festivities in celebration of Daud Beureu'eh's installation, the meeting called for the purpose of forming such a committee being extremely poorly attended because of lack of interest and support.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to internal regional opposition to what was described by S.M. Amin (1956:28) as "a transfer of all the power in the region to the PUSA party, without any control or super-

vision from a higher regional authority”, the Central Government had the necessary reservations. Instead of endorsing Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s regulation and duly enacting a law declaring Aceh a separate province, it set up a Commission of Inquiry chaired by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Susanto Tirtoprojjo (Susanto Tirtoprojo).

This Committee, during a visit to Banda Aceh, proceeded to inform the Acehnese leaders that the Central Government had not made up its mind whether Aceh should, in fact, constitute an independent province. Naturally the announcement was not well received. The PUSA tried to lend force to their pleas for a separate province by threatening that if Aceh should again be made part of a province of North Sumatra they refused to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order any longer. In addition they tried, like Amir Husin al Mudjahid, to rally popular support for the continued existence of the province of Aceh (Amin 1965:30). Reportedly Daud Beureu’eh himself hinted repeatedly at a likely rebellion by publicly stating that he and his supporters would take the mountains to build up Aceh in their way (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:103).

Notwithstanding Acehnese opposition, a new preparatory committee for the creation of the province of North Sumatra was formed on August 1st, 1950. It was headed by S. Parman Reksodihardjo (S. Parman Reksodiharjo) and included Teuku Mohammad Daudsjah among its members. Again political developments beyond the control of the Acehnese had influenced the Central Government’s attitude to the administrative division of Sumatra. One and a half years previously the second Dutch “military action” had prompted the Republican Government to postpone the creation of the province of North Sumatra. Now the negotiations between the Indonesian Republic and the United States of Indonesia provided an excuse to re-form this province.

On August 15th, 1950, the United States of Indonesia were officially abrogated and the unitary Republic of Indonesia proclaimed. This had been preceded by the issuing of a number of regulations governing the administrative division of Indonesia into provinces by the Indonesian Government the previous day, among them government regulation no. 21 (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 21, 1950). This regulation stated in its first article that the territory of Indonesia was to be divided into ten provinces, one of which would be North Sumatra. At the same time the government regulation in substitution of law no. 5 was issued, revoking Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s regulation whereby the

province of Aceh had been created (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang no. 5).

The legal basis on which the province of North Sumatra was created was very precarious. Again a province had been formed not by law but by government regulation. Moreover, both regulations – probably to take the wind out of the sails of any opposition – made reference to the agreements between the United States of Indonesia and the Indonesian Republic, including an agreement of July 20th regarding the division of Sumatra into three provinces. As Logemann (1955:163) points out, this agreement was never made public, however.

Acehnese reaction was prompt. A motion rejecting incorporation into the province of North Sumatra was carried unanimously by the Regional Parliament. It was supplemented in September by an explanatory statement drawn up by the Regional Government of Aceh (Sumatera Utara 1953:400–409). The motion, and more especially the statement in explanation of it, was very lengthy, listing all the arguments for giving Aceh independent status. The area's special position and specific problems are described at length, and arguments are advanced for the need to treat Aceh differently in many respects.

Aceh's distinctive situation and special problems in the educational, economic, legal and religious fields set it apart from the rest of North Sumatra, it argued. The region was different not only because of the special nature of these problems, but also on account of their magnitude. For Aceh had to cope with an enormous educational lag, while the irrigation system and the roads were in extreme disrepair, and the fishing industry in need of great improvement. It went on to claim that the problems were too enormous to be dealt with effectively by a regency administration, but required the attention of a provincial-level government. At the same time it stressed the necessity for the people working on the solution of these problems to be well aware of and familiar with Aceh's special situation, expressing the fear that, if Aceh became part of North Sumatra, the second of these conditions would not be met, so that as a consequence the problems would not be dealt with properly. The statement concludes with the threat that "if Aceh does not become an independent province under the sovereignty of the Central Government, we, the Sons of Aceh, who currently occupy positions in the Administration and all share these same ideals, the day the Central Government rejects the afore-stated demands will leave the Government institutions and will ask for the return of

our mandate by the head of the Regional Government to the Central Government". Nevertheless Daud Beureu'eh intimated, stressing that the Acehnese were no Moluccans, that the civil servants would simply resign and that Aceh would not proclaim itself an independent state (N 21-10-1950).

This threat was repeated on the occasion of a visit to Aceh by a Central Government delegation from Jakarta headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Assaat, at the end of September. Here leading Acehnese administrators issued a statement at the conclusion of a meeting between the delegation and themselves at which the status of Aceh had been discussed that if the Central Government went on refusing to recognize the Acehnese people's claim to autonomy in the widest sense of the word, they would resign, as would a great many of their subordinates. Assaat's delegation failed to talk the regional leaders round. Nor did the Indonesian Vice-President, Mohammad Hatta, succeed in this on his visit to Banda Aceh in November.

A solution was finally found in January 1951 by the then Prime Minister, Natsir. On January 23rd he made a radio speech in Banda Aceh announcing the conclusion of an agreement in the matter. Here Natsir stated that the creation of the province of North Sumatra now no longer was regarded "by our brothers in Aceh as a bolt forever locking out all other possibilities" (Sumatera Utara 1953:422-430). Teungku Daud Beureu'eh issued a statement on the agreement reached at the same time. This statement adduced a number of reasons why Aceh had ceased its opposition to incorporation into the province of North Sumatra, including the fact that the Central Government was not rejecting Aceh's claim to autonomy, the agreement that the matter would be settled in a nation-wide context, and Aceh's reluctance to obstruct the functioning of the administration of North Sumatra. At the same time it indicated that the struggle for autonomy would be continued and that "the notion of resignation from office as one form of non-cooperation if Aceh's claim to autonomy is not satisfied is still resolutely adhered to" (Sumatera Utara 1953:430-431).

On January 25th, 1951, Abdul Hakim was installed as governor of North Sumatra, with Medan being made the seat of the Provincial Government, to which city the personnel of the former province of Aceh subsequently had to be moved. For the region of Aceh a resident-coordinator was appointed to supervise the functioning of the regional administration.

The creation of the latter function at first gave rise to some

misunderstanding. Daud Beureu'eh claimed not to have been informed of it. It is even possible that the Government had intended him for it, with or without his knowledge. In any case, all letters addressed to the resident-coordinator of Aceh were returned to Medan unopened on Daud Beureu'eh's orders (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:104). The official appointment of R.M. Danubroto to the function of resident-coordinator of Aceh put a definitive end to this situation, however. Daud Beureu'eh was hereupon called to Jakarta by the Central Government to be appointed as governor attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although he never went to Jakarta to take up this position. At the same time a number of other changes were effected in the Civil Administration of Aceh – e.g. a number of *bupatis* were replaced – without this arousing opposition for the time being.

##### 5. *Causes of Discontent*

The period of quiet in Aceh resulting from the solution worked out by Natsir and Daud Beureu'eh did not last long. As early as April the first indications of renewed unrest were to be noted as a new anti-PUSA movement gained momentum.

On April 8th, 1951, the *Badan Keinsyafan Rakyat* (BKR), People's Awareness Organization, was founded in Aceh. It resembled in many ways the Sajid Ali Alsaqaf movement. Aiming to all appearances at the establishment of an incorrupt and capable government, the principal target was the PUSA leaders. Also as in the Sajid Ali Alsaqaf movement, *ulèëbalang* and Islamic scholars joined forces in it. The stated aims of the BKR were to assist the Government, "wherever necessary", in giving out information on its policies and strengthening the ties with the people.

A more concrete programme was outlined in a resolution adopted by the BKR on April 15th. It opened with the statement that the population of Aceh had become alienated from the Government, "or, to be more exact, from the majority of those styling themselves representatives or leaders of the people, who at the moment hold seats in the Administration of Aceh, and that the people's awareness in this respect has become increasingly clear since their experiences during the time those same leaders were fighting for their own ideals and competing in the amassing of personal wealth".

As a way of restoring the people's confidence the BKR urged

the Government to dismiss those of its officials who were obstructing the execution of Government decisions or who were corrupt or incompetent. It further called on the Government to supply proof that it was indeed exerting itself to protect the citizens and their property. The measures proposed by the BKR included the restoration of the property administered by the Councils of Review to the orphans of deceased *ulèëbalang*, and a clarification of the Government's attitude to the crimes committed during the "social revolution" and its aftermath. The BKR in addition requested the Government to dismiss the – allegedly PUSA-dominated – committee set up for the preparation of the general election in Aceh, and to take steps to improve the economic situation. If necessary, finally, the Civil Administration should be replaced by a military one (Sumatera Utara 1953:439–440; Amin 1956:267–269). Although the BKR resolution mentioned no names, it was obviously directed against the PUSA and its leaders.

Both the BKR and the PUSA had ample opportunity to attract the public attention during President Soekarno's visit to Aceh. On his arrival in Banda Aceh on July 30th, 1951, he was greeted by both PUSA and BKR demonstrators. The latter's signs read: "Do not try only the people, but also the embezzlers of the people's property", "The chicken thief goes to jail, the big thieves continue in office", and "Teungku Daud Beureu'eh, the sucker of the people's blood". All these slogans clearly alluded to alleged malpractices on the part of the Acehnese leaders, who exploited their positions as such to acquire personal wealth and cover up their crimes. The PUSA demonstrators carried boards displaying signs like "Aceh must not be treated as a stepchild", and "We love the President, but we love religion more". With this latter slogan the PUSA demonstrators were expressing their distrust of Soekarno, whom they believed to have betrayed Islam by propagating the *Pancasila*, instead of Islam, as the basis of the Indonesian State.

The next issue that made feelings in Aceh run high was that of the Indonesia-wide mass arrests the next month. The Cabinet then in power, the *Masyumi*-PNI coalition Cabinet headed by Sukiman, was characterized by a strong anti-communist attitude. This reached its climax in the so-called "August razzias", in which on the pretext of the discovery of a plot to overthrow the Government about 15,000 people were put under arrest. These included a number of *Masyumi* politicians, presumably on account of contacts with *Darul Islam* groups. As Feith



(1973:189) points out, however, “Apparently the greatest number of those arrested were either Chinese or supporters of the PKI”. Feith (1973:190) further writes that “the choice of persons to be arrested had been made hastily, with a high degree of discretion being left to the local authorities, especially the *bupatis*, to arrest whomever they considered dangerous to security in their areas”. His assessment is correct, generally speaking. There was indeed a high degree of discretion left to local authorities. But it was precisely this factor that set the arrests in Aceh apart from those in the rest of Indonesia.

In Aceh, as elsewhere, the military authorities were strongly anti-communist. But, unlike those in other parts of Indonesia, they felt that they had a more dangerous enemy still to contend with: the PUSA. Another point on which Aceh differed was sharp cleavage between the military of the province of North Sumatra and the local Civil Administration in Aceh. The latter, in spite of earlier changes in personnel, was still PUSA-oriented. As a consequence it was in the main members of the PUSA rather than members or supporters of the Communist party, PKI, who were arrested or interrogated in Aceh. They included some of the PUSA’s top leaders, such as Daud Beureu’eh, Teungku Sulaiman Daud, the current *bupati* of Pidie, and Teungku Hasan Hanafiah, head of the Office of Religion of West Aceh. Furthermore, it was alleged by the Council of Review of Pidie that its members were a special target of the August raids (Sekitar n.d. I:240, III:83). The arrests were interpreted by the victims, in fact, as an *ulèëbalang* attempt to get even.

As a State of War and Siege (SOB) still continued in North Sumatra, the arrests were carried out by the Regional Military Command. Those arrested were described in a monograph on North Sumatra (Sumatera Utara 1953:448) as “elements who disturbed the peace and security, who engaged in activities of an anti-national nature, and who undermined the authority of the Government”. The Army of North Sumatra, for its part strongly denied having acted on its own authority, without orders from or the prior knowledge of its superiors.

In the subsequent situation again the troubles in Aceh were viewed in the light of the long-standing conflict between *ulama* and *ulèëbalang*. A distinction was drawn between the military and the Civil Administration of North Sumatra, or more precisely speaking of Aceh, which ran along the same line as that between the *ulèëbalang* and the *ulama* or PUSA. In this interpretation, which itself contributed to the tension, the Civil Administration

was still PUSA-dominated, while the Army was increasingly becoming an instrument of the *ulèëbalang*.

In 1953, during the parliamentary debates on the *Darul Islam* rebellion in Aceh, the arrests by the Army were defended by PNI member Abdullah Jusuf (Abdullah Yusuf), who also referred obliquely to the cleavage between the Army and the Civil Administration of North Sumatra. Criticizing the Civil Government for ignoring the complaints lodged with and the information passed to it concerning the activities of Daud Beureu'eh and other PUSA leaders in the early 1950's, he praised the Army as being the only institution to act on this information and again and again thwarting the PUSA in its designs (Sekitar n.d. I:279). Another spokesman for the secular parties, PKI member Sarwono S. Sutardjo (Sarwono S. Sutarjo), likewise put the blame for the rebellion partly on the laxity of the Civil Administration. According to him the governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, had put "more faith in his subordinates in Aceh – who were known to be PUSA/*Masyumi* champions – than in the actual facts . . ." (Sekitar n.d. I:178).

The members of parliament representing the Islamic parties in the debate, rather than stressing the connection between the PUSA and the Civil Administration, like Abdullah Jusuf and Sarwono S. Sutardjo, laid emphasis on that between the *ulèëbalang*, or the *Badan Keinsyafan Rakyat*, and the military. A former secretary of PUSA, Nur el Ibrahimy, for instance, lodged the accusation that the BKR had actively cooperated with the Army during the August arrests (Sekitar n.d. I:142). Amelz likewise hinted at the connections between the Army and the *ulèëbalang*. He claimed that the people's distrust of the Army had increased since observing that the Army and Police maintained contacts with persons whom they labelled obstructors of (Indonesia's) independence (Sekitar n.d. I:262).

Even so, by identifying the Civil Administration with the PUSA and the military with the *ulèëbalang* one ignores the complexity of the problems involved. The conflicts in Aceh were not exclusively the outcome of a struggle for power between the two social classes of the *ulama* and the *ulèëbalang*. The Acehnese claims for regional autonomy and the Central Government's efforts to extend its influence also played a role here. The Central Government, in its attempts to extend its influence, looked to the enemies of the PUSA as possible allies, and tried to reduce the PUSA's grip over the Civil Administration and Army in the area. In the latter attempt it was far more successful with the Army

than with the Civil Administration. Although it had had a number of senior civil servants replaced after the creation of the province of North Sumatra, at the local level the Government had failed in establishing its control over the Civil Administration by appointing loyal pro-government officials. In the Army, on the other hand, the problem had been much easier to tackle. The Government had succeeded in purging the Army of PUSA influence through a policy of replacements, the dissolution of particular army units, and the stationing of troops from other regions in Aceh as early as 1950.

Consequently the loyalties of the Army in Aceh at this time were quite different from those in the period immediately following the social revolution. For just after March 1946, after the replacement of Sjammaun Gaharu by Husin Jusuf as commander of the Division V, the Republican Army Division in Aceh, following Amir Husin al Mudjahid's coup PUSA control had been strongest. Husin Jusuf had subsequently become commander of the *Gajah* I (First Elephant) Division, as the Division V was renamed in February 1947, and a month after that commander of the Division X, in which the *Gajah* I Division merged with the *Gajah* II Division of East Sumatra, and of which Colonel Sitompul, a former commander of the *Gajah* II Division, was appointed Chief of Staff.<sup>13</sup>

In June 1947 the Central Army Command had decreed that the many irregular guerilla units should be incorporated into the Republican Army. This decision had been greeted with reserve if not outright refusal by the Acehnese guerilla organizations, which at first were strongly opposed to such integration. Their opposition was so strong, in fact, that, as Nur el Ibrahimy later stated in Parliament (Sekitar n.d. I:132), there had been fears of bloodshed. Only after the attempt at mediation of Daud Beureu'eh, then military governor of Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo, had the guerilla organizations given in. The negotiations about integration had started in December 1947, with talks taking place not only between Daud Beureu'eh and the commanders of the guerilla organizations, but also within the guerilla units themselves. So on December 14th a special internal meeting had been held by both the *Mujahidin* and the *Dipisi Rencong Kesatria Pesindo* (the continuation of the BPI), at which incorporation into the Republican Army had been one of the subjects of discussion.<sup>14</sup> Earlier, on December 8th, a commission for the preparation of incorporation had been formed in Aceh. As its head had been appointed Colonel R.M.S. Surjosurarso (R.M.S. Suryosurar-

so), one of Daud Beureu'eh's military advisors, while its members included Amir Husin al Mudjahid and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Teungku A. Wahab. At the end of December the Republican Army Provisional Command, or *Dewan Pimpinan Sementara TNI*, had been set up in Aceh at the suggestion of this Commission, with A. Wahab as chairman, and R.M.S. Surjosurarlo as deputy chairman. The latter in addition had become Chief of the General Staff, which further included the Commander of the Republican Army Division in Aceh, and the Commanders of the three local irregular guerilla organizations: the *Dipisi Rencong Kesatria Pesindo*, *Dipisi X Teungku Chik di Tiro* (formed in 1947, after a reorganization of the *Mujahidin*), and the *Dipisi Teungku Chik Paya Bakong* (founded by Amir Husin al Mudjahid).

It had taken six months for the merger to become a fact, and the institution of the new Division X had been officially announced on June 13th, 1948. Its first commander had been Daud Beureu'eh, in his capacity as military governor, followed in October by the old commander, Husin Jusuf. In November 1949 the Acehnese Division had changed its name to *Komando Tentara & Territorium Aceh*, or Army and Territorial Command of Aceh, with Husin Jusuf remaining in command (Sumatera Utara 1953:165–169; Dua Windhu 1972:140–144).

Thereupon some major changes had been effected. First of all, in December 1949, the *Komando Tentara & Territorium I*/North Sumatra had been formed under the command of Kawilarang, who five months later had been succeeded by Sitompul, a Christian Batak. Subsequently the *Komando Tentara & Territorium Atjeh* had become the Brigade CC of the Army and Territorial Command I/*Bukit Barisan*, under the command of Hasbullah Hadji (Hasbullah Haji), as Husin Jusuf, after a conflict with Kawilarang, had by that time left the Army.

Probably because of these changes the guerilla leaders of Aceh at the end of 1950 had revived the various irregular guerilla organizations, this giving rise to persistent rumours that a rebellion was afoot. In Aceh itself the move had been justified by saying that these organizations had been called into being again so as to be prepared for a third World War (N 6-11-1950).

The transformation of the Republican Army Division of Aceh into a brigade had brought a number of important personnel changes in its wake and greatly boosted the authority of the Central Army Command. The Acehnese army had fallen victim to the Republican Government's demobilization policy, with the

demobilized in Aceh including prominent commanders such as Husin Jusuf, Amir Husin al Mudjahid, Njak Neh (commander of the *Dipisi Rencong Kesatria Pesindo*) and Said Abubakar. To their great indignation the sacked Acehnese civil and military leaders had been openly described as “mere illiterates” (which in many cases was not true) and “*madrasah* party people” (Husin Jusuf 1954 in a letter to S.M. Amin in *Gelanggang* 1956:135).

Moreover, the Central Army Command had stationed troops from Aceh in other parts of Indonesia and moved non-Acehnese troops into Aceh. The latter included Bataks and former KNIL soldiers. The Brigade CC, for its part, was ordered to East Sumatra and to Tarutung in North Tapanuli, while Acehnese troops were further sent to the Moluccas. Later, as the signs of an impending *Darul Islam* rising grew stronger, units of the Mobile Brigade were sent to Aceh.

These moves on the one hand assured the Army Command of the presence of loyal troops in Aceh. At the outbreak of the *Darul Islam* rebellion, in fact, few regular soldiers stationed in Aceh participated. On the other hand, this assurance was paid for with a further alienation of the former guerillas in Aceh. There were suspicions that the Bataks were trying to gain the upper hand in the North Sumatran army, and accordingly in Aceh the Batak soldiers were looked upon almost as enemies. It was further thought that the new commander for North Sumatra, Maludin Simbolon, wanted to gain control of Aceh, and was aided in his designs by fellow-Bataks in Jakarta, namely the generals Nasution and Simatupang.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, where the Central Government was more or less successful in building up a loyal army in Aceh, it failed in its attempt to gain influence in the civil service. Estimates of the number of civil servants joining the *Darul Islam* movement here vary, but are all quite high. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Sutikno P. Sumarto, at the time a member of the security staff of Aceh, stated as early as October 24th, 1953, that about seventy per cent of the civil servants in Aceh were active participants in the rebellion (Sekitar n.d. I:78–79). At about the same time Amin stated that ninety per cent of them might quite reasonably be estimated to have sided with the rebels, because “they all came from the same group” (Sekitar n.d. I:80).

## 6. Preparations for Rebellion

During the first months of 1953 the tension steadily mounted in Aceh. There were rumours of new arrests, secret meetings, and contacts between Daud Beureu'eh and Kartosuwirjo circulating. PUSA members commenced their campaign for the general election and in their speeches stressed the need for regional autonomy and an Islamic State.

The names that crop up most frequently in connection with the preparations for a rebellion in this period are those of Daud Beureu'eh, Hasan Aly, Husin Jusuf and Amir Husin al Mudjahid. The latter two exerted themselves especially to enlist the support of demobilized guerillas, towards which end they founded the (*Persatuan*) *Bekas Perjuang (Islam) Aceh* (BPA), (Association of) Former (Islamic) Fighters of Aceh. This organization was headed by Husin Jusuf, and had Daud Beureu'eh as patron. Amir Husin al Mudjahid is said to have entertained relations with another organization of former guerillas, the *Biro Bekas Angkatan Perang*, Bureau of Former Members of the Armed Forces, as well in an attempt to win over discontented former guerilla fighters in East Sumatra.<sup>16</sup> Contacts were also established with Acehnese troops with a view to inciting them to desertion (Gelanggang 1956:38).

That there were connections between Daud Beureu'eh and the *Darul Islam* movement before September 1953 is certain. It is less certain, however, who had taken the initiative: the rebels in Aceh or Kartosuwirjo. According to a secret report, Daud Beureu'eh and Amir Husin al Mudjahid allegedly had travelled to Java to confer with Kartosuwirjo in Bandung after a secret meeting called by Daud Beureu'eh on March 13th, which was attended by Amir Husin al Mudjahid, Husin Jusuf, Sulaiman Daud, Hasan Aly (Director of Public Prosecutions in Aceh, at that time on official leave), Said Abubakar and A.R. Hanafiah (an employee of the Office of Religion of East Aceh), and at which the conspirators had delegated the two to go to Java to establish contact with leaders of the *Darul Islam* movement there (Sekitar n.d. I:302–303). According to the same report, Amir Husin al Mudjahid on his return from Java had stayed a few days in Medan to meet representatives of other Islamic organizations there, such as the *Masyumi* and its youth branch, the GPII.

Daud Beureu'eh and Kartosuwirjo remained in touch with each other through envoys. So Kartosuwirjo decided to send Mustafa Rasjid (Mustafa Rasyid) to Aceh to discuss the integration of this territory into the Islamic State of Indonesia and to appoint Daud

Beureu'eh chief of the Aceh Command. Mustafa Rasjid, whose real name was Abdul Fatah Tanu Wirananggapa and who styled himself *chargé d'affaires* of the Islamic State of Indonesia for Aceh, had been arrested on his return to Java in May 1953. There an envoy of Daud Beureu'eh had also been captured (Meuraxa 1956:32; Sekitar n.d. I:547–553; PR 28-9-1953). The Central Government, which tried to keep these arrests a secret, did not proceed to put Daud Beureu'eh under arrest, and only increased the number of Mobile Brigade units in Aceh.

In North Sumatra, meanwhile, two important congresses had taken place in April 1953. First a congress of Islamic scholars was held at Medan from April 11th to 15th. Secondly a congress to evaluate the results of the Medan congress was organized by the PUSA at Langsa from April 15th till 29th. Both meetings were chaired by Daud Beureu'eh, who was thus provided with an excellent opportunity to inform those he trusted of his plans and to discuss the possibility of a rebellion with them.

The two congresses provided the starting-point for a comprehensive Aceh-wide campaign in which the Islamic leaders urged the population to vote for an Islamic party in the coming general elections (which at the time seemed close at hand), and for Islam as the constitutional basis of the Indonesian State. They moreover raised a number of issues which had for a long time aroused the resentment of an important section of the Acehnese population, viz. the alleged anti- or un-Islamic attitude of the Indonesian Government, the latter's neglect of Aceh, and the replacement of Acehnese with people from outside the region in the Regional Administration and Army. At mass meetings and in sermons they further accused the Javanese and Bataks of harbouring intentions to take over Aceh, alleged that the Republican troops sent to Aceh were made up of former KNIL soldiers and infidels, and attacked Soekarno for wanting to promote Hinduism. One monograph on the Acehnese rebellion (Gelanggang 1956:13) states that the Islamic scholars "resolutely vowed . . . that on their return to their region they would leave no stone unturned to persuade the people to fight for an Islamic State in the coming elections for Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, and that if a victory was not won in this way, then they would not shrink from employing illegal means towards this end".

The two congresses not only provided the starting-point for the Aceh-wide campaign to expound the Islamic leaders' view on the Islamic State and to incite the people to rebellion against the

Central Government. It also provided the impetus for renewed efforts to extend the PUSA's influence in society. The latter's organizational structure was strengthened by the institution of mass organizations to mobilize its supporters. Thus the PUSA's youth branch, the *Pemuda* PUSA, which had for years been dormant, was revived, the above-mentioned *Persatuan Bekas Pejuang Islam Aceh* was founded, and the PUSA strengthened its hold over the Acehnese Boy Scout movement, the *Pandu Islam*, by appointing A.G. Mutiara as its head. These three organizations played an important part in the military preparations for the coming rebellion. Besides providing the Acehnese *Darul Islam* with the bulk of its troops, they greatly facilitated the planning for the coordinated actions at the outbreak of the rebellion, whereby the major towns of Aceh were attacked simultaneously. The former guerillas united in the *Persatuan Bekas Perjuang Islam Aceh* constituted the principal shock troops, supported by the youths from the *Pemuda* PUSA and the *Pandu Islam* as auxiliaries.

This *Pandu Islam* was more than just a Boy Scout movement. Apart from the normal quasi-military drill, it provided its members with a rudimentary military training. "The *Pandu Islam* grew healthier and gained more followers day by day. It then appeared that its members were receiving military training from specially selected experienced soldiers and were taught methods of attack and assault. They received this training not only by day but also by night" (Gelanggang 1956:18). A proportion of the Boy Scouts, whose number was estimated by the Government at 4,000 (Keterangan Pemerintah 1953:107), were former guerillas, moreover.

With the preparations well under way, the moment finally arrived when a date for the start of the rebellion had to be fixed. From an ideological point of view the most suitable day would have been August 7th, the date on which Kartosuwirjo had proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia. There are, in fact, indications that the *Darul Islam* leaders of Aceh considered this an appropriate day. And according to the Singapore magazine *Asia Newsletter* (quoted in *Waktu* Vol. VIII, n.37, Oct. 10, 1953; Sekitar n.d. I:493) the rebels had originally decided to start the rebellion on August 7th, but had changed their mind after information reaching the Central Government, where upon Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, a devout Muslim, had persuaded the ring-leaders to give up this plan. Another possible date mentioned was August 17th, the anniversary of the declaration of Indone-



sian independence. According to the above-mentioned secret report (Sekitar n.d. I:303), August 17th had been decided upon at a meeting of August 1st, at which twelve people, including i.a. Amir Husin al Mudjahid (but not Daud Beureu'eh)<sup>17</sup>, assembled at the house of Zainy Bakri, *bupati* at Langsa. It had also been agreed at this same meeting, according to the report, to postpone the start of the rebellion until mid-September at the latest if the preparations were not yet completed by August 17th.

To ease the situation in Aceh visits had been paid to the region by President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta, the former in March 1953. His visit did not do much to decrease the tension, however, being too much dominated by his speech at Amuntai, which had also enraged devout Muslims in Aceh. As during his earlier visit in 1951, Soekarno was greeted by signs bearing such slogans as "We love the President but we love Religion more" (Feith 1973:346). More successful on the face of it was Hatta's endeavour. During his visit, which took place in July, he had conferred with, among others, Daud Beureu'eh. He had subsequently returned to Jakarta in an optimistic frame of mind, confident that he had worked out a solution and that the situation was still under control. Daud Beureu'eh and his associates were not put under arrest, in spite of the Government's knowledge of their contacts with Kartosuwirjo. Later the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the political party which was most critical of the rebellion, accused Hatta of having personally interfered in the affairs of the Government by instructing Prime Minister Wilopo (whose Cabinet resigned at the end of July) not to take preventive action in Aceh. According to PKI spokesmen, Hatta's attitude had been no different before and after his visit to Aceh. Before setting off he had felt confident about being able to deal with the problems in Aceh; after his return he had told Wilopo that nothing was going to happen and that he was sure peace and order could be preserved (Sekitar n.d. I:178, 281-286).

The Government was attacked not only by the PKI for its lack of alertness. The Islamic parties too, notably *Masyumi*, criticized it for failing to act upon information supplied it. Both groups had, in fact, pointed to the growing unrest in Aceh, with the communists drawing attention to the preparations for the rebellion and the PUSA's efforts to extend its influence, and the *Masyumi*, on the other hand, trying to convince the Government that the mounting feeling of dissatisfaction was a result of its own faulty policy. The *Masyumi* still pleaded for a change of policy after the outbreak of the rebellion, asking for greater

financial assistance for Aceh, the replacement of the troops from other areas by Acehnese soldiers, and the reinstatement of Acehnese officials in high military and civil functions.

The Regional Government authorities in North Sumatra and Aceh followed the line of the Central Government in Jakarta and did their utmost to remove any impression that a rebellion was brewing. They repeatedly denied that the situation was serious or that there was a rebellious movement taking shape. In some cases these statements were made out of genuine ignorance, in others they were inspired by a desire to set people's mind at ease, while in yet other cases they were deliberately intended to deceive other government officials and to cover up the many intrigues.

In early September a number of official meetings were held to discuss the security situation in Aceh. One of these took place at Medan on September 14th – exactly one week before the outbreak of the rebellion. It was attended by the *bupatis* of East Aceh, Zainy Bakri, of Pidie, T.A. Hasan, and of North Aceh, Usman Azis, who briefed the governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, on the situation in their respective regions and assured him that all was well and that there was no immediate threat to the peace. This meeting was also attended by Sulaiman Daud, acting resident-coordinator of Aceh (Gelanggang 1956:19–25), who a few weeks later turned out to be the commander of the rebel force in Greater Aceh. At that same time it transpired that the *bupatis* of Pidie, T.A. Hasan, and of East Aceh, Zainy Bakri, had gone over to the *Darul Islam*.<sup>18</sup> Of course Abdul Hakim also received information that contradicted the views put forward by the *bupatis*. Such information was passed on to him by, among others Nja' Umar (Nya' Umar), Police coordinator for Aceh, who judged the situation to be so grave that he had ordered the stationing of guards at important public buildings (Alers 1956:270). Abdul Hakim may actually have attached more credence to this latter kind of information, in fact. At the end of September, when he was free to disclose the truth, he admitted that the atmosphere had been “hot” in August, whereupon things cooled off again, only to reach a new climax in mid-September, at the outbreak of the rebellion (Sekitar n.d. I:8).

In the month of August people began preparing themselves to flee Aceh or to go into hiding. While the Government continued to turn a deaf ear to warnings of growing tension by people from both the left and the right, private citizens began leaving the area for Medan and East Sumatra in large numbers. They were mostly

relatives of *ulèëbalang* and members or sympathizers of the secular parties, in particular the PKI. But members of the Islamic parties, including the PUSA, also felt insecure. Their fear of renewed repressive measures by the Republican Army, as witnessed by them in August 1951, mounted as rumours that the Government had compiled a list of names of prominent Acehnese who were earmarked for arrest circulated. This list according to some contained three hundred, according to others one hundred and ninety names (Sekitar n.d. I:263).

Some authors claim this list to have constituted the immediate cause of the rebellion. Boland (1971:73) writes, for example: "According to information acquired in Atjeh, left-wing politicians in Djakarta had earlier in 1953 begun to spread the rumour that Atjeh was indeed organizing a rising. As a result of this rumour 'Djakarta' listed 190 prominent Atjehnese who were to be arrested. In July 1953 this became known in Atjeh; later on it turned out that this list of names had probably been leaked on purpose. As these leading Atjehnese had the feeling that they might be arrested, they decided to take to the mountains on September 19th, 1953. This was the official break with 'Djakarta', and the beginning of the so-called Darul Islam revolt in Atjeh." A similar view was put forward by Amelz in a parliamentary debate at the outbreak of the rebellion. Basing himself on an article in the Indonesian daily *Lembaga*, he put the leaking of the list at a much later date, however, namely after the occurrence of the first rebel actions on September 20th and 21st. But he shares Boland's view that the presence of their names on the list induced a number of leaders to join the rebellion. Those who had intended not to act until the government did so first, now, after being informed of the list, according to Amelz, decided to defect (Sekitar n.d. I:263).

Although there is some truth in Boland's and Amelz' assessment of the importance of the black list, both authors overlook, or underestimate, the difference of opinion between later *Darul Islam* leaders about the urgency of an armed rebellion. The confidence displayed by Hatta after his return from Aceh was in part due to a miscalculation of Daud Beureu'eh's position. The latter was regarded by Hatta as the leader of the discontented elements in the region, of which elements he believed him to be in full control. It is of course quite possible that Daud Beureu'eh was regarded by a large proportion of the Acehnese population as the only person suitable for and capable of leading a rising against the Central Government. It is also true, on the other hand, that

Daud Beureu'eh had considerable difficulty in restraining the die-hards impatient for action.

Thus the rebellion may well have been triggered off by over-hasty armed actions undertaken by agitated youths with the aim of stealing arms off the Police, thereby forcing the implementation of a plan devised in early 1953 whose realization had been postponed after the talks between Hatta and Daud Beureu'eh. The latter, realizing that he would be among the first to be arrested at the first sign of a rebellion, then was left with no alternative but to join and assume the leadership of the rebellion.

That Daud Beureu'eh indeed experienced difficulty in restraining the young radicals was revealed by Amelz, according to whom there were voices demanding quick action to be heard in the month preceding the outbreak of the rebellion. This plea for action by the young had been prompted by the increasingly tense situation as well as by the fear of possible repressive measures on the part of the Government (Sekitar n.d. I:262). The older leaders had succeeded in temporarily silencing these voices, however.

The theory that some of the leaders themselves were caught unawares by the outbreak of the rebellion would explain some of the developments of the first weeks following this. Although seemingly well prepared, with simultaneous attacks being launched on towns cities all over Aceh, there are some facts testifying to a definite lack of preparation of this event. At the time of the attack on the police station at Peureulak by *Darul Islam* troops led by Chazali Idris (Khazali Idris) on September 19th, which marked the actual start of the rebellion, Daud Beureu'eh was still in Banda Aceh. Other leaders had not yet returned from Medan, where they had been attending a national sports festival, moreover.

## 7. *The Rebellion*

During the first two weeks of the rebellion various towns and cities were attacked, including Banda Aceh. Plans for the attack of the latter came to the notice of the Police only on the day preceding the night in which the insurrection started (Alers 1956:271), namely that of September 19th. On the east coast the attacks were concentrated on the towns and cities located on the railroad from Banda Aceh, via Seulimeum in Greater Aceh, Sigli and Meureudu in Pidie, Bireuen and Lhokseumawe in North Aceh, and Idi, Peureulak and Langsa in East Aceh, to Medan.

The small police post of Peureulak, which was manned by about ten officers, was among the first to be attacked. Both the police station and the town of Peureulak were occupied by a rebel force commanded by Chazali Idris without encountering any resistance within two hours. Guards were stationed at strategic points and the *Darul Islam* flag was flown from important buildings in the town.<sup>19</sup> On that and the next few days also the nearby towns of Idi and Bayeuen were seized, again without any resistance being offered. The occupation of all of these towns was much facilitated by the support lent the rebels by a number of local civil servants. At Peureulak it was the assistant *wedana*, A.R. Hassan, and in Idi police inspector Aminuddin Ali, who assisted the rebels.<sup>20</sup>

After capturing Idi, Bayeuen and Peureulak and bringing all railway traffic to a standstill, the different rebel forces linked up to march on Langsa, the capital of East Aceh. Towards this end buses and private cars were confiscated for the transportation of troops. Up to that moment the rebels had met with very little opposition, and had disarmed local Police units without much trouble at all. For a short while it looked as though it might be possible also to take Langsa without a shot being fired. For the population of this town, in the absence of the *bupati* of East Aceh (who would have sided with the rebels anyway) and of the chief of Police, who were both of them still at Medan, was strongly in favour of surrender. Accordingly delegates were sent to Peureulak and to Bayeuen to sound out the rebels as to their intentions and to discuss the terms of surrender with them. These returned with the message that the *Darul Islam* troops in any case would march on Langsa to collect the arms of the Army and Police units stationed there. A stopper was put on these plans for surrender when the chief of Police returned from Medan and in turn imposed an ultimatum on the rebels to hand over their arms. *Darul Islam* troops approached Langsa from the west and the north and launched a concerted attack on the Military Police and Mobile Brigade barracks on September 21st. The Republican Army, supported by fresh troops from Medan, was able to repulse this attack. The defeat of the rebels at Langsa marked the turning-point in the fighting in East Aceh. On September 23rd Republican troops recaptured Bayeuen, and in the next two days Idi and Peureulak.

In North Aceh the regional capital of Lhokseumawe was violently attacked in vain a number of times, the first time on the morning of September 21st, when the rebels were obliged to

retreat after a battle of about four hours. They renewed their attack several times the next few days, but again without success, although at one point the situation became so critical that the evacuation of the civil population was contemplated. Another town in North Aceh, Bireuen, was occupied by them for a short time. So was Seulimeum in Greater Aceh, which was taken on September 21st. Upon the rebels' attacking it the Republican Police garrison offered no resistance.

