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Reinstitutionalizing Families: Life Course Policy and Marriage in the Military

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Reinstitutionalizing Families: Life Course Policy and Marriage in the Military

20 The transition to adulthood has become an 21 increasingly telescoped process for Americans 22 with marital formation occurring increasingly 23 later in the life course. It is therefore striking to 24 find a context like the U.S. military, in which mar-25 riage rates bear an anachronistic resemblance to 26 those of the 1950s era. Using narrative data from 27 life history interviews with military affiliates, 28 the authors show that the military has reinstitu-29 tionalized military families at the same time that 30 civilian families are becoming deinstitutional-31 ized. Structural conditions of modern military 32 service, such as war deployment and frequent 33 geographical relocation, have created policies 34 that rely on families to make these conditions 35 more bearable to military personnel. These 36 policies are part of an overarching institutional 37 culture that directly and indirectly promotes 38 marriage. The authors bring together life course 39 literatures on turning points, the welfare state 40 and linked lives to show how the military has 41 reinstitutionalized families in these ways. 42

Research shows that the pathways taken toadulthood leave an indelible mark on the life

52 53 This article was edited by Kevin M. Roy.

Key Words: xxxx,

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course (Rindfuss, 1991). One of these pathways to adulthood-marriage-now occurs increasingly later in the American life course (Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006). Among some low-income populations, marriage is often foregone altogether (Edin & Kefalas, 2005; Goldstein & Kenney, 2001). This retreat from marriage reflects the protracted and individualized transition to adulthood that has become common throughout the Western world. In the midst of this societal shift, one well-known American institution appears resistant to these processes: The U.S. military, which is characterized by early and pervasive marriage rates (Lundquist 2004; Lundquist & Smith 2005; Drummet, Coleman, & Cable, 2003; Hogan & Furst Seifert, 2010; Teachman, 2009) that today stand in contrast to the rest of U.S. society. Although these trends have been well documented, the processes through which they occur are poorly understood. We suggest that U.S. military service hastens an early transition to adulthood by deliberately embedding families into its core institutional structure. In so doing, we bring together life course literatures on turning points, the welfare state, and linked lives to show how the military has reinstitutionalized families.

Existing explanations for prevalent military48marriage rates center primarily on its compen-
sation package, in particular financial incentives49provided by housing benefits for married cou-
ples (Hogan & Furst Seifert, 2010; U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, 2008. We take a broader view.51On the basis of life history interviews, we argue54

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1 that housing benefits are but a small piece of the 2 puzzle contextualizing military marriage. Major 3 structural conditions of modern military service, 4 such as war deployment and the military's inex-5 orable demand for frequent geographic reloca-6 tion, have created policies that implicitly rely on 7 families to make these conditions more bearable 8 to service members. These policies are part of 9 an overarching institutional culture that directly and indirectly promotes marriage. 10

BACKGROUND

14 During the brief period lasting from the end 15 of World War II into the 1970s, the transi-16 tion to adulthood was far more uniform than 17 it is today. Life course theorists call this the *Fordist era*, one that was characterized by early 18 19 and near-universal marriage (Katz & Autor, 20 1999; Mayer, 2004; Mayer & Muller, 1986; 21 Sironi & Furstenberg, 2012). Postwar socioe-22 conomic mobility provided secure employment 23 earlier in the life stage, whereas today upward 24 mobility has become a privilege enjoyed mainly 25 by the college educated. In tandem, women's 26 employment has increased dramatically due to the decline of family wages and shifts in gen-27 28 der values. In this post-Fordist, deindustrialized 29 era, marriage has been pushed back increasingly 30 later in the life course, and for some it is out of 31 reach completely. In short, families are diversifying and deinstitutionalizing. 32

33 In the military, on the other hand, families 34 have been reinstitutionalized. Repeat studies 35 have shown that marriage is much higher among 36 service members than their same-age civilian 37 counterparts (Drummet et al., 2003; Lundquist, 38 2004; Teachman, 2009). Research has shown 39 that role transitions have differing impacts 40 depending on whether they occur at normatively 41 prescribed periods during the life course (Setter-42 sten & Hägestad, 1996). While early marriage 43 among civilians has become normatively "out of time," the pervasiveness of young military 44 marriage makes it culturally "on time" in that 45 46 context. Little is known empirically about how 47 this process happens. Few sources collect data 48 on the military population, and those that do are 49 limited. Nevertheless, a substantial amount of 50 speculative attention has been given to the mili-51 tary's housing benefits as an incentivizing factor. 52 Single, lower ranking enlistees must live in mili-53 tary barracks, but upon marriage they may move 54 into privatized housing and receive rental funds.

This is called the *basic allowance* for housing. 1 2 The average allowance for junior enlistees ranges from \$800 to \$1,900 per month ("2014 3 Basic Allowance," 2014). Anecdotes about 4 5 "green card marriages"-arrangements between friends for a housing allowance—are common. 6 Even at higher ranks, where barracks are not 7 required, married members receive a higher 8 housing allowance than singles so that they 9 can purchase more living space in the civilian 10 economy. The difference adds up to an annual 11 \$2,500 differential between the two groups. 12

A recent report by the Defense Advisory 13 Committee on Military Compensation recom-14 15 mended abolishing the housing differential, concluding that the policy is embedded with 16 a marriage incentive (U.S. Department of 17 Defense, 2008). Scholars have also attributed 18 19 housing policy to early marriage (Kelty, Kleykamp, & Segal, 2010). Only one study 20 tested the impact of housing policy empirically, 21 concluding that housing benefits are a major 22 motivating factor of early marriage in the mili-23 tary (Hogan & Furst Seifert, 2010). Although the 24 authors creatively manipulated cross-sectional 25 data to rule out selectivity, they left out a number 26 of broader incentives for military marriages that 27 28 we argue are built into the basic military employment structure. Viewing housing benefits as a 29 30 "perverse incentive" that inadvertently causes marriage eclipses something more pervasive. 31 In fact, the military has a powerful incentive to 32 institutionalize early marriage among its troops. 33 34

THE MILITARY AS A TURNING POINT

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37 Glen Elder (1986) was one of the first scholars 38 to examine the critical role of military service in the life course, connecting veterans' stories to 39 their changing society. Although military service 40 has played a varying role for different cohorts in 41 differing eras, it has always served as an institu-42 tional turning point in the lives of young people. 43 During the draft era, military service enabled a 44 knifing off of negative influences while simul-45 taneously delaying the transition to adulthood 46 47 (Laub & Sampson, 2003). Although military service no longer affects as many Americans as it 48 did during the height of World War II, it remains 49 America's largest employer and, as such, is a 50 51 major pathway to adulthood in our society.

Because of low retention rates after the 52 Korean War due to family disruption, the Pentagon resolved to make families an essential 54

component of personnel policy and management 1 2 (Bourg & Segal, 1999; Little, 1971). The transi-3 tion to the all-volunteer force in 1973 required 4 reinvention in order to recruit and retain young 5 people amid civilian labor market competition. To offset the hardships of enlisted life, the 6 7 Pentagon adopted an unusual array of policies 8 to support families, including full family health 9 coverage, family housing, day care services, schooling systems, and so on. These policies 10 11 are unique in U.S. society as a whole, which lacks a well-articulated welfare state, and rarer 12 13 still in the low-wage economy. Today's military 14 still serves as a crucial turning point in young people's lives but, instead of delaying it, it now 15 advances the transition to adulthood in the form 16 17 of marriage. This stands in marked contrast to 18 other major institutions that serve as influential 19 turning points in the lives of young adults. The 20 higher education and penal system, for example, delay and disrupt family formation. In this sense 21 the military is unusual. 22 23

MILITARY SERVICE IN THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG WELFARE STATE

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27 Life course scholars have observed that the 28 welfare state has become a major source of 29 important life course markers throughout 30 Europe (Mayer & Muller, 1986; Settersten, 31 2008). Although the U.S. welfare state is comparatively less generous, its military stands in 32 33 contrast as a major provider of universalis-34 tic entitlements to service members and their families. It is not a surprise, then, that military 35 service is a major determinant of young adult 36 37 life course transitions in the United States. 38 Work-family strain characterizes all employ-39 ment in the postindustrial era; however, military 40 travel and deployment demands are particularly 41 extreme. To lessen this tension, the service 42 engulfs families into the military apparatus 43 entirely. The results of this are reflected in the 44 population of dependents and spouses that now 45 dwarfs the number of members, in clear contrast 46 to the draft era (Office of the Deputy Under 47 Secretary of Defense, 2013).

