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RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS AND FORGIVENESS OF
VICTIMS IN POLAND AND UGANDA

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PHD

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2018

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RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS AND FORGIVENESS OF
VICTIMS IN POLAND AND UGANDA

by

KRYGIER Kamila Anna

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Sciences

Lingnan University

2018

ABSTRACT

Relative Deprivation, Justice Perceptions and Forgiveness of Victims in Poland and Uganda

by

KRYGIER Kamila Anna

Doctor of Philosophy

This study examines the question of how persisting economic and social inequalities between perpetrators and victims affect victims' perceptions of justice and forgiveness in cross-cultural settings by applying the theory of relative deprivation. The hypothesis of this study is that inequalities trigger relative deprivation in victims, which in turn has a direct negative effect on forgiveness as well as an indirect effect via justice perceptions. Relative deprivation is defined as a consequence of a disadvantageous comparison with an outgroup. It includes the cognitive elements of comparing and perceiving the own outcome as less than deserved, as well as the affective components of anger and resentment. The comparison conditions applied in this study are economic status and social acknowledgement.

In order to test the direct effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness, as well as the indirect effect via justice perceptions, vignette experiments were employed. The same causal relationships were tested with a survey to complement the experiment with a real-life setting. The studies were conducted in two culturally and historically diverse post-conflict settings, namely Poland and northern Uganda. To achieve a fuller picture of the similarities and differences between those settings this study made use of qualitative methods, such as open-ended questions and interviews.

The regression analysis revealed consistent negative effects of relative deprivation on justice perceptions. The direct negative effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness are mostly significant but vary across both countries with regard to its different dimensions. As expected, a perception of justice contributes to forgiveness. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, victims experience varying degrees of relative deprivation in all experimental conditions except the one, where they are better off than the perpetrator. The qualitative findings revealed that an improvement of economic conditions is of utmost importance for the justice perceptions of most victims in both countries, as are apologies and remorse for forgiveness.

DECLARATION

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly acknowledged.

SIGNED

(KRYGIER Kamila Anna)

Date: 15.09.2018

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS





RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS AND FORGIVENESS OF
VICTIMS IN POLAND AND UGANDA

by

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Doctor of Philosophy

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IGS	Injustice Gap Scale
IPS	Injustice Perceptions Scale
IPN	Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (Institute of National Remembrance)
KOR	Komitet Obrony Robotników (Workers' Defence Committee)
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-government Organisation
OHCHR	Office of the United High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPZZ	Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (All Poland Alliance Trade Unions)
PIS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
PO	Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PZPR	Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers Party)
SB	Służba Bezpieczeństwa (Security Service)
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TRIM	Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivation scale
UB	Urząd Bezpieczeństwa (Bureau of Public Security)
UN	United Nations
UPDF	Uganda Peoples Defence Forces
WRON	Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego (Military Council of National Salvation)
ZOMO	Zmotoryzowane Odwoły Milicji Obywatelskiej (Motorized Reserves of the Citizen Militia)

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and problem statement

Many countries are faced with the legacy of human rights violations perpetrated during times of conflict or by repressive regimes. When the regime collapses or the conflict ends, the victims and perpetrators have to continue to live together, often side-by-side. For this to be possible in the long run, forgiveness — understood in its most minimal definition as ‘foregoing revenge’ — plays a vital role. Even though not without its controversy, forgiveness has been lauded as the best response to past atrocities (Biggar 2003). It has also been described as a means for achieving national reconciliation (Minow 1998; Tutu and Tutu 2014).

Some victims are able to forgive even crimes described as unforgivable. The desire to let go of anger and hatred can have healing effects on those who succeed in doing so. It has repeatedly been asserted that forgiveness has a beneficial effect on the mental well-being of the forgiving person (American Psychological Association 2006; Exline et al. 2003; Freedman and Enright 1996; Harris et al. 2006; Kira et al. 2009). In many cases, however, and sometimes despite a variety of efforts undertaken by countries to overcome the legacies of the past, victims continue to hold on to their grievances. Apart from the detrimental effect this has on them as individuals, it can also reinforce and exacerbate divisions existing in post-conflict societies, possibly even resulting in renewed conflict if the wounds of the past do not heal. There are various measures that contribute to forgiveness, such as for instance apologies, or remorse shown by the perpetrators. Reparation granted by the state to the victims also contributes to their ability to forgive their perpetrators. (Field and Chhim 2008; David and Choi 2005, 2006, 2009; Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009). But the question is: what are some of the obstacles that restrain the achievement of forgiveness? In the same way as there are factors contributing to forgiveness, there might also be characteristics of the post-conflict setting that impede it. This is the focus of the present study: to find out what the obstacles are that inhibit the process of forgiveness.

Forgiveness is one of the central concerns of transitional justice, as emphasized by leading scholars (Gibson 2012). Transitional justice has been defined as a set of judicial and nonjudicial measures adopted to address “past human rights violations by providing truth, justice, redress, and reconciliation” (Stan and Nedelsky 2013). It can

be also broadly be described as the “pursuit of justice in periods of political flux” (Teitel 2003, 69). Minow (1998, 9) calls justice one of the “two purposes animating societal responses to collective violence”. On the micro-level this is related to individual perception of justice, which some scholars perceive as one of the basic human motivations, possibly with genetic predispositions (Lerner 1980; Wright 1995). But does a perceived lack of justice represent an obstacle to forgiveness? When investigating topics related to individual attitudes and perceptions the conceptual apparatus of the scholarly field of transitional justice proves limited. The few studies which do address these topics, as the ones mentioned above, mostly describe effects and findings without providing explanations based on existing theories. These issues are, on the other hand, very well placed within the field of social psychology, which studies thoughts, feelings or behaviour in social contexts.

While justice and forgiveness are very broad topics the following chapters will outline which aspects of both concepts will be at the centre of this study and why. A major objective is to explore the role of economic and social inequalities in the perception that victims have of justice and forgiveness. Economic concerns have been singled out as particularly important for victims in post-conflict settings; yet it is often neglected by transitional justice scholars and practitioners (Z. Miller 2008; Laplante 2008; Ajetunmobi 2012; Robins 2012a; Gready and Robins 2014). This study endeavours to narrow down those broad statements by focusing on the specific case of post-conflict inequalities between victims and perpetrators. In order to do this the social psychological theory of relative deprivation is applied.

Recognizing that the perspectives of different groups in a post-conflict setting differ, this study adopts a victim-centred approach. As the group affected by the past injustice more than any other, its perspective is regarded as crucial when addressing past human rights violations (van Boven 1993, 2005; Bassiouni 2000). The “UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power” defines victims as *“persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms relating to human rights”* (UN 1985).

The term “victims” is being adopted here instead of the term “survivors”. This may appear controversial due to the more positive connotation of the latter. However, this choice does not imply any value judgment but is mostly guided by practical considerations. Firstly, as pointed out by David (2017), the term “victims” is more specific than the broader term “survivors”. Secondly, most of the studies, as well as international documents such as the UN Declaration on which the present definition is based, use the term “victims”.

1.2 Theoretical relevance

The study of justice and forgiveness after mass human rights violations is an quintessential of transitional justice, the beginning of which is mostly considered to be the Nuremberg trials after WWII (Teitel 2003). Now, many decades later, a vibrant and multidisciplinary scientific field has developed alongside a growing number of practical applications of the diverse measures that constitute transitional justice (Dancy 2010; Hayner 1994; Teitel 2003; Stan and Nedelsky 2013). The most common measures include, but are not limited to, trials, truth commissions, lustration, reparations and various formal and informal reconciliatory approaches. The ambitions or expectations attached to them are often enormous as evidenced by the United Nations description of transitional justice as:

“incorporating the full range of judicial and non-judicial measures to ensure accountability, serve justice, provide remedies to victims, promote healing and reconciliation, establish independent oversight of the security system and restore confidence in the institutions of the State and promote the rule of law” (UN n.d.)

While this definition appears to be all-embracing there are voices within the field who seek to broaden the understanding of transitional justice even further. Some doubt the “transition” element in transitional justice as the field includes the examination of ongoing conflicts or memorialisation (Craigie and McAuliffe 2013). Attempting a more holistic understanding of transitional justice, Weinstein and Fletcher (2002) propose a comprehensive model of “social repair”, which has been described as “do everything, engage everyone” (Gready 2005, 7). Finally, more and more authors emphasize societal inequalities, in particular economic ones, as contributing to the outbreak of conflicts, as well as posing a danger for renewed violence in the post-conflict phase (Laplante 2008; Z. Miller 2008; Gready and Robins 2014; Schmid and

Nolan 2014).

Thus, transitional justice appears to be torn between wanting too much (Waldorf 2012) while others, pointing to its gaps and shortcomings, suggest that it settles for too little, thereby risking failure.

This study does not attempt to add another voice to the debate on what transitional justice should or should not be. The question of what works is always tied to the envisioned goal. The focus on macro-level democratization processes requires studies and assessments that differ from micro-level investigations into attitudes and perceptions. The argument follows those of Minow (1998) and David (2017) stating that the field is too complex to be comprehensively apprehended from the position of one scientific discipline. The perspective applied here recognizes instead that psychological processes involved in dealing with a violent past, such as grappling with perceptions about justice and the role of forgiveness, are complex and resist being forced into specific time periods or circumscribed by a predetermined set of tools. A psychological point of view is difficult to reconcile with an assessment of the effects of transitional justice measures on victims as each measure may carry a different psychological meaning for each individual victim. Similarly, perceptions of justice and willingness to forgive may encompass aspects that reach beyond the scope of the measures and may, therefore, easily go unnoticed. By focusing on the psychological consequences of particular attributes of the post-conflict context, and the potential resulting impact on victims' attitudes, this study contributes an additional perspective to the assessment of transitions. The importance of an evaluation of the common transitional justice measures and their effects on victims cannot be overestimated. However, it is equally vital to keep in mind that post-conflict settings, including a variety of residues from the past, are defined by more than transitional justice measures. This point of view is reflected in some of the criticisms reiterated above; and is also what the present study aims to address.

A victim-centred approach involves a particular challenge. While many empirical studies and reviews speak of "the victims" as a homogenous group, it is not clear to what extent general statements about them are justified, even though macro-level decisions are often claimed to be based on their needs (David and Choi 2005). Many of the leading scholars on transitional justice have focused on reviewing and assessing

the most widespread measures such as trials, truth commissions, lustration or reparations (Hayner 2010, 1994; Minow 1998; David 2011; Elster 2006; Orentlicher 1991; David 2014; Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010). Recently, however, a number of small-scale qualitative studies have appeared criticizing most of these approaches as “elitist” and arguing that many victims, especially in developing countries, have concerns that are different from those attributed to them by transitional justice scholars (Robins 2012a; Millar 2011; Ajetunmobi 2012). In his review of micro-level empirical transitional justice studies David (2017) emphasizes this problem of generalizing across diverse groups of victims.

How can the goal of making more generally applicable statements be reconciled with the justified critique of those who advocate a more bottom-up and localized approach? Above all, more empirical studies across different victim groups are needed. Research on the macro-level has employed wide-ranging international comparisons (Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010). This research, while crucial, does not advance knowledge on the micro-level, which is the focus of this study. Most of the quantitative victim-centred studies, have, by comparison, been predominantly carried out in one country, or historically and culturally similar regions (David and Choi 2006, 2005, 2009; Gibson 2002, 2006; Backer 2010; Nussio, Rettberg, and Ugarriza 2015; Kaminer et al. 2001). As they focused on the specifics of those settings it might be difficult to apply some of the findings to completely different contexts. Other previously-mentioned, small-scale qualitative victim-centred studies did not even aim to produce more general statements.

A few studies that compare diverse cultural groups with regard, for instance, to their willingness to forgive or with regard to their understanding of forgiveness, do exist (Azar and Mullet 2002; Kadiangandu et al. 2007). However, these studies are still very limited. Furthermore, they either do not deal with victims — and are, therefore, not situated within the scope of transitional justice (Kadiangandu et al. 2007). Or, even if they do focus on culturally diverse victim groups, they were carried out within the same post-conflict setting (Azar and Mullet 2002). As a consequence, the wide-ranging applicability might yet again be questioned. The cause of these challenges is understandable, as finding an applicable theoretical framework to study very different victim groups in diverse conflict contexts is problematic.

Here, yet again, the social psychology perspective provides an advantage. The aim of this scientific field is in itself to find general patterns of human attitudes and behaviours. The theories describing these patterns are supposed to be widely applicable, even though cross-cultural research to test many of the theoretical assumptions is still limited. Nevertheless, the discipline of social psychology provides a valuable theoretical framework that has the potential for generating general statements and finding similarities between diverse groups. As such, the assumptions are not based on the particularities of the conflict setting, but rather on theories relevant for all people, victims or not, adapted for the transition context. To put it differently, the application of social psychological theories in the field of transitional justice can provide new answers and help to synthesize the universal with the local.

A few attempts to apply social psychology theories within the context of transitional justice have been undertaken, most notably by Gibson (2009), who made use of the construct of procedural justice to analyse the effectiveness of truth commissions in South Africa. Other studies on perceptions and attitudes towards the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) in former Yugoslavia applied psychological theories as explanations (Ford 2012; Biro et al. 2004a). However, these attempts are still largely limited. Mostly the theories were applied post hoc to explain existing findings instead of being tested in a specifically developed research design. This is the gap the present study aims to address by testing predictions based on the theory of relative deprivation in culturally and historically different post-conflict settings.

Finally, when studying justice perceptions and forgiveness it is not easy to avoid the issue of normative assessments. Ignoring them completely may seem forced and, moreover, raise questions about the significance of these topics, especially since both are complex and often controversial. Often scholars argue for certain measures based on the field they are associated with, such as those attached to legal disciplines advocating for the importance of trials and retribution (Orentlicher 1991). Decisions taken by nations to forego retribution are justified by emphasizing the importance of reconciliation and forgiveness, as was the case in South Africa (Tutu and Tutu 2014).

While much of this normative debate might be better placed within the scope of ethics or philosophy, the question of whether forgiveness in particular is worth pursuing should be, at least briefly, addressed. Psychological studies do offer some insight in

this regard, while the field of transitional justice also contributes debates and opinions on the two issues. While not attempting to resolve any ambiguities with regard to the value of justice and forgiveness, it is nevertheless important to understand them better. Studies that contribute to the advancement of knowledge on what affects perceptions of justice and the forgiveness of victims can provide valuable insights for different scientific fields, such as social psychology or transitional justice. Moreover, findings can help practitioners to make informed decisions during transition processes regardless of the chosen normative perspective. The following section will focus in more detail on the objectives of the present study, outlining the main aspects of the applied theoretical framework.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The question addressed by the present study is which aspects of the post-conflict setting may hinder forgiveness. Moreover, the study aims to assess similarities and differences with regard to the victims' perceptions of justice and their motivation for forgiving in two different cultural and historical conflict settings. Narrowing down the wide spectrum of potential empirical assessments, this study builds on the arguments put forward by those who emphasize the importance of economic inequalities. By applying the social psychological theory of relative deprivation to the post-conflict context, the study endeavours to put those theoretical assumptions to test investigating conditions, which might impact forgiveness and perception of justice. Various effects of relative deprivation have been found in a variety of countries and among different ethnic groups, suggesting its potential pervasiveness.¹ This cross-cultural empirical background makes it a suitable theoretical framework for a study conducted in two culturally different post-conflict settings.

In order to determine equality versus inequality, it is imperative to draw comparisons. There are a multiplicity of possible or available comparisons between different groups, different individuals and over different time periods. From the perspective of victims, however, perpetrators are mostly those who initially created an unequal situation and therefore a comparison with them is likely to be particularly significant. More

¹ See section 2.4.

generally, the whole transition context as such can be interpreted as a struggle for the restoration of balance or equality between victims and perpetrators (David and Choi 2009, 2006). A situation where perpetrators might still be benefiting from the roles they occupied during the conflict or repressive regime, though not universal, is not uncommon. A prominent example of a situation where, despite a much applauded extensive transitional justice process and a change of regime, the former perpetrators are still largely in a better economic situation, is South Africa (Goodman 2017; Leibbrandt, Finn, and Woolard 2012). The fact that many victims actually do compare themselves with former perpetrators when assessing their own conditions has been, reported in qualitative interviews with victims in the Czech Republic (David and Choi 2009).

In order to test the effects of perceived inequalities on victims, resulting from comparisons with perpetrators, the application of the theoretical framework of relative deprivation is proposed. The theory of relative deprivation was first developed by Samuel Stouffer (1949), who observed that the assessment of one's own situation is less dependent on objective criteria and more on the group one chooses to compare oneself with. Later developments of the theory have found not only different applications for the theory, but the theory itself has been refined to establish the criteria which can be used for assessing the existence of relative deprivation. These criteria are the cognitive components of a disadvantageous comparison; a belief that this worse situation is undeserved; and the affective components of anger and resentment (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2014; H. J. Smith et al. 2012).

In this study the negative effects that relative deprivation may have on victims' perceptions of justice and forgiveness are postulated. Relative deprivation is conceptualized as resulting from economic inequalities as well as inequalities regarding social acknowledgement. Both aspects have been suggested by theoreticians and empirically supported to be important for various victim groups (e.g. Gibson 2002; David and Choi 2005, 2009; Robins 2012b; Minow 1998).

The association of relative deprivation and justice perceptions appears to be intuitive. Not only is relative deprivation considered to be within the field of justice related theories (Tyler et al. 1997); the symbol of justice itself is often portrayed as a pair of scales, illustrating the close association of justice with equality or balance. Scales are

an even more apt symbol of the connection between justice, inequality and comparison. One side is always higher or lower only in relation to the other side.

An assumption that victims are likely to assess a disadvantageous comparison between themselves and perpetrators as an injustice appears self-evident. This study, however, goes a step further by suggesting that this assessment of individual injustice has a negative effect on the assessment of justice in the whole post-conflict setting. This postulation is based on theories related to justice heuristics, mental shortcuts applied for justice assessments, particularly in situations of uncertainty (Proudfoot and Lind 2015; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).

The proposed negative effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness is more complex. Various studies suggest diverse negative effects of relative deprivation on attitudes towards the outgroup constituting the comparison target (e.g. Abrams and Grant 2012; Pettigrew et al. 2008). Interestingly, however, the question of how relative deprivation might impact on forgiveness has not been tested as far as could be established for the purpose of this study. Possibly, the reason is that to test such an assumption a specific context is necessary. Comparisons with more privileged groups do not usually happen in a context where forgiveness is likely to play a role. This is different in a post-conflict situation between victims and perpetrators.

The assumption of the present study that relative deprivation might have negative implications for forgiveness in a post-conflict settings is based on the following theoretical claims: Firstly, as mentioned previously, several authors argue that economic inequalities may lead to renewed violence. In the sense in which forgiveness is conceptualized (as the opposite of revenge and, therefore, the opposite of violence) it means that economic inequalities reduce the motivation to forgive. Secondly, the findings of David and Choi (2009) support the assumption that reducing inequality contributes to forgiveness. While relative deprivation cannot simply be equated with inequality, as will be explained in the next chapter, its effects can be presumed to be even more pronounced. Not every inequality results in negative attitudes. On the other hand, and as pointed out above, the claims of negative effects of relative deprivation on outgroup attitudes have received strong empirical support over time. So, even though never directly tested, the assumption of the negative effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness does have theoretical and empirical backing.

Moreover, relative deprivation is assumed to have an indirect effect on forgiveness by exacerbating the perception of injustice. The relationship between justice and forgiveness is controversial. Yet again, there seem to be more theoretical assumptions than empirical studies. Based on limited existing research (e.g. Wenzel and Okimoto 2014; Davis et al. 2015; Karremans and Van Lange 2005) this study assumes positive effects of justice perceptions on forgiveness. However, none of those studies has been conducted in a cross-cultural setting, or with victims of large-scale human rights violations.

To sum up, the above deliberations narrow down the general research question about which conditions of a post-conflict setting are likely to hinder forgiveness of victims. Based on the adopted theoretical framework of relative deprivation, the study focuses on how persisting economic and social inequalities between perpetrators and victims might affect victims' perceptions of justice and forgiveness in different cultural post-conflict settings.

1.4 Research design

The research questions posed above as well as the assumptions regarding the effects of relative deprivation on justice and forgiveness are best addressed with a mixed-method design. A quantitative study is necessary in order to assess effects and impacts of different variables upon each other. To find out if and what, and to what extent, relative deprivation has a bearing on justice perceptions and forgiveness, an explanatory approach with procedures allowing for hypotheses verification is needed. At the same time, when conducting research in two different cultural settings, with the purpose of investigating similarities and differences between justice perceptions and forgiveness, a more exploratory and descriptive approach is needed. The definitions of attitudes, beliefs or values across different cultural groups cannot be taken for granted. The understanding of such complex constructs as justice and forgiveness might differ widely even within one culture, but possibly even more so in different settings.

The design chosen for this research, based on the above considerations, can be categorized, following Creswell's (2013) classification, as convergent parallel mixed method design. The quantitative part consists of a vignette experiment and a survey of victims' perceptions and attitudes. The experimental approach is crucial in establishing causality. The survey links the outcomes to real life conditions of victims,

corroborating the experiment findings with evidence from personal experiences and attitudes towards existing perpetrator groups.

The qualitative part includes open-ended questions and interviews exploring, among others, the perceived preconditions as well as definitions of justice and forgiveness.

The research has been divided into two studies conducted in Poland and Uganda. The choice of these two countries in particular included formal and practical reasons. Firstly, testing how far-reaching the assumed effects of victims' relative deprivation on forgiveness and justice perceptions might be necessitates diverse post-conflict settings. Secondly, this study, which focuses largely on outgroup attitudes such as forgiveness, will not benefit from post-conflict contexts characterized by an ethnic dimension. Ethnic divisions, which are often a pronounced and highly divisive element, may obscure other effects of interest for this study. Consequently, forgiveness and justice perceptions could be predominantly affected by the ethnicity of victims and perpetrators (Biro et al. 2004a; Longman, Pham, and Weinstein 2004). The possibility of this consequence leads to a preference for post-conflict settings which do not have a major ethnic component. Thirdly, post-conflict settings have been selected where the conflict or repressive regime came to an end years before. Relative deprivation might need some time to develop as promises might be made in the wake of transitions but not kept in the long run. Victims' assessments of the post-conflict context often change over time (Backer 2010; Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002). This may affect the existence of relative deprivation. Furthermore, in both Uganda and Poland, the issue of favouring former perpetrators has been a topic of debate. It has been, however, a controversial topic allowing space for variation in points of view and responses. Finally, personal experience of both countries facilitates practical considerations that service better access and a deeper understanding of the contexts.

The present study takes place among vulnerable groups warranting particular ethical considerations. While a specific section is dedicated to this topic it needs to be highlighted at this point that all necessary ethical clearances, from Lingnan University ethical commission as well as from the Ugandan National Council for Science and Technology, have been obtained for the study.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This last section of the introduction presents a very short outline of the organization and main contents of the present study.

The next chapter of the thesis gives a more detailed overview of the main concepts that were briefly introduced above. In dealing with post-conflict victims, this study is broadly situated within the scope of transitional justice research even though it diverges from the more common approaches that focus on widely applied transitional justice measures and their effects. Therefore, the first section provides an outline of the main themes and dilemmas of the field which have led to the adoption of the present approach.

The next sections of this chapter provide more detailed insights into the theoretical concepts and existing studies about the topics of forgiveness, justice and relative deprivation. Each section highlights to what extent studies exist outside the Western cultures. The literature review chapter ends with the exposition of the hypotheses of this study.

The next chapter introduces the settings of Poland and Uganda, providing some background on the conflicts as well as transitional justice measures undertaken in both countries.

The methodology chapter discusses the approach in more detail than it was when introduced above and explains the strategy adopted in this study. Thereafter the sampling method is described followed by the description of the various methodologies employed, namely the vignette experiment, survey methodology and qualitative methods. A separate section identifies some of the common challenges of studies conducted in different cultural settings and explains how they have previously been addressed.

The results section of the thesis consists of three chapters focusing on findings achieved through each of the three methodologies. This is followed by a conclusion chapter, which will also include a section on the limitations of the present study.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The research question introduced in this first chapter focuses on the factors that may hinder forgiveness of victims. More specifically, by applying the theory of relative deprivation, the research addresses the issue of how persistent economic and social inequalities between perpetrators and victims are likely to affect victims' perceptions of justice and forgiveness.

By seeking answers to the question about what affects the attitudes of respondents at an individual level in post-conflict contexts, the focus of the present study requires the adoption of a micro-level victim-centred approach. Questions about the perception of justice and forgiveness in the aftermath of human rights violations situate the present study within the realm of transitional justice. At the same time the studies of attitudes and behaviours in a social setting are the domain of the discipline of social psychology. The literature review will, therefore, begin with a brief overview of victim-centred empirical studies on justice and forgiveness from within the field of transitional justice. This will be followed by an exploration of how social psychology can contribute answers that provide for a better understanding of transition at the micro-level, and emphasising how the two disciplines can complement each other.

Thereafter, the core concepts of the present study: forgiveness, justice perceptions and relative deprivation, are introduced. A summary of the state of relevant current research is given along with definitions of the concepts in the present study and their significance for transitional justice. Each concept is examined with regard to its cross-cultural applicability based on the existing research and theoretical assumptions.

At the end of this chapter the theoretical framework concludes with the specific hypotheses of the present study.

2.1 Transitional justice

The next sections briefly introduce the field of transitional justice, its origin and development as well as some of the criticisms about it. An overview of the studies designed to address some of these criticisms is provided with a particular focus on victim-centred approaches. Then some of the remaining gaps are pointed out, followed by a suggestion as to how the application of theories from the field of social

psychology may help to fill the gaps, thus introducing the theoretical background of the present study.

2.1.1 Overview – development, criticism and empirical studies

The history of humanity is intertwined with histories of large-scale conflicts, wars and regimes. In a globalised world the conflicts involved more and more countries to culminate in two world wars and, in their aftermath, the first undertaking of international justice at the Nuremberg trials. Those trials are frequently referred to as the start of transitional justice (Teitel 2003), though some authors mention much earlier examples of transitional justice cases² (Elster 2004, 2006, 2).

Following the practical application of a variety of measures, which came to be known as transitional justice, the scholarly discipline of the same name developed in recent decades in an attempt to approach the task of dealing with the past from a theoretical and empirical perspective. For some time transitional justice enjoyed a period of approbation on both perspectives among practitioners and scholars alike. On the practical level this resulted in the establishment of the International Criminal Court after several ad-hoc tribunals had been held in the 1990s. The popularity of transitional justice is also reflected in the increase in the number of truth commissions since that time. Before 1990 only a handful countries had established truth commissions. By 2007 33 countries formed some sort of a truth commission (Dancy 2010, 357; Hayner 1994). The scholarly field of transitional justice contributed to the emergence of two journals and an Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice (Stan and Nedelsky 2013), apart from countless books and articles.

With the popularity, however, came the critical voices. The theories and hypotheses of the field were described as “untested or inconclusive” (Duggan 2010). The statements made about transitional justice were criticized as often “faith-based” rather than “fact-based” (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2010). The need for more empirical research has repeatedly been reiterated. However, to gauge whether transitional justice produces any results and if so, whether they are successful, it is necessary to understand what the measures were intended to achieve in the first place (Duggan 2010). This is

² Jon Elster mentions the overthrow of Athenian oligarchs in 411 and 403 B.C.. and the English and French Restorations.

especially so as the goals are diverse and situated on both the macro- and micro-levels of society. On the macro-level, for instance, efforts have been undertaken to compare various worldwide transitional justice measures with regard to their success in achieving political and structural changes such as rule of law, democratization or adherence to human rights principles (Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010). The value of such studies for the field of transitional justice cannot be overestimated. At the same time, however, the findings do not say anything about the perceptions and attitudes on the micro-level. This is the purpose of the present study: to investigate justice perceptions and forgiveness situated at an individual, victim-centred level of analysis.

The macro- and micro-level, while strongly intertwined in cases of mass human rights violations, need to be examined separately. Often, the societal and individual levels have been confused and conflated. For example, positive or “healing” effects on victims have been inferred from measures on the societal level such as truth commissions or trials (Landsman 1996; Chapman and Ball 2001; Minow 2010). This is obviously problematic and can be almost, in some cases, described as an ecological fallacy. The limited efforts to describe the effects of truth commissions or trials on victims are mixed (Hayner 2010) or unambiguously negative (Brouneus 2010). Then again, attempts have been made to compare the “healing” of nations with individual psychological processes of dealing with trauma. The latter is equally problematic and has been contested by psychologists (Hamber 2010). Various measures undertaken on the societal level to address previous atrocities may have healing effects for some and re-traumatizing effects for others (David 2017). Much depends on the meaning of the measures and the interpretation of them by victims. These few examples show the limitations of the conceptual apparatus of transitional justice in addressing questions of attitudes, perceptions or emotions — topics originally situated within the scope of various psychological disciplines.

A number of studies within the field have focused on victims’ perceptions directly. Apart from a number of small-scale qualitative studies (Robins 2012a; Millar 2011), some researchers have undertaken more systematic attempts to assess the perceptions of victims (David and Choi 2006, 2009, 2005; Gibson 2002, 2006; Backer 2010; Field and Chhim 2008; Stover and Weinstein 2004; David 2017). In particular, the new and ground-breaking experimental methodology of vignette studies have provided some valuable insights into victims’ opinions by exploring, for example, how punishment,

compensation or apologies contribute to acceptance of the transitional justice measures or to reducing a desire for retribution of victims (Gibson 2002; David 2011, 2014). The above cited studies advance knowledge about post-conflict victims' perceptions substantially. However, some aspects have yet to be explored.

For example, while some cross-national comparisons at the macro-level do exist (Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010; David 2006), as well as comprehensive descriptions of specific measures such as truth commissions in particular countries (Hayner 2010), micro-level studies on victims' perceptions are mostly conducted in single countries, or regions that share similar historical patterns. Clearly, there are cultural differences; and from a perspective of relativism detailed studies in a specific context are important. On the other hand, there might be some universal aspects that are applicable to very different victim groups. Such insights are not obtainable from localized studies.

Moreover, the victim-centred studies have predominantly focused on the assessment of the effects of transitional justice measures. While it is important to understand what measures victims prefer, most of the studies do not offer satisfactory reasons for the victims' preferences. Some of the interesting explanations provided for the mechanisms behind victims' perceptions remain at a speculative level. For example David and Choi (2009) assumed that the mechanism that explains why certain measures contributed to reducing the retributive desires of victims is the need for equality or balance. In other words, by bringing perpetrators down or victims up a sense of balance, which had disintegrate during the regime or conflict, could be restored. This very interesting assumption was, however, only tested indirectly. Moreover, it was not supported by or linked to any theories, which might have underpinned and explained the connection between retribution and inequality. Gibson (2009) assumed that it is to a great degree the perception of legitimacy that makes truth commissions successful in transforming societies and changing attitudes. This postulation, however, was also not tested, but merely deduced.

In his overview of the existing body of research on effects of various transitional justice measures on victims David (2017) points out that, as briefly mentioned above, those effects differ. Some studies found that truth-telling had a positive effect and in other cases it appears to have had negative implications for victims. Financial compensation can have a meaning beyond economic considerations and punishment

appears to be sometimes associated with forgiveness. These are just a few examples of the various findings of the studies reviewed by David (2017). A measure such as lustration for example, while mainly revelatory, can have retributive or reparatory functions. In other words, the same measure can have different functions or alternatively, different measures can have the same function. Most of the transitional justice literature, however, does not provide a more detailed account of when and why measures have the effects that they do.

While of utmost importance for the field of transitional justice, this perspective, therefore, falls short when it attempts to explain the reasons and patterns behind individual attitudes. The field of transitional justice does not have the necessary theoretical or methodological underpinnings to fully examine or explain concepts such as justice perceptions and forgiveness on an individual level. Without a foundation based on a solid theoretical framework empirical studies in transitional justice may continue to yield contradicting results without being able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for the results. The problem of a limited body of existing theories within this relatively young field has been acknowledged by scholars (Duggan 2010).

Moreover, transitional justice measures adopted in the aftermath of conflicts obviously cannot claim to be the sole source of justice and forgiveness. On the contrary, as a number of recent qualitative studies from a diverse range of developing countries have demonstrated, transitional justice measures might not even be what many victims need and want (Ajetunmobi 2012; Robins 2012a; Millar 2011; Waldman 2007). Advocates of the inclusion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into the scope of transitional justice approaches identify economic inequalities as highly important, yet neglected, and in danger of exacerbating or renewing conflicts (Z. Miller 2008; Laplante 2008; Gready and Robins 2014). The needs of the victims have often been seen as secondary or sacrificed on behalf of the perceived needs of the country (Hamber 2002). This oversight has resulted in victims “feeling let down” by transitional justice processes (Hamber, Nageng, and O’Malley 2000). In other cases the needs of the victims were instrumentalised for policy debates or served as arguments for proponents of different transitional justice approaches (David 2017). Some authors have also argued that including other topics within transitional justice makes the whole process too broad and impractical (Waldorf 2012). Practicality, however, should not be an argument in a process aimed at the restoration of justice and reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict.

2.1.2 Transitional justice and social psychology

In the search for an appropriate theoretical framework to explain and possibly predict victims' attitudes, such as justice perceptions and forgiveness, the field of social psychology offers a wide range of relevant scholarship.

Though the related field of peace and conflict studies has been considerably influenced by social psychology concepts (e.g., Bar-Tal 2011; Kelman 2010), they have only played a limited role in the field of transitional justice, which has in turn been dominated by legal and political perspectives. The literature that has focussed on the psychological aspects of a transition process has in turn mainly been preoccupied with mental health, trauma and the effects of transitional justice measures on the psychological damage suffered by the victims (Brouneus 2010; Hamber 2010; Kaminer et al. 2001).

Recently, there has been greater recognition of the role of social psychology in understanding and assessing transitional justice processes (Bilali and Ross 2012; Biro et al. 2004a; Fletcher and Weinstein 2002; Ford 2011). These contributions illustrate how much of the post-conflict and transition context can be explained and subsequently better understood through the prism of some of the classic theories of social psychology. Bilali and Ross (2012) recount how processes described by the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) shape remembering and the glorification or cleansing of history, and how this in turn can exacerbate conflicts. Drawing on psychological theories Weinstein and Fletcher (2002) explain societal breakdown, showing how neighbours can turn on neighbours. The authors build on their theory of breakdown to develop a model of social repair.

Some authors have attempted to apply theories from the area of social psychology to explain diverging reactions of different groups to transitional justice measures. Ford (2011, pp. 426) applies Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1962) in explaining the negative attitudes of Serbs towards the (ICTY) and their perceptions of it as biased (Biro et al. 2004a). These are examples of how various internal processes such as the need for positive self-perception or a positive perception of one's group can be much more beneficial to victims' attitudes than the rather rational legitimacy evaluations postulated by other transitional justice researchers (Burke-White 2003; Dickinson 2003; Gibson 2009).

The same theories can potentially be used to understand the findings of Gibson (2004) regarding the differences between the ethnic groups in South Africa. He found that truth was linked to reconciliation for white South Africans but not for the black South Africans. Social identity theory postulates that a considerable part of a person's identity stems from group belonging, which constitutes a source of self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Cognitive dissonance theory explains what happens when people are faced with facts that contradict their beliefs (Festinger 1962). Conflicting values or beliefs create a cognitive dissonance, which is an uncomfortable state that needs to be resolved. South Africa's white population can be seen as a group faced with the problem of cognitive dissonance as members of that group. On the one hand there is a need to perceive one's own group in a positive light, as a source of pride. On the other hand, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC — established by the new government after the regime change) revealed facts about the crimes and atrocities committed by the Apartheid regime. In order to resolve its cognitive dissonance the white South Africans as a group is faced with two options. They can deny the facts in order to retain their positive self-image. That would have a negative effect on reconciliation as it would mean that they perceive black South Africans and the TRC as untruthful. Alternatively, if they were to accept the facts they would be obliged to do something to repair their groups' tainted self-image; this would mean distancing themselves from the crimes of the past and embracing reconciliation. Another possibility for some, would be to see themselves as a distinct group of those white South Africans, who engaged in the anti-Apartheid struggle and who would therefore support reconciliation anyway. This group would not have a negative self-image of their sub-group and the facts do not give rise to cognitive dissonance for them. All these possible outcomes would not take place amongst black South Africans as a group for whom the facts only revealed their suffering which did not lead to any uncomfortable psychological states. Even in cases where the revelation of the truth showed that violent acts and human rights abuses were committed by black South Africans the acts could be interpreted as part of a justified struggle. The revelations would not taint the positive self-image of the group of black South Africans as a whole. The truth would, therefore, have no effect on attitudes towards the outgroup and its willingness to reconcile would probably be dependent on other issues.

This alternative explanation is obviously speculative and studies would be needed to see if it can be verified. It does provide, however, an illustrative example to demonstrate the largely neglected potential of social psychology within transitional justice, in particular, taking into account the limited theoretical body of the field. Only by understanding patterns of attitudes and behaviour can it be successfully predicted. The discipline of social psychology can complement transitional justice micro-level studies by offering explanatory potential through existing theories about human interaction.

In an attempt to put the deliberations about the mutually enriching relationship between transitional justice and social psychology into practice this study will draw on both fields in order to develop a number of predictions.

The field of transitional justice provides a number of theoretical assumptions as well as empirical findings regarding economic and social inequalities and the potential effects of those inequalities. Inequality, as described previously, has been the assumed motivation for retributive desires of victims in the study conducted by David and Choi (2009). To put it differently, a re-establishment of equality was suggested by the authors to reduce those desires. Economic inequality has been postulated as a risk factor for renewed violence (Laplante 2008). Financial compensation or economic justice have repeatedly been found to be among the priorities for victims in diverse settings (David and Choi 2005; Gibson 2002; Millar 2011; Robins 2012a; Gready and Robins 2014). Backer (2010), in his longitudinal study of victims in South Africa, linked the significant drop in approval of amnesty for perpetrators over the years to a lack of anticipated improvement in the life conditions of victims. One of the major findings of studies conducted in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was that no direct link has been found between trials and reconciliation, instead the authors emphasized the need to pay more attention to economic and social factors (Stover and Weinstein 2004). While economic factors can be perceived as linked to individual empowerment, another dimension affecting forgiveness and the desire for retribution of victims is social acknowledgment or recognition, which can be perceived as social empowerment (David and Choi 2006, 2009). In his overview of victim-centred transitional justice studies David (2017) concludes that forgiveness does appear to be linked to issues of status and power. And finally, a study on the survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime

found that current socioeconomic status was an important determinant of a desire for revenge (Field and Chhim 2008).

While factors that constitute individual and social empowerment have been found in surveys to be related to forgiveness or retribution, the specific element of inequality was only assumed. The effects of economic and social inequality on forgiveness and justice perceptions have not been empirically tested in a cross-cultural setting to my knowledge.

In order to determine equality or lack thereof, a process of comparison is necessary. If forgiveness is linked, as postulated, to status and power it would be plausible to assume that the group chosen for comparison would be a group that benefitted from its status and power at the expense of victims before the transition, namely the perpetrators. The theory from the field of social psychology, which focuses on the effects of deprivation as result of a comparison with an outgroup, is the theory of relative deprivation. While various negative effects of relative deprivation on outgroup relations have been established in the past³ the effect on forgiveness has not been studied. The scholarship and theoretical assumptions from the field of transitional justice do, however, suggest such a connection. By linking these two fields and testing the effects of relative deprivation on justice perceptions and forgiveness, the present study will contribute to an advancement of knowledge in both fields.

2.2 Relative deprivation and the context of political transition

The previous section reviewed a number of studies and theoretical assumptions which postulate an important role of economic and social inequalities in influencing victims' perceptions from within the field of transitional justice. This section introduces a theory, which deals explicitly with inequality established as a result of comparisons, namely relative deprivation. Much of the empirical research on relative deprivation over the decades has focused on its consequences in terms of attitudes or behaviour. By applying it to the field of transitional justice it might contribute to a better understanding of victims' perceptions providing an explanation and a connection between some aspects of the post-conflict setting and victims' attitudes.

³ See section 2.2.

The concept, origin and definition of relative deprivation are presented followed by an outline of the current state of research, in particular regarding its effects. Having existed for many decades the theory of relative deprivation has attracted not only a considerable amount of empirical research but also some criticism. The major controversies are described as well as ways to overcome the problematic aspects of the concept. Finally, bearing in mind the cross-cultural setting of this research, the question is addressed of whether and to what extent the theory, and its postulated effects, can be extended and applied beyond the scope of Western cultures, where it was originally developed.

2.2.1 Relative deprivation – development, criticism and definition

The origins of the theory of relative deprivation stem from the research of Samuel Stouffer on American Soldiers at the end of WWII (Pettigrew 2015; Stouffer 1949). One of his most puzzling findings was that some groups of soldiers, such as the military police or the African American soldiers in southern camps, were more satisfied with their situation than objectively more privileged groups such as air corpsmen, for whom promotion was much faster; or African American soldiers in northern camps, where racism was less prevalent. Stouffer's explanation of these surprising results became the foundation of one of the most influential theories in social psychology. He reasoned that the soldiers compared themselves with the group immediately available. That means African American soldiers in the south had chosen other African Americans in the region as their reference group and the military police other military police members. Stouffer discovered that rather than relying on objective criteria, satisfaction with one's situation or the sense of deprivation is relative. It depends on the comparison group subjectively chosen as the reference point (Pettigrew 2015). Though various subsequent researchers postulated other than social comparison options, such as temporal comparison with own situation at different points in time (Davies 1962; Walker and Smith 2002), comparisons with internal standards (Helson 1964) or with an imagined more favourable alternative (Folger 1986), much of the social psychological studies regarding relative deprivation focused on comparisons with other people or groups (Tyler et al. 1997, 23; Walker and Smith 2002).

Over time the concept of relative deprivation developed. Specification and details beyond the simple disadvantageous comparisons were added to improve the theory. A crucial development was the distinction between egoistic and fraternal (or alternatively individual and group) relative deprivation first introduced by Runciman (Runciman 1967). Egoistic relative deprivation means feeling disadvantaged as an individual; and fraternal or group relative deprivation describes a situation in which a person feels discriminated or disadvantaged as a member of a group. For example, a person might feel his or her individual salary is unfair compared to the salaries of others, or a woman might feel disadvantaged as a member of her gender group after learning that on average women earn less than men. The two types of relative deprivation have been found to be related to different emotional and behavioural responses. There is some evidence suggesting that people are more likely to recognize group as opposed to individual victimization (Major 1994) and that people are also more likely to engage in political protests or other social movements in the case of fraternal relative deprivation (Pettigrew 2015, 13; Tyler et al. 1997, 27).

However, after a period of time and inconsistent findings, many of which failed to support the explanatory potential of relative deprivation (e.g. Gaskell and Smith 1984; Thompson 1989), the theory has been largely abandoned (Pettigrew 2015). In recent years a new wave of research has addressed some of the shortcomings of the previous studies. For example, the disregard for the distinction between group and individual relative deprivation has been found to be one of the problematic aspects of earlier research (Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002).

Another core part of the relative deprivation construct, which has been frequently overlooked in the past, weakening the effects of this theory, is the affective dimension (H. J. Smith et al. 2012; H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014; Walker and Pettigrew 1984). In some of the earlier studies, for example, respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale with regard to worst vs. best possible life, and then place another group on the same scale. If the ingroup was placed below the outgroup, it was deduced that this was an indicator of relative deprivation. But firstly, people may not necessarily compare themselves with this particular group in real life (H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002). And secondly, even if they might, it does not mean they would feel entitled to what the others have and feel angry and resentful about not having it themselves (Pettigrew 2015). An earlier, but very influential model by Crosby (1976) emphasized these

aspects, even though Crosby's model focused on individual or egoistic relative deprivation instead of group relative deprivation. The preconditions for relative deprivation identified in this model are: wanting something, seeing that someone else has it, lacking it, feeling entitled to it and believing that it is feasible to obtain. In her later studies, she demonstrated that these findings were also relevant on a group level (Crosby 1976).

While anger and resentment have been found to represent a crucial affective dimension, without which the theory is incomplete (Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith et al. 2012; H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014), they are closely linked to the element of entitlement or "deservingness". It is the perception of deserving something or being entitled to it that leads to those negative emotional reactions and not the comparison as such. Various terms, such as deservingness, entitlement, legitimacy or feasibility, have been used by different authors. Since this is an important concept in this theoretical framework of relative deprivation, and consequently for this study, the theoretical differentiations between these terms will be outlined.

Feasibility, which was used by Runciman, who first distinguished between fraternal and egoistic relative deprivation, has been described by some scholars as vague or ambiguous (Olson and Hazlewood 1986, 3). Crosby (1976) used the term "entitlement" in her model of egoistic relative deprivation and described it as the most important element in personal but also group relative deprivation. Finally, Feather (Feather 1999, 22; H. J. Smith 2002) in his book about deservingness, devotes considerable space to the differentiation between some of these terms which, in particular entitlement and deservingness, are often used interchangeably. The details of this comprehensive debate as summarized by Feather would be beyond the scope of this chapter. The key aspect on the conceptual level, and important for the current context, is, according to Feather (1999, pp. 24), the difference between having a right to something based on agreed-upon rules, that might have, for example, a legal status or represent a societal norm, and a kind of moral claim based on actions, conduct or behaviour. The first description refers to entitlement and the second to deservingness or desert. In other words, a person might be entitled to something but not deserve it or deserve something but not be entitled to it.

In order to provide some examples the following situations can be considered: A high-level bank manager might be entitled to his or her salary or bonus based on a contract and the policies of the employer. At the same time the bonuses of various bank managers during the latest financial crisis, which bankrupted many people, are perceived by the majority in the society as highly undeserved. Another example might be people living in extreme poverty who might not be entitled to anything according to the laws of their country, but could be perceived as deserving a better life in a moral sense.

As Feather (1999, pp. 24) points out, the perceptions of various scholars on the relation between entitlement and deservingness differ. Some see deservingness as "a particular instance of entitlement", while others prefer to differentiate between both and see them rather as separate concepts. This study follows Feather's point of view of separating the terms. His understanding of deservingness focuses on action and outcome related situations, meaning that a positively valued action deserves a positively valued outcome. Deservingness, however, can also be understood in the opposite context of negative actions that need to be followed by negative outcomes. The just desert impulse, or perspective, represents a crucial element in the wish for punishment or retribution (Darley and Pittman 2003). In other words, in the same way as people are seen as deserving a reward based on their achievements, work or other virtues they are also seen as deserving punishment for negative actions they are responsible for. This makes deservingness and "un-deservingness" two sides of the same coin. Anger might follow a person's awareness of not having something perceived as deserving, just as it might follow an observation that someone else has something they do not deserve.

While the exact definitions of the concepts of deservingness, entitlement or feasibility vary between different authors, a common denominator is the perception that the actions of a person should be related in some way to the outcomes. This perception is what is commonly subsumed under the term "justice" and it also represents the link to and the reason why relative deprivation should be perceived as one of the justice-related theories. Actions evaluated positively should be followed by positive outcomes in the same way as negative actions "deserve" a negative outcome. If the personal outcome or the outcome of the ingroup is less than what is regarded as being deserved, based on comparisons with others, it leads to a feeling of relative deprivation.

For the current study, the term "deservingness" is the most relevant, even though other terms have also been used in relative deprivation studies in other contexts. The expectations regarding social and economic statuses of victims should be seen as based on moral claims rather than rules and regulations.

The connection between deservingness and moral assessments also contributes to an explanation of the role of emotions within the construct of relative deprivation. Moral outrage, a feeling arising out of a violation of moral beliefs, has been found to affect justice reasoning (Darley and Pittman 2003; Mullen and Skitka 2006; Skitka et al. 2010). More specifically, anger at outcomes that contradict moral convictions has been found to affect justice judgments, while it has been previously believed that it is justice judgments that result in an emotional response (Mullen and Skitka 2006). Relative deprivation is likely to supplement these findings as a construct involving outcome assessments, deservingness (which includes a moral claim), and anger and resentment as affective components. The assumption of the present study is that relative deprivation affects justice perceptions. This assumption can be based, among others, on the outcome of the studies of Mullen and Skitka (2006).

Regarding the specification of these emotional components, anger and resentment have been found particularly fitting since resentment is a more publicly shared feeling as opposed to envy or jealousy. It is, therefore, more suited for potential group action. In addition, angry resentment is also more long-lasting compared to other anger emotions. A temporary, even though intense effect, is less likely to have a long-term impact on attitudes or behaviour (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014).

To sum up, a comprehensive definition presented by recent scholars states that

“relative deprivation [can be defined] as a judgment that one or one’s ingroup is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent, and that this judgment invokes feelings of anger, resentment and entitlement” (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2).

In other words, relative deprivation consists of a comparative element involving a cognitive assessment to determine if the ingroup is disadvantaged and in the conclusion that this disadvantage is undeserved. This, in turn arouses feelings of anger and resentment. As pointed out by various researchers in the field, if either of these elements is missing, the definition of relative deprivation is incomplete (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith et al. 2012).

Addressing the above-mentioned criticism of the weak effect of relative deprivation, a recent meta-analysis has tried to assess the value of the theory focusing on only those studies that have included all the dimensions of relative deprivation as well as differentiating between group and individual phenomena. The meta-analysis found predominantly significant effects of relative deprivation and concluded that, if measured correctly, the theory does have considerable explanatory potential of various social and individual behavioural and attitudinal phenomena (H. J. Smith et al. 2012).

2.2.2 The effects of relative deprivation

After establishing and discussing in detail the core elements and antecedents of relative deprivation the next question is: what are the consequences of the experience of relative deprivation?

Relative deprivation is one of the fundamental concepts at the intersection of sociology, political science and social psychology, and has attracted various waves of research over the years. The importance of most theories in sociology and social psychology is their potential of explanatory power with regard to human behaviour or attitudes. Relative deprivation has drawn the attention of many scholars in the hope that it would predict the trajectory of social protests. Initially, as mentioned above, these promises appeared unfulfilled, which led some scholars to discard the theory as having little explanatory value (Gurney and Tierney 1982). Others argued that the theories apparent failure was due to the fact that many of the studies did not apply the concept correctly (Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002; H. J. Smith et al. 2012).

Relative deprivation still inspires research linking it to a variety of social behaviours such nationalism, separatism and voting behaviour (Abrams and Grant 2012), intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew et al. 2008), grievance formation (Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier 2001), intergroup contact (Koschate, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2012) or even susceptibility to terrorism (Moghaddam 2005), to name a few. With regard to the resultant behaviour, the differentiation between group and individual relative deprivation has been highlighted as crucial (e.g. Ellemers, 2002; Pettigrew, 2015; Smith & Ortiz, 2002; Smith et al., 2012; Taylor, 2001). The behavioural consequences are very different for both types of relative deprivation. Only group relative deprivation has been linked to any kind of collective response; while individual

relative deprivation has been associated with stress, depression or physical health problems (Kawakami and Dion 1995; Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith and Ortiz 2002).

In the main, egoistic or individual relative deprivation is experienced in situations when comparisons are drawn with other members of the ingroup. Conversely, group relative deprivation arises from a comparison between the ingroup and the outgroup. There is, however, another option, which is rather ambiguous in nature and that is an individual comparison with an outgroup member. Some scholars have postulated that in this case individual relative deprivation should shift towards group relative deprivation. The explanation offered for this shift is that the perceived personal disadvantage is interpreted in group terms. For example the discovery of her lower salary by a woman employee as compared with her male colleague (interpersonal comparison between ingroup “women” and outgroup “men” member) should, according to the theory, trigger the interpretation of the situation in group terms. The salary difference is attributed to the group membership (women versus men) rather than explained in individual terms (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). Although this explanation seems intuitively logical, the aspect of ingroup identification should be considered as well. In other words, a woman for whom her female identity is important and therefore salient, would be more inclined to shift from individual relative deprivation to group relative deprivation than a woman who rarely considers herself in gender categories.

Noor et al have suggested that victims, the group relevant to the present study, have strong bonds as a result of their shared experience of previous suffering (Noor et al. 2012). Victimhood, the authors point out, might strengthen ingroup cohesiveness and provide them with some moral and other benefits. When studying the effects of relative deprivation it is, therefore, crucial to establish the type of deprivation under investigation.

One possible consequence of relative deprivation, which has inspired considerable research and is of particular interest in the context of this study, is the issue of attitudes towards the outgroup. While some researchers have discovered that outgroup prejudice arises as result of group relative deprivation (Pettigrew et al. 2008), the results were not always consistent. Other scholars found increased contact or even admiration for the outgroup (Koschate, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2012) and yet another study appeared

to suggest that perceived hostility of the outgroup is the most relevant predictor of outgroup attitudes, while relative deprivation mainly has a moderating effect. The studies, which appeared to show inconsistent or even positive effects of relative deprivation, however, all had a number of problems.

A study conducted in South Africa found that the perceptions of black South Africans towards white Afrikaners were different than those towards English speaking Whites although both outgroups were better off economically. The Afrikaners were seen in more negative light, which the authors have attributed to the perception that Afrikaners bear greater hostility towards the ingroup of the black South African population (Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002). Moreover, measured relative deprivation towards both groups declined between the pre- to post-election periods, while the outgroup attitudes did not change. The conclusion is that it is perceived outgroup hostility rather than relative deprivation that which predicts negative outgroup attitudes.

While the strength of the South African study is its longitudinal design, it did take place over a relatively short and turbulent period of time just before and after South African elections. Meanwhile, the authors themselves acknowledged that the effects of relative deprivation on inter-group attitudes might take a long time, possibly years, to become apparent. It can therefore be argued that the authors prematurely disregarded their own assumption that the time factor might play a role. They point out themselves that in the short time period between the studies (four months) not much would have shifted with regard to socioeconomic factors. That means the reduced experience of relative deprivation can be attributed solely to belief (as the authors acknowledge) and possibly expectations of improvement in future. In the event that these expectations were to be disappointed the outcomes are likely to change.

The present study looks at relative deprivation among victims after a considerable amount of time has passed since the transitions. Moreover, it focuses on attitudes towards a group (the perpetrators), which is not only perceived as hostile due to a generalization based on ethnic membership, but who actually behaved with hostility towards the ingroup of victims. If the conclusions of Duckitt and Mphuthing are true and relative deprivation has no effect apart from the effect of outgroup hostility, then the attitudes towards a group that is hostile should not depend on different levels of

relative deprivation. In other words, there should be no connection between the level of relative deprivation and attitudes toward the hostile outgroup.

The study, which found that relative deprivation led to increased intergroup contact and admiration towards the outgroup was conducted in Germany between the lower status ingroup (East Germans) and the higher status outgroup (West Germans) (Koschate, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2012). This study, however, omitted the crucial affective components of relative deprivation. Purely cognitive relative deprivation has also been found to increase outgroup admiration in the South African study cited above (Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002). The observation that the ingroup's situation is worse than the situation of an outgroup does not have much effect on its own. Indeed, it can even lead to admiration of the successful outgroup. On the contrary, it is the perception that the ingroup's disadvantaged situation coupled with the outgroup's more advantaged situation are undeserved combined with anger and resentment, that really constitutes relative deprivation and leads to negative perceptions about the outgroup.

Initially, after the reunification, the East Germans would not have had much reason to blame the West Germans for their lower status. The status differences were a result of outside political forces combined with chance, depending on which side of the border people ended up after WWII. The lower status of the East Germans compared with the status of West Germans was more likely to have served as an incitement or stimulus. In a different study, investigating the relationship between relative deprivation and prejudice towards ethnic minorities, the attribution of blame for the minorities' difficult situation has been found to be a significant mediator (Pettigrew et al. 2008). It can, therefore, be assumed that the attribution of responsibility by East Germans for their lower economic status would also play a role in their outgroup perceptions. If the West Germans are not seen as responsible the negative outgroup attitudes toward them should reduce.

This shows that firstly, the context needs to be taken into consideration. Who is perceived as responsible for the miserable conditions of the disadvantaged group? Secondly, it is equally important to measure all the components of relative deprivation, the cognitive and the affective ones.

Similar problems can be found in a study conducted in Malawi on the effects of relative deprivation on life satisfaction and happiness (Lokshin and Ravallion 2005). The

authors found negative effects of relative deprivation among slightly more affluent groups only and not among the poorest part of the population. Subsequently, they concluded that the higher income of a comparison group can have positive effects on the poor in terms of social support, which trumps the negative implications of relative deprivation. However, relative deprivation was again only inferred from the difference between own economic status and the economic status of friends and neighbours. The highly crucial element of "un-deservingness", as well as its affective component, had been omitted. Obviously, friends and neighbours, especially those willing to help and support their less well-off peers, might not be perceived as undeserving of their lot, or engender anger and resentment.

The groups considered in the context of the present research are quite different. Not only is it reasonable to assume that perpetrators, who enjoy high economic and social status would be perceived as undeserving by the victims. In this context they are most likely to be blamed for the disadvantageous situation of the victim ingroup. Why victims might choose the former perpetrators as a comparison group and why and how the outcome of this comparison would affect their justice estimation of the whole post-conflict setting will be outlined in the following section dealing with justice⁴.

Mostly, the studies presented above suggest negative outgroup attitudes as a result of relative deprivation. In a post-conflict context, however, some negative attitudes might very likely already be present, taking into consideration the recent violence of the past. The question in the aftermath of the atrocities is rather — to what extent are the victims ready or willing to overcome their negative attitudes? Or, to put it differently, how willing are they to forgive and what might affect their willingness to forgive?

As already stated, the connection between relative deprivation and forgiveness has not been studied to date. The reason is probably that such a question would only become relevant in a very particular setting. Such a setting would not only include social or economic inequalities but also at least two groups, of which one has committed transgressions that can or cannot be forgiven by the other group. This is exactly the situation of some societies in transition, where perpetrators might continue to benefit from their previous positions in the higher ranks of society. It is reasonable to assume

⁴ See section 2.4.1

that if relative deprivation results in negative outgroup attitudes under less extreme circumstances, in the post-conflict context it would have detrimental effects on forgiveness, which effectively means an improvement of outgroup attitudes.

To sum up, among other effects relative deprivation, and in particular group relative deprivation, has been found to be related to collective forms of action, especially in the case of a strong identification with the ingroup (Ellemers 2002; Kawakami and Dion 1995). Relative deprivation has more specifically been found to have an effect on negative attitudes and prejudices towards the outgroup (Pettigrew et al. 2008). The logical extension of this reasoning applied in a post-conflict setting would be that relative deprivation is not likely to contribute to an improvement of inter-group relations or, in other words, to the forgiveness of victims towards former perpetrators. While not all findings have been consistent, some negating any effects of relative deprivation or even suggesting positive attitudes towards the outgroup as a result, a closer inspection of those studies shows that in many cases relative deprivation has not been measured correctly.

