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Reference without anaphora: on agency through grammar

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Abstract: In this article, we investigate a puzzle for standard accounts of reference in natural language processing, psycholinguistics and pragmatics: occasions where, following an initial reference (e.g., *the ice*), a subsequent reference is achieved using the same noun phrase (i.e., *the ice*), as opposed to an anaphoric form (i.e., *it*). We argue that such non-anaphoric reference can be understood as motivated by a central principle: the expression of agency in interaction. In developing this claim, we draw upon research in what may initially appear a wholly unconnected domain: the marking of epistemic and deontic stance, standardly investigated in linguistics as turn-level grammatical phenomena. Examination of naturally-occurring talk reveals that to analyze such stances solely through the lens of turn-level resources (e.g., modals) is to address only partially the means by which participants make epistemic and deontic claims in everyday discourse. Speakers' use of referential expressions illustrates a normative dimension of grammar that incorporates both form and position, thereby affording speakers the ability to actively depart from this form-position norm through the use of a repeated NP, a grammatical practice that we show is associated with the expression of epistemic and deontic authority. It is argued that interactants can thus be seen to be agentively mobilizing the resources of grammar to accommodate the inescapable temporality of interaction.

Keywords: anaphora; discourse grammar; noun phrases; pragmatics; reference; social interaction; topic

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1 Introduction

1.1 Reference and anaphora in discourse

The study of linguistic reference has overwhelmingly focused on anaphora resolution as the clearest domain in which to investigate what, at least at the inter-sentential or discourse level, has been the central issue: linguistic and processing constraints on co-reference (see, e.g., King and Lewis 2017; Mitkov 2003 for overviews; and Geach 1962 for a historical dimension). Implicit in such studies is an orientation to the Gricean Maxim of Quantity (Grice 1975): that, canonically, an anaphoric form is parasitically referential by means of a link through an antecedent.¹ And, in the data of naturally occurring language use, we see ample evidence of such forms.

Take as a case-in-point the following extract (1) in which *Annie* is first referred to as *such* (line 1), and then subsequently as *she* (lines 3, 5):

- (1) 01 Bea: → *U-huh .hh We:ll oh: uh ↑I think **Annie** has uh:*
 02 *u-may and maybe as you say slightly different,*
 03 ⇒ *.hh but I think **she** has her (.) good*
 04 *sen[se of h u m o r.]*
 05 Mau: ⇒ *[iYeah I think **sh**e does too but **she** has*
 06 *a different ty:pe.*
 07 *(0.2)*
 08 Bea: *Uh-huh,*
 [SBL 2-1-7]²

Once *Annie* has been introduced into this spate of talk, and given that there are no competing potential antecedents that could create referential ambiguity, both speakers can freely use the anaphoric reference *she* in subsequent utterances, as seen in lines 3 and 5.

The same is true of other NP referents and their corresponding anaphoric forms, as in (2) where an initial referent *the house* (line 1) is referenced subsequently with the anaphoric *it* (line 5):

- (2) 01 Emm: → *Oh honey I bet **the house** is beautiful. huh?*
 02 Lot: *Oh God Emma. (.) Jesus. How lucky.*

¹ There is also much recent psycholinguistic work which, although not on anaphora as such, appears to align with Gricean pragmatic principles, proposing that language production may be driven by a preference for communicative efficiency (e.g., Genzel and Charniak 2003; Jaeger 2010).

² Transcripts follow the conventions outlined in Jefferson (2004) and Hepburn and Bolden (2017), with standardized orthography. Italics are used for all examples per the Journal's norms.

03 (.)
 04 Emm: *Mm.*
 05 Lot: ⇒ *You have no idea **it's** right across the street*
 06 *from the El Dorado.*
 [NB:IV:10.R]

This is similarly the case for references to places (3), times (4), and various other ontological categories.

(3) 01 911: *Nine one one emergency may I help you.*
 02 Clr: *Yes. You probably got some calls already about*
 03 *→ the fire **up in Mountain Glade?***
 04 911: *Yes ((short))*
 05 Clr: *Oka:y.*
 06 911: ⇒ *Yeah we're- we're **there.***
 [MG10:CT1F2; Raymond and Zimmerman (2007: 44)]

(4) 01 Dan: *Do you want me to pop over.*
 02 Gor: *Please.*
 03 *(0.3)*
 04 Dan: *Okay, about what time.*
 05 Gor: → *Uh up to you. **In the afternoon.***
 06 Dan: *Okay,*
 07 *(.)*
 08 Dan: ⇒ *Bye I'll see you **then then***
 [Field SO_88-1-03]

Such paradigmatic cases in conversational data evidence, and appear to underscore, standard assumptions regarding co-referentiality. With respect to interaction, Schegloff (1996b), in discussing reference to persons, makes an initial distinction between reference forms and the occasions on which they are produced – in other words, the positions they occupy in discourse:

We can note that there can be locally *initial* reference occasions and locally *subsequent* ones – the first time in a spate of talk that some person is referred to and subsequent occasions in that spate of talk in which that person is referred to. And, separately, we can note that there are locally initial reference *forms* and locally subsequent ones. Full noun phrases, for example, or names can be used as locally *initial* reference forms ... pronouns are transparently designed for use as locally *subsequent* reference forms. (Schegloff 1996b: 450 [italics in original])

Such a perspective finds common ground with Hopper and Thompson's (1984) observation that the prototypical function of the noun phrase is to introduce a

referent into a spate of discourse, in order to track that referent. Accordingly, most of a language's complex nominal morphology will be used for that prototypical function, and other functions of nouns and noun phrases will tend to show reduced morphological alternatives (on which, see also Raymond and Fox 2020).

Whatever the theoretical or analytic commitment in the vast span of literature on (discourse) anaphora – be it dynamic semantics and DRT (e.g., Kamp et al. 2011) or natural language processing more broadly (e.g., Kilicoglu and Demner-Fushman 2016; Lappin and Leass 1994; Mitkov and Hallett 2007; Poesio 2016; Wolf and Gibson 2005), government and binding theory in generativist traditions (e.g., Büring 2005; Carnie 2013), Gricean and neo-Gricean approaches (e.g., Levinson 2000), the cognitive assumptions of Relevance Theory (e.g., Sperber and Wilson 1998), discourse-functional linguistics (Kärkkäinen 2003), or Hallidayan text analysis (e.g., Sanders and Pander Maat 2006) – the occurrence of such forms in a particular sequence, with an anaphoric reference form occurring subsequent to an initial antecedent, is taken as a given. Of course, Lasnik (1976) made the influential observation that anaphoric forms do not necessarily require antecedents, the interactional exemplification of which is captured in the following anecdote by Schegloff, who observes that, on the day that President Kennedy was shot:

One could walk on the street or campus and observe others being approached – or be approached oneself – by apparently unacquainted persons who asked, ‘Is he still alive?’ What was striking was that virtually without fail the reference was understood; and with great regularity that reference had taken the form of a ... subsequent reference in ... initial position. It served at the time as a striking embodiment of community, for each speaker presumed, and presumed successfully, what was ‘on the mind’ of the other, or could readily be ‘activated’ there. The ... subsequent reference term tapped that directly ... in the convergence of their orientations lay ‘community’. (Schegloff 1996b: 451)

However, even such exceptions to the assumed correlation of position and form – here, a subsequent *form* in an initial *position* – preserve the focus on subsequent reference forms. As a consequence, there has been broad consensus on the focus of linguistic attention – anaphoric reference – if not its treatment.

1.2 Non-anaphoric reference

Despite this overwhelming consensus from a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives, investigation of reference in naturally-occurring language use reveals that, in fact, there are frequently occasions when this form-position paradigm does not hold in actual practice.

Returning to extract (1), for instance, we find the following continuation in (5), at lines 9–13:

- (5) 01 Bea: → *U-huh .hh We:ll oh: uh ↑I think **Annie** has uh:*
 02 *u-may and maybe as you say slightly different,*
 03 ⇒ *.hh but I think **she** has her (.) good*
 04 *sen [se of h u m o r.]*
 05 Mau: ⇒ *[iYeah I think **sh**e does too but **she** has*
 06 *a different ty:pe.*
 07 *(0.2)*
 08 Bea: *Uh-huh,*
 09 Mau: *Different type completely.*
 10 Bea: *°Uh-hu [h.°*
 11 Mau: *→ *[.hhh We:ll: anywa:y <Was **Annie** there last night=*
 12 Bea: *=Ye:s uh huh,*
 13 Mau: *Uh huh,*
 [Continuation of (1), SBL 2-1-7]

Here, in line 11, after a flurry of anaphoric *shes* from both participants (lines 3 and 5), we see that the initial form *Annie* is re-introduced in line 11, and in a context where no competing antecedent has intervened that might create potential referential ambiguity with regard to the anaphoric form.

Linguistic accounts of such uses have hitherto emerged primarily from experimental studies and have been grounded in considerations of processing limitations – the assumption being that, over several turns-at-talk, successful co-reference requires the re-introduction of a full initial NP (see, e.g., Kazanina et al. 2007). Evidence from naturally occurring language use, however, reveals that speakers can – and in fact routinely do – successfully recover anaphoric references over substantial stretches of time. In discussing such “return-pops”, as they term them, Reichman (1981) and Fox (1987) both cite examples in which anaphoric forms are returned to unproblematically after several minutes of intervening talk.