In the absence of draft-era coercion, the military had to gain recruits' consent to control in a number of other ways. Janowitz (1964) famously argued that a future military would rely on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. An important part of this persuasion process is providing two elements that are often out of reach to working class young adults: 1 (a) secure employment with opportunity for 2 advancement and (b) ample provision for family members. These conditions were created to 4 serve the needs of both military families and the 5 military, although toward two different ends. 6

Toward the first end, military enlistment 7 provides a rare form of employment to young 8 people, the equivalent of what the unionized fac-9 tory job was in the past. Economic security and 10 career stability at early life stages for these youth 11 has led to a more stable transition to adulthood 12 than for civilians (Kelty et al., 2010). Relative 13 to entry-level service economy jobs for young 14 people who lack a college degree, military work 15 pays in the top percentile (U.S. Department of 16 Defense, 2008). To illustrate, Walmart, second 17 in size only to the military, offers an average 18 full-time annual wage of \$26,000 with few to 19 no benefits (Folbre, 2013). Once the military's 20 in-kind benefits, such as universal health care, 21 22 retirement pension, continuing education, GI 23 Bill education benefits, and room and board are factored in, military service compensation 24 eclipses other entry-level jobs in the service 25 economy, with an estimated \$99,000 entry level 26 value (Folbre, 2013). Furthermore, military 27 active duty members and veterans are able to 28 acquire mortgages without down payments and 29 commonly purchase homes earlier than civilians 30 (Segal & Sullivan, 1998). Military service is 31 largely immune to layoffs while providing an 32 33 unambiguous occupational mobility ladder. As a result, military enlistment for today's cohorts 34 35 triggers a succession of early role transitions that reverberate through the life course. In 36 this article we focus on marriage, but other 37 pathways to adulthood, such as early career 38 entry, homeownership, and early parenthood, 39 are intertwined, mutually influential experiences 40 for many military youth. 41

Toward the second end, the military depends 42 implicitly on familial labor, which explains in 43 part the generosity of its benefits. Here we draw 44 a parallel to the more conservative branch of 45 European countries described in the compara-46 47 tive welfare state literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990). These welfare states channel social 48 policies through the employed male head of 49 household, relying on the reproductive and 50 caretaking labor of women. Similarly, in an 51 extension of Becker's (1981) household special-52 ization model, military spouses are expected to 53 provide a full support system in the face of long 54

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hours, constant transfers, and war deployments. This intensive reliance on spousal labor by the military intersects with the life course concept of 4 linked lives to aptly illustrate the process through which the military institutionalizes marriages.

LINKED LIVES

A foundational element of the life course per-9 spective, linked lives describes the sharing 10 of mutually intertwined life trajectories that 11 extend throughout the life course (Elder, 1998; 12 13 Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003). Although 14 often intergenerationally focused, such research also focuses on the interconnected lives of 15 spouses (Moen & Wethington, 1998). Spouses 16 are among the most intensive linkages because 17 they move through the life course together. 18 This is particularly true of the military, in 19 20 which the nuclear family members are often geographically separated from extended family 21 members. 22

The military plays an explicit role in this link-23 24 ing process because it depends upon spousal support roles to operate. To illustrate, the Army 25 spouse guide (U.S. Army, 2007) notes that "fam-26 ilies must be very self-reliant, such as when a 27 soldier is at training, a special duty assignment, 28 or even deployed overseas," which will bring 29 about "new confidence . . . gained from its abil-30 31 ity to work together and to grow while supporting the Soldier" (p. 2). The Army's Deployment 32 Readiness Family Handbook for DA Civilians 33 and Family Members (U.S. Army, 2010) extends 34 this point, demonstrating that the family domain 35 is inherently a "militarized" space: 36

38 It is of utmost importance that Army Families prepare, train, and resource themselves for the 39 day-to-day requirements associated with Army 40 living. They must be ready to assume command of 41 the home front in the absence of their Soldier on 42 short notice. This means equipping, arming, and 43 training as Army Families to meet the needs of 44 self-reliance, preservation, and forward movement 45 as Soldiers focus on the mission that lies in front 46 of them. (p. 9) 47

48 As such, family members are clearly also 49 doing time in the service. Military research has 50 shown that, in addition to being more likely to 51 reenlist, married members have fewer depressive 52 symptoms and lower rates of job-related prob-53 lems (Burnham, Meredith, Sherbourne, Valdez, 54 & Vernez, 1992). Thus, linking the lives of its members to spouses is an effective strategy not only to ensure domestic support but also to counteract unpredictable or even volatile elements of young (usually male) adulthood.

Military families receive the generous pro-5 vision described earlier in exchange for a high 6 degree of regulation. The military aggres-7 sively intervenes with social services it deems 8 appropriate, excludes nonnormative families, 9 and enforces conservative family military law 10 (Burland & Lundquist, 2012).. Although the 11 military recently decreed that officer promo-12 tion could no longer be influenced by the 13 actions of the spouse, expectations for volun-14 15 teerism and other uncompensated work operate informally (Gassmann, 2010; Harrell, 2001a), 16 illustrating the depth of linked lives in the 17 military. Spouses of all ranks are relied on to 18 19 be the primary caretaker of the children during deployment and to participate in military 20 culture integration classes and family support 21 groups (Harrell, 2001b). Military volunteer 22 organizations expect and rely on the labor of 23 family members, an invisible military subsidy 24 worth billions (Christensen, 2011; Gassmann, 25 2010). The geographic structure of the military 26 career makes family portability a necessity, 27 28 which necessarily deprioritizes spousal careers. Military spouses are often unable to accumu-29 30 late work experience and face higher rates of unemployment than civilians (Kleykamp, 31 2012). This structural feature of the military is 32 more supportive of breadwinner-homemaker 33 families than dual-career families and, much 34 like conservative European welfare states, relies 35 on the specialized labor of each member. This 36 37 necessity helps explain the considerably generous in-kind benefits provided by the military to 38 entry-level, low-skill workers. 39

A policy encouraging linked lives ensures the 40 provision of care work and emotion labor, in 41 particular during episodes of war when service 42 members need it most. Running the household 43 while the employee is at war and being avail-44 able psychologically and emotionally for the 45 deployed member and the military community 46 47 as a whole are major support roles. The Deployment Handbook urges the spouse to "Accept 48 your responsibility [to the Unit] in assisting in a 49 50 positive and nurturing role" (U.S. Army, 2007, p. 51 25). It suggests how spouses can best help their children process the long-term absence of a par-52 ent while emphasizing the importance of staying 53 connected to the soldier: 54 As you and your Family members are learning
 ways to manage and cope with the separation and
 deployment of a loved one, it is equally important to stay in touch and connected throughout the
 deployment . . . Maintaining an emotional connection is essential . . . Active communication also
 boosts morale for both the Soldier and those left
 at home. (U.S. Army, 2010, p. 60)

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- 9 This caretaking labor at the home front pro-10 vides service members and other military fam-11 ilies with security and morale that the military 12 would find difficult to substitute in other forms. 13 The military family literature shows that com-14 bat deployment is associated with higher stress 15 levels for families (Huebner, Mancini, Wilcox, 16 Grass, & Grass, 2007; Karney & Crown, 2007; 17 RAND Corporation, 2008), yet it has also found 18 that military families are unusually resilient in a 19 variety of ways (Karney & Crown, 2007; Mac-20 Dermid Wadsworth, 2010). This resilience effect 21 must be credited to the great deal of unpaid work 22 and emotion management on the part of spouses 23 whose lives have been linked to the military 24 apparatus.
- 25 Furthermore, the spouse's duality as both 26 military affiliate and civilian provides a crucial, 27 often-overlooked service for the military: that 28 of reintegrating veterans into civilian life and 29 serving as ambassadors for their emotional 30 management throughout the transition. The 31 military's family support and expectation for 32 reciprocity can become a lifelong obligation, 33 even after active duty. GI Bill educational 34 transfers to family members, disability and 35 retirement pensions, and veteran home loans 36 are not freely given; family members are major 37 long-term caregivers of physically disabled and 38 emotionally disturbed veterans (Rosen, Durand, 39 & Martin, 2000). Even in the event of death, the 40 military remains entwined in the family's life. In 41 exchange for survivors' benefits, the widow or 42 widower's marital status is monitored to in order 43 to determine whether he or she will continue 44 to receive full benefits. By being paid not to 45 remarry, the widow/widower's emotion work 46 of bereavement is thus symbolically extended 47 across the life course.
- 48 Very little empirical research has investigated 49 the ways in which the lives of family members 50 are shaped by their connection to the military; 51 our research provides important insight into how 52 those linkages are initially formed. In this article 53 we demonstrate that military service reinstitu-54 tionalizes marriage in a variety of early-career