2.2.3 Relative deprivation and culture

An aspect that needs to be addressed in a cross-cultural study like the present one is to what extent the constructs explored can be generalized. Many sociological and psychological concepts have been developed in Western cultural settings and it is a continuous debate as to what extent they can be assumed to exist in other cultures. This section will, therefore, briefly review the cross-cultural studies conducted on the topic of relative deprivation to find out to what extent the concept is universally applicable across different cultures.

The introduction to a recent publication focusing solely on relative deprivation mentions that studies relating to the application of this construct have been conducted in over 30 countries, including such diverse cultural settings and groups as the Dutch, Maoris, Mongolians or Canadians (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015).

In a cross-cultural study conducted in the Netherlands and Singapore and examining how individualistic and collectivistic mindsets affect relative deprivation effects, some differences have been discovered but more with regard to the degree of reactions than to the quality. The experimental study manipulated individualistic and collectivistic

conditions in both countries by priming the respective mindsets. The findings showed that in individualistic conditions participants respond more negatively to being deprived as individuals, while in the collectivistic condition there was not much difference between the effects of individual and group deprivation. More importantly, they also found that cultural mindsets are fluid and depend on contexts, salience and priming, even though divergent inclinations exist in different settings (Bos, Veldhuizen, and Au 2015).

Negative attitudes towards an outgroup as an effect of relative deprivation, described previously in studies conducted in Western cultures (e.g. Pettigrew et al. 2008), have also been demonstrated among the Maori ethnic group in New Zealand (Osborne and Sibley 2015). A cross-cultural study on temporal relative deprivation and its effects on well-being conducted in Mongolia and South Africa found very similar results in both groups further contributing to the assumed generalizability of relative deprivation as a concept (de la Sablonnière et al. 2015).

Of course, the quantity of research on relative deprivation in non-Western countries is still limited. Nevertheless, drawing on the examples presented above from a variety of cultural groups in different parts of the world allows for the assumption that relative deprivation is a phenomenon that can be perceived as having universal applicability. It is less clear, however, if the effects of relative deprivation differ. Some studies point to similar effects, while others describe some differences in the implications of relative deprivation across cultures.

While not negating cultural differences, this study assumes that the identity and experiences of being a victim will be more salient accentuating the similarities rather than the cultural differences between the two participant groups.

2.3 Forgiveness

The topic of forgiveness gained prominence in the field of transitional justice in particular in the context of truth commissions and forward-looking measures, which focused on reconciliation, as opposed to backward-looking retribution and punishment. Though not without controversy, which will be described later in this chapter, forgiveness has been stressed by many as vital for peace and reconciliation after brutal conflicts or regimes (Minow 1998; Cairns et al. 2005). Political forgiveness —also described as “knowing forgetting”, which means remembering the past without being

defined by it — has been singled out as probably the best response to past atrocities (Biggar 2003). Archbishop Tutu, the head of the South African TRC, even goes as far as to say that forgiveness is the only way to achieve personal healing and end the cycle of violence (Tutu and Tutu 2014).

On an individual level, forgiveness has been the subject of study in particular in the area of psychology. Advocates of forgiveness have highlighted its benefits for mental health and psychological well-being (American Psychological Association 2006; Exline et al. 2003; Freedman and Enright 1996; Harris et al. 2006; Kira et al. 2009). The value of forgiveness is so highly esteemed that this has resulted in the development of forgiveness training or forgiveness therapy (Freedman and Enright 1996; Reed and Enright 2006). In the field of transitional justice a number of studies and surveys have focused on the question of whether and how some of the implemented measures have influenced the willingness of victims to forgive (Cárdenas et al. 2015; David and Choi 2009, 2006; OHCHR 2007; Samii 2013).

However, as important as some consider forgiveness to be in the aftermath of violence, it is a complex construct and not without controversy. Some authors question the potential benefits of forgiving “murderers and torturers” (Saunders 2011), while others stress the dangers of unconditional forgiveness in encouraging perpetrators, thus weakening the position of the victims and contributing to denial and complacency (Griswold 2007).

This section begins by first describing the efforts and challenges of defining forgiveness. It explains how these complexities can be addressed. Before giving the definitions, some differentiations between concepts will be explained in order to clarify the type of forgiveness that applies to this study. One of these differentiations is the psychological differentiation between “state” forgiveness and “trait” forgiveness, which is important for the present context and has implications for the type of effects that are investigated in the study. Another differentiation is between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness. The context of mass human rights violations with many victims as well as perpetrators has certain characteristics that need to be considered and which differ from the characteristics of the cases of individual singular transgressions.

In addition, a few factors that may play a role in the context of the present study and which may impact on forgiveness are described. One of these factors is the question of religiosity and another is the issue of what forgiveness means in different cultures.

The underlying assumption of this study is that victims' forgiveness is a goal worth achieving in a post-conflict society. If not, why study it at all? This cannot be simply stated without addressing one of the controversies of the field, namely, whether forgiveness is actually positive and empowering or whether it has the effect of weakening and demeaning the victims. The various arguments of advocates and critics on the question of forgiveness are described, and followed with a presentation of the position adopted about these questions in the present study.

The final part of the section presents a recent theoretical approach that endeavours to synthesize the various empirical studies and elements constituting forgiveness into a coherent framework. The purpose is to address the question of when and under what conditions people do forgive. This typology of forgiveness is based on a meta-analysis of over a hundred empirical studies. It presents a valuable framework for understanding the similarities and differences in the concepts of forgiveness, in particular in the context of a cross-cultural study, such as this one.

2.3.1 Conceptualization of forgiveness

In this section, challenges that relate to the definition of forgiveness are outlined and different types of forgiveness are explained.

The section concludes with the definition that applies to the present study.

Definition and differentiation from other similar concepts

There are a number of terms and concepts that are related to forgiveness or frequently even confused with it. Most authors, therefore, begin defining forgiveness by pointing out what it is not. It is not defined as excusing, pardoning, condoning, forgetting or restoring trust (Exline et al. 2003, 339). Forgiveness is also often distinguished from reconciliation. Both are perceived to be closely related, though the nature of the link is vague. Some authors perceive reconciliation as being a step further than forgiveness, implying the rebuilding of broken relationships (Exline et al. 2003, 341; Freedman and Enright 1996, 983; Kira et al. 2009, 388). Other scholars, conversely, see forgiveness as the outcome of a reconciliation process (Bar-Tal and Cehajic-Clancy 2014, 132).

This close relationship of forgiveness and reconciliation, the latter being commonly understood as rebuilding a trusting relationship, has caused the most criticism, especially with regard to forgiveness. Forgiveness understood in this way has been described as unhealthy and potentially dangerous for victims in cases of serious transgressions (Freedman and Enright 1996, 983). Similarly, some researchers stress the abandonment of negative feelings, including avoidance, and an increase in positive feelings towards the perpetrator as crucial elements of forgiveness (McCullough 2001, 194). One example of this notion of forgiveness is the following:

“[...] willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly hurt us, while fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love towards him or her.” (Enright, Freedman, and Rique 1998, 46–47).

One commonly used measurement tool, the “Psychological Profile of Forgiveness Scale”, does apply this definition by operationalising forgiveness as an absence of negative and existence of positive emotions, judgements and behaviours (Freedman and Enright 1996, 984).

Such a definition, however, is at the core of the controversy and raises some substantial questions. Does forgiveness really have to mean that the offended party develops positive feeling towards the perpetrator? Studies show that even though avoidance and revenge motivation towards transgressors reduces overtime, increased benevolence is not the typical pattern (McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003). The question of whether forgiveness goes beyond a reduction of negative attitudes is still unresolved among scholars (Exline et al. 2003, 339). In the context of transition after mass human rights violations, with crimes often described as “unforgivable”, the development of positive emotions towards perpetrators may appear particularly questionable if applied as a standard definition. Additionally, it might add to the confusion between the terms of forgiveness and reconciliation.

Another definition proposed by McCullough and colleagues describes forgiveness as an “intraindividual, prosocial change toward a perceived transgressor that is set within a specific interpersonal context” (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005, 396). This definition is more general and does not necessarily imply compassion or generosity towards the perpetrator.

Meanwhile, even though theorists might agree to draw a line between the above-mentioned terms such as condoning, forgetting, pardon and forgiveness, their meaning is frequently blurred and confused with everyday usage of the word. In other words, the definition that various scholars use is likely to be different from the common language meaning of the term (Exline et al. 2003, 340; Saunders 2011, 121).

Yet another question in defining forgiveness is concerned with its nature. Is forgiveness a conscious decision taken by the offended party, or is it a feeling (Saunders 2011, 121)? Some scholars, acknowledging this difference, recently tried to separate these aspects of forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012)⁵. But this leads back to the challenge mentioned above. The scientific and lay definitions might differ considerably. Simply asking directly about forgiveness might not yield reliable and valid outcomes. Obviously a definition of forgiveness as forswearing revenge is drastically different from forgiveness leading to the restoration of a friendly relationship. In measuring forgiveness as a variable or an outcome it should, therefore, be clearly established that what is actually measured has the same meaning for the people answering the questions.

This complexity of the concept has resulted in some difficulties in the limited research on the topic in post-conflict contexts. In some studies single item responses were used (David and Choi 2009, 2006). The problems with this approach have been outlined above. Gibson (2004) uses the concept of reconciliation instead of forgiveness. While he does use a scale, it has been developed for the purpose of his study and the items appear to cover issues related to social distance and prejudices rather than forgiveness. It is also questionable if the opposite of racial stereotyping automatically constitutes respect, which he implies as being the basis for reconciliation. In any case, his study can be only remotely considered as related to forgiveness. A different approach was chosen in a study on survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime. The authors used a shortened version of an established scale but decided to focus solely on the element of revenge (Field and Chhim 2008).

⁵ In an attempt to grasp the concept of forgiveness in a more comprehensive way, Worthington et al (2012) differentiated between decisional and emotional forgiveness. One is understood as the cognitive resolve to behave in a less negative way towards the offender. Emotional forgiveness is associated with the development of positive emotional attitudes to replace the negative ones. The authors found that the measures of both types of forgiveness are psychometrically related but distinct.

To sum up, forgiveness, even though pronounced to be important within the field of transitional justice and widely debated by supporters and opponents has, nevertheless, has rarely been empirically studied by transitional justice scholars. Additional in-depth perspectives in terms of understanding and definitions are offered by the field of psychology, demonstrating yet again the value of interdisciplinary approaches. Before proceeding to the question of definition as applied in the present study there are some additional characteristics that need to be considered when defining forgiveness.

Forgiveness as a trait and as a state

The distinction between “states” and “traits” in psychology has a long research history; a detailed overview is beyond the scope of this chapter. This paragraph describes the distinction briefly, and only insofar as it refers to the subject of forgiveness. In psychology “traits” are understood as the characteristics or attributes of an individual that are fairly stable over time and less responsive to situational factors. The term “states” applies to psychological variables that are understood as context depended. Forgiveness can be both.

Forgiveness as a state means the act of forgiveness in the situation of a specific transgression. This has been the initial focus of forgiveness research and has resulted in developing a number of scales with which to measure the readiness to forgive particular transgressions;⁶ or to assess context factors that might facilitate or inhibit forgiveness. The act of forgiveness has been described as a motivational change towards the offender; and has been linked to empathy (McCullough, Worthington Jr., and Rachal 1997) and various situational factors such as perceived intent, apologies or cancellation of negative consequences (Girard and Mullet 2012). In short, research on forgiveness as a state attempts to determine the contextual prerequisites before, of and after the transgression that contribute to forgiveness.

After their initial focus on studying the act of forgiveness in specific cases, the interest of researchers turned to forgiveness as a trait. Forgiveness as a trait is the general tendency of forgiving across different situations, times and contexts. It has been named

⁶ Some common scales to measure forgiveness as a state include Transgressions-Related Interpersonal Motivation Scale (TRIM) (McCullough, Root, and Cohen 2006) or the Enright Forgiveness Inventory (Subkoviak et al. 1995).

“forgivingness”. The term was first introduced by Roberts (1995) but has subsequently been picked up by other scholars, who have proceeded to develop scales to measure this personal disposition. There seems to be no connection with gender but a positive link with religious activity, whereby people who are more religiously active are also more forgiving (Berry et al. 2001). There are also indications that a higher education level might contribute to a higher self-declared willingness to forgive (Azar and Mullet 2002, 20). Measuring forgiveness as a trait, however, has some challenges. For example, as has been pointed out, there is a difference between self-declared attitudes towards forgiveness and an actual willingness to forgive (DeShea 2003). In other words, people might have a positive attitude towards forgiveness and value it as a virtue but that does not necessarily mean that they are always more willing to forgive transgressions themselves. Even though a positive link might be assumed between attitude and the act of forgiveness, they are not exactly the same.

While the distinction between trait and state forgiveness might seem rather technical, it is important to point it out in order to specify what type of forgiveness is at the centre of this study. In the context of transitional justice the focus on forgiveness as a “state” is more pertinent. The issue as far as the present study is concerned, is not about personal characteristics of participants — more applicable in the field of personality psychology — but rather what contextual factors might influence forgiveness amongst different individuals, and across different experiences and even cultural settings. This differentiation is also crucial in the choice of the appropriate tool as questionnaires measuring traits and states obviously differ.

Interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness

Another differentiation, which requires a brief clarification is between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness. In everyday circumstances, forgiveness is associated with interpersonal forgiveness: e.g., when one person commits a transgression that harms another the aggrieved is left with the choice of either to forgive or deny forgiveness. In the context of transitional justice, however, interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness are often difficult to separate. Though one victim can forgive one or several individual perpetrators, which would be related to interpersonal forgiveness, still the victim is one among many and the perpetrator is a member of a group and has probably committed transgressions against many others. While the internal decision to forgive

can still be individual, any public act of forgiveness by one victim does, to a certain extent, involve or affect the whole group and can, therefore, easily become political. Questions of the "right to forgive" come up, where many others have been harmed. While the present study focuses on the individual attitudes of the victims, these attitudes are directed towards a group, the group of perpetrators. This situation cannot simply be equated with an ordinary interpersonal forgiveness scenario. It can be argued that in a transitional context it is difficult, if not impossible, to perceive forgiveness as a purely individual act and it is plausible to presume that victims are aware of and affected by it.

A crucial aspect appears to be the motivation to forgive. Research suggests that in interpersonal situations, victims may have a higher motivation to forgive and experience the benefits of releasing their negative emotions (McCullough, Worthington Jr., and Rachal 1997; Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot 2015). Consequently, the implications of forgiveness and un-forgiveness in close relationships differ from those that arise from a context of violent conflict. In intergroup settings, the cohesiveness of the victim group may provide greater benefits for the group members than the benefits derived from letting go of the negative emotions by forgiving (Noor et al. 2012). On the other hand, other scholars have also argued that un-forgiveness in situations of mass human rights violations may be psychologically challenging and result in suffering as it affects large portions of society and has implications for future co-existence that may undermine solidarity or societal support (Kira et al. 2009). Furthermore, in some group contexts victims may feel socially pressurized to forgive (Govier 2002, 93). This pressure might even be more pronounced in particular cultural settings with stricter or more collectivist norms.

As previously mentioned, the approach that has been adopted for the present study relates to the forgiveness of individuals who were victims and as such participated in the research. Intergroup forgiveness is a different field and not an issue that needs to be addressed here in detail. Nevertheless, the transgressions to which the study relates occurred in an intergroup context. They affected many victims and were committed by many perpetrators. The possible effects of on the social environment cannot be completely ignored when it comes to post-conflict settings, especially in the case of a cross-cultural study. Despite all these differences, the scholarship on forgiveness suggests that un-forgiveness in interpersonal situations as well as in post-conflict

settings, where victims and perpetrators have to continue to live side-by-side, both carry high psychological costs for those not able to forgive.

Definition of forgiveness in the present study

To sum up, forgiveness may be perceived as abandoning negative attitudes towards the transgressor or, in addition, as developing positive feelings. Forgiveness can also be measured as a personal disposition or as a function of situational factors. It can be interpersonal or occur between groups of people.

As previously highlighted the type of forgiveness applied in the present study is interpersonal “state” forgiveness, in other words, an individual act that is dependable on context and not personal characteristics. The situational factors affecting forgiveness are a subject of this study. A recent meta-analysis has shown that the situational aspects appear to account for greater variance in forgiveness than the individual disposition (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010). Nevertheless, some individual factors, which might affect forgiveness such as religiosity or cultural aspects, will also be considered. These topics are addressed in the following sections.

The definition applied for the present study is the more general understanding of an “intraindividual prosocial change towards a transgressor” (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005, 396). While it implies a reduction in negative attitudes, this definition does not include the development of positive feelings. To put it differently, this form of forgiveness is defined by an abandoning of revenge or avoidance motivations. Such a definition may raise two difficulties. It is likely to be perceived as too minimal and, therefore, it may be open to criticism as to whether it constitutes forgiveness at all.

Albeit considered to be minimal, this definition has been chosen for a reason. While in many cases of common or “everyday” transgressions the development of positive feelings towards a transgressor might be quite realistic, suggesting this to victims of human rights violations or crimes against humanity may be perceived as inappropriate. Forgiveness in post-conflict settings is a highly sensitive topic and the very mention of the term might be difficult for some victims (Cairns et al. 2005). It should, therefore, be approached without the risk of including additional controversy. This is not to say that there is no one capable of this kind of forgiveness. Nevertheless, it is not something that can be expected from, and therefore suggested to, the majority of victims without any difficulty. Even in interpersonal transgressions the development

of benevolence has been found to be atypical rather than the usual pattern (McCullough, Fincham, and Tsang 2003). It can also be questioned if benevolence is really necessary. While it might be healing, empowering or a relief for many victims to experience a more pronounced or deeper form of forgiveness, this is probably not the case for all and, moreover, not a topic to be addressed within the scope of transitional justice but more appropriately within psychology. For society as a whole, if victims are able to abandon their revenge or avoidance motivation towards the former perpetrators this may be perceived as sufficient. Suggesting that this is not enough might put pressure on victims and turn out to be damaging and counterproductive for individuals or the society as a whole. Finally, an operationalisation of forgiveness as the opposite of revenge and avoidance motivation is more straightforward and the resulting items might carry fewer ambiguities. This is particularly important in a cross-cultural setting where forgiveness could possibly be understood differently.

The second issue, as to whether the absence of revenge and avoidance really constitute forgiveness is more complex. While such an interpretation of forgiveness might be debated by some there is, however, not one universal definition of forgiveness allowing for diverse interpretations of the concept, some broader and some more specific. Moreover, the definition of forgiveness that describes what it is not is common. Finally, the definition of forgiveness as the absence of revenge and avoidance motivation has been applied in one of the most widely used scales measuring forgiveness, the Transgression Related Interpersonal Inventory (TRIM-12) (McCullough et al. 1998)⁷. Nevertheless, this study does not fully rely on this definition by including an additional item that asks about forgiveness directly. This will answer the question if forgiveness, as understood by the participants, is related to revenge and avoidance motivation or not. And finally, in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture, the victims will have the opportunity to include their own understanding of forgiveness.

⁷ There is a TRIM-18 version, which includes benevolence items additionally to those measuring revenge and avoidance, but the TRIM-12 is also commonly used.

In other words, while a specific definition is necessary for operationalisation and measurement this study acknowledges its limitations. The mixed-method approach counterbalances these limitations by allowing for a more explorative approach and an inclusion of the victims' own point of view.

2.3.2 Forgiveness in context – culture and religion

Obviously, there are many factors — both, individual or social — which might influence forgiveness. This section focuses on two factors that are particularly relevant for the present study, namely culture and religion.

Forgiveness and Culture

If people in different cultural contexts speak about forgiveness, do they essentially mean something similar? Despite a widespread and interdisciplinary interest in the topic of forgiveness, there is little empirical cross-cultural research to answer this question.

Much of the scholarship, which focuses on differences, follows the widespread individualistic versus collectivistic paradigm first developed by Geert Hofstede in the 80's (Hofstede 1984)^{8,9}. For example, it has been suggested that individualistic and collectivistic cultures are likely to pursue different goals when it comes to forgiveness (Sandage and Williamson 2005). While the focus of forgiveness in most Western cultures, characterized as predominantly individualistic, is on personal healing and well-being, in collectivistic cultures it is rather a restoration of social harmony (Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009). The methods and approaches consequently also differ. While Western cultures often apply individual coping skills or psychotherapy, in many collectivistic cultures the involvement of others is sought through rituals or narratives. (Sandage and Wiens 2001; Sandage and Williamson 2005).

⁸ At that time Hofstede conducted the largest survey of IBM employees in different countries all over the world. Based on this research he developed several types of cultural dimensions and categorized different nationalities according to the average values on those dimensions. The individualistic versus collectivistic dimension was one of them. See also <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/> for the different countries comparisons.

⁹ See for example (Paz, Neto, and Mullet 2008; Kadiangandu et al. 2007; Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009)

It needs to be pointed out that the individualism-collectivism perspective, despite its continuous widespread application, has attracted various criticisms over time. Some authors describe it as trying to “pigeonhole whole cultures into dichotomous categories” and pointed out that “subtle nuances” might get lost (Voronov and Singer 2002, 461). More recent studies also negate the early conceptualization of individualism and collectivism as opposites and argue that the categories should rather be perceived as orthogonal (Coon and Kemmelmeier 2001). The present study does not endeavour to join this debate, as testing the empirical value of these categories is not a focus of this research. However, those categories’ still widespread application especially with regard to forgiveness studies in a cross-cultural context, does mean that it is necessary to mention them, especially since they can offer some additional explanatory potential for the conceptualizations of forgiveness in different cultures, which might be relevant to the present study.

For example, in a study comparing the French and Congolese it has been found that the French perceive forgiveness more as an intrapersonal process, while the Congolese view it as interpersonal (Kadiangandu et al. 2007). For the Congolese forgiveness is more closely associated with reconciliation and replacing the negative emotions towards the perpetrator with positive feelings. The Congolese are also more ready to extend forgiveness to people with whom they have not interacted directly, including institutions or groups, instead of perceiving it as a process strictly between the offended and offender. The authors explain their findings partly with the everyday necessity in many collectivistic cultures to live together and co-exist even after crimes and atrocities. According to the authors, forgiveness, in such a context might “constitute a strategy that allows being relieved from resentment towards members of the group” (p.436).

Such an interpretation may contribute to an explanation for some almost unbelievable anecdotal stories of forgiveness from cultures classified as collectivistic. The Forgiveness Project¹⁰ collects various such narratives and testimonies from victims. One woman in Sierra Leone described how she forgave her rapist, who killed her child

¹⁰ See (The Forgiveness Project n.d.) <http://theforgivenessproject.com/topics/war-and-conflict/> (accessed 20.01.2018)

and who now lives in the neighbourhood; while another survivor of the genocide in Rwanda tells the story of how he visited and forgave the man who killed his mother. At the same time, a close reading of these testimonies indicates the complex motivations for forgiveness in many of the victims. Some authors suggested that forgiveness in collectivistic cultures may be more related to decisional than full emotional forgiveness (Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009); or that it is often rather viewed as a societal duty than a personal attitude. This view appears to have some foundation in surveys done on the topic of dealing with the past in Northern Uganda, where the formulation “we have to forgive” can be repeatedly found in victims’ narratives (OHCHR 2007, 29–30).

While theory and the limited existing empirical findings describe some cultural differences with regard to forgiveness — with particular emphasis on the differentiation between collectivistic and individualistic cultures — there is by no means a consensus among scholars about this topic. Even though the existence of cultural differences is generally acknowledged, at the same time various similarities have also been pointed out and supported by research (Sandage and Williamson 2005). A study conducted among various cultural groups in Lebanon by Azar and Mullet (2002) confirms the previous findings, which suggest the universal role played by apologies, perceived intentionality, and consequences of the committed transgression in predicting forgiveness (Sandage and Williamson 2005). Others caution not to fall into the trap of an excessive relativist perspective by assuming that the cultural differences with regard to forgiveness are so great that we are unable to understand each other (Gries and Peng 2002). Moreover, individualism and collectivism also vary within groups and cannot simply be attributed to specific nations or ethnicities (Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009).

This brief overview illustrates some challenges of cross-cultural studies. How can a complex phenomenon like forgiveness be studied in different cultural settings? Or, to put it differently, how can it be assumed that the subject of the study is the same across the groups? A specific definition and the application of well-established measurement tools that have ideally been tested in different cultural settings helps to counterbalance some of the challenges. The definition applied in this study, i.e., of the reduction of revenge and avoidance motivation provides a meaning that is specific and sufficiently clear to avoid ambiguities that might arise if people were merely to declare their

forgiveness or their lack thereof. While this predetermined definition circumvents some problems, it can be argued that the individual or cultural significance of forgiveness is ignored. This possibility is addressed through the qualitative elements of the study. By including a single direct item about forgiveness, it can be established if forgiveness is really perceived as the opposite of avoidance and revenge in both the cultural settings of Poland and Uganda. This approach allows a twofold accomplishment. By predefining forgiveness as abandoning negative attitudes, which can be considered the minimalistic understanding of this concept, the explanatory purpose of determining associations with other variables can be pursued. At the same time, the exploratory qualitative approach enables a comparison of forgiveness with regard to meaning and content in both countries.

Moreover, an additional aspect can be considered in the present study. Most of the theoretical deliberations regarding the differences in the meaning of forgiveness between collectivistic and individualistic cultures relate to common or “normal” transgressions. The transitional justice context is an exceptional and extreme situation with its specific and distinct characteristics.

Mass atrocities, human rights violations, the subsequent attempts at dealing with the past and transitional justice measures occur and are performed in a group context. Forgiveness or apologies in this context, as highlighted in the previous section about inter-and intrapersonal forgiveness, can rarely be seen as purely individual acts. They take place in settings with many stakeholders on the perpetrator- as well as on the victim side and cannot be separated from the social context in which they occur. Acts of forgiveness, as well as the rejection thereof, raise debates of either approval or condemnation. While rituals as a means in the process of forgiveness have been mostly associated with collectivistic cultures, the ritualistic nature and performance characteristics of the many common transitional justice measures from truth commissions to international tribunals have been pointed out by some (Celermajer 2013). On the other hand, even though the scope of the crimes committed and the means of dealing with them are collective, the extent, nature and consequences of atrocities are deeply personal. This is illustrated by the extreme levels of mental health problems, such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or depression, experienced in the aftermath of conflicts among people who belong to cultures mostly associated with collectivism (Vinck et al. 2007).

It can, therefore, be argued that even if a variety of differences with regard to forgiveness in daily or individual transgressions might exist between cultures, this extreme experience — both social and individual at the same time — negates some of these differences. To put it differently, it is possible that the context of mass human rights violations transcends, to a certain degree, the suggested cultural individualistic and collectivistic dichotomy. By being, on the one hand, more collective but, on the other hand, more harmful at an individual level than ordinary transgressions, it might bring the victims from various points on the individualistic-collectivistic culture spectrum closer together. Under normal circumstances the focus for victims of transgressions in Western cultures is mostly on individual approaches such as therapy or counselling. Forgiveness is an individual inner process, as exemplified, among others, by the forgiveness therapy approach (e.g. Reed and Enright 2006; Freedman and Enright 1996). In collectivistic cultures forgiveness often occurs as reconciliation between groups, even if the transgression was individual. Rituals involve whole clans and the focus is not on the inner healing of the individual but the restoration of social peace and cooperation. It can be argued that in the context of mass atrocities all victims, regardless of their cultural background, may need both. Those from individualistic cultures need a social repair process apart from individual healing (Becker et al. 1990; Fletcher and Weinstein 2002). In the same way the widespread prevalence of mental illness in countries categorized as collectivistic might require individual approaches, such as counselling beyond the social processes of reconciliation rituals (Vinck et al. 2007; OHCHR 2011; UN Peacebuilding Programme 2011). Therefore, in these extreme situations the understanding and preconditions for forgiveness might be more analogous between diverse victim groups than in other contexts.

Forgiveness and Religion

Forgiveness plays a major role in religions, and not only in the major world religions, but also in animistic cultures, demonstrated by sacrifices to spirits that are supposed to entice their forgiveness (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005; Rye and McCabe 2014). Consistent with the intuitive assumption of a positive link between religiosity and forgiveness most studies confirm the positive correlation (Azar and Mullet 2002; David and Choi 2006; Davis et al. 2013; McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005). This positive relationship, however, is not such a simple one. Though forgiveness might generally be viewed positively from a religious perspective, the conditions under

which forgiveness should be granted differ between and even, to a certain degree, within belief systems. While Judaism is generally considered to perceive atonement as a necessary condition, and Christianity is seen as maintaining a concept of unconditional forgiveness (Exline et al. 2003, 338–39), the second statement is questioned by other authors, who do not agree with the view of Christianity as a “religion of unconditional forgiveness” (Garrard and McNaughton 2011).

Further, despite the fact that religious people attach greater value to forgiveness and perceive themselves as forgiving, it seems that this is not necessarily always the case when it comes to real transgressions (McCullough 2001, 195). This difference between self-reported and actual forgiveness has been referred to as “the religion-forgiveness discrepancy”. Later studies have shown that, although there might be a positive correlation, it appears to be relatively small (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005, 399). Moreover, although religions generally attach positive value to forgiveness most of the major world religions also contain aspects that support revenge or retributive justice. This has raised the question of whether religious people are likely to choose between a more forgiving or a more revenge-oriented attitude, depending on the situation and justifying their respective choices with their religious beliefs. A study with Christian students supports the assumption that religious people do waiver between forgiving or revengeful attitudes in response to different situations (McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005, 399).

Summarizing, it appears that although religion does correlate with forgiveness in many cases, this connection is not as straightforward as might be anticipated. It depends on the situation. Even in cases of a positive correlation, the link might not be sufficiently strong. On the negative side, religion might also be used to put pressure on religious people, who might actually not be ready to forgive (Saunders 2011, 139). The positive effects of forgiveness have also been shown to be lower for people who forgave because of religious pressure as compared to people who forgave out of a sense of compassion and love (Exline et al. 2003, 342–43). This aspect is related to the concepts of decisional vs. emotional forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012). While people might make the decision “to forgive” because they see it as their “religious duty” this does not mean that they genuinely feel a sense of forgiveness for the transgressor.

Concluding, religion is clearly a relevant variable to be considered in the present study as a possible influencing factor with regard to willingness to forgive. While there appears to be a positive correlation between religion and forgiveness, the correlation is not sufficiently convincing to indicate a clear relationship between the two.

2.3.3 The value of forgiveness - empowering vs. demeaning

The subject of this study is not to assess the value of forgiveness. However, at the core there is a presumption of the positive contribution of forgiveness to the building of a post-conflict society. If that was not the case forgiveness would have virtually no role to play in transitional justice. The generally assumed positive impact of forgiveness is not uncontested. Consequently, the question of whether the forgiveness by victims is desirable in a post-conflict scenario needs to be addressed.

Many advocates of forgiveness point to the physical and mental health benefit that can be gained by the forgiving party (e.g. American Psychological Association, 2006; Harris et al., 2006). Forgiveness therapy, developed by Enright and colleagues, claims to have proven the positive impact of forgiveness on the victims through its effect of decreasing anxiety symptoms, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, at the same time as increasing their self-esteem and hope, even in serious cases such as spousal abuse or incest (Freedman and Enright 1996; Reed and Enright 2006). On the other hand, it has been pointed out that much of the research was done on interpersonal relationships. Simply translating these research findings into the context of transitional justice, in cases of atrocities and crimes against humanity, may perpetuate the inequality and put pressure on victims to accept the injustice. This might favour the perpetrators at the expense of the victims (Saunders 2011). As Saunders (2011) has stressed, women or deeply religious people in particular might feel the pressure to forgive put on them by the society or religious authorities. Victims might end up feeling guilty or morally incapable of fulfilling the societal expectations that they should forgive. This question might also arise in certain cultural settings, particularly in African countries, which are characterized by collectivist and very religious attributes.

These arguments are particularly pertinent in the context of unconditional forgiveness. Some authors, emphasizing the interpersonal nature of forgiveness, argue that unconditional forgiveness is not forgiveness at all (Griswold 2007). Unconditional

forgiveness is also criticized as compromising the self-respect of the forgiving party and, so the argument goes, should therefore not be perceived as a virtue (J. G. Murphy and Hampton 1998). On the other hand, psychologists have found even unilateral forgiveness to have healing effects on the mental health of victims (Freedman and Enright 1996; Reed and Enright 2006). Archbishop Tutu brings forward the point that by conditioning forgiveness on the actions of others, victims limit their freedom and eventually depend on the offender with the decision to forgive or not (Tutu and Tutu 2014). Empirical findings from Rwanda also show positive effects of unconditional forgiveness for the victims (Mukashema and Mullet 2013).

While the value of unconditional forgiveness is highly controversial, there is more agreement regarding the situation of a repentant perpetrator and the context in which a certain degree of justice has been achieved. Forgiveness under these conditions appears less questionable. Even though many African traditions and cultures are often associated with being more forgiving and this appears to be supported by the few studies conducted on this topic and cited previously (Kadiangandu et al. 2007; Mukashema and Mullet 2013), it does not mean that the nature of this forgiveness is unconditional. On the contrary, compensation is often a part of reconciliation rituals. It has also been argued that the form in which some of the rituals, like Mato Oput¹¹ in Northern Uganda, are conducted, encourages the offender to repent and resume responsibility more than the Western justice system does, which facilitates denial instead (Brock-Utne 2004). It can, therefore, by no means be considered a unilateral or unconditional form of forgiveness; and also not one where justice is sacrificed in the name of forgiveness.

Moreover, a study conducted in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein examined the effects of forgiveness in the context of a political conflict (Kira et al. 2009). The researchers found a positive association between forgiving the collaborators and physical and mental health, especially when the collaborators are ingroup members. In particular, forgiveness relieved PTSD symptoms contributing to reconciliation. This

¹¹ Mato Oput means drinking the bitter herb. It is a reconciliation ritual performed in case of serious transgressions, such as killings, between the clan of the victim and the clan of the perpetrator. At the end of the ritual the victim and perpetrator drink the bitter herb together to remind them of the bitter taste of conflict and strengthen their resolve to reconcile.

conclusion is supported by another study, which found high levels of PTSD to be linked to a preference of violent over non-violent conflict resolution (Vinck et al. 2007). These studies appear to contradict the more critical view of forgiveness in the context of transitional justice.

Summarizing the debate on the value of forgiveness, it appears that it is mainly unconditional forgiveness that attracts the most controversy. The problem with the criticism of forgiveness arises when the authors are not particular about the definition of forgiveness they are referring to with their critique.

The issue of unconditional forgiveness is not pertinent to the topic at hand. While the qualitative part of this study will allow for different perceptions of forgiveness, and for an exploration of how forgiveness is understood, and what type of forgiveness is preferred by various victims, the main question concerns the preconditions for forgiveness. The value of unconditional forgiveness, therefore, does not play a noteworthy role in this study.

Concluding, the question of whether forgiveness is either empowering or demeaning depends on the context. In particular, in a post-conflict setting — and considering the long-lasting devaluation of victims — this is a valid issue. It is therefore appropriate to point out that the danger of forgiveness is that it is likely to perpetuate the demeaning of victims, or enhance the existing imbalance between victims and perpetrators (Saunders 2011; Staub 2006). So, while forgiveness can have healing effects on individuals as well as positive implications for societies, it is crucial, in a post-conflict setting particularly, that it takes place under the right circumstances. If forgiveness is granted voluntarily from a position of strength there is little argument against it.

A position of strength implies that the imbalance, which existed over the course of the regime or conflict and which led to the undermining of the victims, is rectified. And this is precisely one of the assumptions on which this study is based. The importance restoration of equality has for forgiveness, has been asserted in the context of empirical studies as well as in theoretical deliberations on the effects of apologies and repentance, which have been interpreted as having the effect of bringing the perpetrator down (Azar and Mullet 2002; David and Choi 2006, 2009; Fehr and Gelfand 2010; Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010; Girard and Mullet 2012; Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot 2015; Griswold 2007; J. G. Murphy and Hampton 1998). However, as important as apologies

are, they are transient and if they do not lead to a change in the circumstances of the victims, their effects might not endure (Staub 2005). Even worse, such apologies may have no effect at all if perceived as insincere. The restoration of balance between victims and perpetrators constitutes a foundation not only for transitional justice but also for forgiveness to be constructive, healing or even simply possible for victims.

2.3.4 Forgiveness – summary and synthesis

The purpose of this section is to present the many facets of forgiveness and to explain why it is not easy to grasp or define. For a concept that has existed for millennia, since the earliest days of humanity or even in our ancestors before the evolution of the modern human (McCullough, 2008), scholars still seem to struggle with understanding it. By demonstrating some of the challenges in forgiveness research this section has aimed to emphasize why a clear definition is important and why it is not enough to simply determine forgiveness by asking about it directly. In other words, the difficulties of forgiveness scholarship at the same time suggest ways of overcoming them.

This final part of the forgiveness section focuses on presenting the most comprehensive attempt at systematization of the knowledge about this concept to date. While it does not answer all the questions and controversies that forgiveness research has to offer, and which have been outlined in the previous sections, it does contribute to a better understanding of when and how people forgive. A theoretical forgiveness framework provides guidelines in situating the variety of understandings and meanings within an existing system. It is, therefore, helpful to explore the differences and similarities between the two research sites of the present study. While the quantitative part of the study does apply a predetermined and clear-cut definition, this classification attempt is particularly significant for the explorative and qualitative component of this study.

The findings are a result of a meta-analysis of 175 studies that addressed the question of when people forgive (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010). The authors suggest a forgiveness typology consisting of three parts, namely cognitions, affects, and constraints. Cognitions involve a victim's attempt to make sense of the transgression by answering the question "what happened?" The elements that play a role in this context are, for example, intent or responsibility. The affective part consists of seeking

an answer to the question "what do I feel?" Negative affects lead to less, and positive affects to more, forgiveness. Finally, constraints deal with situational and internal aspects that relate to the question "what happens if I do not forgive?" The issues assumed to influence forgiveness are, for example, the victim's relationship with the offender, societal norms or internal beliefs such as moral convictions or religiosity.

Although this typology is just the beginning, and the authors emphasize various limitations such as the inability in a meta-analytical approach to examine interactions, it nevertheless seems very promising. The attempts of other authors to define when and why people forgive are in agreement with this typology which discloses the same cognitive or emotional elements or constraints (e.g. Berry et al. 2001; Exline et al. 2003; McCullough 2001). Moreover, many of the correlates described above can be linked to this framework. For example, religiosity can play a role as a constraining element if people feel compelled to forgive based on their beliefs. Cultural aspects can be interpreted in the same way as societal limitations imposed upon victims. Aspects related to justice fall partly in the cognitive and partly in the emotional category, since justice incorporates both components.

This typology can be related to descriptions of comprehensive apologies that comprise elements corresponding to each of the parts defined above. A comprehensive apology is supposed to consist of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, acknowledgment of wrongdoing, acknowledgment of harm and victim suffering, an undertaking to behave better in future and offers of repair (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009). Remorse is linked to the emotional level of the victim. Acknowledgement of harm and wrong doing and acceptance of responsibility answer the question "what happened" from the perspective of a repentant offender. And finally, the promise to improve and compensate tell the victims what happens if they do forgive and what they can expect in future.

In a similar way, these elements can be found in transitional justice measures. While perpetrators cannot be made to apologize the emotional element is addressed by trying to create conditions conducive to remorse through truth and reconciliation commissions. Even in legal justice, a remorseful perpetrator can expect a more lenient sentence. In truth commissions and legal justice, uncovering the facts and assigning responsibility, constitute central elements; while victim testimonies contribute to the

general public's acknowledgment of their suffering. Restorative measures address repair for the harm done; and reforms and punishments are attempts to ensure non-repetition. Finally, the predominant social discourse in the respective post-conflict setting either facilitates or inhibits a process of forgiveness.

These elements describe the conditions under which people forgive, and which should be present for an apology to be accepted. From this it can be assumed that circumstances which violate some or all of these elements will be contrary to forgiveness. Persistent inequalities, which result in relative deprivation, can be expected to have negative implications, in particular for the cognitive and affective components of the forgiveness typology.

2.4 Justice perceptions – social psychology perspective

Justice research constitutes an extremely wide and interdisciplinary field that can only be reviewed in a limited way within the scope of this work. In order to narrow it down and focus on the topics that are particularly pertinent to the present research the justice scholarship in the field of social psychology is reviewed in the following section on conceptualization. The concern of social psychology can be subsumed as concentrating on what people perceive as justice and under what circumstances.

To begin, the common categorization of justice into different types is described and explained. This is followed by linking the theoretical discourse on people's justice judgments with the field of transitional justice, which explores the question of which assumptions can be deduced from existing scholarship on victims' perception of justice. Then the definition of justice as applied to the present study is presented. The definition reflects the current state of justice research and is appropriate to the context of a post-conflict setting. Finally, in the light of the cross-cultural background of this study, the contemporary state of knowledge on justice across cultures is outlined.

2.4.1 Conceptualization of justice

There is widespread support for the theory that justice is a basic human motivation. Describing his "belief in a just world" theory Lerner (Lerner 1980) argues that this belief is fundamental for societies to function as it provides a necessary illusion of a predictable and controllable world, which enables long-term planning and goal achievement. Other scholars in the field of evolutionary psychology go even further

suggesting there are genetic predispositions in humans for justice (Wright 1995). So while a justice motive appears to be universally human, what does it mean exactly?

Mostly, when speaking of justice, and in particular within the transitional justice setting, the legal meaning of the concept is apposite. Justice associated with rule-breaking is, however, only one type of justice. Generally, justice is divided into four categories: retributive, restorative, distributive and procedural. The first two apply to situations of rule-breaking and are directed either at the perpetrator or the victim. The third type addresses situations of resource sharing and fair distribution. The final category applies to the perception of procedures, and the question of when and why they are seen as just and legitimate.

Justice, as applied in rule-breaking situations, has a long history. Its complexity derives from the fact that it has both social and individual components, more so than forgiveness, which, apart from some specific situations, is mostly an individual act. Justice is dispensed by the society or through societal structures and is frequently associated with objectivity, impartiality, and neutrality symbolized by a female figure, often blindfolded, holding scales. At the same time, however, it is a subjective concept, which all people individually strive to abide by (Tyler et al. 1997, 4).

Modern law is commonly equated with justice, although modern law does not always seem to be just. The etymology of the word comes from the notion of paying back, settling scores. According to Miller (2007, 197) justice was first a matter of paying back, of buying back, of determining the amount of the obligation owed or the value of the thing or the person to be redeemed". Miller emphasized the semantic relationship between justice as paying back and peace, which originally comes from the Latin "pacare" and developed from the concept of paying (p. 15). In this sense peace was basically understood as settling the debts. The early concept of justice arose from talionic cultures, as described by Miller (2007), who focused on the idea of getting even, of an eye for an eye. He argues that even though these earlier concepts are often today perceived as barbaric, they are often closer to people's inner understanding of justice than the modern legal procedures. The concept of "paying back" can be divided into the person paying, who is the perpetrator, and the one receiving, who is the victim. These elements are basically at the core of the two types of justice: retribution and restoration.. Retribution refers to the perpetrator paying in

different ways for the breaking of a rule. Restoration refers to the victim being compensated for the harm done. Darley and Pittman (2003) in an attempt to establish which type of justice is preferred under which circumstances proposed that the crucial element is the perpetrator's intention in committing the harm. This involves a cognitive assessment and can lead to low or high moral outrage. This in turn affects the determination of justice. Intentional crime results in high moral outrage and a desire for punishment. Unintentional crime or, alternatively, circumstances providing an excuse, lower the moral outrage and lessen the demand for retribution. In these cases compensation is perceived as adequate, while in situations of premeditated and intentional rule-breaking, compensation is seen as desirable but insufficient.

While retribution and restoration only refer to transgressions, the remaining two types of justice, distributive and procedural, have more general applications. Distributive justice developed from a rather rational understanding of justice based mostly on equity theory. Equity theory assumes that people feel justice is being done when outcomes match the inputs (Adams 1963). This idea of justice, also described as resource-based models, and related to social exchange theory, postulates that people want to maximize their gains (Tyler 1994). In other words, justice assessments depend on how favourable the outcomes are.

This mostly economic perspective on human justice judgments was followed in the 1970s by research on procedural justice. Scholars discovered that sometimes people care less about economic outcomes and more about being treated with respect. The social context and the procedures often appear more important for justice assessments than the actual revenues (Lind and Tyler 1988; Murphy and Tyler 2008; Skitka et al. 2010; Tyler 2006; Tyler et al. 1997).

The challenge, as put forward by Skitka et al. (2010) in their historical overview of justice research, is to establish which type of justice is applied when. The authors, in close agreement with the above categorization, describe the different waves of justice research as related to the perception of human nature as "homo oeconomicus", homo socialis" and "homo moralis" or, in other words, influenced by economic, relational or moral motives. Consequently, justice judgments are being made depending on the favourability of the results, on respect and fair procedures or based on moral

convictions. The question is, however, as highlighted above, which justice approach prevails in which situation.

2.4.2 Victims' justice perceptions in a post-conflict setting

The question what role justice plays for victims after conflicts, and what type of justice might be the most important one for them is pertinent to transitional justice, and reflected in much of the research in this field. Even though many transitional justice scholars do not necessarily make use of the same psychological terms, they basically address the same issues. In the following section the social psychological justice scholarship is applied to the post-conflict context and the empirical studies from the transitional justice field in search of some answers.

Drawing on the various schools of justice research presented above, diverse conclusions could result for the post-conflict setting. The proponents of retributive justice emphasize the fact that crimes have taken place. This suggests the triggering of the moral motive and moral outrage, and should subsequently result in a demand for “just desert” and punishment. The critics of this limited legal perspective point to the importance of the economic needs and rights of the victims and condemn that they are ignored and neglected by most transitional justice approaches. This suggests the primacy of distributive justice. Others, finally, emphasize the needs of victims to be acknowledged and respected in their suffering and their need to “have a voice” after having been silenced for so long. This is related to the “homo socialis” or procedural justice perspective. All these aspects are relevant and important. So does the existing justice scholarship provide any indication of which type of justice — retributive, restorative, distributive or procedural — is likely to be prioritised in which circumstances?

Skitka et al. (2010) attempted to answer this question by, among others, drawing on Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, Maslow, and Geiger 1993).¹² In their contingency model, justice motivation depends on the circumstances and the salience

¹² Maslow's need hierarchy is a theory within motivational psychology. He assumed that people's motivations are hierarchical, often pictured as a pyramid. Once one level is fulfilled, the needs on the next level up are those which motivate people. The groups of needs were originally divided into five levels with physiological (basic) needs at the bottom, followed by safety, love or belonging, esteem and self-actualization at the top.

of a particular perspective. One important characteristic of a situation, activating the respective justice perspectives, is related to the question which needs on Maslow's pyramid are satisfied. Basic needs at the bottom of the hierarchy are the most crucial. The authors, therefore, argue that the "homo oeconomicus" justice perspective applies in situations where basic needs have not been satisfied, or in situations of danger. When these needs are satisfied to an acceptable degree, the needs on a higher level on the pyramid come into play; these relate to the need to belong and the need for esteem, referred to as the "homo socialis" justice motive. Only when both of these groups of needs have been met, the "homo moralis" perspective applies

These assumptions are supported by various findings from the field of transitional justice. The criticism of the "elitist perspective" prioritizing retributive and legal justice as opposed to economic needs in various developing countries (Robins 2012a; Millar 2011; Ajetunmobi 2012) directly corresponds to the predictions of this model. Moreover, again in accordance with this model, justice priorities among victims can differ even within one country. Research in Timor-Leste has shown that victims from the more affluent region around the capital placeless emphasis on economic needs as compared to victims from poorer areas (Robins 2012b).

The importance of apologies, remorse and acknowledgement have been repeatedly proven in various studies (David and Choi 2006, 2009; David 2018). These actions and attitudes can be related to the "homo socialis" perspective, the need for belonging and respect, which in turn is an important aspect of procedural justice. In his comprehensive overview of transitional justice interventions and their effects, David (2017:171) has argued that the importance of apologies can be explained by a theory of justice that depends on awareness of and satisfaction with the offender's transformation. He differentiates this theory from the theories of procedural justice, and their focus on impartiality and fairness. This view of procedural justice is, however, limited. Initially, the focus of procedural justice related to outcomes, which were expected to be more satisfactory with increased control over procedure and decision-making itself (Thibaut and Walker 1976). Later developments of the theory added a relational dimension to the concept of procedural justice as opposed to the self-interest model (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1989). This interpretation of procedural justice emphasized the need for respect, belonging, group membership and position within this group. As such, it corresponds to the "homo socialis" perspective of justice.

Apologies and remorse, instead of affecting justice assessments through the perceived transformation of the offender, may tend to reinforce or re-affirm group membership and the status of victims, which is very much within the realm of procedural justice as interpreted by a group-value model. The meaning and importance of apologies as “setting new moral standards for the society, that, ideally, will be conducive to equality of membership” is similarly made in the Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice (Stan and Nedelsky 2013, 17).

So, what assumptions can be drawn about the justice perceptions of victims? Based on the review of the justice research and the scholarship on transitional justice, several assumptions emerge. While victims clearly have different justice needs, which depend on their situations, context and history, economic and relational motives do stand out as the most important ones. Theories as well as empirical studies suggest that retributive desires based on moral principles, though not insignificant, only become a priority when other needs have been satisfied. Moreover, the economic or distributive justice perception is often closely intertwined with the relational justice motive. Findings of justice research support the assumption that distributive justice assessments are influenced by relational judgments (Tyler 1994). If people trust in the relational structures that dispense social and economic benefits, these outcomes are perceived as more fair.

This is what happens under “normal” circumstances. Applying this reasoning to a post-conflict setting this hierarchical order may, however, reasonably be reversed. Victims find themselves in a new environment and do not have any basis, yet, for trust. On the contrary, they have been accustomed to mistrusting social and political structures. Many have economic needs, but even those who do not, are likely to have had their needs for belonging and esteem violated over a long period of time. Instead of judging the fairness of the outcomes based on trust they might, therefore, judge the justice of the new environment based on the perceived fairness of outcomes. The distributive justice, in this case, may convey two meanings. Apart from the purely economic aspect, distributive justice can also communicate a message to the victims about their standing in the group, their value and consequently the justice of the whole new post-conflict setting. This supposition is supported by the findings of a study conducted within the field of peace and conflict research. While considering the endurance of peace agreements, the study found that the equality principle of distributive justice is a

pivotal and mediating influence of procedural justice (Albin and Druckman 2012). Even though this study did not deal with victims' perceptions as such, it supported the suggestion that in a volatile environment characterised by a history of mistrust, equal shares contribute to trust and cooperation, which in turn has a positive impact on the peace process.

This reasoning is also in accordance with the postulations of justice heuristics theory. Heuristics are mental shortcuts used to form an opinion in complex or uncertain situations, or when relevant information is missing (Proudfoot and Lind 2015; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). A post-conflict context is a situation in which there is much uncertainty immediately after the conflict has ended when it is not clear how the new order will look. Many of the transitional justice measures are full of legal complexities, difficult for an average person to grasp. As Ford (2011, p. 425) points out, many citizens of transition countries as well as former victims have very limited information or understanding about those mechanisms and processes. This corresponds with the findings of a survey conducted in Northern Uganda, where people were asked, among others, about their perceptions of the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Even though their knowledge about the functioning of this international court was limited, it did not prevent them from having opinions on the subject (Longman, Pham, and Weinstein 2004; Pham and Vinck 2007, 38). So how can victims form opinions about fairness or not, as the case may be, in this complex and confusing environment? The theory of justice heuristics suggests that people use whatever information is available to quickly pass judgement, which then shapes and influences any new experiences they may have (Proudfoot and Lind 2015). To put it differently, victims need to know if the new environment will be better and more just to adjust to the new order and have a feeling of control and predictability (Lerner 1980). Getting acquainted with the frequently complex transitional justice measures in order to form these justice opinions is not practicable for most people without expert knowledge. Justice heuristics theory suggests that they will, therefore, use more easily accessible information to form these judgments, which will in turn reflect back on how they assess the transitional justice measures and the whole new environment.

The fairness of the distribution of outcomes, whether it be in economic terms or whether it relates to social acknowledgement — both requirements in which victims have been previously disadvantaged — will provide this easily accessible information.

This fairness of distribution is in particular relevant when compared to the group of the former perpetrators who, at the same time, were often the beneficiaries of the past conditions. The new economic and social status vis-à-vis the perpetrator group symbolizes the value of the group membership of the former victims in the same sense as their previous low status represented their low value. A justice judgment formed based on those comparisons can, according to the existing theory, be far reaching and stable over time.

Obviously, it can be argued that people do not always react negatively to disadvantageous comparisons. System justification theory which developed out of many studies and findings, contradicts these assumptions. The theory posits that the motivation to justify the status quo might be in many cases equally important or even more so than the justice motive. This results in people defending social and political systems that are clearly disadvantageous to them (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). People might have different aims in defending the existing system. One explanation might be offered by the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1962).¹³ Justice is a value that most people hold. If they are consistently confronted with an environment that contradicts this value, one way of dealing with this contradiction is to re-interpret the context and justify the injustice. In the present context this would imply, that having suffered for so long, the victims' need for justice may manifest in a way that they want the new environment to be better and fair at any cost. This might lead to interpreting whatever happens during the transition process, even inequality with regard to economic and social status, in a positive way by finding excuses in order to defend the new system. While this is a possible psychological reaction, the various studies conducted in the field of transitional justice suggest that victims do have a need for equality, do compare themselves with former perpetrators; and do voice discontent if their outcomes are unfavourable (David and Choi 2009). Victims are also not always appreciative of the transition process, especially when promises, which might have instigated their trust and prompted positive attitudes early on, are not met (Backer 2010).

¹³ For details on cognitive dissonance theory see section 2.1

Summarizing, the assumptions made in the present study, based on comprehensive interdisciplinary justice research, place the economic status and social acknowledgement of the victims in the post-conflict setting at the centre. Comparisons that victims make with the perpetrator group reveal whether the need for distributive justice in the new environment — something clearly important for victims — has been met, but also the relational dimension of procedural justice. The outcome of this comparison reveals the value of the victims' group membership and provides an accessible tool for justice assessments of the whole post-conflict setting.

The justice definition, which best reflects these considerations is the injustice gap (Davis et al. 2015). The injustice gap is defined by the authors as the gap between the reality and the “ideal justice” as perceived by the victims. This is in particular fitting for a post-conflict setting. Victims have various expectations, which in most cases cannot be all met. In other words, there will always be an injustice gap. The question is how big this gap turns out to be and what can be done to make it smaller. The explanations provided above lead to the assumption that a comparison with perpetrators in order to assess the extent of persisting economic and social inequalities will have a considerable impact on the size of this gap.

2.4.3 Justice and culture

This section draws on the existing cross-cultural justice research to address a number of questions relevant to the present study. These questions include the issue of the universality of the justice motive as such, and if people across cultures use similar principles for their justice assessments. Moreover, is the classification of the previously described different justice types generally applicable?

The cross-cultural justice research is still rather limited and many studies focus either on a comparison between Western countries or Asian with Western countries, most notably China or Hong Kong and US. Nevertheless, theories as well as findings suggest the universal existence of a justice motive (Lerner 1980; Tyler et al. 1997; Wright 1995). Some scholars even describe it as basic human need (A. J. W. Taylor 2009).

The findings from 82 countries examining the generalizability of Schwartz's basic value theory confirm that universalism, which in his definition encompasses norms such as social justice and equality, is one of the values rated most highly across cultures

(Schwartz 2012). A recent meta-analysis of organizational justice studies across cultures also found various similarities such as the general preference for the equity principle with regard to distributive justice, or the importance of relational concerns within procedural justice research (Silva and Caetano 2016). In a study focusing on preferences in dispute resolution methodologies comparing different ethnic groups in the US, the researchers found overwhelming similarities in patterns and preferences far outweighed the differences (Lind, Huo, and Tyler 1994).

On the other hand, despite the strong support for the assumption that a justice motive as such is universal and that people across cultures use similar principles to make justice assessments, differences do exist. A number of studies applied the Hofstede model¹⁴ and the differentiation in individualistic and collectivistic cultures to explore variations in the perception of justice. For example, the perceptions of justice related to interactional justice have been shown to be affected by the collectivistic values of cultures (Silva and Caetano 2016). Situational factors that persist over long periods of time can affect cultural justice perceptions, such as resource scarcity in India, which contributed to a preference for the need principle in distributive justice over equity (Tyler et al. 1997, 236). Collectivistic cultures also appear to show more preference for equality and need principles than individualistic cultures (Silva and Caetano 2016).

To sum up, there is strong support for the assumption that people find justice as a value important across cultures. Also the previously described types of justice can be found in different cultural settings even though the preferences might differ depending on the degree of the prevalence of individualistic or collectivistic characteristics as well as long lasting situational factors.

Similarly as with forgiveness, it is important not to overlook some core aspects of justice perceptions by solely relying on established definitions. While definitions are critical for quantitative measurements, room should be left for exploration of the nuances of complex concepts such as justice, especially across different cultures. To put it differently, while the comparison element described above is assumed to play a crucial role in justice perceptions in both Poland and Uganda, there will be other elements, which reduce or increase the injustice gap. A comprehensive understanding

¹⁴ See section 2.3 (Hofstede 1984, 2011)

of these justice perceptions as well as differences and similarities between the two countries, requires an additional exploration of these other aspects.

2.5 Hypotheses

The research questions of the present study endeavour to explore the role of economic and social inequalities in justice perceptions and the motivation of victims to forgive in both Poland and Uganda. In order to do this the theory of relative deprivation is applied, which explains the consequences of disadvantageous comparisons.

The previous sections introduced the field of transitional justice, which provides the background for this study situated in post-conflict settings, as well as the main variables, namely relative deprivation, forgiveness and justice. This final section of the literature review describes how and why these variables are assumed to influence each other and in what way these assumptions are relevant at the proposed research sites. Each sub-section ends by presenting a hypothesis derived from the presented theories as well as observations about the research sites.

2.5.1 Relative deprivation and the motivation to forgive of victims

The search for relevant research material conducted for the purpose of this study has shown that the question of whether relative deprivation makes an impact on forgiveness has not been studied so far. This is surprising taking into account the long history of relative deprivation and the various effects that have, according to established research, resulted from it. Which theoretical deliberations and what empirical evidence would, therefore, suggest that relative deprivation might affect forgiveness? Why and how would that be important in a post-conflict setting?