By the same token, it is evident that processing limitations cannot be the sole determining factor in anaphoric usage, as speakers often reproduce initial (i.e., non-anaphoric) forms *in the very next turn*, thereby effectively *repeating* that initial form. In the following case involving the serving of pre-dinner drinks, for instance, the NP reference is to *the ice*:

- (6) 01 Ada: → *>Shall I get sm-< I dunno where **the ice** is actually*
 02 *[s(h)o-*
 03 Van: *→ *[Oh I'll get **the ice** ((with mouth full))*
 [Clift, 22:19; see also example (20)]

In this case, the Gricean assumption that the second, subsequent reference to the ice is achieved by an anaphoric form (e.g., here, *it*, as in the case of *the house* earlier in (2)), is clearly not sustained.

Ordinary language use in fact displays an abundance of such exemplars where anaphoric reference *could* – and perhaps in Gricean and psycholinguistic terms, strictly *should* – but in fact *does not* occur, and so where a second full NP reference form is, strictly speaking, informationally redundant.³ A central irony here is that these exemplars are frequent in the environment of mundane conversation, which is standardly held – and indeed observed – to be a context replete with various forms of ellipsis. How, then, is it possible to account for such uses, which appear to challenge semantic, pragmatic, and psycholinguistic accounts of anaphoric reference?

In this paper, we use data from naturally occurring conversation in both American and British English to examine this use of full noun phrases in contexts where current linguistic accounts suggest anaphoric forms might otherwise be expected⁴ – what Schegloff (1996b) has referred to as “initial forms” in “subsequent position”.⁵

This phenomenon has been documented in part by both Fox (1987) and Schegloff (1996b), who focus exclusively on person reference. In her foundational study of anaphora in English, Fox (1987) lists a number of these occurrences, ultimately concluding that such non-anaphoric reference forms occur in such a “wide range of conditions” (e.g., disagreements, overt recognitionals, assessments, etc.) that it is not clear there is “any common principle at work in them” (62). Moreover, the “interactive work” of this particular anaphoric pattern was “beyond the scope” of Fox’s study (64). Similarly, Schegloff, presenting some additional cases of person reference, and citing Fox’s work, notes that: “it quickly became apparent that a cluster of such instances occurred in disagreement environments of some sort. I ... cannot take up the matter further here” (1996b: 453).

In the present analysis, we seek to extend these observations beyond reference solely to persons, and expand and consolidate these insights by bringing

³ It is relevant to note that such informational “redundancy” has been shown cross-linguistically to be a crucial means through which speakers achieve various pragmatic goals, as exemplified, e.g., by research on repetitional answers to polar questions (Enfield et al. 2019; Heritage and Raymond 2012; Raymond 2003; Schegloff 1996). Indeed, we will discuss some of these findings in more depth in the sections that follow.

⁴ For discussion of a related phenomenon – a subsequent form repaired to an initial form – see Ford and Fox (1996).

⁵ Schegloff (1996b) uses the terms “*locally* initial” and “*locally* subsequent”; but here, as in Clift (2016: 197, fn. 19), we adopt the abbreviated forms “initial” and “subsequent” in the interest of clarity.

contemporary research to bear on this phenomenon. In pursuit of a unified account of such usage, our central finding is that what initially appears to be a divergent set of cases are in fact united by a common principle: the interactional expression of agency. What is more, the discovery of this principle has its origins in what might seem initially to be a wholly unrelated domain of work: linguistic stance.

2 Linguistic stance: on agency in epistemic and deontic rights

Research on linguistic stance initially developed out of a vigorous interest in grammaticalized evidentiality – marking speakers’ epistemic access to states of affairs (Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003; Chafe and Nichols 1986; Dendale and Tasmowski 2001; Guentchéva 1996; Johanson and Utas 2000). To cite a well-known example of such work, Barnes (1984: 256) writes that “the independent verb in Tuyuca is minimally composed of a verb root and an evidential,” the evidential morpheme indicating whether the speaker has personally seen the situation, has perceived it by hearing or some other sense, infers it, has learnt it from others, or deems it reasonable to assume. More recent years have seen a growing interest in the related phenomenon of egophoricity – marking relative access – which can likewise be indicated morphosyntactically (Evans et al. 2018a, 2018b; Floyd et al. 2018; Sandman 2016: 208–238; San Roque et al. 2018; Schultze-Berndt 2017). Nonetheless, even without such dedicated or grammatically obligatory morphosyntactic markers, it is clear that, as Joseph notes, “probably all languages have some means of taking a covering [epistemic] stance towards statements and events that are not a matter of category or grammar *per se*” (2003: 311). So, in English and French, for example, such distinctions may be achieved lexically, (e.g., *apparently*, *évidemment* ‘evidently’) or modally (e.g., *that’ll be the postman*, *la Reine **serait** malade* ‘the Queen is understood to be ill’ [*lit.* ‘the Queen **would be** ill’]).

In this line of research, epistemic stance marking is clearly a form of deixis in its indexing of information to some point of origin (for discussion, see Mushin 2001: 33–35). Just as deictic terms index aspects of the speaker’s position, whether spatiotemporal or social (see Levinson 1983), such stance indexes aspects of the speaker’s position with regard to what they are saying: their “epistemological

assessment” (Mushin 2001: xi) of it.⁶ And just as deictic terms carry spatiotemporal or social coordinates, stance is inherent in – and clearly carried by – certain linguistic forms.⁷

Alongside morphosyntactic and lexical means of marking stance, work in Conversation Analysis (CA) has identified another, distinct means by which egophoricity or relative epistemic access may be indexed, with resources not explicitly marked for such purposes (Heritage and Raymond 2005). This draws not on utterance-level grammar *in vacuo*, but on the combined resources of grammar and a feature of language use that emerges from the inescapable temporality of interaction: *sequential position* (Clift 2006; Clift et al. 2013; Deppermann and Günthner 2015; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Schegloff 1996a, 2007; Thompson et al. 2015).

In interaction, being the first to describe or evaluate some state of affairs is understood and oriented to as an implied claim of primary rights on the matter at hand, while being the second or subsequent speaker is understood as taking a secondary position (Heritage and Raymond 2005).⁸ Thus a speaker producing an assessment action such as *It’s a nice day*, by default claims prior rights to assess purely by dint of going first – and the recipient thereby, by default, is in the position of having to go second, with, for example, a second assessment built as an agreement: *Yes, it’s lovely*. However, it does not necessarily follow that a speaker proffering an assessment first (or second) will thereby embrace the position-implied primary (or secondary) rights to assess. In some cases, speakers offering first assessments may work to defeat the inherent implication that they are claiming primary rights to evaluate the matter at hand; so, a first position assessment may be modulated in specific grammatical and interactional ways in order to downgrade the speaker’s claim to primary rights of assessment – and thus their epistemic stance. By the same token, the epistemic stance of a second assessment may be upgraded in various ways in an effort to overcome the

6 For such studies of stance in interaction, see, e.g., Du Bois (2007), who examines explicit indices of stance, and Clift (2006), who shows reported speech to be a form of stance. Conversation-analytic investigations explicitly referencing stance in their arguments include topics as diverse as Gardner’s (2002) work on response tokens, Raymond et al.’s (2021) analysis of the morphosyntax of requests and offers, and Wu’s (2004) examination of Mandarin final particles – an indication of how broadly construed the notion of stance has become.

7 For further examples of the relationship between stance and deixis, see Oh (2007, 2010) on Korean, and Raymond (2016) on Spanish.

8 Enfield (2013: 125) proposes that first position implies primary rights by means of three mechanisms.

1. Being the one to say it (via an agent unity heuristic).
2. Saying it in the form of an assertion.
3. Saying it independently.

downgraded stance inherently embodied in sequential secondness (for an overview of which, see Thompson et al. 2015: Ch. 4).

Taking English as an example,⁹ evidentials and tag questions are frequently used in first assessments of states of affairs by speakers who claim lesser epistemic rights, while interrogatives, repetitional confirmations, and *oh*-prefaced responses are used in second position to assert greater epistemic rights with respect to the matter at hand (Heritage and Raymond 2005). Note that upgrading or downgrading is achieved by the combination of linguistic resources *and* sequential position, with the result that the same resource (e.g., a tag question) can serve to either upgrade or downgrade, according to its position (see Schegloff 1996c on “positionally sensitive grammar”). Table 1 below displays a set of such resources.

Table 1: Some practices for indexing relative primacy and subordination of assessments (adapted from Raymond and Heritage 2006: 685).