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stage dimensions of members' lives. Marriage 1 2 envelops spouses into the military from their civilian life, interconnects their fate to that of 3 the service member, and mutually "militarizes" 4 both individuals. We will show how timing 5 and context within the early military career life 6 course determine the occurrence of such linked 7 lives. The 43 life history interview excerpts 8 that follow provide rich insight into relation-9 ship formation in the Army from many per-10 spectives, demonstrating the sheer pervasiveness 11 of opportunities to marry in the military. Our 12 data suggest an institutionalization of nuptial-13 ity that extends well beyond abuses of loopholes 14 in housing policy. Three powerful mechanisms 15 that link the lives of spouses to service members 16 are (a) war zone deployment, (b) the marriage 17 policy as it relates to relocation assignments, 18 19 and (c) overarching Fordist regime-like characteristics of military employment. Together, 20 these structural conditions of the military insti-21 tution function as marriage catalysts, pushing 22 the transition to adulthood early in life for its 23 members. 24

Method

In 2010 and 2011 the first author conducted a 28 study of individuals associated with two U.S. 29 30 Army military installations located in Germany as part of a research project sponsored by the 31 Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Quali-32 tative data from 79 interviews (43 in-depth, 33 semistructured life history interviews and 36 tar-34 35 geted short topical interviews) were collected over a period of 11 months. This data collec-36 37 tion is the first stage in a comparative project that evaluates institutional impacts on U.S. families 38 across a spectrum of four workplace sites where 39 the degree of "total institutionalism" varies from 40 high to low: (a) an international military base, 41 42 (b) a domestic military base, (c) civil service employment, and (d) private sector employment. 43

We use life history interviews for this arti-44 cle (N = 43), which solicited narratives on the 45 full spectrum of the respondents' life events. 46 47 We chose a life history interview approach in order to better understand the meaning people 48 construct about their experiences and their 49 50 relationships. This narrative process provides an opportunity for new meanings to emerge 51 from life events and experiences, generating 52 respondent reflections that might otherwise go 53 54 unspoken and even unrealized (Atkinson, 1998).

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The first author conducted this research as a part-time guest lecturer with a military-affiliated institution that provides educational classes to U.S. active duty soldiers and family members stationed in Europe. Through her contacts at the institution and in the local community, she snowball-sampled respondents associated with two different Army installations in Germany. Germany was chosen as the international study site it hosts the largest proportion of the U.S. military population outside the United States, with 287 military bases (Lutz 2000) and is

9 Germany was chosen as the international study 10 site it hosts the largest proportion of the U.S. 11 military population outside the United States, 12 with 287 military bases (Lutz, 2009) and is 13 considered to be a standard tour of duty for most 14 military families. Both affiliation sites were 15 established in the immediate post-World War II 16 era during the beginning of U.S. occupation in 17 Germany. Although each installation has similar 18 command functions, they differ drastically in 19 size and surroundings. The first site is small, 20 consisting of approximately 15,000 community 21 members, and located in an industrial city. 22 The second site is large, with approximately 23 60,000 community members, and situated in a 24 historic, tourist city. Interviews took place at a 25 location of the respondents' choice outside work 26 hours and lasted from 90 minutes to 3 hours. 27 She used purposive sampling (Patton, 1990) to 28 select a wide range of individuals affected by 29 the military from differing locations within the 30 institution. Institutional review board approval 31 was granted, and we ensured confidentiality and 32 protection of respondent identities. 33

Active duty enlisted soldiers comprised half 34 the sample, with unmarried partners, spouses, 35 and adult children comprising the other half. 36 The first author used an interpretive approach 37 to develop emergent themes (Charmaz, 2006; 38 Glaser & Strauss, 1967) on the ways that enscon-39 cement in a near-total institution differentially 40 affects relationships and other outcomes. She 41 was open to discovering the specific catalysts for 42 marriage from the perspectives of interviewees 43 while remaining attentive to the institutionalized 44 context in which such catalysts were occurring 45 and in which decisions were being made. Going 46 into the field, she began with some sensitizing 47 concepts (or tacit knowledge) based on the liter-48 ature about military families, but the data collec-49 50 tion process was primarily inductive. As themes 51 emerged from interviews, her inquiry became 52 increasingly more focused and she continually 53 adjusted the sampling frame to maximize varia-54 tion (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Although the project focuses on the military's 1 2 impact on individuals and their families, the first half of the interview established a baseline 3 4 comparison to civilian life prior to one's mil-5 itary experience. Thus, interviews began with childhood memories of immediate and extended 6 7 family, neighborhood, schooling, and friendship 8 experiences and moved sequentially over the life 9 course to encompass the individual's major life 10 events, schooling and employment transitions, 11 and relationship histories. The process of going 12 through detailed life experiences from early to 13 present provided opportunities for the respon-14 dents to express key themes of most importance 15 to them and a nuanced context against which 16 to position their current situation and belief 17 system. The breadth of the interviews also 18 allowed for the identification of continuities, as 19 well as inconsistencies and anomalies, in the 20 narratives. As an example, respondents framed 21 marital decisions as purely individual decisions, 22 rooted in the expected descriptions of love and 23 romance. But in later describing the events 24 surrounding the marital decision, their language 25 consistently indicated a notable absence of 26 autonomy.

27 The first author was both an insider and an 28 outsider among participants. Being an Ameri-29 can living abroad in Germany created an instant 30 bond in a way it would not have if the interviews 31 had taken place in the United States. She often 32 knew the person who had referred the respondent 33 to her, which helped create a foundation of some 34 trust. Some of the interviews took place with for-35 mer students in her small, 18-student Introduc-36 tion to Sociology course. Although her position 37 of relative power could have created a distanc-38 ing effect, her out-group civilian status made her 39 less threatening. Some students remarked that 40 they were able to share information with her that 41 they would have felt less comfortable revealing 42 to, say, a higher ranking official in the military. 43 There was also a previous semester's worth of 44 rapport and trust built up with former students, 45 which made for a safer space for communica-46 tion and candid discussion. Outside the inter-47 views, the researcher spent a year in the field 48 working and socializing with a wide variety of 49 military affiliates. This prolonged engagement 50 process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), informed by 51 her career-long study of military social dynam-52 53 ics, provided a strong foundation from which to 54 carry out the study.

1 The average age of the respondents was 2 early to mid-20s. A slight majority of the inter-3 viewees (58%) were men; most were either 4 African American (40%) or White (45%); the 5 third largest ethnic group was Latina/Latino (12%). Of the soldiers, most were enlisted, not 6 7 officers. Enlisted soldiers comprise 80% of the 8 military and do not enter with college degrees 9 like officers do. Most soldiers were relatively junior, meaning that they were in low to middle 10 11 military ranks and had been on active duty for 3 to 4 years. The average age at marriage was 12 13 22. All the soldiers had previous experience in stateside military service, and the life history 14 interviews collected this information. 15

Data coding took place in a series of phases. 16 17 The first author trained a team of five research 18 assistants, and the group met weekly to col-19 laboratively code the interviews using the 20 open source programming software WeftQDA 21 (www.pressure.to/qda/.) The group began by 22 reading through each of the transcripts in an 23 open coding process to group a priori themes 24 into initial conceptual codes. Then we began to 25 dimensionalize (LaRossa, 2012) the codes into 26 specific variables by systematically comparing 27 the frequency and nuances of these themes as 28 we worked sequentially through the interviews, 29 going back frequently to expand or refine the 30 original coding schema. In this axial coding 31 phase, we paid special attention both within and 32 across interviews to repetitions of specific words 33 and phrases, contradictory sentiments, and pat-34 terns related to demographic and life course 35 context. In the final coding phase, we identified 36 interrelated subcategories relating to romantic 37 relationships, both the respondents' own and 38 those around them, and their experiences of 39 military life that affected these relationships.

