

Religious Affinities and International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts in the Middle East and Beyond

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International Intervention in a Changing World

This study examines the influence of religion on the extent of intervention in ethnic conflict using data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. Key questions include whether ethnoreligious minorities—which are defined here as ethnic minorities who belong to a different religion or a different denomination of the same religion as the majority group in a state—attract more intervention and whether religious affinities between a state and an ethnic minority make it more likely that the state will intervene on that minority's behalf.

Although it also addresses other regions and other religions, this study focuses on the Middle East-North Africa region (MENA) and Islam. Anecdotally, Islamic identity has been becoming increasingly prominent in recent years and there have been a number of high-profile interventions on behalf of Muslim minorities in the MENA and elsewhere. However, anecdotal evidence is insufficient to reach definitive conclusions about whether the MENA is unique in this respect.

Beyond these more specific concerns, the general issue of international intervention is becoming more visible in the world after the Cold War for three reasons. First, the end of superpower rivalry during the Cold War made intervention less one-dimensional than in the past. For example, when the United States and its allies intervene, they no longer

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automatically are opposed by the Soviet Union. Opposition to the US now, by contrast, usually takes the form of a generally unsympathetic public opinion around the world that is rarely backed up by subsequent material action by governments.

Second, the increasing occurrence of intervention reflects the changing nature of sovereignty.¹ Limits are emerging on what states can do within their own borders. Intervention, especially when condoned to a degree by some international body, is considered justified under certain circumstances including humanitarian intervention (Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Cooper and Berdal, 1993; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003) and intervention in states that are believed to support terrorism. While not universally accepted, such intervention by states, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations has gained a higher level of consent in recent years.

Third, the nature of conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. Domestic conflicts, including ethnic ones, form a greater proportion of strife (David, 1997; Huntington, 2000). Furthermore, religious conflict is becoming more common among domestic conflicts (Fox, 2007a). This is particularly important for the present study because decisive military intervention correlates with the prevention or limitation of attempted genocide and reduction of time until victory for groups that receive significant third-party intervention in a civil war (Krain, 2005; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). Accordingly, questions related to the nature of minorities who might attract intervention become salient.

While we focus on Islam and intervention in the MENA, the link between Islam and intervention is not limited to that region. Conflicts in non-MENA Islamic states also draw considerable international attention. Even before military action by the US after 9/11, Iran, the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Pakistan all provided some form of military support for at least one of the factions involved in the conflict in Afghanistan.

There are also many instances of intervention in conflicts related to Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states. These include NATO's intervention in Kosovo and the activities of several states in the Chechen conflict, including, but by no means limited to, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.²

That being said, there are many instances of intervention which involve neither Muslims nor the MENA. The ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi have attracted military intervention by Zaire, Belgium, France, Uganda, and Tanzania, among others. Similarly, Russia has intervened politically and militarily in several domestic conflicts in former Soviet Bloc countries, such as the Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, and Estonia. This is not to mention the activities of the US, which, based on the data used in this study, has intervened more often than any other state around the world.

Abstract. This study asks questions that are important for both theory and policy: Do ethno-religious minorities attract more intervention than other ethnic minorities? Do Middle Eastern and Islamic ethnic minorities attract more international intervention than ethnic minorities living elsewhere, and if so, why? The Minorities at Risk database, which contains information on intervention in all ethnic conflicts between 1990 and 1995, is used to answer these questions. The findings show that Middle Eastern and Islamic minorities do, in fact, attract more international intervention than other minorities. This is due to a larger pattern where states, especially Islamic ones, rarely intervene on behalf of ethnic minorities with which they share no religious affinities. The results also show that ethno-religious minorities are more likely to attract political intervention than other ethnic minorities. These results confirm the importance of religious affinities in spite of a general disposition in the field of international relations to minimize their effects.

Résumé. Cette étude répond à des questions d'importance théorique et pratique. Est-ce que les minorités ethno-religieuses attirent plus d'interventions internationales que les autres types de minorités? Est-ce que les minorités ethniques islamiques et du Moyen-Orient attirent plus d'interventions internationales que les minorités ethniques d'ailleurs et si oui, pour quelle raison? La banque de données du programme *Minorities at Risk*, qui répertorie les interventions dans tous les conflits ethniques survenus entre 1990 et 1995, est outillée pour répondre à ces questions. Les résultats de recherche démontrent que les minorités ethniques islamiques et du Moyen-Orient attirent, en effet, plus d'interventions internationales que les autres minorités. Cela s'explique par le fait que les États, et plus particulièrement les États islamiques, interviennent rarement en faveur des minorités avec lesquelles ils ne partagent aucune affinité religieuse. Les résultats démontrent également que les minorités ethno-religieuses ont tendance à attirer plus d'interventions étrangères à caractère politique que les autres types de minorités. Les conclusions de recherche confirment donc l'importance que revêt l'affinité religieuse pour les interventions internationales dans les conflits ethniques, à l'encontre de l'opinion générale des experts en relations internationales, qui tendent à minimiser son rôle.

Despite the preceding range of cases in terms of actors and location, from simply reading or watching the news one easily could get the impression that the trend toward international intervention is particularly prevalent in MENA ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts as well as strife involving Islamic groups living elsewhere. We ask here whether this is, in fact, the case.

Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses

Why do states intervene in ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts? The literature describes a multitude of factors that influence a state's decision to intervene in a conflict. These factors fall into three categories. First, characteristics of the potential intervener can influence the decision to intervene. Such characteristics include the extent of institutional constraints on elites; proximity to the conflict; the presence of hegemonic ambitions; status as a regional or international power; the extent to which responsibility is felt for maintaining world order; whether the conflict in question constitutes a threat to core values; whether there is an interest in the parties and issues involved in the conflict; size and power; moral

imperatives, such as upholding human rights; humanitarian concerns; and cost-benefit analysis. Second, characteristics of the conflict itself can influence the decision to intervene. These include the magnitude of internal disruption caused by a conflict; the spilling of conflicts over international borders both through refugees and through its demonstration effect—the extent to which a conflict inspires or is believed likely to inspire similar minorities elsewhere to oppose their government; whether the conflict involves autonomy or secession; and the extent to which the conflict is seen to threaten regional stability. Third, and finally, system-level factors can influence the decision to intervene. These include the character of the international system—whether the system is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar; transnational economic, military, educational, social, and political linkages; and whether both the intervener and intervenee's governments are democracies (Cooper and Berdal, 1993; Carment and James, 1996, 1998 and 2000; Heraclides, 1990; Khosla, 1999; Regan, 1996 and 1998; Saideman, 1997).