Epistemic function	Position	
	First	Second
Downgrade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Evidential weakening (e.g., ‘seems’, ‘sounds’, ‘I bet’) – tag questions (e.g., ‘aren’t they’) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Evidential weakening (e.g., ‘seems’, ‘sounds’, ‘I bet’)
Upgrade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Negative interrogatives (e.g. ‘isn’t she a doll?’) (Heritage 2002a) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Confirmation + agreement (e.g., ‘they are, yes’; also Enfield et al. 2019) – <i>oh</i>-prefaced second assessments (e.g., ‘oh she’s a beautiful girl!’) – tag questions (e.g., ‘it is, isn’t it’) – Negative interrogatives (e.g. ‘isn’t she a doll?’) – Modified repeats (e.g., ‘it <u>is</u> a school night’) (Stivers 2005; also Raymond 2017) – Reported speech (e.g., ‘I said to him ...’) (Clift 2006)

⁹ Work explicitly addressed to the marking of epistemic rights has hitherto also established such devices in, amongst others, Danish, Swedish, Spanish, Japanese, Finnish, Mandarin, Lao, Italian, Russian, and #Akhoe Haillom (e.g., Hayano 2011, 2013; Kendrick 2018; Raymond 2015, 2016; Stivers et al. 2011; Wu 2004; for overviews, see Clift 2016; Enfield 2013; Heritage 2013).

Thus in the following example, when Jenny offers an initial assessment of Vera's family (specifically, Vera's son, his partner, and their children), she does so with an epistemically downgraded form – the tag question in line 3. In response, rather than a simple type-conforming *yes* (Raymond 2003), Vera first issues a repetitional answer – *They are:* (line 4) – thereby asserting her primary epistemic rights to assess her own son and his family (Heritage and Raymond 2005).

- (7) 01 Jen: *Mm* [I: bet they proud o:f the family.=
 02 Ver: [Ye:s.
 03 Jen: → =They're [a lovely family now aren't they.
 04 Ver: *→ [°Mm:° [They are: ye [s.
 05 Jen: [eeYe [s:.,
 06 Ver: [Yes,
 [Rah 14:2]

Sequences of action such as that in (7) provide concrete evidence in support of Schegloff's (1996a: 194) observation that “the apparently petty ‘who is agreeing with whom’...can and does matter”. Here we see that interactants make a distinction between mere *agreement*, on the one hand, and *confirmation*, on the other (Heritage and Raymond 2012; Schegloff 1996a; see also Clift and Raymond 2018; Drew 2018; Heritage 2018). While a simple *yes* from Vera would have constituted an agreement by acquiescing to Jenny's position-implied epistemic rights to assess the family, the repetitional answer exerts additional agency and asserts Vera's own epistemic authority over the assessable at hand, thereby confirming the state of affairs that Jenny described as opposed to simply agreeing with it. Importantly, it is *through the linguistic design of turns-at-talk* that this epistemic landscape between the participants is reconstituted: While in some languages such a turn by Vera may have been marked with a (final) particle to assert epistemic primacy – e.g., Japanese *yo* (Hayano 2011) or Mandarin *ba* (Kendrick 2018) or *a* (Wu 2004; Wu and Heritage 2017) – in English it is repetition that is routinely implicated in the sequential management of epistemic rights (Heritage and Raymond 2012; for a crosslinguistic perspective, see Enfield et al. 2019, who argue for a semantic-pragmatic division of labor between response types).

As orientations to knowledge – epistemic rights – are a basic resource for participants in the construction and interpretation of action in interaction, so too are orientations to authority in the *implementation* of actions – that is, interactants' respective *deontic* rights. While this dimension is clearly signaled grammatically in deontic modals (e.g., *can*, *may*, *ought*, *must*, *should*), recent crosslinguistic work has illustrated how grammar interacts with sequential and other contextual factors in the negotiation of deontic authority. A case-in-point is found in Rossi and Zinken's (2016) analysis of impersonal deontic statements in Italian and Polish,

where the authors argue that the specific pragmatic functions of such turns-at-talk are systematically shaped by socio-interactional features of the ongoing discourse. Such work in deontic stance-taking demonstrates that the issue of who actually determines at any particular moment “what is obligatory, permissible, or forbidden” (Stevanovic and Peräkylä 2012: 299) is subject to negotiation *across sequences of action*. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that similar kinds of practices as those described above are deployed to the same ends of upgrading or downgrading one’s own deontic rights vis-à-vis those of one’s interlocutor. Turn prefaces offer one concrete example (cf. *oh*-prefacing cited above): Clayman (2013), for instance, documents the import of turn-initial address terms as a linguistic means for subverting the agentic subordination of responses to both requests for information and requests for action. Similarly, Sidnell (2007) examines *look*- and *listen*-prefacing in responsive utterances, which he argues work to “intercede” and “redirect” lines of action initiated by a prior turn. Through the use of such turn-prefacing practices, then, speakers effectively embody a local stance of deontic authority over the immediate forward trajectory of the interaction (for a crosslinguistic perspective on turn-initial particles, see Heritage and Sorjonen 2018).

A crucial insight of this evolving, crosslinguistic body of research is that sequential position – whether one goes first or second with an action such as an assessment – provides a set of parameters within which grammatical resources can be used in implementing particular actions (such as, in the above example, confirmation). And while sequential position provides a constraint, speakers can also exploit it by using linguistic resources to subvert the rights implied by it. In such a way is grammar used to accommodate the inescapable temporality of interaction (Clift 2006: 585–586).

Thus, in examining why subsequent NPs are deployed non-anaphorically (e.g., (6) *I’ll get **the ice***), the central observation from work on epistemic and deontic rights is that first, or initial, position is the default locus for the expression of agency in interaction and carries a tacit claim of independence and primacy (Heritage and Raymond 2005; see also Stevanovic 2018). Subsequent NPs are, of course, by definition, in *non*-initial position. This departure from the default ordering of form and position suggests that the agency associated with the use of the full form (standardly, of course, in initial position) might be mobilized by speakers in other-than-initial position, in accordance with their moment-by-moment interactional aims and needs.

In what follows, we begin our analysis by discussing two major interactional contexts for such usage – one responsive and one initiating environment. These are identified by the distinct actions being implemented in the turn where an initial form is observed in subsequent position. These contexts, which will be presented in more detail in the sections that follows, are:

- (1) **Sequence-Responsive: Epistemic Stance in Confirmation and Disconfirmation:** Turns in which a proposition in a prior turn (either interrogatively or declaratively formatted) is endorsed or ratified; or turns that disconfirm the proposition (whether interrogatively or declaratively formatted) of a prior turn. As we will illustrate, the use of non-anaphoric forms in such responsive actions is associated with the assertion of epistemic authority over the content of the prior turn.
- (2) **Sequence-Initiating: Deontic Stance in Sequence/Topic Initiation:** While actions in interaction (assertions, requests, invitations, etc.) are often implemented across sequences of two or more turns, here we target sequence- and topic-initiating utterances. The use of non-anaphoric forms in such utterances, we will argue, is associated with the assertion of deontic authority over the forward trajectory of the talk.

After illustrating the agentive nature of non-anaphoric forms in these two specific interactional environments, we then extend our analysis to other action contexts in which non-anaphoric reference forms are routinely observed. This discussion will demonstrate that initial reference forms can in fact be used in a wide range of actions wherein a subsequent speaker's assertion of epistemic and/or deontic rights is deemed interactionally relevant. What binds this diversity of cases together, we argue, is that in each instance, anaphoric reference can be seen to be abandoned "for cause", thereby revealing NP repetition to be an inherently agentive practice in discourse.

3 Initial reference forms in subsequent position

In what follows, we provide evidence of the two interactional contexts listed above, in which speakers produce full NP referents where, following prior linguistic accounts, anaphoric referents might standardly be expected.

3.1 Sequence-responsive: epistemic stance in confirmation and disconfirmation

One primary context in which non-anaphoric forms can be frequently observed in subsequent position is confirmation and disconfirmation. In these cases, their use is associated with the speaker's primary epistemic access to the state of affairs under discussion, most commonly in responses to polar questions seeking information or confirmation, which we target here. Under these circumstances, the questioner has already ceded epistemic primacy to the respondent by requesting

information from them, but the non-anaphoric reference form reinforces the respondent's epistemic authority over the information at hand.¹⁰

In the telephone-call extract (8), Margy has been describing some activities that her husband, Larry, is currently involved in: public relations and event planning for the city of Los Angeles. Emma then comments that she saw one such event described in the paper (line 10), to which Margy responds that Larry himself wrote the article: *Mhm well tha:t's Larry's story*. (line 11). After a silence, Emma seeks confirmation that it was indeed Larry who wrote the story, a routine method of noting the newsworthiness of an announcement and displaying interest in it (Jefferson 1993; Thompson et al. 2015: 80–82; Heritage 1984; cf.; Raymond and Stivers 2016). Observe the form of Margy's confirmatory answer in line 14.