40 We now provide a brief description of 41 our coding process. Married respondents, for 42 example, had fairly standard and immediate 43 answers when asked why they had married, 44 answering with normative cultural scripts: "I was in love," "She was my best friend," "We 45 were ready," and so on. But when we went 46 47 through their life histories year by year, it 48 became clear that, as with most major life 49 decisions, timing and context were key driv-50 ing factors. Through a constant-comparison 51 process we identified two recurring subthemes 52 of geographic relocation and war deployment 53 that infused narrative descriptions of life events 54 leading up to marital decisions. Although our

original a priori codes included categories for the 1 2 pro-nuptial influence of life course conditions in 3 the military, respondents rarely drew direct associations between the two. But variables embody-4 ing the early transition to adulthood were 5 constantly described, and we began to appre-6 ciate how the two other emerging subthemes 7 were intimately embedded within this institu-8 tional context. Whereas the role of relocation, 9 deployment, and Fordism subthemes were fairly 10 constant without variation across the respon-11 dents' military affiliation, gender, and ethnicity, 12 variation did emerge in relation to the housing 13 benefits subtheme, primarily with regard to 14 sexual orientation. In general, more discordant 15 discourses emerged with regard to the housing 16 benefits theme than the other subthemes. 17

We assessed interrater reliability contin-18 19 uously as we went through the coding and analysis process. There was 60% agreement on 20 the first iteration of coding variables. After reex-21 22 amining data where disagreement was highest, 23 we triangulated and refined the schema, resulting in high levels of agreement of 80% + as24 the coding process matured. We later solicited 25 comments from one of the key respondents on 26 an early draft of this article. This, combined 27 with the use of multiple coders using an inter-28 active constant-comparison process and the first 29 author's cultural immersion in the study envi-30 ronment, ensured accurate data interpretation 31 and extensive analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 32

FINDINGS

In the following sections we present vignettes 36 from our interviews that most clearly illuminate 37 the major themes emerging from our narrative 38 analysis. First, we assess the extent to which 39 housing incentives drive marital behaviors in the 40 military. We then describe two other emergent 41 42 narratives that point to a more structural incorporation of early marriage in the military: (a) war deployment and (b) duty reassignment. Finally, 44 we analyze the recurring themes of the mili-45 tary's social welfare provision that permeate the 46 biographies and narratives of our interviews and 47 provide a backdrop against which the foregoing 48 themes occur.

The Promise of Housing

53 In the existing literature, housing benefits are often invoked to explain early marriage in the 54

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1 military; however, we found that its role in incen-2 tivizing marriage failed to map onto common 3 arguments regarding the financial advantages 4 of such benefits. Instead, it played more of an 5 escape role for our respondents than a finan-6 cial one. Most of the narratives focused on the 7 fact that barracks afford far less privacy than 8 a private residence and that barracks are subject to rules and scrutiny by one's superiors. For 9 10 example, Alex, an outgoing junior reservist mar-11 ried to an active duty spouse, jokingly described 12 his search for a "spouse shield" from the bar-13 racks. For Alex and his wife, getting married 14 was a way to avoid feeling like they were liv-15 ing in a fishbowl: "They're watching you," he 16 observed. "The barracks is a horrible thing to 17 live in. Everybody knows your business. When 18 you have a family, nobody comes and bothers 19 you." Now, 3 years later and expecting a baby, 20 he said that it worked out for the best. "It was 21 supposed to be a contract marriage at first . . . 22 but it turned into a real relationship." His wife, 23 Mary, a soft-spoken 22-year-old who grew up in 24 the military, often raised a sardonic eyebrow at 25 her husband's comments during the interview. 26 On this point, however, she concurred, adding, 27 "Yeah, like Jenelle and Mark. They got to the 28 unit and they didn't know each other, got mar-29 ried, now they're having a kid. A lot of people 30 do that." After describing a barracks money pool 31 among men taking bets on which of the only 32 three women in the barracks would sleep with 33 them first, she added, "Thank God I found my 34 husband and got out of the barracks!"

Later in the interview, however, both Alex
and Mary revealed an earlier impetus for getting
married, which happened well before Mary ever
began living in the German barracks. They had
been dating in the United States for about 8
months, both living in on-base barracks, when
she was transferred to a duty station in Germany:

We had strong feelings for each other . . . we went to the courthouse and got married so he could come back over [to Germany]. Technically, he wouldn't have housing here unless he was a dependent, which now he is.

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49 After a few months of barracks life on a Ger50 man Army base, Mary moved into an apartment
51 once Alex was transferred to join her.

52 Erin, a high-ranking noncommissioned offi-53 cer, was sympathetic to the "barracks escape" 54 theme. Recalling her own experience as a junior-ranked enlistee, she said, "You live in a 1 2 little, you know, 10×15 cell, and you probably 3 have to share a bathroom . . . You don't have your own kitchen" She said that she doesn't 4 5 blame couples, adding, "Like, I can come and, uh, inspect the room, basically whenever I 6 want . . . but if you're married, I can't just 7 come in your house." The incentive to escape 8 the watchful eye of one's superiors and gain 9 10 some modicum of privacy was mentioned often 11 among the interviewees. Outside the military, young couples who wish to escape parental 12 rules leave the house and establish a cohabiting 13 union. In the recent past, however, their options 14 were more similar to Mary's and Alex's,: The 15 only acceptable way they could enter an intimate 16 17 union was to marry. In the military setting, this antiquated expectation continues because of the 18 19 structure of the workforce and the policies it has 20 adopted.

There were alternative views. Many interviewees thought contract marriages were more hype than they were common, as Zack, a mid-level enlistee in his early 30s, explained: 21

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They're too much trouble. Not worth the money. The problem is, there's all the other stuff that goes along with it on the legal stance. Nah. Not for a couple extra hundred bucks... You can get in big trouble if they find out.

31 Zack's commentary indicates that there is 32 substantial onus on the couple to "prove" that 33 they are in a legitimate union. Derek, a veteran 34 contractor, similarly mentioned that, although 35 some people "talk the talk" about contract 36 marriages, they are uncommon. Darryl, another 37 veteran contractor, voiced surprise that anyone 38 could dislike barracks life, saying, "I've never 39 met anybody who done that. I loved the bar-40 racks. The barracks was a blast—we partied the 41 hell out of the barracks!" 42

But not everyone finds the barracks to be such 43 a blast. This context holds less allure for soldiers 44 struggling to maintain their sexual identity in 45 the shadow of the former "Don't Ask Don't 46 Tell" (DADT) policy. Gay and lesbian service 47 members have far more to lose in barracks 48 life and described the extra risk and trouble of 49 a contract marriage as worth it. At one point 50 Arnold, a constantly smiling junior enlistee with 51 a deep Southern accent, showed me a picture of 52 53 his wife, who was still living back in the United States. A few months later I ran into him and a 54

1 friend on post, holding hands; he introduced her 2 to me, with visible discomfort, as his girlfriend. 3 When we met for our interview a few weeks 4 later, he told me he would never cheat on a 5 "real" wife and that, in fact, the woman in the States was a contract wife from his previous 6 7 military posting in Alabama. He explained that 8 his wife, a civilian and good friend, was in a committed lesbian relationship with one of 9 his friends, a female soldier, who in turn was 10 11 involved in a contract marriage with a gay soldier. This arrangement enabled the two women 12 13 to live off post together, and Arnold and the gay 14 soldier each used their extra housing allowance 15 to obtain their own off-base housing, thereby 16 avoiding "superiors coming into your room at 3 17 o'clock in the morning without warning going through your stuff." It provided an altogether 18 different kind of "spouse shield" for the lesbian 19 20 and gay service members whose sexual identi-21 ties might otherwise come under scrutiny. For 22 Arnold, who made sure to describe himself as 23 "straight as an arrow in Cupid's quiver," this 24 marital arrangement enabled him to live at home 25 with his mother and help her out with his share 26 of the housing allowance while also providing 27 medical and dental benefits to his contract wife 28 (who could not legally marry her partner in the 29 military). If this seems complicated, it is. Arnold detailed his effort to keep up such appearances 30 31 on his Facebook and MySpace pages, noting that military oversight was "very strict 32 33 on it-talking to your friends, checking your 34 records."