In Pidie the rebels failed to take the capital, Sigli. They were more successful at Tangse, Geumpang and Meureudu, which latter town gave them a lot of trouble, however. It only fell after an assault by what may be described as the Acehnese *Darul Islam*'s crack troops, after its defenders ran out of ammunition, moreover. The troops occupying Meureudu comprised a unit of regular Republican Army soldiers originating from Aceh, commanded by Hasan Saleh, who at the outbreak of the rebellion had deserted and marched from Sidikalang in Tapanuli, where they had been stationed, back to North Aceh. Hasan Saleh himself had been sent on long furlough before the outbreak of the rebellion.

In Central Aceh the *Darul Islam* forces occupied Takengon. As at Meureudu, they were able to enter the town only after the Republican troops had run out of ammunition. Another town that fell was Tapak Tuan in South Aceh (Amin 1956:48–61; Keterangan Pemerintah 1953; Ariwiadi 1965:3–7).

The rebels did not accomplish a great deal by the occupation of these towns. Their leaders might have hoped that they were strong enough to drive the Republican Army out of at least a major part of the territory of Aceh and to repulse any counter-attacks, but this proved an over-estimation of the strength of the *Darul Islam* forces. They were not able to hold the towns and cities they had taken for very long. A counter-offensive by Republican Government troops drove the *Darul Islam* troops out of them with obvious ease. Some towns were reoccupied within days. Others held out longer. With the fall of Takengon, Tangse and Geumpang at the end of November, however, the rebels were definitively dislodged from the urban areas. They retreated to the countryside, where, notably in the *kabupatens* along the north coast, they put up a fierce resistance.

The government officials showed themselves extremely pleased at the speedy success of the first military actions. So S.M. Amin (1953:4), who was soon thereafter to be appointed governor of North Sumatra, stated that from a military point of view the

rebellion was over and that all that remained for the Government to do was to launch a pacification campaign. Even so, it must have been obvious at the same time, in the light of the situation in West Java, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, that pacification was no easy matter. This was certainly realized by the commander of the *Bukit Barisan* Division of North Sumatra, Colonel Maludin Simbolon, who from the start expressed the opinion that the situation was and continued to be very grave and that the rebels would be impossible to subdue by military means alone (Sekitar n.d. I:37; ANP-Aneta 1954:126).

The outbreak of the rebellion had moreover made the administration of the area very difficult for the Republican Government, and had seriously disrupted the functioning of the regional government and economy. In the former it was the departments harbouring the most PUSA sympathizers which suffered most, owing to the defection of their personnel. Amin, in a tentative assessment of the situation (1953:7), estimated that about seventy per cent of the employees of the Regional Government Departments of Religion, Social Affairs, and Information had left their jobs and joined the rebels. The Department of Education had to cope with a different though equally serious problem, namely that a large proportion of the teachers had fled to Medan or had been evacuated. For the first few months of the rebellion they refused to return to Aceh, saying that they would rather be dismissed (Amin 1953:8). There were similar problems in the local administration. A number of *bupatis*, as we have seen, had sided with the rebels. The situation at a lower level was worse still. Many of the lowest-level administrators, the *keuchiks* and the *imeums* (heads) of the *mukims*, had gone over to the rebels.<sup>21</sup> Worst affected by this was Pidie, where the *bupati*, all three *wedanas*, all but one of the twenty *camats*, and 99 of the 188 *imeums* changed their allegiance (ANP-Aneta 1954:106). As in other areas affected by *Darul Islam* risings, it was the lowest officials who felt the impact of the rebellion most directly. The exercise of their function in areas where *Darul Islam* influence was strong was outright dangerous. So it is not surprising that the Republican Government, in its efforts to build up its local administration again, had difficulty in finding people prepared to represent it on the village level. Although it succeeded in filling vacancies and replacing officials whose loyalty was under suspicion in the higher administrative echelons, it failed to find enough loyal candidates for these lower positions. By April 1954 the Republican Government had succeeded in building up its

administration again from the *camat* level upwards, i.e. in the relatively safe urban areas. Even so, a parliamentary commission visiting Aceh in early 1954 was obliged to report that the newly appointed *bupatis*, *wedanas* and *camats* in Greater Aceh and Pidie were still not able to make inspection tours in their areas and were only safe in the towns and in places where Republican troops were stationed. Some *camats* had to be conveyed to their posts under armed escort in the mornings and taken back to the city in the same way at night (ANP-Aneta 1954:107). At the same time twenty per cent of the functions of *imeum mukim* and *keuchik* were still vacant (Pendapat pemerintah 1954:2). In a number of villages, moreover, the Republican *imeum mukim* and *keuchik* were also secretly working for the rebels.

Economically the region suffered greatly from the disruption of traffic. Many parts of Aceh showed the at that time very familiar scene of ruined bridges and impassable roads. Sometimes road travel was only possible under convoy. In other cases the permission of local *Darul Islam* troops was required, which was usually received only after payment of a fee. This applied not only to private travel but also to bus and truck traffic. Some entrepreneurs in fact paid the rebels regular sums of money just to be able to continue operating.<sup>22</sup> The railways also experienced difficulties. Apart from the hazard of train hold-ups, there were frequent damages to rail-tracks and stations. For a number of years it was impossible to have trains run to schedule, especially in Pidie (Keterangan pemerintah 1954:11; Gelanggang 1956:113–115; Junus 1955:3). The safest way to travel was by boat, but the shipping facilities were far from sufficient to compensate for the decrease in land transport facilities (Amin 1953:8).

Initially the rebellion does not seem to have brought about any sudden shortage of food or drop in the productivity of the agricultural estates. There were some alarming reports circulating about the negative effects of the rebellion on the estate economy, such as that labourers had fled in large numbers and that the agricultural work and administration of the plantations had suffered badly. Foreign personnel were advised to evacuate the estates, while in some cases in addition the Indonesian management fled to join the rebels. There was one report of Said Abubakar, who had leased an estate at Langsa, having disappeared, taking with him Rp. 300,000.— in wages. In the East Acehnese oil-fields furthermore, the entire management, including general manager Amir Husin al Mudjahid, disappeared.



According to official government sources all this did not affect productivity, however. The oil fields were still functioning normally (which meant very poorly), while estate yields had even increased by 15 per cent, so Amin noted (Keterangan pemerintah 1953:110; Amin 1953:10).

The problem which caused the government the most headaches at the time, apart from the military actions themselves, was that of the care and accommodation of prisoners. By the end of March 1954 a total of 4,666 persons had been arrested. The capacity of the existing prisons was far from sufficient to cope with this huge number, and schools and other public buildings had to be converted into internment camps. Even then there was not enough room and prisoners had to be taken to places outside Aceh (Pendapat pemerintah 1954:4–5). By this latter means the Republican Government also hoped to speed up the interrogation of prisoners, there being an insufficient number of qualified personnel for this in Aceh, but the measure failed to have the required result. The prisons and camps in Aceh continued to be filled to overflowing and the interrogation of prisoners to be an extremely slow process. When the interrogations got really underway, most of the prisoners proved to be innocent and to have been arrested on only the slightest of suspicions. By 1956 all but about 400 were released again (Amin 1956:130–132).

### 8. *The Islamic State of Aceh*

At the outbreak of the rebellion Daud Beureu'eh issued a proclamation in which, in the name of the Islamic community of Aceh, he declared Aceh and surrounding areas part of the Islamic State of Indonesia. He justified the proclamation and the repudiation of the Indonesian Republic by arguing that the Republican leaders in Jakarta had deviated from the right course. The Republic had not developed into a state based upon Islam, in his eyes the only possible implication of the principle of Belief in the One and Only God, the first pillar of the *Pancasila*. On the contrary, it had become increasingly clear to him that the Republican politicians were moving further and further away from this ideal. By this he was alluding to the attempts to place greater emphasis on another *Pancasila* pillar: Indonesian nationalism, which he had discerned. Hereby he picked out some of the main elements of Soekarno's ill-fated speech at Amuntai. Taking up Soekarno's statement that he gave preference to a national state from fear lest, in the event of the creation of an Islamic State, some regions

break away from it, Daud Beureu'eh posited that Aceh had taken the lead in breaking away from a state that was based only on nationalism. His words testify that, for some at least, the difference between a religious or Islamic and a national state was no longer a matter of terminology but had developed into an important factual opposition. Daud Beureu'eh claimed that the people of Aceh understood the real meaning of the words "religion" and "nationalism", and that anyone who believed that religious people did not love their country probably misunderstood Islam. He further asserted that the Indonesian Republic did not, in fact, guarantee freedom of religion in the true sense of the word. It did not accept the fact of Islam's non-differentiation between the religious and the secular fields or the Muslim view that Islamic principles should be applied in all spheres of life. If there existed real freedom of religion, then Islamic law would be operative in Aceh, considering that one hundred per cent of the population of Aceh were Muslims. In this sort of situation it would be absolutely impossible for the Attorney General to prohibit sermons with a political content, he claimed, as politics and religion were indistinguishable.

Another point on which Daud Beureu'eh attacked the Central Government was that it had never acceded to any of Aceh's requests and that it now regarded Aceh, which during the revolution had been the Republic's "capital" area, as a wayward region.<sup>23</sup> Nor had it made any concessions to Aceh's pleas for autonomy, then still conceived within the framework of the Republic. Daud Beureu'eh wondered why a debate on this had had to await the formation of the Constituent Assembly, and whether this was perhaps because the Government and Central Parliament only wanted to shelve the issue. That the latter were capable of speedy action had been demonstrated at the time of the conversion of the federal United States of Indonesia into the unitary Indonesian Republic. Daud Beureu'eh underlined the fact that the people of Aceh had patiently waited for the formation of the Constituent Assembly for years, but that the Government and Parliament had not realized this and had now even decided to postpone the general elections. He expressed the supposition that perhaps the government put its own interests before those of the people. He further wondered if the government might possibly be giving more help and encouragement to the small group of believers in the One and Only God of another creed, or to people who did not believe in God at all, in flagrant contempt of the ideas and wishes of the majority.

The people of Aceh did not want to become separated from their brothers, Daud Beureu'eh stressed, but neither did they want to be treated like a stepchild. In this connection he pointed to the lack of good educational facilities and job opportunities for the children of Aceh, while the absence of a satisfactory transport system was hampering people in their economic activities.

His proclamation of the Islamic State of Aceh did not mean that a state within a state had been created, he added. In the past the Indonesian Republic had been regarded as a golden bridge towards the realization of an ideal of the state that had been cherished from the beginning. Now, however, the bridge was no longer looked upon as a means of communication, but rather as an obstacle. Loyalty to the Republic, based as it was on nationalism, had disappeared, while further the people no longer felt themselves united by a common legal system.

In response to the claims that the proclamation of the Islamic State would give rise to chaos and was in conflict with the law, Daud Beureu'eh asserted that on the contrary, the prevailing legal chaos had provoked the rebellion. He advised the Republican leaders not to use violence, but to tackle the crux of the matter and correct the foundations of their state as well as rectify their policies (Gelanggang 1956:45–51).

In other statements the rebellion was characterized as a movement to free Aceh from Javanese colonialism. Here the leaders in Jakarta were depicted as infidels out after the destruction of Islam, e.g. through reforms of the educational system. They were further branded as corrupt administrators, appointing their own friends to positions of importance, and allegedly firing or retiring at will anyone who did not belong to their circle, "because their health was not one hundred per cent, because they had no education, there was something wrong with their appearance, in short, for a thousand and one reasons" (cited by Amin 1956:88). This latter quotation testifies, incidentally, that the Central Government's policy of applying fixed standards for admission to the Civil Service and Army aroused strong resentment in Aceh as well.

The Republican leaders in Jakarta were accused of trying to promote the interests of Java and the Javanese. Much was made of their alleged Hinduist background. In April 1954, for instance, Daud Beureu'eh described the Republican Government as a Hinduistic one clothed in a nationalistic jacket which very closely resembled Communism (Gelanggang 1956:54). Its chief desire, in

the eyes of the Acehnese rebels, was to bring back the time of the Javanese empire of Majapahit in its hey-day. It was allegedly bent on disseminating its ideas through the medium of the laws, ordinances, etc., issued by the Indonesian Republic, which all breathed a spirit of Hinduism. The PNI and a number of smaller parties were accused of being instrumental in these efforts. For these parties all emphasized the *Pancasila* pillar of Indonesian nationalism as a political cover for their attempts to further Hinduism. Many Muslims had reportedly fallen into the trap and had supported individuals who were actually bent on the destruction of Islam.

Besides identifying the Javanese Muslims with Hinduism, these statements expressed fear at and lashed out against the advance of Communism. The change of government of July 1953 was interpreted as a clear sign of the growing influence of Communism in the political sphere. This change had involved the replacement of the Wilopo Cabinet, supported by *Masyumi* and the PNI, by the first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, which included no *Masyumi* ministers and had PKI's support in Parliament. The change was indicated as one of the immediate causes of the rebellion. With the *Masyumi* being forced into the opposition, the government had fallen into the hands of the enemies of Islam.

The rebellion was further represented to the people of Aceh as a continuation of their pre-war resistance to Dutch colonialism and their struggle for independence. The Indonesian Republic was explicitly stated to have forfeited the right to act in the name of the proclamation of independence. Not only had it failed to give Islam its due place in society, but worse still, it was actually a Dutch product. In the tradition of the other rebellious movements it was dubbed the "Round Table Conference Republic". The true heir of the August 1945 proclamation was the Islamic State of Indonesia, which had taken over the struggle for independence after the Indonesian Republic had ceased to exist as a result of the arrest of its Government by the Dutch in December 1948 (Amin 1956:87–94; Gelanggang 1956:33–34).

In putting forward the latter argument, the leaders of the rebellion had some difficulty in explaining why they had joined the Islamic State of Indonesia only now and not from its inception in 1949. Hence the emphasis on the postponement of the general elections and on the change in government. Although the people of Aceh had continued to hope and had patiently awaited the granting of their requests by Jakarta, these two incidents had been the last straw.

Initially Aceh was envisaged as a province of the Islamic State of Indonesia with wide autonomy. Head of this province was Daud Beureu'eh, who, as during the struggle for independence, fulfilled the function of civil and military governor and in this capacity was also commander of the Fifth Territorial Division of the Islamic Army of Indonesia, the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division, and representative of the Central Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia. In civil matters he was assisted by an Administrative Council, called *Dewan Syura*, alongside which the formation of a Parliament, the *Majlis Syura*, was announced.<sup>24</sup> In military matters he was assisted by a Military Council, the *Dewan Militer*, which was made up of three persons: Daud Beureu'eh himself, Amir Husin al Mudjahid, as vice-chairman of the *Dewan Syura*, and Husin Jusuf, as Chief of Staff of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division. At the lower levels, those of the *kabupatens* and the *kecamatanans*, military and civil affairs for the time being remained separated, in principle at least. The commanders of local army units did not necessarily have to be the heads of the Civil Administration, and vice versa.

Within the next two years the administrative structure was changed twice. The first adjustments were made upon the rebels' recovery from the shock sustained as a result of the failure of the plan to occupy the towns and cities and the driving back of the *Darul Islam* forces into the forests. They were prompted by the realization that the strategy had to be changed from one of frontal attacks on Republican troops to one of guerilla warfare, and the awareness that the number of people who in one way or another assisted the enemy was increasing day by day (Pendjelasan penting Komando Tentara Islam Indonesia Terr. V Divisi Teungku Tjhik Ditiro 5-4-1954).

For the sake of waging a more effective guerilla war, the Military and Civil Administrations were brought together into the one hand through the institution of *Komandemens*. There was such a command for Aceh as a whole as well as for each of the *kabupatens* (divided into a number of subcommands) and *kecamatanans*. The commander of the relevant military unit became the first commander of the *Komandemen*, and his Chief of Staff its Chief of Staff. The heads of the Civil Administration, the *bupati* or *camat* (and in the case of the *kabupaten* sub-commands the *wedana*), were made second commanders. These three functionaries, of whom the first commander was the supreme head, thus constituted the executive of each *Komandemen*.<sup>25</sup>

These changes further strengthened Daud Beureu'eh's position,

as he now headed both the Civil and the Military Administration. For the Command of Aceh as a whole this meant that he was almost the entire executive committee. Moreover, the *Dewan Syura*, *Majlis Syura* and *Dewan Militer* were declared “passive”, while the *Komandemen* was given legislative powers. Admittedly, it was decreed at the same time that all decisions of a legislative nature should be discussed with a newly instituted consultative body. This body, however, was made up of the *Komandemen*’s executive, supplemented with the heads of the government agencies of the region concerned – who all belonged to the *Komandemen* staff and were subordinate to its first commander – and at most three outsiders, usually religious leaders (Gelanggang 1956:63–71; Amin 1956:72).

To effectuate the changes, the structure of the Islamic Army of Aceh had to be changed as well. Originally the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division was made up of five regiments, each divided into a number of battalions. As early as the end of 1953 these regiments were styled bases (*pangkalan*), and were supposed in theory at least to comprise both mobile and territorial troops (Buku 1956:9), the latter being made up for the greater part of local people armed with machetes and knives and the like. Now, in June 1954, the division was redivided into six regiments, one for each *kabupaten*. Later on a seventh regiment, the *Tharmihim* Regiment, was formed, to carry out guerilla operations in East Sumatra.<sup>26</sup>

Further changes were introduced in September of the next year, when the rebels held a conference at Batèë Kurèng, in Greater Aceh. This conference was attended by ninety people, of whom two represented East Sumatra. It was organized a few months after Daud Beureu’eh’s appointment by Kartosuwirjo as Vice-President of the Islamic State of Indonesia in January 1955. Other people from Aceh besides had been included in the new all-Indonesian Cabinet of the Islamic State of Indonesia. So Al Murthadla (Amir Husin al Mudjahid) was appointed Second Deputy Minister of Defence, Hasan Aly Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Teungku Nja’ Tjut (Nya’ Cut) Minister of Education. At the Batèë Kurèng conference the position of Aceh within the Islamic State of Indonesia and the region’s administrative structure were discussed. Originally Daud Beureu’eh had intended conferring only with his closest advisors, the members of the consultative body of the Aceh *Komandemen*, about the area’s relations with the Islamic State of Indonesia and the Indonesian Republic. He advocated the creation of a separate state of Aceh,

still within the framework of a (federal) Islamic State. The actual presence at Batèë Kurëng of a larger number of *Darul Islam* leaders in connection with the plans for celebrating the second anniversary of the proclamation of 1953 forced Daud Beureu'eh to convene a larger meeting. At this second meeting the leaders agreed on the formation of a separate state, though some, such as T.A. Hasan, did so with a certain reluctance. In return they pushed through their wishes for a more democratic structure of this state, in which the civil administration was again to be free from military supervision and in which a parliament would be formed. The conference culminated in the Batèë Kurëng Charter, whereby the status of Aceh was changed from that of a province to a state within the Islamic State of Indonesia.

The Charter, which served as a kind of provisional constitution, again provided for a separation of the executive and legislative powers. The Head of State, or *Wali Negara*, who was to be elected by the people of Aceh, was to be the head of the executive. For the time being Daud Beureu'eh was designated as such by the delegates, however (par. 3). He was assisted in his function by a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister. The Cabinet and ministers were to be accountable to the Head of State (par. 4). In this Charter the *Majlis Syura* made its reappearance. Although the members of this parliament were to be elected by the people, for the time being they would be appointed by the Head of State (par. 5). The *Majlis Syura* as agreed upon at Batèë Kurëng was to consist of a Chairman (Amir Husin al Mudjahid), two vice-chairmen and sixty-one members.<sup>27</sup> No special provisions were made as regards the term of office of its members or its powers. Besides the *Majlis Syura*, the *Majlis Ifta*, a council for the deliverance of *fatwas* to be headed by Teungku Hasbullah Indrapuri, was created. On the subject of the relation of the area to the Central Government of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the Batèë Kurëng Charter stated that the Acehnese State was to conduct its own affairs except in matters of foreign policy, defence and economic policy (par. 6). At the same time it emphasized that as long as the Islamic State of Indonesia was at war and went on fighting in the defence of Islam, the units of the Islamic Army of Indonesia operating in Aceh were to remain an instrument of the Acehnese State, as were the Police Force and *lasykars* (par. 8). In the newly created Cabinet, which was headed by Hasan Aly as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Husin Jusuf occupied the function of Minister of Security, and T.A. Hasan held the portfolios of Finance and Health, while T.M. Amin was appointed

Minister of Economic Affairs and Welfare, Zainul Abidin Muhammad Tiro of Justice, M. Ali Kasim of Education, and Abdul Gani Mutiara of Information.<sup>28</sup>

The new Cabinet drafted a nine-point programme in which it undertook to re-organize and improve the Civil Administration, the Army and the Police Force, and to ameliorate the social conditions of its civil and military personnel, as well as of the population at large. Steps in this direction had already been taken through the foundation of a Military Academy in East Aceh and the establishment of hospitals.<sup>29</sup> The new Cabinet further pledged in its programme to expand the judiciary, which was explicitly stated in the Batèë Kurëng Charter to form a power apart. But, as in the case of the Civil Administration, it made the reservation that in concrete realization the fact that the country was still in a state of (guerilla) war would have to be taken into account (Gelanggang 1956:202–207; Amin 1956:72; Meuraxa 1956:49–57; PR 4-1-1956).

The Cabinet lacked a Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Charter leaving foreign affairs to the Central Government. Still, just as it had its own defence policy, so Aceh maintained its own foreign relations. In this respect it was much more fortunate than any of the other *Darul Islam* areas. Partly this was the result of its proximity to the Malaysian Peninsula, which facilitated the smuggling of arms and other goods and money, as well as the maintenance of close relations with representatives and sympathizers on the opposite coast. From time to time rumours circulated that Daud Beureu'eh had crossed the Straits to enlist Malaysian support. Moreover, Said Abubakar was frequently mentioned as being in Penang or Singapore to solicit financial aid or even to establish contact with the Communist rebels in Malaysia (Sekitar n.d. III:127–128).<sup>30</sup> Most active in enlisting foreign support for the Islamic State of Indonesia, and later on for the United Republic of Indonesia, however, was Hasan Muhammad Tiro, a brother of Minister of Justice Zainul Abidin Tiro.

Hasan Muhammad Tiro, described by an American journalist as “intelligent, well educated, well informed, and endowed with a seldom met combination of charm and firmness” (Burham 1961), was born at the village Tiro, near Lammeulo in Pidie. In the Dutch period he was one of Daud Beureu'eh's pupils at the *Blang Paseh madrasah* in Sigli, while during the Japanese occupation he studied at the *Perguruan Normal Islam*, where he became a “favourite” of Said Abubakar. After the proclamation of



independence he went to Yogyakarta to study at the Faculty of Law of the *Universitas Islam Indonesia*.

He returned to Aceh for a short while to work for the Emergency Government of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Back in Yogyakarta, he became one of the two students of the *Universitas Islam Indonesia* who in 1950 received a grant to continue their studies at Columbia University. In the United States Hasan Muhammad Tiro worked with the Department of Information of the Indonesian United Nations Delegation for a time (BI 13-1-1950, IB 11-9-1954).

In the second half of 1954 he caused the Republican Government considerable embarrassment. Styling himself “Plenipotentiary Minister” and “Ambassador to the United Nations and United States” of the Islamic Republic of Indonesia, as he called the Islamic State, he sent an ultimatum to Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in early September of that year. In this he accused the “communist-fascist” government of leading the Indonesian nation to the brink of economic and political collapse, poverty, dissension and civil war, and of committing aggression against the people of Aceh, West Java, Central Java, South and Central Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and further of pursuing a policy of *divide et impera* and colonialism, and of stirring up the various ethnic and religious groups against each other. He asked Ali Sastroamidjojo whether perhaps a new age of colonialism had set in in which only the Communists reaped the fruits of independence, while the rest would simply be killed off. He then demanded that the Ali Sastroamidjojo Government cease its aggressive policies, release its political prisoners, and start negotiations with the *Darul Islam* rebels. If not, then he personally would take a number of measures. For instance, he would open embassies all over the world – in the United States, Europe, Asia, and all the Islamic countries, as well as at the United Nations – and expose the Republican Government’s savagery and cruelty and its violation of Human Rights in Aceh before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and ask the latter to send a Committee of Inquiry to Aceh. Let the international forum be informed, he said, of the most vicious acts of cruelty committed in the world since the times of Genghis Khan and Hulagu (the latter’s grandson, who ruled Iran from 1251–1265).

Other steps Hasan Muhammad Tiro was contemplating were to bring a charge of genocide against the Republican Government before the United Nations, to inform the Islamic world of the cruelty committed against religious scholars in Aceh, West and

Central Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi and to fight for international recognition of and moral and material support for the Islamic Republic of Indonesia. He moreover announced that if the Republican Government failed to satisfy his demands, he would try and effect an international diplomatic and economic boycott of the Republic, as well as discontinuation of the aid provided it through the Colombo Plan or by the United Nations and the United States (PR 7-9-1954; Sekitar n.d. III:445-447).

The Republican Government brushed Hasan Mohammad Tiro's demands aside and gave him till September 22nd to return to Indonesia. When he disobeyed the order, his passport was withdrawn. Hasan Muhammad Tiro was thereupon taken into custody by the American Immigration Service and detained at Ellis Island. He was released again after paying a bail of US\$ 500.--. He retaliated by publishing a letter in the New York Times drawing attention to the advance of Communism in Indonesia since the Ali Sastroamidjojo Government had come into power, and by submitting to the United Nations a report on "Violations of Human Rights by the Sastroamidjojo regime in Indonesia".

The Republican Government was unable to silence Muhammad Hasan Tiro, or to get him extradited from the United States. Hasan Muhammad Tiro thus was able to continue his anti-Republican propaganda campaign in New York. Early in 1955 he sent letters to twelve Islamic countries asking them to boycott the Afro-Asian Conference, a Republican Government show-piece, which was to be held in Bandung in April. In justification of his request he claimed that Islamic leaders and their followers, except for those who bowed to the Communists, were being persecuted and killed by the Army and Police of the "communist-dominated" Ali Sastroamidjojo Government (Sekitar n.d. III:443-488; PR 18-9-1954, 30-9-1954, 9-2-1955).

### 9. *Conflicts and Negotiations*

Immediately following Daud Beureu'eh's proclamation of the rebellion the governor of North Sumatra applied to the Central Government for military assistance. His request was promptly granted, and troops from Central Sumatra and the remainder of North Sumatra were brought into action. Later on units of the Central Javanese *Diponegoro* Division were also ordered to Aceh. The Government was determined to deal with the situation with firmness and to quash the rebellion quickly. As it was put by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo: "When the house is on fire,

put the fire out without stopping to ask questions” (Sjamsuddin 1975:63). Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for the security operations continued to lie with the civil authorities. This was because of the special character of the region, and more particularly in view of the strength of Islam, as Ali Sastroamidjojo explained in Parliament in 1955. No martial law, whereby the military would take charge, was declared. The Government moreover promised from the start of the rebellion to study the question of autonomy for Aceh and to give more attention to the area’s economic development. The Government, in framing its policy, had to consider on the one hand the PNI and PKI demands for stronger military action, and on the other hand the voices pressing for negotiations and for giving in to some of the rebels’ demands.

Proponents of both views were to be found in Jakarta as well as in Aceh. Some political parties and organizations in Aceh urged the Government not to discuss any of the rebels’ demands until order was restored. In addition a number of Islamic scholars deplored the rebellion and branded it as prohibited by Islam and in conflict with Islamic law (Amin 1956:106-107; Sekitar n.d. III:17). These denunciations by Islamic scholars reached their peak in early 1955, when two of them, Teungku Haji Sani and Teungku Haji Ismail, founded the *Gerakan Keamanan Rakyat Muslimin Daerah Aceh* (Peace Movement of the Muslim People of Aceh). In leaflets dropped by plane over Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe they explicitly denied that Islam advocated insubordination against the legitimate government, however despotic that government might be. And they pointed out, appealing to the Indonesian translation of *Basic concepts of the Islamic State* by the Pakistani author Khalif Abdul Hakim, that if one did not succeed in defending one’s basic human rights by peaceful means, then the only course left open to one was *hijrah*. They further tried to convince the population that the Republican Government guaranteed all its citizens freedom of religion and attacked Hasan Muhammad Tiro for his activities at the United Nations (*Gerakan Keamanan Rakjat Muslimin Daerah Atjeh*, *Siaran Kilat* no. 1, 2, 3 and 4). The Movement’s campaign backfired, however. There were strong suspicions that it was actively supported by the Central Government, while some strict Muslims took offence at leaflets with Koranic texts written on them ending up in the gutter, seeing in this an insult to Islam (Sekitar n.d. III:193-200).

Those people in favour of negotiations also organized themselves. In Aceh they instituted a *Badan Kontak Pribadi Peristiwa*

*Aceh* (Private Contact Committee in the Aceh Affair) for the purpose of keeping in touch with the rebels and transmitting the latter's grievances to the Central Government, on the initiative of a leading merchant, D.M. Djuned (D.M. Juned), in November 1953.<sup>31</sup>

In Jakarta there was a strong pro-rebel lobby centered around the Members of Parliament Amelz, a former PSII member now acting independently, and Nur el Ibrahimy, a member of *Masyumi* and ex-secretary of PUSA, to plead their case. They were in general supported by the *Masyumi* politicians, who also urged the Government not to try to solve the situation through military measures alone, but to seek a political solution and remove some of the causes prompting the rebels to take up arms. The Government thus was advised to carefully investigate the pros and cons of granting Aceh some form of regional autonomy, and even of giving it the status of a special region.

Because this latter was a question bearing upon the second of the Indonesian Republic's major constitutional problems, that of whether the Indonesian state structure should be unitary or federal, it had extremely wide implications. Those in favour of granting Aceh greater autonomy were the same parties and groups that advocated a federal state structure or greater decentralization. They included not only the *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI) but also a party with a regional basis like the *Serikat Kerakyatan Indonesia* (SKI), or Indonesian People's Association, of South Kalimantan. Together they formed a group capable of rallying considerable support. This became clear in February 1954, when a parliamentary commission which had visited Aceh the previous month submitted its resultant report. This report extensively quoted the Acehnese Islamic scholars whom the members of the commission had talked to. Among the recommendations made by these scholars the report mentioned that for the adoption by the Government, with a view to the ideal of an Islamic State in Aceh, of part of the Islamic law, for instance the civil law, and so forbid everything that was in conflict with this law, such as gambling, dancing, and the sale of liquor. The report moreover quoted the Islamic scholars as being of the opinion that the Central Government should send a mission to Aceh to meet Daud Beureu'eh, and should pay attention to the demands for autonomy of many Acehnese (ANP-Aneta 1954:113-114).<sup>32</sup>

The commission remained completely impartial in its report, contenting itself with simply quoting the views put forward by

people in Aceh. However, its members, on their way back to Jakarta, had formulated a proposal of their own urging the Government to change the administrative subdivision of Indonesia and to make Aceh one of the nineteen (new) autonomous provinces of Indonesia (Sekitar n.d. III:14-15).<sup>33</sup> Because the Government needed more time and had already started making preparations for a new provincial division the proposal was not tabled.

Nevertheless, during the discussion of the report another proposal was submitted, this time by a group of members of parliament headed by Djuir Muhammad (Juir Muhammad) of the PSI.<sup>34</sup> It cited Aceh as an illustration par excellence of the artificial way in which provinces had been created in the past, and argued that the only way of solving the problems in Aceh was by granting it autonomy (Sekitar n.d. III:2-4).

In the subsequent debate representatives of the PNI and PKI, both of which had their largest followings in Java, rejected the proposal. They argued that the ordinary people in Aceh had not expressed themselves in favour of autonomy, and that it was not the question of autonomy but the ideal of the Islamic State that was behind the rebellion. The Government for its part rejoined that the proposal was superfluous as it was already preparing a provincial redivision of Indonesia and in this connection was considering granting Aceh the status of a province (Sekitar n.d. III:14-54). In the end the proposal was shelved, as it turned out indefinitely, awaiting the results of the debates on a bill on regional administration introduced by the Government which had just begun. There continued to be great dissatisfaction at the Government's policy and its inability to subdue the various rebellions successfully. The Government's security policy thus remained under attack, prompting Jusuf Wibisono of the *Masyumi* party, for instance, to bring a motion of no-confidence against the Government. This motion, which was defeated with the slight majority of 115 against versus 92 for at the end of 1954, kept the controversy over Aceh alive.

The Government was criticized for the continuing insecurity of Aceh as well as for the misconduct of its troops there. Although military actions initiated by it had had some success, the situation was still far from satisfactory. The effects of the operations of the Republican Army and the Mobile Brigade had been such that by mid-1954 almost half of Aceh was safe enough for the military assistance to be withdrawn, leaving the maintenance of law and order to the regional Police Force. Only in the *kabu-*

*patens* of Greater Aceh (where the rebels were operating within a few miles of Banda Aceh), Pidie (where Daud Beureu'eh had established the centre of his civil and military administration), North Aceh and the region of Takengon in Central Aceh – the areas in which the rebels were strongest – was military aid continued.

In these latter areas the *Darul Islam* remained extremely active. In the villages under its control here it imposed taxes – in some cases also on schoolteachers and officials of the Republican Government whom it continued in office –, registered marriages and divorces, and generally administered the law, adjudicating routine criminal cases and cases involving the violation of Islamic law, such as the breaking of the fast, and sometimes also passing sentences on waverers unable to make up their minds as to whether to side with the Islamic State or with the Republic (Soeyatno 1977:71; Sekitar n.d. III:103).

From their positions in the mountains and forests the rebels continued harassing traffic and attacking army patrols and outposts, operating in groups of sometimes a few hundred. Occasionally they also launched attacks on towns and cities. On the visit to Aceh of the parliamentary commission in January 1954 several exchanges of fire were noted by its members just outside Banda Aceh and Sigli. During the commission's stay in Banda Aceh the rebels threw incendiary bombs and tried to start fires in the town (ANP-Aneta 1954:105). On August 17th, 1954, furthermore, *Darul Islam* troops entered and occupied Lamno, holding the town for two days. Around the same time they attacked Seulimeum, also in Greater Aceh. The next year the rebels tried to enter Idi and moreover fired on Sigli. The attack on Idi was one indication that these other parts of Aceh, too, still had to reckon with *Darul Islam* activities, which after 1954 became more frequent again. In West, Central and East Aceh as well – which areas the Republican Government considered to be relatively safe – the *Darul Islam* became more active, as a consequence partly of resentment at the behaviour of Republican troops and partly of Islamic Army troop movements.

In early 1955 Hasan Saleh moved from Pidie to West Aceh. After leaving his brother Ibrahim Saleh in command there, he then proceeded to East Aceh, with as ultimate destination Tapanuli in East Sumatra. In East Aceh his troops were reinforced by units commanded by Banda Chairullah (Banda Khairullah), who also came from Pidie. Other troops from Pidie, commanded by A.G. Mutiari, marched in West Aceh (Sekitar n.d. III:130, 132).

The *Darul Islam* in Aceh now also tried, more than ever before, to harm the Republican Government economically. It not only continued its attempts to disrupt communications, but also began to direct attacks at plantations and industrial plants. In Central Aceh a number of resin estates were attacked and set on fire. In East Aceh the oil-fields became a target of rebel attacks. The guerillas scored one of their biggest successes in March 1955, when they attacked the harbour of Kuala Langsa, setting fire to all the warehouses (only that of the Dutch KPM was mysteriously spared), and inflicting considerable damage (Gelanggang 1956:115-119; Sekitar n.d. III:121-122; Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:37).

The Republican Army had the greatest difficulty in suppressing the guerillas' activities. As late as 1956 the Military Command of North Sumatra was obliged to admit that the morale of the rebel army – whose strength was estimated at 1,400 – was high, and that the enemy had supporters and sympathizers in almost every village. In Aceh, it stated, the one major condition for waging a successful guerilla war was met, namely the support of the local population. Even people who at first had been opposed to the Islamic State of Indonesia, or had been neutral, had been won over to the rebels' cause by the propaganda made by them.

The Army Command admitted that the misconduct of its own soldiers had contributed to this success of the *Darul Islam* propaganda (Buku 1956:12-13, 46). Soldiers from outside the region – Batak, Minangkabau and Javanese – had sometimes gravely offended the Acehnese by their conduct. To remedy this the Army issued instructions to its personnel on the correct treatment of the local population, giving them information on Acehnese society as well as advice on how to behave in this society. So it warned them against entering mosques wearing shoes and against gambling and drinking alcoholic beverages, exhorting them to respect local custom. In this connection it informed them on the proper conduct vis-à-vis Acehnese women, advising them, if they wished to marry a local girl, to approach her parents and relatives and become acquainted with the relevant rules first (Buku 1956:54-63).

The conflicts that occurred did not stem exclusively from sheer ignorance, however. There were also instances of deliberately offensive behaviour, as well as cases of alleged torture and murderous assault. A number of accusations were in fact lodged against the Republican Army for alleged war crimes and misconduct, and as early as February 1954 the *Masyumi* Member of

Parliament Mohammad Nur el Ibrahimy proposed the institution of a parliamentary commission to inquire into what he called the cruel and arbitrary behaviour of Republican soldiers (ANP-Aneta 1954:124). Some cases involved violations of the (strict) moral rules of the region. In early 1955, for instance, some Minangkabau soldiers entered a village near Banda Aceh and ordered all the women to assemble, whereupon they lowered their trousers, exhibiting their private parts, and asked the women if they were not as fine as those of Acehnese men. On another occasion some Acehnese prisoners of war were forced to compare their genitals with those of Republican soldiers to show them that there was no difference, and that the latter, too, were circumcised and hence should not be branded infidels (Gelanggang 1956:94, 103).

Other incidents involved looting by Republican troops, the burning down of houses abandoned by their occupants on suspicion that the latter had gone over to the rebels, and the killing and torturing of prisoners and of innocent villagers (Gelanggang 1956:81-112).