While there are different types of relative deprivation, in that not all are based on social comparisons,¹⁵ this study focuses on relative deprivation that results from a disadvantageous comparison with an outgroup, namely, the perpetrators. The first and basic assumption in the present context is that such an ingroup-outgroup categorization can be safely presumed. This needs to be, at least briefly, addressed as in both countries the conflicts were not along pre-existing ethnic or religious lines. While it might appear

¹⁵ See section 2.2 and also (Davies 1962; Walker and Smith 2002; Folger 1986; de la Sablonnière et al. 2015)

technical, it is an important question, since studies suggest that comparisons with ingroup members lead to outcomes that differ from the comparisons that are made with outgroup individuals.¹⁶

The ingroup-outgroup categorization is one of the most basic assumptions of social psychology and most theories beginning with the early scholars of intergroup relations make use of this differentiation (Sherif 1966; Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Tajfel (1970) revolutionized social psychology in discovering the minimal group paradigm and showing the innate importance of this differentiation for human relations and attitudes. He demonstrated that ingroup favouritism exists even in conditions where people have never met and the only connecting element was the proclaimed existence of a virtual “group”. Tajfel subsequently concluded that “socialization into “groupness” is powerful and unavoidable; it has innumerable valuable functions. It also has some odd side-effects that may — and do — reinforce acute intergroup tensions whose roots lie elsewhere” (Tajfel 1970, 102). While ingroup-outgroup categorization exists — surprisingly, even under the most minimal conditions, — its existence in cases of conflict is more intuitive. The earlier Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) developed by Sherif (1966) and verified in empirical experiments, made use of an existing conflict to demonstrate competition and antagonism between groups. Based on this theoretical background it is reasonable to assume that even if conflict lines do not run along pre-existing criteria, such as ethnicity or religious affiliation, the mere fact of standing on opposing sides for a considerable amount of time is likely to be more than enough to entrench group categorization in victims. This categorization, so significant during and after the conflict, is likely to also make the perpetrators a relevant and salient group for comparisons in order to assess the changes of the post-conflict environment.

While the effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness has not been studied *per se*, the predominant evidence of the literature on relative deprivation discussed above suggests that it leads to negative outgroup attitudes. Even though a few selected studies concluded that relative deprivation might lead to positive attitudes towards the outgroup, it seems that in these cases relative deprivation was not correctly measured

¹⁶ See section 2.2.2 and also (H. J. Smith et al. 2012)

correctly.¹⁷ The study, which compares most closely with the context of the present research, is the one conducted in South Africa where the authors disputed that relative deprivation has a strong effect on negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Duckitt and Mphuthing 2002). However, the reduction in relative deprivation described in this study, was probably based solely on optimism and the anticipation of a better future created by the change in the political system. This reduction was, therefore, intangible and might not have produced any strong effects. What happens, however, if the initial enthusiasm subsides and the victims find themselves after some time still with a lower economic or social status compared to their perpetrators? This is a pertinent question as such situations are not uncommon, especially in the context of negotiated conflict resolutions, where the perpetrators often retain various benefits. Because they are expected to give up political or military power, they may have been promised amnesties and the retention of economic benefits instead.

The issue of beneficial treatment of former perpetrators has been at the centre of the public debate in Poland for many years (e.g. Fakt.Pl 2015; Ferfecki 2013; Kostrzewski 2017). Some scholars describe how the former perpetrators in Poland became the new capitalists (Los and Zybertowicz 2000; Staniszki 1990, 2001). The support for former perpetrators as opposed to many victims has also been a controversial topic in Uganda¹⁸ (Borzello 2009). The anecdotal evidence from post-conflict settings with such differential treatment suggests the realistic possibility of resentment on the side of the victims.

The majority of relative deprivation research described in previous sections indicates negative outgroup attitudes as a result. This is the case for people or groups that do not necessarily share a prior history. In case of a post-conflict setting, there is already a history of discrimination, probably expectations of improvement on the victims' side and predominantly negative attitudes towards perpetrators. Forgiveness would mean a positive shift in those existing negative attitudes. If relative deprivation can exacerbate intergroup relations under conditions where there is no conflict, it can reasonably be

¹⁷ See section 2.2.2.

¹⁸ A critical debate on financial support given to Uganda's former perpetrators by the Uganda Amnesty Commission while victims receive nothing has been also observed by the author at the National War Victims Conference, Kampala, May 2014

expected that it will hamper a shift to more positive attitudes towards the perpetrators where negative perceptions already exist.

Therefore, this study assumes that a disadvantageous comparison between victims and perpetrators in Poland and Uganda is likely to result in relative deprivation, which in turn is likely to lead to decrease in motivation to forgive. Taking into account the inferred universal application of both concepts — relative deprivation and forgiveness — it is proposed that the negative effect on forgiveness is likely to be present in both countries.

Assuming that victims compare themselves with perpetrators, which comparison domains would they most probably choose? Relative deprivation theory states that the preconditions for the deprivation include wanting something, not having it and seeing that someone else has it. In most conflict contexts victims are likely to have been deprived with regard to their social and economic status. Often they are prevented from pursuing their economic or career goals as a result of the oppression or because of the circumstances created by the conflict. Certainly, this was the case with regard to the victim groups in the present study, namely Poland and Uganda. Furthermore, economic and social status are the categories mostly investigated in relative deprivation research as they symbolize peoples' rank in society and represent tangible categories for comparison. Therefore, social and economic status represent the most identifiable social divisions for the purpose of comparison.

H1: Relative deprivation of victims increases revenge and avoidance motivation and decreases their willingness to forgive

2.5.2 Relative deprivation and victims' perceptions of justice

As mentioned in the previous section,¹⁹ a justice motive is considered to be generally important for people but in particular it has been found to play a central role in a situation of uncertainty. The uncertainty management model stipulates that people engage in fairness assessments to reduce uncertainty, which is an unpleasant experience (van den Bos and Lind 2002; Proudfoot and Lind 2015). A post-conflict situation is a situation of high uncertainty in which it is not clear to what extent and in

¹⁹ See chapter 2.4

what ways the social and political structures have changed or improved. According to this theory, victims are likely to be highly motivated to make justice assessments in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with the new environment.

Most justice judgements require some kind of comparison. Distributive justice is assessed when victims compare their own outcomes with those of others. The severity of punishment is established by comparing it with other punishments. Even the fairness of procedural justice is determined by a comparison with procedures applied to the treatment of others. During conflict or in a repressive regime, victims suffer in various ways while perpetrators have power over them, and often benefit from the existing conditions. The extent to which this status quo is retained or changed provides one of the simplest and most direct possibilities for assessing justice. This is in line with the theory of thinking heuristics under conditions of uncertainty. One heuristic commonly applied when only limited information is available is representativeness, which depends on similarity (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Something is representative of something else to the degree to which both are similar to each other. Consequently, a post-conflict setting represents a truly new system to the degree to which it is dissimilar to the old. A related idea is represented in victim's statements "we are not like them",²⁰ which is supposed to accentuate their dissimilarity to former perpetrators in terms of values and attitudes. The easiest way to examine the similarity or dissimilarity between the previous and the new systems is through assessing the relative positions and conditions of the victims and perpetrators in the new context. As pointed out previously, empirical findings support the assumption that victims do compare their situations with those of the perpetrators and then draw conclusions from the comparison (David and Choi 2009).

Of course, in the current study, the context is not completely new. In both countries years have passed since the peace process and the transition. However, the primacy effect of the fairness heuristics theory specifies that justice assessments made early on in the new context carry more weight and affect the interpretation of later events (Proudfoot and Lind 2015). This has important implications for post-conflict contexts

²⁰ For example a slogan used by former victims in the Czech Republic after the transition (David 2011, 112)

that delay in addressing previous inequalities. The convictions formed early on that the new system does not prioritize the rectification of past injustices is likely to be very difficult to change. In fact, even positive attitudes that were initially based on beliefs, promises or expectations change quickly if none of the expected changes materialize (David and Choi 2009; David 2011; Backer 2010). As predicted by the primacy effect, the disappointment might persist even if far-reaching transitional justice measures are implemented later on, as was the case in the Czech Republic (David 2018).

Therefore, based on theoretical as well as empirical evidence, it can reasonably be assumed that victims are likely to make comparisons between their own and the perpetrators' group, and that the outcome will impact on their justice assessment of the new post-conflict environment. In the previous section it was established that the most likely spheres of comparison would be economic and social status. The question is, if both would be similarly relevant for justice judgments. The substitutability fairness heuristic predicts that people use whatever information is available to make their justice assessments (Proudfoot and Lind 2015). In other words, economic status or social acknowledgment will be used depending on the availability of information in order for victims to make decisions about whether justice has been achieved.

The assumptions of the present study that were based on relative deprivation theory predict that economic or social relative deprivation will have a negative effect on the assessment of justice in the post-conflict setting. However, this is by no means obvious as other theories would predict different reactions. System justification theory and a consistently growing amount of empirical evidence suggest that people often ignore and justify inequalities and injustices done to them (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). As already briefly explained in a previous section, their motivation is to justify the status quo. This need can derive from cognitive dissonance created by the experience of living surrounded by injustice. As justice does appear to be a universal need for people this discomfort can be resolved by justifying the injustice. It could be argued that this might be particularly pertinent in the case of victims. During a long period of war or regime, the one thing that might help victims keep going is the anticipation of a better future. When the future they have hoped or maybe even fought for arrives and they realize that it is not what they imagined, it is possible that they will engage in system justification by finding reasons or excuses or ignoring the injustices while focusing on the positive changes. In such a case, the disadvantageous comparison and relative

deprivation will not lead to the perception of injustice. Either the victims would not experience relative deprivation at all or even if they do, it would not lead to an assessment that the whole new system is unfair.

Therefore, based on theoretical assumptions, there are different possibilities. The victims might merely compare their own situations before and after the conflict and not engage in comparisons with perpetrators. In that case, there would only be a significant effect of the victims' situation and the situations of the perpetrators would be irrelevant. Secondly, it is possible that victims might engage in system justification. In this case, the disadvantageous comparison would have no effect on the experience of relative deprivation and/or there would be no effect of relative deprivation on justice perceptions. For the reasons explained above, this study assumes that victims engage in social comparisons with the perpetrator group above and beyond the trajectory of their own situation before and after the conflict. Furthermore, it can be argued that living through a conflict or under a repressive regime is likely to have made them more, not less, sensitive to issues of injustice. This would be true for both economic as well as social status comparisons, as victims are likely to use whatever information is available to them to assess whether justice has been achieved in the post-conflict environment.

H2: Relative deprivation increases injustice perceptions

2.5.3 Justice assessment and its impact on the motivation of victims to forgive

The previous sections explained the presumed relationship between relative deprivation and forgiveness; as well as relative deprivation and the perception of justice. So what, if anything, could the relationship between justice perceptions and forgiveness be? This question resulted over time in a multitude of often completely opposing suppositions.

In reviewing existing theory some authors have pointed out that in particular forgiveness literature does suggest a negative relationship (Karremans and Van Lange 2005b). Justice and forgiveness are often seen as mutually exclusive choices insofar as justice is presumed to imply “just deserts” and the suffering of the perpetrator, whereas forgiveness is associated with forsaking the demands of punishment (Wenzel and Okimoto 2014). In the transitional justice context forgiveness is frequently emphasized as leading to peace and ending violence (Tutu and Tutu 2014), while

justice is perceived as carrying with it the danger of the further division of fragile post-conflict societies, possibly resulting in renewed fighting. This controversy is reflected in the “peace versus justice” debate, particularly common in transition contexts in Africa (Sriram and Pillay 2009). The Ugandan case is a good example, where this debate was sparked by the ICC involvement and arrest warrants for leading rebel leaders. A number of scholars became involved in subsequently trying to analyse a diverse range of pro- and contra- arguments on both sides (Clark 2011; Gissel 2015; Krzan 2016; Waddell 2008) accompanied by NGO and media voices (Kersten 2011; McConnell 2006; Otim and Wierda 2010). While some argued against an emphasis on justice for the benefit of peace others insisted that true peace cannot exist without justice. In line with this argument, addressing the crimes of the past and reducing victims’ perceived injustice could, therefore, also have the effect of exacerbating “un-forgiveness” of victims. They could feel affirmed and supported by the society in their condemnation of the perpetrators, instead of becoming more forgiving. Justice could make the revenge motivation more salient reducing the motivation to forgive. In the specific context of post-conflict transition a public debate about justice could remind victims of all the injustices they have suffered, and make them less prone to grant forgiveness, but more angry and vengeful instead.

Wenzel and Okimoto (2014) maintain, however, that this common perception of justice and forgiveness as irreconcilable only represents one point of view. The two concepts can also be seen as unrelated or, on the contrary, as positively related. As Miller (2007) states, there is even a semantic relationship between “peace” and paying back as a means of settling the scores as a core precondition for reconciliation.

Interestingly, even though both concepts are so common and important in various areas of social life, there is little research focusing on the relationship between justice and forgiveness (Karremans and Van Lange 2005b; Wenzel and Okimoto 2014). The lack of certainty in the conjectures about the link between these two notions can be traced back to the previously mentioned challenges with the definitions of both concepts. Forgiveness, understood as an unconditional annulment of debts is in obvious contradiction to justice, particularly if understood as retributive justice. However, forgiveness does not have to be, and often is not, unconditional. At the same time, retributive justice represents only one type of justice. Restorative justice, which focuses on repairing the harm and addressing the needs of the victims and the

obligations of the perpetrator (Zehr 2015) does not appear as contradictory to the meaning of forgiveness. Others even describe the goal of restorative justice as reaffirming joint values shared by both parties (Wenzel et al. 2008), an understanding very related to the concept of forgiveness. Generally, therefore, there seems to be strong support for the assumption that restorative justice has a positive effect on forgiveness (Wenzel and Okimoto 2014).

Even the findings regarding retributive justice and forgiveness are, however, not as obvious as it might seem. Studies among victims of the communist regime in the Czech Republic suggest a positive relationship between punishment and forgiveness (David and Choi 2006, 2009). This was consistent with the expectations of the researchers who explained the outcome as "reduction in inequality" between the victims and the perpetrators, which was in their opinion an important precondition for forgiveness. This perception of justice and forgiveness is closely related to the concept of the "injustice gap" described in the previous section (Davis et al. 2015). The authors argue that any factor, which decreases the injustice gap is likely to contribute to forgiveness (Exline et al. 2003; Wenzel and Okimoto 2014). The empirical findings of Davis et al. (2015) confirm these assumptions. Further, a neutral priming of justice, leaving the interpretation of the concept to the participants, has also been found to have a positive effect on forgiveness (Karremans and Van Lange 2005b). Finally, apart from the inconclusiveness in theory or research on justice and forgiveness in conjunction with the issue of the definitions, justice is, in many studies merely inferred from given scenarios and not directly assessed (Witvliet et al. 2008).

To sum up, despite various debates and assumptions related to the relationship between justice and forgiveness, the empirical studies are still rather limited (Wenzel and Okimoto 2014). Based on the described existing theoretical assumptions both, a negative and positive effect of justice on forgiveness could be argued. However, the definition of justice perceptions in the present study as the "injustice gap" postulates that a positive relationship is more likely, and is thus in agreement with the findings of Davis et al. (2015). Based on empirical findings, whatever the expectations of the victims with regard to justice are, if there is a narrowing of the gap between their expectations about the "ideal justice" and what they see happening in reality, this should have a positive effect on forgiveness. Conversely, if the injustice gap widens this should affect forgiveness negatively (David and Choi 2009; Davis et al. 2015;

Karremans and Van Lange 2005a). Therefore, this study postulates that increased perceptions of injustice result in increased avoidance and revenge motivation, and reduced willingness to forgive.

H3: The perception of injustice reduces the motivation to forgive and increases revenge and avoidance motivation

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH SITES – POLAND AND NORTHERN UGANDA

The research sites to test the hypotheses of the present study are northern Uganda and Poland. Since this research is not historic, all this section needs to provide with regard to the scope of this study is a brief overview of the conflicts, transitions and post-conflict situations in both countries. A short historic background is deemed necessary in order to be able to fully understand and interpret the findings.

Therefore the section below deals with a brief overview of the historic backgrounds of the two countries; the nature of the conflict in both countries; and the type and scale of transitional justice measures applied in the aftermath of these conflicts. In addition, the section addresses the extent to which the topic of relative deprivation might play a role in both Poland and northern Uganda.

3.1 Poland

This section is divided into a brief historical overview of communist rule and the struggle against it in Poland. The second half of the section provides a description of the transition and the main transitional justice measures undertaken.

3.1.1 Historical overview

As a result of the Yalta Peace Conference at the end of WWII, Poland became part of the Eastern Bloc, and as such, has been within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union from 1945 until 1989.

The period, 1945-1989, is notorious as an epoch of imprisonment, torture, political killings, expropriation and other human rights violations at all levels of intensity. The Stalinist period, which had already begun during WWII in the territories occupied by the Soviet Union, continued until 1956, a few years after Stalin's death in 1953. These years were the most repressive of the whole period (Nalepa 2013, 384). Widespread persecution of the WWII resistance members of the Polish Home Army took place, alongside show trials, judicial killings, political arrests and torture (Ash 1999, 10). The Poles have been described as the nation in Eastern Europe least ready to accept another domination of a foreign power²¹, this time by the Soviet-style socialism. According to

²¹ Poland has been divided and occupied by Prussia, Russia and Austria and effectively ceased to exist as an independent state for 123 years from 1795 until the end of WWI.

historians, Stalin himself equated the introduction of communism to Poland to "putting a saddle on a cow" (Ash 1999, 6). Consequently, the brutality and suppression used to coerce the nation into submission was extreme. A series of events, starting with the death of Stalin in March 1953, hurled the communist regime into crisis. Stalin's death was followed three years later by the death of Bolesław Bierut — a vicious and hard-line Polish Communist leader. Later that year, 1956, mass strikes of workers demanding "bread and freedom" broke out in Poznań, a city in central Poland. In pacifying the workers the army caused the death and injury of many civilians. This plunged the country into a crisis. The hard-liners in the party were weakened and the attempts to cover up the protests of Poznań and present them as inspired by counter-revolutionary forces did not succeed. Calls for democratisation were met by the threat of Soviet invasion similar to the invasions that had taken place in neighbouring Eastern European countries. The Party, however, managed to assure the Soviet leadership that they were still in control and the invasion was prevented (Prazmowska 2006, 202). A certain relaxation of the severe suppression of the Stalinist period and a short period described as "little stabilisation" or "Gomułka's thaw" under Gomułka, leader of the Polish United Worker's Party (PZPR), followed. The hopes of a more substantial change were, however, not fulfilled and the worsening economic situation, urgently in need of reform and barely disguised by frozen staple food prices (Ash 1999,13). Obviously, this could not continue indefinitely and the regime made a disastrous decision to increase the food prizes without prior warning on 13 December 1970, only two weeks before Christmas. Strikes and protests across the country were once again brutally quashed with many workers of the Lenin shipyard in Gdańsk being shot dead or injured. The Party, however, was shaken too and their leader Gomułka was toppled. Leadership of the Party by the new leader, Edward Gierek, was promising to begin with; but an attempt to secure a higher standard of living was financed by foreign debt, which was also unsustainable and inevitably followed by price increases. Renewed strikes followed (Prazmowska 2006, 209). The most prominent outburst of public discontent was the strike in Radom in June 1976 triggered once more by increased food prices. The strike was brutally crushed and many participants imprisoned and

tortured during their walk between lines of ZOMO²² troops, cynically described as "paths of health", where they were beaten with batons (IPN 2006). Later, the communist regime tried to portray the protesters as hooligans and criminals (Morgan 1997). Following these repressive measures, the Komitet Obrony Robotników (Workers Defence Committee, KOR,) was formed by Polish intellectuals to assist the workers arrested in 1976 (Prazmowska 2006, 210). At the same time, it embarrassed the Party, which pretended to represent the working class (Morgan 1997).

Even though the strikes of 1956, 1970 and 1976 had been caused by economic issues and rising prices, it has been disputed that those were the only reasons. Ash (1999) argues that in accordance with Tocqueville's²³ observation the period of Gierek's leadership shows that revolutions develop during times of economic improvement. The disappointed hopes together with a change in consciousness led to the start of the next wave of strikes, which ultimately led to the final revolution in the 1980s (Ash 1999, 35). The development of this new consciousness was awakened by the election of the Polish Pope, Karol Wojtyła, in 1978. This was a significant event, not only in reinforcing the power of the Catholic Church, the traditional opposition of the communist regime, (Prazmowska 2006, 211) but also due to the charismatic personality of the new Pope himself, who captivated millions during his historic pilgrimage to Poland in 1979, giving them a new sense of faith and pride (Ash 1999, 32).

A new wave of strikes broke out in the coastal towns and cities of Poland in the summer of 1980 ushering in the final decade of the communist regime in Poland and the establishment of the non-government trade union of Solidarność (known as the Solidarity movement) with its leader, and later Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Lech Wałęsa. Gierek was forced to leave and was followed for a short period of time by Stanislaw Kania, while the Solidarność grew ever more powerful reaching around 10 million members at the height of its popularity (Stan and Nedelsky 2013, 385). As a result of the strikes the party was forced to negotiate and legalized Solidarność in 1980. This short time of apparently increased freedom and power of the new opposition came

²² Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (Motorized Reserves of the Citizens' Militia), para-military riots troop and police formations during communist era in Poland

²³ Based on Tocqueville's theory of revolution (Tocqueville 1856)

to an abrupt end on December 13th 1981 with the new head of government general Jaruzelski declaring martial law or literally “the state of war”²⁴ and rendering the Solidarity movement illegal (Prazmowska 2006, 214). A wave of arrests of Solidarity activists swept through Poland with 3.5 thousand detentions on the first day alone after the declaration of the martial law (IPN n.d.). Later 9862 Solidarność leaders were detained (Nalepa 2013, 385). Strikes that ensued all over Poland, were brutally crushed by the ZOMO troops, when the generals decided not to test the loyalty of the official conscripted troops by making them shoot their fellow citizens. They used the paramilitary, special police and security forces instead (Ash 1999, 278). The symbol of the strike’s brutal “pacifications” was the mine “Wujek” where the riot troops massacred nine workers and injured many more. Martial law continued until 22nd July 1983, though it was suspended on 31st December 1982. During that time Poland was governed by an interim executive body, the Military Council of National Salvation (Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego “WRON”). Many of the political prisoners detained under martial law were, however, detained in prison until a general amnesty in 1986 (Prazmowska 2006, 215).

The policy of suppressing all opposition continued through much of the 1980s until changes started taking place in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. This changing political situation, its anticipated impact on internal politics of the Soviet Union’s satellite states, and the continued economic challenges—including huge foreign debts—finally paved the way for negotiations with the opposition. The roundtable negotiations between Solidarity, the communist-controlled trade union, OPZZ,²⁵ and the Polish communist government began on February 9th until April 6th 1989. One of the most significant results was the communist government’s agreement to hold semi-free elections in June of the same year, thus potentially ending the communist regime in Poland.

The number of victims and the extent of victimization over such a long period of over four decades is difficult to estimate. Moreover, as highlighted above, the type and

²⁴ The Polish name is “stan wojenny” which means literally the “state of war”.

²⁵ Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions), founded in 1984.

extent of victimization differed over time with more and less excessive repression periods. The most oppressive time was the Stalinist period, which lasted until mid 1950s, a few years after Stalin's death. It has been estimated that in 1948 there have been around 173 000 political prisoners and in 1950-1952 slightly above 100 000. This would mean every 140th or 260th Polish citizen has been a political prisoner in 1948 and 1950/52, respectively. The prisoners were beaten and tortured physically and psychologically in various ways (Jarosz 2010). The number of death sentences until 1955 is estimated by historians to be no less than 5 000 (of which 2500) have been carried out), while more than 20 000 people died in various prisons during this time (IPN 2002). The second most repressive period was in the 1980s after the rise of the opposition movement and began with the imposition of Martial Law on 13th December 1981. Within the first year around 10 500 people were detained. 11 500 were arrested and 5 100 sentenced. The sentences were harsh, sometimes several years for carrying a few copies of flyers. Any demonstrations and strikes were brutally quashed and 12 people were killed during strike pacifications. Around 56 000 are estimated to have lost their jobs before August 1982 (Paczkowski 2010).

All through the existence of the communist regime in Poland one of its main tools of control and oppression was the secret police. First called the Bureau of Public Security (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB) during the Stalinist period, and later renamed as the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa, SB), it employed 15 000 – 25 000 people per year from 1975–1989 (Nalepa 2013, 385).

3.1.2 Transitional justice in Poland

As was the case in other Eastern Europe post-communist countries, the main transitional justice method in Poland was lustration. It comprises of variety of forms for vetting people in public offices in order to discover their association with the previous regime. The scope of the application of this method differed across the Eastern Bloc region. In Poland the process has been largely described by scholars as mild, reconciliatory or communist-forgiving (David 2006; Nalepa 2010; Szczerbiak 2015). The vetting process was voluntary and did not include higher level communist party officials (Szczerbiak 2015, 52). In addition, it did not necessarily result in dismissing the collaborator from public office. This only happened in situations where the person in question was found to have lied on his or her affidavit; in which case he

or she would be excluded from public office for ten years (David 2011, 86). Essentially, the basic idea was to expose the truth about people who occupied official positions and to meter out a certain amount of punishment. The punishment took the form of social ostracism or “naming and shaming” since the contents of the affidavits, as well as cases in which a person had lied were published in *Monitor Polski*, an official government website. David (2011, 85) points out the irony of calling the system in Poland reconciliatory, taking into account the low level of reconciliation that appears to exist in Polish society 25 years after the end of the repressive regime. One of the reasons might not only be the mild nature of the transitional justice mechanisms but also the delay in implementing it (David 2003) and its inconsistent nature.

After the elections in 1989, the initial approach by the first non-communist Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was to draw a “thick line” between the present and the past (Szczurbiak 2015, 54). Subsequently, the Lustration Act (*Dziennik Ustaw* 1997) did not come into being until 1997, and was only implemented in 1999, a decade after the first semi-free elections (David 2011, 84). As Nalepa (2010) points out, lustration law appropriate for the level of security service infiltration was not put in place until 2007. Around that time lustration law was extended to include top government officials, high level members of the judiciary, people in managing positions in public media or companies, where the state was a main shareholder, headmasters in high schools and administrative staff and faculty of universities, among others (Nalepa 2013, 386). This lustration law has been amended several times, changing its scope and depending on the current political party in power.

The reasons for the delayed and inconsistent pursuing of lustration have been explained in different ways by different scholars. Factors such as characteristics of the previous regime, the level of injustice or the instrumentalisation for political competition between parties have been named (Szczurbiak 2015, 60). Another explanation that has been offered by Nalepa (2010) is the high level of infiltration of the opposition in Poland. In her account the reason the communists were promised impunity and, moreover, those promises were kept, was that the opposition was afraid of the “skeletons in their closets” possibly damaging their own reputations and legitimacy. This contributed to the failure of some early attempts at lustration, such as the list of collaborators prepared by the then Minister of the Interior, Antoni Macierewicz. In 1992 he was tasked by the *sejm*, the lower house of the Polish

Parliament, to come up with names of collaborators occupying senior public official positions. After compiling it he handed the list of 66 names to the president Lech Wałęsa, which led to the dismissal of the government. The list, subsequently leaked to the press, included the name of Wałęsa himself (Szczerbiak 2015, 54). This “wild lustration period” continued until the implementation of the Lustration Act in 1999 (David 2003). The delay and lack of regulation led to many accusations that files had been destroyed by a few who had access during this time (Nalepa 2010, 2013).

Around the same time as the lustration law was enacted the Institute of National Remembrance was established. Apart from prosecuting crimes against the Polish nation (including the crimes of the communist regime), it was tasked with the custody of the SB (security service) files. However, the slow pace at which the files were made accessible to a wider number of people caused further leakages, such as the list of 240 000 names being made public by the journalist Wildstein in 2005 (Szczerbiak 2015, 57). The problem with this list was that it included anyone whose files existed regardless of whether the person had been a collaborator or a victim.

These few examples show the continuous fight and struggle between different sides of Polish society: those who wanted a more radical transitional justice approach and those who were opposed to it for various reasons, including the most obvious one of having too much to lose through a more drastic lustration process. It points to the continued influence and power of the former communist elites, not only in the political, but also in the economic sphere. The trading of political power for economic power and influence of the former communists in Poland has been a topic of academic research (Los and Zybertowicz 2000; Staniszkis 1990, 2001; Wasilewski 1999); of journalistic investigation (Kania, Targalski, and Marosz 2014) and of public debate. This has been described by Staniszkis (1990) as “political capitalism” symbolized by the slogan “making owners of the nomenklatura” and widely used in particular in the 1990s. Around half of the later post-communist economic elite occupied higher managerial positions before 1989 (Wasilewski 1999, quoted in Staniszkis 2001). A recent bestseller documents how the next generation of children of the former communist elites still dominates positions of social influence (Kania, Targalski, and Marosz 2014). David (2003) mentions that one of the objectives of the post-communist legislature was to rectify the injustices of the past by giving opportunities to those who have been

excluded for political reasons. This does not seem to have succeeded, at least not to a satisfactory degree.

Further transitional justice approaches in Poland have only been implemented to a very limited extent. Trials of communist leaders, who were in charge when the killings of striking workers took place in Gdańsk in 1970, or in Katowice in 1981, dragged on and were mostly terminated due to ill health of the defendants or lack of evidence. The Reprivatisation Law was vetoed by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 2001. Rehabilitation took place but without any meaningful financial consequences (Nalepa 2013, 390).

The struggle regarding compensation of former oppositionists, as well as the instigation of some form of financial consequences for those who worked for the communist regime, continues to this day. The Institute of National Remembrance has issued information about compensation options and offered to provide advice for those seeking some form of restitution (IPN 2014). Nevertheless, the economic situation of many former oppositionists is dire while the political debates about compensation were overdue and the proposed amounts small (Mańczak 2016; Wasilewska 2014). Until very recently there has merely been some limited financial support for the poorest oppositionist. An estimated tens of thousands of them live in poverty. The newest amendment to the law targeting former anti-communist opposition members grants 402,72 zł (around 100 USD) per month regardless of their economic situations (Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2017). Meanwhile, many of the former perpetrators receive high pensions or benefit from the wealth amassed during the privatization period of the former communist regime. While those on the highest level of the former hierarchy receive several times the amount many of the poorest oppositionists have to live on (Fakt.Pl 2015), even the pensions of the average security service agents were considerably higher until recently (Gazeta Prawna 2010; WPROST 2016). The fact that the pensions of particularly former officials of the security agencies were too high was, after years of debate, acknowledged by the government in the new law targeting the pensions of this group and implemented from October 2017 (Sejm RP 2016). The statement on the website of the Ministry of the Interior reads that the pension reduction is not meant as punishment but rather as an attempt to restore social justice by revoking undeserved privileges (MSWiA 2017). It further states that those measures apply to 39 000 former security officials.

For years there has been an ongoing public debate about the economic situation of many oppositionists versus former perpetrators, with various NGOs and victim's associations at the forefront. One example is the campaign by the NGO "Stowarzyszenie Wolnego Słowa" (Free Word Association), which demanded that the pensions of victims should be at least 1 Zł (roughly 25 Cents) higher than the pensions of former security agents (PAP 2013). This symbolic amount highlights the significance of the social comparison postulated before: social comparison and relative deprivation are about more than just economic benefits. The level of salary, pension or compensation people receive indicates how much their work, social contribution or loss was worth in the eyes of the society. The higher economic or social wellbeing of the former perpetrators signals to the victims that the transformation was meaningless and the system largely remained the same, with the same people remaining on the same rungs of the social hierarchy. Forgiveness under conditions of imbalance, when the victim remains in a lower position, is difficult to achieve, and is the type of forgiveness criticized as demeaning by scholars (Griswold 2007; J. G. Murphy and Hampton 1998).

3.2 Uganda

In line with the previous section about Poland, a brief overview of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) war in Northern Uganda will be followed by a description of the transitional justice measures undertaken since the end of that war.

3.2.1 Historical overview of the LRA conflict

Before describing the LRA conflict in Northern Uganda it is necessary to briefly outline the post-colonial history of the country and some of the factors that contributed to the brutal 20-year long war.

The postcolonial period in Uganda has been seen by many in the West as an embodiment of the "African disaster" that seemed to befall many countries on the continent post-independence (Crowder 1987). Notorious internationally for the brutal regime of the dictator Idi Amin, the country described as "the Pearl of Africa" never experienced a peaceful change of government after independence. Apart from the very brief tenures of Sir Edward Muteesa II as the first president of Uganda, and much later of Yusuf Lule, Godfrey Binaisa and Tito Okello, Ugandan history and politics until 1986 have been dominated by the dictators Milton Obote, who was president twice from 1966–1971 and 1980–1985, and the more notorious Idi Amin (1971-1979). Both,

trying to assert their power, filled the army with members of their ethnic groups. Originally, the army under Obote, himself a Langi, was dominated by the Lango and Acholi people, both from Northern Uganda, and with a long history of rivalry but also cooperation (Finnström 2008, 65). However, in his second term of office Obote started to heavily favour his own Langi people at the expense of the Acholi by slowly removing them from any positions of influence in the army (Tindigarukayo 1988). At the same time, in 1981, Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army started a guerrilla war to remove Obote from power. The weakened government was finally overthrown by Tito Okello, an Acholi general, in 1985. As the new president, Tito Okello signed a peace agreement with Museveni during the Nairobi Peace talks in 1985. However, the latter continued fighting and in 1986, a few weeks after signing the peace deal, he overthrew Okello's government and became president, marking the last change of power in Uganda to date. While many saw Museveni's rule as an improvement and a period characterized by the development of the country, the Acholi people have not benefitted from the increase in prosperity (Finnström 2008, 63). They felt betrayed by Museveni's coup after they had signed the peace deal in Nairobi, calling the peace talks the "peace jokes" (Green 2009). Instead of the peace talks marking the end of continuous conflict, new ones began, this time in Northern Uganda, the home of the Acholi people.

Within the two years after Museveni had assumed power around 27 rebel groups were fighting his government (Bond and Vincent 2002, 354). Many of the rebel groups consisted of former soldiers from the north, who fled to their home region. While most of those rebel movements failed, the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena turned out surprisingly successful for a short period of time. It was finally defeated at Iganga, a southern town in close proximity to the capital city of Kampala. Alice Lakwena's initially non-violent and egalitarian movement enjoyed much popular support due to the mounting grievances of the Acholi people who felt marginalized under the new government (Finnström 2008, 75). After her defeat two new rebel groups emerged, one belonging to her father, Severino Lukoya, and another to her alleged cousin, Joseph Kony. When Lukoya finally surrendered, Kony's rebel group, which later came to be known as the Lord's Resistance Army, absorbed his fighters together with those of Alice Lakwena and other unsuccessful rebel groups who wanted to continue fighting

(Finnström 2008, 77; Nannyonjo 2005). This marked the beginning of one of the longest and most brutal civil wars on the continent. It lasted for two decades.

What initially started as a rebellion to overturn the government quickly turned against the local population from the same ethnic group as the rebels, the Acholi (Nannyonjo 2005). While the government of Uganda, beginning in 1996, forcibly displaced the majority of the population in the Acholi sub-region under the pretext of protection (HRW 2005), the rebels began accusing the civilians of collaborating with the government (Finnström 2008, 90). By 2005, 1.9 million people of northern Uganda, of which 1.1 million were Acholi (95% of the Acholi population), had been forcefully displaced (HRW 2005; OHCHR 2011). Though accurate data is difficult to obtain according to some estimates up to 66 000 people have been abducted (Annan et al. 2008) of which, as of 2005, 20 000 were estimated to be abducted children (HRW 2005). Torture, killings, maiming, sexual violence and countless other atrocities characterized the conflict, which was described in 2004 by the UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, as the worst, but forgotten, humanitarian crisis in the world. Several surveys conducted towards the end of war describe the exposure to violence as extremely high with, for example, 40% of their respondents reporting abduction, 45% witnessing the death of a family member and 23% physical mutilation (Phuong et al. 2005). The extent of violence of the LRA was so prevalent that some authors described it as “auto-genocide” (Jackson 2002).

After numerous failed peace talks, the Juba Peace Talks mediated by Riek Machar, at the time the Vice President of autonomous South Sudan, began in 2006. This heralded the end of the violence in northern Uganda. Sudan and South Sudan have been involved in the conflict with the LRA, with the rebel group being partly based in South Sudan, and allegedly supported by the government of Sudan (Finnström 2008, 84; Nannyonjo 2005). Even though the final peace agreement was never signed, and the fight between the government of Uganda and the LRA continued in later years, most notably in 2008/2009 with the Operation Lightning Thunder in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the location shifted outside the borders of Uganda. The transition and post-conflict period began in 2006/2007 with various, sometimes conflicting, attempts to come to terms with the violent past.

It is important to note that while the LRA and their leader Joseph Kony often appeared, and are described, especially by foreigners, as bizarre with their obscure spiritual background, linking traditional beliefs in spirits with elements of Christian faith, the reason they were able to develop is rooted in real existing grievances.

3.2.2 Transitional justice in Northern Uganda

Much of the transitional justice debate in Northern Uganda focused on the question of retributive justice as represented by the International Criminal Court (ICC), traditional reconciliation rituals and amnesty for the returning rebels, declared by the parliament of Uganda in the Amnesty Act (Parliament of Uganda 2000).

After more than a decade of war, the failure of peace talks and as a result of persistent advocacy by various groups, the Amnesty Act was enacted in 2000 for LRA fighters who had abandoned the rebellion. The president was reported to be against amnesty for the rebels and the operation “Iron Fist” in 2002 demonstrated that the military option had not been abandoned (Allen 2006, 75). Nevertheless, it soon encouraged thousands of rebels to flee, surrender and apply for amnesty (Allen 2006, 77). Paradoxically, soon afterwards President Museveni referred the LRA case to the ICC, which took it up issuing arrest warrants for the top five rebel commanders in 2005 (Office of the Prosecutor 2005).

Meanwhile, renewed negotiations began with the rebels raising issues about whether the measures were contradictory in that they offered amnesty and peace negotiations, on the one hand, while legal prosecutions were instituted, on the other (Allen 2006, 72). Since the top rebels were excluded from the amnesty provisions many wondered what incentive they might have to sign a peace deal and whether the ICC does constituted an impediment to the peace process (Apuuli 2006). Consequently, the final peace agreement was never signed.

Currently, of the five indicted rebels three are dead or presumed dead, one is at The Hague on trial and the leader, Joseph Kony, is still at large. The situation in Uganda reflects one of the challenges, and also endorses criticisms, of international legal transitional justice approaches. Of the thousands of rebels and millions of victims the international justice measures only directly affect two commanders—in case Kony is ever captured— and a small number of victims through the victims' fund, at a fraction

of the cost of an international trial (The Trust Fund for Victims 2016).²⁶ Meanwhile, the general population has to come to terms with the considerable number of ex-rebels who have returned home.

The extraordinary capacity of the Acholi people to forgive and welcome the returnees home has been repeatedly acknowledged by traditional and religious leaders, NGO workers, media and many others (Allen 2006, 129; Borzello 2009, 157). It has been used to criticize the ICC involvement and to promote traditional ways of reconciliation such as “mato oput” or “nyono tong gweno” rituals. “Mato oput” is a ritual performed in cases of killings.²⁷ In the ritual the perpetrator acknowledges his or her guilt and responsibility, asks for forgiveness and offers compensation. At the end, the wrongdoer and representative of the wronged family drink a bitter juice (the meaning of “mato oput” in Acholi is drinking the bitter juice) as a symbolic gesture to show that they do not want to taste such bitterness again. “Nyono tong gweno”, which means stepping on the egg, is performed to welcome home clan members who have been away. The purpose of the ritual is to cleanse them from anything that might have happened when they were away. These rituals have been implemented in the context of the current conflict and widely advocated as local forms of justice to be preferred instead of foreign and Western systems of legal trials and imprisonment (Bangura 2008).

Other writers have, however, questioned whether such rituals are applicable or appropriate in the case of mass atrocities and human rights violations (Allen 2008). Another controversial issue with regard to the ICC involvement was its focus on the LRA only, even though there had been various reports of the government army’s, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), atrocities. Although the president was the person who approached the ICC in the first place, he subsequently tried to repudiate his government’s involvement with the ICC (Bangura 2008). This has not been successful and the trial of the first captured top rebel, Dominic Ongwen is currently ongoing at The Hague.

²⁶ According to the 2016 Annual Report of the victims trust there have been 42 827 direct beneficiaries in Uganda. The focus of the programmess is on physical and psychological rehabilitation. There are no reparations as of now, as none of those for whom arrest warrants were issued have been convicted yet.

²⁷ See also chapter 2.3.3.

Most of the other former rebels have benefitted from the Amnesty Act, which is still in place after several extensions and ongoing controversy. Apart from amnesty ex-rebels are entitled to receive resettlement packages to enable them to start a new life. While this measure was put in place to help former rebels, some of whom have been in the bush for years, to adjust to civilian life, the selective nature of this approach has been criticized²⁸ (Borzello 2009, 157). Even more problematic appears to be the treatment of high-ranking commanders as compared with the majority of returnees. The complex nature of this conflict with blurred lines between victims and rebels, many of whom have been abducted as minors, often contributes positively to forgiveness and understanding. Many victims are aware that those who have been abducted often had no choice and did not commit atrocities voluntarily or intentionally. However, this applies less to senior LRA commanders. Ironically, those higher in the ranks seem to benefit more while many abductees are excluded. For example, it has been pointed out that abducted girls, forced into marriages with LRA commanders, have been excluded from the amnesty law, while the provision of material benefits to rebels and commanders was referred to some people as “aggression bonuses” (Hazan 2017). Some of the most senior commanders receive considerable salaries, have been staying in best hotels in the region, or have even started NGOs to help rehabilitate child soldiers (Borzello 2009, 158). Kenneth Banya, once the fourth most powerful LRA commander, has been initially put in charge of the Labora Farm, a project funded by international organizations and the Ugandan government to provide livelihoods for former rebels. Not only has this replicated the hierarchies of the bush but it has provided a living and power to the most brutal perpetrators, while other victims live in poverty. Others have been absorbed into the army (Borzello 2009, 159), which means not only that they have fairly secure employment, but they are also in positions of power and authority.

The difference between the official treatment metered out to the majority of returnees and the benefits afforded high-level commanders has been replicated during some of the ceremonies and rituals carried out to integrate the ex-rebels back into communities.

²⁸ At the national victims conference organized by Ayinet in May 2014 in Kampala, several victims pointed out that even though they understood the reasoning behind the resettlement packages the fact that victims did not receive anything would probably contribute to conflicts and be seen as rewarding rebels.

This was apparent at the “nyono tong gweno” ritual witnessed by the author in March 2015. The ritual was performed to welcome back a group of returnees and the high ranking commander, Caesar Acellam. Acellam was treated like a guest of honour, given time to speak and was seated among the most important guests of the celebration, separate from the other returnees. Meanwhile the abductees huddled as a group on the ground under a tree. Acellam received amnesty, while his subordinate, lower level ex-rebel Thomas Kwoyelo, is currently facing charges of crimes against humanity at the Uganda’s special chamber of the International Crimes Division, established in 2008 (Hazan 2017; Okiror 2015).

More than a decade after the cessation of hostilities in Northern Uganda the issue of transitional justice is still ongoing and continues to be controversial. Not only do the various measures appear to contradict each other, but the government and the president continue to change their support and opinion about the most appropriate way to deal with the past. While the Justice, Law and Order Sector of Uganda appears to be committed to implementing a transitional justice policy (Justice, Law and Order Sector 2014), the proposed Transitional Justice Bill has been shelved (Muto-Ono 2017). Programmes designed to develop and reconcile northern Uganda, such as the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan have been marred by corruption and have suffered from serious implementation challenges, reducing their potential benefits for the victims. Meanwhile, it seems that those who are most responsible for harm done to these victims, benefit the most, while the majority of the Northern Ugandan population and former abductees still suffer the economic and psychological consequences of the war.

CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes in detail the methods used in carrying out the current study. The chapter begins by describing the general approach, which involves an explanation of the reason for choosing a mixed-method methodology. The second section of the chapter explains the reasons for choosing Poland and northern Uganda as research sites. Thereafter, the general research design is outlined, namely, the sampling and the three main methods applied in the present study. These methods involve an experiment, a survey and qualitative questions and interviews.

The general research question, addressing the effects of relative deprivation on justice perceptions and forgiveness, is split into two sub-studies. One deals with the effects of economic relative deprivation and the second with relative deprivation regarding social acknowledgement. The term “social acknowledgment” has been chosen for the variable as it encompasses a twofold definition of social recognition arising from the knowledge of the past experiences of the victims. Though the methodologies and variables are very similar, for purposes of clarity both studies are described here separately.

In addition, the cross-cultural aspect of this research, including a description of the challenges of such an approach and ways of dealing with them, is addressed. The final section is concerned with the ethical considerations of a research that deals with a vulnerable group of people.

4.1 Mixed-method approach

The present study applies a mixed-method approach to answer the research questions. Mixed-method studies combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to gain a deeper understanding of the research topic and balance out some of the weaknesses of both methodologies. A brief description of mixed-method studies including a categorization of the present study is followed by an explanation of the reasons for choosing this particular approach.

After decades of debate and dispute between proponents of quantitative and qualitative research, a third approach emerged that in some ways attempts to bridge the divide by drawing on the strengths of both approaches (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004). As it combines quantitative and qualitative elements, it has been called a mixed-method approach. Since the approach is still relatively new there has been, and still is, some

confusion with regard to the definition and typology of various possible mixed-method designs. An attempt to bring some structure into this field has been undertaken by Leech and Onwuegbuzie (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009). They propose a three-dimensional typology based on the following decisions of the researcher: the degree of mixing the qualitative and quantitative approaches (fully or partially mixed); the chronology (sequential or concurrent); and the emphasis of the method (equal or dominant status of the methods). Based on this typology this research can be categorized as partially mixed, concurrent dominant status design.

Leech and Onwuegbuzie describe a research process in four stages: the research objective, the type of data and operations, the type of analysis and the type of inference (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009, 267). A fully mixed approach involves mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches within or across one or all stages. A partially mixed approach involves conducting each part separately, while the mixing occurs at the interpretation stage.

The design applied in the present study includes the quantitative elements of a vignette study and a survey; and the qualitative elements of a number of open-ended questions and several in-depth interviews. Even though the open-ended questions were added to the quantitative questionnaires, the interviews, as well as the analysis, were conducted separately. While the focus is on the quantitative approach, the qualitative interviews have been conducted for triangulation purposes, to increase the validity and strengthen the interpretation of the obtained data.

Relative deprivation, as described in the previous chapters, is a concept that has existed in social psychology and related disciplines for a long time; and has been studied extensively. Although it has not been applied in the context of transitional justice, and its effects on forgiveness of victims have not been studied, certain assumptions can be developed based on the extensive literature. Therefore, a purely exploratory approach, as applied in qualitative studies, is not necessary or appropriate to advance knowledge in this field. Based on the existing research, hypotheses can be developed and tested using a quantitative approach.

At the same time, motivation for forgiveness and justice perceptions are complex concepts. Especially in a cross-cultural study, important elements of local understanding about these concepts can unintentionally be omitted when providing the

respondents with pre-existing answer options alone. To capture these meanings, the motivations to forgive, to assess deservingness, the emotional aspects and justice perceptions a qualitative approach is necessary for a fuller and more nuanced comprehension and analysis of the results. In other words, because existing scales apply a preset definition, qualitative data is indispensable in order to interpret the similarities and differences between the samples. Gathering qualitative data will also allow the respondents to express their own understanding of justice and forgiveness without have had a definition imposed on them beforehand. This plays an even more important role in case of cross-cultural studies. The interviews, moreover, give interviewees the space to relate the study to their particular circumstances and context. While the focus and aim of this research is to determine whether the assumed mechanisms have common features and are possibly generalizable across various contexts, the contexts themselves should, nevertheless, not be ignored. Therefore, while the focus is on the quantitative data, which, according to the previous typology, makes the study a dominant status design, the qualitative data has an important supportive role. It adds context, meaning and facilitates validation and triangulation of findings.

Triangulation and validation are further achieved through the employment of two quantitative approaches, namely vignette experiment and survey. The experiment facilitates an investigation of causality and enables a direct comparison between both research sites by using the same vignette stories. The survey investigates the same relationships between the variables in a real life context. In particular those who have researched forgiveness have found that scenario and recall methodologies complement each other as they tend to impact on cognitive versus emotional responses, respectively (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010).

As pointed out, the data collection can be done concurrently or sequentially. A sequential design can, for example, be used to explore a certain topic in order to test hypotheses afterwards based on the previously conducted qualitative study. Alternatively, a quantitative research study can be conducted and then certain aspects can be explored more extensively through a subsequent qualitative study. Those two approaches have been called “exploratory sequential” and “explanatory sequential mixed method design”, respectively (Creswell 2013). The third possibility is to conduct the data collection simultaneously in order to obtain a fuller picture of the

research problem in question. This is referred to as “concurrent” (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009) or “a convergent parallel mixed method design” (Creswell 2013). Since a mixed method approach was chosen for the purpose of triangulation and a deeper understanding of the research question in the present case, the concurrent or convergent design was deemed the most appropriate for this objective.

4.2 Choice of research sites

The study was conducted in two countries, Poland and Uganda. The major reason for conducting a cross-cultural study was to assess the differences and similarities of the effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness and justice perceptions in diverse contexts. It was considered that this would add knowledge about important factors that play a role in dealing with the past in various historical and cultural settings. While the research sites have been described in detail in a previous chapter, this chapter explains the reasons for choosing these two particular countries.

Places that belong to the same geographic region and share various historical features with regard to conflict frequently also apply similar transitional justice mechanisms. For example, while Eastern European countries predominantly chose the approach of lustration, many African countries have favoured either some elements of truth and reconciliation commissions or some methods derived from traditional ways of dealing with conflict. Interestingly, the supposition of a universality of justice perceptions formed the basis for the establishment of courts such as the ICC. Yet, apart from theoretical debates, those assumptions have rarely been tested. Studies conducted in one country or in a region within a country which shares similar historical or cultural features cannot contribute to answering questions about universality or relativity of justice perceptions or forgiveness. Meanwhile, in the globalized world, more and more institutions addressing these issues, such as international courts or human rights treaties, are supposed to be accepted, supported and internalized by all people, regardless of their nationality. So, while the universality assumption is, and has been, practically implemented for decades, in many ways the scientific study of cross-cultural similarities in forgiveness or justice perceptions lags behind. By choosing two completely distinct settings this study contributes to answering these questions.

While historically and culturally diverse, and with different conflict contexts, both Poland and Uganda share some similar features that are important in the context of

this study. The sites were chosen also because of the nature of some of these similarities.

Firstly, in both countries, negotiations played an important role in ending the conflict, and the majority of perpetrators were not punished. In Poland, negotiations formed the basis of the gradual transfer of power from the communist regime to a democratically elected government. In Uganda, though the peace talks were not concluded, they nevertheless played a crucial role in ending the civil war. The topics of interest of this study are the effects of economic and social inequalities between victims and perpetrators. A situation where perpetrators retain some benefits at the end of the conflict does rather happen in contexts of a negotiation than when the former perpetrators are, for instance, defeated in war.

Secondly, in both countries the grant of amnesty to the majority of former perpetrators represented a central characteristic and approach, since a more retributive approach was seen as possibly endangering peace or the transition process. The context and the circumstances in both countries led to a situation in which promises were made to the former perpetrators. Apart from a few selected cases, these promises largely prevented retributive justice from taking place. The prevention of punishment has been closely linked to the perception that former perpetrators benefitted from the process in both countries. While avoiding punishment, many former rebels in Uganda have been integrated into the army, received resettlement packages to enable them to start a new life and in particular higher ranking, ex-rebels were offered financial opportunities which exceeded those of most victims. In Poland, the financial benefits of former security agents remain a highly controversial topic to date. These circumstances, yet again, can contribute to perceived inequality between perpetrators and victims and the experience of relative deprivation of the latter group.

Thirdly, in both countries, though the measures applied were different, they were nevertheless predominantly perpetrator-centred. The measures directed at victims were rather limited. The lack of focus on the victims can let them feel left out, exacerbate perceived inequality and contribute to relative deprivation.

Finally, in both countries, the church plays an important role and the majority of the population belongs to the Christian faith, most of them being Catholics. Religion has been repeatedly reported to have a positive effect on forgiveness (Azar and Mullet

2002; Davis et al. 2013; McCullough, Bono, and Root 2005). As different religious denominations are assumed to have different approaches to and facilitate different attitudes toward forgiveness (Exline et al. 2003) it is considered advantageous for the present study not to add another potentially confounding factor. While not at the focus of the research questions of the present study, religiosity is added as a control variable. Another critical reason for choosing those two settings is the fact that the conflict in these countries was not driven by ethnicity per se. Ethnic conflicts have different dynamics, which are not easily comparable with other contexts. For one, people are automatically assigned to one side or the other. While they may choose to not actively participate in the conflict, they are still always seen as belonging to either one side or the other. In a non-ethnic conflict, the social psychological categories of victim and perpetrators are chosen or develop in the course of the conflict. The ingroup-outgroup categorization is based on actions and choices and not on pre-existing identities. The fact if the conflict was based on pre-existing categories, such as ethnicity, or not, can be presumed to have implications for forgiveness as well as justice perceptions (e.g. Ford 2012; Biro et al. 2004). Therefore, two research sites were chosen where ethnicity did not play a major role.

Finally, a rather pragmatic reason for the choice of the two countries was knowledge and previous experience of both settings. This was considered significant in facilitating preparation of the study, gaining access to with relative ease as well as enhancing understanding and the interpretation of the results.

4.3 Research design and strategy

This section starts with an outline of the sampling in both countries. The second part of the section describes the procedures and operationalization of the variables used in the experiment, the survey and the qualitative research. Finally, the last part of this section highlights some of the challenges of cross-cultural studies, potential sources of bias and how they have been addressed in the present study.

The two studies are described separately even though most of the questions were very similar. The first study addresses the effects of social comparison and relative deprivation with regard to economic wellbeing and the second study focuses on social acknowledgement.

The tools consisted of a questionnaire with two parts. The first part was the vignette experiment and the second part was the survey. The first page explained the content and context of the study and informed the participants that it was anonymous, voluntary and that it would take around 30-40 minutes to answer all questions. Both parts included a few open-ended questions. The interviews were carried out separately and roughly followed a semi-structured interview guide.

A small pilot study was carried out beforehand in both countries. Questionnaires were sent to contact persons by email for printing and distribution by them. The pilot study was done to ensure that the vignette's story and the questions were understood in both countries. Feedback from the contact persons provided an opportunity to improve the questionnaire.

4.3.1 Sampling

The participants in both countries had been victims. In Poland they had been victims of the communist regime and in Uganda they were victims of the LRA war in the Acholi sub-region. The definition provided in the UN "Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power" was used to define victims. According to this definition "victim" means:

“persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms relating to human rights”. (UN 1985).

In line with this definition the victimization categories included in the study were physical harm, economic loss, death of a close relative and arrest/detention or abduction, in Poland and Uganda, respectively.

To locate the participants, formal victims' associations and a few informal groups and networks of victims in both countries were contacted. The lists of victims' organisations were obtained online from platforms gathering these types of associations. or from NGOs that work with victims or victim groups. The contact persons for the respective groups were then contacted, either personally, by mail or phone, to explain the content and purpose of the present study. In Uganda, personal meetings then took place with group members, while in Poland mostly contact lists of

members were provided by those associations or groups who agreed to participate. The demographic detail of the participants in both countries and studies are summarized below (table 1).

In Poland, seven in-depth interviews were conducted with five male and two female interviewees. In Uganda, thirteen interviews with ten male and three female interviewees took place.

The reason for the gender imbalance in Poland (visible in table 1) was that most of the associations assembled people, who were political prisoners and the majority of political prisoners were male. Another imbalance, visible in particular in study 2 as well as in fewer interviews conducted in the Polish sample, was the smaller sample size in Poland. This is due to the particularities of the sampled population. Victims are in general not an easily accessible group.²⁹ A study among this kind of population is, perforce, accompanied by various challenges, participants are not easy to find and, additionally, there are various time and financial constraints.

The difference between the two research sites is that the LRA war in Uganda was focused on one particular region in the north of the country, while in Poland the victims are spread all over the country. This difference has a number of implications for the research exercise. In Uganda, it was possible to introduce the study personally. In fact, it was generally necessary as often no other means of communication exists. In Poland a considerable part of the communication with the participants was done by email or mail. The time and cost implications made it impossible to meet the victim group in person. Moreover, some of the groups do not even meet very regularly themselves. The groups are often not founded based on the geographic proximity of the members but, for instance, assemble former prisoners of particular prisons they have been detained in decades ago.

In many cases it would have, therefore, meant meeting the individuals in person. This was not possible within the scope of this research. While many victims in Poland did use online communication to ask questions about the study, and there was some

²⁹ Ethical considerations are addressed in section 4.4.

personal contact, it was less frequent than in Uganda.³⁰ Clearly, especially in the case of such sensitive topics, many victims felt more comfortable to participate when they had met the researchers in person. This made the sampling in Uganda easier in some ways as compared to Poland, and in the light of time constraints impacted on sample sizes in Poland.

³⁰ The issues of different questionnaire administration and the ramifications are addressed in detail in section 4.3.5.

Table 1 Demographic details in both studies

Study 1		Uganda n=131	Poland n=116
Age	Range	20-78	45-84
	Mean	39.8.	65.5
Sex	Female	65	16
	Male	66	100
Education	No formal Ed.	22	
	Primary	74	7
	Secondary	33	41
	Tertiary	2	68
Marital status	Single	25	11
	Married	103	84
	Divorced	1	12
	Widowed	2	9
Study 2		Uganda n=126	Poland n=74
Age	Range	19-82	38-93
	Mean	44.1	66.9
Sex*	Female	80	9
	Male	45	65
Education†	No formal Ed.	42	
	Primary	71	
	Secondary	11	25
	Tertiary		48
Marital status††	Single	13	2
	Married	79	61
	Divorced	4	4
	Widowed	29	7
<p>* One participant in the Ugandan sample did not disclose his or her gender</p> <p>† One participant in the Polish and two in the Ugandan sample did not disclose their education levels.</p> <p>†† Two participants in the Ugandan sample did not disclose their marital status.</p>			

4.3.2 Experiment

The experiments formed the central part of both studies. All participants were given one short vignette story, out of four possible scenarios, about victim and perpetrator in a fictitious country. This constituted a between-subject (BS) study.

In order to be able to give the victims in both countries the same vignettes the story was situated in a fictitious post-conflict country. Some elements were similar to the Polish context and some were similar to the Ugandan context in order to enable people to relate to the victims. The qualitative responses indicated that the victims were able to relate to the story. The other option would have been to design two different stories, one for the Ugandan and one for the Polish context. This would have made the two settings much less comparable.

The vignette describes a country that had been subjected to a military regime and a civil war with rebels but had since undergone a democratic transformation after peace negotiations and elections. The experiences of Daniel, a victim of the regime, were briefly outlined followed by a description of his situation in the newly democratic country. Another protagonist in the vignette, whose situation during and after the conflict is depicted, was Robert, a high-ranking former perpetrator. The two chosen names, Daniel and Robert, exist and are common in both countries making them familiar names and the story therefore easier for the respondents to relate to.