Rather than focusing on some of these influences on intervention, this study builds on the literature by focusing on what is not sufficiently addressed in that literature: religion. None of the influences on the decision to intervene just noted singles out why religious minorities or those of a particular religion would attract more intervention. However, another well-documented influence on the decision to intervene, affinities between groups, has this implication. Emotional ties created by shared identity can create feelings of affinity and responsibility for oppressed kindred living elsewhere, motivating a state to intervene on their behalf.

Clearly religious affinities are not the only type that can exist between groups. Other sources of affinities include shared ethnic, national, ideological, and even economic traits. Previous studies show that ethnic affinities between a state and an ethnic minority in another state can influence foreign policy behaviour and the extent of international conflict (Davis et al., 1997; Davis and Moore, 1997). Thus it becomes interesting to explore the effects of religion vis-à-vis intervention.

We argue that religious affinities are particularly strong compared to other forms of identity for at least three reasons. First, religion has been identified as a uniquely strong basis for identity by multiple and diverse aspects of the relevant literature. For instance, Seul argues that “no other repositories of cultural meaning have historically offered so much in response to the human need to develop a secure identity. Consequently, religion often is at the core of individual and group identity” (1999: 558). Similarly, Little argues that religion can “often play an active and prominent part in defining group identity and in picking out and legitimating particular ethnic and national objectives” (1991: 20). The literature on fundamentalism attributes its rise—a major source of conflict in recent years—to efforts to defend religious identities (Appleby,

2000; Esposito, 1998). These arguments are echoed in the sociological literature (for example, Wilson, 1982: 33–34) and the literature on Islam (Fenton, 1999; Ferguson and Mansbach, 1999; Lewis, 1993). While this is only a sampling of a much broader literature, it is sufficient to show that many consider religious identity among the most powerful forms of identity.

Second, religion is associated with a number of other factors that are believed to be strong influences on behaviour as well as one of the major motivations behind extreme actions. For example, many argue that religion is an important source of people's belief systems, which clearly influence their actions (Geertz, 1973; Greenwalt, 1988: 30; Juergensmeyer, 1993; Wentz, 1987). It has been associated with individual political attitudes (Hayes, 1995) as well as nationalism (Smith, 1999) and ethnicity (Gurr, 1993), which represent other important sources of identity. Religion often is cited as both a cause and justification for terrorism (Drake, 1998; Juergensmeyer, 1997; Ranstorp, 1996; Rapoport, 1990). Recently, nationalism, ethnicity, and separatism seem less common as motivations for terrorism, with the religion component increasing (Hoffman, 1995; Rapoport, 1984). Religion is also frequently cited as a rationale for other forms of conflict and violence, including international conflict (Henderson, 1997), discrimination (Little, 1996a and 1996b; Fox, 2008); genocide (Fein, 1990); millenarian violence (Lewy, 1974; Taylor, 1991; Zitrin, 1998); intolerance by Christian groups (Jelen and Wilcox, 1990; Wald, 1987); and ethnic conflict (Fox, 2004). Furthermore, quantitative studies show religion to be particularly important in ethnic conflicts in the MENA and in other strife involving Muslim groups (Fox, 2006).

Third, Rapoport argues that religion has an intrinsic capacity to inspire violence (1991). This is linked to religion's unsurpassed ability to inspire emotions and commitment. This intensity of feeling stimulates the use of force, causes strife to be more protracted, and invites violent solutions. Additionally, Rapoport argues that religion's social origins can be traced to its status as a method for controlling violence within the community. Thus, when people seek to recreate their original or founding religious communities, they often use violence against outsiders to cast out those who support the ideas of the so-called "establishment" (Rapoport, 1991). Intervention, perhaps, might become more likely as a function of witnessing such intense conflict.

Given all of this, it is not difficult to infer the possibility that religion could affect the decision to intervene in ethnic conflicts. To be clear, we do not intend to argue that religious affinities are the only consideration, or even the primary consideration, when a state decides to intervene. Rather, we argue here that religion is a relevant and important consideration that has not been given the treatment it deserves in the literature on intervention, especially since religious groups frequently com-

prise larger audiences than ethnic or linguistic ones and, accordingly, a larger pool of potential interveners.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that religious affinities alone are enough to prompt an intervention. There are many dyads of states and ethnic minorities which share religious affinities but no intervention occurs. Also many interventions occur which do not involve religious affinities. Clearly many of the additional factors described above play a role in most, if not all, decisions by states to intervene. The impact of religious affinities on intervention by states is better described as follows: the presence of religious affinities between a state-minority dyad makes intervention more likely and the absence of such affinities makes it less likely.

There are a number of reasons to believe that this relationship will be particularly salient for Muslims. First, given the current resurgence of Islamic identity (Esposito and Voll, 2000; Haynes, 1994), it is possible that these affinities are stronger among Muslims. This contention is supported by Norris and Inglehart's finding, based on the World Values Survey that Muslims more strongly support a role for religion and religious authorities in society and politics (2004: 146–47). Other studies based on these data show Muslims to be more religious than members of other religions (Esmer, 2002). These stronger affinities might result in a higher propensity for Muslim states to intervene on behalf of Muslim minorities.

Second, this religious identity is more likely to influence foreign policy in states that strongly support religion. According to a survey of 175 states, Muslim majority states support religion more strongly than non-Muslim states. They are over four times as likely to declare an official religion than are non-Muslim states. They also engage nearly three times as much religious legislation as non-Muslim states (Fox, 2007b; 2008).

Third, it is arguable that affinities would be more likely to monolithically influence the behaviour of autocratic states. In democratic states, a vocal minority might influence the behaviour of a state including whether it will intervene on behalf of a group with which that minority has religious affinities or make a state less likely to intervene against a state with which the minority has such affinities. This would dilute the impact of the religious affinities of the majority group on intervention. Autocratic governments are less likely to take the wishes of a religious minority into account and, accordingly, the religious affinities of the majority will have a more monolithic influence on intervention. This is significant in the present context because studies show that Muslim majority states tend to be more autocratic (Midlarsky, 1998; Fisch, 2002).