Reportedly the two most serious of these incidents took place at Cot Jeumpa and Pulot Leupung, two villages near Banda Aceh in Greater Aceh, an area which was considered safe by the Republican troops, in February 1955. The two incidents were exposed by the newspaper *Peristiwa* which was published in Banda Aceh. According to the *Peristiwa* report, Republican troops on February 26th had taken all the inhabitants of Cot Jeumpa prisoner and shot them dead. A similar incident had occurred at nearby Pulot Leupung two days later. *Peristiwa* alleged that in the two incidents about one hundred people in all had been killed, including children. The version put forward by the Army was different, however. Not denying the high number of deaths, it tried to justify these by saying that the victims had all fallen in battle. A few days before the incidents, the Army spokesmen explained, shots had been fired at an army truck on a brigade near Cot Jeumpa. One of the bullets had hit the petrol tank, setting the truck ablaze, as a result of which fifteen Republican soldiers had burnt to death. The ambush had been laid by one Pawang Leman, an ex-major of the revolution and a former local *camat*. Information gathered by the Republican Army had shown that the local population on the fateful day had turned all traffic – with the exception of the army truck – back on the pretext that the bridge was broken. Pawang Leman, according to the same source, had incited the population to start a holy war. The Republican commander had subsequently decided to act on this



information, and sent a patrol to Cot Jeumpa. Here it had been shot at and attacked by *Darul Islam* troops (by which was meant the local population) armed with machetes and knives. Likewise at Pulot Leupung an army patrol had been attacked by the villagers. Another statement put out stressed that it had been almost impossible to tell the guerillas apart from ordinary villagers, as the former had mingled with the local population or forced the villagers to advance in the front line.

The killings at Cot Jeumpa and Pulot Leupung provoked a great many protests from Islamic and Acehnese organizations. The *Front Pemuda Aceh* (Acehnese Youth Front) threatened to report the incidents to the United Nations and the Afro-Asian Conference countries if justice was not done and an investigation instituted by the Government. In Parliament questions were asked by Mohammad Nur el Ibrahimy, Amelz and Sutardjo Kartohadikusuma. On the side of the Government the Minister of Internal Affairs was sent to Aceh, while representatives of the Central Army Staff and the Attorney General also visited the area. Furthermore, the governor of North Sumatra, S.M. Amin, started an investigation. On his visit to the two villages he found Cot Jeumpa completely deserted, while in Pulot Leupung all the men who had escaped the massacre had fled into the mountains. Following this Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo made a statement to Parliament on behalf of the Government in mid-April, the account of events in which was no different from that put forward by the Republican Army (Sekitar n.d. III:272–442; Risalah 1955; ANP-Aneta 1955:208–211).

The *Darul Islam* forces for their part were also accused of crimes and mass murders. So they had allegedly killed over 200 prisoners near Lammeulo, the area in which the social revolution had begun, upon being forced to retreat here in October 1953. Speaking of this same incident, the parliamentary commission reported the cruel murder of 123 member of the PNI, 120 of the PKI and 28 of the *Perti* following its visit to Aceh (ANP-Aneta 1954:115; Sekitar n.d. III:149).

The incidents involving Republican Army troops were seized upon by those in favour of a peaceful settlement to press once more for negotiations and for concessions to some of the rebels' demands. So far the attempts to persuade the *Darul Islam* rebels in Aceh to give up their struggle and negotiate with the Republic had failed. The new governor of North Sumatra, S.M. Amin, had been engaged in an exchange of letters with prominent rebel leaders since the end of 1953. Although not himself an Acehnese

(he was a Mandailing Batak), Amin's relation with Daud Beureu'eh and his close associates was good. In fact, his appointment in the place of Abdul Hakim, who had alienated the Acehese leaders by his attitude, had been partly prompted by his close acquaintance of these leaders.<sup>35</sup> For during the Japanese period he had been headmaster of a secondary school at Banda Aceh, while later he had been a member of the court of justice at Sigli together with Usman Raliby and Hasan Aly. After the proclamation of independence he had become first a member and later, in January 1946, chairman of the Republican Parliament of Aceh. Later still his appointment as governor of North Sumatra had followed.

From the initial outbreak of the rebellion Amin had shown himself an advocate of negotiations with the rebels as a means of arriving at a peaceful solution (Sekitar n.d. I:67). True to this principle, he had established contact with Said Abubakar. He had further entered into the said exchange of letters with *Darul Islam* leaders in secret, without at first informing the Central Government, in December 1953. In these letters, which he explicitly stated himself to be writing as a private citizen, he indicated that he agreed with the aims of the rebels as representing the ideals of all Muslims, and that he felt that the events that had triggered off the rebellion had been a result of misunderstanding. The methods chosen by the rebels, however, were not approved of by all Muslims. He accordingly asked the rebels to put forward their ideas on how to end the bloodshed (Gelanggang 1956:126, 129–130).

Amin received replies from Husin Jusuf and Daud Beureu'eh. Both underlined the duty of every Indonesian Muslim to participate in a *jihād* in defence of the Islamic State of Indonesia, which, they pointed out, had become a reality that could not be ignored. They thereupon indicated that the conflict might end as soon as the Republican Government took note of the aspirations of the Islamic community. They denied that the social revolution or the desire for autonomy had inspired their rebellion, asserting that its root cause lay in religion. Nor did they share Amin's view that the trouble had been caused by misunderstandings. The policies pursued by the Republican Government, its reaction to the Cumbok Affair and to the demands for autonomy, the Army reorganizations in Aceh, and so on, constituted ample evidence to the contrary (Gelanggang 1956:132–157; Amin 1956:198–200).

Amin replied to this in August 1954. Refusing to meet the

guerilla leaders in person, he sent a draft of a letter for signing by Daud Beureu'eh and Hasan Aly, in which the two promised to end their resistance, to lay down their arms and to meet representatives of the Republican Government if the latter for its part was prepared to recognize their right to strive for an Islamic State in a non-violent way, to give more attention to the interests of Aceh in future, and to grant the rebels an amnesty. If Daud Beureu'eh and Hasan Aly signed the draft, then he, Amin, would personally go to Jakarta to fight for acceptance of the agreement by the Government.

Daud Beureu'eh and Hasan Aly did not sign, however. They in turn drafted a government regulation for signing by Ali Sastroamidjojo, which they asked Amin to take to Jakarta with him. Herein the Republican Government undertook to open negotiations with the founders of the Islamic State of Indonesia in Java, Aceh, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and to protect and assist the members of the delegation of the Islamic State for the duration of these negotiations. In their accompanying letter, dated October 5th, 1954, they made it clear that what they wanted was not an amnesty but negotiations (Gelanggang 1956:157–167).

Amin sent all these letters on to Jakarta. The Government did not react, however. He thereupon discontinued his correspondence for the time being, to resume it after the fall of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet and its replacement by a new government headed by Burhanuddin Harahap of the *Masyumi* in August 1955 (Amin 1956:205).

The formation of a new Cabinet under the leadership of a *Masyumi* Prime Minister, and in which the PNI was not represented, made the prospects of a reconciliation more likely. Burhanuddin Harahap, moreover, was known to be in favour of ending the rebellion in a peaceful way. He had already some months before come to an agreement with Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, the highly controversial Deputy Chief of Staff of the Republican Army at the time, that everything possible should be done to find a political solution to the problem of the various rebellions.<sup>36</sup> He subsequently requested Daud Beureu'eh's son, Hasballah Daud, to go to Aceh to get in touch with his father and make him an amnesty offer. Hasballah Daud left Jakarta on July 5th, 1955, with letters from Hatta and from the Ministry of Information in his pocket, and accompanied by Abdullah Arif, an employee of the Ministry of Information. He returned at the end of August. Neither the Ali Sastroamidjojo nor the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet took

official responsibility for the trip, and both stressed that it had been a private initiative. Nevertheless, Abdullah Arif went to Aceh once more to meet Hasan Aly in February 1956. This attempt, too, was futile. The *Darul Islam* leaders in Aceh were not yet to be tempted with amnesty offers, while the Republic refused the rebels' demand for negotiations on a government to government basis. The attempts at mediation, of which it was not clear to what extent they were backed by the Republican Government in Jakarta, only irritated the rebel leaders. The latter remained prepared to negotiate, but only on a formal basis.

The Republican Government's proposals were discussed by the *Darul Islam* leaders at Batèë Kurëng. They had, in fact, constituted the immediate cause of Daud Beureu'eh's wish to consult with his close advisors. The concrete outcome of the discussions, as formulated in one of the points of the new Cabinet's programme was the resolution that it should be tried to solve the conflict with the "*Pancasila* government" not only by force of arms but also by political means.

As a consequence Hasan Aly in November sent a letter to Amin urging that the Republican Government publicly state its standpoint and in addition that all future negotiations be conducted by official delegations from both sides, and no longer be informal. Only if there were pressing reasons preventing the Republican Government from doing so would Hasan Aly be prepared to continue informal discussions. In that case, however, the Republican Government should make it known as soon as possible that there were such pressing reasons (Amin 1956:301).

#### 10. *Settlement or Further Conflict?*

The Batèë Kurëng conference provided one of the most unmistakable signs of the existence of disagreement among the *Darul Islam* rebels in Aceh. It testified to dissatisfaction at the way in which all the decisions were made by Daud Beureu'eh with a small group of advisors, and at the subordination of civil to military affairs.

Although there definitely existed rivalry and conflict among the leaders of the Islamic State in Aceh, here, in contrast to the other areas, this does not appear to have led to frequent clashes between troop commanders.<sup>37</sup> Where some of the leaders of the first hour had been removed from the centre of power, the Batèë Kurëng conference brought a certain redress. The concentration of power and the elimination of certain leaders went back to

1954, when the *Dewan Syura*, *Majelis Syura* and *Dewan Militer* had been dissolved. At that time Husin Jusuf had lost his function as Chief of Staff of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division to Amir Husin al Mudjahid. Although he had been appointed security coordinator for Aceh, this promotion meant the loss of control over most of the combat troops. The same thing happened later to his successor, Amir Husin al Mudjahid, who was replaced by Hasan Aly.

There had moreover been opposition to Daud Beureu'eh's reaction to the peace overtures from the Republican side. Some people disapproved of his outright rejection of a possible amnesty offer, and notably in the Islamic Army proper there was a large, powerful group in favour of accepting such an offer (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:39–40).

In view of the above and of the large number of soldiers who had already returned to their villages, one of the regimental commanders, Ijas Lebai (Ilyas Lebai) from Central Aceh, in November 1955 issued a communique announcing that no action would be taken against those soldiers of his regiment who returned home, provided this did not harm the struggle. He himself had also been invited to report to the authorities, he said, but he wanted to await the results of the elections. He was contemplating duly so reporting because the Cabinet currently in power, the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet, came close in ideology to the ideals of the struggle in Aceh (Pengumuman 20 November 1955).

Generally speaking the *Darul Islam* rebels in Aceh adopted a moderate attitude to the elections. At first, at the outbreak of their rebellion, they had taken an ambivalent view of them. On the one hand they had accused the Republican Government of trying to put them off indefinitely, while on the other hand they branded the elections as a Republican Government device for getting its own way. Now that the elections were actually about to take place, they did nothing to obstruct them (Feith 1971:42).

The satisfactory results of the elections in Aceh, where the *Masyumi* gained two thirds of the votes, provided those in favour of ending the rebellion with yet another argument in support of their cause. Their case was further strengthened when, this time again under an Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, at the end of 1956 a bill was passed into law whereby Aceh was granted the status of an autonomous province. The Act became effective in January 1957. A. Hasjmy, the pre-war leader of the PUSA Youth of Greater Aceh and former Chairman of the BPI/*Pesindo*, became the province's first governor.

Yet another factor favouring the termination of hostilities was that in the military field as well a former guerilla leader was appointed to the supreme command in Aceh. He was Sjammaun Gaharu, commander of the Republican Army in Aceh for a short period during the revolution and one of the two signatories to the ultimatum to the *ulèëbalang* at Lammeulo (before his function was seized by Amir Husin al Mudjahid).

By his own account Sjammaun Gaharu owed his appointment to the support he received from Nasution for his ideas on ending the rebellion in Aceh. He had had frequent meetings with Nasution in the period between 1952 and 1955, when the latter had been removed from his function as Chief of Staff of the Republican Army, to provide him with information for the books he was writing on the Indonesian revolution and on guerilla warfare in general. During these interviews Sjammaun Gaharu had gradually unfolded his views on the best ways of solving the problems in Aceh. The gist of his theory was that the Acehnese situation was different from that elsewhere and was very complicated, and that it could best be solved by the Acehnese themselves in an Acehnese way. Vice-President Mohammad Hatta was also interested in Sjammaun Gaharu's ideas on this subject and asked him to put them in writing. He presented the result to Hatta in October 1955, and when a few days later Nasution was re-appointed Chief of Staff of the Republican Army, he sent him a copy as well.

Nasution subsequently reacted by offering him the function of military commander of Aceh. Sjammaun Gaharu had at first wanted to decline the offer, because he felt that his views were incompatible with the policy of the commander for North Sumatra, Maludin Simbolon. At Nasution's promise that Maludin Simbolon would be transferred in the near future he accepted the position, however. The opportunity to put his ideas into practice presented itself to him when at the end of 1956 Maludin Simbolon, who had been Nasution's major rival for the function of Chief of Staff, in an attempt to prevent his transfer broke off relations between the Territorial Command of North Sumatra and the Central Army Command. Sjammaun Gaharu immediately dissociated himself from Maludin Simbolon and remained in close contact with Nasution (Gaharu 1958:40–43).

Sjammaun Gaharu was now free to put his plans into execution. Together with the newly appointed governor, A. Hasjmy, and with the explicit backing of Nasution, he embarked upon a policy of reconciliation. In mid-April 1957, in the middle of the

fast, negotiations were held with a number of prominent *Darul Islam* leaders at Lamteh, a village a few miles from Banda Aceh. The discussions culminated in a charter, the *Ikrar Lamteh*, in which both sides pledged themselves to promote Islam, to stimulate the development of Aceh in the broadest sense of the word, and to try and bring prosperity and peace to the people and society of Aceh. On the Republican side the charter was signed by Sjammaun Gaharu and by his Chief of Staff, Teuku Hamzah, by A. Hasjmy, and by the chief of Police for Aceh, M. Insja (M. Insy). The *Darul Islam* leaders who signed it were Hasan Aly, Hasan Saleh, and Ishak Amin (the *bupati* of Greater Aceh). Later, accompanied by A. Hasjmy and M. Insja, Sjammaun Gaharu also met Daud Beureu'eh, who at that time still did not want to hear of a settlement (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:40–41; DM 23-3-1959).

In accordance with his policy, which he had styled *Konsepsi prinsipiel dan bijaksana* (Blueprint for a fundamental and well-considered solution), Sjammaun Gaharu together with A. Hasjmy continued his efforts to find a solution. Both remained in touch with the *Darul Islam* leaders and visited Jakarta a number of times to find out how far they could go in their negotiations with the rebels. In September 1957 Prime Minister Djuanda (Juanda) told them that they might give the concept of regional autonomy the widest possible interpretation, even to the extent that Aceh was treated as a separate state, providing that they remained within the limits of the Indonesian Constitution, which still provided for a unitary Republic (Hasjmy 1958:57–58).

No settlement was reached at that time, however. This was due partly to the fact that the PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion was attracting attention, and partly to the presence within the Islamic State of Aceh of a powerful faction headed by Daud Beureu'eh which did not want to hear of any compromise and stuck to the principle of formal negotiations between the Islamic State of Aceh and the Indonesian Republic.

Daud Beureu'eh's standpoint nevertheless met with increasing opposition. Notably within the Acehnese Islamic Army of Indonesia there were many who contemplated surrender. This group was headed by Hasan Saleh, the Commander of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division and Chief of Staff of the Islamic Army. He accused Daud Beureu'eh of trying to plunge Aceh into a new war without considering the fate of the ordinary soldiers and the population at large, who had to put up with the consequences (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:41–42).

As a result the fighting decreased considerably after the Lamteh Charter. Even so the end of the rebellion was still not in sight. It took Daud Beureu'eh's opponents two years to make up their minds and definitely break away from him.

This happened in March 1959, when, charging Daud Beureu'eh with arbitrary, despotic behaviour, Hasan Saleh and his supporters toppled him. They formed their own government at a meeting in Pidie attended by about a thousand people on March 15th. The dissidents, styling themselves the *Gerakan Revolusioner Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Movement), subsequently instituted a *Dewan Revolusi (Negara Bagian Aceh)* or Revolutionary Council (of the State of Aceh). It was chaired by Abdul Gani Usman, and its vice-chairman was Hasan Saleh, with Abdul Gani Mutiara becoming its secretary general and head of the Information Section. It counted among its members such prominent *Darul Islam* leaders as Amir Husin al Mudjahid, T.A. Hasan, Ibrahim Saleh, T.M. Amin and Husin Jusuf.

Abdul Gani Usman's first step in his capacity as chairman of the Revolutionary Council was to make an announcement to the effect that the function of Head of State would for the time being be fulfilled by a *Dewan Pertimbangan Revolusi* (Revolutionary Consultative Council), of which Amir Husin al Mudjahid was appointed chairman. At the same time he ordered his followers to stop collecting taxes in the villages, threatening to take action against anyone continuing to do so. With respect to the Islamic Army, Hasan Saleh confined the soldiers of the *Teungku Chik Ditiro* Division to their barracks, withdrawing them from the villages where they had been stationed. He further announced that the Revolutionary Council would send a delegation to Jakarta to discuss the termination of the rebellion with the Republican authorities. In the course of the next few months the Revolutionary Council was joined by troops from West Aceh commanded by T.R. Idris and by the Commander of the Seventh Regiment of East Sumatra, Haji Hasanuddin.<sup>38</sup> In August Abdul Gani Mutiara claimed the *Dewan Revolusi* to be supported by 24,000 *Darul Islam* members (DM 18-3-1959, 23-3-1959, 28-3-1959, 25-5-1959, 6-8-1959, 7-8-1959, 25-8-1959).

These developments initiated a new series of negotiations. In early May Sjammaun Gaharu and A. Hasjmy again went to Jakarta, this time on the invitation of Prime Minister Djuanda. They explained the new situation to the Cabinet and to President Soekarno and made a number of recommendations as to what



steps were to be taken with regard to it. Subsequently Djuanda issued a resolution (Keputusan Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia no. 1/Missi/1959) to the effect that as of May 26th the Province of Aceh could style itself *Daerah Istimewa Aceh*, or Special Region of Aceh. This placed Aceh in rather a unique position, as of the other provinces of Indonesia only the capital, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta enjoyed special status. Aceh was further promised the widest possible autonomy, in particular in the fields of religion, education and customary law, with the proviso, however, as Djuanda stated in his resolution, that this should not be in contravention of the existing legislation.

At the same time the Central Government sent a mission to Aceh to confer with the Revolutionary Council. This mission was headed by the First Deputy Prime Minister, Hardi, and included the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Republican Army, Major-General Gatot Subroto, and the Minister for Economic Stability without Portfolio, Colonel Suprajogi (Suprayogi). Two days later, on May 26th, 1959, after the mediation of A. Hasjmy and Lieutenant-Colonel T. Hamzah in attempts to break the deadlock, a provisional agreement was reached with the leaders of the Revolutionary Council accepting the proposals of the Central Government. For their part they pledged themselves in writing to return to the fold of the Republic and to swear an oath of loyalty to its constitution.

The precise nature of the compromise remained vague. As Djuanda had stipulated beforehand, autonomy was not to be interpreted in such a way that any new regulations introduced would contravene the existing legislation. Hardi added in Banda Aceh that the question of whether or not the Islamic community of Aceh could be forced to observe Islamic law was a matter for the Constituent Assembly, which at that time was discussing the return to the 1945 Constitution, to decide. He linked it to the Jakarta Charter, which was currently again the subject of much heated debate in the Constituent Assembly in Jakarta. As it turned out, the Islamic politicians were not strong enough to get it passed this time either. The only thing achieved by them was Soekarno's acknowledgement in the Decree proclaiming the return to the 1945 Constitution that the Jakarta Charter had inspired this Constitution and formed a unity with it (Boland 1971:90–100).<sup>39</sup>

It was further agreed in principle that a proportion of the soldiers of the Islamic Army, after due screening, would be admitted to an emergency militia. Later, on October 1st, it was

agreed that a *Teungku Chik Ditiro* unit would be constituted as a special section of the Army Division in Aceh. The *Darul Islam* civil servants who joined the Revolutionary Council were treated in more or less the same way. An undertaking that where possible they would be integrated into the Republican Administration was confirmed by the central military authorities at the end of October, who thus empowered the Regional Administration of Aceh to appoint former rebels who had sworn allegiance to the Republic to positions in the Civil Administration.<sup>40</sup>

The agreement of May was formally accepted by the supporters of the Revolutionary Council at a major conference held in the first week of November. At the end of that same month Nasution went to Pidie, where he took the salute of five thousand supporters of the Revolutionary Council (Abdul Murat Mat Jan 1976:43; DM 28-5-1959, 25-11-1959, 26-11-1959, 27-11-1959, 1-12-1959).

### 11. *The Die-Hards Refuse to Give in*

Daud Beureu'eh was no party to the agreement. He and Hasan Aly continued the struggle. According to the then governor of Aceh, A. Hasjmy, they could still count on the support of about thirty per cent of their original followers (DM 20-5-1960). Like his counterpart in South Sulawesi, Kahar Muzakkar, Daud Beureu'eh joined forces with the remnants of the PRRI/*Permesta* troops. First his force was joined by a number of individual PRRI Commanders and their men. Then it was reinforced with rebel units commanded by Major Nukum and Captain Hasanuddin, a former captain of the Military Police.<sup>41</sup> Both the latter were offered ministerial posts by Daud Beureu'eh to fill up the positions vacated by those who had defected to the Revolutionary Council (DM 20-5-1959, 21-5-1959, DP 20-5-1959).

At the same time discussions were held by the leaders of the PRRI and of the *Darul Islam* in Aceh. These resulted in the proclamation of the federal *Republik Persatuan Indonesia* (RPI), United Republic of Indonesia, in February 1960, which represented a coalition of losers, of people who found themselves fighting a lost war in the jungle.<sup>42</sup> The RPI, moreover, united people who in the past had been in two different camps and at best had had some sympathy for each other's cause, and at worst had been outright enemies. In addition the United Republic of Indonesia was exclusively a Sumatran and Sulawesi affair. It dropped the claim, still made by the Islamic State of Indonesia

and the PRRI/*Permesta*, that its territory encompassed the whole of Indonesia.

The RPI was made up of ten states, all but two of them located in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Aceh, as the *Republik Islam Aceh* (RIA), or Islamic State of Aceh, was one of the six Sumatran states, and South Sulawesi one of the two states in that island.<sup>43</sup> Apart from these eight states there were, probably as a propitiatory gesture to the RMS, a State of the Moluccas and a State of the South Moluccas. Conspicuously absent were states in Java, such as a State of West Java, the cradle of the *Darul Islam* movement, and in South Kalimantan, where Ibnu Hadjar was operating.<sup>44</sup>

Both parties entered the new federation with great reluctance. Earlier negotiations between *Darul Islam* and PRRI/*Permesta* leaders had had almost no result. While mutual military cooperation and support had been promised, this had never materialized. Both camps also included people who outright rejected every form of formal cooperation. In South Sulawesi Kahar Muzakkar's flirtation with the *Permesta* was partly responsible for the surrender of Bahar Mattaliu, while in Aceh such relations constituted one of several factors stimulating the formation of the Revolutionary Council. The defections at the same time forced the remaining *Darul Islam* rebels into closer cooperation with the PRRI/*Permesta*.

The PRRI rebels in Sumatra at the end of 1959 fell into three different groups advocating different courses. One group simply wanted the PRRI to continue, however insignificant it might have become as a result of the Republican Army actions. Another group, with Zulkifli Lubis and Maludin Simbolon as its main representatives, was in favour of the proclamation of a Federal Republic of Indonesia while opposing cooperation with the *Darul Islam*. The third faction advocated joining forces with the *Darul Islam*. Its principal spokesmen were two former Prime Ministers, Mohammad Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap, and the influential *Masyumi* politician Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, all three of whom had fled from Jakarta to join the discontented regional commanders in Sumatra in December 1957 (DM 23-11-1959; Feith and Lev 1963:38; Mossman 1961:229).

The RPI did not count for much either in the military or in the political sense. The uneasy alliance between Muslims like Daud Beureu'eh and Kahar Muzakkar who for many years had fought to establish and defend an Islamic State in Indonesia, Muslims who for long times on end had served in key functions in the

Indonesian Republic, and military commanders like Maludin Simbolon, Kawilarang and Warouw who for prolonged periods had led the Republican military actions against the *Darul Islam*, and of whom some were moreover Christians, was extremely precarious. The RPI may have represented, as Hasan Muhammad Tiro described it, an act “to insure their sacred rights of self-government which has been denied them by the Sukarno dictatorship in Djakarta, which is imposing Javanese colonialism upon more than a dozen nationalities” (1961b:1), or a rejection of the “new, brown Javanese colonialism” (1965:1), but their hatred of Soekarno and the Javanese was all they had in common.

As a result the RPI was extremely short-lived. In April 1961 Maludin Simbolon and another military commander, Achmad Husein (Akhmad Husein), disassociated themselves from it to establish the *Pemerintah Darurat Militer* (Military Emergency Government) (Feith and Lev 1963:43).<sup>45</sup> Hereupon they issued an appeal to the rebels to cease their resistance and surrender themselves in June and July. The civilian leaders of the PRRI followed suit after receiving a promise of pardon from Soekarno (Peraturan Presiden no. 13/1961). Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Prime Minister of the rebels, subsequently advised his followers to surrender, himself reporting to the authorities at the end of August.<sup>46</sup>

This spelt the virtual end of the rebellions, including that of the *Darul Islam*, in Aceh, where in the previous months many had surrendered. Peace was completely restored in Aceh in May 1962, when Daud Beureu'eh, too, ceased his resistance.

To celebrate Aceh's change from a *Dar al-harb*, or territory of war, to a *Dar al-salam*, region of peace (to use the current phrase of those days), and furthermore to give formal expression to the restored unity of the Acehnese a grand ceremony was held at the end of that year, namely the *Musyawaharah Kerukunan Rakyat Aceh* (MKRA, Solidarity Conference of the People of Aceh), which took place at Blangpadang from December 18th to 22nd, 1962. It culminated in the Blangpadang Charter, which was signed by all of the seven hundred prominent Acehnese attending the conference. They pledged to maintain and foster a solidarity radiating unity and eternal friendship (DM 20-11-1962, 28-12-1962, 29-12-1962, 31-12-1962).

Aceh thereafter remained quiet for fifteen years or so. In early 1977, when *Darul Islam* activities were reported again also in Java and in other parts of Sumatra, Hasan Muhammad Tiro pro-

claimed Aceh an independent state. Styling himself Chairman of the National Liberation Front and Head of the State, he returned to Aceh to personally lead the struggle of the Free Aceh Movement, but his movement did not gain much momentum.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### WHY DID PEOPLE JOIN THE DARUL ISLAM?

One of the salient features of the *Darul Islam* rebellion is its tenacity. In this respect it contrasts sharply with the PRRI/*Permesta* rising, which, once the Central Republican Army took action against it, subsided quickly, lacking as it did local popular support. The longevity of the *Darul Islam* struggle also stands in contrast to the PKI resistance after 1965, which was crushed by the Republican Army in a matter of a few years. This distinguishing feature makes it all the more interesting to try and single out the social and political factors which stimulated people to join the movement and carry on the struggle in the face of considerable hardship.

From the foregoing description *two interrelated factors which induced people to rise* against the established government are immediately apparent. They are, firstly, *the resentment at the growing influence of the Republican Army* and the connected subordinate position in which irregular guerilla groups were placed, together with the Republican Government's subsequent demobilization policy. And secondly, *the growing Republican Government control of the provinces* which followed in the wake of the advance of its Army, along with its attempts to build up a loyal and efficient civil service. The ill-feeling between the Central Government and the regional population was exacerbated by the divergence of their respective economic interests.

As the expansion of central control was a gradual process, the moments at which the conflicts occurred and the nature they assumed differed from region to region. The first conflict erupted in Java, where the Republic's determination to establish control was felt most directly. Its earliest manifestations included the reactions to the social revolution at Pekalongan, the fights against the *Lasykar Rakyat* in Karawang in April 1947, and the clashes with *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* units at the *Siliwangi* Division's retreat to Central Java in 1948. The problems were aggravated, as we have seen, by the scarcity of firearms and by early attempts to streamline the Republican Army.

For a time, in 1948, the conflict was confined to parts of Central and East Java – the areas to which the Republic had been forced to withdraw – with as its most violent manifestation the rebellion at Madiun in September 1948.<sup>1</sup> Following the second Dutch military action and the return of the *Siliwangi* Division to the regions from which it had retreated the previous year, the area of conflict extended again. So the Republican Army and Government met with fierce resistance from groups which had continued the local guerilla wars against the Dutch in West Java and Pekalongan. These groups had established their own military and civil administration, and refused to yield to the claims of the Republic, which in their view had abandoned them.

There were similar problems outside Java between 1945 and 1950, with various guerilla groups vying for the ascendancy over their rivals. The successful ones – whether fully or only partially so – thereupon came to form the local section of the Republican Army. In Aceh it was the members of the PUSA, in South Kalimantan those of the ALRI Div IV, and in South Sulawesi of the KGSS who regarded themselves as local representatives of the Republican Army and Government.

These groups were able for a while to develop relatively independently, without control or supervision from the Central Republican Government and Army in Java. This changed just before and after the recognition of independence, however. Representatives of the Central Government and Army then visited the various regions in preparation of the formation of a civil service and army of the United States of Indonesia. The guerillas, instead of being shown recognition for their efforts and given acknowledgement as the rightful military and civil Government branch in their respective regions – which they regarded as a just reward – fell victim to the Central Government's rationalization policy. They had to stand back and look on while others assumed control. Their own large-scale demobilization was in preparation while outsiders were being appointed to important military and civil positions, and former enemies – KNIL soldiers and officials of the States that were to make up the United States of Indonesia – were appointed to functions in the service of the new federation.

The consequences of all this were felt first in South Kalimantan, where, in total disregard of the achievements of the ALRI Div IV, the Republican Government, pledged as it was to the federal state structure, forced the guerillas to recognize the Autonomous Areas of Banjar and South-East Kalimantan. In

return the ALRI Div IV was officially confirmed as a section of the Republican Army, which, however, did not safeguard its soldiers against demobilization. On the contrary, it facilitated the Division's dissolution.

Slightly different from this was the situation in South Sulawesi, the next area where things came to a show-down. Here the KGSS guerillas, though their position had been less strong during the revolution than that of the ALRI Div IV in South Kalimantan, felt that it was they who should take over from the Dutch and their local allies. They continued their operations in the rural areas, and actually went to the assistance of Republican troops sent from Java in the latter's military clashes with KNIL units in anticipation of this event. It was all to no avail, however. What the Republican Government wanted was, as Nawawi (1968:283) points out, "the maintenance of order and the peaceful take-over of military authority from the Dutch forces". In this view of things there was no room for the guerillas and their struggle against traditional leaders and against those who had worked and fought for the State of East Indonesia. For the guerillas were looked upon with distrust and regarded as a potential source of trouble. The best way to achieve peace again, in the Government's view, was through demobilization and either the preservation in office of those officials who had worked for the State of East Indonesia or the appointment of outsiders.

In Aceh the conflicting interests of the expansion of central authority and regional opposition thereto led to an armed rebellion later again. Even so, the conditions here were the same: the supplanting of local civil servants who had distinguished themselves during the revolution and the demobilization of the Army. There was one major difference with the other trouble areas, however. Aceh was one Indonesian region which had never been occupied by Dutch troops during the revolution. As a consequence the leaders who had come to the force in its course had been relatively successful in comparison with those of South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi in securing themselves a prominent military, civil and economic position. As a result of being left quite undisturbed and of lack of either interference from the Central Republican Government or rivalry from a Dutch-backed State for a period of almost five years, they had actually been able to consolidate the positions acquired by them during and after the social revolution.

*Two factors contributing to the Darul Islam rebellion* which will also be discussed in this chapter are the *changing norms and*



*values with respect to land ownership and the role played by religion.* As regards land ownership, stress will be laid on the consequences of the “individualization of society”, by which is meant the decreasing social control of the kinship group and the territorial community. Some of the outward signs of this are the increase in private land ownership and in the free sale and purchase of land, the absence of communal rites, and the geographic mobility of the population as evidenced not only by the phenomenon of emigration, but also by the existence of a floating labour force for the work on the estates and in industry.

None of the above-indicated four factors can be isolated as the prime mover. In combination they made the *Darul Islam* what it was, however. None of the four is exclusive to the *Darul Islam* areas, but they do tend to be most pronounced and conspicuous there. It was their co- and inter-action in the historical context of the years following the Indonesian struggle for independence which gave the *Darul Islam* its force and tenacity.

### 1. *The Army Reorganization*

The conflicts between the Republican Army and the irregular local units involved more than the simple refusal to let guerillas take the lead and conduct their own affairs in their home areas. They were additionally a reflection of a difference of opinion as to how society should be organized. The arrival or return of representatives of the Republican Army and Government meant a retrogression of social developments which had taken place over the preceding years.

To be able to understand this we have to return to the first years of the Indonesian revolution and to the consequences of the reorganizations effected in the Republican Army. In the first months after the proclamation of independence many local armed groups sprang up. These were of three distinct types: the local groups in the strict sense of the word, the ideological or religious groups, and the groups of a strongly ethnic character. In the first phase of the revolution it was particularly the groups of the first category, sometimes reinforced by units of those of the second and third type, which were active in efforts to upset the existing local social structure. They spearheaded the actions against the local traditional leaders, whose land and other property they seized and distributed among the poor. They envisaged an egalitarian kind of society, free from outside interferences of the type involved by the levying of taxes, either by

the Dutch or the Republic. These grassroots rebellions took place independently of the national revolution, and sometimes even collided headlong with it. This was the case not only in such prominent *Darul Islam* regions as Pekalongan and Aceh, but also in other areas. *Daulat* actions in which traditional local leaders were ousted, maltreated or even killed occurred practically all over West Java, in Surakarta and environs, and in East Sumatra (Nasution 1977 II:511–544; Onghakham 1978, Soeyatno 1978; Anderson 1972:269–332; Reid 1979).

These so-called social revolutions posed a threat not only to the local power structure but also to the Republican Army. They tended to be looked upon as “excesses” and were considered a danger for the survival of the Republic, which in its struggle against the Dutch needed a strong, efficient administration (Nasution 1977 II:514, 537). Where the Republican Army was strong enough to be able to re-establish law and order, the situation of before the social revolution was more or less restored. But the Republican Army was nowhere strong enough, or willing enough, to completely undo the changes that had been brought about. During the struggle for independence it was able to launch counter-actions only in Java; after 1949, however, it was in a position to extend its influence to the other islands. This extension of central control involved the protection of the traditional local leaders and elite, which procedure was only calculated to strengthen *Darul Islam* feelings against the ruling strata of the local society.

For the Republican Army the problem was all the graver since it itself was at one time threatened by the prospect of rivalry from a strong “people’s army” made up of groups that were more favourably disposed towards radical social change. The architect of this people’s army was Amir Sjarifuddin, Minister of Defence from November 1945 to 1948. He was a member of the Socialist Party and, by his own account in August 1948, since 1935 had been a secret member of the Communist Party. As Minister of Defence he set out to strengthen the position of the *lasykars*, to the detriment of the Republican Army, with the ultimate aim of making them the core of a new Republican Army. First, in May 1946, he formed a *Biro Perjuangan* (Struggle Bureau) within the Ministry of Defence, for the purpose of co-ordinating the irregular units, over the heads of the Army Command.<sup>2</sup> Then, a few months later, a decree was issued to the effect that the irregular guerilla units were to be financed by the Government (or more specifically the Ministry of Defence, rather

than the Republican Army) and that they were to be treated on an equal footing with the Army. When these same units were ordered in July 1947 to merge with the Republican Army to form the new TNI, the *Biro Perjuangan* became defunct again. Amir Sjarifuddin subsequently managed to retain his hold over the *lasykars* by constituting the *TNI bagian Masyarakat*, popularly known as *TNI-Masyarakat* (People's TNI), in August of that year.<sup>3</sup> This *TNI-Masyarakat* he then used for the appointment of trusted personnel to train the irregular guerilla units (Kahin 1970:261).

In addition he tried to extend his influence over the Republican Army proper through the introduction of special political officers, members of the *Pendidikan Politik Tentara (Pepolit)*, or Political Education (Service) of the Army. These officers, all of whom were responsible to the Ministry of Defence, were to be stationed with every Army unit in order to give the soldiers political education, according to the *Pepolit's* opponents leftist indoctrination. The first fifty were appointed in mid-1947.

The Republican Army leaders interpreted all this as an attempt by Amir Sjarifuddin to increase his control over the official Army and to build up alongside it an alternative army with a clear leftist leaning, which was eventually to supersede it. In spite of the fact that the *Pepolit* staff included Anwar Tjokroaminoto of the PSII and H. Mukti of the *Masyumi*, and that from March 1946 to January 1948 the post of Deputy Minister of Defence was occupied by Arudji Kartawinata (first representing *Masyumi* and later PSII), they believed the *Pepolit*, the *Biro Perjuangan* and the *TNI-Masyarakat* all to be instruments of the current political coalition of the left, the *Sayap Kiri*, and the *Pesindo* on their road to power.<sup>4</sup> This belief was shared by a number of *lasykars*, most of them of a Muslim background, who refused to join the *TNI-Masyarakat*.

The *Siliwangi* Division's withdrawal from West to Central Java in February and March 1948 subsequently strengthened the Republican Army's position in the competition with the Ministry of Defence and its *lasykars*. Its reinforcement with loyal, new, high-grade troops, in fact, made the Army Command strong enough to counter any plan of Amir Sjarifuddin's. With the backing of Mohammad Hatta, who as Vice-President had also become Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in January, a scheme for the rationalization of the Republican Army was thereupon drawn up by Nasution.