- (8) 01 Mar: =*That's a di:fferent dea:l and so he's on, (.) for the:m:too:.*
 02 Emm: *M[m hm,*
 03 Mar: [*hhhhh And then he has uh: (.) this uh College Pa:rk which is*
 04 *Up by Fullerton it' [s,*
 05 Emm: [*hhhhh[hhhh]*
 06 Mar: [*it's] [connected with] the]*
 07 Emm: [*OOoo:: that's L]Y:::]NCH!*
 08 (0.2)
 09 Mar: *Ye:ahh.*
 10 Emm: *God it was in the pa:per[::.*
 11 Mar: → [*Mhm well tha:t's Larry's story.*
 12 (0.5)
 13 Emm: → *Is that LARRY'S:?*
 14 Mar: *→ *That was Larry's story yeah. [He wrote it,]*
 15 Emm: [*I: 'll] be da::rmed=*
 [NB:VII:Power Tools, 5:20]

In response to Emma's yes/no question at line 13, which might have received a default, type-conforming *yes* response (Raymond 2003), Margy prioritizes a repetitive answer that includes the non-anaphoric *Larry's story*, providing the interjection answer *yeah* only after this: *That was Larry's story yeah* (line 14). Moreover, it is noteworthy that in addition to reusing the initial form *Larry* (cf. anaphoric *his*), Margy's answer also reintroduces the noun itself (*story*) which was not included in Emma's question in line 13, thereby providing a morphosyntactically expanded response vis-à-vis the question (Raymond 2017; Stivers 2005). As is frequent with repetition confirmations (Heritage and Raymond 2005), Margy

¹⁰ We will return to confirmation and disconfirmation in non-questioning environments in Section 4.

immediately expands her turn to further specify what she means by this being *Larry's story* – namely that *he wrote it* – in overlap with Emma's appreciation of this news in line 15. Crucial for our argument here is that the content of Margy's confirmation in line 14 is not altogether new information; rather, it is information which Margy herself had already put forth in line 11. She is thus being asked for information that she herself has already stated (on which, see Schegloff 1996a), and it is in this sequential context that she asserts her primary epistemic rights over this information by way of a non-anaphoric and expanded repetitional answer.

Consider an additional case of this sort in (9), taken from a corpus of calls in which a reviewing doctor (REV) contacts ENT specialists (ENT) over the phone to discuss proposed courses of surgical treatment (Heritage et al. 2001). In discussing a particular patient's condition, REV issues what eventually becomes, after a few self-repairs, a declarative request for confirmation with *the perf(.) healed*. (line 14–15) (Heritage 2012b). As in the above case (8), ENT has already asserted this in line 8 and is thus being asked to confirm a state of affairs that he himself has already put forth. In response, he provides a non-anaphoric and repetitional answer (line 16).¹¹

- (9) 01 ENT: Got *bilateral basular skull fractures*. [Ear into his
 02 REV: [°Mm.°
 03 ENT: *head, temporal bon:e (0.1) fractured across (.) u::m*
 04 *(.) longitudinally. (.) (E)A::n:d (0.1) hi::s (0.2)*
 05 *right initially:: (.) resolved with just some*
 06 *eustachian tu:be dysfunction. His left .hhh (.) u::m*
 07 *(.) from the time of the fra:cture (0.4) after the-*
 08 *after the initial: h skin healed up. U::m kept hhh*
 09 *(0.2) being persistently plugged. h .h [h U::m-*
 10 REV: [You mean (.) in
 11 *the ear,*
 12 *(0.3)*
 13 ENT: *His ear. Y [e:ah, (.)-*
 14 REV: → [Well did- did the TM- (0.2) u::h (.) **the**
 15 → **perf (.) healed.**
 16 ENT: *→ **The perf's healed but he had a (.) totally flat**
 17 **immovable (.) tympanic membrane. [.hh (.) For a while**
 [LaRue P2:8, #2847 (19.10)]

¹¹ Note also that REV's just-prior initiation of repair to check that ENT is describing the patient's ear – *You mean (.) in the ear*, (lines 10–11) – is confirmed with a non-anaphoric form that, as in the prior case, is prioritized over the interjection answer: *His ear. Ye:ah*, (line 13). In this instance, however, in the absence of a usable anaphoric reference form, the repeat cannot be understood as an alternative to anaphora, but is entirely a resource for confirmation.

In this particular case, given that the reviewer is gathering information in order to evaluate the installation of tympanostomy tubes for this patient, the specialist may interpret the reviewer's request for confirmation in lines 14–15 as a move toward a no-problem diagnosis (Heritage and Stivers 1999), thereby potentially undermining the attending ENT's ability to obtain approval for this surgical procedure. The non-acquiescent, agentive nature of his non-anaphoric and repetitional answer effectively resists such a move: First, contrastive stress on *perf* extracts this noun from REV's question to establish that while the *perf*(oration), specifically, may no longer be an issue, there is indeed still an issue with something else (Bolinger 1961; Couper-Kuhlen 1984; Ogden 2006; Schegloff 1998). This then provides for an expanded turn that insists on the necessity of the procedure for this patient: *The perf's healed but he had a (.) totally flat immovable (.) tympanic membrane* (and beyond the data reproduced here). The agency of this particular non-anaphoric repetitional answer thus not only reasserts the specialist's primary epistemic access to this particular patient, his medical history, and the appropriate treatment, but also thereby effectively resists acquiescing to a claim that might jeopardize his ability to get the surgery approved.

It is not only in *confirming* the content put forth in questions that non-anaphoric reference forms occur; *disconfirmations*, too, can be constructed with full NP referents preserved in their design in lieu of anaphoric forms. In such cases, the fact that the questioning turn's polarity is inapposite may provide an additional impetus for answerers to agentively index their rights over the information in the question, with non-anaphoric forms being a primary means to accomplish this.

In the following case, originally presented in Fox (1987: 62), several men are dismantling a store and the topic turns to some fish tanks that may be divided between them. The topic is initiated by Mike (line 1), who appears to want one of the tanks, with a question to Vic, who is the informal leader of the group and whom Mike treats as the putative "owner" of the tanks. In response, Vic enumerates the range of tanks by their volume (lines 2–3), whereupon another participant, Rob, asserts that the tanks are owned by another individual, Alex. Rob begins his intervention with a declaratively formed assertion – *But those were uh::: Alex's tanks.* (line 6) – which incorporates a stance of definite knowledge and is framed as a counter to Vic's previous claim. Confronted with an "open-class" (Drew 1997) repair initiation (*Hah?*) from Vic, Rob renews his claim with a less definite assertion incorporating a tag question: *Those're Alex's tanks weren't they?* (line 9) (see Table 1). After a second open-class repair initiation (*Pardon me?*), Rob reframes his assertion with a negative interrogative (line 11), which cedes further epistemic ground to Vic (Bolinger 1957; Heritage 2012b: 18; see also; Heritage 2002a; Heritage

and Raymond 2021).¹² It is in this context that Vic's response (line 12) incorporates the non-anaphoric recycling of *Alex*.

- (10) 01 Mik: *You have a tank I like to to- I-I [like-*
 02 Vic: *[Yeah I got a fo:rtty::*
 03 *I had a forty? a fifty, and a twe:nty:: and two ten::s,*
 04 Mik: *[What- What're you doing*
 05 *with [them. Wuh-*
 06 Rob: → *[But those were uh:: [Alex's tanks.*
 07 Vic: *[and a fi:ve.*
 08 Vic: *Huh?*
 09 Rob: → *Those're Alex's tanks weren't they?*
 10 Vic: *Pardon me?*
 11 Rob: → *Weren't- didn't they belong to Al [ex?*
 12 Vic: *→ *[No: Alex has no tanks,=*
 13 *→ *=Alex is tryin' to buy my tank.*
 [US:1076–1086]

In a context where Rob has already ceded the epistemic high ground to Vic by shifting from the declarative to the interrogative, it may be asked why Vic should insist on asserting it in line 12. Here it may be noted that the sequence began with a challenge to Vic's right to dispose of the tanks (line 6); Vic's response at line 12, then, is offered as a definitive riposte to that challenge. Vic immediately expands this riposte with another clause that incorporates a second non-anaphoric reference to *Alex*, asserting that *Alex* is trying to obtain tanks from him. In both units of talk, the non-anaphoric reference form is accomplice to an agentive rejection of a rival claim, a rejection that is based in Vic's assertion of primary epistemic authority over *Alex*'s tank ownership.¹³

In a second disconfirmation case, two women – Vera and Jenny, seen above in (7) – are making arrangements to car-pool to the local shops, when Vera asks whether a third, Ann, will be accompanying them. Jenny disconfirms the implication of the question (Bolinger 1978; Heritage 2010) with an account, while incorporating a non-anaphoric reference to Ann:

¹² In this case, where the context is a steady downgrading of Rob's claims at lines 6 and 9, it is reasonably apparent that his negative interrogative at line 11 is produced from an unknowing (or "blinds down"), rather than a knowing (or "blinds up") position (Bolinger 1957). Thus this utterance is to be understood as a "question" and not as an "assertion", and indeed Vic takes it as such (see also Heinemann 2006; Heritage 2002b, 2013; Koshik 2002, 2005).

¹³ Note also the contrastive stress on Vic's "my" in the second unit of his response to Rob (line 13), through which Vic further asserts his primary knowledge in the 'who owns which tanks' debate.