Based on the preceding discussion of Islam in particular and religion in general, the following set of hypotheses is derived for testing:

Islam Hypothesis: Islamic minorities are more likely than other minorities to attract intervention.

Symmetry Hypothesis: Minorities are more likely to attract intervention from those with the same rather than a different religion.

Intensity of Islam Hypothesis: Among their interventions, the proportion that is military (political) will be higher for Islamic (other) states.

Religious Conflict Hypothesis: Interventions are more likely in conflicts that are inter-religious than those which are intra-religious.

Among the hypotheses, Islam and intensity of Islam have the same roots. Each is based on the contemporary practice of Islam as compared to other religions. This entails a greater consciousness concerning a single world of Islam over and beyond the borders of states as exemplified by the desire of many militant Muslims to create a single, world-encompassing Islamic state. Thus intervention should be associated more directly with Islam. Saideman, for example, finds that states with Muslim majorities give more assistance to more groups (2001).

The symmetry proposition is based on affinity of belief. Religious brethren, all other things being equal, are expected to be a higher priority for intervention. The hypothesis is in line with well-established arguments and evidence about the significance of “ethnic ties” in shaping intervention (Saideman, 2001). Finally, the religious conflict hypothesis posits that, since in intra-religious conflicts both participants belong to the same religion, identity is less likely to be an issue.

Data and Measurement

For the purposes of this study, the MENA refers to Israel and the Arab states in the core of the region, as well as Iran, Cyprus, Turkey, and the Arab states of North Africa. This inclusive treatment reflects the penetration of the region’s politics by states adjacent to its core (Marshall, 1999).

This study evaluates two types of intervention by states,³ military and political, as measured by the MAR Project. Military intervention includes the following activities by a foreign state on behalf of a minority: providing funds for military supplies, direct military equipment donations or sales, providing military training, the provision of military advisors, rescue missions, engaging in cross-border raids, providing cross-border sanctuaries, and sending in-country combat units. Political intervention includes the following activities by a foreign state on behalf of a minority: ideological encouragement, non-military financial support, access to external markets and communications, using peacekeeping units, and instituting a blockade. Both of these types of intervention represent actions by foreign governments on behalf of minorities.⁴

While there are many definitions of ethnicity based on shared traits, including territory of residence, history, myths, religion, language and

appearance—to name just a few—this study focuses on the concept of a shared perception of belonging. That is, the key to defining ethnicity “is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart” (Gurr, 1993: 3).

MAR data in combination with data from other sources are used to address the questions at hand. While MAR contains information on 343 ethnic minorities worldwide between 1945 and 2003, at this time of writing it has data on intervention only for the 1990 to 1995 period for the 275 of these ethnic minorities which were active during this period. Thus, the empirical portion of this study is limited to this problem set. Among the 275 ethnic minorities, 47.3 per cent attracted political intervention and 19.0 per cent attracted military intervention from 1990 to 1995 (Gurr, 2000: 7–8).⁵ The dataset is designed to assess the relationship between specific minorities and their states because each instance is posited to be unique in at least some elements. Accordingly, many minorities appear several times, once for each state in which they live.⁶

While the MAR dataset does not contain the identities of the foreign governments that intervened in these conflicts, the project did collect this information.⁷ As many as four different interveners are coded for each ethnic minority and, as noted above, many experienced no interventions. Accordingly, the analyses based on the identities of the interveners use an *intervener in a conflict* as the basis of the analysis. Hence this part of the analysis looks only at instances where interventions took place; if a single conflict attracted more than one intervener, it is included once for each time that happened.

Multivariate analysis is not feasible for the part of the study that focuses on the identity of the intervener. When asking “when and why” a state intervenes, one also is asking when and why a state does *not* intervene. Unfortunately, data on the characteristics of the interveners are available only on those cases where intervention occurred.⁸ A question naturally arises about the “dogs that don’t bark,” or, states that do not intervene. What if they have precisely the same characteristics that are taken as explanations for intervention when it is observed? If that turned out to be the case, it would be erroneous to infer the characteristics included in the later multivariate analysis carried out in Table 3 are significant after all. We acknowledge this limitation in the research design and leave the task of comparative analysis, which entails further data compilation, for future research (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992).⁹

However, a limited multivariate examination of which minorities attract intervention *is* possible. This analysis must be restricted to the characteristics of the minority group and the state in which it lives for reasons similar to those described above. Since some minorities attracted intervention and others did not, the dependent variable poses no prob-

lem. However, because the characteristics of the intervener are only known and coded for cases where intervention occurred, including them essentially would incorporate a dummy variable for when intervention occurred as an independent variable. For obvious reasons, this would not be appropriate.

Accordingly, this study cannot directly examine the motives of the interveners. Rather, it can only determine whether intervention occurs more often in certain kinds of conflict, in this case those involving ethno-religious minorities and Muslims. It also can determine whether those states that do intervene are religiously similar to the minorities on whose behalf they act. Any conclusions regarding the motivations of interveners can only be inferred, rather than deduced, from these results.

This study is intentionally specific in the questions it asks. Do ethno-religious minorities attract more intervention? Is intervention more common in MENA ethnic conflicts as well as other ethnic conflicts involving Islamic groups, and if so, why? This study addresses neither what causes these conflicts nor the consequences of interventions.¹⁰

Intervention in MENA, Islamic and Other Ethnic Conflicts

Do MENA ethnic conflicts attract more intervention from foreign governments than such strife elsewhere? As shown in Table 1, the answer is “yes” for military intervention (chi-square = 14.6757, $p < 0.012$) but not political intervention (chi-square = 34.8539, $p < 0.001$).¹¹ (The substantial chi-square value reported for political intervention reflects a relatively uneven distribution among the categories in spite of the fact that the MENA is unexceptional in this context.) Among ethnic conflicts in the MENA, 35.7 per cent attract *military* intervention on behalf of the minority group involved. This is nearly one-and-three quarters as often as in Africa, the region with the next highest percentage of intervention, 20.9 per cent, and over twice as often as military intervention occurs in the rest of the world combined (16.7 per cent of the time). Note also that 78 per cent of MENA minorities are Islamic; the next highest region is Asia, with 32.2 per cent. The extent of political intervention in MENA ethnic conflicts, however, is about average. It is very interesting to note, in passing, the absence of military intervention among Western democracies.