35 Erik, a mid-level enlisted self-described "loudmouth" who gained his American citizen-36 37 ship during his stint in Afghanistan, described a similar arrangement: "You know that [housing] 38 39 allowance], all of us queers get married for that 40 [laughs]!" While serving his first term in Texas, 41 he married a friend so that they could "live outside, two separate lives." He explained, "I didn't 42 43 want nobody saying 'Erik is gay' and be all up 44 in my business, um, so I needed to move off post 45 and the only way to do that was to get married." 46 For gay individuals under the former DADT 47 policy, the need for a spouse shield took on more 48 urgency, allowing them to avoid institutionally 49 enforced stigma and potential job loss.

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Mobility and Military Families

53 By far the most common marriage scenario 54 described by military affiliates revolved around

a sudden and looming externally imposed dead-1 2 line. Couples suddenly had to decide whether to commit to one another much earlier than antic-3 ipated. Most respondents described making a 4 5 major relationship decision upon receiving news of an upcoming war deployment or, more fre-6 7 quently, an upcoming duty station move. The 8 language describing marital decisions around these events evoked words like "rush," "haste," 9 and "pressing." We divide the narrative themes 10 11 into two sections. The first involves impending 12 war deployment and how couples negotiate this kind of separation. The second involves reloca-13 tion, a permanent change of duty station location 14 that occurs every few years, forcing couples into 15 a stark choice: link their lives together in mar-16 17 riage or permanently separate.

19 Deployment and emotional connection. Mil-20 itary marriages sometimes occur in response 21 to imminent war separation. When a service 22 member is sent to a war zone, anxieties and 23 emotions run high. Committing to marriage 24 is one way to solidify a relationship against 25 hardship, providing the service member with an 26 emotional connection to home. Many soldiers 27 discussed marital decisions as stemming from 28 an emotional need for stability in the face of the 29 unknown. This process is especially heightened 30 in the climate of mixed fear and excitement that 31 surrounds deployment into a war zone. Derek, 32 a 21-year-old mid-level enlistee, got married 33 just before going to Iraq. He said it made the 34 experience easier "knowing you have a reason 35 to come home . . . knowing you have someone 36 waiting on you." Connecting to loved ones 37 while away and anticipating a homecoming and 38 a life together enables service members to better 39 navigate the stresses of war zone deployment. 40 This is an often-overlooked way that the military 41 benefits from incorporating families into ser-42 vice. Echoing Derek's sentiment, Tony reflected 43 on his experience with soldiers in his platoon: 44 "Deployment has a strong effect on soldiers that 45 have never been into that situation." A more 46 senior enlistee who considered himself a mentor 47 to incoming junior soldiers elaborated: 48

These young boys come in, vulnerable, these women kiss them on their neck, say, "I love you," and they're ready to get married ... I know guys that would've met a girl, dated 3–4 weeks and he's about to go down-range and he wants to marry her before he deploys ... It happens a lot.

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Although deployments sometimes trigger hasty marriages, other soldiers described painful separations, which often led to breakups at some point during the 12 to 16 month

4 at some point during the 12- to 16-month 5 deployment. Soldiers called these break-ups "Dear John" letters, although for most these 6 7 days it is an email. But some interviewees made 8 marital engagement decisions during deploy-9 ment, often resulting in proxy marriages over 10 the Internet. Indeed, there exist half a dozen 11 online proxy-by-marriage services advertised 12 on Google that cater specifically to deployed 13 service members, and a scan of the testimonials 14 echoes the sentiments we document here: worry, 15 commitment, connection.

16 Upon notification of deployment, intervie-17 wees described their emotions as running high, 18 making commitment a way to ease the separa-19 tion. "I was a mess thinking about it . . . I wrote 20 him long letters . . . In some ways I loved him 21 even more at that time because, like, I knew he 22 might never come back, you know?" remem-23 bered Carol, a young civilian woman who mar-24 ried her junior enlisted boyfriend before he left 25 for Afghanistan. Although Carol was still mar-26 ried 4 years later and described her husband 27 as her best friend, her anecdote suggests that 28 decisions made during the intensified context 29 of war are sometimes idealized. Some respon-30 dents, however, were openly practical about the 31 decision. Christine, a veteran who married her 32 enlisted boyfriend 2 weeks prior to his Iraq 33 deployment, explained: 34

I wasn't ready to get married, but I knew there
might be the possibility that . . . [leaves sentence
unfinished]. It was the best option to take care
of my daughter and myself. We already owned a
house together. We were practically married, so
might as well put a label on it.

42 The possible deployment death of her partner 43 was the trigger that led Christine to seek official military recognition so that the family would 44 receive support if her husband were to die in 45 46 the line of duty. Survivor's benefits are generally 47 hundreds of thousands of dollars along with a 48 lifetime pension. This is a deliberate policy on the part of the military that seeks to compensate 49 a family's sacrifice, for both the loss of a loved 50 51 one and for their support during deployment. 52 Her husband was delivered home to Christine with traumatic brain injury, whom the Army now 53 54 recognized as his official caregiver spouse:

I was just so grateful he, you know, survived the [improvised explosive device]...he always knew we were back there rooting for him and made it back safely to us...The recovery has been hardest on Michelle (stepdaughter), who just doesn't get why he seems so different now.

Christine's story illustrates the linked lives role of military marriage. The military provides generous paternalistic policies to partners, but only to those who are married. Upon marriage, the transition is swift. Christine's and her daughter's fate became officially bound up in her husband's life course trajectory and his recovery from the traumatic brain injury.

Not only does military policy make marriage accessible, but also its existence signals a family-supportive culture. For most of the narratives, war-related marriage was a way to remain emotionally connected during an impending, high-risk separation. Relationship solidification in the midst of traumatic events is not without precedent in studies of nonmilitary families (Cohan & Cole, 2002). The fact that the anticipated stressful event is combined with an imminent couple separation is likely to lead to a desire to commit, perhaps as way to give the couple strength to get through the deployment. This emotion labor from the home front helps ensure smoother deployments and more rapid postdeployment recovery among the military's labor force.

Although war deployment is surely an inducement to marriage, only a minority of military couples face deployment at this stage in their relationship. Military marriage rates have been high throughout the last 40 years, including during peacetime. Thus, it is important to examine how couples deal with the major defining structural component of military service that distinguishes it from almost any other civilian job: its constant nomadic lifestyle.

43 Relocation and nomadic lifestyle. By far the 44 most pivotal pretext for marriage in the military 45 revealed by the interview data relates to the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) process, which 46 47 occurs every 2 to 3 years. To deal with the globalized nature of U.S. peacekeeping, the military 48 must offer its labor force a way to include fami-49 50 lies in the face of an imposed nomadic lifestyle. 51 The military's solution is to incorporate families in their entirety, and it pays the full reloca-52 53 tion costs for each family member. This policy 54 enables families to stay together while also being

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1 a crucial way for the military to ensure a portable 2 support system for its employees. It is important 3 to note that PCS moves also promote the forma-4 tion of new marriages. Unmarried couples face 5 permanent separation; however, if they marry in 6 anticipation of an upcoming duty change, the 7 spouse is fully integrated into the relocation pro-8 cess. Thus, relationships that would have oth-9 erwise ended or eventually resulted in marriage 10 undergo a premature turning point process.