The two studies focused on different aspects: one on relative deprivation regarding the economic situation of the victim; and the other on social recognition. The two vignettes as well as the variables used in both studies are described below.

Study 1 – Economic wellbeing

The first study focused on a comparison between the victim and the perpetrator with regard to economic wellbeing. Daniel, the victim, suffered physical harm and economic loss during the conflict. Robert, the perpetrator, was a high-ranking military officer overseeing and ordering many of the human rights violations who had joined the armed forces voluntarily for career reasons.

The experiment consisted of four versions of a vignette. In the first version, the victim was financially well-off, having received compensation, he lived comfortably. The perpetrator was similarly well-off. In the second version, the victim was well-off while

the perpetrator lost all his benefits and was poor. In the third version the victim was poor, while the perpetrator was well-off; and in the last fourth version both were poor³¹.

The four versions were distributed randomly (using the random.org randomizer) to the participants so that each participant received one version of the vignette story. In the first study there have been the following number of participants in each experimental condition:

Vignette	V1	V2	V3	V4
Poland	37	27	29	23
Uganda	32	33	35	31

In the subsequent section, the participants were requested to imagine they were Daniel (the victim) while answering the questions. The following variables formed the experimental part of the questionnaire:

Relative deprivation

The operationalization of relative deprivation was twofold. One is the variable relative deprivation consisting of four items related to the four components of relative deprivation described in the literature review, namely: comparison, deservingness, anger and resentment. The participants were asked to imagine they were Daniel (the victim) and then compare their situation to the one of Robert, assess to what extent they (as Daniel) deserve their conditions or not and finally state the level of anger and resentment about it. This short scale functioned at the same time as a manipulation check. The second way of operationalizing relative deprivation was to consider V3 (the victim is worse off than the perpetrator) as the “relative deprivation scenario”.

The reasons for this two-way operationalization are that the scenarios enable experimental manipulation and capture the different levels of comparison, while the variable “experienced relative deprivation” enables the inclusion of the other crucial elements, which constitute the concept. As has been pointed out in detail before,³² a comparison alone does not guarantee relative deprivation. Using both operationalization methods provides for a more nuanced measurement that captures

³¹ See the appendix for the vignette versions and the questionnaire.

³² See chapter 2.2 for details.

the effects of the particular aspect of a disadvantageous social comparison as well as all the cognitive and affective elements of relative deprivation.

The challenge with relative deprivation is that it has been measured very differently over the decades. Some of these measurements, as highlighted previously, led to erroneous conclusions about the effects of relative deprivation. While this has improved, there is still no consistent scale. Each author uses slightly different items even though recently relative deprivation scholars have all focused on these core components. For the present study, the items used by Huo, Osborne and Smith (study in progress) have been adapted. Following the suggestion of one of the authors,³³ and based on the relative deprivation meta-analysis (H. J. Smith et al. 2012), they have been combined into the “experienced relative deprivation measure”. Each of the four items - comparison, deservingness, anger and resentment - consisted of a 5-point Likert scale.

In order to examine the items more extensively, an exploratory factor analysis with the principal component analysis as the extraction method and Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization was conducted. In both samples, the items loaded on two factors (based on Eigenvalue > 1), which loading is consistent with the multidimensional theoretical conceptualization of relative deprivation, which comprises cognitive and emotional elements. The four items yielded a satisfactory reliability of α .83 in the Polish and .77 in the Ugandan sample respectively.

Forgiveness

To measure forgiveness, the TRIM-12 (McCullough et al. 1998) with the revenge and avoidance sub-scales was adapted for the purpose of this research. The scale measures motivations for revenge and avoidance as opposites of forgiveness. It is one of the most widely applied forgiveness measures and has been used in different cultural contexts also with victims in a post-conflict setting (Field and Chhim 2008). For the purpose of validity, and to add another forgiveness dimension, which is more direct and not framed negatively, one item asking about forgiveness directly was added. The item was used in the analysis as the variable “willingness to forgive”. As expected, the item correlated highly negatively with revenge motivation in Uganda ($r=-.60, p<.01$)

³³ Email communication with Prof Heather Smith, June 2017.

as well as Poland ($r=-.38$, $p<.01$). It was also highly negatively correlated with avoidance motivation in Uganda ($r=-.55$, $p<.01$) but not in Poland, where there was no significant correlation.

The TRIM-12 consists of 5-point Likert scale items, five in revenge and seven in the avoidance sub-scale. The range of answer options was from 1 – “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. The revenge sub-scale had satisfactory reliability in both countries, namely $\alpha.82$ in Poland and $\alpha.74$ in Uganda. The same applied to the avoidance sub-scale with an α of $.76$ in Poland and $\alpha .86$ in Uganda.

In the Polish sample, the translated version of the TRIM-12 (Kossakowska 2012) was used and adapted. The version for the Ugandan sample was back-translated into Acholi.

Justice perceptions

To measure justice perceptions two different scales have been included in the questionnaire to assess construct validity. The two scales adapted for this study were first the Injustice Gap Scale (IGS) measuring the gap between the “ideal justice” as perceived by the respondent and the real justice (Davis et al. 2015). The bigger the gap, the more the situation is perceived as unjust. The answer options, in accordance with the scale as developed by Davis et al ranged from “0= strongly disagree” to “100= strongly agree”, which corresponds to visual analogue scales. The items included statements such as “True justice was done” with one of the four items being reverse coded. α in the Ugandan sample was $\alpha.77$ and in the Polish sample $\alpha a .83$

The second scale consisted of seven items measuring justice perceptions on a 7-point Likert scale, adapted from items developed by Wenzel and Okimoto (2014). The items included statements such as “I am very dissatisfied with the situation as it now stands” or “I feel the situation as it now stands is totally unfair”, with most of the statements phrased negatively and two reverse coded statements. The answer options ranged from “1= strongly disagree” to “7= strongly agree”. The reliability in the Ugandan sample was $\alpha .86$ and in the Polish sample $\alpha .84$. The scale was named the “Injustice Perceptions Scale” (IPS) in the present study.

Both scales are based on the conceptualisation of justice perceptions as the “injustice gap”. In the findings chapter, only the results of one of the two scales, the Injustice Perceptions Scale, will be reported as it yielded higher reliability scores in both samples. However, the outcomes of both scales have been checked to verify whether

the effects are essentially the same. Both scales are highly correlated, thus supportive of the construct validity claim and justifying the use of only one of them in the findings section. In the Polish sample, the correlation coefficient was $r=.57^{**}$ and in the Ugandan sample $r=.67^{**}$ respectively.

In the case of both scales, the justice perceptions were related to the assessment of the general post-conflict setting from the point of view of the victim. So the questions do not ask how just the economic situations of the victim and the perpetrator are. This shows to what extent the comparison influences justice perceptions of the whole post-conflict context.

Study 2 – Social acknowledgement

The procedure in the second study mirrored the one in the first study. Four vignette scenarios were developed with the same background description of the fictitious country and the same characters of Daniel (victim) and Robert (perpetrator). The difference in the second study was that the post-conflict experiences of the victim and perpetrator did not mention their economic situations, but their social recognition and status instead. This was operationalized in the case of high recognition as having a high esteem among neighbours, being invited to school or universities to give speeches as well as at official religious or political events. In the case of low recognition, the person in the story was shunned by neighbours who did not want much to do with him.

Social acknowledgment means respect, social status and recognition as arising from the acknowledgment of past experiences. Daniel's role and experiences as a victim are source of the social recognition or alternatively Robert's social recognition arises due to his position in the society, present and past, while his crimes and role as perpetrator remain "un-acknowledged".

As previously, in one scenario both the victim and perpetrator enjoyed high recognition; in the second the victim was highly recognised and the perpetrator not. In the third version of the vignette the perpetrator enjoyed a great degree of recognition and the victim did not. In the fourth, neither were socially recognized³⁴

The following numbers of participants took part in each experimental condition:

³⁴ See appendix for details.

Vignette	V1	V2	V3	V4
Poland	23	21	20	10
Uganda	31	32	32	31

As described in study 1, participants were asked to imagine they were Daniel (the victim) and answer the questions from his point of view.

Relative deprivation

The relative deprivation variable was constructed in exactly the same way as described in study 1. The factor analysis yielded similar results. In Uganda, all four items loaded on one factor. In Poland, the items loaded on two factors (Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization) with the two factors consisting of the two cognitive and two emotional elements. The 2-factor solution was, however, barely above the Eigenvalue > 1 threshold.

The reliability of the scale was satisfactory with α .74 in Poland and α .78 in Uganda respectively.

Forgiveness

The same forgiveness measure was used as in study 1, namely the TRIM-12, with the revenge and avoidance sub-scales and one added forgiveness item. The reliability of the scales was good with α .81 in Poland and .90 in Ugandan for the avoidance sub-scale and α .87 in Poland and α .74 in Uganda for the revenge sub-scale respectively.

Justice Perceptions

Justice perceptions were measured with the same two scales described above, the IGS and the Injustice Perceptions Scale. Both scales had good reliability with the Injustice Perceptions Scale being slightly more reliable also in study 2. The IGS had an internal reliability of α .72 in Poland and α .85 in Uganda, and the Injustice Perceptions scale α a .85 and α .89 in Poland and Uganda, respectively. The two scales are highly inter-correlated, supporting the claim of construct validity as well as justifying the decision of using only one of the two scales. The correlation coefficient was r -.70** in Uganda and -.68** in Poland.

4.3.3 Survey

The survey formed the second part of the questionnaire and was attached to the experiment component described above.³⁵ Vignette studies are usually combined with classic surveys to reduce each other's weaknesses. Vignettes, being an experimental design, have a stronger internal validity but a lesser external validity, as they can be perceived as less representative and oversimplified. Surveys, on the other hand, have a stronger external and lesser internal validity (Atzmüller and Steiner 2010). Moreover, as mentioned before, scenario and recall methods have been found to have a stronger influence on cognitive versus emotional responses, respectively (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010).

The survey applied the same independent and dependent variables. The difference was that instead of asking about forgiveness, revenge and avoidance of Robert (the perpetrator in the vignette story) the questions were about real life perpetrators. In the case of Poland, the security agents of the Służba Bezpieczeństwa (the security service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) were presented as representative of the perpetrator group. This service was the main security organization in Poland until the end of the communist regime. It was the group directly involved in ordering and carrying out the majority of human rights violations. In Uganda, the situation was slightly more complex, as pointed out in the previous chapter, since many of the rebels were abducted and could have been perceived as unintentional perpetrators. However, it has been emphasized in this study that the perpetrators in question are the high-ranking rebel commanders, i.e., those ordering the human rights violations and atrocities and not the average abductee who followed orders out of fear.

The first section established the demographics such as sex, age, marital status and education. A question about their experiences as victims determined whether they fell into the pre-defined categories. This was done in a similar way in a study of Colombian victims, where the authors asked people about the type of victimization they had experienced presented to them on a list. This ensured that the respondents who were included in the survey all fell within the ambit of the legal definition used by the authors for the study. This list was used even though perception-based indicators (asking whether the participants considered themselves to be victims) appear to be just

³⁵ See appendix.

as robust (Nussio, Rettberg, and Ugarriza 2015). Moreover, the victimization experience was included in the analysis as a control variable.

The other variables are described below, starting with the main independent and dependent variables. This is followed by a number of control variables such as victim identification, victimization experience or religiosity included in this study as they might have an additional influence on the dependent variables beside or beyond the impact of relative deprivation. While not of primary interest for the present study their inclusion may provide additional insights that might prove useful for future research.

Study 1 – Economic wellbeing

The first study focused on relative deprivation regarding economic wellbeing. It was attached to the vignette story where Daniel's and Robert's economic situations were manipulated. Accordingly, the respondents were asked to assess their own economic status and compare themselves with the perpetrator group on economic parameters.

Relative deprivation

As mentioned above, relative deprivation was measured in a similar way to the “experienced relative deprivation” variable applied in the experiment. The first item measured the comparison element by asking the respondents about their own circumstances compared with those of the group of actual perpetrators. This was followed by the three other items measuring deservingness, anger and resentment. The four items together constituted the variable “relative deprivation” in the survey. Moreover, another scale was added with the same items, only this time the subject was not the individual respondent answering the survey but the whole ingroup of victims. The theory is a little vague on the topic of whether individual comparison with an outgroup member constitutes individual or group relative deprivation. The theory states that it could constitute either (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). The two variables turned out to yield very similar results supporting the conclusion that in this case an individual comparison with outgroup members does indeed constitute group relative deprivation. This is not surprising considering that the conceptualisation of this study makes the group identity of being a victim salient. Both variables are also highly and significantly correlated in Uganda ($r=.64$, $p<.01$) as well as in Poland ($r=.50$, $p<.01$). Since the variable requiring an individual comparison with the outgroup yielded on average considerably better reliability and more consistent results, only those results

will be reported in the findings section. The better reliability is plausible, since it is much easier to compare one's own situation with that of an outgroup than to compare the situation of one's whole ingroup with that of an outgroup.

Another exploratory factor analysis using principal component analysis and Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization was performed in conjunction with the Relative Deprivation Variable in the survey. The relative deprivation items in the Ugandan sample loaded on the same two factors (emotional and cognitive) as they did in the experiment. In the Polish sample, all items loaded on one factor. The reliability for relative deprivation in the Polish sample was α .86 and in Uganda α .74.

Forgiveness

As in the experiment, the TRIM-12 was used with perpetrators defined as former security agents in Poland and high-ranking LRA commanders in Uganda. The revenge sub-scale had a reliability of α .86 in the Polish and α .81 in the Ugandan sample. The avoidance scale has a reliability of α .83 in the Polish and α .90 in the Ugandan sample.

Justice perceptions

The same two scales were used as previously, namely the Injustice Gap Scale (IGS) and the items adapted from Wenzel and Okitmoto (2014), which are referred to as the Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS). In assessing the reliability of the scales it turned out that removing one item from the Injustice Perceptions Scale resulted in a considerably improved reliability in the Ugandan sample, α .85 (with all items α .65). In the Polish sample, the reliability did not change and was the same in both cases, namely α .84.

The IGS had a reliability of α .66 in the Polish and α .78 in the Ugandan sample. Also in the survey section of the questionnaire, both scales were highly correlated at r -.71** in the Ugandan and r -.51** in the Polish sample.

Instead of the fictitious post-conflict context of the vignette story, the items of the Injustice Perceptions Scale referred to the real post-conflict/post-regime settings in Uganda and Poland. The IGS items are very general and therefore remained the same, but the short explanation above the question clarified that the respondents were supposed to assess the general situation after the transformation or peace process in Poland and Uganda had taken place, respectively.

Economic wellbeing

To establish the respondents' individual assessment of their own economic situation the adapted financial well-being scale (CFPB 2015) was used. The scale consists of five items with questions like "I am just getting by financially" or "I am concerned that the money I have or will save won't last". Respondents stated to what extent the statements described them on a scale from "1= completely" to "5= not at all". The scale consisted of two parts, one part of three items and the second of two items. The reliability of the Ugandan sample of all five items was not satisfactory at α .42. When only the first part of the scale consisting of three items was used for analysis purposes the reliability improved to α .57. In the Polish sample, the reliability of the 5-item scale versus the 3-item scale was α .88 and α .91, respectively. Therefore, the shortened 3-item version was selected.

Religiosity

Religiosity has been theorised and also found to have effects in particular on forgiveness. As mentioned above it has, therefore, been included as a control variable in the present study. To measure religiosity three items from the European Social Survey were adapted, including questions about the frequency of church visits or prayers as well as an estimation of the degree of own religiosity (European Social Survey 2014). The reliability of the brief scale was good with α .92 in Poland and α a .77 in Uganda.

Victim identification

Ingroup identification was found to play a role in relative deprivation research as an important factor determining social perceptions (Ellemers and Bos 1998)³⁶. As it might, therefore, influence justice perceptions or forgiveness it has been included in the present analysis as a control variable.

The following items were adapted to measure victim group identification "How often do you acknowledge or think about the fact that you are a victim?" (Karasawa 1991; Tropp and Wright 2001) as well as "I feel a strong bond with other victims of (LRA war/Communist regime)" (Ellemers and Bos 1998). To assess the construct validity an additional two items were developed and checked for inter-correlation with the

³⁶ See also 2.2.2

adapted items. The developed items were: “I consider myself a victim” and “I meet with other victims regularly”.

The exploratory factor analysis (Principal Component Analysis) confirmed that in both countries all four items loaded on one factor. Of the two adapted items the item “I feel a strong bond with other victims of (LRA war/Communist regime)” was found to have the most consistent and highest inter-correlations with the other three items in both samples. As this item captures the group identification most clearly (because it has the best face validity), it was applied as the victim identification variable in the present study.

Study 2 – Social acknowledgment

The survey part of study 2 consisted mostly of the same variables as study 1. The main difference was that relative deprivation was not assessed with regard to economic wellbeing but social acknowledgment. Consequently, economic wellbeing was not a variable in the survey and instead the respondents were asked to assess their social standing or recognition. Since the procedure was the same the characteristics of the variables, such as reliability, are outlined only very briefly.

Relative deprivation

The same items were used as previously, only in this study the respondents were asked to compare themselves with the group of perpetrators with regard to social recognition or status.

The factor analysis confirmed that all four relative deprivation items in Poland and Uganda load on the same one factor. The reliability was a .81 in Poland and a .80 in Uganda.

Forgiveness

The reliability of both scales of the TRIM-12 was good, with a a of .85 (Poland) and a .80 (Uganda) for the revenge sub-scale as well as a .88 (Poland) and a .85 (Uganda) for the avoidance sub-scale. Here, as well, the single forgiveness item was added.

Justice Perceptions

As previously, the Injustice Perceptions Scale displayed better internal reliability with the 6-item version at a .84 in both Poland and Uganda, compared to the 7-item version of a .82 and a .68 for Poland and Uganda, respectively. The IGS had a reliability of a

.73 (Poland) and a .86 (Uganda). The correlation of both scales was $r = -.58^{**}$ in Uganda and $r = -.67^{**}$ in Poland.

Social acknowledgement

Social acknowledgement was measured using the MacArthur Scale of subjective social status (Adler and Stewart 2007). The scale was designed in shape of a ladder with ten rungs and respondents were asked to place themselves on one of the rungs according to their perception of where they stood in their community.

Religiosity

The same scale consisting of three items was used. The reliability was good with a .88 in Poland and a .80 in Uganda.

Victim Identification

The Principal Component Factor analysis confirmed that in both samples all the items loaded on one factor. As in study 1 the item “I feel a strong bond with other victims of the (LRA war/Communist regime)” was significantly and positively correlated to the three other items and was used as the victim identification variable.

4.3.4 Qualitative data

The qualitative data in the present study consists of open-ended questions, which were part of the questionnaires and interviews conducted in both countries. This section focuses briefly on the open-ended questions as they also serve to provide meaning and understanding of the concepts of justice and forgiveness in the two countries.

Open-ended questions – justice and forgiveness

The open-ended questions fulfil a twofold role. While they will later inform parts of the analysis, their role was also to capture the meanings people in northern Uganda and Poland attach to forgiveness and justice. As the quantitative component answers questions about whether relative deprivation has an effect on justice perceptions and forgiveness it is crucial in a cross-cultural study to take some time to understand the conceptualisation of these concepts in both countries and to explore what both victim groups considered to be important for justice and forgiveness to take place.

As described in detail in the second chapter, even within the same cultural settings these concepts have a multi-dimensional nature. For example, while some people may see forgiveness as unconditional or may see it as resulting from their religious beliefs,

others are likely to consider certain requirements to be necessary pre-conditions. The same applies to justice. For some people, justice may be associated mainly with legal understanding or punishment, while others may associate the term with social justice, to name just a few examples. In contexts as different as those in the present study it is imperative to gain a deeper understanding of the commonplace meaning of both concepts. Therefore, the next few pages focus on the description and analysis of the definitions of these notions in Poland and Uganda.

The open-ended questions used in both studies came after the vignette. They asked the respondents to describe what would consider important to be able to forgive Robert (the perpetrator) if they were Daniel (the victim). In addition, they were asked what would need to happen for them to feel that justice had been done. The same two questions were asked at the end of the survey component but on this occasion the questions applied to the real-life context and actual perpetrators. The same procedure was repeated in both studies.

Forgiveness

As mentioned before there is a theoretical debate about conditional and unconditional forgiveness. Based on the responses drawn from this study in both countries only a very small minority understands forgiveness as unconditional. In Poland, in the survey component of the first study there were only four people (out of a total of 116) who considered forgiveness to be unconditional; in Uganda there were two (out of 131). In the second study there were three respondents in Poland (out of 74) and 15 (out of 126) in Uganda.

Generally, the expectations and understanding of the conditions for forgiveness in both countries were strikingly similar. The answers given could be generally categorized into three groups. By far the biggest group expected an internal change of the perpetrator in order to consider forgiveness. In both studies and in the hypothetical questions regarding Daniel and Robert as well as the real-life settings, the majority in both countries mentioned issues related to acknowledgment of wrongdoing, remorse or apologies as important for forgiveness. Additionally, victims in both countries expected some form of conduct to see that the attitude change was not merely superficial. In both countries, respondents mentioned some form of redress by the perpetrator. Sometimes it was directly pointed out that the perpetrator should compensate the victims and sometimes the redress or atonement was left vague.

Nevertheless, the responses showed an expectation of a sort of proof that the perpetrator had genuinely changed. Other expectations falling into a similar category were some form of truth-telling and embracing of peace or the democratic system.

Further, the question of intent played a role for some. If the perpetrator had not intended to hurt the victims then he or she was less culpable. Consequently, expectations regarding proof of a change of attitude were lower and forgiveness was easier to achieve. Due to the nature of the conflict and the forced abductions, this element came up more frequently in Uganda than in Poland. Some respondents in Uganda also mentioned that the remaining rebels should return and bring the others back with them.

Generally, the expectation of attitude change made up more than half of the respondents' expectations or requirements for forgiveness in both countries, in both studies and in the fictional experiment part as well as in the survey. This is consistent with the elements of comprehensive apologies, which include an acknowledgment of responsibility and wrongdoing, and a promise of improvement and repair (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009).

The second group of responses, considerably smaller than the first, can be described as "societal or community redress". This category includes means and approaches by the society to right the wrongs of the past. In Uganda, there was a common group of responses, which could be classified as falling between the two categories of perpetrator attitude change, and the community restoration of order. These are traditional reconciliation rituals. They play a dual role in the sense that the perpetrator has to voluntarily participate, which signifies his or her inner change; the will to be accepted back into the community; acknowledging of wrongdoing; abandonment of the previously committed acts; and, traditionally, also some form of repair. At the same time, this should not be done privately but performed by traditional leaders and elders who can be seen as presiding over this process, lending it authority and, thereby, contributing to restoring the rules and norms of the society.

Apart from this special category in Uganda, most respondents, in expecting the society to right the wrongs of the past, mentioned punishment, legal justice or compensation for the victims. The majority did not appear to insist on heavy punishments or suffering for the perpetrators (even though, in both countries, some do). They preferred court proceedings, which would signify that what the perpetrators had done was not

acceptable. The punishment itself often seemed of secondary importance. In Poland, a number of respondents even directly pointed to the symbolic value of a prosecution without expressing an expectation of prison or heavy punishment. Additionally, a number of victims in Poland also mentioned the issue of removing the perpetrators from positions of public influence or power along with official condemnation. On the other hand, they felt that the victims should be remembered and acknowledged for their role and their sacrifices.

Generally, it appeared that if victims do not expect or believe in a change in the perpetrator, they wanted the society to "step in" and restore the order. They contended that this was likely to contribute to a general forgiveness or, if not forgiveness, then it would enable the victims to come to terms with the past. Alternatively, some people expected both a change of attitude in the perpetrators and the necessity for society or the community to acknowledge and address the past in order for the victims to be able to forgive. It seemed that if people were still suffering the consequences of the past this made it more difficult for them to forgive. In particular, in Uganda, a number of respondents mentioned issues relating to a more general support for victims such as health care or psychosocial support and counselling.

Finally, the last category of responses relates to victims who only consider their personal internal attitudes or individual motivations as important for forgiveness. They saw forgiveness (or lack thereof) as an expression of their beliefs and not as a response to how the perpetrator had behaved or what the society had done. Those forgiving unconditionally fall into this category as well as those pointing to their religious beliefs. Similarly, those who declare they would never forgive, no matter the circumstances can be placed in this group in the sense that their convictions or beliefs (that they cannot forgive) are not influenced by any external factors. The motivations behind this un-forgiveness vary. Some might have had expectations in the past but had given up on perpetrators and society. Some pointed to the issue of time; they lamented that it was too late for forgiveness. This was more common in Poland, since more time had passed in Poland since the events targeted in the study than had passed in Uganda. Another reaction was indifference: people who declared they did not care about forgiveness while others emphasised that they would rather focus on the future than think about the past.

In conclusion, the interpretation of forgiveness and expectations from the perpetrators and society in both countries bore a striking resemblance. The majority of victims expected a change in attitude from the offender and a smaller group, either additionally or instead, expected the society to correct the failures of the past. The smallest group relied entirely on their internal convictions or beliefs in deciding about forgiveness. While these categories can be found in both countries and even in the same proportions, some differences reflected the variations in the two contexts. Reconciliation rituals, common in Uganda, do not exist in Poland and therefore, have not been mentioned here. The issue of former perpetrators who are in positions of public office or other places of influence caused more disquiet in Poland than in Uganda and was therefore alluded to more often by Polish respondents.

Justice

The justice perceptions also revealed surprising similarities in both countries. In answer to the question “what would be important to see that justice was done”, the responses across both countries, and across both components of the studies — the survey as well as the vignette — showed that the most common response was an improvement in the situation of victims. In most cases, compensation was mentioned directly. Alternatively, some general form of economic support was expected, as well as improvement in health care facilities for victims or, particularly in Uganda, psychological help or counselling. In Poland, the improvement of victims' situations extended to some form of social recognition, acknowledgment or remembrance. This was occasionally mentioned in Uganda too, but much less so than in Poland. It is one of the instances in which the different historical backgrounds became apparent. The Polish victims who participated in the survey had mostly chosen themselves to become part of the opposition, as opposed to most respondents in Uganda who had been victims due to circumstance. The Poles had been involved in fighting the regime. They had sacrificed a great deal for which many expected some form of acknowledgment and recognition. In Uganda, people were drawn into the conflict and were mostly passive victims. The recognition they expected was more of an acknowledgment of their suffering rather than social acclaim.

Next to improving victims' general situations and wellbeing, the other most frequently mentioned expectation was some form of accountability directed at the perpetrators. Though this was again true for both countries, the proportion of people expecting some

form of legal trial or punishment was higher in Poland. Generally, in both countries, victims associated legal justice with the notion of accountability. In Poland, some respondents also expressed expectations about the former perpetrators being removed from public posts or positions of influence, of lustration or of public condemnation. Finally, in Uganda traditional reconciliation was mentioned again as an in-between category, directed at the victim and the perpetrator simultaneously.

To sum up, while forgiveness was, in both countries, mostly dependent on the behaviour and attitude of the perpetrator, justice was generally expected to be meted out by the society or community as whole. The most common responses were divided into two categories, those directed at the victims and those directed at the perpetrators. In both countries most respondents primarily associated justice with an improvement in the victims' circumstances, be they economic conditions, greater access to health care, or social recognition. Secondly, some form of accountability, demotion or punishment, was expected for the former perpetrators. In Uganda, the first category (improvement in circumstances) was noticeably more predominant while in Poland both were on a par, though by and large the concern for victims still prevailed.

Additionally, a few people in Uganda mentioned apologies, forgiveness or amnesty as important for justice, which was rarer in Poland. Democracy or a new and more just system was highlighted by a few Poles; with peace being mentioned by Ugandan respondents. Some Ugandan respondents also emphasised the involvement or information of victims about ongoing court proceedings. Some of those responses again represented the specifics of both settings. The issue of volition or intent was posed more often in Uganda, where the conflict had been characterised by forced abductions. Therefore, more people mention amnesty or apologies as important for justice. In Uganda, where a majority of victims lived in remote villages and many only speak the local language, the high profile international court involvement left them feeling excluded. It fostered a perception that they had been excluded from a process that should have had them as victims at its forefront. Some contended that they had expected greater involvement in the trial. Finally, a few respondents in both countries mentioned uncovering the truth as important for justice, though by and large, this seemed more related to forgiveness than to expectations about justice.

Interviews

The interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide.³⁷ All have been recorded and transcribed after having obtained permission from the interviewees. None of the interviewed people voiced any objections to being recorded, though one interviewee in Uganda asked to turn off the recorder at a certain point, a request which was granted immediately. All interviews in Uganda were done by the author in English; and in Poland in Polish. The interviews in Poland were around one hour long and in Uganda, the duration ranged from 20-50 minutes, with most interviews lasting around half an hour.

4.3.5 Cross-cultural challenges

While the benefits and importance of cross-cultural studies in transitional justice have been highlighted above, research in such diverse settings has a variety of challenges. In the following section, a number of common cross-cultural biases are outlined, showing how they were addressed in the present study. Moreover, the specific characteristics of the two study settings prompted differences in the research procedure, which is also highlighted and explained.

Even though quantitative research is generally perceived as the most objective methodology, the questions of reliability or validity in cross-cultural studies are rather complex. Smith et al (P. K. Smith et al. 2013) point out a number of potential sources of bias and how to address them to make the study as comparable as possible. One source of bias described by the authors is construct bias, which refers to the psychological underlying construct being defined in different ways across cultures. An example provided is the construct of intelligence, which is understood more broadly in collectivist cultures as compared to many of the Western societies. The non-Western collectivist cultures include social competences in their concept of intelligence, in addition to the cognitive skills that constitute the core of the intelligence definition in most Western societies. Consequently, an intelligence test constructed from the Western point of view will not measure intelligence in its entirety as understood in a different cultural setting. This specific aspect of construct bias has been described as “domain under-representation” (P. K. Smith et al. 2013, 82).

³⁷ See appendix for details.

Another source of bias described by the authors is “instrument bias” (P. K. Smith et al. 2013, 86). The challenge of instrument bias begins with the type of test used. For instance, a written test is likely to cause bias because some groups of people might be more used to using pens and paper or more familiar with translating their perceptions and assessments into Likert-scale types of questionnaires. The instruments used must be locally meaningful and understandable. Therefore, using exactly the same instruments in different cultural settings for the purpose of psychometric comparability might, on the contrary, lead to misleading and biased outcomes. Another challenge with regard to correct understanding in different settings is the question of translation. The administration of the test may present another possibility for bias (P. K. Smith et al. 2013, 88). While the level of the standardisation requirements may differ depending on the measured construct and may be more relevant when, for example, measuring intelligence, it is still important to pay attention to the way the test is administered in the different settings.

The final source of bias is constituted by the sampling procedure (P. K. Smith et al. 2013, 90). While it is advisable for meaningful comparisons to sample similar groups of people, even groups that appear very similar might differ considerably. The example given here regards student samples frequently used for studies. While these samples might seem alike this is not necessarily the case. Studying is quite common in some countries, where a majority of the population attends tertiary education. In countries where access to university is limited, it is mainly reserved for elites. The "interpretation paradox" refers to the challenge that differences found between cultural groups might be a result of very many different conditions. It might, therefore, be difficult to attribute them to some particular cause. In order to address those potential sources of biases certain adjustments were made to the tools as well as procedures in executing the study. This is outlined and explained below.

The construct bias was firstly addressed by conducting a pilot study in both countries. Participants were asked to give feedback on the questions themselves. The translation process followed the procedures suggested by Brislin (Brislin 1981). The questionnaires were translated into Polish and Acholi and then translated back into English by different translators to find if there were any crucial differences. Further, in the process of translation, people with expert knowledge about the culture and languages were consulted extensively to find the most fitting approximation for the

key constructs in the study. Finally, open-ended questions were introduced to capture the possible differences in meaning of the core variables for justice and forgiveness.

In order to address the potential instrument and test administration biases a different procedure was chosen for each of the two countries. While this could constitute a weakness in a study that is not cross-cultural, adhering to strictly the same procedures in different cultural settings might instead lead to more, rather than fewer, errors. In Poland, where all the participants attended primary school at least, and where a majority were high school or university graduates, the questionnaires were self-administered. All the participants could read and write and were familiar with answer options in form of Likert scales.

In Uganda, however, the situation was quite different. Especially among the older people in villages, there are many who did not have any kind of formal education. Since the level of education is not very high in most village schools, even those who did have some education were not necessarily able to read and write without difficulty. Finally, even though most respondents in this region of Uganda were not completely unfamiliar with research studies and questions due to various studies having been conducted on the topic and on the effects of war, many would not have been absolutely at ease with answering Likert scale type of questions on their own. Therefore, in Uganda a decision was made to have the questionnaires administered by research assistants. All the research assistants were from the same ethnic group as the respondents, were fluent in English and Acholi (the local language in which the questionnaires have been translated) and had research and field study experience. They were trained for several days in order for them to thoroughly understand the topic and tools. Due to their previous experiences with questionnaires and scales in local settings they were able to contribute valuable ideas on how to make people understand Likert scale answers. For example, they suggested using water bottles to explain the several steps on a Likert scale for those who would struggle with the scale.

While using different procedures is obviously a problem, the problems in case of using the same procedure would have been much more serious. Administering the tests by research assistants in Poland was well beyond the financial scope and time constraints of this study. While the victims in Uganda are concentrated in one region of the country, of which the most affected one was selected, the victims in Poland, as well as victims' associations, are spread all over the country. Another option would have been to focus

only on well-educated English speaking victims in Uganda, who could have filled in the questionnaires themselves. This would, however, have excluded the absolute majority of people affected by the war while focusing on the least representative group.

This leads to the last type of bias addressed above: the sampling bias. The study purpose was to explore the perceptions of victims. This limited the selection of respondents to those affected by the war or regime. As already pointed out above, the Polish group was different from the Ugandan group. The victims in Poland were naturally much older, because the regime ended more than 25 years ago. They were more highly educated and the majority of them were males. One method applied in the analysis was to use exactly those demographics as control variables.

However, the biases resulting from sampling as well as from differences in test administration may yet result in an overestimation of cultural differences between the groups due to the wrongful attribution of effects of test procedure to cultural differences. The similarities between two groups might, on the other hand, be underestimated since in addition to the cultural differences there are differences in age, education and test administration. This is something to be kept in mind for the discussion of the findings.

4.4 Ethical considerations

The study was conducted among a vulnerable group of people with possible traumatic experiences and, therefore, necessitated special ethical considerations.

The first page of the questionnaire informed participants about the content of the study and that only few questions would address the type of experiences they had had during the war or as a result of the repression of the former regime. They were also informed that participation was anonymous and voluntary. Moreover, the front page provided them with contact details they could use if there were any questions they wanted to ask. This was of particular importance for the Polish samples where questionnaires were self-administered and partly sent by mail.

In Uganda, where the questionnaires were administered by research assistants, participants were informed about the purpose and content of the study before making a decision about whether they wanted to participate or not. In a short meeting, participants had time to ask their questions personally and to obtain whatever kind of information they needed before in order to make their decisions. Those who decided

to participate were read the content of the first page and informed that they could stop and revoke their participation at any time if they so wished.

During these meetings it was discovered that some of the researchers who visited the area before and had made promises to the respondents which they had not kept. It was therefore also necessary to clarify that the present research was not part of any development project and the study was done for research purposes alone. Anyone who was not comfortable with this explanation was free to leave immediately.

Finally, one of the research assistants had received training and many years of experience in trauma counselling of people in northern Uganda. In the event that any person experienced any negative symptoms relating to the trauma the counsellor was on hand to step in and conduct a short intervention.

Before conducting the study ethical clearance from the Ethical Commission of Lingnan University was obtained. In Uganda, an additional ethical clearance certificate constituted part of the research permit application. This application was successful and the clearance certificate was granted by the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology specifically for the present study.

CHAPTER 5. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, FORGIVENESS AND JUSTICE

PERCEPTIONS: VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT FINDINGS

The following chapter is divided into findings of the vignette experiments in two studies. The first study examines relative deprivation in connection with economic status; and the second study, relative deprivation in connection with social acknowledgement. The two sections describing the findings of the vignette experiments in the two studies are structured based on the three hypotheses of this research.

The findings of the Ugandan and Polish samples are first analysed separately, and then as a joint sample. The two approaches complement each other allowing for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the similarities and differences between the two research sites.

5.1 Study 1 – Relative deprivation regarding economic wellbeing

The first study focuses on the effects of economic relative deprivation on victims vis-à-vis perpetrators. The experimental manipulation is done by randomly distributing the four different versions of the vignette among the participants. The four scenarios (also referred to as experimental conditions) describe different levels of economic wellbeing of the victim and the perpetrator³⁸.

The findings of the first study are organized into sub-sections related to the hypotheses of the present research. The first section addresses the question of whether the experimental scenarios resulted in significantly different levels of “experienced relative deprivation”³⁹. Afterwards the assumptions of the first hypothesis are addressed by testing the question of whether relative deprivation has an effect on forgiveness. Secondly, the impact of relative deprivation on justice is assessed, and finally the relationship between justice and forgiveness is examined.⁴⁰

5.1.1 Social comparison and relative deprivation

³⁸ For details see chapter 4 and the appendix

³⁹ See chapter 4 for details regarding this variable

⁴⁰ For alternative analyses with ANOVA and MANOVA see appendix 6

Relative deprivation is operationalized in two ways. One is the experimental manipulation conducted through the application of the four scenarios. The scenario where the victim's economic situation is worse than the one of the perpetrator in the vignette story (V3) is considered the "relative deprivation scenario" and thus compared with the three other experimental conditions. The assumption is that this condition will lead to significantly increased injustice perceptions and reduced forgiveness compared with the three other scenarios, where the victim and perpetrator are either equally rich (V1) or poor (V4) or the one where the victim is better off than the perpetrator (V2).

However, it is important to keep in mind, as pointed out in the previous chapter on relative deprivation, that the comparison element is only one aspect of relative deprivation. At the same time, the comparison element is the only part of relative deprivation captured by the experimental manipulation. Therefore, the variable "experienced relative deprivation"⁴¹ is introduced as the second means of operationalizing relative deprivation. It is designed to capture the full cognitive and emotional range of aspects that are associated with relative deprivation. The variable can be perceived as a "manipulation check" to assess if the different experimental conditions result in different levels of experienced relative deprivation in the participants.

Uganda

The following analysis begins with an examination of whether the vignette scenarios significantly predict different levels of experienced relative deprivation. The first step involves a descriptive statistical overview of the results. The following chart 1 and table 2 show the mean values of experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental conditions.

The next step consists of a more detailed analysis of the differences between the scenarios. A series of multiple regression analyses with vignette scenario dummy variables was performed to assess if the differences between the mean values are statistically significant (table 3).

⁴¹ See chapter 4 for details on operationalization and reliability.

Table 2: Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)

Dependent Variable: Experienced relative deprivation				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	8.156	.340	7.483	8.830
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	12.303	.335	11.640	12.966
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	6.486	.325	5.842	7.130
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	7.323	.346	6.638	8.007
n (total)=131				
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31				

Chart 1 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)




Table 3: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Uganda)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
1	(Constant)	6.486	(.325)	19.931	.000
	V3* ->V1	1.671	(.471)	3.548	.001
	V3 ->V4	.837	(.475)	1.762	.080
	V3-> V2	5.817	(.467)	12.453	.000
2	(Constant)	12.303	(.335))	36.711	.000
	V2-> V1	-4.147	(.478)	-8.682	.000
	V2-> V4	-4.980	(.482)	-10.343	.000
3	(Constant)	8.156	(.340)	23.966	.000
	V1 -> V4	-.834	(.485)	-1.718	.088
n (total)=131					
Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31					

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

The results of the descriptive analysis are compatible with the expected sequence. The condition in which the victim is in a worse economic situation than the perpetrator in the post-conflict setting (V3) elicits the strongest experienced relative deprivation result. This is followed by the scenario in which both, the victim and the perpetrator are poor (V4) and the scenario where the economic situation of both is good (V1). Only the scenario in which the victim is better off than the perpetrator (V2) does not result in experienced relative deprivation on average. The four items, which were combined for the measure of relative deprivation, were operationalized using a 5-point Likert scale. Value number 3 expresses a neutral opinion. Responses with values lower than 3 represent relative deprivation and values higher than 3, responses that do not express relative deprivation. In other words, a combined value of the scale lower than 12 expresses relative deprivation in varying degrees. In the case of the Ugandan sample all scenarios apart from V2 (i.e., in which the victim is better off) elicited some level of relative deprivation.

The regression analyses showed that the experimental manipulation of economic inequalities between the victim and the perpetrator proved to have a highly significant influence on experienced relative deprivation. The size of the effect was considerable, with almost 60% of the variation of relative deprivation explained by the experimental conditions.

While the situation in which the victim is in a better economic situation than the perpetrator (V2 or advantageous comparison) results in significantly less relative deprivation compared to all other scenarios, there are no significant differences between V3 and V4 as well as V1 and V4. This is an interesting outcome. It shows that the vignette scenarios do have an effect on experienced relative deprivation. However, it is not, as previously assumed, the situation where the victim is in a worse economic situation than the perpetrator, which results in particularly extreme relative deprivation. Rather, it is only the situation in which the victim is better off than the perpetrator that does not elicit experienced relative deprivation in respondents.

There is no significant difference between the conditions V1 and V4, where the victim and perpetrator are both rich or both poor, respectively. However, there is a significant difference between the conditions V1 and V2, in both of which the victim is economically well off. This shows that there is a social comparison element which

contributes to experienced relative deprivation beyond the economic situation of the victim as such.

Poland

The same analysis that was carried out in Uganda was also carried out in the Polish sample in order to verify if the vignette scenarios predict different levels of experienced relative deprivation.

The following table 4 and chart 2 show the mean values of experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental conditions. These are followed by a detailed analysis of the differences between the experimental scenarios (table 5).

Table 4 :Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)

Dependent Variable: Experienced relative deprivation				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	10.432	.499	9.444	11.421
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	13.741	.584	12.584	14.898
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	6.483	.564	5.366	7.599
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	8.000	.633	6.746	9.254
n (total)=116 Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23				

Chart 2 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)




Table 5: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Poland)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
1	(Constant)	6.483	(.564)	11.504	.000
	V3* ->V1	3.950	(.753)	5.248	.000
	V3 ->V4	1.517	(.847)	1.791	.076
	V3-> V2	7.258	(.812)	8.943	.000
2	(Constant)	13.741	(.584)	23.527	.000
	V2-> V1	-3.308	(.768)	-4.307	.000
	V2-> V4	-5.741	(.861)	-6.667	.000
3	(Constant)	10.432	(.499)	20.910	.000
	V1 -> V4	-2.432	(.806)	-3.019	.003
n (total)=116					
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23					

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Chart 2 and table 5 show that only the condition in which the perpetrator is worse off than the victim (V2) does not result in experienced relative deprivation. The remaining scenarios all result in different levels of relative deprivation. In them, the condition of victim and perpetrator both being well off elicits the lowest levels of experienced relative deprivation, followed by both being poor and the original “relative deprivation” scenario V3 resulting in highest experienced relative deprivation values.

All the scenarios differ significantly with regard to their effect on relative deprivation, with the exception of V3 and V4. This means that when the victim is poor the levels of experienced relative deprivation do not differ regardless of the situation of the perpetrator. The “relative deprivation” scenario does not singularly affect experienced relative deprivation. To put it differently, even when the perpetrator in the vignette is equally poor after the transition the victim’s situation is still considered as being worse in comparison, is perceived it as undeserved and leads to anger and resentment. The outcome appears puzzling at first but its meaning is analysed in more detail below.

The fact that there is a difference in experienced relative deprivation levels between the scenarios V1 and V2, even though in both the victim is doing equally well economically, shows that the situation of the perpetrator becomes more relevant for eliciting relative deprivation when the victim’s situation improves.

Uganda and Poland – Experimental manipulation and economic relative deprivation

In both research sites the experimental manipulation had an effect on experienced relative deprivation. However, it is not the “relative deprivation scenario” that stands out as the reason for creating significantly higher levels of experienced relative deprivation. It is rather the condition in which the victim is better off than the perpetrator that significantly reduces experienced relative deprivation. This is unexpected and puzzling.

So what does it mean? Relative deprivation results from feeling deprived as a result of a comparison. While the focus of the study is on social comparisons, it was pointed out before that there are other types of comparison, such as temporal comparisons or comparisons with an envisioned better alternative outcome (Folger 1986; Helson 1964; de la Sablonnière et al. 2015). The present findings suggest that under certain conditions, such as a post-conflict situation, these different types of relative deprivation may become intertwined. While the vignette scenarios depict the current


status quo of a victim vis-à-vis a perpetrator, the fact that these two are a victim and perpetrator involved in the same conflict implies a history – both individual and shared. This is a fundamentally different situation than comparing one’s own salary with employees of another company. Being a victim implies discrimination in the past, when the perpetrator was in a better position. The findings suggest that a simple comparison of the current status quo does not entirely explain the experience of relative deprivation. The current situations of the victim and perpetrator described in the vignette cannot be seen separately from their past experiences. To put it differently, to the simple outcome of a social comparison, an additional ballast of the previous history is added. This finding highlights the differences between “equality” and “equity”. Equality, represented by the same status quo of the victim and the perpetrator in the vignette scenarios, does not lead to equity. Even if the victim and the perpetrator are equally rich or poor, still the victim has suffered before, while the perpetrator benefited in the past. The victim’s past suffering is included in the comparison, thereby creating, yet again, a relative deprivation scenario, where equal conditions appear to be the case.

Moreover, victims may anticipate an improvement in their own conditions. If this does not happen, as is the case in two scenarios in which the victim is still poor, this constitutes another case of relative deprivation, as pointed out above. These different types of relative deprivation are compounded leading to experienced relative deprivation in all circumstances, except the one where the victim is well off economically and simultaneously better off than the perpetrator. This is the only situation that does not entail any kind of relative deprivation after all factors such as the victim’s history, the perpetrator’s history, expectations of improvement and a temporal comparison have been considered.

The similarity between the impacts of the different scenarios on experienced relative deprivation in both research settings is illustrated below (chart 3).

The present outcomes highlight the importance of measuring experienced relative deprivation correctly instead of just relying on assumptions about which conditions are likely to lead to relative deprivation.

Chart 3 Experienced economic relative deprivation in the four vignettes — Uganda and Poland



5.1.2 Relative deprivation and forgiveness

The first hypothesis (H1) postulates that relative deprivation has a negative effect on forgiveness. As transpired from the manipulation check, assessing the impact of the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation, it was found that all the scenarios elicited varying levels of experienced relative deprivation, except when the victim was better off than the perpetrator.

Therefore, in the following analysis both are examined: i.e., the effects of the experimental conditions and the effects of the variable that captures experienced relative deprivation.

Uganda

The results of the multivariate regressions are divided into the three different forgiveness measures. The first two constitute the TRIM-12 revenge and avoidance sub-scales (McCullough, Worthington Jr., and Rachal 1997)⁴². Relative deprivation is hypothesized to increase revenge and avoidance motivations. The third measurement is the single forgiveness item measuring the directly stated willingness to forgive. Willingness to forgive is assumed to be reduced by relative deprivation. Firstly, the effects of the experimental manipulation on the different forgiveness measures are assessed. Secondly, the effect of experienced relative deprivation on forgiveness is examined.

The means of each of the forgiveness measures in the four vignette scenarios were determined as a first step. This was done in order to examine, in particular, if the “relative deprivation scenario” (V3) does elicit the highest revenge and avoidance motivation as well as lowest willingness to forgive, as expected. Consistent with the expectations the “relative deprivation scenario” did exhibit the highest mean values of revenge and avoidance and the lowest willingness to forgive (table 6). At the next step the differences between the vignette scenarios for each of the forgiveness measures were assessed. Very few turned out to be significant (table 7). Finally, the effects of the experienced relative deprivation variable on all three forgiveness measures were tested (table 8). It turned out that only the effect on avoidance motivation was

⁴² See chapter 4 for details and reliability.

significant. The control variables were age, gender and education. None of them was significant either.

Table 6: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)

Vignette Version	Mean (s.e.)		
	Revenge	Avoidance	Forgiveness
V1 (V.High_P.High)	16.625 (.742)	25.188 (1.042)	2.969 (.252)
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	16.303 (.730)	23.455 (1.026)	3.424 (.249)
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	17.971 (.709)	26.543(.996)	2.743(.241)
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	16.226 (.753)	25.484 (1.059)	3.387(.257)
n (total)=131 Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V3 n=35; V4 n=31			

Table 7: Differences between the vignette scenarios on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Uganda)

Vignette comparisons		Revenge	Avoidance	Forgiveness
		B (S.E)	B (S.E)	B (S.E)
1	(Constant)	17.971 (.709)	26.543 .996	2.743 (.241)
	V3* ->V1	-1.346 (1.026)	-1.355 1.442	.226 (.349)
	V3 ->V4	-1.746 (1.035)	-1.059 1.454	.644 (.352)
	V3-> V2	-1.668 (1.018)	-3.088 (1.430)*	.681 (.347)*
2	(Constant)	16.303 (.730)	23.455 1.026	3.424 (.249)
	V2-> V1	.322 (1.041)	1.733 1.462	-.455 (.354)
	V2-> V4	-.077 (1.049)	2.029 1.474	-.037 (.357)
3	(Constant)	16.226 (.753)	25.484 1.059	3.387 (.257)
	V1 -> V4	.399 (1.057)	-.296 1.485	-.418 (.360)
		R ² = .03 Ad. R ² = .006	R ² = .04 Ad. R ² = .01	R ² = .04 Ad. R ² = .02
n (total)=131 Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31				

Table 8: Experienced relative deprivation (Ex. RD) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Uganda)

	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>
Constant	19.834 (2.732)	7.259	31.877 (3.713)	8.586	2.485 (.936)	2.654
Ex.RD	-.202 (.125)	-1.615	-.593 (.170)**	-3.486	.076 (.043)	1.776
Age	.014 (.029)	.495	.000 (.039)	-.005	-.005 (.010)	-.471
Sex	-.701 (.796)	-.881	.096 (1.082)	.089	.153 (.273)	.562
Education	-.386 (.590)	-.655	-.830 (.802)	-1.035	-.027 (.202)	-.135
	R ² = .03; Ad. R ² = -.002		R ² = .10; Ad. R ² = .07		R ² = .03; Ad. R ² = -.003	

ns $p > 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$
n = 131

Poland

The same two-part analysis was carried out in Poland, starting with an examination of the effects of the experimental manipulation on the different forgiveness measures and followed by an assessment of the effects of experienced relative deprivation on those same variables.

The mean values of the three forgiveness measures (table 9) showed that the “relative deprivation scenario” has the highest revenge and avoidance values, however, the differences appeared to be too low to be significant. The experimental manipulation directly affected willingness to forgive in the main. The “relative deprivation scenario” resulted in significantly lower willingness to forgive compared to all the other scenarios (table 10).

In the next step of the analysis the effects of the experienced relative deprivation variable on the three forgiveness measures were examined. Experienced relative deprivation had a significant effect on revenge motivation and willingness to forgive, but not on avoidance motivation in the Polish sample (table 11).

Table 9: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four experimental scenarios (Poland)

Vignette Version	Mean (s.e.)					
	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
V1 (V.High_P.High)	13.622	(.746)	25.188	(.819)	2.622	(.194)
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	14.407	(.873)	23.455	(.959)	2.963	(.227)
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	16.034	(.842)	26.543	(.925)	2.069	(.219)
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	14.739	(.946)	25.484	(1.039)	3.130	(.246)
n (total)=116 Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V3 n=29; V4 n=23						

Table 10: Differences between the vignette scenarios on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Poland)

Vignette comparisons		Revenge	Avoidance	Forgiveness
		B (s.e.)	B (s.e.)	B (s.e.)
1	(Constant)	16.034 (.842)	29.483 .925	2.069 (.219)
	V3* ->V1	-2.413 (1.125)*	-2.158 1.235	.553 (.293)^(*)
	V3 ->V4	-1.295 (1.267)	-1.265 1.391	1.061 (.330)**
	V3-> V2	-1.627 (1.213)	-.520 1.332	.894 (.316)**
2	(Constant)	14.407 (.873)	28.963 .959	2.963 (.227)
	V2-> V1	-.786 (1.148)	-1.639 1.261	-.341 (.299)
	V2-> V4	.332 (1.287)	-.746 1.413	.167 (.335)
3	(Constant)	14.739 (.946)	28.217 1.039	2.622 (.194)
	V1 -> V4	-1.118 (1.204)	-.893 1.322	.509 (.314)
		R ² = .01 Ad. R ² = .01	R ² = .03 Ad. R ² = .004	R ² = .10 Ad. R ² = .08
n (total)=116				
Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23				

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Table 11: Experienced relative deprivation (Ex. RD) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Poland)

	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	22.324 (4.973)	4.489	28.628 (5.618)	5.095	2.966 (1.346)	2.203
Ex.RD	-.220 (.110)*	-1.996	-.171 (.124)	-1.377	.065 (.030)*	2.196
Age	-.064 (.055)	-1.158	.047 (.062)	.754	-.024 (.015)	-1.593
Sex	-1.618 (1.215)	-1.331	1.151 (1.373)	.839	.388 (.329)	1.180
Education	.090 (.686)	.132	-.812 (.775)	-1.048	.056 (.186)	.303
	R ² =.05 Ad. R ² =.01		R ² =.05 Ad. R ² =.01		R ² =.10 Ad. R ² =.07	

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n = 116

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 1

The hypothesis that economic relative deprivation affects forgiveness could only be confirmed to a limited degree.

In Uganda the experimental manipulation did not have much effect on any of the forgiveness measures. However, experienced relative deprivation did have a negative effect on avoidance motivation in the Ugandan sample.

In Poland the experimental manipulation did have an effect on willingness to forgive. In particular, as expected, the “relative deprivation scenario”, which reflected the situation of the victim who was poorer than the perpetrator resulted in significantly less willingness to forgive compared to all other scenarios. Experienced relative deprivation also had a significant effect on willingness to forgive and additionally increased the revenge motivation.

While relative deprivation did not affect all forgiveness measures it did have an effect on some forgiveness measures in both countries. Relative deprivation deriving solely from social comparison (experimental manipulation) had weaker effects, which were not significant in Uganda and only significant in the case of willingness to forgive in Poland. In both countries, however, the “relative deprivation scenario” did result in highest revenge and avoidance motivation values and lowest willingness to forgive highlighting the similarities between both samples and indicating that the weak effects might be due to sample size and become significant in a bigger sample. To test this a joint analysis of both samples (Poland and Uganda) has been performed to assess if the “relative deprivation scenario” does indeed lead to significantly more revenge and avoidance and less forgiveness. In this case several control variables have been added to the analysis. The reason is that the individual country samples are relatively homogeneous and potential influencing factors are controlled through the randomization of the experimental conditions. The samples, however, differ significantly between Poland and Uganda with regard to sex, age and education. These demographics (including “country”) have been, therefore, added as control variables in cases of any joint sample analyses. The joint analysis confirms the assumption that the experimental manipulation did yield significant effects in bigger samples (table 12). In particular, revenge motivation was significantly increased and willingness to forgive significantly reduced in victims by the “relative deprivation scenario” (V3) compared to all other scenarios. Willingness to forgive appeared to be particularly

negatively affected by the condition of a wealthy perpetrator. There is no significant difference between the influence of V1 and V3 on willingness to forgive – both scenarios in which the perpetrator is wealthy. The fact that in the scenario V1 the victim is wealthy too does not increase the victims' willingness to forgive. To put it simply, it appears that it is more difficult for victims to forgive a wealthy perpetrator regardless of their own conditions.

Avoidance motivation differs between Poland and Uganda as indicated by the significant country effect. The experimental manipulation of relative deprivation did have an effect on avoidance motivation in Uganda, but not in Poland. These findings verify the assumption that economic relative deprivation, resulting from social comparison between victims and perpetrators, does have a negative effect on forgiveness in victims in both, Poland and Uganda. Experienced relative deprivation showed some significant effects on forgiveness measures in both countries, even in separate country analyses.

Finally, an interesting aspect was the difference between the forgiveness measures that were affected by relative deprivation in both research sites. While relative deprivation affected avoidance in Uganda, it affected revenge motivation and willingness to forgive in Poland. This difference was confirmed in an analysis of the two country samples taken together (table 13). The first model showed the effects of the independent and control variables on the three forgiveness measures. The second model introduced an interaction effect between experienced relative deprivation and country. The comparison showed that country has a highly significant effect on avoidance motivation. This meant that the avoidance level in Poland was much higher on average. The significant interaction effect confirmed that while relative deprivation did not affect the high levels of avoidance in Poland at all, it did increase avoidance motivation in Uganda.

Obviously, the two samples are different on so many levels that the interpretation of the differences can only be speculative. However, a possible explanation of these findings lies in the difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures with regard to forgiveness. Avoidance is not a strong expression of un-forgiveness in an individualistic culture, in particular if there was no close relationship between the victim and perpetrator before. Avoidance might, however, be perceived as a much stronger reaction in a collectivistic culture. Therefore, it is a more accessible reaction

in Poland, which explains the significantly higher levels of avoidance in the Polish results.

Table 12: The effects of the economic “relative deprivation scenario” as compared with the other vignette scenarios on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive - Poland and Uganda

		Revenge	Avoidance	Forgiveness
		B (s.e.)	B (s.e.)	B (s.e.)
V3 as contrast	(Constant)	19.882 (.752)	27.015 (2.635)	2.536 (.632)
	V1	-1.714 (.810)*	-1.721 (.965)	.366 (.231)
	V4	-1.575 (.778)*	-1.088 (1.039)	.784 (.249)**
	V2	-1.561 (1.086)*	-1.939 (.998)*	.747 (.239)**
	Country	-2.054 (.026)	4.493 (1.393)***	-.257 (.334)
	Age	-.002 (.659)	.008 (.033)	-.007 (.008)
	Sex	-.759 (.442)	.508 (.845)	.184 (.203)
	Education	-.318 (.752)	-.822 (.567)	.052 (.136)
		R ² = .10 Ad. R ² = .07	R ² =.11 Ad. R ² = .09	R ² =.09 Ad. R ² = .06
n (total)=247				
Per cell: V1 n=69; V2 n=60; V1 n=64; V4 n=54				

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001

Table 13: The effects of experienced relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance motivation and willingness to forgive in a joint sample of Poland and Uganda

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	20.342 (2.114)	9.621	29.095 (2.661)	10.932	2.460 (.654)	3.760
Ex.RD	-.183 (.080)*	-2.302	-.355 (.100)***	-3.541	.075 (.025)**	3.031
Age	-.002 (.025)	-.068	.003 (.032)	.091	-.009 (.008)	-1.128
Sex	-.883 (.655)	-1.349	.372 (.824)	.451	.245 (.203)	1.211
Country	-1.996 (1.081)	-1.846	4.807 (1.361)***	3.532	-.212 (.335)	-.634
Ed. level	-.272 (.440)	-.617	-.732 (.554)	-1.322	.004 (.136)	.028
	R ² =.10 Ad. R ² =.08		R ² =.14 Ad. R ² =.12		R ² =.07 Ad. R ² =.05	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	20.466 (2.239)	9.140	30.834 (2.797)	11.025	2.439 (.693)	3.520
Ex. RD	-.200 (.128)	-1.570	-.594 (.159)***	-3.727	.078 (.039)*	1.965
Age	-.001 (.026)	-.047	.010 (.032)	.318	-.009 (.008)	-1.129
Sex	-.881 (.656)	-1.342	.403 (.820)	.492	.245 (.203)	1.206
Country	-2.259 (1.886)	-1.197	1.099 (2.356)	.467	-.167 (.584)	-.286
Ed. level	-.273 (.441)	-.618	-.746 (.551)	-1.355	.004 (.136)	.029
RD x Country	.028 (.164)	.170	.394 (.205) (*)	1.923	-.005 (.051)	-.094
	R ² =.10 Ad. R ² =.07		R ² =.15 Ad. R ² =.13		R ² =.07 Ad. R ² =.05	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001						
n (total) = 247						

5.1.3 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions

The second hypothesis (H2) posits that relative deprivation increases injustice perceptions of the post-conflict environment.