That some sort of rationalization should take place was agreed

by all. But on the question of what form it should take and whether the end result should be a people's army with strong political feelings or a neutral professional army the opinions differed. The first steps towards rationalization had already been taken by Amir Sjarifuddin, who favoured the first alternative. The project was now taken over by Hatta and Nasution, who shaped it in a different direction. Their plans called for the abolition of the *TNI-Masyarakat* and the integration of some of its *lasykars* with and subordination to the Republican Army.<sup>5</sup> They were to form part of a General Reserve, *Kesatuan Reserve Umum* (KRU), of which the *Siliwangi* Division was also to become what was called an "autonomous section" (Nasution 1968 III:167). The strength of the Republican Army proper was to be reduced from about 400,000 to 150,000, and eventually to a little over 50,000 (Kahin 1970:262–263; Mrazek 1978 I:45; Djamhari 1971:40–44).

There was strong opposition to Nasution's plan. The ideological differences aside, there were the clashes of the pure self-interest of groups on either side who were afraid of losing the positions they currently occupied or of seeing their influence wane, or who feared that their promotional opportunities would become blocked. There were furthermore fears, inspired by past experience, that the soldiers and officers of the irregular units which were to be integrated into the Republican Army might be treated as second-rate. For in the view of his opponents, the reorganization Nasution had in mind would lead to a definite distinction being made between a first-grade and a second-grade army. This was due to his alleged intention of introducing a distinction between mobile battalions, in which there was to be one firearm to each soldier, and territorial battalions, made up of members of the former *lasykars*, in which there was to be only one firearm to every three soldiers, who, as it was put, would be the "refuse of demobilization" (Nasution 1968 II:170). The impression that this was indeed Nasution's intention was strengthened by the fact that one of the explicitly stated reasons for rationalization was that the Republican officers eventually emerging as the leaders of the Army should be able to compete with the Dutch-trained KNIL officers who were to enter the armed forces of the United States of Indonesia, and hence should be capable and representative officers (Nasution 1968 II:130).

At first the position of Amir Sjarifuddin's supporters in the Republican Army and the irregular units remained unaffected. The first Republican Army unit to be demobilized was one in

which they were weakly represented. Moreover, the first irregular guerilla unit to be disarmed was the *Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia*, commanded by Bung Tomo, an enemy of Amir Sjarifuddin's (Kahin 1970:264–265). The situation changed when the turn came of the Fourth or *Senopati* Division at Surakarta, in which the influence of the *Pesindo* and the other leftist groups making up the *Sayap Kiri* and its successor, the *Front Demokrasi Rakyat* (People's Democratic Front), was strong.<sup>6</sup> The tension was aggravated by skirmishes between *Siliwangi* and *Pesindo* units. The opposition initially took the form of anti-demobilization demonstrations in Surakarta, Blitar and other parts of East Java. It culminated in the open rebellion of *Pesindo* troops and a number of Communist Party leaders (including Amir Sjarifuddin) in the so-called Madiun affair of September 1948.

The Madiun rebellion, in essence one of the many manifestations of the conflict between the Republican Army and the irregular troops, was quickly crushed, however. The *Pesindo* troops were defeated within two months and the leaders of the rebellion, among them Amir Sjarifuddin, killed or executed.

The Madiun affair and its outcome nevertheless had far-reaching consequences. All those who had sympathized most strongly with the local guerilla groups' actions against the traditional local leaders were removed from the decision-making levels of the Republican Army and the Ministry of Defence. It would even so be going too far to conclude, as Mrazek (1978 I:45) does, that this "gave scope to the elimination of all officers and soldiers with leftist sympathies". The situation within the Republican Army and the irregular units was too complicated for this, being marked by a high degree of factionalism, as would become evident in later years. It is moreover impossible to draw a clear-cut distinction between "leftist" and "populist" or "radical" officers.

Even so the Madiun affair thus had drastic effects on the military appointment policy. Officers who envisaged a people's army inspired by revolutionary zeal had to make way for officers stressing professionalism, discipline and technical skill. The officers who were to shape the Republican Army in the years to come were men like Nasution, Simatupang, Kawilarang (all three of them former students of the pre-war Royal Military Academy at Bandung), and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX (McVey 1971 I:143). To them irregular soldiers constituted a menace, whose low professional and intellectual standard they despised. The

soldiers of the irregular units were having their use in the struggle against the Dutch, but only as auxiliary forces assisting the regular Army. The lion's share of the battle should be fought by a mobile regular Army, which was moreover believed to be the only kind of army that should continue on in peace-time.

When victory in the struggle for independence was almost in sight it was from among this group of officers that representatives were sent from Java to the other islands in order to put their ideas into effect there. Mokoginta, and later Kawilarang, were ordered to South Sulawesi, Suhardjo Harjowardojo and Sukanda Bratamenggala to South Kalimantan, and again Kawilarang to North Sumatra for the sake of carrying the Army Command's schemes into effect. The changes these officers wanted to introduce, coupled with their distrust of social movements, brought them immediately into conflict with the local guerillas. Over against revolutionary élan they had education and professional skill to offer, which made any possibility of cooperation unlikely. In addition their demobilization policy was greeted with anything but enthusiasm. To make matters worse, the Republican Army officers aimed at strong central control, and did everything they could to prevent the growth of regionally based Army units made up exclusively of local guerillas.

Military commanders were henceforth drawn from outside. The close ties that had developed between guerillas and their old commanders over the years had to be forcibly broken for fear that otherwise the local Army units might become too strong to bend to control from Java. It was also this line of reasoning which induced the Army leaders to refuse the regions' demands for their own military divisions made up and commanded by former guerillas. According to Feith (1962:248) the Army Command was successful in the attainment of its aim and "most of the commanders both at the territorial [i.e. divisional] and at the regimental level one step lower were taken from elsewhere".

The transfer of units from one region to another was part of the same policy. The preference shown by Nasution and his colleagues already in 1948 for strong mobile units over local (in their words, territorial) ones now also became evident outside Java, where former guerillas were treated in the same way as the *lasykars* of Java in 1948. Demobilization and transfer were the catch-words everywhere, instead of integration with the Army and regional autonomy.

This policy could not but provoke growing regional unrest and opposition from former guerillas. Demobilization posed

enormous problems for the latter. Not only was it in itself offensive to the former guerillas, who saw in it a flagrant disregard for their past services to the Republic, but the mode of its implementation added insult to injury.

In theory the demobilized guerillas were well taken care of. Each one was to receive an allowance to tide him over the period immediately following his discharge from the Republican Army or an irregular unit. The great bulk, it was hoped, would return to their villages to resume their former occupations. For those who could not or would not do so, special provisions were made. They were to be offered employment in state enterprises or on state plantations, or to be given a loan to enable them to set up a business of their own. Others were to be given agricultural or other vocational training at special centres under military direction, in the hope that this would enable them to find employment on local plantations or in local industries. If their employment here necessitated large extra investments, special loans would be offered to these enterprises. Yet others again – according to one official estimate as many as thirty per cent of all the demobilized guerillas – were to be involved in transmigration projects to open up new lands in South Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi (IM 15-8-1952).

In actual reality the process of demobilization was far from smooth, however. In pursuit of the goal of “national reconstruction”, as it was styled – defined as the realization of the Government’s aim to open the way to a decent livelihood in society for all former guerillas and soldiers (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 12, 1951) – various official bodies were called into being. The history of these successive institutions in itself constitutes clear evidence of the failure of the Government’s policy, however.

First, in August 1950, the *Biro Demobilisasi Nasional*, or National Demobilization Bureau, was established (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 15, 1950). This was admitted to be functioning poorly, with a large number of former soldiers and guerillas being still unemployed, as early as February of the next year. Thereupon the Bureau was dissolved and replaced by the *Dewan Rekonstruksi Nasional*, or National Reconstruction Council, and the *Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional* (BRN), National Reconstruction Bureau (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 12, 1951). The former, which included a number of Government ministers on its board, was responsible for planning and supervising the national care for former guerillas and soldiers. The actual execution was in the hands of the National Reconstruction Bureau, which had

branches in every province and, where this was deemed necessary, in some smaller regions.

The government regulation decreeing the institution of these two new bodies listed three categories of people who qualified for Government assistance. The first comprised members of the Armed Forces who had become redundant or had been demobilized but who had so far been unable to find employment. The second – which testifies plainly to the Government's bias in favour of Java and Sumatra – was made up of guerillas who had surrendered after the Government's appeal of November 1950 (which had been in force only for Java and Sumatra), and who were sometimes referred to as "the November 14th Youth". The third category was composed of all members of irregular units who did not belong to either of these two.

This new arrangement, too, proved inadequate. Early in 1952 yet another regulation was promulgated (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 1, 1952) modifying the organizational structure of the "national reconstruction". It provided for the establishment of a new organization, the *Badan Penyelenggara Urusan Rekonstruksi Nasional*, or Executive Body for National Reconstruction Affairs, in regions with branches of the BRN. Coming under the direction of the head of the Civil Administration (*Kepala Daerah*), it was to supervise the activities of these BRN branches and make suggestions as to the most effective ways of organizing the care for demobilized soldiers and guerillas. It was hoped that by increasing the local Administration's participation the Government's efforts might become more effective. Even so the results were far from satisfactory.

In 1954 another new organization was founded, the *Biro Penampungan Bekas Angkatan Perang*, or Bureau for the Care of Ex-Servicemen (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 6, 1954). This was followed by the introduction of another new regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 16, 1954), admitting that this care was not yet proceeding satisfactorily and arguing that to improve the conditions of the former soldiers and guerillas the participation of the Regional Governments should be stepped up further. The ultimate responsibility, which up to then had lain with the Cabinet as supervisor of the National Reconstruction Council, was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time the branches of the Executive Body for National Reconstruction Affairs were integrated with the offices of the regional heads of the Civil Administration. This way a still greater involvement of the Regional Administration as well as coordination and



close supervision by the Ministry of Internal Affairs were ensured.

Organizational adjustments were unable to solve the problems, however. The functioning of all the above-described bodies, as well as of the *Korps Cadangan Nasional*, or National Reserve Corps, which all former guerillas had to join to await selection for and admission to the Army or demobilization, was hampered by enormous financial and administrative difficulties. The number of soldiers and guerillas qualifying for care was huge. Considering the 1948 plan for reducing the strength of the Republican Army from 400,000 to first 150,000 and eventually 50,000, about 350,000 men must have been concerned, not counting the many *lasykar* guerillas who had not entered the Army. These figures alone show how unrealistic and ambitious the 1948 demobilization plan was. Even if it was not wholly carried out, the number of people needing assistance for their return to society was still very high. According to contemporary estimates for 1951 and 1952, for instance by Didi Kartasasmita, Head of the National Reconstruction Bureau, between about 250,000 and 300,000 people were concerned (IM 15-8-1952, I 13-4-1951).

To pay all these people even a small allowance besides the costs of their transmigration and to provide loans to those wanting to start their own business or to entrepreneurs prepared to employ former guerillas and soldiers would have entailed an enormous financial burden. The more so if one remembers that the Indonesian Republic was already having difficulty in financing its standing Army. The problems were of such magnitude that in "1953 and 1954 purchases of new uniforms and textiles in general for Indonesian soldiers had to be stopped; and so appalling was the situation in the military barracks that this resulted in widespread 'demoralization (and) dangerous' excesses in the soldiers' attitude" (Mrazek 1978 I:106, quoting Nasution 1955:251–252, 258).

A second problem was provided by the registration of the former guerillas. To be eligible for the honorific "guerilla" or "freedom fighter" (*pejuang*), and so to qualify for government assistance, one had to be registered as such. This caused no difficulties where soldiers of the regular Republican Army or of guerilla organizations which had registered *en bloc* were concerned. But the situation was complicated by many others besides making, sometimes unjustified, claims on the basis of alleged participation in the war against the Dutch, while many

guerilla leaders, to enhance their personal importance, submitting lists exaggerating the number of guerillas they had had under their command – a trick also resorted to by commanders of the Republican Army.

To deal with the problem, the Government had to devise a definition of *pejuang*. It elected to call everyone so who had participated in the struggle for independence from the start of the second Dutch military action until the formal recognition of independence (Peraturan Pemerintah no. 16, 1954). This formula was still defective, however and Nasution complains that one of the reasons why it took so long to solve the problem of the former guerillas and soldiers who had returned to society was that the authorities were still looking for an adequate definition as late as 1954 (Nasution 1971 III:126). To add to the confusion, it was decided to introduce a re-registration. This was extremely difficult, four years after the end of the war. It created more problems than it solved, in fact, especially as in a number of regions, such as Kalimantan, the re-registration was suspended before its completion (IB 19-1-1955, 5-2-1955).

The failure of this scheme aggravated the former guerillas' sense of frustration only the more. This was particularly so outside Java, where the guerillas additionally had the feeling that they were being discriminated against in favour of their Javanese fellow-guerillas, and that they were being fobbed off with fair words, a few *rupiahs* and a piece of cloth. The slow pace at which the whole process of registration took place slowed down still further the care for the former guerillas, many of whom were living in poverty, thus making for an expansion of the reservoir of disillusioned former guerillas from which the *Darul Islam* movements recruited their followers.

Where the Republican Government had hoped that most guerillas would return to their villages of origin, this did not happen. As it turned out, demobilization for the most part only increased the already high number of un- and underemployed. Those who did return to their villages faced enormous problems of readjustment to village life. But many others went to the big cities. People coming from outside Java who during the revolution had fought in Java had to cope with the additional problem of transport and the fact that the local authorities of their home areas, viewing them as a potential extra source of trouble, were far from happy with their return, and in some cases tried to prevent it.

Even for those who were registered as former guerillas and were

allowed to participate in one of the Government projects, the hardships were anything but over. Quite often people failed to receive their allowances, equipment went astray, or housing and schooling facilities proved inadequate. In particular the management of the transmigration projects left much to be desired. It was reported from South Kalimantan, for example, that transmigrants and their families were made to live in only one room of two by three metres, and that there were no medicines and no schools for the children (IB 21-4-1955). In a number of cases the transmigrants rebelled against these poor living conditions. In August 1953, for instance, the transmigrants from Java at Tayan marched en masse on Pontianak to demand from the local authorities that they be sent back to Java. Also at Tayan disorders occurred which had to be put down by units of the Military Police and Mobile Brigade. These problems then prompted the Kalimantan authorities to refuse to accept any more transmigrants from Java (IB 7-8-1953, 8-11-1953).

## 2. *Regional Sentiments*

Not only the Republican Government's growing military presence, but also the increasing obtrusiveness of its civil arm aroused opposition. At the lowest level – in the villages –, especially where the inhabitants had got rid of the Dutch and of the traditional elite by their own efforts, this took the form of hostility towards any outsider meddling in local affairs. On a higher level, encompassing larger areas and embracing various villages, there was a strong current of anti-Javanese feeling and fear of Javanese domination. Accordingly the publications of the *Darul Islam* rebels in Aceh and South Sulawesi contained many appeals for resistance against Javanese colonialism, and both Daud Beureu'eh and Kahar Muzakkar tried to mobilize the masses against "Javanese Hinduism" or the "Madjapahitism of Soekarno".

These feelings were most explicitly worded in the publications of Hasan Muhammad Tiro. As these testify, regional sentiments blended with ethnic and religious differences. The *Darul Islam* movement in fact had a strong ethnic component. In South Sulawesi it rallied most support from the Makassarese and Bugis (and related ethnic groups), but none from, for instance, the Toraja. When it spread to other parts of the island it did so to regions with a high percentage of Makassarese or Bugis, such as the coastal area east of Bone Bay (by-passing the northern shore of

the Bay, which was a predominantly Toraja region).<sup>7</sup> In Aceh the movement's main area of operation was comprised by the *kabupatens* of Greater Aceh, North Aceh and Pidie, and parts of East Aceh. This region, which constituted at the same time the most densely populated part of Aceh, coincides with the Acehnese heartland. The other areas had experienced much more influence from Minangkabau and East Sumatra, and had a population of a different, though related, ethnic character. In Central and Southeast Aceh lived the Gayo and Alas, in parts of East Aceh the Tamiang (cf. Monografi 1970:11).

Nawawi, in his treatise on regionalism and regional conflicts (1968), actually distinguishes the *Darul Islam* movement of West Java (the only one he identifies as a *Darul Islam* movement at all, in fact) from the rebellions inspired by regionalism. He justifies this procedure "not only by the fact that it began before 1950, but also in view of its obviously non-regional nature". He classes the PRRI/*Permesta* apart for the same reason, as it "involved several widely separated regions and clearly was not based on specifically regionalist sentiment" (Nawawi 1968:14). Nawawi's arguments seem unfounded, however. For regional feelings definitely played a role in the *Darul Islam* risings not only in Aceh, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, but also in West Java.

For one thing, Nawawi underestimates the appeal of the idea of a state encompassing the whole of the territory of Indonesia, for which the *Darul Islam* rebels fought as well, and which furthermore eliminates the reason for treating the PRRI/*Permesta* separately. All regional movements in Indonesia, with the exception of the RMS, were based on a conception of some sort of Indonesian unity somehow. The *Darul Islam* strove for the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia, while the PRRI/*Permesta* sought to provide some form of Counter-Government as an alternative to the Republican Government. But both envisaged the Indonesian territory as some sort of a unitary whole. Regionalism is even so not incompatible with this. Considering exclusively the regional factor, the key aim was never separation, but only the highest possible degree of regional autonomy within the framework of a unitary or federal Indonesian State. The *Darul Islam* and the PRRI/*Permesta* both were configurations of individual rebellions whose common meeting-ground was opposition to what was felt to be domination by Java and which were thus fighting for a common cause.

The regional appeal was most pronounced in Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, it is true, but was not absent in West

Java. In speaking of Javanese domination, one was thinking not so much of the population of the island of Java, as of the Javanese of Central and East Java. Thus in West Java, too, there was opposition to Javanese domination, which went back to pre-war times. In some areas such anti-Javanese feelings were in fact quite strong. So Klaassen, the then Dutch resident of Priangan, related in 1946 by way of illustration of the animosity of the Sundanese towards the Javanese – in which he saw an effective instrument for checking the Indonesian Republic's influence in West Java – how the inhabitants of a particular Priangan village had vowed years previously not to eat any rice until the last Javanese had left the region. According to him the villagers had until that very day kept their vow (NIB VI:672). Many years later there were protest movements demanding the appointment to positions in the Civil Administration of people from West Java or Sundanese themselves. In June 1956, for instance, two leaders of an organization styling itself the *Front Pemuda Sunda*, or Sundanese Youth Front, were arrested for writing a pamphlet entitled "Crush the PNI and Javanese imperialism" (Tampubolon 1978:76).

Moreover, if, unlike Nawawi, one defines regionalism in a not too narrow sense – that of relatively large areas resisting the influence of other large, regional or ethnic, entities – the regional character of the *Darul Islam* rebellion, also in West and Central Java, becomes more evident. For opposition to the penetration of external influences in the village sphere and the direct confrontation with representatives of the Central Government's civil and military apparatus also constitute an aspect of regionalism. This is an aspect which makes people directly aware of the power of outside forces. In fact, it is a prerequisite for the existence of wider regional feelings, as it makes people susceptible to the appeals of those taking up regional causes. The influx of soldiers, military leaders and civil servants from other regions thus heightened the local population's sympathy for the rebels. This was true not only of Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, but also of West Java, Pekalongan and Kebumen, where the Republic's efforts to establish control constituted a root cause of the *Darul Islam* risings.

The Government, in fact, found itself caught in a vicious circle. It felt it could not trust the local population and local Army units to deal with local situations. However, the behaviour of its own troops which it sent to the relevant areas – in fact, the latter's very presence here – along with its appointment of out-

siders or other locally unacceptable persons as military and civil leaders further increased local feelings of discontent.

Initially the Government pursued the same policy with regard to the Civil Service as in the case of the Army. Just as the representatives of local guerilla units were considered unsuitable for important military positions, so the authorities fell back on members of the former pre-war bureaucracy or outsiders to the region for appointment to such positions in the Civil Service. This policy gave rise to accusations that the Central Government wanted to restore the traditional elite to power and that it was importing civil servants from Java.

At the proclamation of Indonesian national independence the provincial governors in the rudimentary administration of the time were still mostly "sons of the region". The governor of Sumatra, Teuku Muhammad Hasan, was a native of Aceh; the governor of Kalimantan, Ir. Pangeran Mohammad Noor, came from Martapura; the governor of Sulawesi, Dr. G.S.S.J. Ratulangi, originally came from Tondano, in the Minahasa; the governor of the Moluccas, J. Latuharhary, was a native of that same region; and the governor of East Java, R.M.T.A. Surjo (Suryo), was born in Magetan. Notable exceptions were the governor of West Java, Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo (Sutarjo Kartohadikusumo), who came from Blora in Central Java, and the governor of Central Java, R.P. Suroso, who came from Sidoarjo, near Surabaya.

At the lower levels the Republican Government simply took over the local officials who had worked for the Dutch and the Japanese. But this sowed discord between itself and the local revolutionary groups. Where the latter subsequently sacked or expelled the officials, it was obliged at first to simply acquiesce. Later, as its power increased, it usually intervened in such cases, however, imposing the changes it deemed necessary.

After the formal recognition of independence the situation was reversed, and as a rule governors no longer were natives of the region of which they were head. Dr. M. Murdjani, a native of Tulungagung in East Java, for instance, was appointed governor of Kalimantan in April 1950. Abdul Hakim, from Jambi, became governor of North Sumatra in January 1951, and Sudiro, who was a native of Yogyakarta, was appointed governor of Sulawesi in June 1951. The latter, moreover, was "a Javanese nobleman whose appointment . . . was justified precisely in terms of his long experience in dealing with traditional rulers" (Nawawi 1968:310).

Besides opposition to its policy in the appointment of higher and lower regional officials, the Republican Government had to deal constantly with demands from regional entities to be created autonomous *kabupatens* or provinces. The best-known example of this is Aceh, though similar demands were also to be heard in the rest of Sumatra and in Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Such claims were often coupled with the accusation that the Central Republican Government was insensitive to the interests of the regions, to the advantage of Java. Over the years the Government drew up a variety of plans for changes in the – to some extent arbitrary – boundaries of provinces and *kabupatens* and their adjustment to regional demands.

An even more difficult task was to establish a balance between central control and regional autonomy. A number of Regional Government Acts were drafted to define which tasks should be delegated and which should remain in the hands of the Central Government (cf. Legge 1961; Wajong 1972; Wajong 1975; The Liang Gie 1977). One facet of the problem concerned the transfer of government offices to the regional authority. Another involved the definition of the status and authority of the heads of the Regional Administration, who combined two mutually opposed functions – as governor, *bupati* or *camat*, they were members of the Government's civil service, while as *kepala daerah* they represented the respective regions. In the end the central interests prevailed. However, at times when regional discontent was at its highest, and when the Republican Government had to deal with the *Darul Islam* and PRRI/Permesta rebellions, there was a strong tendency to give in to regional demands. At one time even the abolition of the entire central civil service and the transfer of its officials to the Regional Administrations was considered.

### 3. *Economic Interference*

Behind all the conflicts loomed the matter of money. In Aceh, where many functionaries apprehended a weakening of their position in the event of greater control being exercised by Jakarta and Medan (the capital of North Sumatra), a good example of this is provided by Amir Husin al Mudjahid. During the revolution, when Aceh was a separate and semi-autonomous administrative entity, he gained control of the oil-fields in East Aceh as General Manager of the *Tambang Minyak Aceh*, or Aceh Oil Mining Company. This firm was renamed *Tambang Minyak*

*Aceh/Sumatera Utara* and extended its control to the oil-field at Pangkalanbrandan, in East Sumatra, after the second Dutch military action, when the Administration of North Sumatra was transferred to Banda Aceh. After Aceh's incorporation into the province of North Sumatra in 1949, however, the firm's headquarters were moved from Aceh to Pangkalanbrandan. The oil-fields of Aceh, moreover, were no longer managed independently by Amir Husin al Mudjahid, but came under the control of the Pangkalanbrandan headquarters (Monografi 1970:307–309).

People in the regions outside Java, where the main export centres were located, had the feeling that they were paying for the development of impoverished Java, without getting much in return, and that their interests were being seriously injured by the Central Government's economic and monetary policies. In a number of ways the population did, in fact, experience the adverse effects of the economic policies pursued by the Republican Government. Well intended though many of its schemes were, the results of some, such as that aimed at increasing the share of autochthonous Indonesians in the import sector and that with respect to the *Yayasan Kopra* or Copra Foundation, which tried to stimulate direct purchases from small producers, were negative. Another effect of the Government's policies, notably with respect to foreign trade, was that over the years the economic interests of Java, which was in general more import-oriented, were served at the expense of other areas, which were more dependent on export earnings. All in all there was a strong impression outside Java that the Central Government was seeking to centralize the economy to serve the interests of certain segments of Javanese society, which the outer regions already suspected of dominating the Administration. By concentrating on Java the Republican Government was neglecting the necessary development and improvement of the inadequate, run-down infrastructure outside Java, it was felt, thus preventing the development of trade and communication and hampering regional economic growth. Export earnings should be spent not on Java, but on the development of the regions from which the exports came. The income earned in the export sector, moreover, suffered severely as a result of inflation and the Central Government's policy in respect of the foreign exchange rate. The *rupiah*, as Feith (1962:490) observes, "was kept overvalued for the whole of the 1949-1957 period", while "the artificial exchange rate penalized certain parts of the country outside Java". Furthermore, also according to Feith, it "definitely penalized the



dominant social groups of the Outer Islands” and “in one sense it disfavored the general population of these islands, in as much as it drew away from them funds available for development investments” (Feith 1962:488).

This coincided (after the first half of 1951) with a sharp decline in income and purchasing power (Wirodihardjo 1956:71). Also at the same time the economic life and productivity were threatened by *Darul Islam* activities, which resulted in a drop in production and trade. This, in turn, strengthened the existing feelings of economic deprivation, which constituted a root cause of the rebellion itself. An added blow was the deterioration of the foreign market, where after the Korean war the prices for some of Indonesia’s export products, such as rubber, oil and tin, dropped sharply. Where in 1951 rubber had still fetched an average price on the New York market of US 59.07 cents per pound, in 1952 it only brought in US 38.57 cents per pound (Wirodihardjo 1956:125), the price dropping even further the next year. The effects of this were most serious for the population of areas with large numbers of smallholders engaged in rubber production, such as West and Southeast Kalimantan, Riau, Jambi and South Sumatra. Java and the other rubber producing areas of Sumatra – e.g. Aceh – also suffered, but not as greatly, as here estate agriculture was more important (cf. Thomas 1957; Smets 1951:D.1.3).

Also disruptive to some extent were the Republican Government’s attempts to control and reorganize important sectors of the economy. In the export regions there was much frustration over its attempts to control foreign trade earnings and to suppress smuggling, as it branded the relevant activities. Actually, however, it was interfering here in what the local population regarded as traditional trade relations, in particular in what may be described as “petty trade”. In any case, by supervising imports and exports in general it made its presence all the more clearly felt in the areas concerned.

Whereas the provinces did receive back a certain percentage of the duties levied on exports, for years they felt they should be getting, and hence demanded, a greater share. To the people in the outer regions it seemed as though their economic potential was being drained by the Government, which claimed a disproportionately high percentage of their export earnings, they felt.

The greatest impact of the Government’s policies, however, was felt in the import sector. Whereas exports in the early 1950’s were still dominated largely by Dutch and other foreign interests,

so that their reorganization on the whole was beyond the Republican Government's power, the situation in the import sector was totally different. One of the first steps taken by the Republican Government in this area was to ensure increased participation of autochthonous entrepreneurs in this sector. Within the framework of its "Indonesianisation policy", by which foreigners and Chinese were to be replaced by autochthonous Indonesians, it proceeded to reserve the import of certain goods to the latter category.<sup>8</sup> A limited number of firms headed by such autochthonous Indonesians – the so-called *Benteng* group – was licensed to import these goods.

Well-intended though it was, the scheme led to a sharp drop in local imports and shortages on the local markets. The restriction of the number of recognized import firms involved a decrease in the number of places where foreign products could enter Indonesia through legal trade channels. The remaining import firms became concentrated in the larger cities. Due to the poor transport system, the high costs of carriage, and the risk of encounters with armed bands, goods either did not reach the interior at all, or did so at too high a price. This, combined with mismanagement, made for a situation in which importers were saddled with large stocks of unsold supplies for which there remained a demand on local markets (Wirodihardjo 1956:70–71).

In Aceh there were initially plans for concentrating the *Benteng* firms in Lhokseumawe, Bireuen and Banda Aceh. When in 1951 the restrictions were relaxed, *Benteng* importers were allowed to operate also in other ports. Even so, the principal consequence of the new system was an overall decline in import activities. Goods which in the past had entered Aceh directly, now had to be imported via Medan, the seat of the major import firms. Before the trading system had time to adjust, the inflow of a number of goods – such as plastic bags, tinned cigarettes, fountain-pens and wrist-watches – virtually stopped (Sekitar n.d.:309).

Equally problematic was the Republican Government's decision to put a stop to the lively barter trade between Aceh and the opposite coast of the Malay Peninsula, in which the share of the Acehnese population was quite large as compared with the export trade involving foreign currency. When at the end of 1951 all barter trade was prohibited, local exports from Aceh almost came to a standstill (Sumatera Utara 1953:626). On top of this, upon Aceh's again becoming part of the province of North Sumatra in January 1951 the official export offices at Lhokseumawe

were closed. Lhokseumawe, which, along with Banda Aceh, had been Aceh's major export port, was of special importance for the export of resin produced in Central Aceh. With the closure of its export offices, the number of ships calling at Lhokseumawe of course decreased. Subsequently market activities in the area declined, and the price smallholders were able to get for their export crops fell (Sekitar n.d. 1:527).

Similar problems were experienced in Sulawesi. Here, too, the Central Government tried to put a stop to smuggling or illegal trading, and in the attempt severely damaged the economic life of towns like Parepare, which of old had been a centre of this form of trade. Parepare additionally lost its status as a port of entrance for goods legitimately brought into South Sulawesi. The *Benteng* importers in this area were concentrated at Ujungpandang and Menado. Only a small number of medium-sized firms, five in all, were left here, which were only allowed to import quality or semi-luxury goods (Sulawesi 1953:401).

The Central Republican Government was unsuccessful in its attempts at controlling foreign trade in both Aceh and Sulawesi. Despite its efforts to enforce its licensing policy and to keep waters under surveillance, illegal trading continued. In the *Darul Islam* territories goods were smuggled both in and out, now partly as the legitimate trade of the Islamic State of Indonesia. In South Sulawesi, for instance, the registered export of copra dropped sharply. After this branch of trade was taken over by Kahar Muzakkar's forces, copra became one of the principal exports of the Islamic State in South Sulawesi (Harvey 1974:322). Later, regional commanders of the Republican Army also actively engaged in smuggling, with the alleged aim of raising funds for their troops. Republican Government attempts to put an end to this kind of smuggling constituted one of the factors triggering off the PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion.

Alongside its efforts to control foreign trade and to impose import and export duties, the Republican Government tried to step up the production and improve the quality of export goods. However, its attempts at interference in the production of and trade in copra and rubber, well intended though they were, likewise backfired. Its measures were viewed as yet another example of government meddling in local affairs and as one more proof of the inefficiency and corruption of the government apparatus and of its disregard for regional interests.

The Republican Government's intentions in this respect were nevertheless good. For it aimed at improving the position of

smallholders and at cutting out the middlemen, feeling that products should be purchased direct from the producers. The quality of these products should be improved through agricultural education. In practice its attempts even so provoked much criticism.

In Sulawesi, which had copra as one of its main export products, and to a lesser extent in Kalimantan, the functioning of the *Yayasan Kopra*, or Copra Foundation, a continuation of the *Coprafonds* founded by the Dutch in 1940, came under attack. This foundation monopolized Indonesian copra exports until 1953, after which year private firms were allowed a share in legal copra exports. Even so, the Foundation remained the principal buyer on the Indonesian copra market. It seems to have scored some success in the furthering of the interests of smallholders by buying direct from them and restricting the role of the middlemen (cf. Sulawesi 1953:455–457). This did not prevent its provoking criticism almost immediately for offering too low a price to the producers (Metcalf 1952:67). It was furthermore accused of “mismanagement, of delayed payment to copra producers, of obtaining an unjustifiably large profit margin, and of misusing these profits to finance political party activities and to build luxurious homes for the Foundation staff in the new Jakarta suburb of Kebayoran” (Harvey 1977:35). The criticism was sharpest in North Sulawesi. In South Sulawesi the *Yayasan* was less prominent, as the production and marketing of copra here was partly controlled by the troops of Kahar Muzakkar. Hence the Foundation operated only in certain parts of South Sulawesi, such as Mandar, where it exported copra and imported rice to offset the drop in rice production caused by the rebellion (Masri 1959:4). Even so, the criticism did not fail to have its effects here, too, as it strengthened the prejudice against large government-controlled organizations.

Another export product of which the Central Government tried to improve the quality and marketing was rubber. Its rubber policy likewise upset producers and traders in this branch, though in a different way than in the case of copra. In its implementation of its long-term policy of improvement of the quality of smallhold rubber, the Republican Government came into direct conflict with the short-term interests of the farmers. Certain standards had to be imposed to ensure that the rubber exported was of high quality. This implied government control and supervision of cultivation, of rubber-tapping, and of the smoke-houses in which the rubber was processed.

The region in which the ensuing conflict was sharpest was Hulusungai, in South Kalimantan. Hulusungai was special in that here were a large number of smoke-houses owned by smallholders themselves, many of them set up without Government permission. Elsewhere the number of smallholder-owned smoke-houses was much smaller. In Hulusungai the first of these smoke-houses had been built in 1935, their number growing quickly after that – in 1936 there were already 369 of them, while in 1950 there were in the whole of South Kalimantan 1,725 legal smoke-houses, the owners of which held a permit from the Government (Kalimantan 1953:194–195).

The phenomenon of what is generally described as “illegal smoke-houses” first manifested itself in 1949. The smoke-houses concerned were those established on a co-operative basis by the ALRI Div IV. Between 1949 and 1951, 800 such houses were built in Hulusungai, 150 in Banjar, and 25 in Kapuas Barito (Kalimantan 1953:197). The monograph on Kalimantan published by the Department of Information (Kalimantan 1953:196–197) asserts that those responsible were people out to “fish in troubled waters”, and that most of these houses were built in insecure areas. It omits to mention, however, that these smoke-houses were set up within the framework of the ALRI Div IV’s plans for re-organizing the economy on a co-operative basis and of its economic war against the Autonomous Areas of Banjar and South-East Kalimantan. In a like way the Republican Government’s attempts after 1949 to close down illegal smoke-houses and the guerillas’ attacks on licensed smoke-houses were part of the Republican Government’s effort to establish control over the rural areas and of the local population’s resistance against this. In fact, the reports of smoke-houses being set on fire were among the first indications that a rebellion against the Indonesian Republic was taking shape in South Kalimantan.

#### *4. The Agrarian Structure*

The conflicts over the reorganization of the Republican Army, the policy with regard to the appointment of civil servants, and the economic policies still form part of the nation-building process in a newly independent state. Paradoxically, it was not people who had supported the Dutch or those who had taken a neutral stand in the struggle for independence, but groups which had actively supported the Republican cause which now rose up in arms against the Government. The grievances against it may

have been stronger in the *Darul Islam* areas, but this still does not set these regions apart from the others.

As the *Darul Islam* is a rural affair, it is worthwhile taking a look at the agrarian structure of the regions concerned and the changes which this structure underwent. In attempts to explain agrarian unrest and rural rebellions in general often such factors as shortage of land, the swelling force of extremely poor, landless peasants, and the excessive poverty of the rural masses are pointed out. Zagoria (1974:33–40), in his attempt to identify the conditions in Asian societies which contribute to agrarian unrest, for example, mentions land hunger, a “concentration of landless, land-poor, and sharecropping peasants”, “an increasing trend towards pauperization of the peasantry, and a high degree of parasitic landlordism”. As Mortimer (1974:100–102) points out, these conditions also obtain in Java, with the exception of the last one (high degree of parasitic landlordism). He accordingly believes one of the reasons for the low revolutionary potential of the Javanese peasantry to be the absence of big landlords and the low degree of differentiation within the peasant community, the great majority of which lives at or below the subsistence level. Agrarian unrest in Java, he writes, has “customarily taken the form of sudden, passionate outpourings of violence and agitation or equally idiosyncratic acts of withdrawal, rather than carefully laid and constructed designs of subversion”.

The *Darul Islam* rebellion, however, did display the latter characteristic. It is not dealt with by Mortimer, possibly because the Reader for which he and Zagoria wrote the relevant article is about “peasant rebellion and Communist revolution in Asia” (Wilson 1974), or possibly because the *Darul Islam*, with its overtones of reactionary, religious fanaticism, is considered unsuitable for socio-economic analysis.

The *Darul Islam* regions admittedly show a higher degree of differentiation in land ownership and wealth than the area studied by Mortimer – Central and East Java. On the other hand, they do not fit the picture outlined by Zagoria, as they fail to display the extreme pressure on land and poverty that characterize most of Central Java and East Java as well as other rice-producing areas in Asia. In West Java there was still land left for opening up, Hulusungai experienced a rubber boom, and Aceh and South Sulawesi were producing a rice surplus.

The aspect that is lacking in the theories that stress differentiation and poverty is the dynamic aspect, the process of change

that alters the structure of the community. Not the absolute poverty or wealth of a given community, nor the differentiation of wealth within it as such, but the socially unaccepted differences lie at the root of the various rebellions. In South Sulawesi, for instance, differences in wealth and land ownership had long been an accepted social fact. Only when it was no longer taken for granted that members of ruling families should own large tracts of land by virtue of their position in society did this become a cause of discontent. Nor is it increasing poverty as a result of more and more people having to live off the same area of land but rather the break-down of the old social structure that brought about the *Darul Islam* risings.