The finding that military intervention is more common in the MENA returns to the question of “why.” One potential answer, as per the Islam hypothesis, is that most MENA ethnic minorities are Islamic and, perhaps, Islamic minorities attract more military intervention. The other regions that experience above-average levels of intervention are Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet bloc. All of these regions feature a substan-

TABLE 1
Intervention by Foreign Governments in Ethnic Conflicts, 1990–1995, by Region

Region	MENA	Western Democracies	Former Soviet Bloc	Asia	Africa	Latin America	Chi-Square	Pr
No. of Cases	28	30	59	59	67	32		
% in Which Political Intervention Occurred	50.0%	20.0%	67.8%	64.4%	32.8%	31.3%	34.8539	0.000
% in Which Military Intervention Occurred	35.7%	0.0%	22.0%	20.7%	20.9%	9.4%	14.6757	0.012

TABLE 2
Intervention by Foreign Governments in Ethnic Conflicts, 1990–1995, by Religion of Minority Group

Region	MENA					All Other Regions				
	Muslim	Christian	Other	Chi-Square	Pr	Muslim	Christian	Other	Chi-Square	Pr
No of Cases	19	3	3			52	137	61		
% in Which Political Intervention Occurred	42.1%	33.3%	66.8%	0.7918	0.673	63.4%	42.3%	45.9%	6.8378	0.033
% in Which Military Intervention Occurred	47.4%	0.0%	0.0%	4.4408	0.109	30.8%	15.4%	9.8%	9.3105	0.010

tial number of Islamic minorities, which supports the line of reasoning behind the Islam hypothesis.¹²

An examination of the extent to which Islamic minorities experience intervention, shown in Table 2, supports the Islam hypothesis more directly. In the MENA, only *Islamic* minorities attract outside military intervention, although the connection is marginal in terms of statistical significance (chi-square = 4.4408, $p < 0.109$).¹³ By comparison, there is no obvious pattern for political intervention. Outside of the MENA, however, the numbers are very clear. Islamic groups attract political intervention about one-and-a-half times as often as do non-Islamic groups (chi-square = 6.8378, $p < 0.033$) and they attract military intervention over twice as often as do non-Islamic minorities (chi-square = 9.3105, $p < 0.010$).¹⁴ Thus the Islam hypothesis is supported by the distribution of cases throughout this table.

A key point to be clear about the results just described is “what is doing the work” with regard to military intervention. Are MENA groups gaining support because of regional dynamics related to oil, terrorism, or perhaps something else? The answer would appear to be “no” because Islamic minorities outside of the MENA are more likely to obtain military intervention as well. This is consistent with the findings noted from Brecher and James that point toward factors other than region in general or the MENA in particular when accounting for differences in crisis management (1988).

Islamic minorities attract both political and military intervention far more often than do other types of groups. This explains why MENA minorities experience intervention on their behalf more often than do minorities elsewhere; religion, not region, is what matters. This finding is consistent with Brecher and James, who found that the protractedness of a conflict—arguably, an analogue for sustained intensity out of religious difference—mattered much more than its location in accounting for conflict (1988).

Table 3 presents two binary logistic regressions testing the influence of religion and Islam on the likelihood a minority will attract political and military intervention. The independent variables were selected based on factors that influence intervention listed earlier in this study as well as in response to issues of the availability of data compatible for use with MAR. Prior to enumerating the variables, it is appropriate to explain “why so many and why these and not others.” First, this design builds on extensive but not co-ordinated prior research. Every variable in the list that follows has shown some ability to account for intervention in some form. Thus the specification that follows is less likely than others before it to exhibit omitted variable bias. Second, this rather complete research design *increases* the challenge to the religion variables as they compete to explain variation in political and military intervention. Third, the “rule of three” from

TABLE 3

Logistic Regression of Multiple Factors that Influence the Decision to Intervene

	Political Intervention		Military Intervention	
	Coefficient	Significance	Coefficient	Significance
Religious Differences	0.5350	0.0020	-0.0611	0.8200
Minority is Christian	0.2635	0.5050	1.0485	0.1440
Minority is Islamic	-0.1202	0.7830	1.7661	0.0140
Ethnic Differences	0.1455	0.1930	0.1342	0.4050
Cultural Differences	-0.1760	0.0740	-0.0341	0.8070
Protest 1990-1995	0.0646	0.0070	0.0206	0.5440
Rebellion 1990-1995	0.0133	0.3920	0.1497	0.0000
Separatism Index	-0.0024	0.9840	-0.0551	0.7640
Contagion of Protest, 1990s	2.4436	0.0020	-1.6982	0.1750
Contagion of Rebellion, 1990s	0.6502	0.1310	0.0419	0.9530
Diffusion of Protest, 1990s	0.1030	0.2930	0.3626	0.0250
Diffusion of Rebellion, 1990s	0.0444	0.5490	0.0265	0.8000
Old Democracy	-2.6807	0.0000	-0.0325	0.9660
New Democracy	-1.2087	0.0120	-0.7528	0.3020
Transitional Polity	-0.4099	0.3240	0.1079	0.8600
Major Oil Exporter	-1.0952	0.0160	-0.8116	0.2740
Constant	-4.7350	0.0020	-2.2450	0.3540
N	264		264	
Pseudo R ²	0.1553		0.4060	

Achen is used to deal with statistical concerns that may arise from a relatively large number of independent variables in the same equation (Achen, 2002). As per Achen's method, each subset of three independent variables is run with the dependent variable to check for robustness (Achen, 2005).

Variables included in Table 3 are as follows: religious differences between the majority and minority group;¹⁵ whether the minority group is Christian; whether the minority group is Muslim;¹⁶ the extent of ethnic differences between the majority and minority group;¹⁷ cultural differences between the minority and majority group;¹⁸ the extent of ethnic conflict as measured by protest and rebellion;¹⁹ the extent to which the ethnic minority is separatist;²⁰ the regime type of the host state;²¹ whether the host state is a major oil exporter;²² and the extent to which conflict crosses borders through processes of contagion²³ and diffusion.²⁴ Thus the independent variables account for the characteristics of the ethnic minority in question, the state in which it lives, and the regional environment in which it exists. The characteristics of the intervener are not included due to the operational limitations described earlier.²⁵ The question of why interveners may be influenced by religion is not addressed by this research design. The test is limited to testing the impact of religion on the likelihood of

intervention and preceding set of factors should *not* be taken to represent a would-be comprehensive theory of ethnic intervention.²⁶

The results presented in Table 3 generally are consistent with those of the bivariate analysis.²⁷ One of the most significant predictors of *political* intervention is whether a conflict concerns an ethnoreligious minority. This supports the religious conflict hypothesis. As the specific religion of the minority does not appear to be important, this finding is consistent across religions. Protest, the spread of protests across borders, and cultural differences, excluding religion, are also significant. This latter influence means that the more two groups are alike culturally (excluding religion as an element of culture), the more likely they are to attract international intervention. It also is interesting to note that democracies are less likely to be the targets of intervention. This accords with the intuition that such states are deemed more likely to be able to manage minority concerns without involvement by outside actors. Finally, it is surprising to see that states classified as major oil exporters are *less* likely to experience political intervention.

