



**REGIONALIZATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND NATIONALISM:  
Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping?**

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## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the interaction among the three forces that shape world politics in the contemporary system: globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. The main thesis suggested here is that these three forces cannot be assessed in isolation, independently from one another, nor from a perspective of either convergence or divergence among them. Rather, globalization, regionalization, and nationalism should be captured and studied as forces relative to and overlapping one another, sometimes antagonistic and sometimes cooperative toward each other but never harmonious. This argument is theoretically relevant both in the context of the world political economy and international security, with special reference to the phenomenon of pluralistic security communities. The Latin American case provides an empirical laboratory to test these theoretical assertions.

## RESUMEN

Este artículo examina la interacción entre los tres factores que dan forma a la política mundial en el sistema contemporáneo: la globalización, la regionalización y el nacionalismo. El principal argumento que aquí se sugiere es que el impacto de cada una de estas tres fuerzas no puede ser estimado aisladamente, separando una de la otra, y tampoco desde una perspectiva de convergencia o divergencia entre estas tres tendencias. Más bien, la globalización, la regionalización y el nacionalismo deberían ser capturados y estudiados como fuerzas superpuestas y relacionadas; a veces de modo antagónico, otras de modo cooperativo, pero nunca armoniosamente. Este argumento es teóricamente relevante tanto en el contexto de la economía política internacional como en el de la seguridad mundial, especialmente con referencia al fenómeno de las comunidades de seguridad pluralistas. En este sentido, el caso de América Latina ofrece un laboratorio empírico para poner a prueba estas afirmaciones teóricas.

## INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the interaction among the three forces that shape world politics in the contemporary system: globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. The main thesis suggested here is that these three forces cannot be assessed in isolation, independently from one another, nor from a perspective of either convergence or divergence among them. Rather, globalization, regionalization, and nationalism should be captured and studied as forces relative to and overlapping one another, sometimes antagonistic and sometimes cooperative toward each other, but never harmonious. This argument is theoretically relevant both in the context of the world political economy and of international security (with special reference to security complexes and pluralistic security communities). In this sense I want to encourage our thinking about the phenomena of pluralistic security communities and to do so by showing how the interaction of these three forces might make them possible. The Latin American case will provide an empirical illustration to those theoretical assertions.

The paper is structured in four sections. First, I briefly define the rather confusing and misleading concepts of globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. Second, I assess the possible linkages (convergent, divergent, and overlapping) among them. Third, I examine how the emergence of pluralistic security communities epitomizes the complex relationships among these three forces. Finally, I illustrate some of the theoretical arguments with reference to the Latin American region.

The implication of the argument presented above is a plea for pluralism and a picture of indeterminacy regarding the mutual and multiple effects of globalization, regionalization, and nationalism. For instance, instead of referring to a single world order, we are witnessing today the emergence of a variety of new regional orders (Lake and Morgan 1997;

Holm and Sorensen 1995). Similarly, we should also qualify the 'global' characterization of globalization: instead of a single one mechanism affecting the entire world, we might also have to specify several or different dimensions, affecting unevenly different regions. Hence, those three forces maintain complex and overlapping relationships with one another. Moreover, they are significant only in *relative* terms (in relation to one another) and dependent dialectically upon each other.

## **DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS: GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION, AND NATIONALISM**

### **Globalization**

What is globalization? There is a lot of confusion about the term, and about the rhetoric of the 'new world order' following the end of the Cold War. Hence, globalization can be conceived as a myth, a rhetorical device, a phenomenon, an ideology, a reality, an orthodoxy, a rationality. In both academic and popular discourses globalization has become one of the catchwords of the 1990s. In fact, globalization is a short form for a cluster of related changes: economic, ideological, technological, and cultural. Economic changes include the internationalization of production, the greatly increased mobility of capital and of transnational corporations, and the deepening and intensification of economic interdependence. The economic manifestations of globalization include the spatial reorganization of production, the interpenetration of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets, the diffusion of identical consumer goods across distant countries, and massive transfers of population (Mittelman 1996b, 2). Ideological changes include investment and trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and the adoption of political democracy in the institutional realm. Technological changes include information and

communications technologies that have shrunk the globe and the shift from goods to services. Finally, cultural changes involve trends toward harmonization of tastes and standards, a universal world culture that transcends the nation-state (Li 1997, 5).

According to Holm and Sorensen (1995, 1–7), globalization can be defined as the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders. In this sense it involves more than the geographical extension of a range of phenomena and issues. It implies not only a significant intensification of global connectedness but also a consciousness of that intensification, with a concomitant diminution in the significance of territorial boundaries (Bretherton 1996, 3). Globalization is pushed by several factors, the most important among which is technological change. The process is uneven in both intensity and geographical scope, in its domestic and international dimensions. Hence, we might obtain different types of globalization across a rich regional variation.

It is important to draw a distinction between the qualitative and the quantitative dimensions of globalization: more of the same (quantitative change) or qualitative shifts (quantum leaps). For instance, true economic globalization invokes a qualitative shift toward a global economic system that is no longer based upon autonomous national economies but relocates production, distribution, and consumption of goods in a consolidated global market-place.

To sum up, the concept of globalization is frequently employed but seldom clearly defined. It means many different things for different people. Among the possible definitions we might include:

- 1) intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders;
- 2) the historical period (or historical epoch) launched since the end of the Cold War;

- 3) the transformation of the world economy epitomized by the anarchy (literally defined) of the financial markets;
- 4) the triumph of the US values, through the combined agenda of neoliberalism in economics and political democracy;
- 5) an ideology and an orthodoxy about the logical and inevitable culmination of the powerful tendencies of the market at work;
- 6) a technological revolution, with social implications;
- 7) the inability of nation-states to cope with global problems that require global solutions, such as demography, ecology, human rights, and nuclear proliferation (see Cox 1996, 23; Reich and Higgott 1998).

The economic side of globalization, which receives most of the scholarly attention to the subject, is found in “that loose combination of free-trade agreements, the Internet, and the integration of financial markets that is erasing borders and uniting the world into a single, lucrative, but brutally competitive, marketplace” (Friedman 1996). It is a small world after all, and that global world is a MacWorld with MTV, CNN, PCs and Macintoshes. Beyond this economic dimension, we might study globalization in the political sense and in the sociological sense as a qualitative shift in the conditions of people’s lives.