Attention should be given in this connection to the individualization of society. The effects of this were twofold. On the one hand it enabled some degree of concentration of wealth and land ownership. On the other hand it led to erosion of the traditional mechanism whereby society took care of its less fortunate members. It may be argued that in this respect the *Darul Islam* regions were ahead of other parts of Indonesia, where this process has only recently gained momentum, as is evident from the spread of the *tebasan* system, which came into vogue in Central Java and the north coast of West Java in the early 1970's. By this system farmers sell their crops to a middleman (*penebas*) just before harvesting. This enables them to evade the traditional obligations and the social pressure of the village. As a consequence, the number of harvesters employed may be drastically reduced and more efficient harvesting methods introduced (cf. Collier, Soentoro, Gunawan Wiradi and Makali 1973).

Wolf, in his study on *Peasant wars of the twentieth century* (1969), points to the changing status of land in peasant societies – namely from an attribute of the community or kinship group to a commodity that could be freely bought and sold – as a factor underlying the peasant revolts studied by him. He writes: “This was accomplished either by force which deprived the original inhabitants of their resources in land – as happened notably in Mexico and Algeria; or through the colonization of new land, unencumbered by customary ties, as in Cochin China; or it could be accomplished by furthering the rise of ‘the strong and sober’ entrepreneurs within the peasant community, who could abandon their ties to neighbours and kin and use their surpluses in culturally novel ways to further their own standing in the market” (Wolf 1969:278). This third alternative mentioned by Wolf appears to have been prevalent in the *Darul Islam*

areas. It only needs to be added here that the entrepreneurs do not necessarily have to come from the peasant community itself. They could, as in Aceh, be members of the ruling class who, without at first interfering in the village life, began by buying up the land to invest the money earned in trade. The process was accelerated by the expansion of the Colonial Administration and the commercialization of agriculture, and more particularly by the growing of export crops, which made farmers more dependent on market fluctuations. As Scott (1972), for instance, points out, these two factors changed the relationship between patron and client, or between the richer farmers and their less fortunate fellow-villagers, to the advantage of the former. Their opening up of the countryside and their backing by a strong outside force made the wealthier farmers (and the traditional elite) less dependent on local support and freer to ignore the old mechanism whereby they redistributed their surplus in the local community.

In general this picture is correct. However, it only constitutes one side of the coin. For just as the wealthier farmers and traditional elite became less dependent on the local community for their security and personal safety, so the latter became more independent of them in various ways than before. They needed less protection against the dangers of banditry and internal warfare. Thus greater wealth and more extensive land ownership, which formerly could be justified only by the fact that it provided the funds necessary for the protection of the local community, became less acceptable, as, for instance, in South Sulawesi.

Taking a close look at the *Darul Islam* regions, we see that they experienced the individualization of society and of land ownership already before the Second World War, so that it was more advanced here than in other parts of Indonesia. This may be inferred from a doctoral thesis published in 1941 by Vink, entitled *De grondslagen van het Indonesische landbouwbedrijf* (The foundations of Indonesian agriculture), which classifies Indonesia's agrarian societies into three broad categories, on the basis of the way in which the ties between the individual and the land are perceived and defined. So the first category is made up of societies in which there are strong ties between the individual and the land through genealogical connections. The second comprises territorial societies, in which the ties between a person and the land are defined through the village or district in which he lives. And the third group, which is of interest here, is that of free individual farmers. Now the latter type is stated by Vink to



be present in West Java, Aceh, Hulusungai, parts of Madura, and the more recent villages of Central and East Java. South Sulawesi is still placed in the second category by him, with the qualification that the territorial ties here are becoming weaker (Vink 1941:22–50).

One of the consequences of the weakening of genealogical and territorial ties is that people are free to buy and sell land. It has opened up possibilities for the concentration of land ownership and absentee ownership, and has stimulated the growth of a reservoir of landless peasants and labourers. Those allowed to own land in a particular area no longer have to be members of a particular kinship group of residents of the village or district concerned. This individualization of society is further characterized by the absence of communal rites and the decreasing importance of mutual aid. Social control, which might once have forced the wealthier section of village society to share its surplus in money or in kind with its fellow-villagers or to come to the latter's assistance in times of need, has become fairly weak.

It goes without saying that this situation also made it difficult for the demobilized soldiers and guerillas to return to their villages, as they could not be certain of re-occupying their former positions here.

### *The Priangan*

The above-mentioned individualization process was certainly observable in Priangan and Pekalongan. Signs of it were also discernible in Aceh, and to a lesser extent South Sulawesi. Hulusungai constituted a case apart, in view of the importance which rubber-growing acquired in this region.

The Priangan area (the *kabupatens* of Sukabumi and Cianjur – both of them administratively part of the Bogor Residency –, Bandung, Sumedang, Garut, Ciamis and Tasikmalaya) is well-known in the literature for its big land ownership (cf. Wertheim 1964:112–114). As early as the turn of the century Kern (1904) pointed to the growing prevalence of this phenomenon as a result of the purchase of land from less fortunate villagers, sometimes by way of the intermediate stage of the pledge. The *Welvaart-onderzoek* (Prosperity-Study) in Java and Madura of 1904 and 1905 also showed the Priangan to be an area with large landholdings (Hasselman 1914:37, 229). The region was characterized by “extensive landholdings, alienation of land to non-villagers and the emergence of landless peasants” (Alisjahbana 1954:47). Communal land ownership was almost absent (Hassel-

man 1914:295). Those owning large plots of land were “members of the *menak* [‘noble’] families, well-to-do villagers, merchants and *hadji*” (Alisjahbana 1954:53).

Figures on large land ownership in Java in 1905 and 1925 provided by Regelink (1931:120) show that this was largely restricted to the Priangan region. In 1905 there were 2,182 farmers who owned over 20 *bouw* (c. 14 hectares) of land in the whole of Java, about half of whom, 1,032 lived in the Priangan. In 1925 these figures were 3,387 and 1,226 respectively. Other figures for the 1920’s are provided by Vroon, according to whom 5.79 per cent of the land owners in the Priangan area owned 31.76 per cent of the land (Vroon 1929-1930, cited by Ploegsma 1936:53).

In the 1950’s the majority of the big land owners was still to be found in West Java. According to data provided by the Republican Ministry of Information there were in Java and Madura in 1957 19,285 farmers who owned over 5 hectares, and in the Javanese context could be considered big land owners. Of these, 9,965 lived in West Java, 4,281 in Central Java and 5,039 in East Java. By contrast, 1,754,723 farmers in West Java, 1,793,419 in Central Java and 1,398,147 in East Java owned less than one hectare (Hardjosudarmo 1970:60).

West Java also differed from the rest of Java in that it was less densely populated. According to the 1930 census, the population density of West Java was 244 per square kilometre, of Central Java 396 and of East Java 314. In West Java the density was high only in the plains of Bandung, Garut and Tasikmalaya. Nevertheless, the *kabupatens* of Garut and Tasikmalaya, due to their sparsely populated southern parts, still had an overall population density of less than 266 per square kilometre, as did the *kabupatens* of Sukabumi and Sumedang (Lekkerkerker 1938 I:196–198).

With time West Java gradually became more densely populated. The average annual population increase between 1920 and 1930 here was 23.88 per cent and between 1930 and 1955 19.15 per cent. For Central Java these figures were 16.72 per cent and 7.32 per cent respectively; for East Java 20.08 and 9.86 per cent (Reksohadiprodjo and Soedarsono Hadisapoetro 1968:14).

There are three main demographic trends to be distinguished here in the first half of the century. First of all there was the population movement to the plains of the north coast of West Java, to the *kabupatens* of Indramayu and Karawang, where new, fertile land was still waiting to be opened up. Secondly, there was

the immigration to South Priangan, in particular to the districts of Banjar, Pangandaran and Karangnunggal in Tasikmalaya, Pameungpeuk and Cikajang in Garut, Banjaran in Bandung, Sukanegara and Sidangbarang in Cianjur, and Jampangtengah and Pelabuhanratu in Sukabumi. These were the districts, with the exception of Banjar and Pangandaran, where most of the government forests and estates were located (Volkstelling 1933-1936 I:26). A proportion of the migrants to these districts were people from the northern Priangan area looking for employment on the estates, this representing the third main trend. These northern regions, except the districts to the north of Bandung (Lembang, Cimahi and Cikalong-Wetan), were pronounced emigration areas (Volkstelling 1933-1936 I:31-33).

This northern Priangan area was also the region where big land ownership was furthest developed. This was most evident around the main population centres (Kern 1904:1924). Here there were vast differences in wealth and size of holdings, a considerable degree of absentee land ownership, and a growing number of landless. The latter were forced to seek employment as sharecroppers, agricultural labourers, or workers on the estates and in small-scale industry, for example the textile industry in Tasikmalaya.

Absentee land ownership in this region seems to have been considerable even as early as the last decade of the 19th century. In the 1890's a study in the village of Bojongsalam, in Cicalengka, revealed 75 per cent of the *sawahs* to be owned by non-residents. In three other villages, in Ciparay, 41 per cent of the *sawahs* was owned by outsiders (Scheltema 1927-1928:24).

Two well-known more recent studies, conducted in the early 1950's, also give an idea of the differentiation in land ownership in this part of Priangan. The first is by H. ten Dam (published in English translation in 1961) on the village of Cibodas, the second by Adiwilaga (1953) on the village of Cipamokolan, both of which villages are located near Bandung. According to Ten Dam, 44 per cent of all the families in Cibodas were completely landless, 25 per cent owned a compound, 23 per cent were small land owners, and 6 to 8 per cent belonged to the category of what he styled small independent farmers, owning between two and a half and twelve acres (Ten Dam 1961:349, 357). The large land owners comprised roughly one and a half per cent. They owned about half of the land in the village, almost all of it the best-quality land (Ten Dam 1961:362). In Cipamokolan, according to the findings of Adiwilaga, 409 of the 1,302 land owners lived

outside the village (Adiwilaga 1953:12). They owned more than half the total *sawah* acreage of Cipamokolan. Their *sawahs*, too, were of the best quality (Adiwilaga 1953:26). Of the 896 resident farmers, only 14 owned over five hectares, together accounting for 116,114 hectares. By contrast, 50 per cent of the male population was looking for a job (Adiwilaga 1953:10).

More recently, Hiroko Horikoshi also pointed to the accumulation of land by the rich and the increase in absentee land ownership in the region since the turn of the century (Horikoshi 1976:18, 110). In the village studied by her, Ciparay, half the land had come into the hands of absentee land owners, who had moreover acquired the best land (Horikoshi 1976:111). She further noted that share-cropping is no longer a widely popular practice in West Java. The reason for this lay partly in the fragmentation of land holdings, partly in the fact that "the limited number of large land owners prefer well-experienced, skilled share-croppers in order to make maximum yield and profit" (Horikoshi 1976:121).

Consequently the rural population of Priangan comprised mainly the following groups: a small but powerful group of large (absentee) land owners, the *tuan tanah*; a slightly larger group of independent rich and middle-class farmers, the *tani kaya* and the *tani sedang*; and the mass of poor farmers, or *tani miskin*, the landless, share-croppers, farm hands (*buruh tani*), and workers on estates and in industry.

Over the years, differentiation has increased as poor farmers, and probably also a proportion of the middle-class ones, who under normal circumstances were just able to make ends meet, have lost their land to the wealthy farmers and landlords. This process has been facilitated by the impersonal and business-like attitude of the larger land owners, which was most pronounced among the absentee landlords. If there was question of the existence of any special condition it was not that of shared poverty, but of unshared wealth. The rich, instead of spending some of their wealth and excess food on care for their less fortunate fellow-villagers, on the contrary, tried to shift the burden of taxation and the risk of crop failure onto the poor.

Scheltema drew attention as early as 1925 to the practices whereby the owners of land passed on many of the risks to the poor farmers and share-croppers. He pointed to similarities between the leasing of land in Priangan and in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. The landlords, who were some of them at the same time money-lenders, had no direct

dealings with the poor farmers and share-croppers. They leased their land to big farmers, who in turn rented it out to poor farmers, showing these no mercy if they were unable to fulfil their obligations towards them owing to crop failure or for other reasons (Scheltema 1927-1928:22).<sup>9</sup>

The findings of Adiwilaga's much later study of Cipamokolan were still in agreement with Scheltema's observations. One of these findings was that individuals who had rented a piece of land did not as a rule cultivate it themselves, but sub-leased it again to share-croppers (Adiwilaga 1953:17). Adiwilaga, like Scheltema (1927-1928:34–38), was of the opinion that the conditions for share-croppers had become worse with time. Both authors pointed to the attempts of landlords and people sub-leasing land to pass the burden of taxation on to the share-croppers (Adiwilaga 1953:21, 27).

With respect to the relation between the concentration of land ownership and the rise of the *Darul Islam* movement an interesting theory is put forward by Kahin (1970:327–328). According to him, Chinese money-lenders towards the end of the Second World War started demanding a percentage of the crop instead of money in repayment of loans in order to offset their losses resulting from the high rate of inflation in the last year of the Japanese occupation. This increased resentment against the Chinese among the indigenous population, who due to the same high rate of inflation would otherwise have been able to pay off long-standing money debts without too much difficulty. As a consequence, after the proclamation of independence there arose "a tendency among many of them to repudiate the debts which they owed to the Chinese". The function of the Chinese as money-lenders subsequently was taken over by Indonesian landlords. The latter were not, like the Chinese, forbidden by law to own land. Hence, unlike the Chinese, they had the legal right to appropriate the land of debtors unable to pay their debts, and made ample use of the opportunity. Many people then lost their land to these landlords in this way. Kahin concluded that it is his "belief that the widespread discontent arising from this among the peasantry throughout much of West Java was utilized by the leaders of the *Darul Islam*, providing them with a major portion of their political capital".

The ousting of the Chinese as money-lenders may have been a contributing factor to the increase in the number of landless peasants, as Kahin argues. I personally, however, am more inclined to argue that if there was a concentration of land owner-

ship this was caused by other factors, and only represented the acceleration of a process that had been going on for a long time. As Kern (1904:1817) and Scheltema (1927-1928) already pointed out, the principal way in which large land ownership increased in the Priangan region was through the purchase and sale of land. Scheltema adds, moreover, that the role played by Chinese money-lenders in Priangan was relatively minor. So in 1901 only one of the total of 56 money-lenders here with a capital of over fl. 5,000 at his disposal was a "Foreign Oriental"; 26 of them were "*hajis*", and 23 "other well-to-do" farmers and merchants (Scheltema 1927-1928:20). Ten Dam (1961:370), too, is of the opinion that people had grown poor not because they had become indebted to merchants or middlemen, but "because a small number of their fellow-villagers were by hook or by crook able to get hold of a large share of the land in the village".

If the number of people who lost their land increased after 1945, this was brought about if anything by the insecurity arising from the struggle for independence (and the *Darul Islam* rebellion), and by the poor economic conditions of those days. For the period between early 1950 and mid-1951 Adiwilaga noted an especially high death rate on the Bandung plateau as a result of these unfavourable economic circumstances, in particular the high price of rice (Adiwilaga 1953:8). This factor most likely forced poorer peasants to sell their land in order to be able to buy food. Another reason why small peasants were compelled to sell their land which is put forward by Adiwilaga (Adiwilaga 1953:21), who notes that there were unusually many land transactions in the years 1951 and 1952. This is the introduction of a new income tax, or *pajak peralihan*. Unfortunately there are no data available on its consequences. But in some regions, notably the less insecure ones, it may indeed have further stimulated the concentration of land ownership. Elsewhere one must take into account the interfering factor of the decreasing demand for land and the consequent drop in its value because of the growing unsafety of working the fields and people fled to the cities in large numbers. Here a more equal distribution may actually have occurred.

Nevertheless, I agree with Kahin that the *Darul Islam* in West Java is likely to have drawn part of its following from among the new landless who had fallen victim to the practices of the landlords and the rich in selling them rice on credit – to feed their families or to plant their fields – or lending them money against

land as security. Subsequently poor farmers who could not pay their debts had their land appropriated. Or worse still, and as seems to have happened before as well as after the war, such poorer farmers were outright cheated out of their land. This involved cases where the creditor stipulated that the debtor formally transfer the deed of his land to him at the time the loan was made available. Then, even if the debtor did repay the creditor, the latter could, and did, go to court to claim the land as his legal property.

Besides the new landless, another group on which the *Darul Islam* could count for support was that of people who had been dispossessed for a long time and who were employed as farmhands or estate labourers. They were an unsettled group, not bound to any village by ties to land, however tiny a plot, and were thus completely free to join the bands in the mountains. They were, moreover, generally susceptible to radical ideas. As Ten Dam (1961:351) writes with regard to the farmhands in the village of Cibodas, they tended "to show an interest in political movements which promise a great deal and in messianistic movements of the *ratu adil* type". As I hope to demonstrate further down, the *Darul Islam* was not a purely Islamic rebellious movement, but it also possessed certain traits of a Messianistic movement.

A second remark by Ten Dam about the attitude of the farmhands is also of interest here. He writes that there were "signs that the 'little man', the farmhand, has begun to wonder what advantage he has gained from national independence" and that "discontent on this score does not tend to be directed against the group of well-to-do large land owners; it finds expression in a long-standing distrust of the intentions of officials, who are the personification of the state" (Ten Dam 1961:367). Above, in the description of the various *Darul Islam* movements, it will have become clear how important the disillusionment with actual independence and opposition to the penetration of the Republican civil and military apparatus into the villages were in inducing people to join these rebellious movements. In a way these sentiments are related to those involved in a Messianistic movement. The expectations of a golden age after the departure of the Dutch were unfulfilled.

#### *Traditional Authority*

Karl D. Jackson (1971), in his Ph.D. thesis entitled *Traditional authority and national integration: the Dar'ul Islam rebellion in*

*West Java*,<sup>10</sup> opposes the view that the *Darul Islam* rising in West Java is explainable from economic factors. In the first part of his study, which falls into two parts, he concludes at the end of a statistical survey of nineteen villages – six of which had supported the *Darul Islam*, seven of which had sided with the Republican Government, and six of which were so-called “swing” villages in that they had changed their allegiance in the course of the struggle – that: “It is difficult, if not utterly impossible, to use these data to support a theory of rebellion based upon economic differences between the villages” (Jackson 1971:133). According to him the choice made by the villages can best be explained in terms of what he calls “traditional authority”. Whether or not a particular village supported the *Darul Islam* was determined by the choice of its leaders, the people to whom the villagers were inclined to look for advice and guidance. He writes: “It is the contention of this dissertation that at critical moments of political choice effective political power is more likely to be mobilized by an appeal to traditional authority than to ideology, economic interests, or even basic value differences”. He then goes on to test his theory at greater depth by means of lengthy questionnaires distributed in three villages: one which had supported the *Darul Islam*, one which had remained loyal to the Republic, and one swing village.

Because his findings are at complete variance with the ideas developed in the present study, we will have to take a closer look at Jackson’s thesis. In so doing, three specific problems will be discussed. The first concerns the concept of traditional authority and the way this is perceived by Jackson; the second is connected with the way Jackson uses the results of his questionnaire and the pitfalls which his approach is likely to encounter; and the third pertains to the method involving statistical research without using contemporary or earlier data, but starting from the situation of a few years later.

The concept of traditional authority is central to Jackson’s study. Unable to isolate any other factors capable of explaining why particular villages took the side of *Darul Islam* and particular others did not, he concludes that it was through the mechanism of traditional authority that the choice was made. This he defines as “. . . a type of power . . . an interaction with the following characteristics: R, the influencer, sends a message to E, the influencee, and E adopts it as the basis of his behaviour 1) without evaluating the request of R in terms of his own standards, or 2) in spite of his initial evaluation of the request in terms of his



own standards and interests” (Jackson 1971:148). Elsewhere he states: “The subordinate obeys the superior without question about morals, religion, values, or ideology” (Jackson 1971:18).

In defining the concept in this way, Jackson explicitly distinguishes it from rational behaviour, although implicitly in the examples provided, he seems to acknowledge the rationality of this type of behaviour, too. Comparing it with patronship, he writes that it “thrives upon the economic and social inequalities that provide the optimum environment for patronship” (Jackson 1971:153). Nonetheless, it differs from the patron-client relation in that the latter “places too much emphasis on the material qualities of the exchange process between the leader and his followers” (Jackson 1971:154). In traditional authority, once “the bond is established, the relationship no longer turns on economic factors alone . . . the optimal strategy for accumulating traditional authority is to transform the follower’s perception of the transaction from one involving a debt of money into one involving a debt of moral obligation (*hutang budi*)” (Jackson 1971:155). It is this moral obligation that induces people to follow their leader without questioning his authority, to the exclusion of other motives.

The perception of traditional authority as a quality involving, as Jackson writes, “automatic, almost reflex action rather than a judgemental analysis of the pros and cons of the leader’s position on any given issue” (Jackson 1971:18–19), deprives the concept of much of its usefulness. It explains nothing exactly, because it can explain everything, like a key that fits any lock, and may even lead one to overlook obviously rational motives.

A good illustration of this is provided by one of the examples of the working of traditional authority given by Jackson himself. It shows how the people of a particular neighbourhood in the city of Bandung after the coup d’état of 1965 turned overnight from staunch PKI supporters into pious Muslims. Jackson, basing himself on the information of “a prominent military officer and politician who lived in the neighbourhood during the events of 1965”, explains the incident from a change of the person in whom traditional authority was vested, namely from a PKI leader to a local Army representative, or *Pembina Militer*. After the former traditional leader, the PKI man, had been put in jail, people automatically followed the new leader, the *Pembina Militer* (Jackson 1971:162–163).

In my opinion the people’s change of ideological outlook had nothing whatever to do with their automatically turning to a new

traditional leader. It was a mere matter of fear and power. Everywhere in Indonesia after September 1965 attendances at places of religious worship rose sharply, if only for the simple sake of avoiding suspicions of atheism and hence communism. If the neighbourhood members had remained openly sympathetic to the PKI they would have ended up in jail or a concentration camp, or might even have been killed. The mechanisms really at work become apparent from the explanation given by the military officer quoted by Jackson. According to him, the second-level leaders who had "been affiliated with the now jailed communist *bapak* were required to report each week to the military authorities. However, after some weeks of favors as well as reports to the military, they became affiliated with the new *bapak*, the *Pembina Militer*. After that these people were let off the hook in terms of their former PKI affiliations. Of course, after the second-level *bapaks* fell into line they carried all of the *anak buahs* (followers) with them, automatically causing a flip-flop of the whole area" (Jackson 1971:163).

All this does not mean to say that personal relations did not play a role in the *Darul Islam* rebellion. There were certainly long-standing relations of this type between leaders going back to the pre-war PSII and the *Suffah* institute. On the lower levels, too, such bonds, cemented by *pesantren* life, must have existed. They provide only part of the picture, however. Personal ties were sometimes broken right in the middle of the *Darul Islam* rebellion itself. There was at all times strife and discord among the leaders, who in some cases followed but in others flouted each other's advice. The *Darul Islam* leaders were moreover not automatically assured of the support they already enjoyed. Existing ties had to be periodically reconfirmed, if only by ceremonially stressing the grievances against the Republican Government or by giving the relation concerned some mystical content by linking up with *ratu adil* (just king) expectations.

The quotation of the military officer at Bandung brings us to the second problem in connection with Jackson's research: the problem of the extent to which its results are reliable and really show what they are meant to show. In other words, one should ask whether the information provided can be taken at face value.

The frequent references by Jackson's informants to traditional authority, *bapakism* and *hutang budi* can equally well be interpreted as elegant ways of masking the actual or threatened use of violence and circumventing delicate issues. When asked why one has gone to the aid of such and such a person, it is easier to reply

that this is because of a debt of honour than because of a debt of money. Saying that one will go to the assistance of a particular person and actually doing so are two different things. What Jackson has investigated is not actual behaviour but ideals and values. But things may turn out to be different if put to the test of reality. Though in reply to the question: "If you need help from a considerable number of people because you are in danger from those who want to do you harm, how many people could you call up who consider you their advisor and patron?" (Jackson 1971:239) an informant may claim that a lot of people will come to his assistance, the actual number may be nil, as is illustrated by the Bandung case. Another example is provided by what happened in one of the swing villages (which displayed the typical traits of a *kongres* attitude). Here in 1965 one of the top traditional authorities found himself out of support when, as a member of the left wing of the PNI, he "was deserted by the chief man of the village and by the commoners because he had become a threat to Tjankuan's ability to adapt to the outside world" (Jackson 1971:517).

The same can be said about questions like: "As a result of his help in the form of money, do you feel morally indebted – hutang budi – towards him?", and "If you felt hutang budi, how far would you go in order to repay it?" (Jackson 1971:235). In Western societies many people, if asked whether they would go to the assistance of a drowning man, would probably answer "yes", with perhaps a disproportionately high percentage of the respondents saying that they could not swim.

The third problem to be discussed concerns Jackson's conducting his research into the contributing factors a few years after the suppression of the *Darul Islam* rebellion. After comparing the nineteen villages on the point of economic structure, geographic proximity, access to modern services, and demographic structure, he concludes, upon finding no significant differences as regards the first three variables, that "it appears that one of the best indicators of whether a village was part of the D.I. is a demographic one . . . because a large number of males went to the mountains and served long years with the forces of Kartosoe-wirjo" (Jackson 1971:141). This immediately shows what Jackson is doing. He is looking for current indicators of whether or not a particular village is an ex-rebel village – which is an already known thing anyway. This may be the same as – but can on the other hand also be something completely different from – looking for indicators of the motives for joining the *Darul Islam*.

Three remarks may serve to illustrate this. Jackson began his research with the following as one of his assumptions: "The rebellious villages, particularly those that fought hard and long against the central government, would tend to be the villages that were cut off from the mainstream of national life by impassable roads or other features of terrain" (Jackson 1971:134). As it happens, there were no differences in this respect at the time of his research. This may also have been the case at the start of the *Darul Islam* rebellion. However, we lack the relevant information as to whether, and if so where, the infrastructure was improved in later years. Moreover, as a result of the activities of the *Darul Islam* bands themselves, accessibility was not simply a matter of presence or absence of roads, buses and trains. It is true that, as Jackson points out, pro- and anti-Republican Government villages could be adjacent. Nevertheless, there remains the question of where these villages were located and how accessible they were to Republican and *Darul Islam* troops respectively.

The same holds true for access to modern services such as medical aid and counselling by agricultural and forestry officials. Jackson "assumed that pro-government villages would have garnered more of the fruits of independence than their rebellious counter-parts" (Jackson 1971:138). This proved to be incorrect, but again, before any conclusions can be drawn, the time factor must be taken into account. At the time of the *Darul Islam* rebellion no government services penetrated deeply into the interior because of the risks of attack. They could only be extended after the suppression of the rebellion. By that time, moreover, it was the Republican Government's stated aim to step up development in formerly insecure regions in an attempt to win over the local population. The former *Darul Islam* strongholds became, so to speak, the target of a pilot project inspired by the new conception of the Republican Army's civil mission. As Mrazek (1978 II:79) writes, in the military operations carried out in West Java following Kartosuwirjo's arrest "one of the most significant principles . . . was to gain the confidence of the people . . . to rehabilitate the village administration, educational system, communications, etc.". Within this same context stress was laid upon the construction and repair of roads and bridges, which further corroborates our argument that the use of the present state of the infrastructure as a variable is open to objection.

Jackson further failed to find systematic differences between the economic structures of the villages of his survey. So he

writes: "If the D.I. rebellion had been merely a division between 'haves' and 'have nots' one would expect the D.I. villages to be the ones that would report insufficiency of rice production and the presence of famine in 1963-64. If economic determinism played a part in the recruitment of villages to the D.I. the rebel villages could be expected to show the greatest food scarcity. This is not the case according to the aggregate data" (Jackson 1971:130). His data, in fact, show that "five of the six D.I. villages fall into the classification indicating high frequency of individual land ownership. In contrast, four out of the seven pro-government villages fall into the category of relatively narrow individual land ownership" (Jackson 1971:131).

Here Jackson is treading on very dangerous ground. Land ownership, in fact, may have been one of the conditions that was most seriously upset by the *Darul Islam* rebellion. There are indications – but this requires more thorough research – that the *Darul Islam* rebellion unintentionally resulted in a more equal distribution of land. As a consequence of the rural unrest and the insecurity of the interior, of both the Republican Army and the Islamic Army operations, and of the mass evacuations, for a time land prices in Priangan actually dropped. As indicated above, the Ministry of Information's monograph on West Java notes that many land transactions took place in the more insecure regions in 1952. Land was sold or rented out here as a result of the owners having fled to the cities and needing money simply to keep alive or to start some new venture there (Djawa Barat 1953:448). Of course another possibility is that the land vacated was bought up by the wealthier farmers and landlords, who probably recovered more quickly from the initial blows, as they also did after the struggle for independence. As was said above, this needs further research, as does the question of how land ownership was affected by the land reforms of the early 1960's. Until such time as we have more insight into these matters, it is impossible to admit the present state of land ownership as a variable whereby to determine why some villages sided with the *Darul Islam* and others did not.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, the use of the food production of a village as a variable for comparison in one's attempts to identify economic indicators is open to criticism. A better approach would seem to be to study the internal economic structure of and economic differentiation within the villages concerned, placing them against the background of the aggregate data from the wider region. It would probably be more worthwhile looking at Prian-

gan as a whole, taking into account the difference in economic structures between the north and the south.

If it is true that, as I am inclined to believe, a proportion of the *Darul Islam* followers were members of the new and the old classes of landless persons, even so the fact that a given village included a high percentage of landless persons cannot in itself be taken as an indication that this village sided with the *Darul Islam*. One of the inherent characteristics of the landless class is that its members are relatively mobile individuals who may freely leave their village of origin. So in point of fact the reverse may have been true, and villages with an initially high proportion of landless may have been the ones which remained loyal to the Republic, as many of the landless had left to join the *Darul Islam* in the mountains.<sup>12</sup> We have to differentiate between two different kinds of situations here. On the one hand there were the villages which lay in the *de facto Darul Islam* territory and which supported Kartosuwirjo by choice or under constraint. On the other hand there were the villages outside these regions from which the *Darul Islam* drew part of its support.

Our conclusion must be, then, that in view of Jackson's methodological errors his data cannot be used for further research. These errors stem partly from his disregard for the historical process, partly from his failure to consult pre-war Dutch literature on the agrarian structure of Priangan, as a result of which he remained unaware that the findings of his survey were in contradiction with developments which had been well under way since the turn of the century.

If we wish to formulate hypotheses about the economic variables which may have contributed to the *Darul Islam* rebellion, the best procedure would seem to be to consult the pre-war literature first, all of which points to growing differentiation in land ownership and a swelling mass of landless in Priangan (cf. Wertheim 1964:110–117; Tichelman 1975:186–189). This literature further provides evidence of a process of “individualization” here. Alisjahbana, for instance, draws attention in this connection to the absence of communal rites for the “worship of the ‘Soul of the Village’, the founder of the village, which is typical of Middle and East Javanese villages” (Alisjahbana 1954:47). The absence of this rite is also mentioned by Vink (1941:49), who adds that in addition the institution of mutual assistance has virtually disappeared. It is interesting to note here that the resident of Priangan observed as early as the turn of the century that the position of the village head in this region was radically

different from that in the rest of Java because of the absence of apanlage land and the existence of individual land ownership. His power was more restricted and the independence of the villagers greater (Hasselman 1905:61).

This fact – combined with the hostility towards the traditional elite which was manifest already before the war (cf. Young Mun Cheong 1973) but especially so during the revolution – would seem to point to a situation the opposite of one of “traditional authority” as defined by Jackson.

### 5. *The Other Regions*

#### *Pekalongan*

If we now turn to Central Java, and more particularly its *Darul Islam* areas of Pekalongan and Kebumen, the first thing to be noted is the link, through migration, between these areas and West Java. Both areas experienced the largest exodus of migrants from Central to West Java before the Second World War. From Pekalongan, and notably Brebes, people emigrated mostly to Karawang and Indramayu; and from Kebumen and adjacent Karanganyar to the districts of Banjar and Pangandaran in Tasikmalaya (Volkstelling 1933-1936 I:24–25; II:28).

The two features of the economic structure which were underlined in the case of Priangan as factors which might explain some of the *Darul Islam* support there are also in evidence in Pekalongan. In the latter area, too, there are a concentration of land ownership and a reservoir of landless labourers. In 1905 the residency of Pekalongan counted the second-highest number of large land owners after Priangan, having 334 land owners with holdings of over 20 *bouws*. In 1925, according to the same source (Regelink 1931:120), Pekalongan ranked only ninth in this respect. Nevertheless, the increase in concentration of land ownership seems to have continued. Also in the year 1925 it was noted that in Brebes the land had come into the ownership of a small minority as a consequence of usury and there were scores of “*hajis*” owning as much as a few hundred *bouws* (Economische Kroniek 1925:314). This observation was made in an article on the position of money-lenders, with emphasis on the role of Arabs as such. It does not specify whether the large land owners were autochthonous Indonesians or Arabs, who, as is disclosed in an article on Pernalang (Lucas 1977:91), controlled considerable areas of land through Indonesian wives.

Pekalongan also included a large group of day-labourers,

employed partly in agriculture, on the sugar estates stretching along the coast, and in all kinds of industries, of which the *batik* one was the most important. In the *kabupaten* of Tegal these constituted 25 per cent of the labour force, the highest percentage for the whole of Central Java. Another special characteristic of Tegal, which it shared with Pemalang, was the relatively high number of male unemployed (Volkstelling 1933-1936 II:87, 92).

Djoko (1974:157) and Lucas (1977:89), in their articles on the social revolution in Pekalongan, point to the increasing number of landless and the general impoverishment of the population here. According to Lucas (1974:167), "The Dutch trained civil servants, the *pangreh praja*, considered the sugarcane factory areas to be 'hardship' postings, which were especially difficult to administer with the high crime rate, gambling, and prostitution centered around the Sub-District towns".

This hardly fits in with the concept of agricultural involution or shared poverty. Pekalongan, in fact, formed one of the exceptions which Geertz himself pointed out for "the sugar areas where villagers were forced into more extreme measures", and did not follow the course of shared poverty whereby economic resources are divided into "a steadily increasing number of minute pieces" (Geertz 1963:97).

The position of these labourers did not improve upon the attainment of national independence, either. Their pay remained only just sufficient for their daily food, while employment opportunities decreased, partly as a result of the declining demand for *batik*, which especially seriously affected the industries in Pekalongan (Djawa Tengah 1953:230-231). As has already been pointed out before, a kind of vicious circle existed here. The poor economic situation which provided a fertile soil for the rise of gangs of bandits was in its turn further aggravated by the insecurity of the rural areas. Estates were unable to operate at full capacity because of bandit activity, and industries were forced to close down as the demand for their products declined or the latter were unable to reach the local markets. Consequently the socio-economic conditions and employment opportunities grew more unfavourable. As the government monograph on Central Java (Djawa Tengah 1953:332) puts it, the landless had a choice between two alternatives: to take active steps to improve their lot and become bandits, or to accept their fate passively and become dropsy cases.

The information on the two other areas of Central Java from which the *Darul Islam* drew its members, but in which the move-



ment itself displayed less tenacity than elsewhere, does not point to these same features. Kebumen was an extremely poor area. Before the Second World War the plain of Bagelen, in which Kebumen is situated, had been one of the Javanese areas from which the most contract labourers had been recruited for work outside Java (Scheltema 1929:412–414). Even at the beginning of the century the southern part of the plain had a reputation as an insecure area, where murder and theft were rampant (Van der Jagt 1955:361). In Klaten, the area of origin of the rebellious members of the 426 Battalion of the *Diponegoro* Division, the rebels reportedly could count on the support of the Muslim land owners, who regarded the battalion as an instrument for defending their interests against the demands of farmhands for the redistribution of land (Subekti 1952:15–16).

### *South Sulawesi*

South Sulawesi and Aceh are characterized by Vink respectively as a region where territorial ties were still important and as an area with free individual land ownership. In both regions large land ownership was associated with members of the traditional ruling class.

South Sulawesi has a relatively high population density, at least for the outlying islands. According to the 1930 population census this density at that time varied from one to two hundred per square kilometre (Volkstelling 1933-1936 V:8). It is furthermore one of Indonesia's major rice-producing areas, with a large *sawah* acreage, particularly in Bone, Parepare and around Ujungpandang. This, combined with the fact that it is populated mainly by Makassarese (in the southwest) and Bugis (in the centre and the east), sets the area apart from the rest of the island.

Though the soil is not of top quality, South Sulawesi has for years produced a surplus of rice and maize (Sulawesi n.d.:408–410). Food production suffered severely from the unrest ensuing from Kahar Muzakkar's rebellion, however. Fields either were destroyed or remained unplanted, and inland transportation, not only of food but also of other commodities, was seriously hampered. As a result regional shortages of rice occurred already in the early 1950's, for instance in Mander, where rice had to be imported from 1952 on (Masri 1959:4). At the end of 1963 a rice shortage was even reported for the whole of South Sulawesi (Jasmi 1968:30).

According to Vink's classification (1941:43–44), South Sula-

wesi did not yet belong to the type of society having free individual agriculture. Territorial ties were still important, although Vink observed that these ties were becoming weaker.<sup>13</sup> The field notes of the anthropologist Kennedy also point in this direction. When he visited Gowa in 1949 he noted that land ownership here was private and that any Indonesian could buy land (Kennedy 1953:62).

Large landholdings and absentee land ownership were also found here, though they possessed a special character. Among the many small farmers here there were a few large landholders, usually members of ruling families. South Sulawesi possessed a high stratified society with a nobility at the top and the common people below them, and in older times the slaves at the very bottom. These differences in social position were reflected in wealth and land ownership. The rulers and members of ruling families held large tracts of land, in most instances in virtue of the offices they occupied.