For *military* intervention, religious differences are not significant; thus the religious conflict hypothesis is only supported for political intervention. But whether the minority group is Islamic is the second most significant predictor, which supports the Islam hypothesis. Thus religion plays a nuanced role in both political and military intervention. Other factors that prove to be significant predictors of military intervention are the presence of rebellion and the diffusion of protest. Thus violence within the host state, demonstration effects from ethnic kin, and Islamic identity create the maximum likelihood of military intervention. Note also a contrast with political intervention in that neither status as a democracy nor as a major oil exporter influences the likelihood of military intervention.

Appendices C-1 and C-2 show substantive effects for political and military intervention, respectively. Two of the most noteworthy connections in Table 3 are for religious differences with regard to political intervention and whether a minority is Islamic with respect to military intervention. In appendix C-1, DY/DX conveys the rate of change in the dependent variable relative to the independent variable. Thus, a shift from absence to presence for religious differences (that is, 0 to 1) produces a 13.33 per cent increase in the likelihood of political intervention. In appendix C-2, the shift from a non-Islamic to Islamic minority increases the probability of military intervention by 22.2 per cent. The numbers reported here reinforce the importance of religious differences and Islamic minorities with regard to intervention.²⁸

Table 4 shows that Islam matters a great deal. This analysis focuses on the types of conflicts in which interveners choose to intervene. The states in all three categories of religion intervene most often on behalf of groups religiously similar to them, which supports the symmetry hypoth-

TABLE 4
 Percentage of Interveners, 1990–1995, Who are Religiously Similar to Intervenee

Religion of Intervener	Political Intervention						Military Intervention							
	Religion Minority					Chi-Square	Pr	Religion Minority					Chi-Square	Pr
	No. of Cases	Muslim	Christian	Other				No. of Cases	Muslim	Christian	Other			
Muslim	63	92.1%	6.4%	1.6%	171.2829	0.000	39	89.7%	5.1%	5.1%	85.1737	0.000		
Christian	94	14.9%	69.2%	16.0%			37	18.9%	78.3%	2.7%				
Other	30	10.0%	10.0%	80.0%			6	16.7%	0.0%	83.3%				

esis (for political intervention, chi-square = 171.2829, $p < 0.001$; for military intervention, chi-square = 85.1737, $p < 0.001$). This tendency, however, is by far the strongest for Islamic states. While 30.9 per cent and 21.6 per cent of political and military interventions, respectively, by Christian states are on behalf of non-Christian groups, only 8 per cent and 10.6 per cent of such interventions by Islamic states are on behalf of non-Muslim groups. Thus Islamic states intervene on behalf of non-Muslim groups far less often than do Christian states on behalf of non-Christian minorities. This implies that religious affinities between Muslims are stronger than those between Christian groups, thus explaining why Islamic minorities more often attract intervention.

However, it is possible that factors or affinities other than religious ones are responsible for this tendency of Islamic states to intervene mostly on behalf of Islamic minorities. As noted above, due to operational limitations, the multivariate analysis that would be necessary to delve further into that matter is not feasible without creating a dataset that included non-interveners. With 92.1 per cent of political interventions and 89.7 per cent of military interventions by Muslim states being on behalf of Muslim minorities, the evidence strongly suggests that either Muslim states make an extra effort to help Muslim minorities or they are rarely willing to intervene on behalf of non-Islamic minorities or perhaps both. It is important to emphasize that this pattern is not unique to Islam and also applies to Christian states—but the tendency is stronger for Muslim states. Again, any conclusion that the difference is due to religious affinities can only be based on inference. Process tracing for individual cases would be the natural follow-up to assess causal mechanisms at work here (Elman and Elman, 2001).

Another difference in intervention by Islamic and Christian states concerns the form that it takes, as per the intensity of Islam hypothesis. While Christian and Muslim states intervene militarily about as often as each other, with 39 military interventions by Muslim states and 37 by Christian states, Christian states intervene politically far more often: 94 as opposed to 63 times. This proportional difference offers partial support to the intensity of Islam hypothesis. The difference observed regarding political intervention could be linked to the fact that Muslim states are more likely to be autocratic than are Christian states (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Fisch, 2002; Midlarsky, 1998). Or, perhaps it is simply the result of regional politics. For example, Turkey's intervention on behalf of Turkish Cypriots is clearly due to ethnic affinity, but this connection also includes religion. Similarly, the intervention by Algeria in the Western Sahara and Syria's interventions in Lebanese affairs reflect local politics. Various interventions by Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey on behalf of the Kurds in these countries can be explained by the convoluted politics involving the respective states and the Kurds.

Yet many of these interventions have a compelling *religious* element. Iran's intervention on behalf of Shi'i Muslims in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq most likely involves religious affinities. The group that receives the most interventions by Muslim states, the Palestinians (whether they are in Jordan, Israel, or Lebanon), is involved in the most intense inter-religious fights in the region. This suggests that these interventions are motivated, at least in part, by religious affinities. Even more telling is the fact that, although six of 28 minorities in the MENA are non-Muslim, none of them attracts military intervention. Furthermore, all of the military interventions by MENA states in locations outside of the MENA were on behalf of Islamic minorities.²⁹ These patterns offer further, specific support to the Islam hypothesis. While local politics may be one of the motivations for intervention by MENA states, they clearly do not intervene militarily except on behalf of other Muslims. This complete absence of exceptions is a strong indicator that religious affinities play a role in their decision to intervene, whether consciously or unconsciously, though there are likely additional considerations. Perhaps the best description for the role of religious affinities in the intervention behaviour of Muslim MENA states is that the presence of religious affinities with the minority group in question is a necessary but not sufficient factor in the decision to intervene. Furthermore, many of the interventions have clear religious elements.