Neoliberals believe that globalization has been the inevitable result of technological change; moreover, that global economic liberalization will strengthen and lead to political democracy. Globalization will open up societies to democratic tendencies, while economic liberalization will provide the material bases for subsequent democratic consolidation (Li 1997, 2). Even if this assertion is true, it conceals a conceptual and normative trap: paradoxically, the economic forces of globalization in themselves are undemocratic if not antidemocratic. The lack of accountability of global forces poses a serious political problem. By condensing the time and space of social relations, economic globalization

transcends territorial states and is not accountable to elected political officials (Mittelman 1996a, 197). The only form of accountability is given to unelected market forces, regulated by the logic of economics, which resonates with the Darwinist tendency of the 'survival of the fittest.'

### **Regions, Security Complexes, and Regionalization**

An international *region* can be broadly defined as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. Accordingly, for each state in the region, the activities of other members of the region (be they cooperative or antagonistic) are significant determinants of its foreign policy (Nye 1968, vii; Cantori and Spiegel 1970, 1). Regional subsystems are characterized by clusters of states coexisting in geographical propinquity as interrelated units that sustain significant security, economic, and political relations (see Wriggins 1992, 4; Kaiser 1968, 86; Buzan 1991, 188). Regions can be thus conceived as an 'intermediate form of community,' between the national community of the state and the potential global community of humankind (Whiting 1993, 20), as is clearly evident in the cases of pluralistic security communities.

One of the difficulties in dealing with any region is the problem of delineating its exact spatial borders. Although many regions are denoted by obvious geographic or cultural boundaries, there is always some arbitrariness in their definition. The major criteria remain geographical contiguity, interaction, and a subjective perception of belonging to a distinctive community and having a collective regional identity (see Russett 1967, 7; Haas 1970, 101). In addition several common characteristics can be suggested, such as: (1) a certain amount or degree of social and cultural homogeneity; (2) similar political attitudes or external behavior toward third parties; (3) common political institutions, as an



expression of political interdependence; (4) a certain degree of economic interdependence; and (5) common behavioral criteria, such as the identification of norms pertaining to conflict management and resolution.

Barry Buzan (1991) defines a *regional security complex* as a specific type of region united by common security problems. In other words, it is a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a given geographic area (Lake 1997, 12). Different types of regional security complexes might include: power restraining power (through regional hegemons); great power concert; collective security; pluralistic security communities; and integration, in an ascending order of institutionalization and shared norms (see Morgan 1997, 32–41).

*Regionalization* can be conceived as the growth of societal integration within a given region, including the undirected processes of social and economic interaction among the units (such as nation-states; see Hurrell 1995a, 39). As a dynamic process, it can be best understood as a continuing process of forming regions as geopolitical units, as organized political cooperation within a particular group of states, and/or as regional communities such as pluralistic security communities (see Whiting 1993, 19).

Similarly, the term *regionalism* refers to the proneness of the governments and peoples of two or more states to establish voluntary associations and to pool together resources (material and nonmaterial) in order to create common functional and institutional arrangements. Furthermore, regionalism can be best described as a process occurring in a given geographical region by which different types of actors (states, regional institutions, societal organizations and other nonstate actors) come to share certain fundamental values and norms. These actors also participate in a growing network of economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, political, and military interactions (Mace and Therien 1996, 2)

Regionalization (the tendency or process to form regions) and regionalism (the purposive proneness to create regional institutions and arrangements) find expression in the economic and security domains, including convergent motivations toward both political/security and economic forms of integration. Some of the common factors that might explain the trend toward economic regionalism ('the new regionalism' of the 1980s and 1990s) are the effects of the end of the Cold War, the shifting balance of world economic power, the uneven effects of globalization, and the shift toward outward-oriented economic policies in many parts of the developing world (Fawcett 1995, 25).

### **Nationalism and the Role of the Nation-State**

*Nationalism* is an immediate derivative of the concept of nation. It refers to the feelings of attachment to one another that members of a nation have and to a sense of pride that a nation (or better, a nation-state) has in itself. Nationalism may be expressed in a number of ways, including the desire to obtain high standards of living, to win more gold medals than other nations at the Olympics, or to grab more territory from your neighbors. Since the eighteenth century, and especially in the twentieth century, nationalism has manifested itself often in the desire of the members of a nation to control and govern the territory in which they live. Hence, the concepts of nation and state fused to yield the 'nation-state,' while nationalism has been identified with the state itself.

The term *nation-state*, therefore, means a state whose inhabitants consider themselves to be a nation. It is a geographically bounded legal entity under a single and recognized government, the population of which psychologically consider themselves to be related, through historical, linguistic, racial, or other links. Countries today are commonly referred as nation-states, even though the vast majority of them they are not. In the

Third World, for instance, the territory included in the many states that received independence after World War II was based on what had been the old colonial boundaries. Thus, in many instances a state counts many nations; while in other cases a single nation might find itself inhabiting several contiguous states, due to the arbitrariness of the colonial boundaries.

We should be extremely careful about defining nationalism only in terms of allegiance or loyalty to the state itself rather than to the nation (or the tribe, or other subnational groups). The forces of nationalism can adopt many and multifaceted guises beyond that of the state itself. For instance, nationalism can be a force seeking to create a homeland state for an existing nation that does not have one (the Jews and Israel before 1948, the Palestinians and Palestine nowadays). Alternatively, nationalism can seek to create a nation for a state that is not one, bringing historically, culturally, and linguistically disparate elements together within its territorial boundaries, as in the case of postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa (Franck 1997, 164).

## **LINKAGES OF CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND OVERLAPPING AMONG GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION, AND NATIONALISM**

In this section I pose three questions in order to examine possible linkages among the three forces that shape world politics: (1) How do globalization and regionalization relate to each other? (2) How do globalization, regionalism, and nationalism interact? And (3) what is the role of the nation-state vis-à-vis processes of globalization? Before answering those three questions we have to differentiate between two distinct issue areas: international (or world) political economy and international (or global) security. The linkages among the three forces adopt different directions according to whether we are talking about economic or security issues. For instance, when trying to assess the complex relationship between regionalization and globalization, one might conclude that “the trend toward economic regionalism is perhaps more mixed than the trend toward security regionalism: In the international economy, globalization and regionalization appear to be pushing states in different directions, but there is today no major impetus toward globalization in the security arena,” perhaps with the exception of nuclear issues such as nonproliferation (Lake 1997, 5, fn. 4). Hence, the regionalization of security is not a universal trend like the formation of economic regions.