As described in the methods section, the questionnaires included two adapted justice scales, the Injustice Gap scale (Davis et al. 2015) and an adapted scale consisting of seven items measuring injustice perceptions, which will be referred to as the Injustice Perceptions scale (Wenzel and Okimoto 2014). Both scales correlated highly, which confirmed their construct validity. They were also both based on the same conceptualization of justice perceptions as an injustice gap, namely, the difference between ideal and real justice. On average, the Injustice Perceptions scale turned out to have better reliability and more consistent results and, therefore, this scale has been used throughout to report the findings.⁴³

The same analyses, described in the previous sections, have been performed to examine the assumed effects of relative deprivation on injustice perceptions. Firstly, the impact of the experimental manipulation, representing relative deprivation based on social comparison, was tested. Secondly, the effect of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions was assessed.

Uganda

In order to have a general overview at the outset of how the experimental manipulation in form of the vignette scenarios affected injustice perceptions, the mean values of the Injustice Perceptions scale in the four vignette scenarios were examined (table 14 and chart 4). The outcomes revealed a very similar pattern to the one found with regard to experienced relative deprivation. The scenario in which the victim is poor and the perpetrator rich (V3) resulted in the highest perceived injustice of the post-conflict setting and the reverse of the poor/rich situation (V2) in lowest perceived injustice. A mean of 28 would signify a neutral response where the situation is perceived as neither just nor unjust. Only V2 was below that point, suggesting that all other conditions were more or less seen as unjust. While the outcome followed the expected pattern as the “relative deprivation scenario” elicited the highest injustice perceptions, there also appeared to be an effect of the victim’s situation. This was indicated by the fact that

⁴³ See chapter 4 for details on both scales and reliability.

the two scenarios in which the victim was poor elicited similar injustice perception values. The next question was, therefore, which scenarios were significantly different from each other when it came to their effect on injustice perceptions. Indeed, as shown in Table 15, the two scenarios in which the victim was poor did not result in injustice perception values that were significantly different from each other. This means that the fact of the victim being poor leads by itself to a negative justice judgement of the post-conflict setting regardless of how the perpetrator is doing. Only when the victim was doing well economically did the social comparison aspect become salient and affected injustice perceptions. This was reflected in the significant difference between the two conditions when the victim was well off. When the victim was doing well economically than the fact of the perpetrator doing equally well resulted in a more negative justice judgement of the post-conflict setting than when the perpetrator was poor.

In addition, experienced relative deprivation was examined as a predictor of injustice perceptions and turned out to be significant, explaining over 20% of the variance (table 16). None of the demographic control variables had a significant effect on injustice perceptions.

The findings in the Ugandan sample suggest that relative deprivation does have strong and highly significant effects on injustice perceptions. It is, however, not the assumed disadvantageous social comparison, which has the most significant influence on injustice perception, but rather the scenario, where the victim was better off than the perpetrator, which significantly reduced injustice perceptions.

Table 14: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS) in the four vignette versions (Uganda)

Dependent Variable: Injustice perceptions				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	31.219	1.375	28.498	33.940
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	26.848	1.354	24.169	29.528
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	40.543	1.315	37.941	43.144
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	37.677	1.397	34.913	40.442
n (total)=131 Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31				

Chart 4 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)




Table 15: Differences between the vignette scenarios on the Injustice Perceptions scale (Uganda)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B (S.E.)			
1	(Constant)	40.543 (1.315)		30.838	.000
	V3* ->V1	-9.324 (1.902)		-4.901	.000
	V3 ->V4	-2.865 (1.918)		-1.494	.138
	V3-> V2	-13.694 (1.887)		-7.256	.000
2	(Constant)	26.848 (1.354)		19.829	.000
	V2-> V1	4.370 (1.930)		2.265	.025
	V2-> V4	10.829 (1.945)		5.566	.000
3	(Constant)	31.219 (1.375)		22.705	.000
	V1 -> V4	6.459 (1.960)		3.295	.001
n (total)=131 Per cell: V1 n=32; V2 n=33; V1 n=35; V4 n=31					

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Table 16: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Uganda)

DV= Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error		
	(Constant)	48.178	(5.460)	8.824	.000
	Experienced Relative Deprivation	-1.486	(.250)	-5.940	.000
	Age	-.029	(.058)	-.507	.613
	Sex	.636	(1.591)	.400	.690
	Education	-.523	(1.179)	-.444	.658
R ² = .23; Adjusted R ² = .20					
n = 131					

Poland

An examination of the mean values of injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios was conducted as a first step in the analysis, analogous to the analysis in the Ugandan sample. The means in the four conditions appear very close to each other with the exception of the advantageous comparison condition (V2). The advantageous comparison (the vignette scenario where the victim is better off than the perpetrator) was the only situation which was not considered unjust (table 17 and chart 5).

An assessment of the differences between the scenarios with regard to their effect on injustice perceptions confirmed the pattern presented by the mean values in the experimental conditions. Only the scenario in which the victim was better off than the perpetrator elicited significantly different (lower) injustice perceptions values, while the others were all similarly perceived as unjust (table 18).

A multivariate regression analysis conducted with the variable experienced relative deprivation as predictor verified the expected highly significant influence on injustice perceptions, which explained 31% of the variance (table 19). The only significant control variable turned out to be age. The negative effect means that injustice perceptions decrease with age.

The findings suggest that social comparison between victims and perpetrators is important for justice judgements. However, it appears, yet again, that victims are affected by a variety of different types of relative deprivation in their justice assessments, making the effect of only social disadvantageous comparison on its own less apparent. If the conditions of the victim do not improve after the conflict, it results in injustice perceptions as is the case when the economic status of the perpetrator remains high. Only when all of these relative deprivation sources are addressed and rectified is this likely to reduce the injustice perceptions of victims significantly.

Table 17: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS) in the four vignette versions (Poland)

Dependent Variable: Injustice perceptions				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	30.730	1.804	27.156	34.304
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	22.556	2.112	18.372	26.740
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	34.138	2.038	30.101	38.175
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	33.957	2.288	29.423	38.490
n (total)=116 Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23				

Chart 5 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)




Table 18: Differences between the vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions (Poland)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B (S.E.)			
1	(Constant)	34.138 (2.038)		16.754	.000
	V3* ->V1	-3.408 (2.721)		-1.252	.213
	V3 ->V4	-.181 (3.064)		-.059	.953
	V3-> V2	-11.582 (2.934)		-3.947	.000
2	(Constant)	22.556 (2.112)		10.681	.000
	V2-> V1	8.174 (2.777)		2.943	.004
	V2-> V4	11.401 (3.113)		3.662	.000
3	(Constant)	30.730 (1.804)		17.035	.000
	V1 -> V4	3.227 (2.914)		1.108	.270
n (total)=116 Per cell: V1 n=37; V2 n=27; V1 n=29; V4 n=23					

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Table 19: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on Injustice Perceptions scale (Poland)

DV=Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
1	(Constant)	72.121	(11.146)	6.471	.000
	Experienced Relative Deprivation	-1.563	(.247)	-6.334	.000
	Age	-.321	(.123)	-2.599	.011
	Sex	1.794	(2.723)	.659	.511
	Education	-2.162	(1.538)	-1.405	.163
$R^2 = .31$; Adjusted $R^2 = .29$ n = 116					

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2

The “relative deprivation scenario” (V3) did not increase injustice perceptions by itself. Even in a combined sample of Poland and Uganda together, the difference between V3 and V4 was still not significant (table 20). However, the experimental condition of an advantageous comparison, represented by the vignette scenario V2 (the victim is better off than the perpetrator) was consistently and significantly perceived as more just than any other scenario in both samples. Similarly, the variable experienced relative deprivation significantly increased injustice perceptions in both countries. Thus, the outcomes in both countries reflected a number of similarities (chart 6).

These findings mean that social comparison does have an effect, but not exactly the effect that was originally assumed would be the outcome. Injustice perceptions seemed to be receptive to the combined impact of several forms of relative deprivation of the victims.

While the individual situation of the victim did appear to have a greater impact on injustice perceptions in Uganda, it did not, by itself, change injustice perceptions in Poland. This means that in Uganda the improved conditions of the victim himself significantly reduced injustice perceptions. Although it needs to be pointed out that even in Uganda the post-conflict setting is still perceived to be unjust when both victim and perpetrator are economically well off. In Poland, on the other hand, a reduction in any type of relative deprivation on its own did not matter for injustice perceptions. If only the victim’s circumstances improved, this did not reduce injustice perceptions. Similarly, the situation of the perpetrator by itself did not have an effect. When the victim was poor, the conditions of the perpetrator did not play a role. Only when all types of relative deprivation were addressed, symbolized by the situation of the victim being better off than the perpetrator, it did significantly reduce injustice perceptions.

A comparison of both countries in a combined analysis assessing the effects of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions did not show significant differences (table 21). Experienced relative deprivation appears to affect the injustice perceptions of victims in a similar way in both countries.

Table 20: The effects of the economic “relative deprivation scenario” as compared with the other vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions - Poland and Uganda

DV= Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B (S.E.)			
V3 as contrast	(Constant)	45.966 (4.440)		10.352	.000
	V1	-6.078 (1.626)		-3.738	.000
	V4	-1.738 (1.751)		-.992	.322
	V2	-12.913 (1.682)		-7.677	.000
	Country	1.848 (2.347)		.787	.432
	Age	-.091 (.055)		-1.634	.104
	Sex	.812 (1.424)		.571	.569
	Education	-2.027 (.956)		-2.121	.035
R ² = .27; Adjusted R ² = .25					
n (total)=247					
Per cell: V1 n=69; V2 n=60; V1 n=64; V4 n=54					

Chart 6 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios - Uganda and Poland




Table 21: The effect of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions in Poland and Uganda

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(S.E)		
1	(Constant)	52.575	(4.521)	11.629	.000
	Ex. RD	-1.467	(.170)	-8.615	.000
	Age	-.105	(.054)	-1.945	.053
	Sex	.868	(1.400)	.620	.536
	Country	2.899	(2.312)	1.254	.211
	Ed. level	-1.411	(.941)	-1.500	.135
R ² =.28 Ad. R ² =.27					
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error		
2	(Constant)	52.546	(4.788)	10.975	.000
	Ex. RD	-1.463	(.273)	-5.362	.000
	Age	-.106	(.055)	-1.930	.055
	Sex	.867	(1.404)	.618	.537
	Country	2.961	(4.033)	.734	.464
	Ed. level	-1.411	(.943)	-1.497	.136
	RDx Country	-.007	(.351)	-.019	.985
R ² =.28 Ad. R ² =.26 n (total) =247					

5.1.4 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness

Apart from an assumed direct effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness, the last hypothesis (H3) posits an effect of injustice perceptions on forgiveness. This suggests an additional indirect effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness via justice perceptions. This assumption necessitates that injustice perceptions impact forgiveness. The effects of injustice perceptions, including an exploration of possible mediator effects, are examined in the following section.

Uganda

A multivariate regression analysis of injustice perceptions on each of the forgiveness measures confirmed that justice judgements did affect forgiveness in the Ugandan sample (table 22). The more the post-conflict setting, described in the vignette scenarios, was perceived as unjust, the more revenge and avoidance motivation were displayed and the less willingness there was to forgive. None of the control variables of age, sex or education had any significant effect on any of the forgiveness measures.

Considering the findings in the Ugandan sample so far it does seem that relative deprivation might affect forgiveness predominantly through injustice perceptions. The only direct effect of experienced relative deprivation was on avoidance motivation. This prompted the question of whether even the effect of relative deprivation on avoidance could be mediated through injustice perceptions. In order to examine if injustice perceptions constitute a significant mediator in the case of avoidance motivation, a Sobel test was performed. The Sobel test confirmed the significance of the mediation (Sobel test statistic -3.27; $p < .01$). It appears that the biggest part of the influence of economic relative deprivation on the different forgiveness measures in the Ugandan sample is, indeed, either indirect via justice perceptions or mediated by them.

Table 22: Injustice Perception Scale (IPS) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Uganda)

	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>
Constant	12.022 (2.715)	4.429	17.631 (3.765)	4.683	4.443 (.979)	4.538
IPS	.171 (.037)***	4.646	.261 (.051)***	5.119	-.037 (.013)**	-2.795
Age	.020 (.027)	.739	.005 (.038)	.131	-.006 (.010)	-.564
Sex	-.818 (.744)	-1.101	-.036 (1.031)	-.035	.173 (.268)	.646
Edu- cation	-.292 (.551)	-.530	-.711 (.765)	-.930	-.045 (.199)	-.225
	R ² =.15 Ad. R ² =.13		R ² =.18 Ad. R ² =.17		R ² =.06 Ad. R ² =.03	

ns $p > 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$
n=131

Poland

The multivariate regression analysis with the same control variables of age, sex and education revealed that injustice perceptions were not a significant predictor of any of the forgiveness measures in the Polish sample. This is a rather surprising result, since this connection was not only suggested by the literature but also confirmed in the Ugandan sample.

It is possible that the fictional setting of the vignette scenarios might, to certain extent, weaken the effects⁴⁴ of injustice perceptions on forgiveness measures. The open-ended questions included in the questionnaires regarding justice and forgiveness implied that victims in both research sites had been able to put themselves in the position of the described victim. Also the effects of the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation strongly suggested that the experimental manipulation was successful. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the effects of justice judgements of a fictional context might produce weaker results than real life injustice perceptions. If this is the case, then the effects of injustice perceptions on forgiveness should be significant in the survey.

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3

This is the only assumption which yielded completely different results in both countries. While the negative effect of injustice perceptions could be fully confirmed in the Ugandan sample on all forgiveness measures, there were no significant effects in Poland. To verify the significance of this difference a joint multivariate regression analysis of the Injustice Perceptions scale on forgiveness in both countries was performed. As is suggested by the results above the effect of injustice perceptions on forgiveness measures, in particular on revenge and avoidance motivation was significantly stronger in Uganda (table 23). Moreover, the significant effect of the country variable shows that revenge motivation in the context of economic injustices is stronger in Uganda, while avoidance motivation is higher in Poland. In Uganda injustice perceptions additionally turned out to mediate the effect of experienced relative deprivation on avoidance motivation.

It remains to be seen if the lack of significance in the Polish sample can be partly due

⁴⁴ See section 4.1 for more details on the difference between scenario and recall methodologies.

to the fact that the fictional setting of the vignette scenarios weakened the effects of the injustice perceptions, or if there is generally no connection between justice and forgiveness in the Polish sample.

Table 23: The effects of injustice perceptions (IPS) on revenge and avoidance motivation and willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	14.371 (2.153)	6.676	20.017 (2.739)	7.308	4.130 (.684)	6.041
IPS	.109 (.026)***	4.233	.146 (.033)***	4.459	-.024 (.008)**	-2.988
Age	.010 (.025)	.420	.022 (.031)	.691	-.012 (.008)	-1.577
Sex	-.966 (.639)	-1.513	.317 (.813)	.391	.247 (.203)	1.216
Country	-2.343 (1.050)*	-2.233	4.198 (1.335)**	3.143	-.090 (.333)	-.269
Edu	-.122 (.431)	-.284	-.555 (.548)	-1.012	-.023 (.137)	-.165
	R ² =.14 Ad. R ² =.12		R ² =.16 Ad. R ² =.15		R ² =.07 Ad. R ² =.05	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	12.330 (2.342)	5.265	16.219 (2.947)	5.503	4.568 (.748)	6.111
IPS	.171 (.039)***	4.417	.262 (.049)***	5.365	-.038 (.012)**	-3.055
Age	.011 (.025)	.435	.022 (.031)	.723	-.012 (.008)	-1.588
Sex	-.965 (.634)	-1.522	.320 (.798)	.401	.246 (.202)	1.217
Country	1.246 (1.982)	.629	10.877 (2.494)***	4.362	-.861 (.633)	-1.361
Edu	-.163 (.428)	-.381	-.631 (.539)	-1.171	-.014 (.137)	-.101
IPS x Country	-.109 (.051)*	-2.129	-.203 (.064)**	-3.149	.023 (.016)	1.433
	R ² =.16 Ad. R ² =.13		R ² =.20 Ad. R ² =.18		R ² =.08 Ad. R ² =.06	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001						
n(total)=247						

5.2 Study 2 – Relative deprivation regarding social acknowledgement

While relative deprivation is mostly studied with regard to economic status, this is not the only kind of deprivation people can experience. In particular in post-conflict settings the issue of social acknowledgement and status after periods of suffering and discrimination can be assumed to play a role as well. This type of relative deprivation is also referred to as “social relative deprivation” in the context of the present research in order to differentiate it from “economic relative deprivation”, which was the subject of study 1.

The second study focuses on social relative deprivation but otherwise investigates the same assumptions and employs the same dependent variables of injustice perceptions and forgiveness.⁴⁵ The experimental manipulation represented by the four vignette scenarios concerns the different levels of social acknowledgement of the victim and the perpetrator after the conflict.

This section presenting the findings of the second study is organized in the same way as study 1. First the effect of the experimental manipulation on experienced relative deprivation is examined, followed by a testing of the three hypotheses.⁴⁶

5.2.1 Social comparison and relative deprivation

This section starts with an examination of the effects of the experimental manipulation on experienced relative deprivation. In the same way as in study 1, this can be considered a manipulation check to examine if the vignette scenarios did result in different levels of experienced relative deprivation, as expected.

Uganda

In an analogous analysis to study 1 the differences between vignette scenarios were examined firstly through a descriptive analysis comparing the mean values of the variable experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental conditions. This preliminary assessment of the mean values revealed the expected pattern. The “relative deprivation scenario” generated the highest relative deprivation values and the

⁴⁵ See chapter 4 for more details about the variables in study 2.

⁴⁶ For alternative analyses with ANOVA and MANOVA see appendix 6

scenario of the victim being more socially acknowledged than the perpetrator, the lowest (table 24 and chart 7).

Secondly, the vignette dummy variables were regressed on the experienced relative deprivation variable to examine if differences appearing in the descriptive analysis are statistically significant. In other words, the analysis addressed the question of whether the different levels of social acknowledgement of the victim and perpetrator resulted in significantly different levels of experienced relative deprivation. It turned out that all the conditions significantly differed from each other in the generated levels of relative deprivation (table 25).

A closer look at the values of relative deprivation in the four conditions shows that while the levels of experienced relative deprivation are significantly different from each other in each condition, only the one in which the victim is in a socially higher position did not result in experienced relative deprivation at all. This means that any condition, apart from the one in which the victim is in a considerably better position than the perpetrator, generated relative deprivation to a certain degree.

Table 24: Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental conditions (Uganda)

Dependent Variable: Experienced relative Deprivation				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	9.032	.462	8.118	9.947
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	12.344	.455	11.444	13.244
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	5.063	.455	4.163	5.962
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	6.677	.462	5.763	7.592
n (total)=126				
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V3 n=32; V4 n=31				

Chart 7 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)




Table 25: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Uganda)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B (s.e.)			
1	(Constant)	5.063 (.455)		11.136	.000
	V3* ->V1	3.970 (.648)		6.125	.000
	V3 ->V2	7.281 (.643)		11.325	.000
	V3-> V4	1.615 (.648)		2.492	.014
2	(Constant)	12.344 (.455)		27.152	.000
	V2-> V1	-3.311 (.648)		-5.110	.000
	V2-> V4	-5.666 (.648)		-8.743	.000
3	(Constant)	6.677 (.462)		14.457	.000
	V1 -> V4	2.355 (.653)		3.605	.000
n (total)=126					
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V1 n=32; V4 n=31					

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Poland

The descriptive analysis of the mean values of experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental conditions showed that the scenario in which the victim is in a better situation than the perpetrator did not result in relative deprivation while all other scenarios appear to have elicited comparable levels of experienced relative deprivation (table 26 and chart 8). This was confirmed by the next step in the analysis that was carried out to establish which of the scenarios are significantly different from the others with regard to the level of experienced relative deprivation they have generated. This was done through a series of multiple regressions of the vignette dummy variables on the experienced relative deprivation variable. As it turned out, indeed, only V2 lead to significantly different (lower) levels of experienced relative deprivation (table 27). These results confirm, yet again, the assumption that experienced relative deprivation, even though strongly influenced by the social comparison factor with the perpetrator also appears to encompass other forms of relative deprivation of victims. Analogous to study 1, victims in the Polish sample in the second study experienced comparable levels of relative deprivation in all scenarios except when the victim enjoyed a higher social status and acknowledgment than the perpetrator.

Table 26: Estimated marginal means of experienced relative deprivation in the four experimental conditions (Poland)

Dependent Variable: Experienced relative Deprivation				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	9.565	.867	7.836	11.294
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	13.095	.907	11.286	14.905
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	8.300	.930	6.446	10.154
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	7.600	1.315	4.978	10.222
n (total)=74				
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V3 n=20; V4 n=10				

Chart 8 Experienced relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)




Table 27: Differences between the vignette scenarios on experienced relative deprivation (Poland)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B (s.e.)			
1	(Constant)	8.300 (.930)		8.928	.000
	V3* ->V1	1.265 (1.271)		.995	.323
	V3 ->V2	4.795 (1.299)		3.691	.000
	V3-> V4	-.700 (1.610)		-.435	.665
2	(Constant)	13.095 (.907)		14.433	.000
	V2-> V1	-3.530 (1.255)		-2.813	.006
	V2-> V4	-5.495 (1.597)		-3.440	.001
3	(Constant)	7.600 (1.315)		5.780	.000
	V1 -> V4	1.965 (1.575)		1.248	.216
n (total)=74					
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V1 n=20; V4 n=10					


* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Uganda and Poland – Experimental manipulation and social relative deprivation

In both research sites the experimental manipulation significantly impacted on experienced relative deprivation. Yet again, the condition in which the victim was in a better situation than the perpetrator (V2) was the only one not resulting in experienced relative deprivation and significantly different from all the other scenarios (chart 9).

In Uganda, however, all other scenarios also elicited significantly different levels of experienced relative deprivation. In Poland experienced relative deprivation values in the remaining three vignette scenarios did not differ significantly from each other. This outcome supports the previously stated assumption that it appears as if all scenarios represented some form of relative deprivation to the victims, except for the one where the victim enjoys higher social acknowledgment (V2).

Chart 9 Experienced social relative deprivation in the four vignette scenarios - Uganda and Poland



5.2.2 Relative deprivation and forgiveness

The hypothesized effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness (H1) were examined by assessing the impact of the experimental manipulation, in particular the “relative deprivation scenario” but also the experienced relative deprivation variable.

Uganda

The examination of the mean values of revenge motivation, avoidance motivation and willingness to forgive in the four experimental conditions showed very small differences between the vignette scenarios (table 28). The differences were so small that any interpretation, based on the assumption that the outcomes might approach significance, does not seem to be applicable here. Regression analyses of the vignette dummy variables on the three forgiveness measures confirmed that the experimental manipulation did not elicit significantly different levels of forgiveness.

A second analysis tested the effects of the experienced relative deprivation variable on the three forgiveness measures. The multivariate regression analysis controlled for age, sex and education (table 29). Experienced relative deprivation turned out to be a significant predictor of avoidance motivation in the Ugandan sample. There was no significant effect on either revenge motivation or on willingness to forgive.

Table 28: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four vignette versions (Uganda)

Vignette Version	Mean (s.e.)		
	Revenge	Avoidance	Forgiveness
V1 (V.High_P.High)	13.419 (.737)	19.581 (1.175)	4.065 (.211)
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	14.281 (.725)	21.219 (1.157)	3.781 (.207)
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	13.875 (.725)	20.469 (1.157)	3.906 (.207)
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	14.677 (.737)	22.516 (1.175)	3.581 (.211)
n (total)=126 Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V3 n=32; V4 n=31			

Table 29: Experienced relative deprivation multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Uganda)

	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>
Constant	12.593 (2.779)	4.532	18.976 (4.408)	4.305	3.969 (.804)	4.939
Ex.RD	-.162 (.097)	-1.666	-.447 (.155)**	-2.889	.031 (.028)	1.106
Age	.023 (.026)	.889	.030 (.041)	.727	-.007 (.007)	-.933
Sex	.991 (.881)	1.125	2.172 (1.397)	1.554	-.205 (.255)	-.806
Education	.089 (.735)	.121	.441 (1.166)	.378	.150 (.213)	.706
			R ² = .09; Ad. R ² = .06			

ns $p > 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$
 $n = 126$

Poland

The descriptive analysis of the mean values of the three forgiveness measures in the four experimental conditions did not reveal any visible differences (table 30) and therefore there is no indication that any of the differences could have been significant by using a bigger sample. The only slight difference was with V4. The number of respondents in this experimental condition was, however, even smaller than in the others and, therefore, such slight and statistically insignificant differences should be treated with caution in this particular case. The regression analyses of the vignette dummy variables on the forgiveness measures confirmed that the experimental manipulation did not affect any of the dependent variables significantly.

Another analysis was performed to test if the experienced relative deprivation variable had any significant effects on forgiveness. Contrary to the assumptions of the first hypothesis (H1) relative deprivation with regard to social status was not a significant predictor of any of the forgiveness measures in the Polish sample. The survey might add some insight to finding an answer to the question of whether this lack of effect was due to the context of the experiment or if the same pattern will appear in the case of a real life context.

Table 30: Estimated marginal means of revenge, avoidance and forgiveness in the four vignette versions (Poland)

Vignette Version	Mean (s.e.)		
	Revenge	Avoidance	Forgiveness
V1 (V.High_P.High)	14.522 (1.005)	29.478 (.990)	2.476 (.262)
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	14.048 (1.051)	29.762 (1.036)	2.905 (.262)
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	14.250 (1.077)	29.900 (1.062)	2.650 (2.650)
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	16.400 (1.524)	26.200 (1.502)	3.400 (.380)
n (total)=74 Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V3 n=20; V4 n=10			

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 1

Relative deprivation related to social acknowledgement turned out to have only very limited effect on forgiveness. In the Polish sample neither the operationalization of relative deprivation deriving from social comparison, and represented by the experimental scenarios, nor the variable experienced relative deprivation had any effect on forgiveness. In Uganda only the experienced relative deprivation did increase avoidance motivation.

Even in a combined analysis of the Ugandan and Polish samples together the “relative deprivation scenario” (V3) did not significantly increase revenge or avoidance motivation or decrease willingness to forgive as compared with the three other scenarios. In other words, the experimental manipulation of relative deprivation related to social acknowledgement had no direct effect on forgiveness in any of the two countries. The only significant control variable in case of willingness to forgive and avoidance motivation was “country”. The outcomes indicated that willingness to forgive was on average significantly higher in Uganda and avoidance motivation on average significantly higher in Poland⁴⁷. There was no significant difference between the countries in case of revenge motivation.

A comparative analysis of the joint sample of both countries showed a significant interaction between experienced relative deprivation and country on the dependent variable of avoidance motivation. Experienced relative deprivation related to social acknowledgment increased avoidance motivation in Uganda, while it had no effect in Poland. Moreover, model 1 showed the significant effect of “country” on avoidance motivation and willingness to forgive. This means that the levels of avoidance motivation are much higher and the willingness to forgive significantly lower in Poland (table 31).

Summarizing, it appears that social relative deprivation plays a much less important role when it comes to direct effects on forgiveness, even though it was not completely irrelevant in the Ugandan sample.

⁴⁷ “Country” as control variable on the dependent variables of:
Willingness to forgive ($b = -1.418$), $t(192) = -3.405$, $p = .001$;
Avoidance motivation ($b = 7.980$), $t(192) = 3.807$, $p < .001$;
Other control variables were sex, education level and age

Table 31: The effects of experienced relative deprivation on revenge and avoidance motivation and willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	14.950 (2.383)	6.274	17.895 (3.302)	5.420	3.537 (.661)	5.350
Ex. RD	-.084 (.075)	-1.124	-.246 (.104)*	-2.359	.025 (.021)	1.195
Age	.013 (.024)	.540	.015 (.033)	.473	-.004 (.007)	-.635
Sex	.181 (.767)	.237	1.999 (1.063)	1.880	-.034 (.212)	-.159
Country	1.402 (1.489)	.941	8.033 (2.064)***	3.892	-1.425 (.413)***	-3.453
Ed. level	-.612 (.616)	-.993	.633 (.853)	.742	.195 (.171)	1.139
	Nothing sig		R ² =.34 Ad. R ² =.32		R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.17	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	15.317 (2.416)	6.341	19.041 (3.316)	5.742	3.510 (.671)	5.228
Ex. RD	-.150 (.103)	-1.459	-.450 (.141)**	-3.186	.030 (.029)	1.049
Age	.014 (.024)	.587	.019 (.032)	.585	-.004 (.007)	-.646
Sex	.229 (.769)	.298	2.146 (1.056)*	2.033	-.037 (.213)	-.175
Country	.061 (2.068)	.030	3.858 (2.839)	1.359	-1.323 (.576)*	-2.296
Ed. level	-.585 (.617)	-.948	.717 (.846)	.847	.192 (.171)	1.122
RD x Country	.141 (.151)	.934	.438 (.207)*	2.119	-.011 (.042)	-.255
	Nothing sig		R ² =.35 Ad. R ² =.33		R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.16	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001						
n (total)=200						

5.2.3 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions

The second hypothesis (H2) postulates that relative deprivation increases injustice perceptions. The effects of the experimental manipulation through vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions are examined together with an analysis of the effects of experienced relative deprivation.

Uganda

The examination of the mean values of the Injustice Perceptions scale in the four experimental conditions presented a pattern which suggested that in Uganda it is more likely the situation of the victim that affects the justice judgements most (table 32 and chart 10). The mean values also implied that both conditions in which the victim was socially acknowledged did not lead to relative deprivation. Both conditions have values below 28, which is the value of an average neutral response indicating neither perceived justice nor injustice.

An examination of the differences between the vignette scenarios confirmed the pattern presented by the mean values (table 33). The two conditions in which the victim was socially acknowledged did not result in significantly different injustice perceptions. The same was true for the two conditions in which the victim was not socially acknowledged.

The effects of experienced social relative deprivation on injustice perceptions were also tested. A multiple regression analysis with the control variables age, sex and education level confirmed the assumptions of this research (table 34). Experienced relative deprivation increased injustice perceptions, which accorded with the second hypothesis. Additionally, the education level had an impact on injustice perceptions. A higher education level predicted a higher level of perceived injustice in the post-conflict setting in the Ugandan sample.

Table 32: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS) in the four experimental conditions (Uganda)

Dependent Variable: Injustice perceptions				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	24.323	1.440	21.471	27.174
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	24.281	1.418	21.475	27.088
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	32.906	1.418	30.100	35.713
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	34.581	1.440	31.729	37.432
n (total)=126				
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V3 n=32; V4 n=31				

Chart 10 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Uganda)




Table 33: Differences between the vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions (Uganda)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(S.E.)		
1	(Constant)	32.906	(1.418)	23.210	.000
	V3* ->V1	-8.584	(2.021)	-4.247	.000
	V3 ->V4	1.674	(2.021)	.828	.409
	V3-> V2	-8.625	(2.005)	-4.302	.000
2	(Constant)	24.281	(1.418)	17.126	.000
	V2-> V1	.041	(2.021)	.020	.984
	V2-> V4	10.299	(2.021)	5.096	.000
3	(Constant)	24.323	(1.440)	16.885	.000
	V1 -> V4	10.258	(2.037)	5.036	.000
n (total)=126					
Per cell: V1 n=31; V2 n=32; V1 n=32; V4 n=31					

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Table 34: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions (Uganda)

DV=Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
	(Constant)	28.161	(5.395)	5.220	.000
	Experienced Relative Deprivation	-1.347	(.189)	-7.118	.000
	Age	.034	(.050)	.674	.502
	Sex	2.729	(1.710)	1.596	.113
	Education	3.511	(1.427)	2.460	.015
$R^2 = .31$; Adjusted $R^2 = .29$ n = 126					

Poland

The descriptive analysis of the mean values of the Injustice Perceptions scale in the four experimental conditions showed that V2, the condition in which the victim was better off than the perpetrator, appeared different (table 35 and chart 11). All in all the effects of the experimental manipulation of social acknowledgement on injustice perceptions in the Polish sample appeared less pronounced as compared to the manipulation of the economic conditions.

An analysis of the differences between the four experimental conditions with regard to their effect on injustice perceptions showed that, yet again, it is mostly the relative advantage condition (V2) that differs significantly from the other scenarios (table 36). The situation in which the victim was more highly regarded socially than the perpetrator elicited significantly lower injustice perceptions (was perceived as most just) than all the other scenarios. The fact that the difference between V2 and V4 is not significant can most probably be attributed to the extremely small sample size in the V4 condition. All the outcomes in connection with this condition should be viewed with caution.

Experienced relative deprivation significantly affected injustice perceptions in the Polish sample (table 37). As expected, the regression analysis verified that experienced relative deprivation increased injustice perceptions. None of the control variables age, sex or education had any significant effect.

Summarizing, it appears that different types of relative deprivation add up, as previously outlined, making only the condition in which the victim was in a better situation than the perpetrator stand out. To put it differently, victims need to be better off than the perpetrator to perceive the post-conflict setting as just. If the victim is on a low level of the social hierarchy, the situation of the perpetrator does not play a very important role, as the low status of the victim is perceived as unjust as such. When the victim is highly regarded the comparison with the perpetrator becomes more relevant. The victims perceive the situation where the perpetrator is equally highly regarded as less just.

Table 35: Estimated marginal means of the Injustice Perceptions scale in the four experimental conditions (Poland)

Dependent Variable: Injustice perceptions				
Vignette Version	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
V1 (V.High_P.High)	28.913	1.979	24.965	32.861
V2 (V.High_P.Low)	22.619	2.071	18.488	26.750
V3 (V.Low_P.High)	29.300	2.123	25.067	33.533
V4 (V.Low_P.Low)	27.600	3.002	21.613	33.587
n (total) =74				
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V3 n=20; V4 n=10				

Chart 11 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios (Poland)




Table 36: Differences between the vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions (Poland)

Vignette comparisons		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B (s.e.)			
1	(Constant)	29.300	(2.123)	13.804	.000
	V3* ->V1	-.387	(2.902)	-.133	.894
	V3 ->V4	-1.700	(3.676)	-.462	.645
	V3-> V2	-6.681	(2.966)	-2.253	.027
2	(Constant)	22.619	(2.071)	10.920	.000
	V2-> V1	6.294	(2.865)	2.197	.031
	V2-> V4	4.981	(3.647)	1.366	.176
3	(Constant)	27.600	(3.002)	9.195	.000
	V1 -> V4	1.313	(3.596)	.365	.716
n (total)=74					
Per cell: V1 n=23; V2 n=21; V1 n=20; V4 n=10					

* V3 represents the “relative deprivation” scenario

Table 37: Regression results of experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions (Poland)

DV=Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
1	(Constant)	46.510	(11.963)	3.888	.000
	Experienced Relative Deprivation	-.921	(.226)	-4.083	.000
	Age	.078	(.099)	.782	.437
	Sex	-1.425	(3.130)	-.455	.650
	Education	-3.856	(2.161)	-1.784	.079
R ² = .26; Adjusted R ² = .22					
n=74					

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2

The findings regarding hypothesis 2 in the second study showed an interesting picture. While experienced relative deprivation had a highly significant effect on injustice perceptions in both research sites, the sources of the relative deprivation affecting justice judgments appeared to differ. In both cases the injustice perceptions did not seem to be predominantly derived from an upward comparison of social acknowledgement with that of the perpetrator (chart 12).

In Uganda, relative deprivation related to the before and after comparison of victim's conditions, which in two scenarios improved post-conflict and in two did not, had the strongest effect on injustice perceptions in study 2.

In Poland, the comparison with the perpetrator became relevant when the victim himself was highly socially acknowledged. In that case victims perceived a situation where the perpetrator was on a low level of social hierarchy as more just than when he was as highly regarded as the victim, which resulted in an assessment of the post-conflict setting as less just. The post-conflict context was generally perceived as unjust when the victim was on a low level of the social hierarchy regardless of how the social status of the perpetrator was.

An analysis of the joint sample of Poland and Uganda did not contribute any new insights (table 38). When the “relative deprivation scenario” (V3) was compared with the other scenarios, a similar picture emerged. When it comes to injustice perceptions, a low social status of the victim outweighs other comparison factors, which might only become relevant when the victim is better off. Experienced relative deprivation had a highly significant effect on injustice perceptions in both country samples. However, it did not appear to result predominantly from an upward social comparison with the perpetrator.

A comparative analysis of the joint Ugandan and Polish samples did not reveal significant differences between the two countries in study 2 (table 39) It showed that also experienced relative deprivation related to social acknowledgement did have a highly negative effect on justice perceptions of both victim groups in Uganda and Poland. .

Chart 12 Injustice perceptions in the four vignette scenarios - Uganda and Poland




Table 38: The effects of the social “relative deprivation scenario” as compared with the other vignette scenarios on injustice perceptions - Poland and Uganda

DV=Injustice Perceptions		B (s.e.)	T	Sig.
V3 as contrast	(Constant)	29.406 (4.939)	5.954	.000
	V1	-5.374 (1.741)	-3.086	.002
	V4	1.512 (1.867)	.810	.419
	V2	-7.825 (1.722)	-4.543	.000
	Country	-3.152 (3.066)	-1.028	.305
	Age	.019 (.048)	.388	.699
	Sex	.418 (1.581)	.264	.792
	Education	.670 (1.271)	.527	.599
R ² = .17; Adjusted R ² = .14				
Per cell: V1 n=54; V2 n=53; V1 n=52; V4 n=41				
n (total)=200				

Table 39: The effects of social experienced relative deprivation on injustice perceptions - Poland and Uganda

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(S.E.)		
1	(Constant)	35.423	(4.613)	7.679	.000
	Ex. RD	-1.148	(.146)	-7.890	.000
	Age	.029	(.046)	.637	.525
	Sex	.317	(1.485)	.213	.831
	Country	-2.415	(2.884)	-.838	.403
	Education level	.79	(1.192)	.663	.508
R ² =.26; Ad R ² =.24					
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(S.E.)		
2	(Constant)	36.291	(4.672)	7.768	.000
	Ex. RD	-1.303	(.199)	-6.550	.000
	Age	.032	(.046)	.695	.488
	Sex	.429	(1.487)	.288	.773
	Country	-5.578	(4.000)	-1.394	.165
	Education level	.854	(1.192)	.716	.475
	RDx Country	.332	(.291)	1.140	.256
R ² =.27; Ad R ² =.24 n(total)=200					

5.2.4 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness

The third hypothesis (H3) assumes a negative relation between injustice perceptions and forgiveness and, thus, an additional indirect effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness via justice. Injustice perceptions, in case of study 2 triggered by social inequality, are postulated to increase revenge and avoidance motivation and reduce the willingness to forgive. In order to test the hypothesis a multivariate regression analysis of the Injustice Perceptions Scale on the three forgiveness measures was carried out in both research sites. The findings are reported below.

Uganda

The assumed relationship between injustice perceptions and forgiveness could be verified in study 2 in the Ugandan sample. A multivariate regression analysis confirmed that injustice perceptions increased revenge and avoidance motivation and reduced willingness to forgive (table 40). The control variables included age, sex and education and none of them had any significant effect on any of the forgiveness measures.

In order to test if the direct effect of the experienced relative deprivation variable on avoidance is mediated by injustice perceptions a Sobel test was performed. The test confirmed that injustice perceptions constitute a significant mediator between relative deprivation and avoidance (Sobel test statistic -2.83; $p < .01$). The effect of experienced relative deprivation on avoidance motivation became insignificant when the Injustice Perceptions scale was added into the regression analysis, indicating a full mediation. This means that all effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness in the Ugandan sample are via justice perceptions.

Poland

The assumptions of the third hypothesis could also be confirmed by the Polish sample. The multivariate regression analysis revealed significant effects of injustice perceptions on all three forgiveness measures, increasing, as expected revenge and avoidance motivation and reducing the willingness to forgive (table 41). Age, sex and education level were controlled for and education had a significant effect on avoidance motivation in the Polish sample. A higher level of education contributed to more avoidance motivation.

Table 40: Injustice Perception Scale (IPS) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Uganda)

	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>
Constant	8.556 (2.723)	3.142	11.247 (4.385)	2.565	5.003 (.788)	6.350
IPS	.150 (.038)***	3.991	.257 (.061)***	4.236	-.041 (.011)***	-3.752
Age	.018 (.024)	.753	.020 (.039)	.499	-.006 (.007)	-.836
Sex	.607 (.837)	.725	1.405 (1.348)	1.042	-.109 (.242)	-.451
Education	-.400 (.697)	-.574	-.557 (1.123)	-.496	.271 (.202)	1.342
	R ² = .14; Ad. R ² = .11		R ² = .15; Ad. R ² = .13		R ² = .14; Ad. R ² = .11	

ns $p > 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$
n(total)=126

Table 41: Injustice Perception Scale (IPS) multivariate regression results on revenge, avoidance and forgiveness (Poland)

	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>	Unstandardized <i>B</i> (s.e.)	<i>t</i>
Constant	15.812 (6.221)	2.542	16.635 (6.204)	2.682	2.866 (1.626)	1.763
IPS	.176 (.055)**	3.175	.223 (.055)***	4.036	-.048 (.014)**	-3.310
Age	-.037 (.051)	-.737	-.067 (.050)	-1.320	.015 (.013)	1.175
Sex	-1.438 (1.568)	-.917	.717(1.563)	.459	.617 (.406)	1.520
Education	-.577 (1.122)	-.514	2.751 (1.119)*	2.459	-.151 (.294)	-.515
	R ² = .16; Ad. R ² = .11		R ² = .23; Ad. R ² = .18		R ² = .17; Ad. R ² = .12	

ns $p > 0.05$; * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$
n=74

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3

The hypothesis that injustice perceptions triggered by social inequality have a negative effect on forgiveness was verified in both countries. Injustice perceptions increased revenge and avoidance motivation and reduced the willingness to forgive in Uganda as well as in Poland. This indicates a significant similarity between these very different settings, which supports the assumption that justice and forgiveness are closely related.

A comparative analysis of both country samples together confirmed the assumed similarity. None of the interaction effects between country and injustice perceptions on any of the forgiveness measures turned out to be significant (table 42). Injustice perceptions triggered by social inequality had similar effects on forgiveness in both countries. The significant effect of the country variable in model 1 showed that, as discovered previously, avoidance motivation was generally higher and willingness to forgive lower in the Polish sample.

Finally, it turned out that injustice perceptions mediated the effect of relative deprivation on avoidance motivation in the Ugandan sample. This makes injustice perceptions a central factor in the relationship between social relative deprivation and forgiveness in both countries.

Table 42: The effect of injustice perceptions (IPS) on revenge motivation, avoidance motivation and willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	10.000 (2.345)	4.265	10.040 (3.281)	3.060	4.837 (.658)	7.351
IPS	.158 (.031)***	5.171	.224 (.043)***	5.229	-.040 (.009)***	-4.715
Age	.008 (.022)	.379	.009 (.031)	.290	-.003 (.006)	-.509
Sex	.137 (.720)	.190	1.928 (1.008)	1.913	-.022 (.202)	-.107
Country	1.802 (1.401)	1.286	8.576 (1.960)***	4.374	-1.524 (.392)***	-3.886
Edu	-.664 (.576)	-1.153	.464 (.806)	.576	.207 (.161)	1.282
	R ² =.14 Ad. R ² =.11		R ² =.40 Ad. R ² =.39		R ² =.27 Ad. R ² =.25	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	10.117 (2.400)	4.215	9.511 (3.354)	2.835	4.839 (.673)	7.192
IPS	.152 (.039)***	3.866	.251 (.055)***	4.556	-.041 (.011)***	-3.684
Age	.008 (.022)	.373	.009 (.031)	.305	-.003 (.006)	-.508
Sex	.151 (.724)	.208	1.865 (1.012)	1.843	-.021 (.203)	-.105
Country	1.344 (2.363)	.569	10.640 (3.301)***	3.223	-1.536 (.664)*	-2.315
Edu	-.642 (.584)	-1.099	.366 (.816)	.449	.208 (.164)	1.265
IPS x Country	.015 (.064)	.241	-.069 (.089)	-.778	.000 (.018)	.022
	R ² =.14 Ad. R ² =.11		R ² =.41 Ad. R ² =.39		R ² =.27 Ad. R ² =.24	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001						
n(total)=200						

5.3 Conclusion of both experimental studies in Uganda and Poland

The experimental study revealed a number of interesting findings that could not have been discovered without the experimental manipulation of scenarios. The initial focus of the experiment and the whole present study was on relative deprivation, which derives from a disadvantageous social comparison. The central assumption was that if victims are in a worse situation than the perpetrators, even after the conflict or regime has ended, this will lead to relative deprivation and further to a reduced willingness to forgive the perpetrator group.

The conceptualization and design of the study was challenging since relative deprivation has not been studied before in the context of transitional justice and there have also been no studies on the relationship between relative deprivation and forgiveness. The four vignette scenarios were developed to represent all possible social comparison situations between victim and perpetrator. In study 1, the scenario of the victim being worse off than the perpetrator in economic terms represented the “relative deprivation” condition; and in study 2 the relative deprivation related to a disparity in social acknowledgment of victim vis-à-vis perpetrator. This scenario was assumed to generate relative deprivation according to theory, while the others would not.

The experienced relative deprivation variable, consisting of the comparison, deservingness, anger and resentment elements of relative deprivation, constituted a manipulation check to see if the vignette scenarios elicited different levels of experienced relative deprivation as assumed. To put it simply, the group of victims in the “relative deprivation” condition (the vignette scenario where the victim was worse off than the perpetrator) was expected to display the highest level of experienced relative deprivation.

The finding, puzzling at first, but consistent throughout both research sites and both studies, showed that the experimental manipulation had a highly significant effect on experienced relative deprivation, but not quite as expected. Firstly, the most consistent finding was that the condition of the victim’s privileged situation vis-à-vis the perpetrator (or downward comparison of the victim with the perpetrator) stood out as the one being consistently different from all the other conditions. The condition in which the victim was better off than the perpetrator was also the only one that did not elicit experienced relative deprivation. The other scenarios were sometimes

significantly different from each other with regard to the level of relative deprivation they experienced and sometimes not. For example, in the first study the difference between the two scenarios in which the victim was poor did not differ in the strengths of resulting relative deprivation. The situation of the perpetrator seemed less relevant. It means that when the victim is poor, he is still perceived to be worse off than the perpetrator even when the perpetrator is equally poor.

While the pattern was generally as expected with the “relative deprivation scenario” condition resulting in the highest experienced relative deprivation, the situation of the victim being poor (in study 1) or on a low social hierarchy level (in study 2) had such a strong effect that the fact of perpetrator being poor too was not registered. Victims still perceived him as being in a better situation and experienced relative deprivation similar to the one they felt when the perpetrator was truly better off.

However, it was also clear that not only the situation of the victim played a role. There was a consistently significant difference between the levels of experienced relative deprivation in the two conditions in which the victim was well off, socially and economically. The condition in which the perpetrator was worse off than the victim consistently generated less experienced relative deprivation and this consistency was significantly found in both studies and both countries. It appears that the situation of the perpetrator becomes more relevant when the conditions of the victims, social or economic, are good. A possible explanation is “cumulative” perspective on the perpetrator’s conditions. Even when the perpetrator is poor now, he used to be wealthy and therefore, is still considered better off than the victim, who was and still is poor. Similarly, when both, victim and perpetrator, are well off economically the victims still suffered before while nothing changed for the perpetrator. This makes victims experience relative deprivation even when the victim and perpetrator in the vignette story are both doing equally well after the conflict.

The experienced relative deprivation variable had strong and consistent effects increasing injustice perceptions across studies and samples. The direct effects of the experimental manipulation on injustice perceptions showed that it is mostly the comparatively privileged condition of the victim, which leads to less perceived injustice while the differences between the three other scenarios are less pronounced. In particular, when the victim is poor or on a low level of social hierarchy this leads on average to strong injustice perceptions that are not lessened by the perpetrator being

equally badly off. Only when the victim is doing well the downward comparison with the perpetrator becomes significant in reducing injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting

A possible interpretation was that there is an element of social comparison between the victim and perpetrator, which strongly impacts experienced relative deprivation and injustice perceptions. But it is not the whole story. Experienced relative deprivation is apparently influenced by other factors too. The theory of relative deprivation offers an explanation. While much of literature has focused, as with this study initially, on relative deprivation deriving from social comparisons of the present status quo (i. e. comparison between ingroup and outgroup at one particular point in time), there are other types of relative deprivation. These other types might be particularly relevant for victims in a post-conflict setting. Temporal relative deprivation, for instance, involves a comparison of the ingroups's before and after conditions or relative deprivation can arise out of a comparison with an imagined better alternative outcome (Helson 1964; Folger 1986; de la Sablonnière et al. 2015).

All of these types of relative deprivation might be applicable to victims in a post-conflict setting. Victims might compare their own situations over time and they are also likely to have expectations that their situations will improve when the conflict or regime ends. Moreover, they might also compare the situation of the perpetrators over time and have expectations about how the perpetrators' circumstances should evolve as well. If any of those comparisons turns out to be negative it may contribute to experienced relative deprivation overall. Depending on the context and the targeted comparison (e.g. economic conditions, social status etc.) the dominance of the one type or another of relative deprivation may differ. However, one clearly emerging finding appears to be that "punishing" the perpetrator economically or socially, without simultaneously improving the conditions of the victims might not have much effect on neither the victims' experienced relative deprivation nor on their justice assessments of the post-conflict setting. At the same time improving victims' conditions while leaving the perpetrators in a privileged position (in particular in economic terms) also results in a certain degree of relative deprivation and injustice perceptions. Both relative deprivation and injustice perceptions are significantly reduced by improving the conditions of victims but are still present if the perpetrators are not demoted – economically or socially.

The consideration of the different types of relative deprivation experienced by victims and described above contributes to a better understanding of the findings. It explains the different outcomes between the effects of the experimental “relative deprivation scenario” and the effects of the experienced relative deprivation variable. It appears that, contrary to the assumptions, all vignette scenarios constitute different levels of experienced relative deprivation except the one where the victim is better off. This explanation also helps interpret the finding that vignette scenarios, which described conditions of apparent equality between victim and perpetrator, still generated relative deprivation. And finally it explains why the comparatively privileged situation of the victim (and downward comparison with the perpetrator) was the only condition which did not result in relative deprivation and was always significantly different from all scenarios. It is the only condition which comes close to addressing and reversing several possible types of relative deprivation that victims might experience.

The experimental scenarios offer some additional clues as to what type of relative deprivation might play a more important role depending on the research site and the object of comparison. When it comes to economic wellbeing the comparison with the perpetrator only becomes relevant in the Ugandan sample when the victim’s economic conditions are good. In Poland, only the scenario where the victim is better off economically significantly reduces injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting. The other three scenarios do not differ significantly from each in their effects on injustice perceptions. Neither the victim’s improved economic conditions nor the decline of the perpetrator’s economic situation on their own is significant enough to affect injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting.

When it comes to social acknowledgment, in Uganda the victims’ improvement in his own circumstances appeared to affect justice judgements more heavily. In Poland it was again the different types of social relative deprivation that added up and contributed to injustice perceptions. If the victim is not higher in the social hierarchy than the perpetrator this leads to a perception of the post-conflict setting as unjust.

The experienced relative deprivation variable affected injustice perceptions consistently in both countries and both studies. The general average level of injustice

perceptions, though, was higher in study 1 in both countries⁴⁸. This seems to indicate that economic conditions have overall more power to trigger injustice perceptions than a lack of social acknowledgement.

The effects on forgiveness, considering the multidimensional and complex nature of this concept, were more mixed. Relative deprivation did appear to affect forgiveness, but it affected the different measures slightly differently. In the Ugandan sample a part of the effects, in particular of social relative deprivation, on the different forgiveness measures was indirect or mediated by injustice perceptions. In Poland there are some direct effects of economic relative deprivation on forgiveness.

Economic relative deprivation turned out to have more pronounced effects on forgiveness than social relative deprivation. Moreover, in case of forgiveness the disadvantageous comparison (or upward comparison of the victim with the perpetrator) did play the most important role for the victims. In a combined sample of Poland and Uganda the victims in the “relative deprivation scenario” displayed the highest revenge motivation compared with all other scenarios. Moreover, when it comes to willingness to forgive the economic conditions of the perpetrator seemed to be of utmost importance, more so than the conditions of the victim. The scenarios where the perpetrator was rich resulted in significantly less forgiveness than the scenarios where the perpetrator was poor.

A mostly consistent picture was presented by the findings regarding the effects of injustice perceptions on forgiveness. Those effects were generally present in the expected direction in both countries and studies. The only exception was the Polish sample in study 1.

A comparative analysis of the two research sites revealed, moreover, some significant country effects. The avoidance level towards the perpetrator was generally higher in Poland across studies. When economic injustices were salient there was a higher level of revenge motivation in Uganda compared to Poland. When social inequalities were salient there was less forgiveness in the Polish sample.

⁴⁸ Study 1: Uganda (mean 34.1; median 36; mode 42); Poland (mean 30.3; median 31; mode 49)
Study 2: Uganda (mean 29; median 30; mode 27); Poland (mean 27; median 28.5; mode 35)

To sum up, it appears that different comparisons affect different aspects of injustice perceptions and forgiveness. When it comes to injustice perceptions, if the victim's conditions are low (economic or social) or the perpetrator's conditions are high it both contributes to increasing injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting among victims. To reduce injustice perceptions the victims need to be better off. When it comes to forgiveness it is mostly the "relative deprivation scenario", which leads to revenge motivation. The willingness to forgive, finally, is influenced mostly by the conditions of the perpetrator. The victims seem more willing to forgive a poor perpetrator than a rich one.

CHAPTER 6. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION EFFECTS ON FORGIVENESS AND JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS – SURVEY

The hypotheses that were tested by means of an experiment involving different versions (or scenarios) of a vignette were also tested using a survey methodology. The results of the latter are reported in this chapter. The two approaches are intended to complement each other as each has their own strengths and weaknesses as experiments tend to have greater internal and surveys a better external validity.

The purpose of the experimental design with its separate conditions (or versions) of the same vignette was to introduce variance and allow for causality verification. The experiment also enabled a more nuanced understanding of relative deprivation, which would not have been possible by means of the survey methodology alone.

In contrast with hypothetical situations provided by the experiment,, real life situations and own experiences are likely to produce stronger opinions and emotions. Victims may be opposed to revenge on an abstract level and declare their willingness to forgive when presented with a fictional story; however, when it comes to their own history and the perpetrators who actually had a negative effect on their lives, their attitudes may differ. The survey can, therefore, corroborate the experiment findings in a real life context enabling a more reliable interpretation of the results.

This chapter is organized in the same way as the previous chapter 5 was. First the findings of study 1, which explored the effects of economic relative deprivation, are described. Study 2, which followed, focused on social relative deprivation. Within these two studies, subsections dealt with the three hypotheses, namely the effects of relative deprivation on forgiveness (H1) and on injustice perceptions (H2) and finally, the effects of injustice perceptions on forgiveness (H3) including the testing of possible mediation effects. The findings from the two research sites alternated for each hypothesis.

The country samples are first analyzed separately, followed by a comparative section for each of the hypotheses.

6.1 Study 1 - Relative deprivation related to economic wellbeing

In the following sections the findings regarding the three hypotheses are presented in the Ugandan and Polish samples. The same measurement tools and scales have been

applied as in the experimental study to enable comparisons⁴⁹. A number of additional control variables have been included that relate to the real life experiences and attitudes of the interviewees and might, therefore, have an impact in a non-fictional setting.

6.1.1 Relative deprivation and forgiveness

The first hypothesis (H1) assumes a negative impact of relative deprivation on forgiveness. To assess the potential effects of relative deprivation on the different forgiveness measures, the same tools were applied as in the experiments. Relative deprivation was operationalized through the same four items as the experienced relative deprivation variable in the experiment.⁵⁰ The dependent variable of forgiveness was measured with the TRIM-12 questionnaire, consisting of revenge and avoidance motivation sub-scales, and the added forgiveness item.

Additionally, some control variables were included, which might influence forgiveness, such as religiosity, victimization experience and victim identification. The outcomes of the analyses are divided into two models. Adding more control variables can reduce the statistical significance of the predictor variable. Therefore, the first model only includes relative deprivation and the demographic variables, while in the second model religiosity, victimization experience and victim identification are added. Religiosity has been theorized to affect forgiveness.⁵¹ Identification with other victims is significant for group relative deprivation⁵² and might negatively affect forgiveness if the suffering of others is added to own painful experiences. Victimization experience, finally, obviously differs in Uganda and Poland. In Uganda it was operationalized as abduction and in Poland as arrest or detention. Abduction, in Uganda, can be seen as representing one of the most pronounced forms of victimization experiences and may also have a negative effect on forgiving the perpetrators. In Poland the political prisoners are differentiated from those who had not spent time in prison.

Victim identification and victimization (i. e. abduction/arrest) experience are both single items. Victim identification is measured with a 5-point Likert scale and

⁴⁹ The reliability of all scales applied in the survey is described in chapter 4.

⁵⁰ See chapter 4 for details.

⁵¹ See chapter 2.3.2.