11 When considering the career cycle of a 12 recruit, transfers occur more frequently over 13 time than either war deployments or barracks 14 assignments. Nowhere in the military marriage 15 literature did we find speculation as to the strong 16 incentive that geographical separation avoidance 17 is likely to play in the lives of military members. 18 Yet this is a major component that is built into 19 today's military service. Military nomadism is 20 a theme that emerged from our very first inter-21 views. Whether married, single, or a dependent, 22 relocation loomed large as an anticipated event 23 in the lives of each of the interviewees. It was 24 described as a distinct turning point in the life 25 course of a romantic relationship when couples 26 were forced to make a decision. Unlike war 27 deployment, when military members usually 28 return, a PCS means that the partner is unlikely 29 to return to that town again. Thus, couples are 30 faced with two diametrically opposed choices: 31 (a) dissolve their relationship or (b) transition 32 into a marital arrangement. For the civilian 33 partner, marriage means being brought along, 34 all expenses paid, to the next duty station. But 35 though the moving expenses are free, there is an 36 implicit expectation on the part of the military. 37 Marriage to a service member means linking 38 your life to the military system and taking 39 on a distinct labor role as a military spouse, 40 while leaving your civilian lifestyle, hometown, 41 family, and, often, career behind. 42

We came to see that although marital deci-43 sions were often framed by the interviewees as 44 a choice, their language consistently indicated 45 a notable absence of autonomy. This was par-46 ticularly true for nonmilitary spouses, whose 47 lives often changed radically upon marriage to a 48 member of the military. Margaret, a new military 49 recruit at the time, had been dating her future 50 51 husband for 7 months when she was ordered to 52 move across the country. She told her boyfriend 53 there was only one way they could stay 54 together:

"We can get married and you can come with me, or um . . . you know." I really left it up to him. He was, like, "Well, I want to be with you." And I was, like, "Well, then, we need to get married . . . And he said, "All right, if that's what it takes."

6 Margaret described the difficulties her hus-7 band faced leaving his home and adjusting to 8 life out West: "It was rough for him." Just a 9 few months after relocating in order to stay 10 together, they became separated anew when she 11 was called out on a series of overseas duties and 12 then deployed to Iraq for 15 months. Although 13 the couple was able to exercise some control 14 by forcing the military to accommodate their decision to marry, it meant that Margaret's hus-16 band was enveloped into the military complex on 17 the military's terms, and they still had no con-18 trol over Margaret's constantly changing assign-19 ments that took her away from their new home. 20 This is a distinctive way in which the linked 21 spousal role is more all encompassing within the 22 military context. 23

Another soldier, Marta, described how she came to marry her husband, also a soldier, who was about to get transferred:

While I was deployed, we had to get married online ... And I'm, like, I don't want to get married ... But at the same time, I know he would be gone by the time I get back if we don't get married, so we had to rush.

33 In this relationship, war separation was not 34 the catalyst for the decision to marry, although 35 it may well have heightened the intensity of 36 the commitment. The ultimate catalyst was the 37 prospect of Marta returning from a war zone 38 to find that her boyfriend has been shipped off 39 to another location. Similarly, Jenna, a veteran, 40 married to avoid a breakup. Describing the cir-41 cumstances under which her first marriage took 42 place at age 18, she prefaced her story with, 43 "Well, it's a little embarrassing," continuing, "I 44 dated him for six months and he was getting sta-45 tioned somewhere else and he was, like, "I want 46 to take you with me," and I was, like, "Naaaah!" 47 But then we just got married on a whim." Five 48 days later, realizing this was "probably the stupi-49 dest thing I'd ever done in my life," Jenna filed 50 for an annulment. Her story highlights the pos-51 sibility that, depending on when in the life of a 52 relationship a transfer occurs, individuals may 53 54 be forced to make premature decisions about the

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relationship's significance. Jenna is now married to a different soldier.

This scenario was common, both among the interviewees themselves and in stories they relayed about their friends in the military. For example, Amy, an enlisted soldier, shared the following:

Yeah, tons of soldiers get married just so they can be with their girlfriend. I kinda did this. I got an assignment to Italy and missed my boyfriend so much that I returned for a few days on leave and married him—just so he could get reassigned to Italy. It worked, but the problem is we didn't get married for the right reasons, and we broke up within a year. Getting married just for convenience is never a good idea.

Margaret, Marta's, and Jenna's stories suggest
that divorce may not be an unexpected outcome
when marriages occur under hurried circumstances. Derek, the veteran contractor we introduced earlier, himself a divorcee, told us, "That's
why the divorce rate is twice as high in the Army
side than the civilian side, because you've got to
get married without really knowing somebody."

Derek's perception of divorce counters evi-27 dence showing that, on average, the divorce rate 28 in the military is no higher than among civilians 29 (Karney & Crown, 2007), but it supports stud-30 ies showing that women soldiers (Adler-Baeder, 31 Pittman, & Taylor, 2006) and combat veter-32 ans have high divorce rates (MacLean & Elder, 33 2007). There is widespread anecdotal specula-34 tion that too many service members are marrying 35 before they are mature enough to choose com-36 patible partners. Derek's comments also suggest 37 that all marriages, whether remarriages or first 38 marriages, are heavily incentivized. Counting on 39 two hands the number of couples he knew who 40 married in order to transfer as a couple, he went 41 on to explain, "You meet someone in the mil-42 itary and it's two years at any given duty sta-43 tion; how [else] are you gonna stay together?" 44 The military's imposed nomadism clearly makes 45 life challenging for individuals who wish to fos-46 ter a long-term, nonmarital relationship. Darryl 47 echoed Derek's opinion, saying, "The only way 48 to do it is 'Let's get married. You can come 49 with me.' . . . Because of the urgency of things 50 and not knowing where we're going, we rush 51 things."

52 Interviewees matter-of-factly described
53 relocation-driven marriages as simply a part of
54 military life. Brenda, the daughter of an officer

who married an enlisted soldier when she was 1 2 just 19, said that all of her military-affiliated family members had married young. When 3 asked why she thought this was, she said, "Well, 4 we all know long distance just doesn't work," 5 indicating that these marriages took place to 6 7 avoid the difficulties of maintaining a relationship from afar. Mary, who earlier discussed 8 her marriage as a way for her boyfriend to join 9 her in Germany, said her civilian friends were 10 surprised by how young she married. When 11 asked more about this she remarked, "I think 12 that's normal . . . it's because we know even-13 tually you have to move on. You don't want 14 to end a relationship with that person, so you 15 have to get married." Although Mary indicated 16 that her early marriage was out of the culturally 17 proscribed life course time frame of civilian 18 society, it was clearly normative in the military 19 environment. 20

Anna, the daughter of military parents (who 21 knew each other for 2 weeks before getting 22 married after notification of a transfer to Europe) 23 was dating an enlisted soldier and agreed, saying 24 she will probably get married sooner than later: 25 "I don't know if I want to get married so soon, 26 but the military forces you to. I hate to say it." 27 Then she went on, "When he moves to his new 28 duty station . . . I can't afford to just pick up 29 and go with him, but the Army will pay for 30 me if I'm married to him." Along with other 31 accounts, Anna's example illustrates the way 32 that the military job held by her boyfriend had 33 a ripple effect into her own linked life. Also, 34 upon marriage, Anna's life would dramatically 35 alter, beginning first with a major relocation. 36 These stories also demonstrate how early ages at 37 marriage in the military correspond to the early 38 life course stage at which a recruit experiences 39 his or her first duty station transfer. 40

Incidentally, the nomadic lifestyle of military service and its impact on relationships is not limited to romantic relationships. Darryl described how couples at least have the option of marriage as a way to buffer the negative effects of constant relocation:

Darryl: [Marriage] is a way to save their relationship . . . because, no matter what [Military Occupational Specialty] or position, it's impossible to have a stable relationship.

Interviewer: So not just intimate relationships? Darryl: Anybody. You have to start all over again. You meet somebody the first day you come. . . . In two years, it's bye-bye. Being in the military is

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like being on an emotional roller coaster. Can you imagine moving every two years?

Even professional and working friendships are constantly cut short by the military's geographical imperative. As one soldier's husband said to me, "Truthfully, I'll be surprised if she stays in touch with you after we transfer. That's just the way she deals with always having to ditch people. She just cuts 'em off."