### **How Do Regionalization and Globalization Relate to Each Other?**

There are three possible options regarding the mutual relations between regionalization and globalization, especially in the economic dimension: (1) regionalization as a component of globalization (convergent trends); (2) regionalization as a challenge or response to

globalization (divergent trends); (3) regionalization and globalization as parallel processes (overlapping trends) (see Mittelman 1996a).

#### **A. Regionalization as a Component of Globalization:**

Regionalism is emerging today as a potent force in the processes of globalization. If globalization is regarded as the compression of the temporal and spatial aspects of social relations, then regionalism may be understood as but one component, or 'chapter' of globalization (Mittelman 1996a, 189). According to this view, by helping national economies to become more competitive in the world market, regional integration will lead to multilateral cooperation on a global scale, the adoption of liberal premises about cooperation, and the opening of the local economies. Thus, the process of regional integration can be interpreted as part of the international (or global) economic order at the end of the twentieth century; if impelled by raw material forces (of the market), then it becomes a result and a component of globalization (see Reynolds 1997, 1). Moreover, since globalization unfolds in uneven rather than uniform dynamic patterns, it may reveal itself in processes that are less than geographically global in scope. Therefore, globalization may be expressed through regionalization (Holm and Sorensen 1995, 6–7).

#### **B. Regionalization as a Challenge or Response to Globalization:**

Is regionalism a means toward something else other than globalization? Can regionalism lead to a more pluralistic world order populated by diverse and distinct patterns of socioeconomic organizations that are accountable to their populations? (See Mittelman 1996a, 189.) Unlike the first trend, the impetus toward regionalization might stem in this case from a reaction and challenge to the amorphous, undemocratic, and inexorable economic rules of globalization. This reaction can be motivated by either nationalistic/mercantilistic or pluralistic/humanistic

concerns (in same cases, even by both). In the first place, by creating trade blocs and integration frameworks based on mercantilistic premises, regionalism opposes the neoliberal 'harmony of interest' view of the world economy in favor of national (and regional) loyalties and frameworks. Conversely, the drive toward the formation of regions might be also motivated by the denial of a single universal culture (and ideology) and the promotion of alternative or pluralistic forms of social and political organizations other than the nation-states at the regional level.

### **C. Regionalization and Globalization as Parallel Processes:**

When we refer to the world economy, it encompasses the trends of both regional-ization—i.e., the division of the international economy into the megaregions of North America (or the Americas), Europe, and East Asia—and globalization (see Wyatt-Walter 1995). Conversely, in the international (global) security arena, it is more difficult to assess the (co)existence of security communities and security complexes without an overall dimension of global security, which is less evident. Thus, rather than reacting to each other, a third possibility is that regionalization and globalization might act as parallel or overlapping processes in the two issue-areas of economics and security.

### **How Do Globalization, Regionalization, and Nationalism Interact?**

Bringing the forces of nationalism and the possible role(s) of the nation-state into the equation creates the following possible linkages: (1) nation-states oppose globalization (divergent trends); (2) nationalism and the formation of new states are encouraged by the forces of globalization (convergent trends); (3) nation-states oppose the forces of regionalization (divergent trends); (4) nationalism and the nation-states can be strengthened through regionalism (convergent trends); (5) regionalization

coexists with nationalism and with globalization (overlapping trends); (6) nation-states mediate between trends of regionalization and globalization (overlapping trends); and (7) nation-states oppose globalization through regionalization (divergent trends).

**A. Nation-States and Nationalism Oppose Processes of Globalization:**

Processes of disintegration, fragmentation, autarky, and localization diverge from the overall trend of globalization. For instance, the blossoming of statehood may be a response to the homogenizing forces of globalization (Holsti 1996a, 22). The persistence or resurgence of nationalism can be regarded as a response to the alienating forces of the global market, by relocating or bolstering legitimacy and loyalties at the national or even subnational levels, in direct contradiction to the transnational or supranational logic of economic globalization.

**B. Nationalism and the Formation of New States Are Encouraged by the Forces of Globalization:**

Through a process of technological dissemination, globalization might actually promote nationalism and the formation of new states. Hence, globalization and nationalism might converge, through a new (global) revolution of 'rising expectations,' which encourages states to cope with and to manage the forces of globalization. Here lies an interesting paradox: Although forces of globalization seem to undermine state sovereignty, technological changes might also improve the material conditions for the enhancement or resurgence of nationalistic trends. Thus, globalization creates new strategies and roles for the nation-state (Drezner 1998, 210 and 218).

**C. Nation-States Oppose the Forces of Regionalization:**

Nation-states might oppose forces of regionalization that attempt to transcend the power (and authority) of the state in a supranational direction by setting limits and constraints to the development of a regional identity and supranational institutions. Thus, states will regard regional and subregional integration frameworks through the prism of international organizations with a limited mandate in terms of intervention, domestic jurisdiction, and the exercise of sovereignty.

#### **D. Nationalism and the Nation-States Can Be Strengthened through Regionalism:**

As mentioned above, regionalization in a given region might result from mercantilistic/ nationalistic tendencies of the member-states that see frameworks of regional integration as a means to pool and increase their national power resources. In this sense, the logic of the 'new regionalism' is not very different from that of the 'old' security alliances. In both cases, the goal is to guarantee the bloc (region) members greater security in their international relations in a context of increasing vulnerability of either the world economy or global security (see Axline 1996, 199).

#### **E. Regionalization Coexists with Nationalism and with Globalization:**

In this case we have neither convergence nor divergence but rather coexistence—the three processes are taking place simultaneously. Thus, there might be parallel processes of globalization and continuing trends of fragmentation and disintegration. Historically, political fragmentation, often manifested by the quest for national self-determination and the creation of new states, has been a trend with as much significance as the (parallel) forces of economic globalization (Holsti 1996a, 21–22). In this perspective the effects of globalization upon regionalization and especially on the nation-state are rather indeterminate: "The structural logic of globalization and the recent history of the global economy can be read as



providing rationales for 'high stateness' as well as 'low stateness'" (Evans 1997, 64). Whether processes of globalization might undermine the role and actions of the nation-state remains to be seen and should be examined in particular regional contexts.