⁵² See chapter 2.2.2

victimization is a dummy variable. Religiosity is measured in the form of a short 3-item scale.⁵³

Originally, in the survey, two measures of relative deprivation were included. The differences between the two scales are described in the methodology section. The reason for the two measures was that the case of an individual comparison with outgroup individuals was considered ambiguous as it could either constitute group or individual relative deprivation (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). In the present study, even though respondents were asked to compare their individual situation with that of the perpetrators', it was their identity of being a victim, which was triggered and which made the victim group membership salient. It can, therefore, be assumed that the individual comparison with perpetrators in this research is more likely to represent group relative deprivation. However, in order to be sure that it does, both measures of relative deprivation were included, one focusing on the individual comparison (personal economic situation compared with the economic conditions of the perpetrators) and one focusing on the comparison of the ingroup of victims with the outgroup of perpetrators.

The result was that both scales had, indeed, very similar effects across both studies and countries. In order to simplify the following section only the outcomes of one of the scales are presented, namely the one where the victims are asked to compare their personal situation with the perpetrators (and not the whole group of victims). While both measurements are similar, this scale yielded more consistent results and had on average a better reliability. The reason is most probably that it is easier for people to compare their own situation, which they know very well, with the circumstances of a group of perpetrators, than compare the conditions of their whole group with that of perpetrators.

Uganda

The first hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan sample. Relative deprivation turned out to be the most significant predictor of revenge and avoidance motivation, as well as willingness to forgive in both models (table 43). Other significant predictors include victim identification, which increases revenge and avoidance motivation;

⁵³ See chapter 4 for details.

religiosity, which reduces avoidance motivation and increases willingness to forgive; and finally, the experience of abduction, which reduces the willingness to forgive.

Poland

The first hypothesis was partly verified in the Polish sample. Relative deprivation is a significant predictor of revenge motivation and willingness to forgive (in model 2). It has no effect on avoidance motivation for which the only significant predictor is education level, which decreases avoidance motivation (table 44). This supports the findings of Azar and Mullet (2002), who found that willingness to forgive increases with higher levels of education. Other significant control variables include victim identification, increasing revenge motivation and religiosity, increasing willingness to forgive.

Table 43: Multivariate regression results of economic relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Uganda)

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	23.014 (2.887)	7.973	31.253 (3.605)	8.669	1.597 (.940)	1.699
RD	-.522 (.133)***	-3.925	-.618 (.166)***	-3.724	.134 (.043)**	3.091
Age	-.016 (.031)	-.512	-.025 (.039)	-.643	.004 (.010)	.364
Sex	-.699 (.861)	-.812	.388 (1.076)	.361	.211 (.282)	.750
Education	-1.021 (.639)	-1.596	-.684 (.799)	-.856	.149 (.208)	.717
	R ² =.13 Ad. R ² =.10		R ² =.11 Ad. R ² =.08		R ² =.08 Ad. R ² =.05	
Model2						
	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	20.387 (3.551)	5.741	32.347 (4.721)	6.851	1.756 (1.151)	1.525
RD	-.402 (.144)**	-2.791	-.775 (.192)***	-4.041	.117 (.047)**	2.503
Age	-.023 (.031)	-.755	-.038 (.041)	-.940	.006 (.010)	.611
Sex	.146 (.900)	.162	1.803 (1.196)	1.507	-.145 (.292)	-.495
Education	-.869 (.632)	-1.374	-1.376 (.841)	-1.637	.050 (.205)	.243
Religiosity	-.277 (.177)	-1.562	-.502 (.236)*	-2.129	.129 (.058)*	2.236
Abduction	1.416 (.841)	1.684	.786 (1.118)	.703	-.626 (.274)*	-2.289
Victim Id.	.797 (.373)*	2.138	1.093 (.496)*	2.205	-.138 (.121)	-1.146
	R ² =.21 Ad. R ² =.16		R ² =.28 Ad. R ² =.24		R ² =.17 Ad. R ² =.12	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=131						

Table 44: Multivariate regression results of economic relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Poland)

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	20.405 (4.371)	4.668	28.832 (5.141)	5.608	3.087 (1.222)	2.527
RD	-.395 (.107)***	-3.683	.179 (.126)	1.420	.046 (.030)	1.546
Age	-.011 (.051)	-.223	.085 (.060)	1.414	-.006 (.014)	-.421
Sex	-.237 (1.186)	-.200	1.234 (1.395)	.885	-.315 (.327)	-.966
Education	-.241 (.788)	-.306	-2.765 (.926)**	-2.985	.017 (.219)	.080
	R ² =.17 Ad. R ² =.14					
Model2						
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	14.333 (4.970)	2.884	27.923 (6.047)	4.618	2.485 (1.420)	1.751
RD	-.328 (.111)**	-2.952	.188 (.135)	1.387	.066 (.031)*	2.135
Age	-.016 (.051)	-.310	.091 (.062)	1.469	-.012 (.014)	-.832
Sex	-.509 (1.285)	-.396	.926 (1.563)	.592	-.437 (.359)	-1.216
Education	.139 (.779)	.178	-2.621 (.948)**	-2.765	.038 (.220)	.174
Religiosity	.027 (.115)	.231	-.058 (.140)	-.415	.072 (.032)*	2.226
Arrest/ Detention	-.444 (1.048)	-.423	-.800 (1.276)	-.627	-.003 (.293)	-.010
Victim Id.	1.146 (.405)**	2.831	.365 (.492)	.740	.029 (.114)	.255
	R ² =.23 Ad. R ² =.18				R ² =.10 Ad. R ² =.04	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=116						

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan, and partly in the Polish, sample. The main difference is the fact that there is no significant effect on avoidance motivation in the Polish sample. This resembles the findings from the experiment, where the suggested possible explanation was that it might reflect some differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. The assumption was that avoidance might constitute a much stronger reaction in a collectivistic culture, while it might have little meaning in an individualistic culture, especially if there had been no previous close relationship between the victim and perpetrator. This finding was corroborated by a comparative analysis of both research sites, which showed a significant interaction between the effects of the country and relative deprivation on avoidance. Moreover, model 1 displayed the highly significant influence of country on avoidance motivation, which means that in the real-life conditions the level of avoidance towards the perpetrators is on general much higher in Poland as well (table 45).

Another interesting outcome is the positive correlation between religiosity and self-declared willingness to forgive in both samples, while there is no significant effect of religiosity on revenge motivation. As described earlier the connection between religiosity and forgiveness is not a simple one. While a positive connection is generally assumed, forgiveness researches have pointed out that this connection is likely to be superficial. In other words, while forgiveness is valued by religious people and while they perceive and declare themselves as being more forgiving, this might not necessarily be the case in reality (McCullough 2001).

A strong identification with the victim group increased revenge motivation in both samples and constituted another similarity between the two countries.

Finally, while the experience of abduction in Uganda does have a negative effect on forgiveness, arrest in Poland has no effect at all. A more nuanced explanation might be provided by the qualitative data. It is possible, however, that for oppositionists the risk of arrest and detention was taken consciously and perceived as an integral part of the struggle. It might, therefore, have a lesser impact on forgiveness.

Table 45: Relative deprivation and revenge motivation, avoidance motivation and willingness to forgive - Poland and Uganda

Modell1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	16.773 (2.498)	6.716	25.079 (3.345)	7.498	2.548 (.772)	3.299
RD	-.346 (.084)***	-4.124	-.215 (.112) (*)	-1.913	.094 (.026)***	3.647
Age	-.014 (.025)	-.563	.008 (.034)	.239	.000 (.008)	.015
Sex	.024 (.693)	.034	1.201 (.928)	1.294	-.233 (.213)	-1.092
Country	.550 (1.099)	.500	5.738 (1.471)***	3.900	-.560 (.338)	-1.657
Edu	-.601 (.462)	-1.302	-1.315 (.619)*	-2.126	-.020 (.142)	-.141
Victim Id.	.975 (.264)***	3.687	1.107 (.354)**	3.126	-.101 (.081)	-1.240
Rel	-.082 (.095)	-.864	-.280 (.127)*	-2.204	.095 (.029)***	3.245
Arr./ Abd.	.754 (.635)	1.189	.391 (.850)	.461	-.408 (.195)	-2.089
	R ² =.21 Ad. R ² =.18		R ² =.21 Ad. R ² =.19		R ² =.14 Ad. R ² =.11	
Model2						
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	16.994 (2.676)	6.351	30.309 (3.450)	8.785	2.273 (.827)	2.749
RD	-.370 (.133)**	-2.784	-.783 (.171)***	-4.573	.124 (.041)**	3.025
Age	-.015 (.026)	-.584	-.007 (.033)	-.200	.001 (.008)	.116
Sex	.020 (.695)	.029	1.113 (.896)	1.242	-.229 (.213)	-1.074
Country	.304 (1.525)	.199	-.091 (1.966)	-.046	-.257 (.468)	-.549
Edu	-.620 (.470)	-1.320	-1.754 (.606)**	-2.896	.003 (.144)	.020
Victim Id.	.965 (.269)***	3.591	.862 (.346)*	2.489	-.088 (.083)	-1.067
Rel	-.078 (.097)	-.801	-.176 (.125)	-1.409	.090 (.030)**	3.006
Arr./ Abd.	.750 (.636)	1.179	.290 (.820)	.353	-.402 (.196)*	-2.055
RD x Country	.037 (.160)	.233	.884 (.206)***	4.285	-.046 (.049)	-.934
	R ² =.21 Ad. R ² =.18		R ² =.27 Ad. R ² =.24		R ² =.14 Ad. R ² =.11	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=247						

6.1.2 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions

The second hypothesis (H2) postulates that relative deprivation increases injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting.

As in the experiment, justice perceptions were measured with items adapted from Wenzel and Okimoto (2014). The items, called here Injustice Perceptions scale (IPS), have been adapted in the survey by removing one item (item nr 6) in order to improve the reliability. The Injustice Gap scale (IGS) was additionally included in the questionnaires in order to assess the construct validity of both scales and corroborate the findings. As expected the two scales are highly correlated ($r=-.71$; $p<.01$). Both scales yielded very similar results and since the Injustice Gap scale has on average, across the studies and samples, a lower reliability and proved less consistent, only the findings of the Injustice Perceptions scale are reported below.

The control variables used in testing the second hypothesis are the demographic variables. As opposed to forgiveness, there was no particular theoretical background to assume that the additional control variables, used in the models predicting forgiveness, would have any effect on injustice perceptions.

Uganda

The second hypothesis was verified by the Ugandan sample. Relative deprivation does have a significant effect on injustice perceptions. The assessment of the post-conflict setting as unjust increased with more experienced relative deprivation (table 46).

Poland

The second hypothesis was also verified by the Polish sample. The multivariate regression of relative deprivation on the Injustice Perceptions scale yielded highly significant results, with the model explaining a considerable amount of variance of injustice perceptions, namely 38% (table 47).

Table 46: Regression results of economic relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Uganda)

DV=Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
	(Constant)	33.442	(4.869)	6.868	.000
	RD	-.692	(.224)	-3.086	.002
	Age	.032	(.053)	.598	.551
	Sex	-.926	(1.453)	-.637	.525
	Education	.502	(1.079)	.465	.642
$R^2 = .08$; Adjusted $R^2 = .05$ n=131					

Table 47: Regression results of economic relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Poland)

DV=Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
1	(Constant)	47.304	7.774	6.085	.000
	RD	-1.219	.191	-6.387	.000
	Age	-.113	.091	-1.245	.216
	Sex	-.167	2.110	-.079	.937
	Education	-.361	1.401	-.258	.797
R ² = .38; Adjusted R ² = .35 n=116					

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2

Economic relative deprivation is a highly significant predictor of injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting in both countries. The second hypothesis was therefore clearly verified in study 1. The only difference was that relative deprivation explains more variance of injustice perceptions in the Polish than in the Ugandan sample.

A comparative analysis of both research sites confirmed that while the hypothesis was verified in both samples, there are some differences (table 48). As indicated by the significant interaction of the relative deprivation and country variables, relative deprivation has a significantly stronger effect on increasing injustice perceptions in Poland than it does in Uganda.

Table 48: The effect of relative deprivation on injustice perceptions in Poland and Uganda

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
1	(Constant)	38.877	3.547	10.961	.000
	RD	-1.060	.136	-7.810	.000
	Age	-.017	.045	-.372	.710
	Sex	-.697	1.169	-.596	.552
	Country	.306	1.933	.158	.874
	Education	-.134	.825	-.162	.871
R ² =.26 Ad. R ² =.24					
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		T	Sig.
		B	(s.e.)		
2	(Constant)	35.732	3.862	9.251	.000
	RD	-.710	.222	-3.203	.002
	Age	-.008	.045	-.176	.861
	Sex	-.785	1.162	-.675	.500
	Country	4.088	2.701	1.514	.131
	Education	.125	.830	.150	.881
	RD x Country	-.549	.275	-1.992	.048
	R ² =.27 Ad. R ² =.25 n=247				

Relative deprivation and low economic status

The results of the previous sections confirm that relative deprivation does have an effect on justice perceptions and forgiveness. The question to be addressed here is, to what extent are these effects similar or different from effects that a low economic status might have on the dependent variables? This is important, especially taking into account that in many studies relative deprivation has only been measured by an assessment of the own economic wellbeing. When this was low and the assessment of others' conditions was higher, relative deprivation was automatically assumed (H. J. Smith et al. 2012). Obviously, an assessment of own financial situation as low is related to relative deprivation. If someone believes himself to be economically privileged, it is less likely that he will experience relative deprivation. On the other hand, if someone perceives his economic status as low, relative deprivation is more probable. At the same time a low economic status by no means always leads to relative deprivation.

The following findings in both research sites reveal whether relative deprivation is a poorer, similar or better predictor of injustice perceptions and forgiveness.

Own economic wellbeing was measured with an adapted short 3-item scale.⁵⁴

Uganda

Relative deprivation and an assessment of own economic wellbeing are significantly correlated in the Ugandan sample ($r = .29, p < .01$). It means that victims who struggle financially in Uganda are also more likely to experience relative deprivation.

The predictive power of economic wellbeing was tested by including it in the models with the dependent variables of injustice perceptions and the forgiveness measures instead of relative deprivation.⁵⁵

It turns out that the outcomes of relative deprivation and economic wellbeing do indeed differ, even though economic wellbeing is a significant predictor on some of the dependent variables assessed in this study. Economic wellbeing is not a significant predictor of injustice perceptions in the Ugandan sample. It does significantly predict revenge motivation ($\beta = -.874, t(126) = -4.162, p < .000$) and does explain a similar

⁵⁴ See chapter 4 for details

⁵⁵ Control variables age, sex and education

amount of variance as relative deprivation ($R^2 = .14$, $F(4, 126)=5.267$, $p<.001$). Economic wellbeing is also a significant predictor of avoidance motivation ($\beta=-.888$, $t(126)=-2.961$, $p<.01$) with a similar amount of variance explained as relative deprivation ($R^2=.10$, $F(4, 126)= 3.596$, $p <.01$) and finally, also of willingness to forgive ($\beta=.306$, $t(126)= 4.613$, $p <.000$) with slightly more variance explained ($R^2 =.15$, $F(4, 125) = 5.674$, $p < .001$).

To summarize, economic wellbeing in the Ugandan sample is as effective as a predictor of the forgiveness measures as relative deprivation is. However, it has no effect on injustice perceptions.

Poland

The same analyses were carried out in the Polish sample. First the relation between the relative deprivation and the economic wellbeing scales were examined. Both variables correlated highly ($r=.72$; $p<.01$) indicating that also in the Polish sample those victims who perceive their economic status as low are more likely to experience relative deprivation.

Economic wellbeing is a significant predictor of injustice perceptions ($\beta=-1.190$, $t(111)=-5.237$, $p<.001$) but explains less variance ($R^2 =.32$, $F(4,108)= 12.524$, $p <.001$) than relative deprivation. The same is true for revenge motivation ($\beta=-.350$, $t(111)=-2.797$, $p <.01$) and ($R^2 =.13$, $F(4,107)=3.936$, $p<.01$). It is not a significant predictor of avoidance motivation or willingness to forgive.

In conclusion, while economic wellbeing is a significant predictor of the same dependent variables as relative deprivation, which is to be expected considering the highly significant correlation, it does explain less variance.

6.1.3 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness

The third hypothesis (H3) postulates that injustice perceptions have a negative effect on forgiveness by increasing revenge and avoidance motivation and reducing the willingness to forgive. This assumption suggests an additional indirect effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness via justice. The findings for the two samples are presented below. The multivariate regression analyses were again done in two steps. The first model controlled only for the demographic variables of age, sex and education. In the second model religiosity, the experience of abduction (in Uganda) or arrest/detention (in Poland) and victims' identification were added.

Uganda

In the Ugandan sample the third hypothesis was confirmed. Regardless of the number of control variables, injustice perceptions are a highly significant predictor of all forgiveness measures (table 49). The only significant demographic variable is level of education, which reduces avoidance and revenge motivation.

In the second model victim identification turns out to be highly significant increasing revenge and avoidance motivation, and reducing the willingness to forgive. The experience of abduction has a negative effect on the willingness to forgive. Both models explain a considerable amount of variance of all three forgiveness measure.

Injustice perceptions were tested for their potential role as mediator between relative deprivation and forgiveness measures. When injustice perceptions are added into the regression on forgiveness measures together with relative deprivation, relative deprivation remains significant but the significance decreases in the case of revenge motivation and willingness to forgive, suggesting a partial mediation. The Sobel test confirmed that injustice perceptions are a significant mediator between relative deprivation and willingness to forgive (Sobel statistic 2.65 and one-tail $p=.004$) as well as revenge (Sobel statistic -2.71 and one-tailed $p= 0.003$) and avoidance motivation (Sobel statistic -2.73 and one-tailed $p=.003$).

Those findings show that while there always remains a direct significant effect of relative deprivation on all forgiveness measures in the Ugandan sample, part of all the effects is via injustice perceptions.

Poland

The third hypothesis was also confirmed in the Polish sample. However, it turns out that injustice perceptions do not affect all forgiveness measures. While they increase revenge motivation and reduce the willingness to forgive, they have no effect on avoidance motivation (table 50). The only variable to affect avoidance motivation is education level, which decreases it.

The control variables present a more varied picture. Religiosity increases the willingness to forgive; victim identification increases revenge motivation, while the experience of arrest or detention has no effect at all.

Also in the Polish sample potential mediator effects were tested. There is no mediator effect in case of willingness to forgive. Neither injustice perceptions nor relative deprivation have any effect on avoidance motivation. In the case of revenge motivation, there appears to be a mediator effect from relative deprivation instead. When both relative deprivation and injustice perceptions are regressed on revenge motivation, the significance of both effects is reduced. Relative deprivation is, however, still significant at $p=.033$, while injustice perceptions are not significant anymore at $p=.057$. Therefore, the Sobel test was performed to test relative deprivation as mediator between injustice perceptions and revenge. It turned out to be significant (Sobel statistic 3.20 and $p=.001$).

Table 49: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Uganda)

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	11.662 (2.942)	3.963	16.266 (4.044)	4.022	4.860 (.951)	5.109
IPS	.272 (.048)***	5.639	.388 (.066)***	5.864	-.082 (.016)***	-5.262
Age	-.015 (.030)	-.512	-.026 (.041)	-.627	.004 (.010)	.427
Sex	-.552 (.816)	-.676	.839 (1.122)	.748	.164 (.265)	.618
Education	-1.264 (.604)*	-2.093	-1.955 (.830)*	-2.354	.216 (.195)	1.107
	R ² =.22 Ad. R ² =.20		R ² =.25 Ad. R ² =.22		R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.16	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	7.402 (3.385)	2.187	12.021 (4.614)	2.605	5.535 (1.117)	4.956
IPS	.263 (.046)***	5.672	.370 (.063)***	5.856	-.076 (.015)***	-5.005
Age	-.028 (.028)	-.988	-.040 (.038)	-1.051	.007 (.009)	.800
Sex	-.045 (.825)	-.055	1.464 (1.124)	1.302	-.089 (.272)	-.325
Education	-1.247 (.577)*	-2.159	-2.012 (.787)**	-2.556	.160 (.190)	.839
Religiosity	-.067 (.167)	-.399	-.204 (.227)	-.897	.067 (.055)	1.224
Abduction	1.033 (.763)	1.353	.068 (1.041)	.066	-.516 (.253)*	-2.037
Victim Id.	1.218 (.306)***	3.987	1.929 (.417)***	4.630	-.261 (.101)**	-2.587
	R ² =.33 Ad. R ² =.30		R ² =.36 Ad. R ² =.33		R ² =.28 Ad. R ² =.23	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=131						

Table 50: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Poland)

Modell1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	12.266 (4.858)	2.525	27.291 (5.726)	4.766	4.324 (1.337)	3.235
IPS	.164 (.046)***	3.533	.042 (.055)	.766	-.027 (.013)*	-2.063
Age	.017 (.051)	.327	.078 (.060)	1.302	-.009 (.014)	-.632
Sex	.252 (1.171)	.215	.696 (1.380)	.504	-.349 (.318)	-1.096
Education	-.966 (.706)	-1.369	-1.823 (.832)*	-2.192	.060 (.193)	.312
	R ² =.16 Ad. R ² =.13		R ² =.08 Ad. R ² =.04		R ² =.07 Ad. R ² =.03	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	7.618 (5.220)	1.459	27.102 (6.367)	4.257	4.071 (1.469)	2.772
IPS	.136 (.048)**	2.849	.054 (.058)	.931	-.035 (.013)**	-2.659
Age	.007 (.051)	.140	.094 (.062)	1.501	-.016 (.014)	-1.150
Sex	-.187 (1.281)	-.146	.652 (1.562)	.417	-.491 (.353)	-1.392
Education	-.442 (.710)	-.623	-1.788 (.866)*	-2.064	.122 (.198)	.616
Religiosity	.033 (.115)	.288	-.148 (.141)	-1.054	.075 (.032)*	2.353
Arrest/ Detention	-.578 (1.049)	-.551	-.615 (1.279)	-.481	.016 (.289)	.055
Victim Id.	1.158 (.406)**	2.856	.191 (.495)	.386	.036 (.113)	.317
	R ² =.23 Ad. R ² =.18		R ² =.09 Ad. R ² =.03		R ² =.12 Ad. R ² =.06	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=116						

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3

The third hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan and partly in the Polish samples. Injustice perceptions increased revenge and avoidance motivation and reduced the willingness to forgive in Uganda. In Poland there was no effect on avoidance motivation, which is similar to the findings of the effects of relative deprivation on the forgiveness measures. Avoidance does appear to be less relevant as a measure of forgiveness in the Polish sample.

A comparative analysis of both countries revealed that even though the injustice perceptions negatively affect forgiveness in both countries, there are some differences (table 51). The effect of injustice perceptions on all three forgiveness measures is much stronger in Uganda. Injustices in the context of salient economic inequalities increase revenge and avoidance motivation and reduce willingness to forgive to a greater degree in the Ugandan, compared to the Polish, sample. Consistent with previous findings the general level of avoidance motivation towards the perpetrators turned out to be significantly higher in Poland than in Uganda.

Table 51: The effects of injustice perceptions on revenge and avoidance motivation as well as willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	7.761 (2.464)	3.149	17.460 (3.330)	5.243	5.025 (.769)	6.533
IPS	.197 (.031)***	6.259	.190 (.042)***	4.474	-.054 (.010)***	-5.549
Age	-.009 (.024)	-.385	.011 (.033)	.349	-.001 (.008)	-.109
Sex	.088 (.664)	.132	1.330 (.897)	1.482	-.249 (.206)	-1.208
Country	.227 (1.045)	.217	5.628 (1.412)***	3.985	-.486 (.324)	-1.498
Edu	-.794 (.427)	-1.860	-1.306 (.577)*	-2.264	.029 (.133)	.221
Victim Id.	1.170 (.240)***	4.887	1.165 (.324)***	3.600	-.154 (.074)*	-2.071
Rel	-.052 (.089)	-.579	-.281 (.121)*	-2.330	.086 (.028)**	3.107
Arr./ Abd.	.569 (.602)	.944	.347 (.814)	.427	-.363 (.187)	-1.939
	R ² =.28 Ad. R ² =.25		R ² =.27 Ad. R ² =.24		R ² =.20 Ad. R ² =.17	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	5.610 (2.658)	2.110	11.899 (3.503)	3.397	5.721 (.827)	6.920
IPS	.266 (.046)***	5.816	.369 (.060)***	6.126	-.077 (.014)***	-5.434
Age	-.015 (.024)	-.622	-.003 (.032)	-.105	.001 (.008)	.122
Sex	.059 (.660)	.089	1.254 (.869)	1.443	-.240 (.204)	-1.175
Country	4.396 (2.263)*	1.943	16.403 (2.982)***	5.501	-1.849 (.702)**	-2.635
Edu	-.941 (.430)*	-2.189	-1.685 (.566)**	-2.976	.079 (.133)	.589
Victim Id.	1.207 (.238)***	5.061	1.259 (.314)***	4.007	-.166 (.074)*	-2.244
Rel	-.001 (.092)	-.015	-.151 (.121)	-1.246	.070 (.028)*	2.454
Arr./ Abd.	.500 (.599)	.835	.171 (.790)	.216	-.338 (.186)	-1.819
IPS x Country	-.135 (.065)*	-2.074	-.349 (.086)***	-4.067	.044 (.020)*	2.185
	R ² =.29 Ad. R ² =.26		R ² =.31 Ad. R ² =.29		R ² =.21 Ad. R ² =.18	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=247						

6.2 Study 2 - Relative deprivation related to social acknowledgement

The second study tested the same hypotheses as study 1, namely that relative deprivation has a negative effect on forgiveness and increases injustice perceptions while injustice perceptions have a negative effect on forgiveness.

The difference in the second study was that it did not focus on economic relative deprivation but on relative deprivation regarding social status or acknowledgement. The question was whether this type of relative deprivation had similar effects on victims as the economic one did. The variables were the same as in study 1.⁵⁶

6.2.1 Relative deprivation and forgiveness

This section presents the findings resulting from testing the first hypothesis (H1) in Uganda and Poland that social relative deprivation increases revenge and avoidance motivation and reduces willingness to forgive.

Uganda

The first hypothesis was fully verified in the Ugandan sample. Social relative deprivation is a significant predictor of all forgiveness measures, increasing revenge and avoidance motivation and reducing willingness to forgive (table 52). Though the effect was less pronounced in the case of willingness to forgive, the result was approaching significance at $p=.069$ in model 1 and $p=.075$ in model 2. None of the control variables, which include demographics (age, sex and education level), religiosity, victimization experience and victim identification had any effect on the forgiveness measures.

Poland

The hypothesis was not verified in the Polish sample. Social relative deprivation had no effect on any of the forgiveness measures. None of the control variables had any effect either, the exception being religiosity which increased the willingness to forgive.

⁵⁶ See chapter 4 for details on the operationalization and reliability.

Uganda and Poland - Hypothesis 1

The testing of the first hypothesis (H1), which posited that relative deprivation has a negative effect on forgiveness, revealed different outcomes for the two research sites. While the hypothesis was confirmed in Uganda, social relative deprivation had no effect on forgiveness in Poland.

The comparative analysis of both countries showed the significant effect of the research site on willingness to forgive and avoidance motivation (table 53). This confirms previous findings about the generally significantly higher levels of avoidance motivation in Poland and lower willingness to forgive. Even though social relative deprivation did have a significant effect on revenge motivation in the Ugandan sample but not in the Polish sample, the comparative analysis did not reveal a country effect or significant interaction effect. This suggests that the lack of effect in Poland is more likely due to a small sample; while the direction and influence of social relative deprivation in increasing revenge motivation is similar in both countries.

Table 52: Multivariate regression results of social relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Uganda)

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Cons- tant	14.177 (2.929)	4.840	22.231 (4.241)	5.241	3.325 (.944)	3.523
RD	-.270 (.088)**	-3.082	-.352 (.127)**	-2.772	.052 (.028)	1.832
Age	.002 (.026)	.086	.022 (.037)	.581	-.001 (.008)	-.101
Sex	1.111 (.885)	1.255	.956 (1.282)	.746	-.060 (.285)	-.211
Edu- cation	-.068 (.725)	-.094	-1.056 (1.049)	-1.007	.146 (.233)	.626
	R ² =.11 Ad. R ² =.07		R ² =.10 Ad. R ² =.07			
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Cons- tant	17.377 (3.723)	4.668	25.963 (5.405)	4.804	2.438 (1.207)	2.020
RD	-.268 (.089)**	-3.006	-.344 (.129)**	-2.658	.052 (.029)	1.794
Age	.003 (.026)	.121	.024 (.038)	.646	-.001 (.008)	-.117
Sex	1.627 (.918)	1.772	1.647 (1.333)	1.236	-.193 (.298)	-.647
Edu- cation	-.234 (.732)	-.320	-1.273 (1.062)	-1.199	.191 (.237)	.804
Reli- giosity	-.339 (.178)	-1.900	-.452 (.259)	-1.746	.088 (.058)	1.527
Ab- duction	-.441 (.801)	-.550	-.455 (1.163)	-.391	.112 (.260)	.432
Victim Id.	.132 (.307)	.429	.265 (.446)	.594	-.023 (.100)	-.234
	R ² =.14 Ad. R ² =.08		R ² =.13 Ad. R ² =.08			
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001						
n=126						

Table 53: Multivariate regression results of social relative deprivation on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive in Poland and Uganda

Modell1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	16.173 (2.965)	5.455	19.039 (4.268)	4.461	2.403 (.903)	2.663
RD	-.261 (.072)***	-3.598	-.221 (.104)*	-2.118	.050 (.023)*	2.218
Age	-.004 (.023)	-.173	-.002 (.033)	-.067	.001 (.007)	.087
Sex	1.026 (.761)	1.347	2.083 (1.096)	1.900	-.231 (.235)	-.981
Country	1.136 (1.464)	.776	9.257 (2.108)***	4.392	-1.344 (.446)**	-3.011
Edu	-.297 (.594)	-.500	-.015 (.855)	-.017	.186 (.182)	1.019
Victim Id.	.096 (.270)	.354	.251 (.389)	.644	-.042 (.082)	-.506
Rel	-.100 (.110)	-.912	-.071 (.158)	-.446	.099 (.034)**	2.952
Arr./ Abd.	-.624 (.682)	-.914	-.981 (.982)	-1.000	.095 (.210)	.453
	R ² =.11 Ad. R ² =.07		R ² =.33 Ad. R ² =.30		R ² =.16 Ad. R ² =.13	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	16.251 (3.010)	5.399	19.946 (4.313)	4.625	2.397 (.918)	2.612
RD	-.269 (.090)**	-3.001	-.322 (.129)*	-2.502	.051 (.027)	1.851
Age	-.004 (.023)	-.173	-.002 (.033)	-.067	.001 (.007)	.087
Sex	1.014 (.767)	1.322	1.948 (1.099)	1.773	-.229 (.238)	-.964
Country	.895 (2.069)	.433	6.465 (2.965)*	2.181	-1.324 (.647)*	-2.045
Edu	-.307 (.599)	-.512	-.128 (.858)	-.149	.187 (.185)	1.013
Victim Id.	.097 (.271)	.359	.271 (.389)	.696	-.042 (.083)	-.506
Rel	-.097 (.112)	-.871	-.037 (.160)	-.229	.099 (.034)**	2.881
Arr./ Abd.	-.628 (.684)	-.917	-1.028 (.980)	-1.048	.095 (.210)	.452
RD x Country	.024 (.143)	.165	.275 (.206)	1.336	-.002 (.046)	-.042
	R ² =.11 Ad. R ² =.06		R ² =.34 Ad. R ² =.30		R ² =.16 Ad. R ² =.12	

ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001
n=200

6.2.2 Relative deprivation and injustice perceptions

The second hypothesis (H2) addresses the question of the effect of social relative deprivation on injustice perceptions. The assumption of the present study is that any type of relative deprivation, including the one related to social acknowledgement, increases injustice perceptions. The same control variables (age, sex and education level) have been included in the models as was the case in study 1. The outcomes at both research sites are reported below.

Uganda

The second hypothesis was verified in the Ugandan sample. Social relative deprivation did have a significant effect on injustice perceptions. As expected, it increased injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting. None of the control variables had any significant effect (table 54).

Poland

The second hypothesis was also verified in the Polish sample. Social relative deprivation is a highly significant predictor and the model explains almost 50% of the variance of injustice perceptions. None of the demographic control variables had any significant effect (table 55).

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis was verified in both research sites. As expected, social relative deprivation significantly increased perceptions that the post-conflict or post-regime setting is unjust. None of the demographic control variables had any significant effect on the injustice perceptions. Relative deprivation did, however, appear to explain considerably more variance of injustice perceptions in the Polish than in the Ugandan sample.

A comparative analysis of both countries confirmed that there is indeed a significant interaction effect between country and relative deprivation, meaning that social relative deprivation increased injustice perceptions significantly more in Poland than in Uganda (table 56).

Table 54: Regression results of social relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Uganda)

DV=Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(S.E.)		
	(Constant)	33.702	(5.571)	6.050	.000
	RD	-.828	(.167)	-4.973	.000
	Age:	.008	(.049)	.172	.863
	Sex	-.184	(1.684)	-.109	.913
	Education level	.732	(1.378)	.531	.596
$R^2 = .18$; Adjusted $R^2 = .15$ n=126					

Table 55: Regression results of social relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale (Poland)

DV=Injustice Perceptions		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(S.E.)		
	(Constant)	52.097	(9.691)	5.376	.000
	RD	-1.432	(.190)	-7.516	.000
	Age:	-.111	(.080)	-1.393	.168
	Sex	-1.775	(2.643)	-.672	.504
	Education level	-.382	(1.742)	-.219	.827
$R^2 = .49$; Adjusted $R^2 = .46$ $n=74$					

Table 56: Regression results of social relative deprivation on Injustice Perception scale in Poland and Uganda

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	(S.E)		
1	(Constant)	38.912	(4.307)	9.034	.000
	RD	-1.056	(.124)	-8.488	.000
	Age	-.015	(.041)	-.375	.708
	Sex	-.656	(1.355)	-.484	.629
	Country	-.164	(2.570)	-.064	.949
	Ed. level	-.014	(1.064)	-.013	.990
R ² =.30 Ad. R ² =.28					
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error		
2	(Constant)	36.311	(4.414)	8.226	.000
	RD	-.831	(.158)	-5.247	.000
	Age	-.019	(.040)	-.467	.641
	Sex	-.468	(1.343)	-.348	.728
	Country	5.611	(3.606)	1.556	.121
	Ed. level	.206	(1.057)	.195	.846
	RD x Country	-.562	(.249)	-2.258	.025
	R ² =.32 Ad. R ² =.30 n=200				

Relative deprivation and individual low social acknowledgement

The effects of relative deprivation were compared with those of low social status. In order to do this, an assessment of own social status was used as a predictor instead of relative deprivation. Own social status was measured on a 10-rung ladder of community standing in which respondents were requested to place themselves according to how they estimated their social positions.⁵⁷ The findings for Uganda and Poland are reported below.

Uganda

Social relative deprivation was significantly correlated with the assessment of own social status ($r=.69$; $p<.01$) in the Ugandan sample. This means that for victims in Uganda a perception of own social status as low is strongly linked to an experience of relative deprivation.

The question examined here was whether the assessment of own social status would yield the same results as relative deprivation. In the Ugandan sample the assessment of own social status was a significant predictor of injustice perceptions ($b = -.697$, $t(121) = -2.368$, $p < .05$). Victims, who perceived their social status as high, considered the Ugandan environment after the conflict as being more just compared to those who perceived their social status as low. However, it is a less significant predictor than relative deprivation and explains much less variance ($R^2 = .05$, $F(4, 116) = 1.556$, n.s).

When it came to the forgiveness measures the difference was even more pronounced. The assessment of own social status significantly predicted revenge motivation only ($b = -.296$, $t(121) = -2.039$, $p < .05$) as opposed to relative deprivation, which was a significant predictor of all three measures. The amount of variance explained by the assessment of own social status was also much smaller ($R^2 = .08$, $F(4, 116) = 2.422$, $p = .05$)⁵⁸.

In the Ugandan sample relative deprivation was a much more significant and better predictor of injustice perceptions and forgiveness than the assessment of own social status.

⁵⁷ See chapter 4 for more details on the variable and operationalization.

⁵⁸ Control variables: age, sex and education.

Poland

The same analysis was conducted in the Polish sample to compare relative deprivation as a predictor with an assessment of own social status. The same variables were used with social status measured on a 10-rung ladder representing the levels of societal hierarchy. The correlation between individual relative deprivation and own social status assessment was highly significant similarly to the Ugandan sample ($r=.62$; $p<.01$).

The assessment of own social status was a significant predictor of justice perceptions ($b = -1.881$, $t(69) = -4.441$, $p < .01$). However, it explained considerably less variance than relative deprivation, namely ($R^2 = .28$, $F(4, 64) = 6.354$, $p < .000$)⁵⁹. Neither relative deprivation nor individual social status had any significant effect on any of the forgiveness measures.

6.2.3 Injustice perceptions and forgiveness

The third hypothesis (H3), stipulating that injustice perceptions increase revenge and avoidance motivation and reduce willingness to forgive, was also tested in study 2. The findings of the Ugandan and Polish samples are presented below.

Uganda

The third hypothesis was fully verified in study 2 in the Ugandan sample. Injustice perceptions significantly predicted all forgiveness measures, increasing revenge and avoidance motivation and reducing the willingness to forgive (table 57). None of the control variables was a significant predictor of forgiveness.

Considering the strong and significant effects of injustice perceptions on all forgiveness measures, the Sobel test was carried out to test if injustice perceptions might be a significant mediator between relative deprivation and forgiveness. The mediator effect was only tested for revenge and avoidance motivation because relative deprivation had only a marginal effect on willingness to forgive. When relative deprivation and injustice perceptions were both included as predictors, relative deprivation became insignificant in the cases of both revenge and avoidance motivation, while injustice perceptions remained highly significant. The Sobel test

⁵⁹ Control variables: age, sex and education.

confirmed the significance of the mediation in the Ugandan sample for revenge (Sobel statistic -3.45; $p < .001$) as well as avoidance motivation (Sobel statistic -3.25; $p < .001$).

Poland

As was the case with the Ugandan sample, the second hypothesis was verified in the Polish sample (table 58). Injustice perceptions increased revenge and avoidance motivation and were marginally significant reducing willingness to forgive in the second model at $p = .057$. The only significant control variable was religiosity which increased willingness to forgive.

Uganda and Poland – Hypothesis 3

The predictions of the third hypothesis were verified in both countries. Injustice perceptions proved to be a significant predictor of forgiveness in study 2 as well. Even though the effect on willingness to forgive in the Polish sample was only marginal, the small size of the sample and the fact that willingness to forgive was measured by only one item, was sufficient to warrant the assumption that this was a relevant relationship.

In both countries the effect of social relative deprivation on forgiveness turned out to be indirect via injustice perceptions. While in Poland relative deprivation had no direct effect on forgiveness at all, in the Ugandan sample the existing direct effects were fully mediated by injustice perceptions.

A comparative analysis of both country samples revealed no significant interactions between country and injustice perceptions on the forgiveness measures which indicated that injustice perceptions affected the forgiveness measures in a similar way at both research sites (table 59). There is, however, a strong country effect, which means, in accordance with previous findings, that avoidance motivation levels are much higher and willingness to forgive much lower in Poland compared to Uganda.

Table 57: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Uganda)

Model1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	6.073 (2.756)	2.204	11.703 (4.035)	2.900	5.195 (.893)	5.815
IPS	.202 (.042)***	4.845	.263 (.061)***	4.292	-.052 (.014)***	-3.871
Age	.000 (.024)	-.011	.018 (.036)	.515	.000 (.008)	-.042
Sex	1.329 (.829)	1.603	1.241 (1.214)	1.022	-.084 (.269)	-.314
Education	-.169 (.688)	-.246	-1.186 (1.008)	-1.177	.181 (.223)	.810
	R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.17		R ² =.17 Ad. R ² =.15		R ² =.12 Ad. R ² =.09	
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	7.983 (3.493)	2.285	13.876 (5.120)	2.710	4.602 (1.137)	4.046
IPS	.193 (.043)***	4.539	.249 (.062)***	3.992	-.050 (.014)***	-3.627
Age	.000 (.025)	-.004	.020 (.037)	.554	.000 (.008)	-.025
Sex	1.687 (.870)	1.939	1.722 (1.275)	1.350	-.177 (.283)	-.623
Education	-.236 (.699)	-.338	-1.277 (1.024)	-1.246	.202 (.228)	.886
Religiosity	-.210 (.173)	-1.216	-.286 (.253)	-1.131	.056 (.056)	.988
Abduction	-.535 (.765)	-.699	-.576 (1.122)	-.514	.130 (.249)	.523
Victim Id.	.200 (.289)	.692	.352 (.423)	.831	-.029 (.094)	-.305
	R ² =.21 Ad. R ² =.16		R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.14		R ² =.13 Ad. R ² =.08	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=126						

Table 58: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive (Poland)

Modell1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Cons- tant	13.011 (6.063)	2.146	20.666 (8.653)	2.388	2.077 (1.819)	1.142
IPS	.148 (.055)**	2.677	.189 (.079)*	2.382	-.017 (.016)	-1.029
Age	-.026 (.048)	-.542	-.122 (.068)	-1.786	.012 (.014)	.824
Sex	.739 (1.583)	.467	2.152 (2.259)	.952	-.100 (.485)	-.207
Edu- cation	-.822 (1.055)	-.779	2.007 (1.506)	1.332	.203 (.311)	.651
	R ² =.13 Ad. R ² =.08		R ² =.16 Ad. R ² =.11			
Model2						
Model2	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Cons- tant	13.138 (6.753)	1.946	19.184 (8.939)	2.146	2.419 (1.919)	1.261
IPS	.175 (.066)*	2.661	.188 (.087)*	2.150	-.036 (.019)	-1.945
Age	-.005 (.051)	-.091	-.094 (.067)	-1.400	.004 (.014)	.269
Sex	-.099 (1.763)	-.056	.714 (2.334)	.306	-.241 (.510)	-.473
Edu- cation	-.486 (1.095)	-.444	2.488 (1.449)	1.717	.146 (.311)	.471
Reli- giosity	-.068 (.156)	-.433	.054 (.207)	.258	.125 (.044)**	2.835
Ab- duction	-1.754 (1.477)	-1.188	-2.123 (1.955)	-1.086	.094 (.420)	.223
Victim Id.	-.053 (.567)	-.094	.247 (.750)	.329	-.090 (.160)	-.565
	R ² =.16 Ad. R ² =.06		R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.10			
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=74						

Table 59: Multivariate regression results of Injustice Perceptions Scale (IPS) on revenge, avoidance and willingness to forgive - Poland and Uganda

Modell1	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	8.414 (2.675)	3.145	11.249 (3.859)	2.915	3.989 (.830)	4.805
IPS	.188 (.033)***	5.639	.224 (.048)***	4.657	-.042 (.010)***	-4.106
Age	-.001 (.022)	-.061	.001 (.031)	.035	4.687E-5 (.007)	.007
Sex	1.278 (.722)	1.769	2.270 (1.042)*	2.179	-.267 (.227)	-1.179
Country	1.086 (1.394)	.779	9.372 (2.011)***	4.660	-1.350 (.431)**	-3.131
Edu	-.329 (.567)	-.580	-.037 (.818)	-.045	.197 (.176)	1.117
Victim Id.	.129 (.253)	.510	.208 (.365)	.570	-.040 (.078)	-.514
Rel	-.126 (.105)	-1.203	-.120 (.152)	-.790	.106 (.033)***	3.268
Arr./ Abd.	-.742 (.651)	-1.140	-1.093 (.939)	-1.164	.114 (.203)	.562
	R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.15		R ² =.39 Ad. R ² =.36		R ² =.21 Ad. R ² =.18	
Model2						
	Revenge		Avoidance		Forgiveness	
	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t	Unstandardized B (s.e.)	t
Constant	8.061 (2.846)	2.833	10.255 (4.101)	2.501	4.201 (.880)	4.774
IPS	.198 (.043)***	4.628	.252 (.062)***	4.086	-.048 (.013)***	-3.665
Age	-.002 (.022)	-.083	.000 (.032)	-.009	.000 (.007)	.053
Sex	1.254 (.727)	1.725	2.203 (1.047)*	2.103	-.251 (.228)	-1.099
Country	1.802 (2.387)	.755	11.389 (3.440)***	3.311	-1.790 (.739)*	-2.422
Edu	-.347 (.571)	-.608	-.087 (.822)	-.106	.209 (.177)	1.179
Victim Id.	.135 (.254)	.532	.225 (.366)	.615	-.044 (.078)	-.557
Rel	-.114 (.111)	-1.025	-.084 (.160)	-.523	.098 (.034)**	2.862
Arr./ Abd.	-.739 (.653)	-1.133	-1.086 (.940)	-1.155	.111 (.203)	.548
IPS x Country	.026 (.071)	-.370	-.074 (.102)	-.723	.016 (.022)	.733
	R ² =.19 Ad. R ² =.15		R ² =.39 Ad. R ² =.36		R ² =.22 Ad. R ² =.18	
ns p > 0.05; *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 n=200						

6.3 Comparison of both survey studies in Poland and Uganda

The hypotheses were largely confirmed in both studies and both samples. Besides all the similarities there were, however, also some differences between the studies on economic versus social relative deprivation as well as between the two research sites that are worth pointing out.

The effects of both types of relative deprivation on injustice perceptions were consistent in both studies and countries. While the hypothesis was confirmed, which signified a relevant relationship between these variables in the very different settings of Poland and Uganda, there were also some differences that became apparent in the comparative analysis of a joint sample. Economic as well as social relative deprivation affected injustice perceptions more in Poland than in Uganda. A possible explanation is that when it comes to comparisons with perpetrators, victims in Uganda have more limited access to information due to less media coverage. This only enables them to make comparisons in their immediate environment. These comparisons in turn depend on whether there is a high ranking perpetrator who is better off in their immediate proximity.

Other comparisons, which are assumed to possibly influence relative deprivation, such as a comparison with an envisioned better alternative, may also differ due to context. Polish victims may have had more grounds to expect considerable improvements after fighting for a better and more just system, and finally achieving a regime change. When their expectations did not materialize, this might have contributed strongly to relative deprivation and consequently a perception of injustice in the post-regime setting. Victims in Uganda, on the other hand, had probably less grounds for high expectations. Moreover, the conflict was, and possibly still is, looming in the background, since the LRA rebel group continues to exist, even though they have not been active in Uganda for over ten years. For Ugandan victims the envisioned alternative is more likely to be renewed conflict, which would make their current status quo comparatively better. Even though victims in Uganda do see their situation as unjust the element of relative deprivation apparently plays a slightly smaller role in this assessment than in Poland.

The effects of injustice perceptions on forgiveness also proved to be mostly present and significant. Apart from the non-existing effect on avoidance motivation in study 1

in the Polish sample, these effects were consistent in both studies and countries. Justice perceptions do appear to strongly influence forgiveness of diverse groups of victims in different post-conflict settings. The comparative analyses revealed some additional insights showing consistently higher avoidance levels and partly, in study 2, lower forgiveness levels in Poland compared with Uganda. This outcome was addressed previously with the tentative explanation that avoidance does not constitute unforgiveness in a more individualistic society in a similar way to what it does in a collectivistic society. Avoidance is more accessible in Poland, while at the same time there is no social need or pressure for greater co-existence and cooperation. In other words, avoidance of the perpetrators is more easily executed and has much less, if any, social costs in Poland as compared to a collectivistic communal lifestyle and culture in Uganda.

More willingness to forgive in Uganda, on the other hand, may be due to extensive awareness-raising and NGO intervention in peace-building as well as strong advocacy of the churches reinforcing the need to forgive. While victims might feel the social pressure to declare forgiveness, indicated by the higher forgiveness levels in Uganda, this is likely to be superficial to a certain extent. This assumption is based on the fact that there are no significant differences between Poland and Uganda when it comes to revenge motivation. It means that the higher declared forgiveness does not necessarily lead to equally reduced revenge motivation. Moreover, injustice perceptions triggered by economic inequalities had a stronger negative impact on all forgiveness measures in Uganda. This would again suggest that while victims in Uganda might express their willingness to forgive when economic injustices are present, it nevertheless hinders forgiveness significantly and significantly more so than in Poland. The stronger effect of injustice perceptions on forgiveness in Uganda in the context of economic inequalities might reflect the time factor. The regime change in Poland happened further back than the end of conflict in Uganda. The emotional impact created by the perceived injustices and associated with un-forgiveness might have reduced to certain degree over time in Poland as compared to Uganda.

Finally, the most complex relation in which the question of hypothesis verification, cannot be answered in a simple, straightforward way is the relation between relative deprivation and forgiveness. Economic relative deprivation does appear to have a direct effect on most of the forgiveness measures. While the effect on willingness to

forgive in the Ugandan sample was only marginal and there was no effect on avoidance among the Polish victims, all other effects were significant. Even though injustice perceptions mediated part of the relationship in the Ugandan sample, economic relative deprivation continued to retain a partly direct influence on the forgiveness measures. In the Polish sample, moreover, it appeared that it was more likely relative deprivation that mediated the relationship between injustice perceptions and forgiveness. The picture looked slightly different in the case of social relative deprivation. In the second study all the influences on forgiveness seemed to be via justice. In the Polish sample there was no direct effect of social relative deprivation on forgiveness at all, while in the Ugandan sample the existing effects were all fully mediated through injustice perceptions.

These findings seem to indicate that the question of social status elicits in general weaker reactions across victim groups than economic wellbeing. This assumption is supported by a comparison of the effects of the additional variables, which represent the assessments of own economic wellbeing in study 1 or own social status in study 2. While not unimportant, social status does seem to have weaker and less consistent effects in particular on forgiveness measures than economic wellbeing in both countries. There are different possible explanations. One is related to Maslow's hierarchy of needs.⁶⁰ Economic wellbeing is related to survival and basic needs at the bottom of Maslow's need pyramid. These needs are considered to be the most important ones. Another possibility is that a high economic status is frequently related to a higher social status, while the opposite is not necessarily the case.

The control variables, though not of primary interest, also revealed some relevant additional information worth considering briefly. The control variable with a largely significant effect on revenge motivation in both countries was victim identification. In Uganda as well as in Poland, the more victims felt a strong bond with other victims the more this increased their revenge motivation. To analyze this outcome in detail is beyond the scope of this study, which focuses on other topics. But there are various indications in literature of, for example, biased collective memories, in which the past trauma becomes embedded in the identity or that, in addition, victimhood bolsters

⁶⁰ See also chapter 2.4.1.

group cohesiveness (Noor et al. 2012). Relative deprivation theory also suggests that social identification does play a role (e.g. Ellemers 2002) and that interpreting relative deprivation in group terms affects the reactions and consequences. In other words, strong identification with the ingroup reinforces the interpretation of relative deprivation in group terms, which results in more active responses and outgroup prejudices (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). The present findings, showing the impact of victim identification on revenge motivation, confirm this.

Religiosity shows effects on willingness to forgive in both countries. It is, however, not a significant predictor of revenge motivation. This fact can be interpreted in the sense that religiosity possibly leads to self-declared forgiveness while not really reducing “un-forgiveness”. This is in accordance with the literature on religion and forgiveness (McCullough 2001). It can also be explained with the concepts of decisional versus emotional forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012). Religious people might decide to forgive, possibly due to pressure created by values attached to forgiveness in Christianity,⁶¹ while at the same time not forgiving on the emotional level, and still experiencing revenge or avoidance motivation.

In conclusion, it has to be pointed out that due to the nature of the analyses in most of these cases a reverse relationship cannot be ruled out. In other words, while the hypotheses assume that injustice perceptions affect forgiveness, which is based on theory and literature, the possibility that it might be forgiveness affecting justice perceptions cannot be dismissed. This applies to most of the relationships described in this chapter, which include attitudes or feelings.

⁶¹ There might be similar effects with regard to other religions too. The reason why Christianity was singled out in this context is that it is the predominant religion at both research sites. The study cannot make any assumptions regarding the effects of other religious denominations.

CHAPTER 7. QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

This chapter describes the findings obtained from the qualitative data collected through interviews with victims in Poland and Uganda as well as open-ended questions included in the questionnaires. There are several reasons for choosing a mixed-method design that combines quantitative with qualitative data. While hypotheses can be tested through statistical methodologies, a deeper understanding of complex concepts such as justice and forgiveness might elude a purely quantitative analysis. In particular, when it comes to grasping the differences and similarities between the two diverse victim groups that might emerge from the quantitative analysis, qualitative data is important to explain and interpret these findings. Moreover, there is a variety of factors influencing justice perceptions and forgiveness beyond those defined and measured through quantitative tools. Qualitative data enables a more nuanced examination contributing to a better understanding of victims' attitudes and motivations and placing them in context.

The interviews were all started by asking about the personal history of the participants during the conflict or regime. The question was formulated generally, encouraging the interviewees to tell a little about themselves and their life during the conflict or regime, while emphasizing that they should only speak about issues they felt comfortable discussing. Though the personal history was not part of the research this was included in the interviews for two reasons. Firstly, it created an environment conducive to an interview about difficult topics and to provide room for telling own stories. Beginning immediately with a list of questions was likely to make the interviewees feel like "study objects". While a comfortable and secure interview setting is generally important, it is even more so in the case of a vulnerable group of people such as victims. Emphasizing that they should only speak about topics they felt comfortable talking about was intended to limit the risk of provoking unwanted memories. The wish to speak about the past or be heard is as diverse as the victims. The question about the history of the victim's personal experience of the conflict was intended to accommodate the broad range of those who wanted to tell more and those who preferred to only stick to general facts. This turned out to be a successful strategy to achieve these requirements because, for one, it did leave the interviewees feeling comfortable while none reported any distress during or after the interview.

Secondly, this general question was the equivalent of an item from the survey assessing the nature of victimization and ensured that all interviewees fell into the victim definition as applied in this study.

The analysis of the interviews was done with NVivo with a focus on the topics in question, namely justice perceptions, forgiveness and relative deprivation. Because the comparison objects that this study is focusing on are economic wellbeing and social acknowledgement, victims' assessments of their own conditions as well as those of the perpetrator group constituted another important element of the interviews.

The chapter is organized into sections dealing with these topics, firstly in Poland and then in Uganda. The final section is a comparison of the similarities and differences between the responses in the two countries.

7.1 Poland

Of the seven interviewees in Poland, five had been political prisoners in the 1980s while the two others suffered prolonged repression in their workplaces leading to severe economic losses and psychological suffering. Of those arrested three reported beatings, which in two cases were so severe that the wounds left them permanently disabled. The interviewees were from different regions of Poland including Warsaw, Siedlce, Czestochowa, and Bialystok. Since the situation of people in the large urban centres, Warsaw in particular, is often quite different from those in the provinces, it was imperative to include both. For the sake of anonymity the interviewees were numbered from 1 to 7 and no other information is provided. The quotations below are translations from Polish, the language in which the interviews were conducted.

7.1.1 Assessment of the situation of victims and former perpetrators

Economic conditions

All the interviewees agreed that the financial situation of many victims is unsatisfactory. Some assumed that the majority were poorly off while others were not sure if this was true for the majority of victims as a group nationwide. However, all were of the opinion that there is a considerable number of people who could be considered to live in poverty. One person (INT6) described the situation outright as "tragic" and another one even stated that it is worse now than it was during the communist regime (INT7). The examples given by many of the interviewees, especially those more politically engaged and informed, presented a rather desolate

picture with a significant nationwide group of victims receiving less than 1000 zł (ca. 280 USD) per month. Some still have families to support and others, who are older, struggle to pay for medicine.

This was not only a subjective perception of victims. A recent Act, which was only introduced in 2015, provided limited help to those former oppositionists in the most difficult financial conditions (who received not more than 120% of the minimum pension) of 400 zł per month for one year, with an option to extend to five years (Sejm RP 2015).⁶² As the threshold was set so low, many victims in very difficult conditions, but whose incomes were above the set amount, received no assistance at all.

As explained by the interviewees, the reason many received extremely low pensions was that, even though the length of time they had spent in detention itself was recognized for the pension fund, other acts of repression, which had severely impacted on their employment circumstances, were not. Many people were dismissed from one job after another when their political engagement surfaced; others were not able to complete their education or find work at all. These circumstances, which left many people with drastically diminished career and subsequent pension eligibility, were not accounted for.

Those, who were younger at the time of the transition, better educated and healthier managed to adapt to the new political environment and make a living for themselves. But many others, in particular the older victims, were unprepared for a capitalist system after decades of communism (INT2, INT4 and INT 5). This left many people on the margins of the new societal order, unable to cope or adjust without some external support.

Social acknowledgement

It became apparent during the interviews that social status is difficult to separate from economic status, especially when many people suffer from poverty. This came up repeatedly during the interviews. Several pointed out that not having any money prevents people from “living in dignity” (INT1, INT7). Even the opinion on the

⁶² This has been changed since the interviews were conducted. The act has been amended including changes that, among others, remove the time limitation and make all oppositionists eligible regardless of their income (Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2017)

financial support described above is divided. While some declared they receive support which they appreciated (INT2 and INT 4), others described the amount, or the process of applying for it, as embarrassing or humiliating (INT5 and INT7). One of the interviewees even described this financial assistance as an insult.

“For the state this 1 600 000 zł⁶³ for us, this, this is charity, this is a spit in the face. This is discrimination until death. Personally, answering your question, I don’t believe that any government of any party will give us some compensation (...). This is impossible. Because these are people from the same group.” (INT6)

The element of having to ask or, as some called it, beg for this little amount after having sacrificed so much for the country and the lack of satisfactory acknowledgement for their efforts to change the system were recurring themes. Some pointed out that applying for additional financial support in a queue with “homeless drunkards” (INT5) was degrading in itself, and that many victims are too proud to ask for help (INT3).

Though most of the interviewees received some form of recognition or acknowledgment in the form of medals, opinions about those rewards were also divided. INT4 described the celebration at the presidential palace as deeply satisfying.

“We didn’t even get a cent, but this is about honour (...). For me this honour is more important than money. It is very important that I have a signature of such a wonderful man [note: the president], who was in the presidential palace. Then one year later he invited all those awarded again. That for those like us there was a ‘thank you’, this is what is important” (INT4).

Others, however, felt differently. They saw the recognition and acknowledgment as cheap, as a pat on the back without any practical ramifications (INT 6 and INT7). As one put it:

"You see, this is such hypocrisy (...). On the one hand, they give medals and so on, they speak of heroes on television, but those heroes are only for medals and

⁶³ The calculation done by the interviewee is based on the promised 400 zł (monthly) for each person with a valid “combatant card” that oppositionists could obtain. This amount was contrasted with the amount the state would save through the reduction of the pensions of the former security service agents, which the interviewee estimated at 11 000 000 zł (monthly).

TV. (...) While in reality there is tightening the belts and hunger, in other words, discrimination. This is an incredible hypocrisy." (INT6).