Tideman (1933) in his description of Enrekang, Chabot (1950) in his thesis on Gowa, Wesseling (1939) in his article on agrarian customary law in Wajo, Kriebel (1919) in his report on Selayar, and Rookmaker (1924) all point to the existence of large land ownership in one form or another. Some of their descriptions also show how the rules regulating land ownership were circumvented.

Wesseling (1939:405), for instance, describes the attempts of the local administration in Wajo to re-establish communal rights with respect to certain types of land which in the course of time had become private property. The reason for this was that regional heads had acquired disproportionately large holdings of land through abuse of power. Control over larger areas of land might further be secured by lending money against land as security, especially where customary law precluded the outright sale of land (Rookmaker 1924:521). In many cases, as Peddemors (1935:41) argues for Sidenreng, it was in fact better because of the large sums of money involved, to speak of selling with the right to repurchase than of mortgaging.

Detailed information is provided on the subject by Chabot (1950:40–44). In the village of Bontoramba in Gowa which he studied he discovered that households owned on average 54 acres of *sawah* and 69 acres of unirrigated land. Of the total *sawah* area the villagers held 160 hectares, while the remainder of the village agricultural land (almost 290 hectares) was in the hands of relatives of the Ruler of Gowa.

An additional characteristic of South Sulawesi, according to Chabot (1950:110–114), was that there was no shortage of land which forced people to work the land of others. The people who worked the fields of the landlords were the latter's retainers. Landlords owning many *sawahs* in different villages as a rule appointed a representative in each of these villages to act as overseer, who in turn selected the tillers. It was dependent on the personality and prestige of the landlord and his overseer whether they succeeded in recruiting sufficient people to work these *sawahs*. Chabot further points out that it was very difficult for a non-noble to find a good manager and thus secure an adequate number of tillers, which provided an obstacle for rich merchants to invest in land. Nevertheless, in another part of his thesis (Chabot 1950:58) he speaks of traders who had grown rich in the past ten to fifteen years and had become large land owners in Parepare and used migrant labourers to work their fields.

Chabot's observation on the availability of uncultivated land does not hold true for the whole of South Sulawesi. In some areas there was a shortage of land, as parts of these areas consisted of jungle and mountainous terrain. This was the case in Soppeng for instance, where many people were forced to leave their native village to seek a living elsewhere (cf. Opdyke n.d.:24). Other sources corroborate that Chabot's observation is only partly correct. Nooteboom (1938:627–628) points to the custom in force in South Sulawesi, not only among the poor but also among the better-off, of going to other areas to work as labourer during harvest-time. In fact, the whole of South Sulawesi was one of the well-known emigration areas in Indonesia already before the Second World War. In Parepare as much as 25.1 per cent of the population regularly left their place of residence for shorter or longer periods (Volkstelling 1933-1936 V:47–48).

Like West Java and Pekalongan, South Sulawesi had its share of big land owners, and also of landless peasants and share-croppers. It was on the way to a more individualized type of society. Rules on land ownership were apt to be evaded, while at the same time the position of the ruling class came under frequent attack. Due to the increased safety since the turn of the century, the latter's function as protectors of society – one of the important reasons why they had formerly been able to attract followers – had suffered a weakening. Their subsequent association with the Dutch administration, as well as the introduction of modern ideas, had eroded their prestige still further. The importance of

territorial ties was waning, too, making possible a greater concentration of land ownership. One of the first effects of this was a decrease in social differentiation. That members of the ruling class should control large areas of land as a corollary of the offices they held was no longer taken for granted. They could hence no longer rely fully on their prestige and authority for success in recruiting retainers and thus tillers for their land. The result was a decline in their wealth.

Because of the association of large land ownership with the nobility in South Sulawesi it is impossible to distinguish clearly between Kahar Muzakkar's attempts to achieve a more egalitarian kind of society as a reaction against agrarian conditions or as an expression of opposition to the ruling elite.

### *Aceh*

The situation in Aceh resembled that of South Sulawesi. In Aceh there existed the same connection between the ruling elite and large land ownership, although here the concentration of land ownership in the hands of the *ulëëbalang* was of more recent date, but at the same time more pronounced. Aceh likewise had become a rice surplus area, having experienced a considerable increase in rice production in the last years of Dutch rule. Whereas in 1938 the region produced only enough rice to feed its own population, after that year it exported this cereal in increasing quantities, in 1941 already as many as 36,000 tons. Rice from North Aceh's "rice barn", Pidie, as well as from the northwest of East Aceh went to the East Coast of Sumatra. It was also exported from Southeast Aceh, the Gayo and Alas areas, and from the west coast of Aceh. The only areas which were unable to produce enough rice were Greater Aceh (containing the urban centres Banda Aceh and Sabang) and the northeastern part of East Aceh (an area in which agricultural estates and oilfields were concentrated) (Piekaar 1949:26). To this day Aceh has remained a region of surplus rice production (cf. Hasan 1976). Production here dropped for only a short interval as a consequence of the neglect of *sawahs* and irrigation systems during the Japanese occupation and a few subsequent years. This decline was also caused by the economic attitude of Acehnese farmers and their keenness to change to crops that were more profitable. So in 1950 many *sawahs* were abandoned in favour of *Pogostemon cablin* (an aromatic plant producing patchouli oil) and rubber (Sumatera Utara 1953:572–573).

In the description of the Daud Beureu'eh rising reference was

already made to the extensive landholdings of the *ulèëbalang* in Pidie and to the wealth accumulated by the latter before the Second World War. With respect to Greater Aceh, Kreemer mentions the frequent sale of rice-fields after harvesting and the mortgaging of land. In this way large *sawahs* became the property of money-lenders, who then leased these again to the original owners or the mortgagors for share-cropping (Kreemer 1922-1923 II:368–371).

Siegel (1969:27) and Piekaar (1948:8) both underline the *ulèëbalangs'* position as large land owners, as well as their considerable interests in trade, especially the pepper trade, which was of particular importance on the east coast of Aceh. The *ulèëbalang* were not traditionally landlords. They only began investing in land after the establishment of Dutch rule at the beginning of the century (Alfian 1976:52–53), when, having grown rich in trade, they began accumulating land for the cultivation of rice and pepper. As a result of providing capital for new pepper fields, they then came to have interests not only in the pepper trade, but also in pepper production (Chew Hock Tong 1974:131–132; Kreemer 1922-1923 I:35–36). By the end of Dutch rule they furthermore controlled rice-milling (Reid 1979:14).

Looking at pre-war Acehnese society from this perspective, it seems to represent a modification of Wolf's hypothesis that one of the factors underlying peasant revolts is the changed position of land as brought about by entrepreneurs within the peasant community itself having broken free from both territorial and kinship constraints (Wolf 1969:278). It was not the villagers who acted in a new way, but the traditional *adat* chiefs, who had hitherto interfered little in village life. It was the resultant changes which provoked and strengthened the anti-*ulèëbalang* feelings which culminated in the so-called social revolution. It is no coincidence, then, that the most violent actions occurred in Pidie, where the concentration of land ownership had progressed furthest.

If we go looking in the agrarian structure for factors which may have been responsible for the tenacity of the *Darul Islam* rebellions, we should be careful to remember in the case of Aceh that agrarian relations here had already changed drastically as a result of the social revolution, which had already led to a redistribution of land. Accordingly the support which the *Darul Islam* movement enjoyed here may be partly explained by the existence of fears that the Republican Government might undo the achievements of the social revolution and deprive people of their newly

won economic position, or that it might try to re-instate the *ulèëbalang*. Another point to consider in this connection is that not everyone benefited by the social revolution, and that the very elements of the agrarian structure which helped to provoke this revolution remained present afterwards. Land continued to be an article of private property which could be bought and sold freely.

Another far-reaching consequence of the social revolution was the almost disappearance of the pepper-growing industry. Pepper production dropped sharply as a result of neglect and crop disease, of the decline of the money trade during the revolution, and of the elimination of the *ulèëbalang*. Before the Second World War, 4,000 hectares had been under pepper. In 1951 there remained only 140, of which 60 consisted of newly planted fields, which were not yet productive (Sumatera Utara 1953:578; Soeyatno 1966:61). The impact of this must have been enormous. Pepper growers and workers had to become ordinary farmers again or to seek other employment, while additionally an important element of the pre-war trade structure disappeared.

Concentration of land ownership was one aspect of pre-war Aceh society. Another was the development of the estate and mining sector which came with the expansion of Dutch rule. The labourer group in Aceh was larger than in South Sulawesi, where the estate and mining sectors were relatively undeveloped. In Aceh, according to the 1930 census, the workers on "non-native estates" constituted 8.1 per cent of the labour force. This is a low figure in comparison with an estate area *par excellence* like East Sumatra where it came to 45.2 per cent, but is still quite significant, and in the rest of Sumatra was only surpassed by Lampung (13.3 per cent) and Bengkulu (9.8 per cent) (Volks-telling 1933-1936 IV:110).

Rubber, coconut and oil palm estates were found in the north-eastern part of East Aceh (Tamiang and Langsa), in Meulaboh, in South Aceh, and to a lesser extent in Central and Southeast Aceh, in particular around Takengon (Piekaar 1949:26-27; Lekkerkerker 1916:248-249; Boediono and Ibrahim Hasan 1974:40-41; Kreemer 1922-1923 I:431-440). The oil-fields were located in East Aceh.

After 1950 a number of these estates developed links with the *Darul Islam*. Some of them were given in lease to former military commanders and their demobilized guerilla followers. So Said Abubakar was given a rubber estate to work at Langsa, and Iljas Lebai a coffee estate at Takengon. At the outbreak of the Daud

Beureu'eh rebellion some of these new managers joined it. According to Republican Government sources Said Abubakar even took Rp. 300,000.— reserved for wages for the labourers with him (Sekitar n.d. I:48, 340; III:48).

Summing up the situation in Aceh, it can be said that although changes in the agrarian structure here contributed to the social revolution, their role as a factor underlying the *Darul Islam* rebellion is less clear. The group of estate and mine workers should definitely be taken into account, though data on the extent and nature of their contribution to the *Darul Islam* forces are lacking. As a proportion of the estate labourers were former guerillas, there must have come support from this group. On the other hand, the estates relied partly on non-Acehnese for their labour.

### *South Kalimantan*

As already indicated, South Kalimantan occupies a place apart, due to the important role of rubber-growing in this area. Besides, it was the rice-barn of Kalimantan as a whole. So in the early 1950's it contributed 180,000 tons to the total Kalimantan rice production of 250,000 tons (Kalimantan 1953:204). A principal rice-growing centre was the Hulusungai area, the base of the Ibnu Hadjar rebellion; another was Ulin, which supplied Banjarmasin with its rice. Hulusungai, although its soil is generally described as poor, under normal circumstances was able at least to meet its own needs and produce a small surplus for export (Broersma 1927:115). Hulusungai was moreover the most populous part of Kalimantan, with a population density of between 23.8 per square kilometre in Tanjung and over one hundred in Barabai (Volkstelling 1933-1936 V:8). The area's most salient feature, however, was rubber cultivation. According to Velsing (1925:213), in 1925 about seven per cent of the Hulusungai population was engaged in this branch of agriculture. The 1930 census (Volkstelling 1933-1936:101) states that in Barabai and Amuntai 4.3 and 2.5 per cent of the work force respectively practised rubber-growing as their main occupation. Both Velsing (1925:227) and Broersma (1927:110) express the opinion that rubber provided the basis for Hulusungai's relative prosperity.

Rubber-growing was a recent industry to the area, the first trees here having been planted in 1910 (Velsing 1925:201–204). Being a new economic activity, it made the region very sensitive to external market movements. Velsing (1925:226–227) nevertheless argues that the effects of an unfavourable market were not so serious here, as rubber-growing remained a secondary

activity, the earnings of which were used for the purchase of luxury articles. Even when the rubber market totally collapsed, as in 1921 and 1922, Hulusungai managed to preserve its prosperity. However, this is probably only true for short periods of declining rubber prices, and even then for only part of the population. Feuilletau de Bruyn (1933:190) has observed, for example, that in years of low rubber prices emigration from the Hulusungai area was greater than in other years. So in 1921, 4,000 people emigrated from Barabai alone, and 1,569 from Tanjung. In 1924, a good rubber year, these figures were 2,500 and 289 respectively.

In other respects, too, rubber proved a disaster in disguise. When rubber prices were high people tended to neglect their rice fields and irrigation channels. This, combined with the effect of war, in 1951 led to serious food problems (N 27-4-1951).

The population of Hulusungai is described in the literature as extremely individualistic (Vink 1941:48) and mobile. So there were people from this area, Banjarese, to be found in Sumatra, Sulawesi and the Malay Peninsula. There was, in fact, a high percentage of emigration from the area: in Barabai 22.3 per cent, and in Amuntai 18.1 per cent (Volkstelling 1933-1936 V:47).

Such high figures are indicative of weak territorial and genealogical ties. The influence of the community and the social control exercised by it were indeed slight. Broersma (1927:120) even concludes that the indigenous population of Hulusungai "lacks a distinctive character, maintains no *adat*", although this is refuted by Mallinckrodt (1928 I:14). Nevertheless, the individualistic nature of this society is obvious even from Mallinckrodt's own description. The family was of little importance, and people were little inclined to help each other (Mallinckrodt 1928 I:125). Although there were even so some instances of mutual assistance, the people giving such assistance, for example with harvesting, were paid according to the amount of work done, which gave "mutual assistance" rather more the character of wage labour (Mallinckrodt 1928 II:59, 77).

Mallinckrodt (1928 II:79-80) in addition observes that as a result of increasing individualization and the development of private ownership a group of wage labourers and of entrepreneurs had come into being. Although it is difficult to distinguish clearly between cause and effect, it is likely that rubber-growing contributed to this individualization. It is in rubber-growing that Mallinckrodt notes the emergence of larger land owners who no longer tap their own trees but engage wage labourers.



Differentiation had also come about in other sectors of the economy. So Feuilletau de Bruyn (1933:91) noted a rudimentary division of labour in small-scale industry and handicrafts. Also important was the pull of the industries located in Banjarmasin, Balikpapan and Pulau Laut, and of the coal, gold and diamond mines in Martapura, Pleihari and Pulau Laut.

### 6. Religion

The title of this study deliberately speaks of *Darul Islam* as a rebellion “under the banner of Islam” to indicate that this movement should not be treated exclusively as a religious one, as other aspects were also of importance. These aspects have been discussed in the foregoing sections. Even so, the specific treatments of such other factors which may have contributed to the rise of *Darul Islam* is not meant to suggest that Islam did not play an important role as a motivating force impelling people to join the movement. The ideal of an Islamic state provided a definite rallying point for resistance against infidel, secular, or religiously lax enemies. In each of the various *Darul Islam* movements in Indonesia Islamic people proceeded from the Muslim law as basis, making persons who did not strictly observe that law the targets of punitive measures.

In the history of Indonesia religiously inspired revolts led by Islamic leaders are a familiar phenomenon. The Dutch colonial rulers, and to a lesser extent also the Japanese, were occasionally harassed by minor, isolated risings against foreign infidels. *Darul Islam* is part of this tradition, to which it added a new dimension, however, transcending as it did narrow local boundaries. This gave it not simply a regional, but a national character.

All areas which experienced *Darul Islam* rebellions were well-known for their orthodox leanings.<sup>14</sup> Even so, the idea that the *Darul Islam*, striving as it did for the establishment of an Islamic State, was a movement of strict Muslims should not be taken in too absolute a sense. The form of Islam that is adhered to in Indonesia is strongly influenced by indigenous Indonesian beliefs and ideals, and is anything but free from heterodox elements. Varying from area to area, the *Darul Islam* followers often expressed ideas which were at variance with orthodox Islam.

Notably in West Java, *Darul Islam* leaders cleverly exploited popular beliefs in the magical properties of amulets and in the coming of a Just King. So there was a story circulating that Kartosuwirjo possessed two magical swords, “Ki Dongkol” and

“Ki Rompang”, about which there existed the belief in the Garut area that the person bringing them together would be victorious in battle and would bring prosperity to the area (Pinardi 1964:154–156).

Kartosuwirjo was also represented as the Mahdi or *Ratu Adil*, the Just King, who, according to the Jayabaya prophecy, would bring peace and justice to the country after a period of foreign domination and turmoil. Kartosowirjo himself, according to one of his commanders, Ateng Djaelani, was very much inclined to mysticism and was not averse to using the prophecies of Jayabaya and the belief in the coming of the Mahdi and the annihilation of the Dajal (a figure comparable to the Antichrist) to impress his followers. Ateng Djaelani moreover claimed that in the final year of the rebellion Kartosuwirjo spread the rumour that he had received a divine blessing. Allegedly six of Kartosuwirjo’s officers had seen a ray of light and liquid forming the phrase *la ilaha illa’llah* (There is no God but Allah) shining for three hours, touching Kartosuwirjo’s eyebrows. Also according to Ateng Djaelani, there was a story in circulation that Allah had decreed Kartosuwirjo Caliph of the world (DM 20-3-1962). Finally, there was a rumour that Kartosuwirjo’s name was *angker*, meaning “spiritually charged”, and that his followers were afraid to use his full name, referring to him simply as “our *Imam*” or as SMK (the abbreviation for Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo) (DM 8-6-1962).

As regards other *Darul Islam* areas the picture is less clear. However, there are indications that here too Islam was mixed with non-Islamic elements at least among *Darul Islam* followers. So there are stories of practices and beliefs that hardly square with orthodox Muslim views in circulation with respect to Central Java and South Kalimantan. Kiyai Haji Machfudz, the leader of the *Angkatan Umat Islam*, for example, is said to have acquired part of his fame from the sale of amulets. And as far as South Kalimantan is concerned, the speculations about Ibnu Hadjar’s invulnerability, the allegations that Mawardi lived on as a ghost, and the tales that the earth refused to accept the body of Masri testify that the population here as well still clung firmly to local popular beliefs.

About the *Darul Islam* movements in South Sulawesi and Aceh there are no such stories. Even so, in South Sulawesi there at least also existed the belief in the future advent of a Just King and the future establishment of a prosperous society – beliefs which the local *Darul Islam* rebels were able to turn to their own

advantage. According to Chabot (1950:135–139) the relevant movements were of two distinctly different kinds. The one was primarily directed against the contemporary indigenous rulers and against the Dutch and Chinese. The other, which was of a much broader vision, believed in the future establishment of a realm encompassing the whole of South Sulawesi which would be governed by a righteous king who would bring peace and prosperity to the area.

The continued presence of such non-Islamic elements nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the *Darul Islam* was an Islamic rebellion, in which religion was a prime mover. Since Geertz' popularization of the distinction between *santri* and *abangan* there has been a tendency to overemphasize the differences between strict and non-strict Muslims. The dichotomy *santri* – *abangan* has not simply been taken as a distinction between two ideal types, as a useful analytical tool, but has been made into a hard and fast law. In this conception the degree of Islamic inspiration is measured not by people's own inner convictions, but by the extent to which they live up to Geertz' definitions. A belief in spirits and amulets and a predilection for *wayang* and *gamelan* thus have been apt to earn their possessors the label "unorthodox" Muslims, or at least to make them look to observers like people who are unsusceptible to Islamic appeals. In some cases this is, in fact, justified. These are the cases of the so-called "statistical Muslims", to use the obnoxious term, who are outright suspicious of the idea of an Islamic state. But in other cases such beliefs have not detracted from the sincerity with which their holders consider themselves Muslims and are motivated by genuine Muslim ideas. True, there has regularly been hostility between strict and non-strict Muslims and the difference between them has been a potential source of conflict. Whether such conflict has actually broken out or whether the differences have been suppressed has depended upon the issues at stake and upon the presence or absence of a common enemy.

This is where the other factors responsible for the *Darul Islam* risings come into play. So interference, real or imaginary discrimination by the Government and Army, and deteriorating economic conditions here were able to unite the two sides and push the differences temporarily into the background. Then – to complicate the picture – once the *Darul Islam* rebellion had got under way, the distinction between "we" and "they" tended to be defined not by religious criteria but by participation or non-participation in the rebellion. Thus, as was mentioned above,

*Darul Islam* rebels sometimes punished Muslims who were lax in the observance of Islamic law. But even orthodox fellow-Muslims were not necessarily safe from attacks. So it was failure to actively support the *Darul Islam* which made enemies and apostates of them. There were even instances – and they do not seem to have been rare, either – of mosques being selected as targets in raids on villages.

This ambiguity of the role of Islam – which, though important as a rallying point was less so as a criterion whereby to distinguish friend from foe – renders it quite useless as an instrument for measuring purity of faith in any attempt to assess the importance of this religion in inducing people to join the *Darul Islam*.

Jackson (1971:312–438) has constructed a scale of religious attitudes whereby to differentiate between modern orthodox Muslims, traditional orthodox Muslims and syncretists. Basing himself on Geertz' distinction between *santri* and *abangan*, he wanted to find out whether the differences between modern and traditional *santris* and *abangan* also existed in West Java. The questions used for the construction of the scale concerned attitudes towards sacred places and religious scholars, beliefs in taboos, spirits, and spirit possession, and the importance attached to fate and predestination as well as to religious meals, or *slamattans*.

By using this scale it proved possible to make the relevant distinctions in East and Central Java as well as in West Java. Not surprisingly, Jackson discovered that the people of “West Java and even East Priangan are not uniformly *santri* in their religious beliefs”, and that “many of the Sundanese at the village level are properly classified as non-orthodox in their religious beliefs” (Jackson 1971:365). Concentrating exclusively on the three villages studied by him, he found it impossible to establish a correlation between the position adopted by them during the *Darul Islam* rebellion and the religious beliefs of their inhabitants. Both the *Darul Islam* village and the pro-Republican one were, according to him, traditional orthodox villages (Jackson 1971:393). A comparison of the answers to another set of questions (concerning opinions on an Islamic State and preparedness to kill for religion) failed to draw a clear distinction between the villages as well.

The conclusion drawn by Jackson is that the religious attitude of the villagers does not “predict the political positions that were taken” (Jackson 1971:433). He formulates this conclusion rather

guardedly, however, stating that religion remains important and that a phrase like “insult to religion” is capable of rousing the *abangan* as much as the *santri*. Even so, he tends to play down religion as a factor contributing to *Darul Islam* support in West Java, arguing that it was the religious attitude not of the villagers but of the village leaders, and consequently traditional authority, that determined a given village’s choice.

The data adduced by Jackson, however, admit of no such interpretation. Statistical conclusions are drawn from statistical populations numbering as few as nine, six or even five. Where Jackson states that in the *pro-Darul Islam* village one hundred per cent of the village leaders favoured an Islamic state, this only means that six leaders did so (Jackson:410–411).

It is further questionable if, in trying to determine the role of Islam, one should define Islam in the narrow sense in which Jackson does so. The important question is not whether the *Darul Islam* rising was an Islamic rebellion in the sense that its participants lived up to the standards of orthodox Islam, but to what extent people were motivated by appeals to “Islam”, irrespective of whether or not they believed in spirits and the like. Perhaps one is justified in expecting the political and religious leaders of the movement to have been orthodox Muslims in the true sense of the word. In the case of the rank and file this is impossible, however.

As Van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:175–177) has argued in his study on the *Darul Islam* in West Java, the villagers reinterpreted Islam and the ideal of an Islamic state and adapted both to their own specific needs. According to him the *Darul Islam* fulfilled “the same function in Javanese society that is provided by revivalist movements in primitive society”. It provided an answer to the questions and doubts raised by the opening up of the closed community as well as the erosion of traditional authority under outside influences. This, according to Van Nieuwenhuijze, at the same time explains the terroristic aspects of the *Darul Islam*. Revivalism as a reaction to external disruptive influences is invariably totalitarian, he argues, as a result of which everyone who does not wholeheartedly cooperate is branded as a traitor: “Thus, every Muslim, every Indonesian within reach of the Dār ul Islām movement, is subject to punishment as a traitor if he fails to co-operate”.

Van Nieuwenhuijze’s observation illustrates the difficulties one is apt to encounter in isolating Islam as a prime mover – there are various other, interfering factors. As I have argued, it is this

interplay of factors – the expansion of central control, the demobilization policy, the changing agrarian structure, and Islam – which gave *Darul Islam* its strength. But even this cannot fully account for the phenomenon. The time must also be taken into consideration. It may well be argued that the *Darul Islam* could never have developed into what it became if its initial phase had not coincided with the collapse of the colonial system and the building up of a new state – the Indonesian Republic. Not only does the breakdown of a state enhance the chances of peasant revolts, as has been observed by others as well (cf. Zagoria 1974:53), but, as in the Indonesian case, the subsequent attempts to shape a new centrally governed state may cause a large proportion of the necessary resentment. This new state at last was a state in which Indonesians could run their own affairs, which, however, in the opinion of part of the population was not being done in accordance with their own ideals – in this case those of Islam.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER I

- 1 The first Indonesian Parliament, possessing only advisory powers, was instituted on August 29th, 1945. Two days later the first Republican Cabinet was formed. An Indonesian Army was officially called into being on October 5th.
- 2 For clashes between Indonesian and Japanese armed forces in Java see, for example, Anderson (1972) and Smail (1964).
- 3 For the social revolutions in Tegal and Aceh respectively see p. 137–143, and p. 273–284.
- 4 Kiyai Jusuf Tauziri was for a time a close friend and mentor of Kartosuwirjo's.
- 5 The proclamation of a *Darul Islam* State by Kartosuwirjo in August is also mentioned by Brugmans (1966).
- 6 At the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946 an Islamic State was proclaimed in Ciamis by one Kiyai Abdul Ilamid, a then member of *Masyumi*.
- 7 For the Japanese policy vis-à-vis the Islamic leaders see *inter alia* Benda (1958) and Sluimers (1968).
- 8 Most of the information on Kartosuwirjo is taken from Pinardi (1964). A short biography on Kartosuwirjo is also found in Boland (1971:55–57); The (1968); Van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:167–169); and Horikoshi (1975).
- 9 According to the results of the *Welvaartsonderzoek* (Prosperity Survey) of 1904/1905, there were in the *afdeling* Rembang, of which Cepu was part, four schools of the second grade (cf. Volkswelvaart 1914:491). See also Kats (1915).
- 10 According to Noer (1973:125) *Sarekat Islam* in 1919 claimed a membership of 2½ million. Benda (1958:42) mentions a figure of two million for that year.
- 11 The section of the party under which this was done was the so-called section B (cf. Dahm 1971:54–55; Noer 1973:123–125).
- 12 Cf. issues of the *Jong Java* magazine *Wederopbouw, tijdschrift aan de Jong-Javanen-Beweging en het Javaansche geestesleven gewijd*.
- 13 Benda (1958:49) also observes that “a nucleus of leaders was being trained in the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, who in later years were to occupy central positions in Islamic political parties”.
- 14 According to Pinardi (1964:22), Kartosuwirjo became chairman of the *Jong Islamieten Bond*. It is not clear whether this was of the central board or of the Surabaya branch.
- 15 Before the adoption of the name *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* the party was called *Partai Sarekat Islam Hindia Timur*.
- 16 As other mentors of Kartosuwirjo Noer (1973:148) mentions Kiyai

- Mustafa Kamil and Kiyai Ramli, and Pinardi (1964:28) Abdul Kudus Gozali Tusi and Oni.
- 17 A fellow-villager of Kartosuwirjo's as cited in Pinardi (1964:28).
  - 18 Agus Salim was chairman of the party council, or *Dewan Partai*, while Abikusno Tjokrosujoso headed the executive committee.
  - 19 This of course does not mean to say that there were no Catholic, Protestant or atheistic nationalists.
  - 20 As the number of those expelled Noer (1973:146) mentions 28, Pluvier (1953) and Horikoshi (1975:62) both 29.
  - 21 For a synopsis see also Noer (1973:146–148).
  - 22 In earlier years Kartosuwirjo had not been opposed to cooperation with other parties. In December 1927 he had attended the inaugural meeting, as representative of the PSII, of the *Permusyawaratan Perhimpunan-perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia* (PPPKI), or Congress of Nationalist Political Associations of Indonesia. See Pinardi (1964:35), who incorrectly calls the PPPKI the *Perhimpunan Pimpinan Politik Umum Indonesia*.
  - 23 In some sources this committee is referred to as *Komite Pembela Kebenaran PSII*.
  - 24 Pinardi bases his account on written statements by Kartosuwirjo to military officials of the *Siliwangi* Division of West Java after his arrest (Pinardi 1964:26).
  - 25 On the meaning of *Suffah*, Horikoshi (1975:63), citing Noer (1973:340), writes: "Suffah refers to an institution at the time of the Prophet at which a number of young men were instructed by the Prophet himself in order to propagate Islam". According to Boland (1971:56), "As-Suffa . . . was probably a long covered portico in the courtyard of the prophet's house and temporary mosque at Medina. According to later tradition . . . the 'people of the *suffa*' were a group of poor and pious Muslims who lived there, spending their time in study and worship . . . The word *suffa* was sometimes considered the origin of the term *tasawwuf* (sufism, mysticism)."
  - 26 For the decline in membership of the (*Partai*) *Sarekat Islam (Indonesia)* cf. Pluvier (1953:197) and Deliar Noer (1973:125). Pluvier writes: "Whereas the SI in 1919-1920, according to the — probably exaggerated — account of Tjokroaminoto, counted 2 million members, in 1930 this number had dwindled to circa 20,000. Five years later the PSII had about 45,000 members. Although there are no figures available for the later years, it can be assumed that, in view of the ruptures in the party after 1935, this latter figure was not exceeded in these years."
  - 27 Kartosuwirjo had also been imprisoned for a few days in 1936, when he had been accused of plotting a rebellion.
  - 28 It should be noted that the territory of the former Dutch East Indies did not come under a single Japanese war command. Java and Madura came under the jurisdiction of the 16th army, Sumatra under that of the 25th army, and Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Nusa Tenggara under that of the 2nd southern fleet (cf. Dahm 1971:84).
  - 29 Benda (1958:112) writes: "Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, . . . , had understandably enough endeavored to reap the fruits of his obstinately 'non-cooperative' past, by prematurely offering his services as Indonesian premier to the 'liberators'". It is doubtful whether Benda's statement



constitutes a true representation of the facts. Sluimers' reading of the events surrounding the formation of an Indonesian cabinet is more likely. It is clear from his article (1968) that the source mentioned by Benda, *Tjahaja Timoer* of March 1942, only published an unofficial list after Abikusno Tjokrosujoso told one of its journalists that he had been appointed *formateur* of an Indonesian cabinet. In the list drawn up on March 9th Abikusno Tjokrosujoso is only mentioned as a candidate for the post of minister of transport (for this list cf. Sluimers 1968:366).

- 30 The decision seems to have been operative only for Java. Because of poor communications it never reached the other islands (cf. M 28-4-1947).
- 31 According to Horikoshi (1975:66) the *Suffah* institute was closed soon after the beginning of the Japanese occupation.
- 32 The Japanese name for the Committee was *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai*. In Indonesian the Committee is called by some *Badan untuk menyelidiki usaha persiapan kemerdekaan* (Yamin 1959-1960 I:60, Boland 1971:16) and by others *Badan penyelidikan usaha persiapan kemerdekaan* (Tudjuh 1961:11). Cf. for the composition of the Committee Muhammad Yamin (1959-1960 I:60) or Harun al Rasjid (1968:23–24).
- 33 At the time of its formation the Committee comprised 62 members, with Radjiman Wediodiningrat as chairman. The original intention had probably been that a Japanese should share its meetings, with Radjiman Wediodiningrat acting as deputy chairman. This is why the Committee was officially said to have 63 members, while it was popularly referred to as the Committee of Sixty-two. Later on still six new members were added.
- 34 As representatives of the Islamic community Dahm (1971:101) mentions Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Sukiman, Mas Mansur, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul Halim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Achmad Sanusi and Wachid Hasjim.
- 35 This address by Soekarno has become known under the title *Lahirnya Pancasila*, or Birth of the *Pancasila*. A condensed English version is to be found in Feith and Castles (1970:40-49). Particularly since September 1965 a number of Indonesians have argued that it was not Soekarno but Muhammad Yamin who was the first to formulate the *Pancasila*. As representative of this view Boland (1971:17–18) mentions an article in *Pandji Masjarakat* in October 1967, a series of articles by Mohamad Roem (*Pandji Masjarakat* 11, 12 and 13, March-April 1967), and a study by K.H.M. Isa Anshary entitled *Mudjahid da'wah*. These all point to Muhammad Yamin's address to the Committee for the Preparation of Independence of May 29th, which was divided into five sections, dealing with nationalism, humanity, belief in God, democracy and prosperity for the people respectively. Boland points out that this division into sections could have been made later. Nugroho Notosusanto (1971a: 14–20) also states that Yamin was the first to formulate the *Pancasila*. He, however, describes Yamin's version of these principles, along with that of Soekarno and the Jakarta Charter, as "only a rough draft". The authentic draft of the *Pancasila*, according to him, is that included in the preamble to the Constitution of 1945.

The least one can say of the respective speeches of Soekarno and Muhammad Yamin in this connection is that the former shows much

more internal consistency than the latter; linking the various “pillars” with each other in a clear way and thus showing that Soekarno had a very clear idea of what he wanted to say. Muhammad Yamin’s speech, although being the only one in his book which has a “table of content”, lacks this consistency. Nowhere does it contain any evidence that he had such five principles in mind, or indications as to why he divided his speech into the said five sections. Belief in God, for instance, which is dealt with in a very brief subsection, is not presented as one of the bases of the state, but as a factor underlying society. The section on prosperity is lengthier but says little about prosperity and much more about the state territory, the position of the Chinese and Arab citizens, and the unitary basis of the state. Another point to make is that only in later years did the question of who introduced the *Pancasila* become at all important. Even as late as 1951 Muhammad Yamin (1951) still mixed up the *Pancasila* with the Jakarta Charter, writing that the Jakarta Charter constituted the preamble to the Constitution of 1945. Later on, around the time he published his minutes of the 1945 meeting (Yamin 1959-1960), he himself gave credit for introducing the *Pancasila* to Soekarno (cf. Yamin 1958).

- 36 Yamin’s report on the first series of meetings of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Independence does not contain much information on the standpoint of the advocates of an Islamic state (Yamin 1959-1960 I:59–145). The author does not fully cover this session, however. He only reproduces his own two speeches and those of Soekarno and Supomo. The reactions to these, *inter alia* Mohammad Hatta’s, are not included in his work.
- 37 The relevant Indonesian sentence reads: “ke-Tuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya”. I have followed Boland’s translation. He renders “menjalankan” with “to practice” and points out (Boland 1971:31) that this is an “imprecise verb”, which can mean “to keep, maintain, carry out, make operative, apply, give effect to”. (Cf. also for the discussion on the Jakarta Charter Wawer (1947:47–51).)
- 38 The third committee, that on finance and economics, was headed by Mohammad Hatta. For the composition of the three committees cf. Yamin (1959-1960 I:250–253, 257).
- 39 Cf. for the minutes of the discussion Yamin (1959-1960 I:257–270). A detailed résumé of the debate is to be found in Boland (1971:29–30).
- 40 A draft constitution had been prepared by a smaller committee of the sub-committee headed by Supomo, with as members Wongsonegoro, Subardjo, Maramis, Singgih, Agus Salim and Sukiman. This draft constitution is reproduced in Yamin (1959-1960 I:264–270). The version of the constitution as given by Yamin may differ from that which was actually debated. The articles on religion were article 4, of which the second paragraph reads: “Only autochthonous Indonesians shall be eligible as President and Vice-President”, and article 29, which reads: “The state shall guarantee the freedom of all citizens to adhere to any religion whatever and to fulfil their religious duties prescribed by their religion”. It may thus well be that the wording of the article being debated differed slightly from that reproduced above, and that the draft did not speak of “any religion whatever”, but of “other religions”. In

- that case the article would have read: “The state shall guarantee the freedom of all citizens to adhere to *other religions* [or, as Indonesian does not differentiate between the singular and plural, to *another religion*] and to fulfil their religious duties in accordance with their own religion and belief”, which could mean something quite different.
- 41 In the seventies at least a distinction came to be drawn between secularism and secularization. Secularism involves a non-religious attitude, secularization the separation of religion and state. Cf. Boland (1972-1973).
  - 42 Cf. for the dispute about the word *kepercayaan* during the discussion on the Broad Outlines of the Course of the State in 1973 *Indonesië van Maand tot Maand* 15:47, and during the parliamentary debates on the Marriage Act in 1973 *Indonesië van Maand tot Maand* 16:62.
  - 43 Again Yamin’s minutes of the meeting of the Study Committee are incomplete. According to him (1959-1960 I:278), Soekarno replied to Hadikusomo that Achmad Sanusi also wanted to scrap the words “for the adherents”, without, however, reporting Sanusi’s statement.
  - 44 The article concerned in the draft constitution is article 29. That the constitution reproduced by Yamin is different from that actually discussed may be deduced *inter alia* from the fact that according to Yamin’s (1959-1960 I:264–270) minutes the discussion concerned article 28.
  - 45 In Indonesian it is called *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*. The Japanese name for which was *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Iinkai*. For the members of the Preparatory Committee cf. Harun Al Rasjid 1968:25; Muh. Yamin 1959-1960 I:399.
  - 46 Later on six additional members were appointed. The Dutch, who after August 1945 were keen to uphold the impression that the Indonesian Republic was a Japanese creation and was confined only to Java, incorrectly adduced the composition of the Preparatory Committee as an argument in support of their view. So Van Mook, the Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, writes in a memorandum of September 3rd, 1945, to Lord L. Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia: “From the final list of members of the ‘final Committee for the completion of Independence’ of August 19th it can be concluded that the movement is limited to Java; no delegates from Sumatra of any importance have participated. The construction is in fact, a one-man government along Japanese lines”. (NIB I:82).
  - 47 Later a Ministry of Religion was after all established. On the founding of this Ministry and its duties cf. Steenbrink (1972); Boland (1977); and Van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:217–243).
  - 48 The epithet Republican will be used throughout this book to distinguish the official (Republican) Army from the irregular guerilla groups.
  - 49 The *Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang* itself had superseded the *Badan Pembantu Prajurit* or *Badan Pembantu Pembelaan*, an organization for assisting *Peta* members and their families from the Japanese period (cf. Smail 1964:31).
  - 50 As it was put in a telegram to Terauchi (the Japanese commander): “I am informed that several days after the original offer of surrender of Japan you declared the independence of the republic Indonesia, naming Soekarno as president and that the Japanese would henceforth leave the

gvt of Java in the hands of Soekarno. This is contrary to the Rangoon agreement and I must insist that you abide by that agreement under which you remain personally responsible for civil administration until my forces take over and that you accordingly and immediately cancel the declaration and announcement to which have referred above.” Of course Terauchi could only reply that “there is no fact that at a time after our peace offer I approved the independence of Indonesian Republic and designated Soekarno as president, instructing him with the executive power over Java” (cf. NIB I:88, 97). The misconception that the Japanese had proclaimed Indonesia’s independence was quite persistent, especially on the Dutch side. Cf., for example, NIB I: 91, 92, 97, 107, 110 and 248.