#### **F. Nation-States Mediate between Trends of Regionalization and Globalization:**

States are active players in the world arena, and their policies are probably the single most important determinant of the scope and direction of both regionalization and globalization (see Holm and Sorensen 1995, 7). The stronger the states, the more capable they are in coping with the intricacies of the economic, political, social, technological, and cultural dimensions of globalization. Conversely, the weaker they are, the more 'penetrated' or exposed to the vulnerabilities of the world economy and the temptations of a shallow world culture and ideology (see Evans 1997, 69–70).

#### **G. Nation-States Oppose Globalization through Processes of Regionalization:**

Nationalism and globalization are linked dialectically. Globalization does not imply necessarily the erosion of the nation-state's authority but rather a needed change in state strategies and redirection of state energies. Conversely, state strategies and state actions can determine the future directions of globalization. One possible option open for states to cope with globalization is by enhancing processes of regionalization, such as the creation of free trade areas that recreate a double (and contradictory) logic of economic relations: liberal at the intraregional level but protectionist/mercantilist toward other rival regions or 'blocs.'

A recurrent theme in these seven linkages is the changing and uncertain role of the nation-state in relation to the forces of regionalization and globalization. Let us examine that point in further detail.

### **What is the Role of the Nation-State vis-à-vis Forces of Globalization?**

What is happening to the state and to the forces of nationalism as a consequence of globalization? Is the state being instrumentalized and superseded by the impersonal forces of capitalism and the nonterritorially-bounded use of technology? As a result of the adoption of the neoliberal orthodoxy there has been an overall decline in the functions of the typical welfare state, which traditionally has tried to find an equilibrium between the market and the need to intervene on behalf of social justice. Globalization has led in the direction of a 'cruel' or 'indifferent' state, captive in the networks of the global market. The state remains an important actor in world politics, but it is no longer the same actor we had studied in the introductory textbooks of international relations. Is this a pernicious aspect of globalization or a welcome one? The interesting question to address remains whether the nation-state has become obsolete or irrelevant under processes of globalization and regionalization.

Especially since the end of the Cold War, it has become almost a ritual to attack the state and the state system and to celebrate the end of the Westphalian system and its eventual replacement by a postmodern, postsovereign order ruled by the forces of globalization and regionalization. Due to a series of global changes that have taken place at the subnational, international, and transnational levels since 1945 (such as the reemergence of ethnic and other subnational identities, the emergence of a global economic system, the advent of broad transnational social movements, the impact of technological advances

upon communication and transportation, the nuclear revolution, and the multiplication of global interdependence catapulted by global issues and problem), the state has been exposed to increasing demands and challenges from within and from without. It has become increasingly 'sandwiched' between cross-pressures from the domestic and international scenes. These pressures cannot be ignored or pushed aside; they are part of the contemporary reality of world politics. Yet the controversy about the continuing relevance of the state in this age of globalization is not about the facts per se but about their interpretation in terms of political legitimacy and significance. Thus, the issue is more one of political values and normative theories than of scientific and empirical analysis.

At the international and global level the state system is attacked on the grounds that it is increasingly obsolete: States cannot cope with the threatening global ecological crisis; there is an emerging global civil society that challenges the authority of states; transnationalism has eroded and even replaced the sovereignty of states; and global interdependence has taken us beyond sovereignty and territoriality in the direction of economic globalization. Economic inter-dependence and global issues have shrunk the world, including the bargaining space of states. Technology has revolutionized international relations in communications and transportation. Nowadays, states can be penetrated by Scud missiles and Internet links. Transnational links and global movements are transcending national (state) loyalties. The 'capture' of the state within its borders by its civil society has been accompanied by the emergence of a parallel global civil society at the international level. Three major global transformations are signaled as symptoms of the obsolescence of the state system: the nuclear revolution in contemporary warfare, the interdependence of national economies, and the advent of a global society dealing with global issues (Gilpin 1981, 214–25). Yet, the

significance of these transformations in terms of state resilience vis-à-vis the forces of globalization and regionalization is still open to debate.

In a futuristic best-seller, Paul Kennedy (1993, 129–31) argued that the globalization of economic transactions (such as the internationalization of manufacturing and finance) accompanied by other developments such as the action of multinational corporations, international terrorism and drugs, illegal migration, and global warming have called into question the usefulness of the nation-state itself. Thus, when global issues and (mainly economic) forces of globalization are replacing outdated problems of national (i.e., international) security, it seems that the state is becoming ill-suited to cope with these momentous transformations. In other words, there seems to be a growing incongruence between the contemporary features of world politics at the level of global society, including the dynamic transnational movement of people, goods, capital, ideas, and information, and the anachronistic way in which politics is still structured and institutionalized through the persistence of the state system. This incongruence is expressed along five dimensions: (1) the protection of global community values vs. the destructiveness of international and civil warfare; (2) the behavior of the global economy vs. the restricting economic structures of the nation-states; (3) the transnational location of ecological systems vs. the obsolescence of political boundaries; (4) the formation of pluralistic cultural identities, on a regional or global basis, vs. the loyalty given to a single nation-state; and (5) the protection and enhancement of universal human rights vs. the norms of state sovereignty, including the principle of nonintervention (Brown 1992, 117). In this regard states are deemed obsolete since they cannot guarantee peace and security at the global level, they cannot fulfill the goals of economic and social justice on a global or even local basis, and they are unable to resolve global ecological crises that transcend political borders.

To sum up, four major arguments have been advanced to demonstrate the obsolescence of the state system in this age of globalization: (1) the global ecological crisis; (2) the development of global social movements and the emergence of a global civil society; (3) the deepening of global interdependence associated with economic globalization; and (4) transnational relations at the economic, social, cultural, and even political levels.