"No beautiful words will help anyone. Twenty-six years have passed and each year on the 31st of August and 13th of December⁶⁴, *sejm* and *senat*⁶⁵ show ceremonial gratitude to such people like us. There have already been over 50 of those official acknowledgments. And so what? Nothing! They feel good about themselves and the rest lives just as before." (INT7).

Taking into account that it is difficult to separate social from economic status, it is understandable that the words, speeches, and gratitude, even if expressed publically, feel empty to many who struggle to survive on a daily basis. Social recognition goes hand-in-hand with the financial situation.

"Even the status of those people is very low, because who wants to talk to a beggar, who has nothing?" (INT7).

"Those people feel abandoned, completely. (...) No one cares if they have something to eat, if they have money for medicine, if they can or cannot work." (INT1).

Finally, most of the interviewees, when asked about social recognition, pointed to the lack of knowledge of the youth and the general public about this period in the country's history (INT1, INT2, INT4, INT5 & INT7). Most felt this indifference came from ignorance. In the same way as people in Poland were proud to have someone in the family who had fought in AK (Polish underground army during WWII) they would be proud of those who were in the opposition during the communist regime (INT7) if they knew more about this historical period.

"To show people there was a group who fought for something, for them. (...) People were never made aware that this did cost something, that someone paid a price for it" (INT5).

⁶⁴ August 31st is the Day of Solidarity and Freedom, a public holiday; and 13th of December is the day martial law was introduced in 1981.

⁶⁵ Lower and upper house of the Polish Parliament.

The interviewees were mostly of the opinion that the majority knew vaguely that communism had existed and that there had been a period of martial law, but they do not know what it meant, how people suffered or what they had sacrificed. If they knew, they would have a very different attitude.

“The youth (...) they do not know about those times, they did not know what situations people were confronted with and they think: They just fight for money and money. But this is not about money. Of course, it is, because we need to live (...). The youth don't understand that we just want minimal amounts to live in dignity from month to month” (INT1).

All these aspects, including a lack of financial support and the feeling that there was a low level of knowledge and information about the former regime, contributed to the majority of the victims' feelings that they had been forgotten and abandoned. They perceived that current Polish society is not interested in this historical period and their experiences as victims. This lack of interest leads, in turn, to a lack of recognition and acknowledgment of the victims' achievements and is exacerbated by their low economic status.

Situation of former perpetrators

Regarding the situation of perpetrators, viz., the former agents of *szużba bezpieczeóstwa* (SB), all the interviewees agreed that many of these perpetrators in particular were doing relatively well financially. However, some victims pointed out that it also depended on the level of each perpetrator's previous social connections and position in society (INT3). The amounts mentioned by the interviewees regarding the pensions of the former SB officials ranged from several thousand up to twenty thousand zł⁶⁶. Several interviewees also pointed to the financial benefits and personal connections of many former communist officials. This had given them a head start in the early period of capitalism (INT1, INT5 & INT7). One of the interviewees gave specific examples of former SB officials who started big and successful private companies after the transition and called the former communist security agents the “richest layer of society in Poland”(INT7).

⁶⁶ According to official statistics only 5.8% of pensioners receive pensions of 4000 zł or above (ZUS 2017)

While it is clearly difficult to obtain statistics in this regard, the perception of victims was in line with the assessment of various scholars describing how the communist “nomenklatura” transferred political into economic power (Los and Zybortowicz 2000, 111; Staniszkis 1990), with various newspaper and magazine publications (Dziennik.pl 2016; Fakt.Pl 2015; WPROST 2016) and supported by several rounds of attempts to reduce the pensions of former communists. Most of the cuts were, however, insignificant (INT6 & INT 7)⁶⁷. Apart from the pensions, some interviewees pointed out that most of the security agents had at least “something” when they left SB, like a car or an apartment (INT3). Moreover, they had already benefitted from these high pensions for many years or decades, so even a serious cut would not really change much in their privileged situations (INT1 & INT4). Several interviewed victims used the term that the state “cares for” the former perpetrators (INT5 & INT6).

Regarding the social status of the former perpetrators, several interviewees stated that they did not suffer from social ostracism or condemnation at that time because many people simply were not aware of their past (INT2 & INT4). They enjoyed a high social status, which was the privilege of most rich people.

“No one looks down on them [the former perpetrators]. Most don’t look down on them simply because the majority do not know who they are. They were not publically condemned, only if the neighbour knows who he is. They go, drive fancy cars; they are looked at as people who have money. They are treated well.”
(INT4)

7.1.2 Relative deprivation

The question of the existence and effects of relative deprivation of victims in vis-à-vis former perpetrators is the main topic of this study. The interviewees were asked, as described above, to assess their circumstances and those of the group of victims as a whole, as well as make an assessment of the living conditions and social status of the

⁶⁷ The perception of inadequate pension reductions expressed by the interviewees has been confirmed by the actions of the Polish government. The latest pension reduction of former security service employees was announced in November 2016, after the data had been collected for this study. According to the information provided by the Ministry of the Interior website some pensions of former security service employees indeed reached up to 19 000 zł (MSWiA 2016). This new law stipulates that the pensions cannot be higher than the national average of 2053 zł. The Ministry of the Interior has described this measure as reinstating social justice (MSWiA 2017).

former perpetrators. In line with the theory of relative deprivation, which is defined as a situation of disadvantageous comparison, un-deservingness, anger and resentment (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015), the interviewees were also asked about their thoughts and feelings regarding these assessments.

Additionally, in the analysis of the interviews, a surprising and unexpected finding emerged. While there were clear indications of relative deprivation towards perpetrators, there was also relative deprivation towards a different group of people, the high profile former members of the resistance, who had benefitted from the transformation. As there were a vast number of oppositionists during the communist regime, the post-transition living conditions, economic and social status, differed significantly within the group of these former victims. For example, many members of the current ruling party had been active oppositionists and political prisoners in the 1980s. From the point of view of the interviewees there was a sharp division between these former oppositionists, who established careers for themselves after the end of the communist regime, and those who ended up in poverty, even though previously they all had been on the same side of the struggle. As will be explained in more detail below, this finding was important, as it added to the sense of betrayal and hopelessness of many victims, who were less fortunate.

Relative deprivation in relation to former perpetrators

It has already been indicated above that many victims perceived the economic conditions of their group, as well as social acknowledgement to some extent, as unsatisfactory. They also assessed the conditions of former perpetrators as much better. The perpetrators, working for the regime's security services, had an uninterrupted work history and many had a successful career ascending to positions of higher authority within the communist system. When this kind of work is counted for the purpose of pension benefits in a similar way as any other job, the retirement benefits of the perpetrators result in obviously higher amounts than those of many of the victims. This was so particularly because the act of repression often consisted of being dismissed, preventing the victims from working, giving them only the worst possible jobs or thwarting their education. The question that arises from this was, do victims make these comparisons and how do they feel about the results?

Most of the interviewees did make the comparisons themselves, often unprompted. Two of them specifically used the phrase that the former SB agents “laugh in their faces” (INT1 & INT4). INT1 described the trial of a former female security official who finally got a suspended sentence. She told the victims present in court that if she went back in time now, she would treat them even more harshly than she had done.

“[She said, she would be] even worse than she was. During the trial, she laughed and said: At least I have a pension, and you? What do you have?”

"During the trial, she retired and she got 100% pension because they have 100% that means she had around 4000 zł, while our people got 700-800 zł. So she could laugh, right?" (INT1)

While relative deprivation theory focuses on the perception that the ingroup deserves more or better, in the case of victims and perpetrators an additional dimension is added. Victims in Poland not only think that their ingroup deserves better but also that the outgroup, in this case the former perpetrators, deserve less. The views regarding what the perpetrators should actually get are divided. While all agreed that their pensions should be reduced, the opinions differed on by how much. Some of the interviewed victims acknowledged that even the perpetrators should have something to live on but their pensions should have been reduced to the national average or the minimum amount (INT1, INT3, INT5, & INT6). Others, on the other hand, stated that the perpetrators should not receive anything at all (INT2 & INT7). One of the interviewees compared the work of the security agents with the activity of common criminals.

“No [pension]! Absolutely! Why?! (...) For what?! For being criminals? Just imagine if a political criminal like an SB agent has a guaranteed legal pension, then every common criminal should also apply. He is also a criminal, also worked, had a dangerous job and has proof from prosecutor and courts, from those who accused him (...). He had a dangerous job because when he was breaking into a house, he could fall out of a window or someone could have beaten him. This is discrimination of the citizen criminal!" (INT7)

INT1, when was asked how much the former perpetrators should get in comparison with the victims, recalled a media report about the wife of general Kiszczak⁶⁸. Mrs Kiszczak expressed outrage at the planned pension cuts stating that she could not survive on 2000 zł (Dziennik.pl 2016).

“[If they should be] worse? Yes, maybe worse! They should try how it is to have a worse situation! (...) They should try how to live with 2000 zł or 1500 or 1000, like others. The wife of Kiszczak now says that she can't, that she won't survive on 2000 zł. (...) And here some people have 800, 900 or 1000 zł, right?” (INT1)

Several of the interviewees, when speaking about comparing the situation of victims and perpetrators, stated that "there is no comparison" (INT2) or described it as "an abyss" (INT6). INT1 also pointed out that when younger people ask why the victims wanted higher pensions instead of being satisfied with what they had, the problem was that "the perpetrators have much higher pensions!".

The quotes cited above provide an example of the different layers or dimensions of relative deprivation among victims in Poland. While the improvement in their own economic conditions was important for the victims, in particular as economic conditions appeared to be closely intertwined with social status, this would not have been enough. The perpetrators should also have received less. These findings support the tentative explanations described in the previous chapters that victims might experience several forms of relative deprivation. In most cases relative deprivation research focuses either on social comparison (e.g. Pettigrew 2015; Smith et al. 2012), on temporal comparisons (de la Sablonnière et al. 2015; Davies 1962) or on comparisons with an envisioned better alternative (Folger 1986), to name some examples. In cases of a pronounced history of discrimination, such as victims in post-conflict settings have, these different types of relative deprivation may all emerge. Victims might anticipate that their own situation may improve, foresee a better alternative on how their life should be after the end of conflict or regime, expect to be in a better condition than those who caused their suffering and, finally, perceive it as

⁶⁸ A Polish general, an interior minister and a prime minister during the communist regime. Next to general Jaruzelski he played a key role in the suppression of the oppositionists, the Solidarity movement and in imposing martial law

warranted that the conditions of the perpetrators should be significantly worse. Having less money has, therefore, a symbolic meaning beyond economic hardship. It communicates to the victims that after decades of suffering, even in this new system they have been fighting for, they are still "worth less". This is communicated through comments such as that the perpetrators are "laughing in their faces". The perception that the state "cares for" the perpetrators was juxtaposed with the victims' sense of themselves as being forgotten, abandoned and not cared for.

The expectation of balance and "getting equal", as described by David & Choi (2009), not only did not materialize from the point of view of the interviewees, but turned into an almost greater inequality exacerbated by disappointed expectations. Asked how he felt about the current situation, one interviewee described it as follows:

"The situation is not normal in this country because the criminals are cherished, because these are criminals and not people who worked for the good of the Republic. These relations should be turned upside down!" (INT7)

This phrase "upside down" expressed the expectations of "getting equal" while the reality, as perceived by many victims, reflected the opposite. The assumption that this was not an isolated view of the interviewed group was supported for example by a recent campaign of one of the former oppositionists' groups the "Free Word Association". They demanded that the pensions of the victims should be higher by at least the symbolic amount of 1 zł⁶⁹ (Czuchnowski 2013). This demonstrated that campaigns to reduce the pensions of former SB agents or increase the benefits of victims had an additional dimension beyond the material one.

While the core elements of relative deprivation — comparison, and deservingness — are present in the accounts of the interviewed victims, the final question was what did they feel about it? Most of the feelings described by the victims fell into the category of emotions typically associated with relative deprivation. Several interviewees expressed anger (INT1, INT2, INT3 & INT7) or bitterness (INT1 & INT5). INT6 stated that he felt indifference, resignation, and apathy; while INT4 admitted to feeling nothing having worked very hard for a long time to not feel hatred towards his

⁶⁹ Roughly equivalent to 0.25 USD.

perpetrators. These two interviewees were, interestingly, also the ones who spoke about religion and its role in their thoughts and feelings most often. This will be discussed in greater detail in the section dealing with forgiveness.

In conclusion, it is obvious from the interviews that all the elements of relative deprivation were present throughout the interviews. The victims saw the perpetrators as being in much better financial situations than they were themselves. While the former agents were not necessarily highly regarded, they often enjoyed high statuses due to their economic wellbeing. In most cases the perpetrators' past as security agents does not impact their social acknowledgement negatively as many people in their immediate environment are not aware of who they were during the communist regime.

The victims clearly saw their group as deserving better and, moreover, the perpetrators as deserving less, both financially and with regard to social recognition. Finally, the feelings predominantly associated with relative deprivation (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015; H. J. Smith et al. 2012), such as anger, bitterness and resentment, were also present in most of the victims' accounts.

Relative deprivation towards high profile oppositionists

Apart from relative deprivation directed towards perpetrators, interestingly and surprisingly, another type of relative deprivation emerged as a recurring theme during the interviews. The interviewees, even though mostly active in various victims' associations, some as chairpersons, were not highly influential people. As briefly outlined in the beginning of this section, the victims appeared to perceive their group as split post-transition along economic and social status lines. Some of the former political prisoners and victims established political or other careers after the end of the communist regime. Others —those who were healthy, younger and well educated— settled into middle class life. Finally, another group of victims —the older ones, often with physical and health problems— continued to suffer economic hardships, frequently comparable to the conditions they had experienced under the communist regime. A sense of betrayal permeated through many interviews, sometimes implicitly suggested and sometimes explicitly expressed. At the time of the communist regime the victims felt as one group and now they felt abandoned by their former colleagues. This was especially so as they felt that those in power or in the government were well placed to address the inequalities they perceived they still suffered.

Interestingly, from the memories of these victims, who had been imprisoned, it became apparent that this categorization of first and second class opposition was already present during the communist regime. The perception of a united and egalitarian group may have been due to a romanticized image of the past, further highlighted by the name “Solidarity”, but which looked quite different in reality. This division was not only internal but also arose from the way the communist officials treated the political prisoners. One could conceivably assume that the more influential the oppositionists were, and the more leadership positions they occupied, the more they would suffer abuse and repression. However, according to one of the interviewees, who had been imprisoned in different places, it was just the opposite.

“There in [name of prison] the conditions were very good. (...) [They] had there everything. People were baking cake, fruits were there, everything (...) rugs and so on. On the wall, there were tiles, which for us at this time, because it was 35 years ago, it was unimaginable! We have never seen tiles like this. (...) There the elite of Solidarity were detained" (INT1).

INT1 also described the relative freedom in this detention centre compared to all the other detention centres she has been imprisoned in. This particular detention centre was at that time referred to as the “golden cage” and presented to foreign delegations to show how well imprisoned oppositionists were treated. Meanwhile, others had been beaten and tortured so much that they became permanently disabled (INT 6 & INT7).

A common perception among the interviewees was that those who were influential during the opposition struggle, the leadership figures, betrayed their colleagues during the roundtable negotiations and then forgot about them completely.

“Those MPs, most of those from PiS or PO⁷⁰, because there are many former activists in PO (...) who... I don't know if they are more meritorious than others (...). They treat us as if we have exaggerated demands (...). And they treat us harshly, and yet, yet alone they would not have achieved anything. Someone like Wałęsa says that he, that it was only him, right? This is not true! What could he have done all by himself? Nothing!" (INT1)

⁷⁰ The two biggest political parties in Poland: PiS (Law and Justice) and PO (Civic Platform).

Another interviewee described a situation in which his colleagues were kept waiting for hours by one of the former oppositionists turned politician when they came for a meeting.

“Such disregard, even though they began together with us. They are now in a different world, they don’t remember what was. It’s clear, such people like Wałęsa and others, who were prominent, they got a lot of support and now they are politicians, so they don’t have to worry about anything. And this common one, who suffered the most in prison and in general, he continues to be discriminated, because no one would even help him to get a job.” (INT2)

And speaking about applying for social support:

“Not one of us will humiliate himself to go there [social support centre]. I don't think this is ambition, but we did something! Some got into the government on our backs. They could care a little bit!" (INT2)

Another interviewee, lamenting the bad conditions, which many victims endure today said:

“And these are people from the front row of the fight with communism, front row! Not from somewhere in the back, but from the front! They carried the biggest weight of the fight with communism, because they lost their health, their money. But those, whose names we heard constantly for 27 years on television, they never suffered poverty, not then and not now. They have forgotten about their colleagues, if you can call them colleagues. I always ask when they say that they were in the Solidarność, I ask, what for? For your own private benefit only!" (INT7)

The roundtable negotiations, often celebrated as an example of a non-violent power transfer, appeared to many victims as a betrayal. One of the interviewees described the negotiations and the transition as "sharing of the spoils" (INT4). This seemed to be the prevalent picture among those who felt left behind. They saw their more prominent colleagues as those who had betrayed them; they had made a deal with communists. The result was that the communists were protected in the new dispensation and even benefitted financially, while the high profile oppositionists gained the political power. The rest of normal common people, who had sacrificed years of their lives, were

forgotten and abandoned in poverty. When asked about his perception of the situation since the transition, one of the interviewees expressed it in the following words:

„I think there is a great deal of disappointment. This is not what people fought for. We have been, in my opinion, betrayed.” (INT2)

This aspect, the comparison with better off former victims, might appear less relevant for the present study, as the focus is on comparison with the outgroup, namely, the perpetrators. It illustrates, however, the different types or layers of relative deprivation, mentioned previously, of which social comparison with perpetrators is only one. The comparison with better off former victims is also relevant for relative deprivation theory, since ingroup and outgroup comparisons have been found to have different consequences. While outgroup comparisons lead to intergroup attitudes (prejudices against outgroup for instance), ingroup comparisons affect internal states such as sadness, hopelessness or depression (H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2014). From the gathered data it was difficult to clearly identify whether these former victims, who succeeded post-transition, were still regarded as members of the ingroup. A combination of anger and resentment resulting from outgroup comparisons, combined with sadness or depression, resulting from ingroup comparisons, was also possible in this situation. In any case, it was likely to exacerbate the negative effects of other types of relative deprivation that existed in the post-conflict context.

7.1.3 Justice perceptions

All the interviewees were adamant that there was no justice at all. Almost all of the interviewees, when asked about what would be needed for them to feel that justice had been done, mentioned an improvement in their economic wellbeing. Some called it social justice (INT1), or described it as a moral duty of a state to reward those who had contributed (INT5). Others mentioned restoration when asked about what would be important for justice.

“Material repair of loss. Because when someone’s life and health was destroyed, if it was destroyed then this needs to be repaired, this is obvious!” (INT7)

INT7, moreover, did not see the state as being responsible for the recompense. He felt that the perpetrators should be the ones who eventually paid.

“There is not a single case where the state treasury demanded a repair payment from the perpetrators. Not a single case! (...) And yet, when I steal from someone, who pays?! The state or me? The perpetrator pays!” (INT7)

This statement constituted the expectation of some form of economic redistribution. It symbolized restoration of balance between victims and perpetrators by taking from the guilty group and giving to those who had suffered. Balance or equality appeared to be important for justice perceptions. The victims felt they have given everything, years of their life, money, emotional distress and some also health, and had received nothing in return. These findings are in accordance with the open questions in the survey in which, in both studies, the majority of respondents, when asked about justice, mentioned compensation or economic support for the victims. Moreover, the fact that the perpetrators enjoyed high economic status was also an issue strongly related to justice. INT4, for example, highlighted this fact as a “great injustice”.

Another topic mentioned repeatedly in relation to justice was some kind of moral acknowledgment for the victims. However, while this was important, it was simultaneously perceived as cheap and hypocritical if the praise came without compensation. It was felt that both were important, but that they needed to be met together. Words do not count without deeds and the praise was otherwise seen as being just for show and not sincere. The type of acknowledgment that was expected was mostly not specified. One aspect mentioned repeatedly, and which appeared to be painful for many victims, was the lack of knowledge of the general public and especially the youth about the time of communism, the opposition struggle and the sacrifices of many (INT1, INT2, INT4, INT5 & INT7).

Punishment of the former perpetrators was a rather ambiguous issue. While courts, trials, punishment or accountability were mentioned by almost all the interviewees, most emphasized that they did not need to see these “old men” actually going to prison. If trials or sentences were demanded by interviewees, it was rather for their symbolic value, to clarify publically what was right and what was wrong. The trials were expected to serve as an official statement about who had been on the right side of history.

“No, not prison but symbolically, if at all... sentencing, but it is not necessary to actually put them in prison” (INT2)

"It is not important for us that he [a former communist official, they have sued] goes to prison. It won't change anything for us. But this should be condemned, that this is not right!" (INT2)

"Yes, punishment, but not in the sense that they go to prison. Demotion, dismissal, like what they have been doing (...). A moral, yes some moral punishment." (INT3)

"Main point [when asked about justice] that people like Jaruzelski should face the court of the free country of Poland. And no one says to lock up this old man, but for posterity, for the historians, the betrayal of the Polish nation... (...) condemnation and accountability for their past." (INT6)

The perception of the victims was mainly that not much had changed in the sense of who the winners and the losers were, even though the political order they had been fighting for came into being. And this clarification, through a justice system, would signify the righting of an historical wrong for the victims.

A final issue, stressed by several interviewees (INT1, INT2 & INT3) was that many of the judges were still the same people as they were under the former regime. The interviewees asserted that in many cases there had been no personnel changes in the judicial system.

"They behave as if nothing has happened. They were positively verified and continue working. Nothing changes for them. This is for me a lack of justice. It can't be that the judge, who sentenced us to prison during martial law when we now apply for compensation (...) he is the one to decide." (INT2)

In conclusion, these perceptions are in accordance with the answers to the questions about justice in the survey. The victims needed an improvement in their own situations, in financial terms and also with regard to acknowledgment and recognition of their contributions. It was felt that the perpetrators should not be better off and it should be clear who was the victim and who the perpetrator, who was right and who was wrong. The qualitative findings also illustrated and explained the impact of relative deprivation on justice perceptions, since the reasons for perceived injustice among Polish victims are rooted in the same views, opinions and attitudes that constituted relative deprivation.

7.1.4 Forgiveness

Several of the interviewed victims verified the connection between forgiveness and relative deprivation, declaring that it would be difficult or impossible for them to forgive if the current situation remained the same, i.e. the perpetrators continued to receive high pensions and benefit financially (INT1, INT2, INT4 & INT5). All four victims also mentioned acknowledgment, remorse, and apologies as very important for them. However, words without actions appeared to be insincere. INT2 explained that murder could never be forgiven but other cases would depend on the circumstances.

"If they acknowledged what they did, apologized, then I would be able to show understanding. Yes, I would be able to. If they acknowledged it, showed remorse. Of course, it depends on what exactly they did at the time, because this is also important." (INT2)

Asked if apologies would suffice and forgiveness would be possible if the current conditions did not change, the interviewee explained:

"No, that would not be enough. (...) Of course not. Especially, since they do not deserve this money. For what?! For beating us?! Of course, I am simplifying everything on purpose but, what should they be paid for?! (...) Of course, it is clear they would not give the money back voluntarily, only a law could make them do it. If someone were to give up the money voluntarily and would pay for one of his victims, he would go up a lot in my estimation!" (INT2)

Two of the interviewees made an explicit connection to religiosity when asked about forgiveness (INT4 & INT6). In particular, INT6 emphasized that social justice and forgiveness are two separate issues and that forgiveness is a personal decision, which is unconditional and rooted in religious beliefs. INT7 also perceived forgiveness as unconditional, explaining that waiting for another person to do something or to apologize would result in the past "eating one up inside". INT3 could not imagine forgiving at all, regardless of the circumstances. INT4 expected some kind of public demonstration of remorse, arguing that the crimes committed were also public.

Most victims expected acknowledgment and remorse, followed by some form of compensation. From their point of view, however, they felt that they received the

opposite, namely ignorance and arrogance. Former agents ridiculed them or looked down on them. Statements, such as the one of Kiszczak's wife, mentioned by INT4, that survival on 2000 zł was impossible, while many victims lived for decades on half of this amount, represented a level of arrogance and condescension to the victims that was hard to stomach. The implicit reaction, probably the only one left for them without a change of external circumstances, was an attitude of moral superiority. Asked about their perception or attitude towards the perpetrators they mentioned contempt (INT5) or pity (INT4 & INT7). INT4 expressed satisfaction about not feeling ashamed of their own behaviour during communist rule. INT7 narrated a story of meeting a former perpetrator and how, according to the interviewee, his behaviour showed clear signs of a bad conscience.

“He knew what he did. So what that he has power? That he is rich? So what? But he is not able to sleep peacefully” (INT7)

The interviews represented the multidimensional nature of forgiveness and the different subjective understandings and perspectives that reflect the debates in the literature described in detail in the second chapter. Most victims fell into the category described in the comprehensive apology approach (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009) that emphasises acknowledgment, remorse, and repair. The repair part, in particular, is supposed to signify a genuine inner change and demonstrate that the remorse is not superficial. Giving up the unethically obtained wealth, the riches amassed as result of their crimes, would represent for the victims a form of atonement. For most victims, therefore, a situation where the perpetrator is still “on top”, a situation of relative deprivation is incompatible with forgiveness. Interestingly, this is often an implicit understanding, rather than something expressed directly. While many victims mentioned remorse or apologies straightaway when asked about forgiveness, the role of social comparison with perpetrators or relative deprivation was implied, rather than explicitly mentioned. Only when asked if they could contemplate forgiveness if the financial conditions of the victims and perpetrators remained the same, most reacted by vehemently rejecting the idea as if it was something that was obvious.

Only two of the interviewees subscribed to the idea of unconditional forgiveness, an idea controversially debated in the literature. Their attitudes and reasoning can be understood by using the forgiveness typology of Fehr et al (2010). Most other

interviewees referred to cognitive or affective factors when asked about if and when they could forgive. To find an answer they made an assessment of the situation —a comparison between themselves and the perpetrators. When assessing the level of perpetrator guilt, some victims included considerations about intent and force. If their assessment implied relative deprivation with feelings of anger and resentment, forgiveness was rejected. For the two other interviewees, the focus with regard to forgiveness lay in the third category of the typology that addresses issues of moral and ethical standards and constraints.

In conclusion, the findings suggest that for the majority a balancing of the scales between themselves and the perpetrators, accompanied by apologies and remorse is critical. There was, however, also a group of victims who decided to forgive unconditionally out of ethical or moral imperatives, or for their own emotional and psychological wellbeing. Conversely, there will always be a group of people, who will not forgive regardless of the circumstances.

7.1.5 Conclusions of the qualitative findings in the Polish sample

The interviews conducted with the Polish victims supported and explained some of the outcomes of the quantitative part of the study. Relative deprivation towards perpetrators was an issue for the victims in Poland because they saw the perpetrators as better off. They considered themselves to deserve more and were angry, bitter or resentful about it. These perceptions were in turn strongly related to a sense of injustice. It has to be pointed out for clarification that these perceptions and attitudes were generally expressed with regard to the group rather than individual perpetrators. Group relative deprivation deals with ingroup-outgroup attitudes. It was the perception that the outgroup were better off than the ingroup that generated these attitudes and emotions. Individual factors came in when expectations about apologies were expressed, for example. Economic and social inequality, studied by applying the theory of relative deprivation, can be perceived as creating conditions that hinder forgiveness, despite or beyond the effect of apologies.

While relative deprivation does seem to influence forgiveness of victims, the relationship appeared more complex than the one between injustice perceptions and relative deprivation. The perception that the perpetrators enjoyed better economic conditions than the victims post-transition affected and tainted the justice judgments

of the post-conflict environment for the victims. Certainly, justice perceptions are also influenced by more factors than relative deprivation alone. However, it did appear to be a strong and prevalent factor in the Polish sample. When it came to forgiveness, various additional, often individual, elements played an important role. Most victims have conditions for forgiveness. Remorse and apologies were very important, in accordance with literature and empirical studies (e.g. Azar and Mullet 2002; Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009; Chapman 2007; David 2018; David and Choi 2009; Gibson 2002; Scher and Darley 1997). On the other hand, words did not seem to be enough. Without some form of repair or restoration of balance, there could be no forgiveness. The implication was that the remorse and inner change of the perpetrators were not seen as sincere. Reparations are likely to have the most effect when provided voluntarily by the perpetrator. Otherwise the society was expected to “step in” and restore balance and moral order, confirming what was right and wrong, and what was acceptable and what was not. While these appeared to be the predominant views, some victims decided to forgive out of religious imperatives or because they perceived forgiveness as beneficial for their own mental and emotional wellbeing. This seemed to reflect the literature on decisional and emotional forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012). Finally, some victims did not forgive under any circumstances or conditions.

While relative deprivation generally focuses on the ingroup's feeling of deserving better, in this case, there is an additional aspect less researched within relative deprivation literature. Not only do the victims feel they deserve better, but most also see the outgroup, in this case, the perpetrators, as deserving less. This finding was linked to the previously mentioned diverse types of relative deprivation experienced by victims. They simultaneously experienced temporal relative deprivation, a sense of being betrayed by not achieving the expected positive outcome after the transition, as well as relative deprivation resulting from a disadvantageous comparison with the perpetrator group. This disadvantageous comparison in turn resulted, not only from the victims having less than they felt they should but, also from the outgroup having more than they should. This finding complemented and explained the surprising outcome of the experiment that the respondents did not display relative deprivation only in response to the one vignette scenario where the victim was better off than the perpetrator. This was the only condition in which all types of relative deprivation were addressed and rectified.

Finally, the qualitative data revealed that the interviewed victims appeared to also experience relative deprivation in comparison with some members of their ingroup. The interviewees compared those former oppositionists who succeeded in economic and social terms with the many victims, mostly including themselves, who were less fortunate after the transition. While studies focusing on victims' attitudes, such as the rather recent concept of competitive victimhood (Noor et al. 2012) focus on comparisons between two different groups of victims (for example two ethnic groups involved in a conflict) the present case constitutes an intragroup comparison. These people have seen each other as colleagues, struggling for the same cause. Even the name of movement *Solidarność* (solidarity) speaks for itself. After the transition, a gap opened (or a previously existing gap became apparent) between those "who made it" and those who did not, revealing a split into a two-class victim group.

7.2 Uganda

In Uganda 13 interviews were conducted. All were recorded and all were carried out in the Acholi sub-region in the northern part of Uganda. All interviewees were members of victims' associations around massacre sites, except for one person. The locations of interviews were as follows: Atiak, Odek, Lukodi, Lamogi, and Parabongo. The one interviewee, who was not a member of victims associations, turned out to be a son of one of the highest ranking rebel commanders and one of the five against whom the ICC arrest warrants were issued. Though not a perpetrator himself and not a direct victim as defined in this study, his account can nevertheless contribute a different perspective and has, therefore, also been included. However, he only admitted his heritage after asking to switch off the recorder. Most of the relevant contributions made by him have been recorded through notes.

All interviews were carried out in English. This was a difficult decision, since it limited the potential interviewees to those who were relatively fluent in English. However, considering all the factors, the disadvantages of obstructing the interview process through translation was found to outweigh the advantages. Much gets lost in translation and professional translators are rather difficult to find in such regions. Moreover, in case of potentially difficult and personal topics, such as this one, a more intimate setting of just two people was perceived as more beneficial. Further, the quantitative study as well as the open-ended questions that constituted part of the questionnaires were translated into the local language and contributed to the qualitative

findings. This ensured that the qualitative data does not only reflect the views of the English speaking group of victims.

Finally, it turned out that in each place there have been a number of people able to speak English fluently enough so that language was not a difficult issue after all.

7.2.1 Assessment of the situation of victims and former perpetrators

Economic conditions

All the interviewees were of the opinion that the victims were not doing well economically. Some particularly mention the difficult situation of old women who lost children during the war and were now left alone to survive and too weak to support themselves; or of children who were left alone after their parents were killed or abducted. In a country, where there is no institutionalized state support for poor people, families are usually all there is when the weak, poor or elderly need help. In that sense the pain of losing loved ones in a conflict was amplified by what families mean for survival.

“Your only son whom you think would be in the best position to help you in future is killed. And an old useless woman remains without a son. There are some women whose children are murdered up to the number of three or even more, so many people. So you find that level of poverty because of the age (...)”

“(...) you would see some mothers, you would really weep. Some of them are really...they are very weak, but they have to work so that they can continue living because the people who are supposed to support them are all not there now. Some are the husbands killed, the children, all killed” (INT 11)

Apart from the fact that properties were looted, animals stolen or houses burnt and people had to start from scratch, several respondents also mentioned the lack of education that resulted from the situation during the war, where regular schooling was often not possible.

“Most of the women in our group here they are widows. And they don’t have any strength to support their children. That’s why most of the children, they are not educated.” (INT 3)

A number of respondents also emphasized mental problems such as trauma, depression and general hopelessness, which can often result in alcoholism.

The situation of the returnees⁷¹ was mostly assessed as being similar to that of the rest. Though some respondents acknowledged that, initially, the returnees did get more support, they mostly saw it as justified owing to their difficult situations and the initially prevalent stigma. By now, however, many of the NGOs supporting the returnees or victims in general, had left, while most of the challenges remained.

“Well, with those ones who have been abducted, they’re almost at the same level. By the time they have been just from the bush, their level of living was a little bit raised. Why do I say this: NGOs were supporting them, but this time, it is not there.” (INT 9)

The role of the government was severely criticized by all the interviewees. A few acknowledged that the government was at least trying to help, or that it had tried to do so during the war by offering some protection. Most, however, place the greater part of the responsibility for their situation on the government and felt completely neglected and abandoned.

This was not the only subjective perception of the victims. The north-south divide in Uganda is obvious and visible, with the river Nile as a dividing line between the more prosperous south and the marginalized and war-ravaged north. Even though there had been some improvement since the end of the war it had been slow, insufficient and many programmes designed to help were riddled with corruption-related problems⁷².

Social acknowledgment

Social recognition and standing in the community are to a certain degree, also in northern Uganda, linked to economic wellbeing. However, there are other ways of showing recognition and acknowledgment of the plight of victims on the side of the

⁷¹ The returnees are those who have been forcefully abducted, sometimes as children, by the rebels and return from the “bush” to their communities.

⁷² For example, a programme particularly designed to rebuild the north after the war, the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), implemented through the Office of the Prime Minister in Uganda, has been at the centre of a major corruption scandal with millions of Euros of donor funds misappropriated (Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2012). The same applies to other programmes such as Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), which at some point has even been suspended due to corruption claims (Batre 2012).

government. Thus, the interviewees did not only emphasize the lack of financial support, but also highlighted the governments' lack of interest in their annual commemoration of the massacres committed in their villages. Most of the respondents bemoaned the low turnout of political leaders, while others implied that those who came, did so for their own political benefit.

“I could say they are paying a deaf ear to our cry. For us here we normally organize an annual memorial prayer. (...) We expect, we normally expect, the local leaders, like the district leaders, the sub-county leaders, even the people from national level to attend. But you rarely see them.” (INT 12)

“(...) the people who come, they come on political grounds. Especially the political leaders, who are in position there, they come just to show themselves that they are with the people, and during the times of politics, they... so that they can (...) get votes, during the times of politics. But the real local government officials, their turn-up is really very low, yes, it is really low. And that's why I can say even (...) the government are not bothered by it.” (INT 5)

At most of the massacre sites, the victims have constructed memorial monuments bearing the names of those who were killed. These monuments were mostly erected with the help of NGOs. It can be argued that memorial monument construction is not part of the culture or tradition of the Acholi and, therefore, perhaps a lack of participation by political leaders in commemorations is not surprising. However, rituals for various events are very common and important in the Acholi culture. The lack of appropriate burial ceremonies, common during the war, is believed to provoke the wrath of spirits who haunt the living until they are appeased (Baines 2010). In many cases, burials are impossible as the remains cannot be found or are scattered. While traditional cleansing ceremonies are performed to enable people to return to their homes where atrocities have been committed, memorial sites and commemoration ceremonies can form another way of appeasing the spirits and restoring the moral order.

The scale and level of violence of the LRA war were unprecedented and, therefore, new forms of dealing with the past are likely to have and have actually been adopted by the victims. These new forms were not originally part of their traditions. Remembrance appears to be important to a number of people, as one of the respondents

in the questionnaires also suggested a school to be constructed in memory of those who died. The lack of participation or interest of political leaders in the annual commemorations, therefore, demonstrates to the victims that the leaders do not consider the past suffering of the victims as important.

Situation of former perpetrators

As explained previously, perpetrator and victim categorization can be difficult in Uganda due to the forced abductions. Thus, a distinction was made in the questionnaires as well as in the interviews between the forcefully abducted ex-rebels (also described as returnees or abductees) and higher level perpetrators, i.e., those who gave the orders and were most responsible for the atrocities that were inflicted on the victims. Generally, the interviewees, some of whom had also been forcefully abducted, made this differentiation themselves.

The situation of these “low-ranking” returnees has generally been acknowledged to be as difficult and challenging as the situations of other victims, possibly even worse, owing to the prolonged stigma attached to them. The status and living conditions of the high-ranking ex-rebel commanders and main perpetrators have, however, been assessed differently. Several of the respondents stated that many of the higher-level ex-rebels joined the army (UPDF)⁷³ and were, therefore, catered for and paid; and were living relatively comfortably compared to the victims.

“There are some who came from the bush at the rank of lieutenant and when they, when they come out they joined UPDF again. So they were what? They were admitted in UPDF to work as soldiers. So they were also what? Been added the rank. So they are doing well. Others even, they have constructed their houses, yes.” (INT5)

With regard to the commanders, several respondents also stated that people are afraid to say anything against them because they are now in the army. A number of respondents provided examples of high-ranking ex-rebel commanders they know who are in high positions or get support from the government. INT 9, for instance, gave the example of his uncle, a former rebel commander, who receives support from the

⁷³ Uganda People’s Defence Force

government for his sons. The special support given to high-ranking commanders or their families has also been verified by a son of one of the highest-ranking former LRA rebels (INT 13), who described the attention from the international community, but also the financial support for school and university studies he has received from members of government. This difference is significant, considering that most respondents complained in particular about the lack of means to continue their education; and many of the younger interviewees stated that they had to drop out of school owing to a lack of financial resources. Some interviewees, such as INT4, used expressions such as “cared” and “catered for” when speaking about the former perpetrators’ situations. This perception of victims is supported by the literature describing the post-conflict situation in northern Uganda (Borzello 2009)⁷⁴.

Another theme that emerged repeatedly, probably due to the simultaneous trial at The Hague of one of the top five LRA commanders, was the perception that the international trial and, possible prison sentence, was preferential treatment and not a punishment at all. Several interviewees pointed out that the current circumstances of Dominic Ongwen, the arrested LRA commander, were much better than the situation of the victims. While they live in poverty and struggled daily for survival, Dominic Ongwen has all his needs taken care of at the international court and in the prison.

“In fact like Dominic Ongwen, for instance, Dominic Ongwen he's (not) suffering, he's just living happily. (...) on the day he was arrested, he was like somebody who is like poor, malnourished, badly off, but now if you're to look at the living conditions because the costs there provide everything necessary for...for his living.” (INT 5)

The respondents considered being taken to The Hague as favouritism and highlighted the clothes, the number of lawyers and the general conditions of the ex-rebel leader they could see on television. It needs to be clarified that it was not the fact of being tried and imprisoned as such that was perceived as preferential treatment, but rather the trial and imprisonment at an international court and in a European prison. As the court hearings were broadcast publically the victims in Uganda had the chance to see the proceedings as well as the conditions provided for the ex-rebel leader on television.

⁷⁴ See chapter 3 for more details.

Particularly in comparison with the local courts and prisons in Uganda these circumstances certainly appeared more than conducive.

7.2.2 Relative deprivation

The victims in northern Uganda made social comparisons that lead to anger or resentment when the outgroup (here: the perpetrators) was perceived to be in a better economic position. Regarding the categorization of perpetrators, many drew distinctions between the different groups of rebels, the high-ranking commanders and the rest, while others focused on the atrocities committed by the whole group and differentiated less. However, the stigma attached to the forcefully abducted returnees appeared to have abated after many efforts to sensitize the public to the issue and since so many families had been affected. Asked about the resettlement packages given to ex-rebels, INT3 described the past situation:

“Other people they were jealous about it. But for us others, we also said, no. These children they were, they have been grabbed without their needs and they suffered a lot. Many of them disappeared. Many of them were dead. So when God helped these few ones that are back there is no need to make jealousy on them, yes.

- So for you, it was ok but some other people were jealous?

- Some other people they abuse you... them with bitter words.

- Because of what they got?

- Yes, yes. That you have been torturing us, now again they are supporting you in, in very terrible words, yes. (INT3)

So, while the apportionment of blame differed, victims drew social comparisons with those they saw as perpetrators.

As was emphasized before, most interviewees, however, recognised the formerly abducted returnees as victims and perceived their situations as similar. Some acknowledged that the returnees received more assistance in the beginning, but, at the same time, many of them also suffered more and now the conditions were similar (INT3). The ex-rebel leaders, on the other hand, were mostly seen as being better off than the rest. Some interviewees (INT7) assumed that it could have been because they were perceived as having more influence. As mentioned before, the European prisons

were perceived as luxury accommodation, understandably from the perspective of rural African conditions. When speaking about Joseph Kony, the main rebel leader, INT3 stated:

“I want him also to suffer like we have suffered. He needs to stay with the community (...) I want him also to suffer like that. Because old men and women they are suffering alone like that. For him also, I want him to stay in a community, to see those physically. When he is in prison whatever ... ah. He will be in a good life.

- So you think the life in prison is better?

- Is better, because everything is free for you, you can go and swim in a pool, do everything.” (INT3)

The interviewees drew a comparison between the life of the average victim living in the post-conflict community and a rebel leader who might go, like Dominic Ongwen, to a prison in Europe following the ICC trial. The prison was seen as providing a better quality of living and the rebel leaders as undeserving of this. Many of the victims who expected punishment would, therefore, have preferred trials of the high-ranking ex-rebels to take place in Uganda.

Another interviewee explained the feelings and reactions of many victims when they saw that former rebel commanders were, for example, embedded in the army or otherwise catered for, while victims were left out.

“It is really bad and it can trigger out peoples mindset, yes. Because it is unbelievable that the person who did all these to you is being supported and you are being left out, yes. So people are not happy” (INT4)

Another interviewee described the particular case of a commander who returned from the bush and joined the army, and was now in a better economic situation.

“Some people are not happy. Because they are saying, we...we...we ...we lost a number of people in Lukodi here, but for him, he is back, and he is doing well and he has two motorbikes what... They are saying that, but not openly. “

- And why do they not say it openly?

- Maybe because of fear.” (INT5)

The element of fear came up repeatedly (e.g. also INT4). It appeared that people who made comparisons got angry, but were often afraid to show their feelings. Not only did the former rebels instigate fear as such but, in addition, they joined another powerful and feared institution, the army. It also seemed that the anger was vented more vehemently against those who were seen as more accessible. Another interviewee described prevailing suspicions that the ICC supported the perpetrators more than it supported the victims.

“In fact I'm very angry with this thing, because these people should have been tried in Uganda, or maybe if they're being tried there, the thing, the process should like be increased, so that by the time these...these victims will die, most of them would have got their benefit. Because this court has a lot of money, and the money, I don't know how they get it, but if they use lump sum of it to cut off for perpetrators it means it is not helping what? It is not helping the victims, yes. (...) because these benefits even some of it are also given to the families of those perpetrators.” (INT6)

INT6 explained how these suspicions and anger provoked people into burning down the house of the wife of Dominic Ongwen.

“And this wife of his [Dominic Ongwen] is no longer in Gulu here. Because people knew of it and one day someone went like to burn the house of that wife.

-Why were they angry?

(...)

- It is because she's getting even better and better and better, and the money...she, ok, no one knew where the money was coming from, yes. But the money is just why, maybe in their account, I don't know, but the...the rate of improvement in the level of standard is increasing very rapidly, yes. So people, like, say maybe if not the thing they looted from the... from the bush, is the one she is using, then it is automatic that is the ICC is providing for her, yes.” (INT6)

This is an example of how the anger aroused through relative deprivation is released when the true culprits are not available. Dominic Ongwen is in The Hague, former high-ranking ex-rebels, who joined the army are feared, but the wife of one of the leaders provided an easier target. Moreover, in the communal culture of the Acholi in northern Uganda, responsibilities for crimes extend to the families and clans of the

culprits. If the clan or the family does not accept this responsibility, the anger is directed at them.

Some highlighted the undeserved recognition and social status awarded to the highest rebels. INT9 recalled the burial of Joseph Kony's mother, which appeared like one "of a president". This showed, according to INT9, that Kony was actually enjoying the war, which had provided him with resources and high status. This was likely to have been painful for many victims whose loved ones had been killed and their remains scattered in unknown locations, while the mother of the main perpetrator received an official burial, which included a large public ceremony. INT9 expressed bitterness at this by declaring that, should Kony die, this would be a cause for celebration.

To sum up, many victims were angry and resentful when they saw cases of perpetrators doing better than they were. At the same time, fear of the ex-rebels as well as army soldiers remained. When former rebels joined the army, victims felt particularly uncomfortable in expressing their feelings. This showed that, even though the war had ended, Uganda was not a free and democratic country where people felt free to speak their minds and express their opinions. The suppressed anger was then sometimes directed at easier targets, especially since other legal avenues are not easily accessible.

Victims in rural areas of northern Uganda were often uninformed about the living conditions or situations of some ex-rebel commanders, except those in their immediate proximity. Access to the media is limited and local news are not widely reported. This leads to suspicions and assumptions replacing facts, especially when it came to questions of economic wellbeing and the sources from which money was alleged to have been received. Nevertheless, the mechanisms were similar as those in Poland. The wealth of perpetrators, whether known about or observed, was frequently compared to the poverty of victims. The wealth of the perpetrators was perceived as undeserved and triggered resentment and anger, which in some cases, as shown in the story of Ongwen's wife, even lead to acts of revenge.

7.2.3 Justice perceptions

The perception that justice had not been done after the conflict was expressed by most of the interviewees, though some acknowledged that the government tried to address some issues during and after the war, or that some steps were being taken, such as the

ICC arrest warrants and the ongoing trial. However, in the main, the government was criticized for not doing enough, even though it also bore responsibility.

Prosecution by the ICC, on the other hand, was not seen as much of a punishment by many, as already mentioned above. The neglect of victims in comparison with the treatment metered out to the perpetrators was highlighted by some interviewees and this had an impact on their justice perceptions.

“ It is not ok. Because it is... it should have been the victims who should be benefiting from this thing [the ICC trial]. Yes, because if you're to look this court has been instituted to like improve the lives of people and to prevent like crimes on people and their property. But if the court division itself provides more better living conditions to the perpetrator than to the victims it means the court is in support of like the perpetrators, yes. It is...it is supportive to perpetrators. Because that money which the institution has should have (...) for these people, should have been used to what? To improve the lives of the victims” (INT 5)

The needs and expectations expressed by the interviewees with regard to justice were largely similar to the answers given in the open-ended questions included in the questionnaires⁷⁵, with most references being made to compensation followed by punishment. When it came to compensation it was generally expected that the government would provide compensation, though some interviewees acknowledged the positive effect that symbolic compensation given by the perpetrators to the victims would have. This is especially so because compensation is usually part of the traditional reconciliation ceremonies. But most respondents adopted a pragmatic approach and explained that expecting compensation for all the victims from a few perpetrators was not realistic.

“So even, like, even if I killed like a 100 people, I (...) cannot pay all those things. Maybe you bring 200.000 [Uganda Shilling], just in human heart, or as a symbol that this thing is now in progress. In fact, just (...) as a symbol that this is something for us the family of perpetrators we are presenting to this team as a compensation for lives lost or property lost (...)” (INT 5)

⁷⁵ See chapter 4

"Because it is the government to compensate the people, but not the perpetrators. Because like, for instance, this one here, Dominic Ongwen, he cannot compensate all the people in northern Uganda. Not even in northern Uganda alone, even in eastern Uganda, even in West Nile. So he cannot." (INT 6)

Most interviewees considered that an improvement in victims' circumstances was an important prerequisite for justice. While ideally, and traditionally, compensation by perpetrator follows transgressions in order to restore social and moral order, victims acknowledged the scale of atrocities and the impossibility of satisfying the needs of all the individuals to an extent that would really improve their circumstances. Here the government was expected to restore balance because it was seen as the only body with sufficient resources to make a difference in the lives of the victims.

The question of punishment appeared ambiguous to a certain extent. On the one hand, many victims expected the perpetrators to pay in some way for what they had done. On the other hand, they also acknowledged that the provision of amnesty helped to end the conflict. Some opted to look forward and focus on the future since the victims would not benefit from any form of punishment. Asked if the commanders should be punished one interviewee answered:

"They should be punished. But all the same I think it would also be useless because when they started coming home, the government of Uganda were receiving them warmly, others also were eager to come because they [knew] when you go home you would not be killed. And people started escaping coming home. So, all the same I think there is nothing to be done. If there is justice I think, government should get a way of supporting the victims, just only supporting the victims. Because we cannot bring those lives again on board. The people were killed are already dead. And the property looted are now not there. So if they really can bring maybe things like resettlement packages to the people so that we continue living our normal lives." (INT 11)

Yet again, the ideal was juxtaposed with the reality. Ideally the perpetrators should have been punished but it would not help anyone so the most important requirement was to improve victims' living conditions. This is in accordance with the previously

described Maslow's hierarchy of needs.⁷⁶ Poverty threatens the basic needs of survival and this takes precedence over the just desert principle, which would fall into the category of psychological needs. The higher level needs become more relevant when the lower level needs have been satisfied.

Finally, the issue of some perpetrators being in a better situation than the victims was also regarded as unjust. One interviewee, who was asked about their thoughts regarding the situation of former LRA commanders who had been embedded in the army and were living comfortably, responded:

"Probably it is not fair. Because if you see they are the one to victimize these ones and then now they are given more attention and they are better than these ones. This is a very clear sign of encouragement that next time if there is any kind of insurgency these people who are victimized and they are left they are also going to what? To join with the aim that next time when they are returning home they will also be catered for the way these ones are catered for." (INT4)

INT4 emphasized the symbolic meaning for future generations of a situation in which right and wrong are not clearly differentiated and treated accordingly. What would there be to ensure the moral order and explain why people should follow any rules if the actions that should be condemned appear instead to be rewarded?

Another interviewee, suspecting that government might be supporting some of the high ranking commanders was asked about their perceptions if this was true and responded:

"It would be worst! (...) So if they are benefiting out of the bad things they have been doing then the government is doing the worst. (...) And I think they are doing so. Because there is one I know the name but this is a man who is really doing very well. He is...he is really very well." (INT 11)

To sum up, the interviewees generally did not perceive that justice had been done after the war. Many were grateful merely for the fact that the war was over and the atrocities had ended. In order to see that justice was done victims need, firstly, an improvement in their own circumstances. Secondly, a situation in which the perpetrators are better

⁷⁶ See chapter 2.4.

off, or some funds are spent on them instead of the victims, is associated with supporting injustice. This corroborates the assumed relationship between relative deprivation and injustice perceptions.

Finally, although some victims ideally expected punishment of or compensation from the perpetrators, they saw it as unrealistic and assumed the pragmatic approach of accepting the unavoidable. Compensation of this magnitude could only come from the government and possibly from international institutions like the ICC, which does have a fund for victims.

7.2.4 Forgiveness

There are various themes emerging from the interviews, which can foster a deeper understanding of the victims' attitudes towards forgiveness. In many cases, the willingness to forgive seemingly unforgivable atrocities may appear astonishing. The war in northern Uganda was full of the most unimaginable cruelties, yet many rebels returned and lived side-by-side with the victims, while the victims declared that they had forgiven the perpetrators. This is something that also appeared in part of the quantitative and qualitative data presented above. So how is this possible? The interviews provided some answers regarding the underlying motivation and understanding of forgiveness by the victims as well as its sometimes ambiguous nature. In the last section of this chapter these findings will also be compared with those in Poland to obtain a fuller picture of the understanding of this concept at both research sites.

One defining characteristic of the war in northern Uganda were the abductions, frequently of children, who would then be forced to kill and torture, sometimes even their relatives. Many victims knew people who had been abducted, had been abducted themselves, or lived in families in which a family member or members had been abducted. Most, therefore, stressed the issue of responsibility and agency when it came to the committed crimes.

"What I can say is because they were also abducted, they were been taken there on order. (...) because like I'm a teacher if I say please, you lie down and I send someone to ...to cane that person. It means (...) I'm behind that. It is not that very child who caned the other, the colleague. But is my order." (INT 6)

While interviewees apportioned responsibility differently, some included the top five commanders indicted by the ICC; some mentioned only Kony; and others included various high ranking rebels who joined voluntarily, most victims made a distinction along these lines. Even though stigmatization of all returnees was not uncommon, it appeared that it had reduced over time. This differentiated view was displayed also in connection with punishment. While many people said they would support the punishment of those responsible, they did not expect all the ex-rebels to be punished. The opinions regarding punishment were found to vary over time and depended on current circumstances of the victims. During conflicts the most critical and urgent issue for most victims was peace and whatever was required to achieve it was viewed positively, even at the cost of impunity (Pham and Vinck 2007). But with the changing context people's needs or expectations also change. Now, that the immediate threat of war had subsided some victims pointed out that the rebels had been given ample opportunities and possibilities to retreat from their stance, atone and give up but had refused to do so.

“(…) there is time for everything. Government opened the way for forgiveness, for so long, I could not now remember, (…) we are going, to have our children who are in the bush, begging them. And government opened the way, and they have closed now the way. ICC came here, and International Criminal Court, (…) that is now the world court, it means, the time of forgiveness has had end[ed].”

(INT 8)

Another interviewee (INT 7) also emphasized the question of time in relation to apologies and stated that the more time passed the less apologies would be perceived as sincere.

This view is connected to the topic of the perceived sincerity of apologies as well as “true forgiveness”. Some victims referred to their faiths and explained that forgiveness is part of their religion or part of the Acholi culture. Others, however, expressed the need for some deeds on the side of the perpetrators instead of only words to symbolically substantiate the sincerity of the remorse at the very least.

“Forgiveness? Oh yes, forgiveness comes during the reconciliation. But it starts with what? that payment of, we call it paying of *kwor*; that compensation. We

call it *culu kwor*,⁷⁷ that compensation. So after compensation, we do reconciliation. (...) Because if I have paid for the lives I lost on your side, then we reconciled. (...) So it is... it takes a process.” (INT5)

That forgiveness was difficult when perpetrators were benefitting and victims were in a poorer economic situation also became apparent in the story described above of people burning down the house of the wife of one of the perpetrators, Dominic Ongwen. This perception was shared by several interviewees. Asked if forgiveness was easier if the perpetrators were poor, or on a similar level to the victims, one interviewee stated:

“Yes, because when he is better, he is moving with the Prado, how can I feel? (...) Yet, you have destroyed everything I have. Again, you are the one in a good life. That can bring jealousy.” (INT 3)

While a disadvantageous comparison that resulted in the experience of relative deprivation did affect willingness to forgive negatively, as evidenced in the quote above, this was only one side of the story. Some victims displayed an attitude that could be described as “resigning into forgiveness”. Some felt that they were still in the weaker position and therefore there was no option for them other than to forgive.

“If you have to ask yourself what do you think you can do about that, ever since they're being back. They're the one in the high rank of the government, and you from the grassroots... what do you think you can do for them? There's nothing, you better forgive other than causing more chaos again.” (INT 10)

Forgiveness promoted by a feeling that there was nothing left to do, that there was no other option, was an emerging theme in several interviews.

“Most of us (...) even the... the cultural leaders the traditional leaders have been saying the same. That let us now forgive those people. There is nothing we can do. Our local chiefs, they were saying that let us forgive those people. We don't want (...) blood again to shed in our land. (...) There's nothing we can do. Because if we...we...we are to retaliate, where are we going to go and fight? Who are we going to...to retaliate on? There is nobody. So the only thing we can

⁷⁷ Paying for life.

do is just to forgive. Nothing apart from the forgiveness we can really do, yes.”

(INT 11)

The perception of “having to forgive” resembles the responses given by victims in a study done by OHCHR in Uganda, where this formulation was repeatedly used by interviewees (OHCHR 2007, 29–30). It was also in accordance with a study conducted in Rwanda after the genocide, where the authors found that unconditional forgiveness was common in the face of a situation where other options were simply not available (Mukashema and Mullet 2013). This does not mean that victims do not have expectations, they might simply not see them as realistic. How do these findings relate to relative deprivation theory?

As mentioned previously in the context of quantitative findings as well as qualitative findings in Poland, when it came to post-conflict settings there seemed to be different types of relative deprivation at play. Some of the empirical findings related to those different types of relative deprivation can contribute to a better understanding of this attitude of “resigned forgiveness”. Relative deprivation scholars found that resentment increased if there was a conceivable alternative that was potentially achievable, and that would yield a better outcome (Folger and Martin 1986). Conversely, the strong emotions of anger and resentment, which are assumed to negatively affect forgiveness, may be reduced if such an alternative scenario cannot be imagined or is not perceived as achievable and realistic. This might just be the case in Uganda and might possibly also apply to the study in Rwanda. To put it differently, the hopelessness of a situation might dampen the effects of relative deprivation and compel people to focus on what they have instead of what they do not have and cannot realistically achieve. Moreover, many of the victims in Uganda are, instead, very able to imagine a worse outcome than the one they have. Renewed conflict is the worst possible alternative. Forgiving appears as a much better option under such circumstances.

Another example that contributes to the above discussion about realistically conceivable alternatives is the expectation of compensation from perpetrators. Compensation paid after the commission of a transgression has substantive but also symbolic meaning. Compensations are traditionally part of reconciliation rituals, such as *mato oput*, in northern Uganda. They improve the situation of the victim by trying to restore balance after the victim has suffered a loss. At the same time, the perpetrator pays, which constitutes a form of punishment. This ensures that transgressions are

unlikely to happen again in future. A perpetrator undergoing such a reconciliation ritual shows the will to be included in the community again, and symbolically and materially atones for his sins. However, in the face of mass atrocities, such expectations are difficult to fulfil.

"If I have power, if at all, I would request them to compensate. They don't have anything to compensate. They are also very poor like me. (...) Unless otherwise, they have hidden their wealth in another country, because they have gone as far as to Central African Republic. (...) I don't know that much. But if at all they have the capacity... in fact people are too many to be compensated. They are too many. Greater North, West Nile, Acholi sub-region, Lango, and Teso. There are very many people." (INT 12)

Apart from the expediency of large-scale compensation by perpetrators, the above statement also implies a certain powerlessness expressed in the use of the term "if I have power".