- (11) 01 Ver: *Are you coming down,*
 02 Jen: *Ehm- I'm ↑just I was ↑just comin' ou:t.*
 03 (.)
 04 Ver: *Oh: goo [d.]Is-*
 05 Jen: *[I]luh-*
 06 (.)
 07 Ver: → *Is **Ann** coming,*
 08 *(0.2)*
 09 Jen: *→ *Ehm- **Ann** is eh gone to North Ormsby Market.*
 10 Ver: *[Oh: [I see.*
 11 Jen: ⇒ *[.hh [Eh do you remember **she** was saying **she**'s gotta go n*
get
 12 *some chi:na or something from Stockton.*
 13 Ver: *Oh:: yes::, [yes.]*
 14 Jen: ⇒ *[And] and **she** said she had to go to North*
Ormsby
 15 *Market to[da:y.*
 16 Ver: *[Ah:: that's alright [then,*
 17 Jen: *[Mm.*
 [RAH-10]

Here the additional assertive force of the response that is mobilized by the repeat of *Ann* in a subsequent position appears to be motivated by the fact that, from Jenny's point of view, this should be shared knowledge between them ("common ground", Clark 1996). Indeed, once Vera's question has revealed that this is not the case, Jenny goes on to invite Vera to *remember* (line 11) that Ann had described her plans to them both, something that Vera does subsequently claim to remember in line 13 (Heritage 1984).¹⁴

It is clear, then, that when confirming or disconfirming the state of affairs that a prior speaker's question has put forth, second speakers have a range of linguistic and grammatical resources with which to agentively assert their own epistemic primacy or independence over the content under discussion. In the same way as repetitive and *oh*-prefaced answers diverge from the default type-conforming answers of *yes* and *no* by asserting some level of independence from the prior turn (Heritage 1998; Heritage and Raymond 2012; see also Table 1), the reintroduction of a full NP referent in lieu of an anaphoric form can work to similar effect, attenuating the dependence that the non-anaphoric answer has on the utterance being

¹⁴ In support of this argument, we note that subsequent references to *Ann* (lines 11 and 14) are achieved by means of default anaphoric reference.

confirmed or disconfirmed and thereby agentively asserting the answerer's primary rights to the knowledge at hand. In this light, we can see how the cases mentioned earlier and observed by Fox (1987) and Schegloff (1996b) to occur in the environment of disagreement, may be motivated by the same principle – disagreement being a primary context for the assertion of agency.

3.2 Sequence-initiating: deontic stance in sequence/topic initiation

Given the association between full, non-anaphoric reference forms and initial position, a second environment in which full NPs are recurrently observed is both in topic-shifts – where clearly there is a move away from one topic to another – and in the initiation of new sequences, where, although the topic might stay constant, there is a move to a new action within that topic.

Conversational participants typically shift to new topics in a “stepwise” fashion (Geluykens 1993; Jefferson 1984; Maynard 1980; Sacks 1992), thereby effectively “shading” (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 305) the transition from one to the next. That is, speakers design new topics to fit the ongoing talk such that the prior topic was never actually brought to an analyzable end before the next one was launched.¹⁵ There are occasions, however, when a speaker may endeavor to launch a new topic in a more overt or disjunctive manner (Button and Casey 1985; Clift 2001; Maynard 1980; Jefferson 1978, 1984), particularly in environments when a current topic has undergone demonstrable attrition (Jefferson 1993), or has been oriented to as finished (e.g., Drew and Holt 1998). In producing such disjunctive shifts, speakers work to “boundary off” a current turn from the prior talk, conveying that the current turn should not be understood as a continuation of, or as having been occasioned by, what came before, but rather as the launch of something new. It was Fox (1987: 69–72) and Schegloff (1996b) who first observed the association of initial forms with new sequences of action, specifically in the domain of references to persons. We are now in a position to show that the selection of these initial forms is motivated by an assertion of deontic authority, and that this more general account extends to non-person NPs as well. We argue that such a move in interaction is inherently agentive in that it effectively proposes a new agenda to be addressed by the participants in subsequent talk; indeed, non-anaphoric reference forms are recurrently deployed in such turns as a grammatical

¹⁵ Indeed, drawing on Sacks (1992), Couper-Kuhlen and Selting (2018: 314) write that “speakers who do not manage to do this but produce ‘a large number of specific new topic starts’ (Sacks 1992: 566) run the risk of being called ‘lousy’ conversationalists”.

means through which to assert this deontic authority. Thus insofar as anaphoric reference contributes to cohesion across turns (Fox 1987: 20–38; Halliday and Hasan 1976), here we will argue that *non*-anaphoric reference can function to attenuate or disengage that cohesion through the expression of deontic agency.

Consider the case of referring to *Annie*, presented earlier and repeated here as (12). While Maude might have continued using *she* to ask the question in line 11, she instead elects to use the initial form *Annie*.

- (12) 01 Bea: → *U-huh .hh We:ll oh: uh ↑I think **Annie** has uh:*
 02 *u-may and maybe as you say slightly different,*
 03 ⇒ *.hh but I think **she** has her (.) good*
 04 *sen [se of h u m o r.]*
 05 Mau: ⇒ *[iYeah I think **sh**e does too but **she** has*
 06 *a different ty:pe.*
 07 *(0.2)*
 08 Bea: *Uh-huh,*
 09 Mau: *Different type completely.*
 10 Bea: *°Uh-hu [h.°*
 11 Mau: *→ *[.hhh We:ll: anywa:y <Was **Annie** there last night=*
 12 Bea: *=Ye:s uh huh,*
 13 Mau: *Uh huh,*
 [Continuation of (1), SBL 2-1-7]

Prior to Maude's question in line 11, the participants have been discussing the senses of humor of their friends. This topic begins to undergo attrition across lines 7–10: Maude receives delayed and only minimal uptake from Bea in line 8, and then again in response to the upgraded version of the claim in line 8, thereby clearing the way for a topic shift (Jefferson 1993). It is in this environment that Maude launches a new topic with the sequence-initiating question *.hhh We:ll: anywa:y <Was Annie there last night* (line 11). Various components of the design of this turn constitute its topic-shift-implicative nature, including the audible in-breath in pre-beginning position (Schegloff 1996c), the *well*-preface (Heritage 2015), as well as the shift-implicative *anyway* (Ferrara 1997; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Park 2010; Sacks 1992: 561–569; see also Drew and Holt 1998: 510). To this list of features, we can also add the use of the initial form *Annie*, repeated here in place of the anaphoric *she*. While Annie had already been introduced, quite recently in fact, into the conversation in the context of discussing senses of humor, at this point Maude launches a discussion of last night's card game, and specifically Annie's participation therein. In this case, this shift in topic also constitutes a shift in granularity (Schegloff 2000), moving from assessing Annie and her sense of humor as a whole or *in vacuo*, to discussing her participation in a particular event.

By attenuating her turn's dependence on prior talk through the use of an initial (rather than subsequent) reference form, Maude not only presents her question as not having been occasioned by what came prior, but in so doing, she asserts a deontically authoritative stance in that subsequent participant conduct must now be oriented to the new topic that she has put forth, as opposed to a continuation of the line that the participants were discussing before. Exercising such deontic rights in interaction is, we argue, an inherently agentive move, and here we see specific grammatical means through which that agency is sequentially accomplished.

Consider an additional case of this sort in (13), previously analyzed both by Fox (1984: 71) and Schegloff (1996b: 452). Here, Mark and Karen discuss *that girl [Keith] use to go with* (line 5), whom Karen identifies as *Alice* in line 6 (Sacks and Schegloff 1979). Alice is subsequently referred to anaphorically with *she* and *her* as Karen offers up what she knows about this individual's current whereabouts (lines 10/12). Similar to the prior example, though, this topic (i.e., Alice's whereabouts at present) begins to lapse across lines 13–15, as Mark provides only minimal uptake to Karen's second version of *I dunno where she is*. It is in this environment that another speaker, Sheri, self-selects (Sacks et al. 1974) to offer an assessment of the individual in question, referring to her with the initial form *Alice* in lieu of the pronoun *she* (line 16).

- (13) 01 Mark: So ('r) you da:ting Keith?
 02 (1.0)
 03 Kar: It's a frie:nd.
 04 (0.5)
 05 Mark: What about that girl he use(d) to go with for so long.
 06 Kar: → A:lice? I [don't-] they gave up.
 07 Mark: [(mm)]
 08 (0.4)
 09 Mark: °(Oh)?°
 10 Kar: ⇒ I dunno where she is but I-
 11 (0.9)
 12 Kar: ⇒ Talks about her every so o:ften, but- I dunno where she is.
 13 (0.5)
 14 Mark: hmh
 15 (0.2)
 16 Sher: *→ Alice was stra::nge,
 17 (0.3) ((rubbing sound))
 18 Mark: ⇒ Very o:dd. She used to call herself a pro:stitute,=
 19 ⇒ =n I used to- (0.4) ask her if she was getting any
 20 more money than...
 [SN4:615-630]

While Alice was unambiguously the subject of the prior sequence, she was topicalized in terms of her relationship to *Keith* (line 5). At line 16 and beyond, Alice emerges as the subject of a novel action trajectory. This is promoted by Sheri's initial assessment (line 16) with its repetition of *Alice*, the initial reference form serving to disengage the continuative link that an anaphoric reference form would otherwise have engendered. And thus rather than a continuation of the prior discussion, Sheri treats this as "a new unit ... separate from what has gone before" (Fox 1987: 71), "embod[ying] this, and incipiently constitut[ing] it, by use of the ... initial reference form" (Schegloff 1996b: 452). That Sheri self-selects to offer this perspective further underscores the agentive nature of such an interactional move. In this case, launch of this new action trajectory is successful in that Mark first agrees with Sheri's assessment (*very o:dd*) and then immediately goes on to provide what is offered up as specific evidence of Alice's "strangeness" (lines 18–20), produced with anaphoric reference forms.