- (1) The *ecological crisis* on a planetary scale poses a more profound threat to the continuing relevance of the state system than the nuclear revolution. The ecological challenge epitomizes the irrevocable gulf between the artificial reality of state sovereignty on the basis of enclosed territorial domains, and the global reality of ecological dynamics (such as environmental pollution or global warming), which do not recognize any political borders (Falk 1975, 23). By definition, then, there is an inherent incompatibility and even contradiction between the national logic of sovereign states and the logic of global problems that cannot be resolved by states on an independent or autarkic basis.
- (2) A second and concomitant argument emphasizes the emergence of globalization forces at the 'grassroots' level, or 'from below': the emergence of a *global civil society* through the transnational undertakings of social forces dedicated to the promotion of human rights, democracy, and sustainable development worldwide (Falk 1993, 221)
- (3) A third and related argument underscores the role of the *economic dimensions of globalization*, especially its financial aspects, in the deepening of global interdependence and the erosion of state sovereignty. The state is losing its function as a territorially bounded 'national economy' within the framework of a larger 'world economy.' This role of 'national economies' has been "undermined or even brought into question by the major transformations in the international division of labor, whose basic units are transnational or multinational enterprises of all sizes, and by the corresponding development of international centers and networks of economic transactions which are, for practical purposes, outside the control of state governments" (Hobsbawm 1990, 181). Hence, states are increasingly losing their autonomy in managing their domestic and international economic policies as a result of the deepening of their economic interdependence and the unregulated forces of economic globalization.
- (4) Finally, nonterritorial actors such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international and nongovernmental organizations link to

subnational groups within states to form together a *transnational network to establish a global society* that transcends the scope of the state system. Thus, transnational relations contribute to the further 'sandwiching' of the state, by creating a 'control gap' between the state aspirations for control and its capability to reach it (Nye and Keohane 1971, xxiii).

It is hard to argue about the *facts* involved in the four dimensions of globalization presented above. Yet, we come back to the question of interpreting them. Nobody will dispute that these four elements—the global ecological crisis, the emergence of a civil society on a global scale, economic interdependence and financial/economic globalization, and transnational relations—all pose a current challenge to the state system and obviously erode state sovereignty, changing the nature of the state and its functionality. But do erosion and challenge mean necessarily obsolescence? Do the forces of globalization and regionalization lead to the neutralization of nationalism and the irrelevance of the nation-state?

In the first place, states are the problem but they can also be part of the solution in our age of globalization, plagued by ecological and other pernicious global issues, provided states can learn (or can be compelled to learn) how to cooperate at the global level through international institutions, especially through international regimes and other multilateral frameworks. Thus, "Those who say that what we have to do is [to] get 'beyond the states-system' forget that war, economic injustice, and ecological mismanagement have deeper causes than those embodied in any particular form of universal political organization [such as the state system, AK] (Bull 1979, 114).

Second, even if we recognize a reality of globalization 'from below' through the emergence of a global civil society, including nonstate actors and transnational relations, it does not necessarily follow that this global civil society is rendering the state system obsolete. As with the

relationship between civil society and its state in the domestic sphere, the 'game' between the global civil society and the state system does not have to be a zero-sum one. It is plausible to argue, for instance, that the increase in the importance of transnational economic flows has been accompanied by a concomitant increase in the role of state machineries (Evans 1985). Similarly, economic forces of globalization have challenged state sovereignty, but at the same time they have also invited responses from states to coordinate their policies and to cope with those challenges (for instance, through the role of international institutions such as the IMF).

Third, increased economic interdependence and the logic of world capitalism is not entirely inconsistent with the role of the state in international relations, even though the recent financial crises in East Asia seem to epitomize the evident incongruence between financial markets and the relative irrelevance of the state. For instance, high levels of exchange and market-rational outcomes in a situation of economic interdependence require stable property rights that minimize costs and increase benefits. So far, the only actors capable of providing such rights have been the modern nation-states (Thompson and Krasner 1989, 197).

Finally, although transnational relations have been significant in world politics, it is not clear whether they have undermined the state system. To begin with, the importance of the multinational corporations does not imply necessarily that they are independent from the action and control of states. Moreover, in many cases states have learned how to manipulate transnational actors to enhance their own power and influence.

Ultimately, the real choice for states and governments is not how best to fight globalization but rather how to manage it. According to Haas and Litan (1998, 6), a paradox lies in the fact that although the age of globalization is usually characterized as challenging the state-system, it is still states and government who determine how to exploit or squander the potential of globalization. In sum, despite the assault on state sovereignty



and states' vulnerabilities (and/or irrelevance) regarding financial markets, the nation-state still remains in (at least partial) control of fiscal and monetary policies, foreign economic policies, international business and, ultimately, war (Drucker 1997).

## **COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS: PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITIES**

The different linkages among the trends of globalization, regionalization, and nationalism can be illustrated in the cases of pluralistic security communities.

### **Defining Pluralistic Security Communities**

The concept of pluralistic security communities is directly linked to the notion of integration. According to Haas (1970), the study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose several factual attributes of sovereignty. A successful integration is reached when states in the region cease to prepare for war against one another and sustain stable expectations of peaceful change. At a more subjective level, integration is achieved when there is a prevalence of mutually compatible self-images of the states participating in the process, up to the point of developing a common identity and mutual expectations of shared economic and security gains.

Karl Deutsch and his associates (1957) draw an important distinction between integration and amalgamation. While the former has to do with the formation of communities, the latter refers to the establishment of formal organizations, associations, or political institutions. This distinction is crucial. In logical terms, we can envision a situation of

amalgamation without integration (i.e., without a sense of community), as in a nation-state torn apart by civil war. Conversely, there exists the possibility of integration without amalgamation, as it is the case with security communities that keep both the regional peace and the political sovereignty of the integrated members of the community. The shared expectations of peaceful change are a function of shared values, mutual responsiveness and trust, and the abandonment of war as a policy option to resolve conflict.

According to the original formulation of Deutsch et al. (1957), two conditions seem essential for the attainment of pluralistic security communities: (a) compatibility of political values associated with common political institutions, such as common democratic norms; (b) links of social communication that reflect a sense of community and shared identity (an intersubjective 'we-feeling') among the members of the region, including mutual empathy and loyalties. Thus, Deutsch et al. hypothesized that if a population in a given region shares values, common memories, self-images, interests, identifications, and goals, its members communicate and transact on a wide range of issue-areas. These communication links reflect a dynamic process of mutual attention, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the decision-making process.