Conclusions

This study offers some striking answers in response to the questions posed at the outset. First, MENA ethnic conflicts are more likely to attract military intervention than are ethnic conflicts elsewhere, with the pattern seeming to reflect the pervasive presence of Islam in the region. Military intervention in a MENA ethnic conflict is over twice as likely as it is in other regions. This is in a large part due to the propensity of states in the MENA to meddle in the affairs of others in the region.

A second noteworthy result is that the propensity of MENA states to intervene on behalf of Muslim minorities is not unique. In fact, conflicts involving Muslim minorities attract a greater proportion of both political and military intervention than do conflicts involving minorities of other religions.

This pattern is explained by the present study's third major finding, namely, that Islamic states in general intervene almost exclusively on behalf of Muslim minorities. This stands in contrast to Christian states which, while most often intervening on behalf of Christian minorities, do intervene in a significant minority of cases for non-Christian minorities.

Finally, ethnoreligious minorities are more likely to attract political intervention than other ethnic minorities. Of course, it is important to

reiterate at this point that it is not claimed here that religious factors are the only criteria states use when deciding whether to intervene. Clearly, other factors, including those discussed above, can influence this. Furthermore, religious affinities alone are not enough to prompt intervention. Otherwise many more interventions would have occurred during the period covered by this study.

Nevertheless, it is shown here that religion—a potential cause of intervention neglected in the previous literature—is strongly correlated with the decision to intervene, especially for Islamic states. Thus, religious affinities between the intervener and intervenee can be described as an enabling condition for intervention. Put differently, without the presence of religious affinities, intervention by states in an ethnoreligious conflict is less likely to occur, but the decision by a state to intervene is in most cases motivated by additional factors.

These results have some important implications. Accusations that Christian states tend to intervene on behalf of Christian groups rather than non-Christian ones has a basis in fact but they do intervene in a substantial minority of conflicts involving non-Christian minorities. Thus, the NATO intervention on behalf of the Albanian Muslims in Kosovo and the Western intervention on behalf of the Kurds in Iraq are not out of the ordinary. In stark contrast, Islamic states intervene mostly on behalf of Islamic minorities. This means that if you are a Christian or Western minority, especially one living in a Muslim state, the only place to seek help is from a Christian state. Muslim states will rarely help you. This implies that campaigns to convince Muslims of the plight of non-Muslim groups are a waste of resources because they seldom bring any positive results. In contrast, Muslim minorities can look for help from both Muslim and Western states. Thus, the efforts of many Muslim groups, including MENA ones such as the Kurds and the Palestinians, to plead their cases in the West represent a sound strategy that can bring tangible benefits.

While the results of this study with regard to who intervenes and which types of groups attract intervention are based on reproducible data, conclusions regarding religious motivations that may explain these findings represent inferences, not certainties. For example, the results clearly show that states do intervene most often on behalf of minorities from their own religion. Whether this is, in fact, due to religious factors cannot be established by the data available at this time, but the inference is that these linkages play a role. Collecting the data necessary to confirm this inference should be on the agenda for future research, although the strength of the findings presented here creates a strong likelihood that these results will be confirmed.

Finally, it is important to note again that the data are based on international behaviour during the early 1990s, well before the events of September 11, 2001. Intervention became even more important issue in the wake of the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by

Islamist terrorists on that day. If anything, the role of religion can be expected to become more prominent in data analyzed for the years since that terrible day. Only time will tell.

Notes

- 1 Evidence on this general point is provided by Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000: 616). On increasing UN intervention since the end of the Cold War, see Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996: 683) and Mullenbach (2005: 530) on the increasing number and complexity of peacekeeping missions.
- 2 While not included in the MAR dataset, information on the identity of interveners has been collected by the project and obtained by the authors. The dataset is available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.
- 3 MAR also includes data on several types of non-state actors. This study does not include these interventions and focuses only on interventions by states.
- 4 The dependent variables in this study—political and military intervention—are based on these criteria and coded as 0 if no such intervention occurred and 1 if an intervention occurred.
- 5 Gurr (2000: 7–8) notes that minorities are included in the dataset if they meet one or both of two criteria: if the group is currently politically active in pursuit of group interests and if the group suffers from persistent discrimination or differential treatment. Note that, while MAR identifies ethnicity by using religion as a component, the focus here is on the latter. Data are not available on interventions on behalf of state governments. It is also worth noting that many of the actions considered intervention on behalf of a minority are legal and common actions when done on behalf of a state.
- 6 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin have criticized the MAR data on grounds of selection bias (1997). Gurr addresses these criticisms, arguing that the project has systematically collected a list of groups that are treated differentially and/or politically active (2000). Thus, the project represents a reasonably complete record of all serious conflicts between ethnic groups and governments. Also, the selection bias issue is less relevant to this study than other studies using MAR because the focus here is on intervention in a conflict. Only those conflicts which are active, based on the MAR criteria, are likely to attract intervention. Furthermore, the problem set used here contains numerous cases where no intervention occurred so there is sufficient variation in the dependent variables.
- 7 Copies of the relevant parts of MAR code sheets are used to identify foreign governments that intervened in ethnic conflicts. Unless otherwise noted, the variables used in this study are taken from the MAR dataset, which is available, along with a codebook, at the MAR website at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.
- 8 For an enlightening exchange on the determinants of secession at a dyadic level, see Belanger et al. (2005 and 2007) and Saideman (2007).
- 9 Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman provide a discussion of how this challenge can be met in their construction of a set of dyads with which to compare dyads that experienced militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). They point out that many more dyads exist that have not experienced MIDs over the comparable period and therefore select a representative sample for comparison from among those non-events. In the present context, the analogous procedure would involve sampling from all non-interveners over the period from 1990 to 1995.
- 10 Quantitative studies of the various influences of religion on ethnic conflict include Fox (2004) and Rummel (1997). Quantitative studies of the role of Islam and the Middle East in ethnic conflict include Fox (2004), which examines how religious

conflicts cross borders. Ayres and Saideman (2000) provide a general analysis of the topic of contagion as does Gurr (1993) in his general overview of the MAR dataset. This study also does not address the influence of specific foreign policies on intervention because there are no data available. It also is not clear that such a complicated and fluid concept could be reduced effectively to quantitative analysis.