As we have already seen, it is not only in reference to persons that initial, non-anaphoric forms can be used in subsequent position, and thus the present analysis expands the scope of prior work by accounting for subsequent NP references to other ontological categories as well. In the following example (14), Hyla confesses that she phoned a romantic interest of hers (Richard), but immediately hung up when he answered the phone (line 3). Nancy then interdicts Hyla's cost-based account for having done so (lines 6–7, 10–11, 13, 15, 17) to ask how she knew that it was in fact Richard who answered the phone: *How do you know he answered, could you tell his voice?* (lines 14, 16). Likely due to this turn being produced in overlap, Hyla issues an 'open-class' repair initiator (*Hu:h?*) in line 19 (Drew 1997), thereby inviting Nancy to repeat her question, which she does in the immediately subsequent line 20. Hyla's response in line 21 – *Yeah, I knew his voice* – then both affirms Nancy's candidate understanding as well as provides an answer to the original question of *How do you know he answered*. Observe how *his voice* is then immediately reintroduced in the new sequence that follows this exchange, as Nancy proposes the emotional experience of hearing the voice as a topic for subsequent commentary by Hyla.

- (14) 01 Nan: You called Richard,=
 02 (:): =hh-hh=
 03 Hyl: =(h)y(h)Yea(h)h en I h(h)ung up w(h)hen he a(h)ns[wer
 04 Nan: [Oh: Hyla=
 05 why::: [::,
 06 Hyl: [.hhh W'first of all I wasn't about to spend seventy
 07 five cents for th(h)r(h)ee(h) mi(h) [nu(h)tes .uh].eh=
 08 Nan: [Y e a h,]=
 09 Nan: =That's true,=
 10 Hyl: =.hihhhh That's a l(h)otta money plus (.) uh then it's
 11 twenty five cents for extra m:minute a(h) [fter that.]=
 12 Nan: [Yea:h,]=
 13 Hyl: =.hhhhh y [ou k n o w,]
 14 Nan: [How do you] know he [answered]=
 15 Hyl: [so for four]=
 16 Nan: → =[could you tell **his voi:ce**?]
 17 Hyl: =[minutes it's a bu:ck.]
 18 (0.2)
 19 Hyl: Hu:h?
 20 Nan: → Could you tell **his vo [i:ce]**,
 21 Hyl: → [Yea]:h, I knew **his voice**,=
 22 Nan: =Oha::: [w,
 23 Hyl: [hhhih.hh=
 24 Nan: *→ =Ho:w was it to hear **his [voice]**,
 25 Hyl: [a h:]: ; .u-.ehhh I wanted to
 26 ⇒ tape [record **ihhhhh** [heh [heh]
 [HG II]

Following the question and its answer in lines 20–21, Nancy offers the change-of-state token *oh* which effectively closes this prior sequence (Heritage 1984; on such “sequence-closing thirds” more generally, see Schegloff 2007: 118–142). Following this, Nancy shifts the topic of conversation away from the factual events of the telling, to the subjective, emotional experience that those events engendered in Hyla.¹⁶ Despite *his voice* having just been mentioned in the prior sequence, Nancy reintroduces it in line 24 with an initial (i.e., full NP) form as

¹⁶ Shifts in second-person reference forms have also been shown to act as a grammatical boundary between the factual events of a telling and the participants' subsequent subjective commentary thereupon (Raymond 2016: 657–660).

accomplice to, and constitutive of, this shift in topical focus. The grammar of the turn thereby claims the deontic rights associated with launching a novel interactional trajectory, to which Hyla acquiesces with her answer in lines 25–26.

In naturally occurring language use, non-anaphoric reference forms are frequently found in such topic-shift and sequence-initiating environments – that is, *after* a referent has already been introduced and successfully understood, and in many cases after the referent has also been subsequently referred to anaphorically across various turns-at-talk. In such cases, following previous accounts by Fox (1987) and Schegloff (1996b) but extending beyond references solely to persons, the initial, full NP form works to disengage or attenuate the cohesion that a pronoun would embody, thereby effectively bracketing off the prior topic or sequence in which the referent was implicated, and reintroducing the same referent for a new conversational purpose. Given that such turns effectively work *against* cohesion and establish a novel interactional trajectory for the participants – in that subsequent talk will orient to, and be interpreted with respect to, this shift in topic and/or in action trajectory – we argue that use of non-anaphoric reference in such contexts embodies a local stance of deontic authority, and as such exemplifies the agentive nature of this particular linguistic practice.

4 Epistemic and deontic rights in other action environments

In the previous sections, we presented a range of cases in which subsequent non-anaphoric reference forms are produced in turns-at-talk that exert agency relative to prior turns. To exemplify the agentive nature of this grammatical practice, we took as cases-in-point confirmation and disconfirmation in response to questions, and sequence and topic initiation. In responses to questions, the reintroduction of an initial reference form confirms or disconfirms the information in the question from an independent standpoint, and as such, it embodies a claim of epistemic primacy on the part of the answerer. In sequence and topic initiations, non-anaphoric reference disengages the current turn and its action from that which came before; inasmuch as such a move in interaction proposes a shift in the topical or sequential trajectory of the talk, such turns constitute an assertion

of deontic authority, as other participants' conduct must now be oriented to that novel trajectory. These agentive uses of non-anaphoric reference forms suggest that such forms might also appear in other action environments wherein the assertion of epistemic and deontic rights is likewise deemed interactionally relevant. And indeed, naturally occurring conversational data provides several such cases.

In the following instances, as in those analyzed in the previous section, a full NP is produced in a subsequent turn after a full NP in initial position. All of these occurrences raise the issue of how the agency implicated in the use of subsequent NPs links the actions being prosecuted with the epistemic or deontic rights and responsibilities of their agents – rights and responsibilities that may also be associated with the locally relevant identities of the parties involved.

4.1 Epistemic rights beyond responding to questions

Confirmation and disconfirmation can occur outside the specific context of requests for information/confirmation that we have discussed thus far; that is, utterances that are not designed to *request* information, but rather to *assert* information,¹⁷ can also be agentively confirmed or disconfirmed by second speakers, with initial forms routinely deployed in the service of claiming primary epistemic authority over the content under discussion.

Consider the following case (15) in which the participants – fourteen-year-old Virginia, her older brother Wesley, and their mother – have been discussing a boy named Paul Paget. Mom has made it clear that she does not like this individual, an opinion which she defends by citing conversations she has had with another parent who has a daughter named Donna: Donna's mother apparently found a letter that Paul had written to Donna and was not pleased with its contents. Mom has overtly expressed that she does not want her own daughter (Virginia) to interact with Paul either (data not shown). It is in the context of discussing Paul's alleged interactions with Donna – and negatively assessing Paul more generally – that Mom asserts that *Donna doesn't like him* (line 1). Observe Virginia's confirmatory treatment of this assertion in line 2.

¹⁷ On which, see Farkas and Bruce (2009) and Roelofsen and Farkas (2015).

- (15) 01 Mom: → °>**Donna** doesn't like< him.
 02 Vir: *→ °I kno:w. [**D o n n a** |d o e s n : o : : t l i k e h]im.
 03 Wes: [>Who ih-< >who i|s< the boy y'all °(talkin')]
 04 (.)
 05 Mom: Paul Paget.
 [Virginia]

Virginia launches her response to Mom's assertion with *I know*, thereby explicitly asserting her own, independent epistemic access to the content of Mom's utterance (Mikesell et al. 2018). She then goes on to repeat the entirety of Mom's turn, including use of a non-anaphoric *Donna*. This is combined with a turn design that is morphosyntactically and prosodically expanded compared to Mom's initial assertion, resources that have been shown to similarly claim epistemic rights in responsive position (Stivers 2005; see also Raymond 2017). Thus the entirety of the design of Virginia's turn-at-talk works to agentively convey that she has not been informed by Mom's assertion in line 1, but rather possessed full knowledge of Donna's dislike of Paul prior to Mom having said so.

Thus far we have seen that when first speakers request information, or endeavor to assert information, second speakers can use non-anaphoric reference forms to grammatically reassert their own superior knowledge over the proposition under discussion. An additional action environment in which this same practice is routinely observed in conversational data is in assessment sequences (Raymond and Heritage 2006), as seen in the following examples (16) and (17).

In the first of these cases, a grandmother (Vera) of two boys (James and Paul) who recently visited her home is discussing their behavior during the visit. Vera's interlocutor is her neighbor and close friend Jenny, who is quite well acquainted with the grandsons. At line 1, Jenny begins with a positive assessment of one of the boys using a right-dislocation, projecting the name of the boy sentence-finally. As she approaches the end of the sentence, Jenny exhibits difficulty in arriving at the relevant name, eventually settling for *James* (line 3). However, at line 4, and in overlap, Vera supplies the other child's name (*Paul*), and Jenny immediately corrects herself, replacing the reference to *James* with a reference to *Paul*. Perhaps to remediate this momentary *faux pas*, Jenny goes on to venture that James's a little devil (line 9), thereby drawing a sharp line of demarcation between the two children, and clearly demonstrating that she knows 'which child is which'. This demonstration, however, involves Jenny taking the lead in asserting a derogatory assessment of the child, an action that implies greater rights to perform the evaluation (Raymond and Heritage 2006).