### **Pluralistic Security Communities: Convergence and Overlapping of Trends**

Pluralistic security communities can be conceived as a middle ground or intersection of the trends of globalization, regionalization, and nationalism in the following ways:

- 1) Security communities are partly motivated by economic forces of globalization, they include transnational links among the peoples composing the different member-states.
- 2) Conversely, by being *pluralistic*, security communities do not rule out the national character, and political independence, of the member-states.
- 3) Security communities, by establishing regions of common identity, epitomize the trends toward regionalization and regionalism.

Deutsch et al. argued that pluralistic security communities are formed by people rather than by states. This is ultimately correct but not very relevant for the purposes of our discussion. After all, states are also formed and conformed by people. Do people articulate in international relations and world politics as 'people' or as 'state'? The answer is equivocal; actually, as *both* people and states. In the case of pluralistic security communities, however, people from different states form them without transcending or replacing their sovereign states. Thus, states comprising a pluralistic security community are still sovereign in a formal or legal sense, though their legitimacy and authority are concomitantly affected by the development of a regional communitarian identity (Adler and Barnett 1996).

Thus, somewhere 'beyond the nation-state,' but short of world government, we find the domain of pluralistic security communities composed of sovereign states that share stable expectations of peaceful change. Between the 'logic of anarchy' (of the state-system), and the 'logic of community' (of a potential world community of humankind), pluralistic security communities offer a possible convergence among the forces of regionalization, globalization, and nationalism. A logic of regional community seems to replace the logic of anarchy as postulated by the Realists, while keeping the structure of sovereign states in a reformed way. In this sense, by preferring the development of a pluralistic

(i.e., sovereign states-based) security communities over a world government or a global federation, it is possible to reconcile some elements of nationalism with those of regionalization, within a more general framework of economic globalization.

## **Pluralistic Security Communities: Divergence among the Three Trends**

The literature on pluralistic security communities does not address extensively the possibility of conflict and clashes between or among regions or communities. It focuses upon peaceful change and peace at the intraregional level, though it ignores the interregional, international, and global levels. In this sense the logic of regionalization can be contradictory to the logic of globalization, which emphasizes global problems, central institutions, and the possibility of global governance and/or government. Moreover, the rationale for regional security complexes (including security communities) might stand in the way of resolving issues of global security, such as nonproliferation.

In addition to the possible contradictions between regionalization and globalization, there is also a potential (if not real) divergence between nationalism and national identity and the establishment of a regional identity that somehow transcends the national identity, despite the 'pluralistic' character of the community. There is an inherent ambiguity on the part of the members of the community (states and peoples) towards delegating their loyalties and authority to supranational levels of identity and sovereignty.

### **COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE**

Some empirical evidence regarding the complex relationships among the three trends can be traced at the regional level by examining different patterns in different regions. For instance, in the Latin American case we can find examples of regionalization and integration, the insertion of the region within economic globalization, nationalism and the continuing

role of the state, and the emergence of an incipient pluralistic security community in the Southern Cone of South America.

### **Regionalization and Integration in Latin America**

Regionalism in the Americas has historically meant two quite different things. In the first place, it has meant regional cooperation and attempted economic integration among the countries of Latin America, excluding the United States. The second form of regionalism covers the entire Western Hemisphere, at the inter-American or Pan-American level, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego (Hurrell 1995b, 250). I will focus here upon the Latin American type of regionalism.

In the Latin American experience after World War II, as in other developing regions, there was an attempt to develop a model of integration that drew upon the European experience as developed in the theory of customs union. In this approach regionalism was used to justify the geographic extension of protection, market reserves, and other barriers of exchange from the national to the regional levels. This form of 'closed regionalism' ultimately failed (Reynold 1997, 1). By contrast, the 'open regionalism' of the last two decades has reconciled itself with the open forces of the global economy, driven by technological change, and by product and process innovation. In terms of regional integration, several schemes of economic development have been launched since the 1980s, foremost Mercosur (since 1991) and the resurrected Andean Group. These schemes of economic integration, however, have not been designed to replace the sovereign nation-states that compose them but rather to enhance the economic capabilities and even the economic independence of member-states.

If the 1970s were characterized by tensions and militarized disputes, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a new impetus to

regionalism, both in political/security and economic terms. In political terms the Central American crisis of the 1980s led to attempts at regional political consultation and consensus (*concertación*), such as the Contadora Group, the Group of Eight, and the contemporary Group of Rio, which includes most of the South American countries in addition to Mexico and Panama. In economic terms the latest wave of economic integration recreated the Andean Group of 1969 while creating Mercosur on the basis of the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Program of 1986. Nowadays we have at least twelve schemes of regional and subregional integration in the Americas, seven of them involving South American states. The reasons for this 'integrative fever' have been various: the increase in intraregional trade; the fear of the uncertain future of the international political economy facing the transnational forces of economic globalization; the formation and consolidation of regional blocs across regions; the Initiative for the Americas launched by US President George Bush in 1990 and continued by President Clinton in 1994 (Miami) and in 1998 (Santiago de Chile); the establishment of NAFTA; the improvement in the regional political climate regarding the resolution, if not management, of outstanding territorial disputes; and domestic political motivations, including the need to enhance the democratization process. Recent state-led cooperation and the emergence of integrative frameworks were designed to promote economic interdependence, not only to manage it. For political rather than economic reasons, such as the need to legitimize and to enhance the new democratic regimes, states decide to create economic interdependence through the institutionalization of mutual cooperation. In contrast to the common theoretical assumption, the order of causality has been reversed in Latin America: economic interdependence became the consequence, not the cause, of political cooperation and of economic integration. Moreover, we have not seen in Latin America a unilinear progression or a 'spillover' process but rather a

'spillaround process' of overlapping bilateral and multilateral agreements, where an impasse in one scheme of integration typically led to the creation of yet another scheme (Klaveren 1993, 118). Hence, increased regional integration is gaining momentum as Latin American economies have emerged from the 'lost decade' of the 1980s, restructured along neoliberal lines and pursuing increasingly market-oriented paths to economic development (Harper and Cuzan 1997, 144).