This aspect of military life was especially 11 prevalent in conversations related to military 12 children. Interviewees lamented and celebrated 13 military children, whom they saw as advantaged 14 because they learn how to deal well with change 15 but disadvantaged in their lack of lifelong friend-16 ships. Thus, romantic relationships are just one 17 type of relationship among many that are threat-18 19 ened by the military's nomadic lifestyle. The consequences of the military lifestyle for such 20 romantic relationships are more visible because 21 there is a deliberate policy that benefits the mil-22 itary apparatus. By design, marital relationships 23 are privileged above all others in the military. 24

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Fordist-Era Employment Conditions

28 Responses to external stimuli, such as deploy-29 ment duty transfer orders, and an incentive to escape public barracks all take place within a 30 31 larger institutional context that has a vested interest in promoting an early transition to adulthood 32 33 and benefiting from the labor of the families that 34 come along with it. Life course theorists document the transition to adulthood across differ-35 ent historical eras, and the military setting is an 36 37 institutional context that mimics the traditional, 38 marriage-oriented Fordist era. The degree of pro-39 vision in place for military families is similar in 40 form and function to the more conservative wel-41 fare states in Europe.

42 Socioeconomic stability is a primary factor 43 that drives marriage rates among civilians. 44 Combined with the structural conditions of 45 military service, its in-kind economic stability 46 fosters an environment in which marriage is 47 extremely common. Few interviewees were 48 unambiguously happy with military service, 49 and some longed for their military affiliation 50 to end. Nevertheless, given often-lackluster 51 civilian employment alternatives, almost every 52 respondent noted economic advancement as a 53 turning point upon becoming affiliated with the 54 service. "Once my mom joined the military,

when I was in middle school, I could see a huge 1 difference," said Anna, recalling her childhood. 2 "I had nice clothes, we had a nice car, lived 3 in military housing It was a huge jump 4 from where I was." Carol, in recounting her rise 5 in living standard upon marrying her soldier 6 7 husband, asked rhetorically, "I mean, what other place is there you can turn to that you can have 8 a steady job, you have a steady paycheck?" 9 Margaret, who was working at K-Mart before 10 enlisting, said about her civilian employment 11 12 opportunities, "This isn't going to work for me. I need better income. So, I went active duty. 13 Now, I can't complain. Money, benefits, it's 14 not bad." For Margaret the advantage was not 15 only a higher income but also job security and 16 17 an array of in-kind benefits absent from the 18 service sector jobs available to someone of her 19 credentials in the civilian labor market: "You're 20 always going to get paid, regardless of whether 21 you're on vacation or not. Up to 30 days of 22 vacation, anytime I want to. Free medical. Free 23 dental. Housing. Steady job." 24

Another major benefit is education and job training. Jamal, a junior enlistee married to a fellow soldier, entered the military with his GED but will exit with his associate's degree. His story shows how the military serves as a safety net that is lacking in civilian society unless one has the income to purchase one: 30

I won't have to pay all the student loans back. I'll be finished with my associate's in occupational technology... And I had my eyes done, my dental work done, school is taken care of. The majority of things that were issues in my life, it took care of that, so I'm good.

Interviewees often compared their current 39 social and economic status favorably to their 40 civilian reference group from high school 41 while also benefiting from what life course 42 theorists call a "knifing off" of negative influ-43 ences. Alex, who said that he was engaged 44 in gang activity at the age of 15, exclaimed, 45 "Oh, yeah, but I showed them; I have every-46 thing!" He went on to explain his success, as 47 measured in consumer items, including his car, 48 "Mostly Army people, if you ever realized, have 49 brand-new cars. Because when you apply for 50 a loan, they know you're in the Army, it's a 51 stable paycheck." Arthur, who had spent time 52 53 in jail prior to joining the military, drew similar comparisons: 54

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I keep in touch with the high school friends that were better off than I was. They all went to college and with the recession have had problems getting a job. I feel really fortunate to be in the military and think that if I was to go back into the real world I would definitely be able to secure a good job.

He also pointed out other, intangible aspects of military life that improved the quality of life for his family, such as cultural exposure and access to leisure activities on base:

It's small and quaint but it has this essence of a rich theater and they do plays similar to Broadway ... It's something good. I'm not sure if I'm using this word out of context, but ... "affluent." Culture. People go there dressed in a nice suit. I took my son to an opera! Can you believe it?

Arthur's commentary captures an important
way in which cultural capital, in addition to
human capital, is transferred in the military setting.

A similar recurring theme in the interviews 23 was how such windows of opportunity altered 24 the way individuals thought about themselves 25 and their future. Alex described a personal 26 metamorphosis: "I became a different person. 27 I started thinking, realizing, appreciating more 28 things in life . . . I went to [Advanced Individual 29 Training] and graduated from that in the upper 30 10 percent of my class." Rico, who grew up in 31 a military family and whose brother is enlisted, 32 described a similar process: "The military has 33 changed my brother's life completely . . . more 34 mature, responsible, settled down, has a family 35 he can actually support now. He's having the 36 life he should be having." 37

In addition to the socioeconomic supports that 38 might encourage marriage and promote mari-39 tal stability, some interviewees discussed aspects 40 of military life that are explicitly designed to 41 support marriage. Anna, whose parents, as men-42 tioned earlier, married after knowing each other 43 for only 2 weeks in order to stay together through 44 a duty station transfer, thinks military marriages 45 have more institutional support than civilian 46 marriages: 47

In the military community there's enough to keep
it going . . . Once a month, there's a marriage
retreat that goes down to Garmish. My parents
have been on it seven times and they don't even
have an issue with their marriage. You have to go
through counseling, but you get free lodging at
the Army resort, get to see the Alps, it's like a

free vacation. Everything—all kinds of stuff . . . Outside the military, you have to pay for that stuff, to go see a counselor . . . The military has a lot of things in place for it.

Such marriage supports are clearly intended to support marriages, once formed, and perhaps also to address perceptions of high divorce rates in the military. Marriage is the norm in the military, which is a natural result of the employment conditions described herein and self-perpetuating in the marriage-normative culture it creates. The pervasiveness of familistic culture in the Army may be best illustrated by the existence of the organization BOSS—"Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers"—that promotes a higher quality of life for unmarried solders.

18 Few individuals attributed economic stabil-19 ity directly to their decision to marry young; 20 however, it emerged as a major undercurrent in 21 each interview. As studies of civilian couples 22 have shown, financial factors are often the pri-23 mary reason deterring the transition to marriage 24 (Smock, Manning, & Porter, 2005). Such socioe-25 conomic benefits of military service are likely 26 what pushes a couple to decide to marry rather 27 than dissolve their relationship when faced with 28 an upcoming move or with deployment pres-29 sures. For example, Rosa, a military spouse mar-30 ried to a midlevel-rank enlistee whose three chil-31 dren and mother-in-law were living in military 32 housing on post, described family and commu-33 nity life on base as a "little time warp." Although 34 she was referring to neighborhood safety and the 35 prevalence of traditional family roles in military 36 communities, we believe this is also an appropri-37 ate characterization of marital trends there. 38

DISCUSSION

It is striking to find a context in which marriage 42 rates bear such an anachronistic resemblance to 43 those of the 1950s era. Our data augment and 44 enrich the small body of research that has exam-45 ined military family formation, much of which 46 has focused on the role of military housing. We 47 have shown that there are much broader factors 48 at play in this process. The military is innately 49 structured to encourage early marriage among its 50 recruits so that it can function efficiently. This 51 is seen most clearly in its provision of a vast 52 safety net and springboard for its members and 53 its formulation of policies specifically intended 54

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1 to make it more convenient to marry than remain 2 single.

3 Although many of our respondents knew peo-4 ple who had married for the purpose of obtaining 5 housing allowances, and even a few claimed to have done it themselves, others suggested it was 6 7 more hype than practice. A few enumerated the 8 disincentives the military puts in place to prevent 9 this from happening widely. One respondent who claimed to have done this revealed later in 10 11 the interview that the more proximate reason she had married was, in fact, an imminent transfer 12 13 of duty station. Although we can only speculate, 14 we wonder whether the rhetoric of contract mar-15 riage may be a way of justifying early marriage 16 to one's peer group. If most junior enlistees agree 17 that barracks life is degrading, claiming one got 18 married to get out of the barracks may be a way 19 to gain respect from peers by showing resistance 20 to military control. Indeed, a common theme in 21 our interviews was the sentiment that service 22 members should unapologetically take advan-23 tage of military policies because the military 24 unapologetically takes advantage of them. It is 25 also notable that most of the concrete examples 26 of contract marriage emerging from the inter-27 views were linked to the DADT policy. If this 28 is a more pressing incentive for lesbian and gay 29 members, it suggests that it may become less of an issue in light of the recent repeal of DADT; 30 31 however, it is unlikely that informal norms in 32 the barracks stigmatizing non-heteronormative 33 behaviors will fade quickly.