## CHAPTER II

- 1 A Dutch report of November 1945 on the attitude of the Japanese troops in Java and their demoralized condition states: “The reactions of the Japanese so far had been threefold. A small minority among them had tried to keep control till the Allies would be able to take over. Amongst other places in Bandoeng, they quickly restored order by drastic action. A large proportion of the Japanese forces, on the other hand, had lost morale and had voluntarily gone into self-imposed internment, in the majority of cases in cool and attractive hill stations, taking large stocks of foodstuffs and other commodities with them. Considerable quantities of weapons had fallen into the hands of the most extremist nationalist elements, as a result of the demoralization of these Japanese forces, while numerous public services and buildings were left by them to the ‘republicans’. Finally, a third group of Japanese in the island had actively organized the transfer of the administration to the ‘republic’ and aided in the equipment and armament of their bands.” (NIB II:133). Although the report was written in reaction to opinions expressed in the British press, this assessment seems to have been a correct illustration of the prevailing situation.
- 2 This account is given in a manuscript on the history of Serpong lent to me by Drs. H. Borkent. For fuller information on the battle at Leng-kong see, for example, Peranan (1965:41–44) and Cuplikan (1972:100–102).
- 3 In West Java incidents also occurred in a number of other places in the vicinity of Jakarta, such as Klender, Kranji and Pondokgede (cf. Sumantri n.d. II:47), and in and around Bandung. An excellent description of the latter is given by Smail (1964).
- 4 Van Wulfften Palthe does admit that one should distinguish in theory between bands in the strict sense and groups into which the regular Army had dissolved. He is uncertain about the real guerilla character of the latter, however, saying: “One should think more in terms of War Lords with their followers, and for all practical purposes again ends up close to ‘bands’”. See also Hettinga (1946:12–13), who says: “The chaos of the present consequently is inherent not in this transitional phase, but in the current spiritual and social make-up of Indonesian society”. The Dutch frequently used the term “*bende*” (band) to describe both regular and irregular units.

- 5 A *wali* in this context is a guardian.
- 6 Smail (1964:91) states: “In the last nine months of the occupation an estimated 50,000 Hizbullah members were given some rudimentary military training in Java”. This figure seems greatly exaggerated.
- 7 Such a moderate estimate is given by Dahm (1971:94), according to whom there were 35,000 *Peta* soldiers at the end of the Japanese occupation. The same figure is quoted by Van der Plas, a Dutch East Indies government representative and political advisor to the Supreme Allied Command, in a report sent by him to Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook in September 1945 (cf. NIB I:127). George McTurnan Kahin (1970:109) writes that, “at its peak strength in the middle of 1945 it numbered about 120,000 armed men”.
- 8 As Sura 2:190 ff. states: “Fight in the Way of God against those who fight against you, but do not commit aggression” (translation by Gibb 1964:67).
- 9 So Smail writes, for example: “In this respect it is significant that in early 1948, when Republican forces evacuated Priangan, Hizbullah (i.e. urban Islamic) units generally accompanied the army on the trek to Central Java, while Sabilillah (i.e. rural Islamic) groups did not” (Smail 1964:92). Superficial reading of a sentence like this may lead to considerable misunderstanding. It was indeed mostly rural groups, in Smail’s terminology *Sabili’llah* groups, which stayed behind, but the majority of these groups styled themselves or were styled *Hizbu’llah*.
- 10 See, among the numerous publications dealing with the early history of the Indonesian Army, A.H. Nasution (1956, 1977); Sumantri (n.d.); Peranan (1965); and Cuplikan (1972). For West Java in particular see Siliwangi (1968).
- 11 According to Smail (1964:129) this acronym stood for *Markas Dewan Pimpinan Perjuangan* (*Perjuangan* Leadership Headquarters). “Later in the MDPP’s career, when it was beginning to be more active in other parts of Priangan outside the city, its initials were sometimes interpreted as meaning *Markas Dewan Perjuangan Priangan* (*Priangan Perjuangan* Board Headquarters)”. In the Indonesian literature the MDPP is often only referred to in the second sense. See, for example, Djawa Barat (1953:183). In Peranan (1965:49) and Djen Amar (1963:69) the letters MDPP are interpreted as *Majelis Dewan Perjuangan Priangan*. Yet another name is mentioned in Siliwangi (1968:184), where it is referred to as *Markas Dewan Pimpinan Perjuangan Priangan* or MDP3. According to Smail the MDPP was set up in the middle of November 1945, whereas the date of foundation given by Peranan and Djen Amar is September 15th, 1945.
- 12 Other leaders were: Djamhuri (Jamhuri), Male Wiranatakusumah, Astrawinata, Samaun Bakri, Nukman and Pakpahan (Djawa Barat 1953:183). According to Smail (1964:132) Pakpahan was the leader of the *Pasukan Istimewa* (Special Troops). The *Pesindo* of Bandung was the continuation of the *Pemuda Republik Indonesia* (Youth of the Indonesian Republic), which again was a continuation of the *Persatuan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia* (P3I, Indonesian Student Association).
- 13 As with the MDPP, there are different interpretations of the acronym MPPP. Djen Amar (1963:69), who mentions as its founding date December 14th, 1945, refers to it as *Majelis Persatuan Perjuangan Priang-*

- an, as does Djawa Barat (1953:184). Siliwangi (1968:184), on the other hand speaks of *Markas Pimpinan Perjuangan Priangan*. According to Siliwangi, Kamran was chairman of the MPPP, while Sutoko headed the logistic department.
- 14 See, for example, Brochure (1977:12) where Abu Hanifah relates how he disobeyed an order from Nasution to come to Garut.
  - 15 The other four battalions were: the *Garuda Hitam*, made up of former BPRI units and commanded by Major Rivai, the *Taruna Jaya*, made up of *Pesindo* units and headed by Major Sudarman, the *Barisan Banteng Republik Indonesia* (BBRI), commanded by Captain Rachmat Sulaeman (Rakhmat Sulaeman), and the *Gabungan* Battalion, headed by Major Pelupessy (Peranan 1965:50).
  - 16 Alers (1956:242) mentions fights between *Hizbu'llah* and *Sabili'llah* at Muntilan.
  - 17 According to Sutomo, the anti-Linggarjati guerilla organizations formed the *Divisi 17 Agustus*. Their commander was Evert Langkay of the KRIS, and the Chief of Staff Amir Fatah (the later *Darul Islam* leader of Central Java). In West Java a *Resimen Macan Citarum* of the *Divisi 17 Agustus* had been formed in early February. It comprised *inter alia* units of the *Hizbu'llah*, *Barisan Banteng*, BPRI, *Lasykar Rakyat* and KRIS (cf. M 11-2-1947).
  - 18 Kahin (1970:210) writes: "The feeling among Masjumi and other political circles was overwhelming that political opportunism was the chief impulse towards formation of the new PSII". According to Dahm (1971:154), "The old PSII had split off from Masjumi, partly from political opportunism and partly because it had always looked askance at the liberal philosophy which was gaining ground in that body".
  - 19 For the announcement of the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet see M 4-7-1947. Kartosuwirjo's letter is referred to in M 8-7-1947, and the composition of the boards of the PSII is announced in M 19-6-1947. The official decision to reactivate the PSII was taken on June 16th, in confirmation of a decision of the Executive Committee of April 14th. See also M 28-4-1947.
  - 20 Oni's full name according to Anne Marie The (1968:4) was Oni Qital, and according to C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:170) R. Oni Mandalatar.
  - 21 Toha Arsjad was commander of the *Pasukan Pemuda* operating around Garut (Suherly 1965 II:31).
  - 22 BARIS stands for *Barisan Rakyat Indonesia*, PADI for *Pahlawan Darul Islam*. Pinardi refers to the latter troops as *Pasukan Darul Islam*. *Pahlawan Darul Islam* seems to be the correct name, however. The PADI was incorporated into the TII on October 30th, 1949.
  - 23 Although Hiroko Horikoshi writes, following C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (1958:173), that Oni became Prime Minister of the *Negara Islam Indonesia*, this statement seems incorrect.
  - 24 The *Dewan Imamah* was composed as follows:  
President or *Imam*, and concurrently *chargé d'affaires* (Minister of Foreign Affairs) – S.M. Kartosuwirjo; Minister of Defence – Kamran; vice-Minister of Defence – Oni; Minister of Internal Affairs – Sanusi Partawidjaja; Minister of Finance – Sanusi Partawidjaja; Minister of Information – Toha Arsjad (Pinardi 1964:81). These same names are

mentioned in Djawa Barat (1953:214) and by Anne Marie The (1968:8). According to the constitution of the Islamic State of Indonesia as published in Boland (1971:263), however, the composition of the *Dewan Imamah* was to be as follows: President and Minister of Defence – S.M. Kartosuwirjo; Minister of Internal Affairs – Sanusi Partawidjaja; Minister of Finance – Sanusi Partawidjaja; Minister of Justice – Abdul Kudus Gozali Tusi; Minister of Information – Toha Arsjad; and members – Kamran and Oni.

Sanusi Partawidjaja was later, around 1960, sentenced to death by Kartosuwirjo and executed. There are two different accounts of the reason for this. According to one Sanusi Partawidjaja was executed because he tried to reconcile the Islamic State of Indonesia with the Republic. According to the other, put forward by the prominent *Darul Islam* figure Djaelani Setiawan (shortly after his surrender in early 1962), the reason was that Sanusi Partawidjaja (in cooperation with the Dutchman Van Kleef) had acted too independently and was suspected by Kartosuwirjo of trying to supplant him (DM 20-3-1962). The said Van Kleef was a former member of the APRA who joined *Darul Islam* and allegedly became head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information of the Islamic State of Indonesia; he became ill and died in the course of the *Darul Islam* rebellion (DM 20-3-1963).

- 25 Some Republican troops had remained behind, while there had also been some Republican infiltration in the area, *inter alia* in August 1948, when a battalion commanded by Rukman was sent back to West Java after clashing with units of the *Tentara Pelajar* (Student Army) in the vicinity of Surakarta. This, however, was more in the nature of an expulsion than an official reinfiltration attempt (Siliwangi 1968:287).
- 26 How precarious the Republican Army's position vis-à-vis the Islamic Army of Indonesia was at that time is testified by the fact that in January 1949 the *Siliwangi* Division was obliged to hide its standard, after recapturing it from the Islamic Army of Indonesia, which had seized it a short while before (Siliwangi 1968:324–328).
- 27 Although article 7 states that every Act required the consent of the *Dewan Syuro*, clause 1 of article 11 stipulates that the *Imam* was to have the power to draw up statutes with the consent of the *Majlis Syuro*.
- 28 This single Indonesian publication on the Islamic state referred to by him is Z.A. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam* (Jakarta 1956).
- 29 There are some slight differences between them, such as, for example, the requirement for the *Majlis Syuro* to assemble at least once a year, and the MPR once every five years.
- 30 According to Boland (1971:59), the word *infaq* is derived from the Koran, Sura 17:100, where it means “the giving of contribution”. The Islamic State of Indonesia defines *infaq* as “a due of every citizen to the state, in the form of both property and goods, which is to be paid a) in both war and peace time (*infaquddin*), and b) only in time of war (*infaq fi sabilillah*)” (Pinardi 1964:86).
- 31 In Banten a group styling itself *Tentara Rakyat* (People's Army) was operating. In October 1949 the Republican Army *Tirtayasa* Brigade was dispatched against it from Bogor. The *Tentara Rakyat*, which derived its main support from the *Bambu Runcing*, sometimes also styled itself

*Darul Islam*, and was often in fact referred to as a *Darul Islam* force.

- 32 Westerling was a captain of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), who had gained a frightening reputation as commander of the “Special Forces”. These counter-insurrection troops had with great success inflicted heavy losses on Indonesian guerilla forces in Sulawesi, for instance, where they had been called in to restore law and order. They had also been active in West Java and other areas of Indonesia. Westerling had remained in command of the Special Forces until the end of 1948, not long after which he proposed the formation of the private army to assist the State of Pasundan in its resistance of guerilla attacks. With the tacit consent of Dutch army authorities and financial assistance from the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (Nefis) Westerling thereupon accomplished the formation of the Army of the Just King, or *Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil* (APRA).
- 33 Jaquet suggests that the first contacts between the State of Pasundan and *Darul Islam* may have been established by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Utarjo Anwar Tjokroaminoto (Utaryo Anwar Cokroaminoto), the Prime Minister of the State (Jaquet 1950:7). Mention is also made of a secret meeting of Kartosuwirjo and the Head of the State of Pasundan, Wiranatakusumah.
- 34 The existence of such external contacts is taken for granted by Indonesians and the relevant information cited without questioning in the Indonesian literature on *Darul Islam*. The persons and foreign Governments accused of involvement vehemently deny these charges. This is particular true with respect to the testimonies given at the Jungschläger and Schmidt trials. By the Dutch these trials – held in 1956, when relations between The Netherlands and Indonesia were rapidly deteriorating – are represented as sham, and the testimony given at them as false and inconsistent.
- Mentioned in connection with Jungschläger’s alleged smuggling of weapons to *Darul Islam* are planes of the *B[ataafsche] P[etroleum] M[aatschappij]* and of the Embassies of Great Britain and the United States of America, while the Dutch Military Mission to Indonesia was also alleged to have a hand in the affair. The United States are further mentioned in a letter by Van Kleef to Westerling, dated May 10th, 1952, where Van Kleef says that in the course of 1950 the Islamic State of Indonesia had been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with the American Government. He goes on to claim that subsequent to the establishment of these contacts a special American Government envoy had been sent to Indonesia to establish contact with representatives of the Islamic State of Indonesia in order to discuss the possibility of American aid. This envoy had been captured by the Republican Government, however. According to Van Kleef this capture constituted the prelude to the problems surrounding the Mutual Security Act. The letter concerned is cited in, among others, Pinardi (1964:140–145). For the Jungschläger and Schmidt trials cf. Schmidt (1961), Beynon (n.d.) and Soenario (1956).
- 35 Originally there had been a *Citarum* Battalion, formed by Republican troops remaining behind at the time of the *Siliwangi* Division’s retreat to Central Java. The *Citarum* Battalion had encompassed a number of irregular guerilla units, including Tjetje Subrata’s *Pasukan Semaji*, or



- Semiaji* Troops. After the *Siliwangi* Division's return to West Java, Tjetje Subrata and his men had broken away for fear of disarmament. They continued using the name *Citarum* (Suherly 1965).
- 36 For data on individuals and bands reporting and arms handed in, cf. *Indonesian Review* no. 7, December 1950. In the whole of Java 8,467 people surrendered, and 710 firearms were turned over.
- 37 On December 21st, 1950, the military commander of Jakarta also declared the *Darul Islam* a prohibited organization.
- 38 The name *Arends* is spelled variously as *Arend* or *Arens*. Conspicuous by its absence on this list is the NIGO, or *Nederlandsch Indische Gerilja Organizatie*. The NIGO, a rather dubious organization, if it existed at all, was supposed to have been founded by former APRA members after the debacle of the attempted APRA coup. Dutch citizens accused of having joined the *Darul Islam* were alleged to have done so as members of this NIGO.
- 39 Colonel Sadikin had been appointed military governor of West Java early in December 1949. He was assisted by Mr. Makmun Sumadipradja, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the State of Pasundan, throughout the period of military rule.
- 40 This conference took place on December 20th and 21st, 1949, and was attended by representatives of the *Masyumi*, *Nahdatul Ulama*, *Muhammadiyah*, *Jamiatul Wasliah* (from Medan), *Tardiatul Islam* (from Bukittinggi) and *Sarekat Muslimin Indonesia* (from Banjarmasin).
- 41 It was also Ijet Hidayat who had escorted Affandi Ridhwan to Sanusi Partawidjaja's headquarters. He had been *Darul Islam bupati* and chairman of the *Majelis Islam* of Bandung between 1947 and 1950. Later, in 1954, he himself was sentenced to 1½ years' gaol, under deduction of the months already spent in detention (PR 19-5-1954).
- 42 The other movements mentioned in the Bill were the *Citarum* Brigade, the *Bambu Runcing* Division, the APRA, the White Eagle Battalion the RMS, the NIGO, the *Barisan Sakit Hati*, the MMC (short of Merapi-Merbabu Complex) and the *Tentara Rakyat* of West Java.
- 43 See Kartosuwirjo's letters to Soekarno published in Boland (1971:244–255).
- 44 See Kartosuwirjo's letter on the position of Van Kleef (PR 10-11-1953).
- 45 Abdul Malik should not be confused with Imam Malik, who also led an irregular band in East Java, and who was arrested in May 1951.
- 46 In some years *Darul Islam* also stepped up its activities in February in celebration of a victory by Oni over Dutch troops at Mount Cupu on February 17th, 1948.
- 47 According to Boland (1971:50) the more traditional members of the *Nahdatul Ulama*, in order to distinguish themselves from the modernists, "liked to call themselves the *ahli sunnah wal djama'ah*, that is, the people who keep the *sunna* (usage) of the Prophet, in community with the one great *umma* or *djama'a*, in short the orthodox . . .".
- 48 For a detailed description of this campaign and the other actions against the *Darul Islam* in West Java cf. Siliwangi 1968:526–557.
- 49 The idea to involve the civilian population was not new. Even in the early 1950's battues in which the population of one or more villages, armed with bamboo spears, participated, were resorted to. What was new in 1960 was the large scale on which this was done.

- 50 At this revival of the *Darul Islam* movement in 1976, Dodo was one of those arrested by the Government. Adah Djaelani Tirtapradja and Kurnia had also taken part (cf. *Tempo* 26-11-1977). According to this same report, Dodo was looked upon by *Darul Islam* followers as the *Putera Mahkota* (crown prince).

### CHAPTER III

- 1 According to Wertheim (1959:270) there are reports of nearly 300,000 *romushas* being sent overseas, while at the end of the war the number of those who were still alive seems to have been no more than 70,000.
- 2 See, for example, Suryanegara (1977).
- 3 See for the role of Islam as an oppositional force against Dutch colonial rule amongst others Tichelman (1975:205–210) and Kartodirdjo (1966).
- 4 See for the *Tiga Daerah Affair*: Anderson (1972:332–345), Djoko (1974), Lucas (1974; 1977), Nuh (1962), Pranata (1976), Suputro (1959:61–64), and Diponegoro (1971:58–62).
- 5 Sungeb Reksoatmodjo, was captured after attending a meeting chaired by resident Besar. The youth at the same time took Tjitrosatmoko but subsequently dropped him at his office (Pranata 1976 n. 3).
- 6 The leaders of the Republican Army (at that time still BKR) in the town of Tegal were: Pitojo (Pitoyo, a former *syodantyo*, or *Peta* platoon commander), Parwoto (a former *Heiho*), Sugiono (a former *syodantyo*) and Sumardi (a former *Heiho*). Kiyai Haji Iskandar Idris was a former *daidantyo*, or *Peta* battalion commander (cf. Pranata 1976 n. 4, 5).
- 7 Dressing the victims in gunny sacks was meant not only to humiliate them, but also to give them an idea of what the people suffered. As Lucas (1977:97) points out: “In the town people could still get cloth, whereas gunny sacking and sarongs of rubber were generally worn in rural areas towards the end of the occupation”.
- 8 Abu Sudjai according to Sajuti Melik was a member of the PSII and an associate of Kartosuwirjo’s (Sajuti Melik 1977).
- 9 Initially it was called *Badan Pekerja Tiga Daerah* (Lucas 1974:176).
- 10 For Sajuti Melik’s own account see: Melik (1977).
- 11 According to Pranata (1976 n. 3) the rebels did not occupy Pekalongan but fell into a trap set by the Republican Army commander of the town, Ali Murtopo. The latter lured Kutil’s troops into the town by creating the impression that Pekalongan had been evacuated by the Republican Army. He thereupon had all the roads closed and had the rebels encircled and disarmed. Judging from the other sources this account is incorrect. It is possible that it was made up to clear Ali Murtopo’s reputation. At the end of 1977, and probably also earlier, in the struggle for power taking place at the time, Ali Murtopo was accused by his enemies of involvement in the *Tiga Daerah Affair*, implying that he had been a communist or at any rate had had leftist sympathies during the Indonesian revolution.
- 12 According to Anderson (1972:340) Sardjio was a member of the pre-war PNI and the illegal PKI. The resident, Besar, had fled Pekalongan in November, and was replaced by Suprpto as acting resident.

- 13 Anderson (1972:341), following Overdijk (1948:34), writes: “It seems that at first the central government was willing to accept his [Sardjo’s] accession as a *fait accompli*. But again local forces ignored official policy and proceeded to try to overthrow Sardjo.” According to Nasution (II:548) the Republican Government in Yogyakarta had ordered the arrest of resident Besar and had instructed the new resident (Suprpto) to negotiate with Kutil. The Government’s reason for doing so, according to Nasution, was that it attached credence to the allegations of Kutil and his men that resident Besar and Iskandar Idris were NICA agents.
- 14 In Pemalang, on the other hand, the *Hizbu’llah* appears to have participated in the social revolution. According to Lucas (1977:114): “Pemalang was unique in the Residency of Pekalongan in that santri pemuda from both the GPAI [*Gerakan Pemuda Arab Indonesia*] and Hizbullah played a major role in the early part of the social revolution”.
- 15 Lucas (1977:120) quotes an interview he had with a former jailer of Pemalang, saying: “People were taught a lesson by the TKR. They were lined up in the town square and whipped until they were half dead. People were screaming, “Tolong! Tolong! Help.”
- 16 *An(an)tareja* is a *wayang* hero. He is the son of one of the *Pandawas*, *Wrekodara* (or *Bratasena*), and the brother of *Gatot Kaca*. *An(an)tareja* has the ability to move under the ground.
- 17 Troops that complied with the rationalization scheme were, for example, BPRI units from the Pekalongan residency. In May members of these units from Pekalongan, Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang handed over their arms to the Republican Army as a contribution to the scheme (M 10-5-1948).
- 18 According to Alers (1956:246) Amir Fatah’s real name was Sjarif Hidajatuliah (Syarif Hidayatuliah). Alers also states that he was *overste* (lieutenant-colonel) in the Republican Army. According to Pranata (1976-1977 n. 13) Amir Fatah was made major-general after the integration of his troops into the Republican Army. According to Jusmar Basri (n.d.:1) Amir Fatah was a member of the *Markas Pembela Masyumi*.
- 19 The SWKS-III, comprising Brebes and Tegal, formed part of the first *Wehrkreise* of the 3rd Division. Besides the *Wehrkreise* and *Sub Wehrkreise* Operational Command and the Civil Administration a Military Administration was also formed. In each *kabupaten* a *Komando Distrik Militer* (KDM) or Military District Command was instituted. In Tegal this was headed by Major Kasimin, in Brebes by Captain Abduljalil. In each *kecamatan*, moreover, a *Komando Onder Distrik Militer* (KODM) or Military Sub District Command was introduced.
- 20 An additional circumstance inspiring Amir Fatah to proclaim the *Darul Islam* in Central Java may have been that the commander of the *Sub Wehrkreise*, Wongsoatmodjo, had given orders for the arrest of the *Hizbu’llah* soldiers. These orders may have been issued after Amir Fatah’s withdrawing the *Hizbu’llah* troops to Pengarasan. Upon the commander of Brebes, Captain Prawoto (the commander of the section B (Brebes) of the *Sub Wehrkreise*, not to be confused with the commander of the KDM), going to Amir Fatah to find out what was happening, the latter had shown him the order for the arrests. Prawoto was subsequently ordered out of Brebes and Tegal by Amir Fatah.

- 21 As *Darul Islam bupati* of Tegal was appointed Kosim Nachrowi, the former commander of the Tegal *Hizbu'llah* branch. Sachroni (Sakhroni) was made head of Intelligence. Later Radimum Sastrastopo was appointed *bupati* of Cilacap. Muchsin (Mukhsin) was appointed Chief of Staff of the SHWK Battalion, with as company commanders Dimjati (Dimiyati), Sjamsuri (Syamsuri), Solihin Subchi (Subkhi) and Slamet.
- 22 For data on bands reporting and arms handed in cf. *Indonesian Review* 7, December 1950, p. 18.
- 23 Co-founders of the AUI were Moh. Sjafei (Moh. Syafei), Saunari and Haji Affandi. Machfudz became its chairman, Moh. Sjafei vice-chairman, Saunari secretary, and Affandi treasurer.
- 24 The rebel movement was also joined by a small *Hizbu'llah* unit of 40 men which had formed part of the *Surengpati* unit.
- 25 Machfudz had a predilection for the word "heaven". So he called the *pesantren* of Sumolangu and its *pondoks Kunci Sorga*, Key to Heaven.
- 26 According to Indonesian sources there were enmity between the members of the 426 Battalion and other *Darul Islam* troops in Brebes and Tegal (ANP-Aneta 1957:739). Other dissatisfied former guerilla groups which had moved to Brebes and Tegal included fighters from the said Merapi Merbabu Complex, who before their defeat had operated around Surakarta, Semarang, and Yogyakarta. They were partly former members of irregular guerilla units. There was less question of a distinct ideology in the case of these groups than in that of the *Darul Islam*, and they were, in fact, commonly referred to as *grajaks* (robbers) (cf. Handjojo 1977). Nevertheless, some of them had risen in rebellion out of protest at the results of the negotiations with the Dutch and at the Army reorganization. The Round Table Conference (*Konperensi Meja Bundar*) was styled *Konperensi Militer Belanda* (Dutch Military Conference) by them. They regarded themselves as "The defenders of the proclamation of August 17th", and also referred to themselves as the "Union of the victims of rationalization" (PR 11-3-1953).
- 27 One of the districts of Klaten that suffered most was the *kewedanaan* Jatinom. Here 425 houses were damaged or destroyed, and 46 civilians killed and 37 badly wounded (I 9-1-1952, 10-1-1952, 6-4-1952).

#### CHAPTER IV

- 1 His name is generally spelt Kahar Muzakkar or Kahar Muzakar. Harvey (1974:VII), following the latter's own spelling of the name between 1958 and 1961, writes it as Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar.
- 2 This short biography of Kahar Muzakkar is based on Tjatatan (1950). See also Harvey (1974:474) and Andaya (1976).
- 3 Andaya (1976:4) writes: "In that year the Hadat, or governing council, of the kingdom of Luwu passed the sentence of *Ripaopangitana* on him. This term means literally 'to put someone or something downward on land', or in other words to treat someone as if dead. To translate the term simply as 'banishment' is to ignore its most dreaded aspect: the severing of the ties which makes a Bugis or Makassar person one, emotionally and spiritually, with all the members of his community."
- 4 In some sources this organization is referred to as the *Gerakan Putera Indonesia Sulawesi Selatan*.

- 5 According to Abbenhuis, the then chief commanding officer of Amacab (Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch) in Jakarta, an additional reason for the general resentment against the Menadonese was provided by the fact that they had collaborated with the enemy to the extent of betraying Indonesians engaged in underground activities during the Japanese occupation (NIB II:567–569).
- 6 The composition of the KRIS board was as follows: chairman – A. Ratulangi, vice-chairman – Baharudin Rahman, first secretary – Kahar Muzakkar, second secretary – J.M. Waworuntu, first treasurer – G. Pakasi, second treasurer – H.M. Idrus, assistants – F. Palemewen, A. Abd. Rachman (A. Abd. Rakhman) and J. Rappart (M 25-10-1945).
- 7 Harvey (1974:174–175) notes that the rendering of the name of the *Batalyon Kesatuan Indonesia* is inconsistent. Some sources call it *Barisan Kemajuan Indonesia* or *Batalyon Kemajuan Indonesia*.
- 8 Andi Selle, who was to play a prominent role in the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion, was one of the regional commanders.
- 9 According to Harvey (1974:178) about 1,000 youths were estimated to have come to South Sulawesi on these expeditions, and only about 100 of them to have escaped imprisonment or death to return to Java. Mohammad Saleh Lahade and Andi Mattalatta were among those who returned.
- 10 The Prince of Bonthain, who was not prepared to surrender, was arrested by the Dutch at the end of November.
- 11 On the guerilla groups in the early stages of the revolution cf. Said (n.d. and 1976), Harvey (1974:145–153), and Sulawesi (1953:334–335).
- 12 The following organizations merged into LAPRIS: *Penerjang Penjajah Indonesia* (PPI) (Ousters of the Colonizers of Indonesia), *Lasykar Pemberontak Turatea* (Laptur) (Revolutionary Army of Turatea) I and II, *Lipang Bajeng, Buka, Kebaktian Rakyat Palangga* (Dedication of the People of Palangga) (Kerap), *Angkatan Lasykar Rakyat* (ALR) (People's Army Task Force), *Barisan Pemberontak Indonesia* (Indonesian Revolutionary Corps) (BPI), *Persatuan Pemuda Nasional Indonesia* (PPNI) (Indonesian National Youth Association), *Tentara Pemberontak Republik Indonesia* (TPRI) (Revolutionary Army of The Indonesian Republic), TPRI Mares, TPRI Camba, *Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia* (Revolutionary Corps of The Indonesian Republic) (BPRI), *Harimau Indonesia* (Indonesian Tigers) (HI), HI Tanete, *Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia Sulawesi* (AMRIS) (Sulawesi Youth Front of The Indonesian Republic) and KRIS *Muda* (Cuplikan 1972:120). According to Nasution (1977 III:604), who states the number of organizations which originally made up LAPRIS to be 19, it was eventually joined by a total of 26 organizations.
- 13 This Sulawesi branch was made up of *inter alia* the *Lasykar Harimau Indonesia*, *Lasykar Pemberontak Turatea*, *Mobile Brigade Ratulangie*, and the *Paceke* Battalion (PR 6-6-1956).
- 14 Harvey (1974:184–185) also relates how originally Lieutenant-Colonel Lembong was to have become commander to the Brigade XVI, but as a result of opposition from Kahar Muzakkar was transferred to Army headquarters.
- 15 After 1949 the region was to become the area of operation of the Abdul Malik rebels.

- 16 Worang and his men left Surabaya on February 15th, but went to Jakarta first. Here they were addressed by Soekarno before setting sail for South Sulawesi.
- 17 Among the members of Mokoginta's staff was Major Mohammad Saleh Lahade, who was charged with the military responsibility for South Sulawesi. Mokoginta was head of the *Komisi Militer Territorial Indonesia Timur*, which *Komisi* was dissolved and converted into the *Komando Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat Territorium Indonesia Timur* in April.
- 18 On Andi Abdul Azis' rebellion cf. Bardosono (1956), Cuplikan (1972:224–230) and Soumokil (1950). In 1953 Andi Abdul Azis was sentenced to 14 years' gaol, the time he had spent in detention counting towards this sentence. In November of the same year President Soekarno reduced the sentence to 8 years.
- 19 Before the founding of the KGSS the guerillas had been organized into 11 battalions. For these battalions and their commanders see Harvey (1974:203). The KGSS is sometimes also referred to as *Komando Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan*. Possibly this is just another name for the same organization; but possibly the KGSS changed its name from *Kesatuan* to *Komando* somewhere in July 1950.
- 20 In sending Kahar Muzakkar back to Sulawesi, the Army Command may have been acting on the advice of Bahar Mattaliu, who at any rate claims so in his book (1965:33). Harvey (1974:220), on the other hand, notes that "letters requesting that Qahhar be sent to Sulawesi flowed in the MBAD [Army headquarters]".
- 21 According to the historiographers of the "Y Battalion", Kahar Muzakkar was kidnapped by the KGSS on June 6th. If this is true, it may, in fact, have been done with his own consent, for as Djarwadi writes: "There-upon Kahar Muzakkar was kidnapped by the guerillas on June 6th, 1950 (or, in point of fact, fled to them in order to provide direct leadership)" (Djarwadi 1959:122).
- 22 Kahar Muzakkar made this statement to Samsudin Rasid, a senior official with the Information Department of West Java. On the latter's return from the trip on which he had this personal meeting with Kahar Muzakkar, he stated it to be his impression that the guerillas had adopted a wait-and-see attitude and had no intention of attacking unless they themselves were attacked (I 29-9-1950).
- 23 The Committee was styled the *Komite Jasa Baik dalam Masalah Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan*. It was not recognized by the Army. Its members did confer with Mohammad Saleh Lahade, but, as was explicitly pointed out, they met the latter in his capacity as a private citizen. Kawilarang still asserted after the committee had already started functioning that he knew nothing of any Committee of Good Services, and that if such a committee was really needed the Army would form one itself. His statement was confirmed by Army headquarters in Jakarta (I 24-8-1950, 26-8-1950; N 18-11-1950).
- 24 The other members were Bebas Daeng Lalo (*Partai Rakyat Nasional*), Zainal Arifin (*Masyumi*), Lukman Wiriadinata (PSI), H. Siradjuddin Abbas (Sirajuddin Abbas) (*Blok Islam*), Mustapha (*Partai Buruh*), Huto-mo Supardan (PKI), and E. Sumantri (a parliamentary employee acting as secretary to the mission).

- 25 Virtually the same conclusion was arrived at by Makmun Sumadipradja, who, after his return from Sulawesi, where he had worked out an agreement with the guerillas (see below), testified before Parliament that the population sympathized with the guerillas not only because of the latter's contribution to the struggle for independence, but also on account of its many family ties with them and its agreement with the guerillas' view that they should be in charge of the development of the region (N 23-12-1950).
- 26 Those who were not to be admitted to the Army were to be assisted by a "Guerilla Rehabilitation Committee", or *Panitya Rehabilitasi Bekas Gerilya*.
- 27 The tendency in Jakarta to think first of Java and Sumatra in dealing with the guerilla problem became evident once more on the occasion of the stipulation of rules for the demobilization of the Student Armies, which again were in force only for Java and Sumatra. Hence, the members of the Student Armies in South Sulawesi had to ask for the same treatment as students in Java and Sumatra, stressing that students in South Sulawesi, too, had fought in the revolution.
- 28 In early February 1951 the Committee in charge of the demobilization of the guerillas or their admission to the Republican Army stated that of the 15,000 guerillas who had entered the zones, 12,000 had had to be sent back to society (I 7-2-1951).
- 29 This committee, named *Panitya I Penyelesaian Masalah Gerilya*, had Major Mochtar, a territorial officer, as vice-chairman. Its members included Abas Daeng Malawa, Mrs. Salawati Daud, Makaraeng Daeng Djarung (Jarung), Aminuddin, S. Sunari, Amin Daud, Jozef Latumahina, and police commissioner Moh. Junus Hile (Moh. Yunus Hile). A guerilla representative still remained to be appointed (N 29-12-1950).
- 30 This committee was named *Panitya II Penyelesaian Masalah Gerilya*. Its other members were S. Sunari, Alinuddin Daeng Mattiro, Saleh Daeng Matinri, Nanlohy, Samsul Kamar, and Lieutenant I.B. Supit. Here, too, a representative of the guerillas still remained to be appointed (N 29-12-1950).
- 31 As Chief of Staff of the National Reserve Corps of South Sulawesi was appointed B. Sutrisno. The incorporation of the *Persiapan Be Hasanuddin* did not imply that peace and order now prevailed everywhere in South Sulawesi. Groups operating independently of the *Persiapan Be Hasanuddin* continued disturbing the public order, notably in the area surrounding Kolaka, in Majene (where members of the *Tengkorak Putih* (White Skull), who had crossed the Ujungpandang Straits from Kalimantan, were operating) and in Gowa and Jeneponto.
- 32 *Batu Putih* is the name of the area surrounding Siwa. Robert Wolter Mongisidi was a former freedom fighter executed by the State of East Indonesia in September 1949. The name "40,000" was chosen in commemoration of the allegedly 40,000 victims of the Westerling action. Arief Rate was the former commander of the *Mobile Battalion Ratulangie* who had been killed by Republican troops in August 1950. Andi Abdullah Bau Masepe was a former Prince of Supa who had been tortured and killed by Westerling's troops after refusing to disclose the whereabouts of Andi Selle.
- 33 The difference was, in fact, one of emphasis rather than of name. The

official name of the corps was *Korps Cadangan Nasional/Persiapan Brigade Hasanuddin*.