### **Latin America and Globalization**

As a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the new populism of the 1990s, the Latin American nations have reopened their economies to extensive trade with the rest of the world. At first with hesitation and then with increasing enthusiasm, the region has embraced the ideological orthodoxy and the policies of 'neoliberalism,' within the framework of the world economy. As a consequence of these neoliberal policies, Latin American states and societies have become firmly tied to market economies and more dependent on and closely integrated into the global economy as exporters of their natural resources and importers of manufactures. Tariffs are coming down, exports are being promoted, foreign investors have been invited to bid on state enterprises that are up for auction and general liquidation, while free-trade agreements if not customs unions are being implemented within the region (Harper and Cuzan 1997, 133 and 143; Espindola 1998, 10). Paradoxically, the more the region has been integrated into the post-Cold War era of economic globalization, characterized by free market homogeneity and cutthroat competition for financial markets, the more it fears being left out and 'marginalized' without any economic or political alternatives (Castañeda 1994).



Turning to the relationship between regionalization and globalization, we can trace in Latin America the three possible patterns discussed above:

### **A. Regionalization as a Component of Globalization**

The 'new regionalism' in Latin America reconciles itself with the forces of economic globalization, being a component of it. In this sense, the schemes of regional integration in Latin America are part and parcel, and derived from, the economic forces of globalization.

### **B. Regionalization as a Challenge to Globalization**

According to this argument, schemes of subregional integration such as Mercosur and the Andean Group, or even the talks about a potential SAFTA (South American Free Trade Area) led by Brazil, can be considered as regional challenges to globalization. By promoting free trade and liberalization at the intraregional level only they can be also considered forces of protectionism and 'regional nationalism' at the interregional or global level. This interpretation is valid for Latin America as well as for the cases of the European Union or ASEAN and APEC in East Asia.

### **C. Regionalization and Globalization as Parallel Processes**

According to this view, we can witness in Latin America the unfolding of multiple and parallel processes of regionalization and globalization that do not necessarily converge or diverge but merely coexist: plans for a free trade area at the Hemispheric level overlap with subregional schemes of economic integration (e.g., Mercosur and the Andean Group).

The adoption of neoliberal policies, within a framework of regionalization and globalization, have not succeeded in bringing about greater economic benefits shared with greater equity by the whole

population (Ward 1997, 107). Hence, regionalization and globalization in the region have also brought disarray, which leads us to pose the question about the lingering role of the state vis-à-vis these two forces and their pernicious effects.

### **Nationalism and the Residual Role of the State in Latin America**

In the early decades of the nineteenth century independent states had emerged in all the territory of mainland Central and South America. As compared with other regions of the Third World, the Latin American countries were spared major sources of identity conflicts, such as ethnicity, tribalism, and religion. Thus, in a continuum between the strong and democratic states of Western Europe and the weak and undemocratic states of Africa, the Latin American case occupies an intermediate position in which weak though consolidated nation-states (especially in South America) have confronted their civil societies and the international environment through different types of political regimes, both authoritarian and democratic. While political regimes have been in dispute until two decades ago, the state as an institution has enjoyed political legitimacy, as the result of long periods of independence and the consolidation of state boundaries. In Latin America the state and its intellectual and political elites antedated and created the nation. Only in the last few decades has the dominance of the state been challenged in subnational terms by the demands of indigenous organizations calling for 'internal self-determination' (see Nagengast, Stavenhagen, and Kearney 1992). Interestingly, these demands for self-determination imply local (usually cultural and economic) autonomy rather than secessionist claims to create new independent states.

In domestic terms the state has always been a primary factor in the process of economic and political development in the region (see

Anderson 1967; Smith 1992). Nowadays, the state in Latin America continues to fulfill a prime role in the national economy, though it has notoriously retreated from productive and distributive functions to that of facilitating surplus extraction and the insertion of the national economies within the whirlpool of economic globalization (see Hagopian 1994; Nef and Bensabat 1992). Hence, it seems that even if the state in Latin America is in the business of liquidating its traditional economic and social roles, it still fulfills a crucial economic and social function in doing so. In this sense an important distinction should be kept between state withdrawal from its role in economic and social life and its retreat from a basic mandate to provide essential public goods, such as personal security, functioning courts, and some semblance of formal legal equality (Adelman 1998, 12).

For Latin America the triumph of capitalism and of economic globalization as a whole has reinforced the need for substantial reductions in the size and functions of the state (Fishlow 1994, 65). Yet, despite its residual role, the state in the region remains an essential force for coping with and responding to the trends toward regionalization and globalization, both in positive and negative terms.

### **Mercosur as an Incipient Pluralistic Security Community?**

The highest level of peace and integration Latin America (or any other region) can expect to achieve is through the formation and maintenance of a pluralistic security community. Nowadays there is a debate—focusing upon the recent Mercosur institutional framework, grouping Argentina and Brazil together with the two small buffer states of Uruguay and Paraguay—as to whether the Southern Cone countries of South America have moved in the direction of a security community (see

Castañeda 1994; Holsti 1996b; Hurrell 1994; Kacowicz 1994 and forthcoming; Hirst and Rico 1992).

Has the Southern Cone of South America transformed itself into a pluralistic security community, in relation to which not only common threats but also shared perceptions and a common identity may be identified? In the economic sphere Mercosur since 1991 epitomizes a serious regionalization effort towards institutionalizing economic cooperation, increasing inter-dependence, and moving in the direction of economic, if not political, integration. In the security domain the level of cooperation regarding nuclear nonproliferation and banning chemical and biological weapons, as well as conventional arms control and reductions, has been notable between Argentina and Brazil. Therefore, it seems that dependable expectations of peaceful change characterize today the relations among Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. At the political level, however, it becomes more difficult to talk about the Southern Cone as a consolidated pluralistic security community. For instance, in the last five years we have seen a growing divergence in the foreign policies of Brazil and Argentina vis-à-vis the United States, showing an interesting reversal in their traditional roles. These differences reflect disparate conceptions of national and regional identity. Argentina has reverted to its nineteenth-century image of a Western, almost European country, while Brazil emphasizes its Latin American reach and Third World pedigree.