- 11 The cases represent the known population, not just a sample, so the table includes chi-square values and significance tests to follow convention only. The differences in this table (and Tables 2 and 4) are real rather than merely estimated. A useful analogy is with an exit poll's prediction as compared to actual results of an election. The exit poll may have a margin of error, but once the votes are counted, the winner is generally known. The p-levels reported in Table 3 reflect the convention in the field for multivariate analysis and are considered merely advisory. We follow convention by regarding a coefficient as significant only when the p-level is below 0.05.
- 12 Appendix A reveals some interesting, specific details about the nature of intervention in the Middle East. Among 20 military interventions in the region, 18 were by Middle Eastern states and all of the minorities that attracted this intervention were Muslim.
- 13 Of the 22 Muslim minorities in the Middle East five are in non-Muslim states. The Turks in Cyprus, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and the Shi'i in Lebanon all benefited from both political and military intervention. The Israeli Arabs and Sunni in Lebanon did not benefit from either type of intervention.
- 14 The difference between the patterns of intervention on behalf of Muslim minorities based on the distinction between Muslim sects is not large. The study includes 51 Sunni minorities, 9 Shi'i minorities, and 11 coded as "Islam: other or undetermined." 19 (37 per cent), 4 (44 per cent), and 2 (18 per cent) of these groups respectively benefited from military intervention as did 32 (63 per cent), six (67 per cent), and three (27 per cent) from political intervention.
- 15 This variable is coded as follows: 0—the groups are of the same religion and denomination; 1—the groups belong to different denominations of the same religion; 2—the groups belong to different religions.
- 16 Both the Christian and Muslim identity variables are coded as 0 if the group does not belong to the religion in question and as 1 if it does.
- 17 This variable is a modified form of the ethnic differences variable used in the MAR dataset. It includes the following component variables: LANG, which measures the linguistic differences between the majority and minority on a scale of 0 to 3; CUSTOM, which measures whether the two groups have different customs (if so, 2 was added to the total of the composite variable); and RACE, which measures the differences in the physical appearances of the two groups on a scale of 0 to 3. The resulting variable ranges from 0 to 8.
- 18 This variable was constructed by adding five variables from the MAR dataset that measure cultural differences: different ethnicity or nationality (culdifx1); different language (culdifx2); different historical origins (culdifx3); different social customs (culdifx5); and different residence (culdifx6). Each of these variables is measured on the following scale: 0—no differences, 1—"some indeterminate differential," 2—"significant differential." The resulting composite variable ranges from 0 to 10.
- 19 Both the protest and rebellion variables are coded yearly in the MAR dataset. Protest is measured on the following scale: 0—none, 1—verbal opposition, 2—symbolic resistance, 3—small demonstrations (participation less than 10,000), 4—medium demonstrations (participation, 10,000 to 99,999), 5—large demonstrations (participation 100,000 or more). Rebellion is coded on the following scale: 0—none, 1—political banditry and sporadic terrorism, 2—campaigns of terrorism, 3—local rebellions, 4—small-scale guerrilla warfare, 5—medium-scale guerrilla warfare, 6—large-scale guerrilla warfare, 7—protracted civil war. The two variables used here total the individual scores for protest and rebellion over the six-year period of 1990–1995 cov-

- ered in this study. For more details on the protest and rebellion variables, as well as all other variables from the MAR dataset, see the MAR website at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.
- 20 This variable is measured on the following scale: 0—the group is not separatist; 1—the group has been separatist in the past; 2—the group has a latent desire for separatism; 3—the group is actively separatist.
 - 21 Data from MAR on regime type are used to create two dichotomous variables. A state is considered an “old democracy” if it democratic institutions were established before 1980 and the state has not reverted to autocratic rule since the 1950s. A “new democracy” is a state with democratic institutions established between 1980 and 1994 that has not reverted to autocratic rule since 1980. The fact that old democracies tend to be more wealthy and capable than new democracies, on average, makes it prudent to separate these regimes for the purpose of a data analysis that focuses on third-party intervention. In each instance, a score of “1” indicates that a state is an old/new democracy, with “0” meaning it is not.
 - 22 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the following countries are commonly referred to as major oil exporters: Algeria, Angola, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. A dummy variable “major oil exporter” was created. The value “1” is assigned to the above mentioned major oil exporters, “0” otherwise.
 - 23 The MAR codebook defines contagion as “the spread of ethnopolitical protest and rebellion through a region. Operationally, we record the mean level of protest and rebellion for the group’s region of residence.” The 1990s versions of the variables for both protest and rebellion are used here.
 - 24 According to the MAR codebook, diffusion is defined as “the demonstration effect of anti-regime activity by a group in one country to kindred groups in other (usually adjoining) countries. Operationally, we record the highest incidence of protest and rebellion (separately) by kindred groups in adjoining countries.” The 1990s versions of the variables for both protest and rebellion are used here.
 - 25 For a discussion of the characteristics of the interveners coded in the MAR dataset, see Khosla, (1999).
 - 26 Although we are cautious about adding to our model in light of admonitions from Achen (2002 and 2005), we also are aware of the possibility that interaction terms could play a role in shaping prospects for intervention. Constraints on space prevent us for providing a rationale for each option tried here, but each of the following has been incorporated into the data analysis: Muslim group with regime type, religious difference, ethnic difference and cultural difference. None of these four interaction terms (1) approaches statistical significance for either political or military intervention or (2) impacts significantly upon the main results from the estimations. To be more specific, in the Middle East, Muslim states intervene exclusively on behalf of other Muslim states in both political and military areas. On the other hand, Muslims outside the Middle East receive about 89 per cent of the military interventions and 81 per cent of political interventions by Muslim states.
 - 27 Appendix B summarizes the results from standard tests for multicollinearity, which fall within the acceptable range in each instance.
 - 28 With a substantial network of variables, we have implemented Achen’s rule of three to check for variation in results when subsets are run together. All variables that reached statistical significance have been run with different combinations of two other variables. No significant changes in the results can be gleaned from the data analysis here, so Table 3 is proven to be robust in this way.
 - 29 These interventions include Iran on behalf of the Hazara in Afghanistan; Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan; the Gulf Co-operation Council on behalf of the Muslims in Bosnia; Turkey on behalf of the Turks in China; Libya on behalf of

the Tuareg in Mali and Niger as well as the Achenese in Indonesia; and Algeria on behalf of the Tuareg in Niger.