- (16) 01 Jen: [Yeah: well I think he's a bri:ght little boy: u[h:m
 02 Ver: [I: do=
 03 Jen: =l [ittle Ja]:[:mes,] uh [Pau:l.yes.]
 04 Ver: [Pau:l,] [mm-m] mm [P a u: : l,]
 05 Jen: Mm.: [Yes.
 06 Ver: [Yes.
 07 (0.3)
 08 Ver: [Yes ()]
 09 Jen: → [Yeah **James's** a little] devil ihhh ↑heh heh
 10 Ver: [That-
 11 Jen: [.huh .hh [h He:-
 12 Ver: *→ [**James** is a little bugger. [isn't he
 13 Jen: [Yeah-
 14 Jen: ⇒ Yeah [(**he** eats) everythi]ng.
 15 Ver: ⇒ [Mind you **he's** good] Jenny, **he** was mischievous
 16 Ver: ⇒ but w-**he** was good.
 17 Jen: ⇒ Oo **he** was beautiful here [wasn't he.=
 18 Ver: [↑↓Yes.
 19 Jen: ⇒ =**He** [was very well be[ha:ved.
 [RAH-14-2]

As it turns out, Vera is in broad agreement with Jenny's assessment, and is even prepared to upgrade the evaluation from *little devil* to *little bugger* (line 12). At the same time, and in keeping with her epistemically privileged position as a grandmother in the evaluation of the children, she deploys a non-anaphoric reference form (*James*) as a part of this assertion. Paralleling what we have seen in prior cases, the non-anaphoric reference form works to frame Vera's assessment as not being produced "merely 'in agreement with' or 'in conformity with' the first speaker's opinion" (Heritage 2002b: 219), but rather as an opinion that Vera herself had already arrived at independently – that is, prior to Jenny's first assessment in line 9. With this more agentive usage, Vera indexes her greater epistemic access and rights to evaluate the children, underscoring in this process her status as a grandmother (Raymond and Heritage 2006). Use of the tag question at the end of this second-position assessment further supports such an analysis, as now it is *Jenny* who is placed sequentially in a position to agree with *Vera's* assessment of the grandchild, rather than the other way around; and indeed, Jenny does just this in lines 13–14.

In an additional assessment case (17), Mary expresses *surprise* that a friend is dating *somebody from the group* (line 1). Alan supports and upgrades this point of view by singling out Tony as an especially surprising choice (line 6), going on to defend and account for that opinion after a silence (Maynard 2013). This account is abandoned, though, as Mary intervenes to offer a mitigated but positive

assessment of Tony, reissuing the initial form: *I don't know Tony's got a nice personality*, (lines 9–10). Then, in response to this assessment, we see Alan reissue the initial form *Tony* again in line 11.

- (17) 01 Mary: *I'm surprised she still went out with somebody from the grou:p.*
 02 (0.7)
 03 Mary: *Mean that's not even a hangup I got caught in that rut too:,*
 04 Alan: *Yea:h,*
 05 (.)
 06 Alan: → *.h I know I w-specialy To::ny.*
 07 (0.4)
 08 Alan: *I mean, (.) they don't have eh- we:ll [I don't kno:w,*
 09 Mary: *→ [.h Tuh- I don't know Tony's
 10 *gotta nice personali[ty,*
 11 Alan: *→ [Oh yeh Tony's ni:ce don't get me wro:ng=
 12 Alan: =[but
 13 Mary: =[It's just hi:s looks default him.
 14 Mary: *Because he is gotten so heavy.*
 15 Alan: *Has he really:?*
 [Kamunsky]

In line 11, Alan's second assessment reissues the non-anaphoric form *Tony* as part of a modified repeat of Mary's assessment. In addition, the initial agreement portion of the turn is *oh*-prefaced, thereby indexing Alan's independent arrival at this same assessment of Tony and his personality (Heritage 2002b). That is, Alan is not simply "agreeing just to agree" in the moment, but rather presents himself as having already come to this opinion of Tony before Mary's having just said it. This constellation of agentive grammatical practices thus work to upgrade Alan's epistemic stance, disengaging the expression of his opinion from being taken as occasioned or coerced by Mary's positive assessment.¹⁸

Consider one additional action environment in (18), this instance concerning reference to an object rather than to a person. In this case, pictures of nineteen-year-old Emily have surfaced on social media in which she can be seen wearing an "All Saints"-brand jumper that belongs to her mother, Jane. Here Jane first solicits Emily's attention in line 1, and then requests – in declarative form – that she return the jumper with *Rea::ily like you: to give me: my All Saints jumper back* (lines 3–4), a request that simultaneously brings off an accusation. Emily's response then preserves the full NP *All Saints jumper* in the immediately next turn, in lieu of an anaphoric *it*.

¹⁸ As such, Alan's line 11 resembles a repair after next turn (Schegloff 1992).

- (18) 01 Jane: *um: (1.0) ↑Emily::hh*
 02 *(1.0)*
 03 Jane: *↑.hhh Rea:::lly like you: to give me:*
 04 → *my All Saints jumper back.*
 05 *(0.5)*
 06 Emily: * → *I don't have your All Saints jumper*
 07 Jane: *[Well that's funny*
 08 *because there're pictures of you wearing it.*
 [Clift:F1:6:13:10]

Emily's response at line 6 – *I don't have your All Saints jumper* – resists endorsing the presupposition in Jane's prior request that she is in possession of the jumper. In extracting and exposing this implicit presupposition, she mobilizes the agentive character of the full NP in order to launch a full-bore denial, asserting primary epistemic authority over what she herself has/does not have, and thereby refusing to acquiesce to the accusation. Just as (16) and (17) show speakers laying claim to prior, independently reached assessments, this case shows a speaker pulling epistemic and chronological rank by means of a full NP in subsequent position.

While prior work left open the question as to why a seemingly diverse range of actions would be realized with non-anaphoric reference forms, examples such as those analyzed in this section reveal the crucial import of epistemic stance to the effectuation of such actions. Whether responding to a question, an assertion, an assessment, or request, second speakers risk being taken as occupying an epistemically inferior position vis-à-vis the first speaker – as simply acquiescing to the state of affairs presented in the first speaker's question or request, as having been duly informed by the first speaker's assertion, or as simply going along with the first speaker's assessment. Use of initial reference forms in response to such first actions indexes firstness, and as such, agentively attenuates the dependence of the responsive action on prior talk in the service of asserting epistemic primacy or independence over the content under discussion.

4.2 Deontic rights beyond sequence and topic initiation

While we exemplified the expression of deontic rights with sequence and topic initiation, underscoring the role that initial NPs play in claiming those rights, close examination of the data reveals that deontic stance can become relevant in a range of other action environments as well. In this section we target two exchanges with NPs that refer to objects in the physical world, and we focus on the deontic stances claimed in the context of ongoing embodied courses of action.

The first case (19) comes in response to a question. A family is laying the table in preparation for a meal at Mary's house. Mary's adult daughter, Vanessa, has cooked for them and a visiting friend (Chris) of her younger sister, Susan. At line 2, Vanessa launches a question projecting the availability of something which Susan, in her response at line 7, identifies as (*place*) *mats*. This is subsequently acknowledged as essentially correct by Vanessa – if not the exact completion she was about to produce herself (Lerner 1996) – in Vanessa's *extra mat*, and then, after a micropause, by a reformulation of a request in its entirety at line 8: *is there an ↑extra mat ↓somewhere*.. After a silence, Mary responds, not only in the affirmative, but also with an appended account: *I found you a mat in he:↓re*. In doing so, and in going beyond a simple type-conforming *yes* or *no* response (Raymond 2003), Mary effectively stakes a claim to having attended to the problem raised in the question, and solved it, before Vanessa's raising of the matter at line 8. It does so by means, initially, of the stress on *found*, which indexes a contrast with the assumption conveyed in the recipient's question (Raymond 2017). The use of the full initial NP *a mat*, rather than a subsequent proform *one*, here works to push back against the secondness of the turn. This claim to deontic agency by Mary, as *de facto* host, is further underscored by Mary's subsequent inquiry of her daughter as to the purpose of the *extra mat*, which effectively requires an account from Vanessa.