Most of the necessary and helpful conditions for the development of a pluralistic security community in the region have been present, some of them even before the last wave of democratization in the 1980s. Among other conditions, we should underline the positive role played by Brazil, together with Argentina, in developing the core of a security community. Yet other favorable conditions, especially in the economic, social, and transnational realms, remain so far incipient. As a consequence, it is still premature to talk about a settled sense of community, shared identity,

mutual sympathy and loyalties ('we-feeling') among the members of the region. Argentina and Brazil, as well as the other members of Mercosur and other subregional integrative schemes, still have a long way to go in terms of articulating common foreign policies and coordinating their macroeconomic policies, above and beyond the continuing development and growth of their national economies.

### **Recap: Complex Linkages in Latin America**

A complex reality of integration and disintegration can be identified in the context of Latin America (Petrash 1998). This reality is characterized by multiple drives toward both regionalization and globalization and by regionalism at the inter-American (pan-American) and Latin American levels. The result is a complex web of linkages, including the following:

#### **A. Nation-States and Nationalism Oppose Processes of Globalization:**

This trend can be identified through the focus of nationalist and revisionist demands, both at the subnational level (e.g., the continuing insurgency in Chiapas, Mexico) or at the regional level (Mercosur or the Andean Group) as a response to globalization.

#### **B. Nation-States Oppose the Forces of Regionalization:**

Despite the drive toward regionalization in Latin America, there is a basic reluctance on the part of the states in the region to give up their authority and sovereignty in favor of supranational frameworks. Hence, international cooperation and international institutions are preferred over federal or quasi-federal schemes.

### **C. Nationalism and the Nation-States Can Be Strengthened through Regionalism:**

The new assertiveness of regional powers such as Argentina and Brazil is directly related to their common efforts at regional integration. In this sense Mercosur has been a result of mercantilistic/nationalistic tendencies to pool and increase the national resources of its member-states.

### **D. Regionalization Coexists with Nationalism and with Globalization:**

The 'new regionalism' in Latin America does not necessarily contradict the trend toward a global economy. Thus, paradoxically, the rationale that justifies the formation or revitalization of subregional schemes of economic integration can stem from either a nationalistic approach or from a neoliberal orthodoxy. While dependencistas and mercantilists will support the Andean Group or Mercosur as an example of subregional autarky and national (or regional) assertiveness, neoliberals will also encourage those integrative schemes as stepping stones in a process of economic globalization. Depending upon contradictory philosophical or ideological beliefs, regionalization trends in Latin America can be regarded as either convergent with globalization (neoliberals) or diverging and challenging it (dependencistas and nationalists).

### **E. Nation-States Mediate between Trends of Regionalization and Globalization:**

Notwithstanding any of those alternative interpretations, it is evident that the role of the nation-states in Latin America has remained crucial to managing regionalism and coping with the forces of globalization, by encouraging or opposing the permeability of their societies to the forces of globalization. For instance, states and governments have negotiated the

increasing role of the IMF in the (re)shaping of their economies, in accord with the logic of economic globalization.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND EXTRAPOLATIONS**

The picture given in this paper has been one of indeterminacy and complexity, of uneven globalization and regional differentiation. Globalization, nationalism, and regionalization are important trends that shape world politics, though their inherent importance is relative to one another through dynamic linkages of convergence, divergence, and uneasy coexistence or overlapping. As a consequence it is probably more accurate (though less parsimonious) to refer to different types and shapes of regionalization or regionalism, and even to several ways and dimensions of globalization, rather than a single, 'global' one.

Has the inexorable logic of economic globalization and regionalization reduced the role of the nation-state in world (or global) politics? The answer is not clear. It is evident that regimes and governments (as representing states) are under stress, civil societies are contesting state roles, and citizens everywhere are turning away from their active support for their states in the direction of alternative foci of loyalties and identities. Yet, alternative forms of governance domestically, internationally, and transnationally coexist with the state system; they have not replaced it. Even the logic of pluralistic security communities has not annulled the logic of a state system embedded in a more sophisticated and progressive international society. Subnational, supranational, transnational, and global processes seem to coexist with and within the state system, without necessarily transcending it.

When one looks at the transformed map of the world, with the latest growth in the number of states in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, it becomes clear that the sovereign state is still the only universally

recognized way of organizing political life in international relations, though not the only possible way. States have lost parts and parcels of their sovereignty in terms of autonomy (if, indeed, they had complete or absolute sovereignty to start with, which I doubt), especially in favor of the economic forces of globalization. Yet this erosion of sovereignty does not signify that they have all become dysfunctional or obsolete. States remain the basic political units for the analysis of world politics by defining the primary space in which political arguments take place (Mayall 1990, 152). New and recent trends of regionalization have not overturned that truism, since they have not annulled the forces of nationalism but rather 'pooled' them in uncertain and uncharted directions, including the possibility of forming megablocs of trade, if not megastates. Trends of globalization, especially in the economic dimension, have created 'virtual spaces' that have made territoriality irrelevant for the making and dynamics of many daily transactions in international relations, especially in the financial arena. Yet this same world economy driven by the amorphous logic of globalization necessitates and recognizes the resilient existence of states, not only as irresponsible troublemakers but also as potential problem-solvers through their international regimes, multilateral cooperation, and international institutions (such as the IMF). At the end of the day (and the millennium) one can still conclude that transnational proletarian solidarity, transnational world market allegiances, or cosmopolitan global loyalties are still not plausible alternatives to the state in terms of identity, legitimacy, allegiance, and even authority.

What are the implications of this analysis? In the first place, we have to be much more careful in the way we define concepts and use the rhetoric of globalization, shying away from the dogmatism we used in the past with reference to terms such as 'national interest' or 'complex interdependence.' We are witnessing a long and tedious process in which



the state and the state system are being transformed by the forces of globalization and regionalization but not necessarily replaced by them.

Secondly, a more clear distinction should be drawn between the reality of the nation-state and that of state sovereignty. While there is no current alternative to the state system, it is becoming evident that state sovereignty has been eroded by the action of nonstate actors, the shaping of regional frameworks with supranational elements, and the dynamics of globalization.

Finally, there is a normative reason why we should care about the fate of the nation-state in relation to regionalization and globalization. Although globalization has been ideologically linked to the spread of democratization, the forces of globalization (and to a lesser extent those of regionalization as well) have been anything but democratic, responding mainly to the amorphous and economic (Darwinist?) logic of the global market. Thus, to preserve democracy we need democratic regimes, not embedded in transnational economic boards or supranational and unelected bureaucracies but within nation-states and accountable to their respective populations.

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