- 34 In the weeks preceding August a conflict about a fourth issue – money – broke out. From mid-December 1950 Kahar Muzakkar and his men had received a living-allowance of Rp. 90,000 a day. This allowance was stopped in June, when responsibility for the guerillas was transferred from the so-called Staf K (= *Keamanan*) to the Army. This new arrangement led to mutual accusations of fraud and corruption. The Government later claimed that between December 16th, 1950, and August 1951 it had paid a total of Rp. 17 million. This was, in fact, the total amount of money reserved by the Government for the guerillas of South Sulawesi from the start in December. Kahar Muzakkar claimed to have received only Rp. 7.5 million, however, while according to the Government he had been paid this sum between the end of March, when the National Reserve Corps was formed, and July 1951. Mussaffa (1951), who investigated the matter, reported that there had indeed been some malversation on the part of the Government. So money had been set aside for barracks that had never been built. He was nevertheless of the opinion that Kahar Muzakkar also had used money for personal ends. As proof he cited the marriage of Usman Balo, the expenses for which had run up to Rp. 35,000.
- 35 Originally Lieutenant-Colonel Sukowati had been commander of these A-troops. Warouw had taken over the command on May 22nd.
- 36 The historiographers of the *Siliwangi* Division (1968:571) depict Kahar Muzakkar as “narrow-minded and very easily influenced by counter-revolutionary elements”. Radik Djarwadi’s observation (1963:5–6) that “K M had long been known as an officer with progressive ideas, while there were even many people who thought him to be a communist” may be just as biased in the opposite direction.
- 37 For PKI contacts with Kahar Muzakkar see Harvey (1974:250–252).
- 38 Alers (1956:262), too, speaks of *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat*, as does Bahar Mattaliu (1956:37). Radik Djarwadi (1963:9) speaks of *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*.
- 39 At the time of the relevant proclamation people doubted its authenticity. That is why Kahar Muzakkar a few weeks later issued a second declaration, stressing that it really had been he who had proclaimed Sulawesi part of the Islamic State (PR 31-10-1953). There were a national flag and a war standard. The national flag was red with a yellow crescent and star. The war standard was also red, and displayed three yellow stars with the number twenty-four in the upper left corner. Both flags were said to have been approved by the Central Government of the Islamic State (IB 11-8-1953).
- 40 For the composition of the Government of the Islamic State of Sulawesi see Harvey (1974:466).
- 41 According to the historiographers of the *Siliwangi* Division (1968:573), Kahar Muzakkar, because of “his oath of loyalty to the TII . . .”, “could not and would not be officially recognized with his men as members of the APRI”. It is also hinted that his contacts with the West Javanese *Darul Islam* made him more uncompromising.
- 42 Regular reports of alleged sexual abuses by the guerillas appeared in the Indonesian press, moreover. In April 1954 IB (24-4-1954), for instance,



- it was reported that compulsory “beauty contests” were held by the guerillas at Sidenreng/Rappang, at which the guerilla leaders chose their wives. Some of these leaders reportedly already had five wives.
- 43 In another section of the Makalua Charter the existing political parties are attacked. The secular parties, such as the PNI, *Murba* and PKI, are described as “hypocritical” (*munafik*) and atheistic. The Islamic parties such as *Masyumi* and *Nahdatul Ulama* are branded “counter-revolutionary”. Both types of parties had to be opposed (Simatupang and Lopian 1978:10).
  - 44 According to the ‘Notes’ men were forbidden to wear or have in their possession “The excellent stock of material” (as the original text phrases this in English) “in the form of woollen and other materials affected by big-city nobs” (continued in Indonesian). Nor were they allowed to have more than two military uniforms, three *sarongs* with printed patterns, two towels, three undershirts, four pairs of underpants, and one raincoat in any one year. Women were not allowed to wear “Especially women stock of materials” (as it is again stated in English) “in the form of tiger fur and other clothes affected by big-city ladies” (continued in Indonesian). Further, they were forbidden to have more than four blouses, four *sarongs* with printed and/or *batik* patterns (apart from their praying garments), one night *sarong*, two towels, four chemises, four pairs of “women’s breeches” and one *stagen* (abdominal belt) a year.
  - 45 In a contemporary series of articles on Kahar Muzakkar (Mussaffa 1951) the number of men due to be demobilized was stated to be 10,000, making the total figure a little higher, i.e. between 13,000 and 14,000.
  - 46 Andi Tenriadjeng fell in battle in May 1954, one month after the surrender of his Chief of Staff, Andi Panrenregi (PR 11-3-1954; IB 9-6-1954).
  - 47 The same factor – competing territorial ambitions within the rebel force – prompted the outbreak of fighting in early 1953 between units of the 40,000 Battalion and the *Batu Putih* Battalion, which both claimed control over the Wajo region. In this fighting 750 people were killed according to a communique issued by Army headquarters in Jakarta (PR 14-4-1953).
  - 48 This fighting erupted between members of the 719 (Andi Selle’s men) and 711 Battalions on January 7th, 1953. A military commission instituted to investigate the matter eventually concluded that this fighting had taken place not between two battalions, but between individual members of the battalions (IM 10-1-1953).
  - 49 Later, Soekarno visited Aceh and toured the trouble-spots of West Java.
  - 50 There were *Darul Islam* troops operating in Tual Tengah, Tengah Liang, Tolehu, Buru, Morotai and North Halmahera (Tobelo).
  - 51 For the English text of the charter as well as its signatories see Harvey (1977:164–167).
  - 52 The territorial Command of East Indonesia (the TT-VII) was officially dissolved on June 8th, 1957, as was the KoDPSST. A month prior the same fate had befallen the KDM-SST (*Komando Daerah Militer – Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara*) (cf. Harvey 1977:59–63).
  - 53 Warouw had been replaced as territorial commander of East Indonesia by Lieutenant-Colonel Ventje Sumual in August 1956. The latter also became involved in the PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion.

- 54 Some commanders had preceded Bahar Mattaliu in surrendering. There were reports of small *Darul Islam* units surrendering in the Indonesian press as early as July, for instance, with as reason for their decision being stated their disapproval of the cooperation with the *Permesta* (DM 8-7-1959, 22-7-1959).
- 55 Sjamsul Bachri left South Sulawesi in December 1958. He went to Egypt, formally for reasons of study and in order to establish contacts with groups abroad which were sympathetic to the Indonesian *Darul Islam* movement (DM 7-4-1959).

## CHAPTER V

- 1 On the origin of the ALRI Div IV (*Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia Divisi IV*) and the infiltration of Kalimantan from Java see Basry (1961), Nasution (1977, II:467–474; 1977, III:597–600), and Mussaffa (1954).
- 2 According to Nasution (1977, II:468, 471) the Kalimantan branch of the PRI comprised about 250 members, that of the *Pesindo* only 120.
- 3 This committee was made up of Mohammad Noor, Gusti Muis, Achmad Jusuf (Akhmad Yusuf), Rezekan, and Hasjim Amin (Hasyim Amin) (Nasution 1977, III:600).
- 4 Gusti Aman, who had been born in Banjarmasin around 1925, had gone to Java after the proclamation of independence, returning to Kalimantan for a short period at the end of 1946.
- 5 According to Nasution (1971, II:44) Gusti Aman unfolded to Hasan Basry's troops new ideas on the conduct of guerilla warfare, the so-called "territorial system", evolved by the Republican Army.
- 6 Before joining the ALRI Div IV, P(angeran) Arya was a contractor working *inter alia* at Dutch military barracks.
- 7 Kahin (1970:354), explaining the difference between states (*negaras*) and autonomous areas (*daerahs istimewa*), writes: "Those in the second category were usually much smaller in population than those in the first or else had been more recently created. The theory upon which this distinction was based was that the less populous of these territories (and usually the most backward with respect to cultural level and economic development) were fit to receive a lesser degree of self-government than the larger, and were to be more dependent upon the central government of the federation." The autonomous area of Banjar had been created in January 1948.
- 8 Nasution (1971, III:45) mentions Hamdi as Minister of Information and Religion, instead of Budy Gawis and Natsir respectively.
- 9 Initially there were only three military districts (or regiments) in South Kalimantan, namely Kandangan, Barabai, and Banjarmasin, with Gusti Aman, Martinus and Rustam as commanders, and one in Southeast Kalimantan, with Muljono (Mulyono) as commander (Mussaffa 1954:n. 3,9). Yet another subdivision is mentioned by Nasution (1971, III:46), who mentions Ibnu Hadjar as one of the two commanders of South Hulusungai.
- 10 The *Gerakan Repolusi Rakyat Indonesia* (GRRRI), which claimed a membership of one thousand armed men and was commanded by R. Kusumanegara (KB 6-10-1949), had operated in the Barito area. It was

- officially incorporated into the ALRI Div IV in November 1949 (KB 13-11-1949). The *Tentara Lawung*, also a former opponent of the ALRI Div IV, operated in the same area, under the command of J.C. Rangkap (KB 8-10-1949).
- 11 The then leader of the *Lasykar Rakyat Murba* in Kandangan was Go Teng Po. Probably some skirmishes took place between members of the *Lasykar Rakyat Murba* and the ALRI Div IV in Kandangan, but reports of such fighting were denied by the leaders on both sides (KB 6-10-1949). According to the leaders of the *Lasykar Rakyat Murba* this name, incorporating the word *Murba*, had been chosen because its members belonged to the proletariat. They denied the existence of any ties, ideological or otherwise, with the *Murba* in Java, however (KB 24-10-1949).
  - 12 Burhanuddin was arrested by the Police in connection with the strike on September 19th, 1949, but was released again in early October of that year.
  - 13 A reporter with the *Kalimantan Berdjuang*, when visiting the ALRI Div IV's camp in August 1949, was informed that Hanafiah and the other kidnapped persons were engaged in forming a KNI to replace the Banjar Council (KB 23-8-1949).
  - 14 Others who "disappeared" included Sjahrul (Syahrul) and M. Fadlan, *kiai kepala* and *kiai kota* of Martapura respectively; A. Arief, *kiai* at Pengaron; Ramlan, *kiai kepala* of Pleihari; Kadri Noor, *kiai* at Karang Intan; and Gusti Darman, public prosecutor at Martapura (KB 23-8-1949, 30-8-1949).
  - 15 The five were A. Ruslan, Dr. Suranto, Achmad Hudari (Akhmad Hudari), Suroto, and R. Sa'ban. At an emergency meeting called on September 28th the daily executive refused to accept their resignation (KB 21-9-1949, 4-10-1949).
  - 16 The member-organizations of the *Gabungan Buruh Kalimantan* were: *Persatuan Pekerja Indonesia*, *Serikat Guru Indonesia*, *Serikat Pos*, *Persatuan Kaum Perawat Indonesia*, *Persatuan Pegawai Indonesia*, and *Rukun Pertukangan Indonesia*.
  - 17 At the end of September Hassan Basry himself issued the order for all schools, private as well as public, to re-open in view of the importance of education (KB 27-9-1949).
  - 18 As a consequence the Dutch had to step up their repressive measures. So it was announced on July 20th that harsh steps would have to be taken and that anyone found out in the streets after curfew would be shot without notice (KB 5-8-1949). Furthermore, all officers from the rank of corporal upwards, as well as all members of the Central Military Intelligence Service (KB 22-7-1949), were empowered, where military interests so required, to arrest people and hold them in custody for a maximum of ten days.
  - 19 Just before the establishment of this contact, on August 30th, Hassan Basry had appointed an ALRI Div IV commission to conduct negotiations. Its chairman was P. Arya, its vice-chairman Burhanuddin, and secretary Mas Sumarjo (Mas Sumaryo), while Gusti Aman and Dr. Gambiro were ordinary members, and Hassan Basry himself was to be advisor (KB 1-9-1949, 3-9-1949).
  - 20 On the basis of this interpretation, Deelman assumed in an announce-

- ment that, because Hassan Basry had been ordered to cease all hostile acts before September 16th, all people on strike would accordingly resume their work as of that date. He added here that he believed that the strike had been forced on the workers concerned, so that as a consequence sanctions would only be taken against those failing to report for work on September 16th (KB 14-9-1949).
- 21 There still remained some confusion. People believed that, as with the ALRI Div IV before, it was compulsory to pay a contribution to the Committee or to become a member. Thus an announcement had to be made that neither the payment of a contribution nor membership was obligatory, but that it was simply hoped that many people would join. Every member was required to pay a membership fee of minimally Dfl 1.— a month (KB 21-10-1949).
  - 22 *Lambung Mangkurat* Division represents the most common form of the Division's name, although it is sometimes referred to as the *Lambu Amangkurat* or *Lembu Mangkurat* Division. Lembu Amangku Rat was the *Mangkubumi* (governor or vice-regent) of "the famous mythical King of Nagara Dipa, Pangeran Suryanata . . ." (Saleh 1976:204).
  - 23 Some of the members of the *Tengkorak Putih* Division joined the Republican Army, but others kept out of it. In East Kalimantan groups like the *Banteng Hitam* (Black Buffalo), commanded by Daeng Toba, the *Kucing Hitam* (Black Cat), headed by Pak Bindruk, the *Tentara Pelajar* (Student Army) P 18 of Rede, the *Harimau* (Tiger) commanded by Agust Times, and the *Culik Hitam* (Black Kidnappers) or *Macan Ketawa* (Laughing Tiger) continued operating (KB 9-12-1949).
  - 24 *Panglima Batur* was the old name of the battalion, which was changed to *Kinibalu* after the second Dutch military action.
  - 25 Firmansjah was attached to the staff of the Army and Territory Command of Kalimantan, and was soon to become Commander of the First Sub-Territory of West Kalimantan.
  - 26 In theory, as was explained by a spokesman of the Kalimantan Command, later, in 1952, a territory constituted a permanent military unit, while a division formed part of a battle formation which could be transformed at will (IM 4-11-1952).
  - 27 Sometimes this organization is referred to as *Kesatuan Rakyat Yang Tertindas* (KRYT).
  - 28 The resentment against the appointment of Javanese to government functions was felt not only in Hulusungai or by Ibnu Hadjar and his followers alone. The resident of West Kalimantan, commenting on the tension there, stated in August that he refused to put stop to the import of civil servants from Java as he wanted to build up a capable regional government apparatus and police force.
  - 29 Sitompul was replaced as Commander of the F Brigade in October 1951 by Major Sjammaun Gaharu, who in turn was replaced a month later by Lieutenant-Colonel Suadi Suromihardjo. Sitompul in January 1952, by which time he had become a lieutenant-colonel, was appointed Chief of Staff of the Kalimantan Army and Territory in place of Colonel Eddy Sukardy.
  - 30 Those of its leaders who surrendered were Latuk in Amuntai, Abubakar in Baturandi, Ibak, Kaderi and Muis in Barabai, and Mastur and Kardjah (Karjah) in Rantau. Yet other groups independent of the

- KRIYT continued their resistance. As late as December 1953 a group of guerillas led by one Kumis, or Moustache, for instance, surrendered at Karang Intan, totally exhausted from having had to defend themselves not only against the Republican Army but also against the KRIYT (IB 27-12-1953).
- 31 Another Asmuni surrendered in Awayan in March 1954 (IB 4-3-1954).
- 32 It has been noted that in this field the ALRI Div IV was, in fact, most successful. In other areas it had not always had the right people with the right knowledge and experience, which had led to fraud, corruption and self-interest.
- 33 There were also allegations of communist sympathies in certain guerilla groups. In 1954 a letter bearing the stamp of the PKI was confiscated, as were some books written by Aidit (IB 4-4-1954). Around the same time there were reports of a group styling itself the *Harimau Hitam* (Black Tigers) striving to introduce a communist system, demanding from the well-to-do (including school teachers) one third of their incomes (IB 16-4-1954). The precise connections of these groups with the KRIYT remain obscure.
- 34 Anang Sulaiman was sentenced to two yeras' imprisonment.
- 35 Imbran Kamarullah was a die-hard, who in the prison of Balikpapan obstinately persisted in his efforts to get an Army of the Islamic Republic off the ground. He was aided in his attempts by one Rusman, sentenced to gaol for having KRIYT sympathies, and a man named Ali, a common criminal. This plot again was made public before it might have repercussions. It was a mystery to everyone how the three conspirators had imagined to extend their activities outside prison (IB 23-1-1954).
- 36 The version in *Indonesian Berdjuang* (14-9-1955) ran:

Indonesia Tuhan jang ratu  
 Tuhan jang amat tahu  
 Disanalah aku ta'atibar  
 Bukti setiap hari

[The original may have been:]

Indonesia Tuhan jang ratu  
 Tuhan jang amat tahu  
 Disanalah aku ta'ati  
 Berbakti setiap hari

[Translation]

*Indonesia God is King  
 God who is omniscient  
 Him I obey  
 And serve devotedly each day*

Indonesia kebangsaanku  
 Bangsa dan agamaku  
 Mari kita berseru  
 Agama Islam banyak jang tak tahu

Indonesia kebangsaanku  
 Bangsa dan agamaku  
 Marilah kita berseru  
 Agama Islam bersatu

*Indonesia my motherland  
 My people and my faith  
 Come, let us shout  
 Muslims unite*

Hiduplah agamaku  
 Hiduplah negaraku  
 Hiduplah rakyatku  
 Semua

Hiduplah agamaku  
 Hiduplah negaraku  
 Bangsaku, rakyatku semuanya

*Long live my faith  
 Long live my state  
 my nation, my people all of them*

Bangunlah badannya  
 Bangunlah jiwanya  
 Untuk agama Allah jang Esa

Bangunlah jiwanya  
 Bangunlah badannya  
 Untuk Agama Allah jang Esa

*Arise in spirit  
 And Body  
 For the Religion of the One and Only God*

Indonesia Raya merdeka merdeka  
 Rakyatnya agamanya semua  
 Indonesia Raya merdeka merdeka  
 Rakyatnya agama Islam bersama

*Indonesia the Great, freedom, freedom  
 Its people and its religion  
 Indonesia the Great, freedom, freedom  
 Its people and Islam together.*

37 Djohansjah was sentenced to six years' gaol in 1955.

## CHAPTER VI

1 Around the same time the Central Government appointed A.K. Gani coordinator of the Republican Army for Sumatra. The latter set up a

- General Headquarters in the island of which he put Suhardjo Harjowardojo (Suharjo Haryowardoyo) in charge. As Chief of Staff for Sumatra was appointed Mohammad Nur (Nasution 1959:110).
- 2 Nasution is probably mixing up the *Barisan Pemuda Indonesia* with the *Pemuda Republik Indonesia*
  - 3 Similar differences arose between the *Pesindo* board and its local branches in East Sumatra, where in early 1947 the *Pesindo* of Pematang Siantar clashed with the Sumatran *Pesindo* command (Nasution 1977, IV:377–380).
  - 4 This book is quoted extensively in Sumatera Utara (1953). Sumantri's account (n.d.:167–170) also seems to be based on it.
  - 5 This *Barisan Perjaga Keamanan* reportedly was divided into three divisions: the *Barisan Cap Bintang* (Star Column), whose task it was to “annihilate those who would not bend to its superior force”, the *Barisan Cap Saud* (probably *Sauh*, anchor), which had as task “to seize the property of persons who were members of independence movements in order to finance the *barisan*”, and the *Barisan Cap Tumbak* (Lance Column), which had the task to “capture intellectuals for imprisonment or execution, and kidnap girls” who were members of independence movements (Revolusi December n.d.:17).
  - 6 So the *ulèëbalang* of the *Sagi* of the XXII *Mukim* declared on February 19th that: 1) the *ulèëbalang*'s right of succession as the leaders of the country was no longer in keeping with the times; 2) the *ulèëbalang* were citizens of the Indonesian Republic and respected the people's well-being; and 3) they had decided, for the sake of the attainment of a perfect organization, a) to request the Government respectfully to grant the population of the twenty-two *mukim* the right to choose its own leaders, and b) to ask all *ulèëbalang*, with the inclusion of the *Sagi* head, to resign their functions (NIB III:553).
  - 7 As deputy commander of the Fifth Division was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Nurdin Sufi, while Major Bachtiar was appointed Chief of Staff (Sumatera Utara 1953:164; Dua Windhu 1972:114).
  - 8 Personal jealousies and regional antagonism may have played a role here. Amir Husin al Mudjahid came from East Aceh, as did Mohammad Daudsjah. According to some observers the fact that the key military and civil functions in Aceh were occupied by two East Acehnese was resented by people from Greater Aceh and Pidie (Persoalan 1953:5).
  - 9 For the composition of the Councils of Review and a report on the functioning of the Council in Pidie see, *inter alia*, Sekitar (n.d. I:202–249).
  - 10 See the letter of Nja'Umar, Chairman of the Council of Review of Pidie, to the *bupatis* and *wedanas* of Sigli, Lammculo and Meureudu (Sekitar n.d. I:218–227).
  - 11 See, for example, the speeches of Nur el Ibrahimy and Kasman Singodimedjo (Sekitar n.d. I:134–139, 192–249).
  - 12 Even someone like Amelz, who usually defended the *Darul Islam* rebels, stated in Parliament in October 1953: “Although I had many differences of opinion with him in the past, I – like his many other friends and enemies – am forced to recognize the enormous influence he enjoyed among the people, especially in the period of our independence, since his becoming head of the Office of Religion, military governor and

- subsequently governor of Aceh. Admittedly his reputation suffered after his appointments as military governor and governor of Aceh and he became very unpopular with a proportion of his former followers. But his influence became very strong again after his resignation, notably in 1952 and 1953” (Sekitar n.d. I:269).
- 13 This merger was effected on April 26th, 1947 (Dua Windhu 1972:116–117). In February 1947 the Sumatra Command had been divided into three Sub-Commands, one of them that of North Sumatra, headed by Mohammad Daudsjah.
  - 14 Four days after this the Sumatra branch of the *Pesindo* had issued a directive to the effect that all the *Pesindo* troops throughout Sumatra should cooperate in the effort to create a National Army of Indonesia. As we have seen, however, relations between the central board and the Aceh branch were not good.
  - 15 Maludin Simbolon was commander of North Sumatra from 1950 till 1956. Abdul Haris Nasution was Chief of Staff of the Republican Army from 1950 to 1952 and from 1955 to 1962. Tahi Bonar Simatupang was Acting Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Republican Army from 1949 to 1954.
  - 16 This information derives from a secret report cited by K. Werdojo (K. Werdoyo) during the parliamentary debate on the Daud Beureu'eh rebellion (Sekitar n.d. I:302–303).
  - 17 Among the persons mentioned as attending were: T. Aziz (chairman of the Social Council of East Aceh), Burhanuddin (*camat* of Langsa), Aminuddin (chief of Police of Idi), Garbie (*wedana* of Idi), and Abdul Rani (*camat* of Peureulak), while the names of Hasan Aly and A.R. Hadjat (A.R. Hajat), the *patih* of Binjai are also mentioned in connection with the meeting, though it is not clear whether they were actually present or not. The name of Hasan Aly, former director of Public Prosecutions in Aceh and the later *Darul Islam* Prime Minister of the region, is also mentioned in connection with a third preparatory meeting which allegedly took place. For this he and a number of other persons were reported to have gathered at the house of the *patih* of Binjai, who later denied that Hasan Aly's visit had had anything to do with the *Darul Islam*, saying that Hasan Aly had only come to his house to pay his respects before leaving for Jakarta, to which city he had been transferred. Hasan Aly had admittedly brought some friends along, but Hadjat did not know what Hasan Aly and these friends had talked about, because they spoke Acehnese, a language he did not understand (Sekitar n.d. I:33).
  - 18 A third *bupati*, Moh. Husin of Central Aceh, was taken prisoner by Republican troops at the outbreak of the rebellion.
  - 19 The Acehnese *Darul Islam* movement had four flags: one red with a white star and crescent, one green with a white star and crescent, one red with a white crescent and four stars, and one white and red, with a crescent in the red bar and a star in the white one (PR 4-11-1953).
  - 20 Amin's report (1956:60–61) confirms that the assistant *wedana* of Peureulak, A.R. Hasan, sided with the rebels. The latter chaired a meeting on September 21st and 22nd at which the fortunes of the rebellion were discussed and a branch of the Islamic Army of Indonesia was called into being.



- 21 A *keuchik* is the head of a *gampong* (*kampung*). A number of such *kampungs* make up a *mukim*.
- 22 Bachtiar Yunus noted (1953:3) with respect to Aceh that whereas such companies as Atra and Nasional were able to continue operating undisturbedly, others had to practically discontinue their services because their vehicles were frequently stopped or attacked.
- 23 Aceh had earned itself the name *Daerah Modal Republik Indonesia*, Capital Area of the Republic of Indonesia, for the role it had played during the revolution. On the one hand the name gave expression to the fact that Aceh – unlike the rest of the Republic – had never been occupied by Dutch troops. On the other hand it was indicative of the financial and material support given by it to the Republican Government.
- 24 The *Dewan Syura* consisted of a chairman (Daud Beureu'eh), a deputy chairman (Amir Husin al Mudjahid), and five members. The *Majlis Syura* also comprised a chairman (Daud Beureu'eh) and a deputy chairman, while its exact composition as well as the number of its members still remained to be fixed.
- 25 For the commanders of the regiments and their battalions see Amin (1956:83–85).
- 26 The *bupatis* at the time were:  
 Pidie: T.A. Hasan  
 North Aceh: Teungku Sjah Abdul Hamid (Ajah Hamid) (Ayah Hamid)  
 East Aceh: Saleh Adri  
 South Aceh: Teungku Zakaria Junus (Zakaria Yunus)  
 Central Aceh: Saleh Hadji (Saleh Haji)  
 Greater Aceh: Ishak Amin (the first *bupati* here, Sulaiman Daud, the former resident-coordinator of Aceh, having been arrested in May 1954).  
 The commanders of the Regiments were:  
 Regiment I (Pidie): Ibrahim Saleh, an elder brother of Hasan Saleh  
 Regiment II (North Aceh): H. Ibrahim  
 Regiment III (East Aceh): A.R. Hanafiah  
 Regiment IV (South Aceh): Saleh Kafa  
 Regiment V (Central Aceh): Iljas Lebai (Ilyas Lebai)  
 Regiment VI (Greater Aceh): Abdullah Wahab  
 Regiment VII (East Sumatra): Haji Hasanuddin  
 (the troops of West Aceh, which were commanded by T.R. Idris, formed part of the Regiment for South Aceh).  
 The *Darul Islam* Police Force was headed by A.R. Hasjim (A.R. Hasyim).  
 There were further three deputy military governors, viz.  
 Hasan Aly for Greater Aceh, Pidie and Central Aceh,  
 Hasan Saleh for North and East Aceh and Langkat-Tanah Karo,  
 A.G. Mutiara for South and West Aceh and West Tapanuli.
- 27 For its composition see Meuraxa (1956:54–56).
- 28 T.M. Amin was a former *bupati* attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He had been managing director of Dagang dan Pembangunan (formerly Indolco) Ltd. and a member of the board of the Aceh Mining Co., of which Hasballah Daud, the son of Daud Beureu'eh, was the director.

- A.G. Mutiara (also known as Abdul Gani) had been managing editor of the newspaper *Tegas*, published at Banda Aceh.
- Zainul Abidin Muhammad Tiro (also known as Zainul Abidin) was an ex-judge of the court of Sigli (PR 4-1-1956; Amin 1953:6).
- 29 So there were reports of villagers near Kualabeë, in West Aceh, receiving free medical care at the local *Darul Islam* hospital, of which a foreigner who was also military instructor was in charge. This foreigner may have been one Dr. Schiphorst, who together with a nurse called Adrie Israel had been missing from the hospital of Kabanjahe, in Tanah Karo, since February 1954, and who was reported to be working for the rebels (Sekitar n.d. III:143–144, 151). Abdul Murat Mat Jan (1976:24) notes that the *Darul Islam* trained its medical personnel at the island of Pulau Kampai, in East Sumatra, and that it obtained medicines from the latter's relatives outside Aceh and from medical workers within Aceh who sympathized with it.
- 30 Besides Singapore, Penang and New York, Tokyo was mentioned as one of the places in which sympathizers of the Acehnese Islamic State of Indonesia tried to rally financial and moral support. In Singapore the movement was moreover represented by "an enterprising Irish public relations officer" (Mossman 1961:44).
- 31 D.M. Djuned, a member of the *Perti* of Aceh, was arrested in May 1954, shortly after the arrest of Sulaiman Daud by Republican troops. After his release Djuned continued his efforts. In February 1955 he visited Jakarta in order to discuss the situation in Aceh and the possibilities of its solution with Central Government officials (Sekitar n.d. III:94, 204). For the composition of the *Badan Kontak Pribadi Peristiwa Aceh* see Amin (1956:198). In March 1955 the *Panitia Badan Penyelesaian Peristiwa Aceh* chaired by T.M. Jahja (T.M. Yahya) was formed at Medan. Like the *Badan Kontak Pribadi*, it set itself the task of finding a solution by maintaining relations with Daud Beureu'eh as well as the Central Republican Government. The initiative for the foundation of this new committee had been taken by the *Persatuan Masyarakat Aceh* (PERMA) in November of the previous year (Sekitar n.d. III:89–90, 220).
- 32 Other recommendations by the Islamic scholars to the Government which were cited by the parliamentary commission in its report were that it should stimulate cooperation between the *teungkus* and *teukus*, give priority to Acehnese in its appointment policy, try and treat Aceh as a father would his son (in view of the courage shown by the Acehnese), and strive to achieve equity in all fields to satisfy the strong sense of justice of the Acehnese people. The commission itself recommended that the Republican Government and its apparatus should eschew everything in their measures that might be offensive to the Acehnese or provoke further discord, avoid creating the impression in the appointment of its employees that it favoured a particular group and consequently make sure that everyone it appointed to positions in Aceh met the requirements of acceptability, capability and integrity, and give priority to Aceh in the allocation of funds and materials for the administrative and power machinery in order to reward the Acehnese population for defending the nation so well.
- 33 These nineteen provinces were: Aceh, East Sumatra (including Riau),

- Tapanuli, Minangkabau (West Sumatra), South Sumatra (Jambi, Palembang, Bengkulu, Lampung, Bangka and Belitung), West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Bali-Lombok, the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Moluccas, West Irian, Mataram (Yogyakarta and Surakarta), and Jakarta (Sekitar n.d. III:15).
- 34 This proposal was co-signed by Amelz, A.M. Djohan (A.M. Johan) (PIR), Ibrahim Sedar (independent), Mayor Polak (PSI), and A.C. Manoppo (*Demokrat*).
  - 35 At the time of Amin's appointment twenty parties and organizations, among them the *Masyumi*, GPII and *Muhammadiyah*, had pressed for Abdul Hakim's continuation in office. The parties adopting the opposite stance included the PKI, which wanted to see Abdul Hakim fired immediately. The point at issue was Abdul Hakim's agrarian policy, the PKI holding him responsible for the arrests of farmers (Sekitar n.d. I:369–370).
  - 36 Zulkifli Lubis and Burhanuddin Harahap were also involved in an attempt to establish contact with Kartosuwirjo. This became apparent in February 1956, when an envoy carrying letters for Kartosuwirjo asking him to agree to a cease-fire was intercepted (PR 4-2-1956, 14-2-1956, 15-2-1956).
  - 37 There were none the less some reports of disciplinary action being taken against local *Darul Islam* commanders. In North Aceh, for instance, one of Hasan Saleh's lieutenants Usman Balo, fled to Pidie on learning that he was to be punished for cruelty (Sekitar n.d. III:18). In spite of the reports of conflicts and of struggles for power between the top leaders — in which the names of Daud Beureu'eh, Hasan Saleh and Husin Jusuf crop up most frequently —, on the whole there was great unity and cohesion in this area.
  - 38 Haji Hasanuddin's function as commander of the East Sumatra Regiment was taken over by Teuku Saat; most of the soldiers followed Hasanuddin, however (DM 7-8-1959).
  - 39 The vagueness of the compromise gave rise to some problems in 1962. At the end of that year the rumour circulated that the Central Army Command was opposed to the introduction of Islamic law in Aceh, which rumour was subsequently contradicted by an Army spokesman. He read out a statement the purport of which was that 1) Islamic law was not a priori rejected, hence also not in Aceh; 2) laws could be made for the Islamic community which might be adjusted to Islamic law; and 3) the Regional Government of Aceh, in accordance with the statement of the Hardi mission, might issue regional regulations in conformity with Islamic law in the fields of religion, education and customary law, provided these did not run counter to the general principles of the state policy, the public interest, or legal rules of a higher order. The discussion was joined by the Minister of Religion, who stated himself to be convinced that the Central Army Command recognized, and hence did not reject, the principle of Islamic law in Aceh (DM 11-12-1962, 12-12-1962, 19-12-1962).
  - 40 This was by *Keputusan Penguasa Perang Pusat* no. 01054/1959 of October 31st, 1959. Indonesia was under martial law from March 1957 till March 1962. During this time it had a Central War Administration,

- Penguasa Perang Pusat (Peperpu)*, and in the provinces a Regional War Administration, *Penguasa Perang Daerah (Peperda)*. In Aceh the chairman of the *Peperda* was the military commander, Sjammaun Gaharu, and the vice-chairman the governor, A. Hasjmy.
- 41 Both these officers belonged to the so-called OSM, or *Operasi Sabang Merauke*, an organization headed by Major Bojke Nainggolan (Boyke Nainggolan). This had originally been the name of the PRRI operation whereby Medan was occupied by the rebels for one day in March 1958.
  - 42 The *Republik Persatuan Indonesia* was sometimes also called the *Negara Demokrasi Indonesia* (NDI) (Democratic State of Indonesia). Consequently its Army, the *Tentara Persatuan Indonesia* (TPI), was sometimes also referred to as the *Tentara Demokrasi Indonesia* (TDI). For the constitution of the RPI see Mudzakkar (n.d.:24–64).
  - 43 The other Sumatran states were: the combined State of Tapanuli and East Sumatra and the States of West Sumatra, the Riau Archipelago, Jambi and South Sumatra. The other state in Sulawesi was that of North Sulawesi (Mossmann 1961:228).
  - 44 Hasan Muhammad Tiro (1965:19), who espoused the United Republic of Indonesia as its representative with the United Nations, pleaded for a Confederation of Southeast Asian States made up of the Republics of Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, the Moluccas, Irian Jaya, Bali, and Sunda. Although overlooking Java and the other Sunda Islands in his enumeration, he did state that Java should also form part of the confederation.
  - 45 Lieutenant-Colonel Achmad Husein had played an important role in the events leading up to the PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion. He had been chairman of the Banteng Council of Central Sumatra and in February 1958 had issued the ultimatum to the Central Republican Government the refusal of which had prompted the proclamation of the PRRI.
  - 46 One of these reporting together with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was Amelz.

## CHAPTER VII

- 1 See Anderson (1976) and Onghokham (1978) for an analysis of the influence of rationalization and of resistance against expanding central control on the Madiun affair.
- 2 This Bureau was headed by Major General Djokosujono (Jokosuyono) and Ir. Sakirman.
- 3 The *TNI bagian Masyarakat* was headed by Major General Ir. Sakirman.
- 4 The core of the *Sayap Kiri* was formed by the PKI, *Partai Sosialis*, *Pesindo*, and *Partai Buruh*.
- 5 According to Djamhari (1971:41) the strength of the *TNI bagian Masyarakat* was 90,000. Nasution (1968 II:130), in his discussion of the problems of rationalization, speaks of a strength of 350,000 with reference to the Armed Forces (including the navy), and 470,000 for the *lasykars*.
- 6 The *Sayap Kiri* coalition was transformed into the *Front Demokrasi Rakyat*, headed by Amir Sjarifuddin, at the end of February 1948. Its principal participants were the *Partai Sosialis*, *Partai Buruh*, PKI, *Pesindo* and *SOBSI*.

- 7 As Makassarese and Bugis had also migrated to Pulau Laut, this seems to account for the fears and frequent rumours of infiltrations by Kahar Muzakkar's troops on this island.
- 8 For a list of the goods involved see Wirodihardjo (1965:102–104).
- 9 The practice of sub-leasing land or share-cropping to poor farmers or landless labourers made for an increase in the number of large landlords and big farmers. More land was controlled by these latter two categories than appeared at a superficial glance at land ownership. The extent to which land was controlled indirectly, through leasing or share-cropping arrangements, was later used, in fact, as a major justification for legislation providing for the redistribution of land. However, in a country where land-holdings in general were very small, and large land ownership was restricted to specific regions, land reforms and land redistribution seemed to have little point. Nevertheless, as the memorandum to the Act on the Size of Agricultural Holdings stated, even if large land ownership was not so widespread (so that there might not appear to be much land to redistribute), most large landholders had become so as a result of the acquisition of land through leasing or share-cropping. The area of the land involved might comprise tens, hundreds and even thousands of hectares (Himpunan 1965:284).
- 10 A commercial edition of Jackson's thesis was published in 1980 (Jackson 1980).
- 11 An additional problem is that Jackson obtained his information on land ownership and share-cropping by means of a questionnaire distributed to village officials. Obviously the official village records do not necessarily reflect the actual landholding situation. To evade the law on maximum holdings, for instance, larger landholders might have some of their land registered in the names of relatives.
- 12 Jackson's findings indeed corroborate this. He writes: "The conclusion to be drawn is that landownership is more widespread in the D.I. villages but that the plots of many are not large enough to preclude the necessity of also working for others. In contrast landownership is more concentrated in the pro-government villages, but those who own land own enough and are not forced to work simultaneously for other farmers" (Jackson 1971:132).
- 13 I will not enter into discussion of whether genealogical ties were of no importance in South Sulawesi, as has been argued by Ter Haar, who probably influenced Vink, or whether this is a false assertion, as is claimed by Chabot (1950:17).
- 14 Looking at the question from the opposite viewpoint, there was one notable exception: the eastern part of East Java, including Madura, in which area, although markedly Islamic, armed support for Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State was not forthcoming. There had been attempts here to build up an East Javanese Division of the Islamic Army, to be commanded by one Achmadi (Akhmadi). In 1954, however, this Achmadi was arrested and sentenced to six years' gaol. His arrest came before he was able to recruit any followers or to collect a significant number of firearms: at the time of his arrest he only had one Colt with five bullets in his possession (PR 26-8-1954, 28-8-1954, 10-9-1954). The absence of a *Darul Islam* movement in East Java is all the more striking as in the late 1970's this was one of the areas in which Holy War Commands, or

*Komando Jihad*, which also strove after the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia, were active.

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
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
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



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IX	Sukabumi	XIX	Garut
X	Cianjur	XX	Tasikmalaya

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



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
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III	Majene
IV	Polmas
V	Tana Toraja
VI	Pinrang
VII	Enrekang
VIII	Sidenreng Rapang
IX	Wajo
X	Barru
XI	Soppeng
XII	Bone
XIII	Pangkajene
XIV	Maros
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XXII	Kodya Ujungpandang
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
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- II Banjar
- III Tanah Laut
- IV Tapin
- V Hulu Sungai Selatan
- VI Hulu Sungai Tengah
- VII Hulu Sungai Utara
- VIII Tanjung
- IX Barito Kuala
- X Kota Baru

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