34 Our interviews showed that the threat of 35 geographical separation due to deployment and in particular relocation transfers was repeatedly 36 37 tied to early marriage. The impact of these 38 stressful life events on already-formed military 39 families is well known in the military family 40 literature, but our data suggest that these stresses 41 play an even more influential role in the initial 42 family life course. Not only do the forces of 43 war and duty relocation affect military families, 44 but also these conditions often generate the 45 formation of these families in the first place.

46 Although the foregoing themes emerged 47 in our research as proximate causes of mar-48 riage, they operate within an institutional context that depends on families to recruit 49 50 and sustain its labor force. Thus, the fourth 51 theme to emerge from our data acts as a more 52 distal but all-encompassing catalyst of mar-53 riage: Fordist-era-like institutional conditions 54 that promote an early transition to adulthood.

Marriage is prevalent in such a setting because 1 2 it has been deliberately made to be compatible with military life. Would the first three explana-3 tions cause high marriage rates in the absence 4 of these employment features? It is likely they 5 would not. The operation of these factors in 6 7 a setting designed to make an early transition to adulthood accessible to marginalized 8 youth undoubtedly shapes the decision-making 9 process. 10

Whereas in the past military service delayed 11 family formation, its post-1973 personnel policy 12 of linked lives makes it an altogether different 13 kind of turning point that now encourages early 14 role transitions into marriage. How this early 15 transition to adulthood will affect military fami-16 lies in the long term, however, is an open ques-17 tion and one in need of examination. This article 18 19 provides insight into just one cohort embedded within a specific historical time period in the 20 21 military. It is notable that although we observed evidence for a knifing off of negative influences 2.2 23 (often economic), enabling service members to start anew, the narratives also suggest another 24 kind of knifing off: that of marriages. Military 25 mobility policy encourages marriage, but it may 26 promote many marriages among the same indi-27 viduals. Ironically, the mobility demands of mil-28 itary service that lead to marriage are also what 29 may destabilize it. Thus, when military service 30 ends it is unclear whether the emotional bonds 31 formed from hastily made marriages are strong 32 33 enough to last in the absence of the military's all-encompassing family benefit system. This 34 suggests that the military reinstitutionalizes fam-35 ilies, but mainly during the period of service 36 when it relies on familial labor the most. After 37 active duty service, the linked lives of veterans 38 and spouses may become much more tenuous. 39

Given the increasingly rare occurrence of 40 early marriage amid the societal-wide retreat 41 from marriage, a recent article urges researchers 42 to ask "not only why people, especially dis-43 advantaged people, *don't* get married, but also 44 why they do" (Uecker & Stokes, 2008, p. 845). 45 We have asked exactly this about the military 46 population. What is then the "transferability" 47 (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) of our findings to civil-48 ian society? Our findings on deployment draw a 49 50 parallel to the impact of trauma and separation on civilian couples. Because deployment is an 51 exogenous event imposed on many couples at 52 53 once, its influence on nuptial decisions are large enough to measure. But our research raises 54

1 the question of whether less identifiable and 2 heterogeneous forces operate on couples in 3 larger society as well. For example, are couples 4 more likely to become engaged when a loved 5 one dies or when they are undergoing stressful 6 periods of their lives? Indeed, some research 7 has documented increases in marriage following 8 natural disasters (Cohan & Cole, 2002).

As for the influence of mobility on military 9 10 families, it would be interesting to see whether civilian occupations catalyze the marriage pro-11 12 cess in similar ways. Of course, rare is the civil-13 ian firm that requires its employees to relocate 14 every couple of years, and such mobility require-15 ments are even more unusual to impose on 16 entry-level employees. Although many civilian 17 jobs require frequent travel, a defining difference in the military is the trip's duration and thus the 18 19 need to permanently relocate. But a few smaller 20 scale occupations, such as the clergy, foreign 21 service and sales, require frequent relocation, 22 often at substantial geographical distances. Sim-23 ilarly, academic jobs may also force couples into 24 marital commitment, given the scarcity and geo-25 graphical diffusion of the job market. Indeed, 26 preliminary findings from a longitudinal study 27 of economist cohorts show that the major cat-28 alyst for marriage between dating couples is a job offer that requires one member to relocate 29 30 (Murray-Close & Helppie McFall, 2013).

31 But we believe our main application to civil-32 ian trends is one of contrast, not similarity. In 33 the highly individualistic, market-driven policy 34 context of the United States, the transition to adulthood has been very weakly supported by 35 36 the state. As a result, youth are often "ware-37 housed" in particular institutional settings dur-38 ing this transitional period of unemployability. 39 Those with parental resources spend time in 40 the college setting, whereas those with the least 41 resources spend time in the prison setting, which 42 functions as a welfare state of last resort. The 43 military, on the other hand, offers a social safety 44 net that few other settings do, providing a clear 45 and structured pathway to adulthood.

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CONCLUSION

49 Our findings could have a number of policy
50 implications. Within the military, barracks
51 could be reconceptualized to be less dehuman52 izing settings or the military could reconsider
53 "homesteading" policies, which keep military
54 members at duty stations for longer periods of

time. However, these ignore the deeper, under-1 2 lying source of nuptiality in the military. The root of early military marriage is its provision 3 of stable employment, comprehensive fam-4 5 ily benefits, and socioeconomic advancement for working-class youth. By stepping in as a 6 7 springboard during the transition to adulthood 8 in ways that are mutually beneficial to both employee and employer, the military is a crit-9 ical turning point in the life course. Altering 10 such employment conditions of military service 11 would leave few individuals willing to incur the 12 risks and unique hardships of military service. 13 Also, it is unlikely that the military has any 14 interest in curbing early marriage. Despite a few 15 high profile cases of upper ranking individuals 16 advocating for policies against marriage among 17 junior-ranked members (Evans, 1993; Schmitt, 18 1993), the military has much to gain from link-19 ing the lives of spouses to military life early on 20 in the career. Without the support and emotion 21 labor of spouses, the modern day military loses 22 manpower readiness. 23

24 The cumulative-exposure model has shown that conditions during young adulthood can 25 protectively mediate earlier life exposures of 26 disadvantage (Berkman, Ertel, & Glymour, 27 28 2011). Military service offers a path to class mobility in the form of early family formation 29 30 and socioeconomic stability that disadvantaged civilians lack. Indeed, life course researchers 31 have found evidence for a "bridging effect" 32 33 among racial/ethnic minority and economically disadvantaged recruits when they eventually 34 enter the civilian labor market (MacLean & 35 Elder, 2007). An open question is how post-36 37 sequester military rebudgeting and personnel reductions will affect the military's ability to 38 serve as a substitute welfare safety net for a 39 substantial portion of young Americans who 40 otherwise have little recourse. 41

42 The biggest policy implication of our research relates to all families, not just military families. 43 Some policymakers and family advocates have 44 argued that the government should promote 45 marital formation. Indeed, for the past decade, 46 47 the federal government has funded the Healthy Marriage Initiative, spending \$150 million a 48 year (Administration for Children and Families, 49 2013). But on the basis of the military example, 50 51 marriage is widespread in part due to stable, decent-paying jobs and transfers of health care 52 53 and education benefits to family members. 54 Given growing class inequality, precarious

underemployment, and long-term unemploy-1 2 ment, perhaps there are some aspects of the mil-3 itary employment model that could be extended 4 to all U.S. youth. A serious jobs creation pro-5 gram modeled on the legacy of the New Deal's Works Progress Administration that borrows the 6 in-kind educational and social benefits of mili-7 8 tary service is one model. Public works projects, such as infrastructure investment, and signif-9 icant expansion of national service programs, 10 11 like AmeriCorps, VISTA, and so on, are alterna-12 tives to military service as a route to economic 13 security for our youth who lack a college degree. Better understanding the transferability of mil-14 itary employment dynamics to civilian contexts 15 may shed light on how to support more stable 16 transitions to adulthood for American youth. 17

Note

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