- (19) 01 Mar: ...and ON the M41, (0.2) [↑AND the by-pass it shows you=
 02 Van: (Have we got the-
 03 Mar: =how to [get off: (0.2) to (>Chesham<) [Hemel
 04 Van: [(-) uhm::
 05 Chr: [yeah
 06 (1.0)
 07 Sus: °some mats-°=
 08 Van: → =**extra mat** (.) is there an ↑**extra mat** ↓somewhere,
 09 (1.0)
 10 Mar: *→ ↑yes I found you **a mat** in he:↓re (0.2) ↑what fo:r
 11 (0.6)
 12 Van: for- >for the< puddin:g
 13 Mar: well ↑I don't think (>I'll have some people can have<) mine:
 14 (0.2)
 15 Mar: >°here you are°<
 16 Hen: There- (.) can you ↑put-
 [Clift, 26:31]

Here the entitled and authoritative deontic stance that Mary assumes in line 10 with respect to the task at hand – laying the table – is thus evidenced in a

- 14 (.)
 15 Har: Mm.=
 16 Mar: =but I haven't watered the tomatoes today=
 17 Har: =N [o.
 18 Mar: [I sh'think they're ga:sping.
 19 (0.4)
 20 Har: Mm: (.) >Right<
 21 Ada: → >Shall I get sm-< I dunno where **the ice** is actually
 22 [s(h)o-
 23 Van: *→ [Oh I'll get **the ice** ((with mouth full))
 24 (0.6)
 [Clift, 22:19]

In both (19) and (20), then, the initial form in subsequent position (*a mat/the ice*) is one means by which speakers make relevant and consequential particular identities in terms of the rights and responsibilities that are associated with them. Indeed, we saw this previously in Example (17), in which Vera underscored her status as a grandmother through her claim to have primary rights to assess the children in question (Raymond and Heritage 2006). Similarly here, in cases (19) and (20), the agentive second-position responses given in each case display their producers' concern to position themselves as not merely responsive to, *but as actively having anticipated*, the requests in prior turn. In (19), Vanessa has cooked the meal in her parents' kitchen. Her mother Mary's agentive response to Vanessa's inquiry about *an extra mat* shows her pushing back against the secondness of her sequential position; her assertion that she has *found ... a mat* clearly reports an event – an engagement with the duties of a host – that *antedates* Vanessa's request for one in line 8. In (20), Vanessa's response to Adam at line 23 actively takes over the task he, the guest, has proposed – a quest for *the ice*. Adam's incipient offer at line 21 potentially intercepts a line of action that Vanessa has initiated – the offering (line 9) and pouring (line 12) of Mary's drink. Adam's incipient offer introduces the possibility of ice, thereby potentially exposing Vanessa's inattention to having, thus far, provided some. Vanessa's report that she will *get the ice*, with its full NP in subsequent position, thus resists the initiative that Adam's turn has displayed, and in so doing resists the responsiveness of its position. Further evidence for this analysis can be found in the *oh*-prefacing of Vanessa's turn, which in this context treats the prior question as inapposite (Heritage 1998).

In (19), it is the host who designs a responsive turn to exert agency from second position. Example (20) might initially look to be a similar case: Vanessa's orientation to the fact that she is Adam's host, in that they are staying at her parents' house. However, it is clear that in this case, the speaker is resisting the incipient

offer of a guest who is implicating himself in the serving of the drink to his host, Mary. A local contingency is here relevant: Vanessa has, at lines 5 and 9, initiated the serving of the drink but has yet to display attention to the provision of ice until her response to Adam's incipient offer at line 21. Her *Oh I'll get the ice*, resisting Adam's initiative to effectively take over the task he has volunteered to do, is thus hearable as following through, and seeing to its conclusion, a course of action that she herself has initiated—what Kendrick (2017) has called a preference for self-over other-remediation. The local sequential contingencies which shape the participants' actions here thus seem less an orientation to the duties of a host as opposed to a guest, than wresting back the initiative with respect to her own course of action. In both (19) and (20), then, it is evident that speakers who are in a sequentially subsequent position – that is, responding to the initiative of others (finding a mat, getting some ice) – use full initial NPs as a means of exerting deontic authority over the trajectory of the interaction from those responsive, subsequent sequential positions.

5 Discussion and conclusions

Our aim in this paper has been to examine instances of non-anaphoric reference where prior semantic, pragmatic, and psycholinguistic accounts – from a range of theoretical and methodological perspectives – would predict the occurrence of anaphoric forms. As the existence of such initial forms in subsequent position abounds in naturally occurring language use, we maintain that no account of linguistic reference can be complete without taking them into consideration.

In line with previous research (Fox 1987; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Schegloff 1996b), here we maintain that anaphoric reference works to create cohesion across turns-at-talk. Once *Alice* is introduced into the conversation, for example, speakers can freely refer to her with the pronominal *she* as they connect subsequent references to an ongoing topical and action trajectory regarding Alice. This relationship between position and form – full NPs initially, pronouns subsequently – is not altogether predetermined or obligatory, however. Rather, this form-position paradigm reveals a *normative* dimension of grammar, one from which participants can depart as they design references in everyday language use.

The temporal reality of moment-by-moment discourse (Clift 2006; Depperman and Günthner 2015; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Schegloff 1996a) routinely places speakers in positions where socio-interactional contingencies can provide an impetus to break with the structural cohesion that might otherwise exist. When such moments arise, speakers have a range of linguistic resources at their disposal through which to attenuate the link between a current turn and prior talk, and non-

anaphoric reference forms are one such resource. We argue, therefore, that the use of initial reference forms in subsequent position constitutes an inherently agentive grammatical practice – one that exploits the normative relationship between form and position in its deviation from it. Our use of the term “normative” here is therefore purposeful, as it foregrounds the orientations of the language users themselves, who demonstrably depart from the norm “for cause” in their agentive use of full NPs in subsequent position.¹⁹

Grammatical agency is operationalized here in terms of how acquiescent to, or parasitic on, prior talk the grammatical element in question is. While a type-conforming *yes* response to a polar question is altogether sequentially parasitic on the prior question for its interpretation, a repetitional answer is less so and as such more agentive (Enfield 2013; Enfield et al. 2019; Heritage and Raymond 2012; Raymond 2003; Thompson et al. 2015). Similarly, an anaphoric reference form crucially depends on the link back to its antecedent in order to be interpretable, whereas a full NP does not. The agency of initial reference forms in subsequent position thus derives from the speaker’s attenuation or disengagement of grammatical dependency on prior talk, introducing the reference as if for a first time rather than acquiescing to the fact that the referent is already readily available in the ongoing discourse.

In offering a unified theoretical account of such NPs – including references to persons and a variety of other entities – we have argued that the expression of this sort of grammatical agency is associated with the assertion of epistemic and deontic primacy in discourse. As we noted earlier, the work of Heritage and Raymond (2005) on the use of grammatical resources to mark epistemic rights opened up entirely new ways of conceptualizing language users’ management of rights to knowledge. Our observations in this paper regarding participants’ orientation to deontic authority similarly argue for the importance of studying the grammar of deontics beyond the domain of the turn to the level of the sequence. Our findings are thus a challenge to expand our understanding of how epistemic and deontic authority can be claimed by means of grammatical resources. So, a second speaker cannot change the fact that they are speaking in subsequent position *vis-à-vis* some prior talk, but they can indeed work to make their own turn as “initial” or “first-like” as possible in order to imbue the content of their utterance with the primacy that speaking in such a position conveys. It is precisely the normative grammar of referential expressions – i.e., the *unmarked* usage – that affords speakers the ability to index firstness through the *marked* use of non-anaphoric forms where anaphora would normatively be expected.

¹⁹ For more discussion of the link between grammar and normativity, see Raymond (2019).

Whether responding directly to a first speaker's action (e.g., request for information, assessment, assertion), or launching a new, referentially connected course of action of one's own, speakers in subsequent position risk their actions being understood as epistemically and/or deontically acquiescent to, or downgraded with regard to, prior talk. By repeating the NP from a prior utterance, such speakers assume a measure of control over the content contained in the turn, thereby relegating the prior turn(s) and their contents to a lesser position vis-à-vis the current turn. The second speaker has thus inescapably 'gone second', but with a grammatical practice that is normatively used to 'go first' such that the epistemic and deontic primacy associated with firstness is "recruited" into subsequent position. The result is a current turn whose grammatical design asserts that it should not be taken as a secondary responsive action that is continuative or dependent on prior talk, but rather as an independent action that escapes the epistemic or deontic constraints in play in the sequence in progress.²⁰

Following Fox (1987) and Schegloff (1996b), an attention to the actions that speakers are effectuating with their turns-at-talk lies at the center of the approach to anaphora that we have taken here. This is because disattention to action is tantamount to disattention to the contingencies that provide the impetus for the use of a particular reference form – be that form anaphoric or non-anaphoric. Importantly, the action-based affordances of grammar that we have explored here cannot be discovered through the examination of utterances *in vacuo*. To investigate the expression of epistemic and deontic primacy solely through the lens of turn-level, morphosyntactic resources (e.g., modals and other grammatically obligatory marking of territories of knowledge and deontic authority) is to address only partially the means by which participants make active use of the resources of grammar to take such stances. As we have shown, there are analytic payoffs to be had by considering not just the compositional details of a turn's design but also its position in a sequence of turns; a heuristic encapsulated by Schegloff as "position and composition" (1993: 121; see also Clift et al. 2013).

By analyzing speakers' production and understanding of language in real time, we contribute to the growing body of research (e.g., Couper-Kuhlen and Selting 2018; Ochs et al. 1996; Thompson et al. 2015) that demonstrates that the grammar of turns-at-talk is contingent on – and interpreted with respect to – the temporality and sequentiality of naturally occurring social interaction. Such a perspective allows us to concretely examine a realm that, alongside the mandates of grammar, is altogether more discretionary, where speakers make choices in

20 A reviewer notes that the account we offer here is compatible with Reinhart's (1981) conceptualization of "aboutness" topic and comment. See, specifically, Reinhart's metaphor of a library catalogue entry as it relates to discourse- versus turn-level topics (79–80).

response to the contingencies of moment-by-moment interaction. In our ascription of rights to knowledge and entitlements to act, such choices are ultimately a deeply social matter; and thus in identifying the grammatical resources that speakers deploy to accommodate the inescapable temporality of talk, we have illustrated the profoundly human basis of expressing agency through reference in the everyday use of language.

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