All these above statements indicate that there are different types of forgiveness. There is forgiveness that takes place under ideal conditions, when expectations of the victims have been fulfilled and the perpetrator shows a genuine willingness to change, to improve and be accepted back into the community. The social order is restored by the perpetrator paying for the transgression and the victim is compensated. But there is also another type of forgiveness, which can be described as forgiveness out of resignation, when a victim recognises that there is no other option. In the words of one of the interviewees:

"In fact, in fact, forgiveness is when I do something wrong on your side, then I come to you, I apologize for the wrong, then you take your time, you think through, then you forgive me. From your heart, not just the words. Because this normal forgiveness we see around, it is just from the mouth, it is not from the heart, yes." (INT 5)

The concept of a "wholehearted" forgiveness was also reiterated by another interviewee:

"I cannot forget. Ok, I could say I can forget, but I still can remember. Let me, let me reframe again yet. In case you have done something wrong to me and you

have apologized to me...., if you accept it, my request, wholeheartedly, then I will be free." (INT 12)

The difference between these types of forgiveness becomes apparent in the words of another interviewee describing the attitude of many victims in northern Uganda towards the perpetrators:

“They forgive, but sometimes when any slight mistake happen, they recognize”
(INT3)

In other words, what is termed “forgiveness” can have widely different meanings for people. This relates to the literature on forgiveness and the attempt of many authors to differentiate between emotional and decisional or cognitive forgiveness (Worthington et al. 2012; Saunders 2011). The responses reflect the theories about the multidimensional nature of forgiveness which encompasses cognition and emotions (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010) by making a distinction between normal and wholehearted forgiveness, or forgiveness “from the mouth and from the heart”.

The question is, why would people forgive at all if it is not “wholehearted”, if they do not really mean it or feel it? The improvement of individual psychological wellbeing emphasized by Western psychologists also appears in the interviews with the Ugandan victims, as in the expression of INT12 above “then I will be free”. But there is another element. African rural communities have in the past always, and still do, heavily relied on a sense of belonging to the group and society as an entity crucial for wellbeing and survival. This relates back to the differentiation between individualistic and collectivistic cultures.⁷⁸ An individual is lost without the community. And without forgiveness, the community will fall apart.

“You must forgive because if not, if many people have wronged you (...) and you don't forgive, that means you're going to live alone, and a person cannot live alone. You have to live with the people. And that's why I'm saying you must forgive.” (INT 7)

⁷⁸ See chapter 2.3.2.

To sum up, victims in northern Uganda expressed the expectations typically associated with forgiveness. Apart from an improvement in their circumstances, remorse, acknowledgment and apologies on the side of the perpetrator played an important role. Payment by the perpetrator was not only part of traditional reconciliation rituals but also fulfils the function of making up for the losses of the victim. Consequently, a situation of relative deprivation in which the victims live in poorer circumstances than their former perpetrators are considered to be a hindrance to forgiveness.

However, many victims did not foresee their expectations as being realistically fulfilled in the future. There seems, therefore, to be a different type of “resigned forgiveness” that victims resort to if “wholehearted” forgiveness is not possible. This is perceived as important in collectivistic societies to prevent communities from falling apart. It is, however, also less stable since any minor transgression may trigger the suppressed feelings of un-forgiveness, possibly resulting in vengeful actions in future.

7.2.5 Conclusion of the qualitative findings in the Ugandan sample

The interviewed victims generally assessed the economic situations of most victims negatively. There is poverty, little or no support and a feeling of being forgotten or abandoned by the government, which appeared to care more about the perpetrators. Not only was there no financial help but there was also little social recognition of the plight of the victims as commemorations of massacres are mostly ignored by political leaders.

In particular, the higher ranking, former perpetrators were mostly perceived as being in better circumstances with many holding positions in the Ugandan army. Even the ICC indictments were seen as beneficial, as victims watched the court proceedings on television and acknowledged the higher standard of living in a European prison compared to village life in a poor community. The general perception amongst victims was that the most criminally liable rebel leaders, instead of being tried in Uganda, were sent abroad where they were surrounded by an army of lawyers and were generally well catered for, while victims struggled to survive.

These views resulted in relative deprivation in the case of several interviewees, who saw the situation in which perpetrators were better off than victims as an impediment to justice and forgiveness. Many victims in Uganda, however, do not necessarily have access to comprehensive information about the situation of perpetrators. If there was

no higher ranking ex-rebel commander resettled in their immediate proximity, they would not be aware about the living conditions of the perpetrators. It seemed that for many the issue of social comparison was, therefore, not the most salient aspect of the post-conflict setting and often not mentioned, unless asked. If it did become salient, however, it appeared to affect victims strongly as examples of perpetrators being better off, benefitting from what they had done or being “rewarded” for their crimes were described and perceived as extremely unjust. This injustice, triggered by social comparisons, could even result in acts of revenge.

While victims in northern Uganda mentioned various expectations before being able to forgive “wholeheartedly”, they generally did not see them as likely to be fulfilled in future. The lack of a realistically imaginable better alternative, while the poorer alternative of a violent war was still very present in their mind, resulted in many victims “resigning into forgiveness”. Forgiveness was perceived by many as highly important for the cohesiveness of the societal structure. Forgiveness in collectivistic cultures, has been described by scholars as a means of restoring social harmony (Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009). Declaring forgiveness can sometimes even be perceived as a form of social duty. At the same time, such forgiveness may be superficial. Despite declaring forgiveness, revenge or avoidance motivations may still be present; and social harmony may be vulnerable to further transgressions in the future.

7.3 Comparison – Poland and Uganda

The accounts of the victims in Poland and northern Uganda revealed a number of similarities despite the different contexts and histories.

Apart from the fact that in both places many victims still suffered the consequences of the past, especially in economic terms, in both countries the perception prevailed that perpetrators were better off, in particular, those, who used be in high-ranking positions. This fact sent out a particularly strong message regarding justice perceptions as well as relative deprivation. Those who were most responsible and who least deserved it, benefitted the most, while many victims continued to struggle economically and often felt unacknowledged and forgotten. In both countries, relative deprivation did appear to have a negative impact on justice perceptions and forgiveness.

In addition to this, in both countries different types of relative deprivation come into play. Victims not only compare themselves with perpetrators, their assessments appear to include the situation of perpetrators before and after, the change of their own situation over time and finally, imagined alternative outcomes. Their justice perceptions and willingness to forgive resulted, among other factors, from all these assessments.

Some of these assessments differ due to the context in which they were experienced. Generally, the advantageous situation of former perpetrators seemed to be more salient for the victims in Poland. The disadvantageous comparisons with perpetrators played a significant role in justice judgments of the post-regime environment. In Uganda, these comparisons were mostly limited to those that were observable in the immediate proximity and were, therefore, frequently less salient. When they became salient, however, the perceived injustice of perpetrators benefitting more juxtaposed with widespread poverty prompted drastic reactions and revenge in some cases. This may have been exacerbated by the fact that other avenues, such as legal means, to address perceived injustice are mostly not accessible to victims in northern Uganda. In other words, while the experiences of relative deprivation and its negative effects on victims' attitudes are similar in both countries, these attitudes and perceptions are to a certain degree dependent on the available information. The subsequent behavioural responses depend in turn on options victims have in reacting to the perceived injustice.

Furthermore, there is a difference between the two countries that can possibly be traced back to relative deprivation as a result of a comparison with an envisioned alternative outcome. There is a group of victims in Poland who experienced a sense of bitterness and betrayal. People did not get caught up in a conflict, as was the case in Uganda. The interviewees actively chose to fight an unjust system. They had foreseen and expected a better outcome. It did not materialize due to a betrayal that took place, in the perception of many victims, during the roundtable negotiations. A disadvantageous comparison with a possible alternative outcome was found to increase a sense of resentment and relative deprivation (Folger 1986). A better outcome was within grasp but the victims felt they had been cheated out of it. Some even described their situations as worse than before.

This was very different in Uganda. The conflict was characterized by countless atrocities for decades and when it ended, the victims did not necessarily have grounds for envisioning improvements in their circumstances from a government that failed to protect them or was even complicit in some of the suffering that had happened to them. It does not mean that victims in Uganda do not have expectations for improved life conditions. Nevertheless, for many peace was the best outcome they could realistically have hoped for and the only conceivable alternative seemed to be renewed conflict. This possibly reduced feelings of resentment and resulted in what has been described before as “resigned forgiveness” out of a feeling that there are no other options. Moreover, forgiveness could be seen as a necessity to restore social harmony in a collectivistic culture (Hook, Worthington, and Utsey 2009; Sandage and Williamson 2005). This forgiveness, which appears to be more cognitive than affective (Worthington et al. 2012), and arise out of societal and cultural constraints (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010) does, however, seem to be more superficial and therefore less stable and more prone to being revoked in the case of new transgressions.

While in both countries social recognition does play a role, in Poland it is more likely to take the shape of awards for individual accomplishments, and in Uganda of recognizing and acknowledging victims and their plight during commemorations. Some victims in Uganda pointed out the need to be involved in, or at least informed about, court proceedings against the perpetrators. While social recognition is important for all, the specific expectations were more dependent on context, history, and culture.

In conclusion, it appears that the factors investigated in this study are present in both countries and do shape and influence victims’ attitudes and perceptions in the directions that were expected. Relative deprivation as a result of a disadvantageous comparison with former perpetrators is an obstacle for forgiveness and is connected with perceptions of injustice. Injustice perceptions of the post-conflict setting make a “wholehearted” forgiveness, which includes affective components, more difficult, even though victims might take a decision to forgive for various individual and societal reasons. Even though forgiveness is declared, revenge or avoidance motivations may still be present.

While the qualitative findings support the experiment and survey results and add a more nuanced understanding of the reasoning, motivations and perceptions of victims

in both settings, there are also differences grounded in the diverging contexts. These contextual differences shape the salience of the respective studied factors and consequently influence the strength of their relationships.

CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS

The research questions this thesis set out to investigate focused on the role of economic and social inequalities of the post-conflict setting in victim's justice perceptions and forgiveness. The assumption was that these inequalities trigger the experience of relative deprivation that contributes to: 1) negative justice judgments of the post-conflict environment; 2) an increase in revenge and avoidance motivation; and 3) a reduced willingness to forgive. Moreover, the effect of relative deprivation on forgiveness was presumed to be partly channelled through perceptions of injustice that were also presumed to affect forgiveness negatively.

The concepts of justice, forgiveness and relative deprivation, which are believed to be universally applicable, were studied in two post-conflict settings, which were specifically chosen for their differences. The question to be addressed through the selection of such diverse settings was to what extent the above stated assumptions of the present research are applicable to and valid in different contexts and among various victim groups.

This final chapter provides a short overview of the main findings. The conclusions address the research question posed at the beginning and highlight the similarities as well as differences between the two victim groups regarding the main topic of this study. The second section addresses the contributions and theoretical implications of the present study in the relevant fields of forgiveness, relative deprivation, justice and transitional justice research. The findings offer some answers but at the same time also provide a variety of new questions to be addressed by future studies, which are also highlighted in this section.

Finally, a mixed-method cross-cultural study, which includes an experimental methodology, is constrained by a variety of limitations. These limitations are addressed in detail in the final section of this chapter.

8.1 Overview of main findings

The main topic of this study was to investigate the potential effects of economic and social inequalities in a post-conflict setting on victims' perceptions of justice and forgiveness. The research framework was derived from the theory of relative deprivation, which describes the consequences of an experience of deprivation that

results from a comparison. The main focus of the present study was on the comparison between victims and perpetrators in terms of economic wellbeing and social acknowledgement. This form of a comparison did prove to play a role in victims' attitudes. However, the study also provided some evidence for the potential significance of other forms of relative deprivation. At the outset it was assumed that the experimental condition of the victim being in a worse post-conflict situation than the perpetrator represented relative deprivation; and the three other situations (viz. 1. victim and perpetrator are equally well off; 2. victim and perpetrator are equally poor and 3. victim is better off than the perpetrator) did not. The findings, however, suggest a different interpretation. Only the situation in which the victim was better off than the perpetrator did not give rise to the experience of relative deprivation while all others did, but to different degrees. Even as victims do compare their circumstances with those of the perpetrators, they also appear to conduct temporal comparisons and comparisons with an imagined alternative outcome. The latter two types of relative deprivation, ie, based on temporal and imagined alternative outcome comparisons, have been studied before and were found to influence perceptions and attitudes (Folger 1986; Folger and Martin 1986; de la Sablonnière et al. 2015; Davies 1962; H. J. Smith and Pettigrew 2015).

Economic relative deprivation resulted on average in more pronounced negative effects on forgiveness in both countries. While relative deprivation regarding social acknowledgement cannot be described as meaningless based on the findings, as it still affects justice perceptions, it clearly appears to be less relevant. One reason is possibly that in most cases a high economic status contributes to a higher social status and acknowledgement, while the reverse is not necessarily true. This became clear in the qualitative data in the Polish sample. Moreover, the victims in Poland frequently perceived social acknowledgement, without adequate economic compensation, as cheap, just for show and hypocritical. For the victims in Uganda the economic struggles were generally the predominant challenge. Referring back to Maslow's need hierarchy (1954) and the assumptions drawn from it at the beginning, it appears that in conditions of scarcity the focus of victims on economic circumstances prevails over other injustices, which might become more apparent once economic inequality has been addressed.

While the quantitative findings supported the initial assumption that relative deprivation affects justice perceptions and forgiveness in the expected directions, the qualitative findings provided some additional insight regarding victims' perceptions. The qualitative data indicated that different types of comparisons conducted by the victims depend on the context and their personal assessment of the situation. These comparisons pertain to other kinds of relative deprivation, besides the social comparison with the perpetrators, such as temporal comparisons or comparisons with an imagined alternative outcome.

The issues relevant for temporal relative deprivation, for instance, are the assessment of the trajectory of the ingroup's conditions over time. Do the victims perceive their situation as improved? Do they expect it to improve further? In particular in times of social change the expectation of own groups' improvement over time has been associated, for example, with higher psychological wellbeing (de la Sablonnière et al. 2015). Moreover, an additional question, particularly relevant in the context of transitional justice, is how the victims perceive the trajectory of the perpetrator groups' conditions? These elements emerged in particular in the Polish sample, when victims pointed out how nothing changed for the perpetrators, or some even assessed the perpetrators' situation as improved.

The other type of relative deprivation, is relative deprivation resulting from a comparison with an imagined alternative outcome (Folger 1986; Folger and Martin 1986). While the qualitative data in both countries suggested that this type of comparison is made by victims, the imagined alternative outcomes appear to differ in Poland and Uganda. At some point in the past around the time of the transition, Polish victims imagined a better outcome. When it failed to meet their expectations, they felt cheated and betrayed. For Ugandan victims, at least currently, the possibility of renewed conflict still looms. While a better outcome, including some form of compensation, is not inconceivable, the threat of conflict and, therefore, a worse alternative outcome is, for many, more tangible.

Adding to the complexity of the relationship between relative deprivation and forgiveness are the different dimensions of forgiveness. The findings confirmed the multi-dimensional nature of forgiveness and reaffirmed the necessity of more nuanced measures. The findings suggested that, in particular, economic relative deprivation

does affect revenge motivation and willingness to forgive in the same way in both countries. The effects on avoidance motivation, however, differ. A mostly consistent result was the lack of any effects on avoidance motivation in the Polish sample. At the same time, the level of avoidance motivation turned out to be generally much higher in the Polish samples.

The effects of both economic and social relative deprivation on justice perceptions were the most consistent across the studies, samples and methodologies. Since relative deprivation has been classified as a justice related theory, this was to be expected (Tyler et al. 1997). In other words, the more victims experience relative deprivation, the more they assess the transition and the post-conflict setting as unjust. This is an important element to emphasise. The injustice perceptions scale measures the injustice gap, which relates to the whole post-conflict scenario. Relative deprivation, therefore, does not only result in a negative justice judgement regarding the disadvantageous comparison; it also influences the justice assessment of the transition and the time afterwards. While, as mentioned above, this result was consistent in both countries a moderation analysis revealed that relative deprivation has a stronger influence on injustice perceptions in Poland.

The qualitative data provided some clues to explain this finding. It appears that the information necessary to make comparisons with former perpetrators in particular is more salient in Poland. There is public as well as political debate about the pensions of former security agents (SB) or high ranking former communist leaders, and when asked about justice several interviewees spontaneously offered these comparisons to explain their perceptions of injustice. In Uganda this kind of information is only accessible in the immediate vicinity of the victims. Only in cases where there is a former perpetrator thriving economically in their neighbourhood does this aspect become salient. The other case is the trial of Dominic Ongwen, one of the highest ranking former LRA rebels at The Hague, which was broadcast on television in Uganda. This prompted several interviewees to compare his living conditions (as they appeared on television); the highly qualified international lawyers; and other visible factors, with their own circumstances in which they were struggling to survive and concluded that he was better off. Those who made this comparison perceived it as unjust and some pointed out that the finance for these ICC prosecutions could better be spent on the victims. This suggests that when information is available, the

comparison mechanism in both settings; the conclusions drawn from it; and the effects on justice perceptions are similar in Poland and Uganda. This interpretation is in accordance with the assumptions derived from justice heuristics. They suggest that as people are motivated to make justice judgements in a new and uncertain context, they will use whatever information is available (Proudfoot and Lind 2015).

The relationships between relative deprivation and the dependent variables of forgiveness and justice appeared stronger in the survey as compared to the experiment. Some effects only emerged during the survey. Fehr et al. (2010) found that scenario methodologies have more effect on cognition, while recalling real life events has greater impact on emotions. They concluded, therefore, that these methodologies should be treated as complementary. Since forgiveness and justice perceptions both have affective components, this might contribute to the weaker experiment results on average.

The more victims perceived the post-conflict environment as unjust the less they were motivated and willing to forgive the former perpetrators. This result was mostly consistent across the studies, samples and research sites. In particular in Uganda injustice perceptions turned out to be a significant mediator between relative deprivation and forgiveness. Injustice perceptions triggered by economic inequalities have also been found to contribute stronger to un-forgiveness in Uganda than they did in Poland. These strong reactions in cases of perceived economic relative deprivation and the resulting injustice in Uganda were supported by the qualitative data in which revenge activity was reported, such as burning the house of the wife of one high ranking perpetrator who was perceived to be thriving economically. A possible explanation for this difference between Poland and Uganda with regard to the intensity of the reactions to perceived injustice may be that the conflict in Uganda is more recent, which might contribute to stronger emotional reactions. Moreover, other avenues of redress, such as legal remedies, are much less accessible for the victims in Uganda compared to Poland. This lack of alternative remedies may lead to a build-up of anger and frustration which result, in some cases, in revenge actions.

To sum up, the main assumptions were generally verified in both countries and the studies confirmed the existence of the relationships between the variables and the hypothesized positive or negative values of those connections. However, the contexts

influenced and shaped the relative importance of each factor as well as the strength of the connections. Moreover, it appeared that various types of relative deprivation, not only the one resulting from a disadvantageous social comparison, played a role for victims. The meaning of these findings for the respective theoretical fields as well as for the field of transitional justice is outlined below.

8.2 Contributions and theoretical implications

The relationship between relative deprivation and forgiveness has not been studied to date, which makes this study a contribution to the advancement of knowledge in this theoretical field. The findings do suggest that relative deprivation in a post-conflict setting has a negative effect on forgiveness, though some of the results were mixed. Economic relative deprivation appears to have stronger effects on forgiveness than social relative deprivation does. This difference might be explained by referring back to Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1954), in which economic needs, which are related to survival, are perceived to be more pressing in case of scarcity than psychological needs. Economic factors were also found to be more prominent among poorer populations in transitional justice studies supporting this interpretation of the findings (Robins 2012b). Moreover, the fact that social acknowledgement is perceived as hypocritical in the absence of economic compensation and support, as was highlighted by various victims in Poland, implies that when economic factors are not an issue, social acknowledgement may become more important.

The findings suggest that relative deprivation may be a useful theoretical framework for studying victims' perceptions and attitudes in a post-conflict setting. In particular, exploring the effects of the previously described types of relative deprivation on victims can contribute to an explanation of the differences between victim groups. For example, social or temporal relative deprivation as well as relative deprivation resulting from comparisons with imagined alternative outcomes might differ in the strength and quality of their impact on victims' attitudes and perceptions. Future studies might also focus on those different types of relative deprivation experienced by victims in an attempt to explain or explore the time trajectory and resilience of relative deprivation.

Relative deprivation may also complement other findings in the field of transitional justice. The type of relative deprivation studied here refers to group processes and

perceptions. The relationship between the specific victims and perpetrators was not the subject matter of the investigation in this context, but rather the role of victims and perpetrators as representatives of their respective groups. A collective approach, or collectivist thinking, in dealing with the past has been criticized for suppressing individual stories with detrimental effects for the whole transition process (David 2018). However, individual measures such as apologies, while highly important for forgiveness (as emerged from the qualitative data of this study), take place in a social context. The qualitative data also suggests that those apologies, which happen in a context of relative deprivation for victims, are perceived as less genuine. The positive effect of apologies, which is the presumed transformation of the perpetrator, appears weakened or possibly annulled if victims perceive the perpetrators as economically privileged.

Moreover, while perpetrators were not the subject of this study it became apparent that in conditions of continued relative economic privilege, it is possible that perpetrators may feel less compelled to apologize. The acknowledgment of guilt and the admission of having done something wrong appear less likely to take place when perpetrators continue to experience relative economic advantage. This is suggested, for example, by the recollection of one of the Polish interviewees about the trial of a former communist official who reportedly laughed at the victims and pointed to her better economic conditions and higher pension. She showed no sign of remorse. Group and individual processes in transitional justice are intertwined by the nature of the crimes committed and, therefore, shape, inform and influence each other.

Injustice perceptions have been defined in the present study as the “injustice gap”, which indicates the gap between ideal justice and the reality (Davis et al. 2015). According to Davis et al an increase in this gap impacts negatively on forgiveness. Conversely, a reduction in the injustice gap should contribute to forgiveness. A verification of this assumption is highly significant in the context of transitional justice since it confirms that justice is important for victims and also appears important for reconciliation. Studying the injustice gap by itself without simultaneously considering the influencing factors, however, leaves open the question of what this ideal justice looks like?

Studies in the field of transitional justice have shown that a variety of measures can contribute to more forgiveness (David and Choi 2009). While the authors did not use the framework of the injustice gap but explained their findings as a restoration of balance or “getting equal” as contributing to forgiveness, the concept is essentially similar.

The present study put forward relative deprivation as another factor that can influence the injustice gap of victims. Clearly, the expectations of victims are diverse and relative deprivation constitutes only one aspect among many that can affect the size of the injustice gap. At this point it is also important to keep in mind the above-mentioned individual and group level factors, as both influence individual injustice perceptions. However, the present findings do suggest that in particular injustice perceptions triggered through economic relative deprivation have significant effect on revenge and avoidance motivation as well as willingness to forgive. This confirms the assertions of several scholars that economic inequality fuels the danger of renewed conflict (Laplante 2008; Z. Miller 2008). The example cited above of burning the house of the family of a high-ranking perpetrator, who was perceived as relatively privileged as compared to the victims, reflected this danger in a very explicit way.

The injustice gap represents another useful theoretical framework for the assessment of justice perceptions and their effects on forgiveness in a post-conflict setting. Further studies could contribute more insight into other factors affecting the size of the injustice gap for different victim groups. Related to the present study topic, the effects of other types of relative deprivation on the injustice gap could be examined. To put it differently, future studies could address the question if temporal, social or comparisons with an imagined alternative outcome affect the injustice gap in similar or different ways.

Finally, the combination of the different methodologies in the present study also allowed for some insight into the multi-dimensional construct of forgiveness. Not only can forgiveness be defined in a positive as well as negative sense as “un-forgiveness” but the elements that constitute it can, moreover, have different connotations in different contexts. This was briefly pointed out above in relation to avoidance motivation in Poland and Uganda. Declaring forgiveness can also have different meanings depending on whether the forgiveness is cognitive (decisional) or emotional

(Worthington et al. 2012). As such, it can either be “true forgiveness” or more likely represent a superficial statement susceptible to revocation.

Here, the typology provided by Fehr et al (2010) can provide additional insight. The authors of this extensive meta-analysis of forgiveness studies tried to answer the question of why and how people forgive. Apart from individual cognitive and affective assessments, the social context plays a role in providing incentives, pressures and constraints. The social factor is summarized by the question people might ask themselves: What happens if I do not forgive? Considering the example of avoidance in the present study, the answer to this question would have been quite different in the context of Poland and Uganda. In most cases, avoidance of perpetrators would not have had significant consequences in Poland. In a collectivistic and communal culture, such as the context of northern Uganda, where in the words of one interviewee “a person cannot live alone”, this is quite different. Social pressure that creates an environment which favours forgiveness might also contribute to decisional yet superficial forgiveness, as was predominantly the case in Uganda. These factors highlight the need to consider the complex nature of forgiveness as well as the various differing motivations for expressing forgiveness in studies focusing on this topic. A simple statement of forgiveness might not reveal much while, on the contrary, suppressing some substantial differences.

In conclusion, the present study also confirmed the claim made at the beginning that social psychology has much to offer the field of transitional justice. Mass human rights violations happen in a social context between groups of people. Therefore, a field that strives to explain human behaviour in a social context can also contribute solutions to the problem of how to deal with and interpret the aftermath of regime change or social upheaval.

8.3 Limitations of the study

A research design involving experimental procedures, a survey, and qualitative interviews, carried out in two different cultural settings, involving three languages and, moreover, on some largely unexplored topics, is bound to incorporate various challenges and difficult decisions, which did have implications for the studies at hand.

Often, vignette experiments on similar topics attempt to be as close to the original setting as possible to enable the respondents to relate to the stories as closely as

possible (David 2011; Gibson 2002). In conducting a vignette experiment in two very diverse settings, there were only two choices, both of which bore specific challenges. One possibility was to devise two different vignettes that would each be close to its context. While this would probably have made the stories more relatable for the respondents, it would have, at the same time, prevented any direct comparisons. Therefore, the decision was taken to develop a vignette set in a fictional country, which would include some elements familiar to either one of the countries. The responses in the open-ended questions revealed that respondents did, in fact, relate to the story, confirming that it was valid to use the same vignette for both countries. In addition, in order to triangulate the outcomes from the fictional setting of the vignette, a survey part was added with similar questions. As pointed out previously, forgiveness scholars have emphasized that scenario and recall studies complement each other since they each tend to affect cognition or emotion, respectively (Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag 2010).

Moreover, if the respondents had not been able to relate to the vignette story, the consequence would probably have been that the effects were likely to be reduced. Relative deprivation does include emotional elements as do forgiveness or justice perceptions. The less the respondents had been able to relate to the victim in the vignette story, the weaker their emotional response would have been. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a more realistic setting would have made the effects stronger, if at all. This is supported by the survey findings in which some effects did appear more significant than the largely similar findings of the experiment.

Another challenge was the administration of the questionnaires. Usually, experiments demand an identical administration. However, as pointed out by cross-cultural scholars, what is commonly considered ideal conditions can, in a cross-cultural study easily lead to instrument bias (P. K. Smith et al. 2013, 86). For example, a self-administered pen and paper questionnaire, a widespread and unproblematic test administration in many countries, can constitute a challenge for people not used to this type of testing and not fluent in reading and writing. A design supposed to make comparisons easier can easily end up creating more differences between the populations than just adapting to the context differences. In view of these anticipated challenges in a rural African setting where many people are not able to read and write at all, two different questionnaire administration techniques were chosen. In Poland, the questionnaires were self-administered while in Uganda, they were administered by research assistants. Bearing

in mind these differences between the two settings, the analyses in the present study were done on two different levels. First, the hypotheses were tested in separate samples. In the second step comparative moderation analyses were carried out by joining the samples in order to assess their similarities and differences. Obviously, this approach is not ideal. However, the various potential research biases are more likely to result in overestimating differences between the samples, as they might be attributable to the test bias and not to true variance between the populations. In other words, the similarities found in Poland and Uganda in the present study are likely to be even greater if the study had been carried out under ideally comparable conditions.

Further, it has to be stated, as already emphasized in the finding section, that in cases of variables designed to measure attitudes and perceptions a reverse causality cannot be ruled out. The assumed directions are based on the existing theoretical background in the respective fields as well as on previous studies. However, it is possible that it is forgiveness that affects justice perceptions or that justice perceptions affect the experience of relative deprivation. With regard to the relationship between the variable experienced relative deprivation and the forgiveness measures, while reverse causality is also an option, the experiment findings support the claim that in the case of economic comparisons it is, indeed, economic relative deprivation that affects forgiveness.

Studies conducted with victims in post-conflict or post-regime settings are by nature extremely difficult. The participant selection is narrow, adding to the time and financial constraints. A number of the assumed effects, insignificant in the analyses conducted separately in the two country samples, turned out to be significant in the combined analysis of the two samples suggesting that some of the effect sizes might have been underestimated. It would, therefore, be worthwhile to conduct further similar studies on the connection between relative deprivation, justice, and forgiveness in other cultural settings and with bigger samples to assess the applicability of the findings of the present study to other contexts and with different victim groups.

Finally, longitudinal studies could provide insight into the effect of temporal relative deprivation on justice perceptions and forgiveness of victims based on trajectories of victims' and perpetrators' economic conditions over time.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Consent page

This study is part of a PhD project by Kamila Krygier, of the department of sociology and social policy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

The purpose is to assess opinions of victims of conflicts or regimes in different countries. Some people might not feel comfortable in describing their experiences during the conflict or regime. There is, however, only one short questions asking about this and you do not need to describe any details.

Your participation will be greatly appreciated and this study will be not possible without your help!

The questionnaire has 2 parts and should take between 30-45 minutes.

The first part consists of a short fictional story about a post-conflict country describing situations and experiences of people during and after the conflict. You will be asked questions about the story and how you think some persons in the story might react or feel. The second part of this questionnaire will ask questions about yourself and your opinions on various issues.

The participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not feel comfortable with the topic or the questions, please do not hesitate to decline participation.

If you choose to participate it is very important that you answer ALL questions.
Otherwise the questionnaire cannot be included in the study. If you are not sure about an answer, please select the one that is closest to your opinion!

All contents of this questionnaire will be anonymous and strictly confidential. No one will know if you participated and how you answered the questions.

For any further information about this study, please feel free to contact me at kamilaannakrygier@ln.hk

Thank you very much for your participation!

Appendix 2: Vignette scenarios

STUDY 1

Vignette version1 (V1)

This is a fictional story about a situation in a post-conflict country. Please read it carefully. On the next page you will find questions about this story.

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel got a generous compensation for his suffering and receives an above average pension. This enables him a comfortable life in a big house with a garden and even making savings. He could also afford an expensive surgery, which considerably reduced his health problems that persisted due to the torture.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert got a generous compensation after leaving his position and now receives an above average pension. During the peace negotiations it was agreed to give high compensations for officials, who have to leave their former jobs. Robert lives in a big house with a garden.

Vignette version 2 (V2)

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel got a generous compensation for his suffering and receives an above average pension. This enables him a comfortable life in a big house with a garden and even making savings. He could also afford an expensive surgery, which considerably reduced his health problems that persisted due to the torture.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert lost his position in the military after the democratic elections. His pension was removed and now he has no source of income. He lives in a very poor neighborhood in miserable conditions. Though he has a number of health problems because of old age he cannot afford good healthcare.

Vignette version 3 (V3)

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel never got any compensation for his suffering. He was left without any source of income and now lives in a miserable room in a very poor neighborhood. He cannot afford good medical care for his health problems, which persist since the detention and torture.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for ordering and overseeing most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert got a generous compensation after leaving his position and now receives an above average pension. During the peace negotiations it was agreed to give high compensations for officials, who have to leave their former jobs. Robert lives in a big house with a garden.

Vignette version 4 (V4)

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel never got any compensation for his suffering. He was left without any source of income and now lives in a miserable room in a very poor neighborhood. He cannot afford good medical care for his health problems, which persist since the detention and torture.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert lost his position in the military after the democratic elections. His pension was removed and now he has no source of income. He lives in a very poor neighborhood in miserable conditions. Though he has a number of health problems because of old age he cannot afford good healthcare.

STUDY 2

Vignette version 1 (V1)

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel is very much liked and admired in his neighborhood. His neighbors look up to him as someone who went through a lot. Many people want to know about the past and his experiences. He has been asked to share his story with school and university students, has given interviews on TV and for newspapers and is frequently invited as a guest of honor to official state events or for big church festivities by the bishop.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert is respected in his neighborhood as someone who held an influential position and is often invited to give speeches at universities or interviews on TV and in newspapers about political matters. He is also often invited to official state or church events, often as a guest of honor.

Vignette version 2 (V2)

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel is very much liked and admired in his neighborhood. His neighbors look up to him as someone who went through a lot. Many people want to know about the past and his experiences. He has been asked to share his story with school and university students, has given interviews on TV and for newspapers and is frequently invited as a guest of honor to official state events or for big church festivities by the bishop.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert is avoided by people in his neighborhood. Many see the former regime officials as criminals they want nothing to do with. Since Robert does not have the high-ranking position anymore he also lost his old friends. He is mostly alone.

Vignette version 3 (V3)

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel is mostly alone. He feels his neighbors look down on him. Many say the former victims just complain all the time. No one was ever interested in hearing his story and he feels most people just want to forget about the past and want nothing to do with those who suffered.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert is respected in his neighborhood as someone who held an influential position and is often invited to give speeches at universities or interviews on TV and in newspapers about political matters. He is also often invited to official state or church events, often as a guest of honor.

Vignette version 4 (V4)

In country B, a 20-year civil war between various rebel groups and a military regime ended 5 years ago. All fighting groups negotiated a peace agreement and elections brought a new democratic government.

Daniel is one of many victims. 10 years ago he has been randomly arrested by the military on his way from work. After torturing and beating him for days, they drove him out of the city severely injured and left him to die in a forest. He was lucky to survive. Upon his return he found his house has been burned and he lost everything. He still suffers from severe pain from those injuries.

Daniel is mostly alone. He feels his neighbors look down on him. Many say the former victims just complain all the time. No one was ever interested in hearing his story and he feels most people just want to leave the past behind and want nothing to do with those who suffered.

Robert was a high-ranking official during the military dictatorship. He joined the military for career reasons and was responsible for most of the detentions and brutal interrogations in the area where Daniel was living.

Robert is avoided by people in his neighborhood. Many see the former regime officials as criminals they want nothing to do with. Since Robert does not have the high-ranking position anymore he also lost his old friends. He is mostly alone.

Appendix 3: Study 1 - Questionnaire

You have just read the story about Daniel and Robert. The following questions are about this story. In some you will be asked to imagine you are Daniel or ask your opinion about Daniel's situation. Please pay close attention to the instructions.

	Significantly worse	Slightly worse	More or less the same	Slightly better	Significantly better
1. Compared to Robert, Daniel's financial situation is...	1	2	3	4	5

	Much worse than he deserves	Somewhat worse than he deserves	Exactly what he deserves	Slightly better than he deserves	Much better than he deserves
2. Do you think Daniels's financial situation is...	1	2	3	4	5

3. What would you feel, if you were Daniel? Please select for EACH feeling a number between 1 (you would not feel this at all) and 5 (this is absolutely what you would feel)

If you were Daniel, to what extent would you feel...?					
	Not at all				Absolutely
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5
Sad or depressed	1	2	3	4	5
Angry	1	2	3	4	5
Fearful or anxious	1	2	3	4	5
Grateful	1	2	3	4	5
Other emotion (please describe):					


4. Please think about the story and imagine you were Daniel. How would you feel about Robert?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I'll make him pay	1	2	3	4	5
I would keep as much distance between me and him as possible	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish that something bad would happen to him	1	2	3	4	5
I would live as if he doesn't exist, is not around	1	2	3	4	5
I would not trust him	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish him to get what he deserves	1	2	3	4	5
I would find it difficult to act warmly toward him	1	2	3	4	5
I would avoid him	1	2	3	4	5
I'm going to get even	1	2	3	4	5
I would cut off any relationship with him	1	2	3	4	5
I would want to see him hurt and miserable	1	2	3	4	5
I would withdraw from him	1	2	3	4	5


I would forgive him	1	2	3	4	5
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5. Think about the situation in country B described in the story. As Daniel would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Place an X anywhere on the line between 0 (strongly disagree) and 100 (strongly agree)


True justice was done




It fell short of true justice



Everything was done to repair the crimes



The situation was handled fairly



6. Please think about the described situation in country B. from the point of view of Daniel and indicate your agreement with the following statements

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
I am very dissatisfied with the situation as it now stands.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel the situation as it now stands is totally unfair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, the transition and the time afterwards have been very negative.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The situation, as it unfolded, is very unjust.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all, the transition and the time afterwards have been a positive experience.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, this situation has not been a very fair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am pleased with the development of events	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. How much would you agree with the next statement?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
--	-------------------	----------	---------	-------	----------------

I think victims like Daniel should be in a better financial situation than former perpetrators	1	2	3	4	5
--	---	---	---	---	---

The next two questions are open ended. They are very important for the study in order to better understand opinions and attitudes, which are not covered by the previous questions. Please kindly take your time to answer them!

8. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to feel that justice was done?

9. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to forgive Robert?

PART 2

1. Personal Information

Age	_____ Years			
Sex	<input type="checkbox"/> Male	<input type="checkbox"/> Female		
Country	_____			
Marital Status	<input type="checkbox"/> Single	<input type="checkbox"/> Married	<input type="checkbox"/> Divorced	<input type="checkbox"/> Widowed
Education	<input type="checkbox"/> No formal education	<input type="checkbox"/> Primary	<input type="checkbox"/> Secondary	<input type="checkbox"/> University

2. Please check the answer options below that describe you best

I am a religious person	<input type="checkbox"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/> Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/> Neutral	<input type="checkbox"/> Agree	<input type="checkbox"/> Strongly Agree
Apart from weddings and funerals I visit the church	<input type="checkbox"/> Never	<input type="checkbox"/> Rarely/on major holiday like Christmas or Easter	<input type="checkbox"/> Once every 1-2 months	<input type="checkbox"/> Every Sunday	<input type="checkbox"/> Every day or almost every day
I pray	<input type="checkbox"/> Practically never	<input type="checkbox"/> Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/> Several times a month	<input type="checkbox"/> Several times a week	<input type="checkbox"/> Daily

3. Please indicate the kind of victimization you have experienced during the LRA war:

<input type="checkbox"/> None	<input type="checkbox"/> Economic loss	<input type="checkbox"/> Physical harm	<input type="checkbox"/> Abduction*	<input type="checkbox"/> Death of a close relative	<input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ _____
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How long ago did this happen?: _____ years

* If yes, please indicate below the duration the abduction

<input type="checkbox"/> Less than 48 hours	<input type="checkbox"/> 48 hours – 1 week	<input type="checkbox"/> More than a week – 1 month	<input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 month – 1 year	<input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 year
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4. How often do you acknowledge or think about the fact that you are a victim?

<input type="checkbox"/> Never	<input type="checkbox"/> Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes	<input type="checkbox"/> Often	<input type="checkbox"/> All the time
--------------------------------	---------------------------------	------------------------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------------------------

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I consider myself a victim					
I feel a strong bond with other victims of LRA war					
I meet with other victims regularly					

5. Please indicate how well the statements below describe you or apply to you

This statement describes me:	Completely	Very well	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Because of my money situation I feel like I will never have the things I want in life					
I am just getting by financially					
I am concerned that the money I have or will save won't last					
This statement applies to me:	Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
I have money left over at the end of the month					
My finances control my life					

6. The next questions ask you to compare your own situation and the situation of victims in general with the situation of the former LRA rebels. Probably you do not have all the information to know this for sure. Please still answer what you think!

	Significantly worse	Slightly worse	More or less the same	Slightly better	Significantly better
Compared to most former LRA rebels my personal financial situation is...	1	2	3	4	5
Compared to most of the former LRA rebels the financial situation of most victims is...	1	2	3	4	5

7. Above you have assessed the financial situation of yourself and the group of victims compared to former LRA rebels. To what extent, in your opinion, you and the group of victims have the financial situation you deserve?

	Much worse than I/they deserve	Somewhat worse than I/they deserve	Exactly what I/they deserve	Slightly better than what I/they deserve	Much better than what I/they deserve
My personal financial situation is...	1	2	3	4	5
The financial situation of most victims is...	1	2	3	4	5

8. How do you feel when you think about your financial situation or the situation of the other victims? Please indicate for EACH of the feelings a number between 1 (you do not feel this at all) and 5 (this is absolutely what you feel)

When I think about my own financial situation I feel...					
	Not at all				Absolutely
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5
Sad or depressed	1	2	3	4	5
Angry	1	2	3	4	5
Grateful	1	2	3	4	5

Other emotion (please describe): _____	1	2	3	4	5
When I think about the financial situation of most victims I feel...					
	Not at all				Absolutely
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5
Sad or depressed	1	2	3	4	5
Angry	1	2	3	4	5
Grateful	1	2	3	4	5
Other emotion: _____	1	2	3	4	5

9. What do you think about the following situations?

	Definitely not willing	Probably not willing	Probably willing	Definitely willing
How would you feel about having a former LRA rebel as a neighbour?	1	2	3	4
How about being on the same job as with someone who was an LRA rebel?	1	2	3	4
How about having one of your children marry a former LRA rebel?	1	2	3	4


10. For the following questions think about the former LRA rebels you have met and indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I'll make them pay	1	2	3	4	5
I would keep as much distance between me and them as possible	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish that something bad would happen to them	1	2	3	4	5
I would live as if they don't exist, are not around	1	2	3	4	5
I would not trust any of them	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish them to get what they deserve	1	2	3	4	5
I would find it difficult to act warmly toward any of them	1	2	3	4	5
I would avoid them	1	2	3	4	5
I'm going to get even	1	2	3	4	5
I would cut off any relationship with them	1	2	3	4	5
I would want to see them hurt and miserable	1	2	3	4	5


	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I would withdraw from them	1	2	3	4	5
I would forgive them	1	2	3	4	5

11. When I think about the situation in Northern Uganda since the peace process up to now I think that:


True justice was done




It fell short of true justice



Everything was done to repair the crimes



The situation was handled fairly



12. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
I am very dissatisfied with the situation as it now stands.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel the situation as it now stands is totally unfair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, the peace process and the time afterwards have been very negative.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The situation, as it unfolded since the end of the war, is very unjust.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all, the peace process has been a positive experience.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, the situation since the end of the war has not been a very fair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
I am pleased with the development of events	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The next questions are open ended. They are very important for the study! Please take your time to answer!

13. What would be important for you personally in order to feel that justice was done for the victims in Northern Uganda

14. What would be important for you personally in order to forgive former LRA rebels?

15. Do you have any thoughts you would like to add?

Appendix 4: Study 2 - Questionnaire

You have just read the story about Daniel and Robert. The following questions are about this story. In some you will be asked to imagine you are Daniel or ask your opinion about Daniel's situation. Please pay close attention to the instructions.

	Significantly worse	Slightly worse	More or less the same	Slightly better	Significantly better
1. Compared to <u>Robert</u> , Daniel's social status is...	1	2	3	4	5

	Much worse than he deserves	Somewhat worse than he deserves	Exactly what he deserves	Slightly better than he deserves	Much better than he deserves
2. Do you think Daniel's social status is...	1	2	3	4	5

3. What would you feel, if you were Daniel? Please select for EACH feeling a number between 1 (you would not feel this at all) and 5 (this is absolutely what you would feel)

If you were Daniel , to what extent would you feel...?					
	Not at all				Absolutely
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5
Sad or depressed	1	2	3	4	5
Angry	1	2	3	4	5
Fearful or anxious	1	2	3	4	5
Grateful	1	2	3	4	5
Other emotion (please describe):					


4. Please think about the story and imagine you were Daniel. How would you feel about Robert?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I'll make him pay	1	2	3	4	5
I would keep as much distance between me and him as possible	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish that something bad would happen to him	1	2	3	4	5
I would live as if he doesn't exist, is not around	1	2	3	4	5
I would not trust him	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish him to get what he deserves	1	2	3	4	5
I would find it difficult to act warmly toward him	1	2	3	4	5
I would avoid him	1	2	3	4	5
I'm going to get even	1	2	3	4	5
I would cut off any relationship with him	1	2	3	4	5
I would want to see him hurt and miserable	1	2	3	4	5
I would withdraw from him	1	2	3	4	5


I would forgive him	1	2	3	4	5
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5. Think about the situation in country B described in the story. As Daniel would you agree or disagree with the following statements? Place an X anywhere on the line between 0 (strongly disagree) and 100 (strongly agree)


True justice was done




It fell short of true justice



Everything was done to repair the crimes



The situation was handled fairly



6. Please think about the described situation in country B. from the point of view of Daniel and indicate your agreement with the following statements

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
I am very dissatisfied with the situation as it now stands.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel the situation as it now stands is totally unfair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, the transition and the time afterwards have been very negative.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The situation, as it unfolded, is very unjust.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all, the transition and the time afterwards have been a positive experience.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, this situation has not been a very fair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am pleased with the development of events	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. How much would you agree with the next statement?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
--	-------------------	----------	---------	-------	----------------

I think victims like Daniel should have a higher social status than former perpetrators	1	2	3	4	5
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The next two questions are open ended. They are very important for the study in order to better understand opinions and attitudes, which are not covered by the previous questions. Please kindly take your time to answer them!

8. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to feel that justice was done?

9. As Daniel, what would be important for you in order to forgive Robert?

PART 2

1. Personal Information

Age	_____ Years			
Sex	<input type="checkbox"/> Male	<input type="checkbox"/> Female		
Country	_____			
Marital Status	<input type="checkbox"/> Single	<input type="checkbox"/> Married	<input type="checkbox"/> Divorced	<input type="checkbox"/> Widowed
Education	<input type="checkbox"/> No formal education	<input type="checkbox"/> Primary	<input type="checkbox"/> Secondary	<input type="checkbox"/> University

2. Please select the answer options below that describe you best

I am a religious person	<input type="checkbox"/> Strongly Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/> Disagree	<input type="checkbox"/> Neutral	<input type="checkbox"/> Agree	<input type="checkbox"/> Strongly Agree
Apart from weddings and funerals I visit the church	<input type="checkbox"/> Never	<input type="checkbox"/> Rarely/on major holiday like Christmas or Easter	<input type="checkbox"/> Once every 1-2 months	<input type="checkbox"/> Every Sunday	<input type="checkbox"/> Every day or almost every day
I pray	<input type="checkbox"/> Practically never	<input type="checkbox"/> Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/> Several times a month	<input type="checkbox"/> Several times a week	<input type="checkbox"/> Daily

3. Please indicate the kind of victimization you have experienced during the LRA war:

<input type="checkbox"/> None	<input type="checkbox"/> Economic loss	<input type="checkbox"/> Physical harm	<input type="checkbox"/> Abduction*	<input type="checkbox"/> Death of a close relative	<input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ _____
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How long ago did this happen?: _____ years

* If yes, please indicate below the duration the abduction

<input type="checkbox"/> Less than 48 hours	<input type="checkbox"/> 48 hours – 1 week	<input type="checkbox"/> More than a week – 1 month	<input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 month – 1 year	<input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 year
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4. How often do you acknowledge or think about the fact that you are a victim?

<input type="checkbox"/> Never	<input type="checkbox"/> Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes	<input type="checkbox"/> Often	<input type="checkbox"/> All the time
--------------------------------	---------------------------------	------------------------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------------------------

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following statements

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I consider myself a victim					
I feel a strong bond with other victims of LRA war					
I meet with other victims regularly					

The following questions will ask you to make an assessment of your own situation or the situation of the victims as a group compared to the group of the former LRA rebels. You might feel that you do not

have all the information to answer these questions. Please just answer what you think! And please answer ALL questions!

5. Assessment of social status

People define community in different ways. Please define it in whatever way is most meaningful to you.

At the top of the ladder are the people who have the highest standing in their community. At the bottom are the people who have the lowest standing in their community

Where would you place yourself?

Please place a large X on the rung where you think you stand at this time in your life relative to other people in your community.

Where would you place most former LRA rebels?

Place a large O where you think most of the former LRA rebels stand today.

And where would you place most victims of the LRA war as a group?

Please place a big V on the rung where you place most victims in the country today.

10.
9.
8.
7.
6.
5.
4.
3.
2.
1.

6. Please, like above, answer what you personally think, even if you are not sure!

	Significantly worse	Slightly worse	More or less the same	Slightly better	Significantly better
Compared to most former LRA rebels my personal social status is...	1	2	3	4	5
Compared to most of the former LRA rebels the social status of most victims is...	1	2	3	4	5

7. Above you have assessed the social status of yourself and the group of victims compared to former LRA rebels. To what extent, in your opinion, you and other victims have the social status you deserve?

	Much worse than I/they deserve	Somewhat worse than I/they deserve	Exactly what I/they deserve	Slightly better than what I/they deserve	Much better than what I/they deserve
My personal social status is...	1	2	3	4	5
The social status of most victims is...	1	2	3	4	5

8. How do you feel when you think about your social status or the status of the other victims?

Please indicate for EACH of the feelings a number between 1 (you do not feel this at all) and 5 (this is absolutely what you feel)

When I think about my own social status I feel.....					
	Not at all				Absolutely
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5

Sad or depressed	1	2	3	4	5
Angry	1	2	3	4	5
Grateful	1	2	3	4	5
Other emotion (please describe): _____	1	2	3	4	5
When I think about the social status of most victims I feel.....					
	Not at all				Absolutely
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5
Sad or depressed	1	2	3	4	5
Angry	1	2	3	4	5
Grateful	1	2	3	4	5
Other emotion: _____	1	2	3	4	5

9. What do you think about the following situations?

	Definitely not willing	Probably not willing	Probably willing	Definitely willing
How would you feel about having a former LRA rebel as a neighbour?	1	2	3	4
How about being on the same job with a former LRA rebel?	1	2	3	4
How about having one of your children marry a former LRA rebel?	1	2	3	4


10. For the following questions think about the former LRA rebels you have met and indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I'll make them pay	1	2	3	4	5
I would keep as much distance between me and them as possible	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish that something bad would happen to them	1	2	3	4	5
I would live as if they don't exist, are not around	1	2	3	4	5
I would not trust any of them	1	2	3	4	5
I would wish them to get what they deserve	1	2	3	4	5
I would find it difficult to act warmly toward any of them	1	2	3	4	5
I would avoid them	1	2	3	4	5
I'm going to get even	1	2	3	4	5
I would cut off any relationship with them	1	2	3	4	5


	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
I would want to see them hurt and miserable	1	2	3	4	5
I would withdraw from them	1	2	3	4	5
I would forgive them	1	2	3	4	5

11. When I think about the situation in Northern Uganda since the peace process up to now I think that:


True justice was done




It fell short of true justice



Everything was done to repair the crimes



The situation was handled fairly



12. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
I am very dissatisfied with the situation as it now stands.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel the situation as it now stands is totally unfair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, the peace process and the time afterwards have been very negative.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The situation, as it unfolded since the end of the war, is very unjust.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
All in all, the peace process has been a positive experience.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Overall, the situation since the end of the war has not been a very fair.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree
I am pleased with the development of events	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The next questions are open ended. They are very important for the study! Please take your time to answer!

13. What would be important for you personally in order to feel that justice was done for the victims in Northern Uganda?

14. What would be important for you personally in order to forgive former LRA rebels?

15. Do you have any thoughts you would like to add?

Appendix 5: Semi-structured Interview Guide

1. Could you tell me a little bit about your experiences during the regime/conflict
2. How would you describe the situation of victims today in terms of economic wellbeing and social status?
3. How do you see your own situation?
4. How do you see the financial status and economic wellbeing of former perpetrators?
5. What do you think when you make this comparison?
6. Would you say that justice was done in Poland/Uganda and why yes/no?
7. What would justice mean for you?
8. What do you feel towards the group of former perpetrators?
9. How do you understand forgiveness in general?
10. What would be important for you if you were to forgive the former perpetrators?
11. Is there anything you would like to add?

Appendix 6: Alternative data analysis – ANOVA

The following tables present the results of data analysis conducted with univariate and multivariate analysis of variance.

Appendix table 1: Uganda Study 1 (Economic wellbeing)

Vignette Versions								
	Mean (SD)				F	df1	df2	p
	V1	V2	V3	V4				
Experienced Relative Deprivation	8.1563 (2.096) ^a	12.303 (2.567) ^b	6.4857 (1.121) ^c	7.3226 (1.640) ^{ac}	59.863	3	127	.000
Injustice Perception Scale	31.219 (8.830) ^{ab}	26.848 (9.304) ^{ab}	40.543 (6.213) ^c	37.677 (6.279) ^c	21.215	3	127	.000
Avoidance	25.188 (6.087)	23.455 (6.717)	26.543 (5.792)	25.484 (4.753)	1.594	3	127	.194
Revenge	16.625 (4.513)	16.30 (4.759)	17.971 (4.076)	16.226 (3.232)	1.276	3	127	.285
Forgiveness	2.969 (1.534)	3.424 (1.324)	2.743 (1.540)	3.387 (1.283)	1.794	3	127	.152
n	32	33	35	31				

a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no statistically significant difference.

Appendix table 2: Poland Study 1 (Economic wellbeing)

Vignette Versions								
	Mean (SD)				F	df1	df2	p
	V1	V2	V3	V4				
Experienced Relative Deprivation	10.4324 (3.3955) ^a	13.7407 (3.8788) ^b	6.4828 (1.7448) ^c	8.000 (2.522) ^c	29.939	3	112	.000
Injustice Perception Scale	30.729 (9.779) ^{ac}	22.556 (10.028) ^b	34.138 (13.034) ^{ac}	33.957 (11.014) ^{ac}	6.536	3	112	.000
Avoidance	27.324 (0.819)	28.963 (0.959)	29.483 (0.925)	28.217 (1.039)	1.157	3	112	.330
Revenge	13.622 (4.912)	14.407 (3.815)	16.034 (4.739)	14.739 (4.412)	1.562	3	112	.203
Forgiveness	2.622 (1.210) ^{abc}	2.963 (1.192) ^{ab}	2.069 (1.193) ^{ac}	3.13 (1.100) ^{ab}	4.245	3	112	.007
n	37	27	29	23				

a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no statistically significant difference

Appendix table 3: Uganda and Poland Study 1 (Economic wellbeing)

	Vignette Versions										Country			
	Mean (SD)										F	df1	df2	p
	V1	V2	V3	V4	V4	F	df1	df2	p					
Experienced Relative Deprivation	9.377 (3.067) ^a	12.950 (3.275) ^b	6.484 (1.425) ^c	7.611 (2.069) ^c		75.282	3	242	.000		12.285	1	242	.001
Injustice Perception Scale	30.957 (9.287) ^a	24.917 (9.793) ^b	37.641 (10.329) ^c	36.093 (10.721) ^c		22.221	3	242	.000		9.167	1	242	.003
Avoidance	26.333 (6.009)	25.933 (6.324)	27.875 (5.423)	26.648 (4.926)		1.662	3	242	.176		21.995	1	242	.000
Revenge	15.015 (4.933)	15.450 (4.428)	17.094 (4.460)	15.593 (3.814)		2.545	3	242	.057		14.695	1	242	.000
Forgiveness	2.78 (1.371) ^{abc}	3.22 (1.277) ^{ab}	2.44 (1.424) ^{ac}	3.28 (1.204) ^{ab}		5.278	3	242	.002		6.873	1	242	.009
n	69	60	64	54										

a,b,c: Comparison of main effects (Bonferroni) between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no statistically significant difference

Appendix table 4: Uganda Study 2 (Social acknowledgement)

Vignette Versions								
	Mean (SD)				F	df1	df2	p
	V1	V2	V3	V4				
Experienced Relative Deprivation	9.0323 (2.880) ^a	12.3438 (3.054) ^b	5.0625 (1.644) ^c	6.6774 (2.481) ^c	48.229	3	122	.000
Injustice Perception Scale	24.3226 (8.780) ^{ab}	24.2813 (7.265) ^{ab}	32.9063 (9.274) ^c	34.5806 (6.407) ^c	14.740	3	122	.000
Avoidance	19.581 (5.954)	21.219 (6.823)	20.469 (6.806)	22.516 (6.536)	1.120	3	122	.344
Revenge	13.419 (3.913)	14.281 (4.259)	13.875 (4.323)	14.677 (3.884)	.538	3	122	.657
Forgiveness	4.065(.964)	3.781 (1.263)	3.906 (1.201)	3.581 (1.232)	.945	3	122	.421
n	31	32	32	31				

a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no statistically significant difference.

Appendix table 5: Poland Study 2 (Social acknowledgment)

Vignette Versions								
	Mean (SD)				F	df1	df2	p
	V1	V2	V3	V4				
Experienced Relative Deprivation	9.5652 (3.395) ^{ac}	13.0952 (5.485) ^b	8.3000 (3.657) ^{ac}	7.6000 (3.339) ^{ac}	6.186	3	70	.001
Injustice Perception Scale	28.9130 (8.943)	22.6190 (10.384)	29.3000 (9.044)	27.6000 (9.724)	2.206	3	70	.095
Avoidance	29.810 (5.372)	29.762 (3.491)	29.900 (4.666)	26.200 (5.865)	1.661	3	68	.184
Revenge	14.571 (6.265)	14.048 (3.485)	14.250 (4.505)	16.400 (4.742)	.579	3	68	.631
Forgiveness	2.476 (1.209)	2.905 (1.091)	2.650 (1.182)	3.400 (1.430)	1.491	3	68	.225
n	21	21	20	10				

a,b,c: Post-hoc test (Bonferroni) of differences between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no statistically significant difference.

Appendix table 6: Uganda and Poland Study 2 (Social acknowledgment)

	Vignette Versions										Country			
	Mean (SD)										F	df1	df2	p
	V1	V2	V3	V4	V4	F	df1	df2	p	F				
Experienced Relative Deprivation	9.259 (3.091) ^a	12.641 (4.156) ^b	6.308 (3.026) ^c	6.902 (2.700) ^c		38.183	3	195	.000	8.251	1	195	.005	
Injustice Perception Scale	26.278 (9.060) ^{ab}	23.623 (8.580) ^{ab}	31.519 (9.268) ^c	32.878 (7.804)		11.636	3	195	.000	.948	1	195	.331	
Avoidance	23.7115 (7.606)	24.604 (7.088)	24.0962 (7.598)	23.415 (6.508)		.311	3	193	.818	88.580	1	193	.000	
Revenge	13.885 (4.973)	14.1888 (3.937)	14.019 (4.354)	15.098 (4.116)		.797	3	193	.497	.982	1	193	.323	
Forgiveness	3.42 (1.319)	3.43 (1.264)	3.42 (1.334)	3.54 (1.267)		.023	3	193	.995	35.509	1	193	.000	
n	52	53	52	41										

a,b,c: Comparison of main effects (Bonferroni) between the experimental conditions. Same letter in the groups indicates no statistically significant difference.

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