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APPENDIX A:
Military Intervention in the MENA,
1990–1995

Country	Minority	Intervener
Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots	Turkey
Iran	Kurds	Iraq
Iraq	Kurds	USA
		UK
		Iran
		Syria
	Shi'is	Iran
Israel	Palestinians	Syria
		Iraq
Jordan	Palestinians	Syria
		Iraq
		Saudi Arabia
Lebanon	Palestinians	Syria
		Iran
	Shi'is	Iran
		Syria
Morocco	Saharawis	Algeria
Turkey	Kurds	Syria
		Iran
		Iraq

APPENDIX B:
Multicollinearity Diagnostics on All Independent Variables*

	Variance inflation factors	Tolerance	R-Square	Eigenvalues	Condition Index
Religious Differences	1.24	0.8097	0.1903	9.3509	1.0000
Minority is Christian	2.04	0.4893	0.5107	1.5012	2.4958
Minority is Islamic	1.91	0.5226	0.4774	1.0690	2.9576
Ethnic Differences	2.47	0.4045	0.5955	0.9419	3.1508
Cultural Differences	2.81	0.3556	0.6444	0.8174	3.3823
Protest 1990–95	1.32	0.7585	0.2415	0.7721	3.4800
Rebellion 1990–95	1.40	0.7138	0.2862	0.6390	3.8254
Separatism Index	1.42	0.7033	0.2967	0.4713	4.4541
Contagion of Protest, 1990–95	1.83	0.5471	0.4529	0.3545	5.1359
Contagion of Rebellion, 1990–95	1.70	0.5887	0.4113	0.2941	5.6384
Diffusion of Protest, 1990–95	1.70	0.5887	0.4113	0.2344	6.3159
Diffusion of Rebellion, 1990–95	1.60	0.6250	0.3750	0.1843	7.1226
Old Democracy	2.58	0.3875	0.6125	0.1534	7.8063
New Democracy	2.15	0.4655	0.5345	0.1448	8.0372
Transitional Polity	1.78	0.5610	0.4390	0.0396	15.3652
Major Oil Exporter	1.26	0.7956	0.2044	0.0267	18.7275

*Note: A general rule of thumb: A serious multicollinearity problem is suspected if the R-Square exceeds 0.80, if the variance inflation factor is greater than 10, the closer is the tolerance value to zero, the greater the degree of collinearity of that variable with the other variables, or if the condition index (that is derived from the Eigenvalue) is greater than 30.

APPENDIX C-1:
Marginal Effects after Logit Political Intervention

	DY/DX	Standard Error	Z	P-Value	95% CI		X
Religious differences	0.1333	0.0424	3.15	0.0020	0.0503	0.2164	0.8182
Minority is Christian	0.0656	0.0979	0.67	0.5030	-0.1264	0.2575	0.5152
Minority is Islamic	-0.0299	0.1080	-0.28	0.7820	-0.2416	0.1819	0.2614
Ethnic differences	0.0363	0.0279	1.30	0.1930	-0.0184	0.0909	4.4318
Cultural differences	-0.0439	0.0245	-1.79	0.0740	-0.0920	0.0042	6.8258
Protest 1990-95	0.0161	0.0060	2.68	0.0070	0.0043	0.0279	9.8939
Rebellion 1990-95	0.0033	0.0039	0.86	0.3920	-0.0043	0.0109	6.3902
Separatism index	-0.0006	0.0302	-0.02	0.9840	-0.0599	0.0586	1.3068
Contagion of protest, 1990-95	0.6090	0.1986	3.07	0.0020	0.2197	0.9982	1.6691
Contagion of rebellion, 1990-95	0.1620	0.1073	1.51	0.1310	-0.0483	0.3723	1.1558
Diffusion of protest, 1990-95	0.0257	0.0244	1.05	0.2930	-0.0222	0.0735	1.8030
Diffusion of rebellion, 1990-95	0.0111	0.0184	0.60	0.5490	-0.0251	0.0472	1.3485
Old democracy	-0.5174	0.0749	-6.91	0.0000	-0.6643	-0.3706	0.2197
New democracy	-0.2820	0.1008	-2.80	0.0050	-0.4795	-0.0845	0.2500
Transitional polity	-0.1011	0.1010	-1.00	0.3170	-0.2990	0.0968	0.2803
Major oil exporter	-0.2518	0.0918	-2.74	0.0060	-0.4317	-0.0719	0.1402

APPENDIX C-2:
Marginal Effects after Logit Military Intervention

	DY/DX	Standard Error	Z	P-Value	95% CI		X
Religious differences	-0.0054	0.0237	-0.23	0.8200	-0.0519	0.0411	0.8182
Minority is Christian	0.0935	0.0640	1.46	0.1440	-0.0319	0.2190	0.5152
Minority is Islamic	0.2220	0.1149	1.93	0.0530	-0.0032	0.4472	0.2614
Ethnic differences	0.0119	0.0142	0.84	0.4030	-0.0160	0.0397	4.4318
Cultural differences	-0.0030	0.0124	-0.24	0.8070	-0.0273	0.0212	6.8258
Protest 1990–1995	0.0018	0.0030	0.61	0.5400	-0.0040	0.0076	9.8939
Rebellion 1990–1995	0.0132	0.0028	4.67	0.0000	0.0077	0.0188	6.3902
Separatism index	-0.0049	0.0163	-0.30	0.7650	-0.0368	0.0271	1.3068
Contagion of protest, 1990s	-0.1502	0.1099	-1.37	0.1720	-0.3657	0.0652	1.6691
Contagion of rebellion, 1990s	0.0037	0.0633	0.06	0.9530	-0.1203	0.1277	1.1558
Diffusion of protest, 1990s	0.0321	0.0139	2.31	0.0210	0.0049	0.0593	1.8030
Diffusion of rebellion, 1990s	0.0023	0.0093	0.25	0.8010	-0.0159	0.0206	1.3485
Old democracy	-0.0029	0.0669	-0.04	0.9660	-0.1340	0.1283	0.2197
New democracy	-0.0578	0.0482	-1.20	0.2310	-0.1523	0.0367	0.2500
Transitional polity	0.0097	0.0563	0.17	0.8630	-0.1005	0.1200	0.2803
Major oil exporter	-0.0573	0.0407	-1.41	0.1590	-0.1370	0.0224